1 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d9af052793730953f4cc37b715bcab92.pdf 6ec3ea09b34a0213154f3e4436e95f9b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XLV 2021 N UMBERS 84-85 A scholarl y annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLAR IK Uni versity of Ottawa Editorial Board ROB ERT K. EVAN SON Uni versity of Mi ssouri GR EGORY C. FERENCE Sali sbury Uni versity JAMES R. FELAK Uni versity of Washington PETER PETRO Uni versity of British Columbi a CA ROLS . LEFF Uni versity of Illi nois PATRI CIA KRA FC IK The Evergreen State Co llege Published by the Slova k League of America with the support of the Chair in Slova k History and C ulture at th e University of Ottawa 205 Madi son Street Passa ic, J 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions shou ld be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is$ I 0.00. Manuscripts fo r poss ibl e publicati on and books for rev iew should be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Ma ur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 32 7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ( 1880-1919) : The Man Who Spoke to the Stars Michal Ksinan ...... ........ ..... .......... .... .... .... ... ... ..... ... .... ... ........ ...... .. 7 Envi sioning a Homeland : Carpatho-Rusyn Immigrants in the USA and the Czechoslovak Option Richard D. Custer .... ... .. .... .... ...... .......... .. .... ... ......... .. .. .... ........... 27 Reconsidering Slovak-A merican Religious Commitment: Thomas Bell 's Out ofthis Furnace in Historiographical Contex t Frederic Hale ...... ........ .. ....... ..... .... ............. ...... .............. ............ 53 On the Road to Nationalist Totalitarianism: Slovaki a in the Turmoi l of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service Roman Licko .. ..... ... ..... ... ... ..... ..... ..... .... ....... ....................... ... ..... 70 Picturing a Nation : Slovak Doc umentary Fi lm from its Birth Until 1950 Nicholas Hudac ... ........ ...... ..... .... ....... ... ...... ...... ... ..... ...... ...... ...... 92 "The Russians are In vad ing Us!" Presov, I 968 M. Mark Stolarik .. ........... ....... .... ...... .. ...... ...... ... ... ..... ... ..... .. ..... 121 REVIEWS Diana Duchonova, Palatin Mikulas Esterhazy Peter Mariassy ............... .... .. ......... ...... ............ .... ... ...... .... .... ... . I 5 I Zora Mintalova Zubercova, Ako sme kedysi i ili Lenka Stolarik ................. .................................................. ....... 153 �4 SLOV AKIA-2021 Daniela Kodajova et. al., Zivena: 150 rokov Spolku slovenskych i ien Edita Bosak .... ..... ................ ...... .............. .... .... .. .. .. ...... ..... .. ....... 154 Jan Raska, Czech Refi,gees in Cold War Canada M. Mark Stolarik ........ ......... ............ .. .... .... .... ............ .... .... .. .. .... 157 Miroslav Londak et. al. , Dubcek Marty Manor Mullins .. ..... .. .. ... .... ..... .. .... ..... .. .. ............... ...... .... 159 Miroslav Mojzita, Knaiko. Demes, Knai ko Ju raj Hocman ........ .. .... .. ......... ...... ... ......... ......... .. .... .... ... .... .... .. 162 Contributors ...... .............. ...... ..... .. .......... ............ .... ... ...... .......... 165 Guidelines for Manuscripts ....... ... ........ ........ ..... ................... .. .. 167 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XLV 2021 N UMBERS 84-85 A scholarl y annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLAR IK Uni versity of Ottawa Editorial Board ROB ERT K. EVAN SON Uni versity of Mi ssouri GR EGORY C. FERENCE Sali sbury Uni versity JAMES R. FELAK Uni versity of Washington PETER PETRO Uni versity of British Columbi a CA ROLS . LEFF Uni versity of Illi nois PATRI CIA KRA FC IK The Evergreen State Co llege Published by the Slova k League of America with the support of the Chair in Slova k History and C ulture at th e University of Ottawa 205 Madi son Street Passa ic, J 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions shou ld be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is$ I 0.00. Manuscripts fo r poss ibl e publicati on and books for rev iew should be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Ma ur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 32 7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ( 1880-1919) : The Man Who Spoke to the Stars Michal Ksinan ...... ........ ..... .......... .... .... .... ... ... ..... ... .... ... ........ ...... .. 7 Envi sioning a Homeland : Carpatho-Rusyn Immigrants in the USA and the Czechoslovak Option Richard D. Custer .... ... .. .... .... ...... .......... .. .... ... ......... .. .. .... ........... 27 Reconsidering Slovak-A merican Religious Commitment: Thomas Bell 's Out ofthis Furnace in Historiographical Contex t Frederic Hale ...... ........ .. ....... ..... .... ............. ...... .............. ............ 53 On the Road to Nationalist Totalitarianism: Slovaki a in the Turmoi l of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service Roman Licko .. ..... ... ..... ... ... ..... ..... ..... .... ....... ....................... ... ..... 70 Picturing a Nation : Slovak Doc umentary Fi lm from its Birth Until 1950 Nicholas Hudac ... ........ ...... ..... .... ....... ... ...... ...... ... ..... ...... ...... ...... 92 "The Russians are In vad ing Us!" Presov, I 968 M. Mark Stolarik .. ........... ....... .... ...... .. ...... ...... ... ... ..... ... ..... .. ..... 121 REVIEWS Diana Duchonova, Palatin Mikulas Esterhazy Peter Mariassy ............... .... .. ......... ...... ............ .... ... ...... .... .... ... . I 5 I Zora Mintalova Zubercova, Ako sme kedysi i ili Lenka Stolarik ................. .................................................. ....... 153 �4 SLOV AKIA-2021 Daniela Kodajova et. al., Zivena: 150 rokov Spolku slovenskych i ien Edita Bosak .... ..... ................ ...... .............. .... .... .. .. .. ...... ..... .. ....... 154 Jan Raska, Czech Refi,gees in Cold War Canada M. Mark Stolarik ........ ......... ............ .. .... .... .... ............ .... .... .. .. .... 157 Miroslav Londak et. al. , Dubcek Marty Manor Mullins .. ..... .. .. ... .... ..... .. .... ..... .. .. ............... ...... .... 159 Miroslav Mojzita, Knaiko. Demes, Knai ko Ju raj Hocman ........ .. .... .. ......... ...... ... ......... ......... .. .... .... ... .... .... .. 162 Contributors ...... .............. ...... ..... .. .......... ............ .... ... ...... .......... 165 Guidelines for Manuscripts ....... ... ........ ........ ..... ................... .. .. 167 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA VOLUME XLV 2021 N UMBERS 84-85 A scholarl y annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLAR IK Uni versity of Ottawa Editorial Board ROB ERT K. EVAN SON Uni versity of Mi ssouri GR EGORY C. FERENCE Sali sbury Uni versity JAMES R. FELAK Uni versity of Washington PETER PETRO Uni versity of British Columbi a CA ROLS . LEFF Uni versity of Illi nois PATRI CIA KRA FC IK The Evergreen State Co llege Published by the Slova k League of America with the support of the Chair in Slova k History and C ulture at th e University of Ottawa 205 Madi son Street Passa ic, J 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions shou ld be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is$ I 0.00. Manuscripts fo r poss ibl e publicati on and books for rev iew should be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Ma ur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 32 7 stolarik@uottawa.ca Table of Contents ARTICLES Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ( 1880-1919) : The Man Who Spoke to the Stars Michal Ksinan ...... ........ ..... .......... .... .... .... ... ... ..... ... .... ... ........ ...... .. 7 Envi sioning a Homeland : Carpatho-Rusyn Immigrants in the USA and the Czechoslovak Option Richard D. Custer .... ... .. .... .... ...... .......... .. .... ... ......... .. .. .... ........... 27 Reconsidering Slovak-A merican Religious Commitment: Thomas Bell 's Out ofthis Furnace in Historiographical Contex t Frederic Hale ...... ........ .. ....... ..... .... ............. ...... .............. ............ 53 On the Road to Nationalist Totalitarianism: Slovaki a in the Turmoi l of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service Roman Licko .. ..... ... ..... ... ... ..... ..... ..... .... ....... ....................... ... ..... 70 Picturing a Nation : Slovak Doc umentary Fi lm from its Birth Until 1950 Nicholas Hudac ... ........ ...... ..... .... ....... ... ...... ...... ... ..... ...... ...... ...... 92 "The Russians are In vad ing Us!" Presov, I 968 M. Mark Stolarik .. ........... ....... .... ...... .. ...... ...... ... ... ..... ... ..... .. ..... 121 REVIEWS Diana Duchonova, Palatin Mikulas Esterhazy Peter Mariassy ............... .... .. ......... ...... ............ .... ... ...... .... .... ... . I 5 I Zora Mintalova Zubercova, Ako sme kedysi i ili Lenka Stolarik ................. .................................................. ....... 153 4 SLOV AKIA-2021 Daniela Kodajova et. al., Zivena: 150 rokov Spolku slovenskych i ien Edita Bosak .... ..... ................ ...... .............. .... .... .. .. .. ...... ..... .. ....... 154 Jan Raska, Czech Refi,gees in Cold War Canada M. Mark Stolarik ........ ......... ............ .. .... .... .... ............ .... .... .. .. .... 157 Miroslav Londak et. al. , Dubcek Marty Manor Mullins .. ..... .. .. ... .... ..... .. .... ..... .. .. ............... ...... .... 159 Miroslav Mojzita, Knaiko. Demes, Knai ko Ju raj Hocman ........ .. .... .. ......... ...... ... ......... ......... .. .... .... ... .... .... .. 162 Contributors ...... .............. ...... ..... .. .......... ............ .... ... ...... .......... 165 Guidelines for Manuscripts ....... ... ........ ........ ..... ................... .. .. 167 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8c532810a94976495b9931f97ec22776.pdf d3414a49ae71d586201a59257f6dbe41 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 7 MILAN RASTISLAV STEFANIK (1880-1919) THE MAN WHO SPOKE TO THE STARS' Michal Ksinan 2 Outside of the Czech and Slovak Republics, people are fairly familiar with Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes, two of the men responsible for the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and who also served as its first presidents. However, another of the country's founders, Milan Rastislav Stefanik, is much less known , partly because his tragic death in 1919 prevented him from holding a key office for any length of time. Although he is relatively unknown to the wider international public, his contemporaries compared him to Pierre Choderlos de Laclos for the use of military tactics in love affairs, 3 to Lawrence of Arabia for vision, to Napoleon Bonaparte for ambition, to Jules Michelet" for patriotism, and to one of the apostles for conviction.5 Who was this man who charn1ed his surroundings all his life and still continues to charm people today? In order to answer this question , I will present this person to the Englishspeaking reader who is often unfamiliar with Stefanik by emphasising several key points in his life. 6 The Young Man Stefan ik was born on 2 1 July 1880 in the hamlet of Kosariska in today 's western Slovakia (Upper-Hungary at the time) to th e family 1 This article was supported by gran ts VEGA n° 2/0087/20 and APVV n° 17-0399. T he auth or works in the Institute of Hi story of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. 3 French genera l and novelist ( 174 1- 1803) best known for Les Liasons dangere11ses. ~ A famous French hi storian ( 1798- 1874 ). 5 Antoine Mares, Edvard Bene!i : Un drame entre Hitler et Staline (Paris, Perrin, 2015), 70. 6 This artic le is modified version of the texts published in the book: Michal Ksirian , Milan Rastisla v Stefanik, tran s. Julia Sherwood (Bratislava: Lindeni jointly with the Slovak National Archive, 20 19) . For more details, see the first scie ntifi c biography of Stefanik published in French : Michal Ksiri an, L 'homme qui parfait avec /es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik , heros ji·anco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EU R 'Orbem, 2019). Its Slovak translation will be published under the titl e Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Mui , ktm)i sa rozpraval s hviezdami by Slovart publi shing hou se and an Engli sh transla tion under the title Milan Ras/is/av S1efanik : The Slovak National Hero and Co-Founder of Czechoslovakia by Routledge publishing house. 2 �8 SLOVAKIA 2021 of a Lutheran pastor with strong national convictions. Rai sed in a deeply religious family, Milan Stefanik used to hold similar beliefs. However, during his student days in Prague he was confronted with many liberal views. Discussions in Jeronym, a Protestant c lub, gave him a new perspective on faith. Its members debated progressive theo logical issues and read foreign journals. Stefanik was particularly influenced by the professor of philosophy Masaryk, and in light of his lectures started to question his Christian faith and indeed the existence of God. Not only did Milan Stefanik reject the divine essence of Jesus C hrist, he went so far as to doubt the very existence of God . He rejected reli gion and believed only in science, something that was regarded as genuinely heretical in his environment; that is why hi s father threw the young rebel out of his house in the summer of 1900. Although this breach was not permanent, it demonstrated that young Milan Stefanik had embarked upon a new journey.7 In thi s respect Stefanik can serve as a typical example of the phenomenon of secularisation in the nineteenth century that one can describe as "a loss of orientation , of certain ty, of a single world-view, of a core of reality. " 8 Another key deci sion of the young Stefanik was to switch from studying civi l engineering at Prague's Imperial and Royal Czech Technical High School (1898- 1900) to a degree in astronomy in the Faculty of Arts at the Czec h Charles-Ferdinand University (today's Charles Univers ity) in 1900- 1904. Astronomical studies fit more his romantic nature, even though thi s led to further conflicts between him and his father. The Astronomer After finishing hi s studies in Prague in 1904, Stefanik decided to go to Paris. He took every possible step to embark on a career in science. He started by taking an unpaid job in the observatory in Meudon under professor Jules Janssen, but that came to an end in 1906 when the leading position at the observatory passed to Henri Deslandres, since neither of the men got along. 9 After that Stefanik was appo inted to the paid position 7 Jaromir Va vra. Vzpo minky na Milana Ste(anika [Remini scences on Milan Stefa nik] (Ceske Velenice, Pave l Nobis, 1930), 15- 16. 8 Jifi Hanus, Historie modern! doby [History of the Modem Age] (B rn o, Barrister & Principal, 2004), 80. 9 Fra ni;:oise La unay, Un globe-trotter de la physique celeste. L ·astronome Jules Janssen (Paris, l' Observa toire de Paris, Vuibert, 2008), 256. �SLOVAKIA 2021 9 of deputy director of the Mont Blanc Observatories Society, thi s time with the help of the daughter and widow of the then deceased Jules Janssen. After a year in this post, Stefanik found himself jobless again. Then he decided to establish his own observatory. He had to decide between North Africa and a certain island in French Polynesia. Stefanik settled on the much closer North Africa. He travelled around, mostly in Algeria and Tunisia, but failed to find a suitable location for an observatory. On behalf of the French Bureau des longitudes, Stefanik then tra vell ed to Tahiti to observe the passage of Halley's Comet and to conduct further astronomical observations on an island in French Polynes ia. 10 The plan to observe Halley's Comet fell through because cloud cover made observation impossible. However, Stefanik did manage to carry out the final part of his plan. He decided to extend his stay on Tahiti and explore the conditions for meteorological and astronomical observations, " Provided Tahiti is shown to offer good conditions for astronomical observations, I would be interested in building a permanent observatory (a scientific embassy) there." 11 For Stefanik building a permanent observatory with a functioning meteorological service on thi s island was hi s most important pre-war scientific project. Traveller, Artist and Collector One of the most common astronomical phenomena that Stefanik focused on was the solar ecli pse that forced him to travel all around the world. He observed thi s phenomenon in Spain ( 1905) where all astronomers who observed it were received by Spanish King Alfonso XIII , in Turkistan ( 1907), but his observations failed because of bad weather, and on hi s way back he met with Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, on Vava'u Island ( 1911) where he had the best results among all sc ientific missions , and in Brazil ( 1912) where again his observations failed beca use of bad weather. Meanwhile, he took beautiful pictures during those journeys. Stefanik was not only interested in astronomica l observations, but also in the life and habits of the locals. During hi s stay in Tahiti , Stefanik bought a horse-drawn cart that he used primarily to check up 10 Rasti slav Rajc hl , Stefanikova paNiska feta [Stefanik 's Pari sian Yea rs] (Praha, Ev ropsk y literarni klub, 1937), 132. 11 Zapisniky M. R. Stefa nika [The Diari es o f M. R. Stefanik) ed . Jose f Bartiisek and Jaroslav Bohac (Praha, Pamatnik osvoboze ni, 1935), 172. �SLOVAKIA 2021 on the meteoro logical stations he had created and also to explore interesting parts of the island. He befriended French officers serving on a gunboat named Zelee and sailed with them to the lesser-known islands of French Pol ynesia. Here Stefanik di scovered and identified some Gaugin woodcuts in Puna'auia, owned by a Tahitian woman who may have been the painter's lover. Inspired by thi s discovery, he continued hi s search and found in her hut a carved wooden tobacco box with relief figures and, e lsewhere, a wooden relief ofa woman . 12 Exotic objects brought back from all five of the planet's inhabited continents formed the most interesting parts of Stefanik's collection. His friendly relations with the natives and hi s ability to develop a quick rapport with new people helped him to acquire these objects . Ivan Kmo remembered Stefanik's apartment thus : It was a strange kind of apartment. In fact, rather than an apartment, it was a small museum. It started in the hallway, which was full of drums, arrows and other weapons used by various indigenous peoples. And the tiny rooms were crammed with exotic objects. I was particularly impressed by the Oriental rugs and Gaugin's woodcuts from Tahiti. Hi s study boasted books, joumals, astronomical equipment and- a beautiful view of the rooftops of Paris. 13 Stefanik also enjoyed entertaining visitors to hi s apartment on the sixth floor at 6 Rue Leclerc with magic trick s. He mastered eighteen illusionist tricks, including cards emerging from a glass, flying and shrinking cards, and a magic wandering ring. 14 He had learned these tricks for a small fee at magicians' gatherings in Paris and bought his equipment from the Academy of Magic. 12 Franti sek Kele and Mi ros lav Musil , Navraty do Po~vnezie. Po S1efanikov1ich slopach [Returns to Polynes ia. Following in the Footsteps of Stefanik ) (OF PRI NT, 1996), 55. 13 Ivan Kmo , " Spomi enky na uj a Milana" [Memori es on Unc le Milan) in S1efanik . Kniha prva : 5pomienl,.y a pos/rehy [S tefanik . Boo k One: Memories and Observations] , ed . Stefan Osusky and Bohdan Pav lu (Praha, Svaz slovenskeho studen tstva v Bratislave, 1938), 38. 14 V ladimir Z uberec, " Za l\1by a zauj my Milana Rasti slava Stefanik a" [The Hobbies and Interests of Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ) in Zbornik Slovenskeho narodneho miizea - His16ria 32 (Martin, Osveta, 1992), I 13- 14. �SLOVAKIA 2021 11 A Worldwide Wireless Telegraph etwork To find suitable support fro m the French government for hi s observatory at Tahiti , Stefanik dev ised hi s own strategy. Through the Bureau des longitudes he planned to donate the observatory and all of its equipment and instruments to the state or the colony, which would cover its operating costs. 15 Willi am Mauri ce Fawtier, the French governor of the colonies in Oceania, asked Stefanik to identify a suitab le location for a wireless station on Tahiti , 16 and subseq uently to have it built and to run it. Stefa nik wanted to join the observatory and wireless station. Thank s to state subsid ies and profits generated by the stati on he would have had suffi cient materi al support. In those days France, the on ly country w ith po liti cal interests in Oceania, was not yet conn ected by wireless telegraph with these colonies, with the exception of New Caledonia. Contact with Tahiti was key, since the island's importance was ex pected to grow following the opening of the Panama Canal. In Jul y of 1912 a draft bill of the Law on an Intercontinenta l Wireless Telegraph Network, to connect the French co loni es scattered around the world with the mother country, was tabled in the French Parliament. Three branches were to radiate fro m Fra nce to the colonies : one w ith Coc hinchina (today the southern part of Vietnam), another w ith the island of Martinique and a third one in the Pac ifi c, with the station s in New Caledonia, th e Marquesas lslands and Tahiti. 17 One of the tasks Stefanik was supposed to fulfil during hi s mi ss ion in Ec uad or ( 1913) was to obtain permi ss ion to establi sh a wireless telegraph station on one of the Galapagos Islands, to facilitate comm unication with Papeete. In spite of the competition of German, Briti sh and America ns companies who had a strong position in these countri es, Stefanik succeeded. 18 Sometime earli er he had presented the French Senator and hi s protector Emil e C hautemps with the project of an 15 Slovensky narodn y archiv, Brati slava (S lovak National Arc hi ves, hereinafter SNA), OF : M. R. Stefanik, box 33, inv. no. I 06 1, Paris, 22 January 19 13, Letter of M. R. Stefan ik to an unknown person (perhaps E. Boutroux). 16 SNA , OF: M. R. Stefa nik, box 33 , inv. no. I 059, Papeete, 16 Octobe r 1913, letter of the governor of the French coloni es in French Pol ynesia W. Fawtier to M. R. Stefan ik . 17 Rasti slav Rajchl , M. R. Stefanik (Praha, Orb is, 194 7), 14- 16 . i x See more: Ekvadorsky zapisnik [Ecuadorian Diary], ed. Vl adimir Polivka (Bratislava, VSSS, 2005, I' ' editi on 1928) . �12 SLOVAKIA 2021 intercontinental telegraph network. Each station was to have an observatory and to provide a meteorological service . In Europe it was to be based on Mont Saleve near Geneva, in Asia its location was to be Hong Kong, in Africa in Morocco, and in Australia and Oceania in Tahiti. Stefanik also wanted to acquire the island of Floriana (Galapagos Islands) to reinforce the French influence in the region , but these projects were doomed because the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared the USA's reaction . He did, however, succeed in strengthening France's influence in Ecuador. At the outbreak of the Great War, Stefanik returned to France. He was in Morocco when the news reached him that he had been made a knight of the Legion d'honneur, with this citation: "Having been entrusted with missions to Tahiti and the Republic of Ecuador in 1913 he exhibited outstanding skill and provided extraordinary service to the merchant navy and to French interests. He founded and estab1ished, at his own expense, an observatory on Tahiti and organised a comprehensive meteorological service on the islands of French Oceania." 19 Stefanik had an extraordinary talent for planning globa l projects. He thought in bold and broad strokes and was not content with partial or local solutions. This was undoubtedly one reason why he so often captivated his friends . On the other hand, he d id not always manage to bring his plans to fruition . Sometimes he seemed to bite off more than he could chew. Pilot, Soldier and Inventor Stefanik became a French citizen in 1912 and was drafted in August of 1914 when the First World War broke out. Because of health problems, Stefanik reported for duty in January of 1915 as a pilot and flew over the Western front. In this ro le he focused on so lving problems relating to military aviation . In those days a big problem was communications between pilots and their bases, which he wanted to solve by installing a radio transmitter in his Maurice Farman airplane. As this proved too heavy, he constructed a "parlophone" (from French parler "to speak") to enab le the pilot to communicate w ith his base. He also mulled over the idea of a vertical launch and landing and exp lored 19 Archi ves nati ona les, Paris, LH/2548/35 - M. R. Ste fanik . �SLOVAKIA 2021 13 the best possible use of binoculars.20 Although most of Stefanik's ideas and inventions were not accepted, his military superiors appreciated " his valuable scientific knowledge." 2 1 Stefanik was also interested in the use of meteorology for military aviation. After constructing a meteorological station in the commune of Brias, he tested various meteorological instruments for their possible use in aircraft at various heights. Weather forecasts could be exploited, not only in aviation, but also in the planning of military actions by the infantry. For this reason, General Ferdinand Foch entrusted him with estab li shing a meteorological service for the section of the front under his command. Stefanik refused to take command of this service and left for a mission in Serbia in order to fight the invading AustroH ungarian army.22 Later, Stefanik founded and organised a meteorological service for the Romanian army. He also planned to set up an inter-allied meteorological service for the armies of the Entente. 23 Stefanik's military career was truly exceptional. Mobilised as a rank-and-file soldier in August of 1914, he did not start serving until January of 1915 and three years later (June of 1918) had reached the rank of Brigadier-General. It should be noted, however, that Stefanik's meteoric rise through the ranks was mainly the result of his diplomatic activities, which French officials used to boost his prestige in the eyes of his compatriots, as well Allied soldiers, diplomats and politicians. He also received numerous military and civilian honours , such as the French army's Croix de guerre (w ith bronze palm), the Italian Military Cross, the Serbian Gold medal for bravery, as well as being made a Knight, Officer and Commander of the Legion d'honneur. 20 Zuberec, "Zal'uby a za ujm y Milana Rastis lava Stefanika", 109- 135. SNA , OF: M. R. Ste fanik, box 33 , in v. no. I 037, Pari s, 13 August I 9 I 5, Au suj et des fu sils- mitrailleurs LEWIS a venir d ' Ang leterre. 21 La memoire conservee du general Milan Rastisla v Stefanik dans /es archives du Service historique de la Defense, ed. Frederi c Gue lton, Emm anuelle Bra ud and Michal Ksinan (Paris, SHD, 2008), 26. See [Emile] Prat, " Vzpominky z roku 1915" [Memories from 1915), in Stefaniki,v memorial [Stefa nik 's Memori a l] , ed. Amost Bares (Praha, Pamatnik odboj e, I 929), 153. 23 Rasti slav Rajchl, " M. R. Ste fanik jako organisator vojenske meteorology" [M . R. Stefanik as Organiser o f Military Meteorol ogy], Ri.fr hvezd, 11° 5 (May 1948), I 00--104. 22 �14 SLOVAKIA 2021 The Beginnings of the Czechoslovak Movement During the First World War, the self-determination of nations became one of the principles of international relations. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state grew out of the close cooperation between leaders of the two nations that had developed in the nineteenth century, as the idea of Slavic mutuality gained ground, and also thanks to the linguistic proximity between Czech and Slovak, two distinct, but closely-related languages. From the geopolitical point of view, Czech and Slovak leaders abroad wanted to replace AustriaHungary as a barrier to German expansion to the East (Orang nach Oesten) by a chain of independent states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) supported by the Entente. 24 But, the "Czechoslovak question" was completely unknown in the West. To fight this ignorance, the Czechoslovak National Council , the highest organ of the Czechoslovak liberation movement during the Great War, established in m id-1916 started a press propaganda campaign. Masaryk was its President, Josef Dtirich Vice-President, Edvard Benes General Secretary, and Stefanik representative of the Slovaks. After Dtirich's expulsion, he was replaced as Vice-President by Stefanik. Branches of the Czechoslovak National Council were established in several Entente countries, led by supporters of its political orientation.25 Political Seducer To gain support for the Czechoslovak movement among the Entente Powers, a lot of work behind the scenes was needed. Thanks to his astronomic and diplomatic missions before the war, Stefanik was in touch with the most important French politicians. Before going into Stefanik's powers of persuasion, we need first look at his image in French society. In the Third Republic scientists had a very positive image and a cult of science seemed to have become a new lay religion . We must never forget that Stefanik was an astronomer, mathema24 Tomas G. Masaryk, La Nouvelle Europe, ed. Alain Soubigou (Pari s, L ' Hannattan, 2002, 1st edition 191 8), 120, 11 5. 25 Edouard Benes, Souvenirs de guerre et de noire revolution (! 9/4-191 8) I vol. (Pari s, Ernest Lero ux, 1928), 128. Vojensky ustfedni archiv - Vojensky historicky archiv, Prague, f. CSNR - Pari s, CSNR Ill , box 22, correspondence of Benes with Masaryk, 20 June 191 6, Benes writin g to Masaryk. �SLOVAKIA 2021 15 tician, meteorologist, pilot, specialist in wireless telegraphy, and traveller etc. Such a person easily aroused interest in Parisian or Rome "salons" where the most important French or Italian politicians met. Stefanik often enjoyed the favour of women in these circles who were enchanted by him. Several people have written that Stefanik could win over diplomats and politicians with his sense of humour. Robert de Billy, a French diplomat in Rome, recounts the following: Stefanik was charged with observing the solar eclipse in Polynesia, where the visibility would be best. Without any hesitation, he travelled to a small remote island somewhere in the Polynesian archipelago. After disembarking with his telescope, he informed the native chief that the sun would soon disappear but that the government of the Republic (cognizant of its protective responsibilities) had sent Stefanik to ensure that sunlight would return. Everything happened as expected. The tribal chief, astoundded by the night in the middle of the day , and the return of the star on the exact day the magician had predicted, fell at the feet of this supernatural being, the master of magic.26 Many people, not least Stefanik himself, were aware of hi s propensity to exaggerate but everyone knew that his accounts were based on a wealth of true stories and experience. Stefanik suffered from ill health from an early age. He was of slender stature and General Maurice Jan in recalled that his frail bodily frame did not seem built for the enormous amount of energy it contained.27 One cause of Stefanik's poor health was the scale of his ambition, whether in his initial eagerness to make his mark as a scientist or, in later years, in his fight for the creation of Czechoslovakia . The constant nervous strain he was under, frequent travel across all five continents in pursuit of science and later on diplomatic and military missions, undoubtedly left their mark on his health. Recalling Stefanik's health problems, the writer Bertrand de Jouvenel described them as his sacrifice for the nation . "Stefanik never stopped travelling. We would encounter him as a major, we would encounter him as a General , ever 26 Archives du ministere des Affaires etrangeres, Pari s - La Coum euve (hereinafter AMA E), PA-AP 2 I, Robert de Billy, vol. 5, Le general Stefanik . 27 Dusan Kovac, S1efanik a Janin. Pribeh pria1e/'s1va [Stefanik and Janin. The Story o f a Friendship] (Brati slava, Dilema, 200 I), 63-65. �16 SLOVAKIA 2021 paler, ever more frantic , he would eat and speak less and less. One might say that the more he gives of his life to his country the less of it is left in him ." 28 In his attempts to persuade others, Stefanik never hesitated to play on their emotions, or cha ll enge the logic of his audience. His scientific work and travels equipped him with a huge arsena l of knowledge, experience and anecdotes. One of his great virtues was his ability to exploit all these to his benefit, or rather, for the benefit of the Czechoslovak liberation movement. The social recognition of these virtues afforded him high standing, which he was able to exploit. The Czechoslovak Army (Legions) in France and Italy The army formed an extremely important, if not the most important, part of the Czechoslovak liberation movement, and Stefanik was one of its chief organisers. From the very moment the war broke out, Czechs and Slovaks abroad began to organise into various combat units fighting alongside the Entente powers, to prove their loyalty to the Allies and to burnish their anti-Austrian credentials. The Czechoslovak National Council sought to unify and direct these various tendencies. A French presidential decree dated 16 December 1917 authorised the formation of a Czechoslovak army in France.29 However, the problem was that there were neither Czech or Slovak prisoners-ofwar, or a sizeable Czech nor Slovak community on French territory, since France was primarily involved in fighting German forces on the Western front. Bringing Czechoslovak volunteers to France became Stefanik ' s primary aim. The Czechoslovak National Counci l intended to recruit mainly in Italy, Russia and the United States. However, the volunteers were not expected to serve on ly in the army but rather, at their own discretion, could also be deployed in military factories. In an effort to find the vo lunteers for the Czechoslovak army in France Stefanik "Minister of Emergency Situations" went to Russia (1916- 1917), Romania (1916- 1917), the USA ( 1917), Italy (1918), 28 Bertrand de Jouvenel , Un voyageur dans le siec/e (Paris, Robert La fTont, 1979), 48-49. 29 AMA E, C PC 1896-191 8, Guerre 19 14- 191 8, Autriche-Hongri e, vo l. 157 , Pari s, 16 December 191 7, Report to the President of the French Republi c. �SLOVAKIA 2021 17 and Russia again ( 19 I 8- 1919). 30 With various successes in those countries, a Czechoslovak Legion with I 0,000 men was established in France and took part in battles on the Western front in the summer and autumn 1918. In Italy in 1918 there were a large number of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war. These had been assembled in separate camps in Padula, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, and Badia Sulmona. Stefanik wanted them to be deployed to France, but this was opposed by the Italian government. It was only prepared to authorise the formation of an auxiliary force to be deployed behind the lines, providing support for the Italian military. As this offer was not favourable to the Czechoslovak movement, Stefanik entered into talks with Italy's top officials. He negotiated with General Armando Diaz, the Minister of War, with King Victor Emmanuel III , with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino, and with Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando.31 Following these negotiations, which Stefanik had to handle with utmost sensitivity due to the country's internal political problems, an agreement was reached on 19 April 191 8. 32 The Czechoslovak Legion was to operate under the Italian supreme command but the political influence over its members would be held by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. The French Ambassador in Italy had a very positive view of the agreement: "It seems to me that these conditions represent the best we could have secured from the Italian government."33 Two days later, on 21 April , the anniversary of the foundation of Rome, Stefanik signed an agreement on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council , while Orlando did so on behalf of the government ofltaly. The negotiations Stefanik conducted in Italy can be regarded as his most significant achievement. The Czechoslovak Legion was the first foreign an11y which received permission to operate on 3 ° Karel Pichlik, Bohumfr Klipa and Jitka Zabloudilova, Ceskosluvensti legionah (/914 - 1920) [The Czechos lovak Legionnaires ( 1914- 1920)] (Praha, Mlada fronta, 1996), 150- 59. Mark Corn wa ll, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle fo r Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke, GB, Macmillan , 2000), 159. See also: Leo Val iani , The End of Austria-Hungmy (New York , A lfred A. Knopf, 1973). 32 Pavel He lan, " La Legione cecoslovacca," in // Patto di Roma e la Legione cecoslovacca. Tra Grande Guerra e Nuova Europa. ed. Francesco Leoncini (Vittorio Veneto, Kellermann Editore, 2014), 67- 72. 33 AMAE, C PC 1896-1918, Guerre 1914- 1918, Autriche-Hongrie, vol. 158, Rome, 19 April 19 18, Barrere writting to th e Minister of Foreign Affairs, no . 841-842. 31 �18 SLOVAKIA 2021 Italian soil. The creation of Polish and Romanian units followed much later. 34 Further important events connected to Stefanik and the Czechoslovak Army in Italy were placing the military flag of the Czec hoslovak Army on the Altar of the Fatherland in Rome on 24 May 1918, on the anniversary of Italy entering the war; this episode was of extraordinary propaganda importance. The Czech Amelie Posse- Brazdova recalled Stefanik's speech on this occasion: " Like a masterful and ingenious conductor, he played all our trembling heartstrings, leaving not one untouched ."35 Finally around 20,000 Czechoslovak so ldiers fought on the Italian front. The Legions in Russia Stefanik went on his first mission to Russ ia in 1916 and was busy dealing with the internal problems of the Czechoslovak movement. After the February Revolution of 19 17, the new Russian Provisional Government authorized the project of the Czechoslovak Legion in the country, but later changed its position . Only in July 19 I 7, after a successful battle at Zborov (in the frame of the Keren sky Offensive) of the Czechoslovak Brigade, composed mainly of Czechs and Slovaks from Ru ssia and thus Russian citizens, the government permitted recruitment among prisoners-of-war. The Legions in Russia grew quickly. Fol lowing the Bolshevik coup in October of I 9 I 7, the new government was intent on making peace with Germany. This put the Czechoslovak Army into a difficult position, since, in the aftermath of such an agreement, its members would no longer be in a territory that shared a front wi th Gemrnny or Austria-Hungary, and would thus have no enemy to fight. In addition, a number of factions were vying for power in Ru ss ia. Masaryk demanded strict neutrality with regard to internal Russian affairs, but in practice this was difficult to achieve. The orders received by the Czechoslovak Army were constantly changing. The Briti sh would have preferred to keep it in Russ ia under their command, while the French wanted to redeploy the Leg ion to the 34 Angelo Tamborra, L 'idea di nazinnalita e la guerra / 914-1918 (Trento, lnstituto per la storia de l Ri so rgimento ita liano, 1963), 37-43 . 35 Eva Kranz. Amelie Posse- Brazdnva. Zivot spjaty s Ceskoslovenskem [Amelie Posse- Brazdova. A Life Linked w ith Czechoslova ki a] ( Praha, Akropo li s, 20 11 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 19 Western front. 36 Soon, open conflict broke out between the Czechoslovak Legion and the Bolsheviks, who wanted to disarm them after an incident in Chelyabinsk. Czechoslovak Army representatives, meeting at a congress in Chelyabinsk, decided to prepare for their passage to France via Vladivostok and to resist any attempts to be stopped. The troops quickly captured the Trans-Siberian Railway and were soon openly fighting the Bolsheviks. Later, this capture changed its purpose- the Legions wanted to facilitate the invasion of Russia planned by the Allies. However, after initial successes on the part of the Czechoslovaks, the Bolsheviks gradually began to prevail. 37 Matters turned even more complicated following the coup led by the monarchist Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Siberia in November of 19 I 8. Most of the 60,000 Czechoslovak soldiers were left-leaning and were not eager to see the counter-revolution prevail. However, Kolchak was allied with the Entente, and thus also with Czechoslovakia. Jan Juricek portrayed the situation in Siberia as follows: The soldiers complained about the excessive demands of officers who, ambitious though they were, lacked in experience. The Czechoslovak commanders, in turn , lamented the fact that Russia's White Guard had no appetite for fighting , was prone to flee or to surrender to the enemy, demoralizing our soldiers. The local commanders of the Siberian anti-Bolshevik forces , on the other hand, complained (to General Janin) that the Czechoslovaks' meddling in Russian politics was inappropriate.38 By the time Stefanik arrived in Siberia in November of I 9 I 8 - he had left France in August of 19 I 8 - the Great War had ended and the soldiers did not understand the need for further fighting, as Czechoslovakia had already been established. At first Stefanik tried to convince the Legionnaires that they had to fight to ensure favourable 36 Karel Pichlik, Bez legend [Without Legends] ( Praha, Panorama, 199 1), 377. See: Betty Miller Unterberger, The United States, Revo/utionCIIJ' Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Victor S. Mamatey, The Un ited States and East Central Europe /914- 191 8. A Studv in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda ( Princeton, ew Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957). 3~ Jan Jurfcek, Milan Rastisla v St~fanik (Bratislava, Q 111 , 2006, P' edi ti on 1968), 150. 37 �20 SLOVAKIA 2021 conditions for the peace treaties and the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. He hoped the Legion could fight its way across Russia to the newlyformed state in the heart of Europe. However, Stefanik changed hi s mind after visiting large numbers of Czechoslovak troops on the front. He and General Maurice Janin (the Commander-in-Chief of the Legion in Russia appointed by the Government of France with the consent of the Czechoslovak National Council) concluded that a withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army was inevitable. They would have to leave Russian forces to fight the Bolsheviks, while the Czechoslovak army was to focus on defending the Trans-Siberian railway. 39 Masaryk gave Stefanik powers of attorney to carry out an internal reorganisation of the army, as well as in matters of international policy. Thanks to their complex origin and development, the Legions in Russia were run democratically. The Legionnaires addressed each other as "brother" and the Legion was led by the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia through elected representatives. While this form of self-government was relatively acceptable in a volunteer army, following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 191 8, the Legion became a regular army that had to be subordinate to the government. Stefanik abolished the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia. 40 By order number 588, issued only after his departure, Stefanik banned the holding of the second Congress of the Czechoslovak Army and the committee's activities. However, Congress delegates had already been elected. The soldiers were unwilling to give up their elected bodies. Enforcing command number 588 turned out to be very difficult. The conflict between the military command and the soldiers grew to such an extent that a total rift in the army was imminent. 41 Stefanik realised that he would be unable to resolve the situation of the Czec hoslovak army in Siberia and returned to Paris, where he started talks with Allied military officials, Marshal Ferdinand Foch in particular. He demanded either an allied intervention or a complete withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army. In April of 1919 Stefanik sent the following note to T.G. Masaryk: "An inter-allied military 39 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 17, Omsk, 19 Apri l 1919, Jan in writi ng to the minister of war, no. 992. 40 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 16, Vladivostok, 27 December 191 8, Regnault and Martel writing to the Foreign Ministry, no. 18 I. 41 Pichlik, Klipa and Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti legionah 246-47. �SLOVAKIA 2021 21 intervention will not take place; our men are perishing in Siberia. Our allies do not always keep their promises because these are made thoughtlessly. There is political and moral chaos."42 The Birth of Czechoslovakia, the Death of Stefanik At the beginning of 1918, the military situation of the Entente Powers was very difficult. Serbia and most of the territory of Romania had been overrun by the enemy in 1915 and in 1916. In 1917 Italy suffered a great defeat at Caporetto and the Italian front moved I 00 km south. The next year Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, which allowed the Germans to move large numbers of soldiers to the Western front. The Central Powers wanted to win a decisive victory with a large offensive in the spring of 191 8, before the arrival of thousands of soldiers from the United States to Europe. In these complex circumstances the Entente powers were more wi lling to support any project that would weaken their enemies. That is why the movements of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary gained more ground. Thanks to their military efforts in France, Italy but mainly in Russia, the international position of the Czechoslovak National Counci l became stronger. It was step-by-step recognized as the Czechoslovak Provisional Government by the Entente Powers. When Czech and Slovak representtatives proclaimed the founding of Czechoslovakia on 28 October 1918 in Prague, and on October 30 in Turciansky Sv. Martin in Slovakia, its international position was assured thanks also to Stefaniks' activities. Stefanik died soon after the creation of Czechoslovakia. His last diplomatic task was to find a compromise between the Italian and French claims to command the Czechoslovak army in the new state, and he succeed where others cou ldn 't. 43 Stefanik decided fly in an Italian plane to his homeland but it crashed while landing at 4 May 1919. His death aroused a lot of suspicions and resulted in conspiracy theories bringing accusations against Benes, with whom Stefanik did 42 Archiv Ustavu T. G. Masaryka, Prague, f. TGM-R, box 424, Paris, 3 April I 919, M. R. Stefanik writing to T . G. Masaryk. 43 Laura Fortunato, " La Mi ssione militare italiana in Slovacchia: un tentativo di "diplomazia militare" fallito," in Per Rila Tolomeo, scrilli di amici sulfa Dalmazia e I 'Europa cen/ro-orienlale fl, ed . E. Capuzzo, B. C revato-Se lvaggi and F. Guida (Venez ia, La Musa Talia, 2014 ), 13 7- 205. �22 SLOVAKIA 2021 not get along, against freemasons, Czechs, Hungarians and so on . The sum total of the facts and evidence available to us today suggests that Stefanik's death was an accident. Of the many who have written on the subject, it was Pavo) Kanis and his documentary film Stefanik. A Hero 's Story, Homeland (20 I 0) that I find the most persuasive. The Memory of Stefanik One might say that the 20 1h century replacements of various statues in what is now L.:udovit Stur Square in Bratislava reflected the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Each change of reg ime in Czechoslovakia was also reflected in changes of statues. This kind of " marking" of territory is not unusual. Quite the contrary. Every reg ime is interested in erecting monuments to figures who represent ideas and va lues close to its heart and have in some way contributed to the development of a particular community or nation. As part of the celebrations of the Hungarian millennial arriva l in the Danube Valley in 1896, a competition was held in Bratislava (then known as Pozsony in Hunga rian and Pressburg in German) for the design of a monument commemorating the coronations of Habsburg rulers that had been held in the city. The competition was won by sculptor Jan Fadrusz with a sculptural group depicting Empress Maria Theresa's ascent to the throne in 1740. Maria Theresa was acceptable as a symbol both to the Hungarians, who revered , indeed idealised her for her pos itive attitude to Hungarian statehood, as well as, of course, to the Habsburgs, who had a forged a close bond with the city of Pressburg, where the coronations were held for centuries. The scu lpture of Maria Theresa was erected on 16 May 1897 on the Royal Hill Square, w hich was then renamed Coronation Hill Square. 44 The lnterwar Period and the Slovak State The newly-founded Czechoslovakia faced serious problems. It had to preserve its existence by forgin g the idea of a Czechoslovak nation while distancing itse lf from everything Habsburg and Hungarian . Soon after Bratislava was occupied by the Czechos lovak army in February of 1919, someone threw a sack over the head of Maria Theresa and the statue was later boarded up. Neith er the Hungarians nor 44 Pavel Dvorak, Zia ta kniha Bratislavv [Golden book of Brati slava] (Bratislava, Slovensky spi sova tel', 1993), 498- 506. �SLOVAKIA 2021 23 the Habsburgs were prepared to accept the fact that the monarchy had collapsed and did everything they could to bring the Slovaks back into Hungary's fold. King Charles I Habsburg wanted to return to Hungary in October of 1921, intending to ascend to throne. In response to this plan a partial mobilization was declared in Czechoslovakia, which also led to the removal of the statue. Local members of the Sokol, the Czech gymnastics organization, and former Legionnaires, destroyed the statue "as a symbol the oppressive regime. " Once the statue of Maria Theresa had been removed, the next problem arose: who should replace her? It was decided to replace her with a statue of General Stefanik. In 1927 the Committee for the Erection of a Monument of Milan Rastislav Stefanik announced a competition, but the winner wasn't selected so, it was repeated the following year. The winning design was by the Czech sculptor Bohumil Kafka's statue of Milan Stefanik surrounded by four lions g uarding the coats-of-arms of the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia - Bohemia; Moravia and Silesia; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Kafka later modified his design , leaving a single lion presiding over the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms. The lion was originally to face the Danube River but, after Austria's Anschluss in March of 1938, it was turned to face towards the Slovak National Museum, allegedly to avoid irking Hitler. But the unveiling ceremony, planned for the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia never happened, because of the Munich Agreement. During demonstrations marking the proclamation of Slovakia's autonomy in October of 1938, protesters pelted the lion with stones. 45 From a brotherly point of view, this change could be characteristic of the situation in interwar Czechoslovakia. Stefanik was one of the most important founders of Czechoslovakia. His funeral in 1919 was reminiscent of a royal one. After his death a number of statues and memorials were erected across the country. The most monumental one is the memorial on Bradlo Hill in western Slovakia, by the renowned Slovak sculptor Dusan Jurkovic, erected between 1924 and 1928. This monument has become on May 4 th , the anniversary of his death, the site of something resembling an annual national pilgrimage (except for the Communist 45 Zdenek Hojda and Jifi Pokorn y, Pomniky a zapomniky [Memorial s and Anti-Memorials] (Praha, Paseka, 1996), 175- 182. �24 SLOVAKIA 2021 period with a short political detente in 1968- 1969).46 Czechoslovakia, a country in the heart of Europe, fell victim to the political turmoil of the twentieth century, as well as its own lack of internal stability. It failed to secure the loyalty of its minorities, especially the Germans and Hungarians and , ultimately, one of its constituent nations- the Slovaks. The state that was founded on 28 October 1918 ceased to exist twenty-one years later on March 14, 1939, when Slovakia, under pressure from Hitler's Germany, declared its independence. Adolf Hitler is said to have declared "Die katze muss weg", although it cannot be confirmed, when he saw the sculpture from a boat on the Danube. Other sources claim that it was another highranking Naz i who said that the cat (i.e. the Czech lion) had to go, but the pilot could stay. One part of the Slovak public was never too keen on the monument. Anyz, the company that had made the original cast of both statues, replaced the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms with the Slovak one, but that was not enough to save the "cat." In May of 1940, Slovak soldiers removed the lion from its base. From the Coup de Prague in 1948 until Today The end of the war brought about a restoration of Czechoslovakia and also the communist takeover of 1948. The Czechoslovak liberation movement of the First World War did not suit communist ideologues and their version of history. They set out to fight the "bourgeois" liberation legend of Masaryk , Stefanik and Benes. 47 Stefanik' s statues throughout Slovakia began to disappear, mostly at night. This new trend was bound to affect Bratislava as well, with respect to what was then Roosevelt (now Stur) Square and the statue that graced it. The statue of Stefanik was melted down in the early I 950s. 48 The name of the square proved to be equally unsuitable and changed from Roosevelt Square to Stur Square. However, 46 Peter Macho, "M. R. Stefanik - bohatier a muceni k?," [M. R. Stefanik - Hero and Martyr?] in Mvty na.fr slovenske [Our Slovak Myths] , ed. Eduard Krekovi c, Elena Mannova and Eva Krekovi cova (Bratislava, AEP, 2005), 172. 47 See L.:udo vi t Holotik, Stefciniko vska legenda a vznik CSR [The Stefanik Legend and the Fou ndin g of the Czec hoslovak Republic] (Bratislava, SAV, 1958). 48 Milan Varos, Stratene slovenske poklady 2 [Lost Slovak Treasures 2] (Ma rtin , Matica slovenska, 2007), 457- 6 1. �SLOVAKIA 2021 25 as it too k seve ral yea rs to ma ke, the statue of L.:udov ft Stur49 and hi s assoc iates was not placed in the square until th e ea rl y 1970s. De mand s for Stefa nik' s re habilitati o n began to be vo iced eve n before th e end of th e co mmuni st reg ime. 50 On th e occas io n o n the 70th anni ve rsa ry of th e fo undin g of Czec hoslova ki a, Ka fk a's lion was a lso pl aced o n th e plinth , a lbe it not on Stur Squ a re, wh ere it used to be befo re, but in fro nt of th e Sl ovak Nati o na l Muse um. It stood o n a py lo n 14.8 5 metres hi g h, 2 metres wid e and 4 me tres in length , bea rin g th e insc ripti o n " On 28 Octobe r 191 8 th e shared moth erl a nd of Czec hs and S lo vak s, th e Czec hos lova k Re publi c was fo und ed ." The fa ll of the communi st regime in 1989 with the Velvet Revolution, fo ll owed by the "ve lvet di vorce" in 1993, res ulted in the creati on of separate Czec h and S lova k Republics. Stefa nik now retoo k hi s place in the Slovak Pantheon of heroes and hi s memory is omnipresent in today's Slovaki a. If you travel to Bratislava by air, you will land at M. R. Stefanik Airport, while the scientific schedul e of Ivan Bella, Slovakia's first man in space, was known as the Stefanik Miss ion etc. The stori es of the Stur Square did not end , however. C urrently vo ices a re heard de ma ndin g that the sculpture o f L:udov ft Stur and hi s assoc iates be moved to ano th er loca ti o n, s uch as N a mes ti e slobody ( Freedo m Squ a re), and a re pli ca of th e statu e of Mari a Th eresa be mounted aga in o n the embankme nt. Th ese proposa ls have stirred up a li ve ly publi c debate - and po le mi cs . Mea nw hil e th e li o n, toge th er w ith a new ly-cas t Stefa nik , have bee n moved to an area in fro nt of th e new Slova k N ati o na l Th ea tre, betw ee n two buildings ofa shopping ce ntre. A noth er fo unde r o f th e first Czechos lova k Republi c - Masa ryk - now towers ove r th e squ are in front o f th e Nati o na l Mu se um . As observe d by th e hi sto ri an Pave l Dvora k : "The Stur statue is the fourth costl y monument erec ted on the fo rmer Co ronation Hill, a place that has had many names, ending as 49 th ( 18 15- 1856) one of the leaders of the S lova k movement in the I 9 centu ry and the ma in cod i11er of standard Slova k. 50 See Martin Mocko, " Yi liam Plevza a ,, rehab il itacia" M . R. Stefanika ( I)" [V iliam Plevza and '' Rehabi litation" of Stefa ni k ( I)], Nave slovo, 17 Septembe r 20 I 9, https://www.noves lovo.sk/c/V iliam Plevza a rehabilitac ia M R Stefanika I and its 2nd and 3'd cont inuati ons. �26 SLOVAKIA 2021 L:udovit Stur Square today. This small square is not where history was made, but it is where it has revealed its most grotesque face. " 51 51 Dvorak, Zlata kniha Bratislavy, 503 . � SLOVAKIA 2021 7 MILAN RASTISLAV STEFANIK (1880-1919) THE MAN WHO SPOKE TO THE STARS' Michal Ksinan 2 Outside of the Czech and Slovak Republics, people are fairly familiar with Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes, two of the men responsible for the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and who also served as its first presidents. However, another of the country's founders, Milan Rastislav Stefanik, is much less known , partly because his tragic death in 1919 prevented him from holding a key office for any length of time. Although he is relatively unknown to the wider international public, his contemporaries compared him to Pierre Choderlos de Laclos for the use of military tactics in love affairs, 3 to Lawrence of Arabia for vision, to Napoleon Bonaparte for ambition, to Jules Michelet" for patriotism, and to one of the apostles for conviction.5 Who was this man who charn1ed his surroundings all his life and still continues to charm people today? In order to answer this question , I will present this person to the Englishspeaking reader who is often unfamiliar with Stefanik by emphasising several key points in his life. 6 The Young Man Stefan ik was born on 2 1 July 1880 in the hamlet of Kosariska in today 's western Slovakia (Upper-Hungary at the time) to th e family 1 This article was supported by gran ts VEGA n° 2/0087/20 and APVV n° 17-0399. T he auth or works in the Institute of Hi story of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. 3 French genera l and novelist ( 174 1- 1803) best known for Les Liasons dangere11ses. ~ A famous French hi storian ( 1798- 1874 ). 5 Antoine Mares, Edvard Bene!i : Un drame entre Hitler et Staline (Paris, Perrin, 2015), 70. 6 This artic le is modified version of the texts published in the book: Michal Ksirian , Milan Rastisla v Stefanik, tran s. Julia Sherwood (Bratislava: Lindeni jointly with the Slovak National Archive, 20 19) . For more details, see the first scie ntifi c biography of Stefanik published in French : Michal Ksiri an, L 'homme qui parfait avec /es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik , heros ji·anco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EU R 'Orbem, 2019). Its Slovak translation will be published under the titl e Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Mui , ktm)i sa rozpraval s hviezdami by Slovart publi shing hou se and an Engli sh transla tion under the title Milan Ras/is/av S1efanik : The Slovak National Hero and Co-Founder of Czechoslovakia by Routledge publishing house. 2 �8 SLOVAKIA 2021 of a Lutheran pastor with strong national convictions. Rai sed in a deeply religious family, Milan Stefanik used to hold similar beliefs. However, during his student days in Prague he was confronted with many liberal views. Discussions in Jeronym, a Protestant c lub, gave him a new perspective on faith. Its members debated progressive theo logical issues and read foreign journals. Stefanik was particularly influenced by the professor of philosophy Masaryk, and in light of his lectures started to question his Christian faith and indeed the existence of God. Not only did Milan Stefanik reject the divine essence of Jesus C hrist, he went so far as to doubt the very existence of God . He rejected reli gion and believed only in science, something that was regarded as genuinely heretical in his environment; that is why hi s father threw the young rebel out of his house in the summer of 1900. Although this breach was not permanent, it demonstrated that young Milan Stefanik had embarked upon a new journey.7 In thi s respect Stefanik can serve as a typical example of the phenomenon of secularisation in the nineteenth century that one can describe as "a loss of orientation , of certain ty, of a single world-view, of a core of reality. " 8 Another key deci sion of the young Stefanik was to switch from studying civi l engineering at Prague's Imperial and Royal Czech Technical High School (1898- 1900) to a degree in astronomy in the Faculty of Arts at the Czec h Charles-Ferdinand University (today's Charles Univers ity) in 1900- 1904. Astronomical studies fit more his romantic nature, even though thi s led to further conflicts between him and his father. The Astronomer After finishing hi s studies in Prague in 1904, Stefanik decided to go to Paris. He took every possible step to embark on a career in science. He started by taking an unpaid job in the observatory in Meudon under professor Jules Janssen, but that came to an end in 1906 when the leading position at the observatory passed to Henri Deslandres, since neither of the men got along. 9 After that Stefanik was appo inted to the paid position 7 Jaromir Va vra. Vzpo minky na Milana Ste(anika [Remini scences on Milan Stefa nik] (Ceske Velenice, Pave l Nobis, 1930), 15- 16. 8 Jifi Hanus, Historie modern! doby [History of the Modem Age] (B rn o, Barrister & Principal, 2004), 80. 9 Fra ni;:oise La unay, Un globe-trotter de la physique celeste. L ·astronome Jules Janssen (Paris, l' Observa toire de Paris, Vuibert, 2008), 256. �SLOVAKIA 2021 9 of deputy director of the Mont Blanc Observatories Society, thi s time with the help of the daughter and widow of the then deceased Jules Janssen. After a year in this post, Stefanik found himself jobless again. Then he decided to establish his own observatory. He had to decide between North Africa and a certain island in French Polynesia. Stefanik settled on the much closer North Africa. He travelled around, mostly in Algeria and Tunisia, but failed to find a suitable location for an observatory. On behalf of the French Bureau des longitudes, Stefanik then tra vell ed to Tahiti to observe the passage of Halley's Comet and to conduct further astronomical observations on an island in French Polynes ia. 10 The plan to observe Halley's Comet fell through because cloud cover made observation impossible. However, Stefanik did manage to carry out the final part of his plan. He decided to extend his stay on Tahiti and explore the conditions for meteorological and astronomical observations, " Provided Tahiti is shown to offer good conditions for astronomical observations, I would be interested in building a permanent observatory (a scientific embassy) there." 11 For Stefanik building a permanent observatory with a functioning meteorological service on thi s island was hi s most important pre-war scientific project. Traveller, Artist and Collector One of the most common astronomical phenomena that Stefanik focused on was the solar ecli pse that forced him to travel all around the world. He observed thi s phenomenon in Spain ( 1905) where all astronomers who observed it were received by Spanish King Alfonso XIII , in Turkistan ( 1907), but his observations failed because of bad weather, and on hi s way back he met with Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, on Vava'u Island ( 1911) where he had the best results among all sc ientific missions , and in Brazil ( 1912) where again his observations failed beca use of bad weather. Meanwhile, he took beautiful pictures during those journeys. Stefanik was not only interested in astronomica l observations, but also in the life and habits of the locals. During hi s stay in Tahiti , Stefanik bought a horse-drawn cart that he used primarily to check up 10 Rasti slav Rajc hl , Stefanikova paNiska feta [Stefanik 's Pari sian Yea rs] (Praha, Ev ropsk y literarni klub, 1937), 132. 11 Zapisniky M. R. Stefa nika [The Diari es o f M. R. Stefanik) ed . Jose f Bartiisek and Jaroslav Bohac (Praha, Pamatnik osvoboze ni, 1935), 172. �SLOVAKIA 2021 on the meteoro logical stations he had created and also to explore interesting parts of the island. He befriended French officers serving on a gunboat named Zelee and sailed with them to the lesser-known islands of French Pol ynesia. Here Stefanik di scovered and identified some Gaugin woodcuts in Puna'auia, owned by a Tahitian woman who may have been the painter's lover. Inspired by thi s discovery, he continued hi s search and found in her hut a carved wooden tobacco box with relief figures and, e lsewhere, a wooden relief ofa woman . 12 Exotic objects brought back from all five of the planet's inhabited continents formed the most interesting parts of Stefanik's collection. His friendly relations with the natives and hi s ability to develop a quick rapport with new people helped him to acquire these objects . Ivan Kmo remembered Stefanik's apartment thus : It was a strange kind of apartment. In fact, rather than an apartment, it was a small museum. It started in the hallway, which was full of drums, arrows and other weapons used by various indigenous peoples. And the tiny rooms were crammed with exotic objects. I was particularly impressed by the Oriental rugs and Gaugin's woodcuts from Tahiti. Hi s study boasted books, joumals, astronomical equipment and- a beautiful view of the rooftops of Paris. 13 Stefanik also enjoyed entertaining visitors to hi s apartment on the sixth floor at 6 Rue Leclerc with magic trick s. He mastered eighteen illusionist tricks, including cards emerging from a glass, flying and shrinking cards, and a magic wandering ring. 14 He had learned these tricks for a small fee at magicians' gatherings in Paris and bought his equipment from the Academy of Magic. 12 Franti sek Kele and Mi ros lav Musil , Navraty do Po~vnezie. Po S1efanikov1ich slopach [Returns to Polynes ia. Following in the Footsteps of Stefanik ) (OF PRI NT, 1996), 55. 13 Ivan Kmo , " Spomi enky na uj a Milana" [Memori es on Unc le Milan) in S1efanik . Kniha prva : 5pomienl,.y a pos/rehy [S tefanik . Boo k One: Memories and Observations] , ed . Stefan Osusky and Bohdan Pav lu (Praha, Svaz slovenskeho studen tstva v Bratislave, 1938), 38. 14 V ladimir Z uberec, " Za l\1by a zauj my Milana Rasti slava Stefanik a" [The Hobbies and Interests of Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ) in Zbornik Slovenskeho narodneho miizea - His16ria 32 (Martin, Osveta, 1992), I 13- 14. �SLOVAKIA 2021 11 A Worldwide Wireless Telegraph etwork To find suitable support fro m the French government for hi s observatory at Tahiti , Stefanik dev ised hi s own strategy. Through the Bureau des longitudes he planned to donate the observatory and all of its equipment and instruments to the state or the colony, which would cover its operating costs. 15 Willi am Mauri ce Fawtier, the French governor of the colonies in Oceania, asked Stefanik to identify a suitab le location for a wireless station on Tahiti , 16 and subseq uently to have it built and to run it. Stefa nik wanted to join the observatory and wireless station. Thank s to state subsid ies and profits generated by the stati on he would have had suffi cient materi al support. In those days France, the on ly country w ith po liti cal interests in Oceania, was not yet conn ected by wireless telegraph with these colonies, with the exception of New Caledonia. Contact with Tahiti was key, since the island's importance was ex pected to grow following the opening of the Panama Canal. In Jul y of 1912 a draft bill of the Law on an Intercontinenta l Wireless Telegraph Network, to connect the French co loni es scattered around the world with the mother country, was tabled in the French Parliament. Three branches were to radiate fro m Fra nce to the colonies : one w ith Coc hinchina (today the southern part of Vietnam), another w ith the island of Martinique and a third one in the Pac ifi c, with the station s in New Caledonia, th e Marquesas lslands and Tahiti. 17 One of the tasks Stefanik was supposed to fulfil during hi s mi ss ion in Ec uad or ( 1913) was to obtain permi ss ion to establi sh a wireless telegraph station on one of the Galapagos Islands, to facilitate comm unication with Papeete. In spite of the competition of German, Briti sh and America ns companies who had a strong position in these countri es, Stefanik succeeded. 18 Sometime earli er he had presented the French Senator and hi s protector Emil e C hautemps with the project of an 15 Slovensky narodn y archiv, Brati slava (S lovak National Arc hi ves, hereinafter SNA), OF : M. R. Stefanik, box 33, inv. no. I 06 1, Paris, 22 January 19 13, Letter of M. R. Stefan ik to an unknown person (perhaps E. Boutroux). 16 SNA , OF: M. R. Stefa nik, box 33 , inv. no. I 059, Papeete, 16 Octobe r 1913, letter of the governor of the French coloni es in French Pol ynesia W. Fawtier to M. R. Stefan ik . 17 Rasti slav Rajchl , M. R. Stefanik (Praha, Orb is, 194 7), 14- 16 . i x See more: Ekvadorsky zapisnik [Ecuadorian Diary], ed. Vl adimir Polivka (Bratislava, VSSS, 2005, I' ' editi on 1928) . �12 SLOVAKIA 2021 intercontinental telegraph network. Each station was to have an observatory and to provide a meteorological service . In Europe it was to be based on Mont Saleve near Geneva, in Asia its location was to be Hong Kong, in Africa in Morocco, and in Australia and Oceania in Tahiti. Stefanik also wanted to acquire the island of Floriana (Galapagos Islands) to reinforce the French influence in the region , but these projects were doomed because the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared the USA's reaction . He did, however, succeed in strengthening France's influence in Ecuador. At the outbreak of the Great War, Stefanik returned to France. He was in Morocco when the news reached him that he had been made a knight of the Legion d'honneur, with this citation: "Having been entrusted with missions to Tahiti and the Republic of Ecuador in 1913 he exhibited outstanding skill and provided extraordinary service to the merchant navy and to French interests. He founded and estab1ished, at his own expense, an observatory on Tahiti and organised a comprehensive meteorological service on the islands of French Oceania." 19 Stefanik had an extraordinary talent for planning globa l projects. He thought in bold and broad strokes and was not content with partial or local solutions. This was undoubtedly one reason why he so often captivated his friends . On the other hand, he d id not always manage to bring his plans to fruition . Sometimes he seemed to bite off more than he could chew. Pilot, Soldier and Inventor Stefanik became a French citizen in 1912 and was drafted in August of 1914 when the First World War broke out. Because of health problems, Stefanik reported for duty in January of 1915 as a pilot and flew over the Western front. In this ro le he focused on so lving problems relating to military aviation . In those days a big problem was communications between pilots and their bases, which he wanted to solve by installing a radio transmitter in his Maurice Farman airplane. As this proved too heavy, he constructed a "parlophone" (from French parler "to speak") to enab le the pilot to communicate w ith his base. He also mulled over the idea of a vertical launch and landing and exp lored 19 Archi ves nati ona les, Paris, LH/2548/35 - M. R. Ste fanik . �SLOVAKIA 2021 13 the best possible use of binoculars.20 Although most of Stefanik's ideas and inventions were not accepted, his military superiors appreciated " his valuable scientific knowledge." 2 1 Stefanik was also interested in the use of meteorology for military aviation. After constructing a meteorological station in the commune of Brias, he tested various meteorological instruments for their possible use in aircraft at various heights. Weather forecasts could be exploited, not only in aviation, but also in the planning of military actions by the infantry. For this reason, General Ferdinand Foch entrusted him with estab li shing a meteorological service for the section of the front under his command. Stefanik refused to take command of this service and left for a mission in Serbia in order to fight the invading AustroH ungarian army.22 Later, Stefanik founded and organised a meteorological service for the Romanian army. He also planned to set up an inter-allied meteorological service for the armies of the Entente. 23 Stefanik's military career was truly exceptional. Mobilised as a rank-and-file soldier in August of 1914, he did not start serving until January of 1915 and three years later (June of 1918) had reached the rank of Brigadier-General. It should be noted, however, that Stefanik's meteoric rise through the ranks was mainly the result of his diplomatic activities, which French officials used to boost his prestige in the eyes of his compatriots, as well Allied soldiers, diplomats and politicians. He also received numerous military and civilian honours , such as the French army's Croix de guerre (w ith bronze palm), the Italian Military Cross, the Serbian Gold medal for bravery, as well as being made a Knight, Officer and Commander of the Legion d'honneur. 20 Zuberec, "Zal'uby a za ujm y Milana Rastis lava Stefanika", 109- 135. SNA , OF: M. R. Ste fanik, box 33 , in v. no. I 037, Pari s, 13 August I 9 I 5, Au suj et des fu sils- mitrailleurs LEWIS a venir d ' Ang leterre. 21 La memoire conservee du general Milan Rastisla v Stefanik dans /es archives du Service historique de la Defense, ed. Frederi c Gue lton, Emm anuelle Bra ud and Michal Ksinan (Paris, SHD, 2008), 26. See [Emile] Prat, " Vzpominky z roku 1915" [Memories from 1915), in Stefaniki,v memorial [Stefa nik 's Memori a l] , ed. Amost Bares (Praha, Pamatnik odboj e, I 929), 153. 23 Rasti slav Rajchl, " M. R. Ste fanik jako organisator vojenske meteorology" [M . R. Stefanik as Organiser o f Military Meteorol ogy], Ri.fr hvezd, 11° 5 (May 1948), I 00--104. 22 �14 SLOVAKIA 2021 The Beginnings of the Czechoslovak Movement During the First World War, the self-determination of nations became one of the principles of international relations. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state grew out of the close cooperation between leaders of the two nations that had developed in the nineteenth century, as the idea of Slavic mutuality gained ground, and also thanks to the linguistic proximity between Czech and Slovak, two distinct, but closely-related languages. From the geopolitical point of view, Czech and Slovak leaders abroad wanted to replace AustriaHungary as a barrier to German expansion to the East (Orang nach Oesten) by a chain of independent states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) supported by the Entente. 24 But, the "Czechoslovak question" was completely unknown in the West. To fight this ignorance, the Czechoslovak National Council , the highest organ of the Czechoslovak liberation movement during the Great War, established in m id-1916 started a press propaganda campaign. Masaryk was its President, Josef Dtirich Vice-President, Edvard Benes General Secretary, and Stefanik representative of the Slovaks. After Dtirich's expulsion, he was replaced as Vice-President by Stefanik. Branches of the Czechoslovak National Council were established in several Entente countries, led by supporters of its political orientation.25 Political Seducer To gain support for the Czechoslovak movement among the Entente Powers, a lot of work behind the scenes was needed. Thanks to his astronomic and diplomatic missions before the war, Stefanik was in touch with the most important French politicians. Before going into Stefanik's powers of persuasion, we need first look at his image in French society. In the Third Republic scientists had a very positive image and a cult of science seemed to have become a new lay religion . We must never forget that Stefanik was an astronomer, mathema24 Tomas G. Masaryk, La Nouvelle Europe, ed. Alain Soubigou (Pari s, L ' Hannattan, 2002, 1st edition 191 8), 120, 11 5. 25 Edouard Benes, Souvenirs de guerre et de noire revolution (! 9/4-191 8) I vol. (Pari s, Ernest Lero ux, 1928), 128. Vojensky ustfedni archiv - Vojensky historicky archiv, Prague, f. CSNR - Pari s, CSNR Ill , box 22, correspondence of Benes with Masaryk, 20 June 191 6, Benes writin g to Masaryk. �SLOVAKIA 2021 15 tician, meteorologist, pilot, specialist in wireless telegraphy, and traveller etc. Such a person easily aroused interest in Parisian or Rome "salons" where the most important French or Italian politicians met. Stefanik often enjoyed the favour of women in these circles who were enchanted by him. Several people have written that Stefanik could win over diplomats and politicians with his sense of humour. Robert de Billy, a French diplomat in Rome, recounts the following: Stefanik was charged with observing the solar eclipse in Polynesia, where the visibility would be best. Without any hesitation, he travelled to a small remote island somewhere in the Polynesian archipelago. After disembarking with his telescope, he informed the native chief that the sun would soon disappear but that the government of the Republic (cognizant of its protective responsibilities) had sent Stefanik to ensure that sunlight would return. Everything happened as expected. The tribal chief, astoundded by the night in the middle of the day , and the return of the star on the exact day the magician had predicted, fell at the feet of this supernatural being, the master of magic.26 Many people, not least Stefanik himself, were aware of hi s propensity to exaggerate but everyone knew that his accounts were based on a wealth of true stories and experience. Stefanik suffered from ill health from an early age. He was of slender stature and General Maurice Jan in recalled that his frail bodily frame did not seem built for the enormous amount of energy it contained.27 One cause of Stefanik's poor health was the scale of his ambition, whether in his initial eagerness to make his mark as a scientist or, in later years, in his fight for the creation of Czechoslovakia . The constant nervous strain he was under, frequent travel across all five continents in pursuit of science and later on diplomatic and military missions, undoubtedly left their mark on his health. Recalling Stefanik's health problems, the writer Bertrand de Jouvenel described them as his sacrifice for the nation . "Stefanik never stopped travelling. We would encounter him as a major, we would encounter him as a General , ever 26 Archives du ministere des Affaires etrangeres, Pari s - La Coum euve (hereinafter AMA E), PA-AP 2 I, Robert de Billy, vol. 5, Le general Stefanik . 27 Dusan Kovac, S1efanik a Janin. Pribeh pria1e/'s1va [Stefanik and Janin. The Story o f a Friendship] (Brati slava, Dilema, 200 I), 63-65. �16 SLOVAKIA 2021 paler, ever more frantic , he would eat and speak less and less. One might say that the more he gives of his life to his country the less of it is left in him ." 28 In his attempts to persuade others, Stefanik never hesitated to play on their emotions, or cha ll enge the logic of his audience. His scientific work and travels equipped him with a huge arsena l of knowledge, experience and anecdotes. One of his great virtues was his ability to exploit all these to his benefit, or rather, for the benefit of the Czechoslovak liberation movement. The social recognition of these virtues afforded him high standing, which he was able to exploit. The Czechoslovak Army (Legions) in France and Italy The army formed an extremely important, if not the most important, part of the Czechoslovak liberation movement, and Stefanik was one of its chief organisers. From the very moment the war broke out, Czechs and Slovaks abroad began to organise into various combat units fighting alongside the Entente powers, to prove their loyalty to the Allies and to burnish their anti-Austrian credentials. The Czechoslovak National Council sought to unify and direct these various tendencies. A French presidential decree dated 16 December 1917 authorised the formation of a Czechoslovak army in France.29 However, the problem was that there were neither Czech or Slovak prisoners-ofwar, or a sizeable Czech nor Slovak community on French territory, since France was primarily involved in fighting German forces on the Western front. Bringing Czechoslovak volunteers to France became Stefanik ' s primary aim. The Czechoslovak National Counci l intended to recruit mainly in Italy, Russia and the United States. However, the volunteers were not expected to serve on ly in the army but rather, at their own discretion, could also be deployed in military factories. In an effort to find the vo lunteers for the Czechoslovak army in France Stefanik "Minister of Emergency Situations" went to Russia (1916- 1917), Romania (1916- 1917), the USA ( 1917), Italy (1918), 28 Bertrand de Jouvenel , Un voyageur dans le siec/e (Paris, Robert La fTont, 1979), 48-49. 29 AMA E, C PC 1896-191 8, Guerre 19 14- 191 8, Autriche-Hongri e, vo l. 157 , Pari s, 16 December 191 7, Report to the President of the French Republi c. �SLOVAKIA 2021 17 and Russia again ( 19 I 8- 1919). 30 With various successes in those countries, a Czechoslovak Legion with I 0,000 men was established in France and took part in battles on the Western front in the summer and autumn 1918. In Italy in 1918 there were a large number of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war. These had been assembled in separate camps in Padula, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, and Badia Sulmona. Stefanik wanted them to be deployed to France, but this was opposed by the Italian government. It was only prepared to authorise the formation of an auxiliary force to be deployed behind the lines, providing support for the Italian military. As this offer was not favourable to the Czechoslovak movement, Stefanik entered into talks with Italy's top officials. He negotiated with General Armando Diaz, the Minister of War, with King Victor Emmanuel III , with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino, and with Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando.31 Following these negotiations, which Stefanik had to handle with utmost sensitivity due to the country's internal political problems, an agreement was reached on 19 April 191 8. 32 The Czechoslovak Legion was to operate under the Italian supreme command but the political influence over its members would be held by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. The French Ambassador in Italy had a very positive view of the agreement: "It seems to me that these conditions represent the best we could have secured from the Italian government."33 Two days later, on 21 April , the anniversary of the foundation of Rome, Stefanik signed an agreement on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council , while Orlando did so on behalf of the government ofltaly. The negotiations Stefanik conducted in Italy can be regarded as his most significant achievement. The Czechoslovak Legion was the first foreign an11y which received permission to operate on 3 ° Karel Pichlik, Bohumfr Klipa and Jitka Zabloudilova, Ceskosluvensti legionah (/914 - 1920) [The Czechos lovak Legionnaires ( 1914- 1920)] (Praha, Mlada fronta, 1996), 150- 59. Mark Corn wa ll, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle fo r Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke, GB, Macmillan , 2000), 159. See also: Leo Val iani , The End of Austria-Hungmy (New York , A lfred A. Knopf, 1973). 32 Pavel He lan, " La Legione cecoslovacca," in // Patto di Roma e la Legione cecoslovacca. Tra Grande Guerra e Nuova Europa. ed. Francesco Leoncini (Vittorio Veneto, Kellermann Editore, 2014), 67- 72. 33 AMAE, C PC 1896-1918, Guerre 1914- 1918, Autriche-Hongrie, vol. 158, Rome, 19 April 19 18, Barrere writting to th e Minister of Foreign Affairs, no . 841-842. 31 �18 SLOVAKIA 2021 Italian soil. The creation of Polish and Romanian units followed much later. 34 Further important events connected to Stefanik and the Czechoslovak Army in Italy were placing the military flag of the Czec hoslovak Army on the Altar of the Fatherland in Rome on 24 May 1918, on the anniversary of Italy entering the war; this episode was of extraordinary propaganda importance. The Czech Amelie Posse- Brazdova recalled Stefanik's speech on this occasion: " Like a masterful and ingenious conductor, he played all our trembling heartstrings, leaving not one untouched ."35 Finally around 20,000 Czechoslovak so ldiers fought on the Italian front. The Legions in Russia Stefanik went on his first mission to Russ ia in 1916 and was busy dealing with the internal problems of the Czechoslovak movement. After the February Revolution of 19 17, the new Russian Provisional Government authorized the project of the Czechoslovak Legion in the country, but later changed its position . Only in July 19 I 7, after a successful battle at Zborov (in the frame of the Keren sky Offensive) of the Czechoslovak Brigade, composed mainly of Czechs and Slovaks from Ru ssia and thus Russian citizens, the government permitted recruitment among prisoners-of-war. The Legions in Russia grew quickly. Fol lowing the Bolshevik coup in October of I 9 I 7, the new government was intent on making peace with Germany. This put the Czechoslovak Army into a difficult position, since, in the aftermath of such an agreement, its members would no longer be in a territory that shared a front wi th Gemrnny or Austria-Hungary, and would thus have no enemy to fight. In addition, a number of factions were vying for power in Ru ss ia. Masaryk demanded strict neutrality with regard to internal Russian affairs, but in practice this was difficult to achieve. The orders received by the Czechoslovak Army were constantly changing. The Briti sh would have preferred to keep it in Russ ia under their command, while the French wanted to redeploy the Leg ion to the 34 Angelo Tamborra, L 'idea di nazinnalita e la guerra / 914-1918 (Trento, lnstituto per la storia de l Ri so rgimento ita liano, 1963), 37-43 . 35 Eva Kranz. Amelie Posse- Brazdnva. Zivot spjaty s Ceskoslovenskem [Amelie Posse- Brazdova. A Life Linked w ith Czechoslova ki a] ( Praha, Akropo li s, 20 11 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 19 Western front. 36 Soon, open conflict broke out between the Czechoslovak Legion and the Bolsheviks, who wanted to disarm them after an incident in Chelyabinsk. Czechoslovak Army representatives, meeting at a congress in Chelyabinsk, decided to prepare for their passage to France via Vladivostok and to resist any attempts to be stopped. The troops quickly captured the Trans-Siberian Railway and were soon openly fighting the Bolsheviks. Later, this capture changed its purpose- the Legions wanted to facilitate the invasion of Russia planned by the Allies. However, after initial successes on the part of the Czechoslovaks, the Bolsheviks gradually began to prevail. 37 Matters turned even more complicated following the coup led by the monarchist Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Siberia in November of 19 I 8. Most of the 60,000 Czechoslovak soldiers were left-leaning and were not eager to see the counter-revolution prevail. However, Kolchak was allied with the Entente, and thus also with Czechoslovakia. Jan Juricek portrayed the situation in Siberia as follows: The soldiers complained about the excessive demands of officers who, ambitious though they were, lacked in experience. The Czechoslovak commanders, in turn , lamented the fact that Russia's White Guard had no appetite for fighting , was prone to flee or to surrender to the enemy, demoralizing our soldiers. The local commanders of the Siberian anti-Bolshevik forces , on the other hand, complained (to General Janin) that the Czechoslovaks' meddling in Russian politics was inappropriate.38 By the time Stefanik arrived in Siberia in November of I 9 I 8 - he had left France in August of 19 I 8 - the Great War had ended and the soldiers did not understand the need for further fighting, as Czechoslovakia had already been established. At first Stefanik tried to convince the Legionnaires that they had to fight to ensure favourable 36 Karel Pichlik, Bez legend [Without Legends] ( Praha, Panorama, 199 1), 377. See: Betty Miller Unterberger, The United States, Revo/utionCIIJ' Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Victor S. Mamatey, The Un ited States and East Central Europe /914- 191 8. A Studv in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda ( Princeton, ew Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957). 3~ Jan Jurfcek, Milan Rastisla v St~fanik (Bratislava, Q 111 , 2006, P' edi ti on 1968), 150. 37 �20 SLOVAKIA 2021 conditions for the peace treaties and the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. He hoped the Legion could fight its way across Russia to the newlyformed state in the heart of Europe. However, Stefanik changed hi s mind after visiting large numbers of Czechoslovak troops on the front. He and General Maurice Janin (the Commander-in-Chief of the Legion in Russia appointed by the Government of France with the consent of the Czechoslovak National Council) concluded that a withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army was inevitable. They would have to leave Russian forces to fight the Bolsheviks, while the Czechoslovak army was to focus on defending the Trans-Siberian railway. 39 Masaryk gave Stefanik powers of attorney to carry out an internal reorganisation of the army, as well as in matters of international policy. Thanks to their complex origin and development, the Legions in Russia were run democratically. The Legionnaires addressed each other as "brother" and the Legion was led by the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia through elected representatives. While this form of self-government was relatively acceptable in a volunteer army, following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 191 8, the Legion became a regular army that had to be subordinate to the government. Stefanik abolished the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia. 40 By order number 588, issued only after his departure, Stefanik banned the holding of the second Congress of the Czechoslovak Army and the committee's activities. However, Congress delegates had already been elected. The soldiers were unwilling to give up their elected bodies. Enforcing command number 588 turned out to be very difficult. The conflict between the military command and the soldiers grew to such an extent that a total rift in the army was imminent. 41 Stefanik realised that he would be unable to resolve the situation of the Czec hoslovak army in Siberia and returned to Paris, where he started talks with Allied military officials, Marshal Ferdinand Foch in particular. He demanded either an allied intervention or a complete withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army. In April of 1919 Stefanik sent the following note to T.G. Masaryk: "An inter-allied military 39 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 17, Omsk, 19 Apri l 1919, Jan in writi ng to the minister of war, no. 992. 40 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 16, Vladivostok, 27 December 191 8, Regnault and Martel writing to the Foreign Ministry, no. 18 I. 41 Pichlik, Klipa and Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti legionah 246-47. �SLOVAKIA 2021 21 intervention will not take place; our men are perishing in Siberia. Our allies do not always keep their promises because these are made thoughtlessly. There is political and moral chaos."42 The Birth of Czechoslovakia, the Death of Stefanik At the beginning of 1918, the military situation of the Entente Powers was very difficult. Serbia and most of the territory of Romania had been overrun by the enemy in 1915 and in 1916. In 1917 Italy suffered a great defeat at Caporetto and the Italian front moved I 00 km south. The next year Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, which allowed the Germans to move large numbers of soldiers to the Western front. The Central Powers wanted to win a decisive victory with a large offensive in the spring of 191 8, before the arrival of thousands of soldiers from the United States to Europe. In these complex circumstances the Entente powers were more wi lling to support any project that would weaken their enemies. That is why the movements of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary gained more ground. Thanks to their military efforts in France, Italy but mainly in Russia, the international position of the Czechoslovak National Counci l became stronger. It was step-by-step recognized as the Czechoslovak Provisional Government by the Entente Powers. When Czech and Slovak representtatives proclaimed the founding of Czechoslovakia on 28 October 1918 in Prague, and on October 30 in Turciansky Sv. Martin in Slovakia, its international position was assured thanks also to Stefaniks' activities. Stefanik died soon after the creation of Czechoslovakia. His last diplomatic task was to find a compromise between the Italian and French claims to command the Czechoslovak army in the new state, and he succeed where others cou ldn 't. 43 Stefanik decided fly in an Italian plane to his homeland but it crashed while landing at 4 May 1919. His death aroused a lot of suspicions and resulted in conspiracy theories bringing accusations against Benes, with whom Stefanik did 42 Archiv Ustavu T. G. Masaryka, Prague, f. TGM-R, box 424, Paris, 3 April I 919, M. R. Stefanik writing to T . G. Masaryk. 43 Laura Fortunato, " La Mi ssione militare italiana in Slovacchia: un tentativo di "diplomazia militare" fallito," in Per Rila Tolomeo, scrilli di amici sulfa Dalmazia e I 'Europa cen/ro-orienlale fl, ed . E. Capuzzo, B. C revato-Se lvaggi and F. Guida (Venez ia, La Musa Talia, 2014 ), 13 7- 205. �22 SLOVAKIA 2021 not get along, against freemasons, Czechs, Hungarians and so on . The sum total of the facts and evidence available to us today suggests that Stefanik's death was an accident. Of the many who have written on the subject, it was Pavo) Kanis and his documentary film Stefanik. A Hero 's Story, Homeland (20 I 0) that I find the most persuasive. The Memory of Stefanik One might say that the 20 1h century replacements of various statues in what is now L.:udovit Stur Square in Bratislava reflected the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Each change of reg ime in Czechoslovakia was also reflected in changes of statues. This kind of " marking" of territory is not unusual. Quite the contrary. Every reg ime is interested in erecting monuments to figures who represent ideas and va lues close to its heart and have in some way contributed to the development of a particular community or nation. As part of the celebrations of the Hungarian millennial arriva l in the Danube Valley in 1896, a competition was held in Bratislava (then known as Pozsony in Hunga rian and Pressburg in German) for the design of a monument commemorating the coronations of Habsburg rulers that had been held in the city. The competition was won by sculptor Jan Fadrusz with a sculptural group depicting Empress Maria Theresa's ascent to the throne in 1740. Maria Theresa was acceptable as a symbol both to the Hungarians, who revered , indeed idealised her for her pos itive attitude to Hungarian statehood, as well as, of course, to the Habsburgs, who had a forged a close bond with the city of Pressburg, where the coronations were held for centuries. The scu lpture of Maria Theresa was erected on 16 May 1897 on the Royal Hill Square, w hich was then renamed Coronation Hill Square. 44 The lnterwar Period and the Slovak State The newly-founded Czechoslovakia faced serious problems. It had to preserve its existence by forgin g the idea of a Czechoslovak nation while distancing itse lf from everything Habsburg and Hungarian . Soon after Bratislava was occupied by the Czechos lovak army in February of 1919, someone threw a sack over the head of Maria Theresa and the statue was later boarded up. Neith er the Hungarians nor 44 Pavel Dvorak, Zia ta kniha Bratislavv [Golden book of Brati slava] (Bratislava, Slovensky spi sova tel', 1993), 498- 506. �SLOVAKIA 2021 23 the Habsburgs were prepared to accept the fact that the monarchy had collapsed and did everything they could to bring the Slovaks back into Hungary's fold. King Charles I Habsburg wanted to return to Hungary in October of 1921, intending to ascend to throne. In response to this plan a partial mobilization was declared in Czechoslovakia, which also led to the removal of the statue. Local members of the Sokol, the Czech gymnastics organization, and former Legionnaires, destroyed the statue "as a symbol the oppressive regime. " Once the statue of Maria Theresa had been removed, the next problem arose: who should replace her? It was decided to replace her with a statue of General Stefanik. In 1927 the Committee for the Erection of a Monument of Milan Rastislav Stefanik announced a competition, but the winner wasn't selected so, it was repeated the following year. The winning design was by the Czech sculptor Bohumil Kafka's statue of Milan Stefanik surrounded by four lions g uarding the coats-of-arms of the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia - Bohemia; Moravia and Silesia; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Kafka later modified his design , leaving a single lion presiding over the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms. The lion was originally to face the Danube River but, after Austria's Anschluss in March of 1938, it was turned to face towards the Slovak National Museum, allegedly to avoid irking Hitler. But the unveiling ceremony, planned for the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia never happened, because of the Munich Agreement. During demonstrations marking the proclamation of Slovakia's autonomy in October of 1938, protesters pelted the lion with stones. 45 From a brotherly point of view, this change could be characteristic of the situation in interwar Czechoslovakia. Stefanik was one of the most important founders of Czechoslovakia. His funeral in 1919 was reminiscent of a royal one. After his death a number of statues and memorials were erected across the country. The most monumental one is the memorial on Bradlo Hill in western Slovakia, by the renowned Slovak sculptor Dusan Jurkovic, erected between 1924 and 1928. This monument has become on May 4 th , the anniversary of his death, the site of something resembling an annual national pilgrimage (except for the Communist 45 Zdenek Hojda and Jifi Pokorn y, Pomniky a zapomniky [Memorial s and Anti-Memorials] (Praha, Paseka, 1996), 175- 182. �24 SLOVAKIA 2021 period with a short political detente in 1968- 1969).46 Czechoslovakia, a country in the heart of Europe, fell victim to the political turmoil of the twentieth century, as well as its own lack of internal stability. It failed to secure the loyalty of its minorities, especially the Germans and Hungarians and , ultimately, one of its constituent nations- the Slovaks. The state that was founded on 28 October 1918 ceased to exist twenty-one years later on March 14, 1939, when Slovakia, under pressure from Hitler's Germany, declared its independence. Adolf Hitler is said to have declared "Die katze muss weg", although it cannot be confirmed, when he saw the sculpture from a boat on the Danube. Other sources claim that it was another highranking Naz i who said that the cat (i.e. the Czech lion) had to go, but the pilot could stay. One part of the Slovak public was never too keen on the monument. Anyz, the company that had made the original cast of both statues, replaced the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms with the Slovak one, but that was not enough to save the "cat." In May of 1940, Slovak soldiers removed the lion from its base. From the Coup de Prague in 1948 until Today The end of the war brought about a restoration of Czechoslovakia and also the communist takeover of 1948. The Czechoslovak liberation movement of the First World War did not suit communist ideologues and their version of history. They set out to fight the "bourgeois" liberation legend of Masaryk , Stefanik and Benes. 47 Stefanik' s statues throughout Slovakia began to disappear, mostly at night. This new trend was bound to affect Bratislava as well, with respect to what was then Roosevelt (now Stur) Square and the statue that graced it. The statue of Stefanik was melted down in the early I 950s. 48 The name of the square proved to be equally unsuitable and changed from Roosevelt Square to Stur Square. However, 46 Peter Macho, "M. R. Stefanik - bohatier a muceni k?," [M. R. Stefanik - Hero and Martyr?] in Mvty na.fr slovenske [Our Slovak Myths] , ed. Eduard Krekovi c, Elena Mannova and Eva Krekovi cova (Bratislava, AEP, 2005), 172. 47 See L.:udo vi t Holotik, Stefciniko vska legenda a vznik CSR [The Stefanik Legend and the Fou ndin g of the Czec hoslovak Republic] (Bratislava, SAV, 1958). 48 Milan Varos, Stratene slovenske poklady 2 [Lost Slovak Treasures 2] (Ma rtin , Matica slovenska, 2007), 457- 6 1. �SLOVAKIA 2021 25 as it too k seve ral yea rs to ma ke, the statue of L.:udov ft Stur49 and hi s assoc iates was not placed in the square until th e ea rl y 1970s. De mand s for Stefa nik' s re habilitati o n began to be vo iced eve n before th e end of th e co mmuni st reg ime. 50 On th e occas io n o n the 70th anni ve rsa ry of th e fo undin g of Czec hoslova ki a, Ka fk a's lion was a lso pl aced o n th e plinth , a lbe it not on Stur Squ a re, wh ere it used to be befo re, but in fro nt of th e Sl ovak Nati o na l Muse um. It stood o n a py lo n 14.8 5 metres hi g h, 2 metres wid e and 4 me tres in length , bea rin g th e insc ripti o n " On 28 Octobe r 191 8 th e shared moth erl a nd of Czec hs and S lo vak s, th e Czec hos lova k Re publi c was fo und ed ." The fa ll of the communi st regime in 1989 with the Velvet Revolution, fo ll owed by the "ve lvet di vorce" in 1993, res ulted in the creati on of separate Czec h and S lova k Republics. Stefa nik now retoo k hi s place in the Slovak Pantheon of heroes and hi s memory is omnipresent in today's Slovaki a. If you travel to Bratislava by air, you will land at M. R. Stefanik Airport, while the scientific schedul e of Ivan Bella, Slovakia's first man in space, was known as the Stefanik Miss ion etc. The stori es of the Stur Square did not end , however. C urrently vo ices a re heard de ma ndin g that the sculpture o f L:udov ft Stur and hi s assoc iates be moved to ano th er loca ti o n, s uch as N a mes ti e slobody ( Freedo m Squ a re), and a re pli ca of th e statu e of Mari a Th eresa be mounted aga in o n the embankme nt. Th ese proposa ls have stirred up a li ve ly publi c debate - and po le mi cs . Mea nw hil e th e li o n, toge th er w ith a new ly-cas t Stefa nik , have bee n moved to an area in fro nt of th e new Slova k N ati o na l Th ea tre, betw ee n two buildings ofa shopping ce ntre. A noth er fo unde r o f th e first Czechos lova k Republi c - Masa ryk - now towers ove r th e squ are in front o f th e Nati o na l Mu se um . As observe d by th e hi sto ri an Pave l Dvora k : "The Stur statue is the fourth costl y monument erec ted on the fo rmer Co ronation Hill, a place that has had many names, ending as 49 th ( 18 15- 1856) one of the leaders of the S lova k movement in the I 9 centu ry and the ma in cod i11er of standard Slova k. 50 See Martin Mocko, " Yi liam Plevza a ,, rehab il itacia" M . R. Stefanika ( I)" [V iliam Plevza and '' Rehabi litation" of Stefa ni k ( I)], Nave slovo, 17 Septembe r 20 I 9, https://www.noves lovo.sk/c/V iliam Plevza a rehabilitac ia M R Stefanika I and its 2nd and 3'd cont inuati ons. �26 SLOVAKIA 2021 L:udovit Stur Square today. This small square is not where history was made, but it is where it has revealed its most grotesque face. " 51 51 Dvorak, Zlata kniha Bratislavy, 503 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 7 MILAN RASTISLAV STEFANIK (1880-1919) THE MAN WHO SPOKE TO THE STARS' Michal Ksinan 2 Outside of the Czech and Slovak Republics, people are fairly familiar with Tomas Garrigue Masaryk and Edvard Benes, two of the men responsible for the birth of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and who also served as its first presidents. However, another of the country's founders, Milan Rastislav Stefanik, is much less known , partly because his tragic death in 1919 prevented him from holding a key office for any length of time. Although he is relatively unknown to the wider international public, his contemporaries compared him to Pierre Choderlos de Laclos for the use of military tactics in love affairs, 3 to Lawrence of Arabia for vision, to Napoleon Bonaparte for ambition, to Jules Michelet" for patriotism, and to one of the apostles for conviction.5 Who was this man who charn1ed his surroundings all his life and still continues to charm people today? In order to answer this question , I will present this person to the Englishspeaking reader who is often unfamiliar with Stefanik by emphasising several key points in his life. 6 The Young Man Stefan ik was born on 2 1 July 1880 in the hamlet of Kosariska in today 's western Slovakia (Upper-Hungary at the time) to th e family 1 This article was supported by gran ts VEGA n° 2/0087/20 and APVV n° 17-0399. T he auth or works in the Institute of Hi story of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. 3 French genera l and novelist ( 174 1- 1803) best known for Les Liasons dangere11ses. ~ A famous French hi storian ( 1798- 1874 ). 5 Antoine Mares, Edvard Bene!i : Un drame entre Hitler et Staline (Paris, Perrin, 2015), 70. 6 This artic le is modified version of the texts published in the book: Michal Ksirian , Milan Rastisla v Stefanik, tran s. Julia Sherwood (Bratislava: Lindeni jointly with the Slovak National Archive, 20 19) . For more details, see the first scie ntifi c biography of Stefanik published in French : Michal Ksiri an, L 'homme qui parfait avec /es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik , heros ji·anco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EU R 'Orbem, 2019). Its Slovak translation will be published under the titl e Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Mui , ktm)i sa rozpraval s hviezdami by Slovart publi shing hou se and an Engli sh transla tion under the title Milan Ras/is/av S1efanik : The Slovak National Hero and Co-Founder of Czechoslovakia by Routledge publishing house. 2 8 SLOVAKIA 2021 of a Lutheran pastor with strong national convictions. Rai sed in a deeply religious family, Milan Stefanik used to hold similar beliefs. However, during his student days in Prague he was confronted with many liberal views. Discussions in Jeronym, a Protestant c lub, gave him a new perspective on faith. Its members debated progressive theo logical issues and read foreign journals. Stefanik was particularly influenced by the professor of philosophy Masaryk, and in light of his lectures started to question his Christian faith and indeed the existence of God. Not only did Milan Stefanik reject the divine essence of Jesus C hrist, he went so far as to doubt the very existence of God . He rejected reli gion and believed only in science, something that was regarded as genuinely heretical in his environment; that is why hi s father threw the young rebel out of his house in the summer of 1900. Although this breach was not permanent, it demonstrated that young Milan Stefanik had embarked upon a new journey.7 In thi s respect Stefanik can serve as a typical example of the phenomenon of secularisation in the nineteenth century that one can describe as "a loss of orientation , of certain ty, of a single world-view, of a core of reality. " 8 Another key deci sion of the young Stefanik was to switch from studying civi l engineering at Prague's Imperial and Royal Czech Technical High School (1898- 1900) to a degree in astronomy in the Faculty of Arts at the Czec h Charles-Ferdinand University (today's Charles Univers ity) in 1900- 1904. Astronomical studies fit more his romantic nature, even though thi s led to further conflicts between him and his father. The Astronomer After finishing hi s studies in Prague in 1904, Stefanik decided to go to Paris. He took every possible step to embark on a career in science. He started by taking an unpaid job in the observatory in Meudon under professor Jules Janssen, but that came to an end in 1906 when the leading position at the observatory passed to Henri Deslandres, since neither of the men got along. 9 After that Stefanik was appo inted to the paid position 7 Jaromir Va vra. Vzpo minky na Milana Ste(anika [Remini scences on Milan Stefa nik] (Ceske Velenice, Pave l Nobis, 1930), 15- 16. 8 Jifi Hanus, Historie modern! doby [History of the Modem Age] (B rn o, Barrister & Principal, 2004), 80. 9 Fra ni;:oise La unay, Un globe-trotter de la physique celeste. L ·astronome Jules Janssen (Paris, l' Observa toire de Paris, Vuibert, 2008), 256. SLOVAKIA 2021 9 of deputy director of the Mont Blanc Observatories Society, thi s time with the help of the daughter and widow of the then deceased Jules Janssen. After a year in this post, Stefanik found himself jobless again. Then he decided to establish his own observatory. He had to decide between North Africa and a certain island in French Polynesia. Stefanik settled on the much closer North Africa. He travelled around, mostly in Algeria and Tunisia, but failed to find a suitable location for an observatory. On behalf of the French Bureau des longitudes, Stefanik then tra vell ed to Tahiti to observe the passage of Halley's Comet and to conduct further astronomical observations on an island in French Polynes ia. 10 The plan to observe Halley's Comet fell through because cloud cover made observation impossible. However, Stefanik did manage to carry out the final part of his plan. He decided to extend his stay on Tahiti and explore the conditions for meteorological and astronomical observations, " Provided Tahiti is shown to offer good conditions for astronomical observations, I would be interested in building a permanent observatory (a scientific embassy) there." 11 For Stefanik building a permanent observatory with a functioning meteorological service on thi s island was hi s most important pre-war scientific project. Traveller, Artist and Collector One of the most common astronomical phenomena that Stefanik focused on was the solar ecli pse that forced him to travel all around the world. He observed thi s phenomenon in Spain ( 1905) where all astronomers who observed it were received by Spanish King Alfonso XIII , in Turkistan ( 1907), but his observations failed because of bad weather, and on hi s way back he met with Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy, on Vava'u Island ( 1911) where he had the best results among all sc ientific missions , and in Brazil ( 1912) where again his observations failed beca use of bad weather. Meanwhile, he took beautiful pictures during those journeys. Stefanik was not only interested in astronomica l observations, but also in the life and habits of the locals. During hi s stay in Tahiti , Stefanik bought a horse-drawn cart that he used primarily to check up 10 Rasti slav Rajc hl , Stefanikova paNiska feta [Stefanik 's Pari sian Yea rs] (Praha, Ev ropsk y literarni klub, 1937), 132. 11 Zapisniky M. R. Stefa nika [The Diari es o f M. R. Stefanik) ed . Jose f Bartiisek and Jaroslav Bohac (Praha, Pamatnik osvoboze ni, 1935), 172. SLOVAKIA 2021 on the meteoro logical stations he had created and also to explore interesting parts of the island. He befriended French officers serving on a gunboat named Zelee and sailed with them to the lesser-known islands of French Pol ynesia. Here Stefanik di scovered and identified some Gaugin woodcuts in Puna'auia, owned by a Tahitian woman who may have been the painter's lover. Inspired by thi s discovery, he continued hi s search and found in her hut a carved wooden tobacco box with relief figures and, e lsewhere, a wooden relief ofa woman . 12 Exotic objects brought back from all five of the planet's inhabited continents formed the most interesting parts of Stefanik's collection. His friendly relations with the natives and hi s ability to develop a quick rapport with new people helped him to acquire these objects . Ivan Kmo remembered Stefanik's apartment thus : It was a strange kind of apartment. In fact, rather than an apartment, it was a small museum. It started in the hallway, which was full of drums, arrows and other weapons used by various indigenous peoples. And the tiny rooms were crammed with exotic objects. I was particularly impressed by the Oriental rugs and Gaugin's woodcuts from Tahiti. Hi s study boasted books, joumals, astronomical equipment and- a beautiful view of the rooftops of Paris. 13 Stefanik also enjoyed entertaining visitors to hi s apartment on the sixth floor at 6 Rue Leclerc with magic trick s. He mastered eighteen illusionist tricks, including cards emerging from a glass, flying and shrinking cards, and a magic wandering ring. 14 He had learned these tricks for a small fee at magicians' gatherings in Paris and bought his equipment from the Academy of Magic. 12 Franti sek Kele and Mi ros lav Musil , Navraty do Po~vnezie. Po S1efanikov1ich slopach [Returns to Polynes ia. Following in the Footsteps of Stefanik ) (OF PRI NT, 1996), 55. 13 Ivan Kmo , " Spomi enky na uj a Milana" [Memori es on Unc le Milan) in S1efanik . Kniha prva : 5pomienl,.y a pos/rehy [S tefanik . Boo k One: Memories and Observations] , ed . Stefan Osusky and Bohdan Pav lu (Praha, Svaz slovenskeho studen tstva v Bratislave, 1938), 38. 14 V ladimir Z uberec, " Za l\1by a zauj my Milana Rasti slava Stefanik a" [The Hobbies and Interests of Milan Rastis lav Stefanik ) in Zbornik Slovenskeho narodneho miizea - His16ria 32 (Martin, Osveta, 1992), I 13- 14. SLOVAKIA 2021 11 A Worldwide Wireless Telegraph etwork To find suitable support fro m the French government for hi s observatory at Tahiti , Stefanik dev ised hi s own strategy. Through the Bureau des longitudes he planned to donate the observatory and all of its equipment and instruments to the state or the colony, which would cover its operating costs. 15 Willi am Mauri ce Fawtier, the French governor of the colonies in Oceania, asked Stefanik to identify a suitab le location for a wireless station on Tahiti , 16 and subseq uently to have it built and to run it. Stefa nik wanted to join the observatory and wireless station. Thank s to state subsid ies and profits generated by the stati on he would have had suffi cient materi al support. In those days France, the on ly country w ith po liti cal interests in Oceania, was not yet conn ected by wireless telegraph with these colonies, with the exception of New Caledonia. Contact with Tahiti was key, since the island's importance was ex pected to grow following the opening of the Panama Canal. In Jul y of 1912 a draft bill of the Law on an Intercontinenta l Wireless Telegraph Network, to connect the French co loni es scattered around the world with the mother country, was tabled in the French Parliament. Three branches were to radiate fro m Fra nce to the colonies : one w ith Coc hinchina (today the southern part of Vietnam), another w ith the island of Martinique and a third one in the Pac ifi c, with the station s in New Caledonia, th e Marquesas lslands and Tahiti. 17 One of the tasks Stefanik was supposed to fulfil during hi s mi ss ion in Ec uad or ( 1913) was to obtain permi ss ion to establi sh a wireless telegraph station on one of the Galapagos Islands, to facilitate comm unication with Papeete. In spite of the competition of German, Briti sh and America ns companies who had a strong position in these countri es, Stefanik succeeded. 18 Sometime earli er he had presented the French Senator and hi s protector Emil e C hautemps with the project of an 15 Slovensky narodn y archiv, Brati slava (S lovak National Arc hi ves, hereinafter SNA), OF : M. R. Stefanik, box 33, inv. no. I 06 1, Paris, 22 January 19 13, Letter of M. R. Stefan ik to an unknown person (perhaps E. Boutroux). 16 SNA , OF: M. R. Stefa nik, box 33 , inv. no. I 059, Papeete, 16 Octobe r 1913, letter of the governor of the French coloni es in French Pol ynesia W. Fawtier to M. R. Stefan ik . 17 Rasti slav Rajchl , M. R. Stefanik (Praha, Orb is, 194 7), 14- 16 . i x See more: Ekvadorsky zapisnik [Ecuadorian Diary], ed. Vl adimir Polivka (Bratislava, VSSS, 2005, I' ' editi on 1928) . 12 SLOVAKIA 2021 intercontinental telegraph network. Each station was to have an observatory and to provide a meteorological service . In Europe it was to be based on Mont Saleve near Geneva, in Asia its location was to be Hong Kong, in Africa in Morocco, and in Australia and Oceania in Tahiti. Stefanik also wanted to acquire the island of Floriana (Galapagos Islands) to reinforce the French influence in the region , but these projects were doomed because the officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs feared the USA's reaction . He did, however, succeed in strengthening France's influence in Ecuador. At the outbreak of the Great War, Stefanik returned to France. He was in Morocco when the news reached him that he had been made a knight of the Legion d'honneur, with this citation: "Having been entrusted with missions to Tahiti and the Republic of Ecuador in 1913 he exhibited outstanding skill and provided extraordinary service to the merchant navy and to French interests. He founded and estab1ished, at his own expense, an observatory on Tahiti and organised a comprehensive meteorological service on the islands of French Oceania." 19 Stefanik had an extraordinary talent for planning globa l projects. He thought in bold and broad strokes and was not content with partial or local solutions. This was undoubtedly one reason why he so often captivated his friends . On the other hand, he d id not always manage to bring his plans to fruition . Sometimes he seemed to bite off more than he could chew. Pilot, Soldier and Inventor Stefanik became a French citizen in 1912 and was drafted in August of 1914 when the First World War broke out. Because of health problems, Stefanik reported for duty in January of 1915 as a pilot and flew over the Western front. In this ro le he focused on so lving problems relating to military aviation . In those days a big problem was communications between pilots and their bases, which he wanted to solve by installing a radio transmitter in his Maurice Farman airplane. As this proved too heavy, he constructed a "parlophone" (from French parler "to speak") to enab le the pilot to communicate w ith his base. He also mulled over the idea of a vertical launch and landing and exp lored 19 Archi ves nati ona les, Paris, LH/2548/35 - M. R. Ste fanik . SLOVAKIA 2021 13 the best possible use of binoculars.20 Although most of Stefanik's ideas and inventions were not accepted, his military superiors appreciated " his valuable scientific knowledge." 2 1 Stefanik was also interested in the use of meteorology for military aviation. After constructing a meteorological station in the commune of Brias, he tested various meteorological instruments for their possible use in aircraft at various heights. Weather forecasts could be exploited, not only in aviation, but also in the planning of military actions by the infantry. For this reason, General Ferdinand Foch entrusted him with estab li shing a meteorological service for the section of the front under his command. Stefanik refused to take command of this service and left for a mission in Serbia in order to fight the invading AustroH ungarian army.22 Later, Stefanik founded and organised a meteorological service for the Romanian army. He also planned to set up an inter-allied meteorological service for the armies of the Entente. 23 Stefanik's military career was truly exceptional. Mobilised as a rank-and-file soldier in August of 1914, he did not start serving until January of 1915 and three years later (June of 1918) had reached the rank of Brigadier-General. It should be noted, however, that Stefanik's meteoric rise through the ranks was mainly the result of his diplomatic activities, which French officials used to boost his prestige in the eyes of his compatriots, as well Allied soldiers, diplomats and politicians. He also received numerous military and civilian honours , such as the French army's Croix de guerre (w ith bronze palm), the Italian Military Cross, the Serbian Gold medal for bravery, as well as being made a Knight, Officer and Commander of the Legion d'honneur. 20 Zuberec, "Zal'uby a za ujm y Milana Rastis lava Stefanika", 109- 135. SNA , OF: M. R. Ste fanik, box 33 , in v. no. I 037, Pari s, 13 August I 9 I 5, Au suj et des fu sils- mitrailleurs LEWIS a venir d ' Ang leterre. 21 La memoire conservee du general Milan Rastisla v Stefanik dans /es archives du Service historique de la Defense, ed. Frederi c Gue lton, Emm anuelle Bra ud and Michal Ksinan (Paris, SHD, 2008), 26. See [Emile] Prat, " Vzpominky z roku 1915" [Memories from 1915), in Stefaniki,v memorial [Stefa nik 's Memori a l] , ed. Amost Bares (Praha, Pamatnik odboj e, I 929), 153. 23 Rasti slav Rajchl, " M. R. Ste fanik jako organisator vojenske meteorology" [M . R. Stefanik as Organiser o f Military Meteorol ogy], Ri.fr hvezd, 11° 5 (May 1948), I 00--104. 22 14 SLOVAKIA 2021 The Beginnings of the Czechoslovak Movement During the First World War, the self-determination of nations became one of the principles of international relations. The union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a common state grew out of the close cooperation between leaders of the two nations that had developed in the nineteenth century, as the idea of Slavic mutuality gained ground, and also thanks to the linguistic proximity between Czech and Slovak, two distinct, but closely-related languages. From the geopolitical point of view, Czech and Slovak leaders abroad wanted to replace AustriaHungary as a barrier to German expansion to the East (Orang nach Oesten) by a chain of independent states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia) supported by the Entente. 24 But, the "Czechoslovak question" was completely unknown in the West. To fight this ignorance, the Czechoslovak National Council , the highest organ of the Czechoslovak liberation movement during the Great War, established in m id-1916 started a press propaganda campaign. Masaryk was its President, Josef Dtirich Vice-President, Edvard Benes General Secretary, and Stefanik representative of the Slovaks. After Dtirich's expulsion, he was replaced as Vice-President by Stefanik. Branches of the Czechoslovak National Council were established in several Entente countries, led by supporters of its political orientation.25 Political Seducer To gain support for the Czechoslovak movement among the Entente Powers, a lot of work behind the scenes was needed. Thanks to his astronomic and diplomatic missions before the war, Stefanik was in touch with the most important French politicians. Before going into Stefanik's powers of persuasion, we need first look at his image in French society. In the Third Republic scientists had a very positive image and a cult of science seemed to have become a new lay religion . We must never forget that Stefanik was an astronomer, mathema24 Tomas G. Masaryk, La Nouvelle Europe, ed. Alain Soubigou (Pari s, L ' Hannattan, 2002, 1st edition 191 8), 120, 11 5. 25 Edouard Benes, Souvenirs de guerre et de noire revolution (! 9/4-191 8) I vol. (Pari s, Ernest Lero ux, 1928), 128. Vojensky ustfedni archiv - Vojensky historicky archiv, Prague, f. CSNR - Pari s, CSNR Ill , box 22, correspondence of Benes with Masaryk, 20 June 191 6, Benes writin g to Masaryk. SLOVAKIA 2021 15 tician, meteorologist, pilot, specialist in wireless telegraphy, and traveller etc. Such a person easily aroused interest in Parisian or Rome "salons" where the most important French or Italian politicians met. Stefanik often enjoyed the favour of women in these circles who were enchanted by him. Several people have written that Stefanik could win over diplomats and politicians with his sense of humour. Robert de Billy, a French diplomat in Rome, recounts the following: Stefanik was charged with observing the solar eclipse in Polynesia, where the visibility would be best. Without any hesitation, he travelled to a small remote island somewhere in the Polynesian archipelago. After disembarking with his telescope, he informed the native chief that the sun would soon disappear but that the government of the Republic (cognizant of its protective responsibilities) had sent Stefanik to ensure that sunlight would return. Everything happened as expected. The tribal chief, astoundded by the night in the middle of the day , and the return of the star on the exact day the magician had predicted, fell at the feet of this supernatural being, the master of magic.26 Many people, not least Stefanik himself, were aware of hi s propensity to exaggerate but everyone knew that his accounts were based on a wealth of true stories and experience. Stefanik suffered from ill health from an early age. He was of slender stature and General Maurice Jan in recalled that his frail bodily frame did not seem built for the enormous amount of energy it contained.27 One cause of Stefanik's poor health was the scale of his ambition, whether in his initial eagerness to make his mark as a scientist or, in later years, in his fight for the creation of Czechoslovakia . The constant nervous strain he was under, frequent travel across all five continents in pursuit of science and later on diplomatic and military missions, undoubtedly left their mark on his health. Recalling Stefanik's health problems, the writer Bertrand de Jouvenel described them as his sacrifice for the nation . "Stefanik never stopped travelling. We would encounter him as a major, we would encounter him as a General , ever 26 Archives du ministere des Affaires etrangeres, Pari s - La Coum euve (hereinafter AMA E), PA-AP 2 I, Robert de Billy, vol. 5, Le general Stefanik . 27 Dusan Kovac, S1efanik a Janin. Pribeh pria1e/'s1va [Stefanik and Janin. The Story o f a Friendship] (Brati slava, Dilema, 200 I), 63-65. 16 SLOVAKIA 2021 paler, ever more frantic , he would eat and speak less and less. One might say that the more he gives of his life to his country the less of it is left in him ." 28 In his attempts to persuade others, Stefanik never hesitated to play on their emotions, or cha ll enge the logic of his audience. His scientific work and travels equipped him with a huge arsena l of knowledge, experience and anecdotes. One of his great virtues was his ability to exploit all these to his benefit, or rather, for the benefit of the Czechoslovak liberation movement. The social recognition of these virtues afforded him high standing, which he was able to exploit. The Czechoslovak Army (Legions) in France and Italy The army formed an extremely important, if not the most important, part of the Czechoslovak liberation movement, and Stefanik was one of its chief organisers. From the very moment the war broke out, Czechs and Slovaks abroad began to organise into various combat units fighting alongside the Entente powers, to prove their loyalty to the Allies and to burnish their anti-Austrian credentials. The Czechoslovak National Council sought to unify and direct these various tendencies. A French presidential decree dated 16 December 1917 authorised the formation of a Czechoslovak army in France.29 However, the problem was that there were neither Czech or Slovak prisoners-ofwar, or a sizeable Czech nor Slovak community on French territory, since France was primarily involved in fighting German forces on the Western front. Bringing Czechoslovak volunteers to France became Stefanik ' s primary aim. The Czechoslovak National Counci l intended to recruit mainly in Italy, Russia and the United States. However, the volunteers were not expected to serve on ly in the army but rather, at their own discretion, could also be deployed in military factories. In an effort to find the vo lunteers for the Czechoslovak army in France Stefanik "Minister of Emergency Situations" went to Russia (1916- 1917), Romania (1916- 1917), the USA ( 1917), Italy (1918), 28 Bertrand de Jouvenel , Un voyageur dans le siec/e (Paris, Robert La fTont, 1979), 48-49. 29 AMA E, C PC 1896-191 8, Guerre 19 14- 191 8, Autriche-Hongri e, vo l. 157 , Pari s, 16 December 191 7, Report to the President of the French Republi c. SLOVAKIA 2021 17 and Russia again ( 19 I 8- 1919). 30 With various successes in those countries, a Czechoslovak Legion with I 0,000 men was established in France and took part in battles on the Western front in the summer and autumn 1918. In Italy in 1918 there were a large number of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war. These had been assembled in separate camps in Padula, Santa Maria Capua Vetere, and Badia Sulmona. Stefanik wanted them to be deployed to France, but this was opposed by the Italian government. It was only prepared to authorise the formation of an auxiliary force to be deployed behind the lines, providing support for the Italian military. As this offer was not favourable to the Czechoslovak movement, Stefanik entered into talks with Italy's top officials. He negotiated with General Armando Diaz, the Minister of War, with King Victor Emmanuel III , with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Sidney Sonnino, and with Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando.31 Following these negotiations, which Stefanik had to handle with utmost sensitivity due to the country's internal political problems, an agreement was reached on 19 April 191 8. 32 The Czechoslovak Legion was to operate under the Italian supreme command but the political influence over its members would be held by the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. The French Ambassador in Italy had a very positive view of the agreement: "It seems to me that these conditions represent the best we could have secured from the Italian government."33 Two days later, on 21 April , the anniversary of the foundation of Rome, Stefanik signed an agreement on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council , while Orlando did so on behalf of the government ofltaly. The negotiations Stefanik conducted in Italy can be regarded as his most significant achievement. The Czechoslovak Legion was the first foreign an11y which received permission to operate on 3 ° Karel Pichlik, Bohumfr Klipa and Jitka Zabloudilova, Ceskosluvensti legionah (/914 - 1920) [The Czechos lovak Legionnaires ( 1914- 1920)] (Praha, Mlada fronta, 1996), 150- 59. Mark Corn wa ll, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle fo r Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke, GB, Macmillan , 2000), 159. See also: Leo Val iani , The End of Austria-Hungmy (New York , A lfred A. Knopf, 1973). 32 Pavel He lan, " La Legione cecoslovacca," in // Patto di Roma e la Legione cecoslovacca. Tra Grande Guerra e Nuova Europa. ed. Francesco Leoncini (Vittorio Veneto, Kellermann Editore, 2014), 67- 72. 33 AMAE, C PC 1896-1918, Guerre 1914- 1918, Autriche-Hongrie, vol. 158, Rome, 19 April 19 18, Barrere writting to th e Minister of Foreign Affairs, no . 841-842. 31 18 SLOVAKIA 2021 Italian soil. The creation of Polish and Romanian units followed much later. 34 Further important events connected to Stefanik and the Czechoslovak Army in Italy were placing the military flag of the Czec hoslovak Army on the Altar of the Fatherland in Rome on 24 May 1918, on the anniversary of Italy entering the war; this episode was of extraordinary propaganda importance. The Czech Amelie Posse- Brazdova recalled Stefanik's speech on this occasion: " Like a masterful and ingenious conductor, he played all our trembling heartstrings, leaving not one untouched ."35 Finally around 20,000 Czechoslovak so ldiers fought on the Italian front. The Legions in Russia Stefanik went on his first mission to Russ ia in 1916 and was busy dealing with the internal problems of the Czechoslovak movement. After the February Revolution of 19 17, the new Russian Provisional Government authorized the project of the Czechoslovak Legion in the country, but later changed its position . Only in July 19 I 7, after a successful battle at Zborov (in the frame of the Keren sky Offensive) of the Czechoslovak Brigade, composed mainly of Czechs and Slovaks from Ru ssia and thus Russian citizens, the government permitted recruitment among prisoners-of-war. The Legions in Russia grew quickly. Fol lowing the Bolshevik coup in October of I 9 I 7, the new government was intent on making peace with Germany. This put the Czechoslovak Army into a difficult position, since, in the aftermath of such an agreement, its members would no longer be in a territory that shared a front wi th Gemrnny or Austria-Hungary, and would thus have no enemy to fight. In addition, a number of factions were vying for power in Ru ss ia. Masaryk demanded strict neutrality with regard to internal Russian affairs, but in practice this was difficult to achieve. The orders received by the Czechoslovak Army were constantly changing. The Briti sh would have preferred to keep it in Russ ia under their command, while the French wanted to redeploy the Leg ion to the 34 Angelo Tamborra, L 'idea di nazinnalita e la guerra / 914-1918 (Trento, lnstituto per la storia de l Ri so rgimento ita liano, 1963), 37-43 . 35 Eva Kranz. Amelie Posse- Brazdnva. Zivot spjaty s Ceskoslovenskem [Amelie Posse- Brazdova. A Life Linked w ith Czechoslova ki a] ( Praha, Akropo li s, 20 11 ), 134. SLOVAKIA 2021 19 Western front. 36 Soon, open conflict broke out between the Czechoslovak Legion and the Bolsheviks, who wanted to disarm them after an incident in Chelyabinsk. Czechoslovak Army representatives, meeting at a congress in Chelyabinsk, decided to prepare for their passage to France via Vladivostok and to resist any attempts to be stopped. The troops quickly captured the Trans-Siberian Railway and were soon openly fighting the Bolsheviks. Later, this capture changed its purpose- the Legions wanted to facilitate the invasion of Russia planned by the Allies. However, after initial successes on the part of the Czechoslovaks, the Bolsheviks gradually began to prevail. 37 Matters turned even more complicated following the coup led by the monarchist Admiral Alexander Kolchak in Siberia in November of 19 I 8. Most of the 60,000 Czechoslovak soldiers were left-leaning and were not eager to see the counter-revolution prevail. However, Kolchak was allied with the Entente, and thus also with Czechoslovakia. Jan Juricek portrayed the situation in Siberia as follows: The soldiers complained about the excessive demands of officers who, ambitious though they were, lacked in experience. The Czechoslovak commanders, in turn , lamented the fact that Russia's White Guard had no appetite for fighting , was prone to flee or to surrender to the enemy, demoralizing our soldiers. The local commanders of the Siberian anti-Bolshevik forces , on the other hand, complained (to General Janin) that the Czechoslovaks' meddling in Russian politics was inappropriate.38 By the time Stefanik arrived in Siberia in November of I 9 I 8 - he had left France in August of 19 I 8 - the Great War had ended and the soldiers did not understand the need for further fighting, as Czechoslovakia had already been established. At first Stefanik tried to convince the Legionnaires that they had to fight to ensure favourable 36 Karel Pichlik, Bez legend [Without Legends] ( Praha, Panorama, 199 1), 377. See: Betty Miller Unterberger, The United States, Revo/utionCIIJ' Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Victor S. Mamatey, The Un ited States and East Central Europe /914- 191 8. A Studv in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda ( Princeton, ew Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1957). 3~ Jan Jurfcek, Milan Rastisla v St~fanik (Bratislava, Q 111 , 2006, P' edi ti on 1968), 150. 37 20 SLOVAKIA 2021 conditions for the peace treaties and the frontiers of Czechoslovakia. He hoped the Legion could fight its way across Russia to the newlyformed state in the heart of Europe. However, Stefanik changed hi s mind after visiting large numbers of Czechoslovak troops on the front. He and General Maurice Janin (the Commander-in-Chief of the Legion in Russia appointed by the Government of France with the consent of the Czechoslovak National Council) concluded that a withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army was inevitable. They would have to leave Russian forces to fight the Bolsheviks, while the Czechoslovak army was to focus on defending the Trans-Siberian railway. 39 Masaryk gave Stefanik powers of attorney to carry out an internal reorganisation of the army, as well as in matters of international policy. Thanks to their complex origin and development, the Legions in Russia were run democratically. The Legionnaires addressed each other as "brother" and the Legion was led by the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia through elected representatives. While this form of self-government was relatively acceptable in a volunteer army, following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 191 8, the Legion became a regular army that had to be subordinate to the government. Stefanik abolished the branch of the Czechoslovak National Council in Russia. 40 By order number 588, issued only after his departure, Stefanik banned the holding of the second Congress of the Czechoslovak Army and the committee's activities. However, Congress delegates had already been elected. The soldiers were unwilling to give up their elected bodies. Enforcing command number 588 turned out to be very difficult. The conflict between the military command and the soldiers grew to such an extent that a total rift in the army was imminent. 41 Stefanik realised that he would be unable to resolve the situation of the Czec hoslovak army in Siberia and returned to Paris, where he started talks with Allied military officials, Marshal Ferdinand Foch in particular. He demanded either an allied intervention or a complete withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army. In April of 1919 Stefanik sent the following note to T.G. Masaryk: "An inter-allied military 39 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 17, Omsk, 19 Apri l 1919, Jan in writi ng to the minister of war, no. 992. 40 AMAE, CPC 1914-1940, Z-Europe, Tchecoslovaquie, vo l. 16, Vladivostok, 27 December 191 8, Regnault and Martel writing to the Foreign Ministry, no. 18 I. 41 Pichlik, Klipa and Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti legionah 246-47. SLOVAKIA 2021 21 intervention will not take place; our men are perishing in Siberia. Our allies do not always keep their promises because these are made thoughtlessly. There is political and moral chaos."42 The Birth of Czechoslovakia, the Death of Stefanik At the beginning of 1918, the military situation of the Entente Powers was very difficult. Serbia and most of the territory of Romania had been overrun by the enemy in 1915 and in 1916. In 1917 Italy suffered a great defeat at Caporetto and the Italian front moved I 00 km south. The next year Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, which allowed the Germans to move large numbers of soldiers to the Western front. The Central Powers wanted to win a decisive victory with a large offensive in the spring of 191 8, before the arrival of thousands of soldiers from the United States to Europe. In these complex circumstances the Entente powers were more wi lling to support any project that would weaken their enemies. That is why the movements of the nationalities of Austria-Hungary gained more ground. Thanks to their military efforts in France, Italy but mainly in Russia, the international position of the Czechoslovak National Counci l became stronger. It was step-by-step recognized as the Czechoslovak Provisional Government by the Entente Powers. When Czech and Slovak representtatives proclaimed the founding of Czechoslovakia on 28 October 1918 in Prague, and on October 30 in Turciansky Sv. Martin in Slovakia, its international position was assured thanks also to Stefaniks' activities. Stefanik died soon after the creation of Czechoslovakia. His last diplomatic task was to find a compromise between the Italian and French claims to command the Czechoslovak army in the new state, and he succeed where others cou ldn 't. 43 Stefanik decided fly in an Italian plane to his homeland but it crashed while landing at 4 May 1919. His death aroused a lot of suspicions and resulted in conspiracy theories bringing accusations against Benes, with whom Stefanik did 42 Archiv Ustavu T. G. Masaryka, Prague, f. TGM-R, box 424, Paris, 3 April I 919, M. R. Stefanik writing to T . G. Masaryk. 43 Laura Fortunato, " La Mi ssione militare italiana in Slovacchia: un tentativo di "diplomazia militare" fallito," in Per Rila Tolomeo, scrilli di amici sulfa Dalmazia e I 'Europa cen/ro-orienlale fl, ed . E. Capuzzo, B. C revato-Se lvaggi and F. Guida (Venez ia, La Musa Talia, 2014 ), 13 7- 205. 22 SLOVAKIA 2021 not get along, against freemasons, Czechs, Hungarians and so on . The sum total of the facts and evidence available to us today suggests that Stefanik's death was an accident. Of the many who have written on the subject, it was Pavo) Kanis and his documentary film Stefanik. A Hero 's Story, Homeland (20 I 0) that I find the most persuasive. The Memory of Stefanik One might say that the 20 1h century replacements of various statues in what is now L.:udovit Stur Square in Bratislava reflected the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Each change of reg ime in Czechoslovakia was also reflected in changes of statues. This kind of " marking" of territory is not unusual. Quite the contrary. Every reg ime is interested in erecting monuments to figures who represent ideas and va lues close to its heart and have in some way contributed to the development of a particular community or nation. As part of the celebrations of the Hungarian millennial arriva l in the Danube Valley in 1896, a competition was held in Bratislava (then known as Pozsony in Hunga rian and Pressburg in German) for the design of a monument commemorating the coronations of Habsburg rulers that had been held in the city. The competition was won by sculptor Jan Fadrusz with a sculptural group depicting Empress Maria Theresa's ascent to the throne in 1740. Maria Theresa was acceptable as a symbol both to the Hungarians, who revered , indeed idealised her for her pos itive attitude to Hungarian statehood, as well as, of course, to the Habsburgs, who had a forged a close bond with the city of Pressburg, where the coronations were held for centuries. The scu lpture of Maria Theresa was erected on 16 May 1897 on the Royal Hill Square, w hich was then renamed Coronation Hill Square. 44 The lnterwar Period and the Slovak State The newly-founded Czechoslovakia faced serious problems. It had to preserve its existence by forgin g the idea of a Czechoslovak nation while distancing itse lf from everything Habsburg and Hungarian . Soon after Bratislava was occupied by the Czechos lovak army in February of 1919, someone threw a sack over the head of Maria Theresa and the statue was later boarded up. Neith er the Hungarians nor 44 Pavel Dvorak, Zia ta kniha Bratislavv [Golden book of Brati slava] (Bratislava, Slovensky spi sova tel', 1993), 498- 506. SLOVAKIA 2021 23 the Habsburgs were prepared to accept the fact that the monarchy had collapsed and did everything they could to bring the Slovaks back into Hungary's fold. King Charles I Habsburg wanted to return to Hungary in October of 1921, intending to ascend to throne. In response to this plan a partial mobilization was declared in Czechoslovakia, which also led to the removal of the statue. Local members of the Sokol, the Czech gymnastics organization, and former Legionnaires, destroyed the statue "as a symbol the oppressive regime. " Once the statue of Maria Theresa had been removed, the next problem arose: who should replace her? It was decided to replace her with a statue of General Stefanik. In 1927 the Committee for the Erection of a Monument of Milan Rastislav Stefanik announced a competition, but the winner wasn't selected so, it was repeated the following year. The winning design was by the Czech sculptor Bohumil Kafka's statue of Milan Stefanik surrounded by four lions g uarding the coats-of-arms of the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia - Bohemia; Moravia and Silesia; Slovakia; Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Kafka later modified his design , leaving a single lion presiding over the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms. The lion was originally to face the Danube River but, after Austria's Anschluss in March of 1938, it was turned to face towards the Slovak National Museum, allegedly to avoid irking Hitler. But the unveiling ceremony, planned for the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia never happened, because of the Munich Agreement. During demonstrations marking the proclamation of Slovakia's autonomy in October of 1938, protesters pelted the lion with stones. 45 From a brotherly point of view, this change could be characteristic of the situation in interwar Czechoslovakia. Stefanik was one of the most important founders of Czechoslovakia. His funeral in 1919 was reminiscent of a royal one. After his death a number of statues and memorials were erected across the country. The most monumental one is the memorial on Bradlo Hill in western Slovakia, by the renowned Slovak sculptor Dusan Jurkovic, erected between 1924 and 1928. This monument has become on May 4 th , the anniversary of his death, the site of something resembling an annual national pilgrimage (except for the Communist 45 Zdenek Hojda and Jifi Pokorn y, Pomniky a zapomniky [Memorial s and Anti-Memorials] (Praha, Paseka, 1996), 175- 182. 24 SLOVAKIA 2021 period with a short political detente in 1968- 1969).46 Czechoslovakia, a country in the heart of Europe, fell victim to the political turmoil of the twentieth century, as well as its own lack of internal stability. It failed to secure the loyalty of its minorities, especially the Germans and Hungarians and , ultimately, one of its constituent nations- the Slovaks. The state that was founded on 28 October 1918 ceased to exist twenty-one years later on March 14, 1939, when Slovakia, under pressure from Hitler's Germany, declared its independence. Adolf Hitler is said to have declared "Die katze muss weg", although it cannot be confirmed, when he saw the sculpture from a boat on the Danube. Other sources claim that it was another highranking Naz i who said that the cat (i.e. the Czech lion) had to go, but the pilot could stay. One part of the Slovak public was never too keen on the monument. Anyz, the company that had made the original cast of both statues, replaced the Czechoslovak coat-of-arms with the Slovak one, but that was not enough to save the "cat." In May of 1940, Slovak soldiers removed the lion from its base. From the Coup de Prague in 1948 until Today The end of the war brought about a restoration of Czechoslovakia and also the communist takeover of 1948. The Czechoslovak liberation movement of the First World War did not suit communist ideologues and their version of history. They set out to fight the "bourgeois" liberation legend of Masaryk , Stefanik and Benes. 47 Stefanik' s statues throughout Slovakia began to disappear, mostly at night. This new trend was bound to affect Bratislava as well, with respect to what was then Roosevelt (now Stur) Square and the statue that graced it. The statue of Stefanik was melted down in the early I 950s. 48 The name of the square proved to be equally unsuitable and changed from Roosevelt Square to Stur Square. However, 46 Peter Macho, "M. R. Stefanik - bohatier a muceni k?," [M. R. Stefanik - Hero and Martyr?] in Mvty na.fr slovenske [Our Slovak Myths] , ed. Eduard Krekovi c, Elena Mannova and Eva Krekovi cova (Bratislava, AEP, 2005), 172. 47 See L.:udo vi t Holotik, Stefciniko vska legenda a vznik CSR [The Stefanik Legend and the Fou ndin g of the Czec hoslovak Republic] (Bratislava, SAV, 1958). 48 Milan Varos, Stratene slovenske poklady 2 [Lost Slovak Treasures 2] (Ma rtin , Matica slovenska, 2007), 457- 6 1. SLOVAKIA 2021 25 as it too k seve ral yea rs to ma ke, the statue of L.:udov ft Stur49 and hi s assoc iates was not placed in the square until th e ea rl y 1970s. De mand s for Stefa nik' s re habilitati o n began to be vo iced eve n before th e end of th e co mmuni st reg ime. 50 On th e occas io n o n the 70th anni ve rsa ry of th e fo undin g of Czec hoslova ki a, Ka fk a's lion was a lso pl aced o n th e plinth , a lbe it not on Stur Squ a re, wh ere it used to be befo re, but in fro nt of th e Sl ovak Nati o na l Muse um. It stood o n a py lo n 14.8 5 metres hi g h, 2 metres wid e and 4 me tres in length , bea rin g th e insc ripti o n " On 28 Octobe r 191 8 th e shared moth erl a nd of Czec hs and S lo vak s, th e Czec hos lova k Re publi c was fo und ed ." The fa ll of the communi st regime in 1989 with the Velvet Revolution, fo ll owed by the "ve lvet di vorce" in 1993, res ulted in the creati on of separate Czec h and S lova k Republics. Stefa nik now retoo k hi s place in the Slovak Pantheon of heroes and hi s memory is omnipresent in today's Slovaki a. If you travel to Bratislava by air, you will land at M. R. Stefanik Airport, while the scientific schedul e of Ivan Bella, Slovakia's first man in space, was known as the Stefanik Miss ion etc. The stori es of the Stur Square did not end , however. C urrently vo ices a re heard de ma ndin g that the sculpture o f L:udov ft Stur and hi s assoc iates be moved to ano th er loca ti o n, s uch as N a mes ti e slobody ( Freedo m Squ a re), and a re pli ca of th e statu e of Mari a Th eresa be mounted aga in o n the embankme nt. Th ese proposa ls have stirred up a li ve ly publi c debate - and po le mi cs . Mea nw hil e th e li o n, toge th er w ith a new ly-cas t Stefa nik , have bee n moved to an area in fro nt of th e new Slova k N ati o na l Th ea tre, betw ee n two buildings ofa shopping ce ntre. A noth er fo unde r o f th e first Czechos lova k Republi c - Masa ryk - now towers ove r th e squ are in front o f th e Nati o na l Mu se um . As observe d by th e hi sto ri an Pave l Dvora k : "The Stur statue is the fourth costl y monument erec ted on the fo rmer Co ronation Hill, a place that has had many names, ending as 49 th ( 18 15- 1856) one of the leaders of the S lova k movement in the I 9 centu ry and the ma in cod i11er of standard Slova k. 50 See Martin Mocko, " Yi liam Plevza a ,, rehab il itacia" M . R. Stefanika ( I)" [V iliam Plevza and '' Rehabi litation" of Stefa ni k ( I)], Nave slovo, 17 Septembe r 20 I 9, https://www.noves lovo.sk/c/V iliam Plevza a rehabilitac ia M R Stefanika I and its 2nd and 3'd cont inuati ons. 26 SLOVAKIA 2021 L:udovit Stur Square today. This small square is not where history was made, but it is where it has revealed its most grotesque face. " 51 51 Dvorak, Zlata kniha Bratislavy, 503 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Milan Rastislav Štefánik (1880-1919): The Man Who Spoke to the Stars Description An account of the resource Michal Kšiňan Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 7-26 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kšiňan, Michal, 1983- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/24c0ac872e7ac6795b014bdd4fddb951.pdf cdf811185b2d67c56e5303bd487cfc0e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 27 ENVISIONING A HOMELAND: CARPATHO-RUSYN IMMIGRANTS IN THE USA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK OPTION 1 Richard D. Custer In the earliest decades of their life in the United States, relations between Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants were frequent and generally productive. But Czech immigrants neither settled in the same places most Rusyn immigrants went, nor had any notable higherlevel contacts with them. Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant newspapers, which were an important means for their readers to become aware of immigrant issues outside their own ethnic group, rarely made mention of Czechs until 19 16. Yet by late 1918, American Rusyn leaders were laying a foundation for their homeland countrymen entering into a new state with the Czechs and Slovaks. In the space of just a few months of the concept of the first Czechoslovak Republic being known to American Rusyns, a plebiscite conducted in some segments of the community resulted in a strong, though not overwhelming, preference for inclusion into the nascent Czechoslovak state. The results would prove decisive in the fate of post-Austro-Hungarian Subcarpathian Rus'. This article will examine why Czechoslovakia became and did, or did not, remain their preferred option. Early Settlement of Carpatho-Rusyns, Slovaks, and Czechs in the U.S.A. [n the formative years of the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant communities, these two Slavic peoples, in many cases already having occasional contact in their shared homeland, experienced times of cooperation and conflict that helped to firmly define their respective identities. Historic "U pper Hungary," specificall y the counties of Abauj /Abov, Szepes/Spis, Saras/Saris, Zemplen/Zemplin, and Ung/ Uz, 1 O ri gi nally presented at "Czec hoslovakia at I 00: Envisioning and Imagi ng Subcarpathian Rus"' panel , Association fo r Slavic, East European, and Euras ian Studies (ASEEES) annua l convention, Boston , MA, 6 December 2018. �28 SLOVAKIA 2021 experienced the highest rate of poverty and thus the highest rate of emigration to the United States starting in the late 19th century. In these counties - for the most part present-day eastern Slovakia - Slovaks were the majority, and Rusyns were a substantial minority. Some villages were ethnically mixed, or neighboring vil lages inhabited mostly by the other ethnic group. The first Slovak immigrants to the United States from Upper Hungary began to arrive in the late 1860s, and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants from Upper Hungary and Austrian Galicia began to arrive in the latter 1870s, but significant numbers of both were not found in the U.S.A. until the 1880s. The communities of both groups began to organize in the early 1880s. In general , Slovaks (particularly those from eastern Slovakia) and Carpatho-Rusyns settled in the same towns and cities in the U.S.A.: metropolitan New York City; Bridgeport, Connecticut; the anthracite coa l mining region of northeastern Pennsylvania; Philadelphia and the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania; western Pennsy lvania; C leveland ; Chicago and northwestern Indiana; St. Louis; Minneapolis; and Detroit. 2 These areas were home to the vast majority of both Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn parishes and other organizations. The places where Slovaks were established that had no Carpatho-Rusyn presence were few, primarily in upstate New York and the Midwest. Specifically Slovak Roman Catholic parishes were founded in Haz leton , Pennsylvania. and Streator, Illinois ( 1885), and a Lutheran parish was founded also in Streator ( 1884), whi le the first CarpathoRusyn Greek Catholic parish was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1884. Their respective mutual-aid "buria l societies," or fraternal insurance lodges, were also founded at around the same time, the first such Slovak society being founded in New York City in 1883 3 , while the first such Ru syn soc iety was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1885 4 . 2 Konstantin Cul en, History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul, Minn .: Czechoslovak Genea logical Society International, 2007), 67-70; Paul R. Magocsi, Our People: Carpatho-Rusvns and Their Descendant.,· in North America. Fourth rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill .: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005), 20-22. 3 M. Mark Sto larik, "A Place fo r Everyone: Slovak Fraternal-Benefit Societies" in Scott Cummings ed., Se(f-Help in America: Patterns of Minoritv Business Ente1prise (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), 130- 141. 4 Magocsi, 49. �SLOVAKIA 2021 29 In the homeland, Carpatho- Ru syns probably would have never met an ethnic Czech/ Bohemian or Moravian, except perhaps as young conscripts serving together in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War 1. 5 (And it is further unlikely that these men wou ld have found their way to the United States until after the end of the war.) Contact between Carpatho-Ru syn and Czech immigrants in the U.S.A. was similarly unlikely, and the two immigrant groups were of substantiall y different character. Czech immigrants began to arrive in the United States much earl ier: the largest number came in the late 1860s. A substantial portion of these immigrants were at least middle class and artisans, in strong contrast to the mostly peasant Slovak and CarpathoRusyn immigrants who took on unskilled jobs in the mines and mills. Finally, Czech settlements were generally in the Midwest and Texas, where farm land was easi ly obtai ned, far from the industrial setting that defined the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant experience.6 Only in cities like Ch icago, C leveland, and Pittsburgh were eastern S lovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns likely to encounter Czech immigrants, if at all. Additionally, Czech immigrants were increasingly less likely to worship in (Roman) Catholic churc hes and thus their contact with Slovak or (i n certain situations) Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants was not frequent. The early Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants, then, in addition to frequent and essential contact with their Lemko Rusyn , Boiko, and Ukrainian co-religionists from Galicia in Greek Catholic parishes and fraternal organizations, were far more familiar with Slovak immigra nts as their neighbors, work friends , and perhaps spouses or extended family. To some extent, Carpatho-Rusyns' and Slovaks' fraternal benefit organizations developed along the same lines and in cooperation. Fraternal organizations were usually the first community institution estab lished in the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant settlements. These were built on the model of simi lar organizations in the homeland, in part as a replacement for the American insurance that was not usually ava il ab le to S lavic immigrants, and out of a need for 5 Magocsi, " The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovaki a," Sla vic Review, Vol. 34, o. 2 (June 1975), 364. 6 Thoma s Capek, The Cechs (Bohemians) in America: A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 36-51 , 60-68. �30 SLOVAKIA 2021 an organization to rally the immigrants on an ethnic basis. The first of these societies arose in pioneer Slovak and Rusyn settlements in the 1880s and 1890s. Some were founded by Roman and Greek Catholics together, e.g., in Bridgeport, Connecticut ( 1888), Kingston, Pennsylvania ( 1887 or 1888), Streator, Illinois ( 1889), McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, Allegheny/Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Passaic, New Jersey ( 1890). Some or most of these organizations would likely have joined the national Slovak organizations founded around that time: the National Slavonic Society of the United States (renamed National Slovak Society of the United States of America in 1913), or the First Catholic Slovak Union, FCSU/"Jednota," both founded in 1890.7 Rusyns would not have their own comparable organization until 1892. But the most striking example of a shared Slovak/Rusyn fraternal society was the Pennsylvania Slovak Roman & Greek Catholic Union (aka Pennsylvania Slovak Union or PSJ). Of all the Slovak-American fraternal societies this organization would count the largest number of Rusyn members, and more than 20 PSJ lodges were identified specifically as Greek Catholic or were based at a Greek Catholic church. 8 Despite having a generally common cultural background, and some shared religious affiliation and shared organizations, on an official level , the political goals of the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants did not always coincide, even as the idea of a Czechoslovak republic began to materiali ze. American Carpatho-Rusyn Fraternal Benefit Societies Greek Catholic Union (GCU). The GCU was the sec ul ar organization with the largest membership and widest geographical reach in the American Rusyn community. Its leadership, and editorial stance of its Amerikansky Russky Viestnik newspaper (ARV) , were generally anti-Hungarian, vehemently anti-Ukrainian, and mildly Russophil e, though never politically inclined to union with Russia. While its 1902 spinoff United Societies, loyal to America's first Greek Catholic 7 Stolarik, 130- 141. Ri chard D. Custer, "Old Countrymen, New Neighbors: Early Carpatho- Rusyn and Slovak Immigra nt Relations in the United States" in S/ovo (National Czech & Slovak Museum & Library, Cedar Rap ids, IA), Summer 2016. Unabridged version on line at https://www .ncsml .org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07 /Old-Countrymen-New-Neighbors.pdf, 6-7. 8 �SLOVAKIA 2021 31 Bishop Soter Ortynsky (an ethnic Ukrainian) since his arrival in 1907 and friendly to the Ga lician clergy, was the GCU 's antagonist on paper, they wou ld prove to be the al li es that would make possible a stronger voice that proved to be the one that caught the ear of the creators of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Slovaks - those who were Greek Catholics as we ll as Roman Catholics - made up a not insignificant portion of the GCU ' s membership, but early on the GCU took a strong stand against the idea that there were actually ethnic S lovak Greek Catholics.9 United Societies of the Greek Catholic Religion. The United Societies spun off from the GCU in 1902 and maintained a loya li st position toward the Greek Catholic Church, at times in opposition to what was perceived as the rebel li ous or disloyal GCU. In its support for Bishop Ortynsky, the society, its newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian ( 1910- 19 17), and its editor, Father Joseph Hanulya, were castigated by the GCU as Ukrainian sympathi zers. Around 1918, the United Societies had about 9,000 members including youth 10 , and published a newspaper, Prosvita, that remained often at odds w ith the GCU and its ARV. Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz (RNS) / Ukrainian National Association (UNA). The GCU in its early years, under c lerically-dominated leadership, became preoccupied with Rusyn affairs in Hungary and enunciated a generally pro-Hungarian political stance. This ali enated the significant membership from Galicia (most of whom were Lemkos), and many lodges, some even with substantial Subcarpathian membership, seceded from the GCU in 1894 to form a new organization . That organization, founded in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, was the Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz, or in English, Russian National Union . It we lcomed as members Rusyns from Hungary and Galicia who had a strong sense of national identity, whether "Rusyn," " Russian," or "Ruthenian ." As the organization and its Svoboda newspaper became more Ukrainian-oriented, and the terms Ukraine and Ukrainian increasing ly used alongside Rus' and Rusyn, those with Russophil e or Old-Ruthenian views wou ld transfer to other organizations, primarily 9 Custer, '" No Such Thing as Greek Catholic Slovaks: ' The GCU's Polemic," The Carpatho-Rusyns of Pennsylvania, http://rusynsofpa. blogspot.com/2 014/12/no-suchthing-as-greek-catholic-slovaks.html. Accessed December I, 201 8. 10 Magocsi, " Political Activity," 398. �32 SLOVAKIA 2021 the Russian Brotherhood Organization. The dominant "Ruthenian" segment would eventually lead the organization to change its name in September 1914 to the Ukrainian National Association. Alienated by this change, approximately 17 UNA lodges, 15 of which had a primarily Subcarpathian Rusyn membership, joined the United Societies between October 1914 and February 1915, resulting in 2 1 new regular United Societies lodges and 6 new United Societies youth lodges. Onl y a few such lodges would remain in the UNA, and so the organization's influence among American Subcarpathian Rusyns had almost entirely di ssipated. Russian Brotherhood Organization (RBO). Some members of GCU and RNS in 1900 gathered in Mahanoy City, Pa ., to form a new fraternal organization that would resist clerical domination, have no requirement of church membership, and avoid both pro-Hungarian and pro-Ukrainian political stands. Most of its early lodges were located in northeastern Pennsylvania and some had left the GCU or RNS to join. Religiously, the society remained officially neutral , but as a Ukrainian orientation came to dominate Ga lician Greek Catholic circles in the U.S.A. and in the homeland, the organization became much more supportive of the Orthodox Church, and an increasing portion of its membership reflected that. The RBO 's consistent stand on Ukrainianism was very negative, but simi larly, it opposed the idea that the Rusyn people's regional distinctions justified separation from Great Russians. While the majority of RBO members originated in the Lemko Region of Galicia, many of its founders and largest lodges originated in Hungary/Subcarpathia. In fact, in 1918 nearly 40 RBO lodges had a Subcarpathian majority, and a comparable number of lodges were loosely affiliated with Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes. Ru ssian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society (ROCMAS). A convention of church brotherhoods that had converted to Orthodoxy took place in September 1895 in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , the center of the Rusyn movement to Orthodoxy led by Father Alexis Toth. They formed a federation, and by the first national convention in 1896, eighteen brotherhoods were members. The Society issued a newspaper, Svit, written in a mixture of Galician Ukrainian and Russian . While somewhat concerned with cultural matters, the Society's primary goal was the defense and promotion of Orthodoxy among socalled " Little Russian" immigrants. It vehemently opposed Ukrainia- �SLOVAKIA 2021 33 nism and the Greek Catholic Church, and promoted a strict Russian identity almost as a necessary feature of Orthodoxy, to the detriment of the local or regional linguistic and cultural traits of its Rusyn membership. Many of its larger and older lodges were primarily Subcarpathian, e.g., Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Scranton , Catasauqua, and Berwick. United Russian Orthodox Brotherhood of America. The organization, at its founding known as the Greek Catholic Pravoslavny Brotherhood, was established in 1915 mainly by former members of the GCU in southwestern Penn sylvania who had recently joined the Ru ssian Orthodox Church. The vast majority of its members hip was of Subcarpathian origin, particularly from the more eastern counties of Uz, Bereg and Maramoros. Within two decades it grew to around 20,000 members 11 . Position of Slovak Fraternals "There is no 'Slovak ' people" - so titled was an art icle in the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik, Aug. 29, 1918. The postwar years and the struggles over the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic would involve back-and-forth arguments between Ru syn American and Slovak American leaders, in print and, no doubt, in face-to-face meetings. But the root of the di strust undoubtedly was the early conflicts in these communities. The National Slovak Society, for its part, both supported the Rusyn people and disagreed at times with the position of the Rusyn leaders: National Slovak Society members expressed their concern for the fate of their brother Slavs, the Rusyns, who were now [World War I] experiencing the brunt of persecution in wartime Europe. Not only were repressive measures being taken against Rusyns in Carpathian Hungary, but in neighboring Galicia, Magyar troops were perpetrating wholesale massac res. This did not mean that the N.S.S. was conceding to th e claims of a Rusyn nationalism in Eastern Slovakia. Although support for the Slovak ca use in the region had been growing - largely thanks to the financi al support of the American Slovak community - certain elements considered the "S lovjaks" (i .e., Greek Catholics speaking the dial ect of the 11 Magocs i, Our People, 57. �34 SLOVAKIA 2021 eastern regions) as a separate nationality. The official N.S.S. policy was that the Slovjaks were Slovak, not Rusyn, Russian , or any other Slav people. 12 Political Actions During and Toward the End of World War I The Rus 'ko-Amerykans 'ka Rada (Rusyn/Ruthenian American Council) was established at a gathering in Philadelphia on December 8, 1914. By design it was to give equal leadership voice to Subcarpathian and Galician Rusyns, and under the patronage of Bishop Ortynsky, its directors included clerical and lay leaders from the Subcarpathian Rusyn community, especially Father Joseph Hanulya, editor of the United Societies newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian , George Gulanich and Ivan Zeedick of the GCU , and John Branik, president of the United Societies. At its Philadelphia meeting it condemned Russia and advocated for support of the political and cultural union of "Ukrainian (Rusyn)"-inhabited Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary. 13 This entity ceased to exist with the death of Ortynsky in 1916, but not without drawing ire upon Father Hanulya for his participation. The American-Russian National Defense (ARND) / Narodna Obrana was founded in 1915 in Braddock, Pa. , near Pittsburgh, by Nicholas Pachuta. At the time Pachuta was assistant editor of the ARV, a post he held until 1918, under Michael Hanchin . National Defense styled itself the defender of Rus ' -ness against Magyarism in the Greek Catholic Church, was also critical of Slovakophiles and Ukrainophiles, and picked up members who were recent converts to Orthodoxy in the era of Bishop Stephen Dzubay. In May of 19 18 he met with Thomas G. Masaryk, the leader of the movement for a new state to be called Czechoslovakia, in Pittsburgh and began a discussion around the fate of Uhro-Rus ' (the Rusyn lands south of the Carpathians, historically part of Hungary). At that time Masaryk disregarded Pachuta's goals because his group "had no following or 12 R. Vl adimir Baumgarten and Joseph Ste fka , The National Slovak Society : 100 Year Histmy. 1890-/990. (Pittsburgh: Nation al Slovak Society, 1990), 76. 13 " Narodnyi z' "izd u Filiadel'fii"," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ ), 19 December 1914, 2; Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884- 1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 35 support among the broad masses of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants." 14 National Defense came around to the Czechoslovak option and delivered a memorandum to Masaryk in October endorsing autonomy within a Czechoslovak state. Around that time Pachuta converted to Orthodoxy, and in 1921 he united the National Defense with the American Russian Brotherhood based in C leve land. From 1922 until 1935 he was editor of the Russkij Vistnik newspaper of U ROBA. The League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia was a strictly Russophile political organization that drew most of its participation from individuals who were already active in organizations like ROCMAS and especially RBO. The vast majority of its members were of Galician background, but about 25% of delegates to its congresses were Subcarpathian Rusyns . 15 It held congresses in 19 17, 1918, and 1919 and made proclamations that Carpatho-Rusyn territory, a long with the who le of Galicia and Bukovina, should be part of Russia. The American National Counci l of Uhro-Rusins was founded in July of 1918 in Pittsburgh, with strong support from the United Societies and eventually the GCU . It grew to more than 100 branches, some of which had I 00 or even 200+ members. This was the organization in which the Pittsburgh attorney Gregory Zatkovich rose to leadership, began meetings with Masaryk, and which led to his post as the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus' . In Philadelphia on October 23, 1918, Zatkovich participated in the Mid-European Democratic Union in the presence of Masaryk . At that time Uhro-Rusyns - Rusyns of Hungary - were accepted as a distinct nationa lity, apart from Ukrainians who were already members. The National Counci l met at Scranton, Pa., on November 12, and formulated its final recommendation that Rusyn territory south of the Carpathians, including all of the original Uhro-Rusyn counties, be united in a Czechoslovak state with broad autonomy. The next day, the resolution was presented to Masaryk, who recommended that a plebiscite be held among American Uhro-Rusyns. 14 Joseph Danko, "Plebiscite of Carpath o- Ruthenians in the United States Recommendin g Union of Carpatho-Rutheni a with the Czec hoslovak Republic," Annals of !he Ukrainian Academy of Aris and Sciences, 11 , nos. 1-2 ( 1964-68), 186. 15 Prikarpalskaia Rus • (New York), Vol. I, o. I, October 191 8. �36 SLOVAKIA 2021 The American Uhro-Rusyn Plebiscite of December 1918 The American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, in conjunction with Masaryk's advice to Zatkovich, resolved to conduct a vote in Subcarpathian Rusyn parishes and fraternal lodges to determine their preferred action with respect to the homeland, among the options it had previously agreed to. Of course, they expected that the result would need to support what had already been decided: that Subcarpathian Rusyn territory should join the Czech and Slovak republic. This vote, then, was limited to the National Council's constituency: Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes - no Orthodox parishes and no Galician-majority parishes would be involved, even if they had substantial numbers of Subcarpathian Rusyn members; and lodges of the GCU and United Societies only, who were already seen to be inclined toward their leadership's preference for Czechoslovakia. The plebiscite was announced in only one issue of the ARV (Nov. 14, 1918), and commenced almost immediately thereafter. There is no extant evidence that there was campaigning within the communities to select a particular option; certainly there would have been very little time for that. We do have results of the vote, which was published in several installments in the ARV and Prosvita, and which were collected in "Plebiscite ofCarpatho-Ruthenians in the United States Recommending Union of Carpatho-Ruthenia with the Czechoslovak Republic" authored by Joseph Danko in 1968. 16 Option Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic Union with the Ukrainian Republic Total independence Union with Carpatho-Russians Union with Russi a Union with Magyar Land fHungaryl Union with Galicia Total Votes (% of tota l) 732 (66.4%) 310 (28. 1%) 27 (2.5%) 13 ( 1.2%) 10 (0.9%) 9 (0.8%) I (0. 1%) I , 102(/00.0%) Unsurprisingly, the organizers' preferred option won decisively, but not overwhelmingly. Based on the individual vote counts by parish and lodge provided by Danko, I would like to comment on some of 16 Danko, 200. �SLOVAKIA 2021 37 the more interesting things I observed. Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic (rank: I} As we will see, each of the options had some very surprising entities voting for them. This option's supporters included two parishes founded as Greek Catholic but which at the time of the vote had Orthodox pastors: Elkhorn, West Virginia (Father John Gratson) and Elizabeth, New Jersey (Father Gregory Varho l). Not very surprising was a vote by a large, mostly Subcarpathian parish of Rusyns from Spis, Saris and Zemplin Counties (Holy Ghost in Tremont), but whose pastor was Father Hanulya, former editor of the United Societies' first newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian - who for years as a supporter of Bishop Ortynsky had been attacked by the GCU in the pages of ARV for being a quasi-Ukrainian . Fourteen of the GCU lodges were based at majority-Galician parishes, although some of these lodges were primari ly Subcarpathian in membership. Union with the Ukrainian Republic (rank: 2) Figure 1. A portion of the American Rusyn communities that voted for union of Uhro-Rusyns with the Ukrainian Republic (66% of tota l votes cast). (Source: Danko, 196-198) The following voted for Uni on of Uhro-Rusins with Ukraini an Republic Societies of the Greek Catholic of Rusin Brothe rhoods in the USA 4 6 17 19 24 28 32 50 Mahoney City, Pa. Donmore , Pa. Rendham, Pa. Lansing, Pa . Eckle y , Pa. Glenlien, Pa. Sheppton, Pa. Mahoney Plane, Pa. (Figure I continues) 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 242 267 292 295 298 324 379 390 St. Clair , Pa. Hannastown, Pa. Wilkes-Barre , Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Baggaley, PP a . New Salem, Pa. Kester, Pa. McKees Rocks, Pa. 3 2 2 3 1 6 2 5 �38 SLOVAKIA 2021 Uhro-Rusins Greek Catholic United Congregations. I St. Johna SL Johna B. V. M. Bleaed TrinitY B. V. M. B. V. M. SL Michael B. V. M. Holy Ghost L Michael hen Scnnton, Pa. Bridgeport, Conn. New Salem, Pa. New Britain, Conn. Freebnd,PL Whitting, Ind. Ref. &am>lky P.ev. Cbomoc:t Rev.~ 400- 8 500-10 400- 8 Blnghamtoo, N.Y. Taylor, Pa. McKeca Rocb, PL St. Clair Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Rev. Thq2t Rev. Petraaovich Rev. A. Suba Rev. Ribovsk Rev. N. Chopey 550- 7 Lt Lansford, Pa. Rev. Martyak 550- 7 ~udloning, Pa. Ha eton, Pa. Rn. p ch Rev. Brinaky llef. Choarboch 500- 6 500· 6 600-12 600-12 550- 7 Rev. FeiuG !&J- s Overall this was the most surprising result, having the second highest number of votes. Some votes came from additionally surprising places. For example: the parish in New Britain had experienced an ugly split with Galician Ukrainians just eight years before, yet they still had a Galician pastor. The Wilkes-Barre parish ' s pastor was Father Nicholas Chopey, who had a few years before been numbered among the pro-Hungary clergy. The Lansford parish ' s pastor was Father Gabriel Martyak, administrator of the Uhro-Rusyn parishes in the wake of Bishop Ortynsky's death two years before. And the Hazleton parish that voted for this option, pastored by the Lemko priest Father John Fekula? This was actually the Galician parish (St. Michael) that split off from two existing Subcarpathian parishes in the same city. We must wonder how this parish had the opportunity to vote at all. The lodges that voted this way included largely-Galician GCU lodges in Glen Lyon (based at an old mostlyGalician parish) and Rankin (based at a mostly-Subcarpathian parish), �39 SLOVAKIA 2021 five other GC U lodges based at Galician-majority pari shes but with mostl y Subcarpathi an members, and a GCU lodge from Father Martyak's paris h in Lansford whose members were mostl y from Sari s and Zemplin Counti es. The following voted for Tou.l Independence of Uhro-Rusins. Societies of the Greek C. Union. ):: ~~•:· an !Im , a. \ Eynon, Pa. lmon, Pa. ~nton, ra. 2 1 I Gymnastic Branches. I61 11 Scranton, Pa. 67 Mahonoy City, Pa. 1 United Societies of Greek C. Religion I ss K.ingaton, Pa. 1 II 60 Edwardavillc, Pa. 2 j Uhro-Rusin Congregations 11 ¥ M : Holy Gbolt iililUIIII t11 Jcaup, Pa. 1&11 li•1 :Rev. Ivan I= i I Figure 2. The Ameri can Rusyn communities whi ch voted fo r tota l indepe ndence of Uhro-Rusyns (3 % of votes cast). (Danko, 198) Total independence of Uhro- Rusyns (rank: 3) Without any traditi on of self-rule, and without any real advocates fo r thi s pos ition, it is not surpri sing that it rece ived so few votes. It 's notable that not only did the pari sh and a GCU lodge in Jessup, Pennsy lvani a, contribute a number of the votes fo r thi s option, but two additional GC U lodges that did , in Eynon , Pennsyl va ni a, were a ffili ated wi th the Jessup pari sh as we ll. Jessup a lso had a large RBO lodge, but it is unlike ly that independence would have been the ir preference. �40 SLOVAKIA 2021 Union with Carpatho-Russians (i.e., Galicians, Bukovinians, UhroRusyns) (rank: 4) This position was represented among American Carpatho-Rusyns mainly by the League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia, although evidently few Subcarpathian Rusyns belonged to that organization, and to some extent originally by the American-Russian National Defense. The few votes for this option came mainly from Gary, Indiana 's GCU Lodge 469 and its Greek Catholic parish, which was primarily of Subcarpathian origin (in its western counties that would be incorporated into Slovakia) although it is not clear to this author why that would have been their choice. Union with Russia (rank: 5) The FolJowing voted for Union with Russia Greek Catholic Union. 550 Olyphant, Pa. 1 Gymnastic Branch 121 Jerome, Pa. I Uhro-Rusin Congregations a. V. M. Mahoooy City, Pa. lln. I. lubck 400- a Figure 3. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Russia (I % of votes cast). (Danko. 199) Among the votes for this option were GCU Lodge 530 in Olyphant, Pennsylvania, mostly Lemko in membership and based at a Galician-majority parish, and perhaps most curious of all , St. Mary 's Greek Catholi c Church in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, whose pastor was the noted Rusyn-language author and cultural patriot Father Emil Kubek. Kubek was also part of the leadership of the American I �41 SLOVAKIA 2021 National Council, which was not supportive of union with Russia at all. While he was not a Russophile, his relative lack of involvement with the GCU (and perhaps due to the RBO being founded in his parish) may have encouraged him to advocate for this option . Or more likely the decisive factor was the RBO's founding president, John Zincak Smith, also being the president of St. Mary's parish. Union with Magyar land (i.e., Hungary) (rank: 6) The Following voted for Union of Uhro-Rwins with Magyar Land Greek Catholic Union. 50 2 181 Clevdand, Ohio Clndand, Ohio Uhro-Rusin Congregations. St. John'• , ClcYeland, Ohio llev. Ballog soo- 6 I Figure 4. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Hungary (I % of votes cast). (Danko, 199) Even though many of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic clergy in the U.S. were Magyarized (if not outright Magyarone), it doesn't seem that any attempt there may have been on their part to influence their parishioners to vote for this option was successful. The ARV denounced Hungary's policy toward its ethnic minorities for years in the lead up to the war. Despite Hungary's liberalized ethnic minority policy that began in 1915, inclination toward Hungary from American Rusyns seems to have changed little. Two GCU lodges voted for this option, but most striking is that six votes came from St. John's Church in Cleveland - not the Rusyn one that in 1918 had hired an Orthodox priest as its pastor - but the Magyar parish, pastored by Father Michael Balogh. This was the only ethnic-Hungarian parish to vote, and it's unlikely that Zatkovich and the American National Council had intended the plebiscite to include the Magyar parishes. (It's possible that they did, we just have no evidence on either side to say for sure.) Union with Galicia (rank: 7) Given the still substantial portion of the GCU's membership either �42 SLOVAKIA 2021 from Galicia or belonging to lodges based at Galician-majority parishes, we could have expected more votes for this option than were returned. However, a number of GCU lodges that were mostly or entirely Galician in membership (e.g., McKeesport Lodge 782, Wilmerding, Pa. , Lodges 348 and 360) - and based at Galician parishes - did not vote. It must be underscored that the plebiscite was not truly representative of the range of religious congregations and fraternal lodges found in the American Carpatho-Rusyn community, not even when speaking exclusively of those from Subcarpathia - the "Uhro-Rusyns." The Orthodox (except for two parishes which inexplicably did vote) were wholly unrepresented, and the significant fraternals RBO, ROCMAS , and fledgling UROBA were likewise ignored. Clearly it was meant to produce the additional justification Zatkovich needed to present the Scranton resolution to the Paris Peace Conference. 17 Understandably alarmed by this development, the activist Ukrainian American community opposed what they had hoped would be an outcome supporting their goal to unite so-called Ukrainian-Ruthenian ethnographic territory in a Ukrainian state. In so doing, they provided what seems to be the only eyewitness account of how the plebiscite was conducted in a Rusyn parish. Here writes a Ukrainian from Bridgeport, Conn .: Our Hungarian brother Rusyns want to unite Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine. On December 8 of this year, a parish meeting was held in Bridgeport, Conn. , right after the Divine Liturgy, in the parish school. The meeting was very interesting for every Ukrainian, because our brother Uhro-Rusyns decided on the fate of our and their brothers across the sea. Local speakers and Father Orest Cornjak [Chornock], local pastor, spoke. The meeting was convened for the purpose of deciding where Hungarian Rus' shou ld belong: whether to Ukraine or to the Czecho-Slovak state. Father Orest Cornjak stated his preference, that he would vote to belong to his brothers, that is, to the Ukrainians, rather than to the Czecho-Slovaks . After much discussion , it turned out that the Uhro-Rusyn 17 Victor S. Mamatey, "The Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians," in Joseph F. O'Grady, ed .. The Immigrants· Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 245-246. �SLOVAKIA 2021 43 leaders wanted to lead the Uhro-Rusyns to the Czecho-Slovaks, without questioning the Uhro-Rusyn people. And again the speakers protested against the "American National Council of UhroRusins" in America that no one has elected; its members of that Council are self-appointed leaders, that they have chosen themselves and have no right to speak in the name of the Uhro-Rusyn people, and further that they proposed an amendment so as not to vote either for Ukraine or against, nor to take a position against the Czecho-Slovak state, and so let it be as Uhro-Rusyns will decide in the old country. They also complained to the Ukrainians that at the founding of the " Mid-European Union" at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pa., they had to say that the Uhro-Rusyns are "a different people" from the Ukrainians, and thus the Ukrainians do not want to accept the UhroRusyns as an equal among equals and so for that reason will not vote in that way. When people were already wanting to leave, Mr. Ivan Boyko, head of the Ukrainian Athletic Association (Sich) in America, while asking forgiveness for the slurs that were committed by Ukrainians, and explaining that the Uhro-Rusyns had already decided at the founding council meetings in L'viv that Hungarian Rus ' should belong to Ukraine together with Galicia and Bukovina, said he did not see the reasons why the Uhro-Rusyns should not vote for the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine. He laid out what benefits the Uhro-Rusyns would have in a Ukrainian state, and what benefits they would have from the Czecho-Slovaks .. .. We Ukrainians, said Mr. Bojko, can never agree that our Hungarian brothers will be in the Czecho-Slovak state. [... ] It should be noted that the audience very intently listened to Mr. Bojko and took his every word to heart. After the speech the audience rewarded him with applause when the other speakers received no applause. Here Mr. Bojko did a great service to the Ukrainian people by proclaiming this speech to the Hungarian brothers, because then now the entire hall of people began to speak differently about it after the speech, because it was moved to vote by secret ballot, about where Hungarian Rus' should belong: whether to Ukraine, or to the Czecho-Slovak state, and another motion, to vote by roll call , so that you know who is against your brothers (Ukrainians). Father Comjak led by saying: Who is for �44 SLOVAKIA 2021 uniting Hungarian Rus' with Ukraine? It was decided unanimously on the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine, and then came the second ballot: Who is for uniting Hungarian Rus' with the Czecho-Slovaks? For this union with the Czecho-Slovaks there was only one vote. So, evidently, the Uhro-Rusyns want to unite with Ukraine. The statement made in Philadelphia by Misters M. Sichynsky and N. Ceglinsky, recognizing the Uhro-Rusyns as a separate nationality, with their representative as Mr. Zatkovich in the "MidEuropean Union," should be retracted for the good of the Ukrainian people and the Uhro-Rusyns . Instead, let them declare that the Uhro-Rusyns are our brothers by blood and by faith , and we can never agree that a second nationality would rule over our Hungarian brothers, even if it were Czecho-Slovakia. In Bridgeport, Conn ., Uhro-Rusyns do not recognize the "American National Council of Uhro-Rusins" because their people did not select them , and that self-styled Counci l has no right to push them into a Czecho-Slovak state, because the Uhro-Rusyn brothers want to unite Hungarian Rus ' with Ukraine. Glory to them for this! 18 The Ukrainian National Association's newspaper Svoboda reported on a Ukrainian National Congress that took place in January 1919. This congress included speakers on the situation in the Subcarpath ian Rusyn community in the U.S. and its recent Scranton resolution and fol low-on plebiscite. Father Kubek , editor of the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik [this is an error, he was not] was supposed to speak, but at the last moment he informed that he was not able to do so. His place was taken by a Galician priest, Father Vasyl' Merenkiv, who said, among other things: "In recent days I was in several Uhro-Rusyn parishes and spoke with several Uhro-Rusyn priest-leaders . We spoke about the idea of uniting Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine . I can assure the esteemed delegates that they are all committed to joining Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine more so than with Czec hoslovak ia. But still, I noticed that American Uhro-Rusyns are sti ll wavering." Mr. Ivan Hajovyc (of Maramoros), a delegate from the Chicago Uhro-Rusyns, was called to speak. He revealed his joy that he has an 18 "Svobidna vo lia uhors' kykh Ru syniv," Svoboda, 14 December 19 I 8, 2. �SLOVAKIA 2021 45 opportunity to speak to so many people who are interested in the fate of Uhro-Rusyns. He talked about the oppression that Uhro-Rusyns suffered from the Magyars. " We, Hungarian Ukrainians," said Mr. Hajovyc, "stand body and soul for the unity of Ukraine.We want to join with Ukraine! We are protesting against the plebiscite conducted among American UhroRusyn s, which was set up for the sake of uniting Uhro-Rus' with Czechoslovakia. Hungarian Ukrainians want to be united with Ukraine. We do not know what Czechoslovakia is and who CzechoSlovaks are. We never want to hear anything about joining them." Mr. Ivan Hundjak (a Galician) argued using statistics that the plebiscite initiated by Masaryk among American Uhro-Rusyns was conducted in a deceptive manner. Finally Mr. Ivan Skakandij, an Uhro-Rusyn cantor-teacher and delegate from Nesquehoning, Pa . was called to speak He regretted that in such an important moment Hungarian Ukrainians in America have not yet all been awakened to a life of national consciousness. " It is the fault of the Uhro-Rusyn clergy, who in the old country were led around by the Magyars and now by the Czechoslovaks. But nationally conscious Hungarian Ukrainians in America want to unite with Ukraine. We are just now awakening to life and there is hope that in a short time we will all be awakened." One speaker (Father Merenkiv) said " Hungarian Ukrainians in America are still waking up, but remember, that as we wake up , Masaryk will do nothing to help." 19 My observations about the results, it turns out, while I arrived at them independently, were noted to some extent already in 1919 in an article in the Ukrainian press. This is the speech by Ivan Hundjak (mentioned previously) in which he analyzed the resu lts and pointed out, among other criticisms, that if a person happened to be a member of a GCU lodge and the United Societies lodge in the same place, and the local Subcarpathian Greek Catholic parish, conceivably that person could vote up to three times. He noted as well (as Danko did) that participation among those eligible to vote was fairly low. He asserted that had these irregularities been taken into account, the leading result 19 "Z narodnohu z'izdu," Svoboda, 18 January 19 19, 2. �46 SLOVAKIA 2021 probably would have been for union with Ukraine. I would counter that had there been time, or the will, to more inclusively offer the vote to all American Subcarpathian Rusyn institutions, and not just the ones affiliated with the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, the results may indeed have been different, but more likely toward union with Russia, as impractical as that might have been. Reception of Czechoslovakia in the Rusyn American Community In May of 19 I 9, the cornerstone was laid in Homestead, Pennsylvania, for the Rusin Peoples Home. This event, under the patronage of the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, occurred just days before the National Counci l in Uzhorod, Subcarpathian Rus ', would accept the American Rusyns ' proposal to unite with Czechoslovakia. The commemorative booklet for this event 20 prominently featured a page with the American, Czechoslovak, and "Rusin" flags entwined, with the slogan "Old Glory Has Made This Federation (Czech-SlovakRusin) Possible." The pages following showed photographs of Zatkovich signing the declaration of the Mid-European Nationalities and Masaryk reading the declaration at a public manifestation in Philadelphia. The book ' s last page is a map showing Europe ' s ethnic groups within the new postwar borders, with Czechoslovakia labeled "Czechoslovaks" and to its east, "Uhro-Rusinia." It's not clear whether UhroRusinia is meant to be depicted as part of Czechoslovakia or not. Whatever the interpretation, this is probably the lone celebratory publication of American Rusyns to mark the decision to join the Czechoslovak Republic. A delegation of American Rusyn gymnasts affiliated with the GCU Sokol division travelled to Prague in the summer of 1920 to participate in a Pan-Slavic Gymnastics exhibition. As part of the trip they also visited Subcarpathian Rus ' and had an audience with Governor Zatkovich. One member of the delegation wrote, " In Prague we were 20 Souvenir Issued by the Rusin Peoples Home, Inc. on the Occasion of the Dedication ofthe Corner-Stone I Pamiatnik izdan ko,poratsieiu Russkii Narodny i Dom iz sluchai posviashcheniia kraeugol 'nago kamen 'ia. Homestead. Pa .. I 9 I 9 (Homestead, Pa., 19 19). �SLOVAKIA 2021 47 warmly welcomed by the Czechs and everything we saw in Prague and the way we were treated , we enjoyed ... " oi...o OLO ..... .. , . . MAO• T .. , . rcDll:.. 4Tt0N ie&&CW·~YAK "v.lNI ~ . . . • 1..• Figure 5. Page from the commemorative booklet for the cornerstone laying ofthe Rusin Peoples Home in Homestead, Pa., May 1919. Another wrote, " With thanks to God , with our appearance at the Pan-Slavic Sokol Meet in Prague, we made a mark in the history of our Sokol Branch which wi ll be permanent proof that we accomplished our mission , that we entered into the order of the Czechoslovak Sokol movement. . . We also left a lasting impression on the youth of Subcarpathian Rus ' ." The trip was promoted in the pages of ARV and chronicled fully in the 1921 almanac of the Sokol division. 2 1 It wou ld not be long before frustration over the lack of autonomy promised Subcarpathian Rus' by Masaryk would boil over in the American Carpatho-Rusyn press, especially when Zatkovich resigned in 1921 , and would continue at least until the late 1920s among Greek Catholics. The GCU printed a number of publications critical of Czechoslovak policy: Zatkovich's Otkrytie-Expose by vseho g ubernatora Podkarpatskoj Rus i, o Podkarpatskoj Rusi ( 1921 ), Wilson's Prin21 C heryl We ller Beck et al. , Opportuni~v Realized: The Greek Catholic Union 's First One Hundred Years, / 892-1992. (Beaver, Pa.: Gree k Catholic Uni on o f the U.S.A. , 1994), 75 . �48 SLOVAKIA 2021 ciples in Czechoslovak Practice: The Situation of the Carpatho-Russian People Under the Czech Yoke ( 1929) and Beskid's Karpatorusskaja pravda ( 1932). They would also lead a National Congress of Rusins in Pittsburgh in November 1922, which issued a memorandum to Prague condemning their policy toward Subcarpathian Rus '. American Rusyns in the Russian Orthodox Church and others of Russophile orientation would take up the opposition to Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus' through the 1930s. 22 I did not find any evidence - written or photographic - in Carpatho-Rusyn communities or parishes of widespread adoption of Czechoslovakia as a symbolic "homeland." There is certain ly no oral folklore around portraits of Masaryk (or Zatkovich, for that matter) being hung in parish halls as there is of portraits of Maria Theresa and Franz Josef from the early immigration. Lasting Impressions on Rusyn Americans of a Czechoslovak "Homeland" A list on the Wikipedia entry for Czech Americans of "The top 50 U.S. communities with the highest percentage of people claiming Czech ancestry" 23 (based on the 2000 U.S . census) contains mostly predictable results - locations in North Dakota, Texas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin , et al. An accompanying list, " U.S. communities with the most residents born in the Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia)," however, contains a curious entry: tied for number IO was the little town of Colver, Pennsylvania, about 20 miles north of Johnstown in the west central part of the state. Colver, a former coal mining company town , had just a few primary ethnic groups : among these were Slovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns. It may we ll have sti ll had a few residents in 2000 who were born in the former Czechos lovakia. It is not clear that these results came from responses declaring their birthplace as "Czech Republic" or "Czechoslovakia," or either, but surely this population in Colver, Pennsylvania, was not ethnic Czechs. 22 Magocsi, Our People, 88-89. "Czech Americans", https ://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech Americans. Accessed December I, 201 8. 23 �SLOVAKIA 2021 49 The U.S. Census Bureau statistics for ancestry 24 (estimated from its 20 I 3 American Community Survey) show that Pennsylvania, historically the state with the largest number of Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants, had more than 52,142 residents with Czech ancestry, or 0.3% of Pennsylvania residents. This is much less than those who indicated Slovak or Ukrainian ancestry, many of which are likely of Carpatho-Rusyn background (or the completely unreali stic 193 ,000 with "Russian" ancestry), but still far higher than the hi storically low Czech settlement of the state would imply. In addition, "Czechoslovak ian" ancestry was estimated at 22,904, which could conceivably include any of Czech, Slovak, or Carpatho-Rusyn-descended individuals, although the much lower national consciousness of CarpathoRusyn Americans - reflected by the miniscule estimated 2,050 of that background - would lead one to expect most of those "Czechoslovak" individuals to have Carpatho-Rusyn ancestry. That many Carpatho-Rusyn Americans of any particular geographic background in Carpathian Rus ' still exhibit confusion about their ethnic and geographical origins is not news to anyone. But it may be that Subcarpathian Rus ' belonging for 20 years to Czechoslovakia created a lingering geographic attachment to the idea of "Czechoslovakia" as the ancestral land of American Carpatho-Rusyns. Consider these newspaper clippings, maybe the most extreme examples of this phenomenon I've encountered. A perhaps unintended corollary to this phenomenon is the everincreasing use of genealogy websites where obituaries, gravestones, and other data are collected; many of the individuals - Carpatho-Rusyns and others - whose ge nealogical data is found on these sites have had their birthplace, which was probably entered by their descendant researcher as "Czechoslovakia," transposed by the site into "Czech Republic," further muddling Carpatho-Rusyn identity by placing Czechoslovak natives into the wrong modem-day country. Thus the main legacy of Carpatho-Rusyns' Czechoslovak homeland may well be their descendants eventually needing to educate themselves about 24 U.S. Census Bureau, Total Ancestry Reported: Total ancestry categories tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories reported, 2013 American Community Survey I- Year Estimates. https :// factfinder.census.gov/ faces/tableservices/ jsf/pages/productview.xhtml ?pid=ACS 13 I YR B04003&prodType=table. Accessed I December 2018. �50 SLOVAKIA 2021 the fact that Subcarpathian Rus ' was indeed part of Czechoslovakia and is not the modem day Czechia, nor Slovakia, for that matter. rites _____§s:,vtces for Mary - • 93, of 1220 Valley Road, Duncott, who died Friday morning at Pottsville Hospital, will be held at 9 :15 a.m. Tuesday !rom Dutcavich Funeral Home, Minersville. Further services will be held at 10 a .m . in Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville . The Very Rev. Michael Hatrak will officiate. Interment will be in the parish cemetery, Branch Township. Born public, sh late Metro and Sophie She came to the United States as a child, resided in the Heckscherville and Duncott areas and attended Heckscherville schools. She was a member of Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville, and was active in numerous church functions for many years. Figure 6. 1998 obituary of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant born in Lochovo, Bereg County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was " born in Lockaway, Czech Republic In any case, on this centennial of the creation of the first Czechoslovak Republic, we can happily remember Mamatey's remark about the significance of American Carpatho-Rusyns' activities around this creation : "while the Slovak immigration in the United States affected Wilson's peace policies only indirectly ... the Carpatho-Ruthenian immigrants did so directly." 25 25 Mamatey, 249. �SLOVAKIA 2021 MARI( 51 R0CMR8ISlalf Pholo Woman celebrates turning 103 Mary 11111111 • l'Nident at York Terrace, Pottsville, wavee to ad- =:~==bi~ le now the Cziech Republ 1891, ahe larecenUy. • member of Sa. Born In Pa,1 ; lie Church, Mlnersvllle, and atlll enjoya muak:al and cooking actlvltlea at York Terrace. 7. 200 I news article of a birthday celebration of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant centenarian born in Cyganovci , Uz County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was "born in what is now the Czech Republic." Figure �52 SLOVAKIA 2021 "UIIRO . RUSINIA, PROPOSED THIUD STATE OF TUE CZl',()JJO!!LO'\"AK REPUBLIC " • 0 ...... ,,.....,....-_-...):/ ~ ( • • • ,. 1'14"-t.~ Figure 8. Map prepared in 1918 by Gregory Zatkovich depicting the proposed future state of "Uhro-Rusinia" within a federal Czechoslovakia, in which all Rusyn-inhabited lands on the southern slopes of the Carpathians were to be included. (Archive of Paul R. Magocsi , used with permission) � SLOVAKIA 2021 27 ENVISIONING A HOMELAND: CARPATHO-RUSYN IMMIGRANTS IN THE USA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK OPTION 1 Richard D. Custer In the earliest decades of their life in the United States, relations between Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants were frequent and generally productive. But Czech immigrants neither settled in the same places most Rusyn immigrants went, nor had any notable higherlevel contacts with them. Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant newspapers, which were an important means for their readers to become aware of immigrant issues outside their own ethnic group, rarely made mention of Czechs until 19 16. Yet by late 1918, American Rusyn leaders were laying a foundation for their homeland countrymen entering into a new state with the Czechs and Slovaks. In the space of just a few months of the concept of the first Czechoslovak Republic being known to American Rusyns, a plebiscite conducted in some segments of the community resulted in a strong, though not overwhelming, preference for inclusion into the nascent Czechoslovak state. The results would prove decisive in the fate of post-Austro-Hungarian Subcarpathian Rus'. This article will examine why Czechoslovakia became and did, or did not, remain their preferred option. Early Settlement of Carpatho-Rusyns, Slovaks, and Czechs in the U.S.A. [n the formative years of the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant communities, these two Slavic peoples, in many cases already having occasional contact in their shared homeland, experienced times of cooperation and conflict that helped to firmly define their respective identities. Historic "U pper Hungary," specificall y the counties of Abauj /Abov, Szepes/Spis, Saras/Saris, Zemplen/Zemplin, and Ung/ Uz, 1 O ri gi nally presented at "Czec hoslovakia at I 00: Envisioning and Imagi ng Subcarpathian Rus"' panel , Association fo r Slavic, East European, and Euras ian Studies (ASEEES) annua l convention, Boston , MA, 6 December 2018. �28 SLOVAKIA 2021 experienced the highest rate of poverty and thus the highest rate of emigration to the United States starting in the late 19th century. In these counties - for the most part present-day eastern Slovakia - Slovaks were the majority, and Rusyns were a substantial minority. Some villages were ethnically mixed, or neighboring vil lages inhabited mostly by the other ethnic group. The first Slovak immigrants to the United States from Upper Hungary began to arrive in the late 1860s, and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants from Upper Hungary and Austrian Galicia began to arrive in the latter 1870s, but significant numbers of both were not found in the U.S.A. until the 1880s. The communities of both groups began to organize in the early 1880s. In general , Slovaks (particularly those from eastern Slovakia) and Carpatho-Rusyns settled in the same towns and cities in the U.S.A.: metropolitan New York City; Bridgeport, Connecticut; the anthracite coa l mining region of northeastern Pennsylvania; Philadelphia and the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania; western Pennsy lvania; C leveland ; Chicago and northwestern Indiana; St. Louis; Minneapolis; and Detroit. 2 These areas were home to the vast majority of both Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn parishes and other organizations. The places where Slovaks were established that had no Carpatho-Rusyn presence were few, primarily in upstate New York and the Midwest. Specifically Slovak Roman Catholic parishes were founded in Haz leton , Pennsylvania. and Streator, Illinois ( 1885), and a Lutheran parish was founded also in Streator ( 1884), whi le the first CarpathoRusyn Greek Catholic parish was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1884. Their respective mutual-aid "buria l societies," or fraternal insurance lodges, were also founded at around the same time, the first such Slovak society being founded in New York City in 1883 3 , while the first such Ru syn soc iety was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1885 4 . 2 Konstantin Cul en, History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul, Minn .: Czechoslovak Genea logical Society International, 2007), 67-70; Paul R. Magocsi, Our People: Carpatho-Rusvns and Their Descendant.,· in North America. Fourth rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill .: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005), 20-22. 3 M. Mark Sto larik, "A Place fo r Everyone: Slovak Fraternal-Benefit Societies" in Scott Cummings ed., Se(f-Help in America: Patterns of Minoritv Business Ente1prise (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), 130- 141. 4 Magocsi, 49. �SLOVAKIA 2021 29 In the homeland, Carpatho- Ru syns probably would have never met an ethnic Czech/ Bohemian or Moravian, except perhaps as young conscripts serving together in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War 1. 5 (And it is further unlikely that these men wou ld have found their way to the United States until after the end of the war.) Contact between Carpatho-Ru syn and Czech immigrants in the U.S.A. was similarly unlikely, and the two immigrant groups were of substantiall y different character. Czech immigrants began to arrive in the United States much earl ier: the largest number came in the late 1860s. A substantial portion of these immigrants were at least middle class and artisans, in strong contrast to the mostly peasant Slovak and CarpathoRusyn immigrants who took on unskilled jobs in the mines and mills. Finally, Czech settlements were generally in the Midwest and Texas, where farm land was easi ly obtai ned, far from the industrial setting that defined the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant experience.6 Only in cities like Ch icago, C leveland, and Pittsburgh were eastern S lovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns likely to encounter Czech immigrants, if at all. Additionally, Czech immigrants were increasingly less likely to worship in (Roman) Catholic churc hes and thus their contact with Slovak or (i n certain situations) Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants was not frequent. The early Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants, then, in addition to frequent and essential contact with their Lemko Rusyn , Boiko, and Ukrainian co-religionists from Galicia in Greek Catholic parishes and fraternal organizations, were far more familiar with Slovak immigra nts as their neighbors, work friends , and perhaps spouses or extended family. To some extent, Carpatho-Rusyns' and Slovaks' fraternal benefit organizations developed along the same lines and in cooperation. Fraternal organizations were usually the first community institution estab lished in the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant settlements. These were built on the model of simi lar organizations in the homeland, in part as a replacement for the American insurance that was not usually ava il ab le to S lavic immigrants, and out of a need for 5 Magocsi, " The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovaki a," Sla vic Review, Vol. 34, o. 2 (June 1975), 364. 6 Thoma s Capek, The Cechs (Bohemians) in America: A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 36-51 , 60-68. �30 SLOVAKIA 2021 an organization to rally the immigrants on an ethnic basis. The first of these societies arose in pioneer Slovak and Rusyn settlements in the 1880s and 1890s. Some were founded by Roman and Greek Catholics together, e.g., in Bridgeport, Connecticut ( 1888), Kingston, Pennsylvania ( 1887 or 1888), Streator, Illinois ( 1889), McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, Allegheny/Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Passaic, New Jersey ( 1890). Some or most of these organizations would likely have joined the national Slovak organizations founded around that time: the National Slavonic Society of the United States (renamed National Slovak Society of the United States of America in 1913), or the First Catholic Slovak Union, FCSU/"Jednota," both founded in 1890.7 Rusyns would not have their own comparable organization until 1892. But the most striking example of a shared Slovak/Rusyn fraternal society was the Pennsylvania Slovak Roman & Greek Catholic Union (aka Pennsylvania Slovak Union or PSJ). Of all the Slovak-American fraternal societies this organization would count the largest number of Rusyn members, and more than 20 PSJ lodges were identified specifically as Greek Catholic or were based at a Greek Catholic church. 8 Despite having a generally common cultural background, and some shared religious affiliation and shared organizations, on an official level , the political goals of the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants did not always coincide, even as the idea of a Czechoslovak republic began to materiali ze. American Carpatho-Rusyn Fraternal Benefit Societies Greek Catholic Union (GCU). The GCU was the sec ul ar organization with the largest membership and widest geographical reach in the American Rusyn community. Its leadership, and editorial stance of its Amerikansky Russky Viestnik newspaper (ARV) , were generally anti-Hungarian, vehemently anti-Ukrainian, and mildly Russophil e, though never politically inclined to union with Russia. While its 1902 spinoff United Societies, loyal to America's first Greek Catholic 7 Stolarik, 130- 141. Ri chard D. Custer, "Old Countrymen, New Neighbors: Early Carpatho- Rusyn and Slovak Immigra nt Relations in the United States" in S/ovo (National Czech & Slovak Museum & Library, Cedar Rap ids, IA), Summer 2016. Unabridged version on line at https://www .ncsml .org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07 /Old-Countrymen-New-Neighbors.pdf, 6-7. 8 �SLOVAKIA 2021 31 Bishop Soter Ortynsky (an ethnic Ukrainian) since his arrival in 1907 and friendly to the Ga lician clergy, was the GCU 's antagonist on paper, they wou ld prove to be the al li es that would make possible a stronger voice that proved to be the one that caught the ear of the creators of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Slovaks - those who were Greek Catholics as we ll as Roman Catholics - made up a not insignificant portion of the GCU ' s membership, but early on the GCU took a strong stand against the idea that there were actually ethnic S lovak Greek Catholics.9 United Societies of the Greek Catholic Religion. The United Societies spun off from the GCU in 1902 and maintained a loya li st position toward the Greek Catholic Church, at times in opposition to what was perceived as the rebel li ous or disloyal GCU. In its support for Bishop Ortynsky, the society, its newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian ( 1910- 19 17), and its editor, Father Joseph Hanulya, were castigated by the GCU as Ukrainian sympathi zers. Around 1918, the United Societies had about 9,000 members including youth 10 , and published a newspaper, Prosvita, that remained often at odds w ith the GCU and its ARV. Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz (RNS) / Ukrainian National Association (UNA). The GCU in its early years, under c lerically-dominated leadership, became preoccupied with Rusyn affairs in Hungary and enunciated a generally pro-Hungarian political stance. This ali enated the significant membership from Galicia (most of whom were Lemkos), and many lodges, some even with substantial Subcarpathian membership, seceded from the GCU in 1894 to form a new organization . That organization, founded in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, was the Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz, or in English, Russian National Union . It we lcomed as members Rusyns from Hungary and Galicia who had a strong sense of national identity, whether "Rusyn," " Russian," or "Ruthenian ." As the organization and its Svoboda newspaper became more Ukrainian-oriented, and the terms Ukraine and Ukrainian increasing ly used alongside Rus' and Rusyn, those with Russophil e or Old-Ruthenian views wou ld transfer to other organizations, primarily 9 Custer, '" No Such Thing as Greek Catholic Slovaks: ' The GCU's Polemic," The Carpatho-Rusyns of Pennsylvania, http://rusynsofpa. blogspot.com/2 014/12/no-suchthing-as-greek-catholic-slovaks.html. Accessed December I, 201 8. 10 Magocsi, " Political Activity," 398. �32 SLOVAKIA 2021 the Russian Brotherhood Organization. The dominant "Ruthenian" segment would eventually lead the organization to change its name in September 1914 to the Ukrainian National Association. Alienated by this change, approximately 17 UNA lodges, 15 of which had a primarily Subcarpathian Rusyn membership, joined the United Societies between October 1914 and February 1915, resulting in 2 1 new regular United Societies lodges and 6 new United Societies youth lodges. Onl y a few such lodges would remain in the UNA, and so the organization's influence among American Subcarpathian Rusyns had almost entirely di ssipated. Russian Brotherhood Organization (RBO). Some members of GCU and RNS in 1900 gathered in Mahanoy City, Pa ., to form a new fraternal organization that would resist clerical domination, have no requirement of church membership, and avoid both pro-Hungarian and pro-Ukrainian political stands. Most of its early lodges were located in northeastern Pennsylvania and some had left the GCU or RNS to join. Religiously, the society remained officially neutral , but as a Ukrainian orientation came to dominate Ga lician Greek Catholic circles in the U.S.A. and in the homeland, the organization became much more supportive of the Orthodox Church, and an increasing portion of its membership reflected that. The RBO 's consistent stand on Ukrainianism was very negative, but simi larly, it opposed the idea that the Rusyn people's regional distinctions justified separation from Great Russians. While the majority of RBO members originated in the Lemko Region of Galicia, many of its founders and largest lodges originated in Hungary/Subcarpathia. In fact, in 1918 nearly 40 RBO lodges had a Subcarpathian majority, and a comparable number of lodges were loosely affiliated with Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes. Ru ssian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society (ROCMAS). A convention of church brotherhoods that had converted to Orthodoxy took place in September 1895 in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , the center of the Rusyn movement to Orthodoxy led by Father Alexis Toth. They formed a federation, and by the first national convention in 1896, eighteen brotherhoods were members. The Society issued a newspaper, Svit, written in a mixture of Galician Ukrainian and Russian . While somewhat concerned with cultural matters, the Society's primary goal was the defense and promotion of Orthodoxy among socalled " Little Russian" immigrants. It vehemently opposed Ukrainia- �SLOVAKIA 2021 33 nism and the Greek Catholic Church, and promoted a strict Russian identity almost as a necessary feature of Orthodoxy, to the detriment of the local or regional linguistic and cultural traits of its Rusyn membership. Many of its larger and older lodges were primarily Subcarpathian, e.g., Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Scranton , Catasauqua, and Berwick. United Russian Orthodox Brotherhood of America. The organization, at its founding known as the Greek Catholic Pravoslavny Brotherhood, was established in 1915 mainly by former members of the GCU in southwestern Penn sylvania who had recently joined the Ru ssian Orthodox Church. The vast majority of its members hip was of Subcarpathian origin, particularly from the more eastern counties of Uz, Bereg and Maramoros. Within two decades it grew to around 20,000 members 11 . Position of Slovak Fraternals "There is no 'Slovak ' people" - so titled was an art icle in the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik, Aug. 29, 1918. The postwar years and the struggles over the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic would involve back-and-forth arguments between Ru syn American and Slovak American leaders, in print and, no doubt, in face-to-face meetings. But the root of the di strust undoubtedly was the early conflicts in these communities. The National Slovak Society, for its part, both supported the Rusyn people and disagreed at times with the position of the Rusyn leaders: National Slovak Society members expressed their concern for the fate of their brother Slavs, the Rusyns, who were now [World War I] experiencing the brunt of persecution in wartime Europe. Not only were repressive measures being taken against Rusyns in Carpathian Hungary, but in neighboring Galicia, Magyar troops were perpetrating wholesale massac res. This did not mean that the N.S.S. was conceding to th e claims of a Rusyn nationalism in Eastern Slovakia. Although support for the Slovak ca use in the region had been growing - largely thanks to the financi al support of the American Slovak community - certain elements considered the "S lovjaks" (i .e., Greek Catholics speaking the dial ect of the 11 Magocs i, Our People, 57. �34 SLOVAKIA 2021 eastern regions) as a separate nationality. The official N.S.S. policy was that the Slovjaks were Slovak, not Rusyn, Russian , or any other Slav people. 12 Political Actions During and Toward the End of World War I The Rus 'ko-Amerykans 'ka Rada (Rusyn/Ruthenian American Council) was established at a gathering in Philadelphia on December 8, 1914. By design it was to give equal leadership voice to Subcarpathian and Galician Rusyns, and under the patronage of Bishop Ortynsky, its directors included clerical and lay leaders from the Subcarpathian Rusyn community, especially Father Joseph Hanulya, editor of the United Societies newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian , George Gulanich and Ivan Zeedick of the GCU , and John Branik, president of the United Societies. At its Philadelphia meeting it condemned Russia and advocated for support of the political and cultural union of "Ukrainian (Rusyn)"-inhabited Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary. 13 This entity ceased to exist with the death of Ortynsky in 1916, but not without drawing ire upon Father Hanulya for his participation. The American-Russian National Defense (ARND) / Narodna Obrana was founded in 1915 in Braddock, Pa. , near Pittsburgh, by Nicholas Pachuta. At the time Pachuta was assistant editor of the ARV, a post he held until 1918, under Michael Hanchin . National Defense styled itself the defender of Rus ' -ness against Magyarism in the Greek Catholic Church, was also critical of Slovakophiles and Ukrainophiles, and picked up members who were recent converts to Orthodoxy in the era of Bishop Stephen Dzubay. In May of 19 18 he met with Thomas G. Masaryk, the leader of the movement for a new state to be called Czechoslovakia, in Pittsburgh and began a discussion around the fate of Uhro-Rus ' (the Rusyn lands south of the Carpathians, historically part of Hungary). At that time Masaryk disregarded Pachuta's goals because his group "had no following or 12 R. Vl adimir Baumgarten and Joseph Ste fka , The National Slovak Society : 100 Year Histmy. 1890-/990. (Pittsburgh: Nation al Slovak Society, 1990), 76. 13 " Narodnyi z' "izd u Filiadel'fii"," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ ), 19 December 1914, 2; Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884- 1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ), 134. �SLOVAKIA 2021 35 support among the broad masses of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants." 14 National Defense came around to the Czechoslovak option and delivered a memorandum to Masaryk in October endorsing autonomy within a Czechoslovak state. Around that time Pachuta converted to Orthodoxy, and in 1921 he united the National Defense with the American Russian Brotherhood based in C leve land. From 1922 until 1935 he was editor of the Russkij Vistnik newspaper of U ROBA. The League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia was a strictly Russophile political organization that drew most of its participation from individuals who were already active in organizations like ROCMAS and especially RBO. The vast majority of its members were of Galician background, but about 25% of delegates to its congresses were Subcarpathian Rusyns . 15 It held congresses in 19 17, 1918, and 1919 and made proclamations that Carpatho-Rusyn territory, a long with the who le of Galicia and Bukovina, should be part of Russia. The American National Counci l of Uhro-Rusins was founded in July of 1918 in Pittsburgh, with strong support from the United Societies and eventually the GCU . It grew to more than 100 branches, some of which had I 00 or even 200+ members. This was the organization in which the Pittsburgh attorney Gregory Zatkovich rose to leadership, began meetings with Masaryk, and which led to his post as the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus' . In Philadelphia on October 23, 1918, Zatkovich participated in the Mid-European Democratic Union in the presence of Masaryk . At that time Uhro-Rusyns - Rusyns of Hungary - were accepted as a distinct nationa lity, apart from Ukrainians who were already members. The National Counci l met at Scranton, Pa., on November 12, and formulated its final recommendation that Rusyn territory south of the Carpathians, including all of the original Uhro-Rusyn counties, be united in a Czechoslovak state with broad autonomy. The next day, the resolution was presented to Masaryk, who recommended that a plebiscite be held among American Uhro-Rusyns. 14 Joseph Danko, "Plebiscite of Carpath o- Ruthenians in the United States Recommendin g Union of Carpatho-Rutheni a with the Czec hoslovak Republic," Annals of !he Ukrainian Academy of Aris and Sciences, 11 , nos. 1-2 ( 1964-68), 186. 15 Prikarpalskaia Rus • (New York), Vol. I, o. I, October 191 8. �36 SLOVAKIA 2021 The American Uhro-Rusyn Plebiscite of December 1918 The American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, in conjunction with Masaryk's advice to Zatkovich, resolved to conduct a vote in Subcarpathian Rusyn parishes and fraternal lodges to determine their preferred action with respect to the homeland, among the options it had previously agreed to. Of course, they expected that the result would need to support what had already been decided: that Subcarpathian Rusyn territory should join the Czech and Slovak republic. This vote, then, was limited to the National Council's constituency: Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes - no Orthodox parishes and no Galician-majority parishes would be involved, even if they had substantial numbers of Subcarpathian Rusyn members; and lodges of the GCU and United Societies only, who were already seen to be inclined toward their leadership's preference for Czechoslovakia. The plebiscite was announced in only one issue of the ARV (Nov. 14, 1918), and commenced almost immediately thereafter. There is no extant evidence that there was campaigning within the communities to select a particular option; certainly there would have been very little time for that. We do have results of the vote, which was published in several installments in the ARV and Prosvita, and which were collected in "Plebiscite ofCarpatho-Ruthenians in the United States Recommending Union of Carpatho-Ruthenia with the Czechoslovak Republic" authored by Joseph Danko in 1968. 16 Option Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic Union with the Ukrainian Republic Total independence Union with Carpatho-Russians Union with Russi a Union with Magyar Land fHungaryl Union with Galicia Total Votes (% of tota l) 732 (66.4%) 310 (28. 1%) 27 (2.5%) 13 ( 1.2%) 10 (0.9%) 9 (0.8%) I (0. 1%) I , 102(/00.0%) Unsurprisingly, the organizers' preferred option won decisively, but not overwhelmingly. Based on the individual vote counts by parish and lodge provided by Danko, I would like to comment on some of 16 Danko, 200. �SLOVAKIA 2021 37 the more interesting things I observed. Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic (rank: I} As we will see, each of the options had some very surprising entities voting for them. This option's supporters included two parishes founded as Greek Catholic but which at the time of the vote had Orthodox pastors: Elkhorn, West Virginia (Father John Gratson) and Elizabeth, New Jersey (Father Gregory Varho l). Not very surprising was a vote by a large, mostly Subcarpathian parish of Rusyns from Spis, Saris and Zemplin Counties (Holy Ghost in Tremont), but whose pastor was Father Hanulya, former editor of the United Societies' first newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian - who for years as a supporter of Bishop Ortynsky had been attacked by the GCU in the pages of ARV for being a quasi-Ukrainian . Fourteen of the GCU lodges were based at majority-Galician parishes, although some of these lodges were primari ly Subcarpathian in membership. Union with the Ukrainian Republic (rank: 2) Figure 1. A portion of the American Rusyn communities that voted for union of Uhro-Rusyns with the Ukrainian Republic (66% of tota l votes cast). (Source: Danko, 196-198) The following voted for Uni on of Uhro-Rusins with Ukraini an Republic Societies of the Greek Catholic of Rusin Brothe rhoods in the USA 4 6 17 19 24 28 32 50 Mahoney City, Pa. Donmore , Pa. Rendham, Pa. Lansing, Pa . Eckle y , Pa. Glenlien, Pa. Sheppton, Pa. Mahoney Plane, Pa. (Figure I continues) 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 242 267 292 295 298 324 379 390 St. Clair , Pa. Hannastown, Pa. Wilkes-Barre , Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Baggaley, PP a . New Salem, Pa. Kester, Pa. McKees Rocks, Pa. 3 2 2 3 1 6 2 5 �38 SLOVAKIA 2021 Uhro-Rusins Greek Catholic United Congregations. I St. Johna SL Johna B. V. M. Bleaed TrinitY B. V. M. B. V. M. SL Michael B. V. M. Holy Ghost L Michael hen Scnnton, Pa. Bridgeport, Conn. New Salem, Pa. New Britain, Conn. Freebnd,PL Whitting, Ind. Ref. &am>lky P.ev. Cbomoc:t Rev.~ 400- 8 500-10 400- 8 Blnghamtoo, N.Y. Taylor, Pa. McKeca Rocb, PL St. Clair Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Rev. Thq2t Rev. Petraaovich Rev. A. Suba Rev. Ribovsk Rev. N. Chopey 550- 7 Lt Lansford, Pa. Rev. Martyak 550- 7 ~udloning, Pa. Ha eton, Pa. Rn. p ch Rev. Brinaky llef. Choarboch 500- 6 500· 6 600-12 600-12 550- 7 Rev. FeiuG !&J- s Overall this was the most surprising result, having the second highest number of votes. Some votes came from additionally surprising places. For example: the parish in New Britain had experienced an ugly split with Galician Ukrainians just eight years before, yet they still had a Galician pastor. The Wilkes-Barre parish ' s pastor was Father Nicholas Chopey, who had a few years before been numbered among the pro-Hungary clergy. The Lansford parish ' s pastor was Father Gabriel Martyak, administrator of the Uhro-Rusyn parishes in the wake of Bishop Ortynsky's death two years before. And the Hazleton parish that voted for this option, pastored by the Lemko priest Father John Fekula? This was actually the Galician parish (St. Michael) that split off from two existing Subcarpathian parishes in the same city. We must wonder how this parish had the opportunity to vote at all. The lodges that voted this way included largely-Galician GCU lodges in Glen Lyon (based at an old mostlyGalician parish) and Rankin (based at a mostly-Subcarpathian parish), �39 SLOVAKIA 2021 five other GC U lodges based at Galician-majority pari shes but with mostl y Subcarpathi an members, and a GCU lodge from Father Martyak's paris h in Lansford whose members were mostl y from Sari s and Zemplin Counti es. The following voted for Tou.l Independence of Uhro-Rusins. Societies of the Greek C. Union. ):: ~~•:· an !Im , a. \ Eynon, Pa. lmon, Pa. ~nton, ra. 2 1 I Gymnastic Branches. I61 11 Scranton, Pa. 67 Mahonoy City, Pa. 1 United Societies of Greek C. Religion I ss K.ingaton, Pa. 1 II 60 Edwardavillc, Pa. 2 j Uhro-Rusin Congregations 11 ¥ M : Holy Gbolt iililUIIII t11 Jcaup, Pa. 1&11 li•1 :Rev. Ivan I= i I Figure 2. The Ameri can Rusyn communities whi ch voted fo r tota l indepe ndence of Uhro-Rusyns (3 % of votes cast). (Danko, 198) Total independence of Uhro- Rusyns (rank: 3) Without any traditi on of self-rule, and without any real advocates fo r thi s pos ition, it is not surpri sing that it rece ived so few votes. It 's notable that not only did the pari sh and a GCU lodge in Jessup, Pennsy lvani a, contribute a number of the votes fo r thi s option, but two additional GC U lodges that did , in Eynon , Pennsyl va ni a, were a ffili ated wi th the Jessup pari sh as we ll. Jessup a lso had a large RBO lodge, but it is unlike ly that independence would have been the ir preference. �40 SLOVAKIA 2021 Union with Carpatho-Russians (i.e., Galicians, Bukovinians, UhroRusyns) (rank: 4) This position was represented among American Carpatho-Rusyns mainly by the League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia, although evidently few Subcarpathian Rusyns belonged to that organization, and to some extent originally by the American-Russian National Defense. The few votes for this option came mainly from Gary, Indiana 's GCU Lodge 469 and its Greek Catholic parish, which was primarily of Subcarpathian origin (in its western counties that would be incorporated into Slovakia) although it is not clear to this author why that would have been their choice. Union with Russia (rank: 5) The FolJowing voted for Union with Russia Greek Catholic Union. 550 Olyphant, Pa. 1 Gymnastic Branch 121 Jerome, Pa. I Uhro-Rusin Congregations a. V. M. Mahoooy City, Pa. lln. I. lubck 400- a Figure 3. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Russia (I % of votes cast). (Danko. 199) Among the votes for this option were GCU Lodge 530 in Olyphant, Pennsylvania, mostly Lemko in membership and based at a Galician-majority parish, and perhaps most curious of all , St. Mary 's Greek Catholi c Church in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, whose pastor was the noted Rusyn-language author and cultural patriot Father Emil Kubek. Kubek was also part of the leadership of the American I �41 SLOVAKIA 2021 National Council, which was not supportive of union with Russia at all. While he was not a Russophile, his relative lack of involvement with the GCU (and perhaps due to the RBO being founded in his parish) may have encouraged him to advocate for this option . Or more likely the decisive factor was the RBO's founding president, John Zincak Smith, also being the president of St. Mary's parish. Union with Magyar land (i.e., Hungary) (rank: 6) The Following voted for Union of Uhro-Rwins with Magyar Land Greek Catholic Union. 50 2 181 Clevdand, Ohio Clndand, Ohio Uhro-Rusin Congregations. St. John'• , ClcYeland, Ohio llev. Ballog soo- 6 I Figure 4. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Hungary (I % of votes cast). (Danko, 199) Even though many of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic clergy in the U.S. were Magyarized (if not outright Magyarone), it doesn't seem that any attempt there may have been on their part to influence their parishioners to vote for this option was successful. The ARV denounced Hungary's policy toward its ethnic minorities for years in the lead up to the war. Despite Hungary's liberalized ethnic minority policy that began in 1915, inclination toward Hungary from American Rusyns seems to have changed little. Two GCU lodges voted for this option, but most striking is that six votes came from St. John's Church in Cleveland - not the Rusyn one that in 1918 had hired an Orthodox priest as its pastor - but the Magyar parish, pastored by Father Michael Balogh. This was the only ethnic-Hungarian parish to vote, and it's unlikely that Zatkovich and the American National Council had intended the plebiscite to include the Magyar parishes. (It's possible that they did, we just have no evidence on either side to say for sure.) Union with Galicia (rank: 7) Given the still substantial portion of the GCU's membership either �42 SLOVAKIA 2021 from Galicia or belonging to lodges based at Galician-majority parishes, we could have expected more votes for this option than were returned. However, a number of GCU lodges that were mostly or entirely Galician in membership (e.g., McKeesport Lodge 782, Wilmerding, Pa. , Lodges 348 and 360) - and based at Galician parishes - did not vote. It must be underscored that the plebiscite was not truly representative of the range of religious congregations and fraternal lodges found in the American Carpatho-Rusyn community, not even when speaking exclusively of those from Subcarpathia - the "Uhro-Rusyns." The Orthodox (except for two parishes which inexplicably did vote) were wholly unrepresented, and the significant fraternals RBO, ROCMAS , and fledgling UROBA were likewise ignored. Clearly it was meant to produce the additional justification Zatkovich needed to present the Scranton resolution to the Paris Peace Conference. 17 Understandably alarmed by this development, the activist Ukrainian American community opposed what they had hoped would be an outcome supporting their goal to unite so-called Ukrainian-Ruthenian ethnographic territory in a Ukrainian state. In so doing, they provided what seems to be the only eyewitness account of how the plebiscite was conducted in a Rusyn parish. Here writes a Ukrainian from Bridgeport, Conn .: Our Hungarian brother Rusyns want to unite Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine. On December 8 of this year, a parish meeting was held in Bridgeport, Conn. , right after the Divine Liturgy, in the parish school. The meeting was very interesting for every Ukrainian, because our brother Uhro-Rusyns decided on the fate of our and their brothers across the sea. Local speakers and Father Orest Cornjak [Chornock], local pastor, spoke. The meeting was convened for the purpose of deciding where Hungarian Rus' shou ld belong: whether to Ukraine or to the Czecho-Slovak state. Father Orest Cornjak stated his preference, that he would vote to belong to his brothers, that is, to the Ukrainians, rather than to the Czecho-Slovaks . After much discussion , it turned out that the Uhro-Rusyn 17 Victor S. Mamatey, "The Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians," in Joseph F. O'Grady, ed .. The Immigrants· Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 245-246. �SLOVAKIA 2021 43 leaders wanted to lead the Uhro-Rusyns to the Czecho-Slovaks, without questioning the Uhro-Rusyn people. And again the speakers protested against the "American National Council of UhroRusins" in America that no one has elected; its members of that Council are self-appointed leaders, that they have chosen themselves and have no right to speak in the name of the Uhro-Rusyn people, and further that they proposed an amendment so as not to vote either for Ukraine or against, nor to take a position against the Czecho-Slovak state, and so let it be as Uhro-Rusyns will decide in the old country. They also complained to the Ukrainians that at the founding of the " Mid-European Union" at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pa., they had to say that the Uhro-Rusyns are "a different people" from the Ukrainians, and thus the Ukrainians do not want to accept the UhroRusyns as an equal among equals and so for that reason will not vote in that way. When people were already wanting to leave, Mr. Ivan Boyko, head of the Ukrainian Athletic Association (Sich) in America, while asking forgiveness for the slurs that were committed by Ukrainians, and explaining that the Uhro-Rusyns had already decided at the founding council meetings in L'viv that Hungarian Rus ' should belong to Ukraine together with Galicia and Bukovina, said he did not see the reasons why the Uhro-Rusyns should not vote for the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine. He laid out what benefits the Uhro-Rusyns would have in a Ukrainian state, and what benefits they would have from the Czecho-Slovaks .. .. We Ukrainians, said Mr. Bojko, can never agree that our Hungarian brothers will be in the Czecho-Slovak state. [... ] It should be noted that the audience very intently listened to Mr. Bojko and took his every word to heart. After the speech the audience rewarded him with applause when the other speakers received no applause. Here Mr. Bojko did a great service to the Ukrainian people by proclaiming this speech to the Hungarian brothers, because then now the entire hall of people began to speak differently about it after the speech, because it was moved to vote by secret ballot, about where Hungarian Rus' should belong: whether to Ukraine, or to the Czecho-Slovak state, and another motion, to vote by roll call , so that you know who is against your brothers (Ukrainians). Father Comjak led by saying: Who is for �44 SLOVAKIA 2021 uniting Hungarian Rus' with Ukraine? It was decided unanimously on the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine, and then came the second ballot: Who is for uniting Hungarian Rus' with the Czecho-Slovaks? For this union with the Czecho-Slovaks there was only one vote. So, evidently, the Uhro-Rusyns want to unite with Ukraine. The statement made in Philadelphia by Misters M. Sichynsky and N. Ceglinsky, recognizing the Uhro-Rusyns as a separate nationality, with their representative as Mr. Zatkovich in the "MidEuropean Union," should be retracted for the good of the Ukrainian people and the Uhro-Rusyns . Instead, let them declare that the Uhro-Rusyns are our brothers by blood and by faith , and we can never agree that a second nationality would rule over our Hungarian brothers, even if it were Czecho-Slovakia. In Bridgeport, Conn ., Uhro-Rusyns do not recognize the "American National Council of Uhro-Rusins" because their people did not select them , and that self-styled Counci l has no right to push them into a Czecho-Slovak state, because the Uhro-Rusyn brothers want to unite Hungarian Rus ' with Ukraine. Glory to them for this! 18 The Ukrainian National Association's newspaper Svoboda reported on a Ukrainian National Congress that took place in January 1919. This congress included speakers on the situation in the Subcarpath ian Rusyn community in the U.S. and its recent Scranton resolution and fol low-on plebiscite. Father Kubek , editor of the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik [this is an error, he was not] was supposed to speak, but at the last moment he informed that he was not able to do so. His place was taken by a Galician priest, Father Vasyl' Merenkiv, who said, among other things: "In recent days I was in several Uhro-Rusyn parishes and spoke with several Uhro-Rusyn priest-leaders . We spoke about the idea of uniting Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine . I can assure the esteemed delegates that they are all committed to joining Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine more so than with Czec hoslovak ia. But still, I noticed that American Uhro-Rusyns are sti ll wavering." Mr. Ivan Hajovyc (of Maramoros), a delegate from the Chicago Uhro-Rusyns, was called to speak. He revealed his joy that he has an 18 "Svobidna vo lia uhors' kykh Ru syniv," Svoboda, 14 December 19 I 8, 2. �SLOVAKIA 2021 45 opportunity to speak to so many people who are interested in the fate of Uhro-Rusyns. He talked about the oppression that Uhro-Rusyns suffered from the Magyars. " We, Hungarian Ukrainians," said Mr. Hajovyc, "stand body and soul for the unity of Ukraine.We want to join with Ukraine! We are protesting against the plebiscite conducted among American UhroRusyn s, which was set up for the sake of uniting Uhro-Rus' with Czechoslovakia. Hungarian Ukrainians want to be united with Ukraine. We do not know what Czechoslovakia is and who CzechoSlovaks are. We never want to hear anything about joining them." Mr. Ivan Hundjak (a Galician) argued using statistics that the plebiscite initiated by Masaryk among American Uhro-Rusyns was conducted in a deceptive manner. Finally Mr. Ivan Skakandij, an Uhro-Rusyn cantor-teacher and delegate from Nesquehoning, Pa . was called to speak He regretted that in such an important moment Hungarian Ukrainians in America have not yet all been awakened to a life of national consciousness. " It is the fault of the Uhro-Rusyn clergy, who in the old country were led around by the Magyars and now by the Czechoslovaks. But nationally conscious Hungarian Ukrainians in America want to unite with Ukraine. We are just now awakening to life and there is hope that in a short time we will all be awakened." One speaker (Father Merenkiv) said " Hungarian Ukrainians in America are still waking up, but remember, that as we wake up , Masaryk will do nothing to help." 19 My observations about the results, it turns out, while I arrived at them independently, were noted to some extent already in 1919 in an article in the Ukrainian press. This is the speech by Ivan Hundjak (mentioned previously) in which he analyzed the resu lts and pointed out, among other criticisms, that if a person happened to be a member of a GCU lodge and the United Societies lodge in the same place, and the local Subcarpathian Greek Catholic parish, conceivably that person could vote up to three times. He noted as well (as Danko did) that participation among those eligible to vote was fairly low. He asserted that had these irregularities been taken into account, the leading result 19 "Z narodnohu z'izdu," Svoboda, 18 January 19 19, 2. �46 SLOVAKIA 2021 probably would have been for union with Ukraine. I would counter that had there been time, or the will, to more inclusively offer the vote to all American Subcarpathian Rusyn institutions, and not just the ones affiliated with the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, the results may indeed have been different, but more likely toward union with Russia, as impractical as that might have been. Reception of Czechoslovakia in the Rusyn American Community In May of 19 I 9, the cornerstone was laid in Homestead, Pennsylvania, for the Rusin Peoples Home. This event, under the patronage of the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, occurred just days before the National Counci l in Uzhorod, Subcarpathian Rus ', would accept the American Rusyns ' proposal to unite with Czechoslovakia. The commemorative booklet for this event 20 prominently featured a page with the American, Czechoslovak, and "Rusin" flags entwined, with the slogan "Old Glory Has Made This Federation (Czech-SlovakRusin) Possible." The pages following showed photographs of Zatkovich signing the declaration of the Mid-European Nationalities and Masaryk reading the declaration at a public manifestation in Philadelphia. The book ' s last page is a map showing Europe ' s ethnic groups within the new postwar borders, with Czechoslovakia labeled "Czechoslovaks" and to its east, "Uhro-Rusinia." It's not clear whether UhroRusinia is meant to be depicted as part of Czechoslovakia or not. Whatever the interpretation, this is probably the lone celebratory publication of American Rusyns to mark the decision to join the Czechoslovak Republic. A delegation of American Rusyn gymnasts affiliated with the GCU Sokol division travelled to Prague in the summer of 1920 to participate in a Pan-Slavic Gymnastics exhibition. As part of the trip they also visited Subcarpathian Rus ' and had an audience with Governor Zatkovich. One member of the delegation wrote, " In Prague we were 20 Souvenir Issued by the Rusin Peoples Home, Inc. on the Occasion of the Dedication ofthe Corner-Stone I Pamiatnik izdan ko,poratsieiu Russkii Narodny i Dom iz sluchai posviashcheniia kraeugol 'nago kamen 'ia. Homestead. Pa .. I 9 I 9 (Homestead, Pa., 19 19). �SLOVAKIA 2021 47 warmly welcomed by the Czechs and everything we saw in Prague and the way we were treated , we enjoyed ... " oi...o OLO ..... .. , . . MAO• T .. , . rcDll:.. 4Tt0N ie&&CW·~YAK "v.lNI ~ . . . • 1..• Figure 5. Page from the commemorative booklet for the cornerstone laying ofthe Rusin Peoples Home in Homestead, Pa., May 1919. Another wrote, " With thanks to God , with our appearance at the Pan-Slavic Sokol Meet in Prague, we made a mark in the history of our Sokol Branch which wi ll be permanent proof that we accomplished our mission , that we entered into the order of the Czechoslovak Sokol movement. . . We also left a lasting impression on the youth of Subcarpathian Rus ' ." The trip was promoted in the pages of ARV and chronicled fully in the 1921 almanac of the Sokol division. 2 1 It wou ld not be long before frustration over the lack of autonomy promised Subcarpathian Rus' by Masaryk would boil over in the American Carpatho-Rusyn press, especially when Zatkovich resigned in 1921 , and would continue at least until the late 1920s among Greek Catholics. The GCU printed a number of publications critical of Czechoslovak policy: Zatkovich's Otkrytie-Expose by vseho g ubernatora Podkarpatskoj Rus i, o Podkarpatskoj Rusi ( 1921 ), Wilson's Prin21 C heryl We ller Beck et al. , Opportuni~v Realized: The Greek Catholic Union 's First One Hundred Years, / 892-1992. (Beaver, Pa.: Gree k Catholic Uni on o f the U.S.A. , 1994), 75 . �48 SLOVAKIA 2021 ciples in Czechoslovak Practice: The Situation of the Carpatho-Russian People Under the Czech Yoke ( 1929) and Beskid's Karpatorusskaja pravda ( 1932). They would also lead a National Congress of Rusins in Pittsburgh in November 1922, which issued a memorandum to Prague condemning their policy toward Subcarpathian Rus '. American Rusyns in the Russian Orthodox Church and others of Russophile orientation would take up the opposition to Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus' through the 1930s. 22 I did not find any evidence - written or photographic - in Carpatho-Rusyn communities or parishes of widespread adoption of Czechoslovakia as a symbolic "homeland." There is certain ly no oral folklore around portraits of Masaryk (or Zatkovich, for that matter) being hung in parish halls as there is of portraits of Maria Theresa and Franz Josef from the early immigration. Lasting Impressions on Rusyn Americans of a Czechoslovak "Homeland" A list on the Wikipedia entry for Czech Americans of "The top 50 U.S. communities with the highest percentage of people claiming Czech ancestry" 23 (based on the 2000 U.S . census) contains mostly predictable results - locations in North Dakota, Texas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin , et al. An accompanying list, " U.S. communities with the most residents born in the Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia)," however, contains a curious entry: tied for number IO was the little town of Colver, Pennsylvania, about 20 miles north of Johnstown in the west central part of the state. Colver, a former coal mining company town , had just a few primary ethnic groups : among these were Slovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns. It may we ll have sti ll had a few residents in 2000 who were born in the former Czechos lovakia. It is not clear that these results came from responses declaring their birthplace as "Czech Republic" or "Czechoslovakia," or either, but surely this population in Colver, Pennsylvania, was not ethnic Czechs. 22 Magocsi, Our People, 88-89. "Czech Americans", https ://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech Americans. Accessed December I, 201 8. 23 �SLOVAKIA 2021 49 The U.S. Census Bureau statistics for ancestry 24 (estimated from its 20 I 3 American Community Survey) show that Pennsylvania, historically the state with the largest number of Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants, had more than 52,142 residents with Czech ancestry, or 0.3% of Pennsylvania residents. This is much less than those who indicated Slovak or Ukrainian ancestry, many of which are likely of Carpatho-Rusyn background (or the completely unreali stic 193 ,000 with "Russian" ancestry), but still far higher than the hi storically low Czech settlement of the state would imply. In addition, "Czechoslovak ian" ancestry was estimated at 22,904, which could conceivably include any of Czech, Slovak, or Carpatho-Rusyn-descended individuals, although the much lower national consciousness of CarpathoRusyn Americans - reflected by the miniscule estimated 2,050 of that background - would lead one to expect most of those "Czechoslovak" individuals to have Carpatho-Rusyn ancestry. That many Carpatho-Rusyn Americans of any particular geographic background in Carpathian Rus ' still exhibit confusion about their ethnic and geographical origins is not news to anyone. But it may be that Subcarpathian Rus ' belonging for 20 years to Czechoslovakia created a lingering geographic attachment to the idea of "Czechoslovakia" as the ancestral land of American Carpatho-Rusyns. Consider these newspaper clippings, maybe the most extreme examples of this phenomenon I've encountered. A perhaps unintended corollary to this phenomenon is the everincreasing use of genealogy websites where obituaries, gravestones, and other data are collected; many of the individuals - Carpatho-Rusyns and others - whose ge nealogical data is found on these sites have had their birthplace, which was probably entered by their descendant researcher as "Czechoslovakia," transposed by the site into "Czech Republic," further muddling Carpatho-Rusyn identity by placing Czechoslovak natives into the wrong modem-day country. Thus the main legacy of Carpatho-Rusyns' Czechoslovak homeland may well be their descendants eventually needing to educate themselves about 24 U.S. Census Bureau, Total Ancestry Reported: Total ancestry categories tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories reported, 2013 American Community Survey I- Year Estimates. https :// factfinder.census.gov/ faces/tableservices/ jsf/pages/productview.xhtml ?pid=ACS 13 I YR B04003&prodType=table. Accessed I December 2018. �50 SLOVAKIA 2021 the fact that Subcarpathian Rus ' was indeed part of Czechoslovakia and is not the modem day Czechia, nor Slovakia, for that matter. rites _____§s:,vtces for Mary - • 93, of 1220 Valley Road, Duncott, who died Friday morning at Pottsville Hospital, will be held at 9 :15 a.m. Tuesday !rom Dutcavich Funeral Home, Minersville. Further services will be held at 10 a .m . in Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville . The Very Rev. Michael Hatrak will officiate. Interment will be in the parish cemetery, Branch Township. Born public, sh late Metro and Sophie She came to the United States as a child, resided in the Heckscherville and Duncott areas and attended Heckscherville schools. She was a member of Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville, and was active in numerous church functions for many years. Figure 6. 1998 obituary of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant born in Lochovo, Bereg County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was " born in Lockaway, Czech Republic In any case, on this centennial of the creation of the first Czechoslovak Republic, we can happily remember Mamatey's remark about the significance of American Carpatho-Rusyns' activities around this creation : "while the Slovak immigration in the United States affected Wilson's peace policies only indirectly ... the Carpatho-Ruthenian immigrants did so directly." 25 25 Mamatey, 249. �SLOVAKIA 2021 MARI( 51 R0CMR8ISlalf Pholo Woman celebrates turning 103 Mary 11111111 • l'Nident at York Terrace, Pottsville, wavee to ad- =:~==bi~ le now the Cziech Republ 1891, ahe larecenUy. • member of Sa. Born In Pa,1 ; lie Church, Mlnersvllle, and atlll enjoya muak:al and cooking actlvltlea at York Terrace. 7. 200 I news article of a birthday celebration of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant centenarian born in Cyganovci , Uz County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was "born in what is now the Czech Republic." Figure �52 SLOVAKIA 2021 "UIIRO . RUSINIA, PROPOSED THIUD STATE OF TUE CZl',()JJO!!LO'\"AK REPUBLIC " • 0 ...... ,,.....,....-_-...):/ ~ ( • • • ,. 1'14"-t.~ Figure 8. Map prepared in 1918 by Gregory Zatkovich depicting the proposed future state of "Uhro-Rusinia" within a federal Czechoslovakia, in which all Rusyn-inhabited lands on the southern slopes of the Carpathians were to be included. (Archive of Paul R. Magocsi , used with permission) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 27 ENVISIONING A HOMELAND: CARPATHO-RUSYN IMMIGRANTS IN THE USA AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK OPTION 1 Richard D. Custer In the earliest decades of their life in the United States, relations between Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants were frequent and generally productive. But Czech immigrants neither settled in the same places most Rusyn immigrants went, nor had any notable higherlevel contacts with them. Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant newspapers, which were an important means for their readers to become aware of immigrant issues outside their own ethnic group, rarely made mention of Czechs until 19 16. Yet by late 1918, American Rusyn leaders were laying a foundation for their homeland countrymen entering into a new state with the Czechs and Slovaks. In the space of just a few months of the concept of the first Czechoslovak Republic being known to American Rusyns, a plebiscite conducted in some segments of the community resulted in a strong, though not overwhelming, preference for inclusion into the nascent Czechoslovak state. The results would prove decisive in the fate of post-Austro-Hungarian Subcarpathian Rus'. This article will examine why Czechoslovakia became and did, or did not, remain their preferred option. Early Settlement of Carpatho-Rusyns, Slovaks, and Czechs in the U.S.A. [n the formative years of the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant communities, these two Slavic peoples, in many cases already having occasional contact in their shared homeland, experienced times of cooperation and conflict that helped to firmly define their respective identities. Historic "U pper Hungary," specificall y the counties of Abauj /Abov, Szepes/Spis, Saras/Saris, Zemplen/Zemplin, and Ung/ Uz, 1 O ri gi nally presented at "Czec hoslovakia at I 00: Envisioning and Imagi ng Subcarpathian Rus"' panel , Association fo r Slavic, East European, and Euras ian Studies (ASEEES) annua l convention, Boston , MA, 6 December 2018. 28 SLOVAKIA 2021 experienced the highest rate of poverty and thus the highest rate of emigration to the United States starting in the late 19th century. In these counties - for the most part present-day eastern Slovakia - Slovaks were the majority, and Rusyns were a substantial minority. Some villages were ethnically mixed, or neighboring vil lages inhabited mostly by the other ethnic group. The first Slovak immigrants to the United States from Upper Hungary began to arrive in the late 1860s, and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants from Upper Hungary and Austrian Galicia began to arrive in the latter 1870s, but significant numbers of both were not found in the U.S.A. until the 1880s. The communities of both groups began to organize in the early 1880s. In general , Slovaks (particularly those from eastern Slovakia) and Carpatho-Rusyns settled in the same towns and cities in the U.S.A.: metropolitan New York City; Bridgeport, Connecticut; the anthracite coa l mining region of northeastern Pennsylvania; Philadelphia and the Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania; western Pennsy lvania; C leveland ; Chicago and northwestern Indiana; St. Louis; Minneapolis; and Detroit. 2 These areas were home to the vast majority of both Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn parishes and other organizations. The places where Slovaks were established that had no Carpatho-Rusyn presence were few, primarily in upstate New York and the Midwest. Specifically Slovak Roman Catholic parishes were founded in Haz leton , Pennsylvania. and Streator, Illinois ( 1885), and a Lutheran parish was founded also in Streator ( 1884), whi le the first CarpathoRusyn Greek Catholic parish was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1884. Their respective mutual-aid "buria l societies," or fraternal insurance lodges, were also founded at around the same time, the first such Slovak society being founded in New York City in 1883 3 , while the first such Ru syn soc iety was founded in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, in 1885 4 . 2 Konstantin Cul en, History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul, Minn .: Czechoslovak Genea logical Society International, 2007), 67-70; Paul R. Magocsi, Our People: Carpatho-Rusvns and Their Descendant.,· in North America. Fourth rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill .: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005), 20-22. 3 M. Mark Sto larik, "A Place fo r Everyone: Slovak Fraternal-Benefit Societies" in Scott Cummings ed., Se(f-Help in America: Patterns of Minoritv Business Ente1prise (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1980), 130- 141. 4 Magocsi, 49. SLOVAKIA 2021 29 In the homeland, Carpatho- Ru syns probably would have never met an ethnic Czech/ Bohemian or Moravian, except perhaps as young conscripts serving together in the Austro-Hungarian army in World War 1. 5 (And it is further unlikely that these men wou ld have found their way to the United States until after the end of the war.) Contact between Carpatho-Ru syn and Czech immigrants in the U.S.A. was similarly unlikely, and the two immigrant groups were of substantiall y different character. Czech immigrants began to arrive in the United States much earl ier: the largest number came in the late 1860s. A substantial portion of these immigrants were at least middle class and artisans, in strong contrast to the mostly peasant Slovak and CarpathoRusyn immigrants who took on unskilled jobs in the mines and mills. Finally, Czech settlements were generally in the Midwest and Texas, where farm land was easi ly obtai ned, far from the industrial setting that defined the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant experience.6 Only in cities like Ch icago, C leveland, and Pittsburgh were eastern S lovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns likely to encounter Czech immigrants, if at all. Additionally, Czech immigrants were increasingly less likely to worship in (Roman) Catholic churc hes and thus their contact with Slovak or (i n certain situations) Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants was not frequent. The early Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants, then, in addition to frequent and essential contact with their Lemko Rusyn , Boiko, and Ukrainian co-religionists from Galicia in Greek Catholic parishes and fraternal organizations, were far more familiar with Slovak immigra nts as their neighbors, work friends , and perhaps spouses or extended family. To some extent, Carpatho-Rusyns' and Slovaks' fraternal benefit organizations developed along the same lines and in cooperation. Fraternal organizations were usually the first community institution estab lished in the Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrant settlements. These were built on the model of simi lar organizations in the homeland, in part as a replacement for the American insurance that was not usually ava il ab le to S lavic immigrants, and out of a need for 5 Magocsi, " The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovaki a," Sla vic Review, Vol. 34, o. 2 (June 1975), 364. 6 Thoma s Capek, The Cechs (Bohemians) in America: A Study of Their National, Cultural, Political, Social, Economic and Religious life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 36-51 , 60-68. 30 SLOVAKIA 2021 an organization to rally the immigrants on an ethnic basis. The first of these societies arose in pioneer Slovak and Rusyn settlements in the 1880s and 1890s. Some were founded by Roman and Greek Catholics together, e.g., in Bridgeport, Connecticut ( 1888), Kingston, Pennsylvania ( 1887 or 1888), Streator, Illinois ( 1889), McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, Allegheny/Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Passaic, New Jersey ( 1890). Some or most of these organizations would likely have joined the national Slovak organizations founded around that time: the National Slavonic Society of the United States (renamed National Slovak Society of the United States of America in 1913), or the First Catholic Slovak Union, FCSU/"Jednota," both founded in 1890.7 Rusyns would not have their own comparable organization until 1892. But the most striking example of a shared Slovak/Rusyn fraternal society was the Pennsylvania Slovak Roman & Greek Catholic Union (aka Pennsylvania Slovak Union or PSJ). Of all the Slovak-American fraternal societies this organization would count the largest number of Rusyn members, and more than 20 PSJ lodges were identified specifically as Greek Catholic or were based at a Greek Catholic church. 8 Despite having a generally common cultural background, and some shared religious affiliation and shared organizations, on an official level , the political goals of the Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants did not always coincide, even as the idea of a Czechoslovak republic began to materiali ze. American Carpatho-Rusyn Fraternal Benefit Societies Greek Catholic Union (GCU). The GCU was the sec ul ar organization with the largest membership and widest geographical reach in the American Rusyn community. Its leadership, and editorial stance of its Amerikansky Russky Viestnik newspaper (ARV) , were generally anti-Hungarian, vehemently anti-Ukrainian, and mildly Russophil e, though never politically inclined to union with Russia. While its 1902 spinoff United Societies, loyal to America's first Greek Catholic 7 Stolarik, 130- 141. Ri chard D. Custer, "Old Countrymen, New Neighbors: Early Carpatho- Rusyn and Slovak Immigra nt Relations in the United States" in S/ovo (National Czech & Slovak Museum & Library, Cedar Rap ids, IA), Summer 2016. Unabridged version on line at https://www .ncsml .org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07 /Old-Countrymen-New-Neighbors.pdf, 6-7. 8 SLOVAKIA 2021 31 Bishop Soter Ortynsky (an ethnic Ukrainian) since his arrival in 1907 and friendly to the Ga lician clergy, was the GCU 's antagonist on paper, they wou ld prove to be the al li es that would make possible a stronger voice that proved to be the one that caught the ear of the creators of the first Czechoslovak Republic. Slovaks - those who were Greek Catholics as we ll as Roman Catholics - made up a not insignificant portion of the GCU ' s membership, but early on the GCU took a strong stand against the idea that there were actually ethnic S lovak Greek Catholics.9 United Societies of the Greek Catholic Religion. The United Societies spun off from the GCU in 1902 and maintained a loya li st position toward the Greek Catholic Church, at times in opposition to what was perceived as the rebel li ous or disloyal GCU. In its support for Bishop Ortynsky, the society, its newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian ( 1910- 19 17), and its editor, Father Joseph Hanulya, were castigated by the GCU as Ukrainian sympathi zers. Around 1918, the United Societies had about 9,000 members including youth 10 , and published a newspaper, Prosvita, that remained often at odds w ith the GCU and its ARV. Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz (RNS) / Ukrainian National Association (UNA). The GCU in its early years, under c lerically-dominated leadership, became preoccupied with Rusyn affairs in Hungary and enunciated a generally pro-Hungarian political stance. This ali enated the significant membership from Galicia (most of whom were Lemkos), and many lodges, some even with substantial Subcarpathian membership, seceded from the GCU in 1894 to form a new organization . That organization, founded in Shamokin, Pennsylvania, was the Ruskij Narodnyj Sojuz, or in English, Russian National Union . It we lcomed as members Rusyns from Hungary and Galicia who had a strong sense of national identity, whether "Rusyn," " Russian," or "Ruthenian ." As the organization and its Svoboda newspaper became more Ukrainian-oriented, and the terms Ukraine and Ukrainian increasing ly used alongside Rus' and Rusyn, those with Russophil e or Old-Ruthenian views wou ld transfer to other organizations, primarily 9 Custer, '" No Such Thing as Greek Catholic Slovaks: ' The GCU's Polemic," The Carpatho-Rusyns of Pennsylvania, http://rusynsofpa. blogspot.com/2 014/12/no-suchthing-as-greek-catholic-slovaks.html. Accessed December I, 201 8. 10 Magocsi, " Political Activity," 398. 32 SLOVAKIA 2021 the Russian Brotherhood Organization. The dominant "Ruthenian" segment would eventually lead the organization to change its name in September 1914 to the Ukrainian National Association. Alienated by this change, approximately 17 UNA lodges, 15 of which had a primarily Subcarpathian Rusyn membership, joined the United Societies between October 1914 and February 1915, resulting in 2 1 new regular United Societies lodges and 6 new United Societies youth lodges. Onl y a few such lodges would remain in the UNA, and so the organization's influence among American Subcarpathian Rusyns had almost entirely di ssipated. Russian Brotherhood Organization (RBO). Some members of GCU and RNS in 1900 gathered in Mahanoy City, Pa ., to form a new fraternal organization that would resist clerical domination, have no requirement of church membership, and avoid both pro-Hungarian and pro-Ukrainian political stands. Most of its early lodges were located in northeastern Pennsylvania and some had left the GCU or RNS to join. Religiously, the society remained officially neutral , but as a Ukrainian orientation came to dominate Ga lician Greek Catholic circles in the U.S.A. and in the homeland, the organization became much more supportive of the Orthodox Church, and an increasing portion of its membership reflected that. The RBO 's consistent stand on Ukrainianism was very negative, but simi larly, it opposed the idea that the Rusyn people's regional distinctions justified separation from Great Russians. While the majority of RBO members originated in the Lemko Region of Galicia, many of its founders and largest lodges originated in Hungary/Subcarpathia. In fact, in 1918 nearly 40 RBO lodges had a Subcarpathian majority, and a comparable number of lodges were loosely affiliated with Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes. Ru ssian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society (ROCMAS). A convention of church brotherhoods that had converted to Orthodoxy took place in September 1895 in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. , the center of the Rusyn movement to Orthodoxy led by Father Alexis Toth. They formed a federation, and by the first national convention in 1896, eighteen brotherhoods were members. The Society issued a newspaper, Svit, written in a mixture of Galician Ukrainian and Russian . While somewhat concerned with cultural matters, the Society's primary goal was the defense and promotion of Orthodoxy among socalled " Little Russian" immigrants. It vehemently opposed Ukrainia- SLOVAKIA 2021 33 nism and the Greek Catholic Church, and promoted a strict Russian identity almost as a necessary feature of Orthodoxy, to the detriment of the local or regional linguistic and cultural traits of its Rusyn membership. Many of its larger and older lodges were primarily Subcarpathian, e.g., Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Bridgeport, Scranton , Catasauqua, and Berwick. United Russian Orthodox Brotherhood of America. The organization, at its founding known as the Greek Catholic Pravoslavny Brotherhood, was established in 1915 mainly by former members of the GCU in southwestern Penn sylvania who had recently joined the Ru ssian Orthodox Church. The vast majority of its members hip was of Subcarpathian origin, particularly from the more eastern counties of Uz, Bereg and Maramoros. Within two decades it grew to around 20,000 members 11 . Position of Slovak Fraternals "There is no 'Slovak ' people" - so titled was an art icle in the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik, Aug. 29, 1918. The postwar years and the struggles over the formation of the First Czechoslovak Republic would involve back-and-forth arguments between Ru syn American and Slovak American leaders, in print and, no doubt, in face-to-face meetings. But the root of the di strust undoubtedly was the early conflicts in these communities. The National Slovak Society, for its part, both supported the Rusyn people and disagreed at times with the position of the Rusyn leaders: National Slovak Society members expressed their concern for the fate of their brother Slavs, the Rusyns, who were now [World War I] experiencing the brunt of persecution in wartime Europe. Not only were repressive measures being taken against Rusyns in Carpathian Hungary, but in neighboring Galicia, Magyar troops were perpetrating wholesale massac res. This did not mean that the N.S.S. was conceding to th e claims of a Rusyn nationalism in Eastern Slovakia. Although support for the Slovak ca use in the region had been growing - largely thanks to the financi al support of the American Slovak community - certain elements considered the "S lovjaks" (i .e., Greek Catholics speaking the dial ect of the 11 Magocs i, Our People, 57. 34 SLOVAKIA 2021 eastern regions) as a separate nationality. The official N.S.S. policy was that the Slovjaks were Slovak, not Rusyn, Russian , or any other Slav people. 12 Political Actions During and Toward the End of World War I The Rus 'ko-Amerykans 'ka Rada (Rusyn/Ruthenian American Council) was established at a gathering in Philadelphia on December 8, 1914. By design it was to give equal leadership voice to Subcarpathian and Galician Rusyns, and under the patronage of Bishop Ortynsky, its directors included clerical and lay leaders from the Subcarpathian Rusyn community, especially Father Joseph Hanulya, editor of the United Societies newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian , George Gulanich and Ivan Zeedick of the GCU , and John Branik, president of the United Societies. At its Philadelphia meeting it condemned Russia and advocated for support of the political and cultural union of "Ukrainian (Rusyn)"-inhabited Galicia, Bukovina, and Hungary. 13 This entity ceased to exist with the death of Ortynsky in 1916, but not without drawing ire upon Father Hanulya for his participation. The American-Russian National Defense (ARND) / Narodna Obrana was founded in 1915 in Braddock, Pa. , near Pittsburgh, by Nicholas Pachuta. At the time Pachuta was assistant editor of the ARV, a post he held until 1918, under Michael Hanchin . National Defense styled itself the defender of Rus ' -ness against Magyarism in the Greek Catholic Church, was also critical of Slovakophiles and Ukrainophiles, and picked up members who were recent converts to Orthodoxy in the era of Bishop Stephen Dzubay. In May of 19 18 he met with Thomas G. Masaryk, the leader of the movement for a new state to be called Czechoslovakia, in Pittsburgh and began a discussion around the fate of Uhro-Rus ' (the Rusyn lands south of the Carpathians, historically part of Hungary). At that time Masaryk disregarded Pachuta's goals because his group "had no following or 12 R. Vl adimir Baumgarten and Joseph Ste fka , The National Slovak Society : 100 Year Histmy. 1890-/990. (Pittsburgh: Nation al Slovak Society, 1990), 76. 13 " Narodnyi z' "izd u Filiadel'fii"," Svoboda (Jersey City, NJ ), 19 December 1914, 2; Myron B. Kuropas, The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884- 1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991 ), 134. SLOVAKIA 2021 35 support among the broad masses of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants." 14 National Defense came around to the Czechoslovak option and delivered a memorandum to Masaryk in October endorsing autonomy within a Czechoslovak state. Around that time Pachuta converted to Orthodoxy, and in 1921 he united the National Defense with the American Russian Brotherhood based in C leve land. From 1922 until 1935 he was editor of the Russkij Vistnik newspaper of U ROBA. The League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia was a strictly Russophile political organization that drew most of its participation from individuals who were already active in organizations like ROCMAS and especially RBO. The vast majority of its members were of Galician background, but about 25% of delegates to its congresses were Subcarpathian Rusyns . 15 It held congresses in 19 17, 1918, and 1919 and made proclamations that Carpatho-Rusyn territory, a long with the who le of Galicia and Bukovina, should be part of Russia. The American National Counci l of Uhro-Rusins was founded in July of 1918 in Pittsburgh, with strong support from the United Societies and eventually the GCU . It grew to more than 100 branches, some of which had I 00 or even 200+ members. This was the organization in which the Pittsburgh attorney Gregory Zatkovich rose to leadership, began meetings with Masaryk, and which led to his post as the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus' . In Philadelphia on October 23, 1918, Zatkovich participated in the Mid-European Democratic Union in the presence of Masaryk . At that time Uhro-Rusyns - Rusyns of Hungary - were accepted as a distinct nationa lity, apart from Ukrainians who were already members. The National Counci l met at Scranton, Pa., on November 12, and formulated its final recommendation that Rusyn territory south of the Carpathians, including all of the original Uhro-Rusyn counties, be united in a Czechoslovak state with broad autonomy. The next day, the resolution was presented to Masaryk, who recommended that a plebiscite be held among American Uhro-Rusyns. 14 Joseph Danko, "Plebiscite of Carpath o- Ruthenians in the United States Recommendin g Union of Carpatho-Rutheni a with the Czec hoslovak Republic," Annals of !he Ukrainian Academy of Aris and Sciences, 11 , nos. 1-2 ( 1964-68), 186. 15 Prikarpalskaia Rus • (New York), Vol. I, o. I, October 191 8. 36 SLOVAKIA 2021 The American Uhro-Rusyn Plebiscite of December 1918 The American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, in conjunction with Masaryk's advice to Zatkovich, resolved to conduct a vote in Subcarpathian Rusyn parishes and fraternal lodges to determine their preferred action with respect to the homeland, among the options it had previously agreed to. Of course, they expected that the result would need to support what had already been decided: that Subcarpathian Rusyn territory should join the Czech and Slovak republic. This vote, then, was limited to the National Council's constituency: Subcarpathian-majority Greek Catholic parishes - no Orthodox parishes and no Galician-majority parishes would be involved, even if they had substantial numbers of Subcarpathian Rusyn members; and lodges of the GCU and United Societies only, who were already seen to be inclined toward their leadership's preference for Czechoslovakia. The plebiscite was announced in only one issue of the ARV (Nov. 14, 1918), and commenced almost immediately thereafter. There is no extant evidence that there was campaigning within the communities to select a particular option; certainly there would have been very little time for that. We do have results of the vote, which was published in several installments in the ARV and Prosvita, and which were collected in "Plebiscite ofCarpatho-Ruthenians in the United States Recommending Union of Carpatho-Ruthenia with the Czechoslovak Republic" authored by Joseph Danko in 1968. 16 Option Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic Union with the Ukrainian Republic Total independence Union with Carpatho-Russians Union with Russi a Union with Magyar Land fHungaryl Union with Galicia Total Votes (% of tota l) 732 (66.4%) 310 (28. 1%) 27 (2.5%) 13 ( 1.2%) 10 (0.9%) 9 (0.8%) I (0. 1%) I , 102(/00.0%) Unsurprisingly, the organizers' preferred option won decisively, but not overwhelmingly. Based on the individual vote counts by parish and lodge provided by Danko, I would like to comment on some of 16 Danko, 200. SLOVAKIA 2021 37 the more interesting things I observed. Union with the Czecho-Slovak Republic (rank: I} As we will see, each of the options had some very surprising entities voting for them. This option's supporters included two parishes founded as Greek Catholic but which at the time of the vote had Orthodox pastors: Elkhorn, West Virginia (Father John Gratson) and Elizabeth, New Jersey (Father Gregory Varho l). Not very surprising was a vote by a large, mostly Subcarpathian parish of Rusyns from Spis, Saris and Zemplin Counties (Holy Ghost in Tremont), but whose pastor was Father Hanulya, former editor of the United Societies' first newspaper Rusin - The Ruthenian - who for years as a supporter of Bishop Ortynsky had been attacked by the GCU in the pages of ARV for being a quasi-Ukrainian . Fourteen of the GCU lodges were based at majority-Galician parishes, although some of these lodges were primari ly Subcarpathian in membership. Union with the Ukrainian Republic (rank: 2) Figure 1. A portion of the American Rusyn communities that voted for union of Uhro-Rusyns with the Ukrainian Republic (66% of tota l votes cast). (Source: Danko, 196-198) The following voted for Uni on of Uhro-Rusins with Ukraini an Republic Societies of the Greek Catholic of Rusin Brothe rhoods in the USA 4 6 17 19 24 28 32 50 Mahoney City, Pa. Donmore , Pa. Rendham, Pa. Lansing, Pa . Eckle y , Pa. Glenlien, Pa. Sheppton, Pa. Mahoney Plane, Pa. (Figure I continues) 2 3 2 3 3 2 2 2 242 267 292 295 298 324 379 390 St. Clair , Pa. Hannastown, Pa. Wilkes-Barre , Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Baggaley, PP a . New Salem, Pa. Kester, Pa. McKees Rocks, Pa. 3 2 2 3 1 6 2 5 38 SLOVAKIA 2021 Uhro-Rusins Greek Catholic United Congregations. I St. Johna SL Johna B. V. M. Bleaed TrinitY B. V. M. B. V. M. SL Michael B. V. M. Holy Ghost L Michael hen Scnnton, Pa. Bridgeport, Conn. New Salem, Pa. New Britain, Conn. Freebnd,PL Whitting, Ind. Ref. &am>lky P.ev. Cbomoc:t Rev.~ 400- 8 500-10 400- 8 Blnghamtoo, N.Y. Taylor, Pa. McKeca Rocb, PL St. Clair Pa. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. Rev. Thq2t Rev. Petraaovich Rev. A. Suba Rev. Ribovsk Rev. N. Chopey 550- 7 Lt Lansford, Pa. Rev. Martyak 550- 7 ~udloning, Pa. Ha eton, Pa. Rn. p ch Rev. Brinaky llef. Choarboch 500- 6 500· 6 600-12 600-12 550- 7 Rev. FeiuG !&J- s Overall this was the most surprising result, having the second highest number of votes. Some votes came from additionally surprising places. For example: the parish in New Britain had experienced an ugly split with Galician Ukrainians just eight years before, yet they still had a Galician pastor. The Wilkes-Barre parish ' s pastor was Father Nicholas Chopey, who had a few years before been numbered among the pro-Hungary clergy. The Lansford parish ' s pastor was Father Gabriel Martyak, administrator of the Uhro-Rusyn parishes in the wake of Bishop Ortynsky's death two years before. And the Hazleton parish that voted for this option, pastored by the Lemko priest Father John Fekula? This was actually the Galician parish (St. Michael) that split off from two existing Subcarpathian parishes in the same city. We must wonder how this parish had the opportunity to vote at all. The lodges that voted this way included largely-Galician GCU lodges in Glen Lyon (based at an old mostlyGalician parish) and Rankin (based at a mostly-Subcarpathian parish), 39 SLOVAKIA 2021 five other GC U lodges based at Galician-majority pari shes but with mostl y Subcarpathi an members, and a GCU lodge from Father Martyak's paris h in Lansford whose members were mostl y from Sari s and Zemplin Counti es. The following voted for Tou.l Independence of Uhro-Rusins. Societies of the Greek C. Union. ):: ~~•:· an !Im , a. \ Eynon, Pa. lmon, Pa. ~nton, ra. 2 1 I Gymnastic Branches. I61 11 Scranton, Pa. 67 Mahonoy City, Pa. 1 United Societies of Greek C. Religion I ss K.ingaton, Pa. 1 II 60 Edwardavillc, Pa. 2 j Uhro-Rusin Congregations 11 ¥ M : Holy Gbolt iililUIIII t11 Jcaup, Pa. 1&11 li•1 :Rev. Ivan I= i I Figure 2. The Ameri can Rusyn communities whi ch voted fo r tota l indepe ndence of Uhro-Rusyns (3 % of votes cast). (Danko, 198) Total independence of Uhro- Rusyns (rank: 3) Without any traditi on of self-rule, and without any real advocates fo r thi s pos ition, it is not surpri sing that it rece ived so few votes. It 's notable that not only did the pari sh and a GCU lodge in Jessup, Pennsy lvani a, contribute a number of the votes fo r thi s option, but two additional GC U lodges that did , in Eynon , Pennsyl va ni a, were a ffili ated wi th the Jessup pari sh as we ll. Jessup a lso had a large RBO lodge, but it is unlike ly that independence would have been the ir preference. 40 SLOVAKIA 2021 Union with Carpatho-Russians (i.e., Galicians, Bukovinians, UhroRusyns) (rank: 4) This position was represented among American Carpatho-Rusyns mainly by the League for the Liberation of Carpatho-Russia, although evidently few Subcarpathian Rusyns belonged to that organization, and to some extent originally by the American-Russian National Defense. The few votes for this option came mainly from Gary, Indiana 's GCU Lodge 469 and its Greek Catholic parish, which was primarily of Subcarpathian origin (in its western counties that would be incorporated into Slovakia) although it is not clear to this author why that would have been their choice. Union with Russia (rank: 5) The FolJowing voted for Union with Russia Greek Catholic Union. 550 Olyphant, Pa. 1 Gymnastic Branch 121 Jerome, Pa. I Uhro-Rusin Congregations a. V. M. Mahoooy City, Pa. lln. I. lubck 400- a Figure 3. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Russia (I % of votes cast). (Danko. 199) Among the votes for this option were GCU Lodge 530 in Olyphant, Pennsylvania, mostly Lemko in membership and based at a Galician-majority parish, and perhaps most curious of all , St. Mary 's Greek Catholi c Church in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, whose pastor was the noted Rusyn-language author and cultural patriot Father Emil Kubek. Kubek was also part of the leadership of the American I 41 SLOVAKIA 2021 National Council, which was not supportive of union with Russia at all. While he was not a Russophile, his relative lack of involvement with the GCU (and perhaps due to the RBO being founded in his parish) may have encouraged him to advocate for this option . Or more likely the decisive factor was the RBO's founding president, John Zincak Smith, also being the president of St. Mary's parish. Union with Magyar land (i.e., Hungary) (rank: 6) The Following voted for Union of Uhro-Rwins with Magyar Land Greek Catholic Union. 50 2 181 Clevdand, Ohio Clndand, Ohio Uhro-Rusin Congregations. St. John'• , ClcYeland, Ohio llev. Ballog soo- 6 I Figure 4. The American Rusyn communities which voted for union ofUhroRusyns with Hungary (I % of votes cast). (Danko, 199) Even though many of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic clergy in the U.S. were Magyarized (if not outright Magyarone), it doesn't seem that any attempt there may have been on their part to influence their parishioners to vote for this option was successful. The ARV denounced Hungary's policy toward its ethnic minorities for years in the lead up to the war. Despite Hungary's liberalized ethnic minority policy that began in 1915, inclination toward Hungary from American Rusyns seems to have changed little. Two GCU lodges voted for this option, but most striking is that six votes came from St. John's Church in Cleveland - not the Rusyn one that in 1918 had hired an Orthodox priest as its pastor - but the Magyar parish, pastored by Father Michael Balogh. This was the only ethnic-Hungarian parish to vote, and it's unlikely that Zatkovich and the American National Council had intended the plebiscite to include the Magyar parishes. (It's possible that they did, we just have no evidence on either side to say for sure.) Union with Galicia (rank: 7) Given the still substantial portion of the GCU's membership either 42 SLOVAKIA 2021 from Galicia or belonging to lodges based at Galician-majority parishes, we could have expected more votes for this option than were returned. However, a number of GCU lodges that were mostly or entirely Galician in membership (e.g., McKeesport Lodge 782, Wilmerding, Pa. , Lodges 348 and 360) - and based at Galician parishes - did not vote. It must be underscored that the plebiscite was not truly representative of the range of religious congregations and fraternal lodges found in the American Carpatho-Rusyn community, not even when speaking exclusively of those from Subcarpathia - the "Uhro-Rusyns." The Orthodox (except for two parishes which inexplicably did vote) were wholly unrepresented, and the significant fraternals RBO, ROCMAS , and fledgling UROBA were likewise ignored. Clearly it was meant to produce the additional justification Zatkovich needed to present the Scranton resolution to the Paris Peace Conference. 17 Understandably alarmed by this development, the activist Ukrainian American community opposed what they had hoped would be an outcome supporting their goal to unite so-called Ukrainian-Ruthenian ethnographic territory in a Ukrainian state. In so doing, they provided what seems to be the only eyewitness account of how the plebiscite was conducted in a Rusyn parish. Here writes a Ukrainian from Bridgeport, Conn .: Our Hungarian brother Rusyns want to unite Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine. On December 8 of this year, a parish meeting was held in Bridgeport, Conn. , right after the Divine Liturgy, in the parish school. The meeting was very interesting for every Ukrainian, because our brother Uhro-Rusyns decided on the fate of our and their brothers across the sea. Local speakers and Father Orest Cornjak [Chornock], local pastor, spoke. The meeting was convened for the purpose of deciding where Hungarian Rus' shou ld belong: whether to Ukraine or to the Czecho-Slovak state. Father Orest Cornjak stated his preference, that he would vote to belong to his brothers, that is, to the Ukrainians, rather than to the Czecho-Slovaks . After much discussion , it turned out that the Uhro-Rusyn 17 Victor S. Mamatey, "The Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians," in Joseph F. O'Grady, ed .. The Immigrants· Influence on Wilson's Peace Policies (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967), 245-246. SLOVAKIA 2021 43 leaders wanted to lead the Uhro-Rusyns to the Czecho-Slovaks, without questioning the Uhro-Rusyn people. And again the speakers protested against the "American National Council of UhroRusins" in America that no one has elected; its members of that Council are self-appointed leaders, that they have chosen themselves and have no right to speak in the name of the Uhro-Rusyn people, and further that they proposed an amendment so as not to vote either for Ukraine or against, nor to take a position against the Czecho-Slovak state, and so let it be as Uhro-Rusyns will decide in the old country. They also complained to the Ukrainians that at the founding of the " Mid-European Union" at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Pa., they had to say that the Uhro-Rusyns are "a different people" from the Ukrainians, and thus the Ukrainians do not want to accept the UhroRusyns as an equal among equals and so for that reason will not vote in that way. When people were already wanting to leave, Mr. Ivan Boyko, head of the Ukrainian Athletic Association (Sich) in America, while asking forgiveness for the slurs that were committed by Ukrainians, and explaining that the Uhro-Rusyns had already decided at the founding council meetings in L'viv that Hungarian Rus ' should belong to Ukraine together with Galicia and Bukovina, said he did not see the reasons why the Uhro-Rusyns should not vote for the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine. He laid out what benefits the Uhro-Rusyns would have in a Ukrainian state, and what benefits they would have from the Czecho-Slovaks .. .. We Ukrainians, said Mr. Bojko, can never agree that our Hungarian brothers will be in the Czecho-Slovak state. [... ] It should be noted that the audience very intently listened to Mr. Bojko and took his every word to heart. After the speech the audience rewarded him with applause when the other speakers received no applause. Here Mr. Bojko did a great service to the Ukrainian people by proclaiming this speech to the Hungarian brothers, because then now the entire hall of people began to speak differently about it after the speech, because it was moved to vote by secret ballot, about where Hungarian Rus' should belong: whether to Ukraine, or to the Czecho-Slovak state, and another motion, to vote by roll call , so that you know who is against your brothers (Ukrainians). Father Comjak led by saying: Who is for 44 SLOVAKIA 2021 uniting Hungarian Rus' with Ukraine? It was decided unanimously on the joining of Hungarian Rus' to Ukraine, and then came the second ballot: Who is for uniting Hungarian Rus' with the Czecho-Slovaks? For this union with the Czecho-Slovaks there was only one vote. So, evidently, the Uhro-Rusyns want to unite with Ukraine. The statement made in Philadelphia by Misters M. Sichynsky and N. Ceglinsky, recognizing the Uhro-Rusyns as a separate nationality, with their representative as Mr. Zatkovich in the "MidEuropean Union," should be retracted for the good of the Ukrainian people and the Uhro-Rusyns . Instead, let them declare that the Uhro-Rusyns are our brothers by blood and by faith , and we can never agree that a second nationality would rule over our Hungarian brothers, even if it were Czecho-Slovakia. In Bridgeport, Conn ., Uhro-Rusyns do not recognize the "American National Council of Uhro-Rusins" because their people did not select them , and that self-styled Counci l has no right to push them into a Czecho-Slovak state, because the Uhro-Rusyn brothers want to unite Hungarian Rus ' with Ukraine. Glory to them for this! 18 The Ukrainian National Association's newspaper Svoboda reported on a Ukrainian National Congress that took place in January 1919. This congress included speakers on the situation in the Subcarpath ian Rusyn community in the U.S. and its recent Scranton resolution and fol low-on plebiscite. Father Kubek , editor of the Amerikansky Russky Viestnik [this is an error, he was not] was supposed to speak, but at the last moment he informed that he was not able to do so. His place was taken by a Galician priest, Father Vasyl' Merenkiv, who said, among other things: "In recent days I was in several Uhro-Rusyn parishes and spoke with several Uhro-Rusyn priest-leaders . We spoke about the idea of uniting Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine . I can assure the esteemed delegates that they are all committed to joining Uhro-Rus ' with Ukraine more so than with Czec hoslovak ia. But still, I noticed that American Uhro-Rusyns are sti ll wavering." Mr. Ivan Hajovyc (of Maramoros), a delegate from the Chicago Uhro-Rusyns, was called to speak. He revealed his joy that he has an 18 "Svobidna vo lia uhors' kykh Ru syniv," Svoboda, 14 December 19 I 8, 2. SLOVAKIA 2021 45 opportunity to speak to so many people who are interested in the fate of Uhro-Rusyns. He talked about the oppression that Uhro-Rusyns suffered from the Magyars. " We, Hungarian Ukrainians," said Mr. Hajovyc, "stand body and soul for the unity of Ukraine.We want to join with Ukraine! We are protesting against the plebiscite conducted among American UhroRusyn s, which was set up for the sake of uniting Uhro-Rus' with Czechoslovakia. Hungarian Ukrainians want to be united with Ukraine. We do not know what Czechoslovakia is and who CzechoSlovaks are. We never want to hear anything about joining them." Mr. Ivan Hundjak (a Galician) argued using statistics that the plebiscite initiated by Masaryk among American Uhro-Rusyns was conducted in a deceptive manner. Finally Mr. Ivan Skakandij, an Uhro-Rusyn cantor-teacher and delegate from Nesquehoning, Pa . was called to speak He regretted that in such an important moment Hungarian Ukrainians in America have not yet all been awakened to a life of national consciousness. " It is the fault of the Uhro-Rusyn clergy, who in the old country were led around by the Magyars and now by the Czechoslovaks. But nationally conscious Hungarian Ukrainians in America want to unite with Ukraine. We are just now awakening to life and there is hope that in a short time we will all be awakened." One speaker (Father Merenkiv) said " Hungarian Ukrainians in America are still waking up, but remember, that as we wake up , Masaryk will do nothing to help." 19 My observations about the results, it turns out, while I arrived at them independently, were noted to some extent already in 1919 in an article in the Ukrainian press. This is the speech by Ivan Hundjak (mentioned previously) in which he analyzed the resu lts and pointed out, among other criticisms, that if a person happened to be a member of a GCU lodge and the United Societies lodge in the same place, and the local Subcarpathian Greek Catholic parish, conceivably that person could vote up to three times. He noted as well (as Danko did) that participation among those eligible to vote was fairly low. He asserted that had these irregularities been taken into account, the leading result 19 "Z narodnohu z'izdu," Svoboda, 18 January 19 19, 2. 46 SLOVAKIA 2021 probably would have been for union with Ukraine. I would counter that had there been time, or the will, to more inclusively offer the vote to all American Subcarpathian Rusyn institutions, and not just the ones affiliated with the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, the results may indeed have been different, but more likely toward union with Russia, as impractical as that might have been. Reception of Czechoslovakia in the Rusyn American Community In May of 19 I 9, the cornerstone was laid in Homestead, Pennsylvania, for the Rusin Peoples Home. This event, under the patronage of the American National Council of Uhro-Rusins, occurred just days before the National Counci l in Uzhorod, Subcarpathian Rus ', would accept the American Rusyns ' proposal to unite with Czechoslovakia. The commemorative booklet for this event 20 prominently featured a page with the American, Czechoslovak, and "Rusin" flags entwined, with the slogan "Old Glory Has Made This Federation (Czech-SlovakRusin) Possible." The pages following showed photographs of Zatkovich signing the declaration of the Mid-European Nationalities and Masaryk reading the declaration at a public manifestation in Philadelphia. The book ' s last page is a map showing Europe ' s ethnic groups within the new postwar borders, with Czechoslovakia labeled "Czechoslovaks" and to its east, "Uhro-Rusinia." It's not clear whether UhroRusinia is meant to be depicted as part of Czechoslovakia or not. Whatever the interpretation, this is probably the lone celebratory publication of American Rusyns to mark the decision to join the Czechoslovak Republic. A delegation of American Rusyn gymnasts affiliated with the GCU Sokol division travelled to Prague in the summer of 1920 to participate in a Pan-Slavic Gymnastics exhibition. As part of the trip they also visited Subcarpathian Rus ' and had an audience with Governor Zatkovich. One member of the delegation wrote, " In Prague we were 20 Souvenir Issued by the Rusin Peoples Home, Inc. on the Occasion of the Dedication ofthe Corner-Stone I Pamiatnik izdan ko,poratsieiu Russkii Narodny i Dom iz sluchai posviashcheniia kraeugol 'nago kamen 'ia. Homestead. Pa .. I 9 I 9 (Homestead, Pa., 19 19). SLOVAKIA 2021 47 warmly welcomed by the Czechs and everything we saw in Prague and the way we were treated , we enjoyed ... " oi...o OLO ..... .. , . . MAO• T .. , . rcDll:.. 4Tt0N ie&&CW·~YAK "v.lNI ~ . . . • 1..• Figure 5. Page from the commemorative booklet for the cornerstone laying ofthe Rusin Peoples Home in Homestead, Pa., May 1919. Another wrote, " With thanks to God , with our appearance at the Pan-Slavic Sokol Meet in Prague, we made a mark in the history of our Sokol Branch which wi ll be permanent proof that we accomplished our mission , that we entered into the order of the Czechoslovak Sokol movement. . . We also left a lasting impression on the youth of Subcarpathian Rus ' ." The trip was promoted in the pages of ARV and chronicled fully in the 1921 almanac of the Sokol division. 2 1 It wou ld not be long before frustration over the lack of autonomy promised Subcarpathian Rus' by Masaryk would boil over in the American Carpatho-Rusyn press, especially when Zatkovich resigned in 1921 , and would continue at least until the late 1920s among Greek Catholics. The GCU printed a number of publications critical of Czechoslovak policy: Zatkovich's Otkrytie-Expose by vseho g ubernatora Podkarpatskoj Rus i, o Podkarpatskoj Rusi ( 1921 ), Wilson's Prin21 C heryl We ller Beck et al. , Opportuni~v Realized: The Greek Catholic Union 's First One Hundred Years, / 892-1992. (Beaver, Pa.: Gree k Catholic Uni on o f the U.S.A. , 1994), 75 . 48 SLOVAKIA 2021 ciples in Czechoslovak Practice: The Situation of the Carpatho-Russian People Under the Czech Yoke ( 1929) and Beskid's Karpatorusskaja pravda ( 1932). They would also lead a National Congress of Rusins in Pittsburgh in November 1922, which issued a memorandum to Prague condemning their policy toward Subcarpathian Rus '. American Rusyns in the Russian Orthodox Church and others of Russophile orientation would take up the opposition to Czechoslovak policy toward Subcarpathian Rus' through the 1930s. 22 I did not find any evidence - written or photographic - in Carpatho-Rusyn communities or parishes of widespread adoption of Czechoslovakia as a symbolic "homeland." There is certain ly no oral folklore around portraits of Masaryk (or Zatkovich, for that matter) being hung in parish halls as there is of portraits of Maria Theresa and Franz Josef from the early immigration. Lasting Impressions on Rusyn Americans of a Czechoslovak "Homeland" A list on the Wikipedia entry for Czech Americans of "The top 50 U.S. communities with the highest percentage of people claiming Czech ancestry" 23 (based on the 2000 U.S . census) contains mostly predictable results - locations in North Dakota, Texas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin , et al. An accompanying list, " U.S. communities with the most residents born in the Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia)," however, contains a curious entry: tied for number IO was the little town of Colver, Pennsylvania, about 20 miles north of Johnstown in the west central part of the state. Colver, a former coal mining company town , had just a few primary ethnic groups : among these were Slovaks and Carpatho-Rusyns. It may we ll have sti ll had a few residents in 2000 who were born in the former Czechos lovakia. It is not clear that these results came from responses declaring their birthplace as "Czech Republic" or "Czechoslovakia," or either, but surely this population in Colver, Pennsylvania, was not ethnic Czechs. 22 Magocsi, Our People, 88-89. "Czech Americans", https ://en .wikipedia.org/wiki/Czech Americans. Accessed December I, 201 8. 23 SLOVAKIA 2021 49 The U.S. Census Bureau statistics for ancestry 24 (estimated from its 20 I 3 American Community Survey) show that Pennsylvania, historically the state with the largest number of Carpatho-Rusyn and Slovak immigrants, had more than 52,142 residents with Czech ancestry, or 0.3% of Pennsylvania residents. This is much less than those who indicated Slovak or Ukrainian ancestry, many of which are likely of Carpatho-Rusyn background (or the completely unreali stic 193 ,000 with "Russian" ancestry), but still far higher than the hi storically low Czech settlement of the state would imply. In addition, "Czechoslovak ian" ancestry was estimated at 22,904, which could conceivably include any of Czech, Slovak, or Carpatho-Rusyn-descended individuals, although the much lower national consciousness of CarpathoRusyn Americans - reflected by the miniscule estimated 2,050 of that background - would lead one to expect most of those "Czechoslovak" individuals to have Carpatho-Rusyn ancestry. That many Carpatho-Rusyn Americans of any particular geographic background in Carpathian Rus ' still exhibit confusion about their ethnic and geographical origins is not news to anyone. But it may be that Subcarpathian Rus ' belonging for 20 years to Czechoslovakia created a lingering geographic attachment to the idea of "Czechoslovakia" as the ancestral land of American Carpatho-Rusyns. Consider these newspaper clippings, maybe the most extreme examples of this phenomenon I've encountered. A perhaps unintended corollary to this phenomenon is the everincreasing use of genealogy websites where obituaries, gravestones, and other data are collected; many of the individuals - Carpatho-Rusyns and others - whose ge nealogical data is found on these sites have had their birthplace, which was probably entered by their descendant researcher as "Czechoslovakia," transposed by the site into "Czech Republic," further muddling Carpatho-Rusyn identity by placing Czechoslovak natives into the wrong modem-day country. Thus the main legacy of Carpatho-Rusyns' Czechoslovak homeland may well be their descendants eventually needing to educate themselves about 24 U.S. Census Bureau, Total Ancestry Reported: Total ancestry categories tallied for people with one or more ancestry categories reported, 2013 American Community Survey I- Year Estimates. https :// factfinder.census.gov/ faces/tableservices/ jsf/pages/productview.xhtml ?pid=ACS 13 I YR B04003&prodType=table. Accessed I December 2018. 50 SLOVAKIA 2021 the fact that Subcarpathian Rus ' was indeed part of Czechoslovakia and is not the modem day Czechia, nor Slovakia, for that matter. rites _____§s:,vtces for Mary - • 93, of 1220 Valley Road, Duncott, who died Friday morning at Pottsville Hospital, will be held at 9 :15 a.m. Tuesday !rom Dutcavich Funeral Home, Minersville. Further services will be held at 10 a .m . in Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville . The Very Rev. Michael Hatrak will officiate. Interment will be in the parish cemetery, Branch Township. Born public, sh late Metro and Sophie She came to the United States as a child, resided in the Heckscherville and Duncott areas and attended Heckscherville schools. She was a member of Ss. Peter and Paul Orthodox Church, Minersville, and was active in numerous church functions for many years. Figure 6. 1998 obituary of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant born in Lochovo, Bereg County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was " born in Lockaway, Czech Republic In any case, on this centennial of the creation of the first Czechoslovak Republic, we can happily remember Mamatey's remark about the significance of American Carpatho-Rusyns' activities around this creation : "while the Slovak immigration in the United States affected Wilson's peace policies only indirectly ... the Carpatho-Ruthenian immigrants did so directly." 25 25 Mamatey, 249. SLOVAKIA 2021 MARI( 51 R0CMR8ISlalf Pholo Woman celebrates turning 103 Mary 11111111 • l'Nident at York Terrace, Pottsville, wavee to ad- =:~==bi~ le now the Cziech Republ 1891, ahe larecenUy. • member of Sa. Born In Pa,1 ; lie Church, Mlnersvllle, and atlll enjoya muak:al and cooking actlvltlea at York Terrace. 7. 200 I news article of a birthday celebration of a Carpatho-Rusyn immigrant centenarian born in Cyganovci , Uz County, now in the Zakarpatska Oblast of Ukraine, which states she was "born in what is now the Czech Republic." Figure 52 SLOVAKIA 2021 "UIIRO . RUSINIA, PROPOSED THIUD STATE OF TUE CZl',()JJO!!LO'\"AK REPUBLIC " • 0 ...... ,,.....,....-_-...):/ ~ ( • • • ,. 1'14"-t.~ Figure 8. Map prepared in 1918 by Gregory Zatkovich depicting the proposed future state of "Uhro-Rusinia" within a federal Czechoslovakia, in which all Rusyn-inhabited lands on the southern slopes of the Carpathians were to be included. (Archive of Paul R. Magocsi , used with permission)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Envisioning a Homeland: Carpatho-Rusyn Immigrants in the USA and the Czechoslovak Option Description An account of the resource Richard D. Custer Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 27-52 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Custer, Richard D. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/64c7484d3942d7f02a6a816065018048.pdf 08cc45405d9a6b4a5edd5b060d9e8483 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 53 RECONSIDERING SLOVAK-AMERICAN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT: THOMAS BELL'S OUT OF THIS FURNACE IN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT Frederick Hale Introduction If any work of fiction deserves to be called " the great SlovakAmerican historical novel ," it is undoubtedly Thomas Bell 's Out of This Furnace. To be sure, the competition is nearly non-existent. 1 Nevertheless, since its initial publication in 1941 , thi s volume of more than 400 pages has offered readers a hi ghly readable and insightful view of immigrant laborers and their descendants, chiefly in the steel mill town s of western Pennsylvania where many Slovaks toiled. Their presence became woven into the multicolored ethni c fabric of that once-booming region. Though for many upward social mobility came at a snai l's pace, organized community li fe began early and remained vibrant, and the members of the group contributed mightily to the prosperity of the cities in which they sacrificed seemingly endless hours on the a ltars of an economy of wh ich they were far more the victims than the lords. Beg inning, apparently, as economically virtually powerless and thus wi lling to accept their su bservient lot in life, many gradua lly gained a bolder spirit through the labor movements in which they participated . In tandem with their inevitable assim ilation, Slovak-Americans eventuall y gained a greater voice in the direction of their working lives. These interrelated matters form much of the thematic warp and woof of Bell 's much-lauded novel , which traces three generations through their tribul ations to a more ass imilated 1 Michael ovak 's quasi-autobiogra phical The Tiber Was S ilver ( 1961) failed to make a perceptible splash in the waters of American literature, and hi s Naked I l eave ( 1970), whi ch was more widely rev iewed, was a lso criticall y interpreted as a fictional ized mirror of hi s transition from Roman Catho li c se minarian to journalist. These intensely personal works by a prominent Slovak-American inte llectua l whose life began in Jo hn stown , Pennsylvania, in 1933 are not w itho ut arti stic merit , but th ey belo ng to a sub-genre o f ficti o n quite different from Be ll 's realistic po rtraya l of th e ethni c g roup's hi story in th e late nin eteenth and ea rl y twenti eth centuri es. �54 SLOVAKIA 2021 status and to higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Mu tat is mutandis, the story it tells echoes that of numerous other immigrant groups in urban America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conceivably the eventual upward mobility-engendered in part by the labor movement- underlay the translation of this work into Slovak and its publication in 1949 in Czechoslovakia, when that country was to a great degree under the hegemony of the Soviet Union during the chilliest days of the Cold War. Furthermore, owing to its pedagogical value for teaching American immigration and labor hi story, in 1976 the University of Pittsburgh reprinted Out of This Furnace in response to a proposal by Professor David P. Demarest of Carnegie Mellon University. It fitted this social activist's converging interests in workingclass literature and labor history hand-in-glove. The relative popularity of the book led to a fiftieth anniversary edition in 1991. Bell illuminated many facets of Slovak-American working-class life and did not hesitate to include in his narrati ve several less savory dimensions of it that less candid writers might have chosen to minimize or ignore entirely in the interests of presenting palatable impressions of their respective ethnic groups. As Professor David J. Goldberg noted in 20 IO when advocating the assignment of Out of This Furnace to university students, " Men get drunk in saloons. Weddings and funerals are occasions for arguments." 2 A Limited Tradition of Scholarly Consideration Out of This Furnace has been neither the beneficiary nor the victim of extensive scholarly criticism, but it has not been completely ignored. In hi s study of American writers of the 1930s, especially those on the political Left, Leo Gurko devoted a few paragraphs to Bell ' s authorship and commented on this novel. However, Gurko did not evince adequate familiarity with this novelist's oeuvre. He judged that the ideological positions taken by Bell's characters "end with trade-unionism and anti-fascism," a myopic observation that overlooks the central character in All Brides Are Beautiful. Turning specifically to the hi storical span of Out o_fThis Furnace, Gurko thought that 2 David J. Goldberg, "Thomas Bell's 0111 o_(This Furnace: An Evaluation and an Appreciation," Journal of American Ethnic History, XXIX, no. 2 (Winter 2010), p. 664 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 55 it covered two generations of Slovak-Americans, when in fact it dealt with three. 3 In 1975, i.e. a year before its republication by the University of Pittsburgh Press, John F. Berko contributed an article about Bell as a novelist to the journal Slovak Studies but devoted only one page to this particular novel. 4 Furthermore, after encouraging its republication Demarest wrote a moderately detailed Afterword in which he provided useful information without dissecting the text. The eminent historian of Slovak immigrants in North America Marian Mark Stolarik has credited Bell with describing Slovak-American life "very we ll" but lamented that he had "completely ignored the religiosity" of this ethnic group. 5 Stolarik's criticism at this point dovetails neatly with what he and other historians have repeatedly stated about the enthusiasm of Slovak-Americans for ecclesiastical life. In his article " Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," for example, published in the Slovak League of America's celebratory bicentennial volume in 1978, Daniel F. Tanzone could declare without reserve that "the most di stinctive characteristic of the Slovaks is their deep and abiding faith in God." The zeal they evinced in Central Europe, he emphasized, became transatlantic as immigrants from Slovakia " made great effort to hear the word of God preached to them in their native Slovak tongue." 6 The linkage between social and religious life has also been highlighted in the pertinent historiography. As Stolarik explained in the 1980s, upon settling in the United States Slovaks typically initiated this by founding "fraternal-benefit" societies to provide emotional and economic safety nets. These lodges usually reflected the discrete religious affiliations of individuals within the larger group and were identifiable as de facto Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist. From the religious cohesion of such local societies formal , 3 Leo Gurko, The Angty Decade (New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, 1947), 66-9. John F. Berko, "Thomas Bell ( 1903- 196 1) Slovak-Ameri can Novelist," Slovak S1udies, XV ( 1975), 143-58. 5 M. Mark Stolarik to Frederick Hale, 14 November 20 17 (electronic correspondence) . 6 Daniel F. Tanzone, "Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," in Slovaks in America: A Bicenlennial S!udy (Middletown, Pennsylvani a: The Slovak League of America, 1978), 57 . 4 �56 SLOVAKIA 2021 distinctly Slovak parishes sprang, often after a period of worshiping with, for example, Polish fellow immigrants.7 In his history of three generations of Slovak-Americans in the steel mill town of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, from the 1880s until the 1970s, Stolarik related in some detail how they were divided into three religious communities, chiefly Roman Catholic but also Greek Catholic and Lutheran . Church life among many of these people appears to have been vibrant, despite chronic financial hardship that, for example, protracted the amortization of mortgages. Church edifices began to appear at a very early stage. 8 He was thus not in doubt that " religion played a central role in the life of Bethlehem Slovaks."9 Of particular relevance to Out of This Furnace, Stolarik argued that on a national basis the "overwhelming loyalty" of Slovak-Americans to their religious life helped to immunize them from an early stage of their history to socialist movements which were drawing support from many other working-class immigrants well before the end of the nineteenth century. 10 More than two decades later, Stolarik published what may be the most up-to-date, albeit still brief, scholarly consideration of SlovakAmerican religious life. Writing in The Catholic Historical Review, he emphasized why the immigrants in question were divided into four denominations and how they adjusted to ecclesiastical circumstances in the United States of America and Canada, particularly the creation of specific ethnic parishes. Stolarik did not, however, deal with such matters as the non-affiliation of individuals with churches, anticlericalism, and hostility to or disagreement with religion as such. He judiciously acknowledged that much research remained to be done before historians could paint anything approaching a comprehensive portrait of the spiritual life of Slovak-Americans generally. 11 7 Marian Mark Stolarik , Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 18701918 (New York: AMS Press, Inc ., 1989), 82-3 . 8 M. Mark Stolarik, Growing Up on the South Side: Three Genera/ions of Slovaks in Bethlehem. Pennsylvania. 1880-/9 76 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1985), 44-62. 44. 10 Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization, 8 1. 11 M. Mark Stolarik, " Slovak Immigrants Come to Term s with Reli g ious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , no. I (January 20 I 0): 5684. 9 Ibid ., �SLOVAKIA 2021 57 The publication in 2012 of his lengthy Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/ 870-2010) gave Stolarik an opportunity to touch on aspects of Slovak immigrants ' religious life in North America. His seventh chapter, "Slovak Marxists Disagree" dealt with what he acknowledged were the "few Marxists" among the Slovaks in the United States and Canada. This minuscule segment established mutual benefit societies which competed on a minor scale with the churches for the loyalty of the immigrants and their descendants but, as Stolarik emphasized, "their number remained small." 12 He briefly traced a waning of the socialists ' initially strident criticism ofreligious life and concluded that by the 1940s the verbal warfare had ceased. 13 The di sagreements to which the chapter' s title refers were largely those among the socialists themselves, especially with regard to political developments in their homeland, not to disputes between these men of the left and the ecclesiastical traditions they had left behind. The empirically challenging question of the scope of general SlovakAmerican indifference to and non-participation in formal religious life thus remained essentially unanswered. Regarding participation in secular campaigns to improve working conditions in industrial America, it is difficult to ascertain how many of these newcomers and their descendants supported the more inclusive labor movement, which in the USA was only partly socialist. However, it is known that Bell himself was a man of the Left, albeit not in a consistently outspoken way. How unrepresentative of SlovakAmericans he was in that regard is an interesting question, though one that necessarily lies beyond the scope of the present article. At any rate, in Out o_f This Furnace Bell presented the labor movement in a positive manner and highlighted the participation of at least a small number of Slovak-Americans in it. This is probably significant to an understanding of the dispersed treatment of religion in this fictional construction. 12 M. Mark Stolarik, Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( / 87020 10) (Bern : Peter Lang AG, Internati onal Academi c Publishers, 201 2), p. 205. 13 Stolarik, Wh ere Is My Home?, pp. 2 12-2 13. �58 SLOVAKIA 2021 A Little-known Literary A rtist Bell ' s earl y li fe endowed him with an intimate know ledge of hi s subj ect. His parents were fro m the village of Ni zny Tvarozec in the Bardejov d istri ct of the Presov reg ion of northwestern Slovaki a. He was born in the mill tow n of Braddock, Penn sylvani a, j ust east of Pi ttsburgh, in 1903 . 14 That small c ity had a popul ati on of 15,654 in 1900, a fig ure whi ch rose to sli ghtly over 20,000 two decades later before a persistent dec line reduced it to a poverty-stri cken village in the late twentieth century. His origi nal name was Ada lbert Thomas Belejcak, a cu mbersome moniker whi ch he never used during hi s career as a nove li st. Leav ing schoo l as an ado lescent, he worked loca ll y from age fifteen as an electri c ian' s apprenti ce but in 1922 re located to New York and was vari ously empl oyed fo r approximate ly a decade as a merchant sea man, boo kstore clerk , and mechani c. Bell 's first nove l, The Breed of Bas il, appeared in 1930, and from 1933 onward he was a fu ll -time writer, th ough onl y fi ve of hi s nove ls were issued. Hi s All Brides Are Beautiful was the bas is of a motion picture starrin g Joa n Fonta ine and Mark Stevens, and Till! Come Back to You was dramati zed and produced on Broadway by Jed Harri s. In other noteworthy d imensions of his career w ith the pen, Be ll contri buted short stori es to such magazi nes as McCall 's and Ladies ' Home J ournal, and eventuall y worked as a Holl ywood screenwriter. After mov ing to Cali fo rni a in 1955 , he continued to write sporadi ca ll y whil e operating the East Side Gift and Stati onery Shop in Santa Cruz. His hea lth deteri orated in the late 1950s, and he di ed of cancer in 196 1. The fun era l was held in a mortuary chapel rather than a church, and Bell 's ashes were interred at the crematory of the Independent Order of Odd Fell ows . 15 The few sources of readil y ava il able info rmation about hi s li fe do not suggest th at he had any ex perience in Slovaki a, and nothin g in Out of This Furnace indi cates that he had noteworthy know ledge of that coun try apart fro m what may have been handed down ora ll y from hi s fo rebears. Bell appears to have reli ed almost exc lusive ly on ora l traditi on and memories of hi s childhood in western Penn sy lvani a when craftin g thi s nove l. 14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wikiff homas_ Bell_(nove list). Accessed 2 January 2020. For SC ovelist T homas Bell Set," Santa Cruz Sentinel, 17 January I 96 1, p. 12. 15 " Servi ces �SLOVAKIA 2021 59 Ideologically, Bell stood unabashedly on the left flank of the American political spectrum. This comes to the fore more vividly in his credible proletarian novel of 1936, All Brides Are Beautiful, which was the basis of the motion picture From This Day Forward, which premiered in 1946. Set in New York during the Depression of the 1930s, its principal protagonist is an Irish-American named Peter Cummings who, like many of his fellow citizens, suffers from underemployment and discrimination in the labor market. He reads a new book of British origin, The Nature of Capitalist Crisis, by John Strachey, a Labour Party politician who, despite his bourgeois origins (his father edited the Conservative-supporting periodical The Spectator) and privileged education at Eton College and the University of Oxford , was a communist sympathizer before turning against Communism in 1940. The narrative is peppered with references to inter alia the Workers Bookshop and the newspaper Daily Worker, published in New York by the Communist Party of the United States of America. In response to a query by another character, Cummings confirms his suspected political sympathies but qualifies this by assuring her, "I ' m not a very good Communist." 16 In the general scholarly literature about American literature (in which works by many individuals about immigrant groups are relatively well represented), Bell remains almost completely invisible. Never did an article about him appear in the hundreds of volumes in the nearly exhaustive reference work Contemporary Authors. As of 2020, the seemingly very inclusive Dictionary of Literary Biography, well over 300 volumes strong, has not included an essay about Bell. Rarely is he even mentioned in general surveys of the wider subject. Anyone searching for information about this fairly productive writer' s life and oeuvre will be fortunate to reap even a meager harvest of information . Contemporary reviews of his novels are a partial exception to this generalization, but even they are not particularly abundant. Out of This Furnace is a constructed family epic, and not even the later stages of the saga, which overlap with its author' s life, are quite autobiographical. In his Afterword in the 1976 edition, Demarest relied heavily on information gleaned from Bell's younger brother, 16 Thomas Bell , All Brides Are Beautiful (Boston: Linle, Brown, and Company, 1936), 21 6. �60 SLOVAKIA 2021 Anthony, to highlight certain fictional departures from the ostensible facts of the Belejcak family history . Plot Summary Out of This Furnace is structured in four parts. The first deals principally with George (or "Djuro") Kracha, who leaves his Slovak peasant life (and, temporarily, his young and pregnant wife in the care of his mother) in the autumn of 1881. After giving birth to a son a few months later, she joins him in Pennsylvania. They eke out a basic existence as George finds employment in a steel mill but his upward mobility is limited to operating a temporarily profitable butcher shop. There is no moral progression in this character. After his wife dies, he marries a fellow Slovak who emigrated simultaneous ly with him, but this frequently inebriated and cognitively unimpressive man is jailed for beating her. The second and third parts relate in much detail the lives of his daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mike Dobrejcak. These members of the second-generation toil arduously but receive scant reward for their labors. However, they are confident that their son, Dobie, can enjoy a materially better life than they have, a conviction this quite Americanized lad shares. He fulfills their expectations to a great degree. Having received several years' schooling, he speaks Eng li sh fluently and uses his rhetorical talent to advocate workers ' rights. In the fourth part, Dobie also toils in mills but plays a crucial role in the unionization of the labor force regionally and ventures to Washington to participate in labor negotiations. To a vastly greater degree than his immigrant grandfather, Dobie embodies an altrui stic spirit. He is a considerate husband and parent who is concerned not merely about his own welfare but a lso that of his descendants and of the working class in general. All in all , the saga of this family through three generations relates much about the initially glacial but gradual and inconsistent rise of Slovak-Americans during decades when the spoils of the labor and entrepreneurial spirit that transformed the United States into a massive industrial power were so unevenly distributed. In doing so, Bell's novel sheds much light on social relationships within the ethnic group, the partial retention of ethnic culture, and other related matters. �SLOVAKIA 2021 61 A Miscellany of Religious Motifs The narrative does not deal in nearly as much detail about the reli gious life of Slovak-Americans as historians of Christianity might wi sh. This theme plays second or third fiddle in an otherwise fairly well-deve loped fictional orchestration of immigrant hi story. How much Bell knew about that aspect of his family's story which forms the core of the construction is difficult to assess. According to his brother Anthony, who provided Demarest with information about the clan, their father was a very active layman " in the church and related organizations" whose involvement in them took him to meetings throughout Pennsylvania and in Ohio. 17 In one of the most didactic sections of Part Two, the narrator genera li zes about the characteristics of the ethnic group. " In the o ld country the Slovaks had been an oppressed minority from the beginning of time, a simple, religious, unwarlike people, a nation of peasants and shepherds whom the centuries had taught patience and humility," he declares, though without relating anything to substantiate this. "In America they were all this and more, foreigners in a strange land, ignorant of the land and customs, fearful of authority in whatever guise." 18 Churches exist in the depicted milieu, but much of the time they remain vague entities in the background. There is relatively little description of either individuals or Slovak-American families worshiping regularly or otherwise participating in ecc lesiastical life, and one finds only occasional hints of private religious devotion. (Certa in key exceptions are discussed below.) There are priests, of course, but one gets the impression that in Bell ' s fictional world some of the key characters interact with them only on special occasions, such as at weddings and funerals, or when they encounter a crisis and perceive a need for sacerdotal intervention . The first such instance occurs in the Old World. When Kracha elects to try his luck in America, he leaves his pregnant wife Elena in the care of his mother, an arrangement which proves inauspicious. The otherwise anonymous local priest who writes letters on behalf of these two presumably illiterate women informs Kracha that his a iling wife 17 18 Dav id P. Demarest, Jr. , " Afterword," in Bell , Ou! of This Furnace, 420. Bell , Ow of This Furnace, 123 . �62 SLOVAKIA 2021 and her mother-in-law are not fully compatible, especially when cohabiting in a one-room hut, and that he should do whatever is necessary to enable her relocation to America at the earliest opportunity. 19 Beyond that brief part, there is virtually nothing in Out of This Furnace about religious life in Slovakia. In the scattered comments about Slovak-American churches, one finds themes that reflect what one can read in nonfictional historical surveys. For example, new clusters of Slovak immigrants typically worshipped temporarily in the sanctuaries of non-Slovaks before founding their own parishes. Early in the narrative, a young Slovak immigrant couple have their nuptial mass in an Irish-American Roman Catholic church because there is not yet one of their own national heritage.20 When the number of Slovaks in individual locales increased to the point where they could organize their own parishes, they sometimes bought church edifices from Protestant congregations whose members were gradually moving to other communities. There are two occurrences of this in Out of This Furnace. In Braddock, Slovak Roman Catholics "took over" First Baptist Church and rededicated it as St. Michael's Church.2 1 Their ethnic fellows of Greek Catholi c loyalty followed suit shortly thereafter, purchasing what had been the First Presbyterian Church in an unappealing location a long the railroad tracks in the same small city. In its new denominational iteration, it had become St. Peter and St. Paul ' s. 22 Readers are not given nearly enough information about the ecclesiastica l life of the community to create a comprehensive portrait of that subject in general or the proportion of Slovaks who were active church members. There is no reason to believe that the dissolute Kracha is such an individual. On the other hand, after his sickly spouse Elena recovers sufficiently to leave the house, she begins to go to church every morning. However, this is described as the behavior of a mentally troubled soul who has largely withdrawn into herself, not as that of one with a normal socia l li fe . C lasping her rosary, Elena has " now more than ever a frightened , beaten look," perhaps owing to her 19 Bell , Bell , 21 Bell , 22 Bell , 20 0111 o( This Ou! of This Ou! of This 0111 of This Furnace, 14. Furnace, 19 . Furnace, 38. Furnace, 69. �SLOVAKIA 2021 63 inability to adapt to her difficult life as Kracha's wife in a dismal mill town. 23 The phenomenon of non-involvement in organized community religious life is dealt with only fleetingly . The most explicit example of this stems from Bell's critique of capitalist exploitation of the steelworkers. Kracha's colleague Joe Dubik is introduced as "a Rusnak, a Greek Catholic from Tvarosc in Sarisa." 24 Having preceded Kracha to Braddock, he welcomes his friend when the latter arrives and shows him around the town. Passing the Carnegie public library (endowed by the philanthropy of the Scottish immigrant steel magnate Andrew Carnegie), Dubik admits that he had never entered it. " When do I have the time for such things?" he explains wistfully. "Since they cut wages and put us on twelve hours l've even stopped going to church." 25 But some continue to attend mass. One is Mike Dobrejcak , the long-suffering son-in-law of Kracha, who rarely finds joy in life and is trapped in his career as a steelworker. In a paragraph of several hundred words, the narrator provides moving insight into the spiritual constitution of this second-generation Slovak-American and the personal significance of his religious life. He prefers to attend the evening mass in the Greek Catholic Church. In contrast to high mass, where God seems to be "the thundering, awe-inspiring Lord of the Universe in vestments of white and gold," for after sunset the deity seems to be "a friend whom one dropped in to visit, God still but God at ease, His shoes and trousers showing below His robes." This approachable deity is one to whom Mike can pray for his wife Mary, their children, and him self. He can do so confident that God is superior to steel corporations and their general superintendents. Moreover, and perhaps just as important to Mike, the church in which this relationship unfolds is a social leveler. In its sanctuary " he was not a check number of a Hunky laborer, but a man." God, he believes, cared not a whit about socioeconomic differences or ethnic strata in American society: " Here he was welcome, here he belonged . Here he spoke in his own tongue; and without fear, without awkwardness, he spoke of himself, hi s hopes, hi s troubles, hi s need of help. And God heard him out." The God of the church, and especially of evening mass, " knew him by name, knew 23 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 64. Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 10. 25 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 34. 24 �64 SLOVAKIA 2021 about Mary and the children understood how it was with all of them and had a pretty good idea what kind of person, behind his laborer's clothes and poor English, Mike really was. God , in short, liked him ." The psychological impact is subtle but real; "The world was always a less unfriendly place and he nearly always walked a little straighter, heartened, protected, when he came out." 26 Nor is Mike alone. The narrator acknowledges that more pews are empty than filled, but the congregation includes inter alia old parishioners who attended mass daily and twice on Sunday. Far more prevalent in the throng are young couples who also appreciated the subdued sociability of a vespers service. It gave them "an irreproachable excuse to be together and was cheaper than a trip to Kennywood," explains the narrator. 27 No single factor, in other words, expla ins why Slovak-Americans participate in the worship of their churches . Bell ' s fictional construction of Slovak participation in the unsuccessful 1919 Great Steel Strike gave him an opportunity to explore a dimension of the ro le of religious factors in a matter of immense personal interest. Hi s sympathy with the goals of the strike, which took place while he was sti ll a teenager in Braddock, is manifest. Bell included a paragraph listing the union's demands, among them such minimal conditions as an eight-hour day, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and one day off every week. 28 Against this background, the support of the long-serving priest in Braddock, Father Kazincy, for the campaign is understandable. Indeed, he has urged parishioners to join the union , and he allows an organizing committee to meet in the basement of his church. When "veiled threats" are made by an unidentified party to foreclose on the parish's mortgage, Kazincy replies that if that is done he will place a sign on the front of the building announcing: "Thi s Church of Christ c losed by the United States Steel Corporation ." He further show s his so lidari ty after mass at St. Michael's on the Sunday morning immediately before the beginning of the strike when a state trooper orders people who congregate outside the building to disperse: "Father Kazincy came out of the church and protested, a tall , gray-haired man in priestly robes standing 26 Bell , Out of This Furnace, 17 1. Bell, Out of This Furnace, 170. Launched in 1899 in West Miffin. southeast of Pittsburgh, Kenn ywood was an amusement park and picnic area th at attracted large numbers of workin g-cl ass people. 28 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 240. 27 �SLOVAKIA 2021 65 beside the trooper's restless horse, his face uplifted, alight with indignation." 29 This sympathy-inspiring partisanship is juxtaposed with less appealing conduct on the part of the Irish-dominated Roman Catholic Church . At its St. Brendan's Church " in the ' good ' part of town", the priest declares in his homily, "This strike is not being brought about by intelligent English-speaking workmen ... . You can't reason with these people. Don't reason with them." The appropriate response, he preached, was to "knock them down!" In Bell ' s narrative, this hostility meshed with the response of the diocesan hierarchy to the strike. A delegation of Catholic strikers call on the bishop of Pittsburgh (whom Bell calls "Bishop Canavan" but in fact was Regis Canevin from 1904 until 1921) imploring him to support the action, not least because a majority of the strikers are Catholics. But that prelate declines to do so. Underscoring the influence of the industrial magnates on religious life, "not long after that the Pittsburgh Catholic Charities received a check for twenty-five thousand dollars from the Carnegie Steel Company."30 An Atheist to the End Too little is known , and perhaps cannot be known , about Bell ' s low-profile life to trace whatever spiritual journey he may have had followed through his fifty-seven years. What is beyond dispute, however, is that the skepticism expressed in Out of This Furnace foreshadowed acknowledged atheism in his final book, In the Midst of life. This nonfictional volume, approximately 270 pages in length, was published a few months after his death in 1961 . It encompasses a miscellany of his thoughts and musings as a terminally ill cancer patient in Santa Cruz. Bell acknowledged in his first brief chapter that he was not on the same spiritual wavelength with many other people. "While others, in the old phrase, make their peace with God," he stated, "I must make mine with myself." 31 Bell noted that his beliefs differed markedly from those of one of his pious customers, a Mrs. Worth, who had sought to 29 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 241 . Out of This Furnace, 241 -2. 3 1Thomas Bell , In the Mid1·t a/Life (New York: Atheneum, 196 1), 5. 30 Bell, �66 SLOVAKIA 2021 encourage him at that critical stage of his life. He had even prayed to " Mrs. Worth 's God" in the privacy of a toilet at a hospital in Palo Alto, but his cancer had progressed unabated. Bell concluded that "belief in a supernatural god may disappear, and a good thing too," but in the same sentence he admitted that there were times "when one can only envy such people as Mrs. Worth. " 32 If his non credo of ca. 1960 represented his attitude towards the Christian faith two decades earlier, his willingness to write sympathetically, albeit briefly, about the religious life of his fictional characters at that time is all the more remarkable. Conclusion A juxtaposition of Out of This Furnace and the nonfictional texts cited in the present article highlights several problems that serious historians of religion encounter when they are seeking to gauge, even in an approximate way, the spiritual life of Slovak immigrants in North America. On the one hand, there are assertions about the group's devotion to Christianity in several of its denominational forms. These assurances are typically supported by reference to the hundreds of churches which Slovaks founded in the New World, usually in the early stages of their community life in surroundings still only partially familiar to them, and in many instances after unsatisfactory experiences in multi-ethnic parishes. On the other hand, when one reads Out of This Furnace as almost certainly the principal fictional reconstruction of Slovak-American history, one finds significantly less about religion than nonfictional literature might reasonably lead one to expect. Considered in isolation, Out a/This Furnace thus gives an impression that is difficult to harmoni ze with the large number of enduring Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and other sorts of parishes which these immigrants founded to serve as their spiritual homes. No doubt part of the answer inheres in accepting the fact that Slovak-Americans were by no means a monolithic entity, but a diverse segment of the Euro-American population which probably always included individuals with varying degrees of religious fervor and criticism thereof, different levels of moral development, and no uniformity of commitment to community life. Gauging the percentage of people 32 Bell, In the Mid1·1 a/Life, 8-9. �SLOVAKIA 2021 67 in any historic ethnic group who chose to affiliate with its religious institutions can be prohibitively difficult. Any calculations done in this regard would probably be estimates rather than precise statistics. Furthermore, such figures do not address the underlying problems of assessing personal commitment and spiritual life as opposed to nominal membership. Other dimensions of the phenomenon bedevil quantification . Historians must look carefully at how the character of their subject evolves over time. In this case, they would be compelled to examine, for instance, the religious commitment of the displaced people who formed the first generation in America and then their at least partly assimilated, Anglophone descendants. Did interest in ecclesiastical life vary diachronically? Was it consistent in large cities and small mill towns? Did it appear to be more vibrant in areas where the Slovaks constituted a relatively large percentage of the population than in those areas where they were but a small minority? Were married men more inclined than bachelors to participate in organized religious life? These and related questions are by no means limited to Slovaks or other Eastern and Central Europeans in North America and their descendants but are relevant to much of the ethnic panorama. A broad consideration of this obviously lies beyond the bounds of the present study, but two quite different kinds of examples illustrate the point. One stems from the present writer's extensive, multidenominational research on the history of the approximately 800,000 Norwegians who emigrated to the United States. Most of them were at least nominal members of the established Evangelical Lutheran Church in their homeland, although levels of participation in its sacraments, services, and so on varied greatly from region to region. Numerous " revival" movements, some of them led by lay preachers, had reinvigorated the spiritual life of the nation. Nonconformist denominations also sprouted in the nineteenth century, giving especially those Norwegians who lived in coastal towns some measure of churches from which to choose. At the same time, however, anticlerical critics emerged, sometimes in tandem with an incipient labor movement. After reaching the United States, large numbers of these Nordic newcomers formed many hundreds of Lutheran churches, chiefly in the Upper Midwest, with smaller numbers in other regions. They also founded several church-related undergraduate colleges, most of which continue to thrive in the twenty-first century, and several theological �68 SLOVAKIA 2021 seminaries for training new generations of pastors. All in all , denominational membership statistics clearly indicate that a higher percentage of Norwegian immigrants than their Swedish and Danish counterparts, to cite the most meaningful comparisons, were affiliated with what can be regarded as their birthright religious institutions. However, as I have demonstrated, this involvement varied immensely, and overall only about 30 percent of first-generation Norwegian-Americans became members of the ethnic Lutheran churches in which one might expect to find them .33 The evidence disconfirmed sweeping generalizations that historians of immigration had made for approximately two generations about the supposedly lofty level of religious loyalty among newcomers from Norway. Turning to a significantly different kind of example, in 1964 Rudolph J. Vecoli strongly challenged the generalized portrayal of immigrants in America which Oscar Handlin had presented in his Pulitzer Prize-winning popular history, The Uprooted, twelve years earlier. Writing about the tens of thousands of contadini (i.e. peasants) from southern Italy who had settled in Chicago, Vecoli declared that the noted Harvard historian 's theory that the process of adjusting to life on American shores had strengthened their religious li fe in an ali en environment. Not so, this Italian-American argued. "American priests were scandali zed by the indifference of the Italians to the Church . Even when Italian churches were provided by the Catholic hierarchy, the contadini seldom displayed any religious enthusiasm ." 34 Within the Slavic-American spectrum, the extent of Slovak detachment from organized religious life awaits detailed ana lysis. In 2005 sociologist Paul Froese published an article about the significantly differing levels of involvement in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in recent decades. He attributed the higher degree among Slovaks to a historically different relationship between religion and nationalism . " In Slovakia," he concluded, "Roman Catholi cism and nationalism are conjoined in much the same way as they are in Poland." One consequence of thi s is greater loya lty to the Roman Catholi c 33 Frederi ck Ha le, No rwegian Religious Pluralism: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 34 Rudo lph J. Vecoli , "Contadini in Chi cago: A Critique of The Uprooted." The Journal of American History LI , no. 3 ( December 1964): 415. �SLOVAKIA 2021 69 Church in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.35 Froese did not, however, deal at all with the history of religious life among Slovaks who had been transplanted to a different environment in North America. Establishing the defensible perimeter of descriptions of SlovakAmerican religious life thus remains a difficult task, one which would have to take into account not only formal religious involvement and activity but also the extent to which an as yet indeterminate number of people chose not to become affiliated or who were directly critical of Christianity and its institutions. Moreover, the historical calculus would have to take into account changes over time. Out of This Furnace offers a stimulating if obviously truncated impression of Slovak religious life during the first few crucial decades of this group's history in industrial America. Indeed, when one considers Bell's personal separation from that important dimension of his ethnic heritage, it is arguably surprising how many aspects of it appear in this novel. One finds observations about inter a/ia priestly ministry, interaction with non-Slovak churches, efforts to raise children according to traditional religious values, prayer, community worship, and the relationship between religious institutions and the labor movement. To be sure, there is silence about significant historical matters, such as the Lutheran and other Protestant churches among Slovak immigrants. Far too little about these topics has been published in any genre. Will future litterateurs take up their pens and construct engaging fictional accounts that tell readers far more about the spiritual life of the group, thereby further enriching the colorful tapestry of ethnic historical fiction? To be sure, no amount of meticulous research could replace Bell ' s first-hand knowledge of Slovak immigrant life in Braddock, but many historical novelists have crafted credible works about topics which they did not experience. While we might be ill-advised to hold our breath, we can find comfort in Alexander Pope ' s oft-quoted words, " Hope springs eternal in the human breast." 35 Paul Froese, "Secular Czechs and Devout Slova ks: Ex ploring Religious Differences," Review of Religious Research XL VI , no. 3 (March 2005): 269, 280. � SLOVAKIA 2021 53 RECONSIDERING SLOVAK-AMERICAN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT: THOMAS BELL'S OUT OF THIS FURNACE IN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT Frederick Hale Introduction If any work of fiction deserves to be called " the great SlovakAmerican historical novel ," it is undoubtedly Thomas Bell 's Out of This Furnace. To be sure, the competition is nearly non-existent. 1 Nevertheless, since its initial publication in 1941 , thi s volume of more than 400 pages has offered readers a hi ghly readable and insightful view of immigrant laborers and their descendants, chiefly in the steel mill town s of western Pennsylvania where many Slovaks toiled. Their presence became woven into the multicolored ethni c fabric of that once-booming region. Though for many upward social mobility came at a snai l's pace, organized community li fe began early and remained vibrant, and the members of the group contributed mightily to the prosperity of the cities in which they sacrificed seemingly endless hours on the a ltars of an economy of wh ich they were far more the victims than the lords. Beg inning, apparently, as economically virtually powerless and thus wi lling to accept their su bservient lot in life, many gradua lly gained a bolder spirit through the labor movements in which they participated . In tandem with their inevitable assim ilation, Slovak-Americans eventuall y gained a greater voice in the direction of their working lives. These interrelated matters form much of the thematic warp and woof of Bell 's much-lauded novel , which traces three generations through their tribul ations to a more ass imilated 1 Michael ovak 's quasi-autobiogra phical The Tiber Was S ilver ( 1961) failed to make a perceptible splash in the waters of American literature, and hi s Naked I l eave ( 1970), whi ch was more widely rev iewed, was a lso criticall y interpreted as a fictional ized mirror of hi s transition from Roman Catho li c se minarian to journalist. These intensely personal works by a prominent Slovak-American inte llectua l whose life began in Jo hn stown , Pennsylvania, in 1933 are not w itho ut arti stic merit , but th ey belo ng to a sub-genre o f ficti o n quite different from Be ll 's realistic po rtraya l of th e ethni c g roup's hi story in th e late nin eteenth and ea rl y twenti eth centuri es. �54 SLOVAKIA 2021 status and to higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Mu tat is mutandis, the story it tells echoes that of numerous other immigrant groups in urban America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conceivably the eventual upward mobility-engendered in part by the labor movement- underlay the translation of this work into Slovak and its publication in 1949 in Czechoslovakia, when that country was to a great degree under the hegemony of the Soviet Union during the chilliest days of the Cold War. Furthermore, owing to its pedagogical value for teaching American immigration and labor hi story, in 1976 the University of Pittsburgh reprinted Out of This Furnace in response to a proposal by Professor David P. Demarest of Carnegie Mellon University. It fitted this social activist's converging interests in workingclass literature and labor history hand-in-glove. The relative popularity of the book led to a fiftieth anniversary edition in 1991. Bell illuminated many facets of Slovak-American working-class life and did not hesitate to include in his narrati ve several less savory dimensions of it that less candid writers might have chosen to minimize or ignore entirely in the interests of presenting palatable impressions of their respective ethnic groups. As Professor David J. Goldberg noted in 20 IO when advocating the assignment of Out of This Furnace to university students, " Men get drunk in saloons. Weddings and funerals are occasions for arguments." 2 A Limited Tradition of Scholarly Consideration Out of This Furnace has been neither the beneficiary nor the victim of extensive scholarly criticism, but it has not been completely ignored. In hi s study of American writers of the 1930s, especially those on the political Left, Leo Gurko devoted a few paragraphs to Bell ' s authorship and commented on this novel. However, Gurko did not evince adequate familiarity with this novelist's oeuvre. He judged that the ideological positions taken by Bell's characters "end with trade-unionism and anti-fascism," a myopic observation that overlooks the central character in All Brides Are Beautiful. Turning specifically to the hi storical span of Out o_fThis Furnace, Gurko thought that 2 David J. Goldberg, "Thomas Bell's 0111 o_(This Furnace: An Evaluation and an Appreciation," Journal of American Ethnic History, XXIX, no. 2 (Winter 2010), p. 664 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 55 it covered two generations of Slovak-Americans, when in fact it dealt with three. 3 In 1975, i.e. a year before its republication by the University of Pittsburgh Press, John F. Berko contributed an article about Bell as a novelist to the journal Slovak Studies but devoted only one page to this particular novel. 4 Furthermore, after encouraging its republication Demarest wrote a moderately detailed Afterword in which he provided useful information without dissecting the text. The eminent historian of Slovak immigrants in North America Marian Mark Stolarik has credited Bell with describing Slovak-American life "very we ll" but lamented that he had "completely ignored the religiosity" of this ethnic group. 5 Stolarik's criticism at this point dovetails neatly with what he and other historians have repeatedly stated about the enthusiasm of Slovak-Americans for ecclesiastical life. In his article " Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," for example, published in the Slovak League of America's celebratory bicentennial volume in 1978, Daniel F. Tanzone could declare without reserve that "the most di stinctive characteristic of the Slovaks is their deep and abiding faith in God." The zeal they evinced in Central Europe, he emphasized, became transatlantic as immigrants from Slovakia " made great effort to hear the word of God preached to them in their native Slovak tongue." 6 The linkage between social and religious life has also been highlighted in the pertinent historiography. As Stolarik explained in the 1980s, upon settling in the United States Slovaks typically initiated this by founding "fraternal-benefit" societies to provide emotional and economic safety nets. These lodges usually reflected the discrete religious affiliations of individuals within the larger group and were identifiable as de facto Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist. From the religious cohesion of such local societies formal , 3 Leo Gurko, The Angty Decade (New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, 1947), 66-9. John F. Berko, "Thomas Bell ( 1903- 196 1) Slovak-Ameri can Novelist," Slovak S1udies, XV ( 1975), 143-58. 5 M. Mark Stolarik to Frederick Hale, 14 November 20 17 (electronic correspondence) . 6 Daniel F. Tanzone, "Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," in Slovaks in America: A Bicenlennial S!udy (Middletown, Pennsylvani a: The Slovak League of America, 1978), 57 . 4 �56 SLOVAKIA 2021 distinctly Slovak parishes sprang, often after a period of worshiping with, for example, Polish fellow immigrants.7 In his history of three generations of Slovak-Americans in the steel mill town of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, from the 1880s until the 1970s, Stolarik related in some detail how they were divided into three religious communities, chiefly Roman Catholic but also Greek Catholic and Lutheran . Church life among many of these people appears to have been vibrant, despite chronic financial hardship that, for example, protracted the amortization of mortgages. Church edifices began to appear at a very early stage. 8 He was thus not in doubt that " religion played a central role in the life of Bethlehem Slovaks."9 Of particular relevance to Out of This Furnace, Stolarik argued that on a national basis the "overwhelming loyalty" of Slovak-Americans to their religious life helped to immunize them from an early stage of their history to socialist movements which were drawing support from many other working-class immigrants well before the end of the nineteenth century. 10 More than two decades later, Stolarik published what may be the most up-to-date, albeit still brief, scholarly consideration of SlovakAmerican religious life. Writing in The Catholic Historical Review, he emphasized why the immigrants in question were divided into four denominations and how they adjusted to ecclesiastical circumstances in the United States of America and Canada, particularly the creation of specific ethnic parishes. Stolarik did not, however, deal with such matters as the non-affiliation of individuals with churches, anticlericalism, and hostility to or disagreement with religion as such. He judiciously acknowledged that much research remained to be done before historians could paint anything approaching a comprehensive portrait of the spiritual life of Slovak-Americans generally. 11 7 Marian Mark Stolarik , Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 18701918 (New York: AMS Press, Inc ., 1989), 82-3 . 8 M. Mark Stolarik, Growing Up on the South Side: Three Genera/ions of Slovaks in Bethlehem. Pennsylvania. 1880-/9 76 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1985), 44-62. 44. 10 Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization, 8 1. 11 M. Mark Stolarik, " Slovak Immigrants Come to Term s with Reli g ious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , no. I (January 20 I 0): 5684. 9 Ibid ., �SLOVAKIA 2021 57 The publication in 2012 of his lengthy Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/ 870-2010) gave Stolarik an opportunity to touch on aspects of Slovak immigrants ' religious life in North America. His seventh chapter, "Slovak Marxists Disagree" dealt with what he acknowledged were the "few Marxists" among the Slovaks in the United States and Canada. This minuscule segment established mutual benefit societies which competed on a minor scale with the churches for the loyalty of the immigrants and their descendants but, as Stolarik emphasized, "their number remained small." 12 He briefly traced a waning of the socialists ' initially strident criticism ofreligious life and concluded that by the 1940s the verbal warfare had ceased. 13 The di sagreements to which the chapter' s title refers were largely those among the socialists themselves, especially with regard to political developments in their homeland, not to disputes between these men of the left and the ecclesiastical traditions they had left behind. The empirically challenging question of the scope of general SlovakAmerican indifference to and non-participation in formal religious life thus remained essentially unanswered. Regarding participation in secular campaigns to improve working conditions in industrial America, it is difficult to ascertain how many of these newcomers and their descendants supported the more inclusive labor movement, which in the USA was only partly socialist. However, it is known that Bell himself was a man of the Left, albeit not in a consistently outspoken way. How unrepresentative of SlovakAmericans he was in that regard is an interesting question, though one that necessarily lies beyond the scope of the present article. At any rate, in Out o_f This Furnace Bell presented the labor movement in a positive manner and highlighted the participation of at least a small number of Slovak-Americans in it. This is probably significant to an understanding of the dispersed treatment of religion in this fictional construction. 12 M. Mark Stolarik, Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( / 87020 10) (Bern : Peter Lang AG, Internati onal Academi c Publishers, 201 2), p. 205. 13 Stolarik, Wh ere Is My Home?, pp. 2 12-2 13. �58 SLOVAKIA 2021 A Little-known Literary A rtist Bell ' s earl y li fe endowed him with an intimate know ledge of hi s subj ect. His parents were fro m the village of Ni zny Tvarozec in the Bardejov d istri ct of the Presov reg ion of northwestern Slovaki a. He was born in the mill tow n of Braddock, Penn sylvani a, j ust east of Pi ttsburgh, in 1903 . 14 That small c ity had a popul ati on of 15,654 in 1900, a fig ure whi ch rose to sli ghtly over 20,000 two decades later before a persistent dec line reduced it to a poverty-stri cken village in the late twentieth century. His origi nal name was Ada lbert Thomas Belejcak, a cu mbersome moniker whi ch he never used during hi s career as a nove li st. Leav ing schoo l as an ado lescent, he worked loca ll y from age fifteen as an electri c ian' s apprenti ce but in 1922 re located to New York and was vari ously empl oyed fo r approximate ly a decade as a merchant sea man, boo kstore clerk , and mechani c. Bell 's first nove l, The Breed of Bas il, appeared in 1930, and from 1933 onward he was a fu ll -time writer, th ough onl y fi ve of hi s nove ls were issued. Hi s All Brides Are Beautiful was the bas is of a motion picture starrin g Joa n Fonta ine and Mark Stevens, and Till! Come Back to You was dramati zed and produced on Broadway by Jed Harri s. In other noteworthy d imensions of his career w ith the pen, Be ll contri buted short stori es to such magazi nes as McCall 's and Ladies ' Home J ournal, and eventuall y worked as a Holl ywood screenwriter. After mov ing to Cali fo rni a in 1955 , he continued to write sporadi ca ll y whil e operating the East Side Gift and Stati onery Shop in Santa Cruz. His hea lth deteri orated in the late 1950s, and he di ed of cancer in 196 1. The fun era l was held in a mortuary chapel rather than a church, and Bell 's ashes were interred at the crematory of the Independent Order of Odd Fell ows . 15 The few sources of readil y ava il able info rmation about hi s li fe do not suggest th at he had any ex perience in Slovaki a, and nothin g in Out of This Furnace indi cates that he had noteworthy know ledge of that coun try apart fro m what may have been handed down ora ll y from hi s fo rebears. Bell appears to have reli ed almost exc lusive ly on ora l traditi on and memories of hi s childhood in western Penn sy lvani a when craftin g thi s nove l. 14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wikiff homas_ Bell_(nove list). Accessed 2 January 2020. For SC ovelist T homas Bell Set," Santa Cruz Sentinel, 17 January I 96 1, p. 12. 15 " Servi ces �SLOVAKIA 2021 59 Ideologically, Bell stood unabashedly on the left flank of the American political spectrum. This comes to the fore more vividly in his credible proletarian novel of 1936, All Brides Are Beautiful, which was the basis of the motion picture From This Day Forward, which premiered in 1946. Set in New York during the Depression of the 1930s, its principal protagonist is an Irish-American named Peter Cummings who, like many of his fellow citizens, suffers from underemployment and discrimination in the labor market. He reads a new book of British origin, The Nature of Capitalist Crisis, by John Strachey, a Labour Party politician who, despite his bourgeois origins (his father edited the Conservative-supporting periodical The Spectator) and privileged education at Eton College and the University of Oxford , was a communist sympathizer before turning against Communism in 1940. The narrative is peppered with references to inter alia the Workers Bookshop and the newspaper Daily Worker, published in New York by the Communist Party of the United States of America. In response to a query by another character, Cummings confirms his suspected political sympathies but qualifies this by assuring her, "I ' m not a very good Communist." 16 In the general scholarly literature about American literature (in which works by many individuals about immigrant groups are relatively well represented), Bell remains almost completely invisible. Never did an article about him appear in the hundreds of volumes in the nearly exhaustive reference work Contemporary Authors. As of 2020, the seemingly very inclusive Dictionary of Literary Biography, well over 300 volumes strong, has not included an essay about Bell. Rarely is he even mentioned in general surveys of the wider subject. Anyone searching for information about this fairly productive writer' s life and oeuvre will be fortunate to reap even a meager harvest of information . Contemporary reviews of his novels are a partial exception to this generalization, but even they are not particularly abundant. Out of This Furnace is a constructed family epic, and not even the later stages of the saga, which overlap with its author' s life, are quite autobiographical. In his Afterword in the 1976 edition, Demarest relied heavily on information gleaned from Bell's younger brother, 16 Thomas Bell , All Brides Are Beautiful (Boston: Linle, Brown, and Company, 1936), 21 6. �60 SLOVAKIA 2021 Anthony, to highlight certain fictional departures from the ostensible facts of the Belejcak family history . Plot Summary Out of This Furnace is structured in four parts. The first deals principally with George (or "Djuro") Kracha, who leaves his Slovak peasant life (and, temporarily, his young and pregnant wife in the care of his mother) in the autumn of 1881. After giving birth to a son a few months later, she joins him in Pennsylvania. They eke out a basic existence as George finds employment in a steel mill but his upward mobility is limited to operating a temporarily profitable butcher shop. There is no moral progression in this character. After his wife dies, he marries a fellow Slovak who emigrated simultaneous ly with him, but this frequently inebriated and cognitively unimpressive man is jailed for beating her. The second and third parts relate in much detail the lives of his daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mike Dobrejcak. These members of the second-generation toil arduously but receive scant reward for their labors. However, they are confident that their son, Dobie, can enjoy a materially better life than they have, a conviction this quite Americanized lad shares. He fulfills their expectations to a great degree. Having received several years' schooling, he speaks Eng li sh fluently and uses his rhetorical talent to advocate workers ' rights. In the fourth part, Dobie also toils in mills but plays a crucial role in the unionization of the labor force regionally and ventures to Washington to participate in labor negotiations. To a vastly greater degree than his immigrant grandfather, Dobie embodies an altrui stic spirit. He is a considerate husband and parent who is concerned not merely about his own welfare but a lso that of his descendants and of the working class in general. All in all , the saga of this family through three generations relates much about the initially glacial but gradual and inconsistent rise of Slovak-Americans during decades when the spoils of the labor and entrepreneurial spirit that transformed the United States into a massive industrial power were so unevenly distributed. In doing so, Bell's novel sheds much light on social relationships within the ethnic group, the partial retention of ethnic culture, and other related matters. �SLOVAKIA 2021 61 A Miscellany of Religious Motifs The narrative does not deal in nearly as much detail about the reli gious life of Slovak-Americans as historians of Christianity might wi sh. This theme plays second or third fiddle in an otherwise fairly well-deve loped fictional orchestration of immigrant hi story. How much Bell knew about that aspect of his family's story which forms the core of the construction is difficult to assess. According to his brother Anthony, who provided Demarest with information about the clan, their father was a very active layman " in the church and related organizations" whose involvement in them took him to meetings throughout Pennsylvania and in Ohio. 17 In one of the most didactic sections of Part Two, the narrator genera li zes about the characteristics of the ethnic group. " In the o ld country the Slovaks had been an oppressed minority from the beginning of time, a simple, religious, unwarlike people, a nation of peasants and shepherds whom the centuries had taught patience and humility," he declares, though without relating anything to substantiate this. "In America they were all this and more, foreigners in a strange land, ignorant of the land and customs, fearful of authority in whatever guise." 18 Churches exist in the depicted milieu, but much of the time they remain vague entities in the background. There is relatively little description of either individuals or Slovak-American families worshiping regularly or otherwise participating in ecc lesiastical life, and one finds only occasional hints of private religious devotion. (Certa in key exceptions are discussed below.) There are priests, of course, but one gets the impression that in Bell ' s fictional world some of the key characters interact with them only on special occasions, such as at weddings and funerals, or when they encounter a crisis and perceive a need for sacerdotal intervention . The first such instance occurs in the Old World. When Kracha elects to try his luck in America, he leaves his pregnant wife Elena in the care of his mother, an arrangement which proves inauspicious. The otherwise anonymous local priest who writes letters on behalf of these two presumably illiterate women informs Kracha that his a iling wife 17 18 Dav id P. Demarest, Jr. , " Afterword," in Bell , Ou! of This Furnace, 420. Bell , Ow of This Furnace, 123 . �62 SLOVAKIA 2021 and her mother-in-law are not fully compatible, especially when cohabiting in a one-room hut, and that he should do whatever is necessary to enable her relocation to America at the earliest opportunity. 19 Beyond that brief part, there is virtually nothing in Out of This Furnace about religious life in Slovakia. In the scattered comments about Slovak-American churches, one finds themes that reflect what one can read in nonfictional historical surveys. For example, new clusters of Slovak immigrants typically worshipped temporarily in the sanctuaries of non-Slovaks before founding their own parishes. Early in the narrative, a young Slovak immigrant couple have their nuptial mass in an Irish-American Roman Catholic church because there is not yet one of their own national heritage.20 When the number of Slovaks in individual locales increased to the point where they could organize their own parishes, they sometimes bought church edifices from Protestant congregations whose members were gradually moving to other communities. There are two occurrences of this in Out of This Furnace. In Braddock, Slovak Roman Catholics "took over" First Baptist Church and rededicated it as St. Michael's Church.2 1 Their ethnic fellows of Greek Catholi c loyalty followed suit shortly thereafter, purchasing what had been the First Presbyterian Church in an unappealing location a long the railroad tracks in the same small city. In its new denominational iteration, it had become St. Peter and St. Paul ' s. 22 Readers are not given nearly enough information about the ecclesiastica l life of the community to create a comprehensive portrait of that subject in general or the proportion of Slovaks who were active church members. There is no reason to believe that the dissolute Kracha is such an individual. On the other hand, after his sickly spouse Elena recovers sufficiently to leave the house, she begins to go to church every morning. However, this is described as the behavior of a mentally troubled soul who has largely withdrawn into herself, not as that of one with a normal socia l li fe . C lasping her rosary, Elena has " now more than ever a frightened , beaten look," perhaps owing to her 19 Bell , Bell , 21 Bell , 22 Bell , 20 0111 o( This Ou! of This Ou! of This 0111 of This Furnace, 14. Furnace, 19 . Furnace, 38. Furnace, 69. �SLOVAKIA 2021 63 inability to adapt to her difficult life as Kracha's wife in a dismal mill town. 23 The phenomenon of non-involvement in organized community religious life is dealt with only fleetingly . The most explicit example of this stems from Bell's critique of capitalist exploitation of the steelworkers. Kracha's colleague Joe Dubik is introduced as "a Rusnak, a Greek Catholic from Tvarosc in Sarisa." 24 Having preceded Kracha to Braddock, he welcomes his friend when the latter arrives and shows him around the town. Passing the Carnegie public library (endowed by the philanthropy of the Scottish immigrant steel magnate Andrew Carnegie), Dubik admits that he had never entered it. " When do I have the time for such things?" he explains wistfully. "Since they cut wages and put us on twelve hours l've even stopped going to church." 25 But some continue to attend mass. One is Mike Dobrejcak , the long-suffering son-in-law of Kracha, who rarely finds joy in life and is trapped in his career as a steelworker. In a paragraph of several hundred words, the narrator provides moving insight into the spiritual constitution of this second-generation Slovak-American and the personal significance of his religious life. He prefers to attend the evening mass in the Greek Catholic Church. In contrast to high mass, where God seems to be "the thundering, awe-inspiring Lord of the Universe in vestments of white and gold," for after sunset the deity seems to be "a friend whom one dropped in to visit, God still but God at ease, His shoes and trousers showing below His robes." This approachable deity is one to whom Mike can pray for his wife Mary, their children, and him self. He can do so confident that God is superior to steel corporations and their general superintendents. Moreover, and perhaps just as important to Mike, the church in which this relationship unfolds is a social leveler. In its sanctuary " he was not a check number of a Hunky laborer, but a man." God, he believes, cared not a whit about socioeconomic differences or ethnic strata in American society: " Here he was welcome, here he belonged . Here he spoke in his own tongue; and without fear, without awkwardness, he spoke of himself, hi s hopes, hi s troubles, hi s need of help. And God heard him out." The God of the church, and especially of evening mass, " knew him by name, knew 23 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 64. Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 10. 25 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 34. 24 �64 SLOVAKIA 2021 about Mary and the children understood how it was with all of them and had a pretty good idea what kind of person, behind his laborer's clothes and poor English, Mike really was. God , in short, liked him ." The psychological impact is subtle but real; "The world was always a less unfriendly place and he nearly always walked a little straighter, heartened, protected, when he came out." 26 Nor is Mike alone. The narrator acknowledges that more pews are empty than filled, but the congregation includes inter alia old parishioners who attended mass daily and twice on Sunday. Far more prevalent in the throng are young couples who also appreciated the subdued sociability of a vespers service. It gave them "an irreproachable excuse to be together and was cheaper than a trip to Kennywood," explains the narrator. 27 No single factor, in other words, expla ins why Slovak-Americans participate in the worship of their churches . Bell ' s fictional construction of Slovak participation in the unsuccessful 1919 Great Steel Strike gave him an opportunity to explore a dimension of the ro le of religious factors in a matter of immense personal interest. Hi s sympathy with the goals of the strike, which took place while he was sti ll a teenager in Braddock, is manifest. Bell included a paragraph listing the union's demands, among them such minimal conditions as an eight-hour day, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and one day off every week. 28 Against this background, the support of the long-serving priest in Braddock, Father Kazincy, for the campaign is understandable. Indeed, he has urged parishioners to join the union , and he allows an organizing committee to meet in the basement of his church. When "veiled threats" are made by an unidentified party to foreclose on the parish's mortgage, Kazincy replies that if that is done he will place a sign on the front of the building announcing: "Thi s Church of Christ c losed by the United States Steel Corporation ." He further show s his so lidari ty after mass at St. Michael's on the Sunday morning immediately before the beginning of the strike when a state trooper orders people who congregate outside the building to disperse: "Father Kazincy came out of the church and protested, a tall , gray-haired man in priestly robes standing 26 Bell , Out of This Furnace, 17 1. Bell, Out of This Furnace, 170. Launched in 1899 in West Miffin. southeast of Pittsburgh, Kenn ywood was an amusement park and picnic area th at attracted large numbers of workin g-cl ass people. 28 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 240. 27 �SLOVAKIA 2021 65 beside the trooper's restless horse, his face uplifted, alight with indignation." 29 This sympathy-inspiring partisanship is juxtaposed with less appealing conduct on the part of the Irish-dominated Roman Catholic Church . At its St. Brendan's Church " in the ' good ' part of town", the priest declares in his homily, "This strike is not being brought about by intelligent English-speaking workmen ... . You can't reason with these people. Don't reason with them." The appropriate response, he preached, was to "knock them down!" In Bell ' s narrative, this hostility meshed with the response of the diocesan hierarchy to the strike. A delegation of Catholic strikers call on the bishop of Pittsburgh (whom Bell calls "Bishop Canavan" but in fact was Regis Canevin from 1904 until 1921) imploring him to support the action, not least because a majority of the strikers are Catholics. But that prelate declines to do so. Underscoring the influence of the industrial magnates on religious life, "not long after that the Pittsburgh Catholic Charities received a check for twenty-five thousand dollars from the Carnegie Steel Company."30 An Atheist to the End Too little is known , and perhaps cannot be known , about Bell ' s low-profile life to trace whatever spiritual journey he may have had followed through his fifty-seven years. What is beyond dispute, however, is that the skepticism expressed in Out of This Furnace foreshadowed acknowledged atheism in his final book, In the Midst of life. This nonfictional volume, approximately 270 pages in length, was published a few months after his death in 1961 . It encompasses a miscellany of his thoughts and musings as a terminally ill cancer patient in Santa Cruz. Bell acknowledged in his first brief chapter that he was not on the same spiritual wavelength with many other people. "While others, in the old phrase, make their peace with God," he stated, "I must make mine with myself." 31 Bell noted that his beliefs differed markedly from those of one of his pious customers, a Mrs. Worth, who had sought to 29 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 241 . Out of This Furnace, 241 -2. 3 1Thomas Bell , In the Mid1·t a/Life (New York: Atheneum, 196 1), 5. 30 Bell, �66 SLOVAKIA 2021 encourage him at that critical stage of his life. He had even prayed to " Mrs. Worth 's God" in the privacy of a toilet at a hospital in Palo Alto, but his cancer had progressed unabated. Bell concluded that "belief in a supernatural god may disappear, and a good thing too," but in the same sentence he admitted that there were times "when one can only envy such people as Mrs. Worth. " 32 If his non credo of ca. 1960 represented his attitude towards the Christian faith two decades earlier, his willingness to write sympathetically, albeit briefly, about the religious life of his fictional characters at that time is all the more remarkable. Conclusion A juxtaposition of Out of This Furnace and the nonfictional texts cited in the present article highlights several problems that serious historians of religion encounter when they are seeking to gauge, even in an approximate way, the spiritual life of Slovak immigrants in North America. On the one hand, there are assertions about the group's devotion to Christianity in several of its denominational forms. These assurances are typically supported by reference to the hundreds of churches which Slovaks founded in the New World, usually in the early stages of their community life in surroundings still only partially familiar to them, and in many instances after unsatisfactory experiences in multi-ethnic parishes. On the other hand, when one reads Out of This Furnace as almost certainly the principal fictional reconstruction of Slovak-American history, one finds significantly less about religion than nonfictional literature might reasonably lead one to expect. Considered in isolation, Out a/This Furnace thus gives an impression that is difficult to harmoni ze with the large number of enduring Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and other sorts of parishes which these immigrants founded to serve as their spiritual homes. No doubt part of the answer inheres in accepting the fact that Slovak-Americans were by no means a monolithic entity, but a diverse segment of the Euro-American population which probably always included individuals with varying degrees of religious fervor and criticism thereof, different levels of moral development, and no uniformity of commitment to community life. Gauging the percentage of people 32 Bell, In the Mid1·1 a/Life, 8-9. �SLOVAKIA 2021 67 in any historic ethnic group who chose to affiliate with its religious institutions can be prohibitively difficult. Any calculations done in this regard would probably be estimates rather than precise statistics. Furthermore, such figures do not address the underlying problems of assessing personal commitment and spiritual life as opposed to nominal membership. Other dimensions of the phenomenon bedevil quantification . Historians must look carefully at how the character of their subject evolves over time. In this case, they would be compelled to examine, for instance, the religious commitment of the displaced people who formed the first generation in America and then their at least partly assimilated, Anglophone descendants. Did interest in ecclesiastical life vary diachronically? Was it consistent in large cities and small mill towns? Did it appear to be more vibrant in areas where the Slovaks constituted a relatively large percentage of the population than in those areas where they were but a small minority? Were married men more inclined than bachelors to participate in organized religious life? These and related questions are by no means limited to Slovaks or other Eastern and Central Europeans in North America and their descendants but are relevant to much of the ethnic panorama. A broad consideration of this obviously lies beyond the bounds of the present study, but two quite different kinds of examples illustrate the point. One stems from the present writer's extensive, multidenominational research on the history of the approximately 800,000 Norwegians who emigrated to the United States. Most of them were at least nominal members of the established Evangelical Lutheran Church in their homeland, although levels of participation in its sacraments, services, and so on varied greatly from region to region. Numerous " revival" movements, some of them led by lay preachers, had reinvigorated the spiritual life of the nation. Nonconformist denominations also sprouted in the nineteenth century, giving especially those Norwegians who lived in coastal towns some measure of churches from which to choose. At the same time, however, anticlerical critics emerged, sometimes in tandem with an incipient labor movement. After reaching the United States, large numbers of these Nordic newcomers formed many hundreds of Lutheran churches, chiefly in the Upper Midwest, with smaller numbers in other regions. They also founded several church-related undergraduate colleges, most of which continue to thrive in the twenty-first century, and several theological �68 SLOVAKIA 2021 seminaries for training new generations of pastors. All in all , denominational membership statistics clearly indicate that a higher percentage of Norwegian immigrants than their Swedish and Danish counterparts, to cite the most meaningful comparisons, were affiliated with what can be regarded as their birthright religious institutions. However, as I have demonstrated, this involvement varied immensely, and overall only about 30 percent of first-generation Norwegian-Americans became members of the ethnic Lutheran churches in which one might expect to find them .33 The evidence disconfirmed sweeping generalizations that historians of immigration had made for approximately two generations about the supposedly lofty level of religious loyalty among newcomers from Norway. Turning to a significantly different kind of example, in 1964 Rudolph J. Vecoli strongly challenged the generalized portrayal of immigrants in America which Oscar Handlin had presented in his Pulitzer Prize-winning popular history, The Uprooted, twelve years earlier. Writing about the tens of thousands of contadini (i.e. peasants) from southern Italy who had settled in Chicago, Vecoli declared that the noted Harvard historian 's theory that the process of adjusting to life on American shores had strengthened their religious li fe in an ali en environment. Not so, this Italian-American argued. "American priests were scandali zed by the indifference of the Italians to the Church . Even when Italian churches were provided by the Catholic hierarchy, the contadini seldom displayed any religious enthusiasm ." 34 Within the Slavic-American spectrum, the extent of Slovak detachment from organized religious life awaits detailed ana lysis. In 2005 sociologist Paul Froese published an article about the significantly differing levels of involvement in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in recent decades. He attributed the higher degree among Slovaks to a historically different relationship between religion and nationalism . " In Slovakia," he concluded, "Roman Catholi cism and nationalism are conjoined in much the same way as they are in Poland." One consequence of thi s is greater loya lty to the Roman Catholi c 33 Frederi ck Ha le, No rwegian Religious Pluralism: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 34 Rudo lph J. Vecoli , "Contadini in Chi cago: A Critique of The Uprooted." The Journal of American History LI , no. 3 ( December 1964): 415. �SLOVAKIA 2021 69 Church in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.35 Froese did not, however, deal at all with the history of religious life among Slovaks who had been transplanted to a different environment in North America. Establishing the defensible perimeter of descriptions of SlovakAmerican religious life thus remains a difficult task, one which would have to take into account not only formal religious involvement and activity but also the extent to which an as yet indeterminate number of people chose not to become affiliated or who were directly critical of Christianity and its institutions. Moreover, the historical calculus would have to take into account changes over time. Out of This Furnace offers a stimulating if obviously truncated impression of Slovak religious life during the first few crucial decades of this group's history in industrial America. Indeed, when one considers Bell's personal separation from that important dimension of his ethnic heritage, it is arguably surprising how many aspects of it appear in this novel. One finds observations about inter a/ia priestly ministry, interaction with non-Slovak churches, efforts to raise children according to traditional religious values, prayer, community worship, and the relationship between religious institutions and the labor movement. To be sure, there is silence about significant historical matters, such as the Lutheran and other Protestant churches among Slovak immigrants. Far too little about these topics has been published in any genre. Will future litterateurs take up their pens and construct engaging fictional accounts that tell readers far more about the spiritual life of the group, thereby further enriching the colorful tapestry of ethnic historical fiction? To be sure, no amount of meticulous research could replace Bell ' s first-hand knowledge of Slovak immigrant life in Braddock, but many historical novelists have crafted credible works about topics which they did not experience. While we might be ill-advised to hold our breath, we can find comfort in Alexander Pope ' s oft-quoted words, " Hope springs eternal in the human breast." 35 Paul Froese, "Secular Czechs and Devout Slova ks: Ex ploring Religious Differences," Review of Religious Research XL VI , no. 3 (March 2005): 269, 280. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 53 RECONSIDERING SLOVAK-AMERICAN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT: THOMAS BELL'S OUT OF THIS FURNACE IN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT Frederick Hale Introduction If any work of fiction deserves to be called " the great SlovakAmerican historical novel ," it is undoubtedly Thomas Bell 's Out of This Furnace. To be sure, the competition is nearly non-existent. 1 Nevertheless, since its initial publication in 1941 , thi s volume of more than 400 pages has offered readers a hi ghly readable and insightful view of immigrant laborers and their descendants, chiefly in the steel mill town s of western Pennsylvania where many Slovaks toiled. Their presence became woven into the multicolored ethni c fabric of that once-booming region. Though for many upward social mobility came at a snai l's pace, organized community li fe began early and remained vibrant, and the members of the group contributed mightily to the prosperity of the cities in which they sacrificed seemingly endless hours on the a ltars of an economy of wh ich they were far more the victims than the lords. Beg inning, apparently, as economically virtually powerless and thus wi lling to accept their su bservient lot in life, many gradua lly gained a bolder spirit through the labor movements in which they participated . In tandem with their inevitable assim ilation, Slovak-Americans eventuall y gained a greater voice in the direction of their working lives. These interrelated matters form much of the thematic warp and woof of Bell 's much-lauded novel , which traces three generations through their tribul ations to a more ass imilated 1 Michael ovak 's quasi-autobiogra phical The Tiber Was S ilver ( 1961) failed to make a perceptible splash in the waters of American literature, and hi s Naked I l eave ( 1970), whi ch was more widely rev iewed, was a lso criticall y interpreted as a fictional ized mirror of hi s transition from Roman Catho li c se minarian to journalist. These intensely personal works by a prominent Slovak-American inte llectua l whose life began in Jo hn stown , Pennsylvania, in 1933 are not w itho ut arti stic merit , but th ey belo ng to a sub-genre o f ficti o n quite different from Be ll 's realistic po rtraya l of th e ethni c g roup's hi story in th e late nin eteenth and ea rl y twenti eth centuri es. 54 SLOVAKIA 2021 status and to higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Mu tat is mutandis, the story it tells echoes that of numerous other immigrant groups in urban America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conceivably the eventual upward mobility-engendered in part by the labor movement- underlay the translation of this work into Slovak and its publication in 1949 in Czechoslovakia, when that country was to a great degree under the hegemony of the Soviet Union during the chilliest days of the Cold War. Furthermore, owing to its pedagogical value for teaching American immigration and labor hi story, in 1976 the University of Pittsburgh reprinted Out of This Furnace in response to a proposal by Professor David P. Demarest of Carnegie Mellon University. It fitted this social activist's converging interests in workingclass literature and labor history hand-in-glove. The relative popularity of the book led to a fiftieth anniversary edition in 1991. Bell illuminated many facets of Slovak-American working-class life and did not hesitate to include in his narrati ve several less savory dimensions of it that less candid writers might have chosen to minimize or ignore entirely in the interests of presenting palatable impressions of their respective ethnic groups. As Professor David J. Goldberg noted in 20 IO when advocating the assignment of Out of This Furnace to university students, " Men get drunk in saloons. Weddings and funerals are occasions for arguments." 2 A Limited Tradition of Scholarly Consideration Out of This Furnace has been neither the beneficiary nor the victim of extensive scholarly criticism, but it has not been completely ignored. In hi s study of American writers of the 1930s, especially those on the political Left, Leo Gurko devoted a few paragraphs to Bell ' s authorship and commented on this novel. However, Gurko did not evince adequate familiarity with this novelist's oeuvre. He judged that the ideological positions taken by Bell's characters "end with trade-unionism and anti-fascism," a myopic observation that overlooks the central character in All Brides Are Beautiful. Turning specifically to the hi storical span of Out o_fThis Furnace, Gurko thought that 2 David J. Goldberg, "Thomas Bell's 0111 o_(This Furnace: An Evaluation and an Appreciation," Journal of American Ethnic History, XXIX, no. 2 (Winter 2010), p. 664 . SLOVAKIA 2021 55 it covered two generations of Slovak-Americans, when in fact it dealt with three. 3 In 1975, i.e. a year before its republication by the University of Pittsburgh Press, John F. Berko contributed an article about Bell as a novelist to the journal Slovak Studies but devoted only one page to this particular novel. 4 Furthermore, after encouraging its republication Demarest wrote a moderately detailed Afterword in which he provided useful information without dissecting the text. The eminent historian of Slovak immigrants in North America Marian Mark Stolarik has credited Bell with describing Slovak-American life "very we ll" but lamented that he had "completely ignored the religiosity" of this ethnic group. 5 Stolarik's criticism at this point dovetails neatly with what he and other historians have repeatedly stated about the enthusiasm of Slovak-Americans for ecclesiastical life. In his article " Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," for example, published in the Slovak League of America's celebratory bicentennial volume in 1978, Daniel F. Tanzone could declare without reserve that "the most di stinctive characteristic of the Slovaks is their deep and abiding faith in God." The zeal they evinced in Central Europe, he emphasized, became transatlantic as immigrants from Slovakia " made great effort to hear the word of God preached to them in their native Slovak tongue." 6 The linkage between social and religious life has also been highlighted in the pertinent historiography. As Stolarik explained in the 1980s, upon settling in the United States Slovaks typically initiated this by founding "fraternal-benefit" societies to provide emotional and economic safety nets. These lodges usually reflected the discrete religious affiliations of individuals within the larger group and were identifiable as de facto Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist. From the religious cohesion of such local societies formal , 3 Leo Gurko, The Angty Decade (New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, 1947), 66-9. John F. Berko, "Thomas Bell ( 1903- 196 1) Slovak-Ameri can Novelist," Slovak S1udies, XV ( 1975), 143-58. 5 M. Mark Stolarik to Frederick Hale, 14 November 20 17 (electronic correspondence) . 6 Daniel F. Tanzone, "Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," in Slovaks in America: A Bicenlennial S!udy (Middletown, Pennsylvani a: The Slovak League of America, 1978), 57 . 4 56 SLOVAKIA 2021 distinctly Slovak parishes sprang, often after a period of worshiping with, for example, Polish fellow immigrants.7 In his history of three generations of Slovak-Americans in the steel mill town of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, from the 1880s until the 1970s, Stolarik related in some detail how they were divided into three religious communities, chiefly Roman Catholic but also Greek Catholic and Lutheran . Church life among many of these people appears to have been vibrant, despite chronic financial hardship that, for example, protracted the amortization of mortgages. Church edifices began to appear at a very early stage. 8 He was thus not in doubt that " religion played a central role in the life of Bethlehem Slovaks."9 Of particular relevance to Out of This Furnace, Stolarik argued that on a national basis the "overwhelming loyalty" of Slovak-Americans to their religious life helped to immunize them from an early stage of their history to socialist movements which were drawing support from many other working-class immigrants well before the end of the nineteenth century. 10 More than two decades later, Stolarik published what may be the most up-to-date, albeit still brief, scholarly consideration of SlovakAmerican religious life. Writing in The Catholic Historical Review, he emphasized why the immigrants in question were divided into four denominations and how they adjusted to ecclesiastical circumstances in the United States of America and Canada, particularly the creation of specific ethnic parishes. Stolarik did not, however, deal with such matters as the non-affiliation of individuals with churches, anticlericalism, and hostility to or disagreement with religion as such. He judiciously acknowledged that much research remained to be done before historians could paint anything approaching a comprehensive portrait of the spiritual life of Slovak-Americans generally. 11 7 Marian Mark Stolarik , Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 18701918 (New York: AMS Press, Inc ., 1989), 82-3 . 8 M. Mark Stolarik, Growing Up on the South Side: Three Genera/ions of Slovaks in Bethlehem. Pennsylvania. 1880-/9 76 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1985), 44-62. 44. 10 Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization, 8 1. 11 M. Mark Stolarik, " Slovak Immigrants Come to Term s with Reli g ious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , no. I (January 20 I 0): 5684. 9 Ibid ., SLOVAKIA 2021 57 The publication in 2012 of his lengthy Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/ 870-2010) gave Stolarik an opportunity to touch on aspects of Slovak immigrants ' religious life in North America. His seventh chapter, "Slovak Marxists Disagree" dealt with what he acknowledged were the "few Marxists" among the Slovaks in the United States and Canada. This minuscule segment established mutual benefit societies which competed on a minor scale with the churches for the loyalty of the immigrants and their descendants but, as Stolarik emphasized, "their number remained small." 12 He briefly traced a waning of the socialists ' initially strident criticism ofreligious life and concluded that by the 1940s the verbal warfare had ceased. 13 The di sagreements to which the chapter' s title refers were largely those among the socialists themselves, especially with regard to political developments in their homeland, not to disputes between these men of the left and the ecclesiastical traditions they had left behind. The empirically challenging question of the scope of general SlovakAmerican indifference to and non-participation in formal religious life thus remained essentially unanswered. Regarding participation in secular campaigns to improve working conditions in industrial America, it is difficult to ascertain how many of these newcomers and their descendants supported the more inclusive labor movement, which in the USA was only partly socialist. However, it is known that Bell himself was a man of the Left, albeit not in a consistently outspoken way. How unrepresentative of SlovakAmericans he was in that regard is an interesting question, though one that necessarily lies beyond the scope of the present article. At any rate, in Out o_f This Furnace Bell presented the labor movement in a positive manner and highlighted the participation of at least a small number of Slovak-Americans in it. This is probably significant to an understanding of the dispersed treatment of religion in this fictional construction. 12 M. Mark Stolarik, Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( / 87020 10) (Bern : Peter Lang AG, Internati onal Academi c Publishers, 201 2), p. 205. 13 Stolarik, Wh ere Is My Home?, pp. 2 12-2 13. 58 SLOVAKIA 2021 A Little-known Literary A rtist Bell ' s earl y li fe endowed him with an intimate know ledge of hi s subj ect. His parents were fro m the village of Ni zny Tvarozec in the Bardejov d istri ct of the Presov reg ion of northwestern Slovaki a. He was born in the mill tow n of Braddock, Penn sylvani a, j ust east of Pi ttsburgh, in 1903 . 14 That small c ity had a popul ati on of 15,654 in 1900, a fig ure whi ch rose to sli ghtly over 20,000 two decades later before a persistent dec line reduced it to a poverty-stri cken village in the late twentieth century. His origi nal name was Ada lbert Thomas Belejcak, a cu mbersome moniker whi ch he never used during hi s career as a nove li st. Leav ing schoo l as an ado lescent, he worked loca ll y from age fifteen as an electri c ian' s apprenti ce but in 1922 re located to New York and was vari ously empl oyed fo r approximate ly a decade as a merchant sea man, boo kstore clerk , and mechani c. Bell 's first nove l, The Breed of Bas il, appeared in 1930, and from 1933 onward he was a fu ll -time writer, th ough onl y fi ve of hi s nove ls were issued. Hi s All Brides Are Beautiful was the bas is of a motion picture starrin g Joa n Fonta ine and Mark Stevens, and Till! Come Back to You was dramati zed and produced on Broadway by Jed Harri s. In other noteworthy d imensions of his career w ith the pen, Be ll contri buted short stori es to such magazi nes as McCall 's and Ladies ' Home J ournal, and eventuall y worked as a Holl ywood screenwriter. After mov ing to Cali fo rni a in 1955 , he continued to write sporadi ca ll y whil e operating the East Side Gift and Stati onery Shop in Santa Cruz. His hea lth deteri orated in the late 1950s, and he di ed of cancer in 196 1. The fun era l was held in a mortuary chapel rather than a church, and Bell 's ashes were interred at the crematory of the Independent Order of Odd Fell ows . 15 The few sources of readil y ava il able info rmation about hi s li fe do not suggest th at he had any ex perience in Slovaki a, and nothin g in Out of This Furnace indi cates that he had noteworthy know ledge of that coun try apart fro m what may have been handed down ora ll y from hi s fo rebears. Bell appears to have reli ed almost exc lusive ly on ora l traditi on and memories of hi s childhood in western Penn sy lvani a when craftin g thi s nove l. 14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wikiff homas_ Bell_(nove list). Accessed 2 January 2020. For SC ovelist T homas Bell Set," Santa Cruz Sentinel, 17 January I 96 1, p. 12. 15 " Servi ces SLOVAKIA 2021 59 Ideologically, Bell stood unabashedly on the left flank of the American political spectrum. This comes to the fore more vividly in his credible proletarian novel of 1936, All Brides Are Beautiful, which was the basis of the motion picture From This Day Forward, which premiered in 1946. Set in New York during the Depression of the 1930s, its principal protagonist is an Irish-American named Peter Cummings who, like many of his fellow citizens, suffers from underemployment and discrimination in the labor market. He reads a new book of British origin, The Nature of Capitalist Crisis, by John Strachey, a Labour Party politician who, despite his bourgeois origins (his father edited the Conservative-supporting periodical The Spectator) and privileged education at Eton College and the University of Oxford , was a communist sympathizer before turning against Communism in 1940. The narrative is peppered with references to inter alia the Workers Bookshop and the newspaper Daily Worker, published in New York by the Communist Party of the United States of America. In response to a query by another character, Cummings confirms his suspected political sympathies but qualifies this by assuring her, "I ' m not a very good Communist." 16 In the general scholarly literature about American literature (in which works by many individuals about immigrant groups are relatively well represented), Bell remains almost completely invisible. Never did an article about him appear in the hundreds of volumes in the nearly exhaustive reference work Contemporary Authors. As of 2020, the seemingly very inclusive Dictionary of Literary Biography, well over 300 volumes strong, has not included an essay about Bell. Rarely is he even mentioned in general surveys of the wider subject. Anyone searching for information about this fairly productive writer' s life and oeuvre will be fortunate to reap even a meager harvest of information . Contemporary reviews of his novels are a partial exception to this generalization, but even they are not particularly abundant. Out of This Furnace is a constructed family epic, and not even the later stages of the saga, which overlap with its author' s life, are quite autobiographical. In his Afterword in the 1976 edition, Demarest relied heavily on information gleaned from Bell's younger brother, 16 Thomas Bell , All Brides Are Beautiful (Boston: Linle, Brown, and Company, 1936), 21 6. 60 SLOVAKIA 2021 Anthony, to highlight certain fictional departures from the ostensible facts of the Belejcak family history . Plot Summary Out of This Furnace is structured in four parts. The first deals principally with George (or "Djuro") Kracha, who leaves his Slovak peasant life (and, temporarily, his young and pregnant wife in the care of his mother) in the autumn of 1881. After giving birth to a son a few months later, she joins him in Pennsylvania. They eke out a basic existence as George finds employment in a steel mill but his upward mobility is limited to operating a temporarily profitable butcher shop. There is no moral progression in this character. After his wife dies, he marries a fellow Slovak who emigrated simultaneous ly with him, but this frequently inebriated and cognitively unimpressive man is jailed for beating her. The second and third parts relate in much detail the lives of his daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mike Dobrejcak. These members of the second-generation toil arduously but receive scant reward for their labors. However, they are confident that their son, Dobie, can enjoy a materially better life than they have, a conviction this quite Americanized lad shares. He fulfills their expectations to a great degree. Having received several years' schooling, he speaks Eng li sh fluently and uses his rhetorical talent to advocate workers ' rights. In the fourth part, Dobie also toils in mills but plays a crucial role in the unionization of the labor force regionally and ventures to Washington to participate in labor negotiations. To a vastly greater degree than his immigrant grandfather, Dobie embodies an altrui stic spirit. He is a considerate husband and parent who is concerned not merely about his own welfare but a lso that of his descendants and of the working class in general. All in all , the saga of this family through three generations relates much about the initially glacial but gradual and inconsistent rise of Slovak-Americans during decades when the spoils of the labor and entrepreneurial spirit that transformed the United States into a massive industrial power were so unevenly distributed. In doing so, Bell's novel sheds much light on social relationships within the ethnic group, the partial retention of ethnic culture, and other related matters. SLOVAKIA 2021 61 A Miscellany of Religious Motifs The narrative does not deal in nearly as much detail about the reli gious life of Slovak-Americans as historians of Christianity might wi sh. This theme plays second or third fiddle in an otherwise fairly well-deve loped fictional orchestration of immigrant hi story. How much Bell knew about that aspect of his family's story which forms the core of the construction is difficult to assess. According to his brother Anthony, who provided Demarest with information about the clan, their father was a very active layman " in the church and related organizations" whose involvement in them took him to meetings throughout Pennsylvania and in Ohio. 17 In one of the most didactic sections of Part Two, the narrator genera li zes about the characteristics of the ethnic group. " In the o ld country the Slovaks had been an oppressed minority from the beginning of time, a simple, religious, unwarlike people, a nation of peasants and shepherds whom the centuries had taught patience and humility," he declares, though without relating anything to substantiate this. "In America they were all this and more, foreigners in a strange land, ignorant of the land and customs, fearful of authority in whatever guise." 18 Churches exist in the depicted milieu, but much of the time they remain vague entities in the background. There is relatively little description of either individuals or Slovak-American families worshiping regularly or otherwise participating in ecc lesiastical life, and one finds only occasional hints of private religious devotion. (Certa in key exceptions are discussed below.) There are priests, of course, but one gets the impression that in Bell ' s fictional world some of the key characters interact with them only on special occasions, such as at weddings and funerals, or when they encounter a crisis and perceive a need for sacerdotal intervention . The first such instance occurs in the Old World. When Kracha elects to try his luck in America, he leaves his pregnant wife Elena in the care of his mother, an arrangement which proves inauspicious. The otherwise anonymous local priest who writes letters on behalf of these two presumably illiterate women informs Kracha that his a iling wife 17 18 Dav id P. Demarest, Jr. , " Afterword," in Bell , Ou! of This Furnace, 420. Bell , Ow of This Furnace, 123 . 62 SLOVAKIA 2021 and her mother-in-law are not fully compatible, especially when cohabiting in a one-room hut, and that he should do whatever is necessary to enable her relocation to America at the earliest opportunity. 19 Beyond that brief part, there is virtually nothing in Out of This Furnace about religious life in Slovakia. In the scattered comments about Slovak-American churches, one finds themes that reflect what one can read in nonfictional historical surveys. For example, new clusters of Slovak immigrants typically worshipped temporarily in the sanctuaries of non-Slovaks before founding their own parishes. Early in the narrative, a young Slovak immigrant couple have their nuptial mass in an Irish-American Roman Catholic church because there is not yet one of their own national heritage.20 When the number of Slovaks in individual locales increased to the point where they could organize their own parishes, they sometimes bought church edifices from Protestant congregations whose members were gradually moving to other communities. There are two occurrences of this in Out of This Furnace. In Braddock, Slovak Roman Catholics "took over" First Baptist Church and rededicated it as St. Michael's Church.2 1 Their ethnic fellows of Greek Catholi c loyalty followed suit shortly thereafter, purchasing what had been the First Presbyterian Church in an unappealing location a long the railroad tracks in the same small city. In its new denominational iteration, it had become St. Peter and St. Paul ' s. 22 Readers are not given nearly enough information about the ecclesiastica l life of the community to create a comprehensive portrait of that subject in general or the proportion of Slovaks who were active church members. There is no reason to believe that the dissolute Kracha is such an individual. On the other hand, after his sickly spouse Elena recovers sufficiently to leave the house, she begins to go to church every morning. However, this is described as the behavior of a mentally troubled soul who has largely withdrawn into herself, not as that of one with a normal socia l li fe . C lasping her rosary, Elena has " now more than ever a frightened , beaten look," perhaps owing to her 19 Bell , Bell , 21 Bell , 22 Bell , 20 0111 o( This Ou! of This Ou! of This 0111 of This Furnace, 14. Furnace, 19 . Furnace, 38. Furnace, 69. SLOVAKIA 2021 63 inability to adapt to her difficult life as Kracha's wife in a dismal mill town. 23 The phenomenon of non-involvement in organized community religious life is dealt with only fleetingly . The most explicit example of this stems from Bell's critique of capitalist exploitation of the steelworkers. Kracha's colleague Joe Dubik is introduced as "a Rusnak, a Greek Catholic from Tvarosc in Sarisa." 24 Having preceded Kracha to Braddock, he welcomes his friend when the latter arrives and shows him around the town. Passing the Carnegie public library (endowed by the philanthropy of the Scottish immigrant steel magnate Andrew Carnegie), Dubik admits that he had never entered it. " When do I have the time for such things?" he explains wistfully. "Since they cut wages and put us on twelve hours l've even stopped going to church." 25 But some continue to attend mass. One is Mike Dobrejcak , the long-suffering son-in-law of Kracha, who rarely finds joy in life and is trapped in his career as a steelworker. In a paragraph of several hundred words, the narrator provides moving insight into the spiritual constitution of this second-generation Slovak-American and the personal significance of his religious life. He prefers to attend the evening mass in the Greek Catholic Church. In contrast to high mass, where God seems to be "the thundering, awe-inspiring Lord of the Universe in vestments of white and gold," for after sunset the deity seems to be "a friend whom one dropped in to visit, God still but God at ease, His shoes and trousers showing below His robes." This approachable deity is one to whom Mike can pray for his wife Mary, their children, and him self. He can do so confident that God is superior to steel corporations and their general superintendents. Moreover, and perhaps just as important to Mike, the church in which this relationship unfolds is a social leveler. In its sanctuary " he was not a check number of a Hunky laborer, but a man." God, he believes, cared not a whit about socioeconomic differences or ethnic strata in American society: " Here he was welcome, here he belonged . Here he spoke in his own tongue; and without fear, without awkwardness, he spoke of himself, hi s hopes, hi s troubles, hi s need of help. And God heard him out." The God of the church, and especially of evening mass, " knew him by name, knew 23 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 64. Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 10. 25 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 34. 24 64 SLOVAKIA 2021 about Mary and the children understood how it was with all of them and had a pretty good idea what kind of person, behind his laborer's clothes and poor English, Mike really was. God , in short, liked him ." The psychological impact is subtle but real; "The world was always a less unfriendly place and he nearly always walked a little straighter, heartened, protected, when he came out." 26 Nor is Mike alone. The narrator acknowledges that more pews are empty than filled, but the congregation includes inter alia old parishioners who attended mass daily and twice on Sunday. Far more prevalent in the throng are young couples who also appreciated the subdued sociability of a vespers service. It gave them "an irreproachable excuse to be together and was cheaper than a trip to Kennywood," explains the narrator. 27 No single factor, in other words, expla ins why Slovak-Americans participate in the worship of their churches . Bell ' s fictional construction of Slovak participation in the unsuccessful 1919 Great Steel Strike gave him an opportunity to explore a dimension of the ro le of religious factors in a matter of immense personal interest. Hi s sympathy with the goals of the strike, which took place while he was sti ll a teenager in Braddock, is manifest. Bell included a paragraph listing the union's demands, among them such minimal conditions as an eight-hour day, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and one day off every week. 28 Against this background, the support of the long-serving priest in Braddock, Father Kazincy, for the campaign is understandable. Indeed, he has urged parishioners to join the union , and he allows an organizing committee to meet in the basement of his church. When "veiled threats" are made by an unidentified party to foreclose on the parish's mortgage, Kazincy replies that if that is done he will place a sign on the front of the building announcing: "Thi s Church of Christ c losed by the United States Steel Corporation ." He further show s his so lidari ty after mass at St. Michael's on the Sunday morning immediately before the beginning of the strike when a state trooper orders people who congregate outside the building to disperse: "Father Kazincy came out of the church and protested, a tall , gray-haired man in priestly robes standing 26 Bell , Out of This Furnace, 17 1. Bell, Out of This Furnace, 170. Launched in 1899 in West Miffin. southeast of Pittsburgh, Kenn ywood was an amusement park and picnic area th at attracted large numbers of workin g-cl ass people. 28 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 240. 27 SLOVAKIA 2021 65 beside the trooper's restless horse, his face uplifted, alight with indignation." 29 This sympathy-inspiring partisanship is juxtaposed with less appealing conduct on the part of the Irish-dominated Roman Catholic Church . At its St. Brendan's Church " in the ' good ' part of town", the priest declares in his homily, "This strike is not being brought about by intelligent English-speaking workmen ... . You can't reason with these people. Don't reason with them." The appropriate response, he preached, was to "knock them down!" In Bell ' s narrative, this hostility meshed with the response of the diocesan hierarchy to the strike. A delegation of Catholic strikers call on the bishop of Pittsburgh (whom Bell calls "Bishop Canavan" but in fact was Regis Canevin from 1904 until 1921) imploring him to support the action, not least because a majority of the strikers are Catholics. But that prelate declines to do so. Underscoring the influence of the industrial magnates on religious life, "not long after that the Pittsburgh Catholic Charities received a check for twenty-five thousand dollars from the Carnegie Steel Company."30 An Atheist to the End Too little is known , and perhaps cannot be known , about Bell ' s low-profile life to trace whatever spiritual journey he may have had followed through his fifty-seven years. What is beyond dispute, however, is that the skepticism expressed in Out of This Furnace foreshadowed acknowledged atheism in his final book, In the Midst of life. This nonfictional volume, approximately 270 pages in length, was published a few months after his death in 1961 . It encompasses a miscellany of his thoughts and musings as a terminally ill cancer patient in Santa Cruz. Bell acknowledged in his first brief chapter that he was not on the same spiritual wavelength with many other people. "While others, in the old phrase, make their peace with God," he stated, "I must make mine with myself." 31 Bell noted that his beliefs differed markedly from those of one of his pious customers, a Mrs. Worth, who had sought to 29 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 241 . Out of This Furnace, 241 -2. 3 1Thomas Bell , In the Mid1·t a/Life (New York: Atheneum, 196 1), 5. 30 Bell, 66 SLOVAKIA 2021 encourage him at that critical stage of his life. He had even prayed to " Mrs. Worth 's God" in the privacy of a toilet at a hospital in Palo Alto, but his cancer had progressed unabated. Bell concluded that "belief in a supernatural god may disappear, and a good thing too," but in the same sentence he admitted that there were times "when one can only envy such people as Mrs. Worth. " 32 If his non credo of ca. 1960 represented his attitude towards the Christian faith two decades earlier, his willingness to write sympathetically, albeit briefly, about the religious life of his fictional characters at that time is all the more remarkable. Conclusion A juxtaposition of Out of This Furnace and the nonfictional texts cited in the present article highlights several problems that serious historians of religion encounter when they are seeking to gauge, even in an approximate way, the spiritual life of Slovak immigrants in North America. On the one hand, there are assertions about the group's devotion to Christianity in several of its denominational forms. These assurances are typically supported by reference to the hundreds of churches which Slovaks founded in the New World, usually in the early stages of their community life in surroundings still only partially familiar to them, and in many instances after unsatisfactory experiences in multi-ethnic parishes. On the other hand, when one reads Out of This Furnace as almost certainly the principal fictional reconstruction of Slovak-American history, one finds significantly less about religion than nonfictional literature might reasonably lead one to expect. Considered in isolation, Out a/This Furnace thus gives an impression that is difficult to harmoni ze with the large number of enduring Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and other sorts of parishes which these immigrants founded to serve as their spiritual homes. No doubt part of the answer inheres in accepting the fact that Slovak-Americans were by no means a monolithic entity, but a diverse segment of the Euro-American population which probably always included individuals with varying degrees of religious fervor and criticism thereof, different levels of moral development, and no uniformity of commitment to community life. Gauging the percentage of people 32 Bell, In the Mid1·1 a/Life, 8-9. SLOVAKIA 2021 67 in any historic ethnic group who chose to affiliate with its religious institutions can be prohibitively difficult. Any calculations done in this regard would probably be estimates rather than precise statistics. Furthermore, such figures do not address the underlying problems of assessing personal commitment and spiritual life as opposed to nominal membership. Other dimensions of the phenomenon bedevil quantification . Historians must look carefully at how the character of their subject evolves over time. In this case, they would be compelled to examine, for instance, the religious commitment of the displaced people who formed the first generation in America and then their at least partly assimilated, Anglophone descendants. Did interest in ecclesiastical life vary diachronically? Was it consistent in large cities and small mill towns? Did it appear to be more vibrant in areas where the Slovaks constituted a relatively large percentage of the population than in those areas where they were but a small minority? Were married men more inclined than bachelors to participate in organized religious life? These and related questions are by no means limited to Slovaks or other Eastern and Central Europeans in North America and their descendants but are relevant to much of the ethnic panorama. A broad consideration of this obviously lies beyond the bounds of the present study, but two quite different kinds of examples illustrate the point. One stems from the present writer's extensive, multidenominational research on the history of the approximately 800,000 Norwegians who emigrated to the United States. Most of them were at least nominal members of the established Evangelical Lutheran Church in their homeland, although levels of participation in its sacraments, services, and so on varied greatly from region to region. Numerous " revival" movements, some of them led by lay preachers, had reinvigorated the spiritual life of the nation. Nonconformist denominations also sprouted in the nineteenth century, giving especially those Norwegians who lived in coastal towns some measure of churches from which to choose. At the same time, however, anticlerical critics emerged, sometimes in tandem with an incipient labor movement. After reaching the United States, large numbers of these Nordic newcomers formed many hundreds of Lutheran churches, chiefly in the Upper Midwest, with smaller numbers in other regions. They also founded several church-related undergraduate colleges, most of which continue to thrive in the twenty-first century, and several theological 68 SLOVAKIA 2021 seminaries for training new generations of pastors. All in all , denominational membership statistics clearly indicate that a higher percentage of Norwegian immigrants than their Swedish and Danish counterparts, to cite the most meaningful comparisons, were affiliated with what can be regarded as their birthright religious institutions. However, as I have demonstrated, this involvement varied immensely, and overall only about 30 percent of first-generation Norwegian-Americans became members of the ethnic Lutheran churches in which one might expect to find them .33 The evidence disconfirmed sweeping generalizations that historians of immigration had made for approximately two generations about the supposedly lofty level of religious loyalty among newcomers from Norway. Turning to a significantly different kind of example, in 1964 Rudolph J. Vecoli strongly challenged the generalized portrayal of immigrants in America which Oscar Handlin had presented in his Pulitzer Prize-winning popular history, The Uprooted, twelve years earlier. Writing about the tens of thousands of contadini (i.e. peasants) from southern Italy who had settled in Chicago, Vecoli declared that the noted Harvard historian 's theory that the process of adjusting to life on American shores had strengthened their religious li fe in an ali en environment. Not so, this Italian-American argued. "American priests were scandali zed by the indifference of the Italians to the Church . Even when Italian churches were provided by the Catholic hierarchy, the contadini seldom displayed any religious enthusiasm ." 34 Within the Slavic-American spectrum, the extent of Slovak detachment from organized religious life awaits detailed ana lysis. In 2005 sociologist Paul Froese published an article about the significantly differing levels of involvement in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in recent decades. He attributed the higher degree among Slovaks to a historically different relationship between religion and nationalism . " In Slovakia," he concluded, "Roman Catholi cism and nationalism are conjoined in much the same way as they are in Poland." One consequence of thi s is greater loya lty to the Roman Catholi c 33 Frederi ck Ha le, No rwegian Religious Pluralism: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 34 Rudo lph J. Vecoli , "Contadini in Chi cago: A Critique of The Uprooted." The Journal of American History LI , no. 3 ( December 1964): 415. SLOVAKIA 2021 69 Church in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.35 Froese did not, however, deal at all with the history of religious life among Slovaks who had been transplanted to a different environment in North America. Establishing the defensible perimeter of descriptions of SlovakAmerican religious life thus remains a difficult task, one which would have to take into account not only formal religious involvement and activity but also the extent to which an as yet indeterminate number of people chose not to become affiliated or who were directly critical of Christianity and its institutions. Moreover, the historical calculus would have to take into account changes over time. Out of This Furnace offers a stimulating if obviously truncated impression of Slovak religious life during the first few crucial decades of this group's history in industrial America. Indeed, when one considers Bell's personal separation from that important dimension of his ethnic heritage, it is arguably surprising how many aspects of it appear in this novel. One finds observations about inter a/ia priestly ministry, interaction with non-Slovak churches, efforts to raise children according to traditional religious values, prayer, community worship, and the relationship between religious institutions and the labor movement. To be sure, there is silence about significant historical matters, such as the Lutheran and other Protestant churches among Slovak immigrants. Far too little about these topics has been published in any genre. Will future litterateurs take up their pens and construct engaging fictional accounts that tell readers far more about the spiritual life of the group, thereby further enriching the colorful tapestry of ethnic historical fiction? To be sure, no amount of meticulous research could replace Bell ' s first-hand knowledge of Slovak immigrant life in Braddock, but many historical novelists have crafted credible works about topics which they did not experience. While we might be ill-advised to hold our breath, we can find comfort in Alexander Pope ' s oft-quoted words, " Hope springs eternal in the human breast." 35 Paul Froese, "Secular Czechs and Devout Slova ks: Ex ploring Religious Differences," Review of Religious Research XL VI , no. 3 (March 2005): 269, 280.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Reconsidering Slovak-American Religious Commitment: Thomas Bell's Out of this Furnace in Historiographical Context Description An account of the resource Frederick Hale Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 53-69 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hale, Frederick, 1948- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d08701c8de6e3c1ea34737b7b5cef77e.pdf 2c4af5a0cc090f418b94aeb049bd6779 PDF Text Text 70 SLOVAKIA 2021 ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALIST TOTALITARIANISM: SLOVAKIA IN THE TURMOIL OF 1938 AS SEEN BY THE UNITED ST ATES FOREIGN SERVICE Roman Licko In the autumn of 2018 I set myself the task of assessing the significance of the year 1938 in Slovak hi story. This was in response to a conference call which invited scholars to address, among other themes, milestones in Czech and Slovak history in which the year happens to have a number eight in it. 1 When I set about preparing my presentation, I had two thoughts about the subj ect. First, I was struck by several historic parallels between 2018 and 1938. No attempt will be made in thi s paper to argue that 2018 was as fateful for Slovakia as the year 1938 was for the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. Yet, given the rise of far-right political extremism in Central Europe, tacitly encouraged by a large authoritarian neighbour to the east, it may be instructive to re-examine the rise of Slovak nationalism in the late 1930s. 2 Then, extreme Slovak nationalists had also been spurred on by an aggressive totalitari an neighbour. 3 The second idea that occurred to me was that 1938 has been somewhat neglected when it came to 1 The paper entitled "From Fledging Democracy to Nationalist Authoritarianism: Slovakia in the Tunnoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service" was presented at the 50th Convention of the Associati on for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies in December of 20 18 in Boston. 2 The large authoritarian neighbour is Russia. Its support for the far-right nationa lists in Centra l European cou ntri es is explained and well documented in Timothy Snyder's book The Road to Unfi·eedom. By supporti ng ex treme nationalist movements in coun tries such as Slovaki a, Russia hopes to weaken their resolve to stay w ithin the European Union. Putin's alternative to th e EU is the Eurasian Union, a trade and political bloc stretching from Chin a to the border of the EU. Timothy Snyder, Th e Road tu Unf,-eedom: Russia. Europe. America. (New York : Crown/ Archetype, 20 18), I 00. The reference to the extreme nationalists in today 's Slovakia is directed towards l 'udovri strana na.iie S/ovensko-The People's Party Our Slovakia. Just two months before Slovakia ' s parliamentary elections in February of 2020, the far-rig ht nationali st party came second in a popul ari ty poll cond ucted by the Focus polling Agency in December of 2019. Historically speaking, leaders of the party, including its leaderMarian Kotleba, subscribe to the ideology of the war-time Slovak Republic. 3 Then it was Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2021 71 turning points in Slovak history.4 By this, I don ' t mean the fact that Slovaks gained their autonomy in that year. What changed quite dramatically in 1938 was the way in which the country was governed. After a relatively brief experience with a democratic form of government in the first Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak leaders set about dismantling the democratic institutions upon which the foundations of their state were built. By the end of the year Slovakia was well on the road to becoming a nationalist totalitarian state. This paper examines political developments in Slovakia in that year from the point of view of an independent observer- the United States Foreign Service. At that time, American diplomats in Czechoslovakia gathered and evaluated intelligence which in tum informed the United States' foreign policy towards Central Europe. Their reports and analyses, despite their limitations, help us understand what went wrong with the process of Slovak national emancipation in 1938. They may also serve as an insight into how easily a Central European democracy may tum into a totalitarian state if extreme nationalism becomes the dominant ideology of its political leaders. 1938 was a critical year in European history. Powerful forces of European nationalism were the driving engine of politics in both totalitarian Germany as well as democratic Czechoslovakia. Because of its large and restive German minority, Czechoslovakia had become vulnerable to the aggressive foreign policy of its large totalitarian neighbour to the west. Adolph Hitler's ambition in Central Europe was to annex ethnic Germans living in foreign territories into his Third Reich . In March of 1938 Germany had annexed Austria. In September, the Gen11an Chancellor achieved the pinnacle of his pre-war diplomatic offensive. As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia had to cede the German-speaking areas of Sudetenland to Germany. The rejection of the Versailles system and the intention by the Nazi s to destroy its eastern democratic neighbour brought the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia to a head in 1938. The issue had been simmering in Czechoslovak politics since the last parliamentary elections in 1935, whose results changed the political map of the republic. In Slovakia, an alliance of nationalist parties, known as the Autono4 1948 and 1968, of course, were more fateful. The former because the coup d 'etat in February brought about a complete regime change, the latter beca use the crushing of the Prague Spring in August was the res ult of a fo rei gn in vasion. �72 SLOVAKIA 2021 mist Bloc, emerged as the most powerful political force in the country.5 The Sudeten German Party became one of the strongest political parties in Czechoslovakia. 6 By the end of 1938, the problem of the constitutional relationship between Czechs and Slovaks had been temporarily resolved. The Declaration of Slovak autonomy on October the 6th marked the beginning of the short-lived period known as the Second Czechoslovak Republic. It ended with the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939. In 1938 the American government did not have a centralised agency that wou ld gather, coordinate and evaluate political intelligence from foreign countries. Instead, its main source of information about developments abroad came from the U.S. diplomatic missions based in countries' capital cities. Thus, the quality of political intelligence from Europe dispatched to Washington depended on the political acumen of individual diplomats, not all of whom were professionally trained. In this respect, Czechoslovakia was a notable exception. In June 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed the Department of State to appoint Wilbur John Carr as the new U.S. Minister in Prague. 7 As Assistant Secretary of State, Carr had been one of the most 5 In the electoral campa ign, the stron gest nationali st party in Slovakia - Hlinka 's Slovak People ' s Party - joined forces with the Slovak National Party. Both parties advocated autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic. They were backed by the parties of Ruthenian and Poli sh minorities, demandin g autonomy for thei r own regions. Collect ive ly the Autonomist Bloc secured 30.1 % of the Slovak vote. The coalition of Magyar parties in Slovakia gained 14.2%. Alena Bartl ova, " Posledne parlamen tn e vol'by v maj i 1935," in V Medzivojnovom Ceskoslovensku 1918- 1939, (Bratislava : Veda, 20 12), 439. 6 The Sudeten Party polled 15. 2% in the 1935 e lection . Natalia Kraj covifova, "Slovakia in Czechoslova kia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20 I I), 154. 7 Wilbur John Carr is often refe rred to as the father of the American Foreign Service. He entered the Department of State as a young clerk in 1892 . He went on to serve in various capac ities, including Assistant Secretary of State between 1924 and 1937. Carr was th e driving force behind th e reform of th e U.S. Foreign Service in the interwar period. In his view, all American ambassadors and mini sters abroad should be professionals - i.e. career diplomats, not political appointees. In June 193 7, after fortyfive yea rs in Washington, Carr was called upon by the President to head the U.S. diplomatic mission in Prague. According to Cordell Hull , Carr was one of the most capable ass istant secretari es in th e history of the department. At the time of his appointment as U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, Carr was sixty-s ix years old . Peter �SLOVAKIA 2021 73 senior government officials ever to represent the United States in its foreign service. This reflected Washington's growing concerns about developments in Central Europe, at the heart of which lay the uneasy relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. 8 In August of 1938, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull decided to increase his diplomatic staff in Prague with the appointment of George Kennan.9 The choice was not coincidental. Kennan had been an experienced career diplomat and a specialist on Russian and East European affairs. His main task at the Prague legation was political reporting. Part of hi s duties consisted of making regular visits to Bratislava, where he gathered information about developments in Slovakia. Carr's diplomatic dispatches from Prague and Kennan 's reports on conditions in Slovakia shaped the views of American policymakers at the Department of State on the eve of WWII. 10 Their writings remained the only source of political intelligence from the region until the establishment of the OSS in 1942. 11 Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," American Diplomacy, accessed December 20, 20 19, http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/ 1998/09/mr-carr-goes-to-prague/. 8 Bridges points out that Carr' s predecessor - Butler Wright - had underestimated German innuence on Czechoslovak affairs in 1930. This view was expressed by both Secretary of State Hull as well as Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Peter Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 9 Best known as an advocate of the U.S. policy of containment after WWII , George Frost Kennan spent 193 8 and 1939 as a diplomat at the American legation in Prague. He served as Secretary of the Legation until the breakout of war in September of 1939. He was nuent in Russian and German, and during his serv ice in Prague he learned to read Czech and Slovak as we ll. George Kennan, From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938- 1940 (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1968), vi. 10 Wilbur J. Carr 's diplomatic correspondence from Prague is deposited in the Library of Congress, the Manuscript Division in Washington D.C. Some of Carr's reports are now part of the collections of the National Archives, entitled "Records of the U.S . Department of State Relating to the Interna l Affairs of Czechoslovakia I 9 10-1944". Some of Kennan ' s reports on the conditions in Slovak ia are in Decimal File 860f. Collecti ve ly, they were published in a book in 1968 . Kennan, From Prague A/ier Munich, 1968. 11 The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was establi shed by the military order issued by President Roosevelt on Jun e 13, 1942 . A predecessor of the modem CIA, the OSS mandate was to collect and ana lyse intelligence required by U.S. foreign-pol icy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Barry M. Katz, "Office of Strategic Services," in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed . I.C.B . Dear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 650. �74 SLOVAKIA 2021 The road to totalitarianism in Slovak politics started in September of 1936. On the 19th of that month, the leaders of Hlinka 's Slovak Peop le's Party (Hlinkova slovenska /'udova strana, or HSL:S) met at a congress in Piest'any to discuss the polic ies and future direction of the party. 12 Leaders of the moderate wing, led by Monsignor Joseph Tiso, were tempted to join the ruling coalition in the Czechoslovak Parliament. Chances were not unreali stic, as the government was headed by Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's first Slovak Prime Minister, who was determined to solve the Slovak question once and for all. 13 In opposition to the moderates stood the young radicals, led by Karol Sidor. 14 For them, cooperation with Hodfa's cabinet was categorically rejected, unless the party's demands were met in full , without any reservations. 15 Whether moderate or radical , all members of the HSL:S were convinced that their party held the so le political mandate to represent Slovaks as a whole. Distrustful of the democratic government in Prague and increasingly authoritarian, the young nationalists had the ear of the old, but charismatic leader of the party - Andrej Hlinka. Hi s ambitions to lead Slovaks as a single nation found expression in one of hi s speeches at the congress, where Hlinka compared himself to Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. As far as the future political 12 The Piest'any Congress has been described in detail by Robert Arpas. For a comprehensive accou nt of the party ' s policies in the interwa r period see Robert Arpas, Vitazsrvo alebo prehra: Vyvrcho lenie politickeho zapasu HSt.;S o alllonomiu S/ovenska. (Brati slava: Veda, 20 11 ). 13 Hodza was convi nced that settling Czechoslovak ia's nationality problem hin ged upon finding a solution to the Czech- Slovak question. Natalia Kraj covicova, "Slova kia in Czec hoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich , Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Ca mbridge University Press, 20 11 ). 155. 14 Apart from Sidor, the most prominent representatives of the youn g generation of Slovak nati onali sts were Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach . The views of these intellectuals and academics on society and government had been shaped by the risin g ri ght-wi ng nationalist ideologies of 1930s Europe. Ad mirers of nati onalist totalitaria ni sm, they questioned democracy, whi ch in thei r view was no longer capab le of offerin g solutions to the mountin g problems o f the time. The only remedy, according to them, was a unity of the nation coupl ed with un swerving loya lty to its omni scient leader. They were strongly anti -Se miti c . Robert Arpas, Vit"azstvo alebo prehra, 52 . 15 Sidor, alongs ide wi th Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach, pushed for complete autonomy, part of which was the demand to recogni ze the Slovaks as a separate nati on. Slova k was to become the o ffi c ial language in Slova kia, and the proposed Slovak Di et was to have broad legislative powers. �SLOVAKIA 2021 75 line of the party was concerned, the radicals he ld sway. Tiso's demand that the congress express loya lty to the embattled Czechoslovak Republic was swept away. Instead, the closing plenary adopted a resolution which condemned "representatives of international materialistic ideology" and "Jewi sh-Bol shev ik anarchy". 16 The following day, Tiso himself proclaimed the principle of"one nation , one leader, one party" to a public rally of party supporters in Piest'any. In 1938 Slovak Americans were once again about to play an active role in the politics of their mother country. For more than half a century, the Slovak diaspora in the United States had been an important voice in the country's plea for national self-determination. 17 One reason for that was the sheer scale of Slovak emigration to the New World. By 1914 as many as one fifth of Slovaks had come to reside in the United States. 18 The other reason was the completely different political and economic environment of their new home country. Unfettered by oppression from the state, politica lly minded and commerciall y successful Slovaks cultivated, in democratic America, a strong feeling of national identity outside Slovakia. 19 As leaders of fraternal societies they campaigned vigorously for Slovak self-dete1mination in the Old World. 20 The patriotic fervour of these Slovak Americans 16 Robert Arpas, " Piest'ansky zjazd ako medznik HSL'.S k totalite," Clovek a 5polocnost', no. 3, vo l 7 (2004): 166, http ://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocn ik-7rok-2004/3/studi e-a-c lanky/piestansky-zjazd-ako-medzn ik-na-ceste- hsls- k-tota lite/. 17 Sil via Mihalikova, " Slovakia Pathways to a Democrati c Community," in Democracv and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans- Dieter Klingeman n, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, Taylor & Franc is Group, 2006), 175. 18 Large-scale em igration of Slovaks to the United States bega n in the late 18 70s. On the eve of WWI , when the Slovak exodus to America peaked, the Slovak-America n comm unity was in per-capita term s the largest among the Centra l Europea n nations and second onl y to the community of Irish-Ameri ca ns among all immigrant peoples in the U.S. Mark Stolari k, "S lovaks in Canada and the United States, 1880- 1990, Similarities and Differences," in Chair in Slovak History and Culture Occasional Papers, no. I ( 1992): 14. 19 In Mark Stolarik 's words - "The principal centre of Slovak nationalism before and during World War I was not the Slovak homeland, but the United States of America." Mark Stolarik , "S lova ks in Ca nada and the United States," 14. 20 The primary reason why Slovaks in America estab li shed fratemals was mutual support. This often happened along confessional lines, reflecting the divi sions among religious denomin ati ons in Slovakia. Interest in mother-country politics was of secondary importance to Slovak Americans, and it was often the domain of a few politically mi nded fraterna l leaders and newspaper editors . �76 SLOVAKIA 2021 found expression first in the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and then in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. In these, Slovak and Czech expatriate communities in the United States pledged their support for the establishment of a common state on the ruins of Austria-Hungary after the Great War. In the former, Slovak Americans sought the creation of a federative union with the Czechs. In the latter, they agreed that Slovakia would have home rule. 2 1 The reason why they settled for somewhat less at Pittsburgh was the opposition to the idea of federation from Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the most important of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Thus, the Slovak-American nationalists, allied primarily in the Slovak League of America, supported the creation of their Czecho-Slovakia, in October 1918, albeit with caution .22 Despite some internal disagreements among the leaders of the League in the I 920s, demand for autonomy remained the League's top political priority in its dealings with the old country until October 1938. In late Apri l 1938, at the 20th convention of the Slovak League in Pittsburgh, a decision was made to send a delegation to Slovakia. The visit was to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the delegation was to take the original copy of the agreement with them. 23 Peter Hletko, the President of the Slovak League, was appointed head of the American delegation and its official spokesman. Another notable member of the delegation was Jozef Husek, former editor-in-chief of the Slovak-American newspaper Jednota and one of the signatories of the Pittsburgh Agreement. The ori ginal idea for a visit by Slovak Americans came from the leadership of 21 The word home-rule itself was not used in the phrasing of th e agreement. Slovakia was to have " its own administration , its Diet and its courts". Slovak was to be " the officia l language in schools and in public life in general". Dav id Grinnell , "Land A Treasures: The Pittsburgh Agreement; Czecho-Slovak Agreement," Western Pennsylvania Hi story 90 (Winter 2007- 08): 8. 22 The Pittsburgh Agreement bore the signatures of members of two Slovak fraternal organ isations - the Slovak League of America and the Slovak Evange lical Society. In I 9 I 8, the Slovak League was an umbrella organisation, comprising the majority of fraternal-benefit societies in the United States, including both Catholics and Lutherans, though th e former predominated. 23 A year before, at th e meeting of the Hlinka Party in Ruzomberok in July, Andrej Hlinka had described th e Pittsburgh Agreement as the "Magna Carta of th e Slovak nation ." Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovak ia (June- August 1938) and their effort to implement the Pittsburgh Agreement into th e Czechoslovak Constitution ," Clo vek a spolocnos( 20, no. 3 (2017): 50. �SLOVAKIA 2021 77 the Hlinka Party, which was planning to hold a congress in Bratislava on June 4th. The intention of the party officials was to increase the pressure on the central government in Prague to implement the party 's demand for autonomy. The public showing of the Pittsburgh Agreement to a rally of loyal supporters the following day was part of the plan. 24 ln the atmosphere of heightened international tensions, ratcheted up by the Czechoslovak crisis earlier that month, the visit of the American delegation was closely followed by the pro-Czechoslovak press throughout the country. 25 A party of Slovak Americans about a hundred strong - arrived at the Polish port of Gdyni a on May 26th, 1938. 26 There, they were greeted by two separate delegations: one, headed by Karol Sidor, who was sent to Poland by the leaders of the Hlinka Party; the other was the diplomatic retinue of Juraj Slav ik, the Czechoslovak Minister to Poland.27 The Slovak Americans then proceeded to Warsaw, from where they were scheduled to travel to Prague. 28 At the instigation of Karol Sidor, however, four members of the League were persuaded to trave l to Rufomberok first , to pay a visit to the ai Iing leader of the party, Andrej Hlinka. 29 24 The party offic ials were thu s responding to various rumours, e.g. that the Pittsburgh Agreement was a fabricati on , or that Masaryk's signature on it was not genuine. Stefan Kucf k, "Americki Slovaci a autonom isti cke hnutie na Slovensku ( 19 181938)," Dvacate sto/eti, no. 2 (2013 ): I 06. 25 The May Cri sis was caused by fa lse reports of German troop movements on the 19th around Czechos lova ki a ' s western borders, raising fea rs th at the country was about to be attacked by Germany. A lthough the reports later proved unsubstantiated, the inc ident contributed to the subseque nt resolve by France and Britain to increase pressure on Czechoslovakia to make concessions to the Sudeten German Party. 26 Milan O lej nik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 51. 27 Although the two delegati ons had travelled to Gdynia by the sa me train, both part ies made the ir way to Gdynia separate ly, as Sidor' s party re fused to jo in the Czechoslovak delegation from Warsaw. Stefan Kucf k, " Americk i Slovac i a autonomi sticke hnutie," I 05 . 28 In Warsaw the Slovak Americans were g iven the red-carpet treatment by representat ives of the muni cipa l authoriti es. They never mention ed Czechoslovak ia in their speec hes. Stefan Kucfk , "Americki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnuti e," I 05. 29 Because of the di sagreements among the leaders of the League ' s delegation, on ly fo ur of them went to Ruzomberok . Andrej Ro lik, a Lutheran pastor fro m Johnstown, refused to trave l to Slovakia first. Stefan Kucik , "Americki Slovac i a autonomisticke hnutie," I 05 . �78 SLOVAKIA 2021 The U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia watched the developments from his legation in Prague.Jo On May 31st he informed the Secretary of State of the arrival of the League's representatives in the Czechoslovak capital and their intention to meet both the President and the Prime Minister.JI The day after their arrival in Prague, the leaders of the League paid a courtesy visit to the American Legation . Carr noted that the Slovak Americans stressed in one of their public announcements that their visit was "not to be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic".J 2 Having spoken to an official from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, Carr came to the conclusion that Prague's government felt uneasy about the visit, wishing it had taken place at some other time.JJ This made the American diplomat feel that the red-carpet treatment accorded to the Slovak Americans in Prague somehow "lacked a ring of sinceri ty." The fee ling of skepticism in his mind was reinforced when he spoke privately to Hletko. According to Carr, the president of the League admitted that their visit to Prague was inopportune, regretting the fact that it had coincided with the minority dispute. In order to make his American readers appreciate the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the visit, Carr factored in the reactions of the press. He noted that the newspapers in Germany had been for some time speaking of the united front between the Hlinka Party and the Sudeten German Party aimed against the Czechs.J4 The pro-Czechoslovak press, for their part, had been accusing Slovak nationalists of collusion with the Germans.J 5 As to the specific results of the talks between the League's representatives 30 Since 1925, the United States' diplomatic mission in Prague had resided at the Schonbom Palace on Mala stran a. Peter Bridges, " Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 31 In mid-June Carr wrote to Washington again, giving a detailed account of the League's participation in th e Hlinka Party congress. 32 National Archives, Washington, 860f.00/5 I 0, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, May 31 , p. I . 33 This was told to Ca rr by an unspecified official from the Czechoslovak Mini stry of Fore ign Affairs on the 3 1st. The Czechoslovak government feared that the visit would be used by the minorities to advance their own political agendas. 860 f.00/589, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, p. 2. 34 NA, 860f.00/534, Di spatch No. 176, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, Jun e 6, p. 2. 35 According to the Police Directory in Bratislava, the Sudeten Party did send a congratulatory telegram to the HSL.:S on the occasion of its party congress on June the 4th. Milan Olej nik, "The visit of de legates of the American Slovak League to Slovaki a," 55. �SLOVAKIA 2021 79 and the Czechoslovak statesmen, Carr echoed Slovak, the press organ of the HSCS. 36 It reported that the discussions bore no concrete results, liut it was agreed that, after a month's study of the conditions in Slovakia, the League's representatives would return for more talks with the Prime Minister. 37 The public proclamations by the League ' s representati ves in support of Slovak autonomy prompted the U.S. Minister to examine the extent of popular support for the Slovak nationalists. In their plans 1938 was to be the crucial year, by the end of which the Slovak question in Czechoslovakia was to be settled once and for all. With the support of their American compatriots, the Slovak nationali sts claimed that the majority of Slovaks in 1938 - whether at home or abroad, were in favour of autonomy. To this purpose, Hletko repeatedly claimed that autonomy was supported by as many as 90% of Slovaks in the United States. 38 The proposed change in the status of Slovakia was also the main order of business at the Party Congress that convened on June 4th in Bratislava. With the League's delegates in attendance, the Party passed a resolution, setting out the details of the new Autonomy Bill. 39 Its text was published in full the following day in Slovak. Carr had it translated for his June 6th report and supplemented it with his commentary. The bid to amend the Czechoslovak Constitution was viewed critically by the U.S. Minister, hi s main reservation being the lack of political mandate to demand such a constitutional change. Drawing on the statistics from the last parliamentary election of 1936, he observed that the HSCS had only polled 30.1 % of the votes cast in Slovakia. 40 The right to speak for all Slovaks was further dimini shed, 36 Hletko and his party urged the Czechoslovak statesmen to recogni ze Slovaks as a sovereign nati on and to grant Slovak ia autonomy as it was sti pulated in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Both Hodza and Benes ex pressed their general agreement, but refused to talk about autonomy. What they wanted to promote, first and foremost, was Czechoslovak unity. Hletko later summarised the outcome of the talks in the phrase "Nothing positive was achi eved." Stefan Kucik, "Ameri cki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnutie na Slovensku," I 07 . 37 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 2. 38 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 7. 39 It demanded the creation of a separate Slovak Diet and governmen t, a long with the introduction of Slovak as the official language on the basis of recognition of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. 40 Of a ll the parliamentary votes cast in Czechos lovakia, Carr po ints out, this was 6.86%. NA , 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 4. �80 SLOVAKIA 2021 in Carr's view, by the fact that the party did not put up its own candidates, but campaigned as part of the Autonomist Bloc.41 Even the recent successes of the HSCS in the communal elections did not alter the fact that Slovak autonomists had never commanded the required 50% of the voting majority in Slovakia. Moreover, Carr argued, all of the HSCS 's former allies "now cooperate with the coalition parties." As far as the capability of the party to mobilise its supporters was concerned, the American estimate in June 1938 was slightly higher the one made by the Czechoslovak authorities. According to an American source, the turnout at the public rally on June 5th - the same day when the Autonomy Bill was published - was around 50,000.42 This was twice as much as the official figure given by the Bratislava police department. 43 To strike a balanced view, Carr devoted an equal amount of space in his reporting to those who opposed the Slovak autonomists. In 1938, this was a group of nationwide Czechoslovak parties - members of the ruling coalition which operated separate branches in Slovakia. The HSCS 's staunchest opponent was the Agrarian Party, led by Prime Minister Hodza. To solve the nationality problem his cabinet drafted, in the early summer of 1938, a constitutional amendment, referred to as the Nationality Statute. 44 Another Slovak in the government who opposed autonomists was Minister of Justice [van Derer, who was also head of the Slovak section of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers ' Party. 45 In 1938 both politicians rejected the idea of Slovaks as a sovereign nation, struggling to maintain Czechoslovak unity in 41 This consisted of the Rutheni an Soj uz Party, the Polish Socia list Party and the Slovak National Party. 42 This was based on th e estimate by Associated Press reporter 0. E. Werner. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. O lejnfk, referring to the police records, puts the number of participants at 25,000 at a maximum . 43 Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 55 . 44 The measure proposed to divide the republi c into four autonomous lands: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Eac h land was to be a legal entity in the eyes of public and private law. Land Diets with curias representing every nationality were envisaged, as was the creation of land governments. President Benes had actively participated in the preparation of the statute. The negotiations between the HSL.:S and President Benes about the Nationality Statute in September 1938 were unsuccessfu l. Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 19 I 8- 1938," 156. 45 Ivan Derer was the Minister of Justice of the Czechoslovak government from Jul y 193 7 until September 1938. �SLOVAKIA 2021 81 the face of mounting demands from the Sudeten Party. Carr reported on the activities of the pro-Czechoslovak movement, gauging its political clout and public support. On June I 0th he sent a di spatch in which he looked at the rally organized by the opponents of Slovak autonomy on June 6th . Agrarian Day, as it was officially called, followed close on the heels of the rally organised by th e Hlinka Party the previous day. According to Carr, the turnout at the Czechoslovak demonstration was I 00,000, about twice as large as the previous day 's demon stration.46 Hodza and Derer were among the main speakers, and the President of the Slovak League addressed the crowds in hi s turn. Judging by the American report, the tone of Hletko 's speec h was much less belligerent than hi s speech the day before. 47 Comparing the two rallies, Carr related in hi s report an interesting fact observed by an Associated Press journalist. It concerned the proclaimed loyalty to the common state - or rather the lack thereof, on th e part of Slovak autonomists. When the national anthem was sung at the Hlinka demonstration, there was practically no response from the crowd to the first, i.e. the Czech part of it. For the second - the Slovak part - however, the crowd joined in with " tremendous vigor". The emblems used at the rallies told the same story. The decorations used at Agrarian Day consisted entirely of Czechoslovak flags, while those used by Hlinka's supporters featured exc lusive ly the party's red double cross on a white background.48 The di smem berment of the last democratic state in Central Europe began on September 30th, 1938. At Munich, the European powers decided the fate of Czechoslovakia in her absence.49 The catastrophe 46 Carr 's estimate of th e tu rnout at the Hlinka' s ra ll y was 50,000. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. 47 According to 0. E. Wern er, " Hletk o declared that the Slovaks in the Un ited States wis h nothin g more than that the Slovaks defend th e Republic which they have he lped to establish and th at they remain true Slovaks in free, beautiful and prosperous Czechoslovak ia." NA, 860f. 00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 4. 48 The onl y exception was the use of the American fla g decorating the rostrum where, among oth er speakers, Hletko gave hi s speech. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 5. 49 The agreement was signed by the government leaders of Germany, France, th e United Kingdom and Ita ly. Czechoslova ki a's leaders were not invited, save two diplomats who we re summoned to receive what the great powers had negotiated. Michael R. D. Foot, " Munich agree ment," in The Oxford Companion to World War If, ed. I.C. B. Dea r (New York: Oxford Uni vers ity Press, I 995), 597. �82 SLOVAKIA 2021 could not have been averted by Czechoslovak leaders, but internal factors contributed to it.so What had played into Hitler's hands were the aspirations of the nationalist movements within the country. Democratic powers of the West had either looked on or followed a policy of active appeasement, so as to avoid a war with Germany.s 1 In an effort to satisfy Hitler's demands, Britain and France acquiesced to the annexation of the German-speaking territories of Czechoslovakia. In so doing, they sanctioned the principle whereby individuals exercised their rights in a state collectively, through belonging to a legally recognized national entity. Such recognition in law went hand-in-hand with the demand for a geographically defined national territory. This ran contrary to Czechoslovakia's liberal constitution, by which members of national minorities had their rights guaranteed as individual citizens. The Nationality Statute proposed by Hodza 's cabinet went a long way towards satisfying the demands of the nationalist movements. It attempted to solve the problem by giving Czechoslovak nationalities territorial and administrative autonomy, but it refused to recognise them as legal entities. In the run-up to Munich, Britain and France had stepped up the pressure on the Czechoslovak government not to implement the Nationality Statute. After the failure of negotiations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak government, on September 22 nd the Slovak nationalists rejected the Nationality Statute.s2 In the wake of the Munich Agreement, in an atmosphere of heightened political uncertainty, leaders of the Hlinka Party summoned representatives of the other Slovak political parties to Zilina. The declaration of Slovak autonomy of October 6th was supported by all of them except the Communists and Social Democrats.s3 50 The genera l consensus among hi storians is that "the Czechs had to capitulate". Thomas Paterson, et al., eds. , Americanforeign relations. Vo lume 2. (Lexington MA : Heath and Company, 2014), 153. 51 On September 25th President Benes appealed to Roosevelt with a view to urging Britain and France to stand by Czechoslovaki a. Two days after that, Roosevelt wrote to Chancellor Hitler: "The government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." Matilda Axton et al., eds., Foreign relations of the United States. 1938. Vo lume I, Washin gton : United States Government Printing Office, 1955. 52 Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," 156. 53 The result of the meeting was the Zilina Agreement, by which its signatories pledged their support for the passage of a constitutional act providing for Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Parliament. The next day Jozef Tiso was appointed head �SLOVAKIA 2021 83 By that time Poland had occupied a territory in the north of Czechoslovakia and Hungary had laid claims to Hungarian-speaking territories in the south of Slovakia. 54 After Munich the Czech Lands were perceived by the United States with considerable sympathy as a small democratic country in peril , resisting the pressures of a totalitarian aggressor. Looking back on the aftermath of Munich in December, Carr appreciated the grav ity of the situation in which the recently reconstructed Czechoslovak government found itself. He noted that after President Benes had resigned on October 5th, not only was the country left without its leader, but "the bottom dropped out of the entire political system through which it had been governed for twenty years." 55 The interim Prime Minister General Jan Syrovy faced the task of preserving "order and di scipline through a period of indescribable difficulty," having to " remake the constitution" so that "a wholly new civil regime may be set up to which power could be turned over. " 56 The appointment of Frantisek Chvalkovsky as Czechoslovak Foreign Mini ster drew particular praise from the American diplomat. With hi s friendly attitude towards the United States, the Czech Minister was considered a "strong advocate of democratic form of government" while, at the same time, "a reali st with regard to the necessity of a new orientation in the foreign affairs of hi s country." 57 Despite overt signs of the Czech political system of the Slovak autonomous govern ment. Valerian Bystricky, Od auton6mie k vzniku Slovenskeho statu (Bratislava: Prodama, 2008), 273. 54 Carpatho-U krai ne' s autonomy became a reality a lmost at the same time. On October 11th the Czechoslovak government in Prague appoi nted its first autonomous government. Frantisek Capka, "Leta prvni i druhe republiky a protektoratu," Dejiny zemi koruny ceske v datech, accessed Janua ry 16, 2020, http://www .libri.cz/databaze/dejiny/text/t84 .html. 55 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 2- 3. 56 NA, 860f.00/589, Ca rr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. 57 Carr's assessmen t of Chva lkovsky's political integrity and his attitudes towards Germany is particul arl y interesting in the light of his subseq uent acti ons and fu rther diplomatic career. Hi s last directive, as the Foreign Minister issued in the wake of the German occupat ion of Bohemia-Moravia in March of 1939, instructed the Czechoslovak ambassadors abroad to close their embassies and hand them over to the Nazis. Many patriotic Czechoslovak diplomats - some of them Slovak by birth - such as Stefa n Osusky, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris, or Juraj Slavik, head of the country's diplomatic mission in Po land, refused to do so. After the breakup of Czechoslova kia Chvalkovsk y became Envoy of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Ge m1any. He di ed during an allied ai r ra id on Berlin in 1945 . "Frantisek �84 SLOVAKIA 2021 leaning towards authoritarian rule, Carr had little doubt that the federal government would continue to be "a strictly democratic form of government," though admitting "it will undoubtedly incorporate such features of totalitarianism as are compatible with democracy. " Its main desire after Munich, thought the American diplomat, was to "dispel any idea that there is any 'Fascist' tinge to the state yet for obvious reason [they] do not wish to damn Fascist methods ." 58 The plight of Bohemia after Munich contrasted sharply with the American description of the situation in Slovakia. The political leaders of the autonomous region known as Slovenska krajina were seen by American diplomats as unpatriotic and irresponsible individuals who drove one nail after another into the coffin of Czechoslovak democracy. 59 Commenting on the immediate aftermath of Munich and the challenges faced by the Czechoslovak government, Carr expected Slovak leaders "out of common patriotism to set aside domestic political differences until these dangerous problems have been settled." Instead, he observed di sappointingly, "S lovaks - now represented exclusively by the Hlinka extremists - took advantage of the catastrophic difficulties of the Prague Government to demand complete autonomy."60 Questioning where the loyalty of Slovakia's leaders stood during the crisis, the American diplomat came to the conclusion that "S lovak sympathies have throughout this period appeared to lean more strongly toward the Germans, than toward the Czechs." From the American perspective, the unity of the Republic stood paramount, and in times of danger it should definitely prevail over local interest. Carr expressed this sentiment several times, in an unequivocal tone. " If the three principal component parts of the Czechoslovak Republic are linked together by any common bonds of loyalty and patriotism," he argued emphatically, " there has been nothing in the actions of the Chvalkovsky," Historie a osobnosti diplomacie. Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, accessed December 20, 20 19, https://www. mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/histori e_a_osobnosti_ ceske_ diplomacie/ministri_a_ ministerstvo_ v_ histori i/frantisek _ chva lkovsky .html . 58 NA, 860f.00/57 I, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, October 26, 1938, p. 3. 59 Slo venska krajina - in English ' the Slovak Land', was the official name used to refer to Slovakia during the First and Second Czechoslovak Republi cs, between 191 8 and 1939. 60 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 2021 85 Slovak leaders during the last few weeks to indicate it." The image of two different worlds - that of the brave Czechs struggling to save the Republic and the unpatriotic Slovaks sympathising with Nazi aggressors - created by the American Legation in Prague after Munich, persisted for a long time on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1942, when the OSS took over from the American foreign service as the primary intelligence gatherer, a report on Slovakia claimed that the pro-Nazi orientation of the Tiso-Tuka leadership had long been apparent before Munich. 61 After it, the report went on, "these leaders came out open ly against the republic, against democracy generally, and for a new world order in Europe. " 62 The pace and complexity of the developments in Czechoslovakia in the closing months of 1938 were overwhelming, and the American Legation in Prague struggled to keep the Department of State fully informed. Reports in this period were mostly factua l, and the U.S. Minister in Prague complained that they had little time to put the rapidly unfolding events into general perspective. Only in the latter part of December did his superiors in Washington receive a comprehensive report on the situation in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. In the first weeks after Munich there was an "unavoidable preoccupation with the foreign" taking precedence over everything e lse. The whole country was in a state of utter turmoil. The report went on to recapitulate the challenges the country had to grapple with in an extremely short space of time. Satisfying the Polish territorial demands in the north was followed by the negotiations with Germany about Czechoslovakia's new borders in the west. The negotiations with Hungary about the cession 61 This was a com prehensive, I 06-page report on the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpath ian Rutheni ans. NA, Washington, Office of Strategic Servi ces, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 25. 62 Strictly speaki ng, thi s was not true. Throughout th e whole of 1938 the Party was led by Jozef Tiso. Tuka on ly came to prominence in 1940, when he became Foreign Minister of th e wartime Slovak Republic, following the Salzburg negotiations with Gem1any. As the principal representative of the moderate wing, Tiso became leader of the Party after Hlinka 's death in August of 1938. He spearheaded Slovak autonomy in October of 1938, but was opposed to the break up of Czechosl ovak ia in March of 1939. The probable reason why the OSS did not have more precise information about the period was the fact that the main source of its information on the situation in Slovakia during WWII was the Czechoslovak Information Service. This a was a special propaganda bureau set up in th e Un ited States by the Czechoslovak govemment-inex ile, controlled by ex- President Benes from London. �86 SLOVAKIA 2021 of Hungari an-speaking territories in Slovakia 's so uth came to nought, and the matter had to be resolved through international arbitration in early November. It was only then that the crippled Republic could turn its attention to its domesti c problems. What followed, according to the author of the report, was a " period of profound change and adjustment in the internal political life of Czechoslovakia." The most pressing of the problems, needing immediate attention in November, were the election of a new President and the passage of an enabling act. Progress in this direction, Carr noted, was " blocked by the Slovaks." They demanded that no presidential election could take place before the Constitution was amended to enact the proposed Autonomy Bill. The U.S. Mini ster in Prague believed that the conditions in the country were " hardly such as to make it a favourable time for the enactment of constitutional leg islation ." The Prague government, however, " had no other choice but to comply with it. " The Autonomy Act and the presidential elections of 1938 were both scrutini sed in the Legation 's report from December 2 1st. The Czechoslovak National Assembly passed the constitutional amendment on November 22nd and elected Czechoslovakia's new president on the 30th. 63 The constitutional arrangement provided, among other things, for an autonomous Slovak government and a Diet of the Slovak Land based in Bratislava. The new relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was also reflected in the altered spelling of the country's name, which was changed to Czecho-Slovakia. Th e asymmetrical model of the state drew criticism from the U.S. Minister in Prague.64 According to him, " the privileges henceforth to be enjoyed by the Slovaks in the national parliament" were far too extensive and thus "entirel y disproportionate to the population and actual importance of Slovakia" as well as " its ability, thus far, unproven , to govern itself 63 Drafted by Ferdinand Durcansky, it was based on th e Autonomy Bill published by Hlinka 's Party on June 6th . 64 The Nati ona l Assembly in Prague retained legislative power fo r the whole of Czechoslovaki a wit h regard to matters of the constituti on, fo reign policy, nat ional defence, citizenship, currency, customs and some oth er areas. Since the Czech Lands did not have their ow n parliament, Czecho-Slovakia became in effect an asymmetrical federa l state. Valerian Bystricky, "Slovakia from the Munich Confere nce to the declaration of independence," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 20 11 ), I 60. �SLOVAKIA 2021 87 alone." 65 Slovaks were also criticised in another report for their approach to the election of the President. Originally, the parliament was to vote on an Enabling Act first, but "this was again blocked by the opposition of the Slovaks." who refused to do so " until they might know who the next president was to be."66 Alluding to the American tradition of presidential elections, Carr commented on the undemocratic nature of the procedure: "It is characteristic of political thought in this part of the world," he wrote sarcastically, "that it seems to have occurred to no one that it would have been possible to have a presidential election without all doubts as to its results having been removed well in advance." As for the candidate himself, Carr favoured Frantisek Chvalkovsky, preferred by most of the Czech deputies. In the end, however, the parliament elected Emil Hacha, former President of the Supreme Court. The American diplomat believed that Chvalkovsky's main disadvantages in the eyes of the Slovaks were his Protestantism, along with the fact that he was divorced.67 The Autonomy Act of November 22nd also provided for elections to the Slovak Diet in the following month . They were held on December 18th, 1938 and, historically, they were the first elections ever to take place in Slovakia for that country's self-governing legislative body. Judging by the Americans, however, it was a missed opportunity. The Legation's report from December 21st commented on a lack of democratic procedure as well the dubiousness of their results. As far as the former was concerned, the U.S. Minister in Prague saw "a pronounced Nazi influence."68 This was a reference to the fact that Slovak voters were presented with only one list of candidates. The sole political entity on the 1938 ballot - Hlinka 's Slovak People's Party, with a subtitle to its name - the Party of Slovak National Unity - was an amalgamation of the Agrarian, National Unity, National Socialist 65 Carr points out the Czechs had no say whatsoever in the Slovak Parliament. As a further example of the favoured position that Slovakia occupied in the matters of the Republi c was the provision according to which a motion of no confidence might be moved by one-thi rd of the Slovak deputies, i.e. 12 as compared with a total of 226 members of the chamber. NA, 860f.00/588, Dispatch No. 302, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 2- 3. 66 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7. 67 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7- 9. 68 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 4. �88 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Fascist Parties. 69 Carr had little doubt that the 98% of the votes cast in its favour was due to the fact that the voters were given no alternative. This bore "striking resemblance to the results achieved in recent German plebiscites." Here, the author of the report reminded the State Department that the bloc of Slovak Autonomists had polled as low as 30.1 % of the Slovak vote in the previous parliamentary elections of 1935. "Fear of recrimination", speculated Carr, may have had "a decided influence on the votes cast by many individuals." Gauging the reactions to the Slovak elections in Prague, Carr noticed a parliamentary objection raised by the former Minister of Social Welfare, then a deputy of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. The criticism was unlikely to be heeded in Bratislava, concluded Carr disparagingly "when the Slovaks are taking what resembles a child-like delight in playing with a new toy." 70 Part of the image of Slovakia created by the American Foreign Service in 1938 concerned Slovak attitudes towards the Jews. At that time U.S. diplomats in Czechoslovakia concentrated mainly on understanding the roots Slovak antisemitism, analysing its popular as we ll as political manifestations. Somewhat subjective - or even biased were the American comparisons of the anti-Jewish sentiments among the Czechs and the Slovaks. For a Czech, it was thought, nationality was a matter of language, rather than race. In other words, animosity was only likely to be felt towards the Jews who spoke German. Apart from a small minority, however, the mass of the Czech people had "very little interest in anti-Semitism." 7 1 In Slovakia, the popular resentment of the Jews was said to be widespread and "deep-seated." 72 The main reason for this was believed to be economic. According to George Kennan, then Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, the Jews of Bohemia li ved mainly in urban areas, whereas those 69 The Communist Party was banned by the autonomous govern ment on October 9th, the Social Democrats on November 16th. The destruction of the other political parties in Slovakia came about on November 8th, when they were all forced to merge with the HSL.:S . Representatives of the ama lgamated political entities did not receive any positions in the autonomous government, being left with a few seats in th e Slovak Diet. Valerian Bystricky, "S lovaki a from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence," 161. 70 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 21 , 1938, p. 4- 5. 71 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 45. 72 George Kennan , From Prague After Munich, 22 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 89 residing in Slovakia were more evenly spread throughout the country. 73 Slovak Jews plied their trades in smaller towns and the countryside as merchants, saloon keepers, druggists, or lawyers. In these professions, Kennan argued, the Jews "played a dominant part," largely because of their "superior intelligence." The Slovaks felt differently about this, being convinced that the Jews owed their success to their "trickiness, unscrupulousness, incurable clannishness and nepotism." This was not the case in in Bohemia, according to Kennan , because the " industry and shrewdness of the Czechs as petty traders and artisans" had been such that the Czech countryside " had never presented a Jew with such attractive possi bilities as the villages in Slovakia. 74 Finally, Kennan identified the lack of social assimilation as another factor why the cultural distinctiveness of the Slovak Jewry was more pronounced than it was in Bohemia. 75 From the American perspective, anti-Semitism in Slovak politics had both historic and religious origins. According to Kennan , many of the educated Jews " have traditionally looked to Budapest for cultural inspiration." In addition, there was a smaller, but influential community of Jews "with a German cultural orientation." In the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, both nationalities were associated with the ruling classes, whereas the Slovak-speaking population had been one of the oppressed nations. Thus, in the Slovak mind, the Jews had always sided with the oppressors. In other words, when the country was under Hungarian rule, "the Slovak Jews made common cause with the Hungarians in exploiting the Slovaks;" when the country found itself in Czechoslovakia, "the Jews joined with the more liberal Czechs in opposi ng Slovak autonomy." 76 To illustrate his theory, Kennan referred his American readership to the pogrom-like operation ordered by Tiso in early November. At that time, Slovak authorities attempted to deport 7,600 Slovak Jews to Hungary, following the announcement of 73 As Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, Kennan made severa l trips to Slovakia in late 1938. In January 1939 he wrote a special report on the conditions in Slovakia. This was followed by a comprehensive despatch in February on the Jewish problem in Czechoslovakia. 74 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 44. 75 Kennan mentions a greater degree of racial intermarriage in Bohemia, especia ll y in upper-class Czech society. 76 George Kennan, From Prague Ajier Munich, 23. �90 SLOVAKIA 2021 the First Vienna Award. 77 In order to establish how Slovakia's Jews were going to be treated in the future , Kennan approached Jozef Tiso. In a personal conversation with the American diplomat, Tiso said that "the Slovak government intended to take measures toward the solution of the Jewish question independently of Prague." The Slovak Prime Minister also expressed his conviction that the planned measures "would probably go farther in scope than any that might be taken by the Prague regime." 78 As far as the religious component of Slovak anti-Semitism was concerned, Kennan pointed out that an important factor in the attitude of the Slovak authorities to the Jews was the position of the Catholi c Church . Tiso was himself a Catholic priest, and the Church had made its position on the matter clear through various officials. One of those, according to Kennan, was Father Rudolf Mikus, Provincial of the Jesuit Order in Slovakia. 79 Speaking for the newspaper Slovak, Mikus advocated elimination of the Jewish influence in political and economic life. This would include, among other things, public segregation. 80 The statements made by the Church convinced Kennan that the Slovak government wou ld face little opposition in the promulgation of its anti-Semitic policies in the future .8 1 As the momentous events of 1938 unfolded in Central Europe, diplomats of the American Foreign Service at the Legation in Prague watched the situation in Czechoslovakia, and took a close interest in political developments in Slovakia. Throughout 1938 the country was perceived by American diplomats as a politically vo latile province, 77 This was a pogrom-like operation ordered by HSI..:S to deport around 7,500 Jews to the territory ceded by Slovakia to Hungary. Kenn an argues that the forced ex pul sion took place as a retaliatory measure for an alleged petition by the leaders of the Bratislava Jews to incorporate the city of Bratislava into the ceded territory. The operation was accompanied by anti-Sem itic ri ots in Brati slava. James Mace Ward, "The 1938 First Vienna Award and the Holocaust in Slovakia," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 29, no. I (2015): 92 . doi: I 0.1093/hgs/dcv004. ISSN 8756-65 83. 78 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51. 79 A full translation of the statement by Mikus was attached at the end of Kenn an' s report. 80 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51 - 52. 81 The institutional persecution of th e Jews in Slovakia began the following year, after Slovak ia gained its nominal independence. On April the 18th , the Slovak Parliament passed its first anti -Semitic law. This was Ordinance 63 which established a lega l definition of a Jew based on a religious principle. Ladislav Lipscher, "The Jews of Slovakia : 1939- 1945," in The Jews ofCzechoslovakia Volume Ill, ed . Avigdor Dagan et al. (Phi ladelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 165. �SLOVAKIA 2021 91 one whose nationalist leaders took advantage of the central government's difficulties after Munich, driving the last democracy in the region into destruction. Slovakia's slide towards totalitarianism in 1938 was perceived by Americans as a consequence of that country's extreme nationalism and its disrespect for the values of the democratic republic established in 1918 . In contrast, tran sition to totalitarian rule in the Czech Lands was viewed by the Americans as a process of necessary accommodation, a sensible political reaction to the external pressures exerted by Nazi Germany. Although American observers did not deny the Slovak right to national self-determination in principle, they considered Slovak demands for autonomy in 1938 as inopportune and highly unpatriotic. They saw the rise of the autonomist movement as a function of Nazi foreign policy, whose sole intention was to use Slovak nationalism in its quest to dismember the Czechoslovak state. Against the backdrop of ri sing international tensions, the visit of the Slovak League of America in the summer appeared to American observers more as an embarrassment than an attempt to save the Republic. Watching the Hlinka Party's push for autonomy, the U.S. Minister in Prague kept reminding the Department of State that the Party lacked a democratic mandate to represent the Slovaks as a whole. In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the Americans openly scolded the behaviour of the Slovak nationalists, reproaching them for a lack of loyalty to the common state. The Slovak declaration of autonomy in October was not seen as a measure to consolidate the embattled state, but as another step to weaken it. American reports between November and December provide an account of the gradual dismantling of the multi-party political system by the government in Bratislava. In contrast to Bohemia, Americans saw anti-Semitism among the Slovak population as deep-seated, with specific - mainly economic - underpinnings. The anti-Semitic policies of the Slovak government, condoned by some representatives of the Catholic Church, were to become more severe and extensive in the foreseeable future . � 70 SLOVAKIA 2021 ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALIST TOTALITARIANISM: SLOVAKIA IN THE TURMOIL OF 1938 AS SEEN BY THE UNITED ST ATES FOREIGN SERVICE Roman Licko In the autumn of 2018 I set myself the task of assessing the significance of the year 1938 in Slovak hi story. This was in response to a conference call which invited scholars to address, among other themes, milestones in Czech and Slovak history in which the year happens to have a number eight in it. 1 When I set about preparing my presentation, I had two thoughts about the subj ect. First, I was struck by several historic parallels between 2018 and 1938. No attempt will be made in thi s paper to argue that 2018 was as fateful for Slovakia as the year 1938 was for the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. Yet, given the rise of far-right political extremism in Central Europe, tacitly encouraged by a large authoritarian neighbour to the east, it may be instructive to re-examine the rise of Slovak nationalism in the late 1930s. 2 Then, extreme Slovak nationalists had also been spurred on by an aggressive totalitari an neighbour. 3 The second idea that occurred to me was that 1938 has been somewhat neglected when it came to 1 The paper entitled "From Fledging Democracy to Nationalist Authoritarianism: Slovakia in the Tunnoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service" was presented at the 50th Convention of the Associati on for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies in December of 20 18 in Boston. 2 The large authoritarian neighbour is Russia. Its support for the far-right nationa lists in Centra l European cou ntri es is explained and well documented in Timothy Snyder's book The Road to Unfi·eedom. By supporti ng ex treme nationalist movements in coun tries such as Slovaki a, Russia hopes to weaken their resolve to stay w ithin the European Union. Putin's alternative to th e EU is the Eurasian Union, a trade and political bloc stretching from Chin a to the border of the EU. Timothy Snyder, Th e Road tu Unf,-eedom: Russia. Europe. America. (New York : Crown/ Archetype, 20 18), I 00. The reference to the extreme nationalists in today 's Slovakia is directed towards l 'udovri strana na.iie S/ovensko-The People's Party Our Slovakia. Just two months before Slovakia ' s parliamentary elections in February of 2020, the far-rig ht nationali st party came second in a popul ari ty poll cond ucted by the Focus polling Agency in December of 2019. Historically speaking, leaders of the party, including its leaderMarian Kotleba, subscribe to the ideology of the war-time Slovak Republic. 3 Then it was Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2021 71 turning points in Slovak history.4 By this, I don ' t mean the fact that Slovaks gained their autonomy in that year. What changed quite dramatically in 1938 was the way in which the country was governed. After a relatively brief experience with a democratic form of government in the first Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak leaders set about dismantling the democratic institutions upon which the foundations of their state were built. By the end of the year Slovakia was well on the road to becoming a nationalist totalitarian state. This paper examines political developments in Slovakia in that year from the point of view of an independent observer- the United States Foreign Service. At that time, American diplomats in Czechoslovakia gathered and evaluated intelligence which in tum informed the United States' foreign policy towards Central Europe. Their reports and analyses, despite their limitations, help us understand what went wrong with the process of Slovak national emancipation in 1938. They may also serve as an insight into how easily a Central European democracy may tum into a totalitarian state if extreme nationalism becomes the dominant ideology of its political leaders. 1938 was a critical year in European history. Powerful forces of European nationalism were the driving engine of politics in both totalitarian Germany as well as democratic Czechoslovakia. Because of its large and restive German minority, Czechoslovakia had become vulnerable to the aggressive foreign policy of its large totalitarian neighbour to the west. Adolph Hitler's ambition in Central Europe was to annex ethnic Germans living in foreign territories into his Third Reich . In March of 1938 Germany had annexed Austria. In September, the Gen11an Chancellor achieved the pinnacle of his pre-war diplomatic offensive. As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia had to cede the German-speaking areas of Sudetenland to Germany. The rejection of the Versailles system and the intention by the Nazi s to destroy its eastern democratic neighbour brought the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia to a head in 1938. The issue had been simmering in Czechoslovak politics since the last parliamentary elections in 1935, whose results changed the political map of the republic. In Slovakia, an alliance of nationalist parties, known as the Autono4 1948 and 1968, of course, were more fateful. The former because the coup d 'etat in February brought about a complete regime change, the latter beca use the crushing of the Prague Spring in August was the res ult of a fo rei gn in vasion. �72 SLOVAKIA 2021 mist Bloc, emerged as the most powerful political force in the country.5 The Sudeten German Party became one of the strongest political parties in Czechoslovakia. 6 By the end of 1938, the problem of the constitutional relationship between Czechs and Slovaks had been temporarily resolved. The Declaration of Slovak autonomy on October the 6th marked the beginning of the short-lived period known as the Second Czechoslovak Republic. It ended with the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939. In 1938 the American government did not have a centralised agency that wou ld gather, coordinate and evaluate political intelligence from foreign countries. Instead, its main source of information about developments abroad came from the U.S. diplomatic missions based in countries' capital cities. Thus, the quality of political intelligence from Europe dispatched to Washington depended on the political acumen of individual diplomats, not all of whom were professionally trained. In this respect, Czechoslovakia was a notable exception. In June 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed the Department of State to appoint Wilbur John Carr as the new U.S. Minister in Prague. 7 As Assistant Secretary of State, Carr had been one of the most 5 In the electoral campa ign, the stron gest nationali st party in Slovakia - Hlinka 's Slovak People ' s Party - joined forces with the Slovak National Party. Both parties advocated autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic. They were backed by the parties of Ruthenian and Poli sh minorities, demandin g autonomy for thei r own regions. Collect ive ly the Autonomist Bloc secured 30.1 % of the Slovak vote. The coalition of Magyar parties in Slovakia gained 14.2%. Alena Bartl ova, " Posledne parlamen tn e vol'by v maj i 1935," in V Medzivojnovom Ceskoslovensku 1918- 1939, (Bratislava : Veda, 20 12), 439. 6 The Sudeten Party polled 15. 2% in the 1935 e lection . Natalia Kraj covifova, "Slovakia in Czechoslova kia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20 I I), 154. 7 Wilbur John Carr is often refe rred to as the father of the American Foreign Service. He entered the Department of State as a young clerk in 1892 . He went on to serve in various capac ities, including Assistant Secretary of State between 1924 and 1937. Carr was th e driving force behind th e reform of th e U.S. Foreign Service in the interwar period. In his view, all American ambassadors and mini sters abroad should be professionals - i.e. career diplomats, not political appointees. In June 193 7, after fortyfive yea rs in Washington, Carr was called upon by the President to head the U.S. diplomatic mission in Prague. According to Cordell Hull , Carr was one of the most capable ass istant secretari es in th e history of the department. At the time of his appointment as U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, Carr was sixty-s ix years old . Peter �SLOVAKIA 2021 73 senior government officials ever to represent the United States in its foreign service. This reflected Washington's growing concerns about developments in Central Europe, at the heart of which lay the uneasy relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. 8 In August of 1938, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull decided to increase his diplomatic staff in Prague with the appointment of George Kennan.9 The choice was not coincidental. Kennan had been an experienced career diplomat and a specialist on Russian and East European affairs. His main task at the Prague legation was political reporting. Part of hi s duties consisted of making regular visits to Bratislava, where he gathered information about developments in Slovakia. Carr's diplomatic dispatches from Prague and Kennan 's reports on conditions in Slovakia shaped the views of American policymakers at the Department of State on the eve of WWII. 10 Their writings remained the only source of political intelligence from the region until the establishment of the OSS in 1942. 11 Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," American Diplomacy, accessed December 20, 20 19, http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/ 1998/09/mr-carr-goes-to-prague/. 8 Bridges points out that Carr' s predecessor - Butler Wright - had underestimated German innuence on Czechoslovak affairs in 1930. This view was expressed by both Secretary of State Hull as well as Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Peter Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 9 Best known as an advocate of the U.S. policy of containment after WWII , George Frost Kennan spent 193 8 and 1939 as a diplomat at the American legation in Prague. He served as Secretary of the Legation until the breakout of war in September of 1939. He was nuent in Russian and German, and during his serv ice in Prague he learned to read Czech and Slovak as we ll. George Kennan, From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938- 1940 (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1968), vi. 10 Wilbur J. Carr 's diplomatic correspondence from Prague is deposited in the Library of Congress, the Manuscript Division in Washington D.C. Some of Carr's reports are now part of the collections of the National Archives, entitled "Records of the U.S . Department of State Relating to the Interna l Affairs of Czechoslovakia I 9 10-1944". Some of Kennan ' s reports on the conditions in Slovak ia are in Decimal File 860f. Collecti ve ly, they were published in a book in 1968 . Kennan, From Prague A/ier Munich, 1968. 11 The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was establi shed by the military order issued by President Roosevelt on Jun e 13, 1942 . A predecessor of the modem CIA, the OSS mandate was to collect and ana lyse intelligence required by U.S. foreign-pol icy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Barry M. Katz, "Office of Strategic Services," in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed . I.C.B . Dear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 650. �74 SLOVAKIA 2021 The road to totalitarianism in Slovak politics started in September of 1936. On the 19th of that month, the leaders of Hlinka 's Slovak Peop le's Party (Hlinkova slovenska /'udova strana, or HSL:S) met at a congress in Piest'any to discuss the polic ies and future direction of the party. 12 Leaders of the moderate wing, led by Monsignor Joseph Tiso, were tempted to join the ruling coalition in the Czechoslovak Parliament. Chances were not unreali stic, as the government was headed by Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's first Slovak Prime Minister, who was determined to solve the Slovak question once and for all. 13 In opposition to the moderates stood the young radicals, led by Karol Sidor. 14 For them, cooperation with Hodfa's cabinet was categorically rejected, unless the party's demands were met in full , without any reservations. 15 Whether moderate or radical , all members of the HSL:S were convinced that their party held the so le political mandate to represent Slovaks as a whole. Distrustful of the democratic government in Prague and increasingly authoritarian, the young nationalists had the ear of the old, but charismatic leader of the party - Andrej Hlinka. Hi s ambitions to lead Slovaks as a single nation found expression in one of hi s speeches at the congress, where Hlinka compared himself to Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. As far as the future political 12 The Piest'any Congress has been described in detail by Robert Arpas. For a comprehensive accou nt of the party ' s policies in the interwa r period see Robert Arpas, Vitazsrvo alebo prehra: Vyvrcho lenie politickeho zapasu HSt.;S o alllonomiu S/ovenska. (Brati slava: Veda, 20 11 ). 13 Hodza was convi nced that settling Czechoslovak ia's nationality problem hin ged upon finding a solution to the Czech- Slovak question. Natalia Kraj covicova, "Slova kia in Czec hoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich , Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Ca mbridge University Press, 20 11 ). 155. 14 Apart from Sidor, the most prominent representatives of the youn g generation of Slovak nati onali sts were Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach . The views of these intellectuals and academics on society and government had been shaped by the risin g ri ght-wi ng nationalist ideologies of 1930s Europe. Ad mirers of nati onalist totalitaria ni sm, they questioned democracy, whi ch in thei r view was no longer capab le of offerin g solutions to the mountin g problems o f the time. The only remedy, according to them, was a unity of the nation coupl ed with un swerving loya lty to its omni scient leader. They were strongly anti -Se miti c . Robert Arpas, Vit"azstvo alebo prehra, 52 . 15 Sidor, alongs ide wi th Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach, pushed for complete autonomy, part of which was the demand to recogni ze the Slovaks as a separate nati on. Slova k was to become the o ffi c ial language in Slova kia, and the proposed Slovak Di et was to have broad legislative powers. �SLOVAKIA 2021 75 line of the party was concerned, the radicals he ld sway. Tiso's demand that the congress express loya lty to the embattled Czechoslovak Republic was swept away. Instead, the closing plenary adopted a resolution which condemned "representatives of international materialistic ideology" and "Jewi sh-Bol shev ik anarchy". 16 The following day, Tiso himself proclaimed the principle of"one nation , one leader, one party" to a public rally of party supporters in Piest'any. In 1938 Slovak Americans were once again about to play an active role in the politics of their mother country. For more than half a century, the Slovak diaspora in the United States had been an important voice in the country's plea for national self-determination. 17 One reason for that was the sheer scale of Slovak emigration to the New World. By 1914 as many as one fifth of Slovaks had come to reside in the United States. 18 The other reason was the completely different political and economic environment of their new home country. Unfettered by oppression from the state, politica lly minded and commerciall y successful Slovaks cultivated, in democratic America, a strong feeling of national identity outside Slovakia. 19 As leaders of fraternal societies they campaigned vigorously for Slovak self-dete1mination in the Old World. 20 The patriotic fervour of these Slovak Americans 16 Robert Arpas, " Piest'ansky zjazd ako medznik HSL'.S k totalite," Clovek a 5polocnost', no. 3, vo l 7 (2004): 166, http ://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocn ik-7rok-2004/3/studi e-a-c lanky/piestansky-zjazd-ako-medzn ik-na-ceste- hsls- k-tota lite/. 17 Sil via Mihalikova, " Slovakia Pathways to a Democrati c Community," in Democracv and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans- Dieter Klingeman n, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, Taylor & Franc is Group, 2006), 175. 18 Large-scale em igration of Slovaks to the United States bega n in the late 18 70s. On the eve of WWI , when the Slovak exodus to America peaked, the Slovak-America n comm unity was in per-capita term s the largest among the Centra l Europea n nations and second onl y to the community of Irish-Ameri ca ns among all immigrant peoples in the U.S. Mark Stolari k, "S lovaks in Canada and the United States, 1880- 1990, Similarities and Differences," in Chair in Slovak History and Culture Occasional Papers, no. I ( 1992): 14. 19 In Mark Stolarik 's words - "The principal centre of Slovak nationalism before and during World War I was not the Slovak homeland, but the United States of America." Mark Stolarik , "S lova ks in Ca nada and the United States," 14. 20 The primary reason why Slovaks in America estab li shed fratemals was mutual support. This often happened along confessional lines, reflecting the divi sions among religious denomin ati ons in Slovakia. Interest in mother-country politics was of secondary importance to Slovak Americans, and it was often the domain of a few politically mi nded fraterna l leaders and newspaper editors . �76 SLOVAKIA 2021 found expression first in the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and then in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. In these, Slovak and Czech expatriate communities in the United States pledged their support for the establishment of a common state on the ruins of Austria-Hungary after the Great War. In the former, Slovak Americans sought the creation of a federative union with the Czechs. In the latter, they agreed that Slovakia would have home rule. 2 1 The reason why they settled for somewhat less at Pittsburgh was the opposition to the idea of federation from Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the most important of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Thus, the Slovak-American nationalists, allied primarily in the Slovak League of America, supported the creation of their Czecho-Slovakia, in October 1918, albeit with caution .22 Despite some internal disagreements among the leaders of the League in the I 920s, demand for autonomy remained the League's top political priority in its dealings with the old country until October 1938. In late Apri l 1938, at the 20th convention of the Slovak League in Pittsburgh, a decision was made to send a delegation to Slovakia. The visit was to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the delegation was to take the original copy of the agreement with them. 23 Peter Hletko, the President of the Slovak League, was appointed head of the American delegation and its official spokesman. Another notable member of the delegation was Jozef Husek, former editor-in-chief of the Slovak-American newspaper Jednota and one of the signatories of the Pittsburgh Agreement. The ori ginal idea for a visit by Slovak Americans came from the leadership of 21 The word home-rule itself was not used in the phrasing of th e agreement. Slovakia was to have " its own administration , its Diet and its courts". Slovak was to be " the officia l language in schools and in public life in general". Dav id Grinnell , "Land A Treasures: The Pittsburgh Agreement; Czecho-Slovak Agreement," Western Pennsylvania Hi story 90 (Winter 2007- 08): 8. 22 The Pittsburgh Agreement bore the signatures of members of two Slovak fraternal organ isations - the Slovak League of America and the Slovak Evange lical Society. In I 9 I 8, the Slovak League was an umbrella organisation, comprising the majority of fraternal-benefit societies in the United States, including both Catholics and Lutherans, though th e former predominated. 23 A year before, at th e meeting of the Hlinka Party in Ruzomberok in July, Andrej Hlinka had described th e Pittsburgh Agreement as the "Magna Carta of th e Slovak nation ." Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovak ia (June- August 1938) and their effort to implement the Pittsburgh Agreement into th e Czechoslovak Constitution ," Clo vek a spolocnos( 20, no. 3 (2017): 50. �SLOVAKIA 2021 77 the Hlinka Party, which was planning to hold a congress in Bratislava on June 4th. The intention of the party officials was to increase the pressure on the central government in Prague to implement the party 's demand for autonomy. The public showing of the Pittsburgh Agreement to a rally of loyal supporters the following day was part of the plan. 24 ln the atmosphere of heightened international tensions, ratcheted up by the Czechoslovak crisis earlier that month, the visit of the American delegation was closely followed by the pro-Czechoslovak press throughout the country. 25 A party of Slovak Americans about a hundred strong - arrived at the Polish port of Gdyni a on May 26th, 1938. 26 There, they were greeted by two separate delegations: one, headed by Karol Sidor, who was sent to Poland by the leaders of the Hlinka Party; the other was the diplomatic retinue of Juraj Slav ik, the Czechoslovak Minister to Poland.27 The Slovak Americans then proceeded to Warsaw, from where they were scheduled to travel to Prague. 28 At the instigation of Karol Sidor, however, four members of the League were persuaded to trave l to Rufomberok first , to pay a visit to the ai Iing leader of the party, Andrej Hlinka. 29 24 The party offic ials were thu s responding to various rumours, e.g. that the Pittsburgh Agreement was a fabricati on , or that Masaryk's signature on it was not genuine. Stefan Kucf k, "Americki Slovaci a autonom isti cke hnutie na Slovensku ( 19 181938)," Dvacate sto/eti, no. 2 (2013 ): I 06. 25 The May Cri sis was caused by fa lse reports of German troop movements on the 19th around Czechos lova ki a ' s western borders, raising fea rs th at the country was about to be attacked by Germany. A lthough the reports later proved unsubstantiated, the inc ident contributed to the subseque nt resolve by France and Britain to increase pressure on Czechoslovakia to make concessions to the Sudeten German Party. 26 Milan O lej nik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 51. 27 Although the two delegati ons had travelled to Gdynia by the sa me train, both part ies made the ir way to Gdynia separate ly, as Sidor' s party re fused to jo in the Czechoslovak delegation from Warsaw. Stefan Kucf k, " Americk i Slovac i a autonomi sticke hnutie," I 05 . 28 In Warsaw the Slovak Americans were g iven the red-carpet treatment by representat ives of the muni cipa l authoriti es. They never mention ed Czechoslovak ia in their speec hes. Stefan Kucfk , "Americki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnuti e," I 05. 29 Because of the di sagreements among the leaders of the League ' s delegation, on ly fo ur of them went to Ruzomberok . Andrej Ro lik, a Lutheran pastor fro m Johnstown, refused to trave l to Slovakia first. Stefan Kucik , "Americki Slovac i a autonomisticke hnutie," I 05 . �78 SLOVAKIA 2021 The U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia watched the developments from his legation in Prague.Jo On May 31st he informed the Secretary of State of the arrival of the League's representatives in the Czechoslovak capital and their intention to meet both the President and the Prime Minister.JI The day after their arrival in Prague, the leaders of the League paid a courtesy visit to the American Legation . Carr noted that the Slovak Americans stressed in one of their public announcements that their visit was "not to be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic".J 2 Having spoken to an official from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, Carr came to the conclusion that Prague's government felt uneasy about the visit, wishing it had taken place at some other time.JJ This made the American diplomat feel that the red-carpet treatment accorded to the Slovak Americans in Prague somehow "lacked a ring of sinceri ty." The fee ling of skepticism in his mind was reinforced when he spoke privately to Hletko. According to Carr, the president of the League admitted that their visit to Prague was inopportune, regretting the fact that it had coincided with the minority dispute. In order to make his American readers appreciate the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the visit, Carr factored in the reactions of the press. He noted that the newspapers in Germany had been for some time speaking of the united front between the Hlinka Party and the Sudeten German Party aimed against the Czechs.J4 The pro-Czechoslovak press, for their part, had been accusing Slovak nationalists of collusion with the Germans.J 5 As to the specific results of the talks between the League's representatives 30 Since 1925, the United States' diplomatic mission in Prague had resided at the Schonbom Palace on Mala stran a. Peter Bridges, " Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 31 In mid-June Carr wrote to Washington again, giving a detailed account of the League's participation in th e Hlinka Party congress. 32 National Archives, Washington, 860f.00/5 I 0, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, May 31 , p. I . 33 This was told to Ca rr by an unspecified official from the Czechoslovak Mini stry of Fore ign Affairs on the 3 1st. The Czechoslovak government feared that the visit would be used by the minorities to advance their own political agendas. 860 f.00/589, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, p. 2. 34 NA, 860f.00/534, Di spatch No. 176, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, Jun e 6, p. 2. 35 According to the Police Directory in Bratislava, the Sudeten Party did send a congratulatory telegram to the HSL.:S on the occasion of its party congress on June the 4th. Milan Olej nik, "The visit of de legates of the American Slovak League to Slovaki a," 55. �SLOVAKIA 2021 79 and the Czechoslovak statesmen, Carr echoed Slovak, the press organ of the HSCS. 36 It reported that the discussions bore no concrete results, liut it was agreed that, after a month's study of the conditions in Slovakia, the League's representatives would return for more talks with the Prime Minister. 37 The public proclamations by the League ' s representati ves in support of Slovak autonomy prompted the U.S. Minister to examine the extent of popular support for the Slovak nationalists. In their plans 1938 was to be the crucial year, by the end of which the Slovak question in Czechoslovakia was to be settled once and for all. With the support of their American compatriots, the Slovak nationali sts claimed that the majority of Slovaks in 1938 - whether at home or abroad, were in favour of autonomy. To this purpose, Hletko repeatedly claimed that autonomy was supported by as many as 90% of Slovaks in the United States. 38 The proposed change in the status of Slovakia was also the main order of business at the Party Congress that convened on June 4th in Bratislava. With the League's delegates in attendance, the Party passed a resolution, setting out the details of the new Autonomy Bill. 39 Its text was published in full the following day in Slovak. Carr had it translated for his June 6th report and supplemented it with his commentary. The bid to amend the Czechoslovak Constitution was viewed critically by the U.S. Minister, hi s main reservation being the lack of political mandate to demand such a constitutional change. Drawing on the statistics from the last parliamentary election of 1936, he observed that the HSCS had only polled 30.1 % of the votes cast in Slovakia. 40 The right to speak for all Slovaks was further dimini shed, 36 Hletko and his party urged the Czechoslovak statesmen to recogni ze Slovaks as a sovereign nati on and to grant Slovak ia autonomy as it was sti pulated in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Both Hodza and Benes ex pressed their general agreement, but refused to talk about autonomy. What they wanted to promote, first and foremost, was Czechoslovak unity. Hletko later summarised the outcome of the talks in the phrase "Nothing positive was achi eved." Stefan Kucik, "Ameri cki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnutie na Slovensku," I 07 . 37 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 2. 38 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 7. 39 It demanded the creation of a separate Slovak Diet and governmen t, a long with the introduction of Slovak as the official language on the basis of recognition of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. 40 Of a ll the parliamentary votes cast in Czechos lovakia, Carr po ints out, this was 6.86%. NA , 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 4. �80 SLOVAKIA 2021 in Carr's view, by the fact that the party did not put up its own candidates, but campaigned as part of the Autonomist Bloc.41 Even the recent successes of the HSCS in the communal elections did not alter the fact that Slovak autonomists had never commanded the required 50% of the voting majority in Slovakia. Moreover, Carr argued, all of the HSCS 's former allies "now cooperate with the coalition parties." As far as the capability of the party to mobilise its supporters was concerned, the American estimate in June 1938 was slightly higher the one made by the Czechoslovak authorities. According to an American source, the turnout at the public rally on June 5th - the same day when the Autonomy Bill was published - was around 50,000.42 This was twice as much as the official figure given by the Bratislava police department. 43 To strike a balanced view, Carr devoted an equal amount of space in his reporting to those who opposed the Slovak autonomists. In 1938, this was a group of nationwide Czechoslovak parties - members of the ruling coalition which operated separate branches in Slovakia. The HSCS 's staunchest opponent was the Agrarian Party, led by Prime Minister Hodza. To solve the nationality problem his cabinet drafted, in the early summer of 1938, a constitutional amendment, referred to as the Nationality Statute. 44 Another Slovak in the government who opposed autonomists was Minister of Justice [van Derer, who was also head of the Slovak section of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers ' Party. 45 In 1938 both politicians rejected the idea of Slovaks as a sovereign nation, struggling to maintain Czechoslovak unity in 41 This consisted of the Rutheni an Soj uz Party, the Polish Socia list Party and the Slovak National Party. 42 This was based on th e estimate by Associated Press reporter 0. E. Werner. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. O lejnfk, referring to the police records, puts the number of participants at 25,000 at a maximum . 43 Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 55 . 44 The measure proposed to divide the republi c into four autonomous lands: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Eac h land was to be a legal entity in the eyes of public and private law. Land Diets with curias representing every nationality were envisaged, as was the creation of land governments. President Benes had actively participated in the preparation of the statute. The negotiations between the HSL.:S and President Benes about the Nationality Statute in September 1938 were unsuccessfu l. Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 19 I 8- 1938," 156. 45 Ivan Derer was the Minister of Justice of the Czechoslovak government from Jul y 193 7 until September 1938. �SLOVAKIA 2021 81 the face of mounting demands from the Sudeten Party. Carr reported on the activities of the pro-Czechoslovak movement, gauging its political clout and public support. On June I 0th he sent a di spatch in which he looked at the rally organized by the opponents of Slovak autonomy on June 6th . Agrarian Day, as it was officially called, followed close on the heels of the rally organised by th e Hlinka Party the previous day. According to Carr, the turnout at the Czechoslovak demonstration was I 00,000, about twice as large as the previous day 's demon stration.46 Hodza and Derer were among the main speakers, and the President of the Slovak League addressed the crowds in hi s turn. Judging by the American report, the tone of Hletko 's speec h was much less belligerent than hi s speech the day before. 47 Comparing the two rallies, Carr related in hi s report an interesting fact observed by an Associated Press journalist. It concerned the proclaimed loyalty to the common state - or rather the lack thereof, on th e part of Slovak autonomists. When the national anthem was sung at the Hlinka demonstration, there was practically no response from the crowd to the first, i.e. the Czech part of it. For the second - the Slovak part - however, the crowd joined in with " tremendous vigor". The emblems used at the rallies told the same story. The decorations used at Agrarian Day consisted entirely of Czechoslovak flags, while those used by Hlinka's supporters featured exc lusive ly the party's red double cross on a white background.48 The di smem berment of the last democratic state in Central Europe began on September 30th, 1938. At Munich, the European powers decided the fate of Czechoslovakia in her absence.49 The catastrophe 46 Carr 's estimate of th e tu rnout at the Hlinka' s ra ll y was 50,000. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. 47 According to 0. E. Wern er, " Hletk o declared that the Slovaks in the Un ited States wis h nothin g more than that the Slovaks defend th e Republic which they have he lped to establish and th at they remain true Slovaks in free, beautiful and prosperous Czechoslovak ia." NA, 860f. 00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 4. 48 The onl y exception was the use of the American fla g decorating the rostrum where, among oth er speakers, Hletko gave hi s speech. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 5. 49 The agreement was signed by the government leaders of Germany, France, th e United Kingdom and Ita ly. Czechoslova ki a's leaders were not invited, save two diplomats who we re summoned to receive what the great powers had negotiated. Michael R. D. Foot, " Munich agree ment," in The Oxford Companion to World War If, ed. I.C. B. Dea r (New York: Oxford Uni vers ity Press, I 995), 597. �82 SLOVAKIA 2021 could not have been averted by Czechoslovak leaders, but internal factors contributed to it.so What had played into Hitler's hands were the aspirations of the nationalist movements within the country. Democratic powers of the West had either looked on or followed a policy of active appeasement, so as to avoid a war with Germany.s 1 In an effort to satisfy Hitler's demands, Britain and France acquiesced to the annexation of the German-speaking territories of Czechoslovakia. In so doing, they sanctioned the principle whereby individuals exercised their rights in a state collectively, through belonging to a legally recognized national entity. Such recognition in law went hand-in-hand with the demand for a geographically defined national territory. This ran contrary to Czechoslovakia's liberal constitution, by which members of national minorities had their rights guaranteed as individual citizens. The Nationality Statute proposed by Hodza 's cabinet went a long way towards satisfying the demands of the nationalist movements. It attempted to solve the problem by giving Czechoslovak nationalities territorial and administrative autonomy, but it refused to recognise them as legal entities. In the run-up to Munich, Britain and France had stepped up the pressure on the Czechoslovak government not to implement the Nationality Statute. After the failure of negotiations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak government, on September 22 nd the Slovak nationalists rejected the Nationality Statute.s2 In the wake of the Munich Agreement, in an atmosphere of heightened political uncertainty, leaders of the Hlinka Party summoned representatives of the other Slovak political parties to Zilina. The declaration of Slovak autonomy of October 6th was supported by all of them except the Communists and Social Democrats.s3 50 The genera l consensus among hi storians is that "the Czechs had to capitulate". Thomas Paterson, et al., eds. , Americanforeign relations. Vo lume 2. (Lexington MA : Heath and Company, 2014), 153. 51 On September 25th President Benes appealed to Roosevelt with a view to urging Britain and France to stand by Czechoslovaki a. Two days after that, Roosevelt wrote to Chancellor Hitler: "The government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." Matilda Axton et al., eds., Foreign relations of the United States. 1938. Vo lume I, Washin gton : United States Government Printing Office, 1955. 52 Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," 156. 53 The result of the meeting was the Zilina Agreement, by which its signatories pledged their support for the passage of a constitutional act providing for Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Parliament. The next day Jozef Tiso was appointed head �SLOVAKIA 2021 83 By that time Poland had occupied a territory in the north of Czechoslovakia and Hungary had laid claims to Hungarian-speaking territories in the south of Slovakia. 54 After Munich the Czech Lands were perceived by the United States with considerable sympathy as a small democratic country in peril , resisting the pressures of a totalitarian aggressor. Looking back on the aftermath of Munich in December, Carr appreciated the grav ity of the situation in which the recently reconstructed Czechoslovak government found itself. He noted that after President Benes had resigned on October 5th, not only was the country left without its leader, but "the bottom dropped out of the entire political system through which it had been governed for twenty years." 55 The interim Prime Minister General Jan Syrovy faced the task of preserving "order and di scipline through a period of indescribable difficulty," having to " remake the constitution" so that "a wholly new civil regime may be set up to which power could be turned over. " 56 The appointment of Frantisek Chvalkovsky as Czechoslovak Foreign Mini ster drew particular praise from the American diplomat. With hi s friendly attitude towards the United States, the Czech Minister was considered a "strong advocate of democratic form of government" while, at the same time, "a reali st with regard to the necessity of a new orientation in the foreign affairs of hi s country." 57 Despite overt signs of the Czech political system of the Slovak autonomous govern ment. Valerian Bystricky, Od auton6mie k vzniku Slovenskeho statu (Bratislava: Prodama, 2008), 273. 54 Carpatho-U krai ne' s autonomy became a reality a lmost at the same time. On October 11th the Czechoslovak government in Prague appoi nted its first autonomous government. Frantisek Capka, "Leta prvni i druhe republiky a protektoratu," Dejiny zemi koruny ceske v datech, accessed Janua ry 16, 2020, http://www .libri.cz/databaze/dejiny/text/t84 .html. 55 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 2- 3. 56 NA, 860f.00/589, Ca rr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. 57 Carr's assessmen t of Chva lkovsky's political integrity and his attitudes towards Germany is particul arl y interesting in the light of his subseq uent acti ons and fu rther diplomatic career. Hi s last directive, as the Foreign Minister issued in the wake of the German occupat ion of Bohemia-Moravia in March of 1939, instructed the Czechoslovak ambassadors abroad to close their embassies and hand them over to the Nazis. Many patriotic Czechoslovak diplomats - some of them Slovak by birth - such as Stefa n Osusky, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris, or Juraj Slavik, head of the country's diplomatic mission in Po land, refused to do so. After the breakup of Czechoslova kia Chvalkovsk y became Envoy of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Ge m1any. He di ed during an allied ai r ra id on Berlin in 1945 . "Frantisek �84 SLOVAKIA 2021 leaning towards authoritarian rule, Carr had little doubt that the federal government would continue to be "a strictly democratic form of government," though admitting "it will undoubtedly incorporate such features of totalitarianism as are compatible with democracy. " Its main desire after Munich, thought the American diplomat, was to "dispel any idea that there is any 'Fascist' tinge to the state yet for obvious reason [they] do not wish to damn Fascist methods ." 58 The plight of Bohemia after Munich contrasted sharply with the American description of the situation in Slovakia. The political leaders of the autonomous region known as Slovenska krajina were seen by American diplomats as unpatriotic and irresponsible individuals who drove one nail after another into the coffin of Czechoslovak democracy. 59 Commenting on the immediate aftermath of Munich and the challenges faced by the Czechoslovak government, Carr expected Slovak leaders "out of common patriotism to set aside domestic political differences until these dangerous problems have been settled." Instead, he observed di sappointingly, "S lovaks - now represented exclusively by the Hlinka extremists - took advantage of the catastrophic difficulties of the Prague Government to demand complete autonomy."60 Questioning where the loyalty of Slovakia's leaders stood during the crisis, the American diplomat came to the conclusion that "S lovak sympathies have throughout this period appeared to lean more strongly toward the Germans, than toward the Czechs." From the American perspective, the unity of the Republic stood paramount, and in times of danger it should definitely prevail over local interest. Carr expressed this sentiment several times, in an unequivocal tone. " If the three principal component parts of the Czechoslovak Republic are linked together by any common bonds of loyalty and patriotism," he argued emphatically, " there has been nothing in the actions of the Chvalkovsky," Historie a osobnosti diplomacie. Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, accessed December 20, 20 19, https://www. mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/histori e_a_osobnosti_ ceske_ diplomacie/ministri_a_ ministerstvo_ v_ histori i/frantisek _ chva lkovsky .html . 58 NA, 860f.00/57 I, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, October 26, 1938, p. 3. 59 Slo venska krajina - in English ' the Slovak Land', was the official name used to refer to Slovakia during the First and Second Czechoslovak Republi cs, between 191 8 and 1939. 60 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. �SLOVAKIA 2021 85 Slovak leaders during the last few weeks to indicate it." The image of two different worlds - that of the brave Czechs struggling to save the Republic and the unpatriotic Slovaks sympathising with Nazi aggressors - created by the American Legation in Prague after Munich, persisted for a long time on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1942, when the OSS took over from the American foreign service as the primary intelligence gatherer, a report on Slovakia claimed that the pro-Nazi orientation of the Tiso-Tuka leadership had long been apparent before Munich. 61 After it, the report went on, "these leaders came out open ly against the republic, against democracy generally, and for a new world order in Europe. " 62 The pace and complexity of the developments in Czechoslovakia in the closing months of 1938 were overwhelming, and the American Legation in Prague struggled to keep the Department of State fully informed. Reports in this period were mostly factua l, and the U.S. Minister in Prague complained that they had little time to put the rapidly unfolding events into general perspective. Only in the latter part of December did his superiors in Washington receive a comprehensive report on the situation in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. In the first weeks after Munich there was an "unavoidable preoccupation with the foreign" taking precedence over everything e lse. The whole country was in a state of utter turmoil. The report went on to recapitulate the challenges the country had to grapple with in an extremely short space of time. Satisfying the Polish territorial demands in the north was followed by the negotiations with Germany about Czechoslovakia's new borders in the west. The negotiations with Hungary about the cession 61 This was a com prehensive, I 06-page report on the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpath ian Rutheni ans. NA, Washington, Office of Strategic Servi ces, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 25. 62 Strictly speaki ng, thi s was not true. Throughout th e whole of 1938 the Party was led by Jozef Tiso. Tuka on ly came to prominence in 1940, when he became Foreign Minister of th e wartime Slovak Republic, following the Salzburg negotiations with Gem1any. As the principal representative of the moderate wing, Tiso became leader of the Party after Hlinka 's death in August of 1938. He spearheaded Slovak autonomy in October of 1938, but was opposed to the break up of Czechosl ovak ia in March of 1939. The probable reason why the OSS did not have more precise information about the period was the fact that the main source of its information on the situation in Slovakia during WWII was the Czechoslovak Information Service. This a was a special propaganda bureau set up in th e Un ited States by the Czechoslovak govemment-inex ile, controlled by ex- President Benes from London. �86 SLOVAKIA 2021 of Hungari an-speaking territories in Slovakia 's so uth came to nought, and the matter had to be resolved through international arbitration in early November. It was only then that the crippled Republic could turn its attention to its domesti c problems. What followed, according to the author of the report, was a " period of profound change and adjustment in the internal political life of Czechoslovakia." The most pressing of the problems, needing immediate attention in November, were the election of a new President and the passage of an enabling act. Progress in this direction, Carr noted, was " blocked by the Slovaks." They demanded that no presidential election could take place before the Constitution was amended to enact the proposed Autonomy Bill. The U.S. Mini ster in Prague believed that the conditions in the country were " hardly such as to make it a favourable time for the enactment of constitutional leg islation ." The Prague government, however, " had no other choice but to comply with it. " The Autonomy Act and the presidential elections of 1938 were both scrutini sed in the Legation 's report from December 2 1st. The Czechoslovak National Assembly passed the constitutional amendment on November 22nd and elected Czechoslovakia's new president on the 30th. 63 The constitutional arrangement provided, among other things, for an autonomous Slovak government and a Diet of the Slovak Land based in Bratislava. The new relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was also reflected in the altered spelling of the country's name, which was changed to Czecho-Slovakia. Th e asymmetrical model of the state drew criticism from the U.S. Minister in Prague.64 According to him, " the privileges henceforth to be enjoyed by the Slovaks in the national parliament" were far too extensive and thus "entirel y disproportionate to the population and actual importance of Slovakia" as well as " its ability, thus far, unproven , to govern itself 63 Drafted by Ferdinand Durcansky, it was based on th e Autonomy Bill published by Hlinka 's Party on June 6th . 64 The Nati ona l Assembly in Prague retained legislative power fo r the whole of Czechoslovaki a wit h regard to matters of the constituti on, fo reign policy, nat ional defence, citizenship, currency, customs and some oth er areas. Since the Czech Lands did not have their ow n parliament, Czecho-Slovakia became in effect an asymmetrical federa l state. Valerian Bystricky, "Slovakia from the Munich Confere nce to the declaration of independence," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 20 11 ), I 60. �SLOVAKIA 2021 87 alone." 65 Slovaks were also criticised in another report for their approach to the election of the President. Originally, the parliament was to vote on an Enabling Act first, but "this was again blocked by the opposition of the Slovaks." who refused to do so " until they might know who the next president was to be."66 Alluding to the American tradition of presidential elections, Carr commented on the undemocratic nature of the procedure: "It is characteristic of political thought in this part of the world," he wrote sarcastically, "that it seems to have occurred to no one that it would have been possible to have a presidential election without all doubts as to its results having been removed well in advance." As for the candidate himself, Carr favoured Frantisek Chvalkovsky, preferred by most of the Czech deputies. In the end, however, the parliament elected Emil Hacha, former President of the Supreme Court. The American diplomat believed that Chvalkovsky's main disadvantages in the eyes of the Slovaks were his Protestantism, along with the fact that he was divorced.67 The Autonomy Act of November 22nd also provided for elections to the Slovak Diet in the following month . They were held on December 18th, 1938 and, historically, they were the first elections ever to take place in Slovakia for that country's self-governing legislative body. Judging by the Americans, however, it was a missed opportunity. The Legation's report from December 21st commented on a lack of democratic procedure as well the dubiousness of their results. As far as the former was concerned, the U.S. Minister in Prague saw "a pronounced Nazi influence."68 This was a reference to the fact that Slovak voters were presented with only one list of candidates. The sole political entity on the 1938 ballot - Hlinka 's Slovak People's Party, with a subtitle to its name - the Party of Slovak National Unity - was an amalgamation of the Agrarian, National Unity, National Socialist 65 Carr points out the Czechs had no say whatsoever in the Slovak Parliament. As a further example of the favoured position that Slovakia occupied in the matters of the Republi c was the provision according to which a motion of no confidence might be moved by one-thi rd of the Slovak deputies, i.e. 12 as compared with a total of 226 members of the chamber. NA, 860f.00/588, Dispatch No. 302, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 2- 3. 66 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7. 67 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7- 9. 68 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 4. �88 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Fascist Parties. 69 Carr had little doubt that the 98% of the votes cast in its favour was due to the fact that the voters were given no alternative. This bore "striking resemblance to the results achieved in recent German plebiscites." Here, the author of the report reminded the State Department that the bloc of Slovak Autonomists had polled as low as 30.1 % of the Slovak vote in the previous parliamentary elections of 1935. "Fear of recrimination", speculated Carr, may have had "a decided influence on the votes cast by many individuals." Gauging the reactions to the Slovak elections in Prague, Carr noticed a parliamentary objection raised by the former Minister of Social Welfare, then a deputy of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. The criticism was unlikely to be heeded in Bratislava, concluded Carr disparagingly "when the Slovaks are taking what resembles a child-like delight in playing with a new toy." 70 Part of the image of Slovakia created by the American Foreign Service in 1938 concerned Slovak attitudes towards the Jews. At that time U.S. diplomats in Czechoslovakia concentrated mainly on understanding the roots Slovak antisemitism, analysing its popular as we ll as political manifestations. Somewhat subjective - or even biased were the American comparisons of the anti-Jewish sentiments among the Czechs and the Slovaks. For a Czech, it was thought, nationality was a matter of language, rather than race. In other words, animosity was only likely to be felt towards the Jews who spoke German. Apart from a small minority, however, the mass of the Czech people had "very little interest in anti-Semitism." 7 1 In Slovakia, the popular resentment of the Jews was said to be widespread and "deep-seated." 72 The main reason for this was believed to be economic. According to George Kennan, then Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, the Jews of Bohemia li ved mainly in urban areas, whereas those 69 The Communist Party was banned by the autonomous govern ment on October 9th, the Social Democrats on November 16th. The destruction of the other political parties in Slovakia came about on November 8th, when they were all forced to merge with the HSL.:S . Representatives of the ama lgamated political entities did not receive any positions in the autonomous government, being left with a few seats in th e Slovak Diet. Valerian Bystricky, "S lovaki a from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence," 161. 70 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 21 , 1938, p. 4- 5. 71 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 45. 72 George Kennan , From Prague After Munich, 22 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 89 residing in Slovakia were more evenly spread throughout the country. 73 Slovak Jews plied their trades in smaller towns and the countryside as merchants, saloon keepers, druggists, or lawyers. In these professions, Kennan argued, the Jews "played a dominant part," largely because of their "superior intelligence." The Slovaks felt differently about this, being convinced that the Jews owed their success to their "trickiness, unscrupulousness, incurable clannishness and nepotism." This was not the case in in Bohemia, according to Kennan , because the " industry and shrewdness of the Czechs as petty traders and artisans" had been such that the Czech countryside " had never presented a Jew with such attractive possi bilities as the villages in Slovakia. 74 Finally, Kennan identified the lack of social assimilation as another factor why the cultural distinctiveness of the Slovak Jewry was more pronounced than it was in Bohemia. 75 From the American perspective, anti-Semitism in Slovak politics had both historic and religious origins. According to Kennan , many of the educated Jews " have traditionally looked to Budapest for cultural inspiration." In addition, there was a smaller, but influential community of Jews "with a German cultural orientation." In the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, both nationalities were associated with the ruling classes, whereas the Slovak-speaking population had been one of the oppressed nations. Thus, in the Slovak mind, the Jews had always sided with the oppressors. In other words, when the country was under Hungarian rule, "the Slovak Jews made common cause with the Hungarians in exploiting the Slovaks;" when the country found itself in Czechoslovakia, "the Jews joined with the more liberal Czechs in opposi ng Slovak autonomy." 76 To illustrate his theory, Kennan referred his American readership to the pogrom-like operation ordered by Tiso in early November. At that time, Slovak authorities attempted to deport 7,600 Slovak Jews to Hungary, following the announcement of 73 As Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, Kennan made severa l trips to Slovakia in late 1938. In January 1939 he wrote a special report on the conditions in Slovakia. This was followed by a comprehensive despatch in February on the Jewish problem in Czechoslovakia. 74 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 44. 75 Kennan mentions a greater degree of racial intermarriage in Bohemia, especia ll y in upper-class Czech society. 76 George Kennan, From Prague Ajier Munich, 23. �90 SLOVAKIA 2021 the First Vienna Award. 77 In order to establish how Slovakia's Jews were going to be treated in the future , Kennan approached Jozef Tiso. In a personal conversation with the American diplomat, Tiso said that "the Slovak government intended to take measures toward the solution of the Jewish question independently of Prague." The Slovak Prime Minister also expressed his conviction that the planned measures "would probably go farther in scope than any that might be taken by the Prague regime." 78 As far as the religious component of Slovak anti-Semitism was concerned, Kennan pointed out that an important factor in the attitude of the Slovak authorities to the Jews was the position of the Catholi c Church . Tiso was himself a Catholic priest, and the Church had made its position on the matter clear through various officials. One of those, according to Kennan, was Father Rudolf Mikus, Provincial of the Jesuit Order in Slovakia. 79 Speaking for the newspaper Slovak, Mikus advocated elimination of the Jewish influence in political and economic life. This would include, among other things, public segregation. 80 The statements made by the Church convinced Kennan that the Slovak government wou ld face little opposition in the promulgation of its anti-Semitic policies in the future .8 1 As the momentous events of 1938 unfolded in Central Europe, diplomats of the American Foreign Service at the Legation in Prague watched the situation in Czechoslovakia, and took a close interest in political developments in Slovakia. Throughout 1938 the country was perceived by American diplomats as a politically vo latile province, 77 This was a pogrom-like operation ordered by HSI..:S to deport around 7,500 Jews to the territory ceded by Slovakia to Hungary. Kenn an argues that the forced ex pul sion took place as a retaliatory measure for an alleged petition by the leaders of the Bratislava Jews to incorporate the city of Bratislava into the ceded territory. The operation was accompanied by anti-Sem itic ri ots in Brati slava. James Mace Ward, "The 1938 First Vienna Award and the Holocaust in Slovakia," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 29, no. I (2015): 92 . doi: I 0.1093/hgs/dcv004. ISSN 8756-65 83. 78 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51. 79 A full translation of the statement by Mikus was attached at the end of Kenn an' s report. 80 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51 - 52. 81 The institutional persecution of th e Jews in Slovakia began the following year, after Slovak ia gained its nominal independence. On April the 18th , the Slovak Parliament passed its first anti -Semitic law. This was Ordinance 63 which established a lega l definition of a Jew based on a religious principle. Ladislav Lipscher, "The Jews of Slovakia : 1939- 1945," in The Jews ofCzechoslovakia Volume Ill, ed . Avigdor Dagan et al. (Phi ladelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 165. �SLOVAKIA 2021 91 one whose nationalist leaders took advantage of the central government's difficulties after Munich, driving the last democracy in the region into destruction. Slovakia's slide towards totalitarianism in 1938 was perceived by Americans as a consequence of that country's extreme nationalism and its disrespect for the values of the democratic republic established in 1918 . In contrast, tran sition to totalitarian rule in the Czech Lands was viewed by the Americans as a process of necessary accommodation, a sensible political reaction to the external pressures exerted by Nazi Germany. Although American observers did not deny the Slovak right to national self-determination in principle, they considered Slovak demands for autonomy in 1938 as inopportune and highly unpatriotic. They saw the rise of the autonomist movement as a function of Nazi foreign policy, whose sole intention was to use Slovak nationalism in its quest to dismember the Czechoslovak state. Against the backdrop of ri sing international tensions, the visit of the Slovak League of America in the summer appeared to American observers more as an embarrassment than an attempt to save the Republic. Watching the Hlinka Party's push for autonomy, the U.S. Minister in Prague kept reminding the Department of State that the Party lacked a democratic mandate to represent the Slovaks as a whole. In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the Americans openly scolded the behaviour of the Slovak nationalists, reproaching them for a lack of loyalty to the common state. The Slovak declaration of autonomy in October was not seen as a measure to consolidate the embattled state, but as another step to weaken it. American reports between November and December provide an account of the gradual dismantling of the multi-party political system by the government in Bratislava. In contrast to Bohemia, Americans saw anti-Semitism among the Slovak population as deep-seated, with specific - mainly economic - underpinnings. The anti-Semitic policies of the Slovak government, condoned by some representatives of the Catholic Church, were to become more severe and extensive in the foreseeable future . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 70 SLOVAKIA 2021 ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALIST TOTALITARIANISM: SLOVAKIA IN THE TURMOIL OF 1938 AS SEEN BY THE UNITED ST ATES FOREIGN SERVICE Roman Licko In the autumn of 2018 I set myself the task of assessing the significance of the year 1938 in Slovak hi story. This was in response to a conference call which invited scholars to address, among other themes, milestones in Czech and Slovak history in which the year happens to have a number eight in it. 1 When I set about preparing my presentation, I had two thoughts about the subj ect. First, I was struck by several historic parallels between 2018 and 1938. No attempt will be made in thi s paper to argue that 2018 was as fateful for Slovakia as the year 1938 was for the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. Yet, given the rise of far-right political extremism in Central Europe, tacitly encouraged by a large authoritarian neighbour to the east, it may be instructive to re-examine the rise of Slovak nationalism in the late 1930s. 2 Then, extreme Slovak nationalists had also been spurred on by an aggressive totalitari an neighbour. 3 The second idea that occurred to me was that 1938 has been somewhat neglected when it came to 1 The paper entitled "From Fledging Democracy to Nationalist Authoritarianism: Slovakia in the Tunnoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service" was presented at the 50th Convention of the Associati on for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies in December of 20 18 in Boston. 2 The large authoritarian neighbour is Russia. Its support for the far-right nationa lists in Centra l European cou ntri es is explained and well documented in Timothy Snyder's book The Road to Unfi·eedom. By supporti ng ex treme nationalist movements in coun tries such as Slovaki a, Russia hopes to weaken their resolve to stay w ithin the European Union. Putin's alternative to th e EU is the Eurasian Union, a trade and political bloc stretching from Chin a to the border of the EU. Timothy Snyder, Th e Road tu Unf,-eedom: Russia. Europe. America. (New York : Crown/ Archetype, 20 18), I 00. The reference to the extreme nationalists in today 's Slovakia is directed towards l 'udovri strana na.iie S/ovensko-The People's Party Our Slovakia. Just two months before Slovakia ' s parliamentary elections in February of 2020, the far-rig ht nationali st party came second in a popul ari ty poll cond ucted by the Focus polling Agency in December of 2019. Historically speaking, leaders of the party, including its leaderMarian Kotleba, subscribe to the ideology of the war-time Slovak Republic. 3 Then it was Nazi Germany. SLOVAKIA 2021 71 turning points in Slovak history.4 By this, I don ' t mean the fact that Slovaks gained their autonomy in that year. What changed quite dramatically in 1938 was the way in which the country was governed. After a relatively brief experience with a democratic form of government in the first Czechoslovak Republic, Slovak leaders set about dismantling the democratic institutions upon which the foundations of their state were built. By the end of the year Slovakia was well on the road to becoming a nationalist totalitarian state. This paper examines political developments in Slovakia in that year from the point of view of an independent observer- the United States Foreign Service. At that time, American diplomats in Czechoslovakia gathered and evaluated intelligence which in tum informed the United States' foreign policy towards Central Europe. Their reports and analyses, despite their limitations, help us understand what went wrong with the process of Slovak national emancipation in 1938. They may also serve as an insight into how easily a Central European democracy may tum into a totalitarian state if extreme nationalism becomes the dominant ideology of its political leaders. 1938 was a critical year in European history. Powerful forces of European nationalism were the driving engine of politics in both totalitarian Germany as well as democratic Czechoslovakia. Because of its large and restive German minority, Czechoslovakia had become vulnerable to the aggressive foreign policy of its large totalitarian neighbour to the west. Adolph Hitler's ambition in Central Europe was to annex ethnic Germans living in foreign territories into his Third Reich . In March of 1938 Germany had annexed Austria. In September, the Gen11an Chancellor achieved the pinnacle of his pre-war diplomatic offensive. As a result of the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia had to cede the German-speaking areas of Sudetenland to Germany. The rejection of the Versailles system and the intention by the Nazi s to destroy its eastern democratic neighbour brought the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia to a head in 1938. The issue had been simmering in Czechoslovak politics since the last parliamentary elections in 1935, whose results changed the political map of the republic. In Slovakia, an alliance of nationalist parties, known as the Autono4 1948 and 1968, of course, were more fateful. The former because the coup d 'etat in February brought about a complete regime change, the latter beca use the crushing of the Prague Spring in August was the res ult of a fo rei gn in vasion. 72 SLOVAKIA 2021 mist Bloc, emerged as the most powerful political force in the country.5 The Sudeten German Party became one of the strongest political parties in Czechoslovakia. 6 By the end of 1938, the problem of the constitutional relationship between Czechs and Slovaks had been temporarily resolved. The Declaration of Slovak autonomy on October the 6th marked the beginning of the short-lived period known as the Second Czechoslovak Republic. It ended with the final destruction of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939. In 1938 the American government did not have a centralised agency that wou ld gather, coordinate and evaluate political intelligence from foreign countries. Instead, its main source of information about developments abroad came from the U.S. diplomatic missions based in countries' capital cities. Thus, the quality of political intelligence from Europe dispatched to Washington depended on the political acumen of individual diplomats, not all of whom were professionally trained. In this respect, Czechoslovakia was a notable exception. In June 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt instructed the Department of State to appoint Wilbur John Carr as the new U.S. Minister in Prague. 7 As Assistant Secretary of State, Carr had been one of the most 5 In the electoral campa ign, the stron gest nationali st party in Slovakia - Hlinka 's Slovak People ' s Party - joined forces with the Slovak National Party. Both parties advocated autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic. They were backed by the parties of Ruthenian and Poli sh minorities, demandin g autonomy for thei r own regions. Collect ive ly the Autonomist Bloc secured 30.1 % of the Slovak vote. The coalition of Magyar parties in Slovakia gained 14.2%. Alena Bartl ova, " Posledne parlamen tn e vol'by v maj i 1935," in V Medzivojnovom Ceskoslovensku 1918- 1939, (Bratislava : Veda, 20 12), 439. 6 The Sudeten Party polled 15. 2% in the 1935 e lection . Natalia Kraj covifova, "Slovakia in Czechoslova kia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20 I I), 154. 7 Wilbur John Carr is often refe rred to as the father of the American Foreign Service. He entered the Department of State as a young clerk in 1892 . He went on to serve in various capac ities, including Assistant Secretary of State between 1924 and 1937. Carr was th e driving force behind th e reform of th e U.S. Foreign Service in the interwar period. In his view, all American ambassadors and mini sters abroad should be professionals - i.e. career diplomats, not political appointees. In June 193 7, after fortyfive yea rs in Washington, Carr was called upon by the President to head the U.S. diplomatic mission in Prague. According to Cordell Hull , Carr was one of the most capable ass istant secretari es in th e history of the department. At the time of his appointment as U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia, Carr was sixty-s ix years old . Peter SLOVAKIA 2021 73 senior government officials ever to represent the United States in its foreign service. This reflected Washington's growing concerns about developments in Central Europe, at the heart of which lay the uneasy relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. 8 In August of 1938, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull decided to increase his diplomatic staff in Prague with the appointment of George Kennan.9 The choice was not coincidental. Kennan had been an experienced career diplomat and a specialist on Russian and East European affairs. His main task at the Prague legation was political reporting. Part of hi s duties consisted of making regular visits to Bratislava, where he gathered information about developments in Slovakia. Carr's diplomatic dispatches from Prague and Kennan 's reports on conditions in Slovakia shaped the views of American policymakers at the Department of State on the eve of WWII. 10 Their writings remained the only source of political intelligence from the region until the establishment of the OSS in 1942. 11 Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," American Diplomacy, accessed December 20, 20 19, http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/ 1998/09/mr-carr-goes-to-prague/. 8 Bridges points out that Carr' s predecessor - Butler Wright - had underestimated German innuence on Czechoslovak affairs in 1930. This view was expressed by both Secretary of State Hull as well as Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Peter Bridges, "Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 9 Best known as an advocate of the U.S. policy of containment after WWII , George Frost Kennan spent 193 8 and 1939 as a diplomat at the American legation in Prague. He served as Secretary of the Legation until the breakout of war in September of 1939. He was nuent in Russian and German, and during his serv ice in Prague he learned to read Czech and Slovak as we ll. George Kennan, From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938- 1940 (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1968), vi. 10 Wilbur J. Carr 's diplomatic correspondence from Prague is deposited in the Library of Congress, the Manuscript Division in Washington D.C. Some of Carr's reports are now part of the collections of the National Archives, entitled "Records of the U.S . Department of State Relating to the Interna l Affairs of Czechoslovakia I 9 10-1944". Some of Kennan ' s reports on the conditions in Slovak ia are in Decimal File 860f. Collecti ve ly, they were published in a book in 1968 . Kennan, From Prague A/ier Munich, 1968. 11 The OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was establi shed by the military order issued by President Roosevelt on Jun e 13, 1942 . A predecessor of the modem CIA, the OSS mandate was to collect and ana lyse intelligence required by U.S. foreign-pol icy makers and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Barry M. Katz, "Office of Strategic Services," in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed . I.C.B . Dear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 650. 74 SLOVAKIA 2021 The road to totalitarianism in Slovak politics started in September of 1936. On the 19th of that month, the leaders of Hlinka 's Slovak Peop le's Party (Hlinkova slovenska /'udova strana, or HSL:S) met at a congress in Piest'any to discuss the polic ies and future direction of the party. 12 Leaders of the moderate wing, led by Monsignor Joseph Tiso, were tempted to join the ruling coalition in the Czechoslovak Parliament. Chances were not unreali stic, as the government was headed by Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's first Slovak Prime Minister, who was determined to solve the Slovak question once and for all. 13 In opposition to the moderates stood the young radicals, led by Karol Sidor. 14 For them, cooperation with Hodfa's cabinet was categorically rejected, unless the party's demands were met in full , without any reservations. 15 Whether moderate or radical , all members of the HSL:S were convinced that their party held the so le political mandate to represent Slovaks as a whole. Distrustful of the democratic government in Prague and increasingly authoritarian, the young nationalists had the ear of the old, but charismatic leader of the party - Andrej Hlinka. Hi s ambitions to lead Slovaks as a single nation found expression in one of hi s speeches at the congress, where Hlinka compared himself to Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. As far as the future political 12 The Piest'any Congress has been described in detail by Robert Arpas. For a comprehensive accou nt of the party ' s policies in the interwa r period see Robert Arpas, Vitazsrvo alebo prehra: Vyvrcho lenie politickeho zapasu HSt.;S o alllonomiu S/ovenska. (Brati slava: Veda, 20 11 ). 13 Hodza was convi nced that settling Czechoslovak ia's nationality problem hin ged upon finding a solution to the Czech- Slovak question. Natalia Kraj covicova, "Slova kia in Czec hoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich , Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Ca mbridge University Press, 20 11 ). 155. 14 Apart from Sidor, the most prominent representatives of the youn g generation of Slovak nati onali sts were Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach . The views of these intellectuals and academics on society and government had been shaped by the risin g ri ght-wi ng nationalist ideologies of 1930s Europe. Ad mirers of nati onalist totalitaria ni sm, they questioned democracy, whi ch in thei r view was no longer capab le of offerin g solutions to the mountin g problems o f the time. The only remedy, according to them, was a unity of the nation coupl ed with un swerving loya lty to its omni scient leader. They were strongly anti -Se miti c . Robert Arpas, Vit"azstvo alebo prehra, 52 . 15 Sidor, alongs ide wi th Ferdinand Durcansky and Alexander Mach, pushed for complete autonomy, part of which was the demand to recogni ze the Slovaks as a separate nati on. Slova k was to become the o ffi c ial language in Slova kia, and the proposed Slovak Di et was to have broad legislative powers. SLOVAKIA 2021 75 line of the party was concerned, the radicals he ld sway. Tiso's demand that the congress express loya lty to the embattled Czechoslovak Republic was swept away. Instead, the closing plenary adopted a resolution which condemned "representatives of international materialistic ideology" and "Jewi sh-Bol shev ik anarchy". 16 The following day, Tiso himself proclaimed the principle of"one nation , one leader, one party" to a public rally of party supporters in Piest'any. In 1938 Slovak Americans were once again about to play an active role in the politics of their mother country. For more than half a century, the Slovak diaspora in the United States had been an important voice in the country's plea for national self-determination. 17 One reason for that was the sheer scale of Slovak emigration to the New World. By 1914 as many as one fifth of Slovaks had come to reside in the United States. 18 The other reason was the completely different political and economic environment of their new home country. Unfettered by oppression from the state, politica lly minded and commerciall y successful Slovaks cultivated, in democratic America, a strong feeling of national identity outside Slovakia. 19 As leaders of fraternal societies they campaigned vigorously for Slovak self-dete1mination in the Old World. 20 The patriotic fervour of these Slovak Americans 16 Robert Arpas, " Piest'ansky zjazd ako medznik HSL'.S k totalite," Clovek a 5polocnost', no. 3, vo l 7 (2004): 166, http ://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocn ik-7rok-2004/3/studi e-a-c lanky/piestansky-zjazd-ako-medzn ik-na-ceste- hsls- k-tota lite/. 17 Sil via Mihalikova, " Slovakia Pathways to a Democrati c Community," in Democracv and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans- Dieter Klingeman n, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, Taylor & Franc is Group, 2006), 175. 18 Large-scale em igration of Slovaks to the United States bega n in the late 18 70s. On the eve of WWI , when the Slovak exodus to America peaked, the Slovak-America n comm unity was in per-capita term s the largest among the Centra l Europea n nations and second onl y to the community of Irish-Ameri ca ns among all immigrant peoples in the U.S. Mark Stolari k, "S lovaks in Canada and the United States, 1880- 1990, Similarities and Differences," in Chair in Slovak History and Culture Occasional Papers, no. I ( 1992): 14. 19 In Mark Stolarik 's words - "The principal centre of Slovak nationalism before and during World War I was not the Slovak homeland, but the United States of America." Mark Stolarik , "S lova ks in Ca nada and the United States," 14. 20 The primary reason why Slovaks in America estab li shed fratemals was mutual support. This often happened along confessional lines, reflecting the divi sions among religious denomin ati ons in Slovakia. Interest in mother-country politics was of secondary importance to Slovak Americans, and it was often the domain of a few politically mi nded fraterna l leaders and newspaper editors . 76 SLOVAKIA 2021 found expression first in the Cleveland Agreement of 1915 and then in the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. In these, Slovak and Czech expatriate communities in the United States pledged their support for the establishment of a common state on the ruins of Austria-Hungary after the Great War. In the former, Slovak Americans sought the creation of a federative union with the Czechs. In the latter, they agreed that Slovakia would have home rule. 2 1 The reason why they settled for somewhat less at Pittsburgh was the opposition to the idea of federation from Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the most important of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Thus, the Slovak-American nationalists, allied primarily in the Slovak League of America, supported the creation of their Czecho-Slovakia, in October 1918, albeit with caution .22 Despite some internal disagreements among the leaders of the League in the I 920s, demand for autonomy remained the League's top political priority in its dealings with the old country until October 1938. In late Apri l 1938, at the 20th convention of the Slovak League in Pittsburgh, a decision was made to send a delegation to Slovakia. The visit was to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the delegation was to take the original copy of the agreement with them. 23 Peter Hletko, the President of the Slovak League, was appointed head of the American delegation and its official spokesman. Another notable member of the delegation was Jozef Husek, former editor-in-chief of the Slovak-American newspaper Jednota and one of the signatories of the Pittsburgh Agreement. The ori ginal idea for a visit by Slovak Americans came from the leadership of 21 The word home-rule itself was not used in the phrasing of th e agreement. Slovakia was to have " its own administration , its Diet and its courts". Slovak was to be " the officia l language in schools and in public life in general". Dav id Grinnell , "Land A Treasures: The Pittsburgh Agreement; Czecho-Slovak Agreement," Western Pennsylvania Hi story 90 (Winter 2007- 08): 8. 22 The Pittsburgh Agreement bore the signatures of members of two Slovak fraternal organ isations - the Slovak League of America and the Slovak Evange lical Society. In I 9 I 8, the Slovak League was an umbrella organisation, comprising the majority of fraternal-benefit societies in the United States, including both Catholics and Lutherans, though th e former predominated. 23 A year before, at th e meeting of the Hlinka Party in Ruzomberok in July, Andrej Hlinka had described th e Pittsburgh Agreement as the "Magna Carta of th e Slovak nation ." Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovak ia (June- August 1938) and their effort to implement the Pittsburgh Agreement into th e Czechoslovak Constitution ," Clo vek a spolocnos( 20, no. 3 (2017): 50. SLOVAKIA 2021 77 the Hlinka Party, which was planning to hold a congress in Bratislava on June 4th. The intention of the party officials was to increase the pressure on the central government in Prague to implement the party 's demand for autonomy. The public showing of the Pittsburgh Agreement to a rally of loyal supporters the following day was part of the plan. 24 ln the atmosphere of heightened international tensions, ratcheted up by the Czechoslovak crisis earlier that month, the visit of the American delegation was closely followed by the pro-Czechoslovak press throughout the country. 25 A party of Slovak Americans about a hundred strong - arrived at the Polish port of Gdyni a on May 26th, 1938. 26 There, they were greeted by two separate delegations: one, headed by Karol Sidor, who was sent to Poland by the leaders of the Hlinka Party; the other was the diplomatic retinue of Juraj Slav ik, the Czechoslovak Minister to Poland.27 The Slovak Americans then proceeded to Warsaw, from where they were scheduled to travel to Prague. 28 At the instigation of Karol Sidor, however, four members of the League were persuaded to trave l to Rufomberok first , to pay a visit to the ai Iing leader of the party, Andrej Hlinka. 29 24 The party offic ials were thu s responding to various rumours, e.g. that the Pittsburgh Agreement was a fabricati on , or that Masaryk's signature on it was not genuine. Stefan Kucf k, "Americki Slovaci a autonom isti cke hnutie na Slovensku ( 19 181938)," Dvacate sto/eti, no. 2 (2013 ): I 06. 25 The May Cri sis was caused by fa lse reports of German troop movements on the 19th around Czechos lova ki a ' s western borders, raising fea rs th at the country was about to be attacked by Germany. A lthough the reports later proved unsubstantiated, the inc ident contributed to the subseque nt resolve by France and Britain to increase pressure on Czechoslovakia to make concessions to the Sudeten German Party. 26 Milan O lej nik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 51. 27 Although the two delegati ons had travelled to Gdynia by the sa me train, both part ies made the ir way to Gdynia separate ly, as Sidor' s party re fused to jo in the Czechoslovak delegation from Warsaw. Stefan Kucf k, " Americk i Slovac i a autonomi sticke hnutie," I 05 . 28 In Warsaw the Slovak Americans were g iven the red-carpet treatment by representat ives of the muni cipa l authoriti es. They never mention ed Czechoslovak ia in their speec hes. Stefan Kucfk , "Americki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnuti e," I 05. 29 Because of the di sagreements among the leaders of the League ' s delegation, on ly fo ur of them went to Ruzomberok . Andrej Ro lik, a Lutheran pastor fro m Johnstown, refused to trave l to Slovakia first. Stefan Kucik , "Americki Slovac i a autonomisticke hnutie," I 05 . 78 SLOVAKIA 2021 The U.S. Minister to Czechoslovakia watched the developments from his legation in Prague.Jo On May 31st he informed the Secretary of State of the arrival of the League's representatives in the Czechoslovak capital and their intention to meet both the President and the Prime Minister.JI The day after their arrival in Prague, the leaders of the League paid a courtesy visit to the American Legation . Carr noted that the Slovak Americans stressed in one of their public announcements that their visit was "not to be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the Republic".J 2 Having spoken to an official from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, Carr came to the conclusion that Prague's government felt uneasy about the visit, wishing it had taken place at some other time.JJ This made the American diplomat feel that the red-carpet treatment accorded to the Slovak Americans in Prague somehow "lacked a ring of sinceri ty." The fee ling of skepticism in his mind was reinforced when he spoke privately to Hletko. According to Carr, the president of the League admitted that their visit to Prague was inopportune, regretting the fact that it had coincided with the minority dispute. In order to make his American readers appreciate the complexity of the circumstances surrounding the visit, Carr factored in the reactions of the press. He noted that the newspapers in Germany had been for some time speaking of the united front between the Hlinka Party and the Sudeten German Party aimed against the Czechs.J4 The pro-Czechoslovak press, for their part, had been accusing Slovak nationalists of collusion with the Germans.J 5 As to the specific results of the talks between the League's representatives 30 Since 1925, the United States' diplomatic mission in Prague had resided at the Schonbom Palace on Mala stran a. Peter Bridges, " Mr. Carr Goes to Prague," Part I. 31 In mid-June Carr wrote to Washington again, giving a detailed account of the League's participation in th e Hlinka Party congress. 32 National Archives, Washington, 860f.00/5 I 0, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, May 31 , p. I . 33 This was told to Ca rr by an unspecified official from the Czechoslovak Mini stry of Fore ign Affairs on the 3 1st. The Czechoslovak government feared that the visit would be used by the minorities to advance their own political agendas. 860 f.00/589, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, p. 2. 34 NA, 860f.00/534, Di spatch No. 176, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, Jun e 6, p. 2. 35 According to the Police Directory in Bratislava, the Sudeten Party did send a congratulatory telegram to the HSL.:S on the occasion of its party congress on June the 4th. Milan Olej nik, "The visit of de legates of the American Slovak League to Slovaki a," 55. SLOVAKIA 2021 79 and the Czechoslovak statesmen, Carr echoed Slovak, the press organ of the HSCS. 36 It reported that the discussions bore no concrete results, liut it was agreed that, after a month's study of the conditions in Slovakia, the League's representatives would return for more talks with the Prime Minister. 37 The public proclamations by the League ' s representati ves in support of Slovak autonomy prompted the U.S. Minister to examine the extent of popular support for the Slovak nationalists. In their plans 1938 was to be the crucial year, by the end of which the Slovak question in Czechoslovakia was to be settled once and for all. With the support of their American compatriots, the Slovak nationali sts claimed that the majority of Slovaks in 1938 - whether at home or abroad, were in favour of autonomy. To this purpose, Hletko repeatedly claimed that autonomy was supported by as many as 90% of Slovaks in the United States. 38 The proposed change in the status of Slovakia was also the main order of business at the Party Congress that convened on June 4th in Bratislava. With the League's delegates in attendance, the Party passed a resolution, setting out the details of the new Autonomy Bill. 39 Its text was published in full the following day in Slovak. Carr had it translated for his June 6th report and supplemented it with his commentary. The bid to amend the Czechoslovak Constitution was viewed critically by the U.S. Minister, hi s main reservation being the lack of political mandate to demand such a constitutional change. Drawing on the statistics from the last parliamentary election of 1936, he observed that the HSCS had only polled 30.1 % of the votes cast in Slovakia. 40 The right to speak for all Slovaks was further dimini shed, 36 Hletko and his party urged the Czechoslovak statesmen to recogni ze Slovaks as a sovereign nati on and to grant Slovak ia autonomy as it was sti pulated in the Pittsburgh Agreement. Both Hodza and Benes ex pressed their general agreement, but refused to talk about autonomy. What they wanted to promote, first and foremost, was Czechoslovak unity. Hletko later summarised the outcome of the talks in the phrase "Nothing positive was achi eved." Stefan Kucik, "Ameri cki Slovaci a autonomisticke hnutie na Slovensku," I 07 . 37 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 2. 38 NA, 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 7. 39 It demanded the creation of a separate Slovak Diet and governmen t, a long with the introduction of Slovak as the official language on the basis of recognition of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. 40 Of a ll the parliamentary votes cast in Czechos lovakia, Carr po ints out, this was 6.86%. NA , 860f.00/534, Carr to the Secretary of State, June 6, p. 4. 80 SLOVAKIA 2021 in Carr's view, by the fact that the party did not put up its own candidates, but campaigned as part of the Autonomist Bloc.41 Even the recent successes of the HSCS in the communal elections did not alter the fact that Slovak autonomists had never commanded the required 50% of the voting majority in Slovakia. Moreover, Carr argued, all of the HSCS 's former allies "now cooperate with the coalition parties." As far as the capability of the party to mobilise its supporters was concerned, the American estimate in June 1938 was slightly higher the one made by the Czechoslovak authorities. According to an American source, the turnout at the public rally on June 5th - the same day when the Autonomy Bill was published - was around 50,000.42 This was twice as much as the official figure given by the Bratislava police department. 43 To strike a balanced view, Carr devoted an equal amount of space in his reporting to those who opposed the Slovak autonomists. In 1938, this was a group of nationwide Czechoslovak parties - members of the ruling coalition which operated separate branches in Slovakia. The HSCS 's staunchest opponent was the Agrarian Party, led by Prime Minister Hodza. To solve the nationality problem his cabinet drafted, in the early summer of 1938, a constitutional amendment, referred to as the Nationality Statute. 44 Another Slovak in the government who opposed autonomists was Minister of Justice [van Derer, who was also head of the Slovak section of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Workers ' Party. 45 In 1938 both politicians rejected the idea of Slovaks as a sovereign nation, struggling to maintain Czechoslovak unity in 41 This consisted of the Rutheni an Soj uz Party, the Polish Socia list Party and the Slovak National Party. 42 This was based on th e estimate by Associated Press reporter 0. E. Werner. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. O lejnfk, referring to the police records, puts the number of participants at 25,000 at a maximum . 43 Milan Olejnik, "The visit of delegates of the American Slovak League to Slovakia," 55 . 44 The measure proposed to divide the republi c into four autonomous lands: Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Eac h land was to be a legal entity in the eyes of public and private law. Land Diets with curias representing every nationality were envisaged, as was the creation of land governments. President Benes had actively participated in the preparation of the statute. The negotiations between the HSL.:S and President Benes about the Nationality Statute in September 1938 were unsuccessfu l. Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 19 I 8- 1938," 156. 45 Ivan Derer was the Minister of Justice of the Czechoslovak government from Jul y 193 7 until September 1938. SLOVAKIA 2021 81 the face of mounting demands from the Sudeten Party. Carr reported on the activities of the pro-Czechoslovak movement, gauging its political clout and public support. On June I 0th he sent a di spatch in which he looked at the rally organized by the opponents of Slovak autonomy on June 6th . Agrarian Day, as it was officially called, followed close on the heels of the rally organised by th e Hlinka Party the previous day. According to Carr, the turnout at the Czechoslovak demonstration was I 00,000, about twice as large as the previous day 's demon stration.46 Hodza and Derer were among the main speakers, and the President of the Slovak League addressed the crowds in hi s turn. Judging by the American report, the tone of Hletko 's speec h was much less belligerent than hi s speech the day before. 47 Comparing the two rallies, Carr related in hi s report an interesting fact observed by an Associated Press journalist. It concerned the proclaimed loyalty to the common state - or rather the lack thereof, on th e part of Slovak autonomists. When the national anthem was sung at the Hlinka demonstration, there was practically no response from the crowd to the first, i.e. the Czech part of it. For the second - the Slovak part - however, the crowd joined in with " tremendous vigor". The emblems used at the rallies told the same story. The decorations used at Agrarian Day consisted entirely of Czechoslovak flags, while those used by Hlinka's supporters featured exc lusive ly the party's red double cross on a white background.48 The di smem berment of the last democratic state in Central Europe began on September 30th, 1938. At Munich, the European powers decided the fate of Czechoslovakia in her absence.49 The catastrophe 46 Carr 's estimate of th e tu rnout at the Hlinka' s ra ll y was 50,000. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 2. 47 According to 0. E. Wern er, " Hletk o declared that the Slovaks in the Un ited States wis h nothin g more than that the Slovaks defend th e Republic which they have he lped to establish and th at they remain true Slovaks in free, beautiful and prosperous Czechoslovak ia." NA, 860f. 00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 4. 48 The onl y exception was the use of the American fla g decorating the rostrum where, among oth er speakers, Hletko gave hi s speech. NA, 860f.00/53 I, Carr to the Secretary of State, June I 0, 1938, p. 5. 49 The agreement was signed by the government leaders of Germany, France, th e United Kingdom and Ita ly. Czechoslova ki a's leaders were not invited, save two diplomats who we re summoned to receive what the great powers had negotiated. Michael R. D. Foot, " Munich agree ment," in The Oxford Companion to World War If, ed. I.C. B. Dea r (New York: Oxford Uni vers ity Press, I 995), 597. 82 SLOVAKIA 2021 could not have been averted by Czechoslovak leaders, but internal factors contributed to it.so What had played into Hitler's hands were the aspirations of the nationalist movements within the country. Democratic powers of the West had either looked on or followed a policy of active appeasement, so as to avoid a war with Germany.s 1 In an effort to satisfy Hitler's demands, Britain and France acquiesced to the annexation of the German-speaking territories of Czechoslovakia. In so doing, they sanctioned the principle whereby individuals exercised their rights in a state collectively, through belonging to a legally recognized national entity. Such recognition in law went hand-in-hand with the demand for a geographically defined national territory. This ran contrary to Czechoslovakia's liberal constitution, by which members of national minorities had their rights guaranteed as individual citizens. The Nationality Statute proposed by Hodza 's cabinet went a long way towards satisfying the demands of the nationalist movements. It attempted to solve the problem by giving Czechoslovak nationalities territorial and administrative autonomy, but it refused to recognise them as legal entities. In the run-up to Munich, Britain and France had stepped up the pressure on the Czechoslovak government not to implement the Nationality Statute. After the failure of negotiations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak government, on September 22 nd the Slovak nationalists rejected the Nationality Statute.s2 In the wake of the Munich Agreement, in an atmosphere of heightened political uncertainty, leaders of the Hlinka Party summoned representatives of the other Slovak political parties to Zilina. The declaration of Slovak autonomy of October 6th was supported by all of them except the Communists and Social Democrats.s3 50 The genera l consensus among hi storians is that "the Czechs had to capitulate". Thomas Paterson, et al., eds. , Americanforeign relations. Vo lume 2. (Lexington MA : Heath and Company, 2014), 153. 51 On September 25th President Benes appealed to Roosevelt with a view to urging Britain and France to stand by Czechoslovaki a. Two days after that, Roosevelt wrote to Chancellor Hitler: "The government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations." Matilda Axton et al., eds., Foreign relations of the United States. 1938. Vo lume I, Washin gton : United States Government Printing Office, 1955. 52 Natalia Krajcovicova, "Slovakia in Czechoslovakia, 191 8- 1938," 156. 53 The result of the meeting was the Zilina Agreement, by which its signatories pledged their support for the passage of a constitutional act providing for Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Parliament. The next day Jozef Tiso was appointed head SLOVAKIA 2021 83 By that time Poland had occupied a territory in the north of Czechoslovakia and Hungary had laid claims to Hungarian-speaking territories in the south of Slovakia. 54 After Munich the Czech Lands were perceived by the United States with considerable sympathy as a small democratic country in peril , resisting the pressures of a totalitarian aggressor. Looking back on the aftermath of Munich in December, Carr appreciated the grav ity of the situation in which the recently reconstructed Czechoslovak government found itself. He noted that after President Benes had resigned on October 5th, not only was the country left without its leader, but "the bottom dropped out of the entire political system through which it had been governed for twenty years." 55 The interim Prime Minister General Jan Syrovy faced the task of preserving "order and di scipline through a period of indescribable difficulty," having to " remake the constitution" so that "a wholly new civil regime may be set up to which power could be turned over. " 56 The appointment of Frantisek Chvalkovsky as Czechoslovak Foreign Mini ster drew particular praise from the American diplomat. With hi s friendly attitude towards the United States, the Czech Minister was considered a "strong advocate of democratic form of government" while, at the same time, "a reali st with regard to the necessity of a new orientation in the foreign affairs of hi s country." 57 Despite overt signs of the Czech political system of the Slovak autonomous govern ment. Valerian Bystricky, Od auton6mie k vzniku Slovenskeho statu (Bratislava: Prodama, 2008), 273. 54 Carpatho-U krai ne' s autonomy became a reality a lmost at the same time. On October 11th the Czechoslovak government in Prague appoi nted its first autonomous government. Frantisek Capka, "Leta prvni i druhe republiky a protektoratu," Dejiny zemi koruny ceske v datech, accessed Janua ry 16, 2020, http://www .libri.cz/databaze/dejiny/text/t84 .html. 55 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 2- 3. 56 NA, 860f.00/589, Ca rr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. 57 Carr's assessmen t of Chva lkovsky's political integrity and his attitudes towards Germany is particul arl y interesting in the light of his subseq uent acti ons and fu rther diplomatic career. Hi s last directive, as the Foreign Minister issued in the wake of the German occupat ion of Bohemia-Moravia in March of 1939, instructed the Czechoslovak ambassadors abroad to close their embassies and hand them over to the Nazis. Many patriotic Czechoslovak diplomats - some of them Slovak by birth - such as Stefa n Osusky, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris, or Juraj Slavik, head of the country's diplomatic mission in Po land, refused to do so. After the breakup of Czechoslova kia Chvalkovsk y became Envoy of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Ge m1any. He di ed during an allied ai r ra id on Berlin in 1945 . "Frantisek 84 SLOVAKIA 2021 leaning towards authoritarian rule, Carr had little doubt that the federal government would continue to be "a strictly democratic form of government," though admitting "it will undoubtedly incorporate such features of totalitarianism as are compatible with democracy. " Its main desire after Munich, thought the American diplomat, was to "dispel any idea that there is any 'Fascist' tinge to the state yet for obvious reason [they] do not wish to damn Fascist methods ." 58 The plight of Bohemia after Munich contrasted sharply with the American description of the situation in Slovakia. The political leaders of the autonomous region known as Slovenska krajina were seen by American diplomats as unpatriotic and irresponsible individuals who drove one nail after another into the coffin of Czechoslovak democracy. 59 Commenting on the immediate aftermath of Munich and the challenges faced by the Czechoslovak government, Carr expected Slovak leaders "out of common patriotism to set aside domestic political differences until these dangerous problems have been settled." Instead, he observed di sappointingly, "S lovaks - now represented exclusively by the Hlinka extremists - took advantage of the catastrophic difficulties of the Prague Government to demand complete autonomy."60 Questioning where the loyalty of Slovakia's leaders stood during the crisis, the American diplomat came to the conclusion that "S lovak sympathies have throughout this period appeared to lean more strongly toward the Germans, than toward the Czechs." From the American perspective, the unity of the Republic stood paramount, and in times of danger it should definitely prevail over local interest. Carr expressed this sentiment several times, in an unequivocal tone. " If the three principal component parts of the Czechoslovak Republic are linked together by any common bonds of loyalty and patriotism," he argued emphatically, " there has been nothing in the actions of the Chvalkovsky," Historie a osobnosti diplomacie. Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, accessed December 20, 20 19, https://www. mzv.cz/jnp/cz/o_ministerstvu/histori e_a_osobnosti_ ceske_ diplomacie/ministri_a_ ministerstvo_ v_ histori i/frantisek _ chva lkovsky .html . 58 NA, 860f.00/57 I, Telegram, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, October 26, 1938, p. 3. 59 Slo venska krajina - in English ' the Slovak Land', was the official name used to refer to Slovakia during the First and Second Czechoslovak Republi cs, between 191 8 and 1939. 60 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to th e Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 3. SLOVAKIA 2021 85 Slovak leaders during the last few weeks to indicate it." The image of two different worlds - that of the brave Czechs struggling to save the Republic and the unpatriotic Slovaks sympathising with Nazi aggressors - created by the American Legation in Prague after Munich, persisted for a long time on the other side of the Atlantic. In 1942, when the OSS took over from the American foreign service as the primary intelligence gatherer, a report on Slovakia claimed that the pro-Nazi orientation of the Tiso-Tuka leadership had long been apparent before Munich. 61 After it, the report went on, "these leaders came out open ly against the republic, against democracy generally, and for a new world order in Europe. " 62 The pace and complexity of the developments in Czechoslovakia in the closing months of 1938 were overwhelming, and the American Legation in Prague struggled to keep the Department of State fully informed. Reports in this period were mostly factua l, and the U.S. Minister in Prague complained that they had little time to put the rapidly unfolding events into general perspective. Only in the latter part of December did his superiors in Washington receive a comprehensive report on the situation in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. In the first weeks after Munich there was an "unavoidable preoccupation with the foreign" taking precedence over everything e lse. The whole country was in a state of utter turmoil. The report went on to recapitulate the challenges the country had to grapple with in an extremely short space of time. Satisfying the Polish territorial demands in the north was followed by the negotiations with Germany about Czechoslovakia's new borders in the west. The negotiations with Hungary about the cession 61 This was a com prehensive, I 06-page report on the Czechs, Slovaks and Carpath ian Rutheni ans. NA, Washington, Office of Strategic Servi ces, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 25. 62 Strictly speaki ng, thi s was not true. Throughout th e whole of 1938 the Party was led by Jozef Tiso. Tuka on ly came to prominence in 1940, when he became Foreign Minister of th e wartime Slovak Republic, following the Salzburg negotiations with Gem1any. As the principal representative of the moderate wing, Tiso became leader of the Party after Hlinka 's death in August of 1938. He spearheaded Slovak autonomy in October of 1938, but was opposed to the break up of Czechosl ovak ia in March of 1939. The probable reason why the OSS did not have more precise information about the period was the fact that the main source of its information on the situation in Slovakia during WWII was the Czechoslovak Information Service. This a was a special propaganda bureau set up in th e Un ited States by the Czechoslovak govemment-inex ile, controlled by ex- President Benes from London. 86 SLOVAKIA 2021 of Hungari an-speaking territories in Slovakia 's so uth came to nought, and the matter had to be resolved through international arbitration in early November. It was only then that the crippled Republic could turn its attention to its domesti c problems. What followed, according to the author of the report, was a " period of profound change and adjustment in the internal political life of Czechoslovakia." The most pressing of the problems, needing immediate attention in November, were the election of a new President and the passage of an enabling act. Progress in this direction, Carr noted, was " blocked by the Slovaks." They demanded that no presidential election could take place before the Constitution was amended to enact the proposed Autonomy Bill. The U.S. Mini ster in Prague believed that the conditions in the country were " hardly such as to make it a favourable time for the enactment of constitutional leg islation ." The Prague government, however, " had no other choice but to comply with it. " The Autonomy Act and the presidential elections of 1938 were both scrutini sed in the Legation 's report from December 2 1st. The Czechoslovak National Assembly passed the constitutional amendment on November 22nd and elected Czechoslovakia's new president on the 30th. 63 The constitutional arrangement provided, among other things, for an autonomous Slovak government and a Diet of the Slovak Land based in Bratislava. The new relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was also reflected in the altered spelling of the country's name, which was changed to Czecho-Slovakia. Th e asymmetrical model of the state drew criticism from the U.S. Minister in Prague.64 According to him, " the privileges henceforth to be enjoyed by the Slovaks in the national parliament" were far too extensive and thus "entirel y disproportionate to the population and actual importance of Slovakia" as well as " its ability, thus far, unproven , to govern itself 63 Drafted by Ferdinand Durcansky, it was based on th e Autonomy Bill published by Hlinka 's Party on June 6th . 64 The Nati ona l Assembly in Prague retained legislative power fo r the whole of Czechoslovaki a wit h regard to matters of the constituti on, fo reign policy, nat ional defence, citizenship, currency, customs and some oth er areas. Since the Czech Lands did not have their ow n parliament, Czecho-Slovakia became in effect an asymmetrical federa l state. Valerian Bystricky, "Slovakia from the Munich Confere nce to the declaration of independence," in Slovakia in Histo,y, ed. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 20 11 ), I 60. SLOVAKIA 2021 87 alone." 65 Slovaks were also criticised in another report for their approach to the election of the President. Originally, the parliament was to vote on an Enabling Act first, but "this was again blocked by the opposition of the Slovaks." who refused to do so " until they might know who the next president was to be."66 Alluding to the American tradition of presidential elections, Carr commented on the undemocratic nature of the procedure: "It is characteristic of political thought in this part of the world," he wrote sarcastically, "that it seems to have occurred to no one that it would have been possible to have a presidential election without all doubts as to its results having been removed well in advance." As for the candidate himself, Carr favoured Frantisek Chvalkovsky, preferred by most of the Czech deputies. In the end, however, the parliament elected Emil Hacha, former President of the Supreme Court. The American diplomat believed that Chvalkovsky's main disadvantages in the eyes of the Slovaks were his Protestantism, along with the fact that he was divorced.67 The Autonomy Act of November 22nd also provided for elections to the Slovak Diet in the following month . They were held on December 18th, 1938 and, historically, they were the first elections ever to take place in Slovakia for that country's self-governing legislative body. Judging by the Americans, however, it was a missed opportunity. The Legation's report from December 21st commented on a lack of democratic procedure as well the dubiousness of their results. As far as the former was concerned, the U.S. Minister in Prague saw "a pronounced Nazi influence."68 This was a reference to the fact that Slovak voters were presented with only one list of candidates. The sole political entity on the 1938 ballot - Hlinka 's Slovak People's Party, with a subtitle to its name - the Party of Slovak National Unity - was an amalgamation of the Agrarian, National Unity, National Socialist 65 Carr points out the Czechs had no say whatsoever in the Slovak Parliament. As a further example of the favoured position that Slovakia occupied in the matters of the Republi c was the provision according to which a motion of no confidence might be moved by one-thi rd of the Slovak deputies, i.e. 12 as compared with a total of 226 members of the chamber. NA, 860f.00/588, Dispatch No. 302, W. J. Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 2- 3. 66 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7. 67 NA, 860f.00/589, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 20, 1938, p. 7- 9. 68 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 2 1, 1938, p. 4. 88 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Fascist Parties. 69 Carr had little doubt that the 98% of the votes cast in its favour was due to the fact that the voters were given no alternative. This bore "striking resemblance to the results achieved in recent German plebiscites." Here, the author of the report reminded the State Department that the bloc of Slovak Autonomists had polled as low as 30.1 % of the Slovak vote in the previous parliamentary elections of 1935. "Fear of recrimination", speculated Carr, may have had "a decided influence on the votes cast by many individuals." Gauging the reactions to the Slovak elections in Prague, Carr noticed a parliamentary objection raised by the former Minister of Social Welfare, then a deputy of the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. The criticism was unlikely to be heeded in Bratislava, concluded Carr disparagingly "when the Slovaks are taking what resembles a child-like delight in playing with a new toy." 70 Part of the image of Slovakia created by the American Foreign Service in 1938 concerned Slovak attitudes towards the Jews. At that time U.S. diplomats in Czechoslovakia concentrated mainly on understanding the roots Slovak antisemitism, analysing its popular as we ll as political manifestations. Somewhat subjective - or even biased were the American comparisons of the anti-Jewish sentiments among the Czechs and the Slovaks. For a Czech, it was thought, nationality was a matter of language, rather than race. In other words, animosity was only likely to be felt towards the Jews who spoke German. Apart from a small minority, however, the mass of the Czech people had "very little interest in anti-Semitism." 7 1 In Slovakia, the popular resentment of the Jews was said to be widespread and "deep-seated." 72 The main reason for this was believed to be economic. According to George Kennan, then Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, the Jews of Bohemia li ved mainly in urban areas, whereas those 69 The Communist Party was banned by the autonomous govern ment on October 9th, the Social Democrats on November 16th. The destruction of the other political parties in Slovakia came about on November 8th, when they were all forced to merge with the HSL.:S . Representatives of the ama lgamated political entities did not receive any positions in the autonomous government, being left with a few seats in th e Slovak Diet. Valerian Bystricky, "S lovaki a from the Munich Conference to the declaration of independence," 161. 70 NA, 860f.00/588, Carr to the Secretary of State, December 21 , 1938, p. 4- 5. 71 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 45. 72 George Kennan , From Prague After Munich, 22 . SLOVAKIA 2021 89 residing in Slovakia were more evenly spread throughout the country. 73 Slovak Jews plied their trades in smaller towns and the countryside as merchants, saloon keepers, druggists, or lawyers. In these professions, Kennan argued, the Jews "played a dominant part," largely because of their "superior intelligence." The Slovaks felt differently about this, being convinced that the Jews owed their success to their "trickiness, unscrupulousness, incurable clannishness and nepotism." This was not the case in in Bohemia, according to Kennan , because the " industry and shrewdness of the Czechs as petty traders and artisans" had been such that the Czech countryside " had never presented a Jew with such attractive possi bilities as the villages in Slovakia. 74 Finally, Kennan identified the lack of social assimilation as another factor why the cultural distinctiveness of the Slovak Jewry was more pronounced than it was in Bohemia. 75 From the American perspective, anti-Semitism in Slovak politics had both historic and religious origins. According to Kennan , many of the educated Jews " have traditionally looked to Budapest for cultural inspiration." In addition, there was a smaller, but influential community of Jews "with a German cultural orientation." In the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, both nationalities were associated with the ruling classes, whereas the Slovak-speaking population had been one of the oppressed nations. Thus, in the Slovak mind, the Jews had always sided with the oppressors. In other words, when the country was under Hungarian rule, "the Slovak Jews made common cause with the Hungarians in exploiting the Slovaks;" when the country found itself in Czechoslovakia, "the Jews joined with the more liberal Czechs in opposi ng Slovak autonomy." 76 To illustrate his theory, Kennan referred his American readership to the pogrom-like operation ordered by Tiso in early November. At that time, Slovak authorities attempted to deport 7,600 Slovak Jews to Hungary, following the announcement of 73 As Secretary of the American Legation in Prague, Kennan made severa l trips to Slovakia in late 1938. In January 1939 he wrote a special report on the conditions in Slovakia. This was followed by a comprehensive despatch in February on the Jewish problem in Czechoslovakia. 74 George Kennan, From Prague After Munich, 44. 75 Kennan mentions a greater degree of racial intermarriage in Bohemia, especia ll y in upper-class Czech society. 76 George Kennan, From Prague Ajier Munich, 23. 90 SLOVAKIA 2021 the First Vienna Award. 77 In order to establish how Slovakia's Jews were going to be treated in the future , Kennan approached Jozef Tiso. In a personal conversation with the American diplomat, Tiso said that "the Slovak government intended to take measures toward the solution of the Jewish question independently of Prague." The Slovak Prime Minister also expressed his conviction that the planned measures "would probably go farther in scope than any that might be taken by the Prague regime." 78 As far as the religious component of Slovak anti-Semitism was concerned, Kennan pointed out that an important factor in the attitude of the Slovak authorities to the Jews was the position of the Catholi c Church . Tiso was himself a Catholic priest, and the Church had made its position on the matter clear through various officials. One of those, according to Kennan, was Father Rudolf Mikus, Provincial of the Jesuit Order in Slovakia. 79 Speaking for the newspaper Slovak, Mikus advocated elimination of the Jewish influence in political and economic life. This would include, among other things, public segregation. 80 The statements made by the Church convinced Kennan that the Slovak government wou ld face little opposition in the promulgation of its anti-Semitic policies in the future .8 1 As the momentous events of 1938 unfolded in Central Europe, diplomats of the American Foreign Service at the Legation in Prague watched the situation in Czechoslovakia, and took a close interest in political developments in Slovakia. Throughout 1938 the country was perceived by American diplomats as a politically vo latile province, 77 This was a pogrom-like operation ordered by HSI..:S to deport around 7,500 Jews to the territory ceded by Slovakia to Hungary. Kenn an argues that the forced ex pul sion took place as a retaliatory measure for an alleged petition by the leaders of the Bratislava Jews to incorporate the city of Bratislava into the ceded territory. The operation was accompanied by anti-Sem itic ri ots in Brati slava. James Mace Ward, "The 1938 First Vienna Award and the Holocaust in Slovakia," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 29, no. I (2015): 92 . doi: I 0.1093/hgs/dcv004. ISSN 8756-65 83. 78 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51. 79 A full translation of the statement by Mikus was attached at the end of Kenn an' s report. 80 George Kennan, From Prague Afier Munich, 51 - 52. 81 The institutional persecution of th e Jews in Slovakia began the following year, after Slovak ia gained its nominal independence. On April the 18th , the Slovak Parliament passed its first anti -Semitic law. This was Ordinance 63 which established a lega l definition of a Jew based on a religious principle. Ladislav Lipscher, "The Jews of Slovakia : 1939- 1945," in The Jews ofCzechoslovakia Volume Ill, ed . Avigdor Dagan et al. (Phi ladelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 165. SLOVAKIA 2021 91 one whose nationalist leaders took advantage of the central government's difficulties after Munich, driving the last democracy in the region into destruction. Slovakia's slide towards totalitarianism in 1938 was perceived by Americans as a consequence of that country's extreme nationalism and its disrespect for the values of the democratic republic established in 1918 . In contrast, tran sition to totalitarian rule in the Czech Lands was viewed by the Americans as a process of necessary accommodation, a sensible political reaction to the external pressures exerted by Nazi Germany. Although American observers did not deny the Slovak right to national self-determination in principle, they considered Slovak demands for autonomy in 1938 as inopportune and highly unpatriotic. They saw the rise of the autonomist movement as a function of Nazi foreign policy, whose sole intention was to use Slovak nationalism in its quest to dismember the Czechoslovak state. Against the backdrop of ri sing international tensions, the visit of the Slovak League of America in the summer appeared to American observers more as an embarrassment than an attempt to save the Republic. Watching the Hlinka Party's push for autonomy, the U.S. Minister in Prague kept reminding the Department of State that the Party lacked a democratic mandate to represent the Slovaks as a whole. In the aftermath of the Munich Agreement, the Americans openly scolded the behaviour of the Slovak nationalists, reproaching them for a lack of loyalty to the common state. The Slovak declaration of autonomy in October was not seen as a measure to consolidate the embattled state, but as another step to weaken it. American reports between November and December provide an account of the gradual dismantling of the multi-party political system by the government in Bratislava. In contrast to Bohemia, Americans saw anti-Semitism among the Slovak population as deep-seated, with specific - mainly economic - underpinnings. The anti-Semitic policies of the Slovak government, condoned by some representatives of the Catholic Church, were to become more severe and extensive in the foreseeable future .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource On the Road to Nationalist Totalitarianism: Slovakia in the Turmoil of 1938 as Seen by the United States Foreign Service Description An account of the resource Roman Ličko Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 70-91 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ličko, Roman Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7477e5a1a94b14d12344c3c38915c93f.pdf 4fae2823cf5ff5e42d36e0e20e1e2faf PDF Text Text 92 SLOVAKIA 2021 PICTURING A NATIO SLOVAK DOCUMENTARY FILM FROM ITS BIRTH UNTIL NICHOLAS 1950 1 HUDAC " Bude Slovak, cim bol medzi narodami'- to bola veta, s ktorou nasi otcovia vstavali a lihali, to bola veta, kotra hybala ich mysliami natol'ko, ze sa v6bec nehybali. Bolo, teda bude, bude i vtedy, ked' budeme len vylihovat'." Alexander Matuska 2 One of the fundamental aims of early Slovak mass produced images 3 (cinema, lithography, and photography, among other media) was to document and catalog the ethnic, geographic, and social uniqueness of the Slovak Lands. This essay intends to trace the influence of the importance of these media in the early 20th century for Slovaks, namely, non-fiction filmmaking, and its connection with Slovak populations not just in what would become Slovakia, but also in communities abroad- primarily in America. While foreign artists typically came to Slovakia to draw inspiration from its rugged countryside and colorful fo lk costumes, Slovak photographers, engravers, and ethnographers often saw their artistic missions as a way to build a Slovak nation through the documenttation, codification, and repetition of symbols common in a geographical location where historically no " Slovak" nation had ever existed . Although Slovak photographers and engravers enjoyed modest success in the 19th 1 This artic le was made possibl e with the support of the Univerzita Karl ova and has bee n undertaken with additional support from the their Progres QI 2 Initiati ve for Literature and Performance. Ta studie vznikla v souvislosti s fesenim programu rozvoje vyzkumu UK Progres Q12 Literatura a performativita. 2 MATUSKA, Al exander, "S love nska viera v minul osti ," in : C HM EL, Rudolf, ed., Slovenskti ottizka v 20. storoci (Bratis lava : Kalligram, 1997), 12 1. Unl ess noted otherwi se, a ll tra nslati ons are my own. 3 For more on the mass-produced image, see: HUDAC, icho las, " Picturing th e ati on: Slovak Nati onal Identity in the Age of the Mass Produced Image," PhD. Di ssertati on, Uni verzit a Karlova, 2020. �SLOVAKIA 2021 93 century, 4 their mediums were soon displaced in the cultural consciousness by the rise of another mass-produced medium, cinema, which provided several boons for the documenttarian . It combined the best qualities of its predecessors : fidelity to the referent image, affordability, durability, transportability, with a novel qualitymotion. This was a new, " lifelike" or "shadowy" 5 quality (to borrow Maxim Gorky's infamous tum of phrase). First, cinema recorded motion. This made it possible to expand the ethnographic activities of Slovak activists in order to capture more aspects of "traditional" culture, ranging from regional dances to the mechanical workings of various implements in Slovak handicrafts. Secondly, cinema also provided the illusion of objecttivity, a quality which could be more easily manipulated to form national and ethnic sentiments. Thirdly, cinema was understandable without any form of specialized training, or in the words of Karel Plicka- "understandable to any people of any country." 6 Lastly, cinema, as one of the first "new" mediums of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, functioned as a source of national and ethnic pride and a vehicle for showing a region's progression into " modernity." In this paper I will first explore how these earlier documentary media contributed to the rise of Slovak documentary filmmaking in the 20th century, and then examine the impact of this tradition . However, as tempting as it would be to think of documentary film (and by extension, the aesthetics of documentary and ethnographic film) as separate from other genres of cinematic expression, for Slovak filmmakers , documentary film proved to be one of the most essential foundations for the building of a national aesthetic, whose presence could be found within a variety of genres and subgenres. Slovak documentary films (as well as certain documentary films about 4 As noted by Macek and Hrubis incky, despite Slovakia's attractiveness for photographers, it lagged behind the Czechs, Austrians, and Hunga rians in the development of both avenues for amateur photographers to disp lay thei r work, and formal training. For more on thi s see: MACEK, Vaclav, and HR UB ISINSC KY Aurel, Dejiny slovenskej fotografie (Bratislava : Slovenska narodna galeria, 200 I), 12- 13. 5 GORKY, Maxim, "The Lumiere C inematograph" in : Si mpson, Philip, et al., Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Vo l. III (New York: Routledge, 2004), 7-8 . 6 PLICKA, Karel, "Poznamky o filme - moznosti ac h a ulohach s lovenskych filmov," Slovenske poh/'ady, September 15, 1934, p. 593. �94 SLOVAKIA 2021 Slovakia produced by Czechs) were not merely reportage, but also an evolution of the same aestheticization and stylization of rural life which so captivated the early ethnographers, albeit with new influences and innovations drawn from various domestic and foreign avant-gardes and aesthetic movements. As we shall see, this repetition of personages, of landscapes, of fo lk culture or traditions, continued through Slovak fiction and animated films, working as both a metacommentary on larger issues of national and regional identities, and as a connecting thread , linking these films of different genres and ideological expressions back to a common foundation. ln most parts of the Western World, documentary, fiction , and non-documentary early film developed simultaneously and concordantly . Early filmmakers immediately realized (in the words of Bill Nicho ls), " film 's capacity to document the world around us." 7 However, documentary films about Slovakia and its people preceded any variety of domestic Slovak filmmaking by several decades, owning to several unique internal factors ; Slovakia's relatively impoverished economic situation, its isolated rural communities, and the relative lack of an educated, culturally-Slovak middle class in the Slovak Lands during the period of cinema's birth and global introduction (e.g. from 1895 to roughly 1905 8). This meant that, while cinema was known in Slovakia, this new medium was chiefly an urban and scientific phenomenon, and thus developed quite differrently in the Slovak Lands than in other neighboring regions. Un like the Czechs, who rapidly embraced this new technology and were soon developing their own domestic cinema industry, Slovak film production remained (at best) sporadic until the end of World War II , frequently dependent on Czech and American financing , talent, and interest for the production of films for a Slovak audience. However, while Slovakia's lack of cinematic infrastructure resulted in the delayed development of a Slovak national cinema, this a lso made the area highly desirable as a destination for documentary filmmakers 7 NICHOLS , Bill , " Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," in Critical lnquirv 27, no. 4 , Summer, 200 I, p. 580. 8 Again, while actualites and trave l films of Slovakia were produced during thi s period of early film , Slovakia ' s lack of cinematic and cultural infrastructure seems to have resulted in a lack of both cinematic modernism and a cinematic avant-garde as is more commonly found in other Western film culture. See: NICHOLS , " Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," p. 580 �SLOVAKIA 2021 95 from outside of the Slovak Lands, if not Slovaks themselves. Although urban Slovaks encountered film roughly at the same time as their Czech brethren to the west, the unique gestation and development of cinema in Slovakia deserves at least a cursory explanation. The first public exhibitions of cinema occurred in 1896, almost a full year after the new technology's unveiling in Paris, when, on December 16th, in Kosice's Hotel Schalkaz, local theatre director ~udovit Szalkay arranged for a demonstration of Edison's cinema technology to the public "at great financial sacrifice."9 On December 25th cinema made its debut in Bratislava (then Pressburg), when it was unveiled to the public in two local hotels- the Hotel Palugyay and the Hotel Kral' Uhorska. These projections were mostly silent, but according to eyewitnesses, they were also accompanied by an Edison phonograph on two occasions. 10 But despite these exhibitions, cinema remained confined to the major urban centers of Kosice and Pressburg/Bratislava, and even in those it was often uneasily tolerated. Early cinema projections were subject to intense governmental regulations, 11 and in 1912, the Press burg city government declared that cinema was "negatively" impacting the public. 12 Cinematic exhibitions and cinemas also faced opposition from the Roman Catholic clergy and laity, 13 who saw the technology as a sign of"moral decline" among the youth, 14 and the Hungarian theatrical community who often saw the newer, cheaper medium in a threatening Iight. 15 Despite this public opposition to the new media, cinema was not entirely absent from public life in the Slovak Lands- instead, it was merely curtailed, limited to a handful of cinemas in Bratislava and Kosice. Because of this, cinema production in the Slovak Lands was limited again to foreign or amateur producers, and little attempt was 9 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA, Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie (Martin : Osveta, 1997), 7. JO ibid. JI ibid. 12 ibid. 13 It is worth comparing the very simi lar opposition to cinema's development and expa nsion that developed in Czech Moravia at roughly the same time . For more on this see: HASAN, Petr, "' Neslusny a nevkusny ti Im nemuze byti krasnym '. Kato licka akce, struktury katolickeho tabora ajejich pusobnost na poli kinematografie v ceske m prostfedi prvni poloviny 20. stoleti," in: /1/uminace, I, 2016 . 14 MAC EK and PASTEKOVA, Dejiny s/ovenskej kinomatogrcifie, 17. 15 MACEK and PASTEKOVA, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografle, 13. �96 SLOVAKIA 2021 made to make the medium accessible in both smaller locales, or in Slovak. I.I SUBJECTS NOT AUTHORS: THE EARLY YEARS OF SLOVAK NON-FICTION FILMMAKING Although film originally received a hostile reception from various social circles in the Slovak Lands, films were made during cinema's early decades, and many of these early films fell under the criteria of what David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson termed "actualities," or films showing an event from real life, and "scenic," 16 crude travelogues designed to showcase exotic places or striking vistas. While cinema started later in the Slovak Lands, by the early 20th century Slovakia had become a destination for Hungarian directors, mainly associated with companies in Budapest 17 who were interested in filming glimpses of Slovakia's mountains. In February of 1908, the Apollo theatre in Bratislava debuted one of the first recorded scenics/actualities set in Slovakia, Wintersport im Tatralomnicz/Zimny sport v Tatranskej Lomnici. 18 A few months later the Apollo's competitor, the Elektro-Biskop cinema projected a series of panoramic scenes as part of their Welt-Panorama special, which included two more films shot in distinctively Slovak locations: Die Hohe Tatra/ Vysoke Tatry and Tur6cz-Szt.-Marton/Turciansky Svaty Martin, as part of its travelogue series. 19 Travelogues, the close cousins of the scenic genre, were a popular genre of early film making, one which attempted to provide a replication or approximation of the traveling experience for audiences hungry for new sensations, as well as a more frugal way of "experiencing" a location for a cash-strapped audience. These films were often accompanied with lectures 20 or packaged as part of a longer cinematic experience, designed to replicate the idea of a larger trave l holiday, albeit condensed into on ly a few minutes. Although these early Slovak travelogues have been 16 BORDWELL, David, and THOMPSON, Kri stin , Film Histo,y : An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 12-13 . 17 MACEK and PASTEKOVA., Dejinyslovenskej kinomatografle. 18-19. 18 "Tagesneuigkeiten!" Pressburger Zeitung. February 5, 1908, p. 2 19 "Elektro-Bioskop nur im Hotel ' zum gri.inen Baum ' in Pozsony, Program vom 14. bis 2 1 Marz," Pressburger Presse, March 16, 1908, p. 5. 20 PETE RSON , Jennifer Lynn, "Travelogues" in : Abel, Rich ard, ed., The Encyclopedia of Early Film (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 640-3. �SLOVAKIA 2021 97 lost, we can reasonnably infer what the experience wou ld have been like by surviving examples of the genre: travelogues were " highly kinetic ," "educational," and positioned as a morally and intell ectuall y healthy a lternative to the salacious or lascivious aspects of other, lesswholesome early films. While these travelogues, actualiti es, and sceni cs were originall y niche productions for audiences located far away from Slovak communities, they nonetheless sti ll largely adhered to the progression of ea rlier Slovak mass-produced images. In the first place, these travel films were essentially a new means of packaging, commodifying, standardizing, and commerciali zing the experience of being in the Slovak Lands, without having to travel and without the politically and socially divisive barrier of language. Secondly, we can clearly tell from the context in which these films were exhibited (e.g. only in the urban centers of Pressburg and Kosice, advertised through the nonSlovak press, and in cinemas that were attached to areas frequented by travelers, the upper classes, and tourists) that these films were again consumed by an Austro-Hungarian audience, not necessarily a "Slovak" one - much as the earl y engravings and lithographs of the Slovak landscape were enjoyed primarily by non-Slovak audiences first, and Slovak audiences later. Lastly, much as ethnographic lithography and photography were rapidly adopted by Slovaks as a means of preserving, codifying, and distributing visua l examp les of Slovak cu ltural identity, as we shall see in the next sections, the rationale behind these sceni cs and travelogues (name ly, that film shou ld give an impression of life in Slovakia, rather than a purely narrative structure) would later be embraced by both non-fiction and fiction filmmakers alike. 1.2 THE BEGIN NINGS OF SLOVAK DOCUMENTARY CINEMA After the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 19 18, Slovaks suddenly fo und themselves, not just as a rural curiosity in a large empire, but the second largest Slavic partner in the newly-fonned Republic of Czechos lovakia. No longer subjects to the stringent censorship laws and the Magyarization policies of the former Kingdom of Hungary, film (as with other forms of mass-produced images) began to expand. Movie theaters grew in number (from three in the �98 SLOVAKIA 2021 early 1900s to 84 by the end of Austria-Hungary,2' and increasing to 153 by the end of the First Republic) and size, appearing all over the Slovak Lands, and not just in Kosice and the newly re-named Bratislava. Furthermore, while theaters had once been limited to showing a handful of Hungarian or Austrian films in Bratislava and Kosice, distributors throughout Slovakia began adding Czech, American, and German films 22 to their theaters, though these often met with resistance from more nationalist groups. 23 Unfortunately, this rapid infusion of new cinematic experiences, techniques, and choices did not necessarily result in Slovaks developing their own cinema industry. Throughout the First Republic, Slovakia remained primarily a destination for filmmaking, but with a few minor exceptions, there would be no Slovak documentaries produced by a Slovak director until well into World War II. However, documentary film was indeed expanding in Slovakia, again often along the same ethnographi c, folkloric , or scenic and, again also widely produced by non-Slovak academics such as the Czech directors, Vladimir Uh lela and Karel Plicka as part of a broader, Czechoslovak agenda. Both Plicka and Uhlela saw their documentary productions as a means of integrating Slovaks into the cultural life of Czechoslovakia, through cultivating an aesthetic appreciation for the fo lkl oric and rural aspects of Slovak culture in non-Slovak audiences, a lbeit in very different ways. Furthermore, directors were officially funded through both government sources, as well as the Matica slovenska, and as a result both sought to bring these traditional aspects of Slovak visual cu lture into a Czecho-Slovak cultural space. In his career as an ethnographer and a photographer, Karel Plicka was concerned with producing works of art which could bridge the growing divide between Czech and Slovak audiences. Plicka 's photographic, ethnographic, and musicological output was prodigious, and from the late 1920s onwards he began a second (or third or fourth career) as a documentary filmmaker in Slovakia and in Slovak MACEK and PASTEKOV A, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie, 597-8. Advertisements for the Kino Palace and Kino Meteor in Banska Bystrica. for example, show both American films and German films on their programs as early as 1928; larger cinemas in Bratis lava and Kosice had, of course, made international progra min g a staple of their repertoires from the very beginning . 23 " Potreba naprvy vo filmovej produckii a predvazdani filmov. Dockame sa v Kosic iach viacerych domacich ti lmov?" Slo vensky v_1ichod, January 24, 1933 , p. 3 . 21 22 �SLOVAKIA 2021 99 communities abroad. Starting with l 928's Za slovenskym /'udom, Plicka approached Slovak culture through the lenses of his earlier work as a musicologist and a photographer, meticulously documenting the exotic aspects of Slovak (and to a lesser extent, Rusyn) culture for Czech, Slovak, and international audiences. Like many early film directors, Plicka had little to no formal training, relying on his amateur knowledge of photography and supplementing this with his learned or natural talent as an ethnographer. For Plicka, this Slovakia, as of yet only barely codified and recognized as a political or social sphere, contained a wealth of information which needed to be documented: On my trips after Slovak folksongs , I came to many lesser known and even forgotten areas, to which almost 'no one' had ever come up until then . No one, or rather, hardly anyone except those with open eyes and trained ears. It ' s no wonder. Ethnographic Slovakia is a vast and extensive world, and there never will be enough of those who could satisfy the need to write down, draw , and photograph this richness.24 Although Plicka was wary of the mechanical " ripping" of folk songs and images from living performances into mechanized fossils, he soon embraced the advantages of these modern technologies. He began to experiment with film starting in the mid- I 920s as a "documentary tool for ethnographic and folkloric events," 25 which could satisfy, if not all of his documentary impulses, at least most of them. Although the Matica slovenska and Plicka had worked together numerous times on his ethnographic photographical and musicological expeditions throughout Slovakia, the organization felt that a movie camera was necessary for the broadening of their efforts in the young Czechoslovakia. 26 Archival records in Matica slovenska show that Plicka obtained a Pathe movie camera in the spring of 1926 in Prague, 27 where he learned to use the new tool; only a few months 24 PLICKA , Karel , " Ako sme filmov ali," S/ovenske poh/'ady. April I , 1930, pp. 215- 16 25 LAC KOVA , Sy lvia, LEXMANN , Juraj , and SLIVKA Martin , eds., Karol Plicka vo fl/m ove) faktografii, (Brati slava: S loven sky film ovy ustav , 1983), 36. 26 KRC M ERY , Ste fan , Tri rol..y Matice slovenskej I 924- 1926 (Turc iansky sv. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1927), 8-9. 27 PLIC KA , Karol. Co rres pondence. Coll ected in: LAC KOVA , Sl yv ia, LEXMANN , Juraj , and SLIVKA Martin , Karol Plicka vo jilmovej f i:1ktogra/ii, 187. �100 SLOVAKIA 2021 later, Plicka wrote to Matica slovenska to arrange the local permissions and cooperation necessary to start his cinematic work, saying: Please send a message immediately to inform the schools in Zliechova, and in Kosecke Rovne, as well as the parish office in Zliechova, that the ethnographic department of Matica Slovenska proposes to, after a number of days/starting from the 14th of this month, to start working there, and to: record songs, photograph, and to film scenes, which the Zleichovans demonstrated in Trencianske Teplice. Matica Slovenska requests moral support for this significant work in these historic villages." 28 In much of 1926, 1927, and 1928, Plicka traveled through Slovakia (primarily in the Liptov and Orava regions popularized by the pioneering ethnographic artists Pavol Sochan and Peter Michal Bohun), recording film footage, as well as continuing his other ethnographic activities. The resulting film Za s/o venskym f'udom was received with great fanfare in the Slovak community on both sides of the Atlantic. Slovaks in America marveled at Plicka's ethnographic ambition, noting that the film was a "powerful piece of cultural propagation," which was "very sympathetically accepted by all of the Slovak and even Czechoslovak public."29 The nationalistic daily Slovak praised the film as "something that is worthwhile for the part of our public, which does not have the possibility to see all the treasures of our national spirit,"30 while the more centrist Slovensky dennik labelled the ft Im "the loveliest surprise of the year" and thri lied at seeing Slovaks on the screen "where one is accustomed to seeing nowadays only the sorrows and joys of other nations ."3 1 The film combined not only Plicka 's photographic talent (indeed many of the scenes depicted on film were also photographed for Plicka's and Matica slovenska's later use) for finding the abstract patterns in the Slovak countryside with the athletic and physical prowess of hi s subjects, who dance traditional dances and display feats of strength while dressed in various traditional regional kroje. 28 Ibid. "Rok kulturnej prace," Ynungstownske slovenske novivny. May 3, 1929, p. 3 30 " Film za slovenskym l'udom ," Slovak (Bratislava), March I, 1929, p. 4. 31 "Za slovenskym l'udom," Slovensk_)1dennik (Bratislava), March 14, 1929, p. 6. 29 �SLOVAKIA 2021 101 Za s/ovenskym /'udom was funded largely by Matica slovenska, which experienced a resurgence of popularity and importance following the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Matica slovenska's mission of preserving, codifying, and unifying Slovak culture internally as well as internationally, meshed with Plicka 's own natural urges to record and transmit. A second well-received documentary about highland Slovaks titled Po horach, po dolach followed in l 929, which received an even wider domestic release than Plicka's first film, as well as winning pri zes in international film and photographic competitions in 1932. Like Za slovenskym /'udom, Po horach, po dolach was also funded by Matica slovenska, and featured much of the same style and content as Plicka's debut film , and was shown to a wider variety of audiences, including Czechs. 32 By the early 1930s, Plicka had begun producing documentari es for both Matica slovenska and private concerns, such as an informative non-fiction quasiadvertisement for the town of Piest'any 's famous medicinal baths and mud treatments. Furthermore, his films were beginning to be utilized by American Slovak organizations like Jednota, the Slovak League of America, and others as a means to educate American Slovaks about their cultural heritage as well as the benefits of Slovak ethnic identity.33 Plicka 's most famous film might be considered to be his 1933 paean to Slovakia, Zem spieva, which combines scenes of rural Slovak folklore and traditional dress along with intertitles by the Slovak poet and translator Jan Smrek. Curiously, although Plicka was an early proponent of the ethnographic and educational possibilities of sound film, he elected to set the film to an impressionistic score by the Czech composer Frantisek Skvor, despite declaring that sound film as a medium is the " the ideal documentation" 34 in an interview with his collaborator Smrek only a few years earlier. Whil e Plicka 's early work 32 MALINA, Vladimir, "O moznostiach slovenskeho zvukoveho filmu ," Elim. November, 193 1. 33 See: CU LEN , Kon stantin, S/ovaci v Amerike: crty z kulturnych dejin (Tuciansky Sv. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1938) as we ll as ALEXANDER , June Granatir, Ethnic Pride, American Parriorism: Slovaks and Orher New Immigrants in rhe lnren var Era (Ph ilade lphia: Templ e Unive rsity Press, 2004). 34 SMREK, Jan, "O praci pre zac hovanie l'udovej piesne: rozhovor s jej znalcom a vasnyvim sbera tel'om Karlom Plickom," £/an: mesiacnik pre literaruru a umenie, March , 1933, p. 5. �102 SLOVAKIA 2021 was often mere documentation for the sake of preservation , Zem spieva is an expansion of Plicka 's more experimental photographic vision. Plicka takes the viewer on a musical and vis ual trip through Slovakia's wild mountains, not for the sake of scientific observation, but to experience the poetic essence of Czechoslovakia ' s most exotic locales. As Bill Nichols noted in his essay "Documentary Film and the Moderni st Avant-Garde," what separated interwar documentary film from mere reportage like newsreel s, was its artistic pretensions. 35 While the First Republic was full of newsreel s documenting world events and cultural phenomena from exotic locales, Slovakia included, Zem spieva represented two complimentary, yet different intentionsthe first was to continue to raise, on the one hand Czech appreciation and awareness of Slovak cu lture, whi le simultaneously allowing Slovaks an opportunity to have their own culture valued on equal standing with the more "sophisticated" and dominant Czech culture. Zem spieva 's modernist influences are most strongly fe lt in its theoretical conception and execution . While the film is a "sound" film in terms of its technical composition with Skvor' s pre-recorded soundtrack , the film ' s formal structure adheres more closely to the avant-garde experimentation of the late silent film era, featuring no diagetic sound or dialogue, and only intertitles explaining the significance of the scenes. 36 This suited Plicka, as he explained in his 1932 article "Poznamky o filme moznostiach a ulohach slovenskych filmov": Slovak films will be sound films , since today, unfortunately, it is impossible to make any other kind. But they will certainly not be I 00% dialogue film s, perhaps thanks to the producers, but an arti stic and commercial error. In the interest of internationali sm, it will be necessary to curb dialogs and really, the entire weight which bears the influence of the theatre, will have to be limited to the most modest, if not reduced entirely for that matter, in order to make the film as understandable as it was at its happi est, when it was silent. This mostly applies to the Slovak situation ; we will not be able to afford many films on ly for ourselves. It is better to 35 NI C HOLS, Bill, " Doc umentary Film and th e Modernist Avan t-Garde," Critical ln- qui,y . Vol. 27, No. 4, Summer, 20 11 , p. 588. 36 LAC KOVA. , Slyvia, LEXMANN, Juraj, and SLIVKA Martin, eds., Karol Plicka vo.filmovej.faktografii (Bratislava : Slovensky filmo vy ustav, 1983), 89 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 103 produce little, but except that which is thoughtful and valuable. 37 Although such an approach to sound design was dec idedly archaic (even in 1933),38 Plicka was, in some se nse, correct: this decision paradoxically increased Zem spieva 's international appeal. On the one hand, the relegation of the Slovak language within the film to small, easily digested intertitles meant that the film was easily accessible to Slovak populations in the United States, whose command of the language might have been fossilized or had languished through the process of assimilation. 39 On the other hand, the focus on the more purely abstract visual and musicological aspects of Slovak folk culture allowed the film to function as " poetry," without the di straction or potential friction of Slovak dialogue, an abstraction that also allowed the film to represent various different "S lovakias" for different audiences. While the American Slovaks rejoiced in finding a poetiziation of their ancestral homeland, Slovakia's most exotic and access ible qualities, such as its visual splendor, its vital folk culture, and its melodies, were easily absorbed by outsiders who did not require any specialized linguistic skill to appreciate them. Additionally, Plicka' s long-time editor, the Czech avant-garde photographer and filmmaker Alexandr Hackenschmied, was instrumental in reshaping the narrative structure of the film through his assured editing style, and via his suggestion that Plicka shoot additional introductory and ending footage. 40 Hackenschmied was born into a family of academics in Prague, and hi s childhood in the (then) industrial neighborhood of Karlin gave him ample opportunity to visit the numerous cinemas around that part of the city, 41 sowing the seeds of hi s great interest in film and photography. Following his high school graduation, Hackenschmeid bega n hi s architectural studies, but found himself drawn more strongly to cinema and photography, and 37 PLICKA , Karel , " Poznamky o filme - moznostiach a ulohach slovenskyc h filmov," S/ovenske poh/'ady, September 15, 1934, p. 593 . 38 For more on the problems of sou nd films in Slovak ia during the interwar period, see my Ph .D. dissertation . HUDAC, Nicholas, " Picturing the Na ti on: Slovak National Identity in the Age of the Mass Produced Image," Univerzita Karlova , 2020. 39 C.f. CU LEN, Konstantin, Slovaci V Amerike. 40 ANDEL, Jaroslav, Alexandr Hackenschmied(Praha: TORST, 2000), 29. 41 BROZ, A /exander Hackenschied (Praha: Ceskoslovensky filmovy ustav, 1973 ), 202 1. �104 SLOVAKIA 2021 various global avant-gardes active in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the work of Man Ray, the Soviet LEF group, Dziga Yertov, and more.42 While Hackenschmied was active in photographic circles from his student days, starting in 1930 he began to make his own films . More than a film enthusiast and a future film editor- he was a film theorist, a photographer, and a filmmaker himself, deeply concerned with the possibilities of montage and form . Hackenschmeid began editing Zem spie va in Prague in 1932, but completed the final cut after Plicka returned from additional shoots in Slovakia with more footage . In a conversation with Martin Sli vka, one of his former students, Plicka recounted his views on the finished product: What do I want Zem spie va to say via film? I would be happy if it was approached without interpretation . It deals with Slovakia as unknown as well as beautiful: the theme of the film is the lives of people in a village and their holy relationship to nature. As the film ' s subtitles suggest, Zem spieva is a cinematic poem celebrating precious traditions; it should be evidence of an enchantingly pure manifestation of life, which is so simple, yet so important. And the film shows a world in which our fathers ' healthy and precious heritage has, by some miracle, been preserved in some regions until today.',4 3 In this sense, Plicka' s intentions for Zem spie va represent an inversion of the earlier ethnographic assumptions that ethnographic subjects are worthy of documentation because of the interesting-yettlawed nature of their ancient practices. Instead, in both the content of Zem spie va and in his comments to the press, Plicka explicitly rejects the predominant political push by Czech (and some Slovak) political and cultural authorities to modernize and industrialize Slovakia .44 Rather, the film's premise is a twist on the time-honored modernist 42 BROZ, Alexander Hackenschied, pp. 2 1-22. SLIVKA , Martin , Karol Plicka. hasnik obrazu (Martin: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1982), 175. 44 Although a compl ete accounting of th e industriali zation debate regarding Slovaki a is beyond th e scope of thi s arti c le, see, for example, MATULA, Antonin, " Dvacatyosmy fij en," in Ceska osveta: /isl venovan_y zajmum vdejneho knihovnictvi a organisaci lidoveho vzdelani. September, 1938, Vol. 35 , No. I, pp. 5-7; and HA VLiCE K, V., " Narodni problem Slovenska," in Nase doba: revue pro vedu. umeni a i ivo/ socia/ni, November, 1933, Vol. 41 , No. 2, pp. 68-73. 4 .1 �SLOVAKIA 2021 105 tradition of the city symphony, a genre of early avant-garde filmmaking practiced by directors such as Walter Ruttmann and Dziga Vertov, which sought to translate the immense vitality and activity of an urban space to the reproducible and distributable form of cinema as a celebration of modern industrialization and urbanization. While not every audience member could afford a trip to Berlin or Moscow, a city symphony provided an impressionistic vision of such urban locales that could satisfy the longings for new visual stimulation and locations for a reasonable price. Plicka ' s vision for Zem spieva followed a model similar to Ruttman's and Vertov's films , yet inverted. For the price of a mere ticket, audience members could journey away from Bratislava, deep into the wild Slovak mountains, where a visual feast of dancing, ethnic clothing and stunning vistas awaited them, accompanied with rapturous song. Although Zem spie va was produced under the auspices of Matica slovenska, the old vanguard of Slovak national sentiment and as part of a series of governmental programs to promote Slovak culture in the Republic, not all Slovak activists were thrilled by Plicka' s aims or the resources devoted to its production. As an anonymous letter in the Slovak periodical Nastup declared: When we think about our devastated Slovakia's economic ruin, about the misery of our Slovak people, the overwhelming question mark which stands before our Slovak intelligentsia is about the misery and scarcity at every step and yet on the other hand, we are making our sole Slovak film 'The Earth Sings,' and between these two, we clench our teeth and deeply sigh. Yes, we sing! But the stomach doesn't sing, it whines .45 Still other Slovak critics noted that, despite Slovakia's reliance on foreign producers and directors focusing on "a narrow slice of Slovakia in Czech films" 46 represented, as Stefan Hoza wrote in Kinorevue, a promising step forward , (the film ' s lack of Slovak financing notwithstanding) giving hope that Zem spieva would usher in a new era of Czech and Slovak films about Slovakia.47 Other Slovak 45 Nastupi sta od Zvolena [pseudonym] "Zem spieva ... " Nastup, March 15, 1935, p. 10. 46 HOZA, Stefan , "Hovom1e o slovenskom film e a - o moznostiach ," Kinorevue, Vol. I, No. 30, March 20, 1935, p. 5. 47 HOZA , Stefan , "Hovorme o slovenskom filme a - o moznostiach," p.6. �106 SLOVAKIA 2021 intellectuals argued amongst themselves as to whether or not Zem spieva counted as ethnographic reportage,48 nationalist "gyc," or a lyrical and stylized portrayal of Slovakia's essence, as Vlado Clementis argued in 1933 49--{;learly not all of Plicka 's artistic experimentation was received in earnest. Perhaps the best sign of the film 's Czechoslovak intent was how vociferously it was condemned on the grounds that Plicka himself, as a non-Slovak, was not qualified to make such a film. Although Czech critics often saw the film as a wonderful celebration of the venerated narodni dilo tradition, the Czech public, on the other hand-especially the fickle Prague audiences, at least according to the press, were not interested in Zem spieva, because of the lingering effect of the "Slovak question" (the repeated calls for Slovak autonomy) had poisoned the well of Czecho(Slovak) culture in the mind of the ordinary Prazak.50 As the Czech critic Jaroslav Broz wrote: We had anticipated that, because, in thi s day and age, when the Slovak question is such a burning domestic political problem of our state, a film about Slovakia would be especially welcomed and raise the interest of the public. But we were sadly disappointed. The numerical balance sheet of the premiere of Plicka 's film in Prague is a sad document of the cultural ignorance of the Prague public. 5 1 Although the film failed to find an audience in the larger Czech metropoles, Zem spieva 's international release and distribution meant that the film was often seen by American Slovaks, "who follow with great interest anything done in Slovakia," 52 and who turned it into both a means of expressing ethnic pride in multicultural American cities, while also using it as an educational tool for non-Slovaks and Slovaks alike. It is, thus, fitting that the artistic ambition of Plicka's last film was most appreciated in American circles, where the Slovak question was either a whispered query among ethnic boosters in a neighborhood 48 TUMA, J., "Zem spieva, ale o cem?" Tvorba. November 9, 1933 . CLEMENTIS, Vladoj "Je Plickov film folkloristickym gycom?" DAV. Vol. I, No. 10, p. 149. 50 SM REK, Jan , "Vel'kost a bieda jednoho vit'azstva," Elim. ovember, 1933 , p. 8. 51 Ibid. 52 GETTING , Milan , "O Slovensku treba prednasat' i Americanom anglickeho jazyka," S/o vensky dennik. September 4, 1935, p. I. 49 �SLOVAKIA 2021 107 bar or forgotten entirely in the multicultural din of American cities. While economic anxiety and nativist sentiment in some comers of Slovak society muted the film 's reaction among hardline nationalists, Zem spieva was warmly received in other areas not just as an artistic achievement, "something that does not have an analog in global [film] production," 53 as the Czech daily Lidove noviny called it, but as an educational tool. It would show the Czech population that Slovak culture could transcend its reputation for provincialism. Furthermore, Slovak cultural groups in America and the Czech Lands scheduled screenings, sometimes with Plicka 's participation in the case of the latter, as a means of promoting Czechoslovak unity. Although the film was shown fairly regularly in the 1930s, it was nearly lost entirely during World War 11 when the original negatives were destroyed by fire in 1944; afterwords, an imperfect and incomplete copy was salvaged from a positive negative in 1945. Zem Spieva was a mixed success in Czechoslovakia, but, perhaps more importantly, it was a striking critical success among avant-garde circles in America and Europe. There, Zem spieva was shown not only at Czech and Slovak ethnic theaters and events, but also in more mainstream settings, such as at the 1934 Venice Biennale, where Plicka was awarded the City Cup of Venice for Best Director. American Slovak institutions were likewise more enthusiastic audiences for Plicka's films . A feature in the Youngstownske slovenske noviny, written by Matica slovenska's Jozef Cincik, considered Zem spieva living history, which captured "the most important moments in Slovak life." 54 Unlike America, whose foundational historical moments were dead and only experienced in museums, Cincik argued that in Zem spieva "we Slovaks have captured in this picture and its subject, all of the moving, speaking, and sounds of music on film for our descendants, everything that Americans will never be able to capture of their own history for themselves." 55 In other words, Zem spieva was able to codify, and solidify, foundational moments in Slovak history and make them available to the entire nation- similar in many regards to the original aim of ethnographic 53 JEZE K, S., "Zem spieva," Lidove noviny , October 27, 1933, p. 16. CINCi K, Jozef, "O filme Zem spieva," Youngtownske slovenske noviny, February 14, 1936, p. 2. 55 Ibid. , p. 2. 54 �108 SLOVAKIA 2021 photography, albeit with a greater power to preserve, to fix in time, and to replicate. The relative success of the film encouraged Matica slovenska to again provi de Plicka with funding and resources for his next featurelength fi lm, I 936's Za Slovakmi od New Yorku po Mississippi. While Zem spieva focused on Plicka's attempts to bring the rhythms and visuals of life in the Slovak highlands to a diverse, urban audience in Czechoslovakia as part of building a modernist Czechoslovak culture, Za Slovakmi instead focused on Slovak expatriate communities and Matica slovenska's activities in America, as Plicka documented the arrival of three of the organization's top officials (Jozef CigerHronsky, Jozef Cincik and Kon stantin Culen,) to the United States in 1936, and the ways in which the ethnographic mission of Matica slovenska was replicated in America. Often considered "only reportage" 56 by Czech and Slovak film critics, this film was not widely shown in Czechoslovakia; however, it did receive a release in America via fraternal and civic American Slovak organizations such as the Slovak Catholic Sokol, and the First Catholic Ladies Slovak Association, another sign of the strong cultural interchange between Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and those in America, which lasted up until World War II . Although Plicka is more widely known today, in terms of contemporary historiography of Slovak film , Vladimir Uh lela was another colleague of Plicka whose personal history bears many simi larities to Plicka 's own. Uhlela was born in Vienna in 1888, studied physiology and botany in Prague and Strassbourg, and, after receiving his doctorate, he became enamored with the possibilities of film after being exposed to it through his postgraduate research.57 After a stint in military pri son during World War I for being a "dangerous Panslavist," 58 Uhlela was released, served honorably, and then returned to Czechoslovakia where he became both an academic in Brno, and a public intellectual. He acted as the science editor for lidove Noviny, as we ll as contributing to numerous other publiccations. Like Plicka, Uh lela was a passionate devotee of folklore, 56 NAVRATIL, Antonin, Ceslv k pravde ci Ii i: 70 lei ceskoslovenskeho dokumenlcirniho filmu (Praha: Akademie muzic kyc h umeni v Praze, 2002), 5 1. 57 STOLL, Martin, et al., Cesky.film: reiisefi - dokumen/arisle (Praha : Libre. 2009), 587-8. SN Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 2021 109 collecting songs and documenting folk culture, not only in Moravia, but in Slovakia as well. Although a well-known popularizer of science in the popular media (including in cinema as well as in print), in the early 1930s, Uhlela devoted himself to making ethnographic films , focusing especial ly on the borderlands between Moravia and Slovakia, where Slovak communities thrived in the mountains . Although Uh lela made several smaller films on ethnographic themes such as Slovacka pisen and Slovacka svatba, he is best known for his full-length ethnographic drama/documentary Mizejici svet/ Miznuci svet shot and released in 1932. Alth ough the film has many ethnographic moments featuring Moravian Slovak villagers from the locations it was shot in, the film is a romantic drama at its core, as it fo ll ows the troubles of a young Czech ethnographer, Stana Homa, who has come from Prague to a small vi ll age on the border of Moravia and Slovakia to document the inhabitants' customs, songs, and kroje (folk costumes). As young Stana becomes more enthralled with the village and a certain young vi ll ager, she finds herself integrating more and more into vi ll age li fe, until the arrival of her friends from Prague shatter the dream. Despite her attempts to become fully integrated into vi ll age life, the vi ll age and its inhabitants vanish, leaving the young ethnographer standing in the middle of an empty room, alone. At its heart Mizmici svet represented, in many ways, a fundamentally Czechoslovak approach to " traditional" Slovak culture, where the dividing line between Slovak and Czech is one not necessarily of language or ethnicity, but of a rural-urban divide. Despite its ethnic ambiguity, the Slovak press praised the film, especially on its visual merits, and eagerly considered it one of their own. Slovenska krajina enthusiastically complimented the film's "beautiful kroj" as "a treat for the eyes," 59 whereas Slovensky dennik enjoyed the film, but negatively compared it to the works of Plicka, saying that, if it were not for Plicka's film , " [Mizmici svet] will most likely be cons idered our first folkloric film , which has no antecedent." 60 Even the stoutly nationalist and famously anti-Czech Slovak grudgingly approved of parts of the film , even though 59 MAZEL, 8. , "Zo prazskeho tyzdna "S/ovenska Krajina, November 22, 1932, p. 2. "Plickov film' Po Horach, po dolach' a Matica Slov.," S/ovensky dennik, November 13 , 1932, p. I. 60 �110 SLOVAKIA 2021 "[ Miznuci svet] does not manage to overcome Plicka's Slovak film of this kind ," it was a sound film , "which captured the disappearing life of Slovak villages on the Moravian border" and the scenes "where the swift life of the majestic lads is best illustrated through dance." 61 The contrast between Uhela's and Plicka's visions was further intensified following its debut in 1932, as a review of Zem spieva in Slovensky dennik praised Plicka's film via a backhanded swipe at Miznuci svet, saying "Zem spieva isn't one of those films which are constructed with cold calculation, inorganically loaded down with so called natural or ethnographic ' action' shots, as was, for example, in the distracting moments in the otherwise superb Miznuci svet, "62 intensifying the competition between the two most prominent Slovak-themed films of the early 1930s. Although Plicka's films were heavily influenced by the Modernist leanings of the Czech avant-garde and Bauhaus, Uh lela's film was in many ways, a different aesthetic experience. Since Plicka 's background in photography meant that he often preferred immaculately composed static shots, with an emphasis on the geometrical patterns he so often found in the Slovak countryside, the collective footage shot by Otakar Schutz, Jan Calabek, Josef Sti'echa, and Josef Buzek used in Miznuci svet is often frenetically active, soaring and zooming around the landscape like a bird, and calling to mind (as the reviewer in Slovak contemptuously pointed out) the "Soviet" 63 influences of the film. Montage sequences also abound throughout the film , repeating shots of the countryside, the growth of plants, the changing of seasons- the very same subjects which were often found in Plicka 's photographic and cinematic work, only viewed through the lens of a different approach to cinematography. However, despite their differences of setting and their treatment of other external cinematic factors, such as sound, Plicka's films and Uhlela's lone ethnographic feature film do share several simi larities. Both films revolve around the allure of leaving civilized, urban environments and reconnecting with older traditions in the countryside. Furthermore, these films sought to break free of the rigid 61 "Film - Mizniici svet. " Slovak, April 5, 1933, p. 5. BALLO, Iva n, "Zem spieva (o prvom slovenskym film e zvukom)," Slo vensky dennik. January I 0, 1933, p. 3. 63 "Film - Mizniici svet. "Slovak. April 5, 1933, p. 5. 62 �SLOVAKIA 2021 111 trappings of purely ethnographic films in a variety of ways: through the hybridization of genre (e.g. Zem spieva 's mixture of the ethnographic film with elements of the city symphony genre, or Miznuci svet 's combination of non-fiction ethnography and fictional melodrama), by incorporating a variety of techniques from Czech or international avant-gardes such as montage and geometrical compositions, and by creating an impressionistic portrait of the experience of Slovakia without relying on the objective aims of scientific film making. And paradoxically, despite their attempts at creating "Czecho-Slovak" Slovak films, or film s about Slovaks and Slovakia within the context of a unified Czechoslovak nation, both directors were, in many ways failures at creating films that transformed their own personal aestheticizations of the Slovak experience into a more unifying one; Plicka 's films were embraced only among Slovak communities at home and abroad as well as among a select group of the urban Czech cultural elite, whereas Uhlela's film languished in obscurity on all fronts- neither Slovak enough for the Slovak nationalists, nor exotic enough for an urban Czech audience. 1.3 FASCISM AND THE RISE OF DOMESTIC SLOVAK PRODUCTION While nationalistic mass-produced images favored by both foreign ethnographers and Slovaks themselves could quickly be repurposed to promote various political ideologies, documentary film was no exception. With the growing support of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP), in the mid-to-late 1930s, the Czecho-Slovak interests in Slovakia (most elegantly embodied in Plicka 's documentary and pedagogical work) found themselves under attack by Slovak nationalists. Indeed, many hardliners took offense at the prominence of Czech and foreign directors producing films about Slovakia and for Slovaks, or alternately ignoring the Slovak market altogether, despite the fact that Czech cinemas and cinema production companies were far more numerous, successful, and better-funded. 64 As a result, on November 4th, 1938, members of the ruling HSPP began to purge not only foreign influences (such as Soviet cinema) from Slovak movie theaters, but also began to initiate a broader range of policies which would eventually forbid Jews, Czechs, and other 64 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA., Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie (Martin : Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1997) 74. �112 SLOVAKIA 2021 minont1es from owning, operating, or participating in the Slovak cinema industry,65 with th e notable exception of a handful of stateapproved Czech directors and cameramen like Eugen Mateicka and Bohus Havranek. 66 In order to satisfy the need for cinema, the Slovak government appealed for outside help in order to replace the technical knowledge and talent driven away or excluded by its policies. In addition to receiving aid from film organizations in Vienna, Berlin, and elsewhere, the Slovak Republic set up three organizations for making non-fiction films : Nastup (which produced primarily weekly newsreel s), Skolfilm (which produced educational films) , and Luc (a film monthly company which produced primarily cultural films .)67 These organizations were respon sible for producing nearl y all of Slovak non-fiction films before 1950. While many of the prominent non-Slovak fi gures in early Slovak cinema such as Karel Plicka were driven out of Slovakia during thi s period, a handful of Slovak directors such as Pal'o Bielik were able to continue, openly and sometimes covertly, the cinematic process started by Plicka. Bielik (who rose to fame playing the infamous bandit Juraj Janosik in Martin Fric 's 1935 film of the same name), along with other young S lovak filmmakers in the late First Republic, had mostly learned their craft through either their time in the fi lm industry as actors (in the case of Bielik) or through studyi ng with Plicka and other instructors at (or loosely affiliated with) the Brati slava-based School of Applied Arts. This was a revolutionary institution which featured instruction not just in photography and filmmakin g, but also graphic design , painting, advertising, typogramphy, and textile design .68 However, regardless of their background, th e young Slovak filmmakers quickly found themselves actively constrained by government and industrial censorship, which sought to exorcise the " dangerous" elements harmful to the Slovak nation from Slovak cinematic production . In practice, this meant not only purging 65 HA AKOVA, Petra, " Proticeska agenda s lovenskeho filmu 1939- 1945 ," in : Minoriry a.film (Bratislava: Asociacia slovenskyc h filmovych klubov, 20 12), 46. 66 HANAKOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska fi lmova kulllira ( Bratislava: Slovensky filmov y ustav, 20 I0). 49. 67 MIHA.LIK , Peter, Vznik slovenskej narodnej kinemarogra/ie / 896- 1948 (Bratislava : Kabinet divadlo a filmu Slovenskej akademi e vied, 1994), 94. 68 MOJZISOVA, Iva, "Avant-Garde Repercussions in the Schoo l of Applied Arts in Bratislava 1929- 1939, Journal of Design Histaty, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1992. p. 273. �SLOVAKIA 2021 113 Slovak cinema of the thematic and formal innovations imported from abroad, but also eliminating the influences of a trio of dangerous domestic ingredients namely the "Czech-Jewish-Bolshevik"69 influence. Nearly all of the official cinematic output during the short-lived Slovak Republic seems to have focused solely on two non-fiction fronts- periodic newsreels depicting the activities of the Slovak troops in World War n, and so-called " kultume filmy ," or "cultural films ,"70 which were an evolution of the pre-war ethnographic films (often influenced as well by Weimar and Fascist-era German nationalist film s), 7 1 designed to promote a se nse of Slovak nationalism and patriotism. The roots of these cultural film s can be traced back to the 1930s, with the rise of ethnographic feature films like Zem spieva. However, unlike Plicka 's work, little attention was paid to making an ethnographically accurate recording of Slovak life; rather, these cultural films were to celebrate an idealized "S lovakia," which never wholly existed. On November 5, 1934, the "S polok priatel'ov kulumeho filmu na Slovensku" was formed in Bratislava. It sought, as part of its educational mission, to establish "cinemas only for cultural film" in Bratislava and to coordinate with a wide circle of Slovak cultural organi zations throughout Slovakia to make " cultura l film s an accessory in the upbringing of children and uplifting the public." 72 In addition to being an educational tool , Slovak nationalists also saw film as a means to transcend the stereotypes of Slovakia as "a beautiful, but poor, land where life is very primitive"73 that had been established in prior ethnographic and documentary work . A second, less-frequently articulated goal (at least not publicl y) was to "make Slovak film production at least as well-regarded as those done by other bigger nations." 74 Finally, the drive for documentary cinema in the Slovak Republic was, ironically, based on an idea which would later be coopted by the communist regime a few years later, name ly that " film 69 HANAKOV A, Petra, " Proticeska agenda slovenskeho filmu 1939- 1945," 46. Ibid., 45. 71 "Charakter kultume ho film a: P6vodny rozhovor 'S lovaka ' s reziserom 'Tobisu, "' Slovak. March 27, 1942, p. 7. 72 " Pre kulturny film," Slovensky dennik. November 4, 1935, p 9. 73 CE RESNA, M., "S lovensky svojraz a cudzina," Nastup, Apri l I, 1940, p. 14. 74 "S lovenska filmova produkcia," Slovak. August, 6, 1942, p. 8. 70 �114 SLOVAKIA 2021 will help raise up a new kind of person ," 75 informing the Slovak population not only about various topical concerns, but also teaching them what it preci sely means to be "Slovak." In February of 1942 Pal'o Bielik, who had been a celebrated actor in interwar Czechoslovak cinema, as well as in the Slovak National Theatre, found himselfunemployed for budgetary and "other creative" reasons, 76 and so he turned to the newly-formed Slovak film agency Nastup for work as a librettist, before finding a position in the departments of short films and cultural films . Bielik, in many ways, was an accidental filmmaker, one who "fell into film ," and often felt quite ambivalent in regards to the medium. In a 1967 interview in Tvorba, Bielik recounted his first accidental exposures to cinema both as a director and as a spectator: "I fell, as they say, straight-legged into film . It was even worse, like when you throw a non-swimmer into cold water. Save yourself, if you know how! And I've saved myselfup until now. But I can't manage to get away from film ." 77 Bielik began his career directing short documentary and cultural films without any formal training, relying on his experiences in front of a camera during his career as an actor in the first Czechoslovak Republic. Although he was forced to work with the semi-fascist regime during this period, the early documentaries which Bielik produced were as apolitical as possible. 1942 's O zdravie robotnika, was a short film about a newly established sanatorium 78 and 1943 's Pod holym nebom, 79 was a 14-minute "artistic reportage" 80 focused on the daily activities around a traditional Orava shepherd's hut and "the romantic splendor of the Slovak countryside." 81 Some of Bielik 's other documentaries during this period included works on fish and the sport of fishing 82 ( 1943 's Hlavatky) , the manufacture and demonstration of traditional Slovak valasky in Miznuca romantika 75 -ik- " Film v novem zivote," Pravda, Vol. I, March I 0, 1944, p. 4. HANJ\KOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska.filmova kulflira, 46. 77 JAN EK, Miroslav, " Vzpominky a plan y Pal'a Bielka," Tvorba: list pro kritiku a umeni. January 12, 196 1, No. 2, pp. 28-9. 78 HAN J\ KOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska.filmova kult1ira. 57. 79 Ibid., 53. 80 Ibid. 81 "S loven ska filmova produkcia," Slo vak. August, 6, 1942, p. 8. 82 "Vel'konocny program premierovyc h kin Nastup a Urania," Slovak, April 7, 1944, and "Nove film y Nastupu," Gardista. November 28, 1943 , p. 4. 76 �SLOVAKIA 2021 115 ( I 943), and the production of flour and bread in Chlieb nas kai dodenny ( 1943). Although not all of Bielik's wartime documenttaries focused on the purely folkloric or ethnographic, by and large, they were films about the Slovak countryside and again, consistent with the aims of earlier ethnographic work. While it appeared that Bielik would spend the war attempting to draw little attention to himself with his documentaries on traditional Slovak subjects, the eruption of the Slovak National Uprising in August of 1944 suddenly changed the young director's career. While in the midst of shooting an unrelated film Hanka sa vydava in Brezena, Bielik and his crew caught wind of the Uprising and immediately rushed to join. As Bielik recalled in 1961, the group not only met with the partizans in order to get footage of the historic event, they actually joined the uprising itself: The Uprising caught me in Brezina during the filming of Hanka sa vydava. There were four other filmmakers with me: Krska, Richter, Plavec, a Sekula. We became lieutenants, they gave us uniforms, and we began to film . I led a group and wrote a scenario under the name 'Odboj 1944.' Krska filmed. It's thanks to him that we have authentic material from those days." 83 This raw reportage, which Bielik shot during his time in Brezina was later renamed, re-edited and repurposed into Bielik's 1945 documentary Za slobodu, although some of the film was lost when unknown persons stumbled upon the hiding place of some of the most sensitive footage: We buried part of the film negative underground in the village ofNemce in a graveyard underneath a tombstone. Some strangers, thinking that they found some treasure, collected the film strips, exposed them to light, and once again overexposed them. So they destroyed ten meters of an extraordinarily valuable film." 84 Although Za slobodu did not premiere during the war and was only finished in 1945,85 it nonetheless served as a potent anti-fascist KJ JAN EK, Miroslav, " Vzpomink y a plany Pal'a Bielka," Tvorba: list pro kritiku a o. 2, p.29. umeni, January 12, 196 1, K ➔ Ibid. 5 K MA CE K Vaclav, PA ST EKOVA , Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinumatugra/ie, 91 . �116 SLOVAKIA 2021 symbol, burnishing the bona-tides of Bielik's group of directors and cameramen as well as Bielik's own reputation as an anti-fascist filmmaker. The surviving film centers around the narrative retelling and reconstruction, not just of the uprising, but also of the "often frequently catastrophic consequences" of the doomed resistance, 86 a thematically daring approach which was seldom replicated in later documentaries. Furthermore, Za slobodu served as an aesthetic turning point for Slovak documentary film- while previous documenttary films about Slovakia had focused on the stylization of the Slovak experience, mediating reportage via romantic conceptions of the Slovak countryside a la PlickaBielik 's film focused on documentary realism, providing a cinematic experience that was out of touch with the postwar "antifascist euphoria." 87 It did not receive widespread distribution, being withdrawn by government officials because of it was "inappropriate for the delicate nature of the theme;" 88 it featured actual reportage, shot under dangerous conditions; and it did not glamorize or stylize the Slovak National Uprising. In short, Za slobodu can be seen as evidence of the first glimmers of cinematic neo-realism in Slovak documentary filmmaking . 1.4 POSTWAR RUPTURING: DOCUMENTARY AND NON-FICTION 1945 TO 1950 While the rise of fascism heralded the end of his career as a filmmaker, Karel Plicka 's legacy and influence on the burgeoning Slovak film industry was only beginning. Before World War II, Plicka had briefly held the position of film instructor in the experimental and short-lived Academy of the Applied Arts in Bratislava, before the institution was shut down due to rising anti-Czech and anti-Hungarian sentiment. While this institution was short-lived, the School of Applied Arts served to provide the basic educational preparation for the careers of several prominent early Slovak directors like Jan Kadar. In 1946, several months after the reunification of Czechoslovakia, Plicka was appointed the first Dean of the Filmova a televizni fakulta Akademie muzickych umenie (F AMU), 89 in charge of, not only FILMMAKING FROM 86 HANA KOY A, Petra, Pa/'o Bielik a slovenskafilmova kulflira, 63. MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOY A, Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie, 91. RH Ibid. , 91 . 89 FRANC, Martin, and KRATKA Lenka, eds., Dejiny A MU: ve vypravenich (Praha : Nakladatelstvi AMU, 2017), I 0 . 87 �SLOVAKIA 2021 117 educating future Czech professsionals, but also the first major generation of academically-trained Slovak film professionals. Although the Slovak students began matriculating from FAMU in the late 1940s and early 1950s, director Eduard Greener (one of the first Slovaks to go to the academy) noted that a vast educational gap existed between the Slovak students and their Czech classmates. 90 Although FAMU contributed enormously to the creation of a stable and thriving Slovak film industry from the 1950s onwards, Slovak documentary cinema (and indeed Slovak cinema as a whole) suffered a rupture, from the mid- I 940s to the early 1950s, as directors who had enthusiastically participated in the Slovak Republic 's film program were "discredited ."91 While some directors, such as Pal'o Bielik, had served in the anti-fascist resistance during the war, those who had not found themselves in the position of Plicka and other minority filmmakers in Slovakia in the 1940s- unwelcome and unemployed. As a result, Slovak documentary production sharply declined in postwar years of the 1940s, with an average of seven nonfiction films per year produced from 1945 to 1948,92 as the most visionary and politically safe directors (such as Bielik) and talented beginners such as Jan Kadar rapidly transitioned into feature filmmaking. 93 Despite newly-increased state support and the establishment of institutions such as FAMU, Slovak nonfiction cinema remained fairly moribund for much of the late 1940s through the early I 960s, due to a lack of qualified personnel and, from 1948 onwards, the newly established communist government's ideological demands. 94 These demands, somewhat paradoxically, were very similar to those espoused by the fascist government: to unify Slovaks around visual tropes and folklore, to show the moderni zation of Slovakia and the tangible benefits of the state, 95 and to build a more- 90 "Eduard Greener: film ako vol'ny vers," interview in literarni noviny. August 4, 20 15. http: //literarky.cz/l iterat ura/cteni/20360-eduard-grener-fi lm-ako-vony-ver 91 Navratil , Antonin, Cesty k pravde ci Ii i : 70 let c'eskoslovenskeho dokumentarniho .filmu (Praha: FAMU, 2002), 159. 92 Ibid. , 16 1. 93 Ibid., 160-2. 94 MA CE K Vaclav, PASTEKOVA , Jelena. Dejiny slovenskej kinomatogrcifie. I 1719. 95 JA SSO, Julius, "Slovak Films in the Last Five Years," Czechoslovak Film, Vol. 7, No. 4, unpag inated. �118 SLOVAKIA 2021 ideologically pure Slovak soc iety96 through the use of mass-produced images. Perhaps the single most stereotypical " identifying characteristic" of a Slovak film , documentary or otherwise, during the postwar and early communist years was a reliance on the folkloric motifs and ethnographic themes which had been become so thoroughly codified by the 1950s. This particular fascination with folk culture was hardly a communist invention , as it drew on the ethnographic traditions which were so popular in the late Austro-Hungarian through interwar periods. Given that amateur ethnographers such as Pavel Sochan eagerly embraced photography as a way of documenting indigenous practices in an effort to distinguish region s and establish Slovak cultural identity during periodic moments of cultural trauma, ethnic repression , and attempts at forced assimilation, 97 it remains a littl e surpri sing how quickly the postwar and communist regimes embraced these formerly divisive aesthetic elements. While cinema had been nationalized by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in August of 1945 as an important national resource, fo lk culture was also nationalized in Slovakia by presidential decree on November 7, 1945. 98 This decree also resulted in the creation of the first Slovak fo lk art collective, the Ustredie l'udovej umeleckej vyroby (UCUV), whose aims were to preserve Slovak folk culture. While ethnographic and folkloric activities had been decidedly controversial in the First Czechoslovak Republic and consisted of a definite part of the fascist propaganda machine during the war, following the 1948 Communist Putsch, the government further reaffirmed the need for fo lkl oric collectives by creating the Slovensky l'udovy umelecky kolekiv (SCUK) in 1949. Further still, the regime stated exp Iicitly ten years later that "folk arts and folk handicrafts make up an important part of our socialist culture," 99 further sanctioning not just the practice of these traditional pastimes, but 96 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA , Jelena, Dejinv slovenskej kinomatografie. 126. See PODOLAK. J. , "The Development of Ethnography in Slo va kia," Midwest Fo lklore, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summ er, 1958 , pp. 69-84. 97 98 " Prozatimni statni zfizeni ceskoslovenske," Dekret presidenta republiky o organisaci lidove a umelecke vvroby . November 7, 1945, Zakon c. I I 0/ 1945 Sb. Note that the decree did not come into effect until November 27th . 99 Zakon c. 56/ 1957 Sb. �SLOVAKIA 2021 119 affording them legal protection and financial support, albeit fossilizing these living traditions even more effectively than the ethnographic projects of the late Austro-Hungarian and interwar periods. By the early 1950s, Communists had not only assumed control of the government, but were also looking to infiltrate or redirect certain cultural outlets for the purposes of creating communist educational entertainment. The creation of Slovak folkloric collectives such as the S:CUK in the late 1940s, along with the overwhelming familiarity with mass-produced images of Slovakia, the prevalence of interest in the folkloric trappings of Slovak films in both the Czech and Slovak lands was, at one point, so prevalent that Czech film critic and dramaturge Jaroslav Bocek vociferously complained that " ... the Slovak cinema watched over the adjective 'Slovak' caring much less about the noun ' cinema.' No wonder there was such a rash of folklore , embroidered blouses, and national songs, since Czech directors could hardly be expected to understand Slovakia any different from the exotic, folklore , or tourist angle." 10° Compounding Bocek's irritation at the more stereotypical depictions of national identity was the fact that "these same features [folkloric trappings] began to creep even into the work of the emerging directors," to which the Czech critic added "Slovak cinema saw its raison d'etre in its very existence . .. such traits can be found in the beginnings of any cultural endeavor." 10 1 Bocek's paternal dismissal of Slovak cinema was, sadly, not an isolated incident, and echoes some of the earlier critiques of earlier ethnographic films by Plicka and others. 1.5 CONCLUSION As we have seen, Slovak documentary film followed the footsteps of earlier ethnographers and ethnographic photographers, whose original mission was to document and to codify Slovak ethnicity through the collection, reportage , and standardization of cultural and visual tropes. These early documentaries, like those in static media, were predominantly produced by non-Slovaks, who turned to Slovakia to record ways of living which had already receded out of living memory elsewhere. Although these early documentary 100 BOCE K, Jaroslav, 'Twenty Yea rs of Czechoslovak Film," in Modern Czechoslovak Film / 945/ 1965 (Praha: Arti a, dat e unknown [ 1966?)), no paginati on. 10 1 BOCE K, Jaros lav, " Twen ty Years of Czechoslovak Film." �120 SLOVAKIA 2021 films by Czech directors could be di visive in the Slovak intellectual community in Czechoslovakia, they were eagerly embraced by Slovaks li ving elsewhere as a necessary connection to their cultural roots, a connection that was prized not only for its entertainment va lue, but also for its ability to educate Slovaks abroad and in Czechoslovakia in the fundamental aspects of Slovak culture. Since Slovak documentary films were also the fundamental cinematic output of Slovak directors from the beginnings of the Slovak Republic in 1939 through the beginnings of the Slovak feature film era in the 1950s, they also proved to be the fundamental training ground for young Slovak directors, who incorporated several aesthetic aspects of documentary filmrnaking into their own feature film works. In each of these different eras of documentary film production, however, one constant remainsa continuation of the aestheticization of Slovakia, a process begun in the 19th century with the ethnographic activities performed by Hungarians, Austrians, Czechs, and eventually Slovaks themselves. The replicability of these aesthetics also helped ensure the spread of certain aspects of Slovak visual cu lture in the countryside, despite the occasional attempt to bring cinematic focus and cu ltural attention to Slovak urban communities. These attempts were ultimately foiled by the implied formal and aesthetic needs of the specifically "S lovak" documentary: since Slovak culture had been so rigorously defined through its codification period as a " rural" identity, attempts to focus on other aspects of Slovak identity (either in other urban locales or through a de-romanticization of the Slovak countryside) were met with political , cultural, and social resistance. � 92 SLOVAKIA 2021 PICTURING A NATIO SLOVAK DOCUMENTARY FILM FROM ITS BIRTH UNTIL NICHOLAS 1950 1 HUDAC " Bude Slovak, cim bol medzi narodami'- to bola veta, s ktorou nasi otcovia vstavali a lihali, to bola veta, kotra hybala ich mysliami natol'ko, ze sa v6bec nehybali. Bolo, teda bude, bude i vtedy, ked' budeme len vylihovat'." Alexander Matuska 2 One of the fundamental aims of early Slovak mass produced images 3 (cinema, lithography, and photography, among other media) was to document and catalog the ethnic, geographic, and social uniqueness of the Slovak Lands. This essay intends to trace the influence of the importance of these media in the early 20th century for Slovaks, namely, non-fiction filmmaking, and its connection with Slovak populations not just in what would become Slovakia, but also in communities abroad- primarily in America. While foreign artists typically came to Slovakia to draw inspiration from its rugged countryside and colorful fo lk costumes, Slovak photographers, engravers, and ethnographers often saw their artistic missions as a way to build a Slovak nation through the documenttation, codification, and repetition of symbols common in a geographical location where historically no " Slovak" nation had ever existed . Although Slovak photographers and engravers enjoyed modest success in the 19th 1 This artic le was made possibl e with the support of the Univerzita Karl ova and has bee n undertaken with additional support from the their Progres QI 2 Initiati ve for Literature and Performance. Ta studie vznikla v souvislosti s fesenim programu rozvoje vyzkumu UK Progres Q12 Literatura a performativita. 2 MATUSKA, Al exander, "S love nska viera v minul osti ," in : C HM EL, Rudolf, ed., Slovenskti ottizka v 20. storoci (Bratis lava : Kalligram, 1997), 12 1. Unl ess noted otherwi se, a ll tra nslati ons are my own. 3 For more on the mass-produced image, see: HUDAC, icho las, " Picturing th e ati on: Slovak Nati onal Identity in the Age of the Mass Produced Image," PhD. Di ssertati on, Uni verzit a Karlova, 2020. �SLOVAKIA 2021 93 century, 4 their mediums were soon displaced in the cultural consciousness by the rise of another mass-produced medium, cinema, which provided several boons for the documenttarian . It combined the best qualities of its predecessors : fidelity to the referent image, affordability, durability, transportability, with a novel qualitymotion. This was a new, " lifelike" or "shadowy" 5 quality (to borrow Maxim Gorky's infamous tum of phrase). First, cinema recorded motion. This made it possible to expand the ethnographic activities of Slovak activists in order to capture more aspects of "traditional" culture, ranging from regional dances to the mechanical workings of various implements in Slovak handicrafts. Secondly, cinema also provided the illusion of objecttivity, a quality which could be more easily manipulated to form national and ethnic sentiments. Thirdly, cinema was understandable without any form of specialized training, or in the words of Karel Plicka- "understandable to any people of any country." 6 Lastly, cinema, as one of the first "new" mediums of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, functioned as a source of national and ethnic pride and a vehicle for showing a region's progression into " modernity." In this paper I will first explore how these earlier documentary media contributed to the rise of Slovak documentary filmmaking in the 20th century, and then examine the impact of this tradition . However, as tempting as it would be to think of documentary film (and by extension, the aesthetics of documentary and ethnographic film) as separate from other genres of cinematic expression, for Slovak filmmakers , documentary film proved to be one of the most essential foundations for the building of a national aesthetic, whose presence could be found within a variety of genres and subgenres. Slovak documentary films (as well as certain documentary films about 4 As noted by Macek and Hrubis incky, despite Slovakia's attractiveness for photographers, it lagged behind the Czechs, Austrians, and Hunga rians in the development of both avenues for amateur photographers to disp lay thei r work, and formal training. For more on thi s see: MACEK, Vaclav, and HR UB ISINSC KY Aurel, Dejiny slovenskej fotografie (Bratislava : Slovenska narodna galeria, 200 I), 12- 13. 5 GORKY, Maxim, "The Lumiere C inematograph" in : Si mpson, Philip, et al., Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Vo l. III (New York: Routledge, 2004), 7-8 . 6 PLICKA, Karel, "Poznamky o filme - moznosti ac h a ulohach s lovenskych filmov," Slovenske poh/'ady, September 15, 1934, p. 593. �94 SLOVAKIA 2021 Slovakia produced by Czechs) were not merely reportage, but also an evolution of the same aestheticization and stylization of rural life which so captivated the early ethnographers, albeit with new influences and innovations drawn from various domestic and foreign avant-gardes and aesthetic movements. As we shall see, this repetition of personages, of landscapes, of fo lk culture or traditions, continued through Slovak fiction and animated films, working as both a metacommentary on larger issues of national and regional identities, and as a connecting thread , linking these films of different genres and ideological expressions back to a common foundation. ln most parts of the Western World, documentary, fiction , and non-documentary early film developed simultaneously and concordantly . Early filmmakers immediately realized (in the words of Bill Nicho ls), " film 's capacity to document the world around us." 7 However, documentary films about Slovakia and its people preceded any variety of domestic Slovak filmmaking by several decades, owning to several unique internal factors ; Slovakia's relatively impoverished economic situation, its isolated rural communities, and the relative lack of an educated, culturally-Slovak middle class in the Slovak Lands during the period of cinema's birth and global introduction (e.g. from 1895 to roughly 1905 8). This meant that, while cinema was known in Slovakia, this new medium was chiefly an urban and scientific phenomenon, and thus developed quite differrently in the Slovak Lands than in other neighboring regions. Un like the Czechs, who rapidly embraced this new technology and were soon developing their own domestic cinema industry, Slovak film production remained (at best) sporadic until the end of World War II , frequently dependent on Czech and American financing , talent, and interest for the production of films for a Slovak audience. However, while Slovakia's lack of cinematic infrastructure resulted in the delayed development of a Slovak national cinema, this a lso made the area highly desirable as a destination for documentary filmmakers 7 NICHOLS , Bill , " Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," in Critical lnquirv 27, no. 4 , Summer, 200 I, p. 580. 8 Again, while actualites and trave l films of Slovakia were produced during thi s period of early film , Slovakia ' s lack of cinematic and cultural infrastructure seems to have resulted in a lack of both cinematic modernism and a cinematic avant-garde as is more commonly found in other Western film culture. See: NICHOLS , " Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," p. 580 �SLOVAKIA 2021 95 from outside of the Slovak Lands, if not Slovaks themselves. Although urban Slovaks encountered film roughly at the same time as their Czech brethren to the west, the unique gestation and development of cinema in Slovakia deserves at least a cursory explanation. The first public exhibitions of cinema occurred in 1896, almost a full year after the new technology's unveiling in Paris, when, on December 16th, in Kosice's Hotel Schalkaz, local theatre director ~udovit Szalkay arranged for a demonstration of Edison's cinema technology to the public "at great financial sacrifice."9 On December 25th cinema made its debut in Bratislava (then Pressburg), when it was unveiled to the public in two local hotels- the Hotel Palugyay and the Hotel Kral' Uhorska. These projections were mostly silent, but according to eyewitnesses, they were also accompanied by an Edison phonograph on two occasions. 10 But despite these exhibitions, cinema remained confined to the major urban centers of Kosice and Pressburg/Bratislava, and even in those it was often uneasily tolerated. Early cinema projections were subject to intense governmental regulations, 11 and in 1912, the Press burg city government declared that cinema was "negatively" impacting the public. 12 Cinematic exhibitions and cinemas also faced opposition from the Roman Catholic clergy and laity, 13 who saw the technology as a sign of"moral decline" among the youth, 14 and the Hungarian theatrical community who often saw the newer, cheaper medium in a threatening Iight. 15 Despite this public opposition to the new media, cinema was not entirely absent from public life in the Slovak Lands- instead, it was merely curtailed, limited to a handful of cinemas in Bratislava and Kosice. Because of this, cinema production in the Slovak Lands was limited again to foreign or amateur producers, and little attempt was 9 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA, Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie (Martin : Osveta, 1997), 7. JO ibid. JI ibid. 12 ibid. 13 It is worth comparing the very simi lar opposition to cinema's development and expa nsion that developed in Czech Moravia at roughly the same time . For more on this see: HASAN, Petr, "' Neslusny a nevkusny ti Im nemuze byti krasnym '. Kato licka akce, struktury katolickeho tabora ajejich pusobnost na poli kinematografie v ceske m prostfedi prvni poloviny 20. stoleti," in: /1/uminace, I, 2016 . 14 MAC EK and PASTEKOVA, Dejiny s/ovenskej kinomatogrcifie, 17. 15 MACEK and PASTEKOVA, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografle, 13. �96 SLOVAKIA 2021 made to make the medium accessible in both smaller locales, or in Slovak. I.I SUBJECTS NOT AUTHORS: THE EARLY YEARS OF SLOVAK NON-FICTION FILMMAKING Although film originally received a hostile reception from various social circles in the Slovak Lands, films were made during cinema's early decades, and many of these early films fell under the criteria of what David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson termed "actualities," or films showing an event from real life, and "scenic," 16 crude travelogues designed to showcase exotic places or striking vistas. While cinema started later in the Slovak Lands, by the early 20th century Slovakia had become a destination for Hungarian directors, mainly associated with companies in Budapest 17 who were interested in filming glimpses of Slovakia's mountains. In February of 1908, the Apollo theatre in Bratislava debuted one of the first recorded scenics/actualities set in Slovakia, Wintersport im Tatralomnicz/Zimny sport v Tatranskej Lomnici. 18 A few months later the Apollo's competitor, the Elektro-Biskop cinema projected a series of panoramic scenes as part of their Welt-Panorama special, which included two more films shot in distinctively Slovak locations: Die Hohe Tatra/ Vysoke Tatry and Tur6cz-Szt.-Marton/Turciansky Svaty Martin, as part of its travelogue series. 19 Travelogues, the close cousins of the scenic genre, were a popular genre of early film making, one which attempted to provide a replication or approximation of the traveling experience for audiences hungry for new sensations, as well as a more frugal way of "experiencing" a location for a cash-strapped audience. These films were often accompanied with lectures 20 or packaged as part of a longer cinematic experience, designed to replicate the idea of a larger trave l holiday, albeit condensed into on ly a few minutes. Although these early Slovak travelogues have been 16 BORDWELL, David, and THOMPSON, Kri stin , Film Histo,y : An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 12-13 . 17 MACEK and PASTEKOVA., Dejinyslovenskej kinomatografle. 18-19. 18 "Tagesneuigkeiten!" Pressburger Zeitung. February 5, 1908, p. 2 19 "Elektro-Bioskop nur im Hotel ' zum gri.inen Baum ' in Pozsony, Program vom 14. bis 2 1 Marz," Pressburger Presse, March 16, 1908, p. 5. 20 PETE RSON , Jennifer Lynn, "Travelogues" in : Abel, Rich ard, ed., The Encyclopedia of Early Film (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 640-3. �SLOVAKIA 2021 97 lost, we can reasonnably infer what the experience wou ld have been like by surviving examples of the genre: travelogues were " highly kinetic ," "educational," and positioned as a morally and intell ectuall y healthy a lternative to the salacious or lascivious aspects of other, lesswholesome early films. While these travelogues, actualiti es, and sceni cs were originall y niche productions for audiences located far away from Slovak communities, they nonetheless sti ll largely adhered to the progression of ea rlier Slovak mass-produced images. In the first place, these travel films were essentially a new means of packaging, commodifying, standardizing, and commerciali zing the experience of being in the Slovak Lands, without having to travel and without the politically and socially divisive barrier of language. Secondly, we can clearly tell from the context in which these films were exhibited (e.g. only in the urban centers of Pressburg and Kosice, advertised through the nonSlovak press, and in cinemas that were attached to areas frequented by travelers, the upper classes, and tourists) that these films were again consumed by an Austro-Hungarian audience, not necessarily a "Slovak" one - much as the earl y engravings and lithographs of the Slovak landscape were enjoyed primarily by non-Slovak audiences first, and Slovak audiences later. Lastly, much as ethnographic lithography and photography were rapidly adopted by Slovaks as a means of preserving, codifying, and distributing visua l examp les of Slovak cu ltural identity, as we shall see in the next sections, the rationale behind these sceni cs and travelogues (name ly, that film shou ld give an impression of life in Slovakia, rather than a purely narrative structure) would later be embraced by both non-fiction and fiction filmmakers alike. 1.2 THE BEGIN NINGS OF SLOVAK DOCUMENTARY CINEMA After the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 19 18, Slovaks suddenly fo und themselves, not just as a rural curiosity in a large empire, but the second largest Slavic partner in the newly-fonned Republic of Czechos lovakia. No longer subjects to the stringent censorship laws and the Magyarization policies of the former Kingdom of Hungary, film (as with other forms of mass-produced images) began to expand. Movie theaters grew in number (from three in the �98 SLOVAKIA 2021 early 1900s to 84 by the end of Austria-Hungary,2' and increasing to 153 by the end of the First Republic) and size, appearing all over the Slovak Lands, and not just in Kosice and the newly re-named Bratislava. Furthermore, while theaters had once been limited to showing a handful of Hungarian or Austrian films in Bratislava and Kosice, distributors throughout Slovakia began adding Czech, American, and German films 22 to their theaters, though these often met with resistance from more nationalist groups. 23 Unfortunately, this rapid infusion of new cinematic experiences, techniques, and choices did not necessarily result in Slovaks developing their own cinema industry. Throughout the First Republic, Slovakia remained primarily a destination for filmmaking, but with a few minor exceptions, there would be no Slovak documentaries produced by a Slovak director until well into World War II. However, documentary film was indeed expanding in Slovakia, again often along the same ethnographi c, folkloric , or scenic and, again also widely produced by non-Slovak academics such as the Czech directors, Vladimir Uh lela and Karel Plicka as part of a broader, Czechoslovak agenda. Both Plicka and Uhlela saw their documentary productions as a means of integrating Slovaks into the cultural life of Czechoslovakia, through cultivating an aesthetic appreciation for the fo lkl oric and rural aspects of Slovak culture in non-Slovak audiences, a lbeit in very different ways. Furthermore, directors were officially funded through both government sources, as well as the Matica slovenska, and as a result both sought to bring these traditional aspects of Slovak visual cu lture into a Czecho-Slovak cultural space. In his career as an ethnographer and a photographer, Karel Plicka was concerned with producing works of art which could bridge the growing divide between Czech and Slovak audiences. Plicka 's photographic, ethnographic, and musicological output was prodigious, and from the late 1920s onwards he began a second (or third or fourth career) as a documentary filmmaker in Slovakia and in Slovak MACEK and PASTEKOV A, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie, 597-8. Advertisements for the Kino Palace and Kino Meteor in Banska Bystrica. for example, show both American films and German films on their programs as early as 1928; larger cinemas in Bratis lava and Kosice had, of course, made international progra min g a staple of their repertoires from the very beginning . 23 " Potreba naprvy vo filmovej produckii a predvazdani filmov. Dockame sa v Kosic iach viacerych domacich ti lmov?" Slo vensky v_1ichod, January 24, 1933 , p. 3 . 21 22 �SLOVAKIA 2021 99 communities abroad. Starting with l 928's Za slovenskym /'udom, Plicka approached Slovak culture through the lenses of his earlier work as a musicologist and a photographer, meticulously documenting the exotic aspects of Slovak (and to a lesser extent, Rusyn) culture for Czech, Slovak, and international audiences. Like many early film directors, Plicka had little to no formal training, relying on his amateur knowledge of photography and supplementing this with his learned or natural talent as an ethnographer. For Plicka, this Slovakia, as of yet only barely codified and recognized as a political or social sphere, contained a wealth of information which needed to be documented: On my trips after Slovak folksongs , I came to many lesser known and even forgotten areas, to which almost 'no one' had ever come up until then . No one, or rather, hardly anyone except those with open eyes and trained ears. It ' s no wonder. Ethnographic Slovakia is a vast and extensive world, and there never will be enough of those who could satisfy the need to write down, draw , and photograph this richness.24 Although Plicka was wary of the mechanical " ripping" of folk songs and images from living performances into mechanized fossils, he soon embraced the advantages of these modern technologies. He began to experiment with film starting in the mid- I 920s as a "documentary tool for ethnographic and folkloric events," 25 which could satisfy, if not all of his documentary impulses, at least most of them. Although the Matica slovenska and Plicka had worked together numerous times on his ethnographic photographical and musicological expeditions throughout Slovakia, the organization felt that a movie camera was necessary for the broadening of their efforts in the young Czechoslovakia. 26 Archival records in Matica slovenska show that Plicka obtained a Pathe movie camera in the spring of 1926 in Prague, 27 where he learned to use the new tool; only a few months 24 PLICKA , Karel , " Ako sme filmov ali," S/ovenske poh/'ady. April I , 1930, pp. 215- 16 25 LAC KOVA , Sy lvia, LEXMANN , Juraj , and SLIVKA Martin , eds., Karol Plicka vo fl/m ove) faktografii, (Brati slava: S loven sky film ovy ustav , 1983), 36. 26 KRC M ERY , Ste fan , Tri rol..y Matice slovenskej I 924- 1926 (Turc iansky sv. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1927), 8-9. 27 PLIC KA , Karol. Co rres pondence. Coll ected in: LAC KOVA , Sl yv ia, LEXMANN , Juraj , and SLIVKA Martin , Karol Plicka vo jilmovej f i:1ktogra/ii, 187. �100 SLOVAKIA 2021 later, Plicka wrote to Matica slovenska to arrange the local permissions and cooperation necessary to start his cinematic work, saying: Please send a message immediately to inform the schools in Zliechova, and in Kosecke Rovne, as well as the parish office in Zliechova, that the ethnographic department of Matica Slovenska proposes to, after a number of days/starting from the 14th of this month, to start working there, and to: record songs, photograph, and to film scenes, which the Zleichovans demonstrated in Trencianske Teplice. Matica Slovenska requests moral support for this significant work in these historic villages." 28 In much of 1926, 1927, and 1928, Plicka traveled through Slovakia (primarily in the Liptov and Orava regions popularized by the pioneering ethnographic artists Pavol Sochan and Peter Michal Bohun), recording film footage, as well as continuing his other ethnographic activities. The resulting film Za s/o venskym f'udom was received with great fanfare in the Slovak community on both sides of the Atlantic. Slovaks in America marveled at Plicka's ethnographic ambition, noting that the film was a "powerful piece of cultural propagation," which was "very sympathetically accepted by all of the Slovak and even Czechoslovak public."29 The nationalistic daily Slovak praised the film as "something that is worthwhile for the part of our public, which does not have the possibility to see all the treasures of our national spirit,"30 while the more centrist Slovensky dennik labelled the ft Im "the loveliest surprise of the year" and thri lied at seeing Slovaks on the screen "where one is accustomed to seeing nowadays only the sorrows and joys of other nations ."3 1 The film combined not only Plicka 's photographic talent (indeed many of the scenes depicted on film were also photographed for Plicka's and Matica slovenska's later use) for finding the abstract patterns in the Slovak countryside with the athletic and physical prowess of hi s subjects, who dance traditional dances and display feats of strength while dressed in various traditional regional kroje. 28 Ibid. "Rok kulturnej prace," Ynungstownske slovenske novivny. May 3, 1929, p. 3 30 " Film za slovenskym l'udom ," Slovak (Bratislava), March I, 1929, p. 4. 31 "Za slovenskym l'udom," Slovensk_)1dennik (Bratislava), March 14, 1929, p. 6. 29 �SLOVAKIA 2021 101 Za s/ovenskym /'udom was funded largely by Matica slovenska, which experienced a resurgence of popularity and importance following the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Matica slovenska's mission of preserving, codifying, and unifying Slovak culture internally as well as internationally, meshed with Plicka 's own natural urges to record and transmit. A second well-received documentary about highland Slovaks titled Po horach, po dolach followed in l 929, which received an even wider domestic release than Plicka's first film, as well as winning pri zes in international film and photographic competitions in 1932. Like Za slovenskym /'udom, Po horach, po dolach was also funded by Matica slovenska, and featured much of the same style and content as Plicka's debut film , and was shown to a wider variety of audiences, including Czechs. 32 By the early 1930s, Plicka had begun producing documentari es for both Matica slovenska and private concerns, such as an informative non-fiction quasiadvertisement for the town of Piest'any 's famous medicinal baths and mud treatments. Furthermore, his films were beginning to be utilized by American Slovak organizations like Jednota, the Slovak League of America, and others as a means to educate American Slovaks about their cultural heritage as well as the benefits of Slovak ethnic identity.33 Plicka 's most famous film might be considered to be his 1933 paean to Slovakia, Zem spieva, which combines scenes of rural Slovak folklore and traditional dress along with intertitles by the Slovak poet and translator Jan Smrek. Curiously, although Plicka was an early proponent of the ethnographic and educational possibilities of sound film, he elected to set the film to an impressionistic score by the Czech composer Frantisek Skvor, despite declaring that sound film as a medium is the " the ideal documentation" 34 in an interview with his collaborator Smrek only a few years earlier. Whil e Plicka 's early work 32 MALINA, Vladimir, "O moznostiach slovenskeho zvukoveho filmu ," Elim. November, 193 1. 33 See: CU LEN , Kon stantin, S/ovaci v Amerike: crty z kulturnych dejin (Tuciansky Sv. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1938) as we ll as ALEXANDER , June Granatir, Ethnic Pride, American Parriorism: Slovaks and Orher New Immigrants in rhe lnren var Era (Ph ilade lphia: Templ e Unive rsity Press, 2004). 34 SMREK, Jan, "O praci pre zac hovanie l'udovej piesne: rozhovor s jej znalcom a vasnyvim sbera tel'om Karlom Plickom," £/an: mesiacnik pre literaruru a umenie, March , 1933, p. 5. �102 SLOVAKIA 2021 was often mere documentation for the sake of preservation , Zem spieva is an expansion of Plicka 's more experimental photographic vision. Plicka takes the viewer on a musical and vis ual trip through Slovakia's wild mountains, not for the sake of scientific observation, but to experience the poetic essence of Czechoslovakia ' s most exotic locales. As Bill Nichols noted in his essay "Documentary Film and the Moderni st Avant-Garde," what separated interwar documentary film from mere reportage like newsreel s, was its artistic pretensions. 35 While the First Republic was full of newsreel s documenting world events and cultural phenomena from exotic locales, Slovakia included, Zem spieva represented two complimentary, yet different intentionsthe first was to continue to raise, on the one hand Czech appreciation and awareness of Slovak cu lture, whi le simultaneously allowing Slovaks an opportunity to have their own culture valued on equal standing with the more "sophisticated" and dominant Czech culture. Zem spieva 's modernist influences are most strongly fe lt in its theoretical conception and execution . While the film is a "sound" film in terms of its technical composition with Skvor' s pre-recorded soundtrack , the film ' s formal structure adheres more closely to the avant-garde experimentation of the late silent film era, featuring no diagetic sound or dialogue, and only intertitles explaining the significance of the scenes. 36 This suited Plicka, as he explained in his 1932 article "Poznamky o filme moznostiach a ulohach slovenskych filmov": Slovak films will be sound films , since today, unfortunately, it is impossible to make any other kind. But they will certainly not be I 00% dialogue film s, perhaps thanks to the producers, but an arti stic and commercial error. In the interest of internationali sm, it will be necessary to curb dialogs and really, the entire weight which bears the influence of the theatre, will have to be limited to the most modest, if not reduced entirely for that matter, in order to make the film as understandable as it was at its happi est, when it was silent. This mostly applies to the Slovak situation ; we will not be able to afford many films on ly for ourselves. It is better to 35 NI C HOLS, Bill, " Doc umentary Film and th e Modernist Avan t-Garde," Critical ln- qui,y . Vol. 27, No. 4, Summer, 20 11 , p. 588. 36 LAC KOVA. , Slyvia, LEXMANN, Juraj, and SLIVKA Martin, eds., Karol Plicka vo.filmovej.faktografii (Bratislava : Slovensky filmo vy ustav, 1983), 89 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 103 produce little, but except that which is thoughtful and valuable. 37 Although such an approach to sound design was dec idedly archaic (even in 1933),38 Plicka was, in some se nse, correct: this decision paradoxically increased Zem spieva 's international appeal. On the one hand, the relegation of the Slovak language within the film to small, easily digested intertitles meant that the film was easily accessible to Slovak populations in the United States, whose command of the language might have been fossilized or had languished through the process of assimilation. 39 On the other hand, the focus on the more purely abstract visual and musicological aspects of Slovak folk culture allowed the film to function as " poetry," without the di straction or potential friction of Slovak dialogue, an abstraction that also allowed the film to represent various different "S lovakias" for different audiences. While the American Slovaks rejoiced in finding a poetiziation of their ancestral homeland, Slovakia's most exotic and access ible qualities, such as its visual splendor, its vital folk culture, and its melodies, were easily absorbed by outsiders who did not require any specialized linguistic skill to appreciate them. Additionally, Plicka' s long-time editor, the Czech avant-garde photographer and filmmaker Alexandr Hackenschmied, was instrumental in reshaping the narrative structure of the film through his assured editing style, and via his suggestion that Plicka shoot additional introductory and ending footage. 40 Hackenschmied was born into a family of academics in Prague, and hi s childhood in the (then) industrial neighborhood of Karlin gave him ample opportunity to visit the numerous cinemas around that part of the city, 41 sowing the seeds of hi s great interest in film and photography. Following his high school graduation, Hackenschmeid bega n hi s architectural studies, but found himself drawn more strongly to cinema and photography, and 37 PLICKA , Karel , " Poznamky o filme - moznostiach a ulohach slovenskyc h filmov," S/ovenske poh/'ady, September 15, 1934, p. 593 . 38 For more on the problems of sou nd films in Slovak ia during the interwar period, see my Ph .D. dissertation . HUDAC, Nicholas, " Picturing the Na ti on: Slovak National Identity in the Age of the Mass Produced Image," Univerzita Karlova , 2020. 39 C.f. CU LEN, Konstantin, Slovaci V Amerike. 40 ANDEL, Jaroslav, Alexandr Hackenschmied(Praha: TORST, 2000), 29. 41 BROZ, A /exander Hackenschied (Praha: Ceskoslovensky filmovy ustav, 1973 ), 202 1. �104 SLOVAKIA 2021 various global avant-gardes active in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the work of Man Ray, the Soviet LEF group, Dziga Yertov, and more.42 While Hackenschmied was active in photographic circles from his student days, starting in 1930 he began to make his own films . More than a film enthusiast and a future film editor- he was a film theorist, a photographer, and a filmmaker himself, deeply concerned with the possibilities of montage and form . Hackenschmeid began editing Zem spie va in Prague in 1932, but completed the final cut after Plicka returned from additional shoots in Slovakia with more footage . In a conversation with Martin Sli vka, one of his former students, Plicka recounted his views on the finished product: What do I want Zem spie va to say via film? I would be happy if it was approached without interpretation . It deals with Slovakia as unknown as well as beautiful: the theme of the film is the lives of people in a village and their holy relationship to nature. As the film ' s subtitles suggest, Zem spieva is a cinematic poem celebrating precious traditions; it should be evidence of an enchantingly pure manifestation of life, which is so simple, yet so important. And the film shows a world in which our fathers ' healthy and precious heritage has, by some miracle, been preserved in some regions until today.',4 3 In this sense, Plicka' s intentions for Zem spie va represent an inversion of the earlier ethnographic assumptions that ethnographic subjects are worthy of documentation because of the interesting-yettlawed nature of their ancient practices. Instead, in both the content of Zem spie va and in his comments to the press, Plicka explicitly rejects the predominant political push by Czech (and some Slovak) political and cultural authorities to modernize and industrialize Slovakia .44 Rather, the film's premise is a twist on the time-honored modernist 42 BROZ, Alexander Hackenschied, pp. 2 1-22. SLIVKA , Martin , Karol Plicka. hasnik obrazu (Martin: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1982), 175. 44 Although a compl ete accounting of th e industriali zation debate regarding Slovaki a is beyond th e scope of thi s arti c le, see, for example, MATULA, Antonin, " Dvacatyosmy fij en," in Ceska osveta: /isl venovan_y zajmum vdejneho knihovnictvi a organisaci lidoveho vzdelani. September, 1938, Vol. 35 , No. I, pp. 5-7; and HA VLiCE K, V., " Narodni problem Slovenska," in Nase doba: revue pro vedu. umeni a i ivo/ socia/ni, November, 1933, Vol. 41 , No. 2, pp. 68-73. 4 .1 �SLOVAKIA 2021 105 tradition of the city symphony, a genre of early avant-garde filmmaking practiced by directors such as Walter Ruttmann and Dziga Vertov, which sought to translate the immense vitality and activity of an urban space to the reproducible and distributable form of cinema as a celebration of modern industrialization and urbanization. While not every audience member could afford a trip to Berlin or Moscow, a city symphony provided an impressionistic vision of such urban locales that could satisfy the longings for new visual stimulation and locations for a reasonable price. Plicka ' s vision for Zem spieva followed a model similar to Ruttman's and Vertov's films , yet inverted. For the price of a mere ticket, audience members could journey away from Bratislava, deep into the wild Slovak mountains, where a visual feast of dancing, ethnic clothing and stunning vistas awaited them, accompanied with rapturous song. Although Zem spie va was produced under the auspices of Matica slovenska, the old vanguard of Slovak national sentiment and as part of a series of governmental programs to promote Slovak culture in the Republic, not all Slovak activists were thrilled by Plicka' s aims or the resources devoted to its production. As an anonymous letter in the Slovak periodical Nastup declared: When we think about our devastated Slovakia's economic ruin, about the misery of our Slovak people, the overwhelming question mark which stands before our Slovak intelligentsia is about the misery and scarcity at every step and yet on the other hand, we are making our sole Slovak film 'The Earth Sings,' and between these two, we clench our teeth and deeply sigh. Yes, we sing! But the stomach doesn't sing, it whines .45 Still other Slovak critics noted that, despite Slovakia's reliance on foreign producers and directors focusing on "a narrow slice of Slovakia in Czech films" 46 represented, as Stefan Hoza wrote in Kinorevue, a promising step forward , (the film ' s lack of Slovak financing notwithstanding) giving hope that Zem spieva would usher in a new era of Czech and Slovak films about Slovakia.47 Other Slovak 45 Nastupi sta od Zvolena [pseudonym] "Zem spieva ... " Nastup, March 15, 1935, p. 10. 46 HOZA, Stefan , "Hovom1e o slovenskom film e a - o moznostiach ," Kinorevue, Vol. I, No. 30, March 20, 1935, p. 5. 47 HOZA , Stefan , "Hovorme o slovenskom filme a - o moznostiach," p.6. �106 SLOVAKIA 2021 intellectuals argued amongst themselves as to whether or not Zem spieva counted as ethnographic reportage,48 nationalist "gyc," or a lyrical and stylized portrayal of Slovakia's essence, as Vlado Clementis argued in 1933 49--{;learly not all of Plicka 's artistic experimentation was received in earnest. Perhaps the best sign of the film 's Czechoslovak intent was how vociferously it was condemned on the grounds that Plicka himself, as a non-Slovak, was not qualified to make such a film. Although Czech critics often saw the film as a wonderful celebration of the venerated narodni dilo tradition, the Czech public, on the other hand-especially the fickle Prague audiences, at least according to the press, were not interested in Zem spieva, because of the lingering effect of the "Slovak question" (the repeated calls for Slovak autonomy) had poisoned the well of Czecho(Slovak) culture in the mind of the ordinary Prazak.50 As the Czech critic Jaroslav Broz wrote: We had anticipated that, because, in thi s day and age, when the Slovak question is such a burning domestic political problem of our state, a film about Slovakia would be especially welcomed and raise the interest of the public. But we were sadly disappointed. The numerical balance sheet of the premiere of Plicka 's film in Prague is a sad document of the cultural ignorance of the Prague public. 5 1 Although the film failed to find an audience in the larger Czech metropoles, Zem spieva 's international release and distribution meant that the film was often seen by American Slovaks, "who follow with great interest anything done in Slovakia," 52 and who turned it into both a means of expressing ethnic pride in multicultural American cities, while also using it as an educational tool for non-Slovaks and Slovaks alike. It is, thus, fitting that the artistic ambition of Plicka's last film was most appreciated in American circles, where the Slovak question was either a whispered query among ethnic boosters in a neighborhood 48 TUMA, J., "Zem spieva, ale o cem?" Tvorba. November 9, 1933 . CLEMENTIS, Vladoj "Je Plickov film folkloristickym gycom?" DAV. Vol. I, No. 10, p. 149. 50 SM REK, Jan , "Vel'kost a bieda jednoho vit'azstva," Elim. ovember, 1933 , p. 8. 51 Ibid. 52 GETTING , Milan , "O Slovensku treba prednasat' i Americanom anglickeho jazyka," S/o vensky dennik. September 4, 1935, p. I. 49 �SLOVAKIA 2021 107 bar or forgotten entirely in the multicultural din of American cities. While economic anxiety and nativist sentiment in some comers of Slovak society muted the film 's reaction among hardline nationalists, Zem spieva was warmly received in other areas not just as an artistic achievement, "something that does not have an analog in global [film] production," 53 as the Czech daily Lidove noviny called it, but as an educational tool. It would show the Czech population that Slovak culture could transcend its reputation for provincialism. Furthermore, Slovak cultural groups in America and the Czech Lands scheduled screenings, sometimes with Plicka 's participation in the case of the latter, as a means of promoting Czechoslovak unity. Although the film was shown fairly regularly in the 1930s, it was nearly lost entirely during World War 11 when the original negatives were destroyed by fire in 1944; afterwords, an imperfect and incomplete copy was salvaged from a positive negative in 1945. Zem Spieva was a mixed success in Czechoslovakia, but, perhaps more importantly, it was a striking critical success among avant-garde circles in America and Europe. There, Zem spieva was shown not only at Czech and Slovak ethnic theaters and events, but also in more mainstream settings, such as at the 1934 Venice Biennale, where Plicka was awarded the City Cup of Venice for Best Director. American Slovak institutions were likewise more enthusiastic audiences for Plicka's films . A feature in the Youngstownske slovenske noviny, written by Matica slovenska's Jozef Cincik, considered Zem spieva living history, which captured "the most important moments in Slovak life." 54 Unlike America, whose foundational historical moments were dead and only experienced in museums, Cincik argued that in Zem spieva "we Slovaks have captured in this picture and its subject, all of the moving, speaking, and sounds of music on film for our descendants, everything that Americans will never be able to capture of their own history for themselves." 55 In other words, Zem spieva was able to codify, and solidify, foundational moments in Slovak history and make them available to the entire nation- similar in many regards to the original aim of ethnographic 53 JEZE K, S., "Zem spieva," Lidove noviny , October 27, 1933, p. 16. CINCi K, Jozef, "O filme Zem spieva," Youngtownske slovenske noviny, February 14, 1936, p. 2. 55 Ibid. , p. 2. 54 �108 SLOVAKIA 2021 photography, albeit with a greater power to preserve, to fix in time, and to replicate. The relative success of the film encouraged Matica slovenska to again provi de Plicka with funding and resources for his next featurelength fi lm, I 936's Za Slovakmi od New Yorku po Mississippi. While Zem spieva focused on Plicka's attempts to bring the rhythms and visuals of life in the Slovak highlands to a diverse, urban audience in Czechoslovakia as part of building a modernist Czechoslovak culture, Za Slovakmi instead focused on Slovak expatriate communities and Matica slovenska's activities in America, as Plicka documented the arrival of three of the organization's top officials (Jozef CigerHronsky, Jozef Cincik and Kon stantin Culen,) to the United States in 1936, and the ways in which the ethnographic mission of Matica slovenska was replicated in America. Often considered "only reportage" 56 by Czech and Slovak film critics, this film was not widely shown in Czechoslovakia; however, it did receive a release in America via fraternal and civic American Slovak organizations such as the Slovak Catholic Sokol, and the First Catholic Ladies Slovak Association, another sign of the strong cultural interchange between Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and those in America, which lasted up until World War II . Although Plicka is more widely known today, in terms of contemporary historiography of Slovak film , Vladimir Uh lela was another colleague of Plicka whose personal history bears many simi larities to Plicka 's own. Uhlela was born in Vienna in 1888, studied physiology and botany in Prague and Strassbourg, and, after receiving his doctorate, he became enamored with the possibilities of film after being exposed to it through his postgraduate research.57 After a stint in military pri son during World War I for being a "dangerous Panslavist," 58 Uhlela was released, served honorably, and then returned to Czechoslovakia where he became both an academic in Brno, and a public intellectual. He acted as the science editor for lidove Noviny, as we ll as contributing to numerous other publiccations. Like Plicka, Uh lela was a passionate devotee of folklore, 56 NAVRATIL, Antonin, Ceslv k pravde ci Ii i: 70 lei ceskoslovenskeho dokumenlcirniho filmu (Praha: Akademie muzic kyc h umeni v Praze, 2002), 5 1. 57 STOLL, Martin, et al., Cesky.film: reiisefi - dokumen/arisle (Praha : Libre. 2009), 587-8. SN Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 2021 109 collecting songs and documenting folk culture, not only in Moravia, but in Slovakia as well. Although a well-known popularizer of science in the popular media (including in cinema as well as in print), in the early 1930s, Uhlela devoted himself to making ethnographic films , focusing especial ly on the borderlands between Moravia and Slovakia, where Slovak communities thrived in the mountains . Although Uh lela made several smaller films on ethnographic themes such as Slovacka pisen and Slovacka svatba, he is best known for his full-length ethnographic drama/documentary Mizejici svet/ Miznuci svet shot and released in 1932. Alth ough the film has many ethnographic moments featuring Moravian Slovak villagers from the locations it was shot in, the film is a romantic drama at its core, as it fo ll ows the troubles of a young Czech ethnographer, Stana Homa, who has come from Prague to a small vi ll age on the border of Moravia and Slovakia to document the inhabitants' customs, songs, and kroje (folk costumes). As young Stana becomes more enthralled with the village and a certain young vi ll ager, she finds herself integrating more and more into vi ll age li fe, until the arrival of her friends from Prague shatter the dream. Despite her attempts to become fully integrated into vi ll age life, the vi ll age and its inhabitants vanish, leaving the young ethnographer standing in the middle of an empty room, alone. At its heart Mizmici svet represented, in many ways, a fundamentally Czechoslovak approach to " traditional" Slovak culture, where the dividing line between Slovak and Czech is one not necessarily of language or ethnicity, but of a rural-urban divide. Despite its ethnic ambiguity, the Slovak press praised the film, especially on its visual merits, and eagerly considered it one of their own. Slovenska krajina enthusiastically complimented the film's "beautiful kroj" as "a treat for the eyes," 59 whereas Slovensky dennik enjoyed the film, but negatively compared it to the works of Plicka, saying that, if it were not for Plicka's film , " [Mizmici svet] will most likely be cons idered our first folkloric film , which has no antecedent." 60 Even the stoutly nationalist and famously anti-Czech Slovak grudgingly approved of parts of the film , even though 59 MAZEL, 8. , "Zo prazskeho tyzdna "S/ovenska Krajina, November 22, 1932, p. 2. "Plickov film' Po Horach, po dolach' a Matica Slov.," S/ovensky dennik, November 13 , 1932, p. I. 60 �110 SLOVAKIA 2021 "[ Miznuci svet] does not manage to overcome Plicka's Slovak film of this kind ," it was a sound film , "which captured the disappearing life of Slovak villages on the Moravian border" and the scenes "where the swift life of the majestic lads is best illustrated through dance." 61 The contrast between Uhela's and Plicka's visions was further intensified following its debut in 1932, as a review of Zem spieva in Slovensky dennik praised Plicka's film via a backhanded swipe at Miznuci svet, saying "Zem spieva isn't one of those films which are constructed with cold calculation, inorganically loaded down with so called natural or ethnographic ' action' shots, as was, for example, in the distracting moments in the otherwise superb Miznuci svet, "62 intensifying the competition between the two most prominent Slovak-themed films of the early 1930s. Although Plicka's films were heavily influenced by the Modernist leanings of the Czech avant-garde and Bauhaus, Uh lela's film was in many ways, a different aesthetic experience. Since Plicka 's background in photography meant that he often preferred immaculately composed static shots, with an emphasis on the geometrical patterns he so often found in the Slovak countryside, the collective footage shot by Otakar Schutz, Jan Calabek, Josef Sti'echa, and Josef Buzek used in Miznuci svet is often frenetically active, soaring and zooming around the landscape like a bird, and calling to mind (as the reviewer in Slovak contemptuously pointed out) the "Soviet" 63 influences of the film. Montage sequences also abound throughout the film , repeating shots of the countryside, the growth of plants, the changing of seasons- the very same subjects which were often found in Plicka 's photographic and cinematic work, only viewed through the lens of a different approach to cinematography. However, despite their differences of setting and their treatment of other external cinematic factors, such as sound, Plicka's films and Uhlela's lone ethnographic feature film do share several simi larities. Both films revolve around the allure of leaving civilized, urban environments and reconnecting with older traditions in the countryside. Furthermore, these films sought to break free of the rigid 61 "Film - Mizniici svet. " Slovak, April 5, 1933, p. 5. BALLO, Iva n, "Zem spieva (o prvom slovenskym film e zvukom)," Slo vensky dennik. January I 0, 1933, p. 3. 63 "Film - Mizniici svet. "Slovak. April 5, 1933, p. 5. 62 �SLOVAKIA 2021 111 trappings of purely ethnographic films in a variety of ways: through the hybridization of genre (e.g. Zem spieva 's mixture of the ethnographic film with elements of the city symphony genre, or Miznuci svet 's combination of non-fiction ethnography and fictional melodrama), by incorporating a variety of techniques from Czech or international avant-gardes such as montage and geometrical compositions, and by creating an impressionistic portrait of the experience of Slovakia without relying on the objective aims of scientific film making. And paradoxically, despite their attempts at creating "Czecho-Slovak" Slovak films, or film s about Slovaks and Slovakia within the context of a unified Czechoslovak nation, both directors were, in many ways failures at creating films that transformed their own personal aestheticizations of the Slovak experience into a more unifying one; Plicka 's films were embraced only among Slovak communities at home and abroad as well as among a select group of the urban Czech cultural elite, whereas Uhlela's film languished in obscurity on all fronts- neither Slovak enough for the Slovak nationalists, nor exotic enough for an urban Czech audience. 1.3 FASCISM AND THE RISE OF DOMESTIC SLOVAK PRODUCTION While nationalistic mass-produced images favored by both foreign ethnographers and Slovaks themselves could quickly be repurposed to promote various political ideologies, documentary film was no exception. With the growing support of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP), in the mid-to-late 1930s, the Czecho-Slovak interests in Slovakia (most elegantly embodied in Plicka 's documentary and pedagogical work) found themselves under attack by Slovak nationalists. Indeed, many hardliners took offense at the prominence of Czech and foreign directors producing films about Slovakia and for Slovaks, or alternately ignoring the Slovak market altogether, despite the fact that Czech cinemas and cinema production companies were far more numerous, successful, and better-funded. 64 As a result, on November 4th, 1938, members of the ruling HSPP began to purge not only foreign influences (such as Soviet cinema) from Slovak movie theaters, but also began to initiate a broader range of policies which would eventually forbid Jews, Czechs, and other 64 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA., Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie (Martin : Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1997) 74. �112 SLOVAKIA 2021 minont1es from owning, operating, or participating in the Slovak cinema industry,65 with th e notable exception of a handful of stateapproved Czech directors and cameramen like Eugen Mateicka and Bohus Havranek. 66 In order to satisfy the need for cinema, the Slovak government appealed for outside help in order to replace the technical knowledge and talent driven away or excluded by its policies. In addition to receiving aid from film organizations in Vienna, Berlin, and elsewhere, the Slovak Republic set up three organizations for making non-fiction films : Nastup (which produced primarily weekly newsreel s), Skolfilm (which produced educational films) , and Luc (a film monthly company which produced primarily cultural films .)67 These organizations were respon sible for producing nearl y all of Slovak non-fiction films before 1950. While many of the prominent non-Slovak fi gures in early Slovak cinema such as Karel Plicka were driven out of Slovakia during thi s period, a handful of Slovak directors such as Pal'o Bielik were able to continue, openly and sometimes covertly, the cinematic process started by Plicka. Bielik (who rose to fame playing the infamous bandit Juraj Janosik in Martin Fric 's 1935 film of the same name), along with other young S lovak filmmakers in the late First Republic, had mostly learned their craft through either their time in the fi lm industry as actors (in the case of Bielik) or through studyi ng with Plicka and other instructors at (or loosely affiliated with) the Brati slava-based School of Applied Arts. This was a revolutionary institution which featured instruction not just in photography and filmmakin g, but also graphic design , painting, advertising, typogramphy, and textile design .68 However, regardless of their background, th e young Slovak filmmakers quickly found themselves actively constrained by government and industrial censorship, which sought to exorcise the " dangerous" elements harmful to the Slovak nation from Slovak cinematic production . In practice, this meant not only purging 65 HA AKOVA, Petra, " Proticeska agenda s lovenskeho filmu 1939- 1945 ," in : Minoriry a.film (Bratislava: Asociacia slovenskyc h filmovych klubov, 20 12), 46. 66 HANAKOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska fi lmova kulllira ( Bratislava: Slovensky filmov y ustav, 20 I0). 49. 67 MIHA.LIK , Peter, Vznik slovenskej narodnej kinemarogra/ie / 896- 1948 (Bratislava : Kabinet divadlo a filmu Slovenskej akademi e vied, 1994), 94. 68 MOJZISOVA, Iva, "Avant-Garde Repercussions in the Schoo l of Applied Arts in Bratislava 1929- 1939, Journal of Design Histaty, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1992. p. 273. �SLOVAKIA 2021 113 Slovak cinema of the thematic and formal innovations imported from abroad, but also eliminating the influences of a trio of dangerous domestic ingredients namely the "Czech-Jewish-Bolshevik"69 influence. Nearly all of the official cinematic output during the short-lived Slovak Republic seems to have focused solely on two non-fiction fronts- periodic newsreels depicting the activities of the Slovak troops in World War n, and so-called " kultume filmy ," or "cultural films ,"70 which were an evolution of the pre-war ethnographic films (often influenced as well by Weimar and Fascist-era German nationalist film s), 7 1 designed to promote a se nse of Slovak nationalism and patriotism. The roots of these cultural film s can be traced back to the 1930s, with the rise of ethnographic feature films like Zem spieva. However, unlike Plicka 's work, little attention was paid to making an ethnographically accurate recording of Slovak life; rather, these cultural films were to celebrate an idealized "S lovakia," which never wholly existed. On November 5, 1934, the "S polok priatel'ov kulumeho filmu na Slovensku" was formed in Bratislava. It sought, as part of its educational mission, to establish "cinemas only for cultural film" in Bratislava and to coordinate with a wide circle of Slovak cultural organi zations throughout Slovakia to make " cultura l film s an accessory in the upbringing of children and uplifting the public." 72 In addition to being an educational tool , Slovak nationalists also saw film as a means to transcend the stereotypes of Slovakia as "a beautiful, but poor, land where life is very primitive"73 that had been established in prior ethnographic and documentary work . A second, less-frequently articulated goal (at least not publicl y) was to "make Slovak film production at least as well-regarded as those done by other bigger nations." 74 Finally, the drive for documentary cinema in the Slovak Republic was, ironically, based on an idea which would later be coopted by the communist regime a few years later, name ly that " film 69 HANAKOV A, Petra, " Proticeska agenda slovenskeho filmu 1939- 1945," 46. Ibid., 45. 71 "Charakter kultume ho film a: P6vodny rozhovor 'S lovaka ' s reziserom 'Tobisu, "' Slovak. March 27, 1942, p. 7. 72 " Pre kulturny film," Slovensky dennik. November 4, 1935, p 9. 73 CE RESNA, M., "S lovensky svojraz a cudzina," Nastup, Apri l I, 1940, p. 14. 74 "S lovenska filmova produkcia," Slovak. August, 6, 1942, p. 8. 70 �114 SLOVAKIA 2021 will help raise up a new kind of person ," 75 informing the Slovak population not only about various topical concerns, but also teaching them what it preci sely means to be "Slovak." In February of 1942 Pal'o Bielik, who had been a celebrated actor in interwar Czechoslovak cinema, as well as in the Slovak National Theatre, found himselfunemployed for budgetary and "other creative" reasons, 76 and so he turned to the newly-formed Slovak film agency Nastup for work as a librettist, before finding a position in the departments of short films and cultural films . Bielik, in many ways, was an accidental filmmaker, one who "fell into film ," and often felt quite ambivalent in regards to the medium. In a 1967 interview in Tvorba, Bielik recounted his first accidental exposures to cinema both as a director and as a spectator: "I fell, as they say, straight-legged into film . It was even worse, like when you throw a non-swimmer into cold water. Save yourself, if you know how! And I've saved myselfup until now. But I can't manage to get away from film ." 77 Bielik began his career directing short documentary and cultural films without any formal training, relying on his experiences in front of a camera during his career as an actor in the first Czechoslovak Republic. Although he was forced to work with the semi-fascist regime during this period, the early documentaries which Bielik produced were as apolitical as possible. 1942 's O zdravie robotnika, was a short film about a newly established sanatorium 78 and 1943 's Pod holym nebom, 79 was a 14-minute "artistic reportage" 80 focused on the daily activities around a traditional Orava shepherd's hut and "the romantic splendor of the Slovak countryside." 81 Some of Bielik 's other documentaries during this period included works on fish and the sport of fishing 82 ( 1943 's Hlavatky) , the manufacture and demonstration of traditional Slovak valasky in Miznuca romantika 75 -ik- " Film v novem zivote," Pravda, Vol. I, March I 0, 1944, p. 4. HANJ\KOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska.filmova kulflira, 46. 77 JAN EK, Miroslav, " Vzpominky a plan y Pal'a Bielka," Tvorba: list pro kritiku a umeni. January 12, 196 1, No. 2, pp. 28-9. 78 HAN J\ KOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska.filmova kult1ira. 57. 79 Ibid., 53. 80 Ibid. 81 "S loven ska filmova produkcia," Slo vak. August, 6, 1942, p. 8. 82 "Vel'konocny program premierovyc h kin Nastup a Urania," Slovak, April 7, 1944, and "Nove film y Nastupu," Gardista. November 28, 1943 , p. 4. 76 �SLOVAKIA 2021 115 ( I 943), and the production of flour and bread in Chlieb nas kai dodenny ( 1943). Although not all of Bielik's wartime documenttaries focused on the purely folkloric or ethnographic, by and large, they were films about the Slovak countryside and again, consistent with the aims of earlier ethnographic work. While it appeared that Bielik would spend the war attempting to draw little attention to himself with his documentaries on traditional Slovak subjects, the eruption of the Slovak National Uprising in August of 1944 suddenly changed the young director's career. While in the midst of shooting an unrelated film Hanka sa vydava in Brezena, Bielik and his crew caught wind of the Uprising and immediately rushed to join. As Bielik recalled in 1961, the group not only met with the partizans in order to get footage of the historic event, they actually joined the uprising itself: The Uprising caught me in Brezina during the filming of Hanka sa vydava. There were four other filmmakers with me: Krska, Richter, Plavec, a Sekula. We became lieutenants, they gave us uniforms, and we began to film . I led a group and wrote a scenario under the name 'Odboj 1944.' Krska filmed. It's thanks to him that we have authentic material from those days." 83 This raw reportage, which Bielik shot during his time in Brezina was later renamed, re-edited and repurposed into Bielik's 1945 documentary Za slobodu, although some of the film was lost when unknown persons stumbled upon the hiding place of some of the most sensitive footage: We buried part of the film negative underground in the village ofNemce in a graveyard underneath a tombstone. Some strangers, thinking that they found some treasure, collected the film strips, exposed them to light, and once again overexposed them. So they destroyed ten meters of an extraordinarily valuable film." 84 Although Za slobodu did not premiere during the war and was only finished in 1945,85 it nonetheless served as a potent anti-fascist KJ JAN EK, Miroslav, " Vzpomink y a plany Pal'a Bielka," Tvorba: list pro kritiku a o. 2, p.29. umeni, January 12, 196 1, K ➔ Ibid. 5 K MA CE K Vaclav, PA ST EKOVA , Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinumatugra/ie, 91 . �116 SLOVAKIA 2021 symbol, burnishing the bona-tides of Bielik's group of directors and cameramen as well as Bielik's own reputation as an anti-fascist filmmaker. The surviving film centers around the narrative retelling and reconstruction, not just of the uprising, but also of the "often frequently catastrophic consequences" of the doomed resistance, 86 a thematically daring approach which was seldom replicated in later documentaries. Furthermore, Za slobodu served as an aesthetic turning point for Slovak documentary film- while previous documenttary films about Slovakia had focused on the stylization of the Slovak experience, mediating reportage via romantic conceptions of the Slovak countryside a la PlickaBielik 's film focused on documentary realism, providing a cinematic experience that was out of touch with the postwar "antifascist euphoria." 87 It did not receive widespread distribution, being withdrawn by government officials because of it was "inappropriate for the delicate nature of the theme;" 88 it featured actual reportage, shot under dangerous conditions; and it did not glamorize or stylize the Slovak National Uprising. In short, Za slobodu can be seen as evidence of the first glimmers of cinematic neo-realism in Slovak documentary filmmaking . 1.4 POSTWAR RUPTURING: DOCUMENTARY AND NON-FICTION 1945 TO 1950 While the rise of fascism heralded the end of his career as a filmmaker, Karel Plicka 's legacy and influence on the burgeoning Slovak film industry was only beginning. Before World War II, Plicka had briefly held the position of film instructor in the experimental and short-lived Academy of the Applied Arts in Bratislava, before the institution was shut down due to rising anti-Czech and anti-Hungarian sentiment. While this institution was short-lived, the School of Applied Arts served to provide the basic educational preparation for the careers of several prominent early Slovak directors like Jan Kadar. In 1946, several months after the reunification of Czechoslovakia, Plicka was appointed the first Dean of the Filmova a televizni fakulta Akademie muzickych umenie (F AMU), 89 in charge of, not only FILMMAKING FROM 86 HANA KOY A, Petra, Pa/'o Bielik a slovenskafilmova kulflira, 63. MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOY A, Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie, 91. RH Ibid. , 91 . 89 FRANC, Martin, and KRATKA Lenka, eds., Dejiny A MU: ve vypravenich (Praha : Nakladatelstvi AMU, 2017), I 0 . 87 �SLOVAKIA 2021 117 educating future Czech professsionals, but also the first major generation of academically-trained Slovak film professionals. Although the Slovak students began matriculating from FAMU in the late 1940s and early 1950s, director Eduard Greener (one of the first Slovaks to go to the academy) noted that a vast educational gap existed between the Slovak students and their Czech classmates. 90 Although FAMU contributed enormously to the creation of a stable and thriving Slovak film industry from the 1950s onwards, Slovak documentary cinema (and indeed Slovak cinema as a whole) suffered a rupture, from the mid- I 940s to the early 1950s, as directors who had enthusiastically participated in the Slovak Republic 's film program were "discredited ."91 While some directors, such as Pal'o Bielik, had served in the anti-fascist resistance during the war, those who had not found themselves in the position of Plicka and other minority filmmakers in Slovakia in the 1940s- unwelcome and unemployed. As a result, Slovak documentary production sharply declined in postwar years of the 1940s, with an average of seven nonfiction films per year produced from 1945 to 1948,92 as the most visionary and politically safe directors (such as Bielik) and talented beginners such as Jan Kadar rapidly transitioned into feature filmmaking. 93 Despite newly-increased state support and the establishment of institutions such as FAMU, Slovak nonfiction cinema remained fairly moribund for much of the late 1940s through the early I 960s, due to a lack of qualified personnel and, from 1948 onwards, the newly established communist government's ideological demands. 94 These demands, somewhat paradoxically, were very similar to those espoused by the fascist government: to unify Slovaks around visual tropes and folklore, to show the moderni zation of Slovakia and the tangible benefits of the state, 95 and to build a more- 90 "Eduard Greener: film ako vol'ny vers," interview in literarni noviny. August 4, 20 15. http: //literarky.cz/l iterat ura/cteni/20360-eduard-grener-fi lm-ako-vony-ver 91 Navratil , Antonin, Cesty k pravde ci Ii i : 70 let c'eskoslovenskeho dokumentarniho .filmu (Praha: FAMU, 2002), 159. 92 Ibid. , 16 1. 93 Ibid., 160-2. 94 MA CE K Vaclav, PASTEKOVA , Jelena. Dejiny slovenskej kinomatogrcifie. I 1719. 95 JA SSO, Julius, "Slovak Films in the Last Five Years," Czechoslovak Film, Vol. 7, No. 4, unpag inated. �118 SLOVAKIA 2021 ideologically pure Slovak soc iety96 through the use of mass-produced images. Perhaps the single most stereotypical " identifying characteristic" of a Slovak film , documentary or otherwise, during the postwar and early communist years was a reliance on the folkloric motifs and ethnographic themes which had been become so thoroughly codified by the 1950s. This particular fascination with folk culture was hardly a communist invention , as it drew on the ethnographic traditions which were so popular in the late Austro-Hungarian through interwar periods. Given that amateur ethnographers such as Pavel Sochan eagerly embraced photography as a way of documenting indigenous practices in an effort to distinguish region s and establish Slovak cultural identity during periodic moments of cultural trauma, ethnic repression , and attempts at forced assimilation, 97 it remains a littl e surpri sing how quickly the postwar and communist regimes embraced these formerly divisive aesthetic elements. While cinema had been nationalized by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in August of 1945 as an important national resource, fo lk culture was also nationalized in Slovakia by presidential decree on November 7, 1945. 98 This decree also resulted in the creation of the first Slovak fo lk art collective, the Ustredie l'udovej umeleckej vyroby (UCUV), whose aims were to preserve Slovak folk culture. While ethnographic and folkloric activities had been decidedly controversial in the First Czechoslovak Republic and consisted of a definite part of the fascist propaganda machine during the war, following the 1948 Communist Putsch, the government further reaffirmed the need for fo lkl oric collectives by creating the Slovensky l'udovy umelecky kolekiv (SCUK) in 1949. Further still, the regime stated exp Iicitly ten years later that "folk arts and folk handicrafts make up an important part of our socialist culture," 99 further sanctioning not just the practice of these traditional pastimes, but 96 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA , Jelena, Dejinv slovenskej kinomatografie. 126. See PODOLAK. J. , "The Development of Ethnography in Slo va kia," Midwest Fo lklore, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summ er, 1958 , pp. 69-84. 97 98 " Prozatimni statni zfizeni ceskoslovenske," Dekret presidenta republiky o organisaci lidove a umelecke vvroby . November 7, 1945, Zakon c. I I 0/ 1945 Sb. Note that the decree did not come into effect until November 27th . 99 Zakon c. 56/ 1957 Sb. �SLOVAKIA 2021 119 affording them legal protection and financial support, albeit fossilizing these living traditions even more effectively than the ethnographic projects of the late Austro-Hungarian and interwar periods. By the early 1950s, Communists had not only assumed control of the government, but were also looking to infiltrate or redirect certain cultural outlets for the purposes of creating communist educational entertainment. The creation of Slovak folkloric collectives such as the S:CUK in the late 1940s, along with the overwhelming familiarity with mass-produced images of Slovakia, the prevalence of interest in the folkloric trappings of Slovak films in both the Czech and Slovak lands was, at one point, so prevalent that Czech film critic and dramaturge Jaroslav Bocek vociferously complained that " ... the Slovak cinema watched over the adjective 'Slovak' caring much less about the noun ' cinema.' No wonder there was such a rash of folklore , embroidered blouses, and national songs, since Czech directors could hardly be expected to understand Slovakia any different from the exotic, folklore , or tourist angle." 10° Compounding Bocek's irritation at the more stereotypical depictions of national identity was the fact that "these same features [folkloric trappings] began to creep even into the work of the emerging directors," to which the Czech critic added "Slovak cinema saw its raison d'etre in its very existence . .. such traits can be found in the beginnings of any cultural endeavor." 10 1 Bocek's paternal dismissal of Slovak cinema was, sadly, not an isolated incident, and echoes some of the earlier critiques of earlier ethnographic films by Plicka and others. 1.5 CONCLUSION As we have seen, Slovak documentary film followed the footsteps of earlier ethnographers and ethnographic photographers, whose original mission was to document and to codify Slovak ethnicity through the collection, reportage , and standardization of cultural and visual tropes. These early documentaries, like those in static media, were predominantly produced by non-Slovaks, who turned to Slovakia to record ways of living which had already receded out of living memory elsewhere. Although these early documentary 100 BOCE K, Jaroslav, 'Twenty Yea rs of Czechoslovak Film," in Modern Czechoslovak Film / 945/ 1965 (Praha: Arti a, dat e unknown [ 1966?)), no paginati on. 10 1 BOCE K, Jaros lav, " Twen ty Years of Czechoslovak Film." �120 SLOVAKIA 2021 films by Czech directors could be di visive in the Slovak intellectual community in Czechoslovakia, they were eagerly embraced by Slovaks li ving elsewhere as a necessary connection to their cultural roots, a connection that was prized not only for its entertainment va lue, but also for its ability to educate Slovaks abroad and in Czechoslovakia in the fundamental aspects of Slovak culture. Since Slovak documentary films were also the fundamental cinematic output of Slovak directors from the beginnings of the Slovak Republic in 1939 through the beginnings of the Slovak feature film era in the 1950s, they also proved to be the fundamental training ground for young Slovak directors, who incorporated several aesthetic aspects of documentary filmrnaking into their own feature film works. In each of these different eras of documentary film production, however, one constant remainsa continuation of the aestheticization of Slovakia, a process begun in the 19th century with the ethnographic activities performed by Hungarians, Austrians, Czechs, and eventually Slovaks themselves. The replicability of these aesthetics also helped ensure the spread of certain aspects of Slovak visual cu lture in the countryside, despite the occasional attempt to bring cinematic focus and cu ltural attention to Slovak urban communities. These attempts were ultimately foiled by the implied formal and aesthetic needs of the specifically "S lovak" documentary: since Slovak culture had been so rigorously defined through its codification period as a " rural" identity, attempts to focus on other aspects of Slovak identity (either in other urban locales or through a de-romanticization of the Slovak countryside) were met with political , cultural, and social resistance. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 92 SLOVAKIA 2021 PICTURING A NATIO SLOVAK DOCUMENTARY FILM FROM ITS BIRTH UNTIL NICHOLAS 1950 1 HUDAC " Bude Slovak, cim bol medzi narodami'- to bola veta, s ktorou nasi otcovia vstavali a lihali, to bola veta, kotra hybala ich mysliami natol'ko, ze sa v6bec nehybali. Bolo, teda bude, bude i vtedy, ked' budeme len vylihovat'." Alexander Matuska 2 One of the fundamental aims of early Slovak mass produced images 3 (cinema, lithography, and photography, among other media) was to document and catalog the ethnic, geographic, and social uniqueness of the Slovak Lands. This essay intends to trace the influence of the importance of these media in the early 20th century for Slovaks, namely, non-fiction filmmaking, and its connection with Slovak populations not just in what would become Slovakia, but also in communities abroad- primarily in America. While foreign artists typically came to Slovakia to draw inspiration from its rugged countryside and colorful fo lk costumes, Slovak photographers, engravers, and ethnographers often saw their artistic missions as a way to build a Slovak nation through the documenttation, codification, and repetition of symbols common in a geographical location where historically no " Slovak" nation had ever existed . Although Slovak photographers and engravers enjoyed modest success in the 19th 1 This artic le was made possibl e with the support of the Univerzita Karl ova and has bee n undertaken with additional support from the their Progres QI 2 Initiati ve for Literature and Performance. Ta studie vznikla v souvislosti s fesenim programu rozvoje vyzkumu UK Progres Q12 Literatura a performativita. 2 MATUSKA, Al exander, "S love nska viera v minul osti ," in : C HM EL, Rudolf, ed., Slovenskti ottizka v 20. storoci (Bratis lava : Kalligram, 1997), 12 1. Unl ess noted otherwi se, a ll tra nslati ons are my own. 3 For more on the mass-produced image, see: HUDAC, icho las, " Picturing th e ati on: Slovak Nati onal Identity in the Age of the Mass Produced Image," PhD. Di ssertati on, Uni verzit a Karlova, 2020. SLOVAKIA 2021 93 century, 4 their mediums were soon displaced in the cultural consciousness by the rise of another mass-produced medium, cinema, which provided several boons for the documenttarian . It combined the best qualities of its predecessors : fidelity to the referent image, affordability, durability, transportability, with a novel qualitymotion. This was a new, " lifelike" or "shadowy" 5 quality (to borrow Maxim Gorky's infamous tum of phrase). First, cinema recorded motion. This made it possible to expand the ethnographic activities of Slovak activists in order to capture more aspects of "traditional" culture, ranging from regional dances to the mechanical workings of various implements in Slovak handicrafts. Secondly, cinema also provided the illusion of objecttivity, a quality which could be more easily manipulated to form national and ethnic sentiments. Thirdly, cinema was understandable without any form of specialized training, or in the words of Karel Plicka- "understandable to any people of any country." 6 Lastly, cinema, as one of the first "new" mediums of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, functioned as a source of national and ethnic pride and a vehicle for showing a region's progression into " modernity." In this paper I will first explore how these earlier documentary media contributed to the rise of Slovak documentary filmmaking in the 20th century, and then examine the impact of this tradition . However, as tempting as it would be to think of documentary film (and by extension, the aesthetics of documentary and ethnographic film) as separate from other genres of cinematic expression, for Slovak filmmakers , documentary film proved to be one of the most essential foundations for the building of a national aesthetic, whose presence could be found within a variety of genres and subgenres. Slovak documentary films (as well as certain documentary films about 4 As noted by Macek and Hrubis incky, despite Slovakia's attractiveness for photographers, it lagged behind the Czechs, Austrians, and Hunga rians in the development of both avenues for amateur photographers to disp lay thei r work, and formal training. For more on thi s see: MACEK, Vaclav, and HR UB ISINSC KY Aurel, Dejiny slovenskej fotografie (Bratislava : Slovenska narodna galeria, 200 I), 12- 13. 5 GORKY, Maxim, "The Lumiere C inematograph" in : Si mpson, Philip, et al., Film Theory: Critical Concepts in Media and Cultural Studies. Vo l. III (New York: Routledge, 2004), 7-8 . 6 PLICKA, Karel, "Poznamky o filme - moznosti ac h a ulohach s lovenskych filmov," Slovenske poh/'ady, September 15, 1934, p. 593. 94 SLOVAKIA 2021 Slovakia produced by Czechs) were not merely reportage, but also an evolution of the same aestheticization and stylization of rural life which so captivated the early ethnographers, albeit with new influences and innovations drawn from various domestic and foreign avant-gardes and aesthetic movements. As we shall see, this repetition of personages, of landscapes, of fo lk culture or traditions, continued through Slovak fiction and animated films, working as both a metacommentary on larger issues of national and regional identities, and as a connecting thread , linking these films of different genres and ideological expressions back to a common foundation. ln most parts of the Western World, documentary, fiction , and non-documentary early film developed simultaneously and concordantly . Early filmmakers immediately realized (in the words of Bill Nicho ls), " film 's capacity to document the world around us." 7 However, documentary films about Slovakia and its people preceded any variety of domestic Slovak filmmaking by several decades, owning to several unique internal factors ; Slovakia's relatively impoverished economic situation, its isolated rural communities, and the relative lack of an educated, culturally-Slovak middle class in the Slovak Lands during the period of cinema's birth and global introduction (e.g. from 1895 to roughly 1905 8). This meant that, while cinema was known in Slovakia, this new medium was chiefly an urban and scientific phenomenon, and thus developed quite differrently in the Slovak Lands than in other neighboring regions. Un like the Czechs, who rapidly embraced this new technology and were soon developing their own domestic cinema industry, Slovak film production remained (at best) sporadic until the end of World War II , frequently dependent on Czech and American financing , talent, and interest for the production of films for a Slovak audience. However, while Slovakia's lack of cinematic infrastructure resulted in the delayed development of a Slovak national cinema, this a lso made the area highly desirable as a destination for documentary filmmakers 7 NICHOLS , Bill , " Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," in Critical lnquirv 27, no. 4 , Summer, 200 I, p. 580. 8 Again, while actualites and trave l films of Slovakia were produced during thi s period of early film , Slovakia ' s lack of cinematic and cultural infrastructure seems to have resulted in a lack of both cinematic modernism and a cinematic avant-garde as is more commonly found in other Western film culture. See: NICHOLS , " Documentary Film and the Modernist Avant-Garde," p. 580 SLOVAKIA 2021 95 from outside of the Slovak Lands, if not Slovaks themselves. Although urban Slovaks encountered film roughly at the same time as their Czech brethren to the west, the unique gestation and development of cinema in Slovakia deserves at least a cursory explanation. The first public exhibitions of cinema occurred in 1896, almost a full year after the new technology's unveiling in Paris, when, on December 16th, in Kosice's Hotel Schalkaz, local theatre director ~udovit Szalkay arranged for a demonstration of Edison's cinema technology to the public "at great financial sacrifice."9 On December 25th cinema made its debut in Bratislava (then Pressburg), when it was unveiled to the public in two local hotels- the Hotel Palugyay and the Hotel Kral' Uhorska. These projections were mostly silent, but according to eyewitnesses, they were also accompanied by an Edison phonograph on two occasions. 10 But despite these exhibitions, cinema remained confined to the major urban centers of Kosice and Pressburg/Bratislava, and even in those it was often uneasily tolerated. Early cinema projections were subject to intense governmental regulations, 11 and in 1912, the Press burg city government declared that cinema was "negatively" impacting the public. 12 Cinematic exhibitions and cinemas also faced opposition from the Roman Catholic clergy and laity, 13 who saw the technology as a sign of"moral decline" among the youth, 14 and the Hungarian theatrical community who often saw the newer, cheaper medium in a threatening Iight. 15 Despite this public opposition to the new media, cinema was not entirely absent from public life in the Slovak Lands- instead, it was merely curtailed, limited to a handful of cinemas in Bratislava and Kosice. Because of this, cinema production in the Slovak Lands was limited again to foreign or amateur producers, and little attempt was 9 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA, Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie (Martin : Osveta, 1997), 7. JO ibid. JI ibid. 12 ibid. 13 It is worth comparing the very simi lar opposition to cinema's development and expa nsion that developed in Czech Moravia at roughly the same time . For more on this see: HASAN, Petr, "' Neslusny a nevkusny ti Im nemuze byti krasnym '. Kato licka akce, struktury katolickeho tabora ajejich pusobnost na poli kinematografie v ceske m prostfedi prvni poloviny 20. stoleti," in: /1/uminace, I, 2016 . 14 MAC EK and PASTEKOVA, Dejiny s/ovenskej kinomatogrcifie, 17. 15 MACEK and PASTEKOVA, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografle, 13. 96 SLOVAKIA 2021 made to make the medium accessible in both smaller locales, or in Slovak. I.I SUBJECTS NOT AUTHORS: THE EARLY YEARS OF SLOVAK NON-FICTION FILMMAKING Although film originally received a hostile reception from various social circles in the Slovak Lands, films were made during cinema's early decades, and many of these early films fell under the criteria of what David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson termed "actualities," or films showing an event from real life, and "scenic," 16 crude travelogues designed to showcase exotic places or striking vistas. While cinema started later in the Slovak Lands, by the early 20th century Slovakia had become a destination for Hungarian directors, mainly associated with companies in Budapest 17 who were interested in filming glimpses of Slovakia's mountains. In February of 1908, the Apollo theatre in Bratislava debuted one of the first recorded scenics/actualities set in Slovakia, Wintersport im Tatralomnicz/Zimny sport v Tatranskej Lomnici. 18 A few months later the Apollo's competitor, the Elektro-Biskop cinema projected a series of panoramic scenes as part of their Welt-Panorama special, which included two more films shot in distinctively Slovak locations: Die Hohe Tatra/ Vysoke Tatry and Tur6cz-Szt.-Marton/Turciansky Svaty Martin, as part of its travelogue series. 19 Travelogues, the close cousins of the scenic genre, were a popular genre of early film making, one which attempted to provide a replication or approximation of the traveling experience for audiences hungry for new sensations, as well as a more frugal way of "experiencing" a location for a cash-strapped audience. These films were often accompanied with lectures 20 or packaged as part of a longer cinematic experience, designed to replicate the idea of a larger trave l holiday, albeit condensed into on ly a few minutes. Although these early Slovak travelogues have been 16 BORDWELL, David, and THOMPSON, Kri stin , Film Histo,y : An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), 12-13 . 17 MACEK and PASTEKOVA., Dejinyslovenskej kinomatografle. 18-19. 18 "Tagesneuigkeiten!" Pressburger Zeitung. February 5, 1908, p. 2 19 "Elektro-Bioskop nur im Hotel ' zum gri.inen Baum ' in Pozsony, Program vom 14. bis 2 1 Marz," Pressburger Presse, March 16, 1908, p. 5. 20 PETE RSON , Jennifer Lynn, "Travelogues" in : Abel, Rich ard, ed., The Encyclopedia of Early Film (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), 640-3. SLOVAKIA 2021 97 lost, we can reasonnably infer what the experience wou ld have been like by surviving examples of the genre: travelogues were " highly kinetic ," "educational," and positioned as a morally and intell ectuall y healthy a lternative to the salacious or lascivious aspects of other, lesswholesome early films. While these travelogues, actualiti es, and sceni cs were originall y niche productions for audiences located far away from Slovak communities, they nonetheless sti ll largely adhered to the progression of ea rlier Slovak mass-produced images. In the first place, these travel films were essentially a new means of packaging, commodifying, standardizing, and commerciali zing the experience of being in the Slovak Lands, without having to travel and without the politically and socially divisive barrier of language. Secondly, we can clearly tell from the context in which these films were exhibited (e.g. only in the urban centers of Pressburg and Kosice, advertised through the nonSlovak press, and in cinemas that were attached to areas frequented by travelers, the upper classes, and tourists) that these films were again consumed by an Austro-Hungarian audience, not necessarily a "Slovak" one - much as the earl y engravings and lithographs of the Slovak landscape were enjoyed primarily by non-Slovak audiences first, and Slovak audiences later. Lastly, much as ethnographic lithography and photography were rapidly adopted by Slovaks as a means of preserving, codifying, and distributing visua l examp les of Slovak cu ltural identity, as we shall see in the next sections, the rationale behind these sceni cs and travelogues (name ly, that film shou ld give an impression of life in Slovakia, rather than a purely narrative structure) would later be embraced by both non-fiction and fiction filmmakers alike. 1.2 THE BEGIN NINGS OF SLOVAK DOCUMENTARY CINEMA After the dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 19 18, Slovaks suddenly fo und themselves, not just as a rural curiosity in a large empire, but the second largest Slavic partner in the newly-fonned Republic of Czechos lovakia. No longer subjects to the stringent censorship laws and the Magyarization policies of the former Kingdom of Hungary, film (as with other forms of mass-produced images) began to expand. Movie theaters grew in number (from three in the 98 SLOVAKIA 2021 early 1900s to 84 by the end of Austria-Hungary,2' and increasing to 153 by the end of the First Republic) and size, appearing all over the Slovak Lands, and not just in Kosice and the newly re-named Bratislava. Furthermore, while theaters had once been limited to showing a handful of Hungarian or Austrian films in Bratislava and Kosice, distributors throughout Slovakia began adding Czech, American, and German films 22 to their theaters, though these often met with resistance from more nationalist groups. 23 Unfortunately, this rapid infusion of new cinematic experiences, techniques, and choices did not necessarily result in Slovaks developing their own cinema industry. Throughout the First Republic, Slovakia remained primarily a destination for filmmaking, but with a few minor exceptions, there would be no Slovak documentaries produced by a Slovak director until well into World War II. However, documentary film was indeed expanding in Slovakia, again often along the same ethnographi c, folkloric , or scenic and, again also widely produced by non-Slovak academics such as the Czech directors, Vladimir Uh lela and Karel Plicka as part of a broader, Czechoslovak agenda. Both Plicka and Uhlela saw their documentary productions as a means of integrating Slovaks into the cultural life of Czechoslovakia, through cultivating an aesthetic appreciation for the fo lkl oric and rural aspects of Slovak culture in non-Slovak audiences, a lbeit in very different ways. Furthermore, directors were officially funded through both government sources, as well as the Matica slovenska, and as a result both sought to bring these traditional aspects of Slovak visual cu lture into a Czecho-Slovak cultural space. In his career as an ethnographer and a photographer, Karel Plicka was concerned with producing works of art which could bridge the growing divide between Czech and Slovak audiences. Plicka 's photographic, ethnographic, and musicological output was prodigious, and from the late 1920s onwards he began a second (or third or fourth career) as a documentary filmmaker in Slovakia and in Slovak MACEK and PASTEKOV A, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie, 597-8. Advertisements for the Kino Palace and Kino Meteor in Banska Bystrica. for example, show both American films and German films on their programs as early as 1928; larger cinemas in Bratis lava and Kosice had, of course, made international progra min g a staple of their repertoires from the very beginning . 23 " Potreba naprvy vo filmovej produckii a predvazdani filmov. Dockame sa v Kosic iach viacerych domacich ti lmov?" Slo vensky v_1ichod, January 24, 1933 , p. 3 . 21 22 SLOVAKIA 2021 99 communities abroad. Starting with l 928's Za slovenskym /'udom, Plicka approached Slovak culture through the lenses of his earlier work as a musicologist and a photographer, meticulously documenting the exotic aspects of Slovak (and to a lesser extent, Rusyn) culture for Czech, Slovak, and international audiences. Like many early film directors, Plicka had little to no formal training, relying on his amateur knowledge of photography and supplementing this with his learned or natural talent as an ethnographer. For Plicka, this Slovakia, as of yet only barely codified and recognized as a political or social sphere, contained a wealth of information which needed to be documented: On my trips after Slovak folksongs , I came to many lesser known and even forgotten areas, to which almost 'no one' had ever come up until then . No one, or rather, hardly anyone except those with open eyes and trained ears. It ' s no wonder. Ethnographic Slovakia is a vast and extensive world, and there never will be enough of those who could satisfy the need to write down, draw , and photograph this richness.24 Although Plicka was wary of the mechanical " ripping" of folk songs and images from living performances into mechanized fossils, he soon embraced the advantages of these modern technologies. He began to experiment with film starting in the mid- I 920s as a "documentary tool for ethnographic and folkloric events," 25 which could satisfy, if not all of his documentary impulses, at least most of them. Although the Matica slovenska and Plicka had worked together numerous times on his ethnographic photographical and musicological expeditions throughout Slovakia, the organization felt that a movie camera was necessary for the broadening of their efforts in the young Czechoslovakia. 26 Archival records in Matica slovenska show that Plicka obtained a Pathe movie camera in the spring of 1926 in Prague, 27 where he learned to use the new tool; only a few months 24 PLICKA , Karel , " Ako sme filmov ali," S/ovenske poh/'ady. April I , 1930, pp. 215- 16 25 LAC KOVA , Sy lvia, LEXMANN , Juraj , and SLIVKA Martin , eds., Karol Plicka vo fl/m ove) faktografii, (Brati slava: S loven sky film ovy ustav , 1983), 36. 26 KRC M ERY , Ste fan , Tri rol..y Matice slovenskej I 924- 1926 (Turc iansky sv. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1927), 8-9. 27 PLIC KA , Karol. Co rres pondence. Coll ected in: LAC KOVA , Sl yv ia, LEXMANN , Juraj , and SLIVKA Martin , Karol Plicka vo jilmovej f i:1ktogra/ii, 187. 100 SLOVAKIA 2021 later, Plicka wrote to Matica slovenska to arrange the local permissions and cooperation necessary to start his cinematic work, saying: Please send a message immediately to inform the schools in Zliechova, and in Kosecke Rovne, as well as the parish office in Zliechova, that the ethnographic department of Matica Slovenska proposes to, after a number of days/starting from the 14th of this month, to start working there, and to: record songs, photograph, and to film scenes, which the Zleichovans demonstrated in Trencianske Teplice. Matica Slovenska requests moral support for this significant work in these historic villages." 28 In much of 1926, 1927, and 1928, Plicka traveled through Slovakia (primarily in the Liptov and Orava regions popularized by the pioneering ethnographic artists Pavol Sochan and Peter Michal Bohun), recording film footage, as well as continuing his other ethnographic activities. The resulting film Za s/o venskym f'udom was received with great fanfare in the Slovak community on both sides of the Atlantic. Slovaks in America marveled at Plicka's ethnographic ambition, noting that the film was a "powerful piece of cultural propagation," which was "very sympathetically accepted by all of the Slovak and even Czechoslovak public."29 The nationalistic daily Slovak praised the film as "something that is worthwhile for the part of our public, which does not have the possibility to see all the treasures of our national spirit,"30 while the more centrist Slovensky dennik labelled the ft Im "the loveliest surprise of the year" and thri lied at seeing Slovaks on the screen "where one is accustomed to seeing nowadays only the sorrows and joys of other nations ."3 1 The film combined not only Plicka 's photographic talent (indeed many of the scenes depicted on film were also photographed for Plicka's and Matica slovenska's later use) for finding the abstract patterns in the Slovak countryside with the athletic and physical prowess of hi s subjects, who dance traditional dances and display feats of strength while dressed in various traditional regional kroje. 28 Ibid. "Rok kulturnej prace," Ynungstownske slovenske novivny. May 3, 1929, p. 3 30 " Film za slovenskym l'udom ," Slovak (Bratislava), March I, 1929, p. 4. 31 "Za slovenskym l'udom," Slovensk_)1dennik (Bratislava), March 14, 1929, p. 6. 29 SLOVAKIA 2021 101 Za s/ovenskym /'udom was funded largely by Matica slovenska, which experienced a resurgence of popularity and importance following the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Matica slovenska's mission of preserving, codifying, and unifying Slovak culture internally as well as internationally, meshed with Plicka 's own natural urges to record and transmit. A second well-received documentary about highland Slovaks titled Po horach, po dolach followed in l 929, which received an even wider domestic release than Plicka's first film, as well as winning pri zes in international film and photographic competitions in 1932. Like Za slovenskym /'udom, Po horach, po dolach was also funded by Matica slovenska, and featured much of the same style and content as Plicka's debut film , and was shown to a wider variety of audiences, including Czechs. 32 By the early 1930s, Plicka had begun producing documentari es for both Matica slovenska and private concerns, such as an informative non-fiction quasiadvertisement for the town of Piest'any 's famous medicinal baths and mud treatments. Furthermore, his films were beginning to be utilized by American Slovak organizations like Jednota, the Slovak League of America, and others as a means to educate American Slovaks about their cultural heritage as well as the benefits of Slovak ethnic identity.33 Plicka 's most famous film might be considered to be his 1933 paean to Slovakia, Zem spieva, which combines scenes of rural Slovak folklore and traditional dress along with intertitles by the Slovak poet and translator Jan Smrek. Curiously, although Plicka was an early proponent of the ethnographic and educational possibilities of sound film, he elected to set the film to an impressionistic score by the Czech composer Frantisek Skvor, despite declaring that sound film as a medium is the " the ideal documentation" 34 in an interview with his collaborator Smrek only a few years earlier. Whil e Plicka 's early work 32 MALINA, Vladimir, "O moznostiach slovenskeho zvukoveho filmu ," Elim. November, 193 1. 33 See: CU LEN , Kon stantin, S/ovaci v Amerike: crty z kulturnych dejin (Tuciansky Sv. Martin: Matica slovenska, 1938) as we ll as ALEXANDER , June Granatir, Ethnic Pride, American Parriorism: Slovaks and Orher New Immigrants in rhe lnren var Era (Ph ilade lphia: Templ e Unive rsity Press, 2004). 34 SMREK, Jan, "O praci pre zac hovanie l'udovej piesne: rozhovor s jej znalcom a vasnyvim sbera tel'om Karlom Plickom," £/an: mesiacnik pre literaruru a umenie, March , 1933, p. 5. 102 SLOVAKIA 2021 was often mere documentation for the sake of preservation , Zem spieva is an expansion of Plicka 's more experimental photographic vision. Plicka takes the viewer on a musical and vis ual trip through Slovakia's wild mountains, not for the sake of scientific observation, but to experience the poetic essence of Czechoslovakia ' s most exotic locales. As Bill Nichols noted in his essay "Documentary Film and the Moderni st Avant-Garde," what separated interwar documentary film from mere reportage like newsreel s, was its artistic pretensions. 35 While the First Republic was full of newsreel s documenting world events and cultural phenomena from exotic locales, Slovakia included, Zem spieva represented two complimentary, yet different intentionsthe first was to continue to raise, on the one hand Czech appreciation and awareness of Slovak cu lture, whi le simultaneously allowing Slovaks an opportunity to have their own culture valued on equal standing with the more "sophisticated" and dominant Czech culture. Zem spieva 's modernist influences are most strongly fe lt in its theoretical conception and execution . While the film is a "sound" film in terms of its technical composition with Skvor' s pre-recorded soundtrack , the film ' s formal structure adheres more closely to the avant-garde experimentation of the late silent film era, featuring no diagetic sound or dialogue, and only intertitles explaining the significance of the scenes. 36 This suited Plicka, as he explained in his 1932 article "Poznamky o filme moznostiach a ulohach slovenskych filmov": Slovak films will be sound films , since today, unfortunately, it is impossible to make any other kind. But they will certainly not be I 00% dialogue film s, perhaps thanks to the producers, but an arti stic and commercial error. In the interest of internationali sm, it will be necessary to curb dialogs and really, the entire weight which bears the influence of the theatre, will have to be limited to the most modest, if not reduced entirely for that matter, in order to make the film as understandable as it was at its happi est, when it was silent. This mostly applies to the Slovak situation ; we will not be able to afford many films on ly for ourselves. It is better to 35 NI C HOLS, Bill, " Doc umentary Film and th e Modernist Avan t-Garde," Critical ln- qui,y . Vol. 27, No. 4, Summer, 20 11 , p. 588. 36 LAC KOVA. , Slyvia, LEXMANN, Juraj, and SLIVKA Martin, eds., Karol Plicka vo.filmovej.faktografii (Bratislava : Slovensky filmo vy ustav, 1983), 89 . SLOVAKIA 2021 103 produce little, but except that which is thoughtful and valuable. 37 Although such an approach to sound design was dec idedly archaic (even in 1933),38 Plicka was, in some se nse, correct: this decision paradoxically increased Zem spieva 's international appeal. On the one hand, the relegation of the Slovak language within the film to small, easily digested intertitles meant that the film was easily accessible to Slovak populations in the United States, whose command of the language might have been fossilized or had languished through the process of assimilation. 39 On the other hand, the focus on the more purely abstract visual and musicological aspects of Slovak folk culture allowed the film to function as " poetry," without the di straction or potential friction of Slovak dialogue, an abstraction that also allowed the film to represent various different "S lovakias" for different audiences. While the American Slovaks rejoiced in finding a poetiziation of their ancestral homeland, Slovakia's most exotic and access ible qualities, such as its visual splendor, its vital folk culture, and its melodies, were easily absorbed by outsiders who did not require any specialized linguistic skill to appreciate them. Additionally, Plicka' s long-time editor, the Czech avant-garde photographer and filmmaker Alexandr Hackenschmied, was instrumental in reshaping the narrative structure of the film through his assured editing style, and via his suggestion that Plicka shoot additional introductory and ending footage. 40 Hackenschmied was born into a family of academics in Prague, and hi s childhood in the (then) industrial neighborhood of Karlin gave him ample opportunity to visit the numerous cinemas around that part of the city, 41 sowing the seeds of hi s great interest in film and photography. Following his high school graduation, Hackenschmeid bega n hi s architectural studies, but found himself drawn more strongly to cinema and photography, and 37 PLICKA , Karel , " Poznamky o filme - moznostiach a ulohach slovenskyc h filmov," S/ovenske poh/'ady, September 15, 1934, p. 593 . 38 For more on the problems of sou nd films in Slovak ia during the interwar period, see my Ph .D. dissertation . HUDAC, Nicholas, " Picturing the Na ti on: Slovak National Identity in the Age of the Mass Produced Image," Univerzita Karlova , 2020. 39 C.f. CU LEN, Konstantin, Slovaci V Amerike. 40 ANDEL, Jaroslav, Alexandr Hackenschmied(Praha: TORST, 2000), 29. 41 BROZ, A /exander Hackenschied (Praha: Ceskoslovensky filmovy ustav, 1973 ), 202 1. 104 SLOVAKIA 2021 various global avant-gardes active in the 1920s and 1930s, such as the work of Man Ray, the Soviet LEF group, Dziga Yertov, and more.42 While Hackenschmied was active in photographic circles from his student days, starting in 1930 he began to make his own films . More than a film enthusiast and a future film editor- he was a film theorist, a photographer, and a filmmaker himself, deeply concerned with the possibilities of montage and form . Hackenschmeid began editing Zem spie va in Prague in 1932, but completed the final cut after Plicka returned from additional shoots in Slovakia with more footage . In a conversation with Martin Sli vka, one of his former students, Plicka recounted his views on the finished product: What do I want Zem spie va to say via film? I would be happy if it was approached without interpretation . It deals with Slovakia as unknown as well as beautiful: the theme of the film is the lives of people in a village and their holy relationship to nature. As the film ' s subtitles suggest, Zem spieva is a cinematic poem celebrating precious traditions; it should be evidence of an enchantingly pure manifestation of life, which is so simple, yet so important. And the film shows a world in which our fathers ' healthy and precious heritage has, by some miracle, been preserved in some regions until today.',4 3 In this sense, Plicka' s intentions for Zem spie va represent an inversion of the earlier ethnographic assumptions that ethnographic subjects are worthy of documentation because of the interesting-yettlawed nature of their ancient practices. Instead, in both the content of Zem spie va and in his comments to the press, Plicka explicitly rejects the predominant political push by Czech (and some Slovak) political and cultural authorities to modernize and industrialize Slovakia .44 Rather, the film's premise is a twist on the time-honored modernist 42 BROZ, Alexander Hackenschied, pp. 2 1-22. SLIVKA , Martin , Karol Plicka. hasnik obrazu (Martin: Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1982), 175. 44 Although a compl ete accounting of th e industriali zation debate regarding Slovaki a is beyond th e scope of thi s arti c le, see, for example, MATULA, Antonin, " Dvacatyosmy fij en," in Ceska osveta: /isl venovan_y zajmum vdejneho knihovnictvi a organisaci lidoveho vzdelani. September, 1938, Vol. 35 , No. I, pp. 5-7; and HA VLiCE K, V., " Narodni problem Slovenska," in Nase doba: revue pro vedu. umeni a i ivo/ socia/ni, November, 1933, Vol. 41 , No. 2, pp. 68-73. 4 .1 SLOVAKIA 2021 105 tradition of the city symphony, a genre of early avant-garde filmmaking practiced by directors such as Walter Ruttmann and Dziga Vertov, which sought to translate the immense vitality and activity of an urban space to the reproducible and distributable form of cinema as a celebration of modern industrialization and urbanization. While not every audience member could afford a trip to Berlin or Moscow, a city symphony provided an impressionistic vision of such urban locales that could satisfy the longings for new visual stimulation and locations for a reasonable price. Plicka ' s vision for Zem spieva followed a model similar to Ruttman's and Vertov's films , yet inverted. For the price of a mere ticket, audience members could journey away from Bratislava, deep into the wild Slovak mountains, where a visual feast of dancing, ethnic clothing and stunning vistas awaited them, accompanied with rapturous song. Although Zem spie va was produced under the auspices of Matica slovenska, the old vanguard of Slovak national sentiment and as part of a series of governmental programs to promote Slovak culture in the Republic, not all Slovak activists were thrilled by Plicka' s aims or the resources devoted to its production. As an anonymous letter in the Slovak periodical Nastup declared: When we think about our devastated Slovakia's economic ruin, about the misery of our Slovak people, the overwhelming question mark which stands before our Slovak intelligentsia is about the misery and scarcity at every step and yet on the other hand, we are making our sole Slovak film 'The Earth Sings,' and between these two, we clench our teeth and deeply sigh. Yes, we sing! But the stomach doesn't sing, it whines .45 Still other Slovak critics noted that, despite Slovakia's reliance on foreign producers and directors focusing on "a narrow slice of Slovakia in Czech films" 46 represented, as Stefan Hoza wrote in Kinorevue, a promising step forward , (the film ' s lack of Slovak financing notwithstanding) giving hope that Zem spieva would usher in a new era of Czech and Slovak films about Slovakia.47 Other Slovak 45 Nastupi sta od Zvolena [pseudonym] "Zem spieva ... " Nastup, March 15, 1935, p. 10. 46 HOZA, Stefan , "Hovom1e o slovenskom film e a - o moznostiach ," Kinorevue, Vol. I, No. 30, March 20, 1935, p. 5. 47 HOZA , Stefan , "Hovorme o slovenskom filme a - o moznostiach," p.6. 106 SLOVAKIA 2021 intellectuals argued amongst themselves as to whether or not Zem spieva counted as ethnographic reportage,48 nationalist "gyc," or a lyrical and stylized portrayal of Slovakia's essence, as Vlado Clementis argued in 1933 49--{;learly not all of Plicka 's artistic experimentation was received in earnest. Perhaps the best sign of the film 's Czechoslovak intent was how vociferously it was condemned on the grounds that Plicka himself, as a non-Slovak, was not qualified to make such a film. Although Czech critics often saw the film as a wonderful celebration of the venerated narodni dilo tradition, the Czech public, on the other hand-especially the fickle Prague audiences, at least according to the press, were not interested in Zem spieva, because of the lingering effect of the "Slovak question" (the repeated calls for Slovak autonomy) had poisoned the well of Czecho(Slovak) culture in the mind of the ordinary Prazak.50 As the Czech critic Jaroslav Broz wrote: We had anticipated that, because, in thi s day and age, when the Slovak question is such a burning domestic political problem of our state, a film about Slovakia would be especially welcomed and raise the interest of the public. But we were sadly disappointed. The numerical balance sheet of the premiere of Plicka 's film in Prague is a sad document of the cultural ignorance of the Prague public. 5 1 Although the film failed to find an audience in the larger Czech metropoles, Zem spieva 's international release and distribution meant that the film was often seen by American Slovaks, "who follow with great interest anything done in Slovakia," 52 and who turned it into both a means of expressing ethnic pride in multicultural American cities, while also using it as an educational tool for non-Slovaks and Slovaks alike. It is, thus, fitting that the artistic ambition of Plicka's last film was most appreciated in American circles, where the Slovak question was either a whispered query among ethnic boosters in a neighborhood 48 TUMA, J., "Zem spieva, ale o cem?" Tvorba. November 9, 1933 . CLEMENTIS, Vladoj "Je Plickov film folkloristickym gycom?" DAV. Vol. I, No. 10, p. 149. 50 SM REK, Jan , "Vel'kost a bieda jednoho vit'azstva," Elim. ovember, 1933 , p. 8. 51 Ibid. 52 GETTING , Milan , "O Slovensku treba prednasat' i Americanom anglickeho jazyka," S/o vensky dennik. September 4, 1935, p. I. 49 SLOVAKIA 2021 107 bar or forgotten entirely in the multicultural din of American cities. While economic anxiety and nativist sentiment in some comers of Slovak society muted the film 's reaction among hardline nationalists, Zem spieva was warmly received in other areas not just as an artistic achievement, "something that does not have an analog in global [film] production," 53 as the Czech daily Lidove noviny called it, but as an educational tool. It would show the Czech population that Slovak culture could transcend its reputation for provincialism. Furthermore, Slovak cultural groups in America and the Czech Lands scheduled screenings, sometimes with Plicka 's participation in the case of the latter, as a means of promoting Czechoslovak unity. Although the film was shown fairly regularly in the 1930s, it was nearly lost entirely during World War 11 when the original negatives were destroyed by fire in 1944; afterwords, an imperfect and incomplete copy was salvaged from a positive negative in 1945. Zem Spieva was a mixed success in Czechoslovakia, but, perhaps more importantly, it was a striking critical success among avant-garde circles in America and Europe. There, Zem spieva was shown not only at Czech and Slovak ethnic theaters and events, but also in more mainstream settings, such as at the 1934 Venice Biennale, where Plicka was awarded the City Cup of Venice for Best Director. American Slovak institutions were likewise more enthusiastic audiences for Plicka's films . A feature in the Youngstownske slovenske noviny, written by Matica slovenska's Jozef Cincik, considered Zem spieva living history, which captured "the most important moments in Slovak life." 54 Unlike America, whose foundational historical moments were dead and only experienced in museums, Cincik argued that in Zem spieva "we Slovaks have captured in this picture and its subject, all of the moving, speaking, and sounds of music on film for our descendants, everything that Americans will never be able to capture of their own history for themselves." 55 In other words, Zem spieva was able to codify, and solidify, foundational moments in Slovak history and make them available to the entire nation- similar in many regards to the original aim of ethnographic 53 JEZE K, S., "Zem spieva," Lidove noviny , October 27, 1933, p. 16. CINCi K, Jozef, "O filme Zem spieva," Youngtownske slovenske noviny, February 14, 1936, p. 2. 55 Ibid. , p. 2. 54 108 SLOVAKIA 2021 photography, albeit with a greater power to preserve, to fix in time, and to replicate. The relative success of the film encouraged Matica slovenska to again provi de Plicka with funding and resources for his next featurelength fi lm, I 936's Za Slovakmi od New Yorku po Mississippi. While Zem spieva focused on Plicka's attempts to bring the rhythms and visuals of life in the Slovak highlands to a diverse, urban audience in Czechoslovakia as part of building a modernist Czechoslovak culture, Za Slovakmi instead focused on Slovak expatriate communities and Matica slovenska's activities in America, as Plicka documented the arrival of three of the organization's top officials (Jozef CigerHronsky, Jozef Cincik and Kon stantin Culen,) to the United States in 1936, and the ways in which the ethnographic mission of Matica slovenska was replicated in America. Often considered "only reportage" 56 by Czech and Slovak film critics, this film was not widely shown in Czechoslovakia; however, it did receive a release in America via fraternal and civic American Slovak organizations such as the Slovak Catholic Sokol, and the First Catholic Ladies Slovak Association, another sign of the strong cultural interchange between Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and those in America, which lasted up until World War II . Although Plicka is more widely known today, in terms of contemporary historiography of Slovak film , Vladimir Uh lela was another colleague of Plicka whose personal history bears many simi larities to Plicka 's own. Uhlela was born in Vienna in 1888, studied physiology and botany in Prague and Strassbourg, and, after receiving his doctorate, he became enamored with the possibilities of film after being exposed to it through his postgraduate research.57 After a stint in military pri son during World War I for being a "dangerous Panslavist," 58 Uhlela was released, served honorably, and then returned to Czechoslovakia where he became both an academic in Brno, and a public intellectual. He acted as the science editor for lidove Noviny, as we ll as contributing to numerous other publiccations. Like Plicka, Uh lela was a passionate devotee of folklore, 56 NAVRATIL, Antonin, Ceslv k pravde ci Ii i: 70 lei ceskoslovenskeho dokumenlcirniho filmu (Praha: Akademie muzic kyc h umeni v Praze, 2002), 5 1. 57 STOLL, Martin, et al., Cesky.film: reiisefi - dokumen/arisle (Praha : Libre. 2009), 587-8. SN Ibid. SLOVAKIA 2021 109 collecting songs and documenting folk culture, not only in Moravia, but in Slovakia as well. Although a well-known popularizer of science in the popular media (including in cinema as well as in print), in the early 1930s, Uhlela devoted himself to making ethnographic films , focusing especial ly on the borderlands between Moravia and Slovakia, where Slovak communities thrived in the mountains . Although Uh lela made several smaller films on ethnographic themes such as Slovacka pisen and Slovacka svatba, he is best known for his full-length ethnographic drama/documentary Mizejici svet/ Miznuci svet shot and released in 1932. Alth ough the film has many ethnographic moments featuring Moravian Slovak villagers from the locations it was shot in, the film is a romantic drama at its core, as it fo ll ows the troubles of a young Czech ethnographer, Stana Homa, who has come from Prague to a small vi ll age on the border of Moravia and Slovakia to document the inhabitants' customs, songs, and kroje (folk costumes). As young Stana becomes more enthralled with the village and a certain young vi ll ager, she finds herself integrating more and more into vi ll age li fe, until the arrival of her friends from Prague shatter the dream. Despite her attempts to become fully integrated into vi ll age life, the vi ll age and its inhabitants vanish, leaving the young ethnographer standing in the middle of an empty room, alone. At its heart Mizmici svet represented, in many ways, a fundamentally Czechoslovak approach to " traditional" Slovak culture, where the dividing line between Slovak and Czech is one not necessarily of language or ethnicity, but of a rural-urban divide. Despite its ethnic ambiguity, the Slovak press praised the film, especially on its visual merits, and eagerly considered it one of their own. Slovenska krajina enthusiastically complimented the film's "beautiful kroj" as "a treat for the eyes," 59 whereas Slovensky dennik enjoyed the film, but negatively compared it to the works of Plicka, saying that, if it were not for Plicka's film , " [Mizmici svet] will most likely be cons idered our first folkloric film , which has no antecedent." 60 Even the stoutly nationalist and famously anti-Czech Slovak grudgingly approved of parts of the film , even though 59 MAZEL, 8. , "Zo prazskeho tyzdna "S/ovenska Krajina, November 22, 1932, p. 2. "Plickov film' Po Horach, po dolach' a Matica Slov.," S/ovensky dennik, November 13 , 1932, p. I. 60 110 SLOVAKIA 2021 "[ Miznuci svet] does not manage to overcome Plicka's Slovak film of this kind ," it was a sound film , "which captured the disappearing life of Slovak villages on the Moravian border" and the scenes "where the swift life of the majestic lads is best illustrated through dance." 61 The contrast between Uhela's and Plicka's visions was further intensified following its debut in 1932, as a review of Zem spieva in Slovensky dennik praised Plicka's film via a backhanded swipe at Miznuci svet, saying "Zem spieva isn't one of those films which are constructed with cold calculation, inorganically loaded down with so called natural or ethnographic ' action' shots, as was, for example, in the distracting moments in the otherwise superb Miznuci svet, "62 intensifying the competition between the two most prominent Slovak-themed films of the early 1930s. Although Plicka's films were heavily influenced by the Modernist leanings of the Czech avant-garde and Bauhaus, Uh lela's film was in many ways, a different aesthetic experience. Since Plicka 's background in photography meant that he often preferred immaculately composed static shots, with an emphasis on the geometrical patterns he so often found in the Slovak countryside, the collective footage shot by Otakar Schutz, Jan Calabek, Josef Sti'echa, and Josef Buzek used in Miznuci svet is often frenetically active, soaring and zooming around the landscape like a bird, and calling to mind (as the reviewer in Slovak contemptuously pointed out) the "Soviet" 63 influences of the film. Montage sequences also abound throughout the film , repeating shots of the countryside, the growth of plants, the changing of seasons- the very same subjects which were often found in Plicka 's photographic and cinematic work, only viewed through the lens of a different approach to cinematography. However, despite their differences of setting and their treatment of other external cinematic factors, such as sound, Plicka's films and Uhlela's lone ethnographic feature film do share several simi larities. Both films revolve around the allure of leaving civilized, urban environments and reconnecting with older traditions in the countryside. Furthermore, these films sought to break free of the rigid 61 "Film - Mizniici svet. " Slovak, April 5, 1933, p. 5. BALLO, Iva n, "Zem spieva (o prvom slovenskym film e zvukom)," Slo vensky dennik. January I 0, 1933, p. 3. 63 "Film - Mizniici svet. "Slovak. April 5, 1933, p. 5. 62 SLOVAKIA 2021 111 trappings of purely ethnographic films in a variety of ways: through the hybridization of genre (e.g. Zem spieva 's mixture of the ethnographic film with elements of the city symphony genre, or Miznuci svet 's combination of non-fiction ethnography and fictional melodrama), by incorporating a variety of techniques from Czech or international avant-gardes such as montage and geometrical compositions, and by creating an impressionistic portrait of the experience of Slovakia without relying on the objective aims of scientific film making. And paradoxically, despite their attempts at creating "Czecho-Slovak" Slovak films, or film s about Slovaks and Slovakia within the context of a unified Czechoslovak nation, both directors were, in many ways failures at creating films that transformed their own personal aestheticizations of the Slovak experience into a more unifying one; Plicka 's films were embraced only among Slovak communities at home and abroad as well as among a select group of the urban Czech cultural elite, whereas Uhlela's film languished in obscurity on all fronts- neither Slovak enough for the Slovak nationalists, nor exotic enough for an urban Czech audience. 1.3 FASCISM AND THE RISE OF DOMESTIC SLOVAK PRODUCTION While nationalistic mass-produced images favored by both foreign ethnographers and Slovaks themselves could quickly be repurposed to promote various political ideologies, documentary film was no exception. With the growing support of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSPP), in the mid-to-late 1930s, the Czecho-Slovak interests in Slovakia (most elegantly embodied in Plicka 's documentary and pedagogical work) found themselves under attack by Slovak nationalists. Indeed, many hardliners took offense at the prominence of Czech and foreign directors producing films about Slovakia and for Slovaks, or alternately ignoring the Slovak market altogether, despite the fact that Czech cinemas and cinema production companies were far more numerous, successful, and better-funded. 64 As a result, on November 4th, 1938, members of the ruling HSPP began to purge not only foreign influences (such as Soviet cinema) from Slovak movie theaters, but also began to initiate a broader range of policies which would eventually forbid Jews, Czechs, and other 64 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA., Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie (Martin : Vydavatel'stvo Osveta, 1997) 74. 112 SLOVAKIA 2021 minont1es from owning, operating, or participating in the Slovak cinema industry,65 with th e notable exception of a handful of stateapproved Czech directors and cameramen like Eugen Mateicka and Bohus Havranek. 66 In order to satisfy the need for cinema, the Slovak government appealed for outside help in order to replace the technical knowledge and talent driven away or excluded by its policies. In addition to receiving aid from film organizations in Vienna, Berlin, and elsewhere, the Slovak Republic set up three organizations for making non-fiction films : Nastup (which produced primarily weekly newsreel s), Skolfilm (which produced educational films) , and Luc (a film monthly company which produced primarily cultural films .)67 These organizations were respon sible for producing nearl y all of Slovak non-fiction films before 1950. While many of the prominent non-Slovak fi gures in early Slovak cinema such as Karel Plicka were driven out of Slovakia during thi s period, a handful of Slovak directors such as Pal'o Bielik were able to continue, openly and sometimes covertly, the cinematic process started by Plicka. Bielik (who rose to fame playing the infamous bandit Juraj Janosik in Martin Fric 's 1935 film of the same name), along with other young S lovak filmmakers in the late First Republic, had mostly learned their craft through either their time in the fi lm industry as actors (in the case of Bielik) or through studyi ng with Plicka and other instructors at (or loosely affiliated with) the Brati slava-based School of Applied Arts. This was a revolutionary institution which featured instruction not just in photography and filmmakin g, but also graphic design , painting, advertising, typogramphy, and textile design .68 However, regardless of their background, th e young Slovak filmmakers quickly found themselves actively constrained by government and industrial censorship, which sought to exorcise the " dangerous" elements harmful to the Slovak nation from Slovak cinematic production . In practice, this meant not only purging 65 HA AKOVA, Petra, " Proticeska agenda s lovenskeho filmu 1939- 1945 ," in : Minoriry a.film (Bratislava: Asociacia slovenskyc h filmovych klubov, 20 12), 46. 66 HANAKOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska fi lmova kulllira ( Bratislava: Slovensky filmov y ustav, 20 I0). 49. 67 MIHA.LIK , Peter, Vznik slovenskej narodnej kinemarogra/ie / 896- 1948 (Bratislava : Kabinet divadlo a filmu Slovenskej akademi e vied, 1994), 94. 68 MOJZISOVA, Iva, "Avant-Garde Repercussions in the Schoo l of Applied Arts in Bratislava 1929- 1939, Journal of Design Histaty, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1992. p. 273. SLOVAKIA 2021 113 Slovak cinema of the thematic and formal innovations imported from abroad, but also eliminating the influences of a trio of dangerous domestic ingredients namely the "Czech-Jewish-Bolshevik"69 influence. Nearly all of the official cinematic output during the short-lived Slovak Republic seems to have focused solely on two non-fiction fronts- periodic newsreels depicting the activities of the Slovak troops in World War n, and so-called " kultume filmy ," or "cultural films ,"70 which were an evolution of the pre-war ethnographic films (often influenced as well by Weimar and Fascist-era German nationalist film s), 7 1 designed to promote a se nse of Slovak nationalism and patriotism. The roots of these cultural film s can be traced back to the 1930s, with the rise of ethnographic feature films like Zem spieva. However, unlike Plicka 's work, little attention was paid to making an ethnographically accurate recording of Slovak life; rather, these cultural films were to celebrate an idealized "S lovakia," which never wholly existed. On November 5, 1934, the "S polok priatel'ov kulumeho filmu na Slovensku" was formed in Bratislava. It sought, as part of its educational mission, to establish "cinemas only for cultural film" in Bratislava and to coordinate with a wide circle of Slovak cultural organi zations throughout Slovakia to make " cultura l film s an accessory in the upbringing of children and uplifting the public." 72 In addition to being an educational tool , Slovak nationalists also saw film as a means to transcend the stereotypes of Slovakia as "a beautiful, but poor, land where life is very primitive"73 that had been established in prior ethnographic and documentary work . A second, less-frequently articulated goal (at least not publicl y) was to "make Slovak film production at least as well-regarded as those done by other bigger nations." 74 Finally, the drive for documentary cinema in the Slovak Republic was, ironically, based on an idea which would later be coopted by the communist regime a few years later, name ly that " film 69 HANAKOV A, Petra, " Proticeska agenda slovenskeho filmu 1939- 1945," 46. Ibid., 45. 71 "Charakter kultume ho film a: P6vodny rozhovor 'S lovaka ' s reziserom 'Tobisu, "' Slovak. March 27, 1942, p. 7. 72 " Pre kulturny film," Slovensky dennik. November 4, 1935, p 9. 73 CE RESNA, M., "S lovensky svojraz a cudzina," Nastup, Apri l I, 1940, p. 14. 74 "S lovenska filmova produkcia," Slovak. August, 6, 1942, p. 8. 70 114 SLOVAKIA 2021 will help raise up a new kind of person ," 75 informing the Slovak population not only about various topical concerns, but also teaching them what it preci sely means to be "Slovak." In February of 1942 Pal'o Bielik, who had been a celebrated actor in interwar Czechoslovak cinema, as well as in the Slovak National Theatre, found himselfunemployed for budgetary and "other creative" reasons, 76 and so he turned to the newly-formed Slovak film agency Nastup for work as a librettist, before finding a position in the departments of short films and cultural films . Bielik, in many ways, was an accidental filmmaker, one who "fell into film ," and often felt quite ambivalent in regards to the medium. In a 1967 interview in Tvorba, Bielik recounted his first accidental exposures to cinema both as a director and as a spectator: "I fell, as they say, straight-legged into film . It was even worse, like when you throw a non-swimmer into cold water. Save yourself, if you know how! And I've saved myselfup until now. But I can't manage to get away from film ." 77 Bielik began his career directing short documentary and cultural films without any formal training, relying on his experiences in front of a camera during his career as an actor in the first Czechoslovak Republic. Although he was forced to work with the semi-fascist regime during this period, the early documentaries which Bielik produced were as apolitical as possible. 1942 's O zdravie robotnika, was a short film about a newly established sanatorium 78 and 1943 's Pod holym nebom, 79 was a 14-minute "artistic reportage" 80 focused on the daily activities around a traditional Orava shepherd's hut and "the romantic splendor of the Slovak countryside." 81 Some of Bielik 's other documentaries during this period included works on fish and the sport of fishing 82 ( 1943 's Hlavatky) , the manufacture and demonstration of traditional Slovak valasky in Miznuca romantika 75 -ik- " Film v novem zivote," Pravda, Vol. I, March I 0, 1944, p. 4. HANJ\KOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska.filmova kulflira, 46. 77 JAN EK, Miroslav, " Vzpominky a plan y Pal'a Bielka," Tvorba: list pro kritiku a umeni. January 12, 196 1, No. 2, pp. 28-9. 78 HAN J\ KOV A, Petra, Palo Bielik a slovenska.filmova kult1ira. 57. 79 Ibid., 53. 80 Ibid. 81 "S loven ska filmova produkcia," Slo vak. August, 6, 1942, p. 8. 82 "Vel'konocny program premierovyc h kin Nastup a Urania," Slovak, April 7, 1944, and "Nove film y Nastupu," Gardista. November 28, 1943 , p. 4. 76 SLOVAKIA 2021 115 ( I 943), and the production of flour and bread in Chlieb nas kai dodenny ( 1943). Although not all of Bielik's wartime documenttaries focused on the purely folkloric or ethnographic, by and large, they were films about the Slovak countryside and again, consistent with the aims of earlier ethnographic work. While it appeared that Bielik would spend the war attempting to draw little attention to himself with his documentaries on traditional Slovak subjects, the eruption of the Slovak National Uprising in August of 1944 suddenly changed the young director's career. While in the midst of shooting an unrelated film Hanka sa vydava in Brezena, Bielik and his crew caught wind of the Uprising and immediately rushed to join. As Bielik recalled in 1961, the group not only met with the partizans in order to get footage of the historic event, they actually joined the uprising itself: The Uprising caught me in Brezina during the filming of Hanka sa vydava. There were four other filmmakers with me: Krska, Richter, Plavec, a Sekula. We became lieutenants, they gave us uniforms, and we began to film . I led a group and wrote a scenario under the name 'Odboj 1944.' Krska filmed. It's thanks to him that we have authentic material from those days." 83 This raw reportage, which Bielik shot during his time in Brezina was later renamed, re-edited and repurposed into Bielik's 1945 documentary Za slobodu, although some of the film was lost when unknown persons stumbled upon the hiding place of some of the most sensitive footage: We buried part of the film negative underground in the village ofNemce in a graveyard underneath a tombstone. Some strangers, thinking that they found some treasure, collected the film strips, exposed them to light, and once again overexposed them. So they destroyed ten meters of an extraordinarily valuable film." 84 Although Za slobodu did not premiere during the war and was only finished in 1945,85 it nonetheless served as a potent anti-fascist KJ JAN EK, Miroslav, " Vzpomink y a plany Pal'a Bielka," Tvorba: list pro kritiku a o. 2, p.29. umeni, January 12, 196 1, K ➔ Ibid. 5 K MA CE K Vaclav, PA ST EKOVA , Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinumatugra/ie, 91 . 116 SLOVAKIA 2021 symbol, burnishing the bona-tides of Bielik's group of directors and cameramen as well as Bielik's own reputation as an anti-fascist filmmaker. The surviving film centers around the narrative retelling and reconstruction, not just of the uprising, but also of the "often frequently catastrophic consequences" of the doomed resistance, 86 a thematically daring approach which was seldom replicated in later documentaries. Furthermore, Za slobodu served as an aesthetic turning point for Slovak documentary film- while previous documenttary films about Slovakia had focused on the stylization of the Slovak experience, mediating reportage via romantic conceptions of the Slovak countryside a la PlickaBielik 's film focused on documentary realism, providing a cinematic experience that was out of touch with the postwar "antifascist euphoria." 87 It did not receive widespread distribution, being withdrawn by government officials because of it was "inappropriate for the delicate nature of the theme;" 88 it featured actual reportage, shot under dangerous conditions; and it did not glamorize or stylize the Slovak National Uprising. In short, Za slobodu can be seen as evidence of the first glimmers of cinematic neo-realism in Slovak documentary filmmaking . 1.4 POSTWAR RUPTURING: DOCUMENTARY AND NON-FICTION 1945 TO 1950 While the rise of fascism heralded the end of his career as a filmmaker, Karel Plicka 's legacy and influence on the burgeoning Slovak film industry was only beginning. Before World War II, Plicka had briefly held the position of film instructor in the experimental and short-lived Academy of the Applied Arts in Bratislava, before the institution was shut down due to rising anti-Czech and anti-Hungarian sentiment. While this institution was short-lived, the School of Applied Arts served to provide the basic educational preparation for the careers of several prominent early Slovak directors like Jan Kadar. In 1946, several months after the reunification of Czechoslovakia, Plicka was appointed the first Dean of the Filmova a televizni fakulta Akademie muzickych umenie (F AMU), 89 in charge of, not only FILMMAKING FROM 86 HANA KOY A, Petra, Pa/'o Bielik a slovenskafilmova kulflira, 63. MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOY A, Jelena, Dejiny slovenskej kinomatografie, 91. RH Ibid. , 91 . 89 FRANC, Martin, and KRATKA Lenka, eds., Dejiny A MU: ve vypravenich (Praha : Nakladatelstvi AMU, 2017), I 0 . 87 SLOVAKIA 2021 117 educating future Czech professsionals, but also the first major generation of academically-trained Slovak film professionals. Although the Slovak students began matriculating from FAMU in the late 1940s and early 1950s, director Eduard Greener (one of the first Slovaks to go to the academy) noted that a vast educational gap existed between the Slovak students and their Czech classmates. 90 Although FAMU contributed enormously to the creation of a stable and thriving Slovak film industry from the 1950s onwards, Slovak documentary cinema (and indeed Slovak cinema as a whole) suffered a rupture, from the mid- I 940s to the early 1950s, as directors who had enthusiastically participated in the Slovak Republic 's film program were "discredited ."91 While some directors, such as Pal'o Bielik, had served in the anti-fascist resistance during the war, those who had not found themselves in the position of Plicka and other minority filmmakers in Slovakia in the 1940s- unwelcome and unemployed. As a result, Slovak documentary production sharply declined in postwar years of the 1940s, with an average of seven nonfiction films per year produced from 1945 to 1948,92 as the most visionary and politically safe directors (such as Bielik) and talented beginners such as Jan Kadar rapidly transitioned into feature filmmaking. 93 Despite newly-increased state support and the establishment of institutions such as FAMU, Slovak nonfiction cinema remained fairly moribund for much of the late 1940s through the early I 960s, due to a lack of qualified personnel and, from 1948 onwards, the newly established communist government's ideological demands. 94 These demands, somewhat paradoxically, were very similar to those espoused by the fascist government: to unify Slovaks around visual tropes and folklore, to show the moderni zation of Slovakia and the tangible benefits of the state, 95 and to build a more- 90 "Eduard Greener: film ako vol'ny vers," interview in literarni noviny. August 4, 20 15. http: //literarky.cz/l iterat ura/cteni/20360-eduard-grener-fi lm-ako-vony-ver 91 Navratil , Antonin, Cesty k pravde ci Ii i : 70 let c'eskoslovenskeho dokumentarniho .filmu (Praha: FAMU, 2002), 159. 92 Ibid. , 16 1. 93 Ibid., 160-2. 94 MA CE K Vaclav, PASTEKOVA , Jelena. Dejiny slovenskej kinomatogrcifie. I 1719. 95 JA SSO, Julius, "Slovak Films in the Last Five Years," Czechoslovak Film, Vol. 7, No. 4, unpag inated. 118 SLOVAKIA 2021 ideologically pure Slovak soc iety96 through the use of mass-produced images. Perhaps the single most stereotypical " identifying characteristic" of a Slovak film , documentary or otherwise, during the postwar and early communist years was a reliance on the folkloric motifs and ethnographic themes which had been become so thoroughly codified by the 1950s. This particular fascination with folk culture was hardly a communist invention , as it drew on the ethnographic traditions which were so popular in the late Austro-Hungarian through interwar periods. Given that amateur ethnographers such as Pavel Sochan eagerly embraced photography as a way of documenting indigenous practices in an effort to distinguish region s and establish Slovak cultural identity during periodic moments of cultural trauma, ethnic repression , and attempts at forced assimilation, 97 it remains a littl e surpri sing how quickly the postwar and communist regimes embraced these formerly divisive aesthetic elements. While cinema had been nationalized by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in August of 1945 as an important national resource, fo lk culture was also nationalized in Slovakia by presidential decree on November 7, 1945. 98 This decree also resulted in the creation of the first Slovak fo lk art collective, the Ustredie l'udovej umeleckej vyroby (UCUV), whose aims were to preserve Slovak folk culture. While ethnographic and folkloric activities had been decidedly controversial in the First Czechoslovak Republic and consisted of a definite part of the fascist propaganda machine during the war, following the 1948 Communist Putsch, the government further reaffirmed the need for fo lkl oric collectives by creating the Slovensky l'udovy umelecky kolekiv (SCUK) in 1949. Further still, the regime stated exp Iicitly ten years later that "folk arts and folk handicrafts make up an important part of our socialist culture," 99 further sanctioning not just the practice of these traditional pastimes, but 96 MACEK Vaclav, PASTEKOVA , Jelena, Dejinv slovenskej kinomatografie. 126. See PODOLAK. J. , "The Development of Ethnography in Slo va kia," Midwest Fo lklore, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summ er, 1958 , pp. 69-84. 97 98 " Prozatimni statni zfizeni ceskoslovenske," Dekret presidenta republiky o organisaci lidove a umelecke vvroby . November 7, 1945, Zakon c. I I 0/ 1945 Sb. Note that the decree did not come into effect until November 27th . 99 Zakon c. 56/ 1957 Sb. SLOVAKIA 2021 119 affording them legal protection and financial support, albeit fossilizing these living traditions even more effectively than the ethnographic projects of the late Austro-Hungarian and interwar periods. By the early 1950s, Communists had not only assumed control of the government, but were also looking to infiltrate or redirect certain cultural outlets for the purposes of creating communist educational entertainment. The creation of Slovak folkloric collectives such as the S:CUK in the late 1940s, along with the overwhelming familiarity with mass-produced images of Slovakia, the prevalence of interest in the folkloric trappings of Slovak films in both the Czech and Slovak lands was, at one point, so prevalent that Czech film critic and dramaturge Jaroslav Bocek vociferously complained that " ... the Slovak cinema watched over the adjective 'Slovak' caring much less about the noun ' cinema.' No wonder there was such a rash of folklore , embroidered blouses, and national songs, since Czech directors could hardly be expected to understand Slovakia any different from the exotic, folklore , or tourist angle." 10° Compounding Bocek's irritation at the more stereotypical depictions of national identity was the fact that "these same features [folkloric trappings] began to creep even into the work of the emerging directors," to which the Czech critic added "Slovak cinema saw its raison d'etre in its very existence . .. such traits can be found in the beginnings of any cultural endeavor." 10 1 Bocek's paternal dismissal of Slovak cinema was, sadly, not an isolated incident, and echoes some of the earlier critiques of earlier ethnographic films by Plicka and others. 1.5 CONCLUSION As we have seen, Slovak documentary film followed the footsteps of earlier ethnographers and ethnographic photographers, whose original mission was to document and to codify Slovak ethnicity through the collection, reportage , and standardization of cultural and visual tropes. These early documentaries, like those in static media, were predominantly produced by non-Slovaks, who turned to Slovakia to record ways of living which had already receded out of living memory elsewhere. Although these early documentary 100 BOCE K, Jaroslav, 'Twenty Yea rs of Czechoslovak Film," in Modern Czechoslovak Film / 945/ 1965 (Praha: Arti a, dat e unknown [ 1966?)), no paginati on. 10 1 BOCE K, Jaros lav, " Twen ty Years of Czechoslovak Film." 120 SLOVAKIA 2021 films by Czech directors could be di visive in the Slovak intellectual community in Czechoslovakia, they were eagerly embraced by Slovaks li ving elsewhere as a necessary connection to their cultural roots, a connection that was prized not only for its entertainment va lue, but also for its ability to educate Slovaks abroad and in Czechoslovakia in the fundamental aspects of Slovak culture. Since Slovak documentary films were also the fundamental cinematic output of Slovak directors from the beginnings of the Slovak Republic in 1939 through the beginnings of the Slovak feature film era in the 1950s, they also proved to be the fundamental training ground for young Slovak directors, who incorporated several aesthetic aspects of documentary filmrnaking into their own feature film works. In each of these different eras of documentary film production, however, one constant remainsa continuation of the aestheticization of Slovakia, a process begun in the 19th century with the ethnographic activities performed by Hungarians, Austrians, Czechs, and eventually Slovaks themselves. The replicability of these aesthetics also helped ensure the spread of certain aspects of Slovak visual cu lture in the countryside, despite the occasional attempt to bring cinematic focus and cu ltural attention to Slovak urban communities. These attempts were ultimately foiled by the implied formal and aesthetic needs of the specifically "S lovak" documentary: since Slovak culture had been so rigorously defined through its codification period as a " rural" identity, attempts to focus on other aspects of Slovak identity (either in other urban locales or through a de-romanticization of the Slovak countryside) were met with political , cultural, and social resistance.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Picturing a Nation: Slovak Documentary Film from its Birth Until 1950 Description An account of the resource Nicholas Hudáč Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 92-120 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hudáč, Nicholas Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/332785cff4f265ad3c4c359600dd8581.pdf 590394fa1a9f7d2f25e394b700d2c443 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 121 "THE RUSSIANS ARE INVADING US!" PRESOV, 1968 M. Mark Stolarik In 1968 Anne and Mark Stolarik experienced two unforgettable events in their lives- they were married and later witnessed the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Not many people can brag that their honeymoon was interrupted by Russian tanks! Meanwhile, they also experienced many culture shocks, as they toured Slovakia for the first time. For the newlyweds the summer of 1968 started quite auspiciously. On June 15, over 400 guests appeared at the wedding of Mark Stolarik and Anne fvanco in Oshawa, Ontario, the automobile capital of Canada. The ceremony was held in the packed Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary on Ritson Road, and was presided over by the Reverend Stefan Adamiak. 1 Afterwards the guests walked to the nearby Slovak Hall ,2 ate a many-course meal in the basement and then proceeded upstairs where the dancing and drinking began . As was typical of Slovak weddings, two men got into a fight and were ejected by the bride 's father. By I 0:00 p.m. a crisis arose- there was no more liquor! Jan Jvanco, the bride 's father, quickly rounded up all of his friends, explained the situation, and they raced home to empty their liquor cabinets in order to keep the celebration going into the wee hours of the morning. After the tearful bridal dance at midnight, during which Mark was ejected from the building, Jan lvanco and his new son-in-law met in a back room and counted up all the monetary donations received, either during the wedding, or during the bridal dance. They totaled $4,000, which was more than enough to cover all of their planned-for honeymoon expenses to Europe, and their research-trip to Slovakia. At that time Mark was a Ph.D. student at the University of Minnesota, where he was studying 1 For the history of this parish see "S lovak Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada" (Xerox copy, Oshawa, 2002) . A copy can be found in the Slovak Arc hi ves, Arc hives and Special Collections, Unive rsity of Ottawa. 2 For a photo of this hall, see the front cover of Polyphony : The Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario 2, No. I (Winter, 1979). �122 SLOVAKIA 2021 under the direction of Timothy L. Smith, who had recently founded the Immigrant Archives at the University. 3 As one of Smith's Research Assistants, Mark 's duties consisted of collecting archival materials in American and Canadian cities pertaining to Slovak immigration to North America and then writing his dissertation based upon these materials. The day after their wedding Mark and Anne fl ew from Toronto to Minneapolis and from there by a special charter plane for uni versity students to Paris. After touring Paris with student colleagues from the University of Minnesota, Mark and Anne took a train to Stuttgart, Germany, where they picked up a brand-new Volkswagen " Beetle" which Mark had purchased for $1,300. With their new car they drove to Munich and Salzburg, where they visited with friend s and then proceeded to Vienna. In this ancient capital of the former Habsburg Empire, which they first toured, they applied for and received visas from the Czechoslovak Consulate to visit the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. After a picturesque drive from Vienna through the towns of Hainburg and Wolfstahl, the newlyweds approached the Czechoslovak border. They could see the Little Carpathians looming in the di stance, and Bratislava castle overlooking the city. As they approached the border, they noticed that they were the only car entering the Republic. A lonely soldier, with a sub-machine gun slung over his back, lifted a heavy cantilevered iron gate, which opened only inwards, and allowed them in . Thereupon two surprised customs officers emerged from a little building off to the side and, under a covered roof asked the travelers for their passports and visas. 3 For the history of the Immigrant Archives, later renamed the Immigration History Research Center, see my " Building Ethnic Arch ives in the United States and Canada since the I 960 's," in Dominique Daniel and Amalia Levi eds., Identity Palimpsests: Archiving Ethnicity in the U.S. and Canada (Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books, 20 13), 59-6 1. �SLOVAKIA 2021 123 Petrfalka border crossing from Austria, 1993 . In 1968 there were no signs at this crossing except the large letters that read " Bratislava." Fortunately, Timothy Smith had arranged for Dr. 1:udovit Holotik, the Director of the Historical [nstitute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, to issue them, as we ll as his entire team of researchers, an official invitation, which made the granting of visas by the Czechoslovak authorities that much easier. After a two-hour wait at the border, while the customs officers awaited a telephone call from Prague confirming their visas as legitimate, the couple was cleared for entrance into the Republic. Before they departed they changed some American dollars for Czechoslovak crowns, because it was noon and their stomachs were growling. Because they had an official invitation , they did not have to exchange $12.00 (U.S.) for Czechoslovak crowns for each day of their stay at the official (and unrealistic) rate of seven crowns for a �124 SLOVAKIA 2021 dollar. The real (black market) rate of exchange was 35 crowns for a dollar. Once they had cleared customs, the two visitors proceeded in their little green Volkswagen along a narrow two-lane road towards the town of Petrzalka, a suburb of Bratislava. They noticed that the road was raised higher than the nearby empty fields , and soon they passed a tall guard-tower, with two more armed soldiers watching them. rt was clear that they had just passed through the "Iron Curtain" which separated the communist East from the democratic West. After the pair had crossed the "Stary most" (Old Bridge) across the Danube River from Petrzalka to Bratislava, and drove along Sturova Street into the heart of the city, they were disappointed by what they saw. The buildings were old and grey, with the plaster falling off. What a contrast with modem, clean and dynamic Vienna! The pedestrians were dressed in what looked like I 940's clothing. It seemed to the visitors that they had entered into the "Third World." As they drove along, they looked in vain for a sign that would advertise a restaurant. When the pair drove their Volkswagen up the hill through the Square of the Slovak National Uprising, past the Church of the Holy Trinity, they noticed a large sign at its base that read "Sovietska kniha" (Soviet Bookstore), which again reminded them that they were in the communist East. Finally, as they emerged into what is now known as " Hodo:fovo namestie" (Hodza Square), the hungry couple spied a sign on the left that read "Restauracia Stefanka." Elated, they parked their car on a side road and entered the restaurant with great anticipation. A friendly waiter in a tuxedo greeted them and sat them beside a window overlooking the square. He explained that the Stefanka did not provide individual service, but they could help themselves at the buffet table. Mark and Anne were delighted to see little open-faced sandwiches, with all sorts of delicacies on them, awaiting their hungry stomachs. They ate to their heart's content. Meanwhile, they noticed that the clientele consisted mostly of older gentlemen and young women. They made nothing of it. A little later, whi le visiting Mark 's cousin Jozef Mazur in nearby Trnava, Jozef asked the couple for their first impressions of Slovakia. When they recounted their lunch at the Stefanka, Jozef burst into laughter. When Mark inquired as to what was so funny, Jozef replied, "Don't you know what the Stefanka is?" To which Mark replied , "no," to which Jozef added, "The Stefanka is �SLOVAKIA 2021 125 notorious in Bratislava as the place where you go if you want to pick up a prostitute! " Upon reflection, Mark and Anne understood why they had seen so many older gentlemen and younger women at the Stefanka. They had a good laugh! After lunch on their first day in Slovakia, Mark and Anne proceeded to the offices of the Historicky ustav SAV (Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences) on Klemensova Street. Here a sheepish Dr. L:udovit Holotik welcomed them and explained that he was leaving shortly on a research trip to England . He failed to mention that he had just been fired as Director of the Institute, because in the l 950 ' s he had written a defamatory book about the Slovak national hero, General Milan R. Stefanik. During the liberali z ing " Dubcek era",4 such books were frowned upon and Holotik was attacked in the now-free press.5 Holotik then introduced Mark to his successor, Dr. Julius Mesaros. The latter was initially skeptical of Mark ' s motives, but when Mark explained that he was a student of Timothy Smith, and part of a team of researchers who were coming to Slovakia to study the emigration of various ethnic groups from the former Kingdom of Hungary, Mesaros mellowed. He offered Mark and Anne some Turkish coffee, made by his secretary, which consisted of one-third coffeegrounds and two-thirds thick, dark, coffee in a demi-tasse. The Canadian couple had never before seen or tasted such coffee and slowly sipped it in order not to insult their host. Mark and Anne were raised on "cafe au lait". Apparently, the Russians had introduced "Turkish coffee" to the Eastern Bloc. After this introduction, Mesaros brought to Mark dozens of articles and books written by himself and his colleagues at the Hi storical Institute on the social history of 19 th century Slovakia.6 Once he had read them, Mark would have a good back- 4 For the Dubce k era , popularl y kn own as the " Prague Spring," see The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact In vasion of Czechoslovakia, / 968: Forty Years Later, ed. by M. Mark Sto larik (Munde lein, IL : Bo lchazy-Carducc i, 20 I 0). 1..:udovit Holotik, Stefa nikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Brati slava: Slove nska academia vied. 1958); fo r th e attacks upon Holot ik see Jan Ml ynarik , " Hi stori ci v Enckylopedii Slovenska- bilanci a neostalinskeho kadrovani a (Studia k slovenskej histori ografii )" Premeny 25 (4, 1988), 147-8. 6 Mesaros's most important publication was Rolnicka a narodnostna otazka na Slovensku, 1848-1900; k problematikef eudalnych prei itkov (Bratislava : Slovenska academia vi ed, 1959). 5 �126 SLOVAKIA 2021 ground understanding of the archival sources which he would subsequently find in various Slovak state archives. After having spent their first night in the nearby Hotel Krym, Mark and Anne proceeded to the headquarters of the Slovak State Archives on the " Ulica obrancov mieru" (Street of the Defenders of Peace; today 's Stefanikova Street). There they met and befriended Dr. Frantisek Bielik, one of the archivists who was interested in the topic of Slovak immigration .7 He subsequently introduced the couple to Deputy Director Jozef Mazur who, it turned out, was Mark 's long-lost cousin on his mother's side. They had a joyful reunion during which Jozef Mazur showed Mark photos of himself visiting with Mark 's family in Turciansky Svaty Martin during the Second World War. Jozef then wrote Mark an official letter of introduction to all the Slovak State Archives scattered across the country, in which Jozef instructed the local archivists to help Mark in finding material s on Slovak emigration to North America. For the next two weeks Frantisek Bielik found such materials for Mark in the Bratislava State Archives. While Mark and Anne stayed at the nearby inexpensive Hotel Tatra, which was full of Russians, they had a curious experience. Every morning when they ate breakfast in the hotel 's dining room, they ordered the same things- ham and eggs with rolls and coffee. The total bill was always 28 crowns, which they rounded up to 30, much to the deli ght of their middle-aged waiter, who collected the money on the spot. They were not used to waiters doing this, because in North America waiters or waitresses usually submitted a bill , and the customers paid through a cashier, who controlled the amount requested and paid. One day, the middle-aged waiter took the day off and was replaced by a much younger colleague. Mark and Anne ordered the same breakfast, but the new waiter charged them 48 crowns! Not wishing to create a scene, they paid the 48 crowns and left. The next day, when the middle-aged waiter returned, they showed him the previous day's breakfast bill. He was furiou s, he apologized, did not charge them for their breakfast, and vowed that his younger colleague would never again repl ace him . Mark and Anne wondered how often waiters in 7 While Bielik started hi s career at the Slovak State Archives, he later switched to the Institute for Slovaks Abroad of the Matica slovenska and published, amon g many others things, the four- volume compendium of documents on Slovak immigrati on entitled Slovenske vystahovalectvo. Dokumenty / -4 (Bratislava: Slovenska academ ia vied, 1969- 1985). �SLOVAKIA 2021 127 Slovakia (and elsewhere in Europe) cheated their customers in this way. After their stay in Bratislava, Mark and Anne drove north to the city of Trnava, to do research in the archives of the Spolok Sv. Yojtecha (Society of St. Adalbert). They stayed with the family of Jozef Mazur, who introduced Mark to the Director of the Spolok, Msgr. Jan Postenyi . The latter was delighted to meet Mark, because Postenyi had been on a tour of the USA in 193 7, and had since not met with any American Slovaks. He gladly opened his rich archive to Mark, where the latter discovered many documents pertaining to the history of the Slovak League of America during and after World War I. These included a carbon-copy of the 1915 Cleveland Agreement. 8 After a week's stay in Trnava, Mark and Anne set out for northern Slovakia, where they met additional members of their family. In Cadca they stayed with Mark 's uncle Jozef Stolarik, who took Mark to see his grandmother Anna Stolarikova and her daughter Terezia Bosakova in the hilly settlement of Dlha, near the city of Turzovka. Anna had not seen her grandson since his Christening in 1943 . Since Anna was illiterate, she wondered how Mark had managed to find her. Mark took out a road map of Europe and showed her the roads they had driven from Stuttgart to Slovakia, but it was hard for her to comprehend what he was showing. Mark, meanwhile, was amused that she was wearing black Converse sneakers. Uncle Jozef explained that it was easier for her to climb up the hill to her house in sneakers than in leather shoes. There was no road up the hill from the one below. After having visited two more aunts and their families, in midJuly, Mark and Anne set out for the city of Martin, Mark's birthplace. While driving between the city of Zilina and the ruins of castle Strecno, Mark and Anne suddenly spotted a long column of Russian military vehicles parked on the old road beside the new one. They were engaged in war games called "operation Sumava" in order to intimidate the Czechoslovak government into stopping the transformation of Czech and Slovak society into "socialism with a human face," as the first Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 8 For the history of the Spolok Sv. Vojtecha see Stefan Hanakovic, Dejiny Spolku sviiteho Vojtecha (Trnava : Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 2005), especia ll y pages 281-84 for Postenyi ' s trip to America. The Cleve land Agreement can be found in the Archiv Spolku Svateho Vojtecha, Politika, fasc. 235 , fol. A. c.2 �128 SLOVAKIA 2021 Alexander Dubcek, put it. As he made clear in hi s memo irs, he and hi s followers were trying to turn communist Czechoslovakia into a Social Democratic Czechoslovakia.9 His colleagues in the Warsaw Pact, particularly Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and East German leader Walter Ulbricht, vehemently disapproved of the path of the so-called Prague Spring, and "operation Sumava" was a prelude to the later in vas ion of Czechoslovakia. 10 Meanwhile, when Mark saw these Soviet military veh icles, he instantly shouted at Anne to start photographing them , because he was driving and was afraid to stop the car, lest the Russians arrest him. A terrified Anne grabbed hi s 35mi llimeter camera and took several color slides of these vehicles. Russ ian military vehicles parked on the old road between Z ilina and Strecno in northern Slovakia, Jul y, 1968 9 Hope Dies Last: The Autohiography of Alexander Dubcek, ed. and trans. by Jiri Hochman (New York: Kodansha International, 1993), 277. 10 For the views of Brezhnev, Gomulka and Ulbricht, see the chapters by Mikhail Latysh, Lukasz Kaminski and Riidi ger Wenzke in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact In vasion, 1-18, 95- 128 and 137-64. �SLOVAKIA 2021 129 Russian "Katyusha" rocket launchers on old road between Zilina and Strecno, July, 1969. Russian ambulance and military vehicles on old road between Zilina and Strecno, July 1968. After this harrowing experience, Mark and Anne kept driving around the Strecno pass until they reached the city of Martin. Here �130 SLOVAKIA 2021 they met Uncle Rudolf and hi s family and stayed with them for a week while Mark worked in the Literary Archive of the Matica slovenska. Here he met Dr. Jozef Telgarsky, the Director of the Slovak National Library of the Matica slovenska. The two of them agreed upon an exchange of books and other materials in the future , a promise which is still in effect. While in Martin, at the urging of Frantisek (Ferko) Bielik, Mark attended the 6th Congress of the Slovak Historical Society, where he heard Dr. Lubomir Liptak 's attack upon the "deformation" of Slovak hi story by Marxist hi storian s in the previous decades. 11 He also heard Prof. Milos Gosiorovsky' s plea for the federation of Czechoslovakia based upon the Cleveland Agreement of 1915. 12 Mark was amused by Ferko Bielik 's antics at this Congress- he lifted hi s hand in approval of various motions made, whi le shaking hi s head sideways in disapproval. He explained that the conference organizers only counted the raised hands, not the heads shaking sideways. This was a small gesture of disapproval of the conference proceedings. After their stay in Martin, at the beginning of August, the newlyweds set out for the city of Presov, to do research in the archives of the former county of Saris, from where the first immigrants had left for America. 13 In Presov they met and stayed with Anne's uncle Andrej Krasnay in the Sid lisko Dukelskych hrdinov (the Apartment Complex of the Heroes of the Duk la Pass). Shortly after their arrival , Andrej took Mark and Anne to visit her grandmother in her vi ll age for the first time, as well as other aunts and uncles. At Andrej 's condo Mark and Anne had to get used to the socialist way of life. For instance, sometimes the water flowed from the faucets in Andrej's apartment, sometimes not. Therefore, Andrej kept his tub full of water, so that he would not run out. Sometimes the water was hot. Sometimes it was not. Whenever the water flowed hot, Andrej called the couple to immediately take a bath. And, even though Presov had street li ghts, they were not turned on at night, in order to conserve electricity. When Mark went to do research in the Slovak State Archives in Presov, which was located on the Main Square, right beside the church of St. Nicholas, he had some interesting experiences. When he met 11 Cubomir Liptak, "U loha a postavenie historiografie v nasej spolocnosti, Hisloricky casopi.1· XVII , c. l , 1969, 98- 11 7. 12 Milos Gosiorovsky, "Slovaci za prvej svetovej vojny," in Slovaci a ich narodnv v;ivin, ed. Oto Takac (Brati slava: Slovenska academ ia vied, I969), 29 1-305 . 13 Slovak State Archives in Presov, county Saris, podzupan, 9809, VB, 1879. �SLOVAK.IA 2021 131 Andrej Lukac, the Director of the Archive, the latter was cool to Mark's visit. He claimed that the material Mark was searching for was not yet processed and suggested that Mark return sometime in the future, when it would become available. Mark then asked if Lukac knew Jozef Mazur, to which Lukac replied, "Hej , onje moj set1'' (Of course! He's my boss.) To which Mark replied, "Hej, on je moj bratranec." (Of course! He's my cousin.) As soon as Lukac heard Mark ' s reply, he jumped into action. Lukac suggested that, since Mark could not read Magyar, and most of the documents were in that language, he hire a translator. Mark agreed and the next day Lukac introduced Mark to Mr. Grant. The latter was the descendant of a Scottish soldier who had remained in Central Europe in the 17 th century. Mr. Grant was in his 80's, he had been educated in the old Austria-Hungary, and knew Slovak, Magyar, German and Latin. He was overly polite, as such gentlemen were trained to be and, whenever he found an interesting document to translate, he would say "No, prosim Vas pekne," which means "Now, if you please," and then would proceed to translate. Lukac suggested that Mark pay Mr. Grant I 00 crowns per day, which was the going rate for such services. Mark agreed, since on the black market that would come to only $3.00 (US) a day. Mr. Grant was so intelligent that, after he had translated some documents, he grasped what Mark was looking for, and then did his translating without any more superv1s1on. Mark and Anne also did research in Kosice. Once they had exhausted their sources in Presov, they drove south to Kosice, to work in the fonner archives of Abov and Zemplin counties, which were housed in the former Abov county headquarters on Orlia Street, one block from the Cathedral of St. Elizabeth. As they drove into Kosice and approached the main square, they noticed and photographed a bust of General Milan R. Stefanik on a pedestal that was obviously erected spontaneously and hurriedly by some local patriots on the exact spot where a much larger statue of Stefanik had been erected in the l 920's. The statue was removed by communist authorities in the I 950's. (See the photo on page 133) This bust testified to the rise of Slovak nationalism during the Dubcek era. At the Slovak State Archives in Kosice Mark and Anne �132 SLOVAKIA 2021 were welcomed by the Director, Ladislav Andrasi and his assistant, Anna Fedorjakova. The latter willingly and eagerly helped Mark to translate documents from Magyar into Slovak. Meanwhile, Mark and Anne were joined by Professor Timothy Smith and another one of his graduate students, Oksana Dragan, who had both just come down from Poland in Smith's brown Volkswagen. Smith was studying Slovak Lutheran immigration from eastern Slovakia while Oksana was researching Rusyn (Ukrainian) immigration to North America. Smith then suggested to Mark that he a lso consult the Roman Catholic bishop's archives, located on Lenin Street, opposite the Cathedral. Since Anne had studied Latin for five years in High School, she volunteered to do this and was assisted by the Rev. Alojs Tkac, who was in charge of the archives. After the collapse of Communism, the latter was e levated to the post of Bishop, and later, Archbishop of Kosice. 14 Meanwhile, Professor Smith arranged a meeting with an "Action Committee" of the newly-resurrected Greek Catholic Church, led by Msgr. Jan Hirka, who, once Communism collapsed, was e levated to Eparch (Bishop) of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Presov. 15 On the evening of August 20, 1968, Mark and Anne, together with Timothy Smith and Oksana Dragan, decided to dine together. They went to the Magyar Restaurant in Kosice , where they enjoyed an exotic meal and did some dancing to the tunes of a Gypsy (Roma) orchestra. 14 Alojz Tkac was persecuted by the Communi sts durin g the period of "Normalization" ( 1970- 1989) and penned hi s memoirs in Pohl'adv z kriiovatky (Kapusany: Bens, 2004). 15 For the hi story of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia from 1968 to 1980, see Martin Lupco, "Grec kokatolick a a pravoslavna cirkev na Slovensku v rokoch 19681980," in Jaroslav Corani c- Jana Koprivnakova- Peter Sturak eds. Grekokatolicka cirkev na Slovensku vo svetle vyroci II (Presov: Presovska univerzita v Presove, 2012), 165-77. Msgr. Jan H irka published hi s memoirs in Pod ochranou Marie: Pastier v zlui be cirkvi (Presov: Presovska univerzita v Presove, 20 13 ). �SLOVAKIA 2021 133 Bust of General M.R. Stefanik on the main square, Kosice, August, 1968. �134 SLOVAKIA 2021 Around 11 :00 p.m. all four researchers decided to drive back to their abodes in Presov. As Mark and Anne drove through the village of Drienov, just north of Kosice, a black cat ran in front of their car. Although they did not kill it, Mark wondered aloud if it signaled that they would have bad luck. "I hope not," Anne answered. Around 4:30 a.m. on August 21 , Mark and Anne were awakened by a very loud noise coming from the streets of Presov. At first they thought that it was the sound of jackhammers, and Mark began to curse the workers who could not wait until 8:00 a.m. to repair the streets. Then they heard a knocking on the door to the apartment. Andrej Krasnay gingerly approached the door and asked, "who ' s there?" Mark and Anne were afraid that the Secret Police had come for them, because they always came at night. Instead, it was the next-doorneighbor. He told Andrej something and Andrej then knocked on Mark and Anne's glass door, came in and announced that "The Russians, Poles, East Germans, Magyars and Bulgarians are occupying us!" 16 All three then understood that the noise from the street was not from jackhammers, but from tanks. Dazed, Mark and Anne decided to immediately dress and repair to the Hotel Dukla, where Professor Smith and Oksana Dragan were staying. It was sunrise by the time they arrived and Smith had just arisen. Mark knocked on his door and as Smith opened it, Mark blurted out "the Russians are invading us." Smith looked out his window at the tanks and remarked that he thought it was military maneuvers again . Mark assured him that it was not, that this was a real invasion . Smith then suggested that Mark go find Anne, who had gone upstairs to inform Oksana of the invasion , to come down to the dining room to discuss the situation. The four researchers, along with a young and lonely waiter, were the only customers in the dining room. While Smith ate a hearty breakfast of scrambled eggs and rolls , the three students were too frightened to eat. Smith nonchalantly remarked, " We ' re Americans. This doesn ' t concern us." He cou ldn 't have been more wrong. Mark was born in Turciansky Svaty Martin in 1943 and Oksana in Berlin in 1942. Oksana was the daughter of the editor of the 16 The East Germans did not parti cipate in the invasion . For a detailed ex planati on sec Rildi gcr Wcnzkc, "The Rol e and Acti vities of the SEO, the East German State and Its Military During th e ' Prague Spring' of 1968," in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion, 137-64. �SLOVAKIA 2021 135 pro-independence Ukrainian weekly Svoboda, published in Jersey City, New Jersey. Both were post-war refugees who, with their families, had ended up in Canada and the USA after the war. Neither the Soviet Union, nor Czechoslovakia, recognized dual citizenship at that time. Either one of these students could be detained by the authorities, whether Czechoslovak or Russian . Smith, however, was so unconcerned about the invasion that he decided that all four researchers should carry on as if nothing had happened. Thus, he instructed Mark and Oksana to go to the state archives and continue with their research. Meanwhile, he took Anne with him to serve as a translator in the Presov city archives. When Smith met with the Mayor of Presov, who was clearly shattered by the invasion, Smith asked for permission to do research in the city archives. The Mayor replied, with Anne translating, that "due to the extraordinary circumstances," the city archives were closed. Smith would not take no for an answer. He repeated his request, and Anne repeated the translation that the archives were closed. After three tries, Smith gave up and told Anne to go join Mark in the state archives. When Mark and Oksana arrived at the Slovak State Archives, they noticed that the entire staff was looking out the windows at the tanks (T55 ' s) roaring by, except Mr. Grant. The latter was nonchalantly reading and translating Magyar documents, oblivious to the noise outside. After a while Mr. Grant's behavior puzzled Mark so much that he asked Mr. Grant, "how can you continue to work while we are being invaded?" Mr. Grant smiled and replied, "This is my fifth invasion ." When Mr. Grant saw the puzzled look on Mark ' s face , he explained that the Russians had broken through the Carpathians into Hungary in the fall and winter of 1914-1915, then Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army occupied Presov in 1919, the Germans occupied Slovakia in 1944 and the Russians in 1945, and again in 1968. " So, what's new?" he asked. "But, don't you want to see the Russian tanks?" Mark asked. Mr. Grant gestured no with his hand. Then he added, "You should have seen a German Tiger. That was a tank!" Mr. Grant then reminisced that, shortly after the Second World War had ended, he took the train from Presov to Kos ice. About half way there he spotted four destroyed tanks in a nearby field . Three were Russian T34 ' s and one was a German Tiger with its treads blown off. It was obvious what had happened. �136 SLOVAKIA 2021 After these reassuring words from Mr. Grant, Mark and Anne cairned down and decided to return to Andrej's apartment, to get their camera, and take some pictures of the invasion. After having eaten some lunch, the intrepid pair set out on Uti ca cervenej arrnady [Red Army Street] (today's Levoca Street) towards the main intersection of Presov at Utica Slovenskej republiky rad [Street of the Slovak Socialist Republic] , today 's Hlavna ulica (Main Street), right in front of the Bosak Bank. 17 There the pair saw a burning Russian military vehicle, which some tank had previously rammed. Just as they were passing by the Bosak Bank, another tank roared by and hit the burning vehicle and it lunged towards the bank . Seeing the approaching truck out of the comer of his eye, Mark shoved Anne out of the way and prepared to be crushed. Fortunately, there was a very strong guard-rail at this location, and it stopped the burning vehicle. After Mark and Anne recovered from this near-fatal mishap, they crossed the street and, upon the urging of a local, climbed up the stairs of the Ukrainian Theater and emerged onto a balcony, where they had an unobstructed view of the invasion . They started to take color slides of the Russian tanks and other vehic les. Ru ss ian military vehicles on Dukla Street, Presov, August 21, 1968. Meanwhile, in the morning they had noticed that elderly citizens had lined up outside various food stores, to "stock up" in case the 17 This bui ldi ng was erected by the American Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak in the I 920 's. He also built a school in Okruhle, hi s village of origin. For more on Bosak see Michal Bosak & Rudolf Bosa k, Michal Bosak- americkj bankar zo Sarisa (Presov, Ibi s Publishin g, 1997). �SLOVAKIA 2021 137 Russian soldiers started looting, as they had done in 1945 . By noon, however, the dynamics had changed. Hundreds of students, who had been home for summer vacation, started to pour into Presov. Soon, they began marching up and down the main square, shouting " Ysetci l'udia na chodniku nemiluju republiku!" (People on the sidewalk do not love the Republic) an old communist slogan from May-day parades. Soon a few of the bravest students jumped onto the street, at the main crossing located at the Bosak Bank, and stopped the tanks! Students blocking Russian tanks at intersection of Dukla and Red Anny Streets, Presov, August 21, 1968. They held up the invasion for three hours. Finally, by mid-afternoon, a Russian military helicopter hovered overhead and must have given the driver of the lead tank orders to proceed because, at that moment, the lead tank lowered its gun and began swinging it from side-to-side, while simultaneously roaring its engine. (Photo next page). That had the desired effect, as the students jumped aside to avoid being hit by the barrel of its canon. After that the tanks proceeded closely and quickly, in order to not give the students a chance to once �138 SLOVAK.IA 2021 again jump in front and stop the tanks. On the first day of the invasion, the commander of occupation forces in Presov announced a state of Martial Law to begin at I 0:00 p.m. Instead of obeying him, the citizens of Presov hit the streets in large numbers and began to shout "Rusi domov! Rusi domov!" (Russians, go home! Russians, go home!). When an armored scout-car appeared, the people began to pelt it with bricks and bottles and it quickly fled the scene. Russian military helicopter hovering above Presov, August 21 , 1968. Russian scout car and tanks on a side street in Presov, August, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 2021 139 During the day individuals posted large anti-Russian posters and placards onto shop windows. One large cartoon was Mark's favorite: It depicted a Russian soldier, who had just had a bowl movement, rising from the toilet and the reactionary communist Vasil Bil'ak was licking his ass! Mark wanted to photograph it, but was afraid to do so, because it was rumored that agents of the Russian KGB were in town, and were arresting people taking such pictures. The citizens of Presov suspected that Vasil Bil'ak, a conservative member of the Czechoslovak Politburo, was one of the traitors who had urged the Russians to invade. The citizens were right. 18 For three days the Russians hurtled through Presov in the direction of Poprad. By the end of the week, when the city was fully occupied. (See the next 5 photographs) Russian soldier guarding tank in central Presov , August, 1968. 18 Six members of the Politburo, including Vasil Bil'ak , signed such a letter of invitation to the Ru ssians just before the invasion. For a copy of this letter see Otakar Korinek, Poz;vvaci list 1968 (Bratislava: Albert Marencin PT, 2006), 82-3. �140 SLOVAKIA 2021 Russ ian soldiers talking to civili ans, Presov, August, 1968. Russ ian vehicles bes ides Post Office in Presov, August 1968 �SLOVAKIA 2021 141 Russian soldiers and officers in a military vehicle, Presov, August, 1968. Russian tanks in front of Czechoslovak military barracks in Presov, August, 1968. �142 SLOVAKIA 2021 A certain professor of the Ukrainian language at the University of Presov, whom Timothy Smith knew, approached the research group from America and suggested that they leave as soon as possible, because he knew that Oksana had been born in Berlin in 1942 and was in danger of being picked up by agents of the KGB . Timothy Smith agreed and the four researchers set out in their respective Volkswagens towards Bratislava via Sabinov, Brezovicka and the Levoca forest in order to avoid the formidable Branisko Pass, where columns of Russian vehicles were moving very slowly. Between Spisske Podhradie and the city of Poprad they had to pass many slow-moving Russian vehicles. At one point, they drove by an entire column stopped by the side of the road, with Russian soldiers picking pears from the trees. Apparently the soldiers were hungry and their supply-wagons had not caught up with them. As the researchers approached the city of Poprad, they saw huge red letters that spelled DUBCEK painted vertically on the entire side of a tall apartment building. A nearby crane revealed how this was made possible. Mark would have photographed this sign, except that he had just passed a moving column of Russians. Meanwhile, Mark's Volkswagen rattled from the ruts in the road made by tank tracks, a ll the way to Bratislava. As they drove west, Mark and Anne noticed that the locals had changed all the directional signs, to try to confuse the Russians . It didn ' t work, since the Russians had good maps of Czechoslovakia, as did Mark and Anne. Meanwhile, Mark and Anne also noticed many pro-Dubcek and anti-Russian signs along the way. For instance, in the village of Brezovicka, past the city of Sabinov, someone had painted " The Whole World Supports Dubcek" on an abandoned log cabin. (First photo next page) On the meandering Vah river, between the cities of Ruzomberok and Martin, the locals had painted on the concrete abutment " DUBCEK JE NAS JANOSIK" (Dubcek is our Janosik), conjuring up Slovakia's I 8 th century social bandit. 19 On the way to Bratislava, the little caravan stopped in Martin, Cadca and Trnava, to bid farewell to family and friends . At the Matica slovenska the sympathetic workers gave Mark souvenir copies of the newly-resurrected daily Narodne noviny, which the communists had 19 For the story of Janosik see Jozef Kocis, Neznamy Jano.~ik (Marti n: Osveta, 1986). �SLOVAKIA 2021 143 shut down in the l 950's, but which now fully supported the Dubcekled government. (Second photo next page) As Mark was driving past the city of Trencin, he pulled out to pass a tractor dragging a wagon of hay and suddenly found himself confronted by a Russian truck barreling down on him. Fortunately, the driver of the truck slammed on his brakes and Mark narrowly avoided colliding with him. Anne upbraided Mark for this near-miss, to which he sourly replied, "The Russians don't belong here! " The American caravan stopped briefly in Trnava and Bratislava, to bid farewell to family and friends. While in Trnava at Jozef Mazur's apartment, where they had lunch, Oksana spied a piano in the living room. She started to play some tunes on it but, when she played the World War II German song "Lily Marl ene," Jozefs wife Lola, who was a schoolteacher and afra id for her job, sc reamed at Oksana to stop, because the communists had forbidden such songs from being played. Graffiti, "The Whole World Supports Dubcek" in Brezovicka, eastern Slovakia, August, 1968. �144 SLOVAKIA 2021 Narodne no viny (Martin, August 29, 1968): " We understand and support you, comrade Dubcek. You negoti ated outside of our homeland ." Thus, even though the Dubcek era had seen the abolition of censorship, self-censorship still prevailed. Meanwhile, as in most Slovak cities and villages, Trnava also had its share of pro-Dubcek and antiRussian posters. Graffiti in central Tmava: "Not what the occupiers demanded, but what we support with Dubcek and Svoboda," August, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 2021 145 The final stop of the caravan was in Bratislava. When the four researchers appeared at the Historicky ustav SA V, they were greeted by the furious but dispirited historians and their secretarial staff. After some discussion , both sides agreed that, in view of the invasion and the uncertainty of the future , it would be best to cancel the planned scholarly conference on Emigration from Eastern Europe to North America in the nearby castle of Smolen ice, which belonged to the Slovak Academy of Sciences. After they bade their farewells , the four researchers returned to their cars parked on Dostojevskeho rad (Dostojevsky Street). Fearing that The Russians would control the border, and search their car for photographs, Mark decided to photograph some more pro-Dubcek and anti-Russian graffiti painted on various buildings in the vicinity, then hide his film in a difficult-to-find spot in his car and hope the Ru ssians would not find it. (See the last 3 Photos) After thi s the American caravan approached the Old Bridge and drove past Russian tanks parked on both sides. Once they had crossed into Petrfalka they noticed what looked like a whole regiment of Russians camped in the park of Janko Kral' beside the Danube River. As they approached the border, however, they saw that Slovak soldiers were still in charge, complete with their sub-machine guns. Only one lonely Russian soldier, seated on a bench and staring at the ground, could be seen. When Mark asked the Slovak customs officers about the Russian soldier, they replied, "We're ignoring him . You should too." After perfunctorily checking their passports and visas, the customs officers bade the travelers farewell and, after the Slovak soldier lifted and pulled into Czechoslovakia the heavy cantilevered gate, the four researchers drove into Austria and freedom . August of 1968 will forever be etched into Mark 's and Anne's memories. What started out as a happy honeymoon in Europe and in Slovakia turned into the tragedy of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was a brutal reminder of how superpowers can intimidate and subjugate their much smaller and weaker neighbors. �146 SLOVAKIA 2021 Graffiti in Bratislava : "Long Live Dubcek .. ." August, 1968. Graffiti in Bratislava: " ... and Svoboda" August, 1968 �SLOVAKIA 2021 Graffiti in Bratislava : " Moscow" (the other way), August, 1968. 147 �� SLOVAKIA 2021 121 "THE RUSSIANS ARE INVADING US!" PRESOV, 1968 M. Mark Stolarik In 1968 Anne and Mark Stolarik experienced two unforgettable events in their lives- they were married and later witnessed the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Not many people can brag that their honeymoon was interrupted by Russian tanks! Meanwhile, they also experienced many culture shocks, as they toured Slovakia for the first time. For the newlyweds the summer of 1968 started quite auspiciously. On June 15, over 400 guests appeared at the wedding of Mark Stolarik and Anne fvanco in Oshawa, Ontario, the automobile capital of Canada. The ceremony was held in the packed Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary on Ritson Road, and was presided over by the Reverend Stefan Adamiak. 1 Afterwards the guests walked to the nearby Slovak Hall ,2 ate a many-course meal in the basement and then proceeded upstairs where the dancing and drinking began . As was typical of Slovak weddings, two men got into a fight and were ejected by the bride 's father. By I 0:00 p.m. a crisis arose- there was no more liquor! Jan Jvanco, the bride 's father, quickly rounded up all of his friends, explained the situation, and they raced home to empty their liquor cabinets in order to keep the celebration going into the wee hours of the morning. After the tearful bridal dance at midnight, during which Mark was ejected from the building, Jan lvanco and his new son-in-law met in a back room and counted up all the monetary donations received, either during the wedding, or during the bridal dance. They totaled $4,000, which was more than enough to cover all of their planned-for honeymoon expenses to Europe, and their research-trip to Slovakia. At that time Mark was a Ph.D. student at the University of Minnesota, where he was studying 1 For the history of this parish see "S lovak Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada" (Xerox copy, Oshawa, 2002) . A copy can be found in the Slovak Arc hi ves, Arc hives and Special Collections, Unive rsity of Ottawa. 2 For a photo of this hall, see the front cover of Polyphony : The Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario 2, No. I (Winter, 1979). �122 SLOVAKIA 2021 under the direction of Timothy L. Smith, who had recently founded the Immigrant Archives at the University. 3 As one of Smith's Research Assistants, Mark 's duties consisted of collecting archival materials in American and Canadian cities pertaining to Slovak immigration to North America and then writing his dissertation based upon these materials. The day after their wedding Mark and Anne fl ew from Toronto to Minneapolis and from there by a special charter plane for uni versity students to Paris. After touring Paris with student colleagues from the University of Minnesota, Mark and Anne took a train to Stuttgart, Germany, where they picked up a brand-new Volkswagen " Beetle" which Mark had purchased for $1,300. With their new car they drove to Munich and Salzburg, where they visited with friend s and then proceeded to Vienna. In this ancient capital of the former Habsburg Empire, which they first toured, they applied for and received visas from the Czechoslovak Consulate to visit the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. After a picturesque drive from Vienna through the towns of Hainburg and Wolfstahl, the newlyweds approached the Czechoslovak border. They could see the Little Carpathians looming in the di stance, and Bratislava castle overlooking the city. As they approached the border, they noticed that they were the only car entering the Republic. A lonely soldier, with a sub-machine gun slung over his back, lifted a heavy cantilevered iron gate, which opened only inwards, and allowed them in . Thereupon two surprised customs officers emerged from a little building off to the side and, under a covered roof asked the travelers for their passports and visas. 3 For the history of the Immigrant Archives, later renamed the Immigration History Research Center, see my " Building Ethnic Arch ives in the United States and Canada since the I 960 's," in Dominique Daniel and Amalia Levi eds., Identity Palimpsests: Archiving Ethnicity in the U.S. and Canada (Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books, 20 13), 59-6 1. �SLOVAKIA 2021 123 Petrfalka border crossing from Austria, 1993 . In 1968 there were no signs at this crossing except the large letters that read " Bratislava." Fortunately, Timothy Smith had arranged for Dr. 1:udovit Holotik, the Director of the Historical [nstitute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, to issue them, as we ll as his entire team of researchers, an official invitation, which made the granting of visas by the Czechoslovak authorities that much easier. After a two-hour wait at the border, while the customs officers awaited a telephone call from Prague confirming their visas as legitimate, the couple was cleared for entrance into the Republic. Before they departed they changed some American dollars for Czechoslovak crowns, because it was noon and their stomachs were growling. Because they had an official invitation , they did not have to exchange $12.00 (U.S.) for Czechoslovak crowns for each day of their stay at the official (and unrealistic) rate of seven crowns for a �124 SLOVAKIA 2021 dollar. The real (black market) rate of exchange was 35 crowns for a dollar. Once they had cleared customs, the two visitors proceeded in their little green Volkswagen along a narrow two-lane road towards the town of Petrzalka, a suburb of Bratislava. They noticed that the road was raised higher than the nearby empty fields , and soon they passed a tall guard-tower, with two more armed soldiers watching them. rt was clear that they had just passed through the "Iron Curtain" which separated the communist East from the democratic West. After the pair had crossed the "Stary most" (Old Bridge) across the Danube River from Petrzalka to Bratislava, and drove along Sturova Street into the heart of the city, they were disappointed by what they saw. The buildings were old and grey, with the plaster falling off. What a contrast with modem, clean and dynamic Vienna! The pedestrians were dressed in what looked like I 940's clothing. It seemed to the visitors that they had entered into the "Third World." As they drove along, they looked in vain for a sign that would advertise a restaurant. When the pair drove their Volkswagen up the hill through the Square of the Slovak National Uprising, past the Church of the Holy Trinity, they noticed a large sign at its base that read "Sovietska kniha" (Soviet Bookstore), which again reminded them that they were in the communist East. Finally, as they emerged into what is now known as " Hodo:fovo namestie" (Hodza Square), the hungry couple spied a sign on the left that read "Restauracia Stefanka." Elated, they parked their car on a side road and entered the restaurant with great anticipation. A friendly waiter in a tuxedo greeted them and sat them beside a window overlooking the square. He explained that the Stefanka did not provide individual service, but they could help themselves at the buffet table. Mark and Anne were delighted to see little open-faced sandwiches, with all sorts of delicacies on them, awaiting their hungry stomachs. They ate to their heart's content. Meanwhile, they noticed that the clientele consisted mostly of older gentlemen and young women. They made nothing of it. A little later, whi le visiting Mark 's cousin Jozef Mazur in nearby Trnava, Jozef asked the couple for their first impressions of Slovakia. When they recounted their lunch at the Stefanka, Jozef burst into laughter. When Mark inquired as to what was so funny, Jozef replied, "Don't you know what the Stefanka is?" To which Mark replied , "no," to which Jozef added, "The Stefanka is �SLOVAKIA 2021 125 notorious in Bratislava as the place where you go if you want to pick up a prostitute! " Upon reflection, Mark and Anne understood why they had seen so many older gentlemen and younger women at the Stefanka. They had a good laugh! After lunch on their first day in Slovakia, Mark and Anne proceeded to the offices of the Historicky ustav SAV (Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences) on Klemensova Street. Here a sheepish Dr. L:udovit Holotik welcomed them and explained that he was leaving shortly on a research trip to England . He failed to mention that he had just been fired as Director of the Institute, because in the l 950 ' s he had written a defamatory book about the Slovak national hero, General Milan R. Stefanik. During the liberali z ing " Dubcek era",4 such books were frowned upon and Holotik was attacked in the now-free press.5 Holotik then introduced Mark to his successor, Dr. Julius Mesaros. The latter was initially skeptical of Mark ' s motives, but when Mark explained that he was a student of Timothy Smith, and part of a team of researchers who were coming to Slovakia to study the emigration of various ethnic groups from the former Kingdom of Hungary, Mesaros mellowed. He offered Mark and Anne some Turkish coffee, made by his secretary, which consisted of one-third coffeegrounds and two-thirds thick, dark, coffee in a demi-tasse. The Canadian couple had never before seen or tasted such coffee and slowly sipped it in order not to insult their host. Mark and Anne were raised on "cafe au lait". Apparently, the Russians had introduced "Turkish coffee" to the Eastern Bloc. After this introduction, Mesaros brought to Mark dozens of articles and books written by himself and his colleagues at the Hi storical Institute on the social history of 19 th century Slovakia.6 Once he had read them, Mark would have a good back- 4 For the Dubce k era , popularl y kn own as the " Prague Spring," see The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact In vasion of Czechoslovakia, / 968: Forty Years Later, ed. by M. Mark Sto larik (Munde lein, IL : Bo lchazy-Carducc i, 20 I 0). 1..:udovit Holotik, Stefa nikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Brati slava: Slove nska academia vied. 1958); fo r th e attacks upon Holot ik see Jan Ml ynarik , " Hi stori ci v Enckylopedii Slovenska- bilanci a neostalinskeho kadrovani a (Studia k slovenskej histori ografii )" Premeny 25 (4, 1988), 147-8. 6 Mesaros's most important publication was Rolnicka a narodnostna otazka na Slovensku, 1848-1900; k problematikef eudalnych prei itkov (Bratislava : Slovenska academia vi ed, 1959). 5 �126 SLOVAKIA 2021 ground understanding of the archival sources which he would subsequently find in various Slovak state archives. After having spent their first night in the nearby Hotel Krym, Mark and Anne proceeded to the headquarters of the Slovak State Archives on the " Ulica obrancov mieru" (Street of the Defenders of Peace; today 's Stefanikova Street). There they met and befriended Dr. Frantisek Bielik, one of the archivists who was interested in the topic of Slovak immigration .7 He subsequently introduced the couple to Deputy Director Jozef Mazur who, it turned out, was Mark 's long-lost cousin on his mother's side. They had a joyful reunion during which Jozef Mazur showed Mark photos of himself visiting with Mark 's family in Turciansky Svaty Martin during the Second World War. Jozef then wrote Mark an official letter of introduction to all the Slovak State Archives scattered across the country, in which Jozef instructed the local archivists to help Mark in finding material s on Slovak emigration to North America. For the next two weeks Frantisek Bielik found such materials for Mark in the Bratislava State Archives. While Mark and Anne stayed at the nearby inexpensive Hotel Tatra, which was full of Russians, they had a curious experience. Every morning when they ate breakfast in the hotel 's dining room, they ordered the same things- ham and eggs with rolls and coffee. The total bill was always 28 crowns, which they rounded up to 30, much to the deli ght of their middle-aged waiter, who collected the money on the spot. They were not used to waiters doing this, because in North America waiters or waitresses usually submitted a bill , and the customers paid through a cashier, who controlled the amount requested and paid. One day, the middle-aged waiter took the day off and was replaced by a much younger colleague. Mark and Anne ordered the same breakfast, but the new waiter charged them 48 crowns! Not wishing to create a scene, they paid the 48 crowns and left. The next day, when the middle-aged waiter returned, they showed him the previous day's breakfast bill. He was furiou s, he apologized, did not charge them for their breakfast, and vowed that his younger colleague would never again repl ace him . Mark and Anne wondered how often waiters in 7 While Bielik started hi s career at the Slovak State Archives, he later switched to the Institute for Slovaks Abroad of the Matica slovenska and published, amon g many others things, the four- volume compendium of documents on Slovak immigrati on entitled Slovenske vystahovalectvo. Dokumenty / -4 (Bratislava: Slovenska academ ia vied, 1969- 1985). �SLOVAKIA 2021 127 Slovakia (and elsewhere in Europe) cheated their customers in this way. After their stay in Bratislava, Mark and Anne drove north to the city of Trnava, to do research in the archives of the Spolok Sv. Yojtecha (Society of St. Adalbert). They stayed with the family of Jozef Mazur, who introduced Mark to the Director of the Spolok, Msgr. Jan Postenyi . The latter was delighted to meet Mark, because Postenyi had been on a tour of the USA in 193 7, and had since not met with any American Slovaks. He gladly opened his rich archive to Mark, where the latter discovered many documents pertaining to the history of the Slovak League of America during and after World War I. These included a carbon-copy of the 1915 Cleveland Agreement. 8 After a week's stay in Trnava, Mark and Anne set out for northern Slovakia, where they met additional members of their family. In Cadca they stayed with Mark 's uncle Jozef Stolarik, who took Mark to see his grandmother Anna Stolarikova and her daughter Terezia Bosakova in the hilly settlement of Dlha, near the city of Turzovka. Anna had not seen her grandson since his Christening in 1943 . Since Anna was illiterate, she wondered how Mark had managed to find her. Mark took out a road map of Europe and showed her the roads they had driven from Stuttgart to Slovakia, but it was hard for her to comprehend what he was showing. Mark, meanwhile, was amused that she was wearing black Converse sneakers. Uncle Jozef explained that it was easier for her to climb up the hill to her house in sneakers than in leather shoes. There was no road up the hill from the one below. After having visited two more aunts and their families, in midJuly, Mark and Anne set out for the city of Martin, Mark's birthplace. While driving between the city of Zilina and the ruins of castle Strecno, Mark and Anne suddenly spotted a long column of Russian military vehicles parked on the old road beside the new one. They were engaged in war games called "operation Sumava" in order to intimidate the Czechoslovak government into stopping the transformation of Czech and Slovak society into "socialism with a human face," as the first Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 8 For the history of the Spolok Sv. Vojtecha see Stefan Hanakovic, Dejiny Spolku sviiteho Vojtecha (Trnava : Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 2005), especia ll y pages 281-84 for Postenyi ' s trip to America. The Cleve land Agreement can be found in the Archiv Spolku Svateho Vojtecha, Politika, fasc. 235 , fol. A. c.2 �128 SLOVAKIA 2021 Alexander Dubcek, put it. As he made clear in hi s memo irs, he and hi s followers were trying to turn communist Czechoslovakia into a Social Democratic Czechoslovakia.9 His colleagues in the Warsaw Pact, particularly Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and East German leader Walter Ulbricht, vehemently disapproved of the path of the so-called Prague Spring, and "operation Sumava" was a prelude to the later in vas ion of Czechoslovakia. 10 Meanwhile, when Mark saw these Soviet military veh icles, he instantly shouted at Anne to start photographing them , because he was driving and was afraid to stop the car, lest the Russians arrest him. A terrified Anne grabbed hi s 35mi llimeter camera and took several color slides of these vehicles. Russ ian military vehicles parked on the old road between Z ilina and Strecno in northern Slovakia, Jul y, 1968 9 Hope Dies Last: The Autohiography of Alexander Dubcek, ed. and trans. by Jiri Hochman (New York: Kodansha International, 1993), 277. 10 For the views of Brezhnev, Gomulka and Ulbricht, see the chapters by Mikhail Latysh, Lukasz Kaminski and Riidi ger Wenzke in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact In vasion, 1-18, 95- 128 and 137-64. �SLOVAKIA 2021 129 Russian "Katyusha" rocket launchers on old road between Zilina and Strecno, July, 1969. Russian ambulance and military vehicles on old road between Zilina and Strecno, July 1968. After this harrowing experience, Mark and Anne kept driving around the Strecno pass until they reached the city of Martin. Here �130 SLOVAKIA 2021 they met Uncle Rudolf and hi s family and stayed with them for a week while Mark worked in the Literary Archive of the Matica slovenska. Here he met Dr. Jozef Telgarsky, the Director of the Slovak National Library of the Matica slovenska. The two of them agreed upon an exchange of books and other materials in the future , a promise which is still in effect. While in Martin, at the urging of Frantisek (Ferko) Bielik, Mark attended the 6th Congress of the Slovak Historical Society, where he heard Dr. Lubomir Liptak 's attack upon the "deformation" of Slovak hi story by Marxist hi storian s in the previous decades. 11 He also heard Prof. Milos Gosiorovsky' s plea for the federation of Czechoslovakia based upon the Cleveland Agreement of 1915. 12 Mark was amused by Ferko Bielik 's antics at this Congress- he lifted hi s hand in approval of various motions made, whi le shaking hi s head sideways in disapproval. He explained that the conference organizers only counted the raised hands, not the heads shaking sideways. This was a small gesture of disapproval of the conference proceedings. After their stay in Martin, at the beginning of August, the newlyweds set out for the city of Presov, to do research in the archives of the former county of Saris, from where the first immigrants had left for America. 13 In Presov they met and stayed with Anne's uncle Andrej Krasnay in the Sid lisko Dukelskych hrdinov (the Apartment Complex of the Heroes of the Duk la Pass). Shortly after their arrival , Andrej took Mark and Anne to visit her grandmother in her vi ll age for the first time, as well as other aunts and uncles. At Andrej 's condo Mark and Anne had to get used to the socialist way of life. For instance, sometimes the water flowed from the faucets in Andrej's apartment, sometimes not. Therefore, Andrej kept his tub full of water, so that he would not run out. Sometimes the water was hot. Sometimes it was not. Whenever the water flowed hot, Andrej called the couple to immediately take a bath. And, even though Presov had street li ghts, they were not turned on at night, in order to conserve electricity. When Mark went to do research in the Slovak State Archives in Presov, which was located on the Main Square, right beside the church of St. Nicholas, he had some interesting experiences. When he met 11 Cubomir Liptak, "U loha a postavenie historiografie v nasej spolocnosti, Hisloricky casopi.1· XVII , c. l , 1969, 98- 11 7. 12 Milos Gosiorovsky, "Slovaci za prvej svetovej vojny," in Slovaci a ich narodnv v;ivin, ed. Oto Takac (Brati slava: Slovenska academ ia vied, I969), 29 1-305 . 13 Slovak State Archives in Presov, county Saris, podzupan, 9809, VB, 1879. �SLOVAK.IA 2021 131 Andrej Lukac, the Director of the Archive, the latter was cool to Mark's visit. He claimed that the material Mark was searching for was not yet processed and suggested that Mark return sometime in the future, when it would become available. Mark then asked if Lukac knew Jozef Mazur, to which Lukac replied, "Hej , onje moj set1'' (Of course! He's my boss.) To which Mark replied, "Hej, on je moj bratranec." (Of course! He's my cousin.) As soon as Lukac heard Mark ' s reply, he jumped into action. Lukac suggested that, since Mark could not read Magyar, and most of the documents were in that language, he hire a translator. Mark agreed and the next day Lukac introduced Mark to Mr. Grant. The latter was the descendant of a Scottish soldier who had remained in Central Europe in the 17 th century. Mr. Grant was in his 80's, he had been educated in the old Austria-Hungary, and knew Slovak, Magyar, German and Latin. He was overly polite, as such gentlemen were trained to be and, whenever he found an interesting document to translate, he would say "No, prosim Vas pekne," which means "Now, if you please," and then would proceed to translate. Lukac suggested that Mark pay Mr. Grant I 00 crowns per day, which was the going rate for such services. Mark agreed, since on the black market that would come to only $3.00 (US) a day. Mr. Grant was so intelligent that, after he had translated some documents, he grasped what Mark was looking for, and then did his translating without any more superv1s1on. Mark and Anne also did research in Kosice. Once they had exhausted their sources in Presov, they drove south to Kosice, to work in the fonner archives of Abov and Zemplin counties, which were housed in the former Abov county headquarters on Orlia Street, one block from the Cathedral of St. Elizabeth. As they drove into Kosice and approached the main square, they noticed and photographed a bust of General Milan R. Stefanik on a pedestal that was obviously erected spontaneously and hurriedly by some local patriots on the exact spot where a much larger statue of Stefanik had been erected in the l 920's. The statue was removed by communist authorities in the I 950's. (See the photo on page 133) This bust testified to the rise of Slovak nationalism during the Dubcek era. At the Slovak State Archives in Kosice Mark and Anne �132 SLOVAKIA 2021 were welcomed by the Director, Ladislav Andrasi and his assistant, Anna Fedorjakova. The latter willingly and eagerly helped Mark to translate documents from Magyar into Slovak. Meanwhile, Mark and Anne were joined by Professor Timothy Smith and another one of his graduate students, Oksana Dragan, who had both just come down from Poland in Smith's brown Volkswagen. Smith was studying Slovak Lutheran immigration from eastern Slovakia while Oksana was researching Rusyn (Ukrainian) immigration to North America. Smith then suggested to Mark that he a lso consult the Roman Catholic bishop's archives, located on Lenin Street, opposite the Cathedral. Since Anne had studied Latin for five years in High School, she volunteered to do this and was assisted by the Rev. Alojs Tkac, who was in charge of the archives. After the collapse of Communism, the latter was e levated to the post of Bishop, and later, Archbishop of Kosice. 14 Meanwhile, Professor Smith arranged a meeting with an "Action Committee" of the newly-resurrected Greek Catholic Church, led by Msgr. Jan Hirka, who, once Communism collapsed, was e levated to Eparch (Bishop) of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Presov. 15 On the evening of August 20, 1968, Mark and Anne, together with Timothy Smith and Oksana Dragan, decided to dine together. They went to the Magyar Restaurant in Kosice , where they enjoyed an exotic meal and did some dancing to the tunes of a Gypsy (Roma) orchestra. 14 Alojz Tkac was persecuted by the Communi sts durin g the period of "Normalization" ( 1970- 1989) and penned hi s memoirs in Pohl'adv z kriiovatky (Kapusany: Bens, 2004). 15 For the hi story of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia from 1968 to 1980, see Martin Lupco, "Grec kokatolick a a pravoslavna cirkev na Slovensku v rokoch 19681980," in Jaroslav Corani c- Jana Koprivnakova- Peter Sturak eds. Grekokatolicka cirkev na Slovensku vo svetle vyroci II (Presov: Presovska univerzita v Presove, 2012), 165-77. Msgr. Jan H irka published hi s memoirs in Pod ochranou Marie: Pastier v zlui be cirkvi (Presov: Presovska univerzita v Presove, 20 13 ). �SLOVAKIA 2021 133 Bust of General M.R. Stefanik on the main square, Kosice, August, 1968. �134 SLOVAKIA 2021 Around 11 :00 p.m. all four researchers decided to drive back to their abodes in Presov. As Mark and Anne drove through the village of Drienov, just north of Kosice, a black cat ran in front of their car. Although they did not kill it, Mark wondered aloud if it signaled that they would have bad luck. "I hope not," Anne answered. Around 4:30 a.m. on August 21 , Mark and Anne were awakened by a very loud noise coming from the streets of Presov. At first they thought that it was the sound of jackhammers, and Mark began to curse the workers who could not wait until 8:00 a.m. to repair the streets. Then they heard a knocking on the door to the apartment. Andrej Krasnay gingerly approached the door and asked, "who ' s there?" Mark and Anne were afraid that the Secret Police had come for them, because they always came at night. Instead, it was the next-doorneighbor. He told Andrej something and Andrej then knocked on Mark and Anne's glass door, came in and announced that "The Russians, Poles, East Germans, Magyars and Bulgarians are occupying us!" 16 All three then understood that the noise from the street was not from jackhammers, but from tanks. Dazed, Mark and Anne decided to immediately dress and repair to the Hotel Dukla, where Professor Smith and Oksana Dragan were staying. It was sunrise by the time they arrived and Smith had just arisen. Mark knocked on his door and as Smith opened it, Mark blurted out "the Russians are invading us." Smith looked out his window at the tanks and remarked that he thought it was military maneuvers again . Mark assured him that it was not, that this was a real invasion . Smith then suggested that Mark go find Anne, who had gone upstairs to inform Oksana of the invasion , to come down to the dining room to discuss the situation. The four researchers, along with a young and lonely waiter, were the only customers in the dining room. While Smith ate a hearty breakfast of scrambled eggs and rolls , the three students were too frightened to eat. Smith nonchalantly remarked, " We ' re Americans. This doesn ' t concern us." He cou ldn 't have been more wrong. Mark was born in Turciansky Svaty Martin in 1943 and Oksana in Berlin in 1942. Oksana was the daughter of the editor of the 16 The East Germans did not parti cipate in the invasion . For a detailed ex planati on sec Rildi gcr Wcnzkc, "The Rol e and Acti vities of the SEO, the East German State and Its Military During th e ' Prague Spring' of 1968," in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion, 137-64. �SLOVAKIA 2021 135 pro-independence Ukrainian weekly Svoboda, published in Jersey City, New Jersey. Both were post-war refugees who, with their families, had ended up in Canada and the USA after the war. Neither the Soviet Union, nor Czechoslovakia, recognized dual citizenship at that time. Either one of these students could be detained by the authorities, whether Czechoslovak or Russian . Smith, however, was so unconcerned about the invasion that he decided that all four researchers should carry on as if nothing had happened. Thus, he instructed Mark and Oksana to go to the state archives and continue with their research. Meanwhile, he took Anne with him to serve as a translator in the Presov city archives. When Smith met with the Mayor of Presov, who was clearly shattered by the invasion, Smith asked for permission to do research in the city archives. The Mayor replied, with Anne translating, that "due to the extraordinary circumstances," the city archives were closed. Smith would not take no for an answer. He repeated his request, and Anne repeated the translation that the archives were closed. After three tries, Smith gave up and told Anne to go join Mark in the state archives. When Mark and Oksana arrived at the Slovak State Archives, they noticed that the entire staff was looking out the windows at the tanks (T55 ' s) roaring by, except Mr. Grant. The latter was nonchalantly reading and translating Magyar documents, oblivious to the noise outside. After a while Mr. Grant's behavior puzzled Mark so much that he asked Mr. Grant, "how can you continue to work while we are being invaded?" Mr. Grant smiled and replied, "This is my fifth invasion ." When Mr. Grant saw the puzzled look on Mark ' s face , he explained that the Russians had broken through the Carpathians into Hungary in the fall and winter of 1914-1915, then Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army occupied Presov in 1919, the Germans occupied Slovakia in 1944 and the Russians in 1945, and again in 1968. " So, what's new?" he asked. "But, don't you want to see the Russian tanks?" Mark asked. Mr. Grant gestured no with his hand. Then he added, "You should have seen a German Tiger. That was a tank!" Mr. Grant then reminisced that, shortly after the Second World War had ended, he took the train from Presov to Kos ice. About half way there he spotted four destroyed tanks in a nearby field . Three were Russian T34 ' s and one was a German Tiger with its treads blown off. It was obvious what had happened. �136 SLOVAKIA 2021 After these reassuring words from Mr. Grant, Mark and Anne cairned down and decided to return to Andrej's apartment, to get their camera, and take some pictures of the invasion. After having eaten some lunch, the intrepid pair set out on Uti ca cervenej arrnady [Red Army Street] (today's Levoca Street) towards the main intersection of Presov at Utica Slovenskej republiky rad [Street of the Slovak Socialist Republic] , today 's Hlavna ulica (Main Street), right in front of the Bosak Bank. 17 There the pair saw a burning Russian military vehicle, which some tank had previously rammed. Just as they were passing by the Bosak Bank, another tank roared by and hit the burning vehicle and it lunged towards the bank . Seeing the approaching truck out of the comer of his eye, Mark shoved Anne out of the way and prepared to be crushed. Fortunately, there was a very strong guard-rail at this location, and it stopped the burning vehicle. After Mark and Anne recovered from this near-fatal mishap, they crossed the street and, upon the urging of a local, climbed up the stairs of the Ukrainian Theater and emerged onto a balcony, where they had an unobstructed view of the invasion . They started to take color slides of the Russian tanks and other vehic les. Ru ss ian military vehicles on Dukla Street, Presov, August 21, 1968. Meanwhile, in the morning they had noticed that elderly citizens had lined up outside various food stores, to "stock up" in case the 17 This bui ldi ng was erected by the American Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak in the I 920 's. He also built a school in Okruhle, hi s village of origin. For more on Bosak see Michal Bosak & Rudolf Bosa k, Michal Bosak- americkj bankar zo Sarisa (Presov, Ibi s Publishin g, 1997). �SLOVAKIA 2021 137 Russian soldiers started looting, as they had done in 1945 . By noon, however, the dynamics had changed. Hundreds of students, who had been home for summer vacation, started to pour into Presov. Soon, they began marching up and down the main square, shouting " Ysetci l'udia na chodniku nemiluju republiku!" (People on the sidewalk do not love the Republic) an old communist slogan from May-day parades. Soon a few of the bravest students jumped onto the street, at the main crossing located at the Bosak Bank, and stopped the tanks! Students blocking Russian tanks at intersection of Dukla and Red Anny Streets, Presov, August 21, 1968. They held up the invasion for three hours. Finally, by mid-afternoon, a Russian military helicopter hovered overhead and must have given the driver of the lead tank orders to proceed because, at that moment, the lead tank lowered its gun and began swinging it from side-to-side, while simultaneously roaring its engine. (Photo next page). That had the desired effect, as the students jumped aside to avoid being hit by the barrel of its canon. After that the tanks proceeded closely and quickly, in order to not give the students a chance to once �138 SLOVAK.IA 2021 again jump in front and stop the tanks. On the first day of the invasion, the commander of occupation forces in Presov announced a state of Martial Law to begin at I 0:00 p.m. Instead of obeying him, the citizens of Presov hit the streets in large numbers and began to shout "Rusi domov! Rusi domov!" (Russians, go home! Russians, go home!). When an armored scout-car appeared, the people began to pelt it with bricks and bottles and it quickly fled the scene. Russian military helicopter hovering above Presov, August 21 , 1968. Russian scout car and tanks on a side street in Presov, August, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 2021 139 During the day individuals posted large anti-Russian posters and placards onto shop windows. One large cartoon was Mark's favorite: It depicted a Russian soldier, who had just had a bowl movement, rising from the toilet and the reactionary communist Vasil Bil'ak was licking his ass! Mark wanted to photograph it, but was afraid to do so, because it was rumored that agents of the Russian KGB were in town, and were arresting people taking such pictures. The citizens of Presov suspected that Vasil Bil'ak, a conservative member of the Czechoslovak Politburo, was one of the traitors who had urged the Russians to invade. The citizens were right. 18 For three days the Russians hurtled through Presov in the direction of Poprad. By the end of the week, when the city was fully occupied. (See the next 5 photographs) Russian soldier guarding tank in central Presov , August, 1968. 18 Six members of the Politburo, including Vasil Bil'ak , signed such a letter of invitation to the Ru ssians just before the invasion. For a copy of this letter see Otakar Korinek, Poz;vvaci list 1968 (Bratislava: Albert Marencin PT, 2006), 82-3. �140 SLOVAKIA 2021 Russ ian soldiers talking to civili ans, Presov, August, 1968. Russ ian vehicles bes ides Post Office in Presov, August 1968 �SLOVAKIA 2021 141 Russian soldiers and officers in a military vehicle, Presov, August, 1968. Russian tanks in front of Czechoslovak military barracks in Presov, August, 1968. �142 SLOVAKIA 2021 A certain professor of the Ukrainian language at the University of Presov, whom Timothy Smith knew, approached the research group from America and suggested that they leave as soon as possible, because he knew that Oksana had been born in Berlin in 1942 and was in danger of being picked up by agents of the KGB . Timothy Smith agreed and the four researchers set out in their respective Volkswagens towards Bratislava via Sabinov, Brezovicka and the Levoca forest in order to avoid the formidable Branisko Pass, where columns of Russian vehicles were moving very slowly. Between Spisske Podhradie and the city of Poprad they had to pass many slow-moving Russian vehicles. At one point, they drove by an entire column stopped by the side of the road, with Russian soldiers picking pears from the trees. Apparently the soldiers were hungry and their supply-wagons had not caught up with them. As the researchers approached the city of Poprad, they saw huge red letters that spelled DUBCEK painted vertically on the entire side of a tall apartment building. A nearby crane revealed how this was made possible. Mark would have photographed this sign, except that he had just passed a moving column of Russians. Meanwhile, Mark's Volkswagen rattled from the ruts in the road made by tank tracks, a ll the way to Bratislava. As they drove west, Mark and Anne noticed that the locals had changed all the directional signs, to try to confuse the Russians . It didn ' t work, since the Russians had good maps of Czechoslovakia, as did Mark and Anne. Meanwhile, Mark and Anne also noticed many pro-Dubcek and anti-Russian signs along the way. For instance, in the village of Brezovicka, past the city of Sabinov, someone had painted " The Whole World Supports Dubcek" on an abandoned log cabin. (First photo next page) On the meandering Vah river, between the cities of Ruzomberok and Martin, the locals had painted on the concrete abutment " DUBCEK JE NAS JANOSIK" (Dubcek is our Janosik), conjuring up Slovakia's I 8 th century social bandit. 19 On the way to Bratislava, the little caravan stopped in Martin, Cadca and Trnava, to bid farewell to family and friends . At the Matica slovenska the sympathetic workers gave Mark souvenir copies of the newly-resurrected daily Narodne noviny, which the communists had 19 For the story of Janosik see Jozef Kocis, Neznamy Jano.~ik (Marti n: Osveta, 1986). �SLOVAKIA 2021 143 shut down in the l 950's, but which now fully supported the Dubcekled government. (Second photo next page) As Mark was driving past the city of Trencin, he pulled out to pass a tractor dragging a wagon of hay and suddenly found himself confronted by a Russian truck barreling down on him. Fortunately, the driver of the truck slammed on his brakes and Mark narrowly avoided colliding with him. Anne upbraided Mark for this near-miss, to which he sourly replied, "The Russians don't belong here! " The American caravan stopped briefly in Trnava and Bratislava, to bid farewell to family and friends. While in Trnava at Jozef Mazur's apartment, where they had lunch, Oksana spied a piano in the living room. She started to play some tunes on it but, when she played the World War II German song "Lily Marl ene," Jozefs wife Lola, who was a schoolteacher and afra id for her job, sc reamed at Oksana to stop, because the communists had forbidden such songs from being played. Graffiti, "The Whole World Supports Dubcek" in Brezovicka, eastern Slovakia, August, 1968. �144 SLOVAKIA 2021 Narodne no viny (Martin, August 29, 1968): " We understand and support you, comrade Dubcek. You negoti ated outside of our homeland ." Thus, even though the Dubcek era had seen the abolition of censorship, self-censorship still prevailed. Meanwhile, as in most Slovak cities and villages, Trnava also had its share of pro-Dubcek and antiRussian posters. Graffiti in central Tmava: "Not what the occupiers demanded, but what we support with Dubcek and Svoboda," August, 1968. �SLOVAKIA 2021 145 The final stop of the caravan was in Bratislava. When the four researchers appeared at the Historicky ustav SA V, they were greeted by the furious but dispirited historians and their secretarial staff. After some discussion , both sides agreed that, in view of the invasion and the uncertainty of the future , it would be best to cancel the planned scholarly conference on Emigration from Eastern Europe to North America in the nearby castle of Smolen ice, which belonged to the Slovak Academy of Sciences. After they bade their farewells , the four researchers returned to their cars parked on Dostojevskeho rad (Dostojevsky Street). Fearing that The Russians would control the border, and search their car for photographs, Mark decided to photograph some more pro-Dubcek and anti-Russian graffiti painted on various buildings in the vicinity, then hide his film in a difficult-to-find spot in his car and hope the Ru ssians would not find it. (See the last 3 Photos) After thi s the American caravan approached the Old Bridge and drove past Russian tanks parked on both sides. Once they had crossed into Petrfalka they noticed what looked like a whole regiment of Russians camped in the park of Janko Kral' beside the Danube River. As they approached the border, however, they saw that Slovak soldiers were still in charge, complete with their sub-machine guns. Only one lonely Russian soldier, seated on a bench and staring at the ground, could be seen. When Mark asked the Slovak customs officers about the Russian soldier, they replied, "We're ignoring him . You should too." After perfunctorily checking their passports and visas, the customs officers bade the travelers farewell and, after the Slovak soldier lifted and pulled into Czechoslovakia the heavy cantilevered gate, the four researchers drove into Austria and freedom . August of 1968 will forever be etched into Mark 's and Anne's memories. What started out as a happy honeymoon in Europe and in Slovakia turned into the tragedy of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was a brutal reminder of how superpowers can intimidate and subjugate their much smaller and weaker neighbors. �146 SLOVAKIA 2021 Graffiti in Bratislava : "Long Live Dubcek .. ." August, 1968. Graffiti in Bratislava: " ... and Svoboda" August, 1968 �SLOVAKIA 2021 Graffiti in Bratislava : " Moscow" (the other way), August, 1968. 147 �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 121 "THE RUSSIANS ARE INVADING US!" PRESOV, 1968 M. Mark Stolarik In 1968 Anne and Mark Stolarik experienced two unforgettable events in their lives- they were married and later witnessed the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Not many people can brag that their honeymoon was interrupted by Russian tanks! Meanwhile, they also experienced many culture shocks, as they toured Slovakia for the first time. For the newlyweds the summer of 1968 started quite auspiciously. On June 15, over 400 guests appeared at the wedding of Mark Stolarik and Anne fvanco in Oshawa, Ontario, the automobile capital of Canada. The ceremony was held in the packed Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary on Ritson Road, and was presided over by the Reverend Stefan Adamiak. 1 Afterwards the guests walked to the nearby Slovak Hall ,2 ate a many-course meal in the basement and then proceeded upstairs where the dancing and drinking began . As was typical of Slovak weddings, two men got into a fight and were ejected by the bride 's father. By I 0:00 p.m. a crisis arose- there was no more liquor! Jan Jvanco, the bride 's father, quickly rounded up all of his friends, explained the situation, and they raced home to empty their liquor cabinets in order to keep the celebration going into the wee hours of the morning. After the tearful bridal dance at midnight, during which Mark was ejected from the building, Jan lvanco and his new son-in-law met in a back room and counted up all the monetary donations received, either during the wedding, or during the bridal dance. They totaled $4,000, which was more than enough to cover all of their planned-for honeymoon expenses to Europe, and their research-trip to Slovakia. At that time Mark was a Ph.D. student at the University of Minnesota, where he was studying 1 For the history of this parish see "S lovak Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada" (Xerox copy, Oshawa, 2002) . A copy can be found in the Slovak Arc hi ves, Arc hives and Special Collections, Unive rsity of Ottawa. 2 For a photo of this hall, see the front cover of Polyphony : The Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario 2, No. I (Winter, 1979). 122 SLOVAKIA 2021 under the direction of Timothy L. Smith, who had recently founded the Immigrant Archives at the University. 3 As one of Smith's Research Assistants, Mark 's duties consisted of collecting archival materials in American and Canadian cities pertaining to Slovak immigration to North America and then writing his dissertation based upon these materials. The day after their wedding Mark and Anne fl ew from Toronto to Minneapolis and from there by a special charter plane for uni versity students to Paris. After touring Paris with student colleagues from the University of Minnesota, Mark and Anne took a train to Stuttgart, Germany, where they picked up a brand-new Volkswagen " Beetle" which Mark had purchased for $1,300. With their new car they drove to Munich and Salzburg, where they visited with friend s and then proceeded to Vienna. In this ancient capital of the former Habsburg Empire, which they first toured, they applied for and received visas from the Czechoslovak Consulate to visit the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. After a picturesque drive from Vienna through the towns of Hainburg and Wolfstahl, the newlyweds approached the Czechoslovak border. They could see the Little Carpathians looming in the di stance, and Bratislava castle overlooking the city. As they approached the border, they noticed that they were the only car entering the Republic. A lonely soldier, with a sub-machine gun slung over his back, lifted a heavy cantilevered iron gate, which opened only inwards, and allowed them in . Thereupon two surprised customs officers emerged from a little building off to the side and, under a covered roof asked the travelers for their passports and visas. 3 For the history of the Immigrant Archives, later renamed the Immigration History Research Center, see my " Building Ethnic Arch ives in the United States and Canada since the I 960 's," in Dominique Daniel and Amalia Levi eds., Identity Palimpsests: Archiving Ethnicity in the U.S. and Canada (Sacramento, CA: Litwin Books, 20 13), 59-6 1. SLOVAKIA 2021 123 Petrfalka border crossing from Austria, 1993 . In 1968 there were no signs at this crossing except the large letters that read " Bratislava." Fortunately, Timothy Smith had arranged for Dr. 1:udovit Holotik, the Director of the Historical [nstitute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, to issue them, as we ll as his entire team of researchers, an official invitation, which made the granting of visas by the Czechoslovak authorities that much easier. After a two-hour wait at the border, while the customs officers awaited a telephone call from Prague confirming their visas as legitimate, the couple was cleared for entrance into the Republic. Before they departed they changed some American dollars for Czechoslovak crowns, because it was noon and their stomachs were growling. Because they had an official invitation , they did not have to exchange $12.00 (U.S.) for Czechoslovak crowns for each day of their stay at the official (and unrealistic) rate of seven crowns for a 124 SLOVAKIA 2021 dollar. The real (black market) rate of exchange was 35 crowns for a dollar. Once they had cleared customs, the two visitors proceeded in their little green Volkswagen along a narrow two-lane road towards the town of Petrzalka, a suburb of Bratislava. They noticed that the road was raised higher than the nearby empty fields , and soon they passed a tall guard-tower, with two more armed soldiers watching them. rt was clear that they had just passed through the "Iron Curtain" which separated the communist East from the democratic West. After the pair had crossed the "Stary most" (Old Bridge) across the Danube River from Petrzalka to Bratislava, and drove along Sturova Street into the heart of the city, they were disappointed by what they saw. The buildings were old and grey, with the plaster falling off. What a contrast with modem, clean and dynamic Vienna! The pedestrians were dressed in what looked like I 940's clothing. It seemed to the visitors that they had entered into the "Third World." As they drove along, they looked in vain for a sign that would advertise a restaurant. When the pair drove their Volkswagen up the hill through the Square of the Slovak National Uprising, past the Church of the Holy Trinity, they noticed a large sign at its base that read "Sovietska kniha" (Soviet Bookstore), which again reminded them that they were in the communist East. Finally, as they emerged into what is now known as " Hodo:fovo namestie" (Hodza Square), the hungry couple spied a sign on the left that read "Restauracia Stefanka." Elated, they parked their car on a side road and entered the restaurant with great anticipation. A friendly waiter in a tuxedo greeted them and sat them beside a window overlooking the square. He explained that the Stefanka did not provide individual service, but they could help themselves at the buffet table. Mark and Anne were delighted to see little open-faced sandwiches, with all sorts of delicacies on them, awaiting their hungry stomachs. They ate to their heart's content. Meanwhile, they noticed that the clientele consisted mostly of older gentlemen and young women. They made nothing of it. A little later, whi le visiting Mark 's cousin Jozef Mazur in nearby Trnava, Jozef asked the couple for their first impressions of Slovakia. When they recounted their lunch at the Stefanka, Jozef burst into laughter. When Mark inquired as to what was so funny, Jozef replied, "Don't you know what the Stefanka is?" To which Mark replied , "no," to which Jozef added, "The Stefanka is SLOVAKIA 2021 125 notorious in Bratislava as the place where you go if you want to pick up a prostitute! " Upon reflection, Mark and Anne understood why they had seen so many older gentlemen and younger women at the Stefanka. They had a good laugh! After lunch on their first day in Slovakia, Mark and Anne proceeded to the offices of the Historicky ustav SAV (Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences) on Klemensova Street. Here a sheepish Dr. L:udovit Holotik welcomed them and explained that he was leaving shortly on a research trip to England . He failed to mention that he had just been fired as Director of the Institute, because in the l 950 ' s he had written a defamatory book about the Slovak national hero, General Milan R. Stefanik. During the liberali z ing " Dubcek era",4 such books were frowned upon and Holotik was attacked in the now-free press.5 Holotik then introduced Mark to his successor, Dr. Julius Mesaros. The latter was initially skeptical of Mark ' s motives, but when Mark explained that he was a student of Timothy Smith, and part of a team of researchers who were coming to Slovakia to study the emigration of various ethnic groups from the former Kingdom of Hungary, Mesaros mellowed. He offered Mark and Anne some Turkish coffee, made by his secretary, which consisted of one-third coffeegrounds and two-thirds thick, dark, coffee in a demi-tasse. The Canadian couple had never before seen or tasted such coffee and slowly sipped it in order not to insult their host. Mark and Anne were raised on "cafe au lait". Apparently, the Russians had introduced "Turkish coffee" to the Eastern Bloc. After this introduction, Mesaros brought to Mark dozens of articles and books written by himself and his colleagues at the Hi storical Institute on the social history of 19 th century Slovakia.6 Once he had read them, Mark would have a good back- 4 For the Dubce k era , popularl y kn own as the " Prague Spring," see The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact In vasion of Czechoslovakia, / 968: Forty Years Later, ed. by M. Mark Sto larik (Munde lein, IL : Bo lchazy-Carducc i, 20 I 0). 1..:udovit Holotik, Stefa nikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Brati slava: Slove nska academia vied. 1958); fo r th e attacks upon Holot ik see Jan Ml ynarik , " Hi stori ci v Enckylopedii Slovenska- bilanci a neostalinskeho kadrovani a (Studia k slovenskej histori ografii )" Premeny 25 (4, 1988), 147-8. 6 Mesaros's most important publication was Rolnicka a narodnostna otazka na Slovensku, 1848-1900; k problematikef eudalnych prei itkov (Bratislava : Slovenska academia vi ed, 1959). 5 126 SLOVAKIA 2021 ground understanding of the archival sources which he would subsequently find in various Slovak state archives. After having spent their first night in the nearby Hotel Krym, Mark and Anne proceeded to the headquarters of the Slovak State Archives on the " Ulica obrancov mieru" (Street of the Defenders of Peace; today 's Stefanikova Street). There they met and befriended Dr. Frantisek Bielik, one of the archivists who was interested in the topic of Slovak immigration .7 He subsequently introduced the couple to Deputy Director Jozef Mazur who, it turned out, was Mark 's long-lost cousin on his mother's side. They had a joyful reunion during which Jozef Mazur showed Mark photos of himself visiting with Mark 's family in Turciansky Svaty Martin during the Second World War. Jozef then wrote Mark an official letter of introduction to all the Slovak State Archives scattered across the country, in which Jozef instructed the local archivists to help Mark in finding material s on Slovak emigration to North America. For the next two weeks Frantisek Bielik found such materials for Mark in the Bratislava State Archives. While Mark and Anne stayed at the nearby inexpensive Hotel Tatra, which was full of Russians, they had a curious experience. Every morning when they ate breakfast in the hotel 's dining room, they ordered the same things- ham and eggs with rolls and coffee. The total bill was always 28 crowns, which they rounded up to 30, much to the deli ght of their middle-aged waiter, who collected the money on the spot. They were not used to waiters doing this, because in North America waiters or waitresses usually submitted a bill , and the customers paid through a cashier, who controlled the amount requested and paid. One day, the middle-aged waiter took the day off and was replaced by a much younger colleague. Mark and Anne ordered the same breakfast, but the new waiter charged them 48 crowns! Not wishing to create a scene, they paid the 48 crowns and left. The next day, when the middle-aged waiter returned, they showed him the previous day's breakfast bill. He was furiou s, he apologized, did not charge them for their breakfast, and vowed that his younger colleague would never again repl ace him . Mark and Anne wondered how often waiters in 7 While Bielik started hi s career at the Slovak State Archives, he later switched to the Institute for Slovaks Abroad of the Matica slovenska and published, amon g many others things, the four- volume compendium of documents on Slovak immigrati on entitled Slovenske vystahovalectvo. Dokumenty / -4 (Bratislava: Slovenska academ ia vied, 1969- 1985). SLOVAKIA 2021 127 Slovakia (and elsewhere in Europe) cheated their customers in this way. After their stay in Bratislava, Mark and Anne drove north to the city of Trnava, to do research in the archives of the Spolok Sv. Yojtecha (Society of St. Adalbert). They stayed with the family of Jozef Mazur, who introduced Mark to the Director of the Spolok, Msgr. Jan Postenyi . The latter was delighted to meet Mark, because Postenyi had been on a tour of the USA in 193 7, and had since not met with any American Slovaks. He gladly opened his rich archive to Mark, where the latter discovered many documents pertaining to the history of the Slovak League of America during and after World War I. These included a carbon-copy of the 1915 Cleveland Agreement. 8 After a week's stay in Trnava, Mark and Anne set out for northern Slovakia, where they met additional members of their family. In Cadca they stayed with Mark 's uncle Jozef Stolarik, who took Mark to see his grandmother Anna Stolarikova and her daughter Terezia Bosakova in the hilly settlement of Dlha, near the city of Turzovka. Anna had not seen her grandson since his Christening in 1943 . Since Anna was illiterate, she wondered how Mark had managed to find her. Mark took out a road map of Europe and showed her the roads they had driven from Stuttgart to Slovakia, but it was hard for her to comprehend what he was showing. Mark, meanwhile, was amused that she was wearing black Converse sneakers. Uncle Jozef explained that it was easier for her to climb up the hill to her house in sneakers than in leather shoes. There was no road up the hill from the one below. After having visited two more aunts and their families, in midJuly, Mark and Anne set out for the city of Martin, Mark's birthplace. While driving between the city of Zilina and the ruins of castle Strecno, Mark and Anne suddenly spotted a long column of Russian military vehicles parked on the old road beside the new one. They were engaged in war games called "operation Sumava" in order to intimidate the Czechoslovak government into stopping the transformation of Czech and Slovak society into "socialism with a human face," as the first Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 8 For the history of the Spolok Sv. Vojtecha see Stefan Hanakovic, Dejiny Spolku sviiteho Vojtecha (Trnava : Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 2005), especia ll y pages 281-84 for Postenyi ' s trip to America. The Cleve land Agreement can be found in the Archiv Spolku Svateho Vojtecha, Politika, fasc. 235 , fol. A. c.2 128 SLOVAKIA 2021 Alexander Dubcek, put it. As he made clear in hi s memo irs, he and hi s followers were trying to turn communist Czechoslovakia into a Social Democratic Czechoslovakia.9 His colleagues in the Warsaw Pact, particularly Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and East German leader Walter Ulbricht, vehemently disapproved of the path of the so-called Prague Spring, and "operation Sumava" was a prelude to the later in vas ion of Czechoslovakia. 10 Meanwhile, when Mark saw these Soviet military veh icles, he instantly shouted at Anne to start photographing them , because he was driving and was afraid to stop the car, lest the Russians arrest him. A terrified Anne grabbed hi s 35mi llimeter camera and took several color slides of these vehicles. Russ ian military vehicles parked on the old road between Z ilina and Strecno in northern Slovakia, Jul y, 1968 9 Hope Dies Last: The Autohiography of Alexander Dubcek, ed. and trans. by Jiri Hochman (New York: Kodansha International, 1993), 277. 10 For the views of Brezhnev, Gomulka and Ulbricht, see the chapters by Mikhail Latysh, Lukasz Kaminski and Riidi ger Wenzke in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact In vasion, 1-18, 95- 128 and 137-64. SLOVAKIA 2021 129 Russian "Katyusha" rocket launchers on old road between Zilina and Strecno, July, 1969. Russian ambulance and military vehicles on old road between Zilina and Strecno, July 1968. After this harrowing experience, Mark and Anne kept driving around the Strecno pass until they reached the city of Martin. Here 130 SLOVAKIA 2021 they met Uncle Rudolf and hi s family and stayed with them for a week while Mark worked in the Literary Archive of the Matica slovenska. Here he met Dr. Jozef Telgarsky, the Director of the Slovak National Library of the Matica slovenska. The two of them agreed upon an exchange of books and other materials in the future , a promise which is still in effect. While in Martin, at the urging of Frantisek (Ferko) Bielik, Mark attended the 6th Congress of the Slovak Historical Society, where he heard Dr. Lubomir Liptak 's attack upon the "deformation" of Slovak hi story by Marxist hi storian s in the previous decades. 11 He also heard Prof. Milos Gosiorovsky' s plea for the federation of Czechoslovakia based upon the Cleveland Agreement of 1915. 12 Mark was amused by Ferko Bielik 's antics at this Congress- he lifted hi s hand in approval of various motions made, whi le shaking hi s head sideways in disapproval. He explained that the conference organizers only counted the raised hands, not the heads shaking sideways. This was a small gesture of disapproval of the conference proceedings. After their stay in Martin, at the beginning of August, the newlyweds set out for the city of Presov, to do research in the archives of the former county of Saris, from where the first immigrants had left for America. 13 In Presov they met and stayed with Anne's uncle Andrej Krasnay in the Sid lisko Dukelskych hrdinov (the Apartment Complex of the Heroes of the Duk la Pass). Shortly after their arrival , Andrej took Mark and Anne to visit her grandmother in her vi ll age for the first time, as well as other aunts and uncles. At Andrej 's condo Mark and Anne had to get used to the socialist way of life. For instance, sometimes the water flowed from the faucets in Andrej's apartment, sometimes not. Therefore, Andrej kept his tub full of water, so that he would not run out. Sometimes the water was hot. Sometimes it was not. Whenever the water flowed hot, Andrej called the couple to immediately take a bath. And, even though Presov had street li ghts, they were not turned on at night, in order to conserve electricity. When Mark went to do research in the Slovak State Archives in Presov, which was located on the Main Square, right beside the church of St. Nicholas, he had some interesting experiences. When he met 11 Cubomir Liptak, "U loha a postavenie historiografie v nasej spolocnosti, Hisloricky casopi.1· XVII , c. l , 1969, 98- 11 7. 12 Milos Gosiorovsky, "Slovaci za prvej svetovej vojny," in Slovaci a ich narodnv v;ivin, ed. Oto Takac (Brati slava: Slovenska academ ia vied, I969), 29 1-305 . 13 Slovak State Archives in Presov, county Saris, podzupan, 9809, VB, 1879. SLOVAK.IA 2021 131 Andrej Lukac, the Director of the Archive, the latter was cool to Mark's visit. He claimed that the material Mark was searching for was not yet processed and suggested that Mark return sometime in the future, when it would become available. Mark then asked if Lukac knew Jozef Mazur, to which Lukac replied, "Hej , onje moj set1'' (Of course! He's my boss.) To which Mark replied, "Hej, on je moj bratranec." (Of course! He's my cousin.) As soon as Lukac heard Mark ' s reply, he jumped into action. Lukac suggested that, since Mark could not read Magyar, and most of the documents were in that language, he hire a translator. Mark agreed and the next day Lukac introduced Mark to Mr. Grant. The latter was the descendant of a Scottish soldier who had remained in Central Europe in the 17 th century. Mr. Grant was in his 80's, he had been educated in the old Austria-Hungary, and knew Slovak, Magyar, German and Latin. He was overly polite, as such gentlemen were trained to be and, whenever he found an interesting document to translate, he would say "No, prosim Vas pekne," which means "Now, if you please," and then would proceed to translate. Lukac suggested that Mark pay Mr. Grant I 00 crowns per day, which was the going rate for such services. Mark agreed, since on the black market that would come to only $3.00 (US) a day. Mr. Grant was so intelligent that, after he had translated some documents, he grasped what Mark was looking for, and then did his translating without any more superv1s1on. Mark and Anne also did research in Kosice. Once they had exhausted their sources in Presov, they drove south to Kosice, to work in the fonner archives of Abov and Zemplin counties, which were housed in the former Abov county headquarters on Orlia Street, one block from the Cathedral of St. Elizabeth. As they drove into Kosice and approached the main square, they noticed and photographed a bust of General Milan R. Stefanik on a pedestal that was obviously erected spontaneously and hurriedly by some local patriots on the exact spot where a much larger statue of Stefanik had been erected in the l 920's. The statue was removed by communist authorities in the I 950's. (See the photo on page 133) This bust testified to the rise of Slovak nationalism during the Dubcek era. At the Slovak State Archives in Kosice Mark and Anne 132 SLOVAKIA 2021 were welcomed by the Director, Ladislav Andrasi and his assistant, Anna Fedorjakova. The latter willingly and eagerly helped Mark to translate documents from Magyar into Slovak. Meanwhile, Mark and Anne were joined by Professor Timothy Smith and another one of his graduate students, Oksana Dragan, who had both just come down from Poland in Smith's brown Volkswagen. Smith was studying Slovak Lutheran immigration from eastern Slovakia while Oksana was researching Rusyn (Ukrainian) immigration to North America. Smith then suggested to Mark that he a lso consult the Roman Catholic bishop's archives, located on Lenin Street, opposite the Cathedral. Since Anne had studied Latin for five years in High School, she volunteered to do this and was assisted by the Rev. Alojs Tkac, who was in charge of the archives. After the collapse of Communism, the latter was e levated to the post of Bishop, and later, Archbishop of Kosice. 14 Meanwhile, Professor Smith arranged a meeting with an "Action Committee" of the newly-resurrected Greek Catholic Church, led by Msgr. Jan Hirka, who, once Communism collapsed, was e levated to Eparch (Bishop) of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Presov. 15 On the evening of August 20, 1968, Mark and Anne, together with Timothy Smith and Oksana Dragan, decided to dine together. They went to the Magyar Restaurant in Kosice , where they enjoyed an exotic meal and did some dancing to the tunes of a Gypsy (Roma) orchestra. 14 Alojz Tkac was persecuted by the Communi sts durin g the period of "Normalization" ( 1970- 1989) and penned hi s memoirs in Pohl'adv z kriiovatky (Kapusany: Bens, 2004). 15 For the hi story of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia from 1968 to 1980, see Martin Lupco, "Grec kokatolick a a pravoslavna cirkev na Slovensku v rokoch 19681980," in Jaroslav Corani c- Jana Koprivnakova- Peter Sturak eds. Grekokatolicka cirkev na Slovensku vo svetle vyroci II (Presov: Presovska univerzita v Presove, 2012), 165-77. Msgr. Jan H irka published hi s memoirs in Pod ochranou Marie: Pastier v zlui be cirkvi (Presov: Presovska univerzita v Presove, 20 13 ). SLOVAKIA 2021 133 Bust of General M.R. Stefanik on the main square, Kosice, August, 1968. 134 SLOVAKIA 2021 Around 11 :00 p.m. all four researchers decided to drive back to their abodes in Presov. As Mark and Anne drove through the village of Drienov, just north of Kosice, a black cat ran in front of their car. Although they did not kill it, Mark wondered aloud if it signaled that they would have bad luck. "I hope not," Anne answered. Around 4:30 a.m. on August 21 , Mark and Anne were awakened by a very loud noise coming from the streets of Presov. At first they thought that it was the sound of jackhammers, and Mark began to curse the workers who could not wait until 8:00 a.m. to repair the streets. Then they heard a knocking on the door to the apartment. Andrej Krasnay gingerly approached the door and asked, "who ' s there?" Mark and Anne were afraid that the Secret Police had come for them, because they always came at night. Instead, it was the next-doorneighbor. He told Andrej something and Andrej then knocked on Mark and Anne's glass door, came in and announced that "The Russians, Poles, East Germans, Magyars and Bulgarians are occupying us!" 16 All three then understood that the noise from the street was not from jackhammers, but from tanks. Dazed, Mark and Anne decided to immediately dress and repair to the Hotel Dukla, where Professor Smith and Oksana Dragan were staying. It was sunrise by the time they arrived and Smith had just arisen. Mark knocked on his door and as Smith opened it, Mark blurted out "the Russians are invading us." Smith looked out his window at the tanks and remarked that he thought it was military maneuvers again . Mark assured him that it was not, that this was a real invasion . Smith then suggested that Mark go find Anne, who had gone upstairs to inform Oksana of the invasion , to come down to the dining room to discuss the situation. The four researchers, along with a young and lonely waiter, were the only customers in the dining room. While Smith ate a hearty breakfast of scrambled eggs and rolls , the three students were too frightened to eat. Smith nonchalantly remarked, " We ' re Americans. This doesn ' t concern us." He cou ldn 't have been more wrong. Mark was born in Turciansky Svaty Martin in 1943 and Oksana in Berlin in 1942. Oksana was the daughter of the editor of the 16 The East Germans did not parti cipate in the invasion . For a detailed ex planati on sec Rildi gcr Wcnzkc, "The Rol e and Acti vities of the SEO, the East German State and Its Military During th e ' Prague Spring' of 1968," in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion, 137-64. SLOVAKIA 2021 135 pro-independence Ukrainian weekly Svoboda, published in Jersey City, New Jersey. Both were post-war refugees who, with their families, had ended up in Canada and the USA after the war. Neither the Soviet Union, nor Czechoslovakia, recognized dual citizenship at that time. Either one of these students could be detained by the authorities, whether Czechoslovak or Russian . Smith, however, was so unconcerned about the invasion that he decided that all four researchers should carry on as if nothing had happened. Thus, he instructed Mark and Oksana to go to the state archives and continue with their research. Meanwhile, he took Anne with him to serve as a translator in the Presov city archives. When Smith met with the Mayor of Presov, who was clearly shattered by the invasion, Smith asked for permission to do research in the city archives. The Mayor replied, with Anne translating, that "due to the extraordinary circumstances," the city archives were closed. Smith would not take no for an answer. He repeated his request, and Anne repeated the translation that the archives were closed. After three tries, Smith gave up and told Anne to go join Mark in the state archives. When Mark and Oksana arrived at the Slovak State Archives, they noticed that the entire staff was looking out the windows at the tanks (T55 ' s) roaring by, except Mr. Grant. The latter was nonchalantly reading and translating Magyar documents, oblivious to the noise outside. After a while Mr. Grant's behavior puzzled Mark so much that he asked Mr. Grant, "how can you continue to work while we are being invaded?" Mr. Grant smiled and replied, "This is my fifth invasion ." When Mr. Grant saw the puzzled look on Mark ' s face , he explained that the Russians had broken through the Carpathians into Hungary in the fall and winter of 1914-1915, then Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army occupied Presov in 1919, the Germans occupied Slovakia in 1944 and the Russians in 1945, and again in 1968. " So, what's new?" he asked. "But, don't you want to see the Russian tanks?" Mark asked. Mr. Grant gestured no with his hand. Then he added, "You should have seen a German Tiger. That was a tank!" Mr. Grant then reminisced that, shortly after the Second World War had ended, he took the train from Presov to Kos ice. About half way there he spotted four destroyed tanks in a nearby field . Three were Russian T34 ' s and one was a German Tiger with its treads blown off. It was obvious what had happened. 136 SLOVAKIA 2021 After these reassuring words from Mr. Grant, Mark and Anne cairned down and decided to return to Andrej's apartment, to get their camera, and take some pictures of the invasion. After having eaten some lunch, the intrepid pair set out on Uti ca cervenej arrnady [Red Army Street] (today's Levoca Street) towards the main intersection of Presov at Utica Slovenskej republiky rad [Street of the Slovak Socialist Republic] , today 's Hlavna ulica (Main Street), right in front of the Bosak Bank. 17 There the pair saw a burning Russian military vehicle, which some tank had previously rammed. Just as they were passing by the Bosak Bank, another tank roared by and hit the burning vehicle and it lunged towards the bank . Seeing the approaching truck out of the comer of his eye, Mark shoved Anne out of the way and prepared to be crushed. Fortunately, there was a very strong guard-rail at this location, and it stopped the burning vehicle. After Mark and Anne recovered from this near-fatal mishap, they crossed the street and, upon the urging of a local, climbed up the stairs of the Ukrainian Theater and emerged onto a balcony, where they had an unobstructed view of the invasion . They started to take color slides of the Russian tanks and other vehic les. Ru ss ian military vehicles on Dukla Street, Presov, August 21, 1968. Meanwhile, in the morning they had noticed that elderly citizens had lined up outside various food stores, to "stock up" in case the 17 This bui ldi ng was erected by the American Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak in the I 920 's. He also built a school in Okruhle, hi s village of origin. For more on Bosak see Michal Bosak & Rudolf Bosa k, Michal Bosak- americkj bankar zo Sarisa (Presov, Ibi s Publishin g, 1997). SLOVAKIA 2021 137 Russian soldiers started looting, as they had done in 1945 . By noon, however, the dynamics had changed. Hundreds of students, who had been home for summer vacation, started to pour into Presov. Soon, they began marching up and down the main square, shouting " Ysetci l'udia na chodniku nemiluju republiku!" (People on the sidewalk do not love the Republic) an old communist slogan from May-day parades. Soon a few of the bravest students jumped onto the street, at the main crossing located at the Bosak Bank, and stopped the tanks! Students blocking Russian tanks at intersection of Dukla and Red Anny Streets, Presov, August 21, 1968. They held up the invasion for three hours. Finally, by mid-afternoon, a Russian military helicopter hovered overhead and must have given the driver of the lead tank orders to proceed because, at that moment, the lead tank lowered its gun and began swinging it from side-to-side, while simultaneously roaring its engine. (Photo next page). That had the desired effect, as the students jumped aside to avoid being hit by the barrel of its canon. After that the tanks proceeded closely and quickly, in order to not give the students a chance to once 138 SLOVAK.IA 2021 again jump in front and stop the tanks. On the first day of the invasion, the commander of occupation forces in Presov announced a state of Martial Law to begin at I 0:00 p.m. Instead of obeying him, the citizens of Presov hit the streets in large numbers and began to shout "Rusi domov! Rusi domov!" (Russians, go home! Russians, go home!). When an armored scout-car appeared, the people began to pelt it with bricks and bottles and it quickly fled the scene. Russian military helicopter hovering above Presov, August 21 , 1968. Russian scout car and tanks on a side street in Presov, August, 1968. SLOVAKIA 2021 139 During the day individuals posted large anti-Russian posters and placards onto shop windows. One large cartoon was Mark's favorite: It depicted a Russian soldier, who had just had a bowl movement, rising from the toilet and the reactionary communist Vasil Bil'ak was licking his ass! Mark wanted to photograph it, but was afraid to do so, because it was rumored that agents of the Russian KGB were in town, and were arresting people taking such pictures. The citizens of Presov suspected that Vasil Bil'ak, a conservative member of the Czechoslovak Politburo, was one of the traitors who had urged the Russians to invade. The citizens were right. 18 For three days the Russians hurtled through Presov in the direction of Poprad. By the end of the week, when the city was fully occupied. (See the next 5 photographs) Russian soldier guarding tank in central Presov , August, 1968. 18 Six members of the Politburo, including Vasil Bil'ak , signed such a letter of invitation to the Ru ssians just before the invasion. For a copy of this letter see Otakar Korinek, Poz;vvaci list 1968 (Bratislava: Albert Marencin PT, 2006), 82-3. 140 SLOVAKIA 2021 Russ ian soldiers talking to civili ans, Presov, August, 1968. Russ ian vehicles bes ides Post Office in Presov, August 1968 SLOVAKIA 2021 141 Russian soldiers and officers in a military vehicle, Presov, August, 1968. Russian tanks in front of Czechoslovak military barracks in Presov, August, 1968. 142 SLOVAKIA 2021 A certain professor of the Ukrainian language at the University of Presov, whom Timothy Smith knew, approached the research group from America and suggested that they leave as soon as possible, because he knew that Oksana had been born in Berlin in 1942 and was in danger of being picked up by agents of the KGB . Timothy Smith agreed and the four researchers set out in their respective Volkswagens towards Bratislava via Sabinov, Brezovicka and the Levoca forest in order to avoid the formidable Branisko Pass, where columns of Russian vehicles were moving very slowly. Between Spisske Podhradie and the city of Poprad they had to pass many slow-moving Russian vehicles. At one point, they drove by an entire column stopped by the side of the road, with Russian soldiers picking pears from the trees. Apparently the soldiers were hungry and their supply-wagons had not caught up with them. As the researchers approached the city of Poprad, they saw huge red letters that spelled DUBCEK painted vertically on the entire side of a tall apartment building. A nearby crane revealed how this was made possible. Mark would have photographed this sign, except that he had just passed a moving column of Russians. Meanwhile, Mark's Volkswagen rattled from the ruts in the road made by tank tracks, a ll the way to Bratislava. As they drove west, Mark and Anne noticed that the locals had changed all the directional signs, to try to confuse the Russians . It didn ' t work, since the Russians had good maps of Czechoslovakia, as did Mark and Anne. Meanwhile, Mark and Anne also noticed many pro-Dubcek and anti-Russian signs along the way. For instance, in the village of Brezovicka, past the city of Sabinov, someone had painted " The Whole World Supports Dubcek" on an abandoned log cabin. (First photo next page) On the meandering Vah river, between the cities of Ruzomberok and Martin, the locals had painted on the concrete abutment " DUBCEK JE NAS JANOSIK" (Dubcek is our Janosik), conjuring up Slovakia's I 8 th century social bandit. 19 On the way to Bratislava, the little caravan stopped in Martin, Cadca and Trnava, to bid farewell to family and friends . At the Matica slovenska the sympathetic workers gave Mark souvenir copies of the newly-resurrected daily Narodne noviny, which the communists had 19 For the story of Janosik see Jozef Kocis, Neznamy Jano.~ik (Marti n: Osveta, 1986). SLOVAKIA 2021 143 shut down in the l 950's, but which now fully supported the Dubcekled government. (Second photo next page) As Mark was driving past the city of Trencin, he pulled out to pass a tractor dragging a wagon of hay and suddenly found himself confronted by a Russian truck barreling down on him. Fortunately, the driver of the truck slammed on his brakes and Mark narrowly avoided colliding with him. Anne upbraided Mark for this near-miss, to which he sourly replied, "The Russians don't belong here! " The American caravan stopped briefly in Trnava and Bratislava, to bid farewell to family and friends. While in Trnava at Jozef Mazur's apartment, where they had lunch, Oksana spied a piano in the living room. She started to play some tunes on it but, when she played the World War II German song "Lily Marl ene," Jozefs wife Lola, who was a schoolteacher and afra id for her job, sc reamed at Oksana to stop, because the communists had forbidden such songs from being played. Graffiti, "The Whole World Supports Dubcek" in Brezovicka, eastern Slovakia, August, 1968. 144 SLOVAKIA 2021 Narodne no viny (Martin, August 29, 1968): " We understand and support you, comrade Dubcek. You negoti ated outside of our homeland ." Thus, even though the Dubcek era had seen the abolition of censorship, self-censorship still prevailed. Meanwhile, as in most Slovak cities and villages, Trnava also had its share of pro-Dubcek and antiRussian posters. Graffiti in central Tmava: "Not what the occupiers demanded, but what we support with Dubcek and Svoboda," August, 1968. SLOVAKIA 2021 145 The final stop of the caravan was in Bratislava. When the four researchers appeared at the Historicky ustav SA V, they were greeted by the furious but dispirited historians and their secretarial staff. After some discussion , both sides agreed that, in view of the invasion and the uncertainty of the future , it would be best to cancel the planned scholarly conference on Emigration from Eastern Europe to North America in the nearby castle of Smolen ice, which belonged to the Slovak Academy of Sciences. After they bade their farewells , the four researchers returned to their cars parked on Dostojevskeho rad (Dostojevsky Street). Fearing that The Russians would control the border, and search their car for photographs, Mark decided to photograph some more pro-Dubcek and anti-Russian graffiti painted on various buildings in the vicinity, then hide his film in a difficult-to-find spot in his car and hope the Ru ssians would not find it. (See the last 3 Photos) After thi s the American caravan approached the Old Bridge and drove past Russian tanks parked on both sides. Once they had crossed into Petrfalka they noticed what looked like a whole regiment of Russians camped in the park of Janko Kral' beside the Danube River. As they approached the border, however, they saw that Slovak soldiers were still in charge, complete with their sub-machine guns. Only one lonely Russian soldier, seated on a bench and staring at the ground, could be seen. When Mark asked the Slovak customs officers about the Russian soldier, they replied, "We're ignoring him . You should too." After perfunctorily checking their passports and visas, the customs officers bade the travelers farewell and, after the Slovak soldier lifted and pulled into Czechoslovakia the heavy cantilevered gate, the four researchers drove into Austria and freedom . August of 1968 will forever be etched into Mark 's and Anne's memories. What started out as a happy honeymoon in Europe and in Slovakia turned into the tragedy of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was a brutal reminder of how superpowers can intimidate and subjugate their much smaller and weaker neighbors. 146 SLOVAKIA 2021 Graffiti in Bratislava : "Long Live Dubcek .. ." August, 1968. Graffiti in Bratislava: " ... and Svoboda" August, 1968 SLOVAKIA 2021 Graffiti in Bratislava : " Moscow" (the other way), August, 1968. 147  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "The Russians are Invading Us!" Prešov, 1968 Description An account of the resource M. Mark Stolarik Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 121-147 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8c4fff75d3899397a9df9a5d6d19c356.pdf 5fecb7d60105e1928d9ff6db123aeaea PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 2021 151 Diana Duchonova. Palatin Mikulas Esterhazy. Dvorska spolocnost' a aristokraticka kai dodennost'. Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2017. 558pp. Illustrated, bibliography, name and place index. (Baron) PETER MA.RlA.SSY Kosice, Slovak Republic This publication is an attempt to present the daily life of Hungarian aristocratic society in the 16 th century through the central character of Palatine Mikulas Esterhazy. The book is divided into three main chapters reflecting the origin and the rise of the Esterhazy family , then the place of his court as a social system, and the rituals of everyday life at his court. The Esterhazy family rose to prominence in the Kingdom of Hungary after the Battle of Mohacs ( 1526). After this disastrous battle with the Turks, the Kingdom was divided into the northwest part (today's Slovakia and western Hungary) under the rule of the Habsburgs, the central part under the control of the Turks and the eastern part (Transylvania), as a vassal province of the Ottoman Empire. At this time Hungary witnessed the arrival of the "Homo novus" Esterhazy family , which originated in the town of Galanta, in Upper Hungary (Slovakia), and whose leader Mikulas eventually became the ruling Palatine of Hungary. This chapter gives a detailed overview of the political situation in the country, but without proper graphs depicting spheres of influence in the given period. The same is true of the examination of the Esterhazy family and their relatives, presenting only the sources that would have demanded not a convoluted but coherent processing of the central person's pedigree, that of Mikulas, but also the family tree's extent as a result of several marriages and family tragedies. In the chapter on the Palatine's court as a social system, the author makes countless references to the functioning of the court, to its members or participants, the Palatine's office and instructions to his Chief Steward. In addition, she refers to rewards, to various craftsmen, as necessary parts of the court, which reflected the sovereignty of the court and, thus, a manifestation of the status of the leader of the Hungarian aristocracy at that time. As in the first chapter, the reader ts inundated with detailed descriptions, instructions and �152 SLOVAKIA 2021 responsibilities of the people in vo lved. The secti ons dea ling wi th salari es and rewards are prese nted onl y from three sources and cannot be considered as representative of the who le court. The map provided definitely fa ils to give a comprehensive overv iew of the scope and possess ions of th e Esterh azys in today's Hungary, Austri a, Slovaki a, Romani a and Ukra ine. All of thi s is made worse by Slovaki zing th e names of the Esterhazys throughout the tex t (e.g. Mikul as instead of Miklos). The third chapter di sc uss ing the everyday rituals of ari stocracy in the Pa latine court is closest to th e dec lared intenti on of the auth or to prov ide a picture of the court of Hungari an hi gh nobility. The ritua ls themselves represent the kind of a system whi ch, if respected, creates certain frameworks of recurring events in the areas of educati on, everyday tas ks, social events, manag in g foreign relati ons, marri ages, hea lth care of fa mil y members, including fun eral s, wheth er becau se of the death of children, wives and espec iall y male descendants of the fa mil y who di ed in th e Turkish wars. In additi on to often very detail ed sources, the chapter lacks order, a labe l and , where appropriate, the dec ision-making key, especiall y when sol ving de li cate events, including the in carcerati on of one of the w ives of th e Palatine. My bi ggest reservati on about thi s chapter is th at it should not end w ith sad pictures of the liquidati o n of their last resting places. Instead, it should conc lude with a summ ary of the personal, organi zati onal, as we ll as po litica l skill s of th e Esterhazys which should secure the ex istence of thi s hi ghl y- respected famil y today and over the centuri es. In conclusion, by introducing a huge number of sources in thi s book without their subsequent process ing into maps, graphs, fa mil y trees, or tables, or even algorithm s, makes thi s publicati on access ible only to the profess ional or know ledgeable reader but not to the general public. For thi s reason, it is a mere compilati on of sources processed into three re lated but generally rather separate topics whi ch could in the end fo rm three separate publicati ons. �SLOVAKIA 2021 153 Zora Mintalova Zubercova. Ako sme kedysi i ili: Obrazky kai dodenneho i ivota nasich predkov. Bratislava. Slovart, 20 I 7. 327pp. Illustrations, definitions, bibliography. LENKA STOLARIK Carleton University Specialists in social history have long awaited this book. Zora Mintalova Zubercova has given us a very detailed description of how Slovaks lived in the past 200 years. She utilized the findings of, not only recent historians such as Anton Spiesz ( 1930-1993), but also the writings of early 19 th century observers of Slovak life such as the Lutheran pastor and national revivalist Ladislav Bartholomeides ( 1754-1825). The latter wrote a monograph in Latin on Gerner County ( 1806-1808) in which he described in great detail the daily life and customs of the local Slovaks. In addition , she consulted similar works by Baron Alojz Mednansky ( 17841844 ), the Lutheran pastor Samuel Kollar ( 1769- I 83 I), and the ethnographer-national revivalist Jan Caplovic ( 1780- I 84 7), among others. Mintalova Zubercova covered daily life in all regions of Slovakia, as well as in its villages and cities. She described people 's dress, their housing, furniture, cooking, religious holidays, marriage, birth and death rituals, the raising and care of animals, village and city governance, farming and crafts practices, folk proverbs and songs. She also contrasted city with country life, the daily life of the gentry versus the peasantry, rich and poor. She took her story into the mid-twentieth century, when Slovaks began to move in great numbers into the cities, looking for work. Since Mintalova Zubercova was trained as an ethnographer, she left out what historians normally include in their works . Thus, when she cites the books of the authors mentioned above, even when she directly quotes from them , she neglects to provide us with footnotes . It is, therefore, impossible to look up her quotations and to seek further information from her sources. She also fails to list their works in her bibliography, which makes me suspect that she did not cite from their original books, but from second-hand sources. Furthermore, she did not include an Index to her book, whether of names, places or �154 SLOVAKIA 2021 concepts. This makes it difficult to look up and compare the cultures of northern , southern and eastern Slovakia. In spite of these shortcomings, those of us who were raised by parents born and educated in Slovakia will recognize many of the customs and traditions described by the author. Unfortunately, many such traditions are fading into insignificance as the Slovaks urbanize and westernize. I, for one, am very grateful to Zubercova Mintalova for having captured our ancestors' "world of the past." Daniela Kodajova et al. Zivena: 150 rokov Spolku slovenskych i ien. Bratislava: Slovart, 20 19. 304 pp. Bibliography, photographs, abbreviations, biographic index. EDITA BOSAK Memorial University of Newfoundland A foreword by the actress-diplomat Magda Vasaryova introduces the reader to a much-needed history of the first Slovak women's organ ization - Zivena. This collection of essays, edited by Daniela Kodajova, was published on the I 50 th anniversary of the founding of Zivena in Turciansky Svaty Martin on 4 August 1869. Dr. Kodajova and her col leagues introduce readers to some we ll-known, and some lesser-known, members of the Slovak intelligentsia of the late nineteenth century, who were instrumental in the founding and the running of this organization. This collection of essays details Zivena's cultural and educational activities from its earliest days to the present. The initial impetus for the creation of Zivena came from the male leadership of the Slovak national movement based in Turc. Sv. Martin . Ambro Pietor, who had studied law in Prague at Charles University, had witnessed the existence and successfu l work of Czech women's organizations in the Czech national movement. Upon graduation he returned to Martin with his observations and imparted these to fellowSlovak nationalists. These gentlemen came to view the women in their own circles not just as cooks, wives, homemakers and mothers, but as the keys to nurturing and educating Slovak children in the Slovak national spirit, the Slovak language and thus thwarting the efforts of the magyarizing goals of the Hungarian government which had steadi ly increased since its Compromise with the Habsburgs in 1867. The �SLOVAKIA 2021 155 nationalists were convinced that safeguarding and further developing the Slovak national movement meant encouraging Slovak mothers to teach their children the Slovak language and to share their knowledge of Slovak culture and customs, because otherwise the Magyar school system would eventually destroy Slovak identity. The organizers of Zivena arranged for membership dues to be sent directly to Matica slovenska (the Slovak national, cultural and literary organization based in Martin) or to trusted members of the Slovak national movement. Thus, Kodajova points out that Zivena was effectively linked to the Slovak national movement from its inception . Slovak female writers became active members of Zivena. They were well versed on the views of western philosophers like John Stuart Mill and so, through their own writings, they tried to draw attention to the inequalities which Slovak girls and women faced in society. Most of these writers came from the Slovak Lutheran middle-class, from Lutheran ministers ' families or well-educated families . Through Zivena they sought to establish a school of higher education for peasant and working-class women and girls. Unfortunately, the Hungarian government steadfastly refused to permit the establishment of such an institution . Dr. Kodajova points out that Ambro Pietor figured prominently, not only in establishing Zivena, but also in serving as its first secretary for a number of years. The first president was Anna Pivkova, the wife of one of Martin's prominent lawyers Ambroz Pivko. Elected for a three-year term, she actually served for twenty-five years due to the political situation in Hungary. The forced closure of Matica slovenska in 1875 by the government of Hungary meant that Zivena now took on the responsibility of holding the annual August nationalist assemblies to allow nationalists of both sexes to gather and discuss the political situation. This chapter also notes that a sister Zivena was established in America, which thrived and financially supported the mother organization in Slovakia. In the following chapter on coordinating nationalism with "conservative feminism ," Dr. K. Holly points out that Zivena was viewed in the 1890s as a dead organization. Its vice-president Elena Mar6thy-Soltesova wrote to her Czech friend and counterpart Yilma Sokolova �156 SLOVAKIA 2021 in 1891 lamenting the organization's lack of activity and failure to achieve any of its goa ls, other than publishing two Almanacs, financially supporting poor Slovak girls, and financing an exhibition of Slovak national dress and embroideries in Prague. The organization and its women were hampered by the very conservative nationalists in Martin, especially the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky. This chapter does much to shed light on the views of the male Slovak nationalists on the role of Zivena, and the place of women in the Slovak national movement. Slovak women were not expected to have opinions or to express them. The following chapters by Ors. G. Dudekova Kovacova, J. Hodolicova, I. Hajducekova, A. Falisova, and A. Bucekova are dedicated to the growth of .Zivena in terms of new chapters and members wherever Slovak women lived - the Hungarian Lowlands and Slovenia - both before and after the end of the Habsburg Monarchy. Dr. Hodolicova writes about the success of Slovak women in Slovenia in establishing a journal despite the magyarizing policies of the government. She points out that Zivena managed to survive the discriminatory policies of the Hungarian government vis-a-vis ethnic minorities by declaring their official name to be Zivena, "a charitable association of Slovak women" rather than its true name "the organization of Slovak women" which would have been viewed suspiciously by the government as an example of pan-Slavi sm. With the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and the creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 191 8, Dr. Hajducekova describes in detail how Zivena was able to thrive. It established chapters throughout Slovakia, and began the work of founding a girls' school. It also regularly published a journal , and created a platform where women could discuss how they viewed their role in civil society, marriage and the familyin other words their emancipation. Dr. A. Falisova's chapter discusses the activity of Zivena in the area of social work and health . Zivena cooperated with the Czechoslovak Red Cross in Prague to establish the Institute of Milan Rastislav Stefanik, which was to educate female social and health workers. They successfully sought guidance from American schools and financial support from the Slovak League of America. In the last chapter Dr. Bucekova highlights the activities of Zivena after 1989 - its rebirth with the end of Communism. After 1948 the Communists had dissolved the Society and confiscated its property. �SLOVAKIA 2021 157 Now its property was returned, albeit in a rather sad state of disrepair. Nevertheless, Slovaks from all walks of life rallied to fund the reconstruction of the building, which is now well on its way. As it completes repairs , Zivena has re-introduced cultural activities, a music school, and now houses the archives of Jana Cigara. Its intentions are to fulfill its original role as that of an educational institution. Its program is aimed at fulfilling the needs of modem young women. This edited collection celebrating the existence of Zivena is a significant and welcome contribution to our understanding of the Slovak women's movement, to the Slovak struggle for national survival, to its achievements in a democratic Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1939, and then its struggle to survive during the fascist period, and finally the communist regime. This volume is a labour of love, for its contributors are university graduates, researchers and academics who have studied the topic and published on it in a variety of journals both academic and popular. Moreover, two of them have a vested interest in seeing Zivena continue to prosper and educate young women. Magda Vasaryova is the national president and Alena Bucekova is the president of the Bratislava chapter. This work deserves the attention and careful study by scholars of the Habsburg Monarchy and of modem-day Slovakia. Jan Raska. Czech Reji,gees in Cold War Canada. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 20 I 8. xii-307pp. Illustrated, notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Despite its title, this book also deals with Slovaks and "Czechoslovaks" in Canada. It is a thoroughly-revised Ph .D. dissertation accepted by the University of Waterloo in Ontario. It gives a very good over-view of Czech and "Czechoslovak" immigrants to Canada after World War II and their goals and aspirations. Raska 's approach is chronological. He first mentions that before World War I, a few thousand Czech immigrants came to Canada largely from the United States to either farm on the Prairies or to work �158 SLOVAKIA 2021 in the coal mines of the West. In this regard they behaved like the Slovaks, who also moved from the USA to Canada at that time for the same reasons. After the Great War, however, far more Slovaks than Czechs (39,652 versus 5,176) moved to Canada, largely to the industrial centers of Ontario and Quebec. After World War II , 36,531 "Czechoslovaks" emigrated to Canada, largely in three waves: 19481951 ; I 968-69 and in the I 970's and I 980's. Unfortunately, the Canadian government did not differentiate between Czechs and Slovaks after World War II. According to the 2016 Census of Canada, when the government did differentiate between the two groups, it counted I 04,680 persons of partial Czech heritage and 72,290 people of partial Slovak heritage. Unfortunately, 40,7 15 persons declared themselves of"Czechoslovak" heritage and it is impossible to tell to which groups they belonged. In any case, Raska then focused on the three main groups of Czech refugees, the I 948ers, the I 968ers, and subsequent refugees. He pointed out that the I 948ers and I 968ers were very similar to each other because they were mostly highly-educated professionals who aspired to a middle-class life in Canada whi le denouncing the evils of Communism. Many joined the already-existing Czechoslovak National Alliance, which was originally founded in 1939 and went through many name-changes until it finally became the Czech and Slovak Association of Canada in 1995, reflecting the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Raska admitted that a majority of its members were Czechs, although it also contained a minority of Slovaks who subscribed to the "Czechoslovak" philosophy. The Czechoslovak National Alliance eventually headquartered itself in Toronto, which contained the largest concentration of Czechs. In 1944 its members bought an old skating rink , which they converted into Masaryk Hall , which eventually became the Masaryk Memorial Insti tute and in 1948 they also bought 64 acres of farmland which they turned into Masaryktown . These two institutions became the center of Czech life and activities in Canada. The three post-war waves of Czechs, according to Raska, pursued three main activities. They were ardent anti-Communists, who denounced this political system at every tum. They helped fellow-refugees establish themselves in Canada. They promoted various "Czechoslovak" causes, either through publications, radio programs, television, "Czechoslovak" days, lobbying Canadian politicians, �SLOVAKIA 2021 159 denouncing the Czechoslovak government for various extortion schemes and so on . They also established "Czechoslovak" schools and even subsidized a Chair in Czechoslovak Studies at the University of Toronto from 1968 to 1971, much to the annoyance of Canadian Slovaks. However, Raska admits that the Czechs were not as nationalist as the Slovaks and their eager pursuit of the middle-class life led to a rapid decline in the membership of the Czechoslovak National Alliance from a high of I 0,000 in 1945 to a mere 1,485 in 1974. He does not give their numbers in 2018, which this reviewer suspects is much lower. This book is a welcome addition to our store of knowledge about Canada's ethnic groups. Raska mined the National Archives of Canada, the archives of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, various oral history collections, Czech and other newspapers and a broad range of secondary sources in order to tell his story. He is only the second professional historian to study the Czechs in Canada. The first was Mark Jovanovic. Both are my former students, of whom I am very proud. Miroslav Londak, Slavomir Michalek a kolektiv . Dubcek. Bratislava : VEDA & Historicky ustav SAV, 2018, 532 pp. Illustrated, list of abbreviations, bibliography, name index. MARTY MANOR MULLINS Flathead Valley Community College, Kalispell, Montana The politician Alexander Dubcek recalls many things to those familiar with his place in history. Most notably he stood at the helm as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the late I 960s as he tried to steer the country towards a kinder, gentler socialism. The eyes of the world were upon him to see if the experiment within the communist sphere would be tolerated by Moscow or again forcibly crushed as had happened to Hungary in 1956. As a result of the extremely popular I 968 ' Prague Spring"' reform period within Czechoslovakia, many Czechs and Slovaks (not to mention those outside the region) remember him fondly. But historians and even Czech �160 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Slovak compatriots have not always been kind in their evaluations of Dubcek . This latest biography of Dubcek endeavors to take a measured, scientific look at his life and achievements by situating them in historical context. Rather than evaluating Dubcek based on his decisions at specific moments, this tome provides a comprehensive look at the experiences, from cradle to grave, that shaped him. It seeks to illuminate the complexity of the times in which he acted and avoids the tendency to anachronistically judge him according to our own times. Dubcek achieves this aim in part due to the structure of the book. By commissioning an all-star team of Slovak and Czech scholars to engage with the latest research , including archival findings , this anthology builds upon itself, resulting in a wide-ranging view of the critical years in postwar Czechoslovak history, which parallels Dubcek's lifespan ( 1921-1992). This format a lso sidesteps the trap of assessing a biographical subject too-favorably. All in all , this study represents a noteworthy contribution to what we know about Dubcek as a person and a politician while also shedding light onto ongoing historical debates. The text elucidates questions such as how did a little-known Slovak rise to Party power so quickly; what was the nature of his relationship with predecessor Antonin Novotny; did Dubcek know about the imminent Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20, 1968 ; what were the planning stages of the invitation to the Soviets to invade Czechos lovakia (the text evidences insight into a July 20-21 meeting at Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar's Lake Balaton estate); where and how did that 'invitation' occur; why was the United States' Johnson administration so reticent to support Dubcek's reform measures and to confront the USSR after the invasion; why did so few Slovak delegates attend the secret Vysocany Congress of August 22, 1968; what did the Kremlin so fear that it a ll owed Dubcek to remain in office in the months following the Warsaw Pact invasion ; how did Dubcek and leading dissident Vaclav Havel estimate each other from their first meeting in July 1968 to the late 1980s just before the Velvet Revolution? Perhaps the biggest question the book addresses (albeit indirectly) is the degree to which Dubcek was or was not trying to alter communist dogma and policy in Czechos lovakia. How much of a 'reformer' was he? The text helps answer this question by compiling and even revealing direct quotations from decisive exchanges between Dubcek and key figures such as Novotny and U.S.S.R. Party Boss Leonid �SLOVAKIA 2021 161 Brezhnev at critical moments. This historical viewpoint allows the reader to appraise Dubcek for himself within a contextual framework that draws upon past and present research . It also provides perspective into Dubcek's role in Slovak history. This is significant as Dubcek ranks among the most influential Slovaks in the history of the nation. The reader learns of Dubcek's mission in the early I 960s to put Slovakia on equal administrative and economic footing with the Czech Lands after decades of failed Stalinist industrial policies in Slovakia since the 1948 communist coup. Responding to the growing unrest in Slovakia as expressed by local economists, journalists and the relocation of Slovak workers to the Czech Lands in the I 960s, Dubcek effectively made the Slovak case to the leadership in Prague in a way that others had not succeeded in doing. He also refused to back down from Novotny (as revealed in their exchanges) when Novotny attempted to brush aside the issue as well as calls for federalization of the country. Ultimately, federalization was achieved in October 1968, despite the Soviet invasion two months earlier. Yet Dubcek was not antagonistic against the Czechs or their economic advantages. As Presidium member in the pre-Prague Spring era, one of his two goals was to restore the Czech-Slovak relationship; the other was to discover a moderate approach to socialism. It was his genius in building consensus rather than dictating policy that helps explain the persuasiveness of his programs. The book does a good job of not only examining Dubcek's achievements but of providing insight into him as a person, explaining how an unlikely character from a modest background catapulted into the limelight in Prague and beyond. For example, the reader learns of his parents' socialist pedigree (which extended from their time as persecuted leftist laborers in Chicago), his thirteen years growing up in Kyrgyzstan and the U.S.S.R . during the most repressive years of Stalinism, his being wounded twice in the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, and his return to study in Moscow in the mid- l 950s during General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's crimes. All of these occurrences forged the stance he was to take as a socialist leader. The book is well-written and is not just for academics but for anyone who is curious to learn the behind-the-scenes drama between �162 SLOVAKIA 2021 political actors at critical moments in the Cold War era. The quotations from phone calls (such as that of August 13 , 1968 between Dubcek and Brezhnev) and official internal memos and memoirs are the most intriguing. However, it was disappointing that while such quotations are listed as footnotes , there is no corresponding bibliographical entry to aid a researcher in finding the exact sources of these important conversations. The bibliography lists only the names of the archives and the relevant collections as well as a selection of secondary sources. Nevertheless, this soundly-researched biography affords scholars and laypeople alike a single volume in which to delve deeper into the times and person of Alexander Dubcek. Miroslav Moj zita. Knai ko. Demes, Knai ko: Formovanie slovenskej diplomacie v rokoch /990 ai 1993. Ustav politickych vied SAY: VEDA, vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 2019, 223 pp. Forewords to the first and second editions, selected articles by the author, list of Slovak diplomats and embassies (January 1993), photographs, afterword, author information, English summary. JURAJ HOCMAN Independent Scholar Miroslav Moj z ita ' s diplomatic career started in the mid- I 970s and continued throughout the 1980s during the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, including two successive postings to China and India. Prior to the split of the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic , Mojzita had opted for the nascent Slovak Foreign Service. In the early 1990s, he played a crucia l role in founding the Slovak Ministry for International Relations and in its gradua l transformation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the independent Slovak Republic as of January I, 1993 . Mojzita ' s book on the formative years of Slovak diplomacy originally appeared in 2004, when Slovakia entered the European Union. In 20 19 it was re-published to provide a new generation with another opportunity to recollect the past and to contemplate the validity of the author 's previous observations and conclusions. The difference between the two editions is marginal. The second edition contains minor additions, such as another Foreword. The core �SLOVAKIA 2021 163 of the text has remained unchanged. Apparently, the primary motive for the second edition was to replenish empty shelves in bookstores. The book 's main quality is its undisputed and lasting authenticity. Based upon the author ' s first-hand experience, it delivers a Slovak perspective on key events which took place during the difficult time when a young democracy and its foreign service were born. Such books are still rare in modem Slovak historiography. What makes the book· s second edition interesting is its external context. When Slovakia eventually caught up with the rest of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) on the challenging journey to fullfledged membership within NATO (2003) and the EU, readers of the first edition, unfamiliar with Slovak history, might have wondered how a tiny and allegedly non-historic state, burdened with a rural past, persistent parochialism, a legacy of obsolete heavy industries and an overall inflexible communist economy, managed to finish the race to the EU with its peers. The same was true for the incipient Slovak Foreign Service. Of the book's three chapters, the first two are dedicated to the creation and shaping of the Slovak Ministry for International Relations, which existed from 1990 to 1992 parallel with the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic . The third chapter covers the first year of the existence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Moj zita paints an accurate picture of an institution which gradually came to life through the activities of personalities from various professions and with various backgrounds, even of those whose past contained shadows and raised eyebrows . Mojzita logically scrutinized the relations of Slovakia with neighbouring countries, particularly with the Czech Repubic and Hungary, in the first place. He provided personal and professional characteristics, as well as the style of work , of the first two heads of the Slovak Foreign Service, Pavo! Demes, a young and talented biologist, and Milan Knazko, an accomplished actor. The latter had publicly snubbed the former communist regime and was one of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution in Slovakia. Knazko became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the independent Slovak Republic. The tone of the publication is sober and balanced. When referring to the birth of independent Slovakia and its acceptance into �164 SLOVAKIA 2021 the United Nations and other key organizations, the book becomes moderately celebratory, and deservedly so. To the author ·s credit, he does not skip the errors and mistakes made by the Ministry that stemmed from inexperience and the overzealousness of its staff. Mojzita's literary style is far from dry or didactic, as his method of diplomatic reporting and political ana lysis is subtly complemented with vivid depictions and flairs of reported events. Since its birth, the Slovak diplomatic service had produced internationally recognized figures. Jan Kubis and Miroslav Lajcak, the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, gained rich experiences and good reputations while working with the UN, the OSCE and other international organizations. They were not alone. From the late 1990s onward, Slovak diplomats responded to the calls of the international community and became active in the first line of contact in many conflict-management and confidence-building missions carried out under the aegis of international organizations, particularly in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their accomplishments can be traced back to the early 1990s and to the building of the fundamentals of the Slovak diplomatic service by devoted and patriotic professionals. This is a comprehensive, critical , we ll-documented and wel l-integrated scholarly monograph on modem Slovak diplomacy. Whereas the first edition appeared as a va luab le and laudable step in the right direction, its second edition is more than a reprint of a once pioneering publication . It should serve as an impulse for a subsequent book, detailing the history of the Slovak Foreign Service to the present day . � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 2021 151 Diana Duchonova. Palatin Mikulas Esterhazy. Dvorska spolocnost' a aristokraticka kai dodennost'. Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2017. 558pp. Illustrated, bibliography, name and place index. (Baron) PETER MA.RlA.SSY Kosice, Slovak Republic This publication is an attempt to present the daily life of Hungarian aristocratic society in the 16 th century through the central character of Palatine Mikulas Esterhazy. The book is divided into three main chapters reflecting the origin and the rise of the Esterhazy family , then the place of his court as a social system, and the rituals of everyday life at his court. The Esterhazy family rose to prominence in the Kingdom of Hungary after the Battle of Mohacs ( 1526). After this disastrous battle with the Turks, the Kingdom was divided into the northwest part (today's Slovakia and western Hungary) under the rule of the Habsburgs, the central part under the control of the Turks and the eastern part (Transylvania), as a vassal province of the Ottoman Empire. At this time Hungary witnessed the arrival of the "Homo novus" Esterhazy family , which originated in the town of Galanta, in Upper Hungary (Slovakia), and whose leader Mikulas eventually became the ruling Palatine of Hungary. This chapter gives a detailed overview of the political situation in the country, but without proper graphs depicting spheres of influence in the given period. The same is true of the examination of the Esterhazy family and their relatives, presenting only the sources that would have demanded not a convoluted but coherent processing of the central person's pedigree, that of Mikulas, but also the family tree's extent as a result of several marriages and family tragedies. In the chapter on the Palatine's court as a social system, the author makes countless references to the functioning of the court, to its members or participants, the Palatine's office and instructions to his Chief Steward. In addition, she refers to rewards, to various craftsmen, as necessary parts of the court, which reflected the sovereignty of the court and, thus, a manifestation of the status of the leader of the Hungarian aristocracy at that time. As in the first chapter, the reader ts inundated with detailed descriptions, instructions and �152 SLOVAKIA 2021 responsibilities of the people in vo lved. The secti ons dea ling wi th salari es and rewards are prese nted onl y from three sources and cannot be considered as representative of the who le court. The map provided definitely fa ils to give a comprehensive overv iew of the scope and possess ions of th e Esterh azys in today's Hungary, Austri a, Slovaki a, Romani a and Ukra ine. All of thi s is made worse by Slovaki zing th e names of the Esterhazys throughout the tex t (e.g. Mikul as instead of Miklos). The third chapter di sc uss ing the everyday rituals of ari stocracy in the Pa latine court is closest to th e dec lared intenti on of the auth or to prov ide a picture of the court of Hungari an hi gh nobility. The ritua ls themselves represent the kind of a system whi ch, if respected, creates certain frameworks of recurring events in the areas of educati on, everyday tas ks, social events, manag in g foreign relati ons, marri ages, hea lth care of fa mil y members, including fun eral s, wheth er becau se of the death of children, wives and espec iall y male descendants of the fa mil y who di ed in th e Turkish wars. In additi on to often very detail ed sources, the chapter lacks order, a labe l and , where appropriate, the dec ision-making key, especiall y when sol ving de li cate events, including the in carcerati on of one of the w ives of th e Palatine. My bi ggest reservati on about thi s chapter is th at it should not end w ith sad pictures of the liquidati o n of their last resting places. Instead, it should conc lude with a summ ary of the personal, organi zati onal, as we ll as po litica l skill s of th e Esterhazys which should secure the ex istence of thi s hi ghl y- respected famil y today and over the centuri es. In conclusion, by introducing a huge number of sources in thi s book without their subsequent process ing into maps, graphs, fa mil y trees, or tables, or even algorithm s, makes thi s publicati on access ible only to the profess ional or know ledgeable reader but not to the general public. For thi s reason, it is a mere compilati on of sources processed into three re lated but generally rather separate topics whi ch could in the end fo rm three separate publicati ons. �SLOVAKIA 2021 153 Zora Mintalova Zubercova. Ako sme kedysi i ili: Obrazky kai dodenneho i ivota nasich predkov. Bratislava. Slovart, 20 I 7. 327pp. Illustrations, definitions, bibliography. LENKA STOLARIK Carleton University Specialists in social history have long awaited this book. Zora Mintalova Zubercova has given us a very detailed description of how Slovaks lived in the past 200 years. She utilized the findings of, not only recent historians such as Anton Spiesz ( 1930-1993), but also the writings of early 19 th century observers of Slovak life such as the Lutheran pastor and national revivalist Ladislav Bartholomeides ( 1754-1825). The latter wrote a monograph in Latin on Gerner County ( 1806-1808) in which he described in great detail the daily life and customs of the local Slovaks. In addition , she consulted similar works by Baron Alojz Mednansky ( 17841844 ), the Lutheran pastor Samuel Kollar ( 1769- I 83 I), and the ethnographer-national revivalist Jan Caplovic ( 1780- I 84 7), among others. Mintalova Zubercova covered daily life in all regions of Slovakia, as well as in its villages and cities. She described people 's dress, their housing, furniture, cooking, religious holidays, marriage, birth and death rituals, the raising and care of animals, village and city governance, farming and crafts practices, folk proverbs and songs. She also contrasted city with country life, the daily life of the gentry versus the peasantry, rich and poor. She took her story into the mid-twentieth century, when Slovaks began to move in great numbers into the cities, looking for work. Since Mintalova Zubercova was trained as an ethnographer, she left out what historians normally include in their works . Thus, when she cites the books of the authors mentioned above, even when she directly quotes from them , she neglects to provide us with footnotes . It is, therefore, impossible to look up her quotations and to seek further information from her sources. She also fails to list their works in her bibliography, which makes me suspect that she did not cite from their original books, but from second-hand sources. Furthermore, she did not include an Index to her book, whether of names, places or �154 SLOVAKIA 2021 concepts. This makes it difficult to look up and compare the cultures of northern , southern and eastern Slovakia. In spite of these shortcomings, those of us who were raised by parents born and educated in Slovakia will recognize many of the customs and traditions described by the author. Unfortunately, many such traditions are fading into insignificance as the Slovaks urbanize and westernize. I, for one, am very grateful to Zubercova Mintalova for having captured our ancestors' "world of the past." Daniela Kodajova et al. Zivena: 150 rokov Spolku slovenskych i ien. Bratislava: Slovart, 20 19. 304 pp. Bibliography, photographs, abbreviations, biographic index. EDITA BOSAK Memorial University of Newfoundland A foreword by the actress-diplomat Magda Vasaryova introduces the reader to a much-needed history of the first Slovak women's organ ization - Zivena. This collection of essays, edited by Daniela Kodajova, was published on the I 50 th anniversary of the founding of Zivena in Turciansky Svaty Martin on 4 August 1869. Dr. Kodajova and her col leagues introduce readers to some we ll-known, and some lesser-known, members of the Slovak intelligentsia of the late nineteenth century, who were instrumental in the founding and the running of this organization. This collection of essays details Zivena's cultural and educational activities from its earliest days to the present. The initial impetus for the creation of Zivena came from the male leadership of the Slovak national movement based in Turc. Sv. Martin . Ambro Pietor, who had studied law in Prague at Charles University, had witnessed the existence and successfu l work of Czech women's organizations in the Czech national movement. Upon graduation he returned to Martin with his observations and imparted these to fellowSlovak nationalists. These gentlemen came to view the women in their own circles not just as cooks, wives, homemakers and mothers, but as the keys to nurturing and educating Slovak children in the Slovak national spirit, the Slovak language and thus thwarting the efforts of the magyarizing goals of the Hungarian government which had steadi ly increased since its Compromise with the Habsburgs in 1867. The �SLOVAKIA 2021 155 nationalists were convinced that safeguarding and further developing the Slovak national movement meant encouraging Slovak mothers to teach their children the Slovak language and to share their knowledge of Slovak culture and customs, because otherwise the Magyar school system would eventually destroy Slovak identity. The organizers of Zivena arranged for membership dues to be sent directly to Matica slovenska (the Slovak national, cultural and literary organization based in Martin) or to trusted members of the Slovak national movement. Thus, Kodajova points out that Zivena was effectively linked to the Slovak national movement from its inception . Slovak female writers became active members of Zivena. They were well versed on the views of western philosophers like John Stuart Mill and so, through their own writings, they tried to draw attention to the inequalities which Slovak girls and women faced in society. Most of these writers came from the Slovak Lutheran middle-class, from Lutheran ministers ' families or well-educated families . Through Zivena they sought to establish a school of higher education for peasant and working-class women and girls. Unfortunately, the Hungarian government steadfastly refused to permit the establishment of such an institution . Dr. Kodajova points out that Ambro Pietor figured prominently, not only in establishing Zivena, but also in serving as its first secretary for a number of years. The first president was Anna Pivkova, the wife of one of Martin's prominent lawyers Ambroz Pivko. Elected for a three-year term, she actually served for twenty-five years due to the political situation in Hungary. The forced closure of Matica slovenska in 1875 by the government of Hungary meant that Zivena now took on the responsibility of holding the annual August nationalist assemblies to allow nationalists of both sexes to gather and discuss the political situation. This chapter also notes that a sister Zivena was established in America, which thrived and financially supported the mother organization in Slovakia. In the following chapter on coordinating nationalism with "conservative feminism ," Dr. K. Holly points out that Zivena was viewed in the 1890s as a dead organization. Its vice-president Elena Mar6thy-Soltesova wrote to her Czech friend and counterpart Yilma Sokolova �156 SLOVAKIA 2021 in 1891 lamenting the organization's lack of activity and failure to achieve any of its goa ls, other than publishing two Almanacs, financially supporting poor Slovak girls, and financing an exhibition of Slovak national dress and embroideries in Prague. The organization and its women were hampered by the very conservative nationalists in Martin, especially the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky. This chapter does much to shed light on the views of the male Slovak nationalists on the role of Zivena, and the place of women in the Slovak national movement. Slovak women were not expected to have opinions or to express them. The following chapters by Ors. G. Dudekova Kovacova, J. Hodolicova, I. Hajducekova, A. Falisova, and A. Bucekova are dedicated to the growth of .Zivena in terms of new chapters and members wherever Slovak women lived - the Hungarian Lowlands and Slovenia - both before and after the end of the Habsburg Monarchy. Dr. Hodolicova writes about the success of Slovak women in Slovenia in establishing a journal despite the magyarizing policies of the government. She points out that Zivena managed to survive the discriminatory policies of the Hungarian government vis-a-vis ethnic minorities by declaring their official name to be Zivena, "a charitable association of Slovak women" rather than its true name "the organization of Slovak women" which would have been viewed suspiciously by the government as an example of pan-Slavi sm. With the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and the creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 191 8, Dr. Hajducekova describes in detail how Zivena was able to thrive. It established chapters throughout Slovakia, and began the work of founding a girls' school. It also regularly published a journal , and created a platform where women could discuss how they viewed their role in civil society, marriage and the familyin other words their emancipation. Dr. A. Falisova's chapter discusses the activity of Zivena in the area of social work and health . Zivena cooperated with the Czechoslovak Red Cross in Prague to establish the Institute of Milan Rastislav Stefanik, which was to educate female social and health workers. They successfully sought guidance from American schools and financial support from the Slovak League of America. In the last chapter Dr. Bucekova highlights the activities of Zivena after 1989 - its rebirth with the end of Communism. After 1948 the Communists had dissolved the Society and confiscated its property. �SLOVAKIA 2021 157 Now its property was returned, albeit in a rather sad state of disrepair. Nevertheless, Slovaks from all walks of life rallied to fund the reconstruction of the building, which is now well on its way. As it completes repairs , Zivena has re-introduced cultural activities, a music school, and now houses the archives of Jana Cigara. Its intentions are to fulfill its original role as that of an educational institution. Its program is aimed at fulfilling the needs of modem young women. This edited collection celebrating the existence of Zivena is a significant and welcome contribution to our understanding of the Slovak women's movement, to the Slovak struggle for national survival, to its achievements in a democratic Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1939, and then its struggle to survive during the fascist period, and finally the communist regime. This volume is a labour of love, for its contributors are university graduates, researchers and academics who have studied the topic and published on it in a variety of journals both academic and popular. Moreover, two of them have a vested interest in seeing Zivena continue to prosper and educate young women. Magda Vasaryova is the national president and Alena Bucekova is the president of the Bratislava chapter. This work deserves the attention and careful study by scholars of the Habsburg Monarchy and of modem-day Slovakia. Jan Raska. Czech Reji,gees in Cold War Canada. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 20 I 8. xii-307pp. Illustrated, notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Despite its title, this book also deals with Slovaks and "Czechoslovaks" in Canada. It is a thoroughly-revised Ph .D. dissertation accepted by the University of Waterloo in Ontario. It gives a very good over-view of Czech and "Czechoslovak" immigrants to Canada after World War II and their goals and aspirations. Raska 's approach is chronological. He first mentions that before World War I, a few thousand Czech immigrants came to Canada largely from the United States to either farm on the Prairies or to work �158 SLOVAKIA 2021 in the coal mines of the West. In this regard they behaved like the Slovaks, who also moved from the USA to Canada at that time for the same reasons. After the Great War, however, far more Slovaks than Czechs (39,652 versus 5,176) moved to Canada, largely to the industrial centers of Ontario and Quebec. After World War II , 36,531 "Czechoslovaks" emigrated to Canada, largely in three waves: 19481951 ; I 968-69 and in the I 970's and I 980's. Unfortunately, the Canadian government did not differentiate between Czechs and Slovaks after World War II. According to the 2016 Census of Canada, when the government did differentiate between the two groups, it counted I 04,680 persons of partial Czech heritage and 72,290 people of partial Slovak heritage. Unfortunately, 40,7 15 persons declared themselves of"Czechoslovak" heritage and it is impossible to tell to which groups they belonged. In any case, Raska then focused on the three main groups of Czech refugees, the I 948ers, the I 968ers, and subsequent refugees. He pointed out that the I 948ers and I 968ers were very similar to each other because they were mostly highly-educated professionals who aspired to a middle-class life in Canada whi le denouncing the evils of Communism. Many joined the already-existing Czechoslovak National Alliance, which was originally founded in 1939 and went through many name-changes until it finally became the Czech and Slovak Association of Canada in 1995, reflecting the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Raska admitted that a majority of its members were Czechs, although it also contained a minority of Slovaks who subscribed to the "Czechoslovak" philosophy. The Czechoslovak National Alliance eventually headquartered itself in Toronto, which contained the largest concentration of Czechs. In 1944 its members bought an old skating rink , which they converted into Masaryk Hall , which eventually became the Masaryk Memorial Insti tute and in 1948 they also bought 64 acres of farmland which they turned into Masaryktown . These two institutions became the center of Czech life and activities in Canada. The three post-war waves of Czechs, according to Raska, pursued three main activities. They were ardent anti-Communists, who denounced this political system at every tum. They helped fellow-refugees establish themselves in Canada. They promoted various "Czechoslovak" causes, either through publications, radio programs, television, "Czechoslovak" days, lobbying Canadian politicians, �SLOVAKIA 2021 159 denouncing the Czechoslovak government for various extortion schemes and so on . They also established "Czechoslovak" schools and even subsidized a Chair in Czechoslovak Studies at the University of Toronto from 1968 to 1971, much to the annoyance of Canadian Slovaks. However, Raska admits that the Czechs were not as nationalist as the Slovaks and their eager pursuit of the middle-class life led to a rapid decline in the membership of the Czechoslovak National Alliance from a high of I 0,000 in 1945 to a mere 1,485 in 1974. He does not give their numbers in 2018, which this reviewer suspects is much lower. This book is a welcome addition to our store of knowledge about Canada's ethnic groups. Raska mined the National Archives of Canada, the archives of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, various oral history collections, Czech and other newspapers and a broad range of secondary sources in order to tell his story. He is only the second professional historian to study the Czechs in Canada. The first was Mark Jovanovic. Both are my former students, of whom I am very proud. Miroslav Londak, Slavomir Michalek a kolektiv . Dubcek. Bratislava : VEDA & Historicky ustav SAV, 2018, 532 pp. Illustrated, list of abbreviations, bibliography, name index. MARTY MANOR MULLINS Flathead Valley Community College, Kalispell, Montana The politician Alexander Dubcek recalls many things to those familiar with his place in history. Most notably he stood at the helm as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the late I 960s as he tried to steer the country towards a kinder, gentler socialism. The eyes of the world were upon him to see if the experiment within the communist sphere would be tolerated by Moscow or again forcibly crushed as had happened to Hungary in 1956. As a result of the extremely popular I 968 ' Prague Spring"' reform period within Czechoslovakia, many Czechs and Slovaks (not to mention those outside the region) remember him fondly. But historians and even Czech �160 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Slovak compatriots have not always been kind in their evaluations of Dubcek . This latest biography of Dubcek endeavors to take a measured, scientific look at his life and achievements by situating them in historical context. Rather than evaluating Dubcek based on his decisions at specific moments, this tome provides a comprehensive look at the experiences, from cradle to grave, that shaped him. It seeks to illuminate the complexity of the times in which he acted and avoids the tendency to anachronistically judge him according to our own times. Dubcek achieves this aim in part due to the structure of the book. By commissioning an all-star team of Slovak and Czech scholars to engage with the latest research , including archival findings , this anthology builds upon itself, resulting in a wide-ranging view of the critical years in postwar Czechoslovak history, which parallels Dubcek's lifespan ( 1921-1992). This format a lso sidesteps the trap of assessing a biographical subject too-favorably. All in all , this study represents a noteworthy contribution to what we know about Dubcek as a person and a politician while also shedding light onto ongoing historical debates. The text elucidates questions such as how did a little-known Slovak rise to Party power so quickly; what was the nature of his relationship with predecessor Antonin Novotny; did Dubcek know about the imminent Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20, 1968 ; what were the planning stages of the invitation to the Soviets to invade Czechos lovakia (the text evidences insight into a July 20-21 meeting at Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar's Lake Balaton estate); where and how did that 'invitation' occur; why was the United States' Johnson administration so reticent to support Dubcek's reform measures and to confront the USSR after the invasion; why did so few Slovak delegates attend the secret Vysocany Congress of August 22, 1968; what did the Kremlin so fear that it a ll owed Dubcek to remain in office in the months following the Warsaw Pact invasion ; how did Dubcek and leading dissident Vaclav Havel estimate each other from their first meeting in July 1968 to the late 1980s just before the Velvet Revolution? Perhaps the biggest question the book addresses (albeit indirectly) is the degree to which Dubcek was or was not trying to alter communist dogma and policy in Czechos lovakia. How much of a 'reformer' was he? The text helps answer this question by compiling and even revealing direct quotations from decisive exchanges between Dubcek and key figures such as Novotny and U.S.S.R. Party Boss Leonid �SLOVAKIA 2021 161 Brezhnev at critical moments. This historical viewpoint allows the reader to appraise Dubcek for himself within a contextual framework that draws upon past and present research . It also provides perspective into Dubcek's role in Slovak history. This is significant as Dubcek ranks among the most influential Slovaks in the history of the nation. The reader learns of Dubcek's mission in the early I 960s to put Slovakia on equal administrative and economic footing with the Czech Lands after decades of failed Stalinist industrial policies in Slovakia since the 1948 communist coup. Responding to the growing unrest in Slovakia as expressed by local economists, journalists and the relocation of Slovak workers to the Czech Lands in the I 960s, Dubcek effectively made the Slovak case to the leadership in Prague in a way that others had not succeeded in doing. He also refused to back down from Novotny (as revealed in their exchanges) when Novotny attempted to brush aside the issue as well as calls for federalization of the country. Ultimately, federalization was achieved in October 1968, despite the Soviet invasion two months earlier. Yet Dubcek was not antagonistic against the Czechs or their economic advantages. As Presidium member in the pre-Prague Spring era, one of his two goals was to restore the Czech-Slovak relationship; the other was to discover a moderate approach to socialism. It was his genius in building consensus rather than dictating policy that helps explain the persuasiveness of his programs. The book does a good job of not only examining Dubcek's achievements but of providing insight into him as a person, explaining how an unlikely character from a modest background catapulted into the limelight in Prague and beyond. For example, the reader learns of his parents' socialist pedigree (which extended from their time as persecuted leftist laborers in Chicago), his thirteen years growing up in Kyrgyzstan and the U.S.S.R . during the most repressive years of Stalinism, his being wounded twice in the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, and his return to study in Moscow in the mid- l 950s during General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's crimes. All of these occurrences forged the stance he was to take as a socialist leader. The book is well-written and is not just for academics but for anyone who is curious to learn the behind-the-scenes drama between �162 SLOVAKIA 2021 political actors at critical moments in the Cold War era. The quotations from phone calls (such as that of August 13 , 1968 between Dubcek and Brezhnev) and official internal memos and memoirs are the most intriguing. However, it was disappointing that while such quotations are listed as footnotes , there is no corresponding bibliographical entry to aid a researcher in finding the exact sources of these important conversations. The bibliography lists only the names of the archives and the relevant collections as well as a selection of secondary sources. Nevertheless, this soundly-researched biography affords scholars and laypeople alike a single volume in which to delve deeper into the times and person of Alexander Dubcek. Miroslav Moj zita. Knai ko. Demes, Knai ko: Formovanie slovenskej diplomacie v rokoch /990 ai 1993. Ustav politickych vied SAY: VEDA, vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 2019, 223 pp. Forewords to the first and second editions, selected articles by the author, list of Slovak diplomats and embassies (January 1993), photographs, afterword, author information, English summary. JURAJ HOCMAN Independent Scholar Miroslav Moj z ita ' s diplomatic career started in the mid- I 970s and continued throughout the 1980s during the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, including two successive postings to China and India. Prior to the split of the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic , Mojzita had opted for the nascent Slovak Foreign Service. In the early 1990s, he played a crucia l role in founding the Slovak Ministry for International Relations and in its gradua l transformation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the independent Slovak Republic as of January I, 1993 . Mojzita ' s book on the formative years of Slovak diplomacy originally appeared in 2004, when Slovakia entered the European Union. In 20 19 it was re-published to provide a new generation with another opportunity to recollect the past and to contemplate the validity of the author 's previous observations and conclusions. The difference between the two editions is marginal. The second edition contains minor additions, such as another Foreword. The core �SLOVAKIA 2021 163 of the text has remained unchanged. Apparently, the primary motive for the second edition was to replenish empty shelves in bookstores. The book 's main quality is its undisputed and lasting authenticity. Based upon the author ' s first-hand experience, it delivers a Slovak perspective on key events which took place during the difficult time when a young democracy and its foreign service were born. Such books are still rare in modem Slovak historiography. What makes the book· s second edition interesting is its external context. When Slovakia eventually caught up with the rest of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) on the challenging journey to fullfledged membership within NATO (2003) and the EU, readers of the first edition, unfamiliar with Slovak history, might have wondered how a tiny and allegedly non-historic state, burdened with a rural past, persistent parochialism, a legacy of obsolete heavy industries and an overall inflexible communist economy, managed to finish the race to the EU with its peers. The same was true for the incipient Slovak Foreign Service. Of the book's three chapters, the first two are dedicated to the creation and shaping of the Slovak Ministry for International Relations, which existed from 1990 to 1992 parallel with the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic . The third chapter covers the first year of the existence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Moj zita paints an accurate picture of an institution which gradually came to life through the activities of personalities from various professions and with various backgrounds, even of those whose past contained shadows and raised eyebrows . Mojzita logically scrutinized the relations of Slovakia with neighbouring countries, particularly with the Czech Repubic and Hungary, in the first place. He provided personal and professional characteristics, as well as the style of work , of the first two heads of the Slovak Foreign Service, Pavo! Demes, a young and talented biologist, and Milan Knazko, an accomplished actor. The latter had publicly snubbed the former communist regime and was one of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution in Slovakia. Knazko became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the independent Slovak Republic. The tone of the publication is sober and balanced. When referring to the birth of independent Slovakia and its acceptance into �164 SLOVAKIA 2021 the United Nations and other key organizations, the book becomes moderately celebratory, and deservedly so. To the author ·s credit, he does not skip the errors and mistakes made by the Ministry that stemmed from inexperience and the overzealousness of its staff. Mojzita's literary style is far from dry or didactic, as his method of diplomatic reporting and political ana lysis is subtly complemented with vivid depictions and flairs of reported events. Since its birth, the Slovak diplomatic service had produced internationally recognized figures. Jan Kubis and Miroslav Lajcak, the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, gained rich experiences and good reputations while working with the UN, the OSCE and other international organizations. They were not alone. From the late 1990s onward, Slovak diplomats responded to the calls of the international community and became active in the first line of contact in many conflict-management and confidence-building missions carried out under the aegis of international organizations, particularly in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their accomplishments can be traced back to the early 1990s and to the building of the fundamentals of the Slovak diplomatic service by devoted and patriotic professionals. This is a comprehensive, critical , we ll-documented and wel l-integrated scholarly monograph on modem Slovak diplomacy. Whereas the first edition appeared as a va luab le and laudable step in the right direction, its second edition is more than a reprint of a once pioneering publication . It should serve as an impulse for a subsequent book, detailing the history of the Slovak Foreign Service to the present day . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA 2021 151 Diana Duchonova. Palatin Mikulas Esterhazy. Dvorska spolocnost' a aristokraticka kai dodennost'. Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2017. 558pp. Illustrated, bibliography, name and place index. (Baron) PETER MA.RlA.SSY Kosice, Slovak Republic This publication is an attempt to present the daily life of Hungarian aristocratic society in the 16 th century through the central character of Palatine Mikulas Esterhazy. The book is divided into three main chapters reflecting the origin and the rise of the Esterhazy family , then the place of his court as a social system, and the rituals of everyday life at his court. The Esterhazy family rose to prominence in the Kingdom of Hungary after the Battle of Mohacs ( 1526). After this disastrous battle with the Turks, the Kingdom was divided into the northwest part (today's Slovakia and western Hungary) under the rule of the Habsburgs, the central part under the control of the Turks and the eastern part (Transylvania), as a vassal province of the Ottoman Empire. At this time Hungary witnessed the arrival of the "Homo novus" Esterhazy family , which originated in the town of Galanta, in Upper Hungary (Slovakia), and whose leader Mikulas eventually became the ruling Palatine of Hungary. This chapter gives a detailed overview of the political situation in the country, but without proper graphs depicting spheres of influence in the given period. The same is true of the examination of the Esterhazy family and their relatives, presenting only the sources that would have demanded not a convoluted but coherent processing of the central person's pedigree, that of Mikulas, but also the family tree's extent as a result of several marriages and family tragedies. In the chapter on the Palatine's court as a social system, the author makes countless references to the functioning of the court, to its members or participants, the Palatine's office and instructions to his Chief Steward. In addition, she refers to rewards, to various craftsmen, as necessary parts of the court, which reflected the sovereignty of the court and, thus, a manifestation of the status of the leader of the Hungarian aristocracy at that time. As in the first chapter, the reader ts inundated with detailed descriptions, instructions and 152 SLOVAKIA 2021 responsibilities of the people in vo lved. The secti ons dea ling wi th salari es and rewards are prese nted onl y from three sources and cannot be considered as representative of the who le court. The map provided definitely fa ils to give a comprehensive overv iew of the scope and possess ions of th e Esterh azys in today's Hungary, Austri a, Slovaki a, Romani a and Ukra ine. All of thi s is made worse by Slovaki zing th e names of the Esterhazys throughout the tex t (e.g. Mikul as instead of Miklos). The third chapter di sc uss ing the everyday rituals of ari stocracy in the Pa latine court is closest to th e dec lared intenti on of the auth or to prov ide a picture of the court of Hungari an hi gh nobility. The ritua ls themselves represent the kind of a system whi ch, if respected, creates certain frameworks of recurring events in the areas of educati on, everyday tas ks, social events, manag in g foreign relati ons, marri ages, hea lth care of fa mil y members, including fun eral s, wheth er becau se of the death of children, wives and espec iall y male descendants of the fa mil y who di ed in th e Turkish wars. In additi on to often very detail ed sources, the chapter lacks order, a labe l and , where appropriate, the dec ision-making key, especiall y when sol ving de li cate events, including the in carcerati on of one of the w ives of th e Palatine. My bi ggest reservati on about thi s chapter is th at it should not end w ith sad pictures of the liquidati o n of their last resting places. Instead, it should conc lude with a summ ary of the personal, organi zati onal, as we ll as po litica l skill s of th e Esterhazys which should secure the ex istence of thi s hi ghl y- respected famil y today and over the centuri es. In conclusion, by introducing a huge number of sources in thi s book without their subsequent process ing into maps, graphs, fa mil y trees, or tables, or even algorithm s, makes thi s publicati on access ible only to the profess ional or know ledgeable reader but not to the general public. For thi s reason, it is a mere compilati on of sources processed into three re lated but generally rather separate topics whi ch could in the end fo rm three separate publicati ons. SLOVAKIA 2021 153 Zora Mintalova Zubercova. Ako sme kedysi i ili: Obrazky kai dodenneho i ivota nasich predkov. Bratislava. Slovart, 20 I 7. 327pp. Illustrations, definitions, bibliography. LENKA STOLARIK Carleton University Specialists in social history have long awaited this book. Zora Mintalova Zubercova has given us a very detailed description of how Slovaks lived in the past 200 years. She utilized the findings of, not only recent historians such as Anton Spiesz ( 1930-1993), but also the writings of early 19 th century observers of Slovak life such as the Lutheran pastor and national revivalist Ladislav Bartholomeides ( 1754-1825). The latter wrote a monograph in Latin on Gerner County ( 1806-1808) in which he described in great detail the daily life and customs of the local Slovaks. In addition , she consulted similar works by Baron Alojz Mednansky ( 17841844 ), the Lutheran pastor Samuel Kollar ( 1769- I 83 I), and the ethnographer-national revivalist Jan Caplovic ( 1780- I 84 7), among others. Mintalova Zubercova covered daily life in all regions of Slovakia, as well as in its villages and cities. She described people 's dress, their housing, furniture, cooking, religious holidays, marriage, birth and death rituals, the raising and care of animals, village and city governance, farming and crafts practices, folk proverbs and songs. She also contrasted city with country life, the daily life of the gentry versus the peasantry, rich and poor. She took her story into the mid-twentieth century, when Slovaks began to move in great numbers into the cities, looking for work. Since Mintalova Zubercova was trained as an ethnographer, she left out what historians normally include in their works . Thus, when she cites the books of the authors mentioned above, even when she directly quotes from them , she neglects to provide us with footnotes . It is, therefore, impossible to look up her quotations and to seek further information from her sources. She also fails to list their works in her bibliography, which makes me suspect that she did not cite from their original books, but from second-hand sources. Furthermore, she did not include an Index to her book, whether of names, places or 154 SLOVAKIA 2021 concepts. This makes it difficult to look up and compare the cultures of northern , southern and eastern Slovakia. In spite of these shortcomings, those of us who were raised by parents born and educated in Slovakia will recognize many of the customs and traditions described by the author. Unfortunately, many such traditions are fading into insignificance as the Slovaks urbanize and westernize. I, for one, am very grateful to Zubercova Mintalova for having captured our ancestors' "world of the past." Daniela Kodajova et al. Zivena: 150 rokov Spolku slovenskych i ien. Bratislava: Slovart, 20 19. 304 pp. Bibliography, photographs, abbreviations, biographic index. EDITA BOSAK Memorial University of Newfoundland A foreword by the actress-diplomat Magda Vasaryova introduces the reader to a much-needed history of the first Slovak women's organ ization - Zivena. This collection of essays, edited by Daniela Kodajova, was published on the I 50 th anniversary of the founding of Zivena in Turciansky Svaty Martin on 4 August 1869. Dr. Kodajova and her col leagues introduce readers to some we ll-known, and some lesser-known, members of the Slovak intelligentsia of the late nineteenth century, who were instrumental in the founding and the running of this organization. This collection of essays details Zivena's cultural and educational activities from its earliest days to the present. The initial impetus for the creation of Zivena came from the male leadership of the Slovak national movement based in Turc. Sv. Martin . Ambro Pietor, who had studied law in Prague at Charles University, had witnessed the existence and successfu l work of Czech women's organizations in the Czech national movement. Upon graduation he returned to Martin with his observations and imparted these to fellowSlovak nationalists. These gentlemen came to view the women in their own circles not just as cooks, wives, homemakers and mothers, but as the keys to nurturing and educating Slovak children in the Slovak national spirit, the Slovak language and thus thwarting the efforts of the magyarizing goals of the Hungarian government which had steadi ly increased since its Compromise with the Habsburgs in 1867. The SLOVAKIA 2021 155 nationalists were convinced that safeguarding and further developing the Slovak national movement meant encouraging Slovak mothers to teach their children the Slovak language and to share their knowledge of Slovak culture and customs, because otherwise the Magyar school system would eventually destroy Slovak identity. The organizers of Zivena arranged for membership dues to be sent directly to Matica slovenska (the Slovak national, cultural and literary organization based in Martin) or to trusted members of the Slovak national movement. Thus, Kodajova points out that Zivena was effectively linked to the Slovak national movement from its inception . Slovak female writers became active members of Zivena. They were well versed on the views of western philosophers like John Stuart Mill and so, through their own writings, they tried to draw attention to the inequalities which Slovak girls and women faced in society. Most of these writers came from the Slovak Lutheran middle-class, from Lutheran ministers ' families or well-educated families . Through Zivena they sought to establish a school of higher education for peasant and working-class women and girls. Unfortunately, the Hungarian government steadfastly refused to permit the establishment of such an institution . Dr. Kodajova points out that Ambro Pietor figured prominently, not only in establishing Zivena, but also in serving as its first secretary for a number of years. The first president was Anna Pivkova, the wife of one of Martin's prominent lawyers Ambroz Pivko. Elected for a three-year term, she actually served for twenty-five years due to the political situation in Hungary. The forced closure of Matica slovenska in 1875 by the government of Hungary meant that Zivena now took on the responsibility of holding the annual August nationalist assemblies to allow nationalists of both sexes to gather and discuss the political situation. This chapter also notes that a sister Zivena was established in America, which thrived and financially supported the mother organization in Slovakia. In the following chapter on coordinating nationalism with "conservative feminism ," Dr. K. Holly points out that Zivena was viewed in the 1890s as a dead organization. Its vice-president Elena Mar6thy-Soltesova wrote to her Czech friend and counterpart Yilma Sokolova 156 SLOVAKIA 2021 in 1891 lamenting the organization's lack of activity and failure to achieve any of its goa ls, other than publishing two Almanacs, financially supporting poor Slovak girls, and financing an exhibition of Slovak national dress and embroideries in Prague. The organization and its women were hampered by the very conservative nationalists in Martin, especially the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky. This chapter does much to shed light on the views of the male Slovak nationalists on the role of Zivena, and the place of women in the Slovak national movement. Slovak women were not expected to have opinions or to express them. The following chapters by Ors. G. Dudekova Kovacova, J. Hodolicova, I. Hajducekova, A. Falisova, and A. Bucekova are dedicated to the growth of .Zivena in terms of new chapters and members wherever Slovak women lived - the Hungarian Lowlands and Slovenia - both before and after the end of the Habsburg Monarchy. Dr. Hodolicova writes about the success of Slovak women in Slovenia in establishing a journal despite the magyarizing policies of the government. She points out that Zivena managed to survive the discriminatory policies of the Hungarian government vis-a-vis ethnic minorities by declaring their official name to be Zivena, "a charitable association of Slovak women" rather than its true name "the organization of Slovak women" which would have been viewed suspiciously by the government as an example of pan-Slavi sm. With the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and the creation of Czecho-Slovakia in 191 8, Dr. Hajducekova describes in detail how Zivena was able to thrive. It established chapters throughout Slovakia, and began the work of founding a girls' school. It also regularly published a journal , and created a platform where women could discuss how they viewed their role in civil society, marriage and the familyin other words their emancipation. Dr. A. Falisova's chapter discusses the activity of Zivena in the area of social work and health . Zivena cooperated with the Czechoslovak Red Cross in Prague to establish the Institute of Milan Rastislav Stefanik, which was to educate female social and health workers. They successfully sought guidance from American schools and financial support from the Slovak League of America. In the last chapter Dr. Bucekova highlights the activities of Zivena after 1989 - its rebirth with the end of Communism. After 1948 the Communists had dissolved the Society and confiscated its property. SLOVAKIA 2021 157 Now its property was returned, albeit in a rather sad state of disrepair. Nevertheless, Slovaks from all walks of life rallied to fund the reconstruction of the building, which is now well on its way. As it completes repairs , Zivena has re-introduced cultural activities, a music school, and now houses the archives of Jana Cigara. Its intentions are to fulfill its original role as that of an educational institution. Its program is aimed at fulfilling the needs of modem young women. This edited collection celebrating the existence of Zivena is a significant and welcome contribution to our understanding of the Slovak women's movement, to the Slovak struggle for national survival, to its achievements in a democratic Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1939, and then its struggle to survive during the fascist period, and finally the communist regime. This volume is a labour of love, for its contributors are university graduates, researchers and academics who have studied the topic and published on it in a variety of journals both academic and popular. Moreover, two of them have a vested interest in seeing Zivena continue to prosper and educate young women. Magda Vasaryova is the national president and Alena Bucekova is the president of the Bratislava chapter. This work deserves the attention and careful study by scholars of the Habsburg Monarchy and of modem-day Slovakia. Jan Raska. Czech Reji,gees in Cold War Canada. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 20 I 8. xii-307pp. Illustrated, notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Despite its title, this book also deals with Slovaks and "Czechoslovaks" in Canada. It is a thoroughly-revised Ph .D. dissertation accepted by the University of Waterloo in Ontario. It gives a very good over-view of Czech and "Czechoslovak" immigrants to Canada after World War II and their goals and aspirations. Raska 's approach is chronological. He first mentions that before World War I, a few thousand Czech immigrants came to Canada largely from the United States to either farm on the Prairies or to work 158 SLOVAKIA 2021 in the coal mines of the West. In this regard they behaved like the Slovaks, who also moved from the USA to Canada at that time for the same reasons. After the Great War, however, far more Slovaks than Czechs (39,652 versus 5,176) moved to Canada, largely to the industrial centers of Ontario and Quebec. After World War II , 36,531 "Czechoslovaks" emigrated to Canada, largely in three waves: 19481951 ; I 968-69 and in the I 970's and I 980's. Unfortunately, the Canadian government did not differentiate between Czechs and Slovaks after World War II. According to the 2016 Census of Canada, when the government did differentiate between the two groups, it counted I 04,680 persons of partial Czech heritage and 72,290 people of partial Slovak heritage. Unfortunately, 40,7 15 persons declared themselves of"Czechoslovak" heritage and it is impossible to tell to which groups they belonged. In any case, Raska then focused on the three main groups of Czech refugees, the I 948ers, the I 968ers, and subsequent refugees. He pointed out that the I 948ers and I 968ers were very similar to each other because they were mostly highly-educated professionals who aspired to a middle-class life in Canada whi le denouncing the evils of Communism. Many joined the already-existing Czechoslovak National Alliance, which was originally founded in 1939 and went through many name-changes until it finally became the Czech and Slovak Association of Canada in 1995, reflecting the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Raska admitted that a majority of its members were Czechs, although it also contained a minority of Slovaks who subscribed to the "Czechoslovak" philosophy. The Czechoslovak National Alliance eventually headquartered itself in Toronto, which contained the largest concentration of Czechs. In 1944 its members bought an old skating rink , which they converted into Masaryk Hall , which eventually became the Masaryk Memorial Insti tute and in 1948 they also bought 64 acres of farmland which they turned into Masaryktown . These two institutions became the center of Czech life and activities in Canada. The three post-war waves of Czechs, according to Raska, pursued three main activities. They were ardent anti-Communists, who denounced this political system at every tum. They helped fellow-refugees establish themselves in Canada. They promoted various "Czechoslovak" causes, either through publications, radio programs, television, "Czechoslovak" days, lobbying Canadian politicians, SLOVAKIA 2021 159 denouncing the Czechoslovak government for various extortion schemes and so on . They also established "Czechoslovak" schools and even subsidized a Chair in Czechoslovak Studies at the University of Toronto from 1968 to 1971, much to the annoyance of Canadian Slovaks. However, Raska admits that the Czechs were not as nationalist as the Slovaks and their eager pursuit of the middle-class life led to a rapid decline in the membership of the Czechoslovak National Alliance from a high of I 0,000 in 1945 to a mere 1,485 in 1974. He does not give their numbers in 2018, which this reviewer suspects is much lower. This book is a welcome addition to our store of knowledge about Canada's ethnic groups. Raska mined the National Archives of Canada, the archives of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario, various oral history collections, Czech and other newspapers and a broad range of secondary sources in order to tell his story. He is only the second professional historian to study the Czechs in Canada. The first was Mark Jovanovic. Both are my former students, of whom I am very proud. Miroslav Londak, Slavomir Michalek a kolektiv . Dubcek. Bratislava : VEDA & Historicky ustav SAV, 2018, 532 pp. Illustrated, list of abbreviations, bibliography, name index. MARTY MANOR MULLINS Flathead Valley Community College, Kalispell, Montana The politician Alexander Dubcek recalls many things to those familiar with his place in history. Most notably he stood at the helm as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the late I 960s as he tried to steer the country towards a kinder, gentler socialism. The eyes of the world were upon him to see if the experiment within the communist sphere would be tolerated by Moscow or again forcibly crushed as had happened to Hungary in 1956. As a result of the extremely popular I 968 ' Prague Spring"' reform period within Czechoslovakia, many Czechs and Slovaks (not to mention those outside the region) remember him fondly. But historians and even Czech 160 SLOVAKIA 2021 and Slovak compatriots have not always been kind in their evaluations of Dubcek . This latest biography of Dubcek endeavors to take a measured, scientific look at his life and achievements by situating them in historical context. Rather than evaluating Dubcek based on his decisions at specific moments, this tome provides a comprehensive look at the experiences, from cradle to grave, that shaped him. It seeks to illuminate the complexity of the times in which he acted and avoids the tendency to anachronistically judge him according to our own times. Dubcek achieves this aim in part due to the structure of the book. By commissioning an all-star team of Slovak and Czech scholars to engage with the latest research , including archival findings , this anthology builds upon itself, resulting in a wide-ranging view of the critical years in postwar Czechoslovak history, which parallels Dubcek's lifespan ( 1921-1992). This format a lso sidesteps the trap of assessing a biographical subject too-favorably. All in all , this study represents a noteworthy contribution to what we know about Dubcek as a person and a politician while also shedding light onto ongoing historical debates. The text elucidates questions such as how did a little-known Slovak rise to Party power so quickly; what was the nature of his relationship with predecessor Antonin Novotny; did Dubcek know about the imminent Warsaw Pact invasion of August 20, 1968 ; what were the planning stages of the invitation to the Soviets to invade Czechos lovakia (the text evidences insight into a July 20-21 meeting at Hungarian Premier Janos Kadar's Lake Balaton estate); where and how did that 'invitation' occur; why was the United States' Johnson administration so reticent to support Dubcek's reform measures and to confront the USSR after the invasion; why did so few Slovak delegates attend the secret Vysocany Congress of August 22, 1968; what did the Kremlin so fear that it a ll owed Dubcek to remain in office in the months following the Warsaw Pact invasion ; how did Dubcek and leading dissident Vaclav Havel estimate each other from their first meeting in July 1968 to the late 1980s just before the Velvet Revolution? Perhaps the biggest question the book addresses (albeit indirectly) is the degree to which Dubcek was or was not trying to alter communist dogma and policy in Czechos lovakia. How much of a 'reformer' was he? The text helps answer this question by compiling and even revealing direct quotations from decisive exchanges between Dubcek and key figures such as Novotny and U.S.S.R. Party Boss Leonid SLOVAKIA 2021 161 Brezhnev at critical moments. This historical viewpoint allows the reader to appraise Dubcek for himself within a contextual framework that draws upon past and present research . It also provides perspective into Dubcek's role in Slovak history. This is significant as Dubcek ranks among the most influential Slovaks in the history of the nation. The reader learns of Dubcek's mission in the early I 960s to put Slovakia on equal administrative and economic footing with the Czech Lands after decades of failed Stalinist industrial policies in Slovakia since the 1948 communist coup. Responding to the growing unrest in Slovakia as expressed by local economists, journalists and the relocation of Slovak workers to the Czech Lands in the I 960s, Dubcek effectively made the Slovak case to the leadership in Prague in a way that others had not succeeded in doing. He also refused to back down from Novotny (as revealed in their exchanges) when Novotny attempted to brush aside the issue as well as calls for federalization of the country. Ultimately, federalization was achieved in October 1968, despite the Soviet invasion two months earlier. Yet Dubcek was not antagonistic against the Czechs or their economic advantages. As Presidium member in the pre-Prague Spring era, one of his two goals was to restore the Czech-Slovak relationship; the other was to discover a moderate approach to socialism. It was his genius in building consensus rather than dictating policy that helps explain the persuasiveness of his programs. The book does a good job of not only examining Dubcek's achievements but of providing insight into him as a person, explaining how an unlikely character from a modest background catapulted into the limelight in Prague and beyond. For example, the reader learns of his parents' socialist pedigree (which extended from their time as persecuted leftist laborers in Chicago), his thirteen years growing up in Kyrgyzstan and the U.S.S.R . during the most repressive years of Stalinism, his being wounded twice in the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, and his return to study in Moscow in the mid- l 950s during General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin's crimes. All of these occurrences forged the stance he was to take as a socialist leader. The book is well-written and is not just for academics but for anyone who is curious to learn the behind-the-scenes drama between 162 SLOVAKIA 2021 political actors at critical moments in the Cold War era. The quotations from phone calls (such as that of August 13 , 1968 between Dubcek and Brezhnev) and official internal memos and memoirs are the most intriguing. However, it was disappointing that while such quotations are listed as footnotes , there is no corresponding bibliographical entry to aid a researcher in finding the exact sources of these important conversations. The bibliography lists only the names of the archives and the relevant collections as well as a selection of secondary sources. Nevertheless, this soundly-researched biography affords scholars and laypeople alike a single volume in which to delve deeper into the times and person of Alexander Dubcek. Miroslav Moj zita. Knai ko. Demes, Knai ko: Formovanie slovenskej diplomacie v rokoch /990 ai 1993. Ustav politickych vied SAY: VEDA, vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 2019, 223 pp. Forewords to the first and second editions, selected articles by the author, list of Slovak diplomats and embassies (January 1993), photographs, afterword, author information, English summary. JURAJ HOCMAN Independent Scholar Miroslav Moj z ita ' s diplomatic career started in the mid- I 970s and continued throughout the 1980s during the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, including two successive postings to China and India. Prior to the split of the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic , Mojzita had opted for the nascent Slovak Foreign Service. In the early 1990s, he played a crucia l role in founding the Slovak Ministry for International Relations and in its gradua l transformation into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the independent Slovak Republic as of January I, 1993 . Mojzita ' s book on the formative years of Slovak diplomacy originally appeared in 2004, when Slovakia entered the European Union. In 20 19 it was re-published to provide a new generation with another opportunity to recollect the past and to contemplate the validity of the author 's previous observations and conclusions. The difference between the two editions is marginal. The second edition contains minor additions, such as another Foreword. The core SLOVAKIA 2021 163 of the text has remained unchanged. Apparently, the primary motive for the second edition was to replenish empty shelves in bookstores. The book 's main quality is its undisputed and lasting authenticity. Based upon the author ' s first-hand experience, it delivers a Slovak perspective on key events which took place during the difficult time when a young democracy and its foreign service were born. Such books are still rare in modem Slovak historiography. What makes the book· s second edition interesting is its external context. When Slovakia eventually caught up with the rest of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) on the challenging journey to fullfledged membership within NATO (2003) and the EU, readers of the first edition, unfamiliar with Slovak history, might have wondered how a tiny and allegedly non-historic state, burdened with a rural past, persistent parochialism, a legacy of obsolete heavy industries and an overall inflexible communist economy, managed to finish the race to the EU with its peers. The same was true for the incipient Slovak Foreign Service. Of the book's three chapters, the first two are dedicated to the creation and shaping of the Slovak Ministry for International Relations, which existed from 1990 to 1992 parallel with the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic . The third chapter covers the first year of the existence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Moj zita paints an accurate picture of an institution which gradually came to life through the activities of personalities from various professions and with various backgrounds, even of those whose past contained shadows and raised eyebrows . Mojzita logically scrutinized the relations of Slovakia with neighbouring countries, particularly with the Czech Repubic and Hungary, in the first place. He provided personal and professional characteristics, as well as the style of work , of the first two heads of the Slovak Foreign Service, Pavo! Demes, a young and talented biologist, and Milan Knazko, an accomplished actor. The latter had publicly snubbed the former communist regime and was one of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution in Slovakia. Knazko became the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the independent Slovak Republic. The tone of the publication is sober and balanced. When referring to the birth of independent Slovakia and its acceptance into 164 SLOVAKIA 2021 the United Nations and other key organizations, the book becomes moderately celebratory, and deservedly so. To the author ·s credit, he does not skip the errors and mistakes made by the Ministry that stemmed from inexperience and the overzealousness of its staff. Mojzita's literary style is far from dry or didactic, as his method of diplomatic reporting and political ana lysis is subtly complemented with vivid depictions and flairs of reported events. Since its birth, the Slovak diplomatic service had produced internationally recognized figures. Jan Kubis and Miroslav Lajcak, the former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, gained rich experiences and good reputations while working with the UN, the OSCE and other international organizations. They were not alone. From the late 1990s onward, Slovak diplomats responded to the calls of the international community and became active in the first line of contact in many conflict-management and confidence-building missions carried out under the aegis of international organizations, particularly in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their accomplishments can be traced back to the early 1990s and to the building of the fundamentals of the Slovak diplomatic service by devoted and patriotic professionals. This is a comprehensive, critical , we ll-documented and wel l-integrated scholarly monograph on modem Slovak diplomacy. Whereas the first edition appeared as a va luab le and laudable step in the right direction, its second edition is more than a reprint of a once pioneering publication . It should serve as an impulse for a subsequent book, detailing the history of the Slovak Foreign Service to the present day .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Diana Duchoňová, Palatín Mikuláš Eterházy (Peter Máriássy), p. 151</li> <li>Zora Mintalová Zubercová, Ako sme kedysi žili: Obrazky každodenného života našich predkov (Lenka Stolarik), p. 153</li> <li>Daniela Kodajová et. al., Živena: 150 rokov Spolku slovenských žien (Edita Bosák), p. 154</li> <li>Jan Raška, Czech Refugees in Cold War Canada (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 157</li> <li>Miroslav Londák et. al., Dubček (Marty Manor Mullins), p. 159</li> <li>Miroslav Mojžita, Kňažko, Demeš, Kňažkor: Formovanie slovenskej diplomacie v rokoch 1990 až 1993 (Juraj Hocman), p. 162</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bosák, Edita, 1950-2022 Hocman, Juraj Máriássy, Peter Mullins, Marty Manor, 1976- Stolarik, Lenka Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 LCNAF name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/91748c99a5834b903fa4c7b2a7002bf2.pdf bd85cb4b2e9651aa4f79e9f008eee20b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 165 CONTRIBUTORS RICHARD D. CUSTER is a founder of the Carpatho-Rusyn Society ( 1994) and served as editor of its newsletter, The New Rusyn Times, from 1994-2016. He compiled and edited the Rusy n-American Almanac ofthe Carpatho-Rusy n Society 2004-2005. He has presented papers on the topic of Rusyn American history at conventions of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) and genealogical and Carpatho-Rusyn conferences. He coauthored the monograph Prikra about his Rusyn grandmother's native village, published in Presov, Slovakia, in 2006. He holds a B.S. degree (Computer Engineering) from Penn State University and MBA and MA (Eastern Europe area studies) degrees from the University of Pittsburgh. He works for the U.S. government as a web communications manager in Washington, D.C. FREDERICK HALE is an international theologian, historian, and literary scholar. He earned his doctorates at Johns Hopkins University and eight universities in Scandinavia and South Africa. His career has encompassed teaching and research appointments at universities in the USA, Norway, Sweden, England, China, and South Africa. To date he has published approximately 260 books and journal articles about topics in his main fields and also in music and linguistics. Presently he is Extraordinary Professor at North-West University in South Africa and a fellow of Liverpool Hope University. NICHOLAS HUDAC is a lecturer in film studies and cultural history at the Film and Television Faculty of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague and Charles University's Department of Film Studies, where he successfull y defended his PhD thesis, "Picturing the Nation : Slovak National Identity in the Age of the Mass - Produced Image" in June of 2020. He has contributed artic les to The Eastern European Film Bulletin and I 6x9, as well as presenting his work on Slovak ethnic identity, mass media, contemporary Czechoslovak cultural history, and Czech and Slovak photography at various Slavic and film �166 SLOVAKIA 2021 studies conferences such as ASEEES, BA SEES, AA TSE EL, and N ECS among others. MICHAL KSINAN received his PhD from the University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne, where he later also lectured (2018- 2019), and from the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, where he currently works. He wrote several books about Milan Rastislav Stefanik and dozens of scholarly papers. Most recently he published l 'homme qui parfait avec !es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik, heros .franco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EUR'Orbem, 2019). His research focuses on memory studies, historiography, international relations and military history. He has received several prestigious scholarships and awards, including " Student Personality of Slovakia" in 2011 and a Fulbright Grant in 2014. ROMAN LICKO teaches in the Faculty of Arts, Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. He was a Fulbri ght scholar in the United States in 2002 - 2003 , and wrote his dissertation on U.S.- Slovak relations during WWII. Among his publications are two monographs on the war-time attitudes of the United States government towards Slovakia: Pod dohl'adom spravodajskych slui ieb - americka vlada a slo venska otcizka v rokoch I 939 - I 945 (2008) and Nevftany host - Milan Hodia v dokumentoch americkej vlady v rokoch 1941 1944. MARJAN MARK STOLARIK, Ph.D. (Minnesota, 1974), is Professor of History and holder of the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa. He has published or edited ten books and over 60 articles, including The Czech and Slovak Republics: Twenty Years of Independence, /993-2003 (Budapest: CEU Press, 20 I 6). Founder of the Slovak Studies Association ( 1977), he also founded and edited the Slovak Studies Newsletter ( 1977-1987), heedits the scholarly annual Slo vakia (since 1982); and he also serves on the editorial boards of The Journal of American Ethnic History (Detroit), the Historicky casopis (Bratislava), and Theologos (Presov). �SLOVAKIA 2021 167 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to theeditor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format to stolarik@uottawa .ca, using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. ���THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestiy Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3 rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , Stephanie Seigel, Cynthia M. Maleski, Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski , David M. Blazek, Sue Ann . M. Seich, Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Stran, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood , Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANArn Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � SLOVAKIA 2021 165 CONTRIBUTORS RICHARD D. CUSTER is a founder of the Carpatho-Rusyn Society ( 1994) and served as editor of its newsletter, The New Rusyn Times, from 1994-2016. He compiled and edited the Rusy n-American Almanac ofthe Carpatho-Rusy n Society 2004-2005. He has presented papers on the topic of Rusyn American history at conventions of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) and genealogical and Carpatho-Rusyn conferences. He coauthored the monograph Prikra about his Rusyn grandmother's native village, published in Presov, Slovakia, in 2006. He holds a B.S. degree (Computer Engineering) from Penn State University and MBA and MA (Eastern Europe area studies) degrees from the University of Pittsburgh. He works for the U.S. government as a web communications manager in Washington, D.C. FREDERICK HALE is an international theologian, historian, and literary scholar. He earned his doctorates at Johns Hopkins University and eight universities in Scandinavia and South Africa. His career has encompassed teaching and research appointments at universities in the USA, Norway, Sweden, England, China, and South Africa. To date he has published approximately 260 books and journal articles about topics in his main fields and also in music and linguistics. Presently he is Extraordinary Professor at North-West University in South Africa and a fellow of Liverpool Hope University. NICHOLAS HUDAC is a lecturer in film studies and cultural history at the Film and Television Faculty of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague and Charles University's Department of Film Studies, where he successfull y defended his PhD thesis, "Picturing the Nation : Slovak National Identity in the Age of the Mass - Produced Image" in June of 2020. He has contributed artic les to The Eastern European Film Bulletin and I 6x9, as well as presenting his work on Slovak ethnic identity, mass media, contemporary Czechoslovak cultural history, and Czech and Slovak photography at various Slavic and film �166 SLOVAKIA 2021 studies conferences such as ASEEES, BA SEES, AA TSE EL, and N ECS among others. MICHAL KSINAN received his PhD from the University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne, where he later also lectured (2018- 2019), and from the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, where he currently works. He wrote several books about Milan Rastislav Stefanik and dozens of scholarly papers. Most recently he published l 'homme qui parfait avec !es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik, heros .franco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EUR'Orbem, 2019). His research focuses on memory studies, historiography, international relations and military history. He has received several prestigious scholarships and awards, including " Student Personality of Slovakia" in 2011 and a Fulbright Grant in 2014. ROMAN LICKO teaches in the Faculty of Arts, Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. He was a Fulbri ght scholar in the United States in 2002 - 2003 , and wrote his dissertation on U.S.- Slovak relations during WWII. Among his publications are two monographs on the war-time attitudes of the United States government towards Slovakia: Pod dohl'adom spravodajskych slui ieb - americka vlada a slo venska otcizka v rokoch I 939 - I 945 (2008) and Nevftany host - Milan Hodia v dokumentoch americkej vlady v rokoch 1941 1944. MARJAN MARK STOLARIK, Ph.D. (Minnesota, 1974), is Professor of History and holder of the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa. He has published or edited ten books and over 60 articles, including The Czech and Slovak Republics: Twenty Years of Independence, /993-2003 (Budapest: CEU Press, 20 I 6). Founder of the Slovak Studies Association ( 1977), he also founded and edited the Slovak Studies Newsletter ( 1977-1987), heedits the scholarly annual Slo vakia (since 1982); and he also serves on the editorial boards of The Journal of American Ethnic History (Detroit), the Historicky casopis (Bratislava), and Theologos (Presov). �SLOVAKIA 2021 167 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to theeditor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format to stolarik@uottawa .ca, using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. ���THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestiy Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3 rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , Stephanie Seigel, Cynthia M. Maleski, Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski , David M. Blazek, Sue Ann . M. Seich, Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Stran, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood , Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANArn Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 165 CONTRIBUTORS RICHARD D. CUSTER is a founder of the Carpatho-Rusyn Society ( 1994) and served as editor of its newsletter, The New Rusyn Times, from 1994-2016. He compiled and edited the Rusy n-American Almanac ofthe Carpatho-Rusy n Society 2004-2005. He has presented papers on the topic of Rusyn American history at conventions of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) and genealogical and Carpatho-Rusyn conferences. He coauthored the monograph Prikra about his Rusyn grandmother's native village, published in Presov, Slovakia, in 2006. He holds a B.S. degree (Computer Engineering) from Penn State University and MBA and MA (Eastern Europe area studies) degrees from the University of Pittsburgh. He works for the U.S. government as a web communications manager in Washington, D.C. FREDERICK HALE is an international theologian, historian, and literary scholar. He earned his doctorates at Johns Hopkins University and eight universities in Scandinavia and South Africa. His career has encompassed teaching and research appointments at universities in the USA, Norway, Sweden, England, China, and South Africa. To date he has published approximately 260 books and journal articles about topics in his main fields and also in music and linguistics. Presently he is Extraordinary Professor at North-West University in South Africa and a fellow of Liverpool Hope University. NICHOLAS HUDAC is a lecturer in film studies and cultural history at the Film and Television Faculty of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague and Charles University's Department of Film Studies, where he successfull y defended his PhD thesis, "Picturing the Nation : Slovak National Identity in the Age of the Mass - Produced Image" in June of 2020. He has contributed artic les to The Eastern European Film Bulletin and I 6x9, as well as presenting his work on Slovak ethnic identity, mass media, contemporary Czechoslovak cultural history, and Czech and Slovak photography at various Slavic and film 166 SLOVAKIA 2021 studies conferences such as ASEEES, BA SEES, AA TSE EL, and N ECS among others. MICHAL KSINAN received his PhD from the University of Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne, where he later also lectured (2018- 2019), and from the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, where he currently works. He wrote several books about Milan Rastislav Stefanik and dozens of scholarly papers. Most recently he published l 'homme qui parfait avec !es etoiles. Milan Rastislav Stefanik, heros .franco-slovaque de la Grande Guerre (Paris, EUR'Orbem, 2019). His research focuses on memory studies, historiography, international relations and military history. He has received several prestigious scholarships and awards, including " Student Personality of Slovakia" in 2011 and a Fulbright Grant in 2014. ROMAN LICKO teaches in the Faculty of Arts, Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. He was a Fulbri ght scholar in the United States in 2002 - 2003 , and wrote his dissertation on U.S.- Slovak relations during WWII. Among his publications are two monographs on the war-time attitudes of the United States government towards Slovakia: Pod dohl'adom spravodajskych slui ieb - americka vlada a slo venska otcizka v rokoch I 939 - I 945 (2008) and Nevftany host - Milan Hodia v dokumentoch americkej vlady v rokoch 1941 1944. MARJAN MARK STOLARIK, Ph.D. (Minnesota, 1974), is Professor of History and holder of the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa. He has published or edited ten books and over 60 articles, including The Czech and Slovak Republics: Twenty Years of Independence, /993-2003 (Budapest: CEU Press, 20 I 6). Founder of the Slovak Studies Association ( 1977), he also founded and edited the Slovak Studies Newsletter ( 1977-1987), heedits the scholarly annual Slo vakia (since 1982); and he also serves on the editorial boards of The Journal of American Ethnic History (Detroit), the Historicky casopis (Bratislava), and Theologos (Presov). SLOVAKIA 2021 167 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to theeditor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format to stolarik@uottawa .ca, using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestiy Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3 rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , Stephanie Seigel, Cynthia M. Maleski, Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski , David M. Blazek, Sue Ann . M. Seich, Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Stran, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood , Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANArn Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85) Description An account of the resource includes Contributors; Guidelines for Manuscripts Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c97c679af730353a337e4d5f611ea38c.pdf 355a2abe7e3006d0f4e1a803db45e6b6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLIV 2019 NUMBERS 82-83 A scholarly annual devoted to the hi story, literature and cu lture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itorial Board GREGO RY C. FERENCE Salisbury University ROBERT K. EV ANSON University of Mi ssouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETE R PETRO Un iversity of British Co lumbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinoi s PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State Co ll ege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is $10.00. Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review shou ld be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Kos ice in the Second Half th of the 19 Century Frank Henschel .... .. ....... ...... ... ........ ...... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .. .. .. .. ...... 7 The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Michael Cude ... ........ ........... ... ...... ... .... ... ........ .. ... .. ..... .. .... .. .. .. .... 18 Imagining a Separate Slovakia : Anti-Communi st Slovak Exiles ' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Ellen L. Paul .. .. ... ........ ........ .. .. ...... .. .. .. ..... ............................... .. . 55 Slovak Emigres in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Actions against Ferdinand Durcansky and Jozef Kirschbaum ( 1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik ....................... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... .... .... .... .. .. .... .. ...... .. ..... .... 72 Russophiles without Russia Vladimir Bauamgarten .............. ... ......... ............ .......... ... .... ..... ... 83 REVIEWS Tiinde Lengyelova, Zivot na s/'achtickom dvore Peter Mariassy ......... .. ............. ..... .... ............ .. ........ .... .. .. .... .. .. .. 133 Kenneth Janda, Th e Emperor and the Peasant M. Mark Stolarik .. .. .... .... .. .. ...................... ........... .. ................... 134 John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family Kenn eth Janda ........ ..... ........ ..... .... ..... ...... .... .... ... .. ...... .... ...... .... 136 Jan Hirka, Pod ochranou Marie Daniel Cerny .. ............ ... ........ ...... .. .... .. ...... .. ...... ....................... 140 �4 SLOV AKIA-2017 Michal Machacek, Gustav Husak Jozef Hyria ........... .................................................... ................ . 143 Contributors .............................................................................. 147 Guidelines for Manuscripts ..... .... .... ......................................... 148 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLIV 2019 NUMBERS 82-83 A scholarly annual devoted to the hi story, literature and cu lture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itorial Board GREGO RY C. FERENCE Salisbury University ROBERT K. EV ANSON University of Mi ssouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETE R PETRO Un iversity of British Co lumbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinoi s PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State Co ll ege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is $10.00. Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review shou ld be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Kos ice in the Second Half th of the 19 Century Frank Henschel .... .. ....... ...... ... ........ ...... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .. .. .. .. ...... 7 The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Michael Cude ... ........ ........... ... ...... ... .... ... ........ .. ... .. ..... .. .... .. .. .. .... 18 Imagining a Separate Slovakia : Anti-Communi st Slovak Exiles ' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Ellen L. Paul .. .. ... ........ ........ .. .. ...... .. .. .. ..... ............................... .. . 55 Slovak Emigres in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Actions against Ferdinand Durcansky and Jozef Kirschbaum ( 1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik ....................... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... .... .... .... .. .. .... .. ...... .. ..... .... 72 Russophiles without Russia Vladimir Bauamgarten .............. ... ......... ............ .......... ... .... ..... ... 83 REVIEWS Tiinde Lengyelova, Zivot na s/'achtickom dvore Peter Mariassy ......... .. ............. ..... .... ............ .. ........ .... .. .. .... .. .. .. 133 Kenneth Janda, Th e Emperor and the Peasant M. Mark Stolarik .. .. .... .... .. .. ...................... ........... .. ................... 134 John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family Kenn eth Janda ........ ..... ........ ..... .... ..... ...... .... .... ... .. ...... .... ...... .... 136 Jan Hirka, Pod ochranou Marie Daniel Cerny .. ............ ... ........ ...... .. .... .. ...... .. ...... ....................... 140 �4 SLOV AKIA-2017 Michal Machacek, Gustav Husak Jozef Hyria ........... .................................................... ................ . 143 Contributors .............................................................................. 147 Guidelines for Manuscripts ..... .... .... ......................................... 148 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLIV 2019 NUMBERS 82-83 A scholarly annual devoted to the hi story, literature and cu lture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itorial Board GREGO RY C. FERENCE Salisbury University ROBERT K. EV ANSON University of Mi ssouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETE R PETRO Un iversity of British Co lumbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinoi s PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State Co ll ege Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is $10.00. Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review shou ld be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca Table of Contents ARTICLES Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Kos ice in the Second Half th of the 19 Century Frank Henschel .... .. ....... ...... ... ........ ...... ... .... .... .... .... ... .... .. .. .. .. ...... 7 The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Michael Cude ... ........ ........... ... ...... ... .... ... ........ .. ... .. ..... .. .... .. .. .. .... 18 Imagining a Separate Slovakia : Anti-Communi st Slovak Exiles ' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Ellen L. Paul .. .. ... ........ ........ .. .. ...... .. .. .. ..... ............................... .. . 55 Slovak Emigres in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Actions against Ferdinand Durcansky and Jozef Kirschbaum ( 1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik ....................... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ... .... .... .... .. .. .... .. ...... .. ..... .... 72 Russophiles without Russia Vladimir Bauamgarten .............. ... ......... ............ .......... ... .... ..... ... 83 REVIEWS Tiinde Lengyelova, Zivot na s/'achtickom dvore Peter Mariassy ......... .. ............. ..... .... ............ .. ........ .... .. .. .... .. .. .. 133 Kenneth Janda, Th e Emperor and the Peasant M. Mark Stolarik .. .. .... .... .. .. ...................... ........... .. ................... 134 John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family Kenn eth Janda ........ ..... ........ ..... .... ..... ...... .... .... ... .. ...... .... ...... .... 136 Jan Hirka, Pod ochranou Marie Daniel Cerny .. ............ ... ........ ...... .. .... .. ...... .. ...... ....................... 140 4 SLOV AKIA-2017 Michal Machacek, Gustav Husak Jozef Hyria ........... .................................................... ................ . 143 Contributors .............................................................................. 147 Guidelines for Manuscripts ..... .... .... ......................................... 148 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/635b6ed1c68bba1673b6a0d1ff764bbc.pdf cf43258673a41d9008eacf50c98385b5 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. 8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . 10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). 12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. 13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- 14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- 16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Košice in the Second Half of the 19th Century Description An account of the resource Frank Henschel Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 7-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Henschel, Frank Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/006f0e8f1b2b40dd7a01877c9000076b.pdf 2d6648d8c8f73dc1a78c92eebb9f6f72 PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA 2019 THE TRANSATLANTIC SLOVAK QUESTION DURING THE INTERW AR YEARS Michael Cude The relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs is an issue that has persisted through the modem hi story of the two peoples. From the 19 th century ' national awakenings ' in Austria-Hungary to the Velvet Divorce between the Slovaks and Czechs in 1993, this 'Slovak question' was at the center of key events, including the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, its breakup and reestablishment after World War II, and the 1968 Prague Spring. 1 While many recent works have addressed the Slovak question, many have underappreciated the extent to which modem Slovak national identity formation was a transatlantic phenomenon. Historians examining this topic from the domestic Slovak perspective rarely delve deeply beyond Slovak borders, while histories of Slovaks abroad have focused predominantly on the Slovaks' place as immigrant communities . In doing so, such histories overlook how interlinked Slovak national politics in Slovakia were to Slovak communities abroad, particularly in North America, and the critical role they played in shaping Slovak national identity formation. Addressed by only a handful of recent works, the transatlantic Slovak question requires more attention.2 1 Reference key for shortened arc hi val ci tations: IHRC : Slovak American Collection, Immi gratio n History Research Center, University of Minneso ta. fil: Slovak Institute, Cleveland, OH. DoS CS 1910-44: Records of th e U.S. Department of Stale Relating to th e Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944, Microfilm (Washin gton D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1982). 2 For some examples of sc holarship considering the Slovak question from a transatlantic perspective, see: M. Mark Sto larik, Where is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( /8 70-2010) (Bern : Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907- 1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35 . Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of CzechoSlovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, 8, Hi stori ca 5 ( 1968), 7-82. Stefan Kucik, Podiel americkych S!ovakov na aulonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku 191 8-/938 (Martin: Matica slovenska, 20 I I). Gregory Curtis Ference, Sixteen Months of Indecision : Slovak American Viewpoints Toward Compatriots and the Homeland from �SLOVAKIA 2019 19 The Slovak efforts abroad during World War I remain the best told component of this story. The foundation of the transatlantic Slovak question was laid in the periods leading up to the First World War, when Slovak-American organizations began to campaign for Slovak political autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. The central organization for Slovak national activism became the Slovak League of America (SLA), founded in May 1907 by Slovak-American leaders to unify the disparate Slovak groups in the United States in common political action. The SLA ' s main objectives were to develop the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in America as a means of supporting the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in the homeland and to fight for Slovak national self-determination. 3 World War I and its accompanying 'Wilsonian moment' entrenched important symbols of Slovak national self-determination, as Slovak immigrant communities contributed to the establishment of the new Czechoslovak Republic. The wartime Czechoslovak National Council and its leaders, including Thomas G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, utilized Slovak-American organizations for financial , military, and diplomatic support. Consequently, Slovak-American demands led to the creation of the most important document relating to Slovak nationalism for the following twenty years: the Pittsburgh Agreement. Signed on 31 May 1918, this document declared common action between the Czechs and Slovaks in the formation of a democratic republic. Nevertheless, the agreement made a clear assertion for Slovak autonomy, under the terms that the Slovaks would I 9 I 4 to I 9 I 5 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna Uni versity Press, 1995). Michael Cude, "The Imagined Exiles: Slovak-Americans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republic," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vo l. 5, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk, Poland: University of Gdansk History Institute, 20 14), 287-305 3 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America, Daniel C. Necas, trans. (St. Paul, MN : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society, 2007). Jan Pankuch, History of the Slovaks of Cleveland and Lakewood, Rasto Gallo, trans. (Cleveland: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society & Western Reserve Historical Society, 2001), 29-38. Stolarik, " Rol e," 7-82 . Stephanie 0. Husek, "Slovak American Fraternal, Cultural, and Civic Organizations to 19 I 4," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study, Joseph C. Krajsa, ed. (Middletown: Slovak League of America, 1978), 23 -38 . Joseph A. Mikus "The Slovak League of America: A Historical Survey," in Slovaks, Krajsa, ed., 3956. R. Vladimir Baumgarten & Joseph Stefka, The National Slovak Society: JOO Year History, I 890-1990 (Pittsburgh: National Slovak Society, 1990), 17-33. �20 SLOVAKIA 2019 have their "own administration, own parliament, and own courts." In the short term, the Pittsburgh Agreement appeased the Slovak-Americans, who consolidated their support around the budding state, while Masaryk used the agreement to legitimize Czech-Slovak coop4 eration in his diplomatic efforts. This campaign allowed Slovak-American leaders a sense of direct influence on the affairs of their homeland, although the Czechoslovak National Council quickly stymied this hope. While the Slovak-Americans had been able to pressure Masaryk into symbolically accepting their goals for Slovak autonomy, their influence only extended to his need to provide evidence of Slovak participation in his political program as he sought recognition from the Entente powers. As a result, the Slovak-Americans found themselves on the margins during the building of the state . Accordingly, many historians consider the Pittsburgh Agreement as a matter of domestic Slovak politics after its initial signing, with little further consideration for the Slovaks abroad. In doing so, they neglect the fact that transatlantic activities continued through the interwar period.5 With the establishment of Czechoslovakia following the war, Slovak national activists on both sides of the Atlantic, hereto identi- 4 "Pittsburgska Dohoda" in Dok:umenty slovenskej narodnej identity a statnosti, vol. I, eds. Jan Benko, et al (Narodne literame centrum: Dom slovenskej literatury, 1998), 484-7. " Masaryk to Mamatey, 22 September 1918," SLA Cabinet, F:llth Congress, Slovak Institute (S I), Cleveland, OH. Pankuch, History, 145-50. Stolarik, "Role," 32-54. Karo l Sidor, ''The Slovak League of America and the Slovak Nation 's Struggle for Autonomy," Slovakia I 7, 40 ( I 967), 39-46. Peter P. Hletko, "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact," Slovakia l 8, 41 ( 1968), 5-54. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , "The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents," in Slovakia 36, 66 & 67 ( 1998), 81-97. lmrich Mazar, A History of the Binghamton Slovaks : Over a Period of Forty Years, 1879-1919, ed. Wilhelmina Mazar Salina, trans. Thomas Janacek (Phoenix: Via Press, 2003), 203-17. Baumgarten & Stefka, National, 81-3. 5 James Ramon Felak, At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, I 994). Peter A. Toma & Dusan Kovac, Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 200 I). Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia : The Struggle for Survival, 2nd ed. (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Jan Rychlik, "Czech-Slovak Relations in Czechoslovakia, I 918-1939," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918- 1948, eds . Mark Cornwall, R.J.W . Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-26. Elisabeth Bakke, "Czechoslovakism in Slovak History," in Slovakia in History, eds. Mikulas Teich, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2011), 247-68. �SLOVAKIA 2019 21 fied as the Slovak 'autonomists,' had full expectations of a federal relationship that would recognize Slovak cultural uniqueness and grant the Slovaks civic equality with autonomy over domestic affairs under the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement. In contrast, most Czech leaders wanted a strongly centralized state, justified by arguments of the commonality of the Czechs and Slovaks, the threat of Hungarian and German irredentism, and the believed necessity of Czech oversight to modernize Slovakia. They relied on support from Slovak ' centralists,' who identified the Czechs and Slovaks as a common people. Slovak autonomists, who saw the Slovaks as a culturally distinct people from the Czechs, perceived this ' Prague centralism' as a form of cultural and political hegemony. In response, they replanted their fight over the Slovak question against the newly formed government in Prague. Both autonomists and centralists mobilized Slovaks at home and abroad behind their version of the state, with the transatlantic component focused on lobbying foreign governments. As with many other nationality groups, Slovak leaders saw the postwar peace process as a key moment to make their case. With the centralists represented at the Versailles Peace Conference by the formal delegation from Czechoslovakia, the autonomists attempted to present their own view, including a flurry of correspondence from Slovak-Americans to United States President Woodrow Wilson and an unofficial delegation led by Slovak nationalist leader Andrej Hlinka. The autonomists appealed for recognition of an independent Slovak identity and the establishment of a federalist system in Czechoslovakia that granted greater domestic political autonomy to Slovakia. Wilson and other western leaders, however, prioritized economic and political modernity as a necessary quality for selfgovernrnent. Czechoslovakia's centralist leaders appealed to the Wilsonian prioritization of modernism to gain American acceptance of their vision, and used a proposed uplift of the Slovaks into modernity to advance this cause. They nonetheless pursued this objective in a way that often cast the Slovaks in a disparaging light and sowed further discord. The Conference in turn legitimated this organization of the Czechoslovak state and ignored Slovak autonomist appeals. 6 6 For more, see : Michael Cude, "Wilsonian National Self-determination and the Slovak Question during th e Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918-192 1," Diplomatic Histo,y (2016) 40, I: 155-80 �22 SLOVAKIA 2019 This failure at Versailles did not dissuade transatlantic Slovak activities. From the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, the Slovak question persisted in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The interwar period saw the Slovak autonomist movement survive with the Czechoslovak state arrayed against them . Slovak autonomists regularly looked across the Atlantic for support in pressuring Prague to change its stance. The Slovak autonomists continued to reference the spirit and goals of Wilsonianism to justify their claims for autonomy, and the Pittsburgh Agreement became their primary symbol. SlovakAmerican autonomists accepted their leading role of defending the Slovaks internationally, and they remained hopeful of convincing world leaders, particularly those in the United States, to embrace their view. This task remained an uphill battle, given the autonomists' inability to match the resources or international connections maintained by Prague, as centralists worked to discredit the idea of domestic autonomy for Slovakia. The Czech and Slovak centralists polarized the issue as a support for state unity through centralism or support for the destruction of the state through autonomy. In international appeals, the centralists disparaged Slovak capabilities for selfgovernment, and presented the Slovak autonomists as a parochial fringe, ignorant of world affairs. Accordingly, this transatlantic debate heavily contributed to the failure of the Czechoslovak concept in the interwar period by helping sow the entrenched distrust that culminated in the splintering of the Czechoslovak Republic in March of 1939. The question of Slovak autonomy remained a principal component of Slovak politics during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks split into three general categories on the Slovak question. The smallest of these groups were the Czechoslovakists, who wanted a close, non-differential linkage with the Czechs. Vavro Srobar, the first appointed Minister for Slovakia in 1918, exemplified this faction. Another group consisted of moderate nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of separate Slovak identity and political autonomy. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of the republic in the late 1930s and leader of the Agrarian Party, best exemplified this faction. Hodza and others supported a federalist model to address national minority questions. Most of the former two groups came from Slovakia's Lutheran minority. The Slovak auton- �SLOVAKIA 2019 23 omists, who were predominantly Catholics, were the most controversial. The Reverend Andrej Hlinka represented them as leader of the Slovak People 's Party. Hlinka and his supporters pushed for complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia, although the radical end of the party increasingly sought greater independence while a smaller minority even promoted a return to Hungary under a promise of autonomy. The Slovak People's Party (SPP) remained the most popular party in Slovakia and mixed cooperation with opposition to push for Slovak autonomy. The Agrarian Party followed in popular support, and it gradually pushed for more autonomy, albeit in a more deliberate fashion than the SPP. The Slovak National Party, the Slovak Communists, and the Hungarian Parties joined them in support of autonomy.7 Politically, some Slovaks took prominent positions in the central government, most notably Hodza. Prague allowed Slovak autonomists to organize and hold seats in Parliament, but it continued to censor nationali st viewpoints and it regularly pursued smear campaigns against Slovak autonomist leaders. The SPP joined the government in 1927, arranged by Hodza after promises of Slovak autonomy, but Hodza's plan proceeded in a watered-down fashion. The SPP participation lasted only two years before accusations of treason against radical politician Vojtech Tuka led to the SPP's withdrawal from the government. The SPP later exploited the Munich Agreement to force Prague's hand to achieve autonomy during the short-lived Second Republic, and then seceded from the state in March of 1939.8 7 Prague regularly promoted the idea that most of the Slovak people opposed autonomy, because the SPP only maintained 30-35% of the electorate in Slovakia. Although it is difficult to determine the true popular support of autonomy based strictly on the electoral support of each party, the support in Slovakia for Prague's version of centralism was probably we ll in the minority when one considers that the three largest parties-SPP, Agrarian, and Communists- all embraced some level of Slovak autonomy. 8 For more on this period in Slovak hi story, see: Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists 1918- 1948 (New York: Columbia University, 1983). Susan Mikula, "The Politics of Frustration : The Slovak Politica l Experience, 191 8-1938," in Reflections on Slovak Histo ry, eds. Stanislav Kirschbaum & Anne C. Rom an (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1987), 73 -88. James Felak, "Slovak Considerations of the Slovak Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist, and Communi st views in lnterwar Czechoslovakia" in The Czech and Slovak Experience, ed . John Morison (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 136-62. Felak, At the �24 SLOVAKIA 2019 The Slovak-A mericans also consolidated their positions on the issue in a similar fas hi on. After an early divide, the leaders of the Slovak League of America gave up on Prague and embraced the autonomist position, as did the large Catholic fraternal organization the First Catholic Slovak Union, and other, smaller organizations, such as the Friends of Slovak Freedom (FSF), an organization formed in the 1920s w ith the singul ar goal of addressing the Slovak question . The large, secular and large ly Protestant, fraternal organizations, the National Slovak Society and the Slovak Evangeli cal Un ion, at first embraced the centralist Slovaks, but nationalist pressure ultimatel y led them to try to moderate between the centrali st and autonomist positions. They ultim ate ly embraced the gradualist position of Hodza. In response, the Czechoslovaki sts established the Slovak National A lliance to serve as the arm of Prague among the SlovakAmericans, along with the Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. Consisting mostl y of secularists and some Lutherans, these organizations regularly attacked the SLA for its Catholic and autonomist leanings and promoted the strict uni ty of the Czechs and Slovaks. 9 As the Slovak question became entrenched in Czechoslovak politics, each competing side pursued a voluminous international lobby ing campaign to build western support for its respective position. This included a fact ion demanding a revision of the Trianon Treaty to return Slovakia to Hungary. The primary international Slovak advocate of this position was the Reverend Francis Jehlicka and hi s organization, the Slovak Council , founded in 1933 . Jehlicka had attended the Paris Peace Conference wi th Hlinka, but decided afterwards that the Slovaks could not trust the Czechs. Jehlicka remained abroad, where he lobbied fo r a Slovak reunion with Hungary based on Hun ga ri an promises of Slovak autonomy. He attempted to build Price of th e Republic. Toma & Kovac, Slovakia, 78-1 06. Kirsc hbaum, History of Slovakia , 155-84. Ryc hlik, "Czec h-Sl ovak Relations," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, 13-2 6. R.J.W. Evans, " Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks : Some Mutual Perceptions," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, I 09-22 . Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia : The State that Failed (New Haven: Yale Uni vers ity Press, 2009), 48-86. Nata lia Kraj covicova, " Slovakia in Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in History, 137-56. 9 Joseph Pauco, "Slovaks Abroad and Their Relati onship with Slovakia," in Slo vakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries, ed. Joseph M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973), 333-42. Josep h V. Adamec, "The Slovak Cath olic Federation," in Slovaks in America, 223-32 . Baumgarten & Stetl<a, National, 85-7. Pankuch, History, 177-86 . Stolarik, " Slovak League," 7-35 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 25 support from the Slovak-Americans by appealing to Slovakia's historical and economic roots in Hungary and exposing claimed mistreatment of the Slovaks by Prague. ' 0 Jehlicka could express his voice abroad because of support from Budapest and later Nazi Germany, and he convinced a few figures in the West, most notably the British publi sher Lord Rothermere, who campaigned on behalf of Hungary internationally. Jehlicka ' s arguments nevertheless carried little weight in other circles . Scottish historian R. W. Seton-Watson, a prominent supporter of the Czechoslovak Republic , pursued a constant back and forth against Jehlicka, and, on both sides of the Atlantic, Slovaks and Czechs of different politica l views unified against Slovakia ' s return to Hungary. The Slovak autonomi sts and centralists , for example, collaborated in an open letter denouncing Jehlicka . 11 Slovak-Americans likewise continued to lobby against Hungarian claims, reminding readers about the old magyarization policy to eliminate Slovak national identity. Slovak-American publisher Jan Pankuch claimed that this was the sole occas ion when the Slovak-American autonomi sts, Czech-Americans, and Slovak10 Anthony Pessenl ehner, "Czechoslovakia' s Ri ght to Statehood Assa iled," Current History, 14, 5 (Aug. I 92 1), 845-8. Dr. F. Jehlicka: Kto on je a co chce (C leveland: 1920). Francis Jehlicka, Reply to Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson 's Book 'Slovakia Th en and Now ' (Vienn a, 1932). The Slovak Co uncil , Th e Unsolved Slovak Problem (Vienna: Slovak Council, 1933). The Slovak Co un cil , Bolsevizmus a slovenska otazka (Geneva: Slovak Council , 193 6), in : 8 : Resolutions, Memoranda, Proclamations, SI. The Slovak Council , Sh ould Great Britain go to Wa r- fo r Czechoslovakia: An Appeal to British Common Sense for th e Sake of Wo rld Peace (London: Haze l, Watson, & Viney, 1937) . Francis Jehli cka, Fa1her Hlinka 's Struggle fo r Slovak Freedom (London: Slova k Council , 1938), 34-5. "The German Minister in Czechoslovaki a (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry (Doc 57)," Documen1s on German Foreign Policy, Seri es D, V2 (Was hington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 132-3 . 11 R.W. Seton-Watson, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers ( London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1934). " Seton-Watson to Alois Ka lisek" (Doc I 32) in R. W. SetonWa tson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks: Documents, / 906- 195 1, vol. I, eds. Jan Ryc hlik, et al (Prague: Ustav T. G. Masaryka, I 995), 393-6. "The Situati on in Slova ki a and the Magyar Minori ty" (Doc 139) in Seton-Watson, 409-25. "Seton-Watson to Martin Razus" (Doc 155 ) in Seton- Watson, 454-5 . "Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc I 60) in Seton-Watson, 465-9. C. L Orbach, "Czechoslovakia ' s Place in the Sun," Current Histo1y, 14, 6 (Sept I 92 1), 944-5. Anonymous, "Another Defense of Czechoslovaki a" Curren/ History, 14, 6 (Sept 192 1), 945-6. Adam Poliak, "Czechos lova ki a's Right to Statehood," Current History, I 5, 3 (Dec I 92 1), 499. " Slovaki a' s Pro test" (Doc 156) in Seton-Watson, 456-9. �26 SLOVAKIA 2019 American centralists came together in common cause, although the resolution almost failed when the two sides sparred over whether the text should declare the Slovaks and Czechs as one nation. The proHungarian autonomists, thus, remained on the periphery of the Sio• 12 va k question. The unified opposition against Hungarian irredentism otherwise did little to ease the conflict between the centralists and autonomists. The Czech and Slovak centralists made the Slovak question a primary component of their international propaganda, and they often perpetuated negative stereotypes of the Slovaks to promote the Czechoslovak vision. The official press in Prague released ample publications by Czech nationali st leaders in the English language on the topic. President Masaryk, for example, made clear his disappointment with the "po litical immaturity" of the Slovak autonomist movement. Masaryk, who continued to highlight his own partial Slovak heritage, likewise claimed to have proven his great love for Slovakia by having liberated it from Hungary and he asserted that Slovak nationalists could prove their own love by embracing Prague 's authority. 13 Edvard Benes, who served as Foreign Minister until succeeding Masaryk to the presidency in 1935, in tum argued that the Czechs and Slovaks remained unified, except for a "fringe minority," working for a return to the pre-war order, and the "dictates of local , provin12 "Rezolucie Vznesene Ustrednym Vyborom Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike na schodzi , vzdrziavanej IO novembra 1920," Person File (PF): Bielek, SI. Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America, Count Albert Apponyi or Revival of Magyar Propaganda in America (Scranton, Pa: Bosak Press, 1923), in: B: Resolutions, SI. American Citizens of Slovak Origin, The Refutation to the Arguments of the Hungarian Kossuth Delegation ( 1928), in: The Podkrivacky, Adam Papers, B: 17, Slovak American Collection, Immigration History Research Center (IHRC), Uni versity of Minnesota. "What the Magyars Forget," The National Slovak Society (NSS) of the US.A . Records, B: 168, F: Slovak League of America (SLA), lHRC. "The Cleveland District Assembly of the SLA to Hoover," 4 December 1929, F#: 860F.00/306, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944 (DoS CS 1910-44), Microfilm (Washington D.C .: National Archi ves and Records Service, 1982). Pankuch, History, 186-90. 13 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918, trans. Henry Wickham Steed (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 2 1, 41 , 208-11 , 338, 361. Thomas G. Masaryk, Masa,yk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, reprint ed., trans. M. & R. Weatherall (New York: Arno Press, 1971 ). "T.G. Masaryk on the Pittsburgh Agreement" (Doc 30) in Slovakia : Political, 209- 10. �SLOVAKIA 2019 27 cial, factional and individualist interests ." 14 Czech scholars, journalists and officials also contributed to this campaign, mostly through studies of the Czechs that glossed over the Slovaks except to praise 15 how the Czechs had liberated them. For example, Czech historian Albert Prazak praised the Czech ro le in uplifting the Slovaks, and condemned Hlinka and the SPP as tools of Hungary and as part of a Catholic conspiracy to take over Central Europe. Prazak then dismissed the Pittsburgh Agreement as "merely a flight of fancy ," rooted in "immaturity of political judgment and lack of understanding." 16 Czech journalist Ales Broz likewise condemned the Slovaks as " retarded in their development" versus the " well educated, practical, realistic" Czechs, and praised the direction of Slovakia under the Czechs for allowing the two peoples to become "one stock, one cul. ,, I 7 ture, one nat10n . Centralist Slovaks also contributed to this campaign, including articles by Interior Minister Juraj Slavik and Minister to France Stefan Osusky on the nationality questions in Czec hoslovakia, as well as one by Education Minister Anton Stefanek praising Prague ' s 14 Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Seiver (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 348, 448, 469, 472-8 1. Edvard Benes, Christmas Message (Prague: Orb is, 193 7), 17. Edvard Benes, "Of Czechoslovak Unity" in We Were and We Shall Be: Th e Czechoslovak Spirit th rough th e Centuries , eds. Zdenk a & Jan Mun zer (New York : Un gar, 1941), 164-6. 15 Kami I Krofta & Jiri Hoetzel, A Short Histo,y of Czechoslovakia ( ew York: Robert McBride & Co, 1934), 137-8, 142, 149-52. Kami! Krofta, "Czechs and Slovaks (I)" The Slavonic and East European Review, 13, 38 (January 1935), 363-7 1. Kami I Kroft a, "Czechs and Slovaks ( II )" The Slavonic and East European Review, I 3, 39 (April 1935), 6 11-26. Josef Borovicka, Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics (Prague: Orbis, 1929), 7-8, 13 , 20-1 , 44, 111-1 2, I I 9-20, I 24-6. Emanuel Capek, "The Background of Political Parti es in Czechoslovaki a" The Sla vonic and East European Review, I 0, 28 (June 193 1), 90- 104. Ales Broz, " Minori ty Ri ghts in th e Czechoslova k State," Foreign Affairs, 6, I (October 1927), 158-60. Ales Broz, " President Masaryk, Creator of the Czechos lovak Republic," Current Histo,y , 24, I (April I 926), 48-53. 16 Prague appointed Prazak, a Czech, to erve at Comenius Uni versity in Brati slava as its primary hi stori an of the Slova ks. The Slavonic Review labeled Prazak the "foremost li ving authority on Slovak History." Albert Prazak, " Review : The ew Slovaki a by R. W. Seton-W atso n" The Slavonic Review, 3, 9 (March 1925), 71 3-20. 17 Ales Broz, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Czech Standpoint," Curren/ Histo,y, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-8 . �28 SLOVAKIA 2019 development of Slovak education. 18 Slovak Social Democrat, and rigid Czechoslovakist, [van Derer's short book on the Pittsburgh Agreement provided the most thorough effort in English to discredit the Slovak autonomists . Derer claimed that most Slovaks embraced the state as constructed, and that only a " pro-Magyar" minority supported autonomy. He likewise dismissed the Slovak-American signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement as not " true" Slovak nationals, because they lived in America. Derer argued that the document had meant simply local administrative autonomy, which he claimed Prague had granted. He then portrayed the Czechs as the Slovaks' saviors and condemned Slovak autonomy: In return for their having helped Slovakia when things were at th eir worst, in return for their having saved our liberty and an independent state apparatus, railway and postal communications, and a Slovak system of education at the tim e when the Slovaks th emselves were weak, unprepared, often distrustful and inclined rather to continue to live under their thousand-year yoke than to live in freedom, in return for having shed their blood for our country on the battlefronts in the Great War, and in the fights against Bolshevist Hungary in I 9 I 9 and thus saving Slovakia from a new occupation by the Magyars -in return for all this are we to remove the Czechs from Slovakia ? 19 Prague also maintained support from American and Eng lish academics and journalists in perpetuating Czechoslovakism. SetonWatson remained a staunch supporter of the idea, boasting how he regularly discredited "cantankerous Slovaks who accused Masaryk and hi s friend s of 'Czec hi sation."' He publicly condemned Hlinka and the SPP and repudiated their criticisms of Prague. Seton-Watson a lso actively denied Slovak agency in Slovak national development. 18 Juraj Slavik, "The Nationality Question in Slovakia," Central European Observer, 11 , 26 (Dec 18, 1933), 463-5 . Stefan Osusky, " Wh y Czechoslovakia?" Foreign Affairs, 15 , 3 (Apri l 1937), 455-71. Anton Stefanek, " Education in Slovakia," Th e Slavonic Review, 2, 5 (Dec 1923), 308-27. 19 Ivan Derer, The Unity of th e Czechs and Slovaks: Has th e Pittsburgh Declaration Been Carried Out? (Prague: Orbis, 193 8). �SLOVAKIA 2019 29 The Slovaks should therefore be thankful that fate has made them dependent upon a race so efficient, so well-educated and well-disciplined as the Czechs ... .At the critical moment, the Slovaks made the impression of a helpless animal fascinated by the approach of the boa-constrictor, and Prague was literally the sole hope.-'0 On the Slovak question, Seton-Watson blamed the " hypersensitive" Slovaks as simply being too parochial, religiously backward and ill developed, and he dismissed autonomist arguments as the "wild talk of extremists." Even in a work of collected essays designed to "show that the Slovaks themselves have had a much greater share in the reconstruction of their country than is often supposed," Seton-Watson turned predominantly to centralist Slovaks whose contributions consisted mostly of self-promotion and praise for the merits of centralism.21 The American philanthropist and writer Kenneth D. Miller was another avid promoter of Czechoslovakism. "Everything points to the wisdom of a cultural as well as political union between the two nationalities. No matter what the cultural development may be, neither nationality can well maintain its political independence without the other." He likewise felt that the Slovak question would disappear with the development of the "slow, passive Slovak," who yet lacked initiative, and who was prone to immorality and drunkenness, and to "religious vagary or fanaticism." 22 Other presentations ranged from industrialist and diplomat John Crane, who attacked the "backward ignorance" of the Slovaks for resisting secularization, to YMCA secretary Fred Rindge who criticized a claimed lack of Slovak interest 20 R.W. Seton-Watson , Th e New Slovakia (Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924), 3, 23-4. R.W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 61. "Seton-Watson Open Letter to Hlinka" (Doc 108), in Seton-Watson, 343-4. "SetonWatson to Alois Kolisek" (Doc 135), in Seton-Watson, 401-2. R.W. Seton-Watson, ed. Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931). When planning the book, Seton-Watson expressed his desire to have an article from a SPP leader, so that Slovak autonomists could not accuse him of onesidedness. He considered an article on the issue of autonomy, but decided only to allow an article on Slovak religion by Hlinka. "Seton-Watson to Milan Hodza" (Docs 144 & 145), in Seton-Watson, 431-2 . 22 Kenneth D. Mill er, The Czecho-Slovaks in America (New York: Doran Company, 1922), 14-25, 121-122, 158-160. 21 �30 SLOVAK.IA 2019 in the arts. Journalist C.J.C. Street claimed, "The Slovak dream was always to regain their lost unity with the Czechs and as a united nation to secure the tolerable conditions of existence. " 23 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia pursued a few efforts during the interwar period to counter this campaign, although they lacked equivalent resources and connections to those held by Prague. The SPP' s most notable attempt was the Zilina Memorandum of 1922. Released to the western press and governments, the document sought to expose the Slovak question to the world, beginning with its sensationalist title, "a country doomed to death, a nation in her last agonies implores the civilized world for help." It decried the failures of Wilsonianism, which had allowed Prague to "bamboozle" the Slovaks "out of the freedom promised to them ." The text went on to explain their issues with the Czechs, discussing concerns from the treatment of religion, to economic exploitation, and the denial of autonomy. The memorandum also condemned Czechoslovakism as simply a tool for domination. The Czechs and Slovaks have been always forming two separate little worlds with a very different character due to their different geographical and economic conditions, their different way of thinking, of feeling and of mind. We have a different view of life, other morals and other traditions; we have a different social structure, different legal rules and different ideas about political economy and culture. The document ultimately claimed the world could still save the Slovaks if it acted quickly. The key of the iron cage in which the Slo vak Nation is being mercilessly incarcerated lays in the hands of the Great Powers. This memorial is our last expedient and our last weap23 John 0. Crane, "Church and State in Czechoslovakia" The Slavonic Review, 6, 17 (Dec. 1927), 364-78. Fred H. Rindge, Jr. "The Charm of Czechoslovakia" Current History, 22, 3 (June 1925), 447-50. C. J. C. Street, Slovakia Past and Present (Westm inster, UK: P.S. King & Son, 1928). For more examples, see: Robert Machray, "Czechoslova ki a a Pioneer in Central European Politics" Current Hislo ry, 25, 6 (Mar. 1927), 839-43 . J. H. Wallis, "The Upbuilding of Czechoslovakia," Curren/ Histo1y, 14, 5 (Aug. 192 1), 835-45 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 31 on ... Though only clad in the rags of our torn freedom we nevertheless appear as accusers before the world, charging the rulers of Prague who are still deluding the powers, and the powers themselves for having out of sheer ignorance become their accomplices. To ignore the Slovak case, thus, would be to support the trampling of liberty. 24 After the Zilina Memorandum bore no fruit, the Slovak autonomists pursued fewer efforts to court the west. They made a few sporadic attempts, such as a translation of the SPP •program in 1930, written by Jozef Tiso, which outlined the SPPs vision of a Slovak national Christian democracy, and appealed for autonomy as a protection of the Slovak cultural tradition. It argued that the Slovak nation's religious roots encouraged it toward a peaceful selfpreservation, unlike other nations that turned toward national chauvinism. 25 Slovak priest and publicist Anton Kompanek also produced an article that emphasized Slovak Christianity as a symbol of Slovak worthiness for self-government. Kompanek believed Slovakia served as an example of how the Church and state could find balance in the modem world. 26 These publications, however, remained exceptions, as the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia maintained little faith in western governments, recognizing Prague's stranglehold over their image internationally. They instead relied on the Slovak-Americans to lead the way in their defense internationally. Slovak nationalist politician Karol Sidor claimed that despite a continued interest in the homeland, the Slovak-Americans began to lose their "onetime vitality and ardor" during the interwar period. He linked this outcome to greater assimilation and a decreasing knowledge of the Slovak language.27 This claim is somewhat true. The energy of the war years certainly diminished, particularly in the 24 "Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 02) & "Covering Letter for the Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 03), in Seton-Watson, pp. 319-33 . 25 Jozef Tiso, The Ideology of th e Slovak Populist Party (Prague: 1930). 26 Anton Kompanek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia" Th e Sla vonic and East European Review, 12, 36 (April 1934), 611-21. 27 Sidor, "Slovak League," 59-62. �32 SLOVAKIA 2019 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression.28 Sidor, however, understated how much the Slovak-Americans remained at the forefront of the international efforts to gain recognition of the Slovak question. Historian Jozef Pauco 's interpretation is much more accurate: "For twenty years the Slovak League of America defended the spirit and letter of the Pittsburgh Pact and by using the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly on American soil, they did so more freely and energetically than the two political parties in their homeland." 29 Based on the volume of publications and direct communications with government officials on both side of the Atlantic, it is clear that the Slovak question continued to dominate the transatlantic interests of the Slovak Americans, as they bolstered their compatriots' activities within Czechoslovakia by applying external pressure on Prague. The Slovak fraternal organizations made constant efforts to keep their members linked to their Slovak cultural identity, and to aid in the fight for autonomy in the homeland. They pursued these efforts through education programs such as national lectures, art and photography tours, but also symbolic actions such as erecting a statue of General Milan R. Stefanik in Cleveland in 1924 and the planting of a Linden Tree on Capitol Hill in honor of Stefanik in 1934. 30 The Slovak question remained high on the list of Slovak-American concerns, and the various Slovak organizations produced a flurry of pamphlets and informative documents on the issue. The Pittsburgh Agreement remained at the center of this debate, with Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic continuing to affirm its legality against the centralist dismissals that it was simply a non-binding text designed to placate the Slovak-Americans during the war. Autonomist publica28 June Alexander, for example, shows how assimilation became an internal issue for Slovak-Americans, as the older generations struggled to assure that their American born children maintained links to their ethnic heritage. June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jn terwar Era (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004), 93-19 I. 29 Pauco, "S lovaks Abroad," 333-42. 30 "Ot. Svec to Podkrivacky," 3 Oct. 1938," PF: Adam Podkrivacky, SI. "S LA to Jakub Vitostak, 30 Nov 1923 ," The First Catholic Slovak Union of America (FCSU) Records, F: 1303, IHRC. "Jan Kocur to Michael Senko, 30 Nov 1926," FCSU, F: 1304, IHRC. 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastisla v Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924), 82-3 . "SLA to Arthur Colegrove," NSS, 8 : 168, F: SLA, IHRC. �SLOVAKIA 2019 33 tions looked to inform about the Slovaks, to expose the failed promises of Prague on autonomy, and to defend against the accusations of Prague centralists. The Slovak League remained at the forefront, hoping that exposure of the situation to the American press and pub1ic would spur sympathy and support? In many cases, the Slovak-Americans directed these publications at Prague, with the hope of convincing a change in policy . They, nevertheless, would consecutively produce English versions, which they then sent to the American President, members of Congress, the Department of State, and assorted press outlets. For example, in 1921 the SLA wrote to Masaryk calling for the immediate implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement. When Prague did not respond, the League followed up with a more detailed Memorandum on November 9, 1922. This document called on Prague to make good on the Pittsburgh Agreement in the name of natural rights and to reward the sacrifices made by Slovak-Americans during World War I. It highlighted Masaryk's role in the formation of the Agreement, and then provided a photograph of the original text as well as a series of letters between the SLA and various Czechoslovak officials that had promised its implementation to show how promises made to the Slovak-Americans never lived up to reality. The text then defended the legitimacy of Slovak autonomy. We are convinced that the honest and upright materialization of the Pittsburgh Pact in no way will harm the unity of the State; on the contrary it will mean a considerable reinforcement within and without and make possible united co-operation of all patriotic forces against the elements of disintegration, depriving them of a dangerous weapon, which they cannot effectively employ against the Republic, fanning discontent, mistrust and spreading hatred between both nations comprising the state. The League made clear, however, that this good will rested "solely upon a sincere Czecho-Slovak reciprocity." It then gave an alternative: 31 "Telegram to Ivan Bielek on 29 Nov 1934," NSS, B: 168, F: SLA , IHRC. �34 SLOVAKIA 2019 We feel it is our duty to emphasize that if our sincere and friendly attempt, which has at its heart the welfare, interest and future of the Republic, should fail to meet with success, the Slovak l eague of America would not be able to prevent the American Slovaks and their factors from turning to the Court of Public Opinion of the civilized world. While the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia acknowledged the letter, Prague neglected to respond. 32 The SLA then passed a follow-up resolution. Asserting that it "fights with fire and sword with everyone who is in favor of autonomy of the Slovak nation," it admonished Prague for manipulating the world into believing the Czechoslovakist image and for leading a smear campaign against the SLA. It then provided a list of examples of hostility, including efforts to undermine its finances , blackmail, the bullying of Slovak-American leaders and press, and attempts to send government officials to propagandize against them . It once again emphasized how the League had made every effort to resolve the Slovak question within the confines of the Czechoslovak Republic , but it would soon submit the issue "to the judgment of public opinion of the civilized world," if Prague continued to treat them with disdain.33 Many more publications followed. The Friends of Slovak Freedom , for example, released two protests in 1923. These texts defended the va lidi ty of the Slovak-Americans as representatives of the Slovak people, and condemned Prague's actions against Slovak autonomists, including such accusations as "false signatures or resolutions, false numbers of people attending their lectures, insulting the Slovak journalists, insulting the Slovak League as anti-state, and many other lies," as well as criticisms about press censorship in Slo- 32 SLA , Memorandum S/ovenskej Ligy v Amerike upra vene na vladu a Narodne Shromai denie Cesko-Slo venskej Republiky v zaujme vtelenia Pittsburgskej Dohody do ustavy C.-S. Republiky (Pittsburgh: Slovak League of America, 1922). Both the full Slovak and English versions of this Document are avai lab le at: SLA Cab, F: Memorandum /922 v Zaum e Pitts. Dohody, SI. Also avai lable in: " Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy v Arnerike" in Dokumenty, Vol 2, 138-44. 33 " An Appeal of the Slovak League of America to All Political Factors of th e Czecho-S lovak Republic," PF: Bielek, SI. �SLOVAKIA 2019 35 vakia. 34 After reading Masaryk's criticism of Hlinka, the Slovak League then produced a pamphlet that challenged the idea that Masaryk personally had liberated the Slovaks. It reminded readers of the Slovak-American war contribution, and then remarked how the SLA and the Pittsburgh Agreement were certainly valid in Masaryk's eyes when he needed Slovak-American support in 1918. The document then included a text from former Czechoslovak ambassador to Japan, Karel Pergler, arguing that both the Slovaks and Czechs had unequivocally recognized the Pittsburgh Agreement upon its signing. 35 Next to these direct appeals, the Slovak-American autonomists also released many publications geared directly toward an American audience. They designed these works to inform about the Slovaks, expose their continued fight for self-determination and to link the Slovak question to American democratic values. These publications included several biographies of Milan R. Stefanik, a translated history by Slovak historian Joseph Skultety that directly challenged images of Slovak backwardness and other stereotypes, and a short pamphlet on Czechoslovakism by Slovak-American historian Ol'ga Husek warning that the concept meant for the Slovaks "the rejection of their cultural past and the stunting of their future growth." 36 They also attempted to rally America to their cause by showing their valiance in the face of domination. An SLA article distributed to the American Press praised how the Slovak-Americans continued to fight even with "the entire machinery of government set against them, calumnies upon calumnies by a government subsidized press, heaped upon the heads of those who take up their cause, and bug- 34 Friends of Slovak Freedom, " Resolution, November 28, 1923," & " Protest against Censorship and Confiscation of Slovak Publications by the Government in Slovakia" in Pankuch , Slo vaks of Cleveland, l 82-6. 35 Slovenska Liga v Amerike, V Zaujme Pra vdy! (In the Interest of Truth !) (Pittsburgh: P. Jamriska, 1930). Found in : SLA Cabinet, F: SLA Presidents, SI. Prague responded to these letters, but it simply reasserted the usual rebutta ls, claiming that 75% of the Slovaks supported centralization and that the Pittsburgh Agreement was simply an American document. "Ohlas Americkeho Memoranda u Nas," 8 : Slovak League of America (SLA) , SI. 36 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastislav Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924). Andrew Slabey, General Milan R. Stefanik (Leisenring, PA: Griglak Printery, 1937). Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, O.D. Koreff, trans . (Middletown, PA : First Catholic Slovak Union, I 930) . Ol'ga Husek, The Czechoslovak Fallacy (Middletown, PA : Jednota, 1935). �36 SLOVAK.IA 2019 bears turned loose to scare those who are not acquainted with conditions. " 37 Religion became a major component of Slovak-American advocacy on the Slovak question in the interwar period. Slovak-American journalist Stephen J. Palickar published many articles in general Catholic publications, including a five-month tit-for-tat with Czech diplomat Josef Hane in defense of Slovak religiosity. He also provided some of the first Slovak-American attempts to link Slovak religiosity to anti-Communism. Palickar likewise defended Slovak agency, and appealed for a lifting of Prague centralism to allow the Slovaks an opportunity to prove their abi lity for self-government. 38 While most of these publications were shorter, more direct works, the Slovak-Americans released a couple of longer exposes on the Slovak question. The first, written by then SLA president Peter P. Hletko on behalf of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, looked to inform the American people about the Pittsburgh Agreement as an American product in line with "the principles of democracy and self-determination of small nations." Hletko praised how the Slovak "has an inherent love for liberty and freedom , and enjoys fostering his national spirit," which had spurred his immigration to America in a "quest for a land of true liberty," and he argued that American democracy had allowed the Slovaks in America to assert their national identity as an independent people. He asserted how the Slovaks had only joined the Czechoslovak movement on the premise that they would be treated fairly and as equals and highlighted a reg37 "The conflict between Czechs and Slovaks," NSS Records, B: 168, F: SLA, IHRC. For many examples, see: "The Slovaks- Past and Present," in Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism to Atheistic Czech Communism (Cambridge, MA : Hampshire Press, 1948), 40-3 . Stephen J. Palickar, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Slovak Standpoint," Current History, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-6. "A Dark Spot in Czecho-Slovakia," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 43-45 . "Who is Masaryk?," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 49-51 . "S lovakia-whither bound," in Palickar, Slovakia : From Hungarian Despotism, 76-83. "Slovak Catholicism vs. Czech Communism," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 84-86. "Slovak Grievance," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 70-72 . "President Masaryk and his State," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 61-62. "Scotus Viator Surveys Slovakia," in Palickar, Slo vakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 72-75. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia of Today (A Lecture), December 12, 1933 , Columbi a University (New York: Slovak Library Association, 1933). 38 �SLOVAKIA 2019 37 ular sense of duplicity and condescension the Slovaks felt from the Czechs. Hlekto praised the Pittsburgh Agreement as having resolved these conflicts, before Masaryk ultimately betrayed his promise, and he gave a detailed defense of its validity and of the right of the Slovak-Americans to speak for their nation during the war. 39 The Slovak-American autonomists shortly thereafter produced an even longer book on the topic . Written by Peter P. Hletko under the pseudonym , "An Autonomist," it served as the most exhaustive consideration of the Slovak question in Eng lish in the early 20 th century. Hletko placed blame on Czech intransigence for fueling the issue unnecessarily. The book argued that the Czechos lovak revolution relied on American money and manpower and "should the President (Masaryk) have failed to dispel the fear and dissatisfaction of the Slovaks through the Moscow and Pittsburgh Agreements, there certainly would not be a Czecho-Slovakia today. " The book then deconstructed Prague 's policies toward the Slovaks, to show Czechoslovakism as a means of hegemony. Hletko considered every issue from the Czech obfuscation on autonomy, the complicity of the Slovak centrali sts, the language issue, schools, and the economy, and he explained the claims of Slovak neediness and incompetence, as we ll as the claimed threat of Hungary, as only a fa<;:ade to justify Czech dominance. He likewise gave examples of Slovak intellectuals to dispute the claim that the Slovaks needed the Czechs to serve that role. He then detailed the domination of Slovakia's administration, civi l service, education system, and cultura l institutions by Slovak centralists and Czechs, and the press censorship and smear campaigns. Ultimately, he concluded that Czechoslovakism was undermining the state and mu st be reversed. Hletko concluded: Th e motive that has promoted us to write this work is not one of revenge, nor a desire to arouse bad feeling, but simply to expose falsehood and reveal truth. It is our sincere hope that, the truth being known, it will enable the Czechs and Slovaks to form a more stable union which will promote justice, trust, and good 39 Slovak Catholi c Federation of America, The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (S lovak Cath olic Federation of America, 1934). Joseph C. Krajsa, " Dr. Peter Hletko, Most Elite of American Slovaks," Slovakia, 22, 45 ( 1972), 57-9. �38 SLOVAKIA 2019 will, and thereby insure national integrity both at home and abroad. 40 A few non-Slovak publications did favor Slovak autonomy . For example, some historians of the First World War, such as Jan Opocensky and C. A. Macartney, attempted to present a balanced consideration of the Slovak question, giving voice to Slovak autonomist concerns.4 1 There were also several publications that utilized the Slovak question to criticize the broader Versailles system . Writer and journalist E. Alexander Powell , for example, highlighted the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks as an example of the precariousness of the region ' s political stability. Although not particularly admiring of the Slovaks, Powell was highly critical of the Czech treatment of them. He commented, "The Czechs, an energetic, ambitious, progressive, and aggressive people, who outnumber the Slovaks three to one, look with condescension, if not contempt, on their less literate, slower thinking, more easy-going partners, whom, if the truth be known , they regard as immensely inferior to themselves." These scholars all argued that the Czechs needed to treat their minorities with more respect and make good on promises for Slovak autonomy for the sake of the survival of the state. 42 A few works were even somewhat favorable to the Slovaks. One such example came from writer Kenneth L. Roberts , who after visiting Czechoslovakia complained, "The Czechs want to socialize everything in sight, and the Slovaks are not poignantly eager to be social- 40 An Autonomist, Slovakia 's Plea for Autonomy (Middletown, Pa: Slovak Literary Society, 1935). 41 Jan Opocensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Mon archy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak Stale (Prague: Orbis, 1928), 153-68, I 93-214. C. A. MaCartney, National States and National Min orities (London : Oxford Uni versity Press, 1934), 117, 201 ,208. 42 E. Alexander Powell , The Danger on th e Danube (New York: Century Company, 1928), 56-8, 62-8, 72-4. M. W. Fodor, South of Hiller (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1939). For oth er examples, see : C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-193 7 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937/ 1965), 73-148. Frank H. Simonds, Can Europe Keep th e Peace? (New York : Harper, I 93 I), 92-10 I. Isaiah Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, 4th ed. (Yonkers, NY : World Book, 1928). Harold Temperley, " How the Hungari an Frontiers were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 6, 3 (April 1928), 432-47 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 39 ized." Comparing the Czechs in Slovakia to U.S. Civil War carpetbaggers, he criticized the Czech administration of Slovakia, their denial of autonomy, and called out Czechoslovakism as a lie. He alternatively praised the Slovaks as "among the most attractive and lovable peasant people of the many I have seen." An article by journalist Robert Sage, after a visit to Slovakia, likewise chided the Czechs for using claims of generosi ty as a mirage for domination over Slovakia. 43 The SLA ultimately made good on its threat to take the issue to the world stage, presenting the Slovak question to the League of Nations in 1932. It produced a long legal brief, which appealed for a cessation of wrongdoing against the Slovaks and the granting of political and cultural autonomy. It then begged the League of Nations to recognize the Slovaks as an independent nation, to demand the implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement, to investigate ill treatment, and to grant recognition of the Slovaks as a true minority in Czechoslovakia. It pointed out how the Slovak-Americans had made multiple attempts to reach out to Prague to explain their concerns and offer an olive branch towards a solution, but that Prague had ignored their appeals and through censorship had silenced their brothers in Slovakia. The document then went on to detail the history of the founding of the state and the Pittsburgh Agreement, their complaints of ill-treatment against the Slovaks, and their view as to why the 44 Slovaks were an independent people. This appeal was unsuccessful. Slovak-Americans also regularly wrote to U.S. government officials. One such example was an "Open Letter" to Masaryk in 1923 that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America also sent to President Coolidge, members of Congress, all the embassies in Prague, and to the American press. The document started with an image of Masaryk approaching the Slovak-Americans as equals during the war, to 43 Kenneth L. Roberts, Europe's Morning After (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921 ), 121-73. Kenneth L. Roberts, Why Europe l eaves Home (New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1922), 28-31 . Robert Sage, "There's no such Nationality as Czecho-Slovak," Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 2, 1930, 6. For other examples, see: Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia / 918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 377-9. Alexander Szana, Die Geschichte der Slowakei (Bratislava: Grenzenbote Verlag, 1930). Robert Nowak, Der Kiinstliche Staal: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938). 44 "To the Supreme Council of the League of Nations at Geneva," SlA Cabinet, F: Supreme Council of the l eague of Na tions at Geneva, 1932, SI. �40 SLOVAKIA 2019 which they responded with loyalty and support. Masaryk then betrayed them, treating the Slovaks "in step-mother fashion, nay, even like slaves," having lured them into "an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and to us 'ignorant' Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred." It bemoaned that the Slovaks again felt endangered in their national existence, and how the Czechs misled the world on the issue. It appealed for Masaryk "to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised us, the American Slovaks," for the sake of Czech-Slovak unity and the secu45 rity of the state. This letter elicited a response from the Slovak-American centralists. The National Slovak Society, the Slovak Sokol, and assorted editors produced a counter response to Masaryk, which they then sent to Coolidge and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. This document asserted open support for the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation. It criticized the SCF letter for having "a spirit of narrow sectarianism," in contrast to "the great majority of the American Slovaks," who supported Masaryk "heart and soul." The document praised Masaryk and the Czechoslovak state for bringing cultural and economic development to Slovakia and it mentioned the centralist Slovaks in the government as a sign of Czech inclusiveness. The text also apologized for the Czech administration of Slovakia, bemoaning that Slovakia lacked enough competent officials. It then claimed that Prague had carried out the Pittsburgh Agreement in full , adding that "during the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they demanded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks." 46 To the frustration of the Slovak autonomists, this campaign barely registered among U.S. officials in Washington. American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Prague paid slightly more attention, although most addressed it only passively and most often from the Czechoslo45 Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-S/ovak Republic (Slovak Catholic Federation of America : 1923). Found in : "Einstein to SoS, No. 611 ," 20 February 1924, F#: 860F.0l / 162, DoS CS 1910-44. The New York Times reported on the letter: " Slovak Protest to All Nations," New York Times, Mar. 12, 1924, 34. 46 National Slovak Society, et al. , An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia ( I 924), in "Joseph Jan eek to Coolidge," 3 May 1924, F# : 860F.0l / 164, Dos cs 1910-44 �SLOVAKIA 2019 41 vakist perspective. The American Ambassador during the 1920s, Lewis Einstein, for example, reported on the SCF letter, misrepresenting it as "a violent indictment of Czech policy in Slovakia," and praised Prague for "accomplishing there a work of civilization. By introducing education and schools in a population where a high degree of illiteracy existed, by bringing in public hygiene, orderly justice and a better fiscal system, they are laying the foundations for the future. " Accordingly, in his view the Slovaks only needed proper education to unify with the Czechs . Ultimately, "Only one thing can be excluded, which is Slovakian autonomy." 47 In another attempt at outreach, Adam Podkrivacky as President of the FCSU wrote to John Hickerson, acting Chief of Western European Affairs at the U.S . State Department. Podkrivacky complained about the U.S. Consul General in Prague sending out correspondence to Slovakia in the Czech language instead of Slovak. He also requested that the State Department use the hyphen when writing 'Czecho-Slovakia. ' Podkrivacky then supplied Hickerson a copy of an autonomist political pamphlet, to "acquaint better with the political situation just as it exists between the Slovaks and the Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia." Hickerson forwarded the letter to the embassy in Prague and asked for a report on the Slovak question. Charge d' affaires J. Web Benton responded, declaring the letter unacceptable due to the threat posed by Czechoslovakia's neighbors. He also made the usual ethnographic arguments, adding how "Czech culture has contributed measurably to the advancement of Slovakia," and predicted the issue would dissipate. Benton dismissed the pamphlet as simply "anti-government propaganda ... the request for autonomy, in the sense of a separate parliament as mentioned in the Pittsburgh Pact, is something that no truly patriotic and far-seeing Slovak could at present afford to advocate." He added, "I assume that the Department will pay no further attention to his communications, but it seems not inopportune to observe that Czech is the official language of this country."48 While a few U.S. diplomats from the period, notably Lewis Einstein, came to develop a more nuanced view on the topic, this ended each time new embassy staff took over. 47 "Einstein to SoS , No . 611 ," DoS CS 1910-44. "Adam Podkrivac ky to John Hickerson," 29 March 1937, F#: 860F.0l / 18 1, DoS CS 1910-44. " Movement for Slovak Autonomy," 30 April 1937, F#: 860F .01 /184, DoS CS 1910-44. 48 �42 SLOVAKIA 2019 The dismissal of Slovak-American pleas stood in contrast to a disproportionate concern among American officials about the proHungarian Slovaks living abroad. The Rothermere campaign spurred some interest, and while some Americans expressed some sympathy to it, including chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Borah and publisher William Randolph Hearst, the U.S. Embassy in Prague wrote profusely about how the Slovaks remained opposed to a return to Hungary. When the exiled nationalist communist Slovak Vince Mihalus created an exile Slovak government in 1928, the State Department gave him disproportionate consideration, even though he held little popular support in Slovakia. Jehlicka reached out to Washington, calling for support against "Czech tyranny" and requesting support for recognition of the Slovaks as a minority in the League of Nations. The Czechoslovak embassy directed the State Department in its response, simply informing U.S. officials that Jehlicka only organized a "small number of Slovak renegades, mostly of Hungarian origin." 49 This flurry of publishing was very much a product of the widespread transatlantic interaction between Slovakia and the United States, as Slovak leaders on both sides of the Atlantic travelled between Europe and North America as they attempted to coordinate common political action. In the early 1920s, Prague still had hopes of guiding the Slovak-Americans to the centralist cause, despite the sentiment building against it. One major effort was the creation of a Slovak League in Slovakia by centralist Slovaks, designed to serve 49 Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban exchanged several letters with Hearst on the issue, facilitated by the State Department, eventually convincing Hearst to no longer give a voice to Rothermere and his supporters. "Einstein to SoS, No. 1355," 30 July 1927, F#: 860F.4016/4, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Butler Wright to SoS, No. 62," 15 Oct 1927, F#: 860F.4016/9, DoS CS 1910-44. "Vladimir Hurban to William Randolph Hearst," 27 May 1937, & " Hurban to Cordell Hull," 4 June 1937, F#: 860F.00/437 & 438 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Council of State of Slovakia to SoS," 6 Nov 1928, F#: 860F.01 / 171 & 172, DoS CS 1910-44. "Nelson Torsler Johnson to Einstein," 28 Jan 1929, F#: 860F.01 / 171 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1747," 28 Feb 1929, F#: 860F.0l/173, DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1756," 9 Mar 1929, F#: 860F.0l / 174, DoS CS 1910-44. "Washburn to SoS, No. 2153." "Einstein to SoS, No. 516," 20 Sep 1923, F#: 860F.00/2 14, DoS CS 1910-44. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 30 July 1933, F#: 860F.00/345, DoS CS 1910-44. "Prentiss B. Gilbert to SoS, No. 650," 8 Aug 1933 , F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 191044. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 29 Aug 1933, F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 1910-44. �SLOVAKIA 2019 43 as a counterpart to the SLA and to build common action across the Atlantic. This effort failed, however, after the Slovak League of America refused to cooperate with it. 50 With autonomist sentiment among the American Slovaks sharpening, Prague sent Slovak centralist leader Vavro Srobar to the United States in 1923. While Srobar attempted to unify the Slovak-Americans behind centralism, his visit had the opposite effect of galvanizing the Slovak-American autonomists. Srobar received support from sympathetic groups such as the Slovak Sokol, but the SLA and other autonomist organizations boycotted his speeches. Prague sent other figures to agitate for centralism, including the priest Jozef Rudinsky and agrarian politician Fedor Ruppeldt. Seton-Watson also reached out to the SlovakAmericans in several letters and later in a visit in 1935 , during which he appealed to the Slovak-Americans to encourage the Slovaks in . · 51 SI ova k ia against autonomy. The efforts by centralists did not change the status quo, as the Slovak-American autonomists remained firm in their opinions and openly repudiated centralist arguments. Pankuch, for example, felt that the only result of Srobar's visit was to destroy Czech-Slovak 52 unity and the internal unity of the Slovak-Americans. Ruppelt in tum complained how even among the Slovak Lutherans he constantly had to fight against autonomist sentiment. 53 With the dividing lines firmly set, the Slovak-American centralists and autonomists quit mutual involvement in each other's organizations and the centralists began a continuous propaganda campaign against the SLA backed by Prague. For example, after Slovak-American autonomists 50 Ignac Gessay, Kratke Dejiny S/ovenskej Ligy Na S/ovensku: od Zalozenia po 1. 0kt. 1926 (Bratislava: Slovenska Liga na Slovensku, 1926). "Nova ohlavka- stary kon. Pozor na Slovensku ligu!" 27 Oct 1924, Bratislava (No 68), in Jozef Tiso, Prejavy a Clanky (1913-193 8), eds. Miroslav Fabricius & Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Historicky 'ustav SA V, 2002),), 196-7. 51 "An Appeal ," PF: Bie/ek, SI. Pankuch, Histo ry, 177-86. "Seton-Watson to Vojtech Mastny" (Doc 124), in Seton -Watson, 375-6. "Odkaz Scotus Viatora Americkym Slovakom" (Doc 125), in Seton-Watson, 377-80. "Seton-Watson to Stefan Osusky "' (Doc 128) & "Osusky to Seton-Watson" (Doc 129), in Seton-Watson, 3857. Mikus, "Slovak League," 46-7. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 1864-1926 (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarne Sv. Andreja, 1934), 503-5 . Palickar, "Czech and Slovak." Tomas Capek, Nase Amerika (Prague: Nakladem Narodni Rady Ceskoslovenske, 1926), 113. 52 Pankuch, History, 180. 53 " Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc 149), in Seton-Watson, 441-2 . �44 SLOVAKIA 2019 confronted him, Srobar reportedly lashed out at them as "knownothing drunkards" and traitors against the Republic. 54 While the Slovaks in America had been legitimate Slovaks when Masaryk needed them during the war, once they became a threat, the centralists began to categorize them as United States citizens, whose influence should not extend beyond America. 55 When the Czechoslovak Government offered a special commendation to the SLA on Czechoslovakia's l 0th anniversary in 1928, for its role in the creation of the state, the Slovak League of America rejected it. 56 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia perceived things quite differently. Many Slovak nationalist leaders believed that the nation as an ethnic and cultural foundation transcended the state, and offered regular praise of the Slovak-Americans as fighters for Slovak liberty and autonomy. Figures such as Hlinka and Lutheran autonomist leader Emil Stodola openly praised the Slovak-Americans and their role in the fight for autonomy, and argued that their past actions allowed the American Slovaks an equal right to speak about the fate of the Slovak homeland. 57 SPP leader Jozef Tiso extolled, "In this (Pittsburgh) agreement we see the heritage of our own American brothers, for which we will fight with the honor and the tenacity of the Slovak spirit, which is not intimidated by prison, the malice of the world, nor the cynicism of centralist agents." Tiso praised the "real Slovak patriots," working in the "free air of America," and he even posited that the Slovak-Americans had a better claim to speak for the Slovaks than the Slovak centralists did, because the SlovakAmericans had made the revolution successful with their blood, treasure and propaganda.58 Slovak scholars also published multiple 54 "A. S. Ambrose to Seton-Watson" (Doc 126) in Seton-Watson, 381-2. "Aby uz raz bolo jasno a aby prestaly r6zne narknutia proti Slov. Lige," PF: Bielek, SI. 55 Masaryk, for example, used such logic to dismiss the Pittsburgh Agreement, which he called a "local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks," whose "signatories were mainly American citizens, only two of them being nonAmericans." Masaryk, Making, 208-11. 56 Stolarik, Where is my Hom e?, 98 . 57 "Hlinka on Scotus Viator" (Doc 109), in Seton-Watson, 345-53. Emil Stodola, Pre/om: Spomienky, Uvahy, Studie (Praha: L. Mazac, 1933), 193-4. 58 "Novy vykrik bratov z Ameriky," 24 Feb 1924, Bratislava (No 43), in Tiso, Prejavy, 157-9. " Pittsburghska dohoda - neplatna?!" 29 May 1924, Bratislava (no 57), in Tiso, Prejavy, 179-80. "Parliamentary Speech," 25 Nov 1931, Prague (No I 64), in Ti so, Preja vy, 347. "Speech to Public Assembly of the Slovak People 's �SLOVAKIA 2019 45 studies of the Slovak-Americans and their role m Slovak national development. 59 Slovak autonomists openly expressed these sentiments through regular trips to the United States. These attempts at direct engagement were nonetheless slow to start. Prague regularly prevented such trips, including the denial of a passport to Bishop Jan Vojtassak out of concern that he would agitate for autonomy and collect money for the SPP while in the United States. The barrier broke in 1926 when Hlinka accepted an invitation to visit America from editor Jozef Husek and the Friends of Slovak Freedom, sponsored by the SLA, the FCSU, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (FCSLU). Hlinka desired to visit the United States to thank the Slovak-Americans in person for their support for Slovak self-determination, to explain firsthand the political situation in Slovakia, and to encourage them to keep fighting. After stalling on the process, Prague ultimately relented to avoid the resulting outrage had they refused. They issued Hlinka a passport to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. Hlinka's visit lasted from June 5 to October 13. Although Hlinka expressed some trepidation that Slovak-American centralists would treat him with hostility, Slovak-American autonomist leaders Josef Husek and Anton Kompanek convinced him the experience would prove the opposite. This claim proved true, as Hlinka received hundreds of invitations to speak to overflowing crowds on each occasion. Demand was so high that, then SLA president Ivan Bielek had to write an article emphasizing Hlinka's time limitations to try to tame expectations. During his visit, Hlinka travelled around the U.S. East and Midwest, visiting local Slovak communities. He regularly attended and celebrated Mass and held meetings with SlovakAmerican organizations, including the SLA from whom he received an honorary membership . Hlinka visited assorted Slovak-American institutions, surveying Slovak-American newsrooms, printeries, Party," 18 August 1937 & 25 August 1937, Bratislava (No 251 & 252), in Tiso, Prejavy, 523-4. "Nase narodnopo liticke palladium," 5 June 1938 (No 260), in Tiso, Prejavy, 543-4. Kon stantin Culen, Po Sviitop/ukovi druha nasa h/ava: Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947), 182-3. 59 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Ruzomberok: Rudinsky, 1921 ). Karol Sidor, S/ovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava: Jednota, 1928). Matica Slovenska, S/ovenskej verejenosti v Amerike (Mati ca slovenska , 1937). Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarei'l Andreja, 193 7) . �46 SLOVAK.IA 2019 schools, and churches. Overall, Hlinka held rallies at 80 locations, gave 200 speeches, and visited more than 100 Slovak parishes. Hlinka's visit spurred a level of excitement and activity among the Slovak-Americans that would never recur. 60 Hlinka kept his goal of directly exposing the Slovak question during his visit. He regularly spoke on the issue, and carried a copy of a censored Slovak nationalist newspaper as evidence. During his visit, Hlinka could not help but contrast the image of America with his experience in Czechoslovakia. In one such speech, he made clear that the Slovaks .. . would prefer not to quarrel with the Bohemians, but when they preach democracy and at the same time practice deceptions and aggression, we have no choice but to oppose them ... America is a superior nation and a master democratic republic. It has a splendid constitution which not only guarantees the rights and liberties to the people, but sees that they get them as well. Hlinka likewise extolled the "firm individuality" that the SlovakAmericans had gained, and he highlighted the sense of natural connection between Slovaks and Americans. "A good Slovak who comes to America makes a good American, and all good SlovakAmericans, including the new generations born in America from Slovak extraction will appreciate what they have inherited from their Slovak ancestry. Neither will they forget Slovakia." In his farewell speech, Hlinka expressed how the Slovak-Americans had filled him with national pride. He affirmed, "I saw the large affl uence of Slovaks, these Slovaks who under the Tatras suffered from hardship and physical and spiritual want," and prai sed how they helped sustain the Slovak nation. He finally asked of them, "do not forget that under the Tatras stand your cradle and your old homeland, our hard-tested and suffering Slovakia!" 61 60 Adamec, "Slovak Catholic Federation ," 223-32. Sidor, Hlinka, 503-5, 510-1 I, 543 -52 . Sidor, "The Slovak League," 57-9. Mikus, "S lovak League," 46-7 . Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 65 -74. 61 Palickar, " Monsignor Hlinka- The Man," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 51-6, 55 . Palickar, " My Interview with Msgr. Hlinka," in Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 56-9. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 543-52. �SLOVAKIA 2019 47 In the 1930s, the Slovak-Americans experienced a few more visits from notable figures. One such visit was from the Slovak cultural organization Matica slovenska, in 1935 . The Slovak-Americans had regular contact with the Matica in the 1920s and there remained regular efforts to create an American branch of the organization.62 With the outbreak of the Great Depression, however, interest and funding for Slovak cultural programs in America declined. The Matica decided a visit to America was necessary to reverse thi s process, which they interpreted as the Slovak-Americans becoming too Americanized. The organization ' s director, the writer Jozef C. Hronsky, led the delegation, but it also included historian Konstantin Culen, and the artist Jozef Cincik, among others. These individuals gave many lectures and supplied ample literature and art, including a donation of libraries of Slovak material to the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago.63 While they found that some second and third generation Slovak-Americans had lost touch with Slovak culture, the delegates gave high praise to the Slovak-Americans for the interest they showed in the lectures, music, art and other cultural information the Matica provided. The experience led Culen to adopt the task of writing a history of Slovak-Americans. The linguist Jozef G. Konus likewise noted how "the Slovak spirit opens up more in free America than the lush fantasie s at home could imagine." When the White House wrote a statement for a Slovak-American information brochure praising the Slovaks as a "healthy minded, freedomloving and determined people," the Matica hailed it as evidence of Slovak democratic bona tides. Ultimately, the delegation praised the trip as very much a success, and took back ample material on the Slovak-Americans for placement in the Slovak National Library. The Matica left satisfied that Slovak culture remained firm in America, although it put pressure on the Slovak-Americans to improve their direct cultural linkages with the homeland. 64 62 To see many examples of this communicati on, see: The Ma tica slovenskti, Martin, Slovakia, re: American Slovaks Papers, IHRC . 63 According to Mark Stol arik, th e Mati ca brought 84 crates of books, totaling 4 I ,000 volumes, while visiting 98 separate Slovak-American communities. Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home?, 96-100. 64 "Vianoce Maticnej delegacie," Slovensko, 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 87-8. Konstantin Culen, "Co m6ze dat' Amerika slovenskej historii ," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 87-8. Jozef C. Hronsky, " Mati ca v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (March 1936), 110-13. Jozef G. Konus, " Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), I I6-18 . �48 SLOVAK.IA 2019 The final major figure to visit America was the Reverend Jozef Tiso in 1937, with the Catholic cultural organization Spolok Sv. Vojtecha. Much like Hlinka, Tiso celebrated mass and heard confessions during his visit, spoke at public assemblies and met with many American priests, journalists, and Slovak-American leaders. He also attended other broader Catholic events, including the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and met with the Papal delegation in Washington, D.C. Tiso made a broad effort to learn about American political life, to determine what Slovak leaders could transfer back to Slovakia. He particularly admired American technical prowess in organization and publishing, which he saw as facilitating a more efficient Catholic organization and action, and conceptualized a plan to send young Slovak leaders to America to learn American methods of organization. Tiso also praised the Slovak-American sense of independence and pride in their Slovak identity. Seeing how the Slovaks had developed on independent terms in the vast American melting pot, Tiso interpreted the Slovak-American experience as proof of Slovak capabilities and their merit for self-determination. Tiso never gave up his sense of solidarity with the Slovak-Americans, and referenced his visit to affirm his desired direction for the Slovaks. 65 The only visit to the United States by a Slovak official to gamer much attention from Washington was Srobar's in 1923. American diplomat Einstein provided notice of the visit, adding that it was "doubtless intended to counteract the seditious anti-Czech propaganda which has been going on for some time both in Slovakia, where it is fomented by Magyar intrigues, and among the Slovak clericals in the United States." Although, he noted that the Slovak autonomy movement remained "noisy and violent in its methods but unaided it can do little and it is not at present causing here any serious conJozef G. Konu s, "Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 116-18. Jozef Hronsky, "Na margo americkeho zapisnika," S/o vensko, 2, IO & I I (June-July 1936), 177-80. Jozef Cincik, "Na margo americkeho zapisnaka," Slo vensko , 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-6. " Maticna vystava v Clevelande," Slo vensko, 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-4. " President Roosevelt pozdravuje slovensky narod," Slovensko , 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 79. "Slovenska Amerika sa hybe," S/ovensko, 4, 3 (Nov 1937), 32-3. "SLA to Sku ltety, I June 1935,".PF: Mamatey, SI. Stolarik, "Slovak League." J.A. Berta, "Slovak America and the Matica Slovenska," Furdek, 23 (1984), 163-71. 65 Culen, Po Sviiloplukovi, 182-9. "Speech about the state account balance from 1926," 23 February 1938, Prague (No 258), in Tiso, Prejavy, 533-6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 49 cem." 66 Several Slovak-American autonomists wrote to the State Department to complain about Srobar's visit, including a letter from a Slovak-American World War I veteran asking the Department to halt Srobar's lectures for sowing discord among the Slovaks in the United States. The most notable letter, however, came from the Reverend John Porubsky on behalf of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association. Porubsky criticized Srobar's claimed "cultural visit" as a ruse to propagandize on behalf of Czechoslovakism. He presented it as part of an effort by Prague, "To inoculate the masses of our people in America as a contracting party with such misconception and ethnographical nonsense," and to discredit the Pittsburgh Agreement. Claiming that Srobar "forgot the scope of his mission, even forgot himself in outbursts against leading Slovak American gentlemen, calling them vile names unworthy of a man of his position," Porubsky asked Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to have him expelled from the country.67 This effort also spurred a response by Prague and its allies in the United States. These letters, in an organized campaign, all repeated versions of the same arguments. They complained that the opposition to Srobar consisted of "Jesuits and Bolsheviks" and other "enemies of the state" that were working for Czechoslovakia's destruction. Srobar was, alternatively, a great statesman fighting against them to bring cultural development to Slovakia. They also personally targeted Porubsky and the Slovak Newspapermen's Association: "The great majority of intelligent American Slovaks are heart and soul in accord with Dr. Srobar's patriotic works; only the ignorant and reactionary masses are ignobly and ignorantly supporting the destructive work of Rev. Porubsky and his few brawling associates." 68 Likewise, the Slovak Sokol, which had arranged Srobar's visit from the American end, took credit for the visit, praising how Srobar had "proved to 66 " Einstein to SoS, No. 502 ," 29 Aug 1923, F#: 860F .0 I/ I 48, DoS CS 1910-44. "John Porubsky to Charles Evans Hughes," 31 Oct 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/149, DoS CS 1910-44. "John J. Nedorostek to Hughes," 13 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01/150, DoS cs 1910-44. 68 "V. Krali cek to Hughes," 12 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 151 , DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Joscak to Hughes," 14 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 154, DoS CS 1910-44. "Henry Russek to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/156, DoS CS 1910-44. "C lement lhrisky & Joscak to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/152, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Kovalovsky to Hughes," 16 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/157, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Olsavicki to Hughes," 19 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/ 155, DoS CS 1910-44. 67 �50 SLOVAKIA 2019 the Slovaks of America that any fears as to the future of their former country are unfounded." 69 The State Department only sent back formulaic verification of receipts to these letters, except for one to John Zeman of the Slovak Sokol, thanking him for "setting forth the real purposes of the visit." William Phillips then requested President Coolidge to meet with Srobar, calling him "one of the five men who founded the Republic of Czechoslovakia," to which Coolidge obliged. 70 In 193 7, the Reverend Francis Dubosh of Lakewood, Ohio, attempted to arrange a meeting between officers of the SCF A, Jozef Tiso, and President Roosevelt, with the help of Monsignor Michael J. Ready at the Catholic University of America. The White House staff supported this meeting, but Roosevelt wanted to first confirm with the State Department so as not "to get mixed up in a Slovak controversy." After consulting with Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban, the State Department reported that the embassy made no official complaint, but that they themselves discouraged the visit with "the opinion that these persons are not of sufficient prominence for the President to receive them." After a back and forth in consideration of the issue, the White House ultimately declined, claiming 71 that the President was simply too busy. The Slovak-Americans also visited Slovakia. The most significant of these occurred in 193 8 in the tense period leading up to the Munich Agreement, when the Slovak League sent a delegation to celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Led by its President, Peter P. Hletko, the delegation, as a deliberate gesture, made its first formal visit in Slovakia to Andrej Hlinka in Rufomberok. The delegation travelled into Slovakia through Poland, to 69 "J. Zeman to Hughes," 18 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01 / 153 , DoS CS 1910-44. "W. R. Castle to Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America," 6 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l49, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. B. Wright to Kralicek," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/15I, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Joscak," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.01/l54, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Zeman," I Dec 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l53 , DoS CS 191044. "William Phillips to G. B. Slemp, 12 Nov 1923," & "Slemp to Phillips, 12 Nov 1923," Coolidge Papers, Series I, 742. 71 "Roosevelt to M. H. McIntyre, 22 Oct 1937," " McIntyre to George F. Summerlin, 23 Oct 193 7," "Spruks to Summerlin, 27 Oct 193 7," "McIntyre to Roosevelt, 29 Oct 1937," "McIntyre to Summerlin, 3 Nov 1937," President 's Personal File (PPF), F: 639, Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDR), Hyde Park, New York. 70 �SLOVAKIA 2019 51 avoid Prague and Bratislava, and the Polish government hosted the delegation on their way through. Both the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak centralists sent representatives to corral them before they entered Slovakia. The centralists were, however, sent back early after Warsaw and Slovak-Americans embraced the SPP delegation as the official one. After arriving in Slovakia, the delegation showed the original of the Pittsburgh Agreement to Hlinka and spent most of the trip associating with the Slovak autonomists. Its activities included several visits to the Matica slovenska in Martin, to which it gifted an authenticated copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement and made clear commitments toward transatlantic cultural programs, including joint publications and a transatlantic cultural council. Prime Minister Milan Hodza also led a continued effort to meet and work with the visiting delegation, believing he could convince them to break their close affiliation with the SPP and align with the Agrarians instead. Out of respect, the delegation did meet with centralist officials, including Hodza and President Eduard Benes, whom they encouraged the granting of autonomy to Slovakia for the sake of unity in those very tense times. In a speech in Prague, Hletko made clear their objectives stating, "Our love for Slovakia and the Czechoslovak Republic has induced us to come here. The object of the Pittsburgh Declaration, the original of which we have brought with us, is not to weaken but to strengthen the Republic ." 72 When describing his meetings, Hletko said that Hodza promised a movement towards autonomy, yet Prague still rejected them. 73 Likewise, Ivan Derer was extremely critical of the SlovakAmericans during their visit, accusing them of having been brainwashed. He also dismissed them as representing a small, vocal minority, and smeared them as deliberate Hungarian, German, or Polish agents, if not otherwise simply duped by the machinations of these neighboring rivals. Derer complained, "This delegation, composed most of autonomists, expressed its separatist convictions during every opportunity, expressed anti-Czech interests, made light of work of 72 "Visit of American Slovak Delegation to Jubilee Congress, Bratislava; Slovak Demands for Autonomy," 6 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/534, DoS CS 1910-44. 73 Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. "Narodna Politika Roku 1938 : Ked Bol P. Hletko na Slovensku," B: Karol Sidor - Diplomat 1901-1958 - Vol 2, SI. Pavel KuklisKunovsky, Ako je na Slovensku ? Z vlastnych skusenosti napisa/ a vydal v mesiaci )uni /940 v Pittsburghu, Pa., U.S.A. (Pittsburgh: Narodne noviny, 1940), 4-7. �52 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the Czechoslovak government successes in Slovakia, ironized Czechoslovak oriented Slovaks." He was extremely derisive of Hletko, accusing him of not being truly Slovak, having been born in the United States, and as being "politically inexperienced, unknowledgeable about the conditions of Europe, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia." 74 The SLA visit culminated in the Jubilee Congress for the anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement on June 4, 1938 in Bratislava. A massive rally was organized where Hlinka, Tiso, and Hletko, among others, gave speeches. A large facsimile of the Pittsburgh Agreement surrounded on each side by the American and Slovak flags served as a backdrop. In his speech, Hletko showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement to the crowd, and praised the attention given to the Agreement. A formal proposal by the SPP in the Czechoslovak Parliament to amend the constitution to implement Slovak autonomy then followed. The centralists, led by Hodza, held a counter-rally two days later. They declared the rally more ambiguously as a celebration of the Slovak farmer, although Prague and the centralists promoted the event afterwards as a pro-state rally in opposition to autonomy. The SLA delegation also attended this celebration and Hletko gave a speech, simply affirming that the SLA continued to work for Slovak freedom . Hletko later claimed that the delegation warned the Czech and Slovak leaders they had met about the need to come to an accommodation on the Slovak question, in favor of autonomy, fearing that the issue might become larger with Adolph Hitler rattling his saber. Hletko claimed, however, that no one took this warning seriously. The delegation departed shortly before Hlinka's death in August of 1938, but the SPP sent a piece of earth from Hlinka's graveside to America. 75 74 Ivan Derer, S/ovensky vyvoj a /ud'acka zrada (Prague: K vasnicka a Hamp) , 1946), 183-9 . Derer was convinced the SLA was part of a Polish conspiracy to absorb Slovaki a, led by Karol Sidor. The SLA, however, openly rebuked Polish calls for absorption of Slovakia during its stop th ere. 75 The exact number of participants in each rally is unclear, but most accounts reflected similar participation rates (around one hundred thousand each) and photos of the Slovak Jubilee show a massive crowd. The urn containing the soil is still on display at the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. " Wilbur Carr to SoS, no 122," 9 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/518, DoS CS 1910-44. " Farmers' Day at Bratislava; Demonstration of Slovak Branch of Czechoslovak Agrarian Party," IO June 1938, F#: 860F.00/531 , DoS CS 1910-44. " Po odchode delegatov Slov- �SLOVAKIA 2019 53 The U.S. Embassy took an interest in the SLA visit to Czechoslovakia in 1938, and U.S . Ambassador Wilbur Carr agreed to meet with the delegation. Carr reported that the visit was cordial and that the delegation affirmed to him that its visit was simply to promote good will and it did not desire to interfere in domestic issues in Czechoslovakia. Carr then stated that the SLA's visit to Czechoslovakia annoyed Prague, due to the enflamed minority issues of the time, but that Czechoslovak officials tried to maintain good will with the delegation, although this sentiment "lacked a ring of sincerity." Accordingly, Hletko admitted to Carr that the timing was not the best, but that it was not by design, since they had come simply for the anniversary celebration. Carr expected no harm from the visit. While Carr described the autonomy proposal and reported statements by Hletko and Jozef Rusek complementing the support of the Pittsburgh Agreement among the Slovaks, he countered by providing the text of an anti-autonomy speech by Derer and a section of Masaryk' s memoirs. Carr then misrepresented the Slovak-Americans as having felt embarrassed for having been "utilized by the Hlinka Party for partisan and election purposes." While Carr reported on each of the two rallies, he praised the Farmer's Day as turning into "a spontaneous demonstration of Czechoslovak unity, homage to Benes, and allegiance and confidence in its leader," hostility to autonomy, and featuring a much larger participation.76 While Czech and Slovak centralists worked to keep the SlovakAmericans at a distance after early efforts to court them failed, the Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic worked around Prague to coordinate their activities. Nevertheless, the autonomists had no means of pushing Prague towards changes on the Slovak question. The Slovak autonomists, however, continued their fight and never gave up. The transatlantic Slovak question during the interwar period established the roots for the eventual Slovak-Czech split. The failure to find a compromise between Slovak autonomists and centralists saw an entrenched distrust that contributed to the fall of the First Republic . When the Munich Agreement formally handed the enskej Ligy v Amerike," Slovensko, 5 ( I 939), 16-17. Sidor, "The Slovak League," 59-62. 76 "Carr to SoS , no 112," 31 May 1938, F#: 860F.00/5 l 0, DoS CS 1910-44. "Visit of American Slovak." "Carr to SoS, no 121 ," 8 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/517, DoS CS 1910-44. "Carr to SoS , No 122." "Farmers ' Day. " �54 SLOVAKIA 2019 Sudetenland to Germany in September of 1938, the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia demanded and received autonomy until the new SPP-led government there declared independence on March 14, 1939, following Nazi Germany's invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovak-American autonomists, although distrustful of Nazi Germany, openly embraced the shift toward Slovak autonomy in the shortlived Second Republic, believing they could no longer trust the Czechs. Peter Hletko, for example, cheered how the Slovaks had "fought and won the victory." 77 Although initially hesitant to support complete independence, most Slovak-American autonomists, the moderates excepted, came to support the World War II Slovak State as a symbol of Slovak self-determination, even as they supported Allied victory in the war. While World War II and the subsequent Cold War limited direct linkages between Slovakia and North America, the same rifts on the Slovak question persisted on both sides of the Atlantic until the 1993 Velvet Divorce. 78 77 Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 6574. 78 For more on this topic during World War II and beyond, see: Michael Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on the Slovak Question, I 9 I 4-/ 948 (PhD Diss., University of Co lorado-Boulder, 20 13 ). M. Mark Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35. � 18 SLOVAKIA 2019 THE TRANSATLANTIC SLOVAK QUESTION DURING THE INTERW AR YEARS Michael Cude The relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs is an issue that has persisted through the modem hi story of the two peoples. From the 19 th century ' national awakenings ' in Austria-Hungary to the Velvet Divorce between the Slovaks and Czechs in 1993, this 'Slovak question' was at the center of key events, including the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, its breakup and reestablishment after World War II, and the 1968 Prague Spring. 1 While many recent works have addressed the Slovak question, many have underappreciated the extent to which modem Slovak national identity formation was a transatlantic phenomenon. Historians examining this topic from the domestic Slovak perspective rarely delve deeply beyond Slovak borders, while histories of Slovaks abroad have focused predominantly on the Slovaks' place as immigrant communities . In doing so, such histories overlook how interlinked Slovak national politics in Slovakia were to Slovak communities abroad, particularly in North America, and the critical role they played in shaping Slovak national identity formation. Addressed by only a handful of recent works, the transatlantic Slovak question requires more attention.2 1 Reference key for shortened arc hi val ci tations: IHRC : Slovak American Collection, Immi gratio n History Research Center, University of Minneso ta. fil: Slovak Institute, Cleveland, OH. DoS CS 1910-44: Records of th e U.S. Department of Stale Relating to th e Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944, Microfilm (Washin gton D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1982). 2 For some examples of sc holarship considering the Slovak question from a transatlantic perspective, see: M. Mark Sto larik, Where is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( /8 70-2010) (Bern : Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907- 1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35 . Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of CzechoSlovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, 8, Hi stori ca 5 ( 1968), 7-82. Stefan Kucik, Podiel americkych S!ovakov na aulonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku 191 8-/938 (Martin: Matica slovenska, 20 I I). Gregory Curtis Ference, Sixteen Months of Indecision : Slovak American Viewpoints Toward Compatriots and the Homeland from �SLOVAKIA 2019 19 The Slovak efforts abroad during World War I remain the best told component of this story. The foundation of the transatlantic Slovak question was laid in the periods leading up to the First World War, when Slovak-American organizations began to campaign for Slovak political autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. The central organization for Slovak national activism became the Slovak League of America (SLA), founded in May 1907 by Slovak-American leaders to unify the disparate Slovak groups in the United States in common political action. The SLA ' s main objectives were to develop the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in America as a means of supporting the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in the homeland and to fight for Slovak national self-determination. 3 World War I and its accompanying 'Wilsonian moment' entrenched important symbols of Slovak national self-determination, as Slovak immigrant communities contributed to the establishment of the new Czechoslovak Republic. The wartime Czechoslovak National Council and its leaders, including Thomas G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, utilized Slovak-American organizations for financial , military, and diplomatic support. Consequently, Slovak-American demands led to the creation of the most important document relating to Slovak nationalism for the following twenty years: the Pittsburgh Agreement. Signed on 31 May 1918, this document declared common action between the Czechs and Slovaks in the formation of a democratic republic. Nevertheless, the agreement made a clear assertion for Slovak autonomy, under the terms that the Slovaks would I 9 I 4 to I 9 I 5 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna Uni versity Press, 1995). Michael Cude, "The Imagined Exiles: Slovak-Americans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republic," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vo l. 5, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk, Poland: University of Gdansk History Institute, 20 14), 287-305 3 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America, Daniel C. Necas, trans. (St. Paul, MN : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society, 2007). Jan Pankuch, History of the Slovaks of Cleveland and Lakewood, Rasto Gallo, trans. (Cleveland: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society & Western Reserve Historical Society, 2001), 29-38. Stolarik, " Rol e," 7-82 . Stephanie 0. Husek, "Slovak American Fraternal, Cultural, and Civic Organizations to 19 I 4," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study, Joseph C. Krajsa, ed. (Middletown: Slovak League of America, 1978), 23 -38 . Joseph A. Mikus "The Slovak League of America: A Historical Survey," in Slovaks, Krajsa, ed., 3956. R. Vladimir Baumgarten & Joseph Stefka, The National Slovak Society: JOO Year History, I 890-1990 (Pittsburgh: National Slovak Society, 1990), 17-33. �20 SLOVAKIA 2019 have their "own administration, own parliament, and own courts." In the short term, the Pittsburgh Agreement appeased the Slovak-Americans, who consolidated their support around the budding state, while Masaryk used the agreement to legitimize Czech-Slovak coop4 eration in his diplomatic efforts. This campaign allowed Slovak-American leaders a sense of direct influence on the affairs of their homeland, although the Czechoslovak National Council quickly stymied this hope. While the Slovak-Americans had been able to pressure Masaryk into symbolically accepting their goals for Slovak autonomy, their influence only extended to his need to provide evidence of Slovak participation in his political program as he sought recognition from the Entente powers. As a result, the Slovak-Americans found themselves on the margins during the building of the state . Accordingly, many historians consider the Pittsburgh Agreement as a matter of domestic Slovak politics after its initial signing, with little further consideration for the Slovaks abroad. In doing so, they neglect the fact that transatlantic activities continued through the interwar period.5 With the establishment of Czechoslovakia following the war, Slovak national activists on both sides of the Atlantic, hereto identi- 4 "Pittsburgska Dohoda" in Dok:umenty slovenskej narodnej identity a statnosti, vol. I, eds. Jan Benko, et al (Narodne literame centrum: Dom slovenskej literatury, 1998), 484-7. " Masaryk to Mamatey, 22 September 1918," SLA Cabinet, F:llth Congress, Slovak Institute (S I), Cleveland, OH. Pankuch, History, 145-50. Stolarik, "Role," 32-54. Karo l Sidor, ''The Slovak League of America and the Slovak Nation 's Struggle for Autonomy," Slovakia I 7, 40 ( I 967), 39-46. Peter P. Hletko, "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact," Slovakia l 8, 41 ( 1968), 5-54. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , "The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents," in Slovakia 36, 66 & 67 ( 1998), 81-97. lmrich Mazar, A History of the Binghamton Slovaks : Over a Period of Forty Years, 1879-1919, ed. Wilhelmina Mazar Salina, trans. Thomas Janacek (Phoenix: Via Press, 2003), 203-17. Baumgarten & Stefka, National, 81-3. 5 James Ramon Felak, At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, I 994). Peter A. Toma & Dusan Kovac, Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 200 I). Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia : The Struggle for Survival, 2nd ed. (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Jan Rychlik, "Czech-Slovak Relations in Czechoslovakia, I 918-1939," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918- 1948, eds . Mark Cornwall, R.J.W . Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-26. Elisabeth Bakke, "Czechoslovakism in Slovak History," in Slovakia in History, eds. Mikulas Teich, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2011), 247-68. �SLOVAKIA 2019 21 fied as the Slovak 'autonomists,' had full expectations of a federal relationship that would recognize Slovak cultural uniqueness and grant the Slovaks civic equality with autonomy over domestic affairs under the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement. In contrast, most Czech leaders wanted a strongly centralized state, justified by arguments of the commonality of the Czechs and Slovaks, the threat of Hungarian and German irredentism, and the believed necessity of Czech oversight to modernize Slovakia. They relied on support from Slovak ' centralists,' who identified the Czechs and Slovaks as a common people. Slovak autonomists, who saw the Slovaks as a culturally distinct people from the Czechs, perceived this ' Prague centralism' as a form of cultural and political hegemony. In response, they replanted their fight over the Slovak question against the newly formed government in Prague. Both autonomists and centralists mobilized Slovaks at home and abroad behind their version of the state, with the transatlantic component focused on lobbying foreign governments. As with many other nationality groups, Slovak leaders saw the postwar peace process as a key moment to make their case. With the centralists represented at the Versailles Peace Conference by the formal delegation from Czechoslovakia, the autonomists attempted to present their own view, including a flurry of correspondence from Slovak-Americans to United States President Woodrow Wilson and an unofficial delegation led by Slovak nationalist leader Andrej Hlinka. The autonomists appealed for recognition of an independent Slovak identity and the establishment of a federalist system in Czechoslovakia that granted greater domestic political autonomy to Slovakia. Wilson and other western leaders, however, prioritized economic and political modernity as a necessary quality for selfgovernrnent. Czechoslovakia's centralist leaders appealed to the Wilsonian prioritization of modernism to gain American acceptance of their vision, and used a proposed uplift of the Slovaks into modernity to advance this cause. They nonetheless pursued this objective in a way that often cast the Slovaks in a disparaging light and sowed further discord. The Conference in turn legitimated this organization of the Czechoslovak state and ignored Slovak autonomist appeals. 6 6 For more, see : Michael Cude, "Wilsonian National Self-determination and the Slovak Question during th e Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918-192 1," Diplomatic Histo,y (2016) 40, I: 155-80 �22 SLOVAKIA 2019 This failure at Versailles did not dissuade transatlantic Slovak activities. From the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, the Slovak question persisted in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The interwar period saw the Slovak autonomist movement survive with the Czechoslovak state arrayed against them . Slovak autonomists regularly looked across the Atlantic for support in pressuring Prague to change its stance. The Slovak autonomists continued to reference the spirit and goals of Wilsonianism to justify their claims for autonomy, and the Pittsburgh Agreement became their primary symbol. SlovakAmerican autonomists accepted their leading role of defending the Slovaks internationally, and they remained hopeful of convincing world leaders, particularly those in the United States, to embrace their view. This task remained an uphill battle, given the autonomists' inability to match the resources or international connections maintained by Prague, as centralists worked to discredit the idea of domestic autonomy for Slovakia. The Czech and Slovak centralists polarized the issue as a support for state unity through centralism or support for the destruction of the state through autonomy. In international appeals, the centralists disparaged Slovak capabilities for selfgovernment, and presented the Slovak autonomists as a parochial fringe, ignorant of world affairs. Accordingly, this transatlantic debate heavily contributed to the failure of the Czechoslovak concept in the interwar period by helping sow the entrenched distrust that culminated in the splintering of the Czechoslovak Republic in March of 1939. The question of Slovak autonomy remained a principal component of Slovak politics during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks split into three general categories on the Slovak question. The smallest of these groups were the Czechoslovakists, who wanted a close, non-differential linkage with the Czechs. Vavro Srobar, the first appointed Minister for Slovakia in 1918, exemplified this faction. Another group consisted of moderate nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of separate Slovak identity and political autonomy. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of the republic in the late 1930s and leader of the Agrarian Party, best exemplified this faction. Hodza and others supported a federalist model to address national minority questions. Most of the former two groups came from Slovakia's Lutheran minority. The Slovak auton- �SLOVAKIA 2019 23 omists, who were predominantly Catholics, were the most controversial. The Reverend Andrej Hlinka represented them as leader of the Slovak People 's Party. Hlinka and his supporters pushed for complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia, although the radical end of the party increasingly sought greater independence while a smaller minority even promoted a return to Hungary under a promise of autonomy. The Slovak People's Party (SPP) remained the most popular party in Slovakia and mixed cooperation with opposition to push for Slovak autonomy. The Agrarian Party followed in popular support, and it gradually pushed for more autonomy, albeit in a more deliberate fashion than the SPP. The Slovak National Party, the Slovak Communists, and the Hungarian Parties joined them in support of autonomy.7 Politically, some Slovaks took prominent positions in the central government, most notably Hodza. Prague allowed Slovak autonomists to organize and hold seats in Parliament, but it continued to censor nationali st viewpoints and it regularly pursued smear campaigns against Slovak autonomist leaders. The SPP joined the government in 1927, arranged by Hodza after promises of Slovak autonomy, but Hodza's plan proceeded in a watered-down fashion. The SPP participation lasted only two years before accusations of treason against radical politician Vojtech Tuka led to the SPP's withdrawal from the government. The SPP later exploited the Munich Agreement to force Prague's hand to achieve autonomy during the short-lived Second Republic, and then seceded from the state in March of 1939.8 7 Prague regularly promoted the idea that most of the Slovak people opposed autonomy, because the SPP only maintained 30-35% of the electorate in Slovakia. Although it is difficult to determine the true popular support of autonomy based strictly on the electoral support of each party, the support in Slovakia for Prague's version of centralism was probably we ll in the minority when one considers that the three largest parties-SPP, Agrarian, and Communists- all embraced some level of Slovak autonomy. 8 For more on this period in Slovak hi story, see: Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists 1918- 1948 (New York: Columbia University, 1983). Susan Mikula, "The Politics of Frustration : The Slovak Politica l Experience, 191 8-1938," in Reflections on Slovak Histo ry, eds. Stanislav Kirschbaum & Anne C. Rom an (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1987), 73 -88. James Felak, "Slovak Considerations of the Slovak Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist, and Communi st views in lnterwar Czechoslovakia" in The Czech and Slovak Experience, ed . John Morison (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 136-62. Felak, At the �24 SLOVAKIA 2019 The Slovak-A mericans also consolidated their positions on the issue in a similar fas hi on. After an early divide, the leaders of the Slovak League of America gave up on Prague and embraced the autonomist position, as did the large Catholic fraternal organization the First Catholic Slovak Union, and other, smaller organizations, such as the Friends of Slovak Freedom (FSF), an organization formed in the 1920s w ith the singul ar goal of addressing the Slovak question . The large, secular and large ly Protestant, fraternal organizations, the National Slovak Society and the Slovak Evangeli cal Un ion, at first embraced the centralist Slovaks, but nationalist pressure ultimatel y led them to try to moderate between the centrali st and autonomist positions. They ultim ate ly embraced the gradualist position of Hodza. In response, the Czechoslovaki sts established the Slovak National A lliance to serve as the arm of Prague among the SlovakAmericans, along with the Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. Consisting mostl y of secularists and some Lutherans, these organizations regularly attacked the SLA for its Catholic and autonomist leanings and promoted the strict uni ty of the Czechs and Slovaks. 9 As the Slovak question became entrenched in Czechoslovak politics, each competing side pursued a voluminous international lobby ing campaign to build western support for its respective position. This included a fact ion demanding a revision of the Trianon Treaty to return Slovakia to Hungary. The primary international Slovak advocate of this position was the Reverend Francis Jehlicka and hi s organization, the Slovak Council , founded in 1933 . Jehlicka had attended the Paris Peace Conference wi th Hlinka, but decided afterwards that the Slovaks could not trust the Czechs. Jehlicka remained abroad, where he lobbied fo r a Slovak reunion with Hungary based on Hun ga ri an promises of Slovak autonomy. He attempted to build Price of th e Republic. Toma & Kovac, Slovakia, 78-1 06. Kirsc hbaum, History of Slovakia , 155-84. Ryc hlik, "Czec h-Sl ovak Relations," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, 13-2 6. R.J.W. Evans, " Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks : Some Mutual Perceptions," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, I 09-22 . Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia : The State that Failed (New Haven: Yale Uni vers ity Press, 2009), 48-86. Nata lia Kraj covicova, " Slovakia in Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in History, 137-56. 9 Joseph Pauco, "Slovaks Abroad and Their Relati onship with Slovakia," in Slo vakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries, ed. Joseph M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973), 333-42. Josep h V. Adamec, "The Slovak Cath olic Federation," in Slovaks in America, 223-32 . Baumgarten & Stetl<a, National, 85-7. Pankuch, History, 177-86 . Stolarik, " Slovak League," 7-35 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 25 support from the Slovak-Americans by appealing to Slovakia's historical and economic roots in Hungary and exposing claimed mistreatment of the Slovaks by Prague. ' 0 Jehlicka could express his voice abroad because of support from Budapest and later Nazi Germany, and he convinced a few figures in the West, most notably the British publi sher Lord Rothermere, who campaigned on behalf of Hungary internationally. Jehlicka ' s arguments nevertheless carried little weight in other circles . Scottish historian R. W. Seton-Watson, a prominent supporter of the Czechoslovak Republic , pursued a constant back and forth against Jehlicka, and, on both sides of the Atlantic, Slovaks and Czechs of different politica l views unified against Slovakia ' s return to Hungary. The Slovak autonomi sts and centralists , for example, collaborated in an open letter denouncing Jehlicka . 11 Slovak-Americans likewise continued to lobby against Hungarian claims, reminding readers about the old magyarization policy to eliminate Slovak national identity. Slovak-American publisher Jan Pankuch claimed that this was the sole occas ion when the Slovak-American autonomi sts, Czech-Americans, and Slovak10 Anthony Pessenl ehner, "Czechoslovakia' s Ri ght to Statehood Assa iled," Current History, 14, 5 (Aug. I 92 1), 845-8. Dr. F. Jehlicka: Kto on je a co chce (C leveland: 1920). Francis Jehlicka, Reply to Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson 's Book 'Slovakia Th en and Now ' (Vienn a, 1932). The Slovak Co uncil , Th e Unsolved Slovak Problem (Vienna: Slovak Council, 1933). The Slovak Co un cil , Bolsevizmus a slovenska otazka (Geneva: Slovak Council , 193 6), in : 8 : Resolutions, Memoranda, Proclamations, SI. The Slovak Council , Sh ould Great Britain go to Wa r- fo r Czechoslovakia: An Appeal to British Common Sense for th e Sake of Wo rld Peace (London: Haze l, Watson, & Viney, 1937) . Francis Jehli cka, Fa1her Hlinka 's Struggle fo r Slovak Freedom (London: Slova k Council , 1938), 34-5. "The German Minister in Czechoslovaki a (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry (Doc 57)," Documen1s on German Foreign Policy, Seri es D, V2 (Was hington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 132-3 . 11 R.W. Seton-Watson, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers ( London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1934). " Seton-Watson to Alois Ka lisek" (Doc I 32) in R. W. SetonWa tson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks: Documents, / 906- 195 1, vol. I, eds. Jan Ryc hlik, et al (Prague: Ustav T. G. Masaryka, I 995), 393-6. "The Situati on in Slova ki a and the Magyar Minori ty" (Doc 139) in Seton-Watson, 409-25. "Seton-Watson to Martin Razus" (Doc 155 ) in Seton- Watson, 454-5 . "Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc I 60) in Seton-Watson, 465-9. C. L Orbach, "Czechoslovakia ' s Place in the Sun," Current Histo1y, 14, 6 (Sept I 92 1), 944-5. Anonymous, "Another Defense of Czechoslovaki a" Curren/ History, 14, 6 (Sept 192 1), 945-6. Adam Poliak, "Czechos lova ki a's Right to Statehood," Current History, I 5, 3 (Dec I 92 1), 499. " Slovaki a' s Pro test" (Doc 156) in Seton-Watson, 456-9. �26 SLOVAKIA 2019 American centralists came together in common cause, although the resolution almost failed when the two sides sparred over whether the text should declare the Slovaks and Czechs as one nation. The proHungarian autonomists, thus, remained on the periphery of the Sio• 12 va k question. The unified opposition against Hungarian irredentism otherwise did little to ease the conflict between the centralists and autonomists. The Czech and Slovak centralists made the Slovak question a primary component of their international propaganda, and they often perpetuated negative stereotypes of the Slovaks to promote the Czechoslovak vision. The official press in Prague released ample publications by Czech nationali st leaders in the English language on the topic. President Masaryk, for example, made clear his disappointment with the "po litical immaturity" of the Slovak autonomist movement. Masaryk, who continued to highlight his own partial Slovak heritage, likewise claimed to have proven his great love for Slovakia by having liberated it from Hungary and he asserted that Slovak nationalists could prove their own love by embracing Prague 's authority. 13 Edvard Benes, who served as Foreign Minister until succeeding Masaryk to the presidency in 1935, in tum argued that the Czechs and Slovaks remained unified, except for a "fringe minority," working for a return to the pre-war order, and the "dictates of local , provin12 "Rezolucie Vznesene Ustrednym Vyborom Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike na schodzi , vzdrziavanej IO novembra 1920," Person File (PF): Bielek, SI. Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America, Count Albert Apponyi or Revival of Magyar Propaganda in America (Scranton, Pa: Bosak Press, 1923), in: B: Resolutions, SI. American Citizens of Slovak Origin, The Refutation to the Arguments of the Hungarian Kossuth Delegation ( 1928), in: The Podkrivacky, Adam Papers, B: 17, Slovak American Collection, Immigration History Research Center (IHRC), Uni versity of Minnesota. "What the Magyars Forget," The National Slovak Society (NSS) of the US.A . Records, B: 168, F: Slovak League of America (SLA), lHRC. "The Cleveland District Assembly of the SLA to Hoover," 4 December 1929, F#: 860F.00/306, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944 (DoS CS 1910-44), Microfilm (Washington D.C .: National Archi ves and Records Service, 1982). Pankuch, History, 186-90. 13 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918, trans. Henry Wickham Steed (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 2 1, 41 , 208-11 , 338, 361. Thomas G. Masaryk, Masa,yk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, reprint ed., trans. M. & R. Weatherall (New York: Arno Press, 1971 ). "T.G. Masaryk on the Pittsburgh Agreement" (Doc 30) in Slovakia : Political, 209- 10. �SLOVAKIA 2019 27 cial, factional and individualist interests ." 14 Czech scholars, journalists and officials also contributed to this campaign, mostly through studies of the Czechs that glossed over the Slovaks except to praise 15 how the Czechs had liberated them. For example, Czech historian Albert Prazak praised the Czech ro le in uplifting the Slovaks, and condemned Hlinka and the SPP as tools of Hungary and as part of a Catholic conspiracy to take over Central Europe. Prazak then dismissed the Pittsburgh Agreement as "merely a flight of fancy ," rooted in "immaturity of political judgment and lack of understanding." 16 Czech journalist Ales Broz likewise condemned the Slovaks as " retarded in their development" versus the " well educated, practical, realistic" Czechs, and praised the direction of Slovakia under the Czechs for allowing the two peoples to become "one stock, one cul. ,, I 7 ture, one nat10n . Centralist Slovaks also contributed to this campaign, including articles by Interior Minister Juraj Slavik and Minister to France Stefan Osusky on the nationality questions in Czec hoslovakia, as well as one by Education Minister Anton Stefanek praising Prague ' s 14 Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Seiver (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 348, 448, 469, 472-8 1. Edvard Benes, Christmas Message (Prague: Orb is, 193 7), 17. Edvard Benes, "Of Czechoslovak Unity" in We Were and We Shall Be: Th e Czechoslovak Spirit th rough th e Centuries , eds. Zdenk a & Jan Mun zer (New York : Un gar, 1941), 164-6. 15 Kami I Krofta & Jiri Hoetzel, A Short Histo,y of Czechoslovakia ( ew York: Robert McBride & Co, 1934), 137-8, 142, 149-52. Kami! Krofta, "Czechs and Slovaks (I)" The Slavonic and East European Review, 13, 38 (January 1935), 363-7 1. Kami I Kroft a, "Czechs and Slovaks ( II )" The Slavonic and East European Review, I 3, 39 (April 1935), 6 11-26. Josef Borovicka, Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics (Prague: Orbis, 1929), 7-8, 13 , 20-1 , 44, 111-1 2, I I 9-20, I 24-6. Emanuel Capek, "The Background of Political Parti es in Czechoslovaki a" The Sla vonic and East European Review, I 0, 28 (June 193 1), 90- 104. Ales Broz, " Minori ty Ri ghts in th e Czechoslova k State," Foreign Affairs, 6, I (October 1927), 158-60. Ales Broz, " President Masaryk, Creator of the Czechos lovak Republic," Current Histo,y , 24, I (April I 926), 48-53. 16 Prague appointed Prazak, a Czech, to erve at Comenius Uni versity in Brati slava as its primary hi stori an of the Slova ks. The Slavonic Review labeled Prazak the "foremost li ving authority on Slovak History." Albert Prazak, " Review : The ew Slovaki a by R. W. Seton-W atso n" The Slavonic Review, 3, 9 (March 1925), 71 3-20. 17 Ales Broz, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Czech Standpoint," Curren/ Histo,y, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-8 . �28 SLOVAKIA 2019 development of Slovak education. 18 Slovak Social Democrat, and rigid Czechoslovakist, [van Derer's short book on the Pittsburgh Agreement provided the most thorough effort in English to discredit the Slovak autonomists . Derer claimed that most Slovaks embraced the state as constructed, and that only a " pro-Magyar" minority supported autonomy. He likewise dismissed the Slovak-American signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement as not " true" Slovak nationals, because they lived in America. Derer argued that the document had meant simply local administrative autonomy, which he claimed Prague had granted. He then portrayed the Czechs as the Slovaks' saviors and condemned Slovak autonomy: In return for their having helped Slovakia when things were at th eir worst, in return for their having saved our liberty and an independent state apparatus, railway and postal communications, and a Slovak system of education at the tim e when the Slovaks th emselves were weak, unprepared, often distrustful and inclined rather to continue to live under their thousand-year yoke than to live in freedom, in return for having shed their blood for our country on the battlefronts in the Great War, and in the fights against Bolshevist Hungary in I 9 I 9 and thus saving Slovakia from a new occupation by the Magyars -in return for all this are we to remove the Czechs from Slovakia ? 19 Prague also maintained support from American and Eng lish academics and journalists in perpetuating Czechoslovakism. SetonWatson remained a staunch supporter of the idea, boasting how he regularly discredited "cantankerous Slovaks who accused Masaryk and hi s friend s of 'Czec hi sation."' He publicly condemned Hlinka and the SPP and repudiated their criticisms of Prague. Seton-Watson a lso actively denied Slovak agency in Slovak national development. 18 Juraj Slavik, "The Nationality Question in Slovakia," Central European Observer, 11 , 26 (Dec 18, 1933), 463-5 . Stefan Osusky, " Wh y Czechoslovakia?" Foreign Affairs, 15 , 3 (Apri l 1937), 455-71. Anton Stefanek, " Education in Slovakia," Th e Slavonic Review, 2, 5 (Dec 1923), 308-27. 19 Ivan Derer, The Unity of th e Czechs and Slovaks: Has th e Pittsburgh Declaration Been Carried Out? (Prague: Orbis, 193 8). �SLOVAKIA 2019 29 The Slovaks should therefore be thankful that fate has made them dependent upon a race so efficient, so well-educated and well-disciplined as the Czechs ... .At the critical moment, the Slovaks made the impression of a helpless animal fascinated by the approach of the boa-constrictor, and Prague was literally the sole hope.-'0 On the Slovak question, Seton-Watson blamed the " hypersensitive" Slovaks as simply being too parochial, religiously backward and ill developed, and he dismissed autonomist arguments as the "wild talk of extremists." Even in a work of collected essays designed to "show that the Slovaks themselves have had a much greater share in the reconstruction of their country than is often supposed," Seton-Watson turned predominantly to centralist Slovaks whose contributions consisted mostly of self-promotion and praise for the merits of centralism.21 The American philanthropist and writer Kenneth D. Miller was another avid promoter of Czechoslovakism. "Everything points to the wisdom of a cultural as well as political union between the two nationalities. No matter what the cultural development may be, neither nationality can well maintain its political independence without the other." He likewise felt that the Slovak question would disappear with the development of the "slow, passive Slovak," who yet lacked initiative, and who was prone to immorality and drunkenness, and to "religious vagary or fanaticism." 22 Other presentations ranged from industrialist and diplomat John Crane, who attacked the "backward ignorance" of the Slovaks for resisting secularization, to YMCA secretary Fred Rindge who criticized a claimed lack of Slovak interest 20 R.W. Seton-Watson , Th e New Slovakia (Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924), 3, 23-4. R.W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 61. "Seton-Watson Open Letter to Hlinka" (Doc 108), in Seton-Watson, 343-4. "SetonWatson to Alois Kolisek" (Doc 135), in Seton-Watson, 401-2. R.W. Seton-Watson, ed. Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931). When planning the book, Seton-Watson expressed his desire to have an article from a SPP leader, so that Slovak autonomists could not accuse him of onesidedness. He considered an article on the issue of autonomy, but decided only to allow an article on Slovak religion by Hlinka. "Seton-Watson to Milan Hodza" (Docs 144 & 145), in Seton-Watson, 431-2 . 22 Kenneth D. Mill er, The Czecho-Slovaks in America (New York: Doran Company, 1922), 14-25, 121-122, 158-160. 21 �30 SLOVAK.IA 2019 in the arts. Journalist C.J.C. Street claimed, "The Slovak dream was always to regain their lost unity with the Czechs and as a united nation to secure the tolerable conditions of existence. " 23 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia pursued a few efforts during the interwar period to counter this campaign, although they lacked equivalent resources and connections to those held by Prague. The SPP' s most notable attempt was the Zilina Memorandum of 1922. Released to the western press and governments, the document sought to expose the Slovak question to the world, beginning with its sensationalist title, "a country doomed to death, a nation in her last agonies implores the civilized world for help." It decried the failures of Wilsonianism, which had allowed Prague to "bamboozle" the Slovaks "out of the freedom promised to them ." The text went on to explain their issues with the Czechs, discussing concerns from the treatment of religion, to economic exploitation, and the denial of autonomy. The memorandum also condemned Czechoslovakism as simply a tool for domination. The Czechs and Slovaks have been always forming two separate little worlds with a very different character due to their different geographical and economic conditions, their different way of thinking, of feeling and of mind. We have a different view of life, other morals and other traditions; we have a different social structure, different legal rules and different ideas about political economy and culture. The document ultimately claimed the world could still save the Slovaks if it acted quickly. The key of the iron cage in which the Slo vak Nation is being mercilessly incarcerated lays in the hands of the Great Powers. This memorial is our last expedient and our last weap23 John 0. Crane, "Church and State in Czechoslovakia" The Slavonic Review, 6, 17 (Dec. 1927), 364-78. Fred H. Rindge, Jr. "The Charm of Czechoslovakia" Current History, 22, 3 (June 1925), 447-50. C. J. C. Street, Slovakia Past and Present (Westm inster, UK: P.S. King & Son, 1928). For more examples, see: Robert Machray, "Czechoslova ki a a Pioneer in Central European Politics" Current Hislo ry, 25, 6 (Mar. 1927), 839-43 . J. H. Wallis, "The Upbuilding of Czechoslovakia," Curren/ Histo1y, 14, 5 (Aug. 192 1), 835-45 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 31 on ... Though only clad in the rags of our torn freedom we nevertheless appear as accusers before the world, charging the rulers of Prague who are still deluding the powers, and the powers themselves for having out of sheer ignorance become their accomplices. To ignore the Slovak case, thus, would be to support the trampling of liberty. 24 After the Zilina Memorandum bore no fruit, the Slovak autonomists pursued fewer efforts to court the west. They made a few sporadic attempts, such as a translation of the SPP •program in 1930, written by Jozef Tiso, which outlined the SPPs vision of a Slovak national Christian democracy, and appealed for autonomy as a protection of the Slovak cultural tradition. It argued that the Slovak nation's religious roots encouraged it toward a peaceful selfpreservation, unlike other nations that turned toward national chauvinism. 25 Slovak priest and publicist Anton Kompanek also produced an article that emphasized Slovak Christianity as a symbol of Slovak worthiness for self-government. Kompanek believed Slovakia served as an example of how the Church and state could find balance in the modem world. 26 These publications, however, remained exceptions, as the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia maintained little faith in western governments, recognizing Prague's stranglehold over their image internationally. They instead relied on the Slovak-Americans to lead the way in their defense internationally. Slovak nationalist politician Karol Sidor claimed that despite a continued interest in the homeland, the Slovak-Americans began to lose their "onetime vitality and ardor" during the interwar period. He linked this outcome to greater assimilation and a decreasing knowledge of the Slovak language.27 This claim is somewhat true. The energy of the war years certainly diminished, particularly in the 24 "Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 02) & "Covering Letter for the Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 03), in Seton-Watson, pp. 319-33 . 25 Jozef Tiso, The Ideology of th e Slovak Populist Party (Prague: 1930). 26 Anton Kompanek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia" Th e Sla vonic and East European Review, 12, 36 (April 1934), 611-21. 27 Sidor, "Slovak League," 59-62. �32 SLOVAKIA 2019 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression.28 Sidor, however, understated how much the Slovak-Americans remained at the forefront of the international efforts to gain recognition of the Slovak question. Historian Jozef Pauco 's interpretation is much more accurate: "For twenty years the Slovak League of America defended the spirit and letter of the Pittsburgh Pact and by using the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly on American soil, they did so more freely and energetically than the two political parties in their homeland." 29 Based on the volume of publications and direct communications with government officials on both side of the Atlantic, it is clear that the Slovak question continued to dominate the transatlantic interests of the Slovak Americans, as they bolstered their compatriots' activities within Czechoslovakia by applying external pressure on Prague. The Slovak fraternal organizations made constant efforts to keep their members linked to their Slovak cultural identity, and to aid in the fight for autonomy in the homeland. They pursued these efforts through education programs such as national lectures, art and photography tours, but also symbolic actions such as erecting a statue of General Milan R. Stefanik in Cleveland in 1924 and the planting of a Linden Tree on Capitol Hill in honor of Stefanik in 1934. 30 The Slovak question remained high on the list of Slovak-American concerns, and the various Slovak organizations produced a flurry of pamphlets and informative documents on the issue. The Pittsburgh Agreement remained at the center of this debate, with Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic continuing to affirm its legality against the centralist dismissals that it was simply a non-binding text designed to placate the Slovak-Americans during the war. Autonomist publica28 June Alexander, for example, shows how assimilation became an internal issue for Slovak-Americans, as the older generations struggled to assure that their American born children maintained links to their ethnic heritage. June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jn terwar Era (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004), 93-19 I. 29 Pauco, "S lovaks Abroad," 333-42. 30 "Ot. Svec to Podkrivacky," 3 Oct. 1938," PF: Adam Podkrivacky, SI. "S LA to Jakub Vitostak, 30 Nov 1923 ," The First Catholic Slovak Union of America (FCSU) Records, F: 1303, IHRC. "Jan Kocur to Michael Senko, 30 Nov 1926," FCSU, F: 1304, IHRC. 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastisla v Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924), 82-3 . "SLA to Arthur Colegrove," NSS, 8 : 168, F: SLA, IHRC. �SLOVAKIA 2019 33 tions looked to inform about the Slovaks, to expose the failed promises of Prague on autonomy, and to defend against the accusations of Prague centralists. The Slovak League remained at the forefront, hoping that exposure of the situation to the American press and pub1ic would spur sympathy and support? In many cases, the Slovak-Americans directed these publications at Prague, with the hope of convincing a change in policy . They, nevertheless, would consecutively produce English versions, which they then sent to the American President, members of Congress, the Department of State, and assorted press outlets. For example, in 1921 the SLA wrote to Masaryk calling for the immediate implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement. When Prague did not respond, the League followed up with a more detailed Memorandum on November 9, 1922. This document called on Prague to make good on the Pittsburgh Agreement in the name of natural rights and to reward the sacrifices made by Slovak-Americans during World War I. It highlighted Masaryk's role in the formation of the Agreement, and then provided a photograph of the original text as well as a series of letters between the SLA and various Czechoslovak officials that had promised its implementation to show how promises made to the Slovak-Americans never lived up to reality. The text then defended the legitimacy of Slovak autonomy. We are convinced that the honest and upright materialization of the Pittsburgh Pact in no way will harm the unity of the State; on the contrary it will mean a considerable reinforcement within and without and make possible united co-operation of all patriotic forces against the elements of disintegration, depriving them of a dangerous weapon, which they cannot effectively employ against the Republic, fanning discontent, mistrust and spreading hatred between both nations comprising the state. The League made clear, however, that this good will rested "solely upon a sincere Czecho-Slovak reciprocity." It then gave an alternative: 31 "Telegram to Ivan Bielek on 29 Nov 1934," NSS, B: 168, F: SLA , IHRC. �34 SLOVAKIA 2019 We feel it is our duty to emphasize that if our sincere and friendly attempt, which has at its heart the welfare, interest and future of the Republic, should fail to meet with success, the Slovak l eague of America would not be able to prevent the American Slovaks and their factors from turning to the Court of Public Opinion of the civilized world. While the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia acknowledged the letter, Prague neglected to respond. 32 The SLA then passed a follow-up resolution. Asserting that it "fights with fire and sword with everyone who is in favor of autonomy of the Slovak nation," it admonished Prague for manipulating the world into believing the Czechoslovakist image and for leading a smear campaign against the SLA. It then provided a list of examples of hostility, including efforts to undermine its finances , blackmail, the bullying of Slovak-American leaders and press, and attempts to send government officials to propagandize against them . It once again emphasized how the League had made every effort to resolve the Slovak question within the confines of the Czechoslovak Republic , but it would soon submit the issue "to the judgment of public opinion of the civilized world," if Prague continued to treat them with disdain.33 Many more publications followed. The Friends of Slovak Freedom , for example, released two protests in 1923. These texts defended the va lidi ty of the Slovak-Americans as representatives of the Slovak people, and condemned Prague's actions against Slovak autonomists, including such accusations as "false signatures or resolutions, false numbers of people attending their lectures, insulting the Slovak journalists, insulting the Slovak League as anti-state, and many other lies," as well as criticisms about press censorship in Slo- 32 SLA , Memorandum S/ovenskej Ligy v Amerike upra vene na vladu a Narodne Shromai denie Cesko-Slo venskej Republiky v zaujme vtelenia Pittsburgskej Dohody do ustavy C.-S. Republiky (Pittsburgh: Slovak League of America, 1922). Both the full Slovak and English versions of this Document are avai lab le at: SLA Cab, F: Memorandum /922 v Zaum e Pitts. Dohody, SI. Also avai lable in: " Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy v Arnerike" in Dokumenty, Vol 2, 138-44. 33 " An Appeal of the Slovak League of America to All Political Factors of th e Czecho-S lovak Republic," PF: Bielek, SI. �SLOVAKIA 2019 35 vakia. 34 After reading Masaryk's criticism of Hlinka, the Slovak League then produced a pamphlet that challenged the idea that Masaryk personally had liberated the Slovaks. It reminded readers of the Slovak-American war contribution, and then remarked how the SLA and the Pittsburgh Agreement were certainly valid in Masaryk's eyes when he needed Slovak-American support in 1918. The document then included a text from former Czechoslovak ambassador to Japan, Karel Pergler, arguing that both the Slovaks and Czechs had unequivocally recognized the Pittsburgh Agreement upon its signing. 35 Next to these direct appeals, the Slovak-American autonomists also released many publications geared directly toward an American audience. They designed these works to inform about the Slovaks, expose their continued fight for self-determination and to link the Slovak question to American democratic values. These publications included several biographies of Milan R. Stefanik, a translated history by Slovak historian Joseph Skultety that directly challenged images of Slovak backwardness and other stereotypes, and a short pamphlet on Czechoslovakism by Slovak-American historian Ol'ga Husek warning that the concept meant for the Slovaks "the rejection of their cultural past and the stunting of their future growth." 36 They also attempted to rally America to their cause by showing their valiance in the face of domination. An SLA article distributed to the American Press praised how the Slovak-Americans continued to fight even with "the entire machinery of government set against them, calumnies upon calumnies by a government subsidized press, heaped upon the heads of those who take up their cause, and bug- 34 Friends of Slovak Freedom, " Resolution, November 28, 1923," & " Protest against Censorship and Confiscation of Slovak Publications by the Government in Slovakia" in Pankuch , Slo vaks of Cleveland, l 82-6. 35 Slovenska Liga v Amerike, V Zaujme Pra vdy! (In the Interest of Truth !) (Pittsburgh: P. Jamriska, 1930). Found in : SLA Cabinet, F: SLA Presidents, SI. Prague responded to these letters, but it simply reasserted the usual rebutta ls, claiming that 75% of the Slovaks supported centralization and that the Pittsburgh Agreement was simply an American document. "Ohlas Americkeho Memoranda u Nas," 8 : Slovak League of America (SLA) , SI. 36 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastislav Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924). Andrew Slabey, General Milan R. Stefanik (Leisenring, PA: Griglak Printery, 1937). Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, O.D. Koreff, trans . (Middletown, PA : First Catholic Slovak Union, I 930) . Ol'ga Husek, The Czechoslovak Fallacy (Middletown, PA : Jednota, 1935). �36 SLOVAK.IA 2019 bears turned loose to scare those who are not acquainted with conditions. " 37 Religion became a major component of Slovak-American advocacy on the Slovak question in the interwar period. Slovak-American journalist Stephen J. Palickar published many articles in general Catholic publications, including a five-month tit-for-tat with Czech diplomat Josef Hane in defense of Slovak religiosity. He also provided some of the first Slovak-American attempts to link Slovak religiosity to anti-Communism. Palickar likewise defended Slovak agency, and appealed for a lifting of Prague centralism to allow the Slovaks an opportunity to prove their abi lity for self-government. 38 While most of these publications were shorter, more direct works, the Slovak-Americans released a couple of longer exposes on the Slovak question. The first, written by then SLA president Peter P. Hletko on behalf of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, looked to inform the American people about the Pittsburgh Agreement as an American product in line with "the principles of democracy and self-determination of small nations." Hletko praised how the Slovak "has an inherent love for liberty and freedom , and enjoys fostering his national spirit," which had spurred his immigration to America in a "quest for a land of true liberty," and he argued that American democracy had allowed the Slovaks in America to assert their national identity as an independent people. He asserted how the Slovaks had only joined the Czechoslovak movement on the premise that they would be treated fairly and as equals and highlighted a reg37 "The conflict between Czechs and Slovaks," NSS Records, B: 168, F: SLA, IHRC. For many examples, see: "The Slovaks- Past and Present," in Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism to Atheistic Czech Communism (Cambridge, MA : Hampshire Press, 1948), 40-3 . Stephen J. Palickar, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Slovak Standpoint," Current History, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-6. "A Dark Spot in Czecho-Slovakia," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 43-45 . "Who is Masaryk?," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 49-51 . "S lovakia-whither bound," in Palickar, Slovakia : From Hungarian Despotism, 76-83. "Slovak Catholicism vs. Czech Communism," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 84-86. "Slovak Grievance," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 70-72 . "President Masaryk and his State," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 61-62. "Scotus Viator Surveys Slovakia," in Palickar, Slo vakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 72-75. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia of Today (A Lecture), December 12, 1933 , Columbi a University (New York: Slovak Library Association, 1933). 38 �SLOVAKIA 2019 37 ular sense of duplicity and condescension the Slovaks felt from the Czechs. Hlekto praised the Pittsburgh Agreement as having resolved these conflicts, before Masaryk ultimately betrayed his promise, and he gave a detailed defense of its validity and of the right of the Slovak-Americans to speak for their nation during the war. 39 The Slovak-American autonomists shortly thereafter produced an even longer book on the topic . Written by Peter P. Hletko under the pseudonym , "An Autonomist," it served as the most exhaustive consideration of the Slovak question in Eng lish in the early 20 th century. Hletko placed blame on Czech intransigence for fueling the issue unnecessarily. The book argued that the Czechos lovak revolution relied on American money and manpower and "should the President (Masaryk) have failed to dispel the fear and dissatisfaction of the Slovaks through the Moscow and Pittsburgh Agreements, there certainly would not be a Czecho-Slovakia today. " The book then deconstructed Prague 's policies toward the Slovaks, to show Czechoslovakism as a means of hegemony. Hletko considered every issue from the Czech obfuscation on autonomy, the complicity of the Slovak centrali sts, the language issue, schools, and the economy, and he explained the claims of Slovak neediness and incompetence, as we ll as the claimed threat of Hungary, as only a fa<;:ade to justify Czech dominance. He likewise gave examples of Slovak intellectuals to dispute the claim that the Slovaks needed the Czechs to serve that role. He then detailed the domination of Slovakia's administration, civi l service, education system, and cultura l institutions by Slovak centralists and Czechs, and the press censorship and smear campaigns. Ultimately, he concluded that Czechoslovakism was undermining the state and mu st be reversed. Hletko concluded: Th e motive that has promoted us to write this work is not one of revenge, nor a desire to arouse bad feeling, but simply to expose falsehood and reveal truth. It is our sincere hope that, the truth being known, it will enable the Czechs and Slovaks to form a more stable union which will promote justice, trust, and good 39 Slovak Catholi c Federation of America, The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (S lovak Cath olic Federation of America, 1934). Joseph C. Krajsa, " Dr. Peter Hletko, Most Elite of American Slovaks," Slovakia, 22, 45 ( 1972), 57-9. �38 SLOVAKIA 2019 will, and thereby insure national integrity both at home and abroad. 40 A few non-Slovak publications did favor Slovak autonomy . For example, some historians of the First World War, such as Jan Opocensky and C. A. Macartney, attempted to present a balanced consideration of the Slovak question, giving voice to Slovak autonomist concerns.4 1 There were also several publications that utilized the Slovak question to criticize the broader Versailles system . Writer and journalist E. Alexander Powell , for example, highlighted the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks as an example of the precariousness of the region ' s political stability. Although not particularly admiring of the Slovaks, Powell was highly critical of the Czech treatment of them. He commented, "The Czechs, an energetic, ambitious, progressive, and aggressive people, who outnumber the Slovaks three to one, look with condescension, if not contempt, on their less literate, slower thinking, more easy-going partners, whom, if the truth be known , they regard as immensely inferior to themselves." These scholars all argued that the Czechs needed to treat their minorities with more respect and make good on promises for Slovak autonomy for the sake of the survival of the state. 42 A few works were even somewhat favorable to the Slovaks. One such example came from writer Kenneth L. Roberts , who after visiting Czechoslovakia complained, "The Czechs want to socialize everything in sight, and the Slovaks are not poignantly eager to be social- 40 An Autonomist, Slovakia 's Plea for Autonomy (Middletown, Pa: Slovak Literary Society, 1935). 41 Jan Opocensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Mon archy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak Stale (Prague: Orbis, 1928), 153-68, I 93-214. C. A. MaCartney, National States and National Min orities (London : Oxford Uni versity Press, 1934), 117, 201 ,208. 42 E. Alexander Powell , The Danger on th e Danube (New York: Century Company, 1928), 56-8, 62-8, 72-4. M. W. Fodor, South of Hiller (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1939). For oth er examples, see : C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-193 7 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937/ 1965), 73-148. Frank H. Simonds, Can Europe Keep th e Peace? (New York : Harper, I 93 I), 92-10 I. Isaiah Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, 4th ed. (Yonkers, NY : World Book, 1928). Harold Temperley, " How the Hungari an Frontiers were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 6, 3 (April 1928), 432-47 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 39 ized." Comparing the Czechs in Slovakia to U.S. Civil War carpetbaggers, he criticized the Czech administration of Slovakia, their denial of autonomy, and called out Czechoslovakism as a lie. He alternatively praised the Slovaks as "among the most attractive and lovable peasant people of the many I have seen." An article by journalist Robert Sage, after a visit to Slovakia, likewise chided the Czechs for using claims of generosi ty as a mirage for domination over Slovakia. 43 The SLA ultimately made good on its threat to take the issue to the world stage, presenting the Slovak question to the League of Nations in 1932. It produced a long legal brief, which appealed for a cessation of wrongdoing against the Slovaks and the granting of political and cultural autonomy. It then begged the League of Nations to recognize the Slovaks as an independent nation, to demand the implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement, to investigate ill treatment, and to grant recognition of the Slovaks as a true minority in Czechoslovakia. It pointed out how the Slovak-Americans had made multiple attempts to reach out to Prague to explain their concerns and offer an olive branch towards a solution, but that Prague had ignored their appeals and through censorship had silenced their brothers in Slovakia. The document then went on to detail the history of the founding of the state and the Pittsburgh Agreement, their complaints of ill-treatment against the Slovaks, and their view as to why the 44 Slovaks were an independent people. This appeal was unsuccessful. Slovak-Americans also regularly wrote to U.S. government officials. One such example was an "Open Letter" to Masaryk in 1923 that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America also sent to President Coolidge, members of Congress, all the embassies in Prague, and to the American press. The document started with an image of Masaryk approaching the Slovak-Americans as equals during the war, to 43 Kenneth L. Roberts, Europe's Morning After (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921 ), 121-73. Kenneth L. Roberts, Why Europe l eaves Home (New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1922), 28-31 . Robert Sage, "There's no such Nationality as Czecho-Slovak," Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 2, 1930, 6. For other examples, see: Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia / 918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 377-9. Alexander Szana, Die Geschichte der Slowakei (Bratislava: Grenzenbote Verlag, 1930). Robert Nowak, Der Kiinstliche Staal: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938). 44 "To the Supreme Council of the League of Nations at Geneva," SlA Cabinet, F: Supreme Council of the l eague of Na tions at Geneva, 1932, SI. �40 SLOVAKIA 2019 which they responded with loyalty and support. Masaryk then betrayed them, treating the Slovaks "in step-mother fashion, nay, even like slaves," having lured them into "an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and to us 'ignorant' Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred." It bemoaned that the Slovaks again felt endangered in their national existence, and how the Czechs misled the world on the issue. It appealed for Masaryk "to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised us, the American Slovaks," for the sake of Czech-Slovak unity and the secu45 rity of the state. This letter elicited a response from the Slovak-American centralists. The National Slovak Society, the Slovak Sokol, and assorted editors produced a counter response to Masaryk, which they then sent to Coolidge and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. This document asserted open support for the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation. It criticized the SCF letter for having "a spirit of narrow sectarianism," in contrast to "the great majority of the American Slovaks," who supported Masaryk "heart and soul." The document praised Masaryk and the Czechoslovak state for bringing cultural and economic development to Slovakia and it mentioned the centralist Slovaks in the government as a sign of Czech inclusiveness. The text also apologized for the Czech administration of Slovakia, bemoaning that Slovakia lacked enough competent officials. It then claimed that Prague had carried out the Pittsburgh Agreement in full , adding that "during the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they demanded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks." 46 To the frustration of the Slovak autonomists, this campaign barely registered among U.S. officials in Washington. American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Prague paid slightly more attention, although most addressed it only passively and most often from the Czechoslo45 Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-S/ovak Republic (Slovak Catholic Federation of America : 1923). Found in : "Einstein to SoS, No. 611 ," 20 February 1924, F#: 860F.0l / 162, DoS CS 1910-44. The New York Times reported on the letter: " Slovak Protest to All Nations," New York Times, Mar. 12, 1924, 34. 46 National Slovak Society, et al. , An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia ( I 924), in "Joseph Jan eek to Coolidge," 3 May 1924, F# : 860F.0l / 164, Dos cs 1910-44 �SLOVAKIA 2019 41 vakist perspective. The American Ambassador during the 1920s, Lewis Einstein, for example, reported on the SCF letter, misrepresenting it as "a violent indictment of Czech policy in Slovakia," and praised Prague for "accomplishing there a work of civilization. By introducing education and schools in a population where a high degree of illiteracy existed, by bringing in public hygiene, orderly justice and a better fiscal system, they are laying the foundations for the future. " Accordingly, in his view the Slovaks only needed proper education to unify with the Czechs . Ultimately, "Only one thing can be excluded, which is Slovakian autonomy." 47 In another attempt at outreach, Adam Podkrivacky as President of the FCSU wrote to John Hickerson, acting Chief of Western European Affairs at the U.S . State Department. Podkrivacky complained about the U.S. Consul General in Prague sending out correspondence to Slovakia in the Czech language instead of Slovak. He also requested that the State Department use the hyphen when writing 'Czecho-Slovakia. ' Podkrivacky then supplied Hickerson a copy of an autonomist political pamphlet, to "acquaint better with the political situation just as it exists between the Slovaks and the Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia." Hickerson forwarded the letter to the embassy in Prague and asked for a report on the Slovak question. Charge d' affaires J. Web Benton responded, declaring the letter unacceptable due to the threat posed by Czechoslovakia's neighbors. He also made the usual ethnographic arguments, adding how "Czech culture has contributed measurably to the advancement of Slovakia," and predicted the issue would dissipate. Benton dismissed the pamphlet as simply "anti-government propaganda ... the request for autonomy, in the sense of a separate parliament as mentioned in the Pittsburgh Pact, is something that no truly patriotic and far-seeing Slovak could at present afford to advocate." He added, "I assume that the Department will pay no further attention to his communications, but it seems not inopportune to observe that Czech is the official language of this country."48 While a few U.S. diplomats from the period, notably Lewis Einstein, came to develop a more nuanced view on the topic, this ended each time new embassy staff took over. 47 "Einstein to SoS , No . 611 ," DoS CS 1910-44. "Adam Podkrivac ky to John Hickerson," 29 March 1937, F#: 860F.0l / 18 1, DoS CS 1910-44. " Movement for Slovak Autonomy," 30 April 1937, F#: 860F .01 /184, DoS CS 1910-44. 48 �42 SLOVAKIA 2019 The dismissal of Slovak-American pleas stood in contrast to a disproportionate concern among American officials about the proHungarian Slovaks living abroad. The Rothermere campaign spurred some interest, and while some Americans expressed some sympathy to it, including chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Borah and publisher William Randolph Hearst, the U.S. Embassy in Prague wrote profusely about how the Slovaks remained opposed to a return to Hungary. When the exiled nationalist communist Slovak Vince Mihalus created an exile Slovak government in 1928, the State Department gave him disproportionate consideration, even though he held little popular support in Slovakia. Jehlicka reached out to Washington, calling for support against "Czech tyranny" and requesting support for recognition of the Slovaks as a minority in the League of Nations. The Czechoslovak embassy directed the State Department in its response, simply informing U.S. officials that Jehlicka only organized a "small number of Slovak renegades, mostly of Hungarian origin." 49 This flurry of publishing was very much a product of the widespread transatlantic interaction between Slovakia and the United States, as Slovak leaders on both sides of the Atlantic travelled between Europe and North America as they attempted to coordinate common political action. In the early 1920s, Prague still had hopes of guiding the Slovak-Americans to the centralist cause, despite the sentiment building against it. One major effort was the creation of a Slovak League in Slovakia by centralist Slovaks, designed to serve 49 Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban exchanged several letters with Hearst on the issue, facilitated by the State Department, eventually convincing Hearst to no longer give a voice to Rothermere and his supporters. "Einstein to SoS, No. 1355," 30 July 1927, F#: 860F.4016/4, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Butler Wright to SoS, No. 62," 15 Oct 1927, F#: 860F.4016/9, DoS CS 1910-44. "Vladimir Hurban to William Randolph Hearst," 27 May 1937, & " Hurban to Cordell Hull," 4 June 1937, F#: 860F.00/437 & 438 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Council of State of Slovakia to SoS," 6 Nov 1928, F#: 860F.01 / 171 & 172, DoS CS 1910-44. "Nelson Torsler Johnson to Einstein," 28 Jan 1929, F#: 860F.01 / 171 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1747," 28 Feb 1929, F#: 860F.0l/173, DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1756," 9 Mar 1929, F#: 860F.0l / 174, DoS CS 1910-44. "Washburn to SoS, No. 2153." "Einstein to SoS, No. 516," 20 Sep 1923, F#: 860F.00/2 14, DoS CS 1910-44. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 30 July 1933, F#: 860F.00/345, DoS CS 1910-44. "Prentiss B. Gilbert to SoS, No. 650," 8 Aug 1933 , F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 191044. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 29 Aug 1933, F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 1910-44. �SLOVAKIA 2019 43 as a counterpart to the SLA and to build common action across the Atlantic. This effort failed, however, after the Slovak League of America refused to cooperate with it. 50 With autonomist sentiment among the American Slovaks sharpening, Prague sent Slovak centralist leader Vavro Srobar to the United States in 1923. While Srobar attempted to unify the Slovak-Americans behind centralism, his visit had the opposite effect of galvanizing the Slovak-American autonomists. Srobar received support from sympathetic groups such as the Slovak Sokol, but the SLA and other autonomist organizations boycotted his speeches. Prague sent other figures to agitate for centralism, including the priest Jozef Rudinsky and agrarian politician Fedor Ruppeldt. Seton-Watson also reached out to the SlovakAmericans in several letters and later in a visit in 1935 , during which he appealed to the Slovak-Americans to encourage the Slovaks in . · 51 SI ova k ia against autonomy. The efforts by centralists did not change the status quo, as the Slovak-American autonomists remained firm in their opinions and openly repudiated centralist arguments. Pankuch, for example, felt that the only result of Srobar's visit was to destroy Czech-Slovak 52 unity and the internal unity of the Slovak-Americans. Ruppelt in tum complained how even among the Slovak Lutherans he constantly had to fight against autonomist sentiment. 53 With the dividing lines firmly set, the Slovak-American centralists and autonomists quit mutual involvement in each other's organizations and the centralists began a continuous propaganda campaign against the SLA backed by Prague. For example, after Slovak-American autonomists 50 Ignac Gessay, Kratke Dejiny S/ovenskej Ligy Na S/ovensku: od Zalozenia po 1. 0kt. 1926 (Bratislava: Slovenska Liga na Slovensku, 1926). "Nova ohlavka- stary kon. Pozor na Slovensku ligu!" 27 Oct 1924, Bratislava (No 68), in Jozef Tiso, Prejavy a Clanky (1913-193 8), eds. Miroslav Fabricius & Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Historicky 'ustav SA V, 2002),), 196-7. 51 "An Appeal ," PF: Bie/ek, SI. Pankuch, Histo ry, 177-86. "Seton-Watson to Vojtech Mastny" (Doc 124), in Seton -Watson, 375-6. "Odkaz Scotus Viatora Americkym Slovakom" (Doc 125), in Seton-Watson, 377-80. "Seton-Watson to Stefan Osusky "' (Doc 128) & "Osusky to Seton-Watson" (Doc 129), in Seton-Watson, 3857. Mikus, "Slovak League," 46-7. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 1864-1926 (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarne Sv. Andreja, 1934), 503-5 . Palickar, "Czech and Slovak." Tomas Capek, Nase Amerika (Prague: Nakladem Narodni Rady Ceskoslovenske, 1926), 113. 52 Pankuch, History, 180. 53 " Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc 149), in Seton-Watson, 441-2 . �44 SLOVAKIA 2019 confronted him, Srobar reportedly lashed out at them as "knownothing drunkards" and traitors against the Republic. 54 While the Slovaks in America had been legitimate Slovaks when Masaryk needed them during the war, once they became a threat, the centralists began to categorize them as United States citizens, whose influence should not extend beyond America. 55 When the Czechoslovak Government offered a special commendation to the SLA on Czechoslovakia's l 0th anniversary in 1928, for its role in the creation of the state, the Slovak League of America rejected it. 56 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia perceived things quite differently. Many Slovak nationalist leaders believed that the nation as an ethnic and cultural foundation transcended the state, and offered regular praise of the Slovak-Americans as fighters for Slovak liberty and autonomy. Figures such as Hlinka and Lutheran autonomist leader Emil Stodola openly praised the Slovak-Americans and their role in the fight for autonomy, and argued that their past actions allowed the American Slovaks an equal right to speak about the fate of the Slovak homeland. 57 SPP leader Jozef Tiso extolled, "In this (Pittsburgh) agreement we see the heritage of our own American brothers, for which we will fight with the honor and the tenacity of the Slovak spirit, which is not intimidated by prison, the malice of the world, nor the cynicism of centralist agents." Tiso praised the "real Slovak patriots," working in the "free air of America," and he even posited that the Slovak-Americans had a better claim to speak for the Slovaks than the Slovak centralists did, because the SlovakAmericans had made the revolution successful with their blood, treasure and propaganda.58 Slovak scholars also published multiple 54 "A. S. Ambrose to Seton-Watson" (Doc 126) in Seton-Watson, 381-2. "Aby uz raz bolo jasno a aby prestaly r6zne narknutia proti Slov. Lige," PF: Bielek, SI. 55 Masaryk, for example, used such logic to dismiss the Pittsburgh Agreement, which he called a "local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks," whose "signatories were mainly American citizens, only two of them being nonAmericans." Masaryk, Making, 208-11. 56 Stolarik, Where is my Hom e?, 98 . 57 "Hlinka on Scotus Viator" (Doc 109), in Seton-Watson, 345-53. Emil Stodola, Pre/om: Spomienky, Uvahy, Studie (Praha: L. Mazac, 1933), 193-4. 58 "Novy vykrik bratov z Ameriky," 24 Feb 1924, Bratislava (No 43), in Tiso, Prejavy, 157-9. " Pittsburghska dohoda - neplatna?!" 29 May 1924, Bratislava (no 57), in Tiso, Prejavy, 179-80. "Parliamentary Speech," 25 Nov 1931, Prague (No I 64), in Ti so, Preja vy, 347. "Speech to Public Assembly of the Slovak People 's �SLOVAKIA 2019 45 studies of the Slovak-Americans and their role m Slovak national development. 59 Slovak autonomists openly expressed these sentiments through regular trips to the United States. These attempts at direct engagement were nonetheless slow to start. Prague regularly prevented such trips, including the denial of a passport to Bishop Jan Vojtassak out of concern that he would agitate for autonomy and collect money for the SPP while in the United States. The barrier broke in 1926 when Hlinka accepted an invitation to visit America from editor Jozef Husek and the Friends of Slovak Freedom, sponsored by the SLA, the FCSU, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (FCSLU). Hlinka desired to visit the United States to thank the Slovak-Americans in person for their support for Slovak self-determination, to explain firsthand the political situation in Slovakia, and to encourage them to keep fighting. After stalling on the process, Prague ultimately relented to avoid the resulting outrage had they refused. They issued Hlinka a passport to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. Hlinka's visit lasted from June 5 to October 13. Although Hlinka expressed some trepidation that Slovak-American centralists would treat him with hostility, Slovak-American autonomist leaders Josef Husek and Anton Kompanek convinced him the experience would prove the opposite. This claim proved true, as Hlinka received hundreds of invitations to speak to overflowing crowds on each occasion. Demand was so high that, then SLA president Ivan Bielek had to write an article emphasizing Hlinka's time limitations to try to tame expectations. During his visit, Hlinka travelled around the U.S. East and Midwest, visiting local Slovak communities. He regularly attended and celebrated Mass and held meetings with SlovakAmerican organizations, including the SLA from whom he received an honorary membership . Hlinka visited assorted Slovak-American institutions, surveying Slovak-American newsrooms, printeries, Party," 18 August 1937 & 25 August 1937, Bratislava (No 251 & 252), in Tiso, Prejavy, 523-4. "Nase narodnopo liticke palladium," 5 June 1938 (No 260), in Tiso, Prejavy, 543-4. Kon stantin Culen, Po Sviitop/ukovi druha nasa h/ava: Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947), 182-3. 59 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Ruzomberok: Rudinsky, 1921 ). Karol Sidor, S/ovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava: Jednota, 1928). Matica Slovenska, S/ovenskej verejenosti v Amerike (Mati ca slovenska , 1937). Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarei'l Andreja, 193 7) . �46 SLOVAK.IA 2019 schools, and churches. Overall, Hlinka held rallies at 80 locations, gave 200 speeches, and visited more than 100 Slovak parishes. Hlinka's visit spurred a level of excitement and activity among the Slovak-Americans that would never recur. 60 Hlinka kept his goal of directly exposing the Slovak question during his visit. He regularly spoke on the issue, and carried a copy of a censored Slovak nationalist newspaper as evidence. During his visit, Hlinka could not help but contrast the image of America with his experience in Czechoslovakia. In one such speech, he made clear that the Slovaks .. . would prefer not to quarrel with the Bohemians, but when they preach democracy and at the same time practice deceptions and aggression, we have no choice but to oppose them ... America is a superior nation and a master democratic republic. It has a splendid constitution which not only guarantees the rights and liberties to the people, but sees that they get them as well. Hlinka likewise extolled the "firm individuality" that the SlovakAmericans had gained, and he highlighted the sense of natural connection between Slovaks and Americans. "A good Slovak who comes to America makes a good American, and all good SlovakAmericans, including the new generations born in America from Slovak extraction will appreciate what they have inherited from their Slovak ancestry. Neither will they forget Slovakia." In his farewell speech, Hlinka expressed how the Slovak-Americans had filled him with national pride. He affirmed, "I saw the large affl uence of Slovaks, these Slovaks who under the Tatras suffered from hardship and physical and spiritual want," and prai sed how they helped sustain the Slovak nation. He finally asked of them, "do not forget that under the Tatras stand your cradle and your old homeland, our hard-tested and suffering Slovakia!" 61 60 Adamec, "Slovak Catholic Federation ," 223-32. Sidor, Hlinka, 503-5, 510-1 I, 543 -52 . Sidor, "The Slovak League," 57-9. Mikus, "S lovak League," 46-7 . Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 65 -74. 61 Palickar, " Monsignor Hlinka- The Man," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 51-6, 55 . Palickar, " My Interview with Msgr. Hlinka," in Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 56-9. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 543-52. �SLOVAKIA 2019 47 In the 1930s, the Slovak-Americans experienced a few more visits from notable figures. One such visit was from the Slovak cultural organization Matica slovenska, in 1935 . The Slovak-Americans had regular contact with the Matica in the 1920s and there remained regular efforts to create an American branch of the organization.62 With the outbreak of the Great Depression, however, interest and funding for Slovak cultural programs in America declined. The Matica decided a visit to America was necessary to reverse thi s process, which they interpreted as the Slovak-Americans becoming too Americanized. The organization ' s director, the writer Jozef C. Hronsky, led the delegation, but it also included historian Konstantin Culen, and the artist Jozef Cincik, among others. These individuals gave many lectures and supplied ample literature and art, including a donation of libraries of Slovak material to the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago.63 While they found that some second and third generation Slovak-Americans had lost touch with Slovak culture, the delegates gave high praise to the Slovak-Americans for the interest they showed in the lectures, music, art and other cultural information the Matica provided. The experience led Culen to adopt the task of writing a history of Slovak-Americans. The linguist Jozef G. Konus likewise noted how "the Slovak spirit opens up more in free America than the lush fantasie s at home could imagine." When the White House wrote a statement for a Slovak-American information brochure praising the Slovaks as a "healthy minded, freedomloving and determined people," the Matica hailed it as evidence of Slovak democratic bona tides. Ultimately, the delegation praised the trip as very much a success, and took back ample material on the Slovak-Americans for placement in the Slovak National Library. The Matica left satisfied that Slovak culture remained firm in America, although it put pressure on the Slovak-Americans to improve their direct cultural linkages with the homeland. 64 62 To see many examples of this communicati on, see: The Ma tica slovenskti, Martin, Slovakia, re: American Slovaks Papers, IHRC . 63 According to Mark Stol arik, th e Mati ca brought 84 crates of books, totaling 4 I ,000 volumes, while visiting 98 separate Slovak-American communities. Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home?, 96-100. 64 "Vianoce Maticnej delegacie," Slovensko, 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 87-8. Konstantin Culen, "Co m6ze dat' Amerika slovenskej historii ," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 87-8. Jozef C. Hronsky, " Mati ca v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (March 1936), 110-13. Jozef G. Konus, " Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), I I6-18 . �48 SLOVAK.IA 2019 The final major figure to visit America was the Reverend Jozef Tiso in 1937, with the Catholic cultural organization Spolok Sv. Vojtecha. Much like Hlinka, Tiso celebrated mass and heard confessions during his visit, spoke at public assemblies and met with many American priests, journalists, and Slovak-American leaders. He also attended other broader Catholic events, including the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and met with the Papal delegation in Washington, D.C. Tiso made a broad effort to learn about American political life, to determine what Slovak leaders could transfer back to Slovakia. He particularly admired American technical prowess in organization and publishing, which he saw as facilitating a more efficient Catholic organization and action, and conceptualized a plan to send young Slovak leaders to America to learn American methods of organization. Tiso also praised the Slovak-American sense of independence and pride in their Slovak identity. Seeing how the Slovaks had developed on independent terms in the vast American melting pot, Tiso interpreted the Slovak-American experience as proof of Slovak capabilities and their merit for self-determination. Tiso never gave up his sense of solidarity with the Slovak-Americans, and referenced his visit to affirm his desired direction for the Slovaks. 65 The only visit to the United States by a Slovak official to gamer much attention from Washington was Srobar's in 1923. American diplomat Einstein provided notice of the visit, adding that it was "doubtless intended to counteract the seditious anti-Czech propaganda which has been going on for some time both in Slovakia, where it is fomented by Magyar intrigues, and among the Slovak clericals in the United States." Although, he noted that the Slovak autonomy movement remained "noisy and violent in its methods but unaided it can do little and it is not at present causing here any serious conJozef G. Konu s, "Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 116-18. Jozef Hronsky, "Na margo americkeho zapisnika," S/o vensko, 2, IO & I I (June-July 1936), 177-80. Jozef Cincik, "Na margo americkeho zapisnaka," Slo vensko , 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-6. " Maticna vystava v Clevelande," Slo vensko, 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-4. " President Roosevelt pozdravuje slovensky narod," Slovensko , 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 79. "Slovenska Amerika sa hybe," S/ovensko, 4, 3 (Nov 1937), 32-3. "SLA to Sku ltety, I June 1935,".PF: Mamatey, SI. Stolarik, "Slovak League." J.A. Berta, "Slovak America and the Matica Slovenska," Furdek, 23 (1984), 163-71. 65 Culen, Po Sviiloplukovi, 182-9. "Speech about the state account balance from 1926," 23 February 1938, Prague (No 258), in Tiso, Prejavy, 533-6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 49 cem." 66 Several Slovak-American autonomists wrote to the State Department to complain about Srobar's visit, including a letter from a Slovak-American World War I veteran asking the Department to halt Srobar's lectures for sowing discord among the Slovaks in the United States. The most notable letter, however, came from the Reverend John Porubsky on behalf of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association. Porubsky criticized Srobar's claimed "cultural visit" as a ruse to propagandize on behalf of Czechoslovakism. He presented it as part of an effort by Prague, "To inoculate the masses of our people in America as a contracting party with such misconception and ethnographical nonsense," and to discredit the Pittsburgh Agreement. Claiming that Srobar "forgot the scope of his mission, even forgot himself in outbursts against leading Slovak American gentlemen, calling them vile names unworthy of a man of his position," Porubsky asked Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to have him expelled from the country.67 This effort also spurred a response by Prague and its allies in the United States. These letters, in an organized campaign, all repeated versions of the same arguments. They complained that the opposition to Srobar consisted of "Jesuits and Bolsheviks" and other "enemies of the state" that were working for Czechoslovakia's destruction. Srobar was, alternatively, a great statesman fighting against them to bring cultural development to Slovakia. They also personally targeted Porubsky and the Slovak Newspapermen's Association: "The great majority of intelligent American Slovaks are heart and soul in accord with Dr. Srobar's patriotic works; only the ignorant and reactionary masses are ignobly and ignorantly supporting the destructive work of Rev. Porubsky and his few brawling associates." 68 Likewise, the Slovak Sokol, which had arranged Srobar's visit from the American end, took credit for the visit, praising how Srobar had "proved to 66 " Einstein to SoS, No. 502 ," 29 Aug 1923, F#: 860F .0 I/ I 48, DoS CS 1910-44. "John Porubsky to Charles Evans Hughes," 31 Oct 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/149, DoS CS 1910-44. "John J. Nedorostek to Hughes," 13 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01/150, DoS cs 1910-44. 68 "V. Krali cek to Hughes," 12 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 151 , DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Joscak to Hughes," 14 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 154, DoS CS 1910-44. "Henry Russek to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/156, DoS CS 1910-44. "C lement lhrisky & Joscak to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/152, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Kovalovsky to Hughes," 16 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/157, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Olsavicki to Hughes," 19 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/ 155, DoS CS 1910-44. 67 �50 SLOVAKIA 2019 the Slovaks of America that any fears as to the future of their former country are unfounded." 69 The State Department only sent back formulaic verification of receipts to these letters, except for one to John Zeman of the Slovak Sokol, thanking him for "setting forth the real purposes of the visit." William Phillips then requested President Coolidge to meet with Srobar, calling him "one of the five men who founded the Republic of Czechoslovakia," to which Coolidge obliged. 70 In 193 7, the Reverend Francis Dubosh of Lakewood, Ohio, attempted to arrange a meeting between officers of the SCF A, Jozef Tiso, and President Roosevelt, with the help of Monsignor Michael J. Ready at the Catholic University of America. The White House staff supported this meeting, but Roosevelt wanted to first confirm with the State Department so as not "to get mixed up in a Slovak controversy." After consulting with Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban, the State Department reported that the embassy made no official complaint, but that they themselves discouraged the visit with "the opinion that these persons are not of sufficient prominence for the President to receive them." After a back and forth in consideration of the issue, the White House ultimately declined, claiming 71 that the President was simply too busy. The Slovak-Americans also visited Slovakia. The most significant of these occurred in 193 8 in the tense period leading up to the Munich Agreement, when the Slovak League sent a delegation to celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Led by its President, Peter P. Hletko, the delegation, as a deliberate gesture, made its first formal visit in Slovakia to Andrej Hlinka in Rufomberok. The delegation travelled into Slovakia through Poland, to 69 "J. Zeman to Hughes," 18 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01 / 153 , DoS CS 1910-44. "W. R. Castle to Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America," 6 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l49, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. B. Wright to Kralicek," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/15I, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Joscak," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.01/l54, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Zeman," I Dec 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l53 , DoS CS 191044. "William Phillips to G. B. Slemp, 12 Nov 1923," & "Slemp to Phillips, 12 Nov 1923," Coolidge Papers, Series I, 742. 71 "Roosevelt to M. H. McIntyre, 22 Oct 1937," " McIntyre to George F. Summerlin, 23 Oct 193 7," "Spruks to Summerlin, 27 Oct 193 7," "McIntyre to Roosevelt, 29 Oct 1937," "McIntyre to Summerlin, 3 Nov 1937," President 's Personal File (PPF), F: 639, Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDR), Hyde Park, New York. 70 �SLOVAKIA 2019 51 avoid Prague and Bratislava, and the Polish government hosted the delegation on their way through. Both the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak centralists sent representatives to corral them before they entered Slovakia. The centralists were, however, sent back early after Warsaw and Slovak-Americans embraced the SPP delegation as the official one. After arriving in Slovakia, the delegation showed the original of the Pittsburgh Agreement to Hlinka and spent most of the trip associating with the Slovak autonomists. Its activities included several visits to the Matica slovenska in Martin, to which it gifted an authenticated copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement and made clear commitments toward transatlantic cultural programs, including joint publications and a transatlantic cultural council. Prime Minister Milan Hodza also led a continued effort to meet and work with the visiting delegation, believing he could convince them to break their close affiliation with the SPP and align with the Agrarians instead. Out of respect, the delegation did meet with centralist officials, including Hodza and President Eduard Benes, whom they encouraged the granting of autonomy to Slovakia for the sake of unity in those very tense times. In a speech in Prague, Hletko made clear their objectives stating, "Our love for Slovakia and the Czechoslovak Republic has induced us to come here. The object of the Pittsburgh Declaration, the original of which we have brought with us, is not to weaken but to strengthen the Republic ." 72 When describing his meetings, Hletko said that Hodza promised a movement towards autonomy, yet Prague still rejected them. 73 Likewise, Ivan Derer was extremely critical of the SlovakAmericans during their visit, accusing them of having been brainwashed. He also dismissed them as representing a small, vocal minority, and smeared them as deliberate Hungarian, German, or Polish agents, if not otherwise simply duped by the machinations of these neighboring rivals. Derer complained, "This delegation, composed most of autonomists, expressed its separatist convictions during every opportunity, expressed anti-Czech interests, made light of work of 72 "Visit of American Slovak Delegation to Jubilee Congress, Bratislava; Slovak Demands for Autonomy," 6 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/534, DoS CS 1910-44. 73 Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. "Narodna Politika Roku 1938 : Ked Bol P. Hletko na Slovensku," B: Karol Sidor - Diplomat 1901-1958 - Vol 2, SI. Pavel KuklisKunovsky, Ako je na Slovensku ? Z vlastnych skusenosti napisa/ a vydal v mesiaci )uni /940 v Pittsburghu, Pa., U.S.A. (Pittsburgh: Narodne noviny, 1940), 4-7. �52 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the Czechoslovak government successes in Slovakia, ironized Czechoslovak oriented Slovaks." He was extremely derisive of Hletko, accusing him of not being truly Slovak, having been born in the United States, and as being "politically inexperienced, unknowledgeable about the conditions of Europe, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia." 74 The SLA visit culminated in the Jubilee Congress for the anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement on June 4, 1938 in Bratislava. A massive rally was organized where Hlinka, Tiso, and Hletko, among others, gave speeches. A large facsimile of the Pittsburgh Agreement surrounded on each side by the American and Slovak flags served as a backdrop. In his speech, Hletko showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement to the crowd, and praised the attention given to the Agreement. A formal proposal by the SPP in the Czechoslovak Parliament to amend the constitution to implement Slovak autonomy then followed. The centralists, led by Hodza, held a counter-rally two days later. They declared the rally more ambiguously as a celebration of the Slovak farmer, although Prague and the centralists promoted the event afterwards as a pro-state rally in opposition to autonomy. The SLA delegation also attended this celebration and Hletko gave a speech, simply affirming that the SLA continued to work for Slovak freedom . Hletko later claimed that the delegation warned the Czech and Slovak leaders they had met about the need to come to an accommodation on the Slovak question, in favor of autonomy, fearing that the issue might become larger with Adolph Hitler rattling his saber. Hletko claimed, however, that no one took this warning seriously. The delegation departed shortly before Hlinka's death in August of 1938, but the SPP sent a piece of earth from Hlinka's graveside to America. 75 74 Ivan Derer, S/ovensky vyvoj a /ud'acka zrada (Prague: K vasnicka a Hamp) , 1946), 183-9 . Derer was convinced the SLA was part of a Polish conspiracy to absorb Slovaki a, led by Karol Sidor. The SLA, however, openly rebuked Polish calls for absorption of Slovakia during its stop th ere. 75 The exact number of participants in each rally is unclear, but most accounts reflected similar participation rates (around one hundred thousand each) and photos of the Slovak Jubilee show a massive crowd. The urn containing the soil is still on display at the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. " Wilbur Carr to SoS, no 122," 9 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/518, DoS CS 1910-44. " Farmers' Day at Bratislava; Demonstration of Slovak Branch of Czechoslovak Agrarian Party," IO June 1938, F#: 860F.00/531 , DoS CS 1910-44. " Po odchode delegatov Slov- �SLOVAKIA 2019 53 The U.S. Embassy took an interest in the SLA visit to Czechoslovakia in 1938, and U.S . Ambassador Wilbur Carr agreed to meet with the delegation. Carr reported that the visit was cordial and that the delegation affirmed to him that its visit was simply to promote good will and it did not desire to interfere in domestic issues in Czechoslovakia. Carr then stated that the SLA's visit to Czechoslovakia annoyed Prague, due to the enflamed minority issues of the time, but that Czechoslovak officials tried to maintain good will with the delegation, although this sentiment "lacked a ring of sincerity." Accordingly, Hletko admitted to Carr that the timing was not the best, but that it was not by design, since they had come simply for the anniversary celebration. Carr expected no harm from the visit. While Carr described the autonomy proposal and reported statements by Hletko and Jozef Rusek complementing the support of the Pittsburgh Agreement among the Slovaks, he countered by providing the text of an anti-autonomy speech by Derer and a section of Masaryk' s memoirs. Carr then misrepresented the Slovak-Americans as having felt embarrassed for having been "utilized by the Hlinka Party for partisan and election purposes." While Carr reported on each of the two rallies, he praised the Farmer's Day as turning into "a spontaneous demonstration of Czechoslovak unity, homage to Benes, and allegiance and confidence in its leader," hostility to autonomy, and featuring a much larger participation.76 While Czech and Slovak centralists worked to keep the SlovakAmericans at a distance after early efforts to court them failed, the Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic worked around Prague to coordinate their activities. Nevertheless, the autonomists had no means of pushing Prague towards changes on the Slovak question. The Slovak autonomists, however, continued their fight and never gave up. The transatlantic Slovak question during the interwar period established the roots for the eventual Slovak-Czech split. The failure to find a compromise between Slovak autonomists and centralists saw an entrenched distrust that contributed to the fall of the First Republic . When the Munich Agreement formally handed the enskej Ligy v Amerike," Slovensko, 5 ( I 939), 16-17. Sidor, "The Slovak League," 59-62. 76 "Carr to SoS , no 112," 31 May 1938, F#: 860F.00/5 l 0, DoS CS 1910-44. "Visit of American Slovak." "Carr to SoS, no 121 ," 8 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/517, DoS CS 1910-44. "Carr to SoS , No 122." "Farmers ' Day. " �54 SLOVAKIA 2019 Sudetenland to Germany in September of 1938, the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia demanded and received autonomy until the new SPP-led government there declared independence on March 14, 1939, following Nazi Germany's invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovak-American autonomists, although distrustful of Nazi Germany, openly embraced the shift toward Slovak autonomy in the shortlived Second Republic, believing they could no longer trust the Czechs. Peter Hletko, for example, cheered how the Slovaks had "fought and won the victory." 77 Although initially hesitant to support complete independence, most Slovak-American autonomists, the moderates excepted, came to support the World War II Slovak State as a symbol of Slovak self-determination, even as they supported Allied victory in the war. While World War II and the subsequent Cold War limited direct linkages between Slovakia and North America, the same rifts on the Slovak question persisted on both sides of the Atlantic until the 1993 Velvet Divorce. 78 77 Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 6574. 78 For more on this topic during World War II and beyond, see: Michael Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on the Slovak Question, I 9 I 4-/ 948 (PhD Diss., University of Co lorado-Boulder, 20 13 ). M. Mark Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA 2019 THE TRANSATLANTIC SLOVAK QUESTION DURING THE INTERW AR YEARS Michael Cude The relationship of the Slovaks to the Czechs is an issue that has persisted through the modem hi story of the two peoples. From the 19 th century ' national awakenings ' in Austria-Hungary to the Velvet Divorce between the Slovaks and Czechs in 1993, this 'Slovak question' was at the center of key events, including the creation of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, its breakup and reestablishment after World War II, and the 1968 Prague Spring. 1 While many recent works have addressed the Slovak question, many have underappreciated the extent to which modem Slovak national identity formation was a transatlantic phenomenon. Historians examining this topic from the domestic Slovak perspective rarely delve deeply beyond Slovak borders, while histories of Slovaks abroad have focused predominantly on the Slovaks' place as immigrant communities . In doing so, such histories overlook how interlinked Slovak national politics in Slovakia were to Slovak communities abroad, particularly in North America, and the critical role they played in shaping Slovak national identity formation. Addressed by only a handful of recent works, the transatlantic Slovak question requires more attention.2 1 Reference key for shortened arc hi val ci tations: IHRC : Slovak American Collection, Immi gratio n History Research Center, University of Minneso ta. fil: Slovak Institute, Cleveland, OH. DoS CS 1910-44: Records of th e U.S. Department of Stale Relating to th e Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944, Microfilm (Washin gton D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1982). 2 For some examples of sc holarship considering the Slovak question from a transatlantic perspective, see: M. Mark Sto larik, Where is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( /8 70-2010) (Bern : Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907- 1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35 . Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of CzechoSlovakia, 1914-19 I 8," Slovak Studies, 8, Hi stori ca 5 ( 1968), 7-82. Stefan Kucik, Podiel americkych S!ovakov na aulonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku 191 8-/938 (Martin: Matica slovenska, 20 I I). Gregory Curtis Ference, Sixteen Months of Indecision : Slovak American Viewpoints Toward Compatriots and the Homeland from SLOVAKIA 2019 19 The Slovak efforts abroad during World War I remain the best told component of this story. The foundation of the transatlantic Slovak question was laid in the periods leading up to the First World War, when Slovak-American organizations began to campaign for Slovak political autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. The central organization for Slovak national activism became the Slovak League of America (SLA), founded in May 1907 by Slovak-American leaders to unify the disparate Slovak groups in the United States in common political action. The SLA ' s main objectives were to develop the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in America as a means of supporting the cultural and political life of the Slovaks in the homeland and to fight for Slovak national self-determination. 3 World War I and its accompanying 'Wilsonian moment' entrenched important symbols of Slovak national self-determination, as Slovak immigrant communities contributed to the establishment of the new Czechoslovak Republic. The wartime Czechoslovak National Council and its leaders, including Thomas G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, utilized Slovak-American organizations for financial , military, and diplomatic support. Consequently, Slovak-American demands led to the creation of the most important document relating to Slovak nationalism for the following twenty years: the Pittsburgh Agreement. Signed on 31 May 1918, this document declared common action between the Czechs and Slovaks in the formation of a democratic republic. Nevertheless, the agreement made a clear assertion for Slovak autonomy, under the terms that the Slovaks would I 9 I 4 to I 9 I 5 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna Uni versity Press, 1995). Michael Cude, "The Imagined Exiles: Slovak-Americans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republic," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vo l. 5, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk, Poland: University of Gdansk History Institute, 20 14), 287-305 3 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America, Daniel C. Necas, trans. (St. Paul, MN : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society, 2007). Jan Pankuch, History of the Slovaks of Cleveland and Lakewood, Rasto Gallo, trans. (Cleveland: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society & Western Reserve Historical Society, 2001), 29-38. Stolarik, " Rol e," 7-82 . Stephanie 0. Husek, "Slovak American Fraternal, Cultural, and Civic Organizations to 19 I 4," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study, Joseph C. Krajsa, ed. (Middletown: Slovak League of America, 1978), 23 -38 . Joseph A. Mikus "The Slovak League of America: A Historical Survey," in Slovaks, Krajsa, ed., 3956. R. Vladimir Baumgarten & Joseph Stefka, The National Slovak Society: JOO Year History, I 890-1990 (Pittsburgh: National Slovak Society, 1990), 17-33. 20 SLOVAKIA 2019 have their "own administration, own parliament, and own courts." In the short term, the Pittsburgh Agreement appeased the Slovak-Americans, who consolidated their support around the budding state, while Masaryk used the agreement to legitimize Czech-Slovak coop4 eration in his diplomatic efforts. This campaign allowed Slovak-American leaders a sense of direct influence on the affairs of their homeland, although the Czechoslovak National Council quickly stymied this hope. While the Slovak-Americans had been able to pressure Masaryk into symbolically accepting their goals for Slovak autonomy, their influence only extended to his need to provide evidence of Slovak participation in his political program as he sought recognition from the Entente powers. As a result, the Slovak-Americans found themselves on the margins during the building of the state . Accordingly, many historians consider the Pittsburgh Agreement as a matter of domestic Slovak politics after its initial signing, with little further consideration for the Slovaks abroad. In doing so, they neglect the fact that transatlantic activities continued through the interwar period.5 With the establishment of Czechoslovakia following the war, Slovak national activists on both sides of the Atlantic, hereto identi- 4 "Pittsburgska Dohoda" in Dok:umenty slovenskej narodnej identity a statnosti, vol. I, eds. Jan Benko, et al (Narodne literame centrum: Dom slovenskej literatury, 1998), 484-7. " Masaryk to Mamatey, 22 September 1918," SLA Cabinet, F:llth Congress, Slovak Institute (S I), Cleveland, OH. Pankuch, History, 145-50. Stolarik, "Role," 32-54. Karo l Sidor, ''The Slovak League of America and the Slovak Nation 's Struggle for Autonomy," Slovakia I 7, 40 ( I 967), 39-46. Peter P. Hletko, "The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact," Slovakia l 8, 41 ( 1968), 5-54. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum , "The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Documents," in Slovakia 36, 66 & 67 ( 1998), 81-97. lmrich Mazar, A History of the Binghamton Slovaks : Over a Period of Forty Years, 1879-1919, ed. Wilhelmina Mazar Salina, trans. Thomas Janacek (Phoenix: Via Press, 2003), 203-17. Baumgarten & Stefka, National, 81-3. 5 James Ramon Felak, At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929-1938 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, I 994). Peter A. Toma & Dusan Kovac, Slovakia: From Samo to Dzurinda (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 200 I). Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia : The Struggle for Survival, 2nd ed. (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Jan Rychlik, "Czech-Slovak Relations in Czechoslovakia, I 918-1939," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918- 1948, eds . Mark Cornwall, R.J.W . Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 13-26. Elisabeth Bakke, "Czechoslovakism in Slovak History," in Slovakia in History, eds. Mikulas Teich, et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 2011), 247-68. SLOVAKIA 2019 21 fied as the Slovak 'autonomists,' had full expectations of a federal relationship that would recognize Slovak cultural uniqueness and grant the Slovaks civic equality with autonomy over domestic affairs under the terms of the Pittsburgh Agreement. In contrast, most Czech leaders wanted a strongly centralized state, justified by arguments of the commonality of the Czechs and Slovaks, the threat of Hungarian and German irredentism, and the believed necessity of Czech oversight to modernize Slovakia. They relied on support from Slovak ' centralists,' who identified the Czechs and Slovaks as a common people. Slovak autonomists, who saw the Slovaks as a culturally distinct people from the Czechs, perceived this ' Prague centralism' as a form of cultural and political hegemony. In response, they replanted their fight over the Slovak question against the newly formed government in Prague. Both autonomists and centralists mobilized Slovaks at home and abroad behind their version of the state, with the transatlantic component focused on lobbying foreign governments. As with many other nationality groups, Slovak leaders saw the postwar peace process as a key moment to make their case. With the centralists represented at the Versailles Peace Conference by the formal delegation from Czechoslovakia, the autonomists attempted to present their own view, including a flurry of correspondence from Slovak-Americans to United States President Woodrow Wilson and an unofficial delegation led by Slovak nationalist leader Andrej Hlinka. The autonomists appealed for recognition of an independent Slovak identity and the establishment of a federalist system in Czechoslovakia that granted greater domestic political autonomy to Slovakia. Wilson and other western leaders, however, prioritized economic and political modernity as a necessary quality for selfgovernrnent. Czechoslovakia's centralist leaders appealed to the Wilsonian prioritization of modernism to gain American acceptance of their vision, and used a proposed uplift of the Slovaks into modernity to advance this cause. They nonetheless pursued this objective in a way that often cast the Slovaks in a disparaging light and sowed further discord. The Conference in turn legitimated this organization of the Czechoslovak state and ignored Slovak autonomist appeals. 6 6 For more, see : Michael Cude, "Wilsonian National Self-determination and the Slovak Question during th e Founding of Czechoslovakia, 1918-192 1," Diplomatic Histo,y (2016) 40, I: 155-80 22 SLOVAKIA 2019 This failure at Versailles did not dissuade transatlantic Slovak activities. From the conclusion of the Treaty of Trianon in June 1920 to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, the Slovak question persisted in the First Czechoslovak Republic. The interwar period saw the Slovak autonomist movement survive with the Czechoslovak state arrayed against them . Slovak autonomists regularly looked across the Atlantic for support in pressuring Prague to change its stance. The Slovak autonomists continued to reference the spirit and goals of Wilsonianism to justify their claims for autonomy, and the Pittsburgh Agreement became their primary symbol. SlovakAmerican autonomists accepted their leading role of defending the Slovaks internationally, and they remained hopeful of convincing world leaders, particularly those in the United States, to embrace their view. This task remained an uphill battle, given the autonomists' inability to match the resources or international connections maintained by Prague, as centralists worked to discredit the idea of domestic autonomy for Slovakia. The Czech and Slovak centralists polarized the issue as a support for state unity through centralism or support for the destruction of the state through autonomy. In international appeals, the centralists disparaged Slovak capabilities for selfgovernment, and presented the Slovak autonomists as a parochial fringe, ignorant of world affairs. Accordingly, this transatlantic debate heavily contributed to the failure of the Czechoslovak concept in the interwar period by helping sow the entrenched distrust that culminated in the splintering of the Czechoslovak Republic in March of 1939. The question of Slovak autonomy remained a principal component of Slovak politics during the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks split into three general categories on the Slovak question. The smallest of these groups were the Czechoslovakists, who wanted a close, non-differential linkage with the Czechs. Vavro Srobar, the first appointed Minister for Slovakia in 1918, exemplified this faction. Another group consisted of moderate nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of separate Slovak identity and political autonomy. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of the republic in the late 1930s and leader of the Agrarian Party, best exemplified this faction. Hodza and others supported a federalist model to address national minority questions. Most of the former two groups came from Slovakia's Lutheran minority. The Slovak auton- SLOVAKIA 2019 23 omists, who were predominantly Catholics, were the most controversial. The Reverend Andrej Hlinka represented them as leader of the Slovak People 's Party. Hlinka and his supporters pushed for complete autonomy within Czechoslovakia, although the radical end of the party increasingly sought greater independence while a smaller minority even promoted a return to Hungary under a promise of autonomy. The Slovak People's Party (SPP) remained the most popular party in Slovakia and mixed cooperation with opposition to push for Slovak autonomy. The Agrarian Party followed in popular support, and it gradually pushed for more autonomy, albeit in a more deliberate fashion than the SPP. The Slovak National Party, the Slovak Communists, and the Hungarian Parties joined them in support of autonomy.7 Politically, some Slovaks took prominent positions in the central government, most notably Hodza. Prague allowed Slovak autonomists to organize and hold seats in Parliament, but it continued to censor nationali st viewpoints and it regularly pursued smear campaigns against Slovak autonomist leaders. The SPP joined the government in 1927, arranged by Hodza after promises of Slovak autonomy, but Hodza's plan proceeded in a watered-down fashion. The SPP participation lasted only two years before accusations of treason against radical politician Vojtech Tuka led to the SPP's withdrawal from the government. The SPP later exploited the Munich Agreement to force Prague's hand to achieve autonomy during the short-lived Second Republic, and then seceded from the state in March of 1939.8 7 Prague regularly promoted the idea that most of the Slovak people opposed autonomy, because the SPP only maintained 30-35% of the electorate in Slovakia. Although it is difficult to determine the true popular support of autonomy based strictly on the electoral support of each party, the support in Slovakia for Prague's version of centralism was probably we ll in the minority when one considers that the three largest parties-SPP, Agrarian, and Communists- all embraced some level of Slovak autonomy. 8 For more on this period in Slovak hi story, see: Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism, Slovakia, and the Communists 1918- 1948 (New York: Columbia University, 1983). Susan Mikula, "The Politics of Frustration : The Slovak Politica l Experience, 191 8-1938," in Reflections on Slovak Histo ry, eds. Stanislav Kirschbaum & Anne C. Rom an (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1987), 73 -88. James Felak, "Slovak Considerations of the Slovak Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist, and Communi st views in lnterwar Czechoslovakia" in The Czech and Slovak Experience, ed . John Morison (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 136-62. Felak, At the 24 SLOVAKIA 2019 The Slovak-A mericans also consolidated their positions on the issue in a similar fas hi on. After an early divide, the leaders of the Slovak League of America gave up on Prague and embraced the autonomist position, as did the large Catholic fraternal organization the First Catholic Slovak Union, and other, smaller organizations, such as the Friends of Slovak Freedom (FSF), an organization formed in the 1920s w ith the singul ar goal of addressing the Slovak question . The large, secular and large ly Protestant, fraternal organizations, the National Slovak Society and the Slovak Evangeli cal Un ion, at first embraced the centralist Slovaks, but nationalist pressure ultimatel y led them to try to moderate between the centrali st and autonomist positions. They ultim ate ly embraced the gradualist position of Hodza. In response, the Czechoslovaki sts established the Slovak National A lliance to serve as the arm of Prague among the SlovakAmericans, along with the Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. Consisting mostl y of secularists and some Lutherans, these organizations regularly attacked the SLA for its Catholic and autonomist leanings and promoted the strict uni ty of the Czechs and Slovaks. 9 As the Slovak question became entrenched in Czechoslovak politics, each competing side pursued a voluminous international lobby ing campaign to build western support for its respective position. This included a fact ion demanding a revision of the Trianon Treaty to return Slovakia to Hungary. The primary international Slovak advocate of this position was the Reverend Francis Jehlicka and hi s organization, the Slovak Council , founded in 1933 . Jehlicka had attended the Paris Peace Conference wi th Hlinka, but decided afterwards that the Slovaks could not trust the Czechs. Jehlicka remained abroad, where he lobbied fo r a Slovak reunion with Hungary based on Hun ga ri an promises of Slovak autonomy. He attempted to build Price of th e Republic. Toma & Kovac, Slovakia, 78-1 06. Kirsc hbaum, History of Slovakia , 155-84. Ryc hlik, "Czec h-Sl ovak Relations," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, 13-2 6. R.J.W. Evans, " Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks : Some Mutual Perceptions," in Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist, I 09-22 . Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia : The State that Failed (New Haven: Yale Uni vers ity Press, 2009), 48-86. Nata lia Kraj covicova, " Slovakia in Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in History, 137-56. 9 Joseph Pauco, "Slovaks Abroad and Their Relati onship with Slovakia," in Slo vakia in the 19th & 20th Centuries, ed. Joseph M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973), 333-42. Josep h V. Adamec, "The Slovak Cath olic Federation," in Slovaks in America, 223-32 . Baumgarten & Stetl<a, National, 85-7. Pankuch, History, 177-86 . Stolarik, " Slovak League," 7-35 . SLOVAKIA 2019 25 support from the Slovak-Americans by appealing to Slovakia's historical and economic roots in Hungary and exposing claimed mistreatment of the Slovaks by Prague. ' 0 Jehlicka could express his voice abroad because of support from Budapest and later Nazi Germany, and he convinced a few figures in the West, most notably the British publi sher Lord Rothermere, who campaigned on behalf of Hungary internationally. Jehlicka ' s arguments nevertheless carried little weight in other circles . Scottish historian R. W. Seton-Watson, a prominent supporter of the Czechoslovak Republic , pursued a constant back and forth against Jehlicka, and, on both sides of the Atlantic, Slovaks and Czechs of different politica l views unified against Slovakia ' s return to Hungary. The Slovak autonomi sts and centralists , for example, collaborated in an open letter denouncing Jehlicka . 11 Slovak-Americans likewise continued to lobby against Hungarian claims, reminding readers about the old magyarization policy to eliminate Slovak national identity. Slovak-American publisher Jan Pankuch claimed that this was the sole occas ion when the Slovak-American autonomi sts, Czech-Americans, and Slovak10 Anthony Pessenl ehner, "Czechoslovakia' s Ri ght to Statehood Assa iled," Current History, 14, 5 (Aug. I 92 1), 845-8. Dr. F. Jehlicka: Kto on je a co chce (C leveland: 1920). Francis Jehlicka, Reply to Mr. R. W. Seton-Watson 's Book 'Slovakia Th en and Now ' (Vienn a, 1932). The Slovak Co uncil , Th e Unsolved Slovak Problem (Vienna: Slovak Council, 1933). The Slovak Co un cil , Bolsevizmus a slovenska otazka (Geneva: Slovak Council , 193 6), in : 8 : Resolutions, Memoranda, Proclamations, SI. The Slovak Council , Sh ould Great Britain go to Wa r- fo r Czechoslovakia: An Appeal to British Common Sense for th e Sake of Wo rld Peace (London: Haze l, Watson, & Viney, 1937) . Francis Jehli cka, Fa1her Hlinka 's Struggle fo r Slovak Freedom (London: Slova k Council , 1938), 34-5. "The German Minister in Czechoslovaki a (Eisenlohr) to the German Foreign Ministry (Doc 57)," Documen1s on German Foreign Policy, Seri es D, V2 (Was hington, D.C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 132-3 . 11 R.W. Seton-Watson, Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers ( London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1934). " Seton-Watson to Alois Ka lisek" (Doc I 32) in R. W. SetonWa tson and His Relations with the Czechs and Slovaks: Documents, / 906- 195 1, vol. I, eds. Jan Ryc hlik, et al (Prague: Ustav T. G. Masaryka, I 995), 393-6. "The Situati on in Slova ki a and the Magyar Minori ty" (Doc 139) in Seton-Watson, 409-25. "Seton-Watson to Martin Razus" (Doc 155 ) in Seton- Watson, 454-5 . "Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc I 60) in Seton-Watson, 465-9. C. L Orbach, "Czechoslovakia ' s Place in the Sun," Current Histo1y, 14, 6 (Sept I 92 1), 944-5. Anonymous, "Another Defense of Czechoslovaki a" Curren/ History, 14, 6 (Sept 192 1), 945-6. Adam Poliak, "Czechos lova ki a's Right to Statehood," Current History, I 5, 3 (Dec I 92 1), 499. " Slovaki a' s Pro test" (Doc 156) in Seton-Watson, 456-9. 26 SLOVAKIA 2019 American centralists came together in common cause, although the resolution almost failed when the two sides sparred over whether the text should declare the Slovaks and Czechs as one nation. The proHungarian autonomists, thus, remained on the periphery of the Sio• 12 va k question. The unified opposition against Hungarian irredentism otherwise did little to ease the conflict between the centralists and autonomists. The Czech and Slovak centralists made the Slovak question a primary component of their international propaganda, and they often perpetuated negative stereotypes of the Slovaks to promote the Czechoslovak vision. The official press in Prague released ample publications by Czech nationali st leaders in the English language on the topic. President Masaryk, for example, made clear his disappointment with the "po litical immaturity" of the Slovak autonomist movement. Masaryk, who continued to highlight his own partial Slovak heritage, likewise claimed to have proven his great love for Slovakia by having liberated it from Hungary and he asserted that Slovak nationalists could prove their own love by embracing Prague 's authority. 13 Edvard Benes, who served as Foreign Minister until succeeding Masaryk to the presidency in 1935, in tum argued that the Czechs and Slovaks remained unified, except for a "fringe minority," working for a return to the pre-war order, and the "dictates of local , provin12 "Rezolucie Vznesene Ustrednym Vyborom Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike na schodzi , vzdrziavanej IO novembra 1920," Person File (PF): Bielek, SI. Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America, Count Albert Apponyi or Revival of Magyar Propaganda in America (Scranton, Pa: Bosak Press, 1923), in: B: Resolutions, SI. American Citizens of Slovak Origin, The Refutation to the Arguments of the Hungarian Kossuth Delegation ( 1928), in: The Podkrivacky, Adam Papers, B: 17, Slovak American Collection, Immigration History Research Center (IHRC), Uni versity of Minnesota. "What the Magyars Forget," The National Slovak Society (NSS) of the US.A . Records, B: 168, F: Slovak League of America (SLA), lHRC. "The Cleveland District Assembly of the SLA to Hoover," 4 December 1929, F#: 860F.00/306, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia 1910-1944 (DoS CS 1910-44), Microfilm (Washington D.C .: National Archi ves and Records Service, 1982). Pankuch, History, 186-90. 13 Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State: Memories and Observations, 1914-1918, trans. Henry Wickham Steed (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927), 2 1, 41 , 208-11 , 338, 361. Thomas G. Masaryk, Masa,yk on Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek, reprint ed., trans. M. & R. Weatherall (New York: Arno Press, 1971 ). "T.G. Masaryk on the Pittsburgh Agreement" (Doc 30) in Slovakia : Political, 209- 10. SLOVAKIA 2019 27 cial, factional and individualist interests ." 14 Czech scholars, journalists and officials also contributed to this campaign, mostly through studies of the Czechs that glossed over the Slovaks except to praise 15 how the Czechs had liberated them. For example, Czech historian Albert Prazak praised the Czech ro le in uplifting the Slovaks, and condemned Hlinka and the SPP as tools of Hungary and as part of a Catholic conspiracy to take over Central Europe. Prazak then dismissed the Pittsburgh Agreement as "merely a flight of fancy ," rooted in "immaturity of political judgment and lack of understanding." 16 Czech journalist Ales Broz likewise condemned the Slovaks as " retarded in their development" versus the " well educated, practical, realistic" Czechs, and praised the direction of Slovakia under the Czechs for allowing the two peoples to become "one stock, one cul. ,, I 7 ture, one nat10n . Centralist Slovaks also contributed to this campaign, including articles by Interior Minister Juraj Slavik and Minister to France Stefan Osusky on the nationality questions in Czec hoslovakia, as well as one by Education Minister Anton Stefanek praising Prague ' s 14 Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs, trans. Paul Seiver (London : George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 348, 448, 469, 472-8 1. Edvard Benes, Christmas Message (Prague: Orb is, 193 7), 17. Edvard Benes, "Of Czechoslovak Unity" in We Were and We Shall Be: Th e Czechoslovak Spirit th rough th e Centuries , eds. Zdenk a & Jan Mun zer (New York : Un gar, 1941), 164-6. 15 Kami I Krofta & Jiri Hoetzel, A Short Histo,y of Czechoslovakia ( ew York: Robert McBride & Co, 1934), 137-8, 142, 149-52. Kami! Krofta, "Czechs and Slovaks (I)" The Slavonic and East European Review, 13, 38 (January 1935), 363-7 1. Kami I Kroft a, "Czechs and Slovaks ( II )" The Slavonic and East European Review, I 3, 39 (April 1935), 6 11-26. Josef Borovicka, Ten Years of Czechoslovak Politics (Prague: Orbis, 1929), 7-8, 13 , 20-1 , 44, 111-1 2, I I 9-20, I 24-6. Emanuel Capek, "The Background of Political Parti es in Czechoslovaki a" The Sla vonic and East European Review, I 0, 28 (June 193 1), 90- 104. Ales Broz, " Minori ty Ri ghts in th e Czechoslova k State," Foreign Affairs, 6, I (October 1927), 158-60. Ales Broz, " President Masaryk, Creator of the Czechos lovak Republic," Current Histo,y , 24, I (April I 926), 48-53. 16 Prague appointed Prazak, a Czech, to erve at Comenius Uni versity in Brati slava as its primary hi stori an of the Slova ks. The Slavonic Review labeled Prazak the "foremost li ving authority on Slovak History." Albert Prazak, " Review : The ew Slovaki a by R. W. Seton-W atso n" The Slavonic Review, 3, 9 (March 1925), 71 3-20. 17 Ales Broz, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Czech Standpoint," Curren/ Histo,y, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-8 . 28 SLOVAKIA 2019 development of Slovak education. 18 Slovak Social Democrat, and rigid Czechoslovakist, [van Derer's short book on the Pittsburgh Agreement provided the most thorough effort in English to discredit the Slovak autonomists . Derer claimed that most Slovaks embraced the state as constructed, and that only a " pro-Magyar" minority supported autonomy. He likewise dismissed the Slovak-American signers of the Pittsburgh Agreement as not " true" Slovak nationals, because they lived in America. Derer argued that the document had meant simply local administrative autonomy, which he claimed Prague had granted. He then portrayed the Czechs as the Slovaks' saviors and condemned Slovak autonomy: In return for their having helped Slovakia when things were at th eir worst, in return for their having saved our liberty and an independent state apparatus, railway and postal communications, and a Slovak system of education at the tim e when the Slovaks th emselves were weak, unprepared, often distrustful and inclined rather to continue to live under their thousand-year yoke than to live in freedom, in return for having shed their blood for our country on the battlefronts in the Great War, and in the fights against Bolshevist Hungary in I 9 I 9 and thus saving Slovakia from a new occupation by the Magyars -in return for all this are we to remove the Czechs from Slovakia ? 19 Prague also maintained support from American and Eng lish academics and journalists in perpetuating Czechoslovakism. SetonWatson remained a staunch supporter of the idea, boasting how he regularly discredited "cantankerous Slovaks who accused Masaryk and hi s friend s of 'Czec hi sation."' He publicly condemned Hlinka and the SPP and repudiated their criticisms of Prague. Seton-Watson a lso actively denied Slovak agency in Slovak national development. 18 Juraj Slavik, "The Nationality Question in Slovakia," Central European Observer, 11 , 26 (Dec 18, 1933), 463-5 . Stefan Osusky, " Wh y Czechoslovakia?" Foreign Affairs, 15 , 3 (Apri l 1937), 455-71. Anton Stefanek, " Education in Slovakia," Th e Slavonic Review, 2, 5 (Dec 1923), 308-27. 19 Ivan Derer, The Unity of th e Czechs and Slovaks: Has th e Pittsburgh Declaration Been Carried Out? (Prague: Orbis, 193 8). SLOVAKIA 2019 29 The Slovaks should therefore be thankful that fate has made them dependent upon a race so efficient, so well-educated and well-disciplined as the Czechs ... .At the critical moment, the Slovaks made the impression of a helpless animal fascinated by the approach of the boa-constrictor, and Prague was literally the sole hope.-'0 On the Slovak question, Seton-Watson blamed the " hypersensitive" Slovaks as simply being too parochial, religiously backward and ill developed, and he dismissed autonomist arguments as the "wild talk of extremists." Even in a work of collected essays designed to "show that the Slovaks themselves have had a much greater share in the reconstruction of their country than is often supposed," Seton-Watson turned predominantly to centralist Slovaks whose contributions consisted mostly of self-promotion and praise for the merits of centralism.21 The American philanthropist and writer Kenneth D. Miller was another avid promoter of Czechoslovakism. "Everything points to the wisdom of a cultural as well as political union between the two nationalities. No matter what the cultural development may be, neither nationality can well maintain its political independence without the other." He likewise felt that the Slovak question would disappear with the development of the "slow, passive Slovak," who yet lacked initiative, and who was prone to immorality and drunkenness, and to "religious vagary or fanaticism." 22 Other presentations ranged from industrialist and diplomat John Crane, who attacked the "backward ignorance" of the Slovaks for resisting secularization, to YMCA secretary Fred Rindge who criticized a claimed lack of Slovak interest 20 R.W. Seton-Watson , Th e New Slovakia (Prague: Fr. Borovy, 1924), 3, 23-4. R.W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York: Macmillan, 1943), 61. "Seton-Watson Open Letter to Hlinka" (Doc 108), in Seton-Watson, 343-4. "SetonWatson to Alois Kolisek" (Doc 135), in Seton-Watson, 401-2. R.W. Seton-Watson, ed. Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931). When planning the book, Seton-Watson expressed his desire to have an article from a SPP leader, so that Slovak autonomists could not accuse him of onesidedness. He considered an article on the issue of autonomy, but decided only to allow an article on Slovak religion by Hlinka. "Seton-Watson to Milan Hodza" (Docs 144 & 145), in Seton-Watson, 431-2 . 22 Kenneth D. Mill er, The Czecho-Slovaks in America (New York: Doran Company, 1922), 14-25, 121-122, 158-160. 21 30 SLOVAK.IA 2019 in the arts. Journalist C.J.C. Street claimed, "The Slovak dream was always to regain their lost unity with the Czechs and as a united nation to secure the tolerable conditions of existence. " 23 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia pursued a few efforts during the interwar period to counter this campaign, although they lacked equivalent resources and connections to those held by Prague. The SPP' s most notable attempt was the Zilina Memorandum of 1922. Released to the western press and governments, the document sought to expose the Slovak question to the world, beginning with its sensationalist title, "a country doomed to death, a nation in her last agonies implores the civilized world for help." It decried the failures of Wilsonianism, which had allowed Prague to "bamboozle" the Slovaks "out of the freedom promised to them ." The text went on to explain their issues with the Czechs, discussing concerns from the treatment of religion, to economic exploitation, and the denial of autonomy. The memorandum also condemned Czechoslovakism as simply a tool for domination. The Czechs and Slovaks have been always forming two separate little worlds with a very different character due to their different geographical and economic conditions, their different way of thinking, of feeling and of mind. We have a different view of life, other morals and other traditions; we have a different social structure, different legal rules and different ideas about political economy and culture. The document ultimately claimed the world could still save the Slovaks if it acted quickly. The key of the iron cage in which the Slo vak Nation is being mercilessly incarcerated lays in the hands of the Great Powers. This memorial is our last expedient and our last weap23 John 0. Crane, "Church and State in Czechoslovakia" The Slavonic Review, 6, 17 (Dec. 1927), 364-78. Fred H. Rindge, Jr. "The Charm of Czechoslovakia" Current History, 22, 3 (June 1925), 447-50. C. J. C. Street, Slovakia Past and Present (Westm inster, UK: P.S. King & Son, 1928). For more examples, see: Robert Machray, "Czechoslova ki a a Pioneer in Central European Politics" Current Hislo ry, 25, 6 (Mar. 1927), 839-43 . J. H. Wallis, "The Upbuilding of Czechoslovakia," Curren/ Histo1y, 14, 5 (Aug. 192 1), 835-45 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 31 on ... Though only clad in the rags of our torn freedom we nevertheless appear as accusers before the world, charging the rulers of Prague who are still deluding the powers, and the powers themselves for having out of sheer ignorance become their accomplices. To ignore the Slovak case, thus, would be to support the trampling of liberty. 24 After the Zilina Memorandum bore no fruit, the Slovak autonomists pursued fewer efforts to court the west. They made a few sporadic attempts, such as a translation of the SPP •program in 1930, written by Jozef Tiso, which outlined the SPPs vision of a Slovak national Christian democracy, and appealed for autonomy as a protection of the Slovak cultural tradition. It argued that the Slovak nation's religious roots encouraged it toward a peaceful selfpreservation, unlike other nations that turned toward national chauvinism. 25 Slovak priest and publicist Anton Kompanek also produced an article that emphasized Slovak Christianity as a symbol of Slovak worthiness for self-government. Kompanek believed Slovakia served as an example of how the Church and state could find balance in the modem world. 26 These publications, however, remained exceptions, as the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia maintained little faith in western governments, recognizing Prague's stranglehold over their image internationally. They instead relied on the Slovak-Americans to lead the way in their defense internationally. Slovak nationalist politician Karol Sidor claimed that despite a continued interest in the homeland, the Slovak-Americans began to lose their "onetime vitality and ardor" during the interwar period. He linked this outcome to greater assimilation and a decreasing knowledge of the Slovak language.27 This claim is somewhat true. The energy of the war years certainly diminished, particularly in the 24 "Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 02) & "Covering Letter for the Zilina Memorandum" (Doc I 03), in Seton-Watson, pp. 319-33 . 25 Jozef Tiso, The Ideology of th e Slovak Populist Party (Prague: 1930). 26 Anton Kompanek, "The Catholic Church in Slovakia" Th e Sla vonic and East European Review, 12, 36 (April 1934), 611-21. 27 Sidor, "Slovak League," 59-62. 32 SLOVAKIA 2019 1930s with the onset of the Great Depression.28 Sidor, however, understated how much the Slovak-Americans remained at the forefront of the international efforts to gain recognition of the Slovak question. Historian Jozef Pauco 's interpretation is much more accurate: "For twenty years the Slovak League of America defended the spirit and letter of the Pittsburgh Pact and by using the freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly on American soil, they did so more freely and energetically than the two political parties in their homeland." 29 Based on the volume of publications and direct communications with government officials on both side of the Atlantic, it is clear that the Slovak question continued to dominate the transatlantic interests of the Slovak Americans, as they bolstered their compatriots' activities within Czechoslovakia by applying external pressure on Prague. The Slovak fraternal organizations made constant efforts to keep their members linked to their Slovak cultural identity, and to aid in the fight for autonomy in the homeland. They pursued these efforts through education programs such as national lectures, art and photography tours, but also symbolic actions such as erecting a statue of General Milan R. Stefanik in Cleveland in 1924 and the planting of a Linden Tree on Capitol Hill in honor of Stefanik in 1934. 30 The Slovak question remained high on the list of Slovak-American concerns, and the various Slovak organizations produced a flurry of pamphlets and informative documents on the issue. The Pittsburgh Agreement remained at the center of this debate, with Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic continuing to affirm its legality against the centralist dismissals that it was simply a non-binding text designed to placate the Slovak-Americans during the war. Autonomist publica28 June Alexander, for example, shows how assimilation became an internal issue for Slovak-Americans, as the older generations struggled to assure that their American born children maintained links to their ethnic heritage. June Granatir Alexander, Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jn terwar Era (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004), 93-19 I. 29 Pauco, "S lovaks Abroad," 333-42. 30 "Ot. Svec to Podkrivacky," 3 Oct. 1938," PF: Adam Podkrivacky, SI. "S LA to Jakub Vitostak, 30 Nov 1923 ," The First Catholic Slovak Union of America (FCSU) Records, F: 1303, IHRC. "Jan Kocur to Michael Senko, 30 Nov 1926," FCSU, F: 1304, IHRC. 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastisla v Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924), 82-3 . "SLA to Arthur Colegrove," NSS, 8 : 168, F: SLA, IHRC. SLOVAKIA 2019 33 tions looked to inform about the Slovaks, to expose the failed promises of Prague on autonomy, and to defend against the accusations of Prague centralists. The Slovak League remained at the forefront, hoping that exposure of the situation to the American press and pub1ic would spur sympathy and support? In many cases, the Slovak-Americans directed these publications at Prague, with the hope of convincing a change in policy . They, nevertheless, would consecutively produce English versions, which they then sent to the American President, members of Congress, the Department of State, and assorted press outlets. For example, in 1921 the SLA wrote to Masaryk calling for the immediate implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement. When Prague did not respond, the League followed up with a more detailed Memorandum on November 9, 1922. This document called on Prague to make good on the Pittsburgh Agreement in the name of natural rights and to reward the sacrifices made by Slovak-Americans during World War I. It highlighted Masaryk's role in the formation of the Agreement, and then provided a photograph of the original text as well as a series of letters between the SLA and various Czechoslovak officials that had promised its implementation to show how promises made to the Slovak-Americans never lived up to reality. The text then defended the legitimacy of Slovak autonomy. We are convinced that the honest and upright materialization of the Pittsburgh Pact in no way will harm the unity of the State; on the contrary it will mean a considerable reinforcement within and without and make possible united co-operation of all patriotic forces against the elements of disintegration, depriving them of a dangerous weapon, which they cannot effectively employ against the Republic, fanning discontent, mistrust and spreading hatred between both nations comprising the state. The League made clear, however, that this good will rested "solely upon a sincere Czecho-Slovak reciprocity." It then gave an alternative: 31 "Telegram to Ivan Bielek on 29 Nov 1934," NSS, B: 168, F: SLA , IHRC. 34 SLOVAKIA 2019 We feel it is our duty to emphasize that if our sincere and friendly attempt, which has at its heart the welfare, interest and future of the Republic, should fail to meet with success, the Slovak l eague of America would not be able to prevent the American Slovaks and their factors from turning to the Court of Public Opinion of the civilized world. While the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia acknowledged the letter, Prague neglected to respond. 32 The SLA then passed a follow-up resolution. Asserting that it "fights with fire and sword with everyone who is in favor of autonomy of the Slovak nation," it admonished Prague for manipulating the world into believing the Czechoslovakist image and for leading a smear campaign against the SLA. It then provided a list of examples of hostility, including efforts to undermine its finances , blackmail, the bullying of Slovak-American leaders and press, and attempts to send government officials to propagandize against them . It once again emphasized how the League had made every effort to resolve the Slovak question within the confines of the Czechoslovak Republic , but it would soon submit the issue "to the judgment of public opinion of the civilized world," if Prague continued to treat them with disdain.33 Many more publications followed. The Friends of Slovak Freedom , for example, released two protests in 1923. These texts defended the va lidi ty of the Slovak-Americans as representatives of the Slovak people, and condemned Prague's actions against Slovak autonomists, including such accusations as "false signatures or resolutions, false numbers of people attending their lectures, insulting the Slovak journalists, insulting the Slovak League as anti-state, and many other lies," as well as criticisms about press censorship in Slo- 32 SLA , Memorandum S/ovenskej Ligy v Amerike upra vene na vladu a Narodne Shromai denie Cesko-Slo venskej Republiky v zaujme vtelenia Pittsburgskej Dohody do ustavy C.-S. Republiky (Pittsburgh: Slovak League of America, 1922). Both the full Slovak and English versions of this Document are avai lab le at: SLA Cab, F: Memorandum /922 v Zaum e Pitts. Dohody, SI. Also avai lable in: " Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy v Arnerike" in Dokumenty, Vol 2, 138-44. 33 " An Appeal of the Slovak League of America to All Political Factors of th e Czecho-S lovak Republic," PF: Bielek, SI. SLOVAKIA 2019 35 vakia. 34 After reading Masaryk's criticism of Hlinka, the Slovak League then produced a pamphlet that challenged the idea that Masaryk personally had liberated the Slovaks. It reminded readers of the Slovak-American war contribution, and then remarked how the SLA and the Pittsburgh Agreement were certainly valid in Masaryk's eyes when he needed Slovak-American support in 1918. The document then included a text from former Czechoslovak ambassador to Japan, Karel Pergler, arguing that both the Slovaks and Czechs had unequivocally recognized the Pittsburgh Agreement upon its signing. 35 Next to these direct appeals, the Slovak-American autonomists also released many publications geared directly toward an American audience. They designed these works to inform about the Slovaks, expose their continued fight for self-determination and to link the Slovak question to American democratic values. These publications included several biographies of Milan R. Stefanik, a translated history by Slovak historian Joseph Skultety that directly challenged images of Slovak backwardness and other stereotypes, and a short pamphlet on Czechoslovakism by Slovak-American historian Ol'ga Husek warning that the concept meant for the Slovaks "the rejection of their cultural past and the stunting of their future growth." 36 They also attempted to rally America to their cause by showing their valiance in the face of domination. An SLA article distributed to the American Press praised how the Slovak-Americans continued to fight even with "the entire machinery of government set against them, calumnies upon calumnies by a government subsidized press, heaped upon the heads of those who take up their cause, and bug- 34 Friends of Slovak Freedom, " Resolution, November 28, 1923," & " Protest against Censorship and Confiscation of Slovak Publications by the Government in Slovakia" in Pankuch , Slo vaks of Cleveland, l 82-6. 35 Slovenska Liga v Amerike, V Zaujme Pra vdy! (In the Interest of Truth !) (Pittsburgh: P. Jamriska, 1930). Found in : SLA Cabinet, F: SLA Presidents, SI. Prague responded to these letters, but it simply reasserted the usual rebutta ls, claiming that 75% of the Slovaks supported centralization and that the Pittsburgh Agreement was simply an American document. "Ohlas Americkeho Memoranda u Nas," 8 : Slovak League of America (SLA) , SI. 36 0. D. Koreff, Milan Rastislav Stefanik: A Short Biography (Cleveland: Slovak League of America, 1924). Andrew Slabey, General Milan R. Stefanik (Leisenring, PA: Griglak Printery, 1937). Joseph Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, O.D. Koreff, trans . (Middletown, PA : First Catholic Slovak Union, I 930) . Ol'ga Husek, The Czechoslovak Fallacy (Middletown, PA : Jednota, 1935). 36 SLOVAK.IA 2019 bears turned loose to scare those who are not acquainted with conditions. " 37 Religion became a major component of Slovak-American advocacy on the Slovak question in the interwar period. Slovak-American journalist Stephen J. Palickar published many articles in general Catholic publications, including a five-month tit-for-tat with Czech diplomat Josef Hane in defense of Slovak religiosity. He also provided some of the first Slovak-American attempts to link Slovak religiosity to anti-Communism. Palickar likewise defended Slovak agency, and appealed for a lifting of Prague centralism to allow the Slovaks an opportunity to prove their abi lity for self-government. 38 While most of these publications were shorter, more direct works, the Slovak-Americans released a couple of longer exposes on the Slovak question. The first, written by then SLA president Peter P. Hletko on behalf of the Slovak Catholic Federation of America, looked to inform the American people about the Pittsburgh Agreement as an American product in line with "the principles of democracy and self-determination of small nations." Hletko praised how the Slovak "has an inherent love for liberty and freedom , and enjoys fostering his national spirit," which had spurred his immigration to America in a "quest for a land of true liberty," and he argued that American democracy had allowed the Slovaks in America to assert their national identity as an independent people. He asserted how the Slovaks had only joined the Czechoslovak movement on the premise that they would be treated fairly and as equals and highlighted a reg37 "The conflict between Czechs and Slovaks," NSS Records, B: 168, F: SLA, IHRC. For many examples, see: "The Slovaks- Past and Present," in Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism to Atheistic Czech Communism (Cambridge, MA : Hampshire Press, 1948), 40-3 . Stephen J. Palickar, "Czech and Slovak at Odds: Both Sides of the Controversy - From the Slovak Standpoint," Current History, 22 , 5 (Aug 1925), 784-6. "A Dark Spot in Czecho-Slovakia," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 43-45 . "Who is Masaryk?," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 49-51 . "S lovakia-whither bound," in Palickar, Slovakia : From Hungarian Despotism, 76-83. "Slovak Catholicism vs. Czech Communism," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 84-86. "Slovak Grievance," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 70-72 . "President Masaryk and his State," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 61-62. "Scotus Viator Surveys Slovakia," in Palickar, Slo vakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 72-75. Stephen J. Palickar, Slovakia of Today (A Lecture), December 12, 1933 , Columbi a University (New York: Slovak Library Association, 1933). 38 SLOVAKIA 2019 37 ular sense of duplicity and condescension the Slovaks felt from the Czechs. Hlekto praised the Pittsburgh Agreement as having resolved these conflicts, before Masaryk ultimately betrayed his promise, and he gave a detailed defense of its validity and of the right of the Slovak-Americans to speak for their nation during the war. 39 The Slovak-American autonomists shortly thereafter produced an even longer book on the topic . Written by Peter P. Hletko under the pseudonym , "An Autonomist," it served as the most exhaustive consideration of the Slovak question in Eng lish in the early 20 th century. Hletko placed blame on Czech intransigence for fueling the issue unnecessarily. The book argued that the Czechos lovak revolution relied on American money and manpower and "should the President (Masaryk) have failed to dispel the fear and dissatisfaction of the Slovaks through the Moscow and Pittsburgh Agreements, there certainly would not be a Czecho-Slovakia today. " The book then deconstructed Prague 's policies toward the Slovaks, to show Czechoslovakism as a means of hegemony. Hletko considered every issue from the Czech obfuscation on autonomy, the complicity of the Slovak centrali sts, the language issue, schools, and the economy, and he explained the claims of Slovak neediness and incompetence, as we ll as the claimed threat of Hungary, as only a fa<;:ade to justify Czech dominance. He likewise gave examples of Slovak intellectuals to dispute the claim that the Slovaks needed the Czechs to serve that role. He then detailed the domination of Slovakia's administration, civi l service, education system, and cultura l institutions by Slovak centralists and Czechs, and the press censorship and smear campaigns. Ultimately, he concluded that Czechoslovakism was undermining the state and mu st be reversed. Hletko concluded: Th e motive that has promoted us to write this work is not one of revenge, nor a desire to arouse bad feeling, but simply to expose falsehood and reveal truth. It is our sincere hope that, the truth being known, it will enable the Czechs and Slovaks to form a more stable union which will promote justice, trust, and good 39 Slovak Catholi c Federation of America, The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact (S lovak Cath olic Federation of America, 1934). Joseph C. Krajsa, " Dr. Peter Hletko, Most Elite of American Slovaks," Slovakia, 22, 45 ( 1972), 57-9. 38 SLOVAKIA 2019 will, and thereby insure national integrity both at home and abroad. 40 A few non-Slovak publications did favor Slovak autonomy . For example, some historians of the First World War, such as Jan Opocensky and C. A. Macartney, attempted to present a balanced consideration of the Slovak question, giving voice to Slovak autonomist concerns.4 1 There were also several publications that utilized the Slovak question to criticize the broader Versailles system . Writer and journalist E. Alexander Powell , for example, highlighted the differences between the Czechs and Slovaks as an example of the precariousness of the region ' s political stability. Although not particularly admiring of the Slovaks, Powell was highly critical of the Czech treatment of them. He commented, "The Czechs, an energetic, ambitious, progressive, and aggressive people, who outnumber the Slovaks three to one, look with condescension, if not contempt, on their less literate, slower thinking, more easy-going partners, whom, if the truth be known , they regard as immensely inferior to themselves." These scholars all argued that the Czechs needed to treat their minorities with more respect and make good on promises for Slovak autonomy for the sake of the survival of the state. 42 A few works were even somewhat favorable to the Slovaks. One such example came from writer Kenneth L. Roberts , who after visiting Czechoslovakia complained, "The Czechs want to socialize everything in sight, and the Slovaks are not poignantly eager to be social- 40 An Autonomist, Slovakia 's Plea for Autonomy (Middletown, Pa: Slovak Literary Society, 1935). 41 Jan Opocensky, The Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Mon archy and the Rise of the Czechoslovak Stale (Prague: Orbis, 1928), 153-68, I 93-214. C. A. MaCartney, National States and National Min orities (London : Oxford Uni versity Press, 1934), 117, 201 ,208. 42 E. Alexander Powell , The Danger on th e Danube (New York: Century Company, 1928), 56-8, 62-8, 72-4. M. W. Fodor, South of Hiller (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1939). For oth er examples, see : C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919-193 7 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937/ 1965), 73-148. Frank H. Simonds, Can Europe Keep th e Peace? (New York : Harper, I 93 I), 92-10 I. Isaiah Bowman, The New World: Problems in Political Geography, 4th ed. (Yonkers, NY : World Book, 1928). Harold Temperley, " How the Hungari an Frontiers were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, 6, 3 (April 1928), 432-47 . SLOVAKIA 2019 39 ized." Comparing the Czechs in Slovakia to U.S. Civil War carpetbaggers, he criticized the Czech administration of Slovakia, their denial of autonomy, and called out Czechoslovakism as a lie. He alternatively praised the Slovaks as "among the most attractive and lovable peasant people of the many I have seen." An article by journalist Robert Sage, after a visit to Slovakia, likewise chided the Czechs for using claims of generosi ty as a mirage for domination over Slovakia. 43 The SLA ultimately made good on its threat to take the issue to the world stage, presenting the Slovak question to the League of Nations in 1932. It produced a long legal brief, which appealed for a cessation of wrongdoing against the Slovaks and the granting of political and cultural autonomy. It then begged the League of Nations to recognize the Slovaks as an independent nation, to demand the implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement, to investigate ill treatment, and to grant recognition of the Slovaks as a true minority in Czechoslovakia. It pointed out how the Slovak-Americans had made multiple attempts to reach out to Prague to explain their concerns and offer an olive branch towards a solution, but that Prague had ignored their appeals and through censorship had silenced their brothers in Slovakia. The document then went on to detail the history of the founding of the state and the Pittsburgh Agreement, their complaints of ill-treatment against the Slovaks, and their view as to why the 44 Slovaks were an independent people. This appeal was unsuccessful. Slovak-Americans also regularly wrote to U.S. government officials. One such example was an "Open Letter" to Masaryk in 1923 that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America also sent to President Coolidge, members of Congress, all the embassies in Prague, and to the American press. The document started with an image of Masaryk approaching the Slovak-Americans as equals during the war, to 43 Kenneth L. Roberts, Europe's Morning After (New York: Harper Brothers, 1921 ), 121-73. Kenneth L. Roberts, Why Europe l eaves Home (New York: Bobbs-Merrill , 1922), 28-31 . Robert Sage, "There's no such Nationality as Czecho-Slovak," Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 2, 1930, 6. For other examples, see: Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia / 918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 377-9. Alexander Szana, Die Geschichte der Slowakei (Bratislava: Grenzenbote Verlag, 1930). Robert Nowak, Der Kiinstliche Staal: Ostprobleme der Tschecho-Slowakei (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938). 44 "To the Supreme Council of the League of Nations at Geneva," SlA Cabinet, F: Supreme Council of the l eague of Na tions at Geneva, 1932, SI. 40 SLOVAKIA 2019 which they responded with loyalty and support. Masaryk then betrayed them, treating the Slovaks "in step-mother fashion, nay, even like slaves," having lured them into "an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and to us 'ignorant' Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred." It bemoaned that the Slovaks again felt endangered in their national existence, and how the Czechs misled the world on the issue. It appealed for Masaryk "to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised us, the American Slovaks," for the sake of Czech-Slovak unity and the secu45 rity of the state. This letter elicited a response from the Slovak-American centralists. The National Slovak Society, the Slovak Sokol, and assorted editors produced a counter response to Masaryk, which they then sent to Coolidge and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes. This document asserted open support for the idea that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation. It criticized the SCF letter for having "a spirit of narrow sectarianism," in contrast to "the great majority of the American Slovaks," who supported Masaryk "heart and soul." The document praised Masaryk and the Czechoslovak state for bringing cultural and economic development to Slovakia and it mentioned the centralist Slovaks in the government as a sign of Czech inclusiveness. The text also apologized for the Czech administration of Slovakia, bemoaning that Slovakia lacked enough competent officials. It then claimed that Prague had carried out the Pittsburgh Agreement in full , adding that "during the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they demanded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks." 46 To the frustration of the Slovak autonomists, this campaign barely registered among U.S. officials in Washington. American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Prague paid slightly more attention, although most addressed it only passively and most often from the Czechoslo45 Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czecho-S/ovak Republic (Slovak Catholic Federation of America : 1923). Found in : "Einstein to SoS, No. 611 ," 20 February 1924, F#: 860F.0l / 162, DoS CS 1910-44. The New York Times reported on the letter: " Slovak Protest to All Nations," New York Times, Mar. 12, 1924, 34. 46 National Slovak Society, et al. , An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia ( I 924), in "Joseph Jan eek to Coolidge," 3 May 1924, F# : 860F.0l / 164, Dos cs 1910-44 SLOVAKIA 2019 41 vakist perspective. The American Ambassador during the 1920s, Lewis Einstein, for example, reported on the SCF letter, misrepresenting it as "a violent indictment of Czech policy in Slovakia," and praised Prague for "accomplishing there a work of civilization. By introducing education and schools in a population where a high degree of illiteracy existed, by bringing in public hygiene, orderly justice and a better fiscal system, they are laying the foundations for the future. " Accordingly, in his view the Slovaks only needed proper education to unify with the Czechs . Ultimately, "Only one thing can be excluded, which is Slovakian autonomy." 47 In another attempt at outreach, Adam Podkrivacky as President of the FCSU wrote to John Hickerson, acting Chief of Western European Affairs at the U.S . State Department. Podkrivacky complained about the U.S. Consul General in Prague sending out correspondence to Slovakia in the Czech language instead of Slovak. He also requested that the State Department use the hyphen when writing 'Czecho-Slovakia. ' Podkrivacky then supplied Hickerson a copy of an autonomist political pamphlet, to "acquaint better with the political situation just as it exists between the Slovaks and the Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia." Hickerson forwarded the letter to the embassy in Prague and asked for a report on the Slovak question. Charge d' affaires J. Web Benton responded, declaring the letter unacceptable due to the threat posed by Czechoslovakia's neighbors. He also made the usual ethnographic arguments, adding how "Czech culture has contributed measurably to the advancement of Slovakia," and predicted the issue would dissipate. Benton dismissed the pamphlet as simply "anti-government propaganda ... the request for autonomy, in the sense of a separate parliament as mentioned in the Pittsburgh Pact, is something that no truly patriotic and far-seeing Slovak could at present afford to advocate." He added, "I assume that the Department will pay no further attention to his communications, but it seems not inopportune to observe that Czech is the official language of this country."48 While a few U.S. diplomats from the period, notably Lewis Einstein, came to develop a more nuanced view on the topic, this ended each time new embassy staff took over. 47 "Einstein to SoS , No . 611 ," DoS CS 1910-44. "Adam Podkrivac ky to John Hickerson," 29 March 1937, F#: 860F.0l / 18 1, DoS CS 1910-44. " Movement for Slovak Autonomy," 30 April 1937, F#: 860F .01 /184, DoS CS 1910-44. 48 42 SLOVAKIA 2019 The dismissal of Slovak-American pleas stood in contrast to a disproportionate concern among American officials about the proHungarian Slovaks living abroad. The Rothermere campaign spurred some interest, and while some Americans expressed some sympathy to it, including chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Borah and publisher William Randolph Hearst, the U.S. Embassy in Prague wrote profusely about how the Slovaks remained opposed to a return to Hungary. When the exiled nationalist communist Slovak Vince Mihalus created an exile Slovak government in 1928, the State Department gave him disproportionate consideration, even though he held little popular support in Slovakia. Jehlicka reached out to Washington, calling for support against "Czech tyranny" and requesting support for recognition of the Slovaks as a minority in the League of Nations. The Czechoslovak embassy directed the State Department in its response, simply informing U.S. officials that Jehlicka only organized a "small number of Slovak renegades, mostly of Hungarian origin." 49 This flurry of publishing was very much a product of the widespread transatlantic interaction between Slovakia and the United States, as Slovak leaders on both sides of the Atlantic travelled between Europe and North America as they attempted to coordinate common political action. In the early 1920s, Prague still had hopes of guiding the Slovak-Americans to the centralist cause, despite the sentiment building against it. One major effort was the creation of a Slovak League in Slovakia by centralist Slovaks, designed to serve 49 Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban exchanged several letters with Hearst on the issue, facilitated by the State Department, eventually convincing Hearst to no longer give a voice to Rothermere and his supporters. "Einstein to SoS, No. 1355," 30 July 1927, F#: 860F.4016/4, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Butler Wright to SoS, No. 62," 15 Oct 1927, F#: 860F.4016/9, DoS CS 1910-44. "Vladimir Hurban to William Randolph Hearst," 27 May 1937, & " Hurban to Cordell Hull," 4 June 1937, F#: 860F.00/437 & 438 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Council of State of Slovakia to SoS," 6 Nov 1928, F#: 860F.01 / 171 & 172, DoS CS 1910-44. "Nelson Torsler Johnson to Einstein," 28 Jan 1929, F#: 860F.01 / 171 , DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1747," 28 Feb 1929, F#: 860F.0l/173, DoS CS 1910-44. "Gittings to SoS, No. 1756," 9 Mar 1929, F#: 860F.0l / 174, DoS CS 1910-44. "Washburn to SoS, No. 2153." "Einstein to SoS, No. 516," 20 Sep 1923, F#: 860F.00/2 14, DoS CS 1910-44. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 30 July 1933, F#: 860F.00/345, DoS CS 1910-44. "Prentiss B. Gilbert to SoS, No. 650," 8 Aug 1933 , F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 191044. "SoS to Geneva and Prague," 29 Aug 1933, F#: 860F.00/346, DoS CS 1910-44. SLOVAKIA 2019 43 as a counterpart to the SLA and to build common action across the Atlantic. This effort failed, however, after the Slovak League of America refused to cooperate with it. 50 With autonomist sentiment among the American Slovaks sharpening, Prague sent Slovak centralist leader Vavro Srobar to the United States in 1923. While Srobar attempted to unify the Slovak-Americans behind centralism, his visit had the opposite effect of galvanizing the Slovak-American autonomists. Srobar received support from sympathetic groups such as the Slovak Sokol, but the SLA and other autonomist organizations boycotted his speeches. Prague sent other figures to agitate for centralism, including the priest Jozef Rudinsky and agrarian politician Fedor Ruppeldt. Seton-Watson also reached out to the SlovakAmericans in several letters and later in a visit in 1935 , during which he appealed to the Slovak-Americans to encourage the Slovaks in . · 51 SI ova k ia against autonomy. The efforts by centralists did not change the status quo, as the Slovak-American autonomists remained firm in their opinions and openly repudiated centralist arguments. Pankuch, for example, felt that the only result of Srobar's visit was to destroy Czech-Slovak 52 unity and the internal unity of the Slovak-Americans. Ruppelt in tum complained how even among the Slovak Lutherans he constantly had to fight against autonomist sentiment. 53 With the dividing lines firmly set, the Slovak-American centralists and autonomists quit mutual involvement in each other's organizations and the centralists began a continuous propaganda campaign against the SLA backed by Prague. For example, after Slovak-American autonomists 50 Ignac Gessay, Kratke Dejiny S/ovenskej Ligy Na S/ovensku: od Zalozenia po 1. 0kt. 1926 (Bratislava: Slovenska Liga na Slovensku, 1926). "Nova ohlavka- stary kon. Pozor na Slovensku ligu!" 27 Oct 1924, Bratislava (No 68), in Jozef Tiso, Prejavy a Clanky (1913-193 8), eds. Miroslav Fabricius & Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Historicky 'ustav SA V, 2002),), 196-7. 51 "An Appeal ," PF: Bie/ek, SI. Pankuch, Histo ry, 177-86. "Seton-Watson to Vojtech Mastny" (Doc 124), in Seton -Watson, 375-6. "Odkaz Scotus Viatora Americkym Slovakom" (Doc 125), in Seton-Watson, 377-80. "Seton-Watson to Stefan Osusky "' (Doc 128) & "Osusky to Seton-Watson" (Doc 129), in Seton-Watson, 3857. Mikus, "Slovak League," 46-7. Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 1864-1926 (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarne Sv. Andreja, 1934), 503-5 . Palickar, "Czech and Slovak." Tomas Capek, Nase Amerika (Prague: Nakladem Narodni Rady Ceskoslovenske, 1926), 113. 52 Pankuch, History, 180. 53 " Fedor Ruppeldt to Seton-Watson" (Doc 149), in Seton-Watson, 441-2 . 44 SLOVAKIA 2019 confronted him, Srobar reportedly lashed out at them as "knownothing drunkards" and traitors against the Republic. 54 While the Slovaks in America had been legitimate Slovaks when Masaryk needed them during the war, once they became a threat, the centralists began to categorize them as United States citizens, whose influence should not extend beyond America. 55 When the Czechoslovak Government offered a special commendation to the SLA on Czechoslovakia's l 0th anniversary in 1928, for its role in the creation of the state, the Slovak League of America rejected it. 56 The Slovak autonomists in Slovakia perceived things quite differently. Many Slovak nationalist leaders believed that the nation as an ethnic and cultural foundation transcended the state, and offered regular praise of the Slovak-Americans as fighters for Slovak liberty and autonomy. Figures such as Hlinka and Lutheran autonomist leader Emil Stodola openly praised the Slovak-Americans and their role in the fight for autonomy, and argued that their past actions allowed the American Slovaks an equal right to speak about the fate of the Slovak homeland. 57 SPP leader Jozef Tiso extolled, "In this (Pittsburgh) agreement we see the heritage of our own American brothers, for which we will fight with the honor and the tenacity of the Slovak spirit, which is not intimidated by prison, the malice of the world, nor the cynicism of centralist agents." Tiso praised the "real Slovak patriots," working in the "free air of America," and he even posited that the Slovak-Americans had a better claim to speak for the Slovaks than the Slovak centralists did, because the SlovakAmericans had made the revolution successful with their blood, treasure and propaganda.58 Slovak scholars also published multiple 54 "A. S. Ambrose to Seton-Watson" (Doc 126) in Seton-Watson, 381-2. "Aby uz raz bolo jasno a aby prestaly r6zne narknutia proti Slov. Lige," PF: Bielek, SI. 55 Masaryk, for example, used such logic to dismiss the Pittsburgh Agreement, which he called a "local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks," whose "signatories were mainly American citizens, only two of them being nonAmericans." Masaryk, Making, 208-11. 56 Stolarik, Where is my Hom e?, 98 . 57 "Hlinka on Scotus Viator" (Doc 109), in Seton-Watson, 345-53. Emil Stodola, Pre/om: Spomienky, Uvahy, Studie (Praha: L. Mazac, 1933), 193-4. 58 "Novy vykrik bratov z Ameriky," 24 Feb 1924, Bratislava (No 43), in Tiso, Prejavy, 157-9. " Pittsburghska dohoda - neplatna?!" 29 May 1924, Bratislava (no 57), in Tiso, Prejavy, 179-80. "Parliamentary Speech," 25 Nov 1931, Prague (No I 64), in Ti so, Preja vy, 347. "Speech to Public Assembly of the Slovak People 's SLOVAKIA 2019 45 studies of the Slovak-Americans and their role m Slovak national development. 59 Slovak autonomists openly expressed these sentiments through regular trips to the United States. These attempts at direct engagement were nonetheless slow to start. Prague regularly prevented such trips, including the denial of a passport to Bishop Jan Vojtassak out of concern that he would agitate for autonomy and collect money for the SPP while in the United States. The barrier broke in 1926 when Hlinka accepted an invitation to visit America from editor Jozef Husek and the Friends of Slovak Freedom, sponsored by the SLA, the FCSU, and the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union (FCSLU). Hlinka desired to visit the United States to thank the Slovak-Americans in person for their support for Slovak self-determination, to explain firsthand the political situation in Slovakia, and to encourage them to keep fighting. After stalling on the process, Prague ultimately relented to avoid the resulting outrage had they refused. They issued Hlinka a passport to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. Hlinka's visit lasted from June 5 to October 13. Although Hlinka expressed some trepidation that Slovak-American centralists would treat him with hostility, Slovak-American autonomist leaders Josef Husek and Anton Kompanek convinced him the experience would prove the opposite. This claim proved true, as Hlinka received hundreds of invitations to speak to overflowing crowds on each occasion. Demand was so high that, then SLA president Ivan Bielek had to write an article emphasizing Hlinka's time limitations to try to tame expectations. During his visit, Hlinka travelled around the U.S. East and Midwest, visiting local Slovak communities. He regularly attended and celebrated Mass and held meetings with SlovakAmerican organizations, including the SLA from whom he received an honorary membership . Hlinka visited assorted Slovak-American institutions, surveying Slovak-American newsrooms, printeries, Party," 18 August 1937 & 25 August 1937, Bratislava (No 251 & 252), in Tiso, Prejavy, 523-4. "Nase narodnopo liticke palladium," 5 June 1938 (No 260), in Tiso, Prejavy, 543-4. Kon stantin Culen, Po Sviitop/ukovi druha nasa h/ava: Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947), 182-3. 59 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Ruzomberok: Rudinsky, 1921 ). Karol Sidor, S/ovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava: Jednota, 1928). Matica Slovenska, S/ovenskej verejenosti v Amerike (Mati ca slovenska , 1937). Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciarei'l Andreja, 193 7) . 46 SLOVAK.IA 2019 schools, and churches. Overall, Hlinka held rallies at 80 locations, gave 200 speeches, and visited more than 100 Slovak parishes. Hlinka's visit spurred a level of excitement and activity among the Slovak-Americans that would never recur. 60 Hlinka kept his goal of directly exposing the Slovak question during his visit. He regularly spoke on the issue, and carried a copy of a censored Slovak nationalist newspaper as evidence. During his visit, Hlinka could not help but contrast the image of America with his experience in Czechoslovakia. In one such speech, he made clear that the Slovaks .. . would prefer not to quarrel with the Bohemians, but when they preach democracy and at the same time practice deceptions and aggression, we have no choice but to oppose them ... America is a superior nation and a master democratic republic. It has a splendid constitution which not only guarantees the rights and liberties to the people, but sees that they get them as well. Hlinka likewise extolled the "firm individuality" that the SlovakAmericans had gained, and he highlighted the sense of natural connection between Slovaks and Americans. "A good Slovak who comes to America makes a good American, and all good SlovakAmericans, including the new generations born in America from Slovak extraction will appreciate what they have inherited from their Slovak ancestry. Neither will they forget Slovakia." In his farewell speech, Hlinka expressed how the Slovak-Americans had filled him with national pride. He affirmed, "I saw the large affl uence of Slovaks, these Slovaks who under the Tatras suffered from hardship and physical and spiritual want," and prai sed how they helped sustain the Slovak nation. He finally asked of them, "do not forget that under the Tatras stand your cradle and your old homeland, our hard-tested and suffering Slovakia!" 61 60 Adamec, "Slovak Catholic Federation ," 223-32. Sidor, Hlinka, 503-5, 510-1 I, 543 -52 . Sidor, "The Slovak League," 57-9. Mikus, "S lovak League," 46-7 . Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 65 -74. 61 Palickar, " Monsignor Hlinka- The Man," in Palickar, Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism , 51-6, 55 . Palickar, " My Interview with Msgr. Hlinka," in Slovakia: From Hungarian Despotism, 56-9. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka, 543-52. SLOVAKIA 2019 47 In the 1930s, the Slovak-Americans experienced a few more visits from notable figures. One such visit was from the Slovak cultural organization Matica slovenska, in 1935 . The Slovak-Americans had regular contact with the Matica in the 1920s and there remained regular efforts to create an American branch of the organization.62 With the outbreak of the Great Depression, however, interest and funding for Slovak cultural programs in America declined. The Matica decided a visit to America was necessary to reverse thi s process, which they interpreted as the Slovak-Americans becoming too Americanized. The organization ' s director, the writer Jozef C. Hronsky, led the delegation, but it also included historian Konstantin Culen, and the artist Jozef Cincik, among others. These individuals gave many lectures and supplied ample literature and art, including a donation of libraries of Slovak material to the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago.63 While they found that some second and third generation Slovak-Americans had lost touch with Slovak culture, the delegates gave high praise to the Slovak-Americans for the interest they showed in the lectures, music, art and other cultural information the Matica provided. The experience led Culen to adopt the task of writing a history of Slovak-Americans. The linguist Jozef G. Konus likewise noted how "the Slovak spirit opens up more in free America than the lush fantasie s at home could imagine." When the White House wrote a statement for a Slovak-American information brochure praising the Slovaks as a "healthy minded, freedomloving and determined people," the Matica hailed it as evidence of Slovak democratic bona tides. Ultimately, the delegation praised the trip as very much a success, and took back ample material on the Slovak-Americans for placement in the Slovak National Library. The Matica left satisfied that Slovak culture remained firm in America, although it put pressure on the Slovak-Americans to improve their direct cultural linkages with the homeland. 64 62 To see many examples of this communicati on, see: The Ma tica slovenskti, Martin, Slovakia, re: American Slovaks Papers, IHRC . 63 According to Mark Stol arik, th e Mati ca brought 84 crates of books, totaling 4 I ,000 volumes, while visiting 98 separate Slovak-American communities. Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home?, 96-100. 64 "Vianoce Maticnej delegacie," Slovensko, 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 87-8. Konstantin Culen, "Co m6ze dat' Amerika slovenskej historii ," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 87-8. Jozef C. Hronsky, " Mati ca v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (March 1936), 110-13. Jozef G. Konus, " Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), I I6-18 . 48 SLOVAK.IA 2019 The final major figure to visit America was the Reverend Jozef Tiso in 1937, with the Catholic cultural organization Spolok Sv. Vojtecha. Much like Hlinka, Tiso celebrated mass and heard confessions during his visit, spoke at public assemblies and met with many American priests, journalists, and Slovak-American leaders. He also attended other broader Catholic events, including the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and met with the Papal delegation in Washington, D.C. Tiso made a broad effort to learn about American political life, to determine what Slovak leaders could transfer back to Slovakia. He particularly admired American technical prowess in organization and publishing, which he saw as facilitating a more efficient Catholic organization and action, and conceptualized a plan to send young Slovak leaders to America to learn American methods of organization. Tiso also praised the Slovak-American sense of independence and pride in their Slovak identity. Seeing how the Slovaks had developed on independent terms in the vast American melting pot, Tiso interpreted the Slovak-American experience as proof of Slovak capabilities and their merit for self-determination. Tiso never gave up his sense of solidarity with the Slovak-Americans, and referenced his visit to affirm his desired direction for the Slovaks. 65 The only visit to the United States by a Slovak official to gamer much attention from Washington was Srobar's in 1923. American diplomat Einstein provided notice of the visit, adding that it was "doubtless intended to counteract the seditious anti-Czech propaganda which has been going on for some time both in Slovakia, where it is fomented by Magyar intrigues, and among the Slovak clericals in the United States." Although, he noted that the Slovak autonomy movement remained "noisy and violent in its methods but unaided it can do little and it is not at present causing here any serious conJozef G. Konu s, "Matica v Amerike," Slovensko, 2, 7 (Mar 1936), 116-18. Jozef Hronsky, "Na margo americkeho zapisnika," S/o vensko, 2, IO & I I (June-July 1936), 177-80. Jozef Cincik, "Na margo americkeho zapisnaka," Slo vensko , 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-6. " Maticna vystava v Clevelande," Slo vensko, 2, IO & 11 (June-July 1936), 181-4. " President Roosevelt pozdravuje slovensky narod," Slovensko , 2, 5 & 6 (Jan-Feb 1936), 79. "Slovenska Amerika sa hybe," S/ovensko, 4, 3 (Nov 1937), 32-3. "SLA to Sku ltety, I June 1935,".PF: Mamatey, SI. Stolarik, "Slovak League." J.A. Berta, "Slovak America and the Matica Slovenska," Furdek, 23 (1984), 163-71. 65 Culen, Po Sviiloplukovi, 182-9. "Speech about the state account balance from 1926," 23 February 1938, Prague (No 258), in Tiso, Prejavy, 533-6. SLOVAKIA 2019 49 cem." 66 Several Slovak-American autonomists wrote to the State Department to complain about Srobar's visit, including a letter from a Slovak-American World War I veteran asking the Department to halt Srobar's lectures for sowing discord among the Slovaks in the United States. The most notable letter, however, came from the Reverend John Porubsky on behalf of the Slovak Newspapermen's Association. Porubsky criticized Srobar's claimed "cultural visit" as a ruse to propagandize on behalf of Czechoslovakism. He presented it as part of an effort by Prague, "To inoculate the masses of our people in America as a contracting party with such misconception and ethnographical nonsense," and to discredit the Pittsburgh Agreement. Claiming that Srobar "forgot the scope of his mission, even forgot himself in outbursts against leading Slovak American gentlemen, calling them vile names unworthy of a man of his position," Porubsky asked Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to have him expelled from the country.67 This effort also spurred a response by Prague and its allies in the United States. These letters, in an organized campaign, all repeated versions of the same arguments. They complained that the opposition to Srobar consisted of "Jesuits and Bolsheviks" and other "enemies of the state" that were working for Czechoslovakia's destruction. Srobar was, alternatively, a great statesman fighting against them to bring cultural development to Slovakia. They also personally targeted Porubsky and the Slovak Newspapermen's Association: "The great majority of intelligent American Slovaks are heart and soul in accord with Dr. Srobar's patriotic works; only the ignorant and reactionary masses are ignobly and ignorantly supporting the destructive work of Rev. Porubsky and his few brawling associates." 68 Likewise, the Slovak Sokol, which had arranged Srobar's visit from the American end, took credit for the visit, praising how Srobar had "proved to 66 " Einstein to SoS, No. 502 ," 29 Aug 1923, F#: 860F .0 I/ I 48, DoS CS 1910-44. "John Porubsky to Charles Evans Hughes," 31 Oct 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/149, DoS CS 1910-44. "John J. Nedorostek to Hughes," 13 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01/150, DoS cs 1910-44. 68 "V. Krali cek to Hughes," 12 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 151 , DoS CS 1910-44. "J. Joscak to Hughes," 14 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / 154, DoS CS 1910-44. "Henry Russek to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/156, DoS CS 1910-44. "C lement lhrisky & Joscak to Hughes," 15 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.0 l/152, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Kovalovsky to Hughes," 16 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/157, DoS CS 1910-44. " Michael Olsavicki to Hughes," 19 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0 1/ 155, DoS CS 1910-44. 67 50 SLOVAKIA 2019 the Slovaks of America that any fears as to the future of their former country are unfounded." 69 The State Department only sent back formulaic verification of receipts to these letters, except for one to John Zeman of the Slovak Sokol, thanking him for "setting forth the real purposes of the visit." William Phillips then requested President Coolidge to meet with Srobar, calling him "one of the five men who founded the Republic of Czechoslovakia," to which Coolidge obliged. 70 In 193 7, the Reverend Francis Dubosh of Lakewood, Ohio, attempted to arrange a meeting between officers of the SCF A, Jozef Tiso, and President Roosevelt, with the help of Monsignor Michael J. Ready at the Catholic University of America. The White House staff supported this meeting, but Roosevelt wanted to first confirm with the State Department so as not "to get mixed up in a Slovak controversy." After consulting with Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban, the State Department reported that the embassy made no official complaint, but that they themselves discouraged the visit with "the opinion that these persons are not of sufficient prominence for the President to receive them." After a back and forth in consideration of the issue, the White House ultimately declined, claiming 71 that the President was simply too busy. The Slovak-Americans also visited Slovakia. The most significant of these occurred in 193 8 in the tense period leading up to the Munich Agreement, when the Slovak League sent a delegation to celebrate the 20 th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Led by its President, Peter P. Hletko, the delegation, as a deliberate gesture, made its first formal visit in Slovakia to Andrej Hlinka in Rufomberok. The delegation travelled into Slovakia through Poland, to 69 "J. Zeman to Hughes," 18 Nov 1923 , F#: 860F.01 / 153 , DoS CS 1910-44. "W. R. Castle to Association of Slovak Newspapermen of America," 6 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l49, DoS CS 1910-44. "J. B. Wright to Kralicek," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.0l/15I, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Joscak," 20 Nov 1923, F#: 860F.01/l54, DoS CS 1910-44. "Castle to Zeman," I Dec 1923, F#: 860F.0l / l53 , DoS CS 191044. "William Phillips to G. B. Slemp, 12 Nov 1923," & "Slemp to Phillips, 12 Nov 1923," Coolidge Papers, Series I, 742. 71 "Roosevelt to M. H. McIntyre, 22 Oct 1937," " McIntyre to George F. Summerlin, 23 Oct 193 7," "Spruks to Summerlin, 27 Oct 193 7," "McIntyre to Roosevelt, 29 Oct 1937," "McIntyre to Summerlin, 3 Nov 1937," President 's Personal File (PPF), F: 639, Slovak Catholic Federation of America, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (FDR), Hyde Park, New York. 70 SLOVAKIA 2019 51 avoid Prague and Bratislava, and the Polish government hosted the delegation on their way through. Both the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak centralists sent representatives to corral them before they entered Slovakia. The centralists were, however, sent back early after Warsaw and Slovak-Americans embraced the SPP delegation as the official one. After arriving in Slovakia, the delegation showed the original of the Pittsburgh Agreement to Hlinka and spent most of the trip associating with the Slovak autonomists. Its activities included several visits to the Matica slovenska in Martin, to which it gifted an authenticated copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement and made clear commitments toward transatlantic cultural programs, including joint publications and a transatlantic cultural council. Prime Minister Milan Hodza also led a continued effort to meet and work with the visiting delegation, believing he could convince them to break their close affiliation with the SPP and align with the Agrarians instead. Out of respect, the delegation did meet with centralist officials, including Hodza and President Eduard Benes, whom they encouraged the granting of autonomy to Slovakia for the sake of unity in those very tense times. In a speech in Prague, Hletko made clear their objectives stating, "Our love for Slovakia and the Czechoslovak Republic has induced us to come here. The object of the Pittsburgh Declaration, the original of which we have brought with us, is not to weaken but to strengthen the Republic ." 72 When describing his meetings, Hletko said that Hodza promised a movement towards autonomy, yet Prague still rejected them. 73 Likewise, Ivan Derer was extremely critical of the SlovakAmericans during their visit, accusing them of having been brainwashed. He also dismissed them as representing a small, vocal minority, and smeared them as deliberate Hungarian, German, or Polish agents, if not otherwise simply duped by the machinations of these neighboring rivals. Derer complained, "This delegation, composed most of autonomists, expressed its separatist convictions during every opportunity, expressed anti-Czech interests, made light of work of 72 "Visit of American Slovak Delegation to Jubilee Congress, Bratislava; Slovak Demands for Autonomy," 6 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/534, DoS CS 1910-44. 73 Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. "Narodna Politika Roku 1938 : Ked Bol P. Hletko na Slovensku," B: Karol Sidor - Diplomat 1901-1958 - Vol 2, SI. Pavel KuklisKunovsky, Ako je na Slovensku ? Z vlastnych skusenosti napisa/ a vydal v mesiaci )uni /940 v Pittsburghu, Pa., U.S.A. (Pittsburgh: Narodne noviny, 1940), 4-7. 52 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the Czechoslovak government successes in Slovakia, ironized Czechoslovak oriented Slovaks." He was extremely derisive of Hletko, accusing him of not being truly Slovak, having been born in the United States, and as being "politically inexperienced, unknowledgeable about the conditions of Europe, Czechoslovakia and Slovakia." 74 The SLA visit culminated in the Jubilee Congress for the anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement on June 4, 1938 in Bratislava. A massive rally was organized where Hlinka, Tiso, and Hletko, among others, gave speeches. A large facsimile of the Pittsburgh Agreement surrounded on each side by the American and Slovak flags served as a backdrop. In his speech, Hletko showed the original copy of the Pittsburgh Agreement to the crowd, and praised the attention given to the Agreement. A formal proposal by the SPP in the Czechoslovak Parliament to amend the constitution to implement Slovak autonomy then followed. The centralists, led by Hodza, held a counter-rally two days later. They declared the rally more ambiguously as a celebration of the Slovak farmer, although Prague and the centralists promoted the event afterwards as a pro-state rally in opposition to autonomy. The SLA delegation also attended this celebration and Hletko gave a speech, simply affirming that the SLA continued to work for Slovak freedom . Hletko later claimed that the delegation warned the Czech and Slovak leaders they had met about the need to come to an accommodation on the Slovak question, in favor of autonomy, fearing that the issue might become larger with Adolph Hitler rattling his saber. Hletko claimed, however, that no one took this warning seriously. The delegation departed shortly before Hlinka's death in August of 1938, but the SPP sent a piece of earth from Hlinka's graveside to America. 75 74 Ivan Derer, S/ovensky vyvoj a /ud'acka zrada (Prague: K vasnicka a Hamp) , 1946), 183-9 . Derer was convinced the SLA was part of a Polish conspiracy to absorb Slovaki a, led by Karol Sidor. The SLA, however, openly rebuked Polish calls for absorption of Slovakia during its stop th ere. 75 The exact number of participants in each rally is unclear, but most accounts reflected similar participation rates (around one hundred thousand each) and photos of the Slovak Jubilee show a massive crowd. The urn containing the soil is still on display at the Slovak Institute in Cleveland. Hletko, "The Slovaks," 5-54. " Wilbur Carr to SoS, no 122," 9 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/518, DoS CS 1910-44. " Farmers' Day at Bratislava; Demonstration of Slovak Branch of Czechoslovak Agrarian Party," IO June 1938, F#: 860F.00/531 , DoS CS 1910-44. " Po odchode delegatov Slov- SLOVAKIA 2019 53 The U.S. Embassy took an interest in the SLA visit to Czechoslovakia in 1938, and U.S . Ambassador Wilbur Carr agreed to meet with the delegation. Carr reported that the visit was cordial and that the delegation affirmed to him that its visit was simply to promote good will and it did not desire to interfere in domestic issues in Czechoslovakia. Carr then stated that the SLA's visit to Czechoslovakia annoyed Prague, due to the enflamed minority issues of the time, but that Czechoslovak officials tried to maintain good will with the delegation, although this sentiment "lacked a ring of sincerity." Accordingly, Hletko admitted to Carr that the timing was not the best, but that it was not by design, since they had come simply for the anniversary celebration. Carr expected no harm from the visit. While Carr described the autonomy proposal and reported statements by Hletko and Jozef Rusek complementing the support of the Pittsburgh Agreement among the Slovaks, he countered by providing the text of an anti-autonomy speech by Derer and a section of Masaryk' s memoirs. Carr then misrepresented the Slovak-Americans as having felt embarrassed for having been "utilized by the Hlinka Party for partisan and election purposes." While Carr reported on each of the two rallies, he praised the Farmer's Day as turning into "a spontaneous demonstration of Czechoslovak unity, homage to Benes, and allegiance and confidence in its leader," hostility to autonomy, and featuring a much larger participation.76 While Czech and Slovak centralists worked to keep the SlovakAmericans at a distance after early efforts to court them failed, the Slovak autonomists on both sides of the Atlantic worked around Prague to coordinate their activities. Nevertheless, the autonomists had no means of pushing Prague towards changes on the Slovak question. The Slovak autonomists, however, continued their fight and never gave up. The transatlantic Slovak question during the interwar period established the roots for the eventual Slovak-Czech split. The failure to find a compromise between Slovak autonomists and centralists saw an entrenched distrust that contributed to the fall of the First Republic . When the Munich Agreement formally handed the enskej Ligy v Amerike," Slovensko, 5 ( I 939), 16-17. Sidor, "The Slovak League," 59-62. 76 "Carr to SoS , no 112," 31 May 1938, F#: 860F.00/5 l 0, DoS CS 1910-44. "Visit of American Slovak." "Carr to SoS, no 121 ," 8 June 1938, F#: 860F.00/517, DoS CS 1910-44. "Carr to SoS , No 122." "Farmers ' Day. " 54 SLOVAKIA 2019 Sudetenland to Germany in September of 1938, the Slovak autonomists in Slovakia demanded and received autonomy until the new SPP-led government there declared independence on March 14, 1939, following Nazi Germany's invasion of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovak-American autonomists, although distrustful of Nazi Germany, openly embraced the shift toward Slovak autonomy in the shortlived Second Republic, believing they could no longer trust the Czechs. Peter Hletko, for example, cheered how the Slovaks had "fought and won the victory." 77 Although initially hesitant to support complete independence, most Slovak-American autonomists, the moderates excepted, came to support the World War II Slovak State as a symbol of Slovak self-determination, even as they supported Allied victory in the war. While World War II and the subsequent Cold War limited direct linkages between Slovakia and North America, the same rifts on the Slovak question persisted on both sides of the Atlantic until the 1993 Velvet Divorce. 78 77 Jozef Pauco, "75 Years of the First Catholic Slovak Union," Furdek, 5 ( 1966), 6574. 78 For more on this topic during World War II and beyond, see: Michael Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on the Slovak Question, I 9 I 4-/ 948 (PhD Diss., University of Co lorado-Boulder, 20 13 ). M. Mark Stolarik, Wh ere is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian League in the Struggle for the Self-determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia, 39, 72 & 73 (2007), 7-35.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Transatlantic Slovak Question during the Interwar Years Description An account of the resource Michael Cude Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 18-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cude, Michael Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ccf1873d68d6bbc109cf0e0c93827068.pdf fb3f1fdee228aec2f6105f14134c17ac PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 55 IMAGINING A SEP ARA TE SLOVAK.IA: ANTICOMMUNIST SLOVAK EXILES' STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND 1 Ellen L. Paul In January 1993, the principle of self-determination reigned supreme as the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic became Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In many ways, this peaceful separation was the logical outcome of decades of anti-communist Slovak emigre efforts. To be sure, Cold War exiles who left Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the February 1948 communist takeover had many disagreements amongst themselves, especially over leadership and direction of their numerous political organizations.2 Over time, however, many of the Slovak exile organizations arrived at some kind of consensus, and by the last two decades of the Cold War, the right of political self-determination provided Slovak emigres with a unifying theme. After all, in August 1968 when the Warsaw Pact armies quashed the Prague Spring, the Soviet Union brutally reminded the world of its firm control over Czechoslovakia. Yet, that event inspired two reasons for hope among Slovak exiles: l . the longpromised federalism of Czechoslovakia and 2. the creation in 1970 of a unifying new organization of Slovak exiles, the Slovak World Congress. As exiles in the free and democratic West, Cold War-era Slovak political exiles not only fought Soviet Communism and advocated for human rights in the homeland, they also defended the unique development of the Slovak nation in Central European history and informed the West about Slovakia, often refuting what many saw as misinformation spread by the Czechs. A recurring theme at the heart of the publications about Slovak history and culture was the dream of political independence for the Slovak nation. 1 A version of thi s paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Polish American Historical Association panel on 7 January 2017 in Denver, Colorado. 2 Igor Lukes, "Czechoslovak Political Ex ile in the Cold War: the earl y years," Polish Review 47 , no. 3 (2002): 332-43. �56 SLOVAKIA 2019 From the early 20 th century, Slovaks in the West became convinced that democracy and the ethnic principle of self-determination went hand-in-hand with political independence. A small group of Slovak exiles favored political union with their Czech neighbors, but others insisted on autonomy and even independence based on the ethnic principle of self-determination. Throughout the Cold War, the groups favoring independence consistently fought for a separate Slovak identity and "equal rights with the other free and democratic nations of Europe and the world." 3 In 1993, the fruit of their struggles resulted in the peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Politically active Slovak exiles in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada can be roughly categorized into three basic groups. These categories are a helpful framework for understanding the issue of Slovak independence and especially the ways exiles aligned themselves in the early years of the Cold War. 1. Czechoslovakists: Slovaks who wanted a close union with the Czechs. 2. Federalists: moderate Slovak nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of a separate Slovak identity and political autonomy both for Slovakia and within the exile organizations. These included figures such as Stefan Osusky and Slovak Democratic Party members sent into exile after the communist coup in February 1948. 4 It is notable that the majority-but not all- of these first two groups came from Slovakia' s Lutheran minority. 3. Slovak autonomists : these Slovaks were decidedly nationalist and predominantly Catholic. They were also the most contentious. They supported Slovak independence, completely eschewing union with the Czechs-and rejecting the idea of a "Czechoslovak nation." They fled into exile right away in 1945, ahead of the Red Army and the returning Czechoslovak government. Among them were academics and journalists, such as historian Konstantin Culen, poet Mikulas Sprinc, and journalist Jozef 3 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, "Americki Slovaci a myslienka slovenskej samostatnosti," Kato/icky kalendar Jednota 87 (I 984), 177-84, 184. 4 The 1948 generation tended to be professionals or factory owners and, generally, among the most skilled and educated. In exile, many worked to resist Communism and return Czechoslovakia to democracy. �SLOVAKIA 2019 57 Pauco. In addition, the group featured several politicians and diplomats from the wartime Slovak state, such as Jozef Kirschbaum, Karol Sidor, and Ferdinand Durcansky. The majority of Slovak autonomists migrated to Canada, with some gaining entry into the United States. Although exact membership figures are unknown, there were far more Slovak autonomist and federalist exile groups in North America. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the autonomist and federalist Slovak exiles. Over time their differences faded, especially after the failed Prague Spring reform movement in 1968. Another reason for this shift was that as post-war emigres died, a younger generation of autonomists and federalists gradually united in their goals for self-determination and political independence for Slovakia. In 1958, linguist and Franciscan priest, Bonaventure S. Bue, categorized Slovak emigres into only two groups, lumping the federalists and autonomists into, simply, the autonomists . He explained the rift between the Czechoslovakists and the autonomists with a question: "Are we Czechs or are we Slovaks? To this question the Czechoslovak would answer: I am a Czech; the Autonomist: I am a Slovak." 5 Bue continued " ... the majority of Slovaks have always felt and professed to be an ethnographically, historically, and culturally distinct nation from the Czechs" and suggested that by the late 1950s the Czechoslovakist versus autonomist conflict was " losing its original raison d 'etre."6 In large part that was because even the Slovaks who wished to preserve the state of Czecho-Slovakia by then had "abandoned the highly disputed fiction of the 'Czechoslovak nation"' and agreed on the distinctness of the Slovaks. 7 The remaining issue was about the best alliance or political form for the nation's survival. Many historians trace the ethnogenesis of the Slovak nation back to the Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century, largely based on oral accounts and the Christianizing and linguistic legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Solid documentary evidence of Slovak linguistic uniqueness harks back to the 1700s, when the Catholic intelli5 B. S. Bue, "Conflicts of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no . 2 ( 1958), 1-1 7: 7 and 16. 6 Bue, 15. 7 Buc,16-17. �58 SLOVAK.IA 2019 gentsia in northern Hungary first suggested a separate identity for the Slovak language-as opposed to a Czech or Czechoslovak language. To them, it no longer made sense to use the more developed Czech language, and so Catholic clergy began writing in the Slovak vernacular even though the majority culture was distinctly Magyar. 8 In the 19 th century, language became "the center of the new national idea," but this was not enough to create a national identity for the Slovaks, who were under increasing pressure to assimi late to Magyar language and culture. In The Slovak National Awakening ( 1976), Peter Brock explains that as the intelligentsia began to promote the Slovak language and nation, and shift from using the Czech language, ideas about political unity with the Czechs also faded. 9 In 1848, I.',udovit Stur and other young Protestant intellectuals formed a short-lived Slavonic nation of their own, but thereafter the process of creating a Slovak political nation was interrupted by Magyarization, which meant the imposition of Magyar culture and language on young intellectuals in the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary. The impetus to assert a separate Slovak identity with a language that was neither Czech nor Magyar had been well under way by the 1840s, involved both Catholics and Protestants, and was an important step toward declaring a distinct Slovak national identity. Toward that end, in the early 1860s the Matica slovenska (Slovak Cultural Institute) was founded to aid the continuing development of Slovak literature and culture. A political merger between Czechs and Slovaks came in 1918 following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the calamity of the First World War, but that union was not predestined. Despite their linguistic similarities and geographical proximity, Czechs and Slovaks had very different histories and cultural influences. For hundreds of years, the Czech lands were part of the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the House of Habsburg, and much influenced by German culture and the Reformation (and the Czech reformer Jan Hus). During that time, the Kingdom of Hungary ruled over the Slovak 8 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia-a Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of National identity of the Slo vaks 191 8-1920, Biblioteca Historica 42 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), 9-10, and Peter Brock, The Slovak National Awakening (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 1837 and 53-4. 9 Brock, 7 & 20-37 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 59 lands, inside the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. While both small nations struggled against strong neighbors, their nineteenth century trajectories to national awakening and political agency were distinctly different. Firstly, the Slovak lands remained largely agricultural while the Czech lands underwent industrialization. Secondly, the Czechs achieved some successes in gaining cultural and linguistic rights at home and a measure of political representation in Vienna. Whereas to the east, the Slovaks faced increasing Magyarization and the loss of their culture. Since the tenth century, the lands of Slovakia had been ruled by foreigners and what had kept the Slovaks from assimilating, disappearing, or dispersing were "language, geography, and tradition ." 10 Not surprisingly, these vastly divergent experiences dramatically shaped the outlook and soul of each nation. Although Slovak culture was repressed in the homeland, the impact of the efforts of the Matica slovenska, Catholic clergy, and Slovak intelligentsia to keep Slovak language and culture alive became apparent by the late 19 th century, when notable numbers of emigres began arriving in the United States and identified themselves as Slovak. By the early twentieth century, the U.S.A. was home to the most influential Slovak diaspora. 11 In 1890, they established two important early exile organizations: the National Slovak Society and the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1907, the Slovak League of America formed and united all Slovak groups in America. While based "on a wide platform of love for [the] Slovak nation," the Slovak League of America's mission at the time was to cast off the Hungarian tyrant ruling over Slovaks in the homeland. 12 Unity among exiles, however, became much harder to achieve after the dissolution of AustriaHungary during the First World War and particularly after the declaration of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. During World War I, politicians began deliberating the future of Central Europe. The most important negotiations regarding Czechoslovak statehood took place in North America among representatives of both the Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs knew that Slovak par10 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 37-8. 11 Jozef Pauco, " Slovaks Abroad and their Relationship with Slovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 2 nd edition, ed. Jozef M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1978), 415-24, 415. 12 Ibid., 417. �60 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ticipation was vital to their cause. With that knowledge, Slovaks were able to leverage some influence by demanding " recognition of an independent Slovak identity and Slovak political autonomy in exchange for their support." 13 Many Slovak exiles believed that "through their immigration to America ... they had helped preserve Slovak national identity" and that "American democracy provided them something they felt would prove beneficial" for Slovaks back home. 14 In the negotiations over Czechoslovakia and its constitution, the efforts of Slovak Stefan Osusky stand out. He worked closely with Tomas G. Masaryk for federalism and for Slovakia to be regarded "as an equal partner by the Czechs in the Czecho-Slovak state." 15 In 1918, the (First) Czechoslovak Republic was created with Masaryk as its president. Unfortunately, Masaryk- whose father was Slovak and mother was Moravian/Czech-did not believe the Slovaks to be a separate nation. In addition, "a fateful ambiguity crept into the very first political statement published by independent Slovak politicians, the Slovak National Council. .. " which although declaring Slovakia a "nation," also suggested Slovak as a "branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation ." 16 The confusion resulted in "misunderstandings, confused government policies, enmity, and even tragedy .. .. [And] politically, it led to all sorts of excesses, including Czech chauvinism and Slovak Czechophobia." 17 The final documents of the new combined state referred only to the "Czechoslovaks" and completely omitted any mention of autonomy for Slovakia. 13 Michael R. Cude, "The Imagined Exiles : Slovak-Ameri cans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republi c," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vol. 5, ed . Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk : University of Gdansk Historical Institute, 2014), 287-305 , 287. 14 Cude writes that Slovak exi les viewed "their experi ence in America" as proof "that the Slovaks could very much develop independently and did not need the strict oversight of the Czechs. As such , the Slovak-American activ ists gradually adopted a role as an 'ex iled' national voice aga inst Prague centra lism," 298 . 15 Joseph A. Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in th e l <J'h and 2dh Centuries, 97-100, 97 . 16 Peter Petro, A History of Slovak Literature, Montreal [Que.] : MQUP, 1995. Ebook Collection (EBSCO host), EBSCOhost (accessed 29 Nov. 2016), 13 1. 17 Petro, 131. �SLOVAKIA 2019 61 In dismissing the wishes of Slovak nationalists in America, and subsequently in Slovakia as well, Masaryk and his supporters were putting the new Republic into j eopardy. The various Czech-dominated governments that ruled the new Republic recruited Slovaks of the 'Czechoslovak ' persuasion (largely Lutherans) to join their ruling coalition. American Czechoslovaks approved of this arrangement. .. . Slovak nationalists, however, were left out in the cold. 18 The centralism 19 of the government in Prague during the First Czechoslovak Republic can be viewed as helping continue the defensive nature of the Slovak national movement, which had begun under the duress of Magyarization. 2° For example, Slovaks seldom felt like equal partners in the new state. Even though in 1918 "the very real existential problems caused by the attempted liquidation of Slovak culture through Magyarization [had] disappeared ... the positive aspect of this momentous change for liberated Slovak culture was somewhat tempered by a paternalistic attitude emanating from Prague." But it was not "always ill-meant and unjustified; from Prague also came tremendous support and help, particularly in the cultural and educational fields ." 21 The perception of inequality, however, became consequential in the late 1930s, when Czechoslovakia found itself under the heel of Nazi Germany. On 14 March 1939, several months after the Munich Pact gave Nazi Germany control over the Sudetenland (in a failed exchange for peace), Catholic Slovak leaders declared the Slovak Republic, albeit under Nazi influence. Six years later, the first Slovak state came to an end. The short-lived, authoritarian Slovak state caused much conflict among exiles in the early post-war years. Among the Catholic autonomists, the Slovak Republic inspired nostalgia and resolve to continue the fight for political independence. But the federalist and Czech18 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," Drustvena istrazivanja [Journal fo r General Social Issues ] 7, no. 1-2 (1998), 75-88, 78. 19 In Czechoslovakia, "centralism" refers to the concentration of political power in the capital, Prague. It often operated in opposition to regional desires for decentralization, self-administration, and autonomy. 20 Nurmi , 18 I. 21 Petro, 13 1. �62 SLOVAKIA 2019 oslovakist Slovak exiles generally condemned that group as, among other things, undemocratic.22 In turn, the Catholic autonomists condemned the federalists as having sold out the Slovaks to communist oppression after the war. The Catholic autonomists defended the wartime Slovak state as a rational decision done for national survival, as "the only way out under the given political circumstances" of Czechoslovakia having fallen under the rule of Nazi German~, and "as the logical conclusion of their former national endeavors." 3 Although controversial and brief, this experiment in political independence gave the Slovaks a new and lasting sense of worthiness among nations. While Masaryk had been a disappointment to many Slovaks, post-war Slovak emigres- autonomists and federalists alike-expressly despised the second Czechoslovak president and wartime leader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exi le in London, Edvard Benes (1935-38 & 1939-48). In a variety of publications during and after World War II, (federalist) politician Stefan Osusky blamed Benes for the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 and for the postwar subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet Union. Former diplomat and historian Joseph A. Mikus (an autonomist) voiced similarly strong views of Benes, holding him responsible not only for the communist takeover in 1948 but also for the failure of the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek in 1968. 24 In general, the Slovak 22 Petro writes "The backlash that led to the super-nationalism of some writers during the existence of the Slovak Republic can be ascribed not to some inbred propensity for political extremism, but to a desperate desire for national self-assertion," 131 -32. 23 B.S. Bue, " Federative Tendencies of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no. 3 ( 1958), 25-32, 30. "The short-lived existence of this independent state gave to Slovak nationalism what it had hitherto lacked, namely, a uniform will to live independently and a conviction that it will know how to stand its ground as an equally worthy member among the other nations." 24 Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in the 19th and 2dh Centuries, 400-405 . In response to a presentation by Kurt Glaser regarding the question of national states and federali sm in Central Europe, Mikus argued "The record of Czechoslovakia is particularly sad, since during World War II Benes had laid the comer-stone of his foreign policy out of collaboration with the Soviet Union, a non-Western and communist power. The guilt complex resulting from [Benes's] 1945 solution of the Sudeten German problem threw him into the arms of the Soviet Union . That embrace became so strong that [Alexander] Dubcek's effort to extricate Czecho- �SLOVAKIA 2019 63 exiles with close ties to the Catholic Slovak Republic felt particularly snubbed by Czechoslovakia's wartime representatives in London and Washington. Slovak politician, diplomat, and later prolific scholar Jozef M. Kirschbaum was unflinching both in his support for Slovak independence and in his criticism of the Czechs: "Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians" led by Benes. 25 In the late 1940s and early '50s, Slovak exile groups contacted a variety of governmental offices in the U.S. and Canada requesting freedom from Soviet domination and independence for Slovakia. 26 Bitterness and rivalries among the groups, however, limited their impact. 27 Ever since the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Slovak exiles had embraced the mission of speaking on behalf of the silenced Slovak people back home in Czechoslovakia. They resumed that role after World War II as Slovak exiles reacted to the "rigid centralism" imposed by the post-war Czechoslovak regime. In addition, Slovak exiles in the West were troubled by the ruthlessness of the Stalinist system, with its "political and religious persecution, economic discrimination, and prohibition of contacts with Western countries." 28 So, American and Canadian Slovaks responded to the new status quo by resuming their role as "interpreters of the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom, democracy, and independence." 29 With a renewed sense of hope, a few dozen post-war exiles took up the challenge of informing the world about Slovakia and " .. .published hundreds of books and articles about the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks. [In the process, they] helped keep the 'Slovak cause ' in the public eye, as well as give it some credence in Slovakia from it was in vain. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia has its roots in that fitiful pactomania of Benes with Moscow," 403. 5 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States," Slovakia 23 , 46 ( 1973), 111-22, 119. 26 Pauco, 423. 27 Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," 82 . 28 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Slovaks Abroad and their Role in Slovakia 's Struggle for Freedom," Slovakia 24, 47 (1974), 63-6, 63-4. 29 Ibid. 63-4. �64 SLOVAKIA 2019 the academic and intellectual circles in North America."30 One important publication with that goal was the academic journal, Slovakia, edited by Filip A. Hrobak and first published in 1951. The journal's purpose was twofold: to defend Slovak political rights and to publicize Slovak national and cultural activities.31 After 26 years as editor of the journal, the Slovak League of America lauded Hrobak as a defender of "the sacred cause of Slovak national freedom. " 32 Exiled Slovaks seldom agreed on what exactly comprised the Slovak cause but many believed that the West would be receptive to their homeland 's plight. The Slovak Question (i.e. rights to autonomy, self-determination, statehood, etc .) continually caused tension, especially among exile organizations consisting of both Czechs and Slovaks. One of the most influential of those, created one year after the communist coup of February 1948, was the Council of Free Czechoslovakia (CFC). The U.S. government relied on the Council for policy advice, but to the Slovaks' dismay Washington paid little attention to the Slovak Question. 33 The many feuds over Slovak autonomy led Slovaks such as Stefan Osusky to demand separate recognition in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and parity in its leadership . However, achieving an equal voice in that organization 34 took over twenty years. In 1948 the Slovak National Council Abroad was founded by Karol Sidor, Jozef Kirschbaum, Peter Privdavok, and Konstantin Culen. The Slovak Leagues of America and Canada recognized the Slovak National Council as the representative body of Slovak politi30 M. Mark Stolarik, "Slovak Historians in Exile in North America, 1945- 1992," Human Affairs 6, no. I ( 1996), 34-44, 34. 31 Pauco, 422 32 Joseph C. Krajsa, ed., "First Catholic Slovak Union (Jednota) of the U.S. and Canada," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study (M iddletown, PA : Slovak League of America, 1978), IO 1-68, 128. 33 Michael R. Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on th e Slo vak Question, /914-1948 (PhD Diss., Univers ity of Colorado-Boulder, 20 13) and Cude, "The Imagined Exiles." 34 The first reconciliation in 1952 attempted to address this issue by givi ng the Slovaks separate recognition with separate votes on programs within the CFC. In 1960, the moderate nationalists in the Council formed the Permanent Confe rence of Slovak Democratic Exiles and formally split from the CFC to join with other Czech dissenters to form the Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakists remained invo lved in the Counci l, and as part of its 1973 reorgani zation, the CFC established Czech-Slovak parity in its leadership. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 65 cal exiles. 35 Another exile group also promoted the nationalist cause. The Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansly and others, defended "the right of self-determination for the Slovak nation." 36 Additionally, many smaller organizations and societies from Australia to Buenos Aires promoted the idea of political independence for Slovakia. 37 The inability of the various organizations to unite, however, hampered their overall impact on Western policy and understanding, especially in the first two and a half decades after the war . . The Prague Spring of 1968 was a turning point for many of the squabbling exiles. In the wake of the failed reform movement, thousands of the disappointed migrated out of Czechoslovakia. The newcomers were received with skepticism, and although there was little that unified Slovak emigres after 1968, Frantisek Braxator suggested that a common ideological platform might be that no compromise with Communism was possible, "human face" or otherwise. He reassuringly concluded that nobody wanted to resurrect the authoritarian wartime state. 38 In many ways, the diversity and energy of the new exiles added much to the cause of Slovak emigres in the West. Indeed, there is evidence that the last two decades of exile activity were more productive than the early decades of the Cold War. By then the political goals of Slovak-Americans and Slovak-Canadians were generally two-fold: continue heritage preservation and call attention in the West to the persecution of Slovaks under communist rule in Czechoslovakia. 39 After the Soviet invasion, the thousands of Prague Spring arrivals to North America and the earlier post-war political exiles from Slovakia, more than ever before, were able to find common purpose, even unity, in their identity as Slovaks. The unprecedented unity came in large part from a new umbrella organization, the Slovak World Congress (Svetovy kongres Slovakov), 35 Pauco, 423. Ibid. Some of the others included Stefan Polakovic, Alojz Macek, and Stanislav Meciar. 37 Ibid., 423-4. 38 Frantisek Braxator, " Slovaks Abroad and Their Relationship to Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20'" Centuries, 425-33. He concluded that "there was "definitely no support for the idea that the majority of this emigration regards aid to Slovakia as taking the form of an effort to revive the Slovak Republic of 1939 to 1945 " 432 39 Kr;jsa, "First Catholic Slovak Union," in Slovaks in America, l O1-68, 126. 36 �66 SLOVAKIA 2019 founded in New York in June 1970. Between 1970 and 1989, the SWC brought together Slovak organizations from North and South America, Western Europe, and Oceania. It absorbed a wide variety of emigre Slovak organizations and individuals, from Catholics and Lutherans to a range of political figures , from the federalist-leaning Stefan Osusky to the ardent nationalist Ferdinand Durcansky. Leadership of the Slovak World Congress encompassed the diversity of Slovaks in exile as well. In addition to the old-guard leaders, 1968generation Slovak exiles such as the Lutheran pastor Dusan T6th and the Jewish ex-communist Eugen Lob! held high positions in the organization. The SWC aimed to resist Communism in the name of democracy, religious freedom , and the principle of self-determination, specifically meaning self-rule and political independence. In 1973, the Slovak World Congress published symposium proceedings to inform and update the West about Slovaks and their long history in Central Europe. Many contributors thought that too few histories of Europe had appreciated the Slovaks' ninth-century state organization. Furthermore, they had neglected to mention Slovak contributions to Slavic civi lizations, such as by Saints Cyril and Methodius. Slovak World Congress organizers were also concerned that when Slovak history was presented, it was "in a distorted light." 40 Founder and benefactor Stephen B. Roman noted the unith th queness of the symposium and resulting book on 19 and 20 century Slovak history: [A} fl the authors, including those of non-Slovak origin, subscribe to the thesis that the Slovaks developed through the centuries into a distin ct Central European nation, and that their language, literature and culture also developed independently of other Slavic nations. From this premise, the right to selfdetermination and equality of rights for the Slovak people be41 came a logical conclusion for all contributors. The Slovak World Congress' mission was to represent "the cultural, social, and political aspirations of the Slovak people in the Western hemisphere" and to "contribute to the search for historical 40 41 Stephen B. Roman, "Preface," Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 5. Roman, " Preface," 6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 67 truth about the Slovaks and thereby to help bring about better understanding and cooperation among the nations of Central Europe."42 Founder Roman declared that the SWC strongly believed "that peoples of that vital area" could "regain their political freedom and build their future through close cooperation and the recognition by each of the equal rights to independence of the others."43 Notably, the Slovak World Congress claimed to work toward freedom and independence not only for Slovakia but for other small European nations as well. In 1978 in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of the Slovak World Congress proceedings, Slovakia in the 1911' and 20th Centuries, editor Joseph M. Kirschbaum further emphasized the balanced and informational nature of the volume: Until very recently Slovak history was presented to the West either by the adherents of the "Czechoslovak" school which denied the separate historical development of Slovakia, or by the historians of the Slovak nationalist school who insisted on the independent political and cultural development of Slovakia . ...By publishing this edition, the Slovak World Congress has no other aim but to help acquaint Western readers with Slovakia and [its} rise to nationhood, and to contribute to the search for freedom and cooperation among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.44 Despite the Slovak World Congress' reputation as the leading late Cold War organization for Slovaks in the West, it was never completely successful in uniting the Slovak exiles. The Czechoslovakists and some of the moderate nationalists disavowed involvement because of the strong views of the Catholic autonomists, especially those with "unclean pasts.,,4s To accommodate the diversity of interests, the SWC comprised three factions regarding constitutional questions: federalization within Czechoslovakia, confederation, and independence. 46 On behalf of the Slovak diaspora, leader Roman had 42 Ibid. Ibid. 44 J.M . Kirschbaum, Slo vakia in the / 9th and 20th Centuries, 8. 45 Jozef Spetko, "Slovenska exilova a emigrantska politika v rokoch 1945-1989," Historicky casopis 39, no . 3 ( I99 I), 24 1-61: 256. 46 Ibid., 257-8. 43 �68 SLOVAK.IA 2019 wanted the organization to "speak as one voice and act according to a single plan" on behalf of the silenced Slovaks in the homeland. But achieving consensus among the exiles, especially about independence and resolution of the Slovak Question, was impossible from the very beginning of the SWC. 47 Nevertheless, the Slovak World Congress devised anti-communist propaganda campaigns, held scholarly conferences and cultural festivals , and even aided the protest movements in Slovakia in the 1980s.48 The organization collaborated with figures such as the Slovak-Canadian hockey player Marian St'astny and the Camogursky family-leading members of the organization-and even organized overseas protests to promote religious freedom in conjunction with the candlelight protests in Bratislava on March 25, 1988. In 1989, the Slovak World Congress officially supported the Velvet Revolution. However, "once the Communists surrendered power to Czech and Slovak dissidents ... the Slovak World Congress began to fracture ." 49 In the wake of the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the SWC organized visits and programs in Slovakia. But relations between the SWC and the post-communist Czechoslovak government quickly became strained, mostly over the issue of Slovak autonomy, which most, but not all, members of the Slovak World Congress still very much supported. 50 Within weeks of the revolution, Secretary-General of the SWC Dusan T6th, who had fled Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968, visited his family in Slovakia and appeared at some political rallies in the capital, Bratislava. The " intoxicated crowds" welcomed him warmly and "listened intently as he told them about the [Slovak 47 Ibid. , 255. M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-20/0) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 281-2. 49 Ibid., 287. The groups were the Civic Forum (Obcanske forum) and the Public Against Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu) in the Czech lands and Slovakia, respectively. 50 The Slovak World Congress began to decline after Roman's death in 1988, especially since he had bankrolled the organization. After the Velvet Divorce in I993, its functions declined even more, with its most notable achievement being to convince the U.S. and Slovak governments to allow dual citizenship. By 2000, the SWC was functionally gone. See Stolarik, Where ... , 279-95. 48 �SLOVAKIA 2019 69 World] Congress and its aspirations for freedom in Slovakia." 5 1 After all, the topic of political independence had been a taboo for forty years. For its part, the SWC tried to engage the Slovak government in talks about independence in early 1990, but Slovak politicians had more immediate concerns such as figuring out how to navigate the new political landscape. "Many were new politicians who faced the task of learning not only the art of political maneuvering, but above all that of public discourse in a democratic society. They were the ones who dealt with the issue of Czecho-Slovak relations which found resolution in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. " 52 The first post-communist elections in Slovakia were for representatives to the Slovak National Council. Although results of the voting in early June 1990 demonstrated the predictable rejection of Communism, they also " indicated that ' the Slovak question' was still on the political agenda. " 53 The biggest surprise was the third place finish for the Slovak National Party (Slovenska narodna strana orSNS), the only party with independence in its platform. "It is quite likely that one particular event preceding the election contributed to the [SNS ' s] success" in the parliamentary elections.54 Trouble began in March 1990 in the Federal Assembly in Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel, who had recently become the new president, was a vocal proponent of federalism and continuing the Czech union with Slovakia. The dispute started when Slovak politicians wanted to return to the original ( 1918-1920) way of writing the country's name: Czecho-Slovakia. Tensions grew when the Czechs agreed that Slovakia could do so, but neither the Czechs nor the federal government of Czechoslovakia would hyphenate. The "hyphen war" showed "how very different were the Czech and Slovak conceptions of their common state and brought into the open the need to reexamine the state of Czech-Slovak relations." 55 For the next two years, the discourse around that reexamination exposed ever more disparities and decades-old animosities . 51 Anne C.R. Roman, "Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too," Slovak Spectator, 29 November 1999, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20009411 /slovak-expats-remember1989-too.html. 52 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, 251-2. 53 Ibid., 255. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid . �70 SLOVAKIA 2019 Economic concerns took center stage, including the question of how quickly to move away from a socialist command economy to a capitalist market economy. While Slovaks feared a continuation of Prague centralism, including federal conduct and policies that favored Czech-and discounted Slovak- economic contributions, Czechs complained about subsidizing the Slovak economy. 56 The contrasting way the Slovaks and Czechs viewed this issue underscores some of the key reasons for their separation in 1993. One Czech-American historian argues that the peaceful separation of Czechs and Slovaks was a "necessity," based on their lack of "shared positive historical experience." 57 History and the "interplay of a series of factors" indeed influenced the breakup of Czechoslovakia. 58 Stanislav Kirschbaum suggests the root of the problem goes back to "the pursuit of [Slovak] national development in cooperation with the Czechs."59 From its inception in 1918 the "ultimate failure" of the Czechoslovak state was that it did not "provide an acceptable framework for Slovak national development," and despite all the benefits and progress, "the common state put Slovaks in a position of having to continue their struggle for survival." 60 In retrospect, the unraveling of Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s is not surprising; nor is the fact of its peaceful evolution. In the eyes of many Slovak exiles, the fall of Communism meant more than just getting rid of the Communists and returning to democracy. Indeed, " ... it was all of this plus home rule," commented M. Mark Stolarik, scholar and former president of the Canadian Slovak 56 S. Kirschbaum, 256-68. Igor Lukes, " Strangers in One House: Czechs and Slovaks, 1918-1992," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism/Revue Canadienne des Etudes sur le Nationalisme 27, 1-2 2000, 33-43 , 41 . 58 S. Kirschbaum, 270. The factors include the following: "The inability of the Czechoslovak state to solve certain social and constitutional problems since 1918; the legacy of the Communist regime; the adaptation crisis resulting from the passage of a single-party state to democratic pluralism ; the lack of experience of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution ; the absence of Czechoslovak parties in the postCommunist era; and the provision in the 1968 constitutional law that allowed Slovak deputies to block federal legislation that was not deemed to be in Slovakia's interest" so that the Slovaks could not be outvoted by the Czech majority." . 59 S. Kirschbaum, 270-71. 60 Ibid., 271. 57 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 71 League, on the tenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution.6 1 In the United States and Canada, Slovak exiles' experiences of democracy and freedom guided them forward before and after the toppling of the hardline communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 62 Their influence on politics in the homeland has yet to be clearly documented, but it is quite possible that Slovak exiles and their endeavor to keep alive the drive for the self-determination and political independence of the Slovak nation provided not only legitimacy in the West, but also moral and political encouragement to their homeland as the nation moved toward independence in the early 1990s. 61 A. Roman, " Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too." Francis D. Raska, Long Road to Victory: A History or Czechoslovak Exile Organizations after I 968 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 20 12). Raska concludes that the influence of exile groups in the fa ll of Communism in Czechoslovakia "was unquestionabl y positive," 172. 62 � SLOVAKIA 2019 55 IMAGINING A SEP ARA TE SLOVAK.IA: ANTICOMMUNIST SLOVAK EXILES' STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND 1 Ellen L. Paul In January 1993, the principle of self-determination reigned supreme as the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic became Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In many ways, this peaceful separation was the logical outcome of decades of anti-communist Slovak emigre efforts. To be sure, Cold War exiles who left Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the February 1948 communist takeover had many disagreements amongst themselves, especially over leadership and direction of their numerous political organizations.2 Over time, however, many of the Slovak exile organizations arrived at some kind of consensus, and by the last two decades of the Cold War, the right of political self-determination provided Slovak emigres with a unifying theme. After all, in August 1968 when the Warsaw Pact armies quashed the Prague Spring, the Soviet Union brutally reminded the world of its firm control over Czechoslovakia. Yet, that event inspired two reasons for hope among Slovak exiles: l . the longpromised federalism of Czechoslovakia and 2. the creation in 1970 of a unifying new organization of Slovak exiles, the Slovak World Congress. As exiles in the free and democratic West, Cold War-era Slovak political exiles not only fought Soviet Communism and advocated for human rights in the homeland, they also defended the unique development of the Slovak nation in Central European history and informed the West about Slovakia, often refuting what many saw as misinformation spread by the Czechs. A recurring theme at the heart of the publications about Slovak history and culture was the dream of political independence for the Slovak nation. 1 A version of thi s paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Polish American Historical Association panel on 7 January 2017 in Denver, Colorado. 2 Igor Lukes, "Czechoslovak Political Ex ile in the Cold War: the earl y years," Polish Review 47 , no. 3 (2002): 332-43. �56 SLOVAKIA 2019 From the early 20 th century, Slovaks in the West became convinced that democracy and the ethnic principle of self-determination went hand-in-hand with political independence. A small group of Slovak exiles favored political union with their Czech neighbors, but others insisted on autonomy and even independence based on the ethnic principle of self-determination. Throughout the Cold War, the groups favoring independence consistently fought for a separate Slovak identity and "equal rights with the other free and democratic nations of Europe and the world." 3 In 1993, the fruit of their struggles resulted in the peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Politically active Slovak exiles in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada can be roughly categorized into three basic groups. These categories are a helpful framework for understanding the issue of Slovak independence and especially the ways exiles aligned themselves in the early years of the Cold War. 1. Czechoslovakists: Slovaks who wanted a close union with the Czechs. 2. Federalists: moderate Slovak nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of a separate Slovak identity and political autonomy both for Slovakia and within the exile organizations. These included figures such as Stefan Osusky and Slovak Democratic Party members sent into exile after the communist coup in February 1948. 4 It is notable that the majority-but not all- of these first two groups came from Slovakia' s Lutheran minority. 3. Slovak autonomists : these Slovaks were decidedly nationalist and predominantly Catholic. They were also the most contentious. They supported Slovak independence, completely eschewing union with the Czechs-and rejecting the idea of a "Czechoslovak nation." They fled into exile right away in 1945, ahead of the Red Army and the returning Czechoslovak government. Among them were academics and journalists, such as historian Konstantin Culen, poet Mikulas Sprinc, and journalist Jozef 3 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, "Americki Slovaci a myslienka slovenskej samostatnosti," Kato/icky kalendar Jednota 87 (I 984), 177-84, 184. 4 The 1948 generation tended to be professionals or factory owners and, generally, among the most skilled and educated. In exile, many worked to resist Communism and return Czechoslovakia to democracy. �SLOVAKIA 2019 57 Pauco. In addition, the group featured several politicians and diplomats from the wartime Slovak state, such as Jozef Kirschbaum, Karol Sidor, and Ferdinand Durcansky. The majority of Slovak autonomists migrated to Canada, with some gaining entry into the United States. Although exact membership figures are unknown, there were far more Slovak autonomist and federalist exile groups in North America. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the autonomist and federalist Slovak exiles. Over time their differences faded, especially after the failed Prague Spring reform movement in 1968. Another reason for this shift was that as post-war emigres died, a younger generation of autonomists and federalists gradually united in their goals for self-determination and political independence for Slovakia. In 1958, linguist and Franciscan priest, Bonaventure S. Bue, categorized Slovak emigres into only two groups, lumping the federalists and autonomists into, simply, the autonomists . He explained the rift between the Czechoslovakists and the autonomists with a question: "Are we Czechs or are we Slovaks? To this question the Czechoslovak would answer: I am a Czech; the Autonomist: I am a Slovak." 5 Bue continued " ... the majority of Slovaks have always felt and professed to be an ethnographically, historically, and culturally distinct nation from the Czechs" and suggested that by the late 1950s the Czechoslovakist versus autonomist conflict was " losing its original raison d 'etre."6 In large part that was because even the Slovaks who wished to preserve the state of Czecho-Slovakia by then had "abandoned the highly disputed fiction of the 'Czechoslovak nation"' and agreed on the distinctness of the Slovaks. 7 The remaining issue was about the best alliance or political form for the nation's survival. Many historians trace the ethnogenesis of the Slovak nation back to the Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century, largely based on oral accounts and the Christianizing and linguistic legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Solid documentary evidence of Slovak linguistic uniqueness harks back to the 1700s, when the Catholic intelli5 B. S. Bue, "Conflicts of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no . 2 ( 1958), 1-1 7: 7 and 16. 6 Bue, 15. 7 Buc,16-17. �58 SLOVAK.IA 2019 gentsia in northern Hungary first suggested a separate identity for the Slovak language-as opposed to a Czech or Czechoslovak language. To them, it no longer made sense to use the more developed Czech language, and so Catholic clergy began writing in the Slovak vernacular even though the majority culture was distinctly Magyar. 8 In the 19 th century, language became "the center of the new national idea," but this was not enough to create a national identity for the Slovaks, who were under increasing pressure to assimi late to Magyar language and culture. In The Slovak National Awakening ( 1976), Peter Brock explains that as the intelligentsia began to promote the Slovak language and nation, and shift from using the Czech language, ideas about political unity with the Czechs also faded. 9 In 1848, I.',udovit Stur and other young Protestant intellectuals formed a short-lived Slavonic nation of their own, but thereafter the process of creating a Slovak political nation was interrupted by Magyarization, which meant the imposition of Magyar culture and language on young intellectuals in the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary. The impetus to assert a separate Slovak identity with a language that was neither Czech nor Magyar had been well under way by the 1840s, involved both Catholics and Protestants, and was an important step toward declaring a distinct Slovak national identity. Toward that end, in the early 1860s the Matica slovenska (Slovak Cultural Institute) was founded to aid the continuing development of Slovak literature and culture. A political merger between Czechs and Slovaks came in 1918 following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the calamity of the First World War, but that union was not predestined. Despite their linguistic similarities and geographical proximity, Czechs and Slovaks had very different histories and cultural influences. For hundreds of years, the Czech lands were part of the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the House of Habsburg, and much influenced by German culture and the Reformation (and the Czech reformer Jan Hus). During that time, the Kingdom of Hungary ruled over the Slovak 8 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia-a Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of National identity of the Slo vaks 191 8-1920, Biblioteca Historica 42 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), 9-10, and Peter Brock, The Slovak National Awakening (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 1837 and 53-4. 9 Brock, 7 & 20-37 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 59 lands, inside the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. While both small nations struggled against strong neighbors, their nineteenth century trajectories to national awakening and political agency were distinctly different. Firstly, the Slovak lands remained largely agricultural while the Czech lands underwent industrialization. Secondly, the Czechs achieved some successes in gaining cultural and linguistic rights at home and a measure of political representation in Vienna. Whereas to the east, the Slovaks faced increasing Magyarization and the loss of their culture. Since the tenth century, the lands of Slovakia had been ruled by foreigners and what had kept the Slovaks from assimilating, disappearing, or dispersing were "language, geography, and tradition ." 10 Not surprisingly, these vastly divergent experiences dramatically shaped the outlook and soul of each nation. Although Slovak culture was repressed in the homeland, the impact of the efforts of the Matica slovenska, Catholic clergy, and Slovak intelligentsia to keep Slovak language and culture alive became apparent by the late 19 th century, when notable numbers of emigres began arriving in the United States and identified themselves as Slovak. By the early twentieth century, the U.S.A. was home to the most influential Slovak diaspora. 11 In 1890, they established two important early exile organizations: the National Slovak Society and the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1907, the Slovak League of America formed and united all Slovak groups in America. While based "on a wide platform of love for [the] Slovak nation," the Slovak League of America's mission at the time was to cast off the Hungarian tyrant ruling over Slovaks in the homeland. 12 Unity among exiles, however, became much harder to achieve after the dissolution of AustriaHungary during the First World War and particularly after the declaration of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. During World War I, politicians began deliberating the future of Central Europe. The most important negotiations regarding Czechoslovak statehood took place in North America among representatives of both the Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs knew that Slovak par10 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 37-8. 11 Jozef Pauco, " Slovaks Abroad and their Relationship with Slovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 2 nd edition, ed. Jozef M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1978), 415-24, 415. 12 Ibid., 417. �60 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ticipation was vital to their cause. With that knowledge, Slovaks were able to leverage some influence by demanding " recognition of an independent Slovak identity and Slovak political autonomy in exchange for their support." 13 Many Slovak exiles believed that "through their immigration to America ... they had helped preserve Slovak national identity" and that "American democracy provided them something they felt would prove beneficial" for Slovaks back home. 14 In the negotiations over Czechoslovakia and its constitution, the efforts of Slovak Stefan Osusky stand out. He worked closely with Tomas G. Masaryk for federalism and for Slovakia to be regarded "as an equal partner by the Czechs in the Czecho-Slovak state." 15 In 1918, the (First) Czechoslovak Republic was created with Masaryk as its president. Unfortunately, Masaryk- whose father was Slovak and mother was Moravian/Czech-did not believe the Slovaks to be a separate nation. In addition, "a fateful ambiguity crept into the very first political statement published by independent Slovak politicians, the Slovak National Council. .. " which although declaring Slovakia a "nation," also suggested Slovak as a "branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation ." 16 The confusion resulted in "misunderstandings, confused government policies, enmity, and even tragedy .. .. [And] politically, it led to all sorts of excesses, including Czech chauvinism and Slovak Czechophobia." 17 The final documents of the new combined state referred only to the "Czechoslovaks" and completely omitted any mention of autonomy for Slovakia. 13 Michael R. Cude, "The Imagined Exiles : Slovak-Ameri cans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republi c," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vol. 5, ed . Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk : University of Gdansk Historical Institute, 2014), 287-305 , 287. 14 Cude writes that Slovak exi les viewed "their experi ence in America" as proof "that the Slovaks could very much develop independently and did not need the strict oversight of the Czechs. As such , the Slovak-American activ ists gradually adopted a role as an 'ex iled' national voice aga inst Prague centra lism," 298 . 15 Joseph A. Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in th e l <J'h and 2dh Centuries, 97-100, 97 . 16 Peter Petro, A History of Slovak Literature, Montreal [Que.] : MQUP, 1995. Ebook Collection (EBSCO host), EBSCOhost (accessed 29 Nov. 2016), 13 1. 17 Petro, 131. �SLOVAKIA 2019 61 In dismissing the wishes of Slovak nationalists in America, and subsequently in Slovakia as well, Masaryk and his supporters were putting the new Republic into j eopardy. The various Czech-dominated governments that ruled the new Republic recruited Slovaks of the 'Czechoslovak ' persuasion (largely Lutherans) to join their ruling coalition. American Czechoslovaks approved of this arrangement. .. . Slovak nationalists, however, were left out in the cold. 18 The centralism 19 of the government in Prague during the First Czechoslovak Republic can be viewed as helping continue the defensive nature of the Slovak national movement, which had begun under the duress of Magyarization. 2° For example, Slovaks seldom felt like equal partners in the new state. Even though in 1918 "the very real existential problems caused by the attempted liquidation of Slovak culture through Magyarization [had] disappeared ... the positive aspect of this momentous change for liberated Slovak culture was somewhat tempered by a paternalistic attitude emanating from Prague." But it was not "always ill-meant and unjustified; from Prague also came tremendous support and help, particularly in the cultural and educational fields ." 21 The perception of inequality, however, became consequential in the late 1930s, when Czechoslovakia found itself under the heel of Nazi Germany. On 14 March 1939, several months after the Munich Pact gave Nazi Germany control over the Sudetenland (in a failed exchange for peace), Catholic Slovak leaders declared the Slovak Republic, albeit under Nazi influence. Six years later, the first Slovak state came to an end. The short-lived, authoritarian Slovak state caused much conflict among exiles in the early post-war years. Among the Catholic autonomists, the Slovak Republic inspired nostalgia and resolve to continue the fight for political independence. But the federalist and Czech18 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," Drustvena istrazivanja [Journal fo r General Social Issues ] 7, no. 1-2 (1998), 75-88, 78. 19 In Czechoslovakia, "centralism" refers to the concentration of political power in the capital, Prague. It often operated in opposition to regional desires for decentralization, self-administration, and autonomy. 20 Nurmi , 18 I. 21 Petro, 13 1. �62 SLOVAKIA 2019 oslovakist Slovak exiles generally condemned that group as, among other things, undemocratic.22 In turn, the Catholic autonomists condemned the federalists as having sold out the Slovaks to communist oppression after the war. The Catholic autonomists defended the wartime Slovak state as a rational decision done for national survival, as "the only way out under the given political circumstances" of Czechoslovakia having fallen under the rule of Nazi German~, and "as the logical conclusion of their former national endeavors." 3 Although controversial and brief, this experiment in political independence gave the Slovaks a new and lasting sense of worthiness among nations. While Masaryk had been a disappointment to many Slovaks, post-war Slovak emigres- autonomists and federalists alike-expressly despised the second Czechoslovak president and wartime leader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exi le in London, Edvard Benes (1935-38 & 1939-48). In a variety of publications during and after World War II, (federalist) politician Stefan Osusky blamed Benes for the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 and for the postwar subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet Union. Former diplomat and historian Joseph A. Mikus (an autonomist) voiced similarly strong views of Benes, holding him responsible not only for the communist takeover in 1948 but also for the failure of the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek in 1968. 24 In general, the Slovak 22 Petro writes "The backlash that led to the super-nationalism of some writers during the existence of the Slovak Republic can be ascribed not to some inbred propensity for political extremism, but to a desperate desire for national self-assertion," 131 -32. 23 B.S. Bue, " Federative Tendencies of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no. 3 ( 1958), 25-32, 30. "The short-lived existence of this independent state gave to Slovak nationalism what it had hitherto lacked, namely, a uniform will to live independently and a conviction that it will know how to stand its ground as an equally worthy member among the other nations." 24 Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in the 19th and 2dh Centuries, 400-405 . In response to a presentation by Kurt Glaser regarding the question of national states and federali sm in Central Europe, Mikus argued "The record of Czechoslovakia is particularly sad, since during World War II Benes had laid the comer-stone of his foreign policy out of collaboration with the Soviet Union, a non-Western and communist power. The guilt complex resulting from [Benes's] 1945 solution of the Sudeten German problem threw him into the arms of the Soviet Union . That embrace became so strong that [Alexander] Dubcek's effort to extricate Czecho- �SLOVAKIA 2019 63 exiles with close ties to the Catholic Slovak Republic felt particularly snubbed by Czechoslovakia's wartime representatives in London and Washington. Slovak politician, diplomat, and later prolific scholar Jozef M. Kirschbaum was unflinching both in his support for Slovak independence and in his criticism of the Czechs: "Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians" led by Benes. 25 In the late 1940s and early '50s, Slovak exile groups contacted a variety of governmental offices in the U.S. and Canada requesting freedom from Soviet domination and independence for Slovakia. 26 Bitterness and rivalries among the groups, however, limited their impact. 27 Ever since the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Slovak exiles had embraced the mission of speaking on behalf of the silenced Slovak people back home in Czechoslovakia. They resumed that role after World War II as Slovak exiles reacted to the "rigid centralism" imposed by the post-war Czechoslovak regime. In addition, Slovak exiles in the West were troubled by the ruthlessness of the Stalinist system, with its "political and religious persecution, economic discrimination, and prohibition of contacts with Western countries." 28 So, American and Canadian Slovaks responded to the new status quo by resuming their role as "interpreters of the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom, democracy, and independence." 29 With a renewed sense of hope, a few dozen post-war exiles took up the challenge of informing the world about Slovakia and " .. .published hundreds of books and articles about the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks. [In the process, they] helped keep the 'Slovak cause ' in the public eye, as well as give it some credence in Slovakia from it was in vain. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia has its roots in that fitiful pactomania of Benes with Moscow," 403. 5 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States," Slovakia 23 , 46 ( 1973), 111-22, 119. 26 Pauco, 423. 27 Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," 82 . 28 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Slovaks Abroad and their Role in Slovakia 's Struggle for Freedom," Slovakia 24, 47 (1974), 63-6, 63-4. 29 Ibid. 63-4. �64 SLOVAKIA 2019 the academic and intellectual circles in North America."30 One important publication with that goal was the academic journal, Slovakia, edited by Filip A. Hrobak and first published in 1951. The journal's purpose was twofold: to defend Slovak political rights and to publicize Slovak national and cultural activities.31 After 26 years as editor of the journal, the Slovak League of America lauded Hrobak as a defender of "the sacred cause of Slovak national freedom. " 32 Exiled Slovaks seldom agreed on what exactly comprised the Slovak cause but many believed that the West would be receptive to their homeland 's plight. The Slovak Question (i.e. rights to autonomy, self-determination, statehood, etc .) continually caused tension, especially among exile organizations consisting of both Czechs and Slovaks. One of the most influential of those, created one year after the communist coup of February 1948, was the Council of Free Czechoslovakia (CFC). The U.S. government relied on the Council for policy advice, but to the Slovaks' dismay Washington paid little attention to the Slovak Question. 33 The many feuds over Slovak autonomy led Slovaks such as Stefan Osusky to demand separate recognition in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and parity in its leadership . However, achieving an equal voice in that organization 34 took over twenty years. In 1948 the Slovak National Council Abroad was founded by Karol Sidor, Jozef Kirschbaum, Peter Privdavok, and Konstantin Culen. The Slovak Leagues of America and Canada recognized the Slovak National Council as the representative body of Slovak politi30 M. Mark Stolarik, "Slovak Historians in Exile in North America, 1945- 1992," Human Affairs 6, no. I ( 1996), 34-44, 34. 31 Pauco, 422 32 Joseph C. Krajsa, ed., "First Catholic Slovak Union (Jednota) of the U.S. and Canada," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study (M iddletown, PA : Slovak League of America, 1978), IO 1-68, 128. 33 Michael R. Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on th e Slo vak Question, /914-1948 (PhD Diss., Univers ity of Colorado-Boulder, 20 13) and Cude, "The Imagined Exiles." 34 The first reconciliation in 1952 attempted to address this issue by givi ng the Slovaks separate recognition with separate votes on programs within the CFC. In 1960, the moderate nationalists in the Council formed the Permanent Confe rence of Slovak Democratic Exiles and formally split from the CFC to join with other Czech dissenters to form the Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakists remained invo lved in the Counci l, and as part of its 1973 reorgani zation, the CFC established Czech-Slovak parity in its leadership. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 65 cal exiles. 35 Another exile group also promoted the nationalist cause. The Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansly and others, defended "the right of self-determination for the Slovak nation." 36 Additionally, many smaller organizations and societies from Australia to Buenos Aires promoted the idea of political independence for Slovakia. 37 The inability of the various organizations to unite, however, hampered their overall impact on Western policy and understanding, especially in the first two and a half decades after the war . . The Prague Spring of 1968 was a turning point for many of the squabbling exiles. In the wake of the failed reform movement, thousands of the disappointed migrated out of Czechoslovakia. The newcomers were received with skepticism, and although there was little that unified Slovak emigres after 1968, Frantisek Braxator suggested that a common ideological platform might be that no compromise with Communism was possible, "human face" or otherwise. He reassuringly concluded that nobody wanted to resurrect the authoritarian wartime state. 38 In many ways, the diversity and energy of the new exiles added much to the cause of Slovak emigres in the West. Indeed, there is evidence that the last two decades of exile activity were more productive than the early decades of the Cold War. By then the political goals of Slovak-Americans and Slovak-Canadians were generally two-fold: continue heritage preservation and call attention in the West to the persecution of Slovaks under communist rule in Czechoslovakia. 39 After the Soviet invasion, the thousands of Prague Spring arrivals to North America and the earlier post-war political exiles from Slovakia, more than ever before, were able to find common purpose, even unity, in their identity as Slovaks. The unprecedented unity came in large part from a new umbrella organization, the Slovak World Congress (Svetovy kongres Slovakov), 35 Pauco, 423. Ibid. Some of the others included Stefan Polakovic, Alojz Macek, and Stanislav Meciar. 37 Ibid., 423-4. 38 Frantisek Braxator, " Slovaks Abroad and Their Relationship to Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20'" Centuries, 425-33. He concluded that "there was "definitely no support for the idea that the majority of this emigration regards aid to Slovakia as taking the form of an effort to revive the Slovak Republic of 1939 to 1945 " 432 39 Kr;jsa, "First Catholic Slovak Union," in Slovaks in America, l O1-68, 126. 36 �66 SLOVAKIA 2019 founded in New York in June 1970. Between 1970 and 1989, the SWC brought together Slovak organizations from North and South America, Western Europe, and Oceania. It absorbed a wide variety of emigre Slovak organizations and individuals, from Catholics and Lutherans to a range of political figures , from the federalist-leaning Stefan Osusky to the ardent nationalist Ferdinand Durcansky. Leadership of the Slovak World Congress encompassed the diversity of Slovaks in exile as well. In addition to the old-guard leaders, 1968generation Slovak exiles such as the Lutheran pastor Dusan T6th and the Jewish ex-communist Eugen Lob! held high positions in the organization. The SWC aimed to resist Communism in the name of democracy, religious freedom , and the principle of self-determination, specifically meaning self-rule and political independence. In 1973, the Slovak World Congress published symposium proceedings to inform and update the West about Slovaks and their long history in Central Europe. Many contributors thought that too few histories of Europe had appreciated the Slovaks' ninth-century state organization. Furthermore, they had neglected to mention Slovak contributions to Slavic civi lizations, such as by Saints Cyril and Methodius. Slovak World Congress organizers were also concerned that when Slovak history was presented, it was "in a distorted light." 40 Founder and benefactor Stephen B. Roman noted the unith th queness of the symposium and resulting book on 19 and 20 century Slovak history: [A} fl the authors, including those of non-Slovak origin, subscribe to the thesis that the Slovaks developed through the centuries into a distin ct Central European nation, and that their language, literature and culture also developed independently of other Slavic nations. From this premise, the right to selfdetermination and equality of rights for the Slovak people be41 came a logical conclusion for all contributors. The Slovak World Congress' mission was to represent "the cultural, social, and political aspirations of the Slovak people in the Western hemisphere" and to "contribute to the search for historical 40 41 Stephen B. Roman, "Preface," Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 5. Roman, " Preface," 6. �SLOVAKIA 2019 67 truth about the Slovaks and thereby to help bring about better understanding and cooperation among the nations of Central Europe."42 Founder Roman declared that the SWC strongly believed "that peoples of that vital area" could "regain their political freedom and build their future through close cooperation and the recognition by each of the equal rights to independence of the others."43 Notably, the Slovak World Congress claimed to work toward freedom and independence not only for Slovakia but for other small European nations as well. In 1978 in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of the Slovak World Congress proceedings, Slovakia in the 1911' and 20th Centuries, editor Joseph M. Kirschbaum further emphasized the balanced and informational nature of the volume: Until very recently Slovak history was presented to the West either by the adherents of the "Czechoslovak" school which denied the separate historical development of Slovakia, or by the historians of the Slovak nationalist school who insisted on the independent political and cultural development of Slovakia . ...By publishing this edition, the Slovak World Congress has no other aim but to help acquaint Western readers with Slovakia and [its} rise to nationhood, and to contribute to the search for freedom and cooperation among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.44 Despite the Slovak World Congress' reputation as the leading late Cold War organization for Slovaks in the West, it was never completely successful in uniting the Slovak exiles. The Czechoslovakists and some of the moderate nationalists disavowed involvement because of the strong views of the Catholic autonomists, especially those with "unclean pasts.,,4s To accommodate the diversity of interests, the SWC comprised three factions regarding constitutional questions: federalization within Czechoslovakia, confederation, and independence. 46 On behalf of the Slovak diaspora, leader Roman had 42 Ibid. Ibid. 44 J.M . Kirschbaum, Slo vakia in the / 9th and 20th Centuries, 8. 45 Jozef Spetko, "Slovenska exilova a emigrantska politika v rokoch 1945-1989," Historicky casopis 39, no . 3 ( I99 I), 24 1-61: 256. 46 Ibid., 257-8. 43 �68 SLOVAK.IA 2019 wanted the organization to "speak as one voice and act according to a single plan" on behalf of the silenced Slovaks in the homeland. But achieving consensus among the exiles, especially about independence and resolution of the Slovak Question, was impossible from the very beginning of the SWC. 47 Nevertheless, the Slovak World Congress devised anti-communist propaganda campaigns, held scholarly conferences and cultural festivals , and even aided the protest movements in Slovakia in the 1980s.48 The organization collaborated with figures such as the Slovak-Canadian hockey player Marian St'astny and the Camogursky family-leading members of the organization-and even organized overseas protests to promote religious freedom in conjunction with the candlelight protests in Bratislava on March 25, 1988. In 1989, the Slovak World Congress officially supported the Velvet Revolution. However, "once the Communists surrendered power to Czech and Slovak dissidents ... the Slovak World Congress began to fracture ." 49 In the wake of the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the SWC organized visits and programs in Slovakia. But relations between the SWC and the post-communist Czechoslovak government quickly became strained, mostly over the issue of Slovak autonomy, which most, but not all, members of the Slovak World Congress still very much supported. 50 Within weeks of the revolution, Secretary-General of the SWC Dusan T6th, who had fled Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968, visited his family in Slovakia and appeared at some political rallies in the capital, Bratislava. The " intoxicated crowds" welcomed him warmly and "listened intently as he told them about the [Slovak 47 Ibid. , 255. M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-20/0) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 281-2. 49 Ibid., 287. The groups were the Civic Forum (Obcanske forum) and the Public Against Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu) in the Czech lands and Slovakia, respectively. 50 The Slovak World Congress began to decline after Roman's death in 1988, especially since he had bankrolled the organization. After the Velvet Divorce in I993, its functions declined even more, with its most notable achievement being to convince the U.S. and Slovak governments to allow dual citizenship. By 2000, the SWC was functionally gone. See Stolarik, Where ... , 279-95. 48 �SLOVAKIA 2019 69 World] Congress and its aspirations for freedom in Slovakia." 5 1 After all, the topic of political independence had been a taboo for forty years. For its part, the SWC tried to engage the Slovak government in talks about independence in early 1990, but Slovak politicians had more immediate concerns such as figuring out how to navigate the new political landscape. "Many were new politicians who faced the task of learning not only the art of political maneuvering, but above all that of public discourse in a democratic society. They were the ones who dealt with the issue of Czecho-Slovak relations which found resolution in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. " 52 The first post-communist elections in Slovakia were for representatives to the Slovak National Council. Although results of the voting in early June 1990 demonstrated the predictable rejection of Communism, they also " indicated that ' the Slovak question' was still on the political agenda. " 53 The biggest surprise was the third place finish for the Slovak National Party (Slovenska narodna strana orSNS), the only party with independence in its platform. "It is quite likely that one particular event preceding the election contributed to the [SNS ' s] success" in the parliamentary elections.54 Trouble began in March 1990 in the Federal Assembly in Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel, who had recently become the new president, was a vocal proponent of federalism and continuing the Czech union with Slovakia. The dispute started when Slovak politicians wanted to return to the original ( 1918-1920) way of writing the country's name: Czecho-Slovakia. Tensions grew when the Czechs agreed that Slovakia could do so, but neither the Czechs nor the federal government of Czechoslovakia would hyphenate. The "hyphen war" showed "how very different were the Czech and Slovak conceptions of their common state and brought into the open the need to reexamine the state of Czech-Slovak relations." 55 For the next two years, the discourse around that reexamination exposed ever more disparities and decades-old animosities . 51 Anne C.R. Roman, "Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too," Slovak Spectator, 29 November 1999, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20009411 /slovak-expats-remember1989-too.html. 52 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, 251-2. 53 Ibid., 255. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid . �70 SLOVAKIA 2019 Economic concerns took center stage, including the question of how quickly to move away from a socialist command economy to a capitalist market economy. While Slovaks feared a continuation of Prague centralism, including federal conduct and policies that favored Czech-and discounted Slovak- economic contributions, Czechs complained about subsidizing the Slovak economy. 56 The contrasting way the Slovaks and Czechs viewed this issue underscores some of the key reasons for their separation in 1993. One Czech-American historian argues that the peaceful separation of Czechs and Slovaks was a "necessity," based on their lack of "shared positive historical experience." 57 History and the "interplay of a series of factors" indeed influenced the breakup of Czechoslovakia. 58 Stanislav Kirschbaum suggests the root of the problem goes back to "the pursuit of [Slovak] national development in cooperation with the Czechs."59 From its inception in 1918 the "ultimate failure" of the Czechoslovak state was that it did not "provide an acceptable framework for Slovak national development," and despite all the benefits and progress, "the common state put Slovaks in a position of having to continue their struggle for survival." 60 In retrospect, the unraveling of Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s is not surprising; nor is the fact of its peaceful evolution. In the eyes of many Slovak exiles, the fall of Communism meant more than just getting rid of the Communists and returning to democracy. Indeed, " ... it was all of this plus home rule," commented M. Mark Stolarik, scholar and former president of the Canadian Slovak 56 S. Kirschbaum, 256-68. Igor Lukes, " Strangers in One House: Czechs and Slovaks, 1918-1992," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism/Revue Canadienne des Etudes sur le Nationalisme 27, 1-2 2000, 33-43 , 41 . 58 S. Kirschbaum, 270. The factors include the following: "The inability of the Czechoslovak state to solve certain social and constitutional problems since 1918; the legacy of the Communist regime; the adaptation crisis resulting from the passage of a single-party state to democratic pluralism ; the lack of experience of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution ; the absence of Czechoslovak parties in the postCommunist era; and the provision in the 1968 constitutional law that allowed Slovak deputies to block federal legislation that was not deemed to be in Slovakia's interest" so that the Slovaks could not be outvoted by the Czech majority." . 59 S. Kirschbaum, 270-71. 60 Ibid., 271. 57 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 71 League, on the tenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution.6 1 In the United States and Canada, Slovak exiles' experiences of democracy and freedom guided them forward before and after the toppling of the hardline communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 62 Their influence on politics in the homeland has yet to be clearly documented, but it is quite possible that Slovak exiles and their endeavor to keep alive the drive for the self-determination and political independence of the Slovak nation provided not only legitimacy in the West, but also moral and political encouragement to their homeland as the nation moved toward independence in the early 1990s. 61 A. Roman, " Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too." Francis D. Raska, Long Road to Victory: A History or Czechoslovak Exile Organizations after I 968 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 20 12). Raska concludes that the influence of exile groups in the fa ll of Communism in Czechoslovakia "was unquestionabl y positive," 172. 62 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 55 IMAGINING A SEP ARA TE SLOVAK.IA: ANTICOMMUNIST SLOVAK EXILES' STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT HOMELAND 1 Ellen L. Paul In January 1993, the principle of self-determination reigned supreme as the post-communist Czech and Slovak Federative Republic became Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In many ways, this peaceful separation was the logical outcome of decades of anti-communist Slovak emigre efforts. To be sure, Cold War exiles who left Czechoslovakia after 1945 and the February 1948 communist takeover had many disagreements amongst themselves, especially over leadership and direction of their numerous political organizations.2 Over time, however, many of the Slovak exile organizations arrived at some kind of consensus, and by the last two decades of the Cold War, the right of political self-determination provided Slovak emigres with a unifying theme. After all, in August 1968 when the Warsaw Pact armies quashed the Prague Spring, the Soviet Union brutally reminded the world of its firm control over Czechoslovakia. Yet, that event inspired two reasons for hope among Slovak exiles: l . the longpromised federalism of Czechoslovakia and 2. the creation in 1970 of a unifying new organization of Slovak exiles, the Slovak World Congress. As exiles in the free and democratic West, Cold War-era Slovak political exiles not only fought Soviet Communism and advocated for human rights in the homeland, they also defended the unique development of the Slovak nation in Central European history and informed the West about Slovakia, often refuting what many saw as misinformation spread by the Czechs. A recurring theme at the heart of the publications about Slovak history and culture was the dream of political independence for the Slovak nation. 1 A version of thi s paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Polish American Historical Association panel on 7 January 2017 in Denver, Colorado. 2 Igor Lukes, "Czechoslovak Political Ex ile in the Cold War: the earl y years," Polish Review 47 , no. 3 (2002): 332-43. 56 SLOVAKIA 2019 From the early 20 th century, Slovaks in the West became convinced that democracy and the ethnic principle of self-determination went hand-in-hand with political independence. A small group of Slovak exiles favored political union with their Czech neighbors, but others insisted on autonomy and even independence based on the ethnic principle of self-determination. Throughout the Cold War, the groups favoring independence consistently fought for a separate Slovak identity and "equal rights with the other free and democratic nations of Europe and the world." 3 In 1993, the fruit of their struggles resulted in the peaceful split of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Politically active Slovak exiles in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada can be roughly categorized into three basic groups. These categories are a helpful framework for understanding the issue of Slovak independence and especially the ways exiles aligned themselves in the early years of the Cold War. 1. Czechoslovakists: Slovaks who wanted a close union with the Czechs. 2. Federalists: moderate Slovak nationalists who pursued cooperation with the Czechs, but wanted recognition of a separate Slovak identity and political autonomy both for Slovakia and within the exile organizations. These included figures such as Stefan Osusky and Slovak Democratic Party members sent into exile after the communist coup in February 1948. 4 It is notable that the majority-but not all- of these first two groups came from Slovakia' s Lutheran minority. 3. Slovak autonomists : these Slovaks were decidedly nationalist and predominantly Catholic. They were also the most contentious. They supported Slovak independence, completely eschewing union with the Czechs-and rejecting the idea of a "Czechoslovak nation." They fled into exile right away in 1945, ahead of the Red Army and the returning Czechoslovak government. Among them were academics and journalists, such as historian Konstantin Culen, poet Mikulas Sprinc, and journalist Jozef 3 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, "Americki Slovaci a myslienka slovenskej samostatnosti," Kato/icky kalendar Jednota 87 (I 984), 177-84, 184. 4 The 1948 generation tended to be professionals or factory owners and, generally, among the most skilled and educated. In exile, many worked to resist Communism and return Czechoslovakia to democracy. SLOVAKIA 2019 57 Pauco. In addition, the group featured several politicians and diplomats from the wartime Slovak state, such as Jozef Kirschbaum, Karol Sidor, and Ferdinand Durcansky. The majority of Slovak autonomists migrated to Canada, with some gaining entry into the United States. Although exact membership figures are unknown, there were far more Slovak autonomist and federalist exile groups in North America. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the autonomist and federalist Slovak exiles. Over time their differences faded, especially after the failed Prague Spring reform movement in 1968. Another reason for this shift was that as post-war emigres died, a younger generation of autonomists and federalists gradually united in their goals for self-determination and political independence for Slovakia. In 1958, linguist and Franciscan priest, Bonaventure S. Bue, categorized Slovak emigres into only two groups, lumping the federalists and autonomists into, simply, the autonomists . He explained the rift between the Czechoslovakists and the autonomists with a question: "Are we Czechs or are we Slovaks? To this question the Czechoslovak would answer: I am a Czech; the Autonomist: I am a Slovak." 5 Bue continued " ... the majority of Slovaks have always felt and professed to be an ethnographically, historically, and culturally distinct nation from the Czechs" and suggested that by the late 1950s the Czechoslovakist versus autonomist conflict was " losing its original raison d 'etre."6 In large part that was because even the Slovaks who wished to preserve the state of Czecho-Slovakia by then had "abandoned the highly disputed fiction of the 'Czechoslovak nation"' and agreed on the distinctness of the Slovaks. 7 The remaining issue was about the best alliance or political form for the nation's survival. Many historians trace the ethnogenesis of the Slovak nation back to the Great Moravian Empire of the ninth century, largely based on oral accounts and the Christianizing and linguistic legacy of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Solid documentary evidence of Slovak linguistic uniqueness harks back to the 1700s, when the Catholic intelli5 B. S. Bue, "Conflicts of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no . 2 ( 1958), 1-1 7: 7 and 16. 6 Bue, 15. 7 Buc,16-17. 58 SLOVAK.IA 2019 gentsia in northern Hungary first suggested a separate identity for the Slovak language-as opposed to a Czech or Czechoslovak language. To them, it no longer made sense to use the more developed Czech language, and so Catholic clergy began writing in the Slovak vernacular even though the majority culture was distinctly Magyar. 8 In the 19 th century, language became "the center of the new national idea," but this was not enough to create a national identity for the Slovaks, who were under increasing pressure to assimi late to Magyar language and culture. In The Slovak National Awakening ( 1976), Peter Brock explains that as the intelligentsia began to promote the Slovak language and nation, and shift from using the Czech language, ideas about political unity with the Czechs also faded. 9 In 1848, I.',udovit Stur and other young Protestant intellectuals formed a short-lived Slavonic nation of their own, but thereafter the process of creating a Slovak political nation was interrupted by Magyarization, which meant the imposition of Magyar culture and language on young intellectuals in the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary. The impetus to assert a separate Slovak identity with a language that was neither Czech nor Magyar had been well under way by the 1840s, involved both Catholics and Protestants, and was an important step toward declaring a distinct Slovak national identity. Toward that end, in the early 1860s the Matica slovenska (Slovak Cultural Institute) was founded to aid the continuing development of Slovak literature and culture. A political merger between Czechs and Slovaks came in 1918 following the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the calamity of the First World War, but that union was not predestined. Despite their linguistic similarities and geographical proximity, Czechs and Slovaks had very different histories and cultural influences. For hundreds of years, the Czech lands were part of the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by the House of Habsburg, and much influenced by German culture and the Reformation (and the Czech reformer Jan Hus). During that time, the Kingdom of Hungary ruled over the Slovak 8 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia-a Playground for Nationalism and National Identity: Manifestations of National identity of the Slo vaks 191 8-1920, Biblioteca Historica 42 (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999), 9-10, and Peter Brock, The Slovak National Awakening (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 1837 and 53-4. 9 Brock, 7 & 20-37 . SLOVAKIA 2019 59 lands, inside the boundaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. While both small nations struggled against strong neighbors, their nineteenth century trajectories to national awakening and political agency were distinctly different. Firstly, the Slovak lands remained largely agricultural while the Czech lands underwent industrialization. Secondly, the Czechs achieved some successes in gaining cultural and linguistic rights at home and a measure of political representation in Vienna. Whereas to the east, the Slovaks faced increasing Magyarization and the loss of their culture. Since the tenth century, the lands of Slovakia had been ruled by foreigners and what had kept the Slovaks from assimilating, disappearing, or dispersing were "language, geography, and tradition ." 10 Not surprisingly, these vastly divergent experiences dramatically shaped the outlook and soul of each nation. Although Slovak culture was repressed in the homeland, the impact of the efforts of the Matica slovenska, Catholic clergy, and Slovak intelligentsia to keep Slovak language and culture alive became apparent by the late 19 th century, when notable numbers of emigres began arriving in the United States and identified themselves as Slovak. By the early twentieth century, the U.S.A. was home to the most influential Slovak diaspora. 11 In 1890, they established two important early exile organizations: the National Slovak Society and the First Catholic Slovak Union. In 1907, the Slovak League of America formed and united all Slovak groups in America. While based "on a wide platform of love for [the] Slovak nation," the Slovak League of America's mission at the time was to cast off the Hungarian tyrant ruling over Slovaks in the homeland. 12 Unity among exiles, however, became much harder to achieve after the dissolution of AustriaHungary during the First World War and particularly after the declaration of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. During World War I, politicians began deliberating the future of Central Europe. The most important negotiations regarding Czechoslovak statehood took place in North America among representatives of both the Czechs and Slovaks. The Czechs knew that Slovak par10 Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 37-8. 11 Jozef Pauco, " Slovaks Abroad and their Relationship with Slovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 2 nd edition, ed. Jozef M. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1978), 415-24, 415. 12 Ibid., 417. 60 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ticipation was vital to their cause. With that knowledge, Slovaks were able to leverage some influence by demanding " recognition of an independent Slovak identity and Slovak political autonomy in exchange for their support." 13 Many Slovak exiles believed that "through their immigration to America ... they had helped preserve Slovak national identity" and that "American democracy provided them something they felt would prove beneficial" for Slovaks back home. 14 In the negotiations over Czechoslovakia and its constitution, the efforts of Slovak Stefan Osusky stand out. He worked closely with Tomas G. Masaryk for federalism and for Slovakia to be regarded "as an equal partner by the Czechs in the Czecho-Slovak state." 15 In 1918, the (First) Czechoslovak Republic was created with Masaryk as its president. Unfortunately, Masaryk- whose father was Slovak and mother was Moravian/Czech-did not believe the Slovaks to be a separate nation. In addition, "a fateful ambiguity crept into the very first political statement published by independent Slovak politicians, the Slovak National Council. .. " which although declaring Slovakia a "nation," also suggested Slovak as a "branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation ." 16 The confusion resulted in "misunderstandings, confused government policies, enmity, and even tragedy .. .. [And] politically, it led to all sorts of excesses, including Czech chauvinism and Slovak Czechophobia." 17 The final documents of the new combined state referred only to the "Czechoslovaks" and completely omitted any mention of autonomy for Slovakia. 13 Michael R. Cude, "The Imagined Exiles : Slovak-Ameri cans and the Slovak Question during the First Czechoslovak Republi c," in From Exsilium to Exile: Coercion in Migration, Studia Historica Gedanensia, vol. 5, ed . Anna Mazurkiewicz (Gdansk : University of Gdansk Historical Institute, 2014), 287-305 , 287. 14 Cude writes that Slovak exi les viewed "their experi ence in America" as proof "that the Slovaks could very much develop independently and did not need the strict oversight of the Czechs. As such , the Slovak-American activ ists gradually adopted a role as an 'ex iled' national voice aga inst Prague centra lism," 298 . 15 Joseph A. Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in th e l <J'h and 2dh Centuries, 97-100, 97 . 16 Peter Petro, A History of Slovak Literature, Montreal [Que.] : MQUP, 1995. Ebook Collection (EBSCO host), EBSCOhost (accessed 29 Nov. 2016), 13 1. 17 Petro, 131. SLOVAKIA 2019 61 In dismissing the wishes of Slovak nationalists in America, and subsequently in Slovakia as well, Masaryk and his supporters were putting the new Republic into j eopardy. The various Czech-dominated governments that ruled the new Republic recruited Slovaks of the 'Czechoslovak ' persuasion (largely Lutherans) to join their ruling coalition. American Czechoslovaks approved of this arrangement. .. . Slovak nationalists, however, were left out in the cold. 18 The centralism 19 of the government in Prague during the First Czechoslovak Republic can be viewed as helping continue the defensive nature of the Slovak national movement, which had begun under the duress of Magyarization. 2° For example, Slovaks seldom felt like equal partners in the new state. Even though in 1918 "the very real existential problems caused by the attempted liquidation of Slovak culture through Magyarization [had] disappeared ... the positive aspect of this momentous change for liberated Slovak culture was somewhat tempered by a paternalistic attitude emanating from Prague." But it was not "always ill-meant and unjustified; from Prague also came tremendous support and help, particularly in the cultural and educational fields ." 21 The perception of inequality, however, became consequential in the late 1930s, when Czechoslovakia found itself under the heel of Nazi Germany. On 14 March 1939, several months after the Munich Pact gave Nazi Germany control over the Sudetenland (in a failed exchange for peace), Catholic Slovak leaders declared the Slovak Republic, albeit under Nazi influence. Six years later, the first Slovak state came to an end. The short-lived, authoritarian Slovak state caused much conflict among exiles in the early post-war years. Among the Catholic autonomists, the Slovak Republic inspired nostalgia and resolve to continue the fight for political independence. But the federalist and Czech18 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," Drustvena istrazivanja [Journal fo r General Social Issues ] 7, no. 1-2 (1998), 75-88, 78. 19 In Czechoslovakia, "centralism" refers to the concentration of political power in the capital, Prague. It often operated in opposition to regional desires for decentralization, self-administration, and autonomy. 20 Nurmi , 18 I. 21 Petro, 13 1. 62 SLOVAKIA 2019 oslovakist Slovak exiles generally condemned that group as, among other things, undemocratic.22 In turn, the Catholic autonomists condemned the federalists as having sold out the Slovaks to communist oppression after the war. The Catholic autonomists defended the wartime Slovak state as a rational decision done for national survival, as "the only way out under the given political circumstances" of Czechoslovakia having fallen under the rule of Nazi German~, and "as the logical conclusion of their former national endeavors." 3 Although controversial and brief, this experiment in political independence gave the Slovaks a new and lasting sense of worthiness among nations. While Masaryk had been a disappointment to many Slovaks, post-war Slovak emigres- autonomists and federalists alike-expressly despised the second Czechoslovak president and wartime leader of the Czechoslovak government-in-exi le in London, Edvard Benes (1935-38 & 1939-48). In a variety of publications during and after World War II, (federalist) politician Stefan Osusky blamed Benes for the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 and for the postwar subjugation of Czecho-Slovakia by the Soviet Union. Former diplomat and historian Joseph A. Mikus (an autonomist) voiced similarly strong views of Benes, holding him responsible not only for the communist takeover in 1948 but also for the failure of the reform movement under Alexander Dubcek in 1968. 24 In general, the Slovak 22 Petro writes "The backlash that led to the super-nationalism of some writers during the existence of the Slovak Republic can be ascribed not to some inbred propensity for political extremism, but to a desperate desire for national self-assertion," 131 -32. 23 B.S. Bue, " Federative Tendencies of Slovak Nationalism," Slovakia 8, no. 3 ( 1958), 25-32, 30. "The short-lived existence of this independent state gave to Slovak nationalism what it had hitherto lacked, namely, a uniform will to live independently and a conviction that it will know how to stand its ground as an equally worthy member among the other nations." 24 Mikus, "Comments," in Slovakia in the 19th and 2dh Centuries, 400-405 . In response to a presentation by Kurt Glaser regarding the question of national states and federali sm in Central Europe, Mikus argued "The record of Czechoslovakia is particularly sad, since during World War II Benes had laid the comer-stone of his foreign policy out of collaboration with the Soviet Union, a non-Western and communist power. The guilt complex resulting from [Benes's] 1945 solution of the Sudeten German problem threw him into the arms of the Soviet Union . That embrace became so strong that [Alexander] Dubcek's effort to extricate Czecho- SLOVAKIA 2019 63 exiles with close ties to the Catholic Slovak Republic felt particularly snubbed by Czechoslovakia's wartime representatives in London and Washington. Slovak politician, diplomat, and later prolific scholar Jozef M. Kirschbaum was unflinching both in his support for Slovak independence and in his criticism of the Czechs: "Unfortunately, Western diplomats displayed little understanding for the aspirations of the Slovak people and mostly adhered to the concept of the Czech exiled politicians" led by Benes. 25 In the late 1940s and early '50s, Slovak exile groups contacted a variety of governmental offices in the U.S. and Canada requesting freedom from Soviet domination and independence for Slovakia. 26 Bitterness and rivalries among the groups, however, limited their impact. 27 Ever since the declaration of Czechoslovakia in 1918, Slovak exiles had embraced the mission of speaking on behalf of the silenced Slovak people back home in Czechoslovakia. They resumed that role after World War II as Slovak exiles reacted to the "rigid centralism" imposed by the post-war Czechoslovak regime. In addition, Slovak exiles in the West were troubled by the ruthlessness of the Stalinist system, with its "political and religious persecution, economic discrimination, and prohibition of contacts with Western countries." 28 So, American and Canadian Slovaks responded to the new status quo by resuming their role as "interpreters of the aspirations of the Slovak people for freedom, democracy, and independence." 29 With a renewed sense of hope, a few dozen post-war exiles took up the challenge of informing the world about Slovakia and " .. .published hundreds of books and articles about the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks. [In the process, they] helped keep the 'Slovak cause ' in the public eye, as well as give it some credence in Slovakia from it was in vain. The occupation of Czecho-Slovakia has its roots in that fitiful pactomania of Benes with Moscow," 403. 5 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Diplomatic and Consular Relations of Slovakia with Neutral States," Slovakia 23 , 46 ( 1973), 111-22, 119. 26 Pauco, 423. 27 Stolarik, "The Role of Slovak Emigres in North America in the Emancipation of the Slovak Nation," 82 . 28 J.M. Kirschbaum, " Slovaks Abroad and their Role in Slovakia 's Struggle for Freedom," Slovakia 24, 47 (1974), 63-6, 63-4. 29 Ibid. 63-4. 64 SLOVAKIA 2019 the academic and intellectual circles in North America."30 One important publication with that goal was the academic journal, Slovakia, edited by Filip A. Hrobak and first published in 1951. The journal's purpose was twofold: to defend Slovak political rights and to publicize Slovak national and cultural activities.31 After 26 years as editor of the journal, the Slovak League of America lauded Hrobak as a defender of "the sacred cause of Slovak national freedom. " 32 Exiled Slovaks seldom agreed on what exactly comprised the Slovak cause but many believed that the West would be receptive to their homeland 's plight. The Slovak Question (i.e. rights to autonomy, self-determination, statehood, etc .) continually caused tension, especially among exile organizations consisting of both Czechs and Slovaks. One of the most influential of those, created one year after the communist coup of February 1948, was the Council of Free Czechoslovakia (CFC). The U.S. government relied on the Council for policy advice, but to the Slovaks' dismay Washington paid little attention to the Slovak Question. 33 The many feuds over Slovak autonomy led Slovaks such as Stefan Osusky to demand separate recognition in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and parity in its leadership . However, achieving an equal voice in that organization 34 took over twenty years. In 1948 the Slovak National Council Abroad was founded by Karol Sidor, Jozef Kirschbaum, Peter Privdavok, and Konstantin Culen. The Slovak Leagues of America and Canada recognized the Slovak National Council as the representative body of Slovak politi30 M. Mark Stolarik, "Slovak Historians in Exile in North America, 1945- 1992," Human Affairs 6, no. I ( 1996), 34-44, 34. 31 Pauco, 422 32 Joseph C. Krajsa, ed., "First Catholic Slovak Union (Jednota) of the U.S. and Canada," in Slovaks in America: A Bicentennial Study (M iddletown, PA : Slovak League of America, 1978), IO 1-68, 128. 33 Michael R. Cude, Transatlantic Perspectives on th e Slo vak Question, /914-1948 (PhD Diss., Univers ity of Colorado-Boulder, 20 13) and Cude, "The Imagined Exiles." 34 The first reconciliation in 1952 attempted to address this issue by givi ng the Slovaks separate recognition with separate votes on programs within the CFC. In 1960, the moderate nationalists in the Council formed the Permanent Confe rence of Slovak Democratic Exiles and formally split from the CFC to join with other Czech dissenters to form the Committee of Free Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakists remained invo lved in the Counci l, and as part of its 1973 reorgani zation, the CFC established Czech-Slovak parity in its leadership. SLOVAK.IA 2019 65 cal exiles. 35 Another exile group also promoted the nationalist cause. The Slovak Liberation Committee, led by Ferdinand Durcansly and others, defended "the right of self-determination for the Slovak nation." 36 Additionally, many smaller organizations and societies from Australia to Buenos Aires promoted the idea of political independence for Slovakia. 37 The inability of the various organizations to unite, however, hampered their overall impact on Western policy and understanding, especially in the first two and a half decades after the war . . The Prague Spring of 1968 was a turning point for many of the squabbling exiles. In the wake of the failed reform movement, thousands of the disappointed migrated out of Czechoslovakia. The newcomers were received with skepticism, and although there was little that unified Slovak emigres after 1968, Frantisek Braxator suggested that a common ideological platform might be that no compromise with Communism was possible, "human face" or otherwise. He reassuringly concluded that nobody wanted to resurrect the authoritarian wartime state. 38 In many ways, the diversity and energy of the new exiles added much to the cause of Slovak emigres in the West. Indeed, there is evidence that the last two decades of exile activity were more productive than the early decades of the Cold War. By then the political goals of Slovak-Americans and Slovak-Canadians were generally two-fold: continue heritage preservation and call attention in the West to the persecution of Slovaks under communist rule in Czechoslovakia. 39 After the Soviet invasion, the thousands of Prague Spring arrivals to North America and the earlier post-war political exiles from Slovakia, more than ever before, were able to find common purpose, even unity, in their identity as Slovaks. The unprecedented unity came in large part from a new umbrella organization, the Slovak World Congress (Svetovy kongres Slovakov), 35 Pauco, 423. Ibid. Some of the others included Stefan Polakovic, Alojz Macek, and Stanislav Meciar. 37 Ibid., 423-4. 38 Frantisek Braxator, " Slovaks Abroad and Their Relationship to Czechoslovakia," in Slovakia in th e 19th and 20'" Centuries, 425-33. He concluded that "there was "definitely no support for the idea that the majority of this emigration regards aid to Slovakia as taking the form of an effort to revive the Slovak Republic of 1939 to 1945 " 432 39 Kr;jsa, "First Catholic Slovak Union," in Slovaks in America, l O1-68, 126. 36 66 SLOVAKIA 2019 founded in New York in June 1970. Between 1970 and 1989, the SWC brought together Slovak organizations from North and South America, Western Europe, and Oceania. It absorbed a wide variety of emigre Slovak organizations and individuals, from Catholics and Lutherans to a range of political figures , from the federalist-leaning Stefan Osusky to the ardent nationalist Ferdinand Durcansky. Leadership of the Slovak World Congress encompassed the diversity of Slovaks in exile as well. In addition to the old-guard leaders, 1968generation Slovak exiles such as the Lutheran pastor Dusan T6th and the Jewish ex-communist Eugen Lob! held high positions in the organization. The SWC aimed to resist Communism in the name of democracy, religious freedom , and the principle of self-determination, specifically meaning self-rule and political independence. In 1973, the Slovak World Congress published symposium proceedings to inform and update the West about Slovaks and their long history in Central Europe. Many contributors thought that too few histories of Europe had appreciated the Slovaks' ninth-century state organization. Furthermore, they had neglected to mention Slovak contributions to Slavic civi lizations, such as by Saints Cyril and Methodius. Slovak World Congress organizers were also concerned that when Slovak history was presented, it was "in a distorted light." 40 Founder and benefactor Stephen B. Roman noted the unith th queness of the symposium and resulting book on 19 and 20 century Slovak history: [A} fl the authors, including those of non-Slovak origin, subscribe to the thesis that the Slovaks developed through the centuries into a distin ct Central European nation, and that their language, literature and culture also developed independently of other Slavic nations. From this premise, the right to selfdetermination and equality of rights for the Slovak people be41 came a logical conclusion for all contributors. The Slovak World Congress' mission was to represent "the cultural, social, and political aspirations of the Slovak people in the Western hemisphere" and to "contribute to the search for historical 40 41 Stephen B. Roman, "Preface," Slovakia in th e 19th and 20th Centuries, 5. Roman, " Preface," 6. SLOVAKIA 2019 67 truth about the Slovaks and thereby to help bring about better understanding and cooperation among the nations of Central Europe."42 Founder Roman declared that the SWC strongly believed "that peoples of that vital area" could "regain their political freedom and build their future through close cooperation and the recognition by each of the equal rights to independence of the others."43 Notably, the Slovak World Congress claimed to work toward freedom and independence not only for Slovakia but for other small European nations as well. In 1978 in the "Introduction to the Second Edition" of the Slovak World Congress proceedings, Slovakia in the 1911' and 20th Centuries, editor Joseph M. Kirschbaum further emphasized the balanced and informational nature of the volume: Until very recently Slovak history was presented to the West either by the adherents of the "Czechoslovak" school which denied the separate historical development of Slovakia, or by the historians of the Slovak nationalist school who insisted on the independent political and cultural development of Slovakia . ...By publishing this edition, the Slovak World Congress has no other aim but to help acquaint Western readers with Slovakia and [its} rise to nationhood, and to contribute to the search for freedom and cooperation among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.44 Despite the Slovak World Congress' reputation as the leading late Cold War organization for Slovaks in the West, it was never completely successful in uniting the Slovak exiles. The Czechoslovakists and some of the moderate nationalists disavowed involvement because of the strong views of the Catholic autonomists, especially those with "unclean pasts.,,4s To accommodate the diversity of interests, the SWC comprised three factions regarding constitutional questions: federalization within Czechoslovakia, confederation, and independence. 46 On behalf of the Slovak diaspora, leader Roman had 42 Ibid. Ibid. 44 J.M . Kirschbaum, Slo vakia in the / 9th and 20th Centuries, 8. 45 Jozef Spetko, "Slovenska exilova a emigrantska politika v rokoch 1945-1989," Historicky casopis 39, no . 3 ( I99 I), 24 1-61: 256. 46 Ibid., 257-8. 43 68 SLOVAK.IA 2019 wanted the organization to "speak as one voice and act according to a single plan" on behalf of the silenced Slovaks in the homeland. But achieving consensus among the exiles, especially about independence and resolution of the Slovak Question, was impossible from the very beginning of the SWC. 47 Nevertheless, the Slovak World Congress devised anti-communist propaganda campaigns, held scholarly conferences and cultural festivals , and even aided the protest movements in Slovakia in the 1980s.48 The organization collaborated with figures such as the Slovak-Canadian hockey player Marian St'astny and the Camogursky family-leading members of the organization-and even organized overseas protests to promote religious freedom in conjunction with the candlelight protests in Bratislava on March 25, 1988. In 1989, the Slovak World Congress officially supported the Velvet Revolution. However, "once the Communists surrendered power to Czech and Slovak dissidents ... the Slovak World Congress began to fracture ." 49 In the wake of the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the SWC organized visits and programs in Slovakia. But relations between the SWC and the post-communist Czechoslovak government quickly became strained, mostly over the issue of Slovak autonomy, which most, but not all, members of the Slovak World Congress still very much supported. 50 Within weeks of the revolution, Secretary-General of the SWC Dusan T6th, who had fled Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968, visited his family in Slovakia and appeared at some political rallies in the capital, Bratislava. The " intoxicated crowds" welcomed him warmly and "listened intently as he told them about the [Slovak 47 Ibid. , 255. M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (/870-20/0) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012), 281-2. 49 Ibid., 287. The groups were the Civic Forum (Obcanske forum) and the Public Against Violence (Verejnost' proti nasiliu) in the Czech lands and Slovakia, respectively. 50 The Slovak World Congress began to decline after Roman's death in 1988, especially since he had bankrolled the organization. After the Velvet Divorce in I993, its functions declined even more, with its most notable achievement being to convince the U.S. and Slovak governments to allow dual citizenship. By 2000, the SWC was functionally gone. See Stolarik, Where ... , 279-95. 48 SLOVAKIA 2019 69 World] Congress and its aspirations for freedom in Slovakia." 5 1 After all, the topic of political independence had been a taboo for forty years. For its part, the SWC tried to engage the Slovak government in talks about independence in early 1990, but Slovak politicians had more immediate concerns such as figuring out how to navigate the new political landscape. "Many were new politicians who faced the task of learning not only the art of political maneuvering, but above all that of public discourse in a democratic society. They were the ones who dealt with the issue of Czecho-Slovak relations which found resolution in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. " 52 The first post-communist elections in Slovakia were for representatives to the Slovak National Council. Although results of the voting in early June 1990 demonstrated the predictable rejection of Communism, they also " indicated that ' the Slovak question' was still on the political agenda. " 53 The biggest surprise was the third place finish for the Slovak National Party (Slovenska narodna strana orSNS), the only party with independence in its platform. "It is quite likely that one particular event preceding the election contributed to the [SNS ' s] success" in the parliamentary elections.54 Trouble began in March 1990 in the Federal Assembly in Czechoslovakia. Vaclav Havel, who had recently become the new president, was a vocal proponent of federalism and continuing the Czech union with Slovakia. The dispute started when Slovak politicians wanted to return to the original ( 1918-1920) way of writing the country's name: Czecho-Slovakia. Tensions grew when the Czechs agreed that Slovakia could do so, but neither the Czechs nor the federal government of Czechoslovakia would hyphenate. The "hyphen war" showed "how very different were the Czech and Slovak conceptions of their common state and brought into the open the need to reexamine the state of Czech-Slovak relations." 55 For the next two years, the discourse around that reexamination exposed ever more disparities and decades-old animosities . 51 Anne C.R. Roman, "Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too," Slovak Spectator, 29 November 1999, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20009411 /slovak-expats-remember1989-too.html. 52 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, 251-2. 53 Ibid., 255. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid . 70 SLOVAKIA 2019 Economic concerns took center stage, including the question of how quickly to move away from a socialist command economy to a capitalist market economy. While Slovaks feared a continuation of Prague centralism, including federal conduct and policies that favored Czech-and discounted Slovak- economic contributions, Czechs complained about subsidizing the Slovak economy. 56 The contrasting way the Slovaks and Czechs viewed this issue underscores some of the key reasons for their separation in 1993. One Czech-American historian argues that the peaceful separation of Czechs and Slovaks was a "necessity," based on their lack of "shared positive historical experience." 57 History and the "interplay of a series of factors" indeed influenced the breakup of Czechoslovakia. 58 Stanislav Kirschbaum suggests the root of the problem goes back to "the pursuit of [Slovak] national development in cooperation with the Czechs."59 From its inception in 1918 the "ultimate failure" of the Czechoslovak state was that it did not "provide an acceptable framework for Slovak national development," and despite all the benefits and progress, "the common state put Slovaks in a position of having to continue their struggle for survival." 60 In retrospect, the unraveling of Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s is not surprising; nor is the fact of its peaceful evolution. In the eyes of many Slovak exiles, the fall of Communism meant more than just getting rid of the Communists and returning to democracy. Indeed, " ... it was all of this plus home rule," commented M. Mark Stolarik, scholar and former president of the Canadian Slovak 56 S. Kirschbaum, 256-68. Igor Lukes, " Strangers in One House: Czechs and Slovaks, 1918-1992," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism/Revue Canadienne des Etudes sur le Nationalisme 27, 1-2 2000, 33-43 , 41 . 58 S. Kirschbaum, 270. The factors include the following: "The inability of the Czechoslovak state to solve certain social and constitutional problems since 1918; the legacy of the Communist regime; the adaptation crisis resulting from the passage of a single-party state to democratic pluralism ; the lack of experience of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution ; the absence of Czechoslovak parties in the postCommunist era; and the provision in the 1968 constitutional law that allowed Slovak deputies to block federal legislation that was not deemed to be in Slovakia's interest" so that the Slovaks could not be outvoted by the Czech majority." . 59 S. Kirschbaum, 270-71. 60 Ibid., 271. 57 SLOVAK.IA 2019 71 League, on the tenth anniversary of the Velvet Revolution.6 1 In the United States and Canada, Slovak exiles' experiences of democracy and freedom guided them forward before and after the toppling of the hardline communist regime in Czechoslovakia. 62 Their influence on politics in the homeland has yet to be clearly documented, but it is quite possible that Slovak exiles and their endeavor to keep alive the drive for the self-determination and political independence of the Slovak nation provided not only legitimacy in the West, but also moral and political encouragement to their homeland as the nation moved toward independence in the early 1990s. 61 A. Roman, " Slovak Expats Remember 1989, too." Francis D. Raska, Long Road to Victory: A History or Czechoslovak Exile Organizations after I 968 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 20 12). Raska concludes that the influence of exile groups in the fa ll of Communism in Czechoslovakia "was unquestionabl y positive," 172. 62  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Imagining a Separate Slovakia: Anti-Communist Slovak Exiles' Struggle for an Independent Homeland Description An account of the resource Ellen L. Paul Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 55-71 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paul, Ellen L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/43238533a84c77e42113ebf07f3426a1.pdf ef777dbe49c69f4a4bc73ef517c5cad9 PDF Text Text 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . �SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 �74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 �SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 �76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. �78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 �SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. �80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 �82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 . � 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . �SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 �74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 �SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 �76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. �78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 �SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. �80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 �82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 72 SLOVAKIA 2019 SLOVAK EMIGRES IN THE REPORTS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ACTIONS AGAINST FERDINAND DURCANSKY AND JOZEF KIRSCHBAUM (1961-1966/68) Petr Kubik Large quantities of material concerning the Slovak post-war emigration have been preserved in the archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague and are now available to researchers. The post-war Czechoslovak government and foreign offices all over the world followed the activities of various exile leaders and organizations regardless of what country they lived in. Two of these emigre groups were closely watched by the new leaders in power si nce the summer of 1945 - the (Czech General Lev) Prchala Group and Slovak "separatists."' This led to a paradox - often those who were actively involved in following and reporting on the exile leaders between 1945-4 7 went into exile themselves in the spring of 1948. These new exiles would also be followed by their communist successors in the Czechoslovak embassies. 2 It is interesting to compare the state and quality of the different archival materials according to the countries covered. The most informative collections concern the emigres in North and South America. Unlike Australia, where there was little information regarding exiles, the Czechoslovak authorities in Argentina, Canada and USA mapped the situation in a very thorough manner. Regarding Europe, many materials were preserved on Italy (Rome and the Vatican), some in Germany but only scant information from other countries such as France, Switzerland, Austria, Great Britain and Spain. In the present study, using archival materials, I would like to de- 1 The Prchala Group were Czech anti-Benes and anti-Communists, led by General Lev Prchala. They were forbidden to return to their homeland, which was ruled by Benes and the Communists. Slovak "separatists" were supporters of Slovak inderendence, a name given to them by Czechoslovak propaganda. E.g. Vladimir Vanek, Jan Pauliny-T6th (Rome), Frantisek Schwarzenberg (the Vatican), Frantisek Nemec (Ottawa) and Josef Kotrly (Montreal) . SLOVAKIA 2019 73 scribe how the Czechoslovak authorities in the l 960's took major actions against key Slovak figures in exile. In Canada it was against Dr. Jozef Kirschbaum, former Secretary-General of the Slovak People 's Party in 1939-1940 and in Germany it was against Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 1939-1940. For administrative reasons Durcansky and the former leader of the German ethnic group in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin, were treated together in the Prague archives. Actions Against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin During 1961-1968 On I 6/02/ 196 I the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (UV KSC) adopted a resolution to prepare and execute a campaign against Ferdinand Durcansky and Franz Karmasin. This was a part of the ongoing campaign against "the West German Revanchists" by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry charged Karmasin with being "a war criminal," and Durcansky, who also lived in Germany, "the leader of the Slovak fascist emigration." Writing a propaganda brochure about "the fascist activities" of the two aforementioned leaders was assigned to Slovak regime historians -- Cubomir Liptak of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (HU SA V) and Lieutenant Colonel Navratil from the Military History Institute (VHU), both in Bratislava. On 02/ 11/1961 Liptak and Navratil went to Prague 's office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss and finalize some details for their publication, Ve znameni dvou kfizu (In the Sign of the Double Cross). 3 The secret propaganda materials were completed in the winter of 196 1/1962. 3,000 vo lumes of the publication In the Sign of the Double Cross were printed in German, with a planned distribution in Germany and other Western countries . The Czech News Agency (CTK) planned a series of propaganda activities supporting the work by Navratil and Liptak. The Czechoslovak Military Film Institute produced a 25-minute documentary concerning mainl y Franz Karmasi n. During this time, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Justice was 3 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, fi le 033964/61 -3 74 SLOVAKIA 2019 preparing extradition requests for Durcansky and Karmasin, although their officers didn ' t believe that they would be successful. In addition, the Regional Court of Bratislava issued new arrest warrants for 4 Durcansky ( on 15/02/1962) and Karmas in (on 14/05/ 1962). In the spring of 1962, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foregin Affairs presented extradition papers regarding Durcansky and Karmasin to the Embassy of the USA in Prague, because the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did not have diplomatic relations.5 This took place publicly on 29/05/ l 962 with the official transmission of the diplomatic note to the government of the FRG via the American embassy. There was no response from the FRG. It was a conscious decision of the German authorities not to respond to this Czechoslovak provocation . Next, the Prague regime appealed to the Austrian authorities - the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna issued an arrest warrant for Durcansky to the Austrian authorities . Despite Czechoslovak insistence on the extradition of Durcansky (a notice written on 22/ 12/ 1962), 6 there was no reaction. In the summer of 1963 , there was still no response from either German or Austrian authorities. Durcansky maintained his activities, even to the extent that he presided at the meeting of the GermanSlovak Society in Munich, held on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Slovak State on 13/03/ l 963. On the occasion of the Sudetenland Day on 3/6/ 1963, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs started a new action with the goal of transmitting new diplomatic notes regarding the arrest of Durcansky to all Western countries. They transmitted again another urgent diplomatic note to the FRG government through the American embassy in Prague.7 On 10/08/ 1965 a Czechoslovak diplomatic note, focusing on Karmasin, 8 was finally transmitted to the American embassy, which passed it on to the German Foreign Office on 23/08/1965. On 4 Ibid, file 0 16696/62-80. In the present study the designation Federal Republic of Germany is used for the West Germany. 6 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 0 16696/62-80. 7 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box NSR 2, file 025560/63 . 8 Ibid, file 02648 1/65-3 . No justification for this delay is mentioned in the documents. 5 SLOVAKIA 2019 75 07 /0 l/ 1966 the German Office responded categorically in the negative to the request regarding the extradition. The reason that the German authorities gave was because of the German Constitutional Basic Law and the Extradition Law, with Karmasin being a citizen of Germany and Durcansky being only involved in political activities. 9 The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs then decided to transmit the matter to the Czechoslovak Governmental Commission Charged with Identifying Nazi War Criminals, which was not successful. This Commission was in session on 14/05/1966 and it insisted on the extradition request. They intended to continue publishing propaganda materials and also to requesting the assistance of the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office in investigating Karmasin. 10 The office of the Munich Public Prosecutor sent a letter to Prague on 29/5/1966, asking for more evidence against Karmasin, as the information they had was insufficient to bring charges against him. The Commission took its time and only on 10/ l l/ 1966 did it decide 11 to help the Munich investigation by collecting more evidence. During this time, the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a new note to the FRG Foreign Office via the US embassy on 10/ 10/1966, repeating the extradition request. It was rejected by the FRG Foreign Office on 11/7/ 196. It based its decision on the London Agreement of 08/08/ 1945 and the UN Resolution of 11/12/ 1946, that created no legal precedent for extraditing citizens. In response, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared another diplomatic note, attacking the FRG for this position and demanding the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin. Otherwise, the Czechoslovaks would refuse to help with the Karmasin process in Munich. The arrival of the Prague Spring in 1968 did not halt this action. Another diplomatic note was delivered to the US embassy on 05/04/ 1968, and during April of 1968 all the embassies of W estem countries and Yugoslavia were notified. 12 The Czechoslovak authorities continued other diplomatic measures against Durcansky. In September of 1968 they protested to the Austrian government against his stay in Austria and in October of 1968 they protested to the US authorities against his travel to the 9 Ibid, file 02230 I /66-4. Ibid, file 024471 /66-4 . 11 Ibid, file 120894/66-4 . 12 Ibid, file 120894/66-4. 10 76 SLOVAKIA 2019 USA . But the extradition issue was about to end. On 04/10/1968 Mr. Kastl , the head of the Department for Socialist Countries of the Bonn Freign Office, communicated to the Czechoslovak trade representative that he had prepared a negative response to the Czechoslovak diplomatic note from 05/04/1968 . He would not send it officially yet, due to the events of the Prague Spring of August of 1968. The Czechoslovak Commission for War Crimes stated, during their reunion on 05/ 11 / 1968, the impossibility of obtaining the extradition of Durcansky and Karmasin and communicated this information to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Prague Ministry had expected this to happen for some time. 13 The Action Against Jozef Kirschbaum in 1962-1965 At the beginning of the I 960's, the Czechoslovak authorities in Canada (the Embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Montreal) started to worry about the growing influence of Jozef Kirschbaum within the Canadian Slovak League, as well as with Canadian politicians in general. During this time Jozef Kirschbaum lectured at the University of Toronto . In December of 1961 Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker received Kirschbaum, as a member of the delegation of the Captive EuropeanNations, and on 08/02/1 962 Kirschbaum was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association. In addition, his friend and collaborator, the influential entrepreneur Stefan B. Roman , had many contacts with Canadian politicians, especially with Paul Martin, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs . The Czechoslovak authorities started a propaganda campaign against Kirschbaum with the aim of discreditng all Slovak emigres in Canada. On 26/0 I/ 1962 the Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal created an extensive document entitled Proposal for Executing the Action Against the Slovak Separatist, Professor Kirschbaum . They proposed to make use of the recent legal proceedings of Israel against the German war criminal Adolf Eichmann and raised the matter of possible other war criminals at large to the attention of the world. Furthermore, they planned to use the anti-Semitic measures taken by the government of Slovakia in 1939-1940 to slander 13 Ibid, file 11 7841 /68-6 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 77 Kirschbaum, one of the leading figures of the Slovak separatist emigres. It would be a huge political coup for Czechoslovak authorities to discredit Kirschbaum. They planned to proceed in several ways, with the Czechoslovak authorities remaining in the background: a) publish several articles against Kirschbaum in the Canadian procommunist Slovak newspaper Eudove zvesti, b) publish a book in English about Kirschbaum which was being prepared in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and disseminate it in Canada, especially among Jews, c) use the Czechoslovak socialist student organizations in Canada to tum students at the University of Toronto against Kirschbaum, and d) review the preparation of an extradition diplo14 matic note. At the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs two sessions regarding Kirschbaum were held in February of I 962 . On 19/2/ 1962 it was decided that the book would be changed in order to point out the "fascist activities" of Kirschbaum in 1939-1940, but without offending the Canadian government. They also examined the possibility of extraditing Kirschbaum. At the second session, held on 28/02/ l 962, the final plans were formulated. To prevent the action from looking like a political persecution of Kirschbaum by the communist authorities, all the accusations would be presented by the Jewish Community of Prague, without the official involvement of the Czechoslovak Embassy. All the arguments regarding Kirschbaum 's political activism against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would be deleted, but they would focus instead on the anti-Semitic measures of the Slovak State and its collaboration with Eichmann. The first part of the action would consist of sending a small book about Kirschbaum 's activities, printed in English and in French, to several places in Canada. At the beginning of April 1962, Comenius University in Bratislava would contact the University of Toronto and try to discredit Kirschbaum and obtain his dismissal. The second part of the action would come after three weeks of publishing a series of articles in Eudove zvesti, focused not only on Kirschbaum, but against the Slovak exiles in general. Once these actions were finished , an extradition request would be considered. 15 14 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada I, number 020/62-A . 15 Ibid, file 023325/62-6/ 1. 78 SLOVAKIA 2019 The text of the book that severely slandered Kirschbaum was modified many times during the spring of 1962. It contained many false statements and sheer nonsense, in line with the highest communist propaganda. The book stated that the "enraged fascist" Kirschbaum was responsible for the war against the USSR and the elimination of the political opponents of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSI.:S). With the approval of then Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach, Kirschbaum allegdly led the Slovak embassy in Rome and Bern and he was allegedly a close collaborator of Eichmann . The text was approved on 27 /03/ I 962 by the head of the 3rd department, a certain Mr. Mikestik, with the focus on Kirschbaum 's allegedly anti-Semitic actions. A few changes were approved by Lieutenant Colonel Fejlek from the VHU on 06/04/ 1962, to accentuate the alleged Kirschbaum connection to Eichmann. 16 On 20/04/1962 the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa that the action against Kirschbaum was almost complete . The di stribution of the books would start at the beginning of May, especially to Jewish organizations . The Embassy was asked to pick 30-40 people from the University of Toronto to distribute the book. Ottawa answered affirmatively on 02/05/1962, together with an item for Minister of Northern Affaires and National Resources Walter Dinsdale in the name of a Slovak cultural officer. According to the wishes of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Czechoslovak Council of Jewish Communities was invo lved in this action. The Council informed the Ministry about its actions on 14/06/ 1962. They published the article against Kirschbaum in their special edition of the Informationsbulletin des Rates der judischen Gemeinden in der bohmischen Liindern , which was published in English and German and sent to 479 addresses in Canada, the USA and other countries of the world. 17 In Canada a crucial article against Kirschbaum, entitled Th e Kirschbaum Enigma, was published in the The Canadian Jewish News . On 28/06/1962 the "progressive" Eudove zvesti and later the 16 ibid, files 023794/62-6/ 1, 024172/62 . Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, file 024907/62 and number 073 /62. 17 SLOVAKIA 2019 79 Czech weekly Nase hlasy joined in. 18 The Czechoslovak Consulate General in Montreal in its report about the Slovak emigration from 27/06/ 1962 reiterated the importance of accusing Kirschbaum as a helper of the Nazis, which would also weaken the position of Stefan B. Roman. 19 The slander campaign against Kirschbaum received a certain reaction in the Canadian press in the summer of 1962 and also provoked some disputes among the leaders of the Canadian Slovak League, which pleased the Czechoslovak authorities. However, the original aim to totally discredit Kirschbaum was not achieved. 20 Kirschbaum defended himself in the press, the American-Canadian Committee for the Defense of Slovak Honour was founded to support him, and Stefan B. Roman supported him as well. Kirschbaum successfully sued The Canadian Jewish News in June of 1963 and the newspaper apologized, publishing "Our Sincere Statement to Dr. Kirschbaum." 21 The publishing of this apology was explained by a letter of 06/08/ 1963, written by a Jewish functionary from Toronto, Herman Landau, who sent it to the Czechoslovak Council for Jewish Communities in Prague. The editor-in-chief, Mr. Niiremberger, was obliged to publish the apology, because he faced a million dollar fine and he would have no witnesses to prove the anti-Kirschbaum statements before a court. Without a living witness, there was no chance to prove before the court the alleged encounter between Kirschbaum and Eichmann. The existing testimony of Dr. Jozef Falath from Austria had no value, since Falath had since changed his mind and was 18 The pro-Czechoslovak newspaper Nase hlasy attacked Kirschbaum already in the spring of 1962, after he was elected vice-president of the Canadian Ethnic Press Association . He was accused of helping the German Nazis in Slovakia. 19 Archives MZV Prague, f. Political reports, box Kanada-Montreal 1948-1973, number 079/62. 20 The secretary of the Canadian Slovak League, Frantisek Kvetan, who often disagreed with Kirschbaum and Roman, welcomed the Jewish critiques of Kirschbaum and refused to apologize, even after the failure of the slander campaign . The issue wasn ' t resolved until 1965 when Kvetan resigned his position. The Czechoslovak authorities followed this issue, which can be shown in the report "Conflicts in the Direction of the Canadian Slovak League", 20/3/ 1965 - Po litical Reports Kanada, Montreal 1948-1973 , number 026/65 . 21 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 80 SLOVAKIA 2019 22 now willing to testify on behalf of Kirschbaum. The festivities of the 1100th anniversary of the arrival of Saints Cyril and Methodius on Slovak territory, held in Toronto on 2930/06/1963 , and attemded by 15,000 people, infuriated the Czechoslovak authorities. Paul Martin, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs , took part in these festivities and severely condemned Communi sm and supported the liberation of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. This provoked an official Czechoslovak protest to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs . Martin, together with Roman , also publicly met with Kirschbaum and expressed their confidence in him. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Ottawa considered this a provocation and on 08/07/1963 it urgently demanded new materials concerning Kirschbaum's alleged collaboration with the Nazis. 23 On I 7/07/1963 the Prague authorities considered their next steps. They faced the danger that Kirschbaum would sue the newspaper Eudove zvesti, which would mean its financial ruin. They decided to protect Eudove zvesti and to reinvolve the Prague Council of Jewish Communities, which would then provide additional arguments to the Canadian Jewish press. It was also necessary to find more of Kirschbaum 's alleged crimes. The meeting held a month later, on 17/08/ 1963 , had a similar aim . The Council of Jewish Communities was asked to spread new incriminating documents to the world. The Slovak Academy of Sciences, particularly their pro-communist historian Liptak, would investigate more of Kirschbaum 's activities. Another extradition request whould be prepared, to include the extradition ofDurcansky and Karmasin from the FRG. 24 The Czechoslovak Embassy in Canada wasn't very optimistic. Ottawa and Montreal wrote a joint report about Kirschbaum on 16/07 / I 963 , stating that Kirschbaum was being strongly defended by all the Slovak separatist emigrants. Canadian politicians assured them that nothing wou ld happen to Kirschbaum, unless he was proven guilty. Also, the editors of Eudove zvesti, Nase hlasy and the communist Canadian Tribune, in danger of being sued, asked for 22 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, fil e 027282/63. 23 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada 2, file 028246/63 . 24 Archives MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965-1969, box Kanada I, files 027282/63 and 027406/63 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 81 new materials against Kirschbaum. 25 The functionaries in Prague and Bratislava, with the participation of the Ministry of the Interior and The Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, feverishly searched for new documents. They also gathered files from 1946/4 7, dealing with previous efforts to put Kirschbaum on the United Nations list of war criminals. 26 Kirschbaum and his lawyers were not in a hurry to sue the aforementioned newspapers. They asked Eudove zvesti to publish an apology and pay $5,000 before 27/ 10/ 1963, otherwise they would take them to court. Nevertheless, the editor-in-chief of Eudove zvesti, Jozef Durjancik, after having consulted with Czechoslovak authorities, didn't do anything and time passed without any action.27 During the winter of 1963/64, Durjancik kept on asking for new materials and assured himself of the support of the Czechoslovak authorities. In February of 1964, he commited an indiscretion by sending a letter by regular mail to Prague. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs was worried that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) would find out that everything was being directed from Prague, even though the RCMP already suspected it. 28 In March of 1965 Kirschbaum ended up suing the Nase hlasy newspaper. Then, a strange cooperation began began between the Czechoslovak communist authorities, Durjancik, the Council of Jewish Communities in Prague and the Czech emigrant newspaper Nase hlasy, which, despite being anti-communist, wasn ' t ashamed to collaborate with the communists against Kirschbaum. The lawyers for Nase hlasy, Mr. Pepper and Mr. Gellner, visited the Czechoslovak Republic on 20-23/04/ 1965, as the Czechoslovak embassy in Ottawa had recommended. They were unsuccessful in Prague, but in Slovakia, they appreciated the collaboration of the pro-communist historian Liptak and the archivist Michal Chreno. In August of 1965, Liptak sent them, via the Canadian embassy in Prague, 51 photocopies and I 08 photographs alleging that Kirschbaum was a Nazi collaboratot and, in return, he was sent many history books from the West. Chreno also sent several photographs, but he was dissatisfied 25 Ibid, file 027424/63. Ibid, file 029762/63 . 27 Ibid, number 076/63. 28 Archi ves MZV Prague, f. Territorial departments-Secret (TO-T) 1965- 1969, box Kanada 1, fil e 021444/64. 26 82 SLOVAKIA 2019 with his reward. In the autumn of 1965, Chreno complained to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the State Bank refused to pay him $1 06CDN for his parcel. The bank wanted to transfer the payment directly to the National Archives account but he felt that the bank did not appreciate his work. This was the tragicomic end to the action called Kirschbaum , which is conserved in the archives of the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs .29 The slander campaigns in the I 960 ' s against Jozef Kirschbaum in Canada and Ferdinand Durcansky in Germany show the unflagging efforts of the Czechoslovak communist authorities to discredit Slovak nationalist emigres around the world. The communist authorities frequently used their subordinate organizations, e.g. the Prague Jewish Community or the Hi storical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (where Cubomir Liptak played an important role and later was praised by many people). 3 From a long-term perspective, the slander campaigns were unsuccessful, but they left bitter traces and needlessly complicated the lives of many exi le politicians. The extradition requests were always unsuccessful. Such were the activities of commnist authorities against Slovak nationalists who worked for the overthrow of the communist regime and for the independence of Slovakia. ° 29 Ibid. °For examples of such praise see "Zomrel Cubomir Liptak," Sm e (Bratislava), Oc- 3 tober 22, 2003 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Émigrés in the Reports of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Actions against Ferdinand Ďurčanský and Jozef Kirschbaum (1961-1966/68) Description An account of the resource Petr Kubík Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 72-82 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kubík, Petr, 1963- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9b607f90c3dd9a49f7fca1ce7e120b68.pdf 529bb88cf46f523dfd6737d72b749b3d PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 83 RUSSOPHILES WITHOUT RUSSIA R. Vladimir Baumgarten (Dedicated to the Memory ofNikolaj Ordos) The Carpatho-Rusyns, technically a stateless people, have been dubbed the "Kurds of Central Europe." They straddle the northern and southern slopes of the Carpathian mountains in the border re1 gions of Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Since the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe, both the Slovak and Polish governments have recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Ukraine, where the largest number of Rusyns dwell, does not. After World War II, incoming communist governments classified the Rusyns as Ukrainians by administrative fiat for reasons of convenience, which shall be explained below. The current post-communist government of Ukraine adamantly adheres to this position. 2 Further west, across the Uz river, many Carpatho-Rusyns in eastern Slovakia have voluntari ly assimilated into the Slovak nationality, for reasons which shall likewise be explained in this essay. The first impetus for the Rusyn national awakening came from a belief that they were part of a Great Russian nation, extending "from the Poprad River [in eastern Slovakia] to the Pacific." 3 The Russophile tradition influenced Carpatho-Rusyn culture and politics for a full century. An examination of its history reveals more than a few 1 Paul Robert Magocsi , " Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXIX, Nos. 3-4 ( 1997), 301-54. 2 The Ukrainophile viewpoint was exemplified by Viacheslav Chomovil ( 19371999). During the Brezhnev era, Chomovil was a dissident journalist and human rights activist. He was sent to the labor camps several times for separatist activities. In the late I 980's he was one of the leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine (better-known as Rukh). After the Soviet Union disintegrated and Ukraine became independent, Chomovil became alarmed by the Rusyn political renaissance. He considered it separatist and urged the Prosecutor General's office in Kiev to file charges aga inst its protagonists. 3 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationalist lntelligentia and the Peasantry in Twentieth Century Subcarpathian Rus "', in Magocs i, Of the Making of Nationalities Th ere is No End, Vol. I (New York, 1999), 19. �84 SLOVAKIA 2019 ironies. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the Russophile tradition lasted as long as it did. Indeed, remnants of it exist to this day. The current essay is an attempt to explain its rise and fall. The Russophile Tradition in Habsburg Hungary, Galicia and America The homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns has been alternatively referred to as Ruthenia, Podkarpatska Rus' (Subcarpathian Rus '), Transcarpathia and Carpatho-Ukraine. For reasons of convenience, this author shall refer to it as Podkarpatska Rus' . It was part of the Kingdom of Hungary for about 900 years. Much of Podkarpatska Rus' was a game preserve for the Hungarian nobility. Its Eastern Slav peasants, shepherds and lumberjacks were forbidden to hunt the deer, even when the latter devoured the people's meagre cabbage plots. Starvation was common. The Rusyns were the most impoverished and illiterate ethnic group in the Hungarian kingdom. Originally a bastion of the Russian Orthodox Church, the homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns was a battleground and passageway in the ongoing struggle between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes. In order to wean these people away from any allegiance to the Transylvanian princes, most of whom were Calvinists, the Habsburgs decided to incorporate them into the Roman Catholic Church. They accomplished this by creating a Slavonic/Greek Rite of the church. At the Union of Uzhorod (April 24, 1646), 63 Orthodox priests pledged to recognize the primacy of the pope and the sanctity of Roman Catholic doctrine in exchange for keeping the Slavonic liturgy and a married clergy.4 These clergymen were exempted from the feudal burdens of serfdom, received an income from their parishioners, and could send their sons to seminaries in the Habsburg Monarchy for higher education. Despite this favorable concession from the Imperial House, the Rusyns remained generally loyal to their Magyar lords. This was especially the case of the Kuruc (Crusader) uprising and freedom war of Ferenc Rakoczi II ( 1703-1711 ). 4 For the most comprehensive study of this event, see Michal Lacko, "The Union of Uzhorod," Slovak Studies, VI ( 1966), 7-190. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 85 The contribution of the Rusyns was sufficiently valorous for them to receive the title gens fidelissima ("the most faithful people").5 In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the various Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy-Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs and Croats-launched their own national revivals, the Rusyns were slow to respond. No Rusyns attended the Slav Congress during the revolutionary year 1948. On the contrary, Greek Catholic seminarians in Uzhorod abandoned their intended vocations in order to volunteer for the Hungarian honveds (National Guard) during Hungary' s 1848-1849 war of independence.6 A few educated Rusyns were aware of a certain kinship with Russia. In 1791 Ivan Orlai ( 1771-1829) emigrated to Russia. A schoolteacher, he had been denied advancement in the Austrian system of education. In St. Petersburg he studied medicine and ultimately became court surgeon, actively working in the reorganization of the Russian medical profession. He advised the Ministry of Education to invite other educated Rusyns "since they usually know Church Slavonic thoroughly." 7 Orlai served as Mentor to Nikolaj Gogol, author of Taras Bulba, the Russified Ukrainian who ultimately became one of the literary giants of nineteenth-century Russia. Orlai encouraged other Russian scholars to take an interest in their kinsmen on the other side of the Carpathians. Meanwhile, a Greek Catholic eparchy was established in Presov, eastern Slovakia, in 1818. Its eparch (bishop), Hrihory Tarkovych, was an active pioneer of Russian culture. In expanding his library, he imported the complete works of the eighteenth-century Russian intellectual and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov.8 5 The Rusyns gained this title as a result of a battle fought near Trencin castle in western Slovakia on August 4, 1708. During the fi ghting Rakoczi vaulted across a ravine on horseback. He was thrown forward , striking his head and losing consciousness. His Carpatho-Rusyn peasant infantry held its ground long enough for him to be carried from the fi eld. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Imperial regulars, these Rusyns were subsequently massacred. 6 Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus: / 848-1 948 (Cambridge, MA: 1978), 43. 7 Elaine Rusinko, Straddling Borders: Literature and Identity in Subcarpathian Rus ' (Toronto, 2008), 99. 8 Athanasius Pekar, The History of the Church in Carpathian Rus' (New York, 1992), 89. �86 SLOVAKIA 2019 The first real impetus for the Carpatho-Rusyn awakening came as a result of the Russian military intervention against the Hungarian war of independence in 1849. It was not undertaken to liberate the Slavs of Hungary who were in a state of revolt against Magyar tyranny. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia employed far more autocratic powers than did the House of Habsburg and regarded the stamping out of the fires of revolution, which had swept Europe since the previous year, as a self-evident duty. Polish revolutionary veterans were serving on the Hungarian side and he feared the spread of revolution to his Polish possessions. Nicholas was no Pan-Slav. Two years earlier a nest of such agitators had been discovered in Kiev. It called itself "The Brotherhood of Sts . Cyril and Methodius," and, according to Nicholas, its adherents had invented some monstrosity called the Ukrainian nationality. One of its leading members was not only Ukraine's best poet, but its best painter as well. His people sought ties with the Czechs and Slovaks. Nicholas saw to it that several of them were jailed and he had Taras Schevcenko drafted into the Russian army for ten years, during which time he was forbidden to write or sketch. 9 A number of Russian Pan-Slav politically conservative individuals sympathized with the Slovak people. Tsar Nicholas admonished the Slavophile journalist Ivan Aksakov ( 1823-1886) that, under the guise of a general Slav alliance, subversive elements in the Kingdom of Hungary wished to create a struggle which was not in the name of 0 God, but in a spirit of mutiny, which was dangerous to Russia. ' The Russian military commanders carefully studied the earlier conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes . They observed that The Austrians had traditionally moved against Transylvania by starting from Kosice in eastern Slovakia. It was considered safer to cross the Hornad and Tisa rivers in the Carpathian 11 foothills than to assault Transylvania from the Hungarian plain. On June 9, the main Russian army commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Paskievitch, consisting of 70,890 soldiers and 240 cannon poured into Slovakia through the Dukla Pass from partitioned Po9 Pav lo Zaitsev, Taras Shevchenko. A Life (Toronto, 1989), 139-57. °Cudovit Holotik, "The Slovaks: An Integrating or Disintegrating Force?" Austrian 1 Histo ry Yearbook, III , Part 2 ( 1967): 2. 11 William Stiles, Austria in 1848-50, II (New York, 1850), 294. Stiles was the American charge d'affaires in Vienna during the revolutionary events of 1848-49. �SLOVAKIA 2019 87 land. The Russians captured Presov on June 20 and took Kosice five days later. To supply their army, the Russians stockpiled large amounts of foodstuffs at the northern end of the Dukla Pass. However, the military bureaucracy of Tsar Nicholas was inefficient. Provisions were made to transport the artillery but not the food . Austrian quartermasters, who also had a supply of food , and were allied with the Russians, had fled the area. The Russian soldiers, hungry and exasperated, turned to plunder. Don Cossacks looted a number of Slovak villages so thoroughly that the inhabitants fled into the for12 ests . The Russian intervention in this area would be remembered with ill-feelings by Magyars and non-Magyars alike. There were Slovak Pan-Slavs who were willing to overlook Russian misconduct. They convinced themselves that Grand Duke Konstantin was preparing to transfer his headquarters from Warsaw to Kosice, where he would proclaim a new Slav state. Slovak leaders appealed to the Russian embassy and military mission in Vienna for recognition. They requested that Slovak advisors and regional administrators be attached to the Russian military in eastern Slovakia. Tsar Nicholas replied to one such request "I received the same thing yesterday from Danilevsky [the Russian consul in Belgrade]. I have no time for such matters." 13 On the other hand, the reception of Russian military intervention was not universally negative. Rusyn peasants in the highlands witnessed a mighty Slav army in their region for the first time. They were awed. They gave fruits and nuts to the invaders. Aleksander Dukhnovych, soon to become an awakener among the Rusyns, later wrote, "One thing really gave me joy in life, and that was in 1849 when I first saw the glorious Rus sian army .. .I can't describe the feeling of gladness at seeing the first Cossacks on the streets of Presov. I danced and cried with delight. .. It was truly the first, perhaps the last, joy of my life." 14 Aleksander Dukhnovych (1803-1865) was born in the village of Topol 'a in the Humenne region of eastern Slovakia. He was descended from Greek Catholic priests and was consequently educated 12 John Shelton Curtis, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1925-/ 854 (Durham, NC, 1865), 298 . 13 Holotik, 383. 14 Quoted in Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity, 45. �88 SLOVAKIA 2019 at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod. After ordination as a priest in 1827, he was assigned to the bishop 's chancellery in Presov. His relatively progressive views clashed with those of the more conservative Tarkovych, who then assigned him to a relatively remote rural parish. Dukhnovych regarded his assignment as a godsend. In Uzhorod he had received a Hungarian education, which influenced his early writings. In the rural parish he discovered, or re-discovered, "the people." He was influenced by the Slovak National Awakening and applied its precepts to the awakening of his own Rusyn people. After the death of Tarkovych, Dukhnovych was reassigned to Presov and appointed eparchical canon in 1843 . He remained closely associated with the city-considered a Rusyn cultural center in spite of its Slovak majority- for the rest of his life. In 1850, after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, Dukhnovych established the first Rusyn cultural association, the Presov Literary Society. His own literary contribution was considerable. In 1851 he composed the poem "Vruchanie," whose opening lines "I was, am, and will remain a Rusyn" became the motif for the unofficial anthem of the Carpatho-Rusyn people. He researched and wrote extensively on the Rusyn people. His monumental achievement was the play "Virtue is More Important than Riches," which is still performed regularly in regional theatres in eastern Slovakia and western Ukraine. 15 The ethical values expressed in this play mirror Dukhnovych 's role as a social reformer. He campaigned vigorously against illiteracy, alcoholism, and the lingering pagan superstitions which persisted among his people. The literary language employed-indeed, invented by Dukhnovych-was peculiar. It was a blend of Old Church Slavonic, standard Russian and the native dialect. His later disciples called it "the traditional Carpatho-Rusyn langage," while his critics derrided it as "jazychije" (macaronic jargon). 16 Indeed, while Dukhnovych was the greatest of the Rusyn awakeners, he inhibited the establishment of a distinctive Rusyn identity by his unequivocal adherence to the Great Russian idea. 15 For an English-language translation, see Aleksander Duchnovych, Virtue is More Important than Riches, ed. by Elai ne Rusinko (New York, 1994). 16 See the entry "Dukhnovych, Aleksander," in Paul Robert Magocs i and Robert Popp, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture (Toronto, 2005), I06. �SLOVAKIA 2019 89 If Dukhnovych was the unquestioned giant among the Rusyns in the realm of culture, then Adolf Dobrian' skyi ( 1817-1901) fulfilled this function in the realm of politics. Dobrian'skyi was born in Rudl'ov, Zemplin county, Slovakia, the son of a Greek Catholic priest. He attended secondary schools in Levoca, Roznava and Misko le, and then studied philosophy in Kos ice ( 1833 ), law in Eger (1834-36) and mining at the Academy of Mines and Forests in Banska Stiavnica, central Slovakia. He was fluent in several foreign languages, including Magyar, German, French, English and Italian. He visited Bohemia, where he was influenced by Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek and other Czech national awakeners. Dobrian'skyi initially welcomed Hungary' s 1848 Revolution for the liberal reforms that it promised. But when the Slovak district of Banska Bystrica elected him as its representative to the Hungarian Diet, the Hungarian government rejected his mandate on the grounds of Pan-Slavism. Dobrian'skyi then indeed became a Pan-Slav. He moved to Presov, where he built a following which advocated a political union of the Rusyns of Hungary with those of Austrian Galicia. When the Russians prepared to invade Hungary, the Austrian government appointed him as its liason with Paskievitch. Dobrian 'skyi then served as advisor to the Russian military. After the defeat of revolutionary Hungary, the Austrian government imposed a centralist bureaucratic regime. Dobrian' skyi then became advisor to the Uzhorod Civil District, which encompassed four counties. He regarded the civil district as a prelude to the establishment of an autonomous Rusyn state under the Emperor of Austria. 17 Defeated in the Austro-Sardinian war of 1859, The Habsburg Monarchy was substantially weakened. It was forced to retreat from bureaucratic centralism and make concessions to the Magyars. Dobrian' skyi was recalled , and the old nobles began to reoccupy county positions. In 1866 Austria suffered another defeat, this time at the hands of Prussia, and resigned itself in 1867 to accepting the Magyar nobility as equal partners in the renamed Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary. Emperor Franz-Josef allowed himself to be crowned King of Hungary in Budapest and the Hungarian nobles were granted complete self-government in internal affairs. By now their obsession 17 See the entry " Dobrian' skyi, Adolf," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 93. �90 SLOVAK.IA 2019 with Pan-Slavism reached paranoid proportions . They viewed the magyarization of Hungary's Slavic minorities as imperative. Persecution of Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn educational and cultural institutions became the order of the day. A similar course evolved in Galicia, the Austrian province of partitioned Poland. Shortly after the 1867 Compromise with Hungary came into effect, Empreor Franz-Josef appointed his trusted Polish confidant Count Agenor Goluchowski as Viceroy of Galicia. Goluchowski gained for his Polish nobles a degree of autonomy that mirrored that of the Magyars. The education system was polonized. This posed a direct threat to the advancement of the Rusyns. Educated Rusyns became politically divided. The Ukrainian movement gained the greatest strength . However, there were still Rusyns who adhered to the traditions of old Rus' .They stubbornly continued to write in Old Church Slavonic and isolated themselves from the people. Cultureally, these Old Ruthenians identified with Russia, but professed allegiance to the Austrian Emperor. Such a dual allegiance became more difficult to maintain as the nineteenth-century ran its course. Austria and Russia were no longer allies, and were in fact competing for hegemony in the Balkans. Similarly, the Rusyns of Galicia found themselves cast in the role of a political football in the rivalry of the two empires. A case in point was the career of Ivan Naumovych (1826-1891), who was born Galicia in 1836. In his youth he was strongly influenced by the Polish national movement. However, he experienced a turning point during the revolutionary year of 1848, when there was a brief uprising in the city of Lviv. Naumovych was observing the fighting from a hillside when imperial soldiers spotted him and assumed he was a Polish rebel. They arrested him, but Naumovych persuaded them to release him by convincing the Austrians that he was a Russian. 18 Being Russian, Naumovych decided, carried certain privileges. After 1850, when Naumovych was ordained a Greek Catholic priest, he became staunchly Russophile in cultural orientation. He organized opposition to a campaign organized by the Roman Catholic Polish clergy to latinize the liturgy of the Greek rite. In this ca18 Keith Dyrud, The Quest fo r th e Rusyn Soul: The Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europ e and America, 1890-World War I (Philadelphia, 1992), 28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 91 pacity he sought Russian support. At this point, Naumovych did not convert to Orthodoxy . He still regarded the Greek Catholic (Uniate) church as a potential bridge between Eastern and Western Christendom. Nontheless, inspired by his activism, an entire village in eastern Galicia converted to Orthodoxy in May of 1877. More conversions followed in the next three years. The Galician authorities charged Naumovych with treason. In their view his activity was not religious but political. Naumovych had indeed maintained contact with Russian Pan-Slav agents. 19In July of 1882 he was finally convicted and sentenced to eight months in jail. Other Rusyns who converted to Orthodoxy likewise found themselves hauled into court, although, surprisingly, a Polish jury acquitted them. Both the Austrian government and Polish patriots understood the necessity of not pushing the Old Ruthenians to the point of open subversion. The Ukrainophile movement predominated in Galicia, but the Russophile tradition was not going to go away. Galicia, unlike Russian Ukraine, was not a particularly productive agricultural region. Much of the countryside is hilly and the soil is poor. A bad harvest usually resulted in famine , and this happened at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russian Pan-Slavs responded by founding the Galician-Russian Benevolent Association in St. Petersburg on February 9, 1903. At the opening meeting acertain Father Petrov delivered the inaugural address. American historian Keith Dyrud described the subsequent address as follows: He likened the world to an artist's palette or a musician 's instrument. God was that artist or musician. The nationalities of the world were like colors on the palette or strings on the instrument. If some of the colors or strings are missing, the painting or music will be incomplete and this is a crime against the spirit. This crime against the spirit occurs when a culture allows itself to become divided. The separation of the people of Galicia and Carpatho-Russia (Subcarpathia) from the Russian nation was just such a crime . It is the obligation of a national culture to unite its people into a united nation. In other words, the orator was suggesting that it was 19 Ibid ., 28 . �92 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the obligation of Russia to unite in a single nation all people with a Russian culture. He included the Galicians and Subcarpathians 20 among the people with a Russian culture. Under the leadership of Count Vladimir Bobrinski , the GalicianRussian Benevolent Association extended financia l relief to famine victims of Galicia. Tsarist Russia, the most despotic and reactionary among the Great Powers, could appear benevolent while working to expand its influence. Bobrinski likewise dispatched agents to Podparkarpatska Rus ' , where starvation was an everyday occurrence, rather than a momentous event. The Hungarian government was less hesitant than its Austrian counterpart to prosecute Rusyns for conversion to the Orthodox faith. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first converts to the Orthodox faith in Podkarpatska Rus ' materialized in the vi llage of Iza. They were simple peasants who disliked their pastor, a magyarized Rusyn, who replaced their language with Magyar in the parish school. Led by the cantor-teacher Andry Vladymir, they appealed to the Serbian patriarch, who had nominal authority over all Orthodox subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy, to send them an Orthodox priest. Greek Catholic priest and historian Athanasius Pekar, himself a Ukrainophile, later admitted: "All that needed to be done to liquidate the so-called 'Orthodox movement' in Iza was to appoint a new village pastor and reopen the parish school." 2 1 Instead, the Hungarian government arrested the participants late in 1903 for alleged ties with Russia, and in the following year placed them on trial in Marmaros. All the defendants were found gui lty of treason. The Maramaros trial made a deep impression on the mind of a simple woodcutter of Iasnyia named Aleksander Kabaliu (18771947). He had just been released from the army, where he had been persecuted by Hungarian officers for his Pan-Slav inclinations. Kabuliak had a pronounced inclination towards a monastic life . He made religious pilgrimages to Russia, Jerusalem and Mount Athos in Greece. At a Russian monastery in the last-named location, he was received into the Orthodox fold . He turned his home in Iasnyia into a veritable Russian museum, collecting and displaying icons. Fearing 20 21 Ibid. , 49-50. Pekar, I 05 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 93 persecution by Hungarian authorities, Kabaliuk emigrated to the Russian Empire, where he was tonsured as a monk in 1910. The Russian Orthodox Church initially intended that Kabaliuk wou ld go to America and assume custody of a modest parish in Pittsburgh.22 Instead, he decided to return to Hungary to share in the martyrdom of the villagers of Iza. The Hungarian authorities were happy to oblige him. At the end of 1913 there was a second Maramaros trial, in which Kabaliuk and 94 peasants were the defendants. The Hungarians were hopeful that the trial would expose the activities of Count Bobrinskii and his associates. All it achieved was international condemnation of Magyar policies . Nonetheless, Kabaliuk was sentenced to four and a half years in jail, while 32 others were sentenced to one or two years and various fines. The rest were dismissed for lack of evidence. It was also at the tum of the century that many Rusyns followed the example of their Slovak kinsmen and neighbors in emigrating to America. Although members of both groups originated in the dirtpoor hill country of the eastern Carpathians, they tended to gravitate towards industrial centers in the United States. Surprisingly, America provided both stimulus for the Russophile tradition and a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox faith. Dyrud writes: The majority of the Rusyn immigrants came to the United States as illiterate peasants and had not participated in the intellectual and cultural conflicts that were raging in the old country. Thus it was in this country that Rusyn peasants from Galicia and Subcarpathia first lived together and found that they did not have as much in common as it first seemed. And it was in the United States that many of them first heard of the Ukrainian movement. And it was there that the Rusyns from Subcarpathia felt free to express national sentiments without the pressures of magyarization. It was in the United States that most of the Rusyn immigrants were told for the first time by the Russian Orthodox mission that they were really Russians. 23 22 See the entry "Kabaliuk, Aleksander," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia o[ Ru syn History and Culture, 223. 2 Dyrud, 58 . �94 SLOVAK.IA 2019 Ironically, the Russian cause was indirectly aided by a most unlikely element: Irish American Catholic priests. Many of the latter resented the fact that Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood were permitted to marry while they were not. Most outstanding was Archbishop John Ireland of Minneapolis-St. Paul. On December 19, 1889, he was visited by a Greek Catholic priest named Alexis Toth. Toth had been dispatched by the Presov eparchy to assume the pastorship of St. Mary ' s, a modest church recently constructed by the Rusyn community of Minneapolis. When Father Toth presented his credentials, Archbishop Ireland became greatly agitated. He informed Toth that he did not consider him to be a genuine Catholic, and denied him permission to administer the sacraments. 24 After consultation with the parishioners of St. Mary's, Toth conferred with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Vladimir of San Francisco. The latter was eager and willing to accept the parish of St. Mary's into the Orthodox fold. Aside from Alaska, which Russia had sold to the United States earlier, there were up to the 1870s only three Orthodox churches in the United States. In addition to San Francisco, there was a Russian parish in New York City and a Greek Orthodox church in New Orleans. Native converts in America were exclusively Alaskan Aleuts and Eskimos . Now, however, the wave of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants indicated a potential source of growth. Since nearly all Rusyn immigrants were in the eastern half of the United States, New York rather than San Francisco was delegated as an episcopal seat. In 1890 the construction of St. Nicholas Cathedral was completed in New York. Tsar Nicholas II personally donated 5,000 roubles to this project. His government subsidized the construction of other churches and supported activities of the Orthodox Missionary Society founded in Moscow. In Minneapolis, Father Toth founded the Russian Mutual Aid Society. These prosletization efforts exceeded all expectations. By the time of the outbreak of World War I in 1914, over one-third of all Rusyn immigrants in the United States had converted to Orthodoxy. 25 They served as enthusiastic supporters of the Russian cause in the Great War. World War I brought with it the culmination of the historic struggle for the Carpathians, and caused great suffering among the 24 25 Ibid 65-6 Ibid: 65 . • �SLOVAK.IA 2019 95 Rusyns of Galicia, eastern Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' . By early September 1914 Russian armies had overrun much of eastern Galicia. Count Georgii Bobrinskii, brother of Count Vladimir, was made governor-general, and started a campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian movement. All Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives and journals were shut down. The Russian language replaced Ukrainian in the school system. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were deported into the depths of Russia. There was admittedly some dissent in Russian governmental circles. Noted statesman Pavel Miliukov described Russian conduct in Galicia as a European scandal. Yet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov stated unequivocally: "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all." 26 The Ukrainophiles had a measure of revenge when the AustroHungarian military reoccupied the province in the following year. They denounced their Russophile neighbors for alleged collaboration with the invaders. Hungarian troops carried out mass hangings. At the same time, Polish nobles spread rumors that the Ukrainophiles were covertly pro-Russian, so as to reassert their own authority in Galicia. In truth, thousands of Russophiles and Ukrainophiles alike suffered internment in Austrian concentration camps. The most notorious of these camps was Talerhof, near Graz. Sanitary conditions were deplorable, and an estimated 1,767 persons died of typhus and 27 other diseases. Austria's parliament was scandalized, and Emperor Karl ordered Talerhof closed early in 1917. Early in 1915, for the second of three occasions in the course of a century, the Russian military crossed through the Dukla Pass. This move came as a result of the seige of Przemysl, Austria-Hungary's principal fortress in Galicia. Russian troops occupied the Carpathian mountain passes to the south to prevent the Austro-Hungarian military from sending reinforcements to break the siege. Casualties on both sides of the winter war of 1914-15 were appalling. It is likely that more soldiers succumbed to the "White Death" (hypothermia) than were killed by enemy bullets. 28 Ultimately, the Austrian side 26 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2009), 343. See the entry "Talerhof," in Magocsi and Pop, eds,. Encyclopedia of Rusy n History and Culture, 488 . 28 For rhe most recent account of the winter campaign, see Traydon A. Tumstell, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of I 9 I 5 (Lawrence, KD, 20 I 0). 27 �96 SLOVAKIA 2019 gave way first. Russian soldiers under General Lavrl' Kornilov pushed through the southern end of Dukla Pass and advanced as far as the village of Lodomirova, just north of the town of Svidnik. Here they established a military cemetery for their dead. Lodomirova eventually became the site of a Russian cultural center in northeastern Slovakia, which shall be discussed in due course. The Russians did not remain in occupation of this toehold in Slovakia for long. Germany, Austria-Hungary's senior partner, launched a counteroffensive eastward across Poland, albeit at the cost of having enough troops to capture Paris. Russian troops painfully withdrew north of the Carpathians. They were now demoralized and ripe for revolution. Mass mutinies forced Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate on March 15, 1917. The reign of the Romanov dynasty had ended. Tsarist Russia was destroyed. Politically speaking, the Russophi-le orientation was now a dead letter. Culturally, its future was now an openended question . At this point Russophiles among the Rusyns looked with growing interest at the now ascendant Czechoslovak independence movement. The Rusyns in Interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland The Czechoslovak independence movement was a curious article. For almost a century, there existed an intellectual tradition which maintained that Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same nationality. Yet the concept of a politically united Czechoslovak state was largely the invention to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk ( 18501937), a Czech philosophy professor and notorious defender of unpopular causes. Perceiving that World War I would result in AustriaHungary coming increasingly under the domination of Kaiser Wilhelm ' s Germany, Masaryk decided to lobby among the opposing Western powers for Czecho-Slovak independence. In Geneva, in neutral Switzerland, he was joined by his protege, the sociology professor Edvard Benes. Together they proceeded to Paris, where they were joined by Milan Rastislav Stefanik, a young Slovak serving as an officer in the French Air Force. This triumvirate formed a Czech Action Committee Abroad, which was eventually expanded and renamed the Czechoslovak National Council. Given his position on this body, the French eventually gave Stefanik genera l' s rank. He raised a Czechoslovak Legion from prisoners of war and deserters �SLOVAKIA 2019 97 from the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Czechoslovak Legion distinguished itself on the Western, Eastern and eventually Italian fronts, and gained increased Allied favor in the struggle for the recognition of the independence movement. 29 In 1918 Masaryk visited the United States, not only to gain official American recognition, but also a mandate from the Slovak community in America, since Slovakia itself was politically gagged. In October of 1915 the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America had already concluded a preliminary agreement for cooperation in Cleveland. Masaryk proceeded to Pittsburgh to conclude a more formal agreement for a Czecho-Slovak merger. Masaryk's visit to the Mecca of the American Slovaks was greeted by a large manifestation of support which included South Slavs as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Yet the negotiations undertaken at Moose Hall on May 29-31 were not without controversy. Masaryk pledged Slovakia an administration, a school system and linguistic rights, but not its own parliament, as specified by the earlier Cleveland Agreement. Here Jozef Husek of the Slovak Catholic Jednota raised strenuous objections. Albert Mamatey, president of the Slovak League, impressed Masaryk with the seriousness of losing the support of the largest single Slovak organization. The delegates were evenly divided, and Masaryk finally broke the deadlock by signing a revised draft with all the proposals. 30 The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also heavily populated by Rusyns from Hungary. Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided 29 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was the most instrumental military force in attaining Allied recognition of the independence movement. With Russia withdrawing from the war in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires wished to be evacuated and sent to France, where a German offensive to capture Paris was anticipated. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to disarm them resu lted in their capture of the Trans-Siberian Railway and a legendary odyssey to the Pacific coast. It also gave the Western Allies a pretext to intervene in the Russian Civil War. The experience of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia boats of a sizable amount of literature. The best Englishlanguage studies are authored by Victor M. Fie, The Revolutionary War for Independence and the Russian Question: The Czechoslovak Army in Russia 1914-191 8 (New Delhi, 1977) and The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion. The Origins of Their Armed Conflict: March to May 1918 (New Delhi , 1978). 30 See Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia" Slo vak Studies, VIII ( 1968), 48-5 1 �98 SLOVAKIA 2019 benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Its members had acquired a measure of political awareness. One such organization was the Greek Catholic Union, headquartered in the HomesteadMunhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, which contained both Greek Catholic and Orthodox members, based in McKeesport. At the time of Masaryk's pilgrimage to Pittsburgh, the Czech independence leader was approached by Nicholas Pachuta, editor of the Greek Catholic Union's newspaper Rus 'kii Viestnik. Pachuta had recently converted to Orthodoxy. Up until this point he had advocated the incorporation of Podkarpatska Rus' into the Russian Empire. Now that there was no more Russian Empire, Pachuta approached Masaryk with the idea of union with a Czecho-Slovak state. He was soon afterwards expelled from the Greek Catholic Union. 3 1 Overall, the Greek Catholic clergy wished their homeland to remain part of Hungary. Many laymen wanted union with Galicia but insisted Galicia was Russian rather than Ukrainian. The end to the Great War was approaching, and territorial changes could be anticipated. One of President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated Fourteen Points for peace was "self-determination for the peoples of AustriaHungary." It was necessary to have a common program. Members of both organizations met in Homestead on July 23, 1918 to form the American National Council of Uhro-Rusyns. The subsequent Homestead Resolution read as follows: If the pre-war boundaries remain, Rusyns, as the most loyal people-gens fidelissima-deserve that Hungary provide [them} with autonomy. If new boundaries are made, they should be made according to nationality; thus, Uhro-Rusyns can belong nowhere else than to their nearest brothers by blood, language and faith, to the Galician and Bukovinian Rusyns. But if we are divided by foreign aspirations from Ukrainians and Old-Russians [Galician Russophiles}, the National Council demands in this case autonomy for Uhro-Rusyns so they can pre32 serve their national character. 31 Magocsi, Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 81. The original text of the Homestead Resolution appears under the heading " Do Vpukh Vhro-Rusynov zhivlych v Soed" in Prosvita, August 8, 1918 32 �SLOVAKIA 2019 99 The Rusyns commissioned a young Pittsburgh lawyer named Gregory Zsatkovich ( 1886-1967) to represent their interests to the United States government. Pennsylvania congressman Guy Campbell arranged a meeting between Zsatkovich and President Wilson on October 21. Wilson thought it unfeasible to grant full independence to so small a nation in a geopolitically sensitive region, and consequently recommended that Zsatkovich seek autonomy in a larger state. He referred Zsatkovich to Masaryk, whose independence movement had been recently recognized by the U.S. State Department, Zsatkovich met with Masaryk in Philadelphia, where the latter hosted a congress called the Mid-European Democratic Union on October 23-26. According to Zsatkovich's memoir afterwards, Masaryk assured him: "If the Rusyns decide to join the Czechoslovak Republic, they shall constitute a fully autonomous state." 33 There remained a sticky issue. Rusyn territorial claims included several counties in eastern Slovakia. Here there were numerous Rusyns in the northern mountain districts whereas elsewhere the population consisted of either Slovaks or Rusyns who had already voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. Masaryk was further alleged to declare on this point: "The frontiers will be so determined that the 34 Rusyns will be satisfied." On November 12, at a meeting of the National Council of UhroRusyns in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Czechoslovak option was provisionally adopted, albeit including the demand for the counties of eastern Slovakia. A subsequent plebiscite among the American Rusyn fraternals provided Zsatkovich with the desired results: out of 1,102 votes submitted, 732 (67 percent) were for union with Czechoslovakia and 310 (28 percent) for union with Ukraine. Additionally, there were 27 votes for complete independence, 10 votes for union with Russia, and 9 votes for remaining part ofHungary. 35 Back in the Old Country, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October of 1918 led to a power vacuum in many areas of the Carpathians. Several different national councils were organized by Rusyns, each of which had its own program for the fu- 33 Gregory Zsatkovich, Otkryhote-Expose bydaltelho gubernatori Podkarpatskoj Rusi (Homestead, PA , 1921 ), 5. 34 Ibid 5 35 Ma~o~si , Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 85. �100 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ture affiliation of the people. A Russophile group in eastern Slovakia, based in Stara Cubovna, initially wanted a merger with Galicia. Dissenters among them, led by the lawyer Antonii Beskyd ( 1855-1933), considered such a move impractical. They reconvened in Presov and declared themselves for union with Czechoslovakia instead. A new revolutionary government in Hungary pledged to grant the Rusyns territorial autonomy. A group of Greek Catholic priests in Uzhorod declared themselves in favor of this option. Another pro-Hungarian group met in Khust, but its speakers were shouted down by Pro-Ukrainian elements led by the lawyer Iulii Braschaiko (1879-1955). The Ukrainophle orientation had at last taken hold in Podkarpatska Rus ', and would grow progressively stronger. Most dramatic of all were events in the easternmost Hutsul region, centered around Iasnyia. Here the populace favored union with Ukraine, but, pending further developments, took matters into their own hands. In the early morning of January 7, 1919, a group of demobilized Rusyn soldiers, aided by troops sent by the West Ukrainian Republic, drove out the Hungarian garrison of 250 militiamen. On February 5 the victorious Rusyns proclaimed their own "Hutsul Republic," with a 42-member elected council and a four-man government. This little state existed until June 11, when the area was occupied by advancing Romanian troops.36 Late in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires returning from the Italian Front had begun a military occupation of Slovakia, and advanced across the Uz River. Uzhorod was occupied on January 10, 1919. The Czechoslovak position was strengthened as a result of a Bolshevik government assuming power in Hungary, much to the alarm of the Western powers. This Hungarian government wished to build upon the "Ruska Kraina" declared by its predecessor, the Karolyi regime. It went to extremes attempting to implement communist rule, threatening the death penalty for even the smallest commercial transactions. This decree became impossible to enforce, since the commissars were themselves profiteering. 37 Podkarpatska Rus' was soon engulfed in counterrevolution. 36 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Rusyn Decision to Unite With Czechoslovakia" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Natio nalities, 134. 37 Ibid, 140-42 �SLOVAKIA 2019 101 Even before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, members of the Uzhorod Council began experiencing doubts concerning the viability of remaining part of Hungary. A leading member of the Council, Reverend Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874-1945), began negotiating with Slovak leader Milan Hodza. Voloshyn was joined by supporters of both Beskid and Brashchaiko. The Russophiles realized that the Russia they had loved and believed in was unlikely to return from the dead. The Ukrainophiles realized that an independent Ukraine was unlikely to survive the turmoil of the Russian Civil War. Members of both orientations were willing to form a single body representing their mutual interests. It was in this spirit that the Central Russian National Council was formed in Uzhorod on May 8, 1919. Zsatkovich arrived with the text of the Scranton Resolution, which was endorsed unanimously. It remained to the Western peacemakers gathered in Paris to give sanction to Podkarpatska Rus' being granted to Czechoslovakia. Yet, contrary to later Hungarian revisionist claims, the victorious Western Allies did not arbitrarily hand the region over to the Czechs. The decision to unite with Czechoslovakia was that of the Rusyn people themselves .38 The realities of being part of the Czechoslovakia disappointed the expectations of many educated Rusyns. Autonomy was not forthcoming. They could send representatives to parliament in Prague, but did not have their own regional parliament. Prague apparently decided that the Rusyns, like the Slovaks, were not ready for autonomy. Zsatkovich became the first provincial governor, but the actual administration lay in the hands of a centralized Czech bureaucracy. Zsatkovich eventually resigned in disgust and returned to America. The disputed counties in eastern Slovakia remained under Slovak administration. To complicate matters further, there was now a group of Rusyns who considered themselves their own nationality, in addition to the existing Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations. Politically, on the local level, Prague would support one and then another orientation, depending upon its convenience at a particular moment. The Czechoslovak administration made great strides in education, virtually eliminating illiteracy in twenty years . The government poured tremendous amounts of money into Podkarpatska Rus ', and liberally funded cultural activities of all three orientations. 38 Ibid, 146. �102 SLOVAKIA 2019 On April 29, 1920, there was a meeting of local leaders in Uzhorod, headed by Iulii Brashchaiko. Its purpose was to establish a cultural organization encompassing all Podkarpatska Rus '. Nothing resulted from this meeting since Russophiles led by Anthonii Beskyd raised angry objections to the Ukrainophile cultural orientation of Brashchaiko ' s group. On May 9 Brashchaiko's fol lowers established the Prosvita Society, modeled along the lines of the Ukrainian society of the same name in Galicia. Its task was to publish all kinds of popular and scholarly books "written in the national tongue and accessible to every Subcarpathian Ru syn." 39 The Czechoslovak Pros vita was reinforced by many educated Ga li cian Ukrainians who found Polish rul e objectionable. On th e May 23 , 1923, those Russophiles who boycotted the Prosvita met in Uzhorod to establish their own organization, which was called the Dukhnovych Society. Its stated goals were to foster "the cultural deve lopment of the Ru ssian people living within Czechoslovakia, and most importantly to educate them in a moral , patriotic and Ru ssian spirit, exclusive of al l political activity." 40 The contrast between the two rival societies was visib le. The old tricolor Ru ssian flag flew over the reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society, whereas Prosvita reading rooms displayed the blue and ye llow Ukrainian national colors. In terms of literature, the new Dukhnovych Society championed the great Russian masters : Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc. The Prosvita Society advanced the writings of Shevchenko and other less known Ukrainian awakeners. Both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles expanded their activities from literature to theater. The Ru ssophiles tended to produce hi storical dramas, whereas the Ukrainophi les focused on folk songs and ballads. The latter used standard Ukrainian as the language of performance, whereas the Russophiles had to translate their productions into a Rusyn dia lect. It must be frankly admitted that the Ukrainophile orientation gained the upper hand in popularity during the course of the kulturkampf for Podkarpatska Rus' in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Avtustyn Voloshyn had become a convert to the Ukrainophile orien39 Statul tova,ystva 'Prosvita • Podkarpatska Rus ·, (Uzhorod, 1920), 6. Usta v Rusakogo ku/'turna-prosvete/'noga obshchturni Aleksandra Duchnovychovicha , (Uzhorod, 1923), 40 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 103 tation. He and his associates were astute and learned men-teachers and scholars who kept closely in touch with Rusyn cultural life. By contrast, the Dukhnovych Society fell increasingly under the influence of Stefan Fentsik ( 1892-1946), a local politician who used the organization as a platform to propagate a his own views, his political ties with Poland and Hungary-which shall be di scussed in due course-became common knowledge by 1937, and did much to compromise the Dukhnovych Society. 41 Russian culture survived more comfortably in eastern Slovakia, since 1928 elevated to the official status of a province. In large measure this direction was due to the efforts of Iulii Lazho (18671929), a native of Svidnik and senator for the Social Democratic Party in the Czechoslovak parliament. Earlier, Lazho had emigrated to America, where he converted to Orthodoxy and also rose in the construction industry. He returned home to start his own construction firm, and also to seek revenge against his former Greek Catholic pastor. As mayor of Ladomirova, where the Russian military cemetery was located, Lazho invited Vital ii Maksimenko ( 1873-1960), former archimandrite of the monastery at Pochaiev (in Polish Volhynia), to establish a missionary headquarters there. Lazho also procured a Cyrillic alphabet printing press which Czechoslovak legionnaires in Russia had appropriated, shipped all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, and which made its way to Prague. During two decades of activity the Ladomirova mission published over I 00 Orthodox church books, the newspaper Pravoslavnaia Karpatskaje Rus ' (1928-1944), the journal for young people Diestvo I ivnost Khristi ( 1935-1941 ), a scholarly journal Pravoslavny put' ( 1938-1940) and the annual almanac Pravnoslavny ruskii/Ruskii narodnyi kalendar ( 1924-1944). The Russian monks also worked to inculcate Russian culture among the native Rusyns, hosting such events as an annual Russian Day in the summers and the tree-lighting ceremony for Orthodox Christmas. 42 In approaching the causes of the Orthodox revival in interwar Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to understand the world view of the 41 Magocsi, "Nationalist Intelligentsia and the Peasantry" in Of th e Making of Nationalities, 200. 42 See the entry "Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , En cyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266 . �104 SLOVAKIA 2019 national-state's founding father. T.G. Masaryk was a complex individual. As one biographer expressed it: "This man wanted to emancipate workers without embracing Marxism, liberate women without promoting feminism, and educate the young without celebrating youth. " 43 He was considered in the West to be an expert on Russia. He had written extensively on the great writer Dostoevsky, whom he regarded as the classic representative of Russian thought. There were elements of the Russian national psychology which Masaryk found disturbing. Like Havlicek before him, he felt that the Western Slavs, especially the Czechs, should follow a different path . As a proponent of Westeren humanism, Masaryk disparaged the mystical tradition of the Eastern Orthodox faith .44 Yet Masaryk reserved even greater hostility for the Roman Catholi c Church. He drew inspiration from Jan Hus, the great Bohemian religious reformer who was burned at the stake for heresy in 1415 . In 1905, while celebrating the anniversary of Hus ' death, Masaryk coined the slogan "Away from Rome! " Politics in the first years of the Czechoslovak Republic had a distinctly anti-Catholic flavor. His government favored the appointment of Lutherans for administration in Slovakia at the expense of the Catholic majority. In Podkarpatska Rus ', where there were virtua lly no Protestants, such a policy was impossible. Here Czechoslovak authorities fostered a revival of Orthodoxy. One Czech mini ster assessed the impact as follows: It seemed to some Russophile politicians, both in Prague and in Ruthenia ... that the right time had come to convert the Rutheni an peasant back to the Greek Orthodox religion. This opinion was shared by many Russian emigres who flocked to Czechoslovak ia ... after 1919. A drive for 'Orthodoxy ' was started in Rutheni a ... It is a question of how much of this movement was spontaneous and due to the pro-Russian feeling of the population and to its di slike for the purely magyarized Uniate clergy, and how much of its strength it owed to the propaganda and preaching of the Russian Orthodox emigres and clergy and to the support of some Czech political circles. 43 Bruce Garver, "Masaryk and Czech Politics 1900-1914" in Stanley B. Winters, ed. , T G. Masaryk (1850- 193 7) Vo lum e I Thinker and Politician (London, 1990), 22 . 44 See Paul 1. Tresky, " Masaryk and Dostoyevsky" in Harry Hanak, ed., T G. Masa1y k (/ 850- 193 7) Volum e II/ Statesman and Cultural Force (London, 1990), 161-77. �SLOVAKIA 2019 105 However, it certainly added one more element to the confusion reigning in Ruthenia and led to animosities which, in the end, turned against the Prague Government itself.45 Reverend Voloshyn bitterly remonstrated against the situation in Prague in 1929: The agitation usually began in the local tavern, where the agitator met the most notorious brawlers in the village. After a short talk, emboldened by 'noisy' arguments and vodka, the peasants would begin to shout abuse against the village pastor. In a matter of two or three days a ' committee' made up of the pastor's 'opponents ' would be formed. The committee did not immediately begin advocating Orthodoxy; instead, it showered the bishop with complaints and delegations, demanding that there be an investigation against the pastor or that he be removed outright. Then followed other forms of harassment, demonstrations, threats against the pastor, intimidation of church curators, and such . The committee would send the pastor letters demanding that he leave the vi llage. As time went on, the committee made increasingly bolder threats that the pastor get out ' or else!' .. .. If, despite such harassment, the priest remained in his parish, the threats escalated. Someone would break his windows, shoot into his windows, poison hi s well , set fire to his grain or stables, and in some cases even the parish house, assault and beat the priest, etc. The government remained indifferent to all this under the pretext of ' Freedom of conscience! Freedom ofreligion!' 46 This state of affairs could not permitted to go on indefinitely. Czechoslovakia was, after all, a republic governed by law. The Vatican made its own contribution to improved church-state relations by transferring Bishop Antonii Papp of Mukachevo to Hungary and replacing him with canon Petro Gebej on July 16, 1924. At the same time, in response to forthcoming parliamentary elections, President Masaryk cryptically declared that "the Catholics will get as many rights as they win." 47 Rusyn voters supported Czech Catho lic political parties which gained an increased measure of strength in parliament. The rights accorded to Greek Catholics by the constitution in 45 Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto, 1955), 38-9. 46 Avhustyn Voloshyn, " Relihijni vidnozny na Podkarpats ' kyi" in Acta Conventia Pragensis pro Studii Orentalibus n. 1919, (Olomouc, 1930), 218-9. 47 Pekar, 11 8. �106 SLOVAKIA 2019 any case were now enforced. Violence and vandalism were now prosecuted and soon ceased. In some instances church property was restored. Bishop Gebej led a religious revival which resulted in priests maintaining closer contact with their parishioners. A number of converts to Orthodoxy returned to the Greek Catholic faith. The Orthodox revival was one of the sources of survival for the Russophile orientation. Another source was, ironically, Hungarian funding . The fall of Bela Kun's communist regime in August of 1919 was followed by the restoration of the nobility in Hungary. Counterrevolutionary White terror now followed Red terror. Right wing elements who rallied under Admiral Miklos Horthy, soon elevated to the position of regent of Hungary, wanted to regain Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' but had to go about it covertly.48 The victorious Western powers would not recognize any government in Hungary which would not accept their peace tenns . On June 4, 1920, Hungary was compelled to sign the Treaty of Trianon, which ceded Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' to Czechoslovakia, Transylvania to Romania, and Croatia and the Voivodina to what became known as Yugoslavia. Trianon psychologically scarred Hungarian society for a full generation. France offered to soften the blow by extending to Hungary financial credits, particularly in the area of railway development, in exchange for compliance. Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen cheerfully accepted the financial aid and outwardly complied with Trianon. Yet his government covertly subsidized elements in Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' who were disgruntled with Czechoslovak centrali sm. Having previously denied these peoples autonomy, the Hungarians now championed their right to selfdetern1ination as a first step toward regaining them. One of the recipients of Hungarian financial aid was Stefan Fentsik. Another was Andrei Brodii ( 1895-1946), a journalist, teacher and chairman of the Autonomous Agricultural Union/Autonomyi Zenled'skij Sojuz (AZS). Fentsik yielded leadership of the Russophile movement to Brodii during the 1930s. Ukrainophile historian Peter Stercho later maintained that Brodii, Fentsik and other select 48 As a precedent to future collaboration in this matter, Poland allowed itself to be used as a staging ground for Hungarian subversion of Czechos lovak administration . A "Magyar-S lovak League" was established in Krakow, and dispatched armed vo lunteers across the border into Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 2019 107 Russophile leaders had to conceal their ties with Hungary from their followers, since even the latter were opposed to territorial revision. 49 Polish policy towards the Rusyns of Galicia followed a similar pattern. In the area directly north of the Dukla Pass lived people belonging to a branch of the Rusyns known as the Lemkos. They can be geographically divided by the San River. The Ukrainian movement penetrated the area east of the San early in the twentieth century and accounted for numerous followers. In November 1918 Lemkos from about 30 villages gathered in the village of Komancza (Komancha in Rusyn) to form their own little republic. This Komancha Republic was viewed as a transitional state, pending merger with a greater Ukraine. West of the San the Lemkos still adhered to the traditions of old Rus'. In autumn 1918 they wanted union with Russia. Since this was obviously never going to happen, the Polish government could afford to humor these Lemkos, The Poles were preoccupied with the West Ukrainian Republic which was proclaimed in Lviv on November 1, 1918, and event which plunged Galicia into an ethnic civil war. On December 5, some 500 Lemko Rusyns representing 130 vi1lages and towns of western Lemkovyna met in Florynka (in Grybow district) to form a government. While the Polish military crushed the Komancha Republic in January 1919, it tended to view the Florynka Lemko Rusyn Republic as a potential ally against the Ukrainians. Polish officials who were present offered the former town hall of Grybow as a political headquarters, while the Polish Army provided arms for a Lemko national guard. Schools and cooperatives were soon organized. Amazingly, the Lemko Rusyn Republic survived a full sixteen months. It was governed by an executive council headed by Reverend Mykhal Iurchakevych and a central national council headed by the lawyer Iaroslaw Kachmarchyk. The Poles were disappointed with the results. The Lemkos were happy to accept whatever aid the Polish government and military were willing to offer but nonetheless were unwilling to take up arms against their errant brethren to the east. Additionally, Kachmarchyk's government rejected the notion of union with a Bolshevik Russia, and began looking at the example of 49 Peter Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in CarpathoUkraine /9/9-/939(NewYork , 1971), 171. �108 SLOVAKIA 2019 their brethren of the south side of the Carpathians. A union with Czechoslovakia now seemed a viable option. Unfortunately, in 1920 relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia were at a particularly low point, owing to border disputes concerning Tesin in Silesia and Orava-Spis in Slovakia. Before the end of March the Poles arrested Kachmarchyk and members of his government. They were tried on June 10, 1921. A Polish jury acquitted them, which was only reasonable insofar as the Poles had encouraged their activities in the first place. But the event marked the death knell of Lemko statehood. 50 Yet the Poles still had use for the Lernkos in the interwar period. The Greek Catholic Church was strongly identified with the Ukrainian national movement. The leadership of the Polish military, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, encouraged the movement to convert the Lemkos to Orthodoxy, and thus express a Russian character at the expense of the Ukrainian .51 It was a classic case of Divide and Rule. Elsewhere, in Volhynia, adherents of the Ukrainian national movement were Orthodox. Here militant Polish nationalists attacked and vandalized Orthodox monasteries and schools. At the same time, for reasons of security, Poland wished to have a common border with Hungary. For this reason the Polish government supported Hungarian efforts to regain Podkarpatska Rus' . The events which accompanied the international crisis in 1938 are well-known. The present author shall limit himself to summarizing key particulars. The Munich "diktat" of September 1938 resulted in Czechoslovakia being forced to yield the Gennan populated Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. Deprived of her most vital border defenses, Czechoslovakia was now rendered militarily defenseless. Hostile neighbors, Poland and Hungary, were now encouraged to make their own territorial claims. Moreover, the Prague government could no longer resist demands for autonomy on the part of Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus ' . 50 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Lemko Rusyn Republic ( 1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus' -Ukraine" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Nationalities, 303315. 51 See Mykola Kucherpa, "The Nationality Policy of Poland towards Ukrainians before World War II" in Paul Berst and Jaroslav Mokolak, eds., Th e Lemko Region 1939-1947, War, Occupation and Deportation (New Haven and Krakow, 2002), 3949. �SLOVAKIA 2019 109 In the case of Podkarpatska Rus', a cabinet was formed on October 11 which consisted of both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. Russophiles predominated, with Brodii as prime minister and Fentsik as deputy prime minister. Brodii was convinced that, if a plebiscite was held, the majority of Rusyns would vote for reunion with Hungary. Brodii 's ministry lasted only fifteen days. An alarmed central government summoned Brodii and Fentsik to Prague. There Brodii was arrested, while Fentsik found asylum in the Polish embassy. 52 Prague authorized Voloshyn, who was a member of the cabinet, to form a new government. Voloshyn proclaimed the province as an autonomous nation with the new name of Carpatho-Ukraine on November 3. The victory of the Ukrainophiles was at last complete. Autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine got off to a rough start. Hungary was prepared to re-annex the region, although conservative circles of the Hungarian government confined their claims to areas which were predominantly Magyar. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy opted to appear in the role of peacemakers in this territorial dispute between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They arbitrated a compromise settlement in Vienna on November 2, 1938. By terms of the First Vienna Award, Kosice, in southern Slovakia, and Uzhorod and Mukachevo, the two leading cities of Carpatho-Ukraine, were restored to Hungary. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine was forced to relocate to Khust, which was little more than an oversized village. Militant Hungarian nationalists regarded the First Vienna Award as a temporary expedient, and worked for the complete annexation of CarpathoUkraine. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, a covert paramilitary group known as the "Ragged Guard" was organized to infiltrate Carpatho-Ukraine and conduct terrorist acts designed to destabilize the regime. Poland likewise dispatched paramilitary units for the same purpose. If the credible research of Ukrainophile historian Stercho is to be believed, the Polish paramilitary units outpaced their Hungarian counterparts in acts of terrorism. 53 Carpatho-Ukraine was in need of allies, and these were forthcoming. Militant Ukrainian nationalists from Poland crossed the mountains to organize the Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich. It has been argued by Russophile opponents that the Riflemen of the Car52 53 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 238. Stercho, 302. �110 SLOVAKIA 2019 pathian Sich inaugurated the reign of "Ukrainian terror." It is true that they focu sed more on the Russophile domestic opposition than they did on Polish or Hungarian infiltrators. A detention camp was established for dissident Russophiles and Rusynophiles at Dumen . Yet conditions of internment were relaxed. Political differences extended to the family leve l, and prisoners under guard where permitted to attend social events in neighboring Rakhiv.54 There was a conflict of interest between the Carpathian Sich and the Voloshyn regime. Sich rifl emen viewed Carpatho-Ukraine as the cornerstore of a future greater Ukraine, and counted on the support of Nazi Germany. Voloshyn , by contrast, decided that adherence to Czecho-Slovakia (now officially spelled with a hyphen) was a necessary expedient. In March of 1939 there were clashes between the Carpathian Sich and the regular Czechoslovak military. This confl ict was abruptly terminated when German leader Adolf Hitler moved to eliminate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia . As he prepared to militarily occupy Prague, he disappointed Ukrainophi les by giving his consent for Hungary to annex the province. Under German pressure, Slovakia declared its independence on March 14. CarpathoUkraine was now cut off from the Czech lands. With Hungarian troops already crossing the border, Voloshyn symbo li cally proclaimed Carpatho-Ukraine's independence on March 15 . Carpatho-Ukraine existed as an independent state for all of a day . On the 16 th , Hungarian military units were fighting for Khust. The Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich resisted with admirab le resolve , but its units were scattered and no match for the Hungarian army. They later regrouped in the mountains or were pushed across the border to Eastern Slovakia, thus encouraging Hungary to invade the latter as well. 55 Hungarian troops reached the Polish border by the end of the I 61\ and were eagerly embraced by their opposite numbers. The region was renamed Subcarpathia and governed directly from Budapest. There was some vague talk in the Hungarian parliament about according autonomy to the most recently annexed portion , but not to Uzhorod or Mukachevo, which were now considered 54 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationality Problem in Subcarpathian Rus ' I 9381939: A Reappraisal" in Magocsi , Of th e Making of Nationalities, 228 . 55 This invasion of Eastern Slovakia resulted in portions of the disputed counties likewise being annexed by Hungary. It also resulted in the Slovak Republic placing itself under the military protection of Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2019 111 directly part of Hungary. Autonomy was del ayed indefinitely. As World War II progressed, the Hungarian military vehemently opposed autonomy for security reaso ns . The Ukrainophiles were particularly singled out for political persecution, while the Russophiles were more or less set aside. Interestingly, the Hungarian government began cultivating the idea that the Rusyns were their own separate nationality, an idea which ultimately became the wave of the future. 56 The resto ration of Hungarian rule dis illusioned the Russophil es. It stood to reason that, once Hungary went down to defeat with Nazi Germany, Andrei Brodii would come to a bad end . He did not attempt to flee when Soviet forces reached the area in the autumn of 1944, but attempted to negotiate with them. He was arrested by the Soviet counterintelligence unit SMERSH, charged as a fascist co ll aborator, and executed on November 7, 1946. A similar fate awa ited Stefan Fentsik: he was shot in the courtyard of the Uzhorod prison on March 30, 1946. Their Ukrainophile rival Voloshyn fared no better. Having taken up res idence in Prague during the war years, he taught at the Ukrainian Free University. In June 1945 he was arrested by SMERSH and transported to Moscow. He died in Lefortovo prison on July 19, undoubtedl y murdered. An ironic footnote of hi story is worth mentioning. Both Brodii and Fentsik were posthumously rehabilitated after the breakup of the Soviet Union. No such rehabilitation has been granted to Voloshyn. World War II and Ukrainiazation If the Russophiles in Podkarpatska Rus' were fatally compromised by collaboration with the Hungarians, then in Eastern Slovakia they earned acclamation for their role in an anti-fascist struggle. A leading force in the resistance to the pro-German regime of president-priest Jozef Ti so was the Slovak Communist Party. George Kennan , at that time charge d 'affa ires to the U.S. embassy in Prague, assessed the pro-communist sentiment in Eastern Slovakia as being a "bird of a different color [which] in former circumstances would have little chance of success." He added, however, that owing to 56 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 248-9 . �112 SLOVAKIA 2019 guidance from Moscow, the Communists could become the most formidable resistance group of all. 57 Kennan's prognosis was largely accurate, though certain qualifying feature s must be noted. The Communists did not have a monopoly on the resistance movement. In prewar Czechoslovakia they were strongest in Podkarpatska Rus ', but in Eastern Slovakia they were never ab le to muster more than seven percent of the vote among the Ru syns in the interwar period. Not wishing to be isolated from other Rusyns in organized resistance to the Tiso regime, local Communi sts opted to join the Carpatho-Russian Council for National Liberation (KRASNO), which shall be introduced shortly. The view of the autonomous and later independent Slovak state on the Rusyns was that the latter were "S lovaks of the Greek Catholic faith ." This view was exemp li fied by Andrej Dudas, who in 1940 was appointed regional administrator of Eastern Slovakia. He was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, a position he maintained a full three decades later as an emigre in Argentina.58 In early 1939, the Rusyn Nationa l Committee and the Carpatho-Russian Nationa l Counci l were banned by the Slovak government, and the activity of the Dukhnovych Society was restricted. The Ukrainian movement among the Rusyns was particularly loathed by the Slovak nationalist leadership. Slovak police reports up until November 1938 indicate that Rusyns in the Presov Region supported union with their brethren east of the Uz Ri ver. Yet, in November, the same police reports indicate a significant change. The Ukrainian movement was even more alien to the Presov Region Rusyns than was Slovak nationalism, and they were henceforth opposed to a revision of borders which was favorable to CarpathoUkraine. 59 Rusyns shared in the economic prosperity of the Slovak Republic which characterized the first half of World War II. Workers in Germany sent money home to their families, whi le locally a number 57 Report written about May I, 1939 on conditions in Slovakia in George Ken nan, From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1 940 (Princeton, 1968), 139140. 58 Andrej Dudas, Rusinska otazka ajej uzadie (B uenos Aires, 1971), 25 . 59 See the entry " Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Counci l for National Liberation/Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet natsional'nmyi osvonodenyi (KRASNO)" in Magocsi and Pop, eds ., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Culture, 58. �SLOVAKIA 2019 113 of Rusyns profited from the expropriation of Jewish property. Yet once it became obvious that the Slovak Republic was on the losing side of the war, a number of Rusyns began to organize, The Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Council for National Liberation (Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet national'nogo obsvobzhdenii-KRASNO) was founded in Presov in September 1943. Its goals were to aid escaped Soviet prisoners of war and partisans and to cooperate with other underground elements opposed to what it considered a clericofascist regime. Its members envisioned a restored Czechoslovakia in which Rusyns would be equal partners with Czechs and Slovaks. Although its orientation was pro-Soviet and decidedly leftist, KRASNO was not a communist front organization. It was founded by civic and cultural leaders of varied political orientation. Vasyl' Karaman ( 1903-1961) was born in the village of Nagov, in Slovakia. After completing his education at the Commercial Academy in Mukachevo (1924-1927), be returned to eastern Slovakia, where he worked as a civil servant in Presov from 1927 to 1933 , and then served in various towns as secretary for the pro-government Agrarian Republican Party. When Czecho-Slovakia was being partitioned in the fall of 1938, he opposed the pro-Ukrainian orientation of the Voloshyn government. He was elected as chairman of a newly re-established Central Russian National Council. Its members included both Russophiles and Rusynophiles who wished to retain ties with what remained of Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the followers of Brodii and Fentsik. Unable to realize his objectives, he returned to the Presov Region. Here he joined a Committee of Rusyns which tried to reach an accommodation with the Slovak government. This was not possible, since Slovak nationalist officials distrusted his Russophile orientation. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Karaman was arrested. He spent a year and a half in jail, and after his release made contact with the Zhydovs'kyi brothers, Ivan and Petro. Together the three men were among the founders of KRASNO. 60 Ivan Zhydovs'kyi (1897-1982) was born in the village of Sarisske Jastrabie. His secondary school education at the Piarist gymnasium in Sabinov was interrupted in 1915, when he was drafted 60 See the entry " Karaman, Vasyl"' in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 228. �114 SLOVAKIA 2019 into the Austro-Hungarian Army. A year later he was captured on the Eastern Front. Like many prisoners of War, he embraced the Bolshevik cause during the Russian Revolution. During the Russian Civil War Zhydovs ' kyi served as a political commissar in the 216 th International Communist Brigade. When he returned home, he discontinued the role of agitator and became at least outwardly conformist. He completed his secondary education in 1919, and then studied law at the Comenius University in Bratislava, obtaining a degree in 1924. He worked for a time as a tax inspector in Uzhorod. By the I 930s he had a law practice in Uzhorod and he was director of the Presov branch of the Uzhorod-based Subcarpathia Bank. As a Russophile, Zhydovs ' kyi was prominent in the Central Russian National Council and in the Dukhnovych Society. Although opposed to the separatist Slovak government, he kept a lower profile then Kamman and was never arrested. He operated a law practice in Giraltovce prior to his invol ve ment with KRASNO .61 His older brother Petro Zhydovs'kyi (1890-1947) was likewise born in Sarisske Jastrabie. As a teenager Petro emigrated to America in 1905 . Although he acquired little formal education, he returned home on the eve of World War I detern1ined to work for the advancement of the Rusyn people. Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, he deserted, then was captured and sentenced to prison. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he joined the Agrarian Republican Party and served as deputy to parliament from 1935 to 1938 . During the crisis of 1938 Zhydovs'kyi joined with Ivan P' ieshchak in submitting a memorandum to the British envoy Lord Runciman, calling for the unification of the Presov Region with an autonomous Podkarpatska Rus' .62 Ivan P' ieshchak ( 1904-1972) was born in the village of Vel'ky Lipnik. After graduating from the gymnasium of Mukachevo and the Presov Greek Catholic Teachers' Co llege, he taught in the regional elementary school s. P ' ieshchak was active in the Union of Rusyn Teachers in Slovakia and helped organize the Union of Rusyn Youth in Slovakia (1933). At the same time he studied law, and attained a 61 See the entry "Zhydovs'kyi, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 55 l. 62 See the entry "Zhydovs' kyi , Petro" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 551-2. �SLOVA.KIA 2019 115 doctoral degree from Charles University in Prague in the same year. By the mid 1930s P 'ieshchak was a prominent figure on the Rusyn political and cultural scene. He joined Andrei Brodii's Autonomous Agricultural Union and served as its representative in parliament. Interestingly, at this time he also worked closely with Andrej Hlinka's Slovak People's Party in the parliament's autonomist bloc . When Podkarpatska Rus' attained autonomy, P'ieshchak served as state secretary in Brodii 's brief-lived cabinet. After Brodii 's demise, he returned to Slovakia, where he maintained a law practice prior to his involvement with KRASNO .63 KRASNO rapidly expanded its network. By the summer of 1944 it controlled 3 7 villages in a sort of "partisan republic" between Medzilaborce and Stropkov. Intensification of partisan activityreinforced by Soviet partisans parachuted across the Carpathiansled to German military intervention in Slovakia at the end of August 1944. The clandestine military center of dissident Slovak Army officers , headquartered in Banska Bystrica, was already in touch with the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London. Its members had to proclaim the Slovak Nationa l Uprising under premature circumstances on August 29. 64 The Slovak National Uprising was a highly complex affair, which goes well beyond the limits of this study. It is sufficient to note here that it was dependent upon Soviet military support. Contrary to allegations by later critics, the Soviets did not deliberately betray the uprising. Their military capacity to cross the Carpathians was severely limited, particularly after the Germans occupied the Dukla pass. Yet the Soviets did not wish to forfeit the political influence they expected to enjoy in postwar Czechoslovakia, and rendered military assistance. In this capacity the Russian military 63 See the entry "P'ieshchak, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 384-5 . 64 Slovak soldiers, under the influence of Captain Piotr Alekseyevitch Velitchko intercepted members of a German military mission passing through Slovakia in the vicinity of Turciansky Sviity Martin. The Slovak soldiers escorted the Germans to the local barracks. It was Velitchko 's intention that the Germans would be disarmed there and that they would be sent to Ukrainian Partisan Headquarters in Kiev. But when the Germans attempted to depart, they were massacred by the Slovaks. Berlin then decided on a complete military occupation of Slovakia. At this point Lieutenant-Colonel Golian in Banska Bystrica issued the order to start the uprising. �116 SLOVAK.IA 2019 crossed through the Dukla pass for a third time in a military campaign that has been immortalized by local historiography. The Carpatho-Dukla operation, initiated on September 8, was undertaken by the 38 1h Soviet Army, led by General Kyril Moskalenko, supported by the 1s i Czechoslovak Army Corps, led by General Ludvik Svoboda. Many of the troops of the Is 1 Army Corps were Rusyns. In the autumn of 1939, as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the Soviets had annexed eastern Galicia and merged it with the Ukrainian S.S.R. An estimated 30,000 Rusyns who were disgruntled with Hungarian rule crossed the mountains into eastern Galicia, expecting to be cordially received by their Slavic brethren. Instead, every single one of them was arrested by the NKVD (Soviet State Security) and received an eight to ten year sentence for the illegal border crossing. A full sixty percent of them perished in the Gulag by the time Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. The survivors were released to join the I s i Czechoslovak Army Corps . Any Pan-Slav feeling- Russophile or Ukrainophi le alikewhich the Rusyn s may have had earlier had been beaten out of them in the Gulag. They merely wished to return home. In the autumn of 1944 it appeared that they would be the vanguard in the liberation of their homeland. Instead, they were committed to the meat-grinder of the Dukla Pass, where their casualties exceeded sixty percent. 65 The storming of the Duk la Pass was finally completed on October 6th. In the fighting which followed, the monastery community of Ladomirova was severely damaged. Most of the buildings, including the print shop but not the church, were destroyed. Now, too , the NKVD began rounding up Russian emigres in Slovakia. The monks fled to Bratislava, and from there fourteen of them emigrated to the United States. They entered the recently established Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, in upstate New York, where Archbishop Maksimenko now served as archimandrite. They built a church that was a replica of its predecessor in Ladomirova. A young Rusyn novitiate from the village, Vasyl' Shkurla (born 1928), ultimately became Archbishop Lavrl' , one of the leading figures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. By the 1980s Holy Trinity had become a major 65 See Vladimir Baumgarten, "Fifty Years Later: An Inquiry into Soviet Military Policy During the Slovak Uprising" in Lewis White, ed., On All Fronts: Czechoslovaks During World War ff Part 2 (Washington , 1995), 2 19-28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 117 cultural center for Russian emigres. When the cello virtuoso Mstislav Rostropovich defected to the United States, he chose to settle in Jordanville in order to be near Holy Trinity. 66 The Germans torched large areas in eastern Slovakia as they were forced to retreat, including the town of Svidnik. General Svoboda was nonetheless hailed as a hero and liberator when he entered it on October 28 .67 After the liberation of Svidnik, the Allies temporarily went on the defensive. KRASNO partisans continued fighting in the hills north of Presov. In October their adherents welcomed a declaration by the Slovak National Council that a resurrected Czechoslovakia would consist of three equal nations- Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns. It must be understood that Rusyns did not fight in partisan units exclusively of their own nationality. Jozef Rodak, longtime director of the East Slovak Military Museum in Svidnik, asserted that most partisan groups in the region had a mixed composition of Slovaks and Rusyns.68 To this day many people in eastern Slovakia have a dual sense of identity : they consider themselves Rusyns by heritage and Slovaks by citizenship. The realities of liberation at the end of World War II disappointed the aspirations of many Rusyns, particularly Russophiles. It undoubtedly di sconcerted them to discover that Moscow now considered them to be Ukrainians. There was already a precedent for thi s aspect of Soviet policy . In 1923 the delegation of Rusyn Communists attended a Party Congress in Soviet Ukraine and declared their acceptance of Ukrainian nationality. It was altogether practical for Soviet authorities to reaffirm acceptance of this principle at the end of 66 See the entry " Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266. 67 General Svoboda was designated as an honorary citizen of Svidnik. As president of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968, Svoboda gave the town its first hospital. In I 979, the year of the old man's death, a statue of him was erected in Svidnik. Owing to the damage of autumn 1944, Svidnik is a modem town . Most of the buildings are constructed in the so-called "social realist" style. Svoboda ' s statue looks strangely at home among the imposing, unattractive concrete structures. 68 As a graduate student of Safarik University in Prefov who specialized in the history of his region during World War 11 , Rodak was frequently delegated to carry the briefcases of Soviet military visitors. He remained outwardly conformist throughout the Soviet era. After the 1989 revolution and the coll apse of the communist system, Rodak wrote a series of articles for newspapers in eastern Slovakia and southeas tern Poland in which he exonerated partisans who had fallen into disfa vor. �118 SLOVAKIA 2019 World War II. Throughout the war, the Soviets had pledged themselves to the recognition of Czechoslovakia' prewar frontiers . Yet now Moscow infom1ed the Czechoslovak government that it could not ignore "the will of the people." In the wake of the Red Army's occupation of Podkarpatska Rus ' , various National Committees were established to vote in favor of the province being merged with the Ukrainian S.S.R. In all fairness to these communities, they overall enjoyed popular support. 69 The region was officially ceded at the end of June, 1945. Across the Uz River, in the Presov Region , the Russophile leaders of the defunct KRASNO drew the politically correct conclusion. Now, they too, considered themselves Ukrainian. They reorganized themselves as the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region. They envisioned that the long disputed counties of eastern Slovakia would be included in the territorial transfer. Indeed, even before the war ended, Vasyl' Karaman and the Zhysov ' skyi brothers planned to stage a meeting in Presov in February 1945 calling for the merger. A Soviet military major explained to them that such a meeting would be inopportune. The war was still on, and the Soviet Union intended to honor its obligations to Czechoslovakia.70 With eastern Slovakia excluded from the territorial settlement, the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region now called for the resurrected Czechoslovakia to consist of three equal nations: Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. The Slovak National Council had already expressed itself in favor of autonomy for the Rusyns. Now, in light of Ukrainian irredentism, it declared its Ukrainian counter• 1·d 11 part as mva 1 . Even after the Rusyns were officially classified as Ukrainian, the Russophile tradition not only persisted but predominated in the Presov Region . It must be noted that the Soviet 3gth Army was composed of elite Guards regiments, the cream of the Soviet military. Its soldiers conducted themselves in a correct and disciplined manner in 69 Yaroslav Pylynsky, Rising Ethnic Self-Awareness. Carpatho-Rusyns- Birth of a New Nation or a Political Game? (Copenhagen, 1998), 20. 70 Memorandum on the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Slovakia. Kosice. February 16, 1945 , in Nemec and Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Ruthenia, Document no.77 , 359-60 71 Magocsi , "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 262 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 119 their interactions with the locals after forcing their way through the Dukla Pass. This was in striking contrast with the soldiers of the 4 th Ukrainian Front, who penetrated Slovakia from the south, and who engaged in rape and widespread looting. This author can personally attest to the fact that citizens of the Svidnik area remember the Russians fondly as having assisted them through a bitter winter, and afterwards helped the locals plant their spring crops. Historian Mykola Musynka, himself a Ukrainophi le, summarizes the local attitudes as follows: The culmination of Russophilism in the cultural life of the Rusyns of the Prefo v Region occurred in the years just after World War II, when due to the Red Army's defeat of German fascism, th e Soviet Union enjoyed considerable authority among Rusyn-Ukrainians as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Everything "Soviet" was perceived as "Russian." Political propaganda attempted to portray the Soviet Union as an ideal country in which all peoples were united around the "Great Russian people. " The Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian individual, and the "Russian Soul " all symbolized the acme ofp e,:fection. 72 Russian Elementary and secondary schools proliferated after World War II, in addition to the Russian gymnasium in Presov, an additional Russian gymnasium was established in Medzilaborce on February 23, 1945, and trade schoo ls were opened in which Russian was the language of instruction. According to official statistics for the 1948-49 school year, there were 43 kindergartens, 276 elementary schools, 38 incomplete and 6 complete secondary schools with instruction in the Russian language, totaling 23, 11 2 pupils.73 After the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region was abolished, it was replaced by a new organization, the cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (Kul'tumy sojuz'ukrajans'kyi trudjascychKSUT), which was staunchly supportive of the Communist Party. KSUT initiated numerous publications in the Ukrainian language. 72 Mykola Musynka, "The Postwar Development of the Regional Culture of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia' in Paul Robert Magocsi, ed., The Persistence of Regional Cultures: Rusyns and Ukrainians in the Carpathian Hom eland and Abroad (New York, 1993), 55. 73 Ibid, 56. �120 SLOVAKIA 2019 Beginning on June 28, 1952, by decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, the language of instruction in all Russian elementary and secondary schools of Eastern Slovakia was changed to Ukrainian . The change in the school system was torturous for all parties. It was implemented too quickly. Instructors who had never studied literary Ukrainian were assigned to take month-long courses, after which they were expected to teach in that language. The vast majority of teachers detested it. There was a shortage of textbooks, dictionaries and other printed materials. Ukrainiazation nonetheless made significant strides in popular culture . In January 1953 , KSUT sponsored the first professional song and dance ensemble in Medzilaborce under the artistic direction of Jurij Kostjik. It was eventually reorganized as the Dukla Ukrainian Folk Ensemble. In September of that year, a Department of Ukrainian Language and Literature was established at the Presov Pedagogical Institute, which in 1959 became the Philosophical Faculty of Safarik University, under the direction of Petro Bungansyn. Literary works by Rusyns in the Presov Region reached an unprecedented level of publication in the course of a decade in the Ukrainian language. After 1959, the Ukrainian division of the Slovak Pedagogical Publishing House had a monopoly on the release of Ukrainian books in the Presov Region. During a thirty-year period it published 373 literary and scholarly works. Not all of them withstood the test of time. Many employed the so-called "socialist realist" style, reflecting a Marxist-Leninist ideological bent which conformed to Party dogma. Yet the Presov Region has produced works which have assumed a permanent place in the history of literature. 74 A number of former Russophiles moved with the times and adopted Ukrainian literary norms. Those Russophiles who remained outside the Communist Party could not expect a triumphal finish . Such was the case of Vasyl' Karaman, who, after the abolition of the body he had chaired, was accused of being a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist." The allegation was blatantly absurd: Karaman steadfactly believed that the future of the Rusyns was closely bound to the Soviet Union . He was nonetheless removed from political and cultural life in the Presov Region. Similarily, Ivan P'ieshchak was ac74 Ibid, 65 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 121 cused of bourgeois nationalism, driven from his home in 1952, and forbidden to practice law for nearly a decade. Ironically, some of the greatest beneficiaries of the new socialist order were those Rusyns of the 1st Czechoslovak Anny Corps who had survived the ordeal of the Dukla Pass. In spite of their suffering in the Gulag, they had fought bravely and well under General Svoboda, in fact becoming his favorite soldiers. 75 The treaty transferring Podkarpatska Rus ' to Soviet Ukraine contained a certain "exemption" clause. Those Rusyns with a record of service in the Czechoslovak Army could retain Czechoslovak citizenship. About half of them chose to do so, relocating west of the Uz. Svoboda redressed the balance for them as much as humanly possible, obtaining jobs for them in the military and especially in the security services. One might suppose that, after their experience in the Gulag, they would have been averse to serving as agents of repression. Instead, thanks to Svoboda' s generous patronage, they became overrepresented in the secret police, not only in eastern Slovakia but in Prague and Bratislava as well. This role fueled the hostility of their fellow citizens. Animosities smoldered beneath the surface for a full generation. During the Prague spring of 1968, the Slovak press suddenly became articulate in its denunciations: " ... this 15 year anti-Slovak movement in eastern ... Slovakia must be liquidated." 76 Slovak nationalists in particular resented the fact that the city of Presov served as a bastion of Ukrainophile activity. Slogans appeared on a number of buildings: "Presov was and will be only- and only- a Slovak city" and "Ukrainians, get out of Presov! " 77 The Slovak element of eastern Slovakia was not the only one which opposed the Ukrainian movement. Passive opposition was expressed by many Rusyns themselves . If they could not be themselves, the Rusyns opted for the closest thing, and voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. 78 The local dialect spoken was not foreign to them, unlike that of the Ukrainian textbooks imported from Kiev. Whenever local citizens were questioned by the police, they declared themselves as Slo75 Magocsi, "Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns in Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 175. 76 Cited in Kulturny zivot (Bratislava) April 15, 1968 and Vychod (Kosice) November 29, 1968. 77 Magocsi, "National Assimilation", 283. 78 fbid, 264-70. �122 SLOVAKIA 2019 vak, fearing deportation to the Soviet Union. Finally, the relatively more advanced Slovak economy drew many to the industrial valleys farther south, where the process was completed. For those Rusyns who continued to consider themselves Ukrainian , yet another shock awaited in the following generation. After the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of communism in East Central Europe, first the Slovak and then the Polish government recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Many young Rusyns eagerly embraced the new orientation. 79 Conclusion. Unrepentant Russophiles: Yurkovsky, Kabuliak, Sidor and Karabelesh The demise of the Russophile orientation among the CarpathoRusyn people was undoubtedly, to employ a Marxist cliche, historically inevitable. An interesting story revealing the pathetic depths to which it had descended by World War II is provided by Marian Zgomiak, later a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow , Poland. At the outbreak of World War II, Zgomiak was a 15 year-old Polish youth. When Poland was militarily crushed by Nazi Germany in September of 1939, Poli sh Army veterans hoped to escape to the West to fight again. Since most of the Polish soldiers fleeing abroad were between the ages of 17 and 30, two groups of people played disproportionately large roles in the domestic resistance movement organized by the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa- AK). One of them was Polish teenagers, who acted as couriers escorting the fugitive s to the border with Slovakia. Another was the Lemkos, who acted as guides. 79 The rejection of Ukrainian identity is by no means unanimous. On November 17, 1990, at the First Congress of the Ru syn Renaissance Society in Medzilaborce, spokesman Mychal Turok-Heter stressed that "while it is vital to preserve national pride, it is wrong to attack the Ukrai nians and the Ukrainian language . Gradually, the Ru syns will write and advance toward the common path which will lead them to fulfilling thei r mi ssive of peace for us all." See Myslenka, 75. Frequently, on the local level , there ex ists a certa in pluralism. In Svidnik, the Museu m of UkrainianRus'Culture acknowledges kinship with the former while stressing the regional identity of the latter. See the entry " Museum of Ukrainian Rus' Culture in Svidnik" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Cu lture, 337. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 123 Young Zgorniak was active in these border expeditions. On July 2, 1942, he and his father were arrested by the Gestapo. After the usual beatings and interrogation in the basement of the Gestapo headquarters in Gorlice, Zgorniak was transferred to the prison in Jaslo. Here he bonded with a Lemko prisoner named Yurkovsky. This Yurkovsky was an unrepentant Russophile. During World War I he and his father were hauled off to internment in Talerhof. Yurkovsky senior died there during the typhus epidemic. Yurkovsky junior returned to the mountain districts of Lemkovyna to serve as a teacher in the interwar years. He did not consider himself a Rusyn or even a Lemko, but a Russian. He was not receptive to Polish efforts to sponsor a separate Lemko identity. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of I 941 , the Nazi Government General (to which Lemkos west of the San River where subject) rounded up Lemkos known for their pro-Russian sentiments. In this manner Yurkovsky found himself in the prison of Jaslo. Both the quality and quantity of food in the prison of Jaslo left much to be desired. In September of 1942 German authorities loosened the regime to the point where Lemkos (but not Poles) could receive food packages. Arrangements were made for Zgomiak's mother to send food to Yurkovsky, who shared it with her son. Working together in the hospital section of the prison, they had the opportunity to engage in intellectual discussions. Zgorniak records the following: During one of the discussions I asked whether or how he could coordinate the Carpatho-Rusyn orientation on the Russia ruled by the Tsar with an orientation on a Russia ruled by the Bolsheviks who had overthrown and murdered the Tsar and his family. He said he could do so because "after the death a/father in Talerhof I had the dream . In it my father appeared and said 'the cause for which both are fighting shall be successful! ' That dream I keep in mind and I believe it will prove to be true. "80 80 Marian Zgomiak, " Meeting with Lemko leaders who had been arrested by the Gestapo and who were in prison in Jaslo 1942" in Best and Moklak, eds ., The Lemko Region, /939-194 7, 129. �124 SLOVAKIA 2019 Zgomiak asserts that he was convinced Yurkovsky and other Lemkos could have been released had they declared themselves Ukrainians. They declined to do so. Eventually, Yurkovsky was transferred to a concentration camp in Pruszkow, from which he was liberated before the end of the war. Yurkovsky then became sold on the plan jointly agreed upon by the Polish and Soviet governments to encourage Lemkos to emigrate to the east. Those whose villages had been destroyed during the Carpatho-Dukla operation went willingly. Others followed Yurkovsky across the border. They were by no means satisfied with living conditions in Soviet Ukraine, and turned on Yurkovsky for encouraging them to leave in the first place. He suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown and developed heart disease. Zgomiak concluded: "I remember him as an intelligent fellow who despite hi s various interests was fatally attracted to the idea for which he fought." 81 In light of its ignominious end in the realm of politics, what remains of the Russophile tradition among the Carpatho-Rusyns in the realm of culture? Here the author wishes to turn to the areas of religion and literature. In the area of reli gion, the Orthodox faith has provided a certain legacy. It must be understood that the majority of Rusyns professing any religious belief adhere to the Greek Catholic rather than the Orthodox Church . Yet the Orthodox revival of the early twentieth century made an enduring impact which was embraced by the communist regimes after World War II. Its most enthusiastic protagonist was Aleksander Kabuliak. At the end of World War I he was released from prison and became a major figure of the Orthodox revival in Czechoslovakia. There was a sc hi sm within the Orthodox Church in the 1920s. Its adherents were subject to the Serbian patriarchate, whereas Czech converts to Orthodoxy wanted their own autocephalous Orthodox Church. They appealed to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. On March 4, 1923 he consecrated the archimandrite Savritij as bishop. Bi shop Savritij 's leadership was contested by Bishop Gorazd, the Serbian patriarch 's representative. Kabuliak sided with the Serbian patriarchate in this di spute. With the Orthodox Church temporarily paralyzed and depri ved of an acting bishop, Kabuliak assumed the role of administrator. The Hungar81 Ibid, 129. �SLOVAKIA 2019 125 ians did not molest him during World War II, nor did he do anything to provoke them. But on November 18, 1944, on behalf of the Orthodox believers of Podkarpatska Rus ', Kabuliak wrote a letter to no less a personage than Soviet leader J. V. Stalin. He recommended the establishment of a Carpatho-Russian Soviet Republic encompassing territory extending "from Iasnyia to Poprad and from Uzhok Pass to Debrecen." 82 Since Moscow was already planning to incorporate Podkarpatska Rus' into the Ukrainian S.S.R., this was not an option. Yet in the following month Kabuliak led a delegation to Moscow requesting the transfer of episcopal jurisdiction from the Serbian to the Moscow patriarchate. Here his efforts were crowned with success. In posthumous recognition of his achievement, in 200 I the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) canonized Kabuliak as the first Carpatho-Rusyn saint. Eastern Galicia, like Podkarpatska Rus ', was ceded to Soviet Ukraine at the end of the war. In both areas incoming communist regimes declared the Greek Catholic Church abolished and transferred its parishes to the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church. In Galicia most of the clergy accepted the formal change and retained their old parishes. The Ukrainian character of the church consequently survived . In Transcarpathia the Greek Catholic clergy was more resistant to Orthodoxy and it was imposed more forcefully. Bishop Teodor Romza of Mukachevo was brutally murdered, while lesser clergymen were arrested and deported.83 They were replaced by Russian priests di spatched from Moscow. The Orthodox Church here acquired an expressively Russian character. From the standpoint of Rusyn culture, inclusion into the Russian Orthodox Church was a double-edged sword. In America, Reverend Alexis Toth had sought to convince his flock that the best way to preserve their rite, tradition and identity was through conversion to Orthodoxy. Yet St. Alexis (He too was canonized) had a great love for the variety of liturgical music known as Carpathian plainchant. 82 See the entry "Kabuliak, Aleksander" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn Hist01:y and Culture, 223 . 83 Pekar, 151 -4. �126 SLOVAK.IA 2019 This and another native aspects of worship were submerged by Russian liturgical tradition .84 In Czechoslovakia the legal status of the Greek Catholic Church was restored as a result of the liberal reforms of the Prague spring of 1968. Yet it lost its Rusyn character and became a force for slovakization. Much church property has been restored since the collapse of the communist system in 1989. Yet there remain adherents of the Orthodox faith in northeastern Slovakia. This author has an endearing memory of a visit to an Orthodox church in Svidnik. It was a modest, prefabricated structure, erected in the L990s. The morning was cold. There was only room inside the church for elderly parishioners. Yet a sizable crowd of young people remained standing outside. They displayed enough reverence to refrain from smoking throughout the Divine Liturgy. If the Rusyns can no longer be considered Great Russians, then the Russian government, and especially the Orthodox Church, wishes to retain whatever bonds still exist. While seminarians of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church have received their education in Ukraine, those who adhere to the Moscow patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been educated in Russia. Such was the case of Dmitri Sidor, born March 29, 1955, currently rector of the Church of the Exaltation of the Cross in Uzhorod. Reverend Sidor heads a movement demanding autonomy for Rusyns of Ukraine. He stresses the religious character of his people, and the similarity of their language with Old Church Slavonic. On December 19, 2008 , the Rusyn issue was raised at an international conference held on the Don, southern Russia. The conference was entitled "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of the Rusyns of Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century]." A resolution was adopted. It stated that, alongside the Armenians, the Rusyns were the first victims of genocide in the twentieth century, thi s in reference to the policy of the Austro-Hungarian military during the First World War. Today, the resolution continued, Kiev engaged in a "policy of cultural ethno- 84 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Adaptati on Wi thout Assimilati on: The Genius of the Greek Catholic Church of Mukachevo" in Of the Making of Nationalities, Volume 11 , 202. �SLOVAKIA 2019 127 cide." It pointed out that the Rusyns were recognized as a distinct nationality by numerous countries, but not Ukraine. 85 The Ukrainophile orientation responded to the Rostov conference. One articulate response may be found in the working paper "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem: A Ukrainian Perspective," by Natalya Belitzer of the Py lip Orlyk Institute for Democracy in Kiev. She outlines the tortutous, complex evolution of the history of a region which has been subject to numerous rulers. She echoes her colleague M. Lanchuk in asserting that the main issue at stake has not been the ethno-cultural identity of the Rusyns but rather what has been termed "political Ruthenianism," which many Ukrainians perceive as a threat. 86 According to Belitzer, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an artificial politicization of the Rusyn question. Belitzer is not opposed to Ru syn autonomy in principle. Yet, as a Ukrainophile, she considers the Rusyn tongue as a mere dialect of the Ukrainian language. Belitzer makes a particularly revealing admission when she states that "Ukrainian democracy is ... quite benevolent to the ideas and practices of the restoration of minorities ' own identity, but at the same time strongly denies Rusyn identity as being separate from the Ukrainian.,,s1 Therein lies the rub. If the Rusyn tongue is a dialect of the Ukrainian language, why is its use not permitted in schools? Rusyn schoolchildren speak one way at home but are required to speak another way at school. Such practices are grist to Dmitri Sidor's mill. Aside from the fact that Ukraine has an army and the Rusyns do not, Father Dmitri's movement faces two serious obstacles. For one, he is an Orthodox priest, whereas the majority of Rusyns still profess (or have resumed professing) the Greek Catholic faith. Secondly, while a majority of the Rusyns in the Presov Region and Lemkovyna 85 Resolution of the International conference "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of Ru syns in Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century] Rostov on the Don, Russia. December 2 1, 2008 www.podkar~atskarus.eu 6 M. Panchuk, " Political Rutheni ani sm" in Demons of Peace and Messengers of War(Kiev, 1997), 323. 87 Natalya Belitzer, "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem : A Ukrainian Perspective". Research paper prepared within the framework of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) sponsored by the Center for European Security Studies and the University of Gronigen (Netherlands). Undated, 12. �128 SLOVAKIA 2019 consider themselves their own nationality, a majority of them in Transcarpathia consider themselves Ukrainian. Yet the movement has a growing popular appeal. In a state where bureaucratic centralism has had a constipating effect, autonomy can be a powerful laxative. Moreover, the Rusyns now possess a certain bargaining chip . A full eighty percent of all Russian petroleum and natural gas which is sold to Europe passes through pipelines in the area of Uzhorod. If the Rusyns were to succeed in establishing an independent state, they would be eligible to receive billions of dollars of gas transit profits from Kiev.88 In the realm of literature, the Russophile tradition has likewise established an enduring legacy. This is especially exemplified by the writings of Andrii Karabelesh ( 1906-1964). Karabelesh was born in the Transcarpathian village of Tibala, near Mukachevo. When he first attended the gymnasium in Mukachevo the language of instruction was still Magyar. This changed due to the arrival in Podkarpatska Rus ' of many Russian emigres fleeing the revolution. Karabelesh adapted to the russification of the school system so enthusiastically that he became the first secular writer among Rusyn Russophi les. He went on to study at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod ( 1925-1928). While still a student he published- in Russian- two collections of poetry, lzbrany e stikhovtvorenia (1928) and V buchalh rassvieta ( 1929). These works have been characterized as "dominated by mysticism, a pessimistic outlook on life, and a love of Russian culture." 89 He did not complete his studies at the Theological Seminary because he converted to Orthodoxy. His conversion was less for religious than for cultural reasons. As literary historian Elaine Rusinko writes: "Karabelesh ' s deity is not the conventional God of the Greek Catholic catechism, but an amorphous, spiritual force that provides metaphysical potential and philosophical substance for the poet." 9 Karabelesh went on to Prague, where he obtained a degree in philosophy from Charles University in 1934. ° 88 See " Ukraine Laun ches Moderni zation of Urengog-Ponary-U zhorod Pipeline," Ukra inian News Agency, Jul y 19, 2011 . 89 See the entry " Karabelesh, Andrii " in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 223. 90 Ru sinko, 350. �SLOVAKIA 2019 129 Karabelesh continued writing exclusively in standard Russian. Unlike earlier Russophiles, he did not look towards Russia for the deliverance of the Rusyn people. In his estimation, it was no longer a matter of what Holy Mother Russia could do for Podkarpatska Rus'. It was a matter of what Carpathian-Rus' could do for Holy Mother Russia. In his enthusiasm for the great Russian literary giants, Karabelesh exhibited a tendency towards plagiarism, using some of their phrases directly in his own poetry. Karabelesh 's special favorite was Mikhail Lennontov, who merits attention here. Like his predecessor, the great Russian Romantic Alexander Pushkin, Lermontov wrote passionately, lived wildly and was killed in a duel. Unlike Pushkin, Lermontov created a literary genre in which the psychology of the protagonist played a leading role. This served as a precedent for the great novels of Dostoyevsky later in the century.91 In his poem "Nevdol'strie" (Dissatisfaction), Karabelesh quotes Lermontov's Pechorin: "I was not born for happiness. " 92 Anyone who studies the course of Karabelesh 's life would probably agree. He taught secondary school for a time in Podkarpatska Rus ', but when the Hungarians reoccupied the region he fled to Bohemia. Karabelesh participated in the Czech Resistance against the Nazis, heading a small underground group in Litamsyl. In this capacity he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942. He passed the remainder of the war in the concentration camps of Mauthausen and Buchenwald. After the war he remained for a time in western Czechoslovakia, serving as principal of the gymnasium of Svitavy (19451953). Then he moved to the Presov Region, where he taught Russian language and literature at Safarik University. Although a member of the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers Union, he continued to write exclusively in Russian. It was not simply a case of Karabelesh being unwilling to move with the times. The red banner of the October Revolution replaced the grey skies in "V karpatikh osin" (Autumn in the Carpathians ). 93 Yet the apolitical, pessimistic tone of Karabelesh 's poetry became increasingly an object of attack by communist ideologues. In 1956, when the Soviet Communist Party was 91 See Semyon Eks hut, " Pushkin 's Heir" Russian Life, 42 , No, 6 (October/November 1999), 20-32. 92 Rusinko, 353. 93 Ibid, 362. �130 SLOVAKIA 2019 in a state of ideological crisis in the aftermath of Stalin's death , Karabelesh raised his voice in criticism of the imposed ukrainization of the Rusyn people. He was subsequently expelled from the Slovak Writers Union and returned to Bohemia. In the homeland, literary hi storian and defender of the "social realist" genre Iurii Bolega opened an ideological offensive against Karabelesh ' s work, condemning it as having a Russian chauvinist and anti-social character. One may ask why Karabelesh would wish to return home under such circumstances. Yet the years he spent in concentration camps had undennined hi s health, and Karabelesh was of the opinion "Where you are born, there you should die! " 94 Terminally ill, Karabelesh finally returned home in 1964. He died in Mukachevo on September 4 . In the post-communist era his poetry has experienced a revival of popularity. The Eastern Carpathians constitute an area of scenic beauty, but also in many places one of the depressing poverty. In his poem " Moi Narod" (My Nation), Karabelesh focuses on "fences and of abandoned gardens," "dried out grape vines," "bars of broken down churches," "unplowed fields," and so on. His writing reflects the mixture of beauty and melancholia that is essential to the brooding Slavic soul. If the Russophile tradition never reached the level of popularity that the Ukrainophile orientation attained, it nonetheless remains an essential part of the cultural landscape. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank and express his deep appreciation to Bob Broedel , president of the Tallahassee-Krasnodar Sister City Program, for hi s technical assistance in accessing material published in Russia and Ukraine. 94 Ibid, 359. � SLOVAKIA 2019 83 RUSSOPHILES WITHOUT RUSSIA R. Vladimir Baumgarten (Dedicated to the Memory ofNikolaj Ordos) The Carpatho-Rusyns, technically a stateless people, have been dubbed the "Kurds of Central Europe." They straddle the northern and southern slopes of the Carpathian mountains in the border re1 gions of Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Since the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe, both the Slovak and Polish governments have recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Ukraine, where the largest number of Rusyns dwell, does not. After World War II, incoming communist governments classified the Rusyns as Ukrainians by administrative fiat for reasons of convenience, which shall be explained below. The current post-communist government of Ukraine adamantly adheres to this position. 2 Further west, across the Uz river, many Carpatho-Rusyns in eastern Slovakia have voluntari ly assimilated into the Slovak nationality, for reasons which shall likewise be explained in this essay. The first impetus for the Rusyn national awakening came from a belief that they were part of a Great Russian nation, extending "from the Poprad River [in eastern Slovakia] to the Pacific." 3 The Russophile tradition influenced Carpatho-Rusyn culture and politics for a full century. An examination of its history reveals more than a few 1 Paul Robert Magocsi , " Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXIX, Nos. 3-4 ( 1997), 301-54. 2 The Ukrainophile viewpoint was exemplified by Viacheslav Chomovil ( 19371999). During the Brezhnev era, Chomovil was a dissident journalist and human rights activist. He was sent to the labor camps several times for separatist activities. In the late I 980's he was one of the leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine (better-known as Rukh). After the Soviet Union disintegrated and Ukraine became independent, Chomovil became alarmed by the Rusyn political renaissance. He considered it separatist and urged the Prosecutor General's office in Kiev to file charges aga inst its protagonists. 3 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationalist lntelligentia and the Peasantry in Twentieth Century Subcarpathian Rus "', in Magocs i, Of the Making of Nationalities Th ere is No End, Vol. I (New York, 1999), 19. �84 SLOVAKIA 2019 ironies. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the Russophile tradition lasted as long as it did. Indeed, remnants of it exist to this day. The current essay is an attempt to explain its rise and fall. The Russophile Tradition in Habsburg Hungary, Galicia and America The homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns has been alternatively referred to as Ruthenia, Podkarpatska Rus' (Subcarpathian Rus '), Transcarpathia and Carpatho-Ukraine. For reasons of convenience, this author shall refer to it as Podkarpatska Rus' . It was part of the Kingdom of Hungary for about 900 years. Much of Podkarpatska Rus' was a game preserve for the Hungarian nobility. Its Eastern Slav peasants, shepherds and lumberjacks were forbidden to hunt the deer, even when the latter devoured the people's meagre cabbage plots. Starvation was common. The Rusyns were the most impoverished and illiterate ethnic group in the Hungarian kingdom. Originally a bastion of the Russian Orthodox Church, the homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns was a battleground and passageway in the ongoing struggle between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes. In order to wean these people away from any allegiance to the Transylvanian princes, most of whom were Calvinists, the Habsburgs decided to incorporate them into the Roman Catholic Church. They accomplished this by creating a Slavonic/Greek Rite of the church. At the Union of Uzhorod (April 24, 1646), 63 Orthodox priests pledged to recognize the primacy of the pope and the sanctity of Roman Catholic doctrine in exchange for keeping the Slavonic liturgy and a married clergy.4 These clergymen were exempted from the feudal burdens of serfdom, received an income from their parishioners, and could send their sons to seminaries in the Habsburg Monarchy for higher education. Despite this favorable concession from the Imperial House, the Rusyns remained generally loyal to their Magyar lords. This was especially the case of the Kuruc (Crusader) uprising and freedom war of Ferenc Rakoczi II ( 1703-1711 ). 4 For the most comprehensive study of this event, see Michal Lacko, "The Union of Uzhorod," Slovak Studies, VI ( 1966), 7-190. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 85 The contribution of the Rusyns was sufficiently valorous for them to receive the title gens fidelissima ("the most faithful people").5 In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the various Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy-Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs and Croats-launched their own national revivals, the Rusyns were slow to respond. No Rusyns attended the Slav Congress during the revolutionary year 1948. On the contrary, Greek Catholic seminarians in Uzhorod abandoned their intended vocations in order to volunteer for the Hungarian honveds (National Guard) during Hungary' s 1848-1849 war of independence.6 A few educated Rusyns were aware of a certain kinship with Russia. In 1791 Ivan Orlai ( 1771-1829) emigrated to Russia. A schoolteacher, he had been denied advancement in the Austrian system of education. In St. Petersburg he studied medicine and ultimately became court surgeon, actively working in the reorganization of the Russian medical profession. He advised the Ministry of Education to invite other educated Rusyns "since they usually know Church Slavonic thoroughly." 7 Orlai served as Mentor to Nikolaj Gogol, author of Taras Bulba, the Russified Ukrainian who ultimately became one of the literary giants of nineteenth-century Russia. Orlai encouraged other Russian scholars to take an interest in their kinsmen on the other side of the Carpathians. Meanwhile, a Greek Catholic eparchy was established in Presov, eastern Slovakia, in 1818. Its eparch (bishop), Hrihory Tarkovych, was an active pioneer of Russian culture. In expanding his library, he imported the complete works of the eighteenth-century Russian intellectual and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov.8 5 The Rusyns gained this title as a result of a battle fought near Trencin castle in western Slovakia on August 4, 1708. During the fi ghting Rakoczi vaulted across a ravine on horseback. He was thrown forward , striking his head and losing consciousness. His Carpatho-Rusyn peasant infantry held its ground long enough for him to be carried from the fi eld. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Imperial regulars, these Rusyns were subsequently massacred. 6 Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus: / 848-1 948 (Cambridge, MA: 1978), 43. 7 Elaine Rusinko, Straddling Borders: Literature and Identity in Subcarpathian Rus ' (Toronto, 2008), 99. 8 Athanasius Pekar, The History of the Church in Carpathian Rus' (New York, 1992), 89. �86 SLOVAKIA 2019 The first real impetus for the Carpatho-Rusyn awakening came as a result of the Russian military intervention against the Hungarian war of independence in 1849. It was not undertaken to liberate the Slavs of Hungary who were in a state of revolt against Magyar tyranny. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia employed far more autocratic powers than did the House of Habsburg and regarded the stamping out of the fires of revolution, which had swept Europe since the previous year, as a self-evident duty. Polish revolutionary veterans were serving on the Hungarian side and he feared the spread of revolution to his Polish possessions. Nicholas was no Pan-Slav. Two years earlier a nest of such agitators had been discovered in Kiev. It called itself "The Brotherhood of Sts . Cyril and Methodius," and, according to Nicholas, its adherents had invented some monstrosity called the Ukrainian nationality. One of its leading members was not only Ukraine's best poet, but its best painter as well. His people sought ties with the Czechs and Slovaks. Nicholas saw to it that several of them were jailed and he had Taras Schevcenko drafted into the Russian army for ten years, during which time he was forbidden to write or sketch. 9 A number of Russian Pan-Slav politically conservative individuals sympathized with the Slovak people. Tsar Nicholas admonished the Slavophile journalist Ivan Aksakov ( 1823-1886) that, under the guise of a general Slav alliance, subversive elements in the Kingdom of Hungary wished to create a struggle which was not in the name of 0 God, but in a spirit of mutiny, which was dangerous to Russia. ' The Russian military commanders carefully studied the earlier conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes . They observed that The Austrians had traditionally moved against Transylvania by starting from Kosice in eastern Slovakia. It was considered safer to cross the Hornad and Tisa rivers in the Carpathian 11 foothills than to assault Transylvania from the Hungarian plain. On June 9, the main Russian army commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Paskievitch, consisting of 70,890 soldiers and 240 cannon poured into Slovakia through the Dukla Pass from partitioned Po9 Pav lo Zaitsev, Taras Shevchenko. A Life (Toronto, 1989), 139-57. °Cudovit Holotik, "The Slovaks: An Integrating or Disintegrating Force?" Austrian 1 Histo ry Yearbook, III , Part 2 ( 1967): 2. 11 William Stiles, Austria in 1848-50, II (New York, 1850), 294. Stiles was the American charge d'affaires in Vienna during the revolutionary events of 1848-49. �SLOVAKIA 2019 87 land. The Russians captured Presov on June 20 and took Kosice five days later. To supply their army, the Russians stockpiled large amounts of foodstuffs at the northern end of the Dukla Pass. However, the military bureaucracy of Tsar Nicholas was inefficient. Provisions were made to transport the artillery but not the food . Austrian quartermasters, who also had a supply of food , and were allied with the Russians, had fled the area. The Russian soldiers, hungry and exasperated, turned to plunder. Don Cossacks looted a number of Slovak villages so thoroughly that the inhabitants fled into the for12 ests . The Russian intervention in this area would be remembered with ill-feelings by Magyars and non-Magyars alike. There were Slovak Pan-Slavs who were willing to overlook Russian misconduct. They convinced themselves that Grand Duke Konstantin was preparing to transfer his headquarters from Warsaw to Kosice, where he would proclaim a new Slav state. Slovak leaders appealed to the Russian embassy and military mission in Vienna for recognition. They requested that Slovak advisors and regional administrators be attached to the Russian military in eastern Slovakia. Tsar Nicholas replied to one such request "I received the same thing yesterday from Danilevsky [the Russian consul in Belgrade]. I have no time for such matters." 13 On the other hand, the reception of Russian military intervention was not universally negative. Rusyn peasants in the highlands witnessed a mighty Slav army in their region for the first time. They were awed. They gave fruits and nuts to the invaders. Aleksander Dukhnovych, soon to become an awakener among the Rusyns, later wrote, "One thing really gave me joy in life, and that was in 1849 when I first saw the glorious Rus sian army .. .I can't describe the feeling of gladness at seeing the first Cossacks on the streets of Presov. I danced and cried with delight. .. It was truly the first, perhaps the last, joy of my life." 14 Aleksander Dukhnovych (1803-1865) was born in the village of Topol 'a in the Humenne region of eastern Slovakia. He was descended from Greek Catholic priests and was consequently educated 12 John Shelton Curtis, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1925-/ 854 (Durham, NC, 1865), 298 . 13 Holotik, 383. 14 Quoted in Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity, 45. �88 SLOVAKIA 2019 at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod. After ordination as a priest in 1827, he was assigned to the bishop 's chancellery in Presov. His relatively progressive views clashed with those of the more conservative Tarkovych, who then assigned him to a relatively remote rural parish. Dukhnovych regarded his assignment as a godsend. In Uzhorod he had received a Hungarian education, which influenced his early writings. In the rural parish he discovered, or re-discovered, "the people." He was influenced by the Slovak National Awakening and applied its precepts to the awakening of his own Rusyn people. After the death of Tarkovych, Dukhnovych was reassigned to Presov and appointed eparchical canon in 1843 . He remained closely associated with the city-considered a Rusyn cultural center in spite of its Slovak majority- for the rest of his life. In 1850, after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, Dukhnovych established the first Rusyn cultural association, the Presov Literary Society. His own literary contribution was considerable. In 1851 he composed the poem "Vruchanie," whose opening lines "I was, am, and will remain a Rusyn" became the motif for the unofficial anthem of the Carpatho-Rusyn people. He researched and wrote extensively on the Rusyn people. His monumental achievement was the play "Virtue is More Important than Riches," which is still performed regularly in regional theatres in eastern Slovakia and western Ukraine. 15 The ethical values expressed in this play mirror Dukhnovych 's role as a social reformer. He campaigned vigorously against illiteracy, alcoholism, and the lingering pagan superstitions which persisted among his people. The literary language employed-indeed, invented by Dukhnovych-was peculiar. It was a blend of Old Church Slavonic, standard Russian and the native dialect. His later disciples called it "the traditional Carpatho-Rusyn langage," while his critics derrided it as "jazychije" (macaronic jargon). 16 Indeed, while Dukhnovych was the greatest of the Rusyn awakeners, he inhibited the establishment of a distinctive Rusyn identity by his unequivocal adherence to the Great Russian idea. 15 For an English-language translation, see Aleksander Duchnovych, Virtue is More Important than Riches, ed. by Elai ne Rusinko (New York, 1994). 16 See the entry "Dukhnovych, Aleksander," in Paul Robert Magocs i and Robert Popp, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture (Toronto, 2005), I06. �SLOVAKIA 2019 89 If Dukhnovych was the unquestioned giant among the Rusyns in the realm of culture, then Adolf Dobrian' skyi ( 1817-1901) fulfilled this function in the realm of politics. Dobrian'skyi was born in Rudl'ov, Zemplin county, Slovakia, the son of a Greek Catholic priest. He attended secondary schools in Levoca, Roznava and Misko le, and then studied philosophy in Kos ice ( 1833 ), law in Eger (1834-36) and mining at the Academy of Mines and Forests in Banska Stiavnica, central Slovakia. He was fluent in several foreign languages, including Magyar, German, French, English and Italian. He visited Bohemia, where he was influenced by Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek and other Czech national awakeners. Dobrian'skyi initially welcomed Hungary' s 1848 Revolution for the liberal reforms that it promised. But when the Slovak district of Banska Bystrica elected him as its representative to the Hungarian Diet, the Hungarian government rejected his mandate on the grounds of Pan-Slavism. Dobrian'skyi then indeed became a Pan-Slav. He moved to Presov, where he built a following which advocated a political union of the Rusyns of Hungary with those of Austrian Galicia. When the Russians prepared to invade Hungary, the Austrian government appointed him as its liason with Paskievitch. Dobrian 'skyi then served as advisor to the Russian military. After the defeat of revolutionary Hungary, the Austrian government imposed a centralist bureaucratic regime. Dobrian' skyi then became advisor to the Uzhorod Civil District, which encompassed four counties. He regarded the civil district as a prelude to the establishment of an autonomous Rusyn state under the Emperor of Austria. 17 Defeated in the Austro-Sardinian war of 1859, The Habsburg Monarchy was substantially weakened. It was forced to retreat from bureaucratic centralism and make concessions to the Magyars. Dobrian' skyi was recalled , and the old nobles began to reoccupy county positions. In 1866 Austria suffered another defeat, this time at the hands of Prussia, and resigned itself in 1867 to accepting the Magyar nobility as equal partners in the renamed Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary. Emperor Franz-Josef allowed himself to be crowned King of Hungary in Budapest and the Hungarian nobles were granted complete self-government in internal affairs. By now their obsession 17 See the entry " Dobrian' skyi, Adolf," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 93. �90 SLOVAK.IA 2019 with Pan-Slavism reached paranoid proportions . They viewed the magyarization of Hungary's Slavic minorities as imperative. Persecution of Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn educational and cultural institutions became the order of the day. A similar course evolved in Galicia, the Austrian province of partitioned Poland. Shortly after the 1867 Compromise with Hungary came into effect, Empreor Franz-Josef appointed his trusted Polish confidant Count Agenor Goluchowski as Viceroy of Galicia. Goluchowski gained for his Polish nobles a degree of autonomy that mirrored that of the Magyars. The education system was polonized. This posed a direct threat to the advancement of the Rusyns. Educated Rusyns became politically divided. The Ukrainian movement gained the greatest strength . However, there were still Rusyns who adhered to the traditions of old Rus' .They stubbornly continued to write in Old Church Slavonic and isolated themselves from the people. Cultureally, these Old Ruthenians identified with Russia, but professed allegiance to the Austrian Emperor. Such a dual allegiance became more difficult to maintain as the nineteenth-century ran its course. Austria and Russia were no longer allies, and were in fact competing for hegemony in the Balkans. Similarly, the Rusyns of Galicia found themselves cast in the role of a political football in the rivalry of the two empires. A case in point was the career of Ivan Naumovych (1826-1891), who was born Galicia in 1836. In his youth he was strongly influenced by the Polish national movement. However, he experienced a turning point during the revolutionary year of 1848, when there was a brief uprising in the city of Lviv. Naumovych was observing the fighting from a hillside when imperial soldiers spotted him and assumed he was a Polish rebel. They arrested him, but Naumovych persuaded them to release him by convincing the Austrians that he was a Russian. 18 Being Russian, Naumovych decided, carried certain privileges. After 1850, when Naumovych was ordained a Greek Catholic priest, he became staunchly Russophile in cultural orientation. He organized opposition to a campaign organized by the Roman Catholic Polish clergy to latinize the liturgy of the Greek rite. In this ca18 Keith Dyrud, The Quest fo r th e Rusyn Soul: The Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europ e and America, 1890-World War I (Philadelphia, 1992), 28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 91 pacity he sought Russian support. At this point, Naumovych did not convert to Orthodoxy . He still regarded the Greek Catholic (Uniate) church as a potential bridge between Eastern and Western Christendom. Nontheless, inspired by his activism, an entire village in eastern Galicia converted to Orthodoxy in May of 1877. More conversions followed in the next three years. The Galician authorities charged Naumovych with treason. In their view his activity was not religious but political. Naumovych had indeed maintained contact with Russian Pan-Slav agents. 19In July of 1882 he was finally convicted and sentenced to eight months in jail. Other Rusyns who converted to Orthodoxy likewise found themselves hauled into court, although, surprisingly, a Polish jury acquitted them. Both the Austrian government and Polish patriots understood the necessity of not pushing the Old Ruthenians to the point of open subversion. The Ukrainophile movement predominated in Galicia, but the Russophile tradition was not going to go away. Galicia, unlike Russian Ukraine, was not a particularly productive agricultural region. Much of the countryside is hilly and the soil is poor. A bad harvest usually resulted in famine , and this happened at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russian Pan-Slavs responded by founding the Galician-Russian Benevolent Association in St. Petersburg on February 9, 1903. At the opening meeting acertain Father Petrov delivered the inaugural address. American historian Keith Dyrud described the subsequent address as follows: He likened the world to an artist's palette or a musician 's instrument. God was that artist or musician. The nationalities of the world were like colors on the palette or strings on the instrument. If some of the colors or strings are missing, the painting or music will be incomplete and this is a crime against the spirit. This crime against the spirit occurs when a culture allows itself to become divided. The separation of the people of Galicia and Carpatho-Russia (Subcarpathia) from the Russian nation was just such a crime . It is the obligation of a national culture to unite its people into a united nation. In other words, the orator was suggesting that it was 19 Ibid ., 28 . �92 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the obligation of Russia to unite in a single nation all people with a Russian culture. He included the Galicians and Subcarpathians 20 among the people with a Russian culture. Under the leadership of Count Vladimir Bobrinski , the GalicianRussian Benevolent Association extended financia l relief to famine victims of Galicia. Tsarist Russia, the most despotic and reactionary among the Great Powers, could appear benevolent while working to expand its influence. Bobrinski likewise dispatched agents to Podparkarpatska Rus ' , where starvation was an everyday occurrence, rather than a momentous event. The Hungarian government was less hesitant than its Austrian counterpart to prosecute Rusyns for conversion to the Orthodox faith. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first converts to the Orthodox faith in Podkarpatska Rus ' materialized in the vi llage of Iza. They were simple peasants who disliked their pastor, a magyarized Rusyn, who replaced their language with Magyar in the parish school. Led by the cantor-teacher Andry Vladymir, they appealed to the Serbian patriarch, who had nominal authority over all Orthodox subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy, to send them an Orthodox priest. Greek Catholic priest and historian Athanasius Pekar, himself a Ukrainophile, later admitted: "All that needed to be done to liquidate the so-called 'Orthodox movement' in Iza was to appoint a new village pastor and reopen the parish school." 2 1 Instead, the Hungarian government arrested the participants late in 1903 for alleged ties with Russia, and in the following year placed them on trial in Marmaros. All the defendants were found gui lty of treason. The Maramaros trial made a deep impression on the mind of a simple woodcutter of Iasnyia named Aleksander Kabaliu (18771947). He had just been released from the army, where he had been persecuted by Hungarian officers for his Pan-Slav inclinations. Kabuliak had a pronounced inclination towards a monastic life . He made religious pilgrimages to Russia, Jerusalem and Mount Athos in Greece. At a Russian monastery in the last-named location, he was received into the Orthodox fold . He turned his home in Iasnyia into a veritable Russian museum, collecting and displaying icons. Fearing 20 21 Ibid. , 49-50. Pekar, I 05 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 93 persecution by Hungarian authorities, Kabaliuk emigrated to the Russian Empire, where he was tonsured as a monk in 1910. The Russian Orthodox Church initially intended that Kabaliuk wou ld go to America and assume custody of a modest parish in Pittsburgh.22 Instead, he decided to return to Hungary to share in the martyrdom of the villagers of Iza. The Hungarian authorities were happy to oblige him. At the end of 1913 there was a second Maramaros trial, in which Kabaliuk and 94 peasants were the defendants. The Hungarians were hopeful that the trial would expose the activities of Count Bobrinskii and his associates. All it achieved was international condemnation of Magyar policies . Nonetheless, Kabaliuk was sentenced to four and a half years in jail, while 32 others were sentenced to one or two years and various fines. The rest were dismissed for lack of evidence. It was also at the tum of the century that many Rusyns followed the example of their Slovak kinsmen and neighbors in emigrating to America. Although members of both groups originated in the dirtpoor hill country of the eastern Carpathians, they tended to gravitate towards industrial centers in the United States. Surprisingly, America provided both stimulus for the Russophile tradition and a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox faith. Dyrud writes: The majority of the Rusyn immigrants came to the United States as illiterate peasants and had not participated in the intellectual and cultural conflicts that were raging in the old country. Thus it was in this country that Rusyn peasants from Galicia and Subcarpathia first lived together and found that they did not have as much in common as it first seemed. And it was in the United States that many of them first heard of the Ukrainian movement. And it was there that the Rusyns from Subcarpathia felt free to express national sentiments without the pressures of magyarization. It was in the United States that most of the Rusyn immigrants were told for the first time by the Russian Orthodox mission that they were really Russians. 23 22 See the entry "Kabaliuk, Aleksander," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia o[ Ru syn History and Culture, 223. 2 Dyrud, 58 . �94 SLOVAK.IA 2019 Ironically, the Russian cause was indirectly aided by a most unlikely element: Irish American Catholic priests. Many of the latter resented the fact that Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood were permitted to marry while they were not. Most outstanding was Archbishop John Ireland of Minneapolis-St. Paul. On December 19, 1889, he was visited by a Greek Catholic priest named Alexis Toth. Toth had been dispatched by the Presov eparchy to assume the pastorship of St. Mary ' s, a modest church recently constructed by the Rusyn community of Minneapolis. When Father Toth presented his credentials, Archbishop Ireland became greatly agitated. He informed Toth that he did not consider him to be a genuine Catholic, and denied him permission to administer the sacraments. 24 After consultation with the parishioners of St. Mary's, Toth conferred with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Vladimir of San Francisco. The latter was eager and willing to accept the parish of St. Mary's into the Orthodox fold. Aside from Alaska, which Russia had sold to the United States earlier, there were up to the 1870s only three Orthodox churches in the United States. In addition to San Francisco, there was a Russian parish in New York City and a Greek Orthodox church in New Orleans. Native converts in America were exclusively Alaskan Aleuts and Eskimos . Now, however, the wave of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants indicated a potential source of growth. Since nearly all Rusyn immigrants were in the eastern half of the United States, New York rather than San Francisco was delegated as an episcopal seat. In 1890 the construction of St. Nicholas Cathedral was completed in New York. Tsar Nicholas II personally donated 5,000 roubles to this project. His government subsidized the construction of other churches and supported activities of the Orthodox Missionary Society founded in Moscow. In Minneapolis, Father Toth founded the Russian Mutual Aid Society. These prosletization efforts exceeded all expectations. By the time of the outbreak of World War I in 1914, over one-third of all Rusyn immigrants in the United States had converted to Orthodoxy. 25 They served as enthusiastic supporters of the Russian cause in the Great War. World War I brought with it the culmination of the historic struggle for the Carpathians, and caused great suffering among the 24 25 Ibid 65-6 Ibid: 65 . • �SLOVAK.IA 2019 95 Rusyns of Galicia, eastern Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' . By early September 1914 Russian armies had overrun much of eastern Galicia. Count Georgii Bobrinskii, brother of Count Vladimir, was made governor-general, and started a campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian movement. All Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives and journals were shut down. The Russian language replaced Ukrainian in the school system. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were deported into the depths of Russia. There was admittedly some dissent in Russian governmental circles. Noted statesman Pavel Miliukov described Russian conduct in Galicia as a European scandal. Yet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov stated unequivocally: "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all." 26 The Ukrainophiles had a measure of revenge when the AustroHungarian military reoccupied the province in the following year. They denounced their Russophile neighbors for alleged collaboration with the invaders. Hungarian troops carried out mass hangings. At the same time, Polish nobles spread rumors that the Ukrainophiles were covertly pro-Russian, so as to reassert their own authority in Galicia. In truth, thousands of Russophiles and Ukrainophiles alike suffered internment in Austrian concentration camps. The most notorious of these camps was Talerhof, near Graz. Sanitary conditions were deplorable, and an estimated 1,767 persons died of typhus and 27 other diseases. Austria's parliament was scandalized, and Emperor Karl ordered Talerhof closed early in 1917. Early in 1915, for the second of three occasions in the course of a century, the Russian military crossed through the Dukla Pass. This move came as a result of the seige of Przemysl, Austria-Hungary's principal fortress in Galicia. Russian troops occupied the Carpathian mountain passes to the south to prevent the Austro-Hungarian military from sending reinforcements to break the siege. Casualties on both sides of the winter war of 1914-15 were appalling. It is likely that more soldiers succumbed to the "White Death" (hypothermia) than were killed by enemy bullets. 28 Ultimately, the Austrian side 26 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2009), 343. See the entry "Talerhof," in Magocsi and Pop, eds,. Encyclopedia of Rusy n History and Culture, 488 . 28 For rhe most recent account of the winter campaign, see Traydon A. Tumstell, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of I 9 I 5 (Lawrence, KD, 20 I 0). 27 �96 SLOVAKIA 2019 gave way first. Russian soldiers under General Lavrl' Kornilov pushed through the southern end of Dukla Pass and advanced as far as the village of Lodomirova, just north of the town of Svidnik. Here they established a military cemetery for their dead. Lodomirova eventually became the site of a Russian cultural center in northeastern Slovakia, which shall be discussed in due course. The Russians did not remain in occupation of this toehold in Slovakia for long. Germany, Austria-Hungary's senior partner, launched a counteroffensive eastward across Poland, albeit at the cost of having enough troops to capture Paris. Russian troops painfully withdrew north of the Carpathians. They were now demoralized and ripe for revolution. Mass mutinies forced Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate on March 15, 1917. The reign of the Romanov dynasty had ended. Tsarist Russia was destroyed. Politically speaking, the Russophi-le orientation was now a dead letter. Culturally, its future was now an openended question . At this point Russophiles among the Rusyns looked with growing interest at the now ascendant Czechoslovak independence movement. The Rusyns in Interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland The Czechoslovak independence movement was a curious article. For almost a century, there existed an intellectual tradition which maintained that Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same nationality. Yet the concept of a politically united Czechoslovak state was largely the invention to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk ( 18501937), a Czech philosophy professor and notorious defender of unpopular causes. Perceiving that World War I would result in AustriaHungary coming increasingly under the domination of Kaiser Wilhelm ' s Germany, Masaryk decided to lobby among the opposing Western powers for Czecho-Slovak independence. In Geneva, in neutral Switzerland, he was joined by his protege, the sociology professor Edvard Benes. Together they proceeded to Paris, where they were joined by Milan Rastislav Stefanik, a young Slovak serving as an officer in the French Air Force. This triumvirate formed a Czech Action Committee Abroad, which was eventually expanded and renamed the Czechoslovak National Council. Given his position on this body, the French eventually gave Stefanik genera l' s rank. He raised a Czechoslovak Legion from prisoners of war and deserters �SLOVAKIA 2019 97 from the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Czechoslovak Legion distinguished itself on the Western, Eastern and eventually Italian fronts, and gained increased Allied favor in the struggle for the recognition of the independence movement. 29 In 1918 Masaryk visited the United States, not only to gain official American recognition, but also a mandate from the Slovak community in America, since Slovakia itself was politically gagged. In October of 1915 the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America had already concluded a preliminary agreement for cooperation in Cleveland. Masaryk proceeded to Pittsburgh to conclude a more formal agreement for a Czecho-Slovak merger. Masaryk's visit to the Mecca of the American Slovaks was greeted by a large manifestation of support which included South Slavs as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Yet the negotiations undertaken at Moose Hall on May 29-31 were not without controversy. Masaryk pledged Slovakia an administration, a school system and linguistic rights, but not its own parliament, as specified by the earlier Cleveland Agreement. Here Jozef Husek of the Slovak Catholic Jednota raised strenuous objections. Albert Mamatey, president of the Slovak League, impressed Masaryk with the seriousness of losing the support of the largest single Slovak organization. The delegates were evenly divided, and Masaryk finally broke the deadlock by signing a revised draft with all the proposals. 30 The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also heavily populated by Rusyns from Hungary. Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided 29 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was the most instrumental military force in attaining Allied recognition of the independence movement. With Russia withdrawing from the war in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires wished to be evacuated and sent to France, where a German offensive to capture Paris was anticipated. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to disarm them resu lted in their capture of the Trans-Siberian Railway and a legendary odyssey to the Pacific coast. It also gave the Western Allies a pretext to intervene in the Russian Civil War. The experience of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia boats of a sizable amount of literature. The best Englishlanguage studies are authored by Victor M. Fie, The Revolutionary War for Independence and the Russian Question: The Czechoslovak Army in Russia 1914-191 8 (New Delhi, 1977) and The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion. The Origins of Their Armed Conflict: March to May 1918 (New Delhi , 1978). 30 See Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia" Slo vak Studies, VIII ( 1968), 48-5 1 �98 SLOVAKIA 2019 benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Its members had acquired a measure of political awareness. One such organization was the Greek Catholic Union, headquartered in the HomesteadMunhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, which contained both Greek Catholic and Orthodox members, based in McKeesport. At the time of Masaryk's pilgrimage to Pittsburgh, the Czech independence leader was approached by Nicholas Pachuta, editor of the Greek Catholic Union's newspaper Rus 'kii Viestnik. Pachuta had recently converted to Orthodoxy. Up until this point he had advocated the incorporation of Podkarpatska Rus' into the Russian Empire. Now that there was no more Russian Empire, Pachuta approached Masaryk with the idea of union with a Czecho-Slovak state. He was soon afterwards expelled from the Greek Catholic Union. 3 1 Overall, the Greek Catholic clergy wished their homeland to remain part of Hungary. Many laymen wanted union with Galicia but insisted Galicia was Russian rather than Ukrainian. The end to the Great War was approaching, and territorial changes could be anticipated. One of President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated Fourteen Points for peace was "self-determination for the peoples of AustriaHungary." It was necessary to have a common program. Members of both organizations met in Homestead on July 23, 1918 to form the American National Council of Uhro-Rusyns. The subsequent Homestead Resolution read as follows: If the pre-war boundaries remain, Rusyns, as the most loyal people-gens fidelissima-deserve that Hungary provide [them} with autonomy. If new boundaries are made, they should be made according to nationality; thus, Uhro-Rusyns can belong nowhere else than to their nearest brothers by blood, language and faith, to the Galician and Bukovinian Rusyns. But if we are divided by foreign aspirations from Ukrainians and Old-Russians [Galician Russophiles}, the National Council demands in this case autonomy for Uhro-Rusyns so they can pre32 serve their national character. 31 Magocsi, Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 81. The original text of the Homestead Resolution appears under the heading " Do Vpukh Vhro-Rusynov zhivlych v Soed" in Prosvita, August 8, 1918 32 �SLOVAKIA 2019 99 The Rusyns commissioned a young Pittsburgh lawyer named Gregory Zsatkovich ( 1886-1967) to represent their interests to the United States government. Pennsylvania congressman Guy Campbell arranged a meeting between Zsatkovich and President Wilson on October 21. Wilson thought it unfeasible to grant full independence to so small a nation in a geopolitically sensitive region, and consequently recommended that Zsatkovich seek autonomy in a larger state. He referred Zsatkovich to Masaryk, whose independence movement had been recently recognized by the U.S. State Department, Zsatkovich met with Masaryk in Philadelphia, where the latter hosted a congress called the Mid-European Democratic Union on October 23-26. According to Zsatkovich's memoir afterwards, Masaryk assured him: "If the Rusyns decide to join the Czechoslovak Republic, they shall constitute a fully autonomous state." 33 There remained a sticky issue. Rusyn territorial claims included several counties in eastern Slovakia. Here there were numerous Rusyns in the northern mountain districts whereas elsewhere the population consisted of either Slovaks or Rusyns who had already voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. Masaryk was further alleged to declare on this point: "The frontiers will be so determined that the 34 Rusyns will be satisfied." On November 12, at a meeting of the National Council of UhroRusyns in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Czechoslovak option was provisionally adopted, albeit including the demand for the counties of eastern Slovakia. A subsequent plebiscite among the American Rusyn fraternals provided Zsatkovich with the desired results: out of 1,102 votes submitted, 732 (67 percent) were for union with Czechoslovakia and 310 (28 percent) for union with Ukraine. Additionally, there were 27 votes for complete independence, 10 votes for union with Russia, and 9 votes for remaining part ofHungary. 35 Back in the Old Country, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October of 1918 led to a power vacuum in many areas of the Carpathians. Several different national councils were organized by Rusyns, each of which had its own program for the fu- 33 Gregory Zsatkovich, Otkryhote-Expose bydaltelho gubernatori Podkarpatskoj Rusi (Homestead, PA , 1921 ), 5. 34 Ibid 5 35 Ma~o~si , Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 85. �100 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ture affiliation of the people. A Russophile group in eastern Slovakia, based in Stara Cubovna, initially wanted a merger with Galicia. Dissenters among them, led by the lawyer Antonii Beskyd ( 1855-1933), considered such a move impractical. They reconvened in Presov and declared themselves for union with Czechoslovakia instead. A new revolutionary government in Hungary pledged to grant the Rusyns territorial autonomy. A group of Greek Catholic priests in Uzhorod declared themselves in favor of this option. Another pro-Hungarian group met in Khust, but its speakers were shouted down by Pro-Ukrainian elements led by the lawyer Iulii Braschaiko (1879-1955). The Ukrainophle orientation had at last taken hold in Podkarpatska Rus ', and would grow progressively stronger. Most dramatic of all were events in the easternmost Hutsul region, centered around Iasnyia. Here the populace favored union with Ukraine, but, pending further developments, took matters into their own hands. In the early morning of January 7, 1919, a group of demobilized Rusyn soldiers, aided by troops sent by the West Ukrainian Republic, drove out the Hungarian garrison of 250 militiamen. On February 5 the victorious Rusyns proclaimed their own "Hutsul Republic," with a 42-member elected council and a four-man government. This little state existed until June 11, when the area was occupied by advancing Romanian troops.36 Late in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires returning from the Italian Front had begun a military occupation of Slovakia, and advanced across the Uz River. Uzhorod was occupied on January 10, 1919. The Czechoslovak position was strengthened as a result of a Bolshevik government assuming power in Hungary, much to the alarm of the Western powers. This Hungarian government wished to build upon the "Ruska Kraina" declared by its predecessor, the Karolyi regime. It went to extremes attempting to implement communist rule, threatening the death penalty for even the smallest commercial transactions. This decree became impossible to enforce, since the commissars were themselves profiteering. 37 Podkarpatska Rus' was soon engulfed in counterrevolution. 36 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Rusyn Decision to Unite With Czechoslovakia" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Natio nalities, 134. 37 Ibid, 140-42 �SLOVAKIA 2019 101 Even before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, members of the Uzhorod Council began experiencing doubts concerning the viability of remaining part of Hungary. A leading member of the Council, Reverend Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874-1945), began negotiating with Slovak leader Milan Hodza. Voloshyn was joined by supporters of both Beskid and Brashchaiko. The Russophiles realized that the Russia they had loved and believed in was unlikely to return from the dead. The Ukrainophiles realized that an independent Ukraine was unlikely to survive the turmoil of the Russian Civil War. Members of both orientations were willing to form a single body representing their mutual interests. It was in this spirit that the Central Russian National Council was formed in Uzhorod on May 8, 1919. Zsatkovich arrived with the text of the Scranton Resolution, which was endorsed unanimously. It remained to the Western peacemakers gathered in Paris to give sanction to Podkarpatska Rus' being granted to Czechoslovakia. Yet, contrary to later Hungarian revisionist claims, the victorious Western Allies did not arbitrarily hand the region over to the Czechs. The decision to unite with Czechoslovakia was that of the Rusyn people themselves .38 The realities of being part of the Czechoslovakia disappointed the expectations of many educated Rusyns. Autonomy was not forthcoming. They could send representatives to parliament in Prague, but did not have their own regional parliament. Prague apparently decided that the Rusyns, like the Slovaks, were not ready for autonomy. Zsatkovich became the first provincial governor, but the actual administration lay in the hands of a centralized Czech bureaucracy. Zsatkovich eventually resigned in disgust and returned to America. The disputed counties in eastern Slovakia remained under Slovak administration. To complicate matters further, there was now a group of Rusyns who considered themselves their own nationality, in addition to the existing Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations. Politically, on the local level, Prague would support one and then another orientation, depending upon its convenience at a particular moment. The Czechoslovak administration made great strides in education, virtually eliminating illiteracy in twenty years . The government poured tremendous amounts of money into Podkarpatska Rus ', and liberally funded cultural activities of all three orientations. 38 Ibid, 146. �102 SLOVAKIA 2019 On April 29, 1920, there was a meeting of local leaders in Uzhorod, headed by Iulii Brashchaiko. Its purpose was to establish a cultural organization encompassing all Podkarpatska Rus '. Nothing resulted from this meeting since Russophiles led by Anthonii Beskyd raised angry objections to the Ukrainophile cultural orientation of Brashchaiko ' s group. On May 9 Brashchaiko's fol lowers established the Prosvita Society, modeled along the lines of the Ukrainian society of the same name in Galicia. Its task was to publish all kinds of popular and scholarly books "written in the national tongue and accessible to every Subcarpathian Ru syn." 39 The Czechoslovak Pros vita was reinforced by many educated Ga li cian Ukrainians who found Polish rul e objectionable. On th e May 23 , 1923, those Russophiles who boycotted the Prosvita met in Uzhorod to establish their own organization, which was called the Dukhnovych Society. Its stated goals were to foster "the cultural deve lopment of the Ru ssian people living within Czechoslovakia, and most importantly to educate them in a moral , patriotic and Ru ssian spirit, exclusive of al l political activity." 40 The contrast between the two rival societies was visib le. The old tricolor Ru ssian flag flew over the reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society, whereas Prosvita reading rooms displayed the blue and ye llow Ukrainian national colors. In terms of literature, the new Dukhnovych Society championed the great Russian masters : Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc. The Prosvita Society advanced the writings of Shevchenko and other less known Ukrainian awakeners. Both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles expanded their activities from literature to theater. The Ru ssophiles tended to produce hi storical dramas, whereas the Ukrainophi les focused on folk songs and ballads. The latter used standard Ukrainian as the language of performance, whereas the Russophiles had to translate their productions into a Rusyn dia lect. It must be frankly admitted that the Ukrainophile orientation gained the upper hand in popularity during the course of the kulturkampf for Podkarpatska Rus' in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Avtustyn Voloshyn had become a convert to the Ukrainophile orien39 Statul tova,ystva 'Prosvita • Podkarpatska Rus ·, (Uzhorod, 1920), 6. Usta v Rusakogo ku/'turna-prosvete/'noga obshchturni Aleksandra Duchnovychovicha , (Uzhorod, 1923), 40 �SLOVAK.IA 2019 103 tation. He and his associates were astute and learned men-teachers and scholars who kept closely in touch with Rusyn cultural life. By contrast, the Dukhnovych Society fell increasingly under the influence of Stefan Fentsik ( 1892-1946), a local politician who used the organization as a platform to propagate a his own views, his political ties with Poland and Hungary-which shall be di scussed in due course-became common knowledge by 1937, and did much to compromise the Dukhnovych Society. 41 Russian culture survived more comfortably in eastern Slovakia, since 1928 elevated to the official status of a province. In large measure this direction was due to the efforts of Iulii Lazho (18671929), a native of Svidnik and senator for the Social Democratic Party in the Czechoslovak parliament. Earlier, Lazho had emigrated to America, where he converted to Orthodoxy and also rose in the construction industry. He returned home to start his own construction firm, and also to seek revenge against his former Greek Catholic pastor. As mayor of Ladomirova, where the Russian military cemetery was located, Lazho invited Vital ii Maksimenko ( 1873-1960), former archimandrite of the monastery at Pochaiev (in Polish Volhynia), to establish a missionary headquarters there. Lazho also procured a Cyrillic alphabet printing press which Czechoslovak legionnaires in Russia had appropriated, shipped all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, and which made its way to Prague. During two decades of activity the Ladomirova mission published over I 00 Orthodox church books, the newspaper Pravoslavnaia Karpatskaje Rus ' (1928-1944), the journal for young people Diestvo I ivnost Khristi ( 1935-1941 ), a scholarly journal Pravoslavny put' ( 1938-1940) and the annual almanac Pravnoslavny ruskii/Ruskii narodnyi kalendar ( 1924-1944). The Russian monks also worked to inculcate Russian culture among the native Rusyns, hosting such events as an annual Russian Day in the summers and the tree-lighting ceremony for Orthodox Christmas. 42 In approaching the causes of the Orthodox revival in interwar Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to understand the world view of the 41 Magocsi, "Nationalist Intelligentsia and the Peasantry" in Of th e Making of Nationalities, 200. 42 See the entry "Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , En cyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266 . �104 SLOVAKIA 2019 national-state's founding father. T.G. Masaryk was a complex individual. As one biographer expressed it: "This man wanted to emancipate workers without embracing Marxism, liberate women without promoting feminism, and educate the young without celebrating youth. " 43 He was considered in the West to be an expert on Russia. He had written extensively on the great writer Dostoevsky, whom he regarded as the classic representative of Russian thought. There were elements of the Russian national psychology which Masaryk found disturbing. Like Havlicek before him, he felt that the Western Slavs, especially the Czechs, should follow a different path . As a proponent of Westeren humanism, Masaryk disparaged the mystical tradition of the Eastern Orthodox faith .44 Yet Masaryk reserved even greater hostility for the Roman Catholi c Church. He drew inspiration from Jan Hus, the great Bohemian religious reformer who was burned at the stake for heresy in 1415 . In 1905, while celebrating the anniversary of Hus ' death, Masaryk coined the slogan "Away from Rome! " Politics in the first years of the Czechoslovak Republic had a distinctly anti-Catholic flavor. His government favored the appointment of Lutherans for administration in Slovakia at the expense of the Catholic majority. In Podkarpatska Rus ', where there were virtua lly no Protestants, such a policy was impossible. Here Czechoslovak authorities fostered a revival of Orthodoxy. One Czech mini ster assessed the impact as follows: It seemed to some Russophile politicians, both in Prague and in Ruthenia ... that the right time had come to convert the Rutheni an peasant back to the Greek Orthodox religion. This opinion was shared by many Russian emigres who flocked to Czechoslovak ia ... after 1919. A drive for 'Orthodoxy ' was started in Rutheni a ... It is a question of how much of this movement was spontaneous and due to the pro-Russian feeling of the population and to its di slike for the purely magyarized Uniate clergy, and how much of its strength it owed to the propaganda and preaching of the Russian Orthodox emigres and clergy and to the support of some Czech political circles. 43 Bruce Garver, "Masaryk and Czech Politics 1900-1914" in Stanley B. Winters, ed. , T G. Masaryk (1850- 193 7) Vo lum e I Thinker and Politician (London, 1990), 22 . 44 See Paul 1. Tresky, " Masaryk and Dostoyevsky" in Harry Hanak, ed., T G. Masa1y k (/ 850- 193 7) Volum e II/ Statesman and Cultural Force (London, 1990), 161-77. �SLOVAKIA 2019 105 However, it certainly added one more element to the confusion reigning in Ruthenia and led to animosities which, in the end, turned against the Prague Government itself.45 Reverend Voloshyn bitterly remonstrated against the situation in Prague in 1929: The agitation usually began in the local tavern, where the agitator met the most notorious brawlers in the village. After a short talk, emboldened by 'noisy' arguments and vodka, the peasants would begin to shout abuse against the village pastor. In a matter of two or three days a ' committee' made up of the pastor's 'opponents ' would be formed. The committee did not immediately begin advocating Orthodoxy; instead, it showered the bishop with complaints and delegations, demanding that there be an investigation against the pastor or that he be removed outright. Then followed other forms of harassment, demonstrations, threats against the pastor, intimidation of church curators, and such . The committee would send the pastor letters demanding that he leave the vi llage. As time went on, the committee made increasingly bolder threats that the pastor get out ' or else!' .. .. If, despite such harassment, the priest remained in his parish, the threats escalated. Someone would break his windows, shoot into his windows, poison hi s well , set fire to his grain or stables, and in some cases even the parish house, assault and beat the priest, etc. The government remained indifferent to all this under the pretext of ' Freedom of conscience! Freedom ofreligion!' 46 This state of affairs could not permitted to go on indefinitely. Czechoslovakia was, after all, a republic governed by law. The Vatican made its own contribution to improved church-state relations by transferring Bishop Antonii Papp of Mukachevo to Hungary and replacing him with canon Petro Gebej on July 16, 1924. At the same time, in response to forthcoming parliamentary elections, President Masaryk cryptically declared that "the Catholics will get as many rights as they win." 47 Rusyn voters supported Czech Catho lic political parties which gained an increased measure of strength in parliament. The rights accorded to Greek Catholics by the constitution in 45 Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto, 1955), 38-9. 46 Avhustyn Voloshyn, " Relihijni vidnozny na Podkarpats ' kyi" in Acta Conventia Pragensis pro Studii Orentalibus n. 1919, (Olomouc, 1930), 218-9. 47 Pekar, 11 8. �106 SLOVAKIA 2019 any case were now enforced. Violence and vandalism were now prosecuted and soon ceased. In some instances church property was restored. Bishop Gebej led a religious revival which resulted in priests maintaining closer contact with their parishioners. A number of converts to Orthodoxy returned to the Greek Catholic faith. The Orthodox revival was one of the sources of survival for the Russophile orientation. Another source was, ironically, Hungarian funding . The fall of Bela Kun's communist regime in August of 1919 was followed by the restoration of the nobility in Hungary. Counterrevolutionary White terror now followed Red terror. Right wing elements who rallied under Admiral Miklos Horthy, soon elevated to the position of regent of Hungary, wanted to regain Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' but had to go about it covertly.48 The victorious Western powers would not recognize any government in Hungary which would not accept their peace tenns . On June 4, 1920, Hungary was compelled to sign the Treaty of Trianon, which ceded Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' to Czechoslovakia, Transylvania to Romania, and Croatia and the Voivodina to what became known as Yugoslavia. Trianon psychologically scarred Hungarian society for a full generation. France offered to soften the blow by extending to Hungary financial credits, particularly in the area of railway development, in exchange for compliance. Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen cheerfully accepted the financial aid and outwardly complied with Trianon. Yet his government covertly subsidized elements in Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' who were disgruntled with Czechoslovak centrali sm. Having previously denied these peoples autonomy, the Hungarians now championed their right to selfdetern1ination as a first step toward regaining them. One of the recipients of Hungarian financial aid was Stefan Fentsik. Another was Andrei Brodii ( 1895-1946), a journalist, teacher and chairman of the Autonomous Agricultural Union/Autonomyi Zenled'skij Sojuz (AZS). Fentsik yielded leadership of the Russophile movement to Brodii during the 1930s. Ukrainophile historian Peter Stercho later maintained that Brodii, Fentsik and other select 48 As a precedent to future collaboration in this matter, Poland allowed itself to be used as a staging ground for Hungarian subversion of Czechos lovak administration . A "Magyar-S lovak League" was established in Krakow, and dispatched armed vo lunteers across the border into Slovakia. �SLOVAKIA 2019 107 Russophile leaders had to conceal their ties with Hungary from their followers, since even the latter were opposed to territorial revision. 49 Polish policy towards the Rusyns of Galicia followed a similar pattern. In the area directly north of the Dukla Pass lived people belonging to a branch of the Rusyns known as the Lemkos. They can be geographically divided by the San River. The Ukrainian movement penetrated the area east of the San early in the twentieth century and accounted for numerous followers. In November 1918 Lemkos from about 30 villages gathered in the village of Komancza (Komancha in Rusyn) to form their own little republic. This Komancha Republic was viewed as a transitional state, pending merger with a greater Ukraine. West of the San the Lemkos still adhered to the traditions of old Rus'. In autumn 1918 they wanted union with Russia. Since this was obviously never going to happen, the Polish government could afford to humor these Lemkos, The Poles were preoccupied with the West Ukrainian Republic which was proclaimed in Lviv on November 1, 1918, and event which plunged Galicia into an ethnic civil war. On December 5, some 500 Lemko Rusyns representing 130 vi1lages and towns of western Lemkovyna met in Florynka (in Grybow district) to form a government. While the Polish military crushed the Komancha Republic in January 1919, it tended to view the Florynka Lemko Rusyn Republic as a potential ally against the Ukrainians. Polish officials who were present offered the former town hall of Grybow as a political headquarters, while the Polish Army provided arms for a Lemko national guard. Schools and cooperatives were soon organized. Amazingly, the Lemko Rusyn Republic survived a full sixteen months. It was governed by an executive council headed by Reverend Mykhal Iurchakevych and a central national council headed by the lawyer Iaroslaw Kachmarchyk. The Poles were disappointed with the results. The Lemkos were happy to accept whatever aid the Polish government and military were willing to offer but nonetheless were unwilling to take up arms against their errant brethren to the east. Additionally, Kachmarchyk's government rejected the notion of union with a Bolshevik Russia, and began looking at the example of 49 Peter Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in CarpathoUkraine /9/9-/939(NewYork , 1971), 171. �108 SLOVAKIA 2019 their brethren of the south side of the Carpathians. A union with Czechoslovakia now seemed a viable option. Unfortunately, in 1920 relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia were at a particularly low point, owing to border disputes concerning Tesin in Silesia and Orava-Spis in Slovakia. Before the end of March the Poles arrested Kachmarchyk and members of his government. They were tried on June 10, 1921. A Polish jury acquitted them, which was only reasonable insofar as the Poles had encouraged their activities in the first place. But the event marked the death knell of Lemko statehood. 50 Yet the Poles still had use for the Lernkos in the interwar period. The Greek Catholic Church was strongly identified with the Ukrainian national movement. The leadership of the Polish military, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, encouraged the movement to convert the Lemkos to Orthodoxy, and thus express a Russian character at the expense of the Ukrainian .51 It was a classic case of Divide and Rule. Elsewhere, in Volhynia, adherents of the Ukrainian national movement were Orthodox. Here militant Polish nationalists attacked and vandalized Orthodox monasteries and schools. At the same time, for reasons of security, Poland wished to have a common border with Hungary. For this reason the Polish government supported Hungarian efforts to regain Podkarpatska Rus' . The events which accompanied the international crisis in 1938 are well-known. The present author shall limit himself to summarizing key particulars. The Munich "diktat" of September 1938 resulted in Czechoslovakia being forced to yield the Gennan populated Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. Deprived of her most vital border defenses, Czechoslovakia was now rendered militarily defenseless. Hostile neighbors, Poland and Hungary, were now encouraged to make their own territorial claims. Moreover, the Prague government could no longer resist demands for autonomy on the part of Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus ' . 50 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Lemko Rusyn Republic ( 1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus' -Ukraine" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Nationalities, 303315. 51 See Mykola Kucherpa, "The Nationality Policy of Poland towards Ukrainians before World War II" in Paul Berst and Jaroslav Mokolak, eds., Th e Lemko Region 1939-1947, War, Occupation and Deportation (New Haven and Krakow, 2002), 3949. �SLOVAKIA 2019 109 In the case of Podkarpatska Rus', a cabinet was formed on October 11 which consisted of both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. Russophiles predominated, with Brodii as prime minister and Fentsik as deputy prime minister. Brodii was convinced that, if a plebiscite was held, the majority of Rusyns would vote for reunion with Hungary. Brodii 's ministry lasted only fifteen days. An alarmed central government summoned Brodii and Fentsik to Prague. There Brodii was arrested, while Fentsik found asylum in the Polish embassy. 52 Prague authorized Voloshyn, who was a member of the cabinet, to form a new government. Voloshyn proclaimed the province as an autonomous nation with the new name of Carpatho-Ukraine on November 3. The victory of the Ukrainophiles was at last complete. Autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine got off to a rough start. Hungary was prepared to re-annex the region, although conservative circles of the Hungarian government confined their claims to areas which were predominantly Magyar. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy opted to appear in the role of peacemakers in this territorial dispute between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They arbitrated a compromise settlement in Vienna on November 2, 1938. By terms of the First Vienna Award, Kosice, in southern Slovakia, and Uzhorod and Mukachevo, the two leading cities of Carpatho-Ukraine, were restored to Hungary. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine was forced to relocate to Khust, which was little more than an oversized village. Militant Hungarian nationalists regarded the First Vienna Award as a temporary expedient, and worked for the complete annexation of CarpathoUkraine. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, a covert paramilitary group known as the "Ragged Guard" was organized to infiltrate Carpatho-Ukraine and conduct terrorist acts designed to destabilize the regime. Poland likewise dispatched paramilitary units for the same purpose. If the credible research of Ukrainophile historian Stercho is to be believed, the Polish paramilitary units outpaced their Hungarian counterparts in acts of terrorism. 53 Carpatho-Ukraine was in need of allies, and these were forthcoming. Militant Ukrainian nationalists from Poland crossed the mountains to organize the Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich. It has been argued by Russophile opponents that the Riflemen of the Car52 53 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 238. Stercho, 302. �110 SLOVAKIA 2019 pathian Sich inaugurated the reign of "Ukrainian terror." It is true that they focu sed more on the Russophile domestic opposition than they did on Polish or Hungarian infiltrators. A detention camp was established for dissident Russophiles and Rusynophiles at Dumen . Yet conditions of internment were relaxed. Political differences extended to the family leve l, and prisoners under guard where permitted to attend social events in neighboring Rakhiv.54 There was a conflict of interest between the Carpathian Sich and the Voloshyn regime. Sich rifl emen viewed Carpatho-Ukraine as the cornerstore of a future greater Ukraine, and counted on the support of Nazi Germany. Voloshyn , by contrast, decided that adherence to Czecho-Slovakia (now officially spelled with a hyphen) was a necessary expedient. In March of 1939 there were clashes between the Carpathian Sich and the regular Czechoslovak military. This confl ict was abruptly terminated when German leader Adolf Hitler moved to eliminate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia . As he prepared to militarily occupy Prague, he disappointed Ukrainophi les by giving his consent for Hungary to annex the province. Under German pressure, Slovakia declared its independence on March 14. CarpathoUkraine was now cut off from the Czech lands. With Hungarian troops already crossing the border, Voloshyn symbo li cally proclaimed Carpatho-Ukraine's independence on March 15 . Carpatho-Ukraine existed as an independent state for all of a day . On the 16 th , Hungarian military units were fighting for Khust. The Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich resisted with admirab le resolve , but its units were scattered and no match for the Hungarian army. They later regrouped in the mountains or were pushed across the border to Eastern Slovakia, thus encouraging Hungary to invade the latter as well. 55 Hungarian troops reached the Polish border by the end of the I 61\ and were eagerly embraced by their opposite numbers. The region was renamed Subcarpathia and governed directly from Budapest. There was some vague talk in the Hungarian parliament about according autonomy to the most recently annexed portion , but not to Uzhorod or Mukachevo, which were now considered 54 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationality Problem in Subcarpathian Rus ' I 9381939: A Reappraisal" in Magocsi , Of th e Making of Nationalities, 228 . 55 This invasion of Eastern Slovakia resulted in portions of the disputed counties likewise being annexed by Hungary. It also resulted in the Slovak Republic placing itself under the military protection of Nazi Germany. �SLOVAKIA 2019 111 directly part of Hungary. Autonomy was del ayed indefinitely. As World War II progressed, the Hungarian military vehemently opposed autonomy for security reaso ns . The Ukrainophiles were particularly singled out for political persecution, while the Russophiles were more or less set aside. Interestingly, the Hungarian government began cultivating the idea that the Rusyns were their own separate nationality, an idea which ultimately became the wave of the future. 56 The resto ration of Hungarian rule dis illusioned the Russophil es. It stood to reason that, once Hungary went down to defeat with Nazi Germany, Andrei Brodii would come to a bad end . He did not attempt to flee when Soviet forces reached the area in the autumn of 1944, but attempted to negotiate with them. He was arrested by the Soviet counterintelligence unit SMERSH, charged as a fascist co ll aborator, and executed on November 7, 1946. A similar fate awa ited Stefan Fentsik: he was shot in the courtyard of the Uzhorod prison on March 30, 1946. Their Ukrainophile rival Voloshyn fared no better. Having taken up res idence in Prague during the war years, he taught at the Ukrainian Free University. In June 1945 he was arrested by SMERSH and transported to Moscow. He died in Lefortovo prison on July 19, undoubtedl y murdered. An ironic footnote of hi story is worth mentioning. Both Brodii and Fentsik were posthumously rehabilitated after the breakup of the Soviet Union. No such rehabilitation has been granted to Voloshyn. World War II and Ukrainiazation If the Russophiles in Podkarpatska Rus' were fatally compromised by collaboration with the Hungarians, then in Eastern Slovakia they earned acclamation for their role in an anti-fascist struggle. A leading force in the resistance to the pro-German regime of president-priest Jozef Ti so was the Slovak Communist Party. George Kennan , at that time charge d 'affa ires to the U.S. embassy in Prague, assessed the pro-communist sentiment in Eastern Slovakia as being a "bird of a different color [which] in former circumstances would have little chance of success." He added, however, that owing to 56 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 248-9 . �112 SLOVAKIA 2019 guidance from Moscow, the Communists could become the most formidable resistance group of all. 57 Kennan's prognosis was largely accurate, though certain qualifying feature s must be noted. The Communists did not have a monopoly on the resistance movement. In prewar Czechoslovakia they were strongest in Podkarpatska Rus ', but in Eastern Slovakia they were never ab le to muster more than seven percent of the vote among the Ru syns in the interwar period. Not wishing to be isolated from other Rusyns in organized resistance to the Tiso regime, local Communi sts opted to join the Carpatho-Russian Council for National Liberation (KRASNO), which shall be introduced shortly. The view of the autonomous and later independent Slovak state on the Rusyns was that the latter were "S lovaks of the Greek Catholic faith ." This view was exemp li fied by Andrej Dudas, who in 1940 was appointed regional administrator of Eastern Slovakia. He was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, a position he maintained a full three decades later as an emigre in Argentina.58 In early 1939, the Rusyn Nationa l Committee and the Carpatho-Russian Nationa l Counci l were banned by the Slovak government, and the activity of the Dukhnovych Society was restricted. The Ukrainian movement among the Rusyns was particularly loathed by the Slovak nationalist leadership. Slovak police reports up until November 1938 indicate that Rusyns in the Presov Region supported union with their brethren east of the Uz Ri ver. Yet, in November, the same police reports indicate a significant change. The Ukrainian movement was even more alien to the Presov Region Rusyns than was Slovak nationalism, and they were henceforth opposed to a revision of borders which was favorable to CarpathoUkraine. 59 Rusyns shared in the economic prosperity of the Slovak Republic which characterized the first half of World War II. Workers in Germany sent money home to their families, whi le locally a number 57 Report written about May I, 1939 on conditions in Slovakia in George Ken nan, From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1 940 (Princeton, 1968), 139140. 58 Andrej Dudas, Rusinska otazka ajej uzadie (B uenos Aires, 1971), 25 . 59 See the entry " Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Counci l for National Liberation/Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet natsional'nmyi osvonodenyi (KRASNO)" in Magocsi and Pop, eds ., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Culture, 58. �SLOVAKIA 2019 113 of Rusyns profited from the expropriation of Jewish property. Yet once it became obvious that the Slovak Republic was on the losing side of the war, a number of Rusyns began to organize, The Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Council for National Liberation (Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet national'nogo obsvobzhdenii-KRASNO) was founded in Presov in September 1943. Its goals were to aid escaped Soviet prisoners of war and partisans and to cooperate with other underground elements opposed to what it considered a clericofascist regime. Its members envisioned a restored Czechoslovakia in which Rusyns would be equal partners with Czechs and Slovaks. Although its orientation was pro-Soviet and decidedly leftist, KRASNO was not a communist front organization. It was founded by civic and cultural leaders of varied political orientation. Vasyl' Karaman ( 1903-1961) was born in the village of Nagov, in Slovakia. After completing his education at the Commercial Academy in Mukachevo (1924-1927), be returned to eastern Slovakia, where he worked as a civil servant in Presov from 1927 to 1933 , and then served in various towns as secretary for the pro-government Agrarian Republican Party. When Czecho-Slovakia was being partitioned in the fall of 1938, he opposed the pro-Ukrainian orientation of the Voloshyn government. He was elected as chairman of a newly re-established Central Russian National Council. Its members included both Russophiles and Rusynophiles who wished to retain ties with what remained of Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the followers of Brodii and Fentsik. Unable to realize his objectives, he returned to the Presov Region. Here he joined a Committee of Rusyns which tried to reach an accommodation with the Slovak government. This was not possible, since Slovak nationalist officials distrusted his Russophile orientation. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Karaman was arrested. He spent a year and a half in jail, and after his release made contact with the Zhydovs'kyi brothers, Ivan and Petro. Together the three men were among the founders of KRASNO. 60 Ivan Zhydovs'kyi (1897-1982) was born in the village of Sarisske Jastrabie. His secondary school education at the Piarist gymnasium in Sabinov was interrupted in 1915, when he was drafted 60 See the entry " Karaman, Vasyl"' in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 228. �114 SLOVAKIA 2019 into the Austro-Hungarian Army. A year later he was captured on the Eastern Front. Like many prisoners of War, he embraced the Bolshevik cause during the Russian Revolution. During the Russian Civil War Zhydovs ' kyi served as a political commissar in the 216 th International Communist Brigade. When he returned home, he discontinued the role of agitator and became at least outwardly conformist. He completed his secondary education in 1919, and then studied law at the Comenius University in Bratislava, obtaining a degree in 1924. He worked for a time as a tax inspector in Uzhorod. By the I 930s he had a law practice in Uzhorod and he was director of the Presov branch of the Uzhorod-based Subcarpathia Bank. As a Russophile, Zhydovs ' kyi was prominent in the Central Russian National Council and in the Dukhnovych Society. Although opposed to the separatist Slovak government, he kept a lower profile then Kamman and was never arrested. He operated a law practice in Giraltovce prior to his invol ve ment with KRASNO .61 His older brother Petro Zhydovs'kyi (1890-1947) was likewise born in Sarisske Jastrabie. As a teenager Petro emigrated to America in 1905 . Although he acquired little formal education, he returned home on the eve of World War I detern1ined to work for the advancement of the Rusyn people. Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, he deserted, then was captured and sentenced to prison. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he joined the Agrarian Republican Party and served as deputy to parliament from 1935 to 1938 . During the crisis of 1938 Zhydovs'kyi joined with Ivan P' ieshchak in submitting a memorandum to the British envoy Lord Runciman, calling for the unification of the Presov Region with an autonomous Podkarpatska Rus' .62 Ivan P' ieshchak ( 1904-1972) was born in the village of Vel'ky Lipnik. After graduating from the gymnasium of Mukachevo and the Presov Greek Catholic Teachers' Co llege, he taught in the regional elementary school s. P ' ieshchak was active in the Union of Rusyn Teachers in Slovakia and helped organize the Union of Rusyn Youth in Slovakia (1933). At the same time he studied law, and attained a 61 See the entry "Zhydovs'kyi, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 55 l. 62 See the entry "Zhydovs' kyi , Petro" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 551-2. �SLOVA.KIA 2019 115 doctoral degree from Charles University in Prague in the same year. By the mid 1930s P 'ieshchak was a prominent figure on the Rusyn political and cultural scene. He joined Andrei Brodii's Autonomous Agricultural Union and served as its representative in parliament. Interestingly, at this time he also worked closely with Andrej Hlinka's Slovak People's Party in the parliament's autonomist bloc . When Podkarpatska Rus' attained autonomy, P'ieshchak served as state secretary in Brodii 's brief-lived cabinet. After Brodii 's demise, he returned to Slovakia, where he maintained a law practice prior to his involvement with KRASNO .63 KRASNO rapidly expanded its network. By the summer of 1944 it controlled 3 7 villages in a sort of "partisan republic" between Medzilaborce and Stropkov. Intensification of partisan activityreinforced by Soviet partisans parachuted across the Carpathiansled to German military intervention in Slovakia at the end of August 1944. The clandestine military center of dissident Slovak Army officers , headquartered in Banska Bystrica, was already in touch with the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London. Its members had to proclaim the Slovak Nationa l Uprising under premature circumstances on August 29. 64 The Slovak National Uprising was a highly complex affair, which goes well beyond the limits of this study. It is sufficient to note here that it was dependent upon Soviet military support. Contrary to allegations by later critics, the Soviets did not deliberately betray the uprising. Their military capacity to cross the Carpathians was severely limited, particularly after the Germans occupied the Dukla pass. Yet the Soviets did not wish to forfeit the political influence they expected to enjoy in postwar Czechoslovakia, and rendered military assistance. In this capacity the Russian military 63 See the entry "P'ieshchak, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 384-5 . 64 Slovak soldiers, under the influence of Captain Piotr Alekseyevitch Velitchko intercepted members of a German military mission passing through Slovakia in the vicinity of Turciansky Sviity Martin. The Slovak soldiers escorted the Germans to the local barracks. It was Velitchko 's intention that the Germans would be disarmed there and that they would be sent to Ukrainian Partisan Headquarters in Kiev. But when the Germans attempted to depart, they were massacred by the Slovaks. Berlin then decided on a complete military occupation of Slovakia. At this point Lieutenant-Colonel Golian in Banska Bystrica issued the order to start the uprising. �116 SLOVAK.IA 2019 crossed through the Dukla pass for a third time in a military campaign that has been immortalized by local historiography. The Carpatho-Dukla operation, initiated on September 8, was undertaken by the 38 1h Soviet Army, led by General Kyril Moskalenko, supported by the 1s i Czechoslovak Army Corps, led by General Ludvik Svoboda. Many of the troops of the Is 1 Army Corps were Rusyns. In the autumn of 1939, as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the Soviets had annexed eastern Galicia and merged it with the Ukrainian S.S.R. An estimated 30,000 Rusyns who were disgruntled with Hungarian rule crossed the mountains into eastern Galicia, expecting to be cordially received by their Slavic brethren. Instead, every single one of them was arrested by the NKVD (Soviet State Security) and received an eight to ten year sentence for the illegal border crossing. A full sixty percent of them perished in the Gulag by the time Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. The survivors were released to join the I s i Czechoslovak Army Corps . Any Pan-Slav feeling- Russophile or Ukrainophi le alikewhich the Rusyn s may have had earlier had been beaten out of them in the Gulag. They merely wished to return home. In the autumn of 1944 it appeared that they would be the vanguard in the liberation of their homeland. Instead, they were committed to the meat-grinder of the Dukla Pass, where their casualties exceeded sixty percent. 65 The storming of the Duk la Pass was finally completed on October 6th. In the fighting which followed, the monastery community of Ladomirova was severely damaged. Most of the buildings, including the print shop but not the church, were destroyed. Now, too , the NKVD began rounding up Russian emigres in Slovakia. The monks fled to Bratislava, and from there fourteen of them emigrated to the United States. They entered the recently established Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, in upstate New York, where Archbishop Maksimenko now served as archimandrite. They built a church that was a replica of its predecessor in Ladomirova. A young Rusyn novitiate from the village, Vasyl' Shkurla (born 1928), ultimately became Archbishop Lavrl' , one of the leading figures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. By the 1980s Holy Trinity had become a major 65 See Vladimir Baumgarten, "Fifty Years Later: An Inquiry into Soviet Military Policy During the Slovak Uprising" in Lewis White, ed., On All Fronts: Czechoslovaks During World War ff Part 2 (Washington , 1995), 2 19-28. �SLOVAKIA 2019 117 cultural center for Russian emigres. When the cello virtuoso Mstislav Rostropovich defected to the United States, he chose to settle in Jordanville in order to be near Holy Trinity. 66 The Germans torched large areas in eastern Slovakia as they were forced to retreat, including the town of Svidnik. General Svoboda was nonetheless hailed as a hero and liberator when he entered it on October 28 .67 After the liberation of Svidnik, the Allies temporarily went on the defensive. KRASNO partisans continued fighting in the hills north of Presov. In October their adherents welcomed a declaration by the Slovak National Council that a resurrected Czechoslovakia would consist of three equal nations- Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns. It must be understood that Rusyns did not fight in partisan units exclusively of their own nationality. Jozef Rodak, longtime director of the East Slovak Military Museum in Svidnik, asserted that most partisan groups in the region had a mixed composition of Slovaks and Rusyns.68 To this day many people in eastern Slovakia have a dual sense of identity : they consider themselves Rusyns by heritage and Slovaks by citizenship. The realities of liberation at the end of World War II disappointed the aspirations of many Rusyns, particularly Russophiles. It undoubtedly di sconcerted them to discover that Moscow now considered them to be Ukrainians. There was already a precedent for thi s aspect of Soviet policy . In 1923 the delegation of Rusyn Communists attended a Party Congress in Soviet Ukraine and declared their acceptance of Ukrainian nationality. It was altogether practical for Soviet authorities to reaffirm acceptance of this principle at the end of 66 See the entry " Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266. 67 General Svoboda was designated as an honorary citizen of Svidnik. As president of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968, Svoboda gave the town its first hospital. In I 979, the year of the old man's death, a statue of him was erected in Svidnik. Owing to the damage of autumn 1944, Svidnik is a modem town . Most of the buildings are constructed in the so-called "social realist" style. Svoboda ' s statue looks strangely at home among the imposing, unattractive concrete structures. 68 As a graduate student of Safarik University in Prefov who specialized in the history of his region during World War 11 , Rodak was frequently delegated to carry the briefcases of Soviet military visitors. He remained outwardly conformist throughout the Soviet era. After the 1989 revolution and the coll apse of the communist system, Rodak wrote a series of articles for newspapers in eastern Slovakia and southeas tern Poland in which he exonerated partisans who had fallen into disfa vor. �118 SLOVAKIA 2019 World War II. Throughout the war, the Soviets had pledged themselves to the recognition of Czechoslovakia' prewar frontiers . Yet now Moscow infom1ed the Czechoslovak government that it could not ignore "the will of the people." In the wake of the Red Army's occupation of Podkarpatska Rus ' , various National Committees were established to vote in favor of the province being merged with the Ukrainian S.S.R. In all fairness to these communities, they overall enjoyed popular support. 69 The region was officially ceded at the end of June, 1945. Across the Uz River, in the Presov Region , the Russophile leaders of the defunct KRASNO drew the politically correct conclusion. Now, they too, considered themselves Ukrainian. They reorganized themselves as the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region. They envisioned that the long disputed counties of eastern Slovakia would be included in the territorial transfer. Indeed, even before the war ended, Vasyl' Karaman and the Zhysov ' skyi brothers planned to stage a meeting in Presov in February 1945 calling for the merger. A Soviet military major explained to them that such a meeting would be inopportune. The war was still on, and the Soviet Union intended to honor its obligations to Czechoslovakia.70 With eastern Slovakia excluded from the territorial settlement, the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region now called for the resurrected Czechoslovakia to consist of three equal nations: Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. The Slovak National Council had already expressed itself in favor of autonomy for the Rusyns. Now, in light of Ukrainian irredentism, it declared its Ukrainian counter• 1·d 11 part as mva 1 . Even after the Rusyns were officially classified as Ukrainian, the Russophile tradition not only persisted but predominated in the Presov Region . It must be noted that the Soviet 3gth Army was composed of elite Guards regiments, the cream of the Soviet military. Its soldiers conducted themselves in a correct and disciplined manner in 69 Yaroslav Pylynsky, Rising Ethnic Self-Awareness. Carpatho-Rusyns- Birth of a New Nation or a Political Game? (Copenhagen, 1998), 20. 70 Memorandum on the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Slovakia. Kosice. February 16, 1945 , in Nemec and Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Ruthenia, Document no.77 , 359-60 71 Magocsi , "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 262 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 119 their interactions with the locals after forcing their way through the Dukla Pass. This was in striking contrast with the soldiers of the 4 th Ukrainian Front, who penetrated Slovakia from the south, and who engaged in rape and widespread looting. This author can personally attest to the fact that citizens of the Svidnik area remember the Russians fondly as having assisted them through a bitter winter, and afterwards helped the locals plant their spring crops. Historian Mykola Musynka, himself a Ukrainophi le, summarizes the local attitudes as follows: The culmination of Russophilism in the cultural life of the Rusyns of the Prefo v Region occurred in the years just after World War II, when due to the Red Army's defeat of German fascism, th e Soviet Union enjoyed considerable authority among Rusyn-Ukrainians as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Everything "Soviet" was perceived as "Russian." Political propaganda attempted to portray the Soviet Union as an ideal country in which all peoples were united around the "Great Russian people. " The Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian individual, and the "Russian Soul " all symbolized the acme ofp e,:fection. 72 Russian Elementary and secondary schools proliferated after World War II, in addition to the Russian gymnasium in Presov, an additional Russian gymnasium was established in Medzilaborce on February 23, 1945, and trade schoo ls were opened in which Russian was the language of instruction. According to official statistics for the 1948-49 school year, there were 43 kindergartens, 276 elementary schools, 38 incomplete and 6 complete secondary schools with instruction in the Russian language, totaling 23, 11 2 pupils.73 After the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region was abolished, it was replaced by a new organization, the cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (Kul'tumy sojuz'ukrajans'kyi trudjascychKSUT), which was staunchly supportive of the Communist Party. KSUT initiated numerous publications in the Ukrainian language. 72 Mykola Musynka, "The Postwar Development of the Regional Culture of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia' in Paul Robert Magocsi, ed., The Persistence of Regional Cultures: Rusyns and Ukrainians in the Carpathian Hom eland and Abroad (New York, 1993), 55. 73 Ibid, 56. �120 SLOVAKIA 2019 Beginning on June 28, 1952, by decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, the language of instruction in all Russian elementary and secondary schools of Eastern Slovakia was changed to Ukrainian . The change in the school system was torturous for all parties. It was implemented too quickly. Instructors who had never studied literary Ukrainian were assigned to take month-long courses, after which they were expected to teach in that language. The vast majority of teachers detested it. There was a shortage of textbooks, dictionaries and other printed materials. Ukrainiazation nonetheless made significant strides in popular culture . In January 1953 , KSUT sponsored the first professional song and dance ensemble in Medzilaborce under the artistic direction of Jurij Kostjik. It was eventually reorganized as the Dukla Ukrainian Folk Ensemble. In September of that year, a Department of Ukrainian Language and Literature was established at the Presov Pedagogical Institute, which in 1959 became the Philosophical Faculty of Safarik University, under the direction of Petro Bungansyn. Literary works by Rusyns in the Presov Region reached an unprecedented level of publication in the course of a decade in the Ukrainian language. After 1959, the Ukrainian division of the Slovak Pedagogical Publishing House had a monopoly on the release of Ukrainian books in the Presov Region. During a thirty-year period it published 373 literary and scholarly works. Not all of them withstood the test of time. Many employed the so-called "socialist realist" style, reflecting a Marxist-Leninist ideological bent which conformed to Party dogma. Yet the Presov Region has produced works which have assumed a permanent place in the history of literature. 74 A number of former Russophiles moved with the times and adopted Ukrainian literary norms. Those Russophiles who remained outside the Communist Party could not expect a triumphal finish . Such was the case of Vasyl' Karaman, who, after the abolition of the body he had chaired, was accused of being a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist." The allegation was blatantly absurd: Karaman steadfactly believed that the future of the Rusyns was closely bound to the Soviet Union . He was nonetheless removed from political and cultural life in the Presov Region. Similarily, Ivan P'ieshchak was ac74 Ibid, 65 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 121 cused of bourgeois nationalism, driven from his home in 1952, and forbidden to practice law for nearly a decade. Ironically, some of the greatest beneficiaries of the new socialist order were those Rusyns of the 1st Czechoslovak Anny Corps who had survived the ordeal of the Dukla Pass. In spite of their suffering in the Gulag, they had fought bravely and well under General Svoboda, in fact becoming his favorite soldiers. 75 The treaty transferring Podkarpatska Rus ' to Soviet Ukraine contained a certain "exemption" clause. Those Rusyns with a record of service in the Czechoslovak Army could retain Czechoslovak citizenship. About half of them chose to do so, relocating west of the Uz. Svoboda redressed the balance for them as much as humanly possible, obtaining jobs for them in the military and especially in the security services. One might suppose that, after their experience in the Gulag, they would have been averse to serving as agents of repression. Instead, thanks to Svoboda' s generous patronage, they became overrepresented in the secret police, not only in eastern Slovakia but in Prague and Bratislava as well. This role fueled the hostility of their fellow citizens. Animosities smoldered beneath the surface for a full generation. During the Prague spring of 1968, the Slovak press suddenly became articulate in its denunciations: " ... this 15 year anti-Slovak movement in eastern ... Slovakia must be liquidated." 76 Slovak nationalists in particular resented the fact that the city of Presov served as a bastion of Ukrainophile activity. Slogans appeared on a number of buildings: "Presov was and will be only- and only- a Slovak city" and "Ukrainians, get out of Presov! " 77 The Slovak element of eastern Slovakia was not the only one which opposed the Ukrainian movement. Passive opposition was expressed by many Rusyns themselves . If they could not be themselves, the Rusyns opted for the closest thing, and voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. 78 The local dialect spoken was not foreign to them, unlike that of the Ukrainian textbooks imported from Kiev. Whenever local citizens were questioned by the police, they declared themselves as Slo75 Magocsi, "Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns in Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 175. 76 Cited in Kulturny zivot (Bratislava) April 15, 1968 and Vychod (Kosice) November 29, 1968. 77 Magocsi, "National Assimilation", 283. 78 fbid, 264-70. �122 SLOVAKIA 2019 vak, fearing deportation to the Soviet Union. Finally, the relatively more advanced Slovak economy drew many to the industrial valleys farther south, where the process was completed. For those Rusyns who continued to consider themselves Ukrainian , yet another shock awaited in the following generation. After the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of communism in East Central Europe, first the Slovak and then the Polish government recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Many young Rusyns eagerly embraced the new orientation. 79 Conclusion. Unrepentant Russophiles: Yurkovsky, Kabuliak, Sidor and Karabelesh The demise of the Russophile orientation among the CarpathoRusyn people was undoubtedly, to employ a Marxist cliche, historically inevitable. An interesting story revealing the pathetic depths to which it had descended by World War II is provided by Marian Zgomiak, later a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow , Poland. At the outbreak of World War II, Zgomiak was a 15 year-old Polish youth. When Poland was militarily crushed by Nazi Germany in September of 1939, Poli sh Army veterans hoped to escape to the West to fight again. Since most of the Polish soldiers fleeing abroad were between the ages of 17 and 30, two groups of people played disproportionately large roles in the domestic resistance movement organized by the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa- AK). One of them was Polish teenagers, who acted as couriers escorting the fugitive s to the border with Slovakia. Another was the Lemkos, who acted as guides. 79 The rejection of Ukrainian identity is by no means unanimous. On November 17, 1990, at the First Congress of the Ru syn Renaissance Society in Medzilaborce, spokesman Mychal Turok-Heter stressed that "while it is vital to preserve national pride, it is wrong to attack the Ukrai nians and the Ukrainian language . Gradually, the Ru syns will write and advance toward the common path which will lead them to fulfilling thei r mi ssive of peace for us all." See Myslenka, 75. Frequently, on the local level , there ex ists a certa in pluralism. In Svidnik, the Museu m of UkrainianRus'Culture acknowledges kinship with the former while stressing the regional identity of the latter. See the entry " Museum of Ukrainian Rus' Culture in Svidnik" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Cu lture, 337. �SLOVAK.IA 2019 123 Young Zgorniak was active in these border expeditions. On July 2, 1942, he and his father were arrested by the Gestapo. After the usual beatings and interrogation in the basement of the Gestapo headquarters in Gorlice, Zgorniak was transferred to the prison in Jaslo. Here he bonded with a Lemko prisoner named Yurkovsky. This Yurkovsky was an unrepentant Russophile. During World War I he and his father were hauled off to internment in Talerhof. Yurkovsky senior died there during the typhus epidemic. Yurkovsky junior returned to the mountain districts of Lemkovyna to serve as a teacher in the interwar years. He did not consider himself a Rusyn or even a Lemko, but a Russian. He was not receptive to Polish efforts to sponsor a separate Lemko identity. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of I 941 , the Nazi Government General (to which Lemkos west of the San River where subject) rounded up Lemkos known for their pro-Russian sentiments. In this manner Yurkovsky found himself in the prison of Jaslo. Both the quality and quantity of food in the prison of Jaslo left much to be desired. In September of 1942 German authorities loosened the regime to the point where Lemkos (but not Poles) could receive food packages. Arrangements were made for Zgomiak's mother to send food to Yurkovsky, who shared it with her son. Working together in the hospital section of the prison, they had the opportunity to engage in intellectual discussions. Zgorniak records the following: During one of the discussions I asked whether or how he could coordinate the Carpatho-Rusyn orientation on the Russia ruled by the Tsar with an orientation on a Russia ruled by the Bolsheviks who had overthrown and murdered the Tsar and his family. He said he could do so because "after the death a/father in Talerhof I had the dream . In it my father appeared and said 'the cause for which both are fighting shall be successful! ' That dream I keep in mind and I believe it will prove to be true. "80 80 Marian Zgomiak, " Meeting with Lemko leaders who had been arrested by the Gestapo and who were in prison in Jaslo 1942" in Best and Moklak, eds ., The Lemko Region, /939-194 7, 129. �124 SLOVAKIA 2019 Zgomiak asserts that he was convinced Yurkovsky and other Lemkos could have been released had they declared themselves Ukrainians. They declined to do so. Eventually, Yurkovsky was transferred to a concentration camp in Pruszkow, from which he was liberated before the end of the war. Yurkovsky then became sold on the plan jointly agreed upon by the Polish and Soviet governments to encourage Lemkos to emigrate to the east. Those whose villages had been destroyed during the Carpatho-Dukla operation went willingly. Others followed Yurkovsky across the border. They were by no means satisfied with living conditions in Soviet Ukraine, and turned on Yurkovsky for encouraging them to leave in the first place. He suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown and developed heart disease. Zgomiak concluded: "I remember him as an intelligent fellow who despite hi s various interests was fatally attracted to the idea for which he fought." 81 In light of its ignominious end in the realm of politics, what remains of the Russophile tradition among the Carpatho-Rusyns in the realm of culture? Here the author wishes to turn to the areas of religion and literature. In the area of reli gion, the Orthodox faith has provided a certain legacy. It must be understood that the majority of Rusyns professing any religious belief adhere to the Greek Catholic rather than the Orthodox Church . Yet the Orthodox revival of the early twentieth century made an enduring impact which was embraced by the communist regimes after World War II. Its most enthusiastic protagonist was Aleksander Kabuliak. At the end of World War I he was released from prison and became a major figure of the Orthodox revival in Czechoslovakia. There was a sc hi sm within the Orthodox Church in the 1920s. Its adherents were subject to the Serbian patriarchate, whereas Czech converts to Orthodoxy wanted their own autocephalous Orthodox Church. They appealed to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. On March 4, 1923 he consecrated the archimandrite Savritij as bishop. Bi shop Savritij 's leadership was contested by Bishop Gorazd, the Serbian patriarch 's representative. Kabuliak sided with the Serbian patriarchate in this di spute. With the Orthodox Church temporarily paralyzed and depri ved of an acting bishop, Kabuliak assumed the role of administrator. The Hungar81 Ibid, 129. �SLOVAKIA 2019 125 ians did not molest him during World War II, nor did he do anything to provoke them. But on November 18, 1944, on behalf of the Orthodox believers of Podkarpatska Rus ', Kabuliak wrote a letter to no less a personage than Soviet leader J. V. Stalin. He recommended the establishment of a Carpatho-Russian Soviet Republic encompassing territory extending "from Iasnyia to Poprad and from Uzhok Pass to Debrecen." 82 Since Moscow was already planning to incorporate Podkarpatska Rus' into the Ukrainian S.S.R., this was not an option. Yet in the following month Kabuliak led a delegation to Moscow requesting the transfer of episcopal jurisdiction from the Serbian to the Moscow patriarchate. Here his efforts were crowned with success. In posthumous recognition of his achievement, in 200 I the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) canonized Kabuliak as the first Carpatho-Rusyn saint. Eastern Galicia, like Podkarpatska Rus ', was ceded to Soviet Ukraine at the end of the war. In both areas incoming communist regimes declared the Greek Catholic Church abolished and transferred its parishes to the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church. In Galicia most of the clergy accepted the formal change and retained their old parishes. The Ukrainian character of the church consequently survived . In Transcarpathia the Greek Catholic clergy was more resistant to Orthodoxy and it was imposed more forcefully. Bishop Teodor Romza of Mukachevo was brutally murdered, while lesser clergymen were arrested and deported.83 They were replaced by Russian priests di spatched from Moscow. The Orthodox Church here acquired an expressively Russian character. From the standpoint of Rusyn culture, inclusion into the Russian Orthodox Church was a double-edged sword. In America, Reverend Alexis Toth had sought to convince his flock that the best way to preserve their rite, tradition and identity was through conversion to Orthodoxy. Yet St. Alexis (He too was canonized) had a great love for the variety of liturgical music known as Carpathian plainchant. 82 See the entry "Kabuliak, Aleksander" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn Hist01:y and Culture, 223 . 83 Pekar, 151 -4. �126 SLOVAK.IA 2019 This and another native aspects of worship were submerged by Russian liturgical tradition .84 In Czechoslovakia the legal status of the Greek Catholic Church was restored as a result of the liberal reforms of the Prague spring of 1968. Yet it lost its Rusyn character and became a force for slovakization. Much church property has been restored since the collapse of the communist system in 1989. Yet there remain adherents of the Orthodox faith in northeastern Slovakia. This author has an endearing memory of a visit to an Orthodox church in Svidnik. It was a modest, prefabricated structure, erected in the L990s. The morning was cold. There was only room inside the church for elderly parishioners. Yet a sizable crowd of young people remained standing outside. They displayed enough reverence to refrain from smoking throughout the Divine Liturgy. If the Rusyns can no longer be considered Great Russians, then the Russian government, and especially the Orthodox Church, wishes to retain whatever bonds still exist. While seminarians of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church have received their education in Ukraine, those who adhere to the Moscow patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been educated in Russia. Such was the case of Dmitri Sidor, born March 29, 1955, currently rector of the Church of the Exaltation of the Cross in Uzhorod. Reverend Sidor heads a movement demanding autonomy for Rusyns of Ukraine. He stresses the religious character of his people, and the similarity of their language with Old Church Slavonic. On December 19, 2008 , the Rusyn issue was raised at an international conference held on the Don, southern Russia. The conference was entitled "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of the Rusyns of Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century]." A resolution was adopted. It stated that, alongside the Armenians, the Rusyns were the first victims of genocide in the twentieth century, thi s in reference to the policy of the Austro-Hungarian military during the First World War. Today, the resolution continued, Kiev engaged in a "policy of cultural ethno- 84 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Adaptati on Wi thout Assimilati on: The Genius of the Greek Catholic Church of Mukachevo" in Of the Making of Nationalities, Volume 11 , 202. �SLOVAKIA 2019 127 cide." It pointed out that the Rusyns were recognized as a distinct nationality by numerous countries, but not Ukraine. 85 The Ukrainophile orientation responded to the Rostov conference. One articulate response may be found in the working paper "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem: A Ukrainian Perspective," by Natalya Belitzer of the Py lip Orlyk Institute for Democracy in Kiev. She outlines the tortutous, complex evolution of the history of a region which has been subject to numerous rulers. She echoes her colleague M. Lanchuk in asserting that the main issue at stake has not been the ethno-cultural identity of the Rusyns but rather what has been termed "political Ruthenianism," which many Ukrainians perceive as a threat. 86 According to Belitzer, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an artificial politicization of the Rusyn question. Belitzer is not opposed to Ru syn autonomy in principle. Yet, as a Ukrainophile, she considers the Rusyn tongue as a mere dialect of the Ukrainian language. Belitzer makes a particularly revealing admission when she states that "Ukrainian democracy is ... quite benevolent to the ideas and practices of the restoration of minorities ' own identity, but at the same time strongly denies Rusyn identity as being separate from the Ukrainian.,,s1 Therein lies the rub. If the Rusyn tongue is a dialect of the Ukrainian language, why is its use not permitted in schools? Rusyn schoolchildren speak one way at home but are required to speak another way at school. Such practices are grist to Dmitri Sidor's mill. Aside from the fact that Ukraine has an army and the Rusyns do not, Father Dmitri's movement faces two serious obstacles. For one, he is an Orthodox priest, whereas the majority of Rusyns still profess (or have resumed professing) the Greek Catholic faith. Secondly, while a majority of the Rusyns in the Presov Region and Lemkovyna 85 Resolution of the International conference "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of Ru syns in Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century] Rostov on the Don, Russia. December 2 1, 2008 www.podkar~atskarus.eu 6 M. Panchuk, " Political Rutheni ani sm" in Demons of Peace and Messengers of War(Kiev, 1997), 323. 87 Natalya Belitzer, "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem : A Ukrainian Perspective". Research paper prepared within the framework of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) sponsored by the Center for European Security Studies and the University of Gronigen (Netherlands). Undated, 12. �128 SLOVAKIA 2019 consider themselves their own nationality, a majority of them in Transcarpathia consider themselves Ukrainian. Yet the movement has a growing popular appeal. In a state where bureaucratic centralism has had a constipating effect, autonomy can be a powerful laxative. Moreover, the Rusyns now possess a certain bargaining chip . A full eighty percent of all Russian petroleum and natural gas which is sold to Europe passes through pipelines in the area of Uzhorod. If the Rusyns were to succeed in establishing an independent state, they would be eligible to receive billions of dollars of gas transit profits from Kiev.88 In the realm of literature, the Russophile tradition has likewise established an enduring legacy. This is especially exemplified by the writings of Andrii Karabelesh ( 1906-1964). Karabelesh was born in the Transcarpathian village of Tibala, near Mukachevo. When he first attended the gymnasium in Mukachevo the language of instruction was still Magyar. This changed due to the arrival in Podkarpatska Rus ' of many Russian emigres fleeing the revolution. Karabelesh adapted to the russification of the school system so enthusiastically that he became the first secular writer among Rusyn Russophi les. He went on to study at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod ( 1925-1928). While still a student he published- in Russian- two collections of poetry, lzbrany e stikhovtvorenia (1928) and V buchalh rassvieta ( 1929). These works have been characterized as "dominated by mysticism, a pessimistic outlook on life, and a love of Russian culture." 89 He did not complete his studies at the Theological Seminary because he converted to Orthodoxy. His conversion was less for religious than for cultural reasons. As literary historian Elaine Rusinko writes: "Karabelesh ' s deity is not the conventional God of the Greek Catholic catechism, but an amorphous, spiritual force that provides metaphysical potential and philosophical substance for the poet." 9 Karabelesh went on to Prague, where he obtained a degree in philosophy from Charles University in 1934. ° 88 See " Ukraine Laun ches Moderni zation of Urengog-Ponary-U zhorod Pipeline," Ukra inian News Agency, Jul y 19, 2011 . 89 See the entry " Karabelesh, Andrii " in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 223. 90 Ru sinko, 350. �SLOVAKIA 2019 129 Karabelesh continued writing exclusively in standard Russian. Unlike earlier Russophiles, he did not look towards Russia for the deliverance of the Rusyn people. In his estimation, it was no longer a matter of what Holy Mother Russia could do for Podkarpatska Rus'. It was a matter of what Carpathian-Rus' could do for Holy Mother Russia. In his enthusiasm for the great Russian literary giants, Karabelesh exhibited a tendency towards plagiarism, using some of their phrases directly in his own poetry. Karabelesh 's special favorite was Mikhail Lennontov, who merits attention here. Like his predecessor, the great Russian Romantic Alexander Pushkin, Lermontov wrote passionately, lived wildly and was killed in a duel. Unlike Pushkin, Lermontov created a literary genre in which the psychology of the protagonist played a leading role. This served as a precedent for the great novels of Dostoyevsky later in the century.91 In his poem "Nevdol'strie" (Dissatisfaction), Karabelesh quotes Lermontov's Pechorin: "I was not born for happiness. " 92 Anyone who studies the course of Karabelesh 's life would probably agree. He taught secondary school for a time in Podkarpatska Rus ', but when the Hungarians reoccupied the region he fled to Bohemia. Karabelesh participated in the Czech Resistance against the Nazis, heading a small underground group in Litamsyl. In this capacity he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942. He passed the remainder of the war in the concentration camps of Mauthausen and Buchenwald. After the war he remained for a time in western Czechoslovakia, serving as principal of the gymnasium of Svitavy (19451953). Then he moved to the Presov Region, where he taught Russian language and literature at Safarik University. Although a member of the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers Union, he continued to write exclusively in Russian. It was not simply a case of Karabelesh being unwilling to move with the times. The red banner of the October Revolution replaced the grey skies in "V karpatikh osin" (Autumn in the Carpathians ). 93 Yet the apolitical, pessimistic tone of Karabelesh 's poetry became increasingly an object of attack by communist ideologues. In 1956, when the Soviet Communist Party was 91 See Semyon Eks hut, " Pushkin 's Heir" Russian Life, 42 , No, 6 (October/November 1999), 20-32. 92 Rusinko, 353. 93 Ibid, 362. �130 SLOVAKIA 2019 in a state of ideological crisis in the aftermath of Stalin's death , Karabelesh raised his voice in criticism of the imposed ukrainization of the Rusyn people. He was subsequently expelled from the Slovak Writers Union and returned to Bohemia. In the homeland, literary hi storian and defender of the "social realist" genre Iurii Bolega opened an ideological offensive against Karabelesh ' s work, condemning it as having a Russian chauvinist and anti-social character. One may ask why Karabelesh would wish to return home under such circumstances. Yet the years he spent in concentration camps had undennined hi s health, and Karabelesh was of the opinion "Where you are born, there you should die! " 94 Terminally ill, Karabelesh finally returned home in 1964. He died in Mukachevo on September 4 . In the post-communist era his poetry has experienced a revival of popularity. The Eastern Carpathians constitute an area of scenic beauty, but also in many places one of the depressing poverty. In his poem " Moi Narod" (My Nation), Karabelesh focuses on "fences and of abandoned gardens," "dried out grape vines," "bars of broken down churches," "unplowed fields," and so on. His writing reflects the mixture of beauty and melancholia that is essential to the brooding Slavic soul. If the Russophile tradition never reached the level of popularity that the Ukrainophile orientation attained, it nonetheless remains an essential part of the cultural landscape. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank and express his deep appreciation to Bob Broedel , president of the Tallahassee-Krasnodar Sister City Program, for hi s technical assistance in accessing material published in Russia and Ukraine. 94 Ibid, 359. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 83 RUSSOPHILES WITHOUT RUSSIA R. Vladimir Baumgarten (Dedicated to the Memory ofNikolaj Ordos) The Carpatho-Rusyns, technically a stateless people, have been dubbed the "Kurds of Central Europe." They straddle the northern and southern slopes of the Carpathian mountains in the border re1 gions of Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine and Romania. Since the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe, both the Slovak and Polish governments have recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Ukraine, where the largest number of Rusyns dwell, does not. After World War II, incoming communist governments classified the Rusyns as Ukrainians by administrative fiat for reasons of convenience, which shall be explained below. The current post-communist government of Ukraine adamantly adheres to this position. 2 Further west, across the Uz river, many Carpatho-Rusyns in eastern Slovakia have voluntari ly assimilated into the Slovak nationality, for reasons which shall likewise be explained in this essay. The first impetus for the Rusyn national awakening came from a belief that they were part of a Great Russian nation, extending "from the Poprad River [in eastern Slovakia] to the Pacific." 3 The Russophile tradition influenced Carpatho-Rusyn culture and politics for a full century. An examination of its history reveals more than a few 1 Paul Robert Magocsi , " Mapping Stateless Peoples: The East Slavs of the Carpathians," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XXIX, Nos. 3-4 ( 1997), 301-54. 2 The Ukrainophile viewpoint was exemplified by Viacheslav Chomovil ( 19371999). During the Brezhnev era, Chomovil was a dissident journalist and human rights activist. He was sent to the labor camps several times for separatist activities. In the late I 980's he was one of the leaders of the People's Movement of Ukraine (better-known as Rukh). After the Soviet Union disintegrated and Ukraine became independent, Chomovil became alarmed by the Rusyn political renaissance. He considered it separatist and urged the Prosecutor General's office in Kiev to file charges aga inst its protagonists. 3 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationalist lntelligentia and the Peasantry in Twentieth Century Subcarpathian Rus "', in Magocs i, Of the Making of Nationalities Th ere is No End, Vol. I (New York, 1999), 19. 84 SLOVAKIA 2019 ironies. In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the Russophile tradition lasted as long as it did. Indeed, remnants of it exist to this day. The current essay is an attempt to explain its rise and fall. The Russophile Tradition in Habsburg Hungary, Galicia and America The homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns has been alternatively referred to as Ruthenia, Podkarpatska Rus' (Subcarpathian Rus '), Transcarpathia and Carpatho-Ukraine. For reasons of convenience, this author shall refer to it as Podkarpatska Rus' . It was part of the Kingdom of Hungary for about 900 years. Much of Podkarpatska Rus' was a game preserve for the Hungarian nobility. Its Eastern Slav peasants, shepherds and lumberjacks were forbidden to hunt the deer, even when the latter devoured the people's meagre cabbage plots. Starvation was common. The Rusyns were the most impoverished and illiterate ethnic group in the Hungarian kingdom. Originally a bastion of the Russian Orthodox Church, the homeland of the Carpatho-Rusyns was a battleground and passageway in the ongoing struggle between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes. In order to wean these people away from any allegiance to the Transylvanian princes, most of whom were Calvinists, the Habsburgs decided to incorporate them into the Roman Catholic Church. They accomplished this by creating a Slavonic/Greek Rite of the church. At the Union of Uzhorod (April 24, 1646), 63 Orthodox priests pledged to recognize the primacy of the pope and the sanctity of Roman Catholic doctrine in exchange for keeping the Slavonic liturgy and a married clergy.4 These clergymen were exempted from the feudal burdens of serfdom, received an income from their parishioners, and could send their sons to seminaries in the Habsburg Monarchy for higher education. Despite this favorable concession from the Imperial House, the Rusyns remained generally loyal to their Magyar lords. This was especially the case of the Kuruc (Crusader) uprising and freedom war of Ferenc Rakoczi II ( 1703-1711 ). 4 For the most comprehensive study of this event, see Michal Lacko, "The Union of Uzhorod," Slovak Studies, VI ( 1966), 7-190. SLOVAK.IA 2019 85 The contribution of the Rusyns was sufficiently valorous for them to receive the title gens fidelissima ("the most faithful people").5 In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the various Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy-Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs and Croats-launched their own national revivals, the Rusyns were slow to respond. No Rusyns attended the Slav Congress during the revolutionary year 1948. On the contrary, Greek Catholic seminarians in Uzhorod abandoned their intended vocations in order to volunteer for the Hungarian honveds (National Guard) during Hungary' s 1848-1849 war of independence.6 A few educated Rusyns were aware of a certain kinship with Russia. In 1791 Ivan Orlai ( 1771-1829) emigrated to Russia. A schoolteacher, he had been denied advancement in the Austrian system of education. In St. Petersburg he studied medicine and ultimately became court surgeon, actively working in the reorganization of the Russian medical profession. He advised the Ministry of Education to invite other educated Rusyns "since they usually know Church Slavonic thoroughly." 7 Orlai served as Mentor to Nikolaj Gogol, author of Taras Bulba, the Russified Ukrainian who ultimately became one of the literary giants of nineteenth-century Russia. Orlai encouraged other Russian scholars to take an interest in their kinsmen on the other side of the Carpathians. Meanwhile, a Greek Catholic eparchy was established in Presov, eastern Slovakia, in 1818. Its eparch (bishop), Hrihory Tarkovych, was an active pioneer of Russian culture. In expanding his library, he imported the complete works of the eighteenth-century Russian intellectual and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov.8 5 The Rusyns gained this title as a result of a battle fought near Trencin castle in western Slovakia on August 4, 1708. During the fi ghting Rakoczi vaulted across a ravine on horseback. He was thrown forward , striking his head and losing consciousness. His Carpatho-Rusyn peasant infantry held its ground long enough for him to be carried from the fi eld. Outnumbered and outgunned by the Imperial regulars, these Rusyns were subsequently massacred. 6 Paul Robert Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus: / 848-1 948 (Cambridge, MA: 1978), 43. 7 Elaine Rusinko, Straddling Borders: Literature and Identity in Subcarpathian Rus ' (Toronto, 2008), 99. 8 Athanasius Pekar, The History of the Church in Carpathian Rus' (New York, 1992), 89. 86 SLOVAKIA 2019 The first real impetus for the Carpatho-Rusyn awakening came as a result of the Russian military intervention against the Hungarian war of independence in 1849. It was not undertaken to liberate the Slavs of Hungary who were in a state of revolt against Magyar tyranny. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia employed far more autocratic powers than did the House of Habsburg and regarded the stamping out of the fires of revolution, which had swept Europe since the previous year, as a self-evident duty. Polish revolutionary veterans were serving on the Hungarian side and he feared the spread of revolution to his Polish possessions. Nicholas was no Pan-Slav. Two years earlier a nest of such agitators had been discovered in Kiev. It called itself "The Brotherhood of Sts . Cyril and Methodius," and, according to Nicholas, its adherents had invented some monstrosity called the Ukrainian nationality. One of its leading members was not only Ukraine's best poet, but its best painter as well. His people sought ties with the Czechs and Slovaks. Nicholas saw to it that several of them were jailed and he had Taras Schevcenko drafted into the Russian army for ten years, during which time he was forbidden to write or sketch. 9 A number of Russian Pan-Slav politically conservative individuals sympathized with the Slovak people. Tsar Nicholas admonished the Slavophile journalist Ivan Aksakov ( 1823-1886) that, under the guise of a general Slav alliance, subversive elements in the Kingdom of Hungary wished to create a struggle which was not in the name of 0 God, but in a spirit of mutiny, which was dangerous to Russia. ' The Russian military commanders carefully studied the earlier conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Transylvanian princes . They observed that The Austrians had traditionally moved against Transylvania by starting from Kosice in eastern Slovakia. It was considered safer to cross the Hornad and Tisa rivers in the Carpathian 11 foothills than to assault Transylvania from the Hungarian plain. On June 9, the main Russian army commanded by Field Marshal Ivan Paskievitch, consisting of 70,890 soldiers and 240 cannon poured into Slovakia through the Dukla Pass from partitioned Po9 Pav lo Zaitsev, Taras Shevchenko. A Life (Toronto, 1989), 139-57. °Cudovit Holotik, "The Slovaks: An Integrating or Disintegrating Force?" Austrian 1 Histo ry Yearbook, III , Part 2 ( 1967): 2. 11 William Stiles, Austria in 1848-50, II (New York, 1850), 294. Stiles was the American charge d'affaires in Vienna during the revolutionary events of 1848-49. SLOVAKIA 2019 87 land. The Russians captured Presov on June 20 and took Kosice five days later. To supply their army, the Russians stockpiled large amounts of foodstuffs at the northern end of the Dukla Pass. However, the military bureaucracy of Tsar Nicholas was inefficient. Provisions were made to transport the artillery but not the food . Austrian quartermasters, who also had a supply of food , and were allied with the Russians, had fled the area. The Russian soldiers, hungry and exasperated, turned to plunder. Don Cossacks looted a number of Slovak villages so thoroughly that the inhabitants fled into the for12 ests . The Russian intervention in this area would be remembered with ill-feelings by Magyars and non-Magyars alike. There were Slovak Pan-Slavs who were willing to overlook Russian misconduct. They convinced themselves that Grand Duke Konstantin was preparing to transfer his headquarters from Warsaw to Kosice, where he would proclaim a new Slav state. Slovak leaders appealed to the Russian embassy and military mission in Vienna for recognition. They requested that Slovak advisors and regional administrators be attached to the Russian military in eastern Slovakia. Tsar Nicholas replied to one such request "I received the same thing yesterday from Danilevsky [the Russian consul in Belgrade]. I have no time for such matters." 13 On the other hand, the reception of Russian military intervention was not universally negative. Rusyn peasants in the highlands witnessed a mighty Slav army in their region for the first time. They were awed. They gave fruits and nuts to the invaders. Aleksander Dukhnovych, soon to become an awakener among the Rusyns, later wrote, "One thing really gave me joy in life, and that was in 1849 when I first saw the glorious Rus sian army .. .I can't describe the feeling of gladness at seeing the first Cossacks on the streets of Presov. I danced and cried with delight. .. It was truly the first, perhaps the last, joy of my life." 14 Aleksander Dukhnovych (1803-1865) was born in the village of Topol 'a in the Humenne region of eastern Slovakia. He was descended from Greek Catholic priests and was consequently educated 12 John Shelton Curtis, The Russian Army under Nicholas I, 1925-/ 854 (Durham, NC, 1865), 298 . 13 Holotik, 383. 14 Quoted in Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity, 45. 88 SLOVAKIA 2019 at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod. After ordination as a priest in 1827, he was assigned to the bishop 's chancellery in Presov. His relatively progressive views clashed with those of the more conservative Tarkovych, who then assigned him to a relatively remote rural parish. Dukhnovych regarded his assignment as a godsend. In Uzhorod he had received a Hungarian education, which influenced his early writings. In the rural parish he discovered, or re-discovered, "the people." He was influenced by the Slovak National Awakening and applied its precepts to the awakening of his own Rusyn people. After the death of Tarkovych, Dukhnovych was reassigned to Presov and appointed eparchical canon in 1843 . He remained closely associated with the city-considered a Rusyn cultural center in spite of its Slovak majority- for the rest of his life. In 1850, after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, Dukhnovych established the first Rusyn cultural association, the Presov Literary Society. His own literary contribution was considerable. In 1851 he composed the poem "Vruchanie," whose opening lines "I was, am, and will remain a Rusyn" became the motif for the unofficial anthem of the Carpatho-Rusyn people. He researched and wrote extensively on the Rusyn people. His monumental achievement was the play "Virtue is More Important than Riches," which is still performed regularly in regional theatres in eastern Slovakia and western Ukraine. 15 The ethical values expressed in this play mirror Dukhnovych 's role as a social reformer. He campaigned vigorously against illiteracy, alcoholism, and the lingering pagan superstitions which persisted among his people. The literary language employed-indeed, invented by Dukhnovych-was peculiar. It was a blend of Old Church Slavonic, standard Russian and the native dialect. His later disciples called it "the traditional Carpatho-Rusyn langage," while his critics derrided it as "jazychije" (macaronic jargon). 16 Indeed, while Dukhnovych was the greatest of the Rusyn awakeners, he inhibited the establishment of a distinctive Rusyn identity by his unequivocal adherence to the Great Russian idea. 15 For an English-language translation, see Aleksander Duchnovych, Virtue is More Important than Riches, ed. by Elai ne Rusinko (New York, 1994). 16 See the entry "Dukhnovych, Aleksander," in Paul Robert Magocs i and Robert Popp, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture (Toronto, 2005), I06. SLOVAKIA 2019 89 If Dukhnovych was the unquestioned giant among the Rusyns in the realm of culture, then Adolf Dobrian' skyi ( 1817-1901) fulfilled this function in the realm of politics. Dobrian'skyi was born in Rudl'ov, Zemplin county, Slovakia, the son of a Greek Catholic priest. He attended secondary schools in Levoca, Roznava and Misko le, and then studied philosophy in Kos ice ( 1833 ), law in Eger (1834-36) and mining at the Academy of Mines and Forests in Banska Stiavnica, central Slovakia. He was fluent in several foreign languages, including Magyar, German, French, English and Italian. He visited Bohemia, where he was influenced by Frantisek Palacky, Karel Havlicek and other Czech national awakeners. Dobrian'skyi initially welcomed Hungary' s 1848 Revolution for the liberal reforms that it promised. But when the Slovak district of Banska Bystrica elected him as its representative to the Hungarian Diet, the Hungarian government rejected his mandate on the grounds of Pan-Slavism. Dobrian'skyi then indeed became a Pan-Slav. He moved to Presov, where he built a following which advocated a political union of the Rusyns of Hungary with those of Austrian Galicia. When the Russians prepared to invade Hungary, the Austrian government appointed him as its liason with Paskievitch. Dobrian 'skyi then served as advisor to the Russian military. After the defeat of revolutionary Hungary, the Austrian government imposed a centralist bureaucratic regime. Dobrian' skyi then became advisor to the Uzhorod Civil District, which encompassed four counties. He regarded the civil district as a prelude to the establishment of an autonomous Rusyn state under the Emperor of Austria. 17 Defeated in the Austro-Sardinian war of 1859, The Habsburg Monarchy was substantially weakened. It was forced to retreat from bureaucratic centralism and make concessions to the Magyars. Dobrian' skyi was recalled , and the old nobles began to reoccupy county positions. In 1866 Austria suffered another defeat, this time at the hands of Prussia, and resigned itself in 1867 to accepting the Magyar nobility as equal partners in the renamed Dual Monarchy of AustriaHungary. Emperor Franz-Josef allowed himself to be crowned King of Hungary in Budapest and the Hungarian nobles were granted complete self-government in internal affairs. By now their obsession 17 See the entry " Dobrian' skyi, Adolf," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 93. 90 SLOVAK.IA 2019 with Pan-Slavism reached paranoid proportions . They viewed the magyarization of Hungary's Slavic minorities as imperative. Persecution of Slovak and Carpatho-Rusyn educational and cultural institutions became the order of the day. A similar course evolved in Galicia, the Austrian province of partitioned Poland. Shortly after the 1867 Compromise with Hungary came into effect, Empreor Franz-Josef appointed his trusted Polish confidant Count Agenor Goluchowski as Viceroy of Galicia. Goluchowski gained for his Polish nobles a degree of autonomy that mirrored that of the Magyars. The education system was polonized. This posed a direct threat to the advancement of the Rusyns. Educated Rusyns became politically divided. The Ukrainian movement gained the greatest strength . However, there were still Rusyns who adhered to the traditions of old Rus' .They stubbornly continued to write in Old Church Slavonic and isolated themselves from the people. Cultureally, these Old Ruthenians identified with Russia, but professed allegiance to the Austrian Emperor. Such a dual allegiance became more difficult to maintain as the nineteenth-century ran its course. Austria and Russia were no longer allies, and were in fact competing for hegemony in the Balkans. Similarly, the Rusyns of Galicia found themselves cast in the role of a political football in the rivalry of the two empires. A case in point was the career of Ivan Naumovych (1826-1891), who was born Galicia in 1836. In his youth he was strongly influenced by the Polish national movement. However, he experienced a turning point during the revolutionary year of 1848, when there was a brief uprising in the city of Lviv. Naumovych was observing the fighting from a hillside when imperial soldiers spotted him and assumed he was a Polish rebel. They arrested him, but Naumovych persuaded them to release him by convincing the Austrians that he was a Russian. 18 Being Russian, Naumovych decided, carried certain privileges. After 1850, when Naumovych was ordained a Greek Catholic priest, he became staunchly Russophile in cultural orientation. He organized opposition to a campaign organized by the Roman Catholic Polish clergy to latinize the liturgy of the Greek rite. In this ca18 Keith Dyrud, The Quest fo r th e Rusyn Soul: The Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europ e and America, 1890-World War I (Philadelphia, 1992), 28. SLOVAKIA 2019 91 pacity he sought Russian support. At this point, Naumovych did not convert to Orthodoxy . He still regarded the Greek Catholic (Uniate) church as a potential bridge between Eastern and Western Christendom. Nontheless, inspired by his activism, an entire village in eastern Galicia converted to Orthodoxy in May of 1877. More conversions followed in the next three years. The Galician authorities charged Naumovych with treason. In their view his activity was not religious but political. Naumovych had indeed maintained contact with Russian Pan-Slav agents. 19In July of 1882 he was finally convicted and sentenced to eight months in jail. Other Rusyns who converted to Orthodoxy likewise found themselves hauled into court, although, surprisingly, a Polish jury acquitted them. Both the Austrian government and Polish patriots understood the necessity of not pushing the Old Ruthenians to the point of open subversion. The Ukrainophile movement predominated in Galicia, but the Russophile tradition was not going to go away. Galicia, unlike Russian Ukraine, was not a particularly productive agricultural region. Much of the countryside is hilly and the soil is poor. A bad harvest usually resulted in famine , and this happened at the beginning of the twentieth century. Russian Pan-Slavs responded by founding the Galician-Russian Benevolent Association in St. Petersburg on February 9, 1903. At the opening meeting acertain Father Petrov delivered the inaugural address. American historian Keith Dyrud described the subsequent address as follows: He likened the world to an artist's palette or a musician 's instrument. God was that artist or musician. The nationalities of the world were like colors on the palette or strings on the instrument. If some of the colors or strings are missing, the painting or music will be incomplete and this is a crime against the spirit. This crime against the spirit occurs when a culture allows itself to become divided. The separation of the people of Galicia and Carpatho-Russia (Subcarpathia) from the Russian nation was just such a crime . It is the obligation of a national culture to unite its people into a united nation. In other words, the orator was suggesting that it was 19 Ibid ., 28 . 92 SLOVAK.IA 2019 the obligation of Russia to unite in a single nation all people with a Russian culture. He included the Galicians and Subcarpathians 20 among the people with a Russian culture. Under the leadership of Count Vladimir Bobrinski , the GalicianRussian Benevolent Association extended financia l relief to famine victims of Galicia. Tsarist Russia, the most despotic and reactionary among the Great Powers, could appear benevolent while working to expand its influence. Bobrinski likewise dispatched agents to Podparkarpatska Rus ' , where starvation was an everyday occurrence, rather than a momentous event. The Hungarian government was less hesitant than its Austrian counterpart to prosecute Rusyns for conversion to the Orthodox faith. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the first converts to the Orthodox faith in Podkarpatska Rus ' materialized in the vi llage of Iza. They were simple peasants who disliked their pastor, a magyarized Rusyn, who replaced their language with Magyar in the parish school. Led by the cantor-teacher Andry Vladymir, they appealed to the Serbian patriarch, who had nominal authority over all Orthodox subjects of the Habsburg Monarchy, to send them an Orthodox priest. Greek Catholic priest and historian Athanasius Pekar, himself a Ukrainophile, later admitted: "All that needed to be done to liquidate the so-called 'Orthodox movement' in Iza was to appoint a new village pastor and reopen the parish school." 2 1 Instead, the Hungarian government arrested the participants late in 1903 for alleged ties with Russia, and in the following year placed them on trial in Marmaros. All the defendants were found gui lty of treason. The Maramaros trial made a deep impression on the mind of a simple woodcutter of Iasnyia named Aleksander Kabaliu (18771947). He had just been released from the army, where he had been persecuted by Hungarian officers for his Pan-Slav inclinations. Kabuliak had a pronounced inclination towards a monastic life . He made religious pilgrimages to Russia, Jerusalem and Mount Athos in Greece. At a Russian monastery in the last-named location, he was received into the Orthodox fold . He turned his home in Iasnyia into a veritable Russian museum, collecting and displaying icons. Fearing 20 21 Ibid. , 49-50. Pekar, I 05 . SLOVAKIA 2019 93 persecution by Hungarian authorities, Kabaliuk emigrated to the Russian Empire, where he was tonsured as a monk in 1910. The Russian Orthodox Church initially intended that Kabaliuk wou ld go to America and assume custody of a modest parish in Pittsburgh.22 Instead, he decided to return to Hungary to share in the martyrdom of the villagers of Iza. The Hungarian authorities were happy to oblige him. At the end of 1913 there was a second Maramaros trial, in which Kabaliuk and 94 peasants were the defendants. The Hungarians were hopeful that the trial would expose the activities of Count Bobrinskii and his associates. All it achieved was international condemnation of Magyar policies . Nonetheless, Kabaliuk was sentenced to four and a half years in jail, while 32 others were sentenced to one or two years and various fines. The rest were dismissed for lack of evidence. It was also at the tum of the century that many Rusyns followed the example of their Slovak kinsmen and neighbors in emigrating to America. Although members of both groups originated in the dirtpoor hill country of the eastern Carpathians, they tended to gravitate towards industrial centers in the United States. Surprisingly, America provided both stimulus for the Russophile tradition and a resurgence of the Russian Orthodox faith. Dyrud writes: The majority of the Rusyn immigrants came to the United States as illiterate peasants and had not participated in the intellectual and cultural conflicts that were raging in the old country. Thus it was in this country that Rusyn peasants from Galicia and Subcarpathia first lived together and found that they did not have as much in common as it first seemed. And it was in the United States that many of them first heard of the Ukrainian movement. And it was there that the Rusyns from Subcarpathia felt free to express national sentiments without the pressures of magyarization. It was in the United States that most of the Rusyn immigrants were told for the first time by the Russian Orthodox mission that they were really Russians. 23 22 See the entry "Kabaliuk, Aleksander," in Magocsi and Popp, eds., Encyclopedia o[ Ru syn History and Culture, 223. 2 Dyrud, 58 . 94 SLOVAK.IA 2019 Ironically, the Russian cause was indirectly aided by a most unlikely element: Irish American Catholic priests. Many of the latter resented the fact that Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood were permitted to marry while they were not. Most outstanding was Archbishop John Ireland of Minneapolis-St. Paul. On December 19, 1889, he was visited by a Greek Catholic priest named Alexis Toth. Toth had been dispatched by the Presov eparchy to assume the pastorship of St. Mary ' s, a modest church recently constructed by the Rusyn community of Minneapolis. When Father Toth presented his credentials, Archbishop Ireland became greatly agitated. He informed Toth that he did not consider him to be a genuine Catholic, and denied him permission to administer the sacraments. 24 After consultation with the parishioners of St. Mary's, Toth conferred with Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Vladimir of San Francisco. The latter was eager and willing to accept the parish of St. Mary's into the Orthodox fold. Aside from Alaska, which Russia had sold to the United States earlier, there were up to the 1870s only three Orthodox churches in the United States. In addition to San Francisco, there was a Russian parish in New York City and a Greek Orthodox church in New Orleans. Native converts in America were exclusively Alaskan Aleuts and Eskimos . Now, however, the wave of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants indicated a potential source of growth. Since nearly all Rusyn immigrants were in the eastern half of the United States, New York rather than San Francisco was delegated as an episcopal seat. In 1890 the construction of St. Nicholas Cathedral was completed in New York. Tsar Nicholas II personally donated 5,000 roubles to this project. His government subsidized the construction of other churches and supported activities of the Orthodox Missionary Society founded in Moscow. In Minneapolis, Father Toth founded the Russian Mutual Aid Society. These prosletization efforts exceeded all expectations. By the time of the outbreak of World War I in 1914, over one-third of all Rusyn immigrants in the United States had converted to Orthodoxy. 25 They served as enthusiastic supporters of the Russian cause in the Great War. World War I brought with it the culmination of the historic struggle for the Carpathians, and caused great suffering among the 24 25 Ibid 65-6 Ibid: 65 . • SLOVAK.IA 2019 95 Rusyns of Galicia, eastern Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' . By early September 1914 Russian armies had overrun much of eastern Galicia. Count Georgii Bobrinskii, brother of Count Vladimir, was made governor-general, and started a campaign to eradicate the Ukrainian movement. All Ukrainian cultural organizations, cooperatives and journals were shut down. The Russian language replaced Ukrainian in the school system. Hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were deported into the depths of Russia. There was admittedly some dissent in Russian governmental circles. Noted statesman Pavel Miliukov described Russian conduct in Galicia as a European scandal. Yet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov stated unequivocally: "Now is exactly the right moment to rid ourselves of the Ukrainian movement once and for all." 26 The Ukrainophiles had a measure of revenge when the AustroHungarian military reoccupied the province in the following year. They denounced their Russophile neighbors for alleged collaboration with the invaders. Hungarian troops carried out mass hangings. At the same time, Polish nobles spread rumors that the Ukrainophiles were covertly pro-Russian, so as to reassert their own authority in Galicia. In truth, thousands of Russophiles and Ukrainophiles alike suffered internment in Austrian concentration camps. The most notorious of these camps was Talerhof, near Graz. Sanitary conditions were deplorable, and an estimated 1,767 persons died of typhus and 27 other diseases. Austria's parliament was scandalized, and Emperor Karl ordered Talerhof closed early in 1917. Early in 1915, for the second of three occasions in the course of a century, the Russian military crossed through the Dukla Pass. This move came as a result of the seige of Przemysl, Austria-Hungary's principal fortress in Galicia. Russian troops occupied the Carpathian mountain passes to the south to prevent the Austro-Hungarian military from sending reinforcements to break the siege. Casualties on both sides of the winter war of 1914-15 were appalling. It is likely that more soldiers succumbed to the "White Death" (hypothermia) than were killed by enemy bullets. 28 Ultimately, the Austrian side 26 Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History (Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2009), 343. See the entry "Talerhof," in Magocsi and Pop, eds,. Encyclopedia of Rusy n History and Culture, 488 . 28 For rhe most recent account of the winter campaign, see Traydon A. Tumstell, Blood on the Snow: The Carpathian Winter War of I 9 I 5 (Lawrence, KD, 20 I 0). 27 96 SLOVAKIA 2019 gave way first. Russian soldiers under General Lavrl' Kornilov pushed through the southern end of Dukla Pass and advanced as far as the village of Lodomirova, just north of the town of Svidnik. Here they established a military cemetery for their dead. Lodomirova eventually became the site of a Russian cultural center in northeastern Slovakia, which shall be discussed in due course. The Russians did not remain in occupation of this toehold in Slovakia for long. Germany, Austria-Hungary's senior partner, launched a counteroffensive eastward across Poland, albeit at the cost of having enough troops to capture Paris. Russian troops painfully withdrew north of the Carpathians. They were now demoralized and ripe for revolution. Mass mutinies forced Tsar Nicholas II to abdicate on March 15, 1917. The reign of the Romanov dynasty had ended. Tsarist Russia was destroyed. Politically speaking, the Russophi-le orientation was now a dead letter. Culturally, its future was now an openended question . At this point Russophiles among the Rusyns looked with growing interest at the now ascendant Czechoslovak independence movement. The Rusyns in Interwar Czechoslovakia and Poland The Czechoslovak independence movement was a curious article. For almost a century, there existed an intellectual tradition which maintained that Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same nationality. Yet the concept of a politically united Czechoslovak state was largely the invention to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk ( 18501937), a Czech philosophy professor and notorious defender of unpopular causes. Perceiving that World War I would result in AustriaHungary coming increasingly under the domination of Kaiser Wilhelm ' s Germany, Masaryk decided to lobby among the opposing Western powers for Czecho-Slovak independence. In Geneva, in neutral Switzerland, he was joined by his protege, the sociology professor Edvard Benes. Together they proceeded to Paris, where they were joined by Milan Rastislav Stefanik, a young Slovak serving as an officer in the French Air Force. This triumvirate formed a Czech Action Committee Abroad, which was eventually expanded and renamed the Czechoslovak National Council. Given his position on this body, the French eventually gave Stefanik genera l' s rank. He raised a Czechoslovak Legion from prisoners of war and deserters SLOVAKIA 2019 97 from the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Czechoslovak Legion distinguished itself on the Western, Eastern and eventually Italian fronts, and gained increased Allied favor in the struggle for the recognition of the independence movement. 29 In 1918 Masaryk visited the United States, not only to gain official American recognition, but also a mandate from the Slovak community in America, since Slovakia itself was politically gagged. In October of 1915 the Bohemian National Alliance and the Slovak League of America had already concluded a preliminary agreement for cooperation in Cleveland. Masaryk proceeded to Pittsburgh to conclude a more formal agreement for a Czecho-Slovak merger. Masaryk's visit to the Mecca of the American Slovaks was greeted by a large manifestation of support which included South Slavs as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Yet the negotiations undertaken at Moose Hall on May 29-31 were not without controversy. Masaryk pledged Slovakia an administration, a school system and linguistic rights, but not its own parliament, as specified by the earlier Cleveland Agreement. Here Jozef Husek of the Slovak Catholic Jednota raised strenuous objections. Albert Mamatey, president of the Slovak League, impressed Masaryk with the seriousness of losing the support of the largest single Slovak organization. The delegates were evenly divided, and Masaryk finally broke the deadlock by signing a revised draft with all the proposals. 30 The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also heavily populated by Rusyns from Hungary. Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided 29 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was the most instrumental military force in attaining Allied recognition of the independence movement. With Russia withdrawing from the war in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires wished to be evacuated and sent to France, where a German offensive to capture Paris was anticipated. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to disarm them resu lted in their capture of the Trans-Siberian Railway and a legendary odyssey to the Pacific coast. It also gave the Western Allies a pretext to intervene in the Russian Civil War. The experience of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia boats of a sizable amount of literature. The best Englishlanguage studies are authored by Victor M. Fie, The Revolutionary War for Independence and the Russian Question: The Czechoslovak Army in Russia 1914-191 8 (New Delhi, 1977) and The Bolsheviks and the Czechoslovak Legion. The Origins of Their Armed Conflict: March to May 1918 (New Delhi , 1978). 30 See Marian Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia" Slo vak Studies, VIII ( 1968), 48-5 1 98 SLOVAKIA 2019 benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Its members had acquired a measure of political awareness. One such organization was the Greek Catholic Union, headquartered in the HomesteadMunhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, which contained both Greek Catholic and Orthodox members, based in McKeesport. At the time of Masaryk's pilgrimage to Pittsburgh, the Czech independence leader was approached by Nicholas Pachuta, editor of the Greek Catholic Union's newspaper Rus 'kii Viestnik. Pachuta had recently converted to Orthodoxy. Up until this point he had advocated the incorporation of Podkarpatska Rus' into the Russian Empire. Now that there was no more Russian Empire, Pachuta approached Masaryk with the idea of union with a Czecho-Slovak state. He was soon afterwards expelled from the Greek Catholic Union. 3 1 Overall, the Greek Catholic clergy wished their homeland to remain part of Hungary. Many laymen wanted union with Galicia but insisted Galicia was Russian rather than Ukrainian. The end to the Great War was approaching, and territorial changes could be anticipated. One of President Woodrow Wilson's celebrated Fourteen Points for peace was "self-determination for the peoples of AustriaHungary." It was necessary to have a common program. Members of both organizations met in Homestead on July 23, 1918 to form the American National Council of Uhro-Rusyns. The subsequent Homestead Resolution read as follows: If the pre-war boundaries remain, Rusyns, as the most loyal people-gens fidelissima-deserve that Hungary provide [them} with autonomy. If new boundaries are made, they should be made according to nationality; thus, Uhro-Rusyns can belong nowhere else than to their nearest brothers by blood, language and faith, to the Galician and Bukovinian Rusyns. But if we are divided by foreign aspirations from Ukrainians and Old-Russians [Galician Russophiles}, the National Council demands in this case autonomy for Uhro-Rusyns so they can pre32 serve their national character. 31 Magocsi, Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 81. The original text of the Homestead Resolution appears under the heading " Do Vpukh Vhro-Rusynov zhivlych v Soed" in Prosvita, August 8, 1918 32 SLOVAKIA 2019 99 The Rusyns commissioned a young Pittsburgh lawyer named Gregory Zsatkovich ( 1886-1967) to represent their interests to the United States government. Pennsylvania congressman Guy Campbell arranged a meeting between Zsatkovich and President Wilson on October 21. Wilson thought it unfeasible to grant full independence to so small a nation in a geopolitically sensitive region, and consequently recommended that Zsatkovich seek autonomy in a larger state. He referred Zsatkovich to Masaryk, whose independence movement had been recently recognized by the U.S. State Department, Zsatkovich met with Masaryk in Philadelphia, where the latter hosted a congress called the Mid-European Democratic Union on October 23-26. According to Zsatkovich's memoir afterwards, Masaryk assured him: "If the Rusyns decide to join the Czechoslovak Republic, they shall constitute a fully autonomous state." 33 There remained a sticky issue. Rusyn territorial claims included several counties in eastern Slovakia. Here there were numerous Rusyns in the northern mountain districts whereas elsewhere the population consisted of either Slovaks or Rusyns who had already voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. Masaryk was further alleged to declare on this point: "The frontiers will be so determined that the 34 Rusyns will be satisfied." On November 12, at a meeting of the National Council of UhroRusyns in Scranton, Pennsylvania, the Czechoslovak option was provisionally adopted, albeit including the demand for the counties of eastern Slovakia. A subsequent plebiscite among the American Rusyn fraternals provided Zsatkovich with the desired results: out of 1,102 votes submitted, 732 (67 percent) were for union with Czechoslovakia and 310 (28 percent) for union with Ukraine. Additionally, there were 27 votes for complete independence, 10 votes for union with Russia, and 9 votes for remaining part ofHungary. 35 Back in the Old Country, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October of 1918 led to a power vacuum in many areas of the Carpathians. Several different national councils were organized by Rusyns, each of which had its own program for the fu- 33 Gregory Zsatkovich, Otkryhote-Expose bydaltelho gubernatori Podkarpatskoj Rusi (Homestead, PA , 1921 ), 5. 34 Ibid 5 35 Ma~o~si , Th e Shaping of a National Identity, 85. 100 SLOVAK.IA 2019 ture affiliation of the people. A Russophile group in eastern Slovakia, based in Stara Cubovna, initially wanted a merger with Galicia. Dissenters among them, led by the lawyer Antonii Beskyd ( 1855-1933), considered such a move impractical. They reconvened in Presov and declared themselves for union with Czechoslovakia instead. A new revolutionary government in Hungary pledged to grant the Rusyns territorial autonomy. A group of Greek Catholic priests in Uzhorod declared themselves in favor of this option. Another pro-Hungarian group met in Khust, but its speakers were shouted down by Pro-Ukrainian elements led by the lawyer Iulii Braschaiko (1879-1955). The Ukrainophle orientation had at last taken hold in Podkarpatska Rus ', and would grow progressively stronger. Most dramatic of all were events in the easternmost Hutsul region, centered around Iasnyia. Here the populace favored union with Ukraine, but, pending further developments, took matters into their own hands. In the early morning of January 7, 1919, a group of demobilized Rusyn soldiers, aided by troops sent by the West Ukrainian Republic, drove out the Hungarian garrison of 250 militiamen. On February 5 the victorious Rusyns proclaimed their own "Hutsul Republic," with a 42-member elected council and a four-man government. This little state existed until June 11, when the area was occupied by advancing Romanian troops.36 Late in 1918, Czechoslovak legionnaires returning from the Italian Front had begun a military occupation of Slovakia, and advanced across the Uz River. Uzhorod was occupied on January 10, 1919. The Czechoslovak position was strengthened as a result of a Bolshevik government assuming power in Hungary, much to the alarm of the Western powers. This Hungarian government wished to build upon the "Ruska Kraina" declared by its predecessor, the Karolyi regime. It went to extremes attempting to implement communist rule, threatening the death penalty for even the smallest commercial transactions. This decree became impossible to enforce, since the commissars were themselves profiteering. 37 Podkarpatska Rus' was soon engulfed in counterrevolution. 36 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Rusyn Decision to Unite With Czechoslovakia" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Natio nalities, 134. 37 Ibid, 140-42 SLOVAKIA 2019 101 Even before the establishment of the Bolshevik regime, members of the Uzhorod Council began experiencing doubts concerning the viability of remaining part of Hungary. A leading member of the Council, Reverend Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874-1945), began negotiating with Slovak leader Milan Hodza. Voloshyn was joined by supporters of both Beskid and Brashchaiko. The Russophiles realized that the Russia they had loved and believed in was unlikely to return from the dead. The Ukrainophiles realized that an independent Ukraine was unlikely to survive the turmoil of the Russian Civil War. Members of both orientations were willing to form a single body representing their mutual interests. It was in this spirit that the Central Russian National Council was formed in Uzhorod on May 8, 1919. Zsatkovich arrived with the text of the Scranton Resolution, which was endorsed unanimously. It remained to the Western peacemakers gathered in Paris to give sanction to Podkarpatska Rus' being granted to Czechoslovakia. Yet, contrary to later Hungarian revisionist claims, the victorious Western Allies did not arbitrarily hand the region over to the Czechs. The decision to unite with Czechoslovakia was that of the Rusyn people themselves .38 The realities of being part of the Czechoslovakia disappointed the expectations of many educated Rusyns. Autonomy was not forthcoming. They could send representatives to parliament in Prague, but did not have their own regional parliament. Prague apparently decided that the Rusyns, like the Slovaks, were not ready for autonomy. Zsatkovich became the first provincial governor, but the actual administration lay in the hands of a centralized Czech bureaucracy. Zsatkovich eventually resigned in disgust and returned to America. The disputed counties in eastern Slovakia remained under Slovak administration. To complicate matters further, there was now a group of Rusyns who considered themselves their own nationality, in addition to the existing Russophile and Ukrainophile orientations. Politically, on the local level, Prague would support one and then another orientation, depending upon its convenience at a particular moment. The Czechoslovak administration made great strides in education, virtually eliminating illiteracy in twenty years . The government poured tremendous amounts of money into Podkarpatska Rus ', and liberally funded cultural activities of all three orientations. 38 Ibid, 146. 102 SLOVAKIA 2019 On April 29, 1920, there was a meeting of local leaders in Uzhorod, headed by Iulii Brashchaiko. Its purpose was to establish a cultural organization encompassing all Podkarpatska Rus '. Nothing resulted from this meeting since Russophiles led by Anthonii Beskyd raised angry objections to the Ukrainophile cultural orientation of Brashchaiko ' s group. On May 9 Brashchaiko's fol lowers established the Prosvita Society, modeled along the lines of the Ukrainian society of the same name in Galicia. Its task was to publish all kinds of popular and scholarly books "written in the national tongue and accessible to every Subcarpathian Ru syn." 39 The Czechoslovak Pros vita was reinforced by many educated Ga li cian Ukrainians who found Polish rul e objectionable. On th e May 23 , 1923, those Russophiles who boycotted the Prosvita met in Uzhorod to establish their own organization, which was called the Dukhnovych Society. Its stated goals were to foster "the cultural deve lopment of the Ru ssian people living within Czechoslovakia, and most importantly to educate them in a moral , patriotic and Ru ssian spirit, exclusive of al l political activity." 40 The contrast between the two rival societies was visib le. The old tricolor Ru ssian flag flew over the reading rooms of the Dukhnovych Society, whereas Prosvita reading rooms displayed the blue and ye llow Ukrainian national colors. In terms of literature, the new Dukhnovych Society championed the great Russian masters : Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, etc. The Prosvita Society advanced the writings of Shevchenko and other less known Ukrainian awakeners. Both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles expanded their activities from literature to theater. The Ru ssophiles tended to produce hi storical dramas, whereas the Ukrainophi les focused on folk songs and ballads. The latter used standard Ukrainian as the language of performance, whereas the Russophiles had to translate their productions into a Rusyn dia lect. It must be frankly admitted that the Ukrainophile orientation gained the upper hand in popularity during the course of the kulturkampf for Podkarpatska Rus' in the First Czechoslovak Republic. Avtustyn Voloshyn had become a convert to the Ukrainophile orien39 Statul tova,ystva 'Prosvita • Podkarpatska Rus ·, (Uzhorod, 1920), 6. Usta v Rusakogo ku/'turna-prosvete/'noga obshchturni Aleksandra Duchnovychovicha , (Uzhorod, 1923), 40 SLOVAK.IA 2019 103 tation. He and his associates were astute and learned men-teachers and scholars who kept closely in touch with Rusyn cultural life. By contrast, the Dukhnovych Society fell increasingly under the influence of Stefan Fentsik ( 1892-1946), a local politician who used the organization as a platform to propagate a his own views, his political ties with Poland and Hungary-which shall be di scussed in due course-became common knowledge by 1937, and did much to compromise the Dukhnovych Society. 41 Russian culture survived more comfortably in eastern Slovakia, since 1928 elevated to the official status of a province. In large measure this direction was due to the efforts of Iulii Lazho (18671929), a native of Svidnik and senator for the Social Democratic Party in the Czechoslovak parliament. Earlier, Lazho had emigrated to America, where he converted to Orthodoxy and also rose in the construction industry. He returned home to start his own construction firm, and also to seek revenge against his former Greek Catholic pastor. As mayor of Ladomirova, where the Russian military cemetery was located, Lazho invited Vital ii Maksimenko ( 1873-1960), former archimandrite of the monastery at Pochaiev (in Polish Volhynia), to establish a missionary headquarters there. Lazho also procured a Cyrillic alphabet printing press which Czechoslovak legionnaires in Russia had appropriated, shipped all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific coast, and which made its way to Prague. During two decades of activity the Ladomirova mission published over I 00 Orthodox church books, the newspaper Pravoslavnaia Karpatskaje Rus ' (1928-1944), the journal for young people Diestvo I ivnost Khristi ( 1935-1941 ), a scholarly journal Pravoslavny put' ( 1938-1940) and the annual almanac Pravnoslavny ruskii/Ruskii narodnyi kalendar ( 1924-1944). The Russian monks also worked to inculcate Russian culture among the native Rusyns, hosting such events as an annual Russian Day in the summers and the tree-lighting ceremony for Orthodox Christmas. 42 In approaching the causes of the Orthodox revival in interwar Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to understand the world view of the 41 Magocsi, "Nationalist Intelligentsia and the Peasantry" in Of th e Making of Nationalities, 200. 42 See the entry "Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , En cyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266 . 104 SLOVAKIA 2019 national-state's founding father. T.G. Masaryk was a complex individual. As one biographer expressed it: "This man wanted to emancipate workers without embracing Marxism, liberate women without promoting feminism, and educate the young without celebrating youth. " 43 He was considered in the West to be an expert on Russia. He had written extensively on the great writer Dostoevsky, whom he regarded as the classic representative of Russian thought. There were elements of the Russian national psychology which Masaryk found disturbing. Like Havlicek before him, he felt that the Western Slavs, especially the Czechs, should follow a different path . As a proponent of Westeren humanism, Masaryk disparaged the mystical tradition of the Eastern Orthodox faith .44 Yet Masaryk reserved even greater hostility for the Roman Catholi c Church. He drew inspiration from Jan Hus, the great Bohemian religious reformer who was burned at the stake for heresy in 1415 . In 1905, while celebrating the anniversary of Hus ' death, Masaryk coined the slogan "Away from Rome! " Politics in the first years of the Czechoslovak Republic had a distinctly anti-Catholic flavor. His government favored the appointment of Lutherans for administration in Slovakia at the expense of the Catholic majority. In Podkarpatska Rus ', where there were virtua lly no Protestants, such a policy was impossible. Here Czechoslovak authorities fostered a revival of Orthodoxy. One Czech mini ster assessed the impact as follows: It seemed to some Russophile politicians, both in Prague and in Ruthenia ... that the right time had come to convert the Rutheni an peasant back to the Greek Orthodox religion. This opinion was shared by many Russian emigres who flocked to Czechoslovak ia ... after 1919. A drive for 'Orthodoxy ' was started in Rutheni a ... It is a question of how much of this movement was spontaneous and due to the pro-Russian feeling of the population and to its di slike for the purely magyarized Uniate clergy, and how much of its strength it owed to the propaganda and preaching of the Russian Orthodox emigres and clergy and to the support of some Czech political circles. 43 Bruce Garver, "Masaryk and Czech Politics 1900-1914" in Stanley B. Winters, ed. , T G. Masaryk (1850- 193 7) Vo lum e I Thinker and Politician (London, 1990), 22 . 44 See Paul 1. Tresky, " Masaryk and Dostoyevsky" in Harry Hanak, ed., T G. Masa1y k (/ 850- 193 7) Volum e II/ Statesman and Cultural Force (London, 1990), 161-77. SLOVAKIA 2019 105 However, it certainly added one more element to the confusion reigning in Ruthenia and led to animosities which, in the end, turned against the Prague Government itself.45 Reverend Voloshyn bitterly remonstrated against the situation in Prague in 1929: The agitation usually began in the local tavern, where the agitator met the most notorious brawlers in the village. After a short talk, emboldened by 'noisy' arguments and vodka, the peasants would begin to shout abuse against the village pastor. In a matter of two or three days a ' committee' made up of the pastor's 'opponents ' would be formed. The committee did not immediately begin advocating Orthodoxy; instead, it showered the bishop with complaints and delegations, demanding that there be an investigation against the pastor or that he be removed outright. Then followed other forms of harassment, demonstrations, threats against the pastor, intimidation of church curators, and such . The committee would send the pastor letters demanding that he leave the vi llage. As time went on, the committee made increasingly bolder threats that the pastor get out ' or else!' .. .. If, despite such harassment, the priest remained in his parish, the threats escalated. Someone would break his windows, shoot into his windows, poison hi s well , set fire to his grain or stables, and in some cases even the parish house, assault and beat the priest, etc. The government remained indifferent to all this under the pretext of ' Freedom of conscience! Freedom ofreligion!' 46 This state of affairs could not permitted to go on indefinitely. Czechoslovakia was, after all, a republic governed by law. The Vatican made its own contribution to improved church-state relations by transferring Bishop Antonii Papp of Mukachevo to Hungary and replacing him with canon Petro Gebej on July 16, 1924. At the same time, in response to forthcoming parliamentary elections, President Masaryk cryptically declared that "the Catholics will get as many rights as they win." 47 Rusyn voters supported Czech Catho lic political parties which gained an increased measure of strength in parliament. The rights accorded to Greek Catholics by the constitution in 45 Frantisek Nemec and Vladimir Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Toronto, 1955), 38-9. 46 Avhustyn Voloshyn, " Relihijni vidnozny na Podkarpats ' kyi" in Acta Conventia Pragensis pro Studii Orentalibus n. 1919, (Olomouc, 1930), 218-9. 47 Pekar, 11 8. 106 SLOVAKIA 2019 any case were now enforced. Violence and vandalism were now prosecuted and soon ceased. In some instances church property was restored. Bishop Gebej led a religious revival which resulted in priests maintaining closer contact with their parishioners. A number of converts to Orthodoxy returned to the Greek Catholic faith. The Orthodox revival was one of the sources of survival for the Russophile orientation. Another source was, ironically, Hungarian funding . The fall of Bela Kun's communist regime in August of 1919 was followed by the restoration of the nobility in Hungary. Counterrevolutionary White terror now followed Red terror. Right wing elements who rallied under Admiral Miklos Horthy, soon elevated to the position of regent of Hungary, wanted to regain Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' but had to go about it covertly.48 The victorious Western powers would not recognize any government in Hungary which would not accept their peace tenns . On June 4, 1920, Hungary was compelled to sign the Treaty of Trianon, which ceded Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' to Czechoslovakia, Transylvania to Romania, and Croatia and the Voivodina to what became known as Yugoslavia. Trianon psychologically scarred Hungarian society for a full generation. France offered to soften the blow by extending to Hungary financial credits, particularly in the area of railway development, in exchange for compliance. Hungarian Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen cheerfully accepted the financial aid and outwardly complied with Trianon. Yet his government covertly subsidized elements in Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus' who were disgruntled with Czechoslovak centrali sm. Having previously denied these peoples autonomy, the Hungarians now championed their right to selfdetern1ination as a first step toward regaining them. One of the recipients of Hungarian financial aid was Stefan Fentsik. Another was Andrei Brodii ( 1895-1946), a journalist, teacher and chairman of the Autonomous Agricultural Union/Autonomyi Zenled'skij Sojuz (AZS). Fentsik yielded leadership of the Russophile movement to Brodii during the 1930s. Ukrainophile historian Peter Stercho later maintained that Brodii, Fentsik and other select 48 As a precedent to future collaboration in this matter, Poland allowed itself to be used as a staging ground for Hungarian subversion of Czechos lovak administration . A "Magyar-S lovak League" was established in Krakow, and dispatched armed vo lunteers across the border into Slovakia. SLOVAKIA 2019 107 Russophile leaders had to conceal their ties with Hungary from their followers, since even the latter were opposed to territorial revision. 49 Polish policy towards the Rusyns of Galicia followed a similar pattern. In the area directly north of the Dukla Pass lived people belonging to a branch of the Rusyns known as the Lemkos. They can be geographically divided by the San River. The Ukrainian movement penetrated the area east of the San early in the twentieth century and accounted for numerous followers. In November 1918 Lemkos from about 30 villages gathered in the village of Komancza (Komancha in Rusyn) to form their own little republic. This Komancha Republic was viewed as a transitional state, pending merger with a greater Ukraine. West of the San the Lemkos still adhered to the traditions of old Rus'. In autumn 1918 they wanted union with Russia. Since this was obviously never going to happen, the Polish government could afford to humor these Lemkos, The Poles were preoccupied with the West Ukrainian Republic which was proclaimed in Lviv on November 1, 1918, and event which plunged Galicia into an ethnic civil war. On December 5, some 500 Lemko Rusyns representing 130 vi1lages and towns of western Lemkovyna met in Florynka (in Grybow district) to form a government. While the Polish military crushed the Komancha Republic in January 1919, it tended to view the Florynka Lemko Rusyn Republic as a potential ally against the Ukrainians. Polish officials who were present offered the former town hall of Grybow as a political headquarters, while the Polish Army provided arms for a Lemko national guard. Schools and cooperatives were soon organized. Amazingly, the Lemko Rusyn Republic survived a full sixteen months. It was governed by an executive council headed by Reverend Mykhal Iurchakevych and a central national council headed by the lawyer Iaroslaw Kachmarchyk. The Poles were disappointed with the results. The Lemkos were happy to accept whatever aid the Polish government and military were willing to offer but nonetheless were unwilling to take up arms against their errant brethren to the east. Additionally, Kachmarchyk's government rejected the notion of union with a Bolshevik Russia, and began looking at the example of 49 Peter Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in CarpathoUkraine /9/9-/939(NewYork , 1971), 171. 108 SLOVAKIA 2019 their brethren of the south side of the Carpathians. A union with Czechoslovakia now seemed a viable option. Unfortunately, in 1920 relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia were at a particularly low point, owing to border disputes concerning Tesin in Silesia and Orava-Spis in Slovakia. Before the end of March the Poles arrested Kachmarchyk and members of his government. They were tried on June 10, 1921. A Polish jury acquitted them, which was only reasonable insofar as the Poles had encouraged their activities in the first place. But the event marked the death knell of Lemko statehood. 50 Yet the Poles still had use for the Lernkos in the interwar period. The Greek Catholic Church was strongly identified with the Ukrainian national movement. The leadership of the Polish military, overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, encouraged the movement to convert the Lemkos to Orthodoxy, and thus express a Russian character at the expense of the Ukrainian .51 It was a classic case of Divide and Rule. Elsewhere, in Volhynia, adherents of the Ukrainian national movement were Orthodox. Here militant Polish nationalists attacked and vandalized Orthodox monasteries and schools. At the same time, for reasons of security, Poland wished to have a common border with Hungary. For this reason the Polish government supported Hungarian efforts to regain Podkarpatska Rus' . The events which accompanied the international crisis in 1938 are well-known. The present author shall limit himself to summarizing key particulars. The Munich "diktat" of September 1938 resulted in Czechoslovakia being forced to yield the Gennan populated Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. Deprived of her most vital border defenses, Czechoslovakia was now rendered militarily defenseless. Hostile neighbors, Poland and Hungary, were now encouraged to make their own territorial claims. Moreover, the Prague government could no longer resist demands for autonomy on the part of Slovakia and Podkarpatska Rus ' . 50 See Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Lemko Rusyn Republic ( 1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus' -Ukraine" in Magocsi, Of the Making of Nationalities, 303315. 51 See Mykola Kucherpa, "The Nationality Policy of Poland towards Ukrainians before World War II" in Paul Berst and Jaroslav Mokolak, eds., Th e Lemko Region 1939-1947, War, Occupation and Deportation (New Haven and Krakow, 2002), 3949. SLOVAKIA 2019 109 In the case of Podkarpatska Rus', a cabinet was formed on October 11 which consisted of both Russophiles and Ukrainophiles. Russophiles predominated, with Brodii as prime minister and Fentsik as deputy prime minister. Brodii was convinced that, if a plebiscite was held, the majority of Rusyns would vote for reunion with Hungary. Brodii 's ministry lasted only fifteen days. An alarmed central government summoned Brodii and Fentsik to Prague. There Brodii was arrested, while Fentsik found asylum in the Polish embassy. 52 Prague authorized Voloshyn, who was a member of the cabinet, to form a new government. Voloshyn proclaimed the province as an autonomous nation with the new name of Carpatho-Ukraine on November 3. The victory of the Ukrainophiles was at last complete. Autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine got off to a rough start. Hungary was prepared to re-annex the region, although conservative circles of the Hungarian government confined their claims to areas which were predominantly Magyar. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy opted to appear in the role of peacemakers in this territorial dispute between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They arbitrated a compromise settlement in Vienna on November 2, 1938. By terms of the First Vienna Award, Kosice, in southern Slovakia, and Uzhorod and Mukachevo, the two leading cities of Carpatho-Ukraine, were restored to Hungary. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine was forced to relocate to Khust, which was little more than an oversized village. Militant Hungarian nationalists regarded the First Vienna Award as a temporary expedient, and worked for the complete annexation of CarpathoUkraine. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, a covert paramilitary group known as the "Ragged Guard" was organized to infiltrate Carpatho-Ukraine and conduct terrorist acts designed to destabilize the regime. Poland likewise dispatched paramilitary units for the same purpose. If the credible research of Ukrainophile historian Stercho is to be believed, the Polish paramilitary units outpaced their Hungarian counterparts in acts of terrorism. 53 Carpatho-Ukraine was in need of allies, and these were forthcoming. Militant Ukrainian nationalists from Poland crossed the mountains to organize the Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich. It has been argued by Russophile opponents that the Riflemen of the Car52 53 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 238. Stercho, 302. 110 SLOVAKIA 2019 pathian Sich inaugurated the reign of "Ukrainian terror." It is true that they focu sed more on the Russophile domestic opposition than they did on Polish or Hungarian infiltrators. A detention camp was established for dissident Russophiles and Rusynophiles at Dumen . Yet conditions of internment were relaxed. Political differences extended to the family leve l, and prisoners under guard where permitted to attend social events in neighboring Rakhiv.54 There was a conflict of interest between the Carpathian Sich and the Voloshyn regime. Sich rifl emen viewed Carpatho-Ukraine as the cornerstore of a future greater Ukraine, and counted on the support of Nazi Germany. Voloshyn , by contrast, decided that adherence to Czecho-Slovakia (now officially spelled with a hyphen) was a necessary expedient. In March of 1939 there were clashes between the Carpathian Sich and the regular Czechoslovak military. This confl ict was abruptly terminated when German leader Adolf Hitler moved to eliminate what remained of Czecho-Slovakia . As he prepared to militarily occupy Prague, he disappointed Ukrainophi les by giving his consent for Hungary to annex the province. Under German pressure, Slovakia declared its independence on March 14. CarpathoUkraine was now cut off from the Czech lands. With Hungarian troops already crossing the border, Voloshyn symbo li cally proclaimed Carpatho-Ukraine's independence on March 15 . Carpatho-Ukraine existed as an independent state for all of a day . On the 16 th , Hungarian military units were fighting for Khust. The Riflemen of the Carpathian Sich resisted with admirab le resolve , but its units were scattered and no match for the Hungarian army. They later regrouped in the mountains or were pushed across the border to Eastern Slovakia, thus encouraging Hungary to invade the latter as well. 55 Hungarian troops reached the Polish border by the end of the I 61\ and were eagerly embraced by their opposite numbers. The region was renamed Subcarpathia and governed directly from Budapest. There was some vague talk in the Hungarian parliament about according autonomy to the most recently annexed portion , but not to Uzhorod or Mukachevo, which were now considered 54 Paul Robert Magocsi , "The Nationality Problem in Subcarpathian Rus ' I 9381939: A Reappraisal" in Magocsi , Of th e Making of Nationalities, 228 . 55 This invasion of Eastern Slovakia resulted in portions of the disputed counties likewise being annexed by Hungary. It also resulted in the Slovak Republic placing itself under the military protection of Nazi Germany. SLOVAKIA 2019 111 directly part of Hungary. Autonomy was del ayed indefinitely. As World War II progressed, the Hungarian military vehemently opposed autonomy for security reaso ns . The Ukrainophiles were particularly singled out for political persecution, while the Russophiles were more or less set aside. Interestingly, the Hungarian government began cultivating the idea that the Rusyns were their own separate nationality, an idea which ultimately became the wave of the future. 56 The resto ration of Hungarian rule dis illusioned the Russophil es. It stood to reason that, once Hungary went down to defeat with Nazi Germany, Andrei Brodii would come to a bad end . He did not attempt to flee when Soviet forces reached the area in the autumn of 1944, but attempted to negotiate with them. He was arrested by the Soviet counterintelligence unit SMERSH, charged as a fascist co ll aborator, and executed on November 7, 1946. A similar fate awa ited Stefan Fentsik: he was shot in the courtyard of the Uzhorod prison on March 30, 1946. Their Ukrainophile rival Voloshyn fared no better. Having taken up res idence in Prague during the war years, he taught at the Ukrainian Free University. In June 1945 he was arrested by SMERSH and transported to Moscow. He died in Lefortovo prison on July 19, undoubtedl y murdered. An ironic footnote of hi story is worth mentioning. Both Brodii and Fentsik were posthumously rehabilitated after the breakup of the Soviet Union. No such rehabilitation has been granted to Voloshyn. World War II and Ukrainiazation If the Russophiles in Podkarpatska Rus' were fatally compromised by collaboration with the Hungarians, then in Eastern Slovakia they earned acclamation for their role in an anti-fascist struggle. A leading force in the resistance to the pro-German regime of president-priest Jozef Ti so was the Slovak Communist Party. George Kennan , at that time charge d 'affa ires to the U.S. embassy in Prague, assessed the pro-communist sentiment in Eastern Slovakia as being a "bird of a different color [which] in former circumstances would have little chance of success." He added, however, that owing to 56 Magocs i, The Shaping of a National Identity, 248-9 . 112 SLOVAKIA 2019 guidance from Moscow, the Communists could become the most formidable resistance group of all. 57 Kennan's prognosis was largely accurate, though certain qualifying feature s must be noted. The Communists did not have a monopoly on the resistance movement. In prewar Czechoslovakia they were strongest in Podkarpatska Rus ', but in Eastern Slovakia they were never ab le to muster more than seven percent of the vote among the Ru syns in the interwar period. Not wishing to be isolated from other Rusyns in organized resistance to the Tiso regime, local Communi sts opted to join the Carpatho-Russian Council for National Liberation (KRASNO), which shall be introduced shortly. The view of the autonomous and later independent Slovak state on the Rusyns was that the latter were "S lovaks of the Greek Catholic faith ." This view was exemp li fied by Andrej Dudas, who in 1940 was appointed regional administrator of Eastern Slovakia. He was convinced that the idea of a Rusyn nationality was created by the Hungarians, a position he maintained a full three decades later as an emigre in Argentina.58 In early 1939, the Rusyn Nationa l Committee and the Carpatho-Russian Nationa l Counci l were banned by the Slovak government, and the activity of the Dukhnovych Society was restricted. The Ukrainian movement among the Rusyns was particularly loathed by the Slovak nationalist leadership. Slovak police reports up until November 1938 indicate that Rusyns in the Presov Region supported union with their brethren east of the Uz Ri ver. Yet, in November, the same police reports indicate a significant change. The Ukrainian movement was even more alien to the Presov Region Rusyns than was Slovak nationalism, and they were henceforth opposed to a revision of borders which was favorable to CarpathoUkraine. 59 Rusyns shared in the economic prosperity of the Slovak Republic which characterized the first half of World War II. Workers in Germany sent money home to their families, whi le locally a number 57 Report written about May I, 1939 on conditions in Slovakia in George Ken nan, From Prague After Munich. Diplomatic Papers 1938-1 940 (Princeton, 1968), 139140. 58 Andrej Dudas, Rusinska otazka ajej uzadie (B uenos Aires, 1971), 25 . 59 See the entry " Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Counci l for National Liberation/Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet natsional'nmyi osvonodenyi (KRASNO)" in Magocsi and Pop, eds ., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Culture, 58. SLOVAKIA 2019 113 of Rusyns profited from the expropriation of Jewish property. Yet once it became obvious that the Slovak Republic was on the losing side of the war, a number of Rusyns began to organize, The Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Council for National Liberation (Karpatorusskii avtonomyi sovet national'nogo obsvobzhdenii-KRASNO) was founded in Presov in September 1943. Its goals were to aid escaped Soviet prisoners of war and partisans and to cooperate with other underground elements opposed to what it considered a clericofascist regime. Its members envisioned a restored Czechoslovakia in which Rusyns would be equal partners with Czechs and Slovaks. Although its orientation was pro-Soviet and decidedly leftist, KRASNO was not a communist front organization. It was founded by civic and cultural leaders of varied political orientation. Vasyl' Karaman ( 1903-1961) was born in the village of Nagov, in Slovakia. After completing his education at the Commercial Academy in Mukachevo (1924-1927), be returned to eastern Slovakia, where he worked as a civil servant in Presov from 1927 to 1933 , and then served in various towns as secretary for the pro-government Agrarian Republican Party. When Czecho-Slovakia was being partitioned in the fall of 1938, he opposed the pro-Ukrainian orientation of the Voloshyn government. He was elected as chairman of a newly re-established Central Russian National Council. Its members included both Russophiles and Rusynophiles who wished to retain ties with what remained of Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the followers of Brodii and Fentsik. Unable to realize his objectives, he returned to the Presov Region. Here he joined a Committee of Rusyns which tried to reach an accommodation with the Slovak government. This was not possible, since Slovak nationalist officials distrusted his Russophile orientation. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, Karaman was arrested. He spent a year and a half in jail, and after his release made contact with the Zhydovs'kyi brothers, Ivan and Petro. Together the three men were among the founders of KRASNO. 60 Ivan Zhydovs'kyi (1897-1982) was born in the village of Sarisske Jastrabie. His secondary school education at the Piarist gymnasium in Sabinov was interrupted in 1915, when he was drafted 60 See the entry " Karaman, Vasyl"' in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 228. 114 SLOVAKIA 2019 into the Austro-Hungarian Army. A year later he was captured on the Eastern Front. Like many prisoners of War, he embraced the Bolshevik cause during the Russian Revolution. During the Russian Civil War Zhydovs ' kyi served as a political commissar in the 216 th International Communist Brigade. When he returned home, he discontinued the role of agitator and became at least outwardly conformist. He completed his secondary education in 1919, and then studied law at the Comenius University in Bratislava, obtaining a degree in 1924. He worked for a time as a tax inspector in Uzhorod. By the I 930s he had a law practice in Uzhorod and he was director of the Presov branch of the Uzhorod-based Subcarpathia Bank. As a Russophile, Zhydovs ' kyi was prominent in the Central Russian National Council and in the Dukhnovych Society. Although opposed to the separatist Slovak government, he kept a lower profile then Kamman and was never arrested. He operated a law practice in Giraltovce prior to his invol ve ment with KRASNO .61 His older brother Petro Zhydovs'kyi (1890-1947) was likewise born in Sarisske Jastrabie. As a teenager Petro emigrated to America in 1905 . Although he acquired little formal education, he returned home on the eve of World War I detern1ined to work for the advancement of the Rusyn people. Drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army, he deserted, then was captured and sentenced to prison. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he joined the Agrarian Republican Party and served as deputy to parliament from 1935 to 1938 . During the crisis of 1938 Zhydovs'kyi joined with Ivan P' ieshchak in submitting a memorandum to the British envoy Lord Runciman, calling for the unification of the Presov Region with an autonomous Podkarpatska Rus' .62 Ivan P' ieshchak ( 1904-1972) was born in the village of Vel'ky Lipnik. After graduating from the gymnasium of Mukachevo and the Presov Greek Catholic Teachers' Co llege, he taught in the regional elementary school s. P ' ieshchak was active in the Union of Rusyn Teachers in Slovakia and helped organize the Union of Rusyn Youth in Slovakia (1933). At the same time he studied law, and attained a 61 See the entry "Zhydovs'kyi, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 55 l. 62 See the entry "Zhydovs' kyi , Petro" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 551-2. SLOVA.KIA 2019 115 doctoral degree from Charles University in Prague in the same year. By the mid 1930s P 'ieshchak was a prominent figure on the Rusyn political and cultural scene. He joined Andrei Brodii's Autonomous Agricultural Union and served as its representative in parliament. Interestingly, at this time he also worked closely with Andrej Hlinka's Slovak People's Party in the parliament's autonomist bloc . When Podkarpatska Rus' attained autonomy, P'ieshchak served as state secretary in Brodii 's brief-lived cabinet. After Brodii 's demise, he returned to Slovakia, where he maintained a law practice prior to his involvement with KRASNO .63 KRASNO rapidly expanded its network. By the summer of 1944 it controlled 3 7 villages in a sort of "partisan republic" between Medzilaborce and Stropkov. Intensification of partisan activityreinforced by Soviet partisans parachuted across the Carpathiansled to German military intervention in Slovakia at the end of August 1944. The clandestine military center of dissident Slovak Army officers , headquartered in Banska Bystrica, was already in touch with the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile in London. Its members had to proclaim the Slovak Nationa l Uprising under premature circumstances on August 29. 64 The Slovak National Uprising was a highly complex affair, which goes well beyond the limits of this study. It is sufficient to note here that it was dependent upon Soviet military support. Contrary to allegations by later critics, the Soviets did not deliberately betray the uprising. Their military capacity to cross the Carpathians was severely limited, particularly after the Germans occupied the Dukla pass. Yet the Soviets did not wish to forfeit the political influence they expected to enjoy in postwar Czechoslovakia, and rendered military assistance. In this capacity the Russian military 63 See the entry "P'ieshchak, Ivan" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 384-5 . 64 Slovak soldiers, under the influence of Captain Piotr Alekseyevitch Velitchko intercepted members of a German military mission passing through Slovakia in the vicinity of Turciansky Sviity Martin. The Slovak soldiers escorted the Germans to the local barracks. It was Velitchko 's intention that the Germans would be disarmed there and that they would be sent to Ukrainian Partisan Headquarters in Kiev. But when the Germans attempted to depart, they were massacred by the Slovaks. Berlin then decided on a complete military occupation of Slovakia. At this point Lieutenant-Colonel Golian in Banska Bystrica issued the order to start the uprising. 116 SLOVAK.IA 2019 crossed through the Dukla pass for a third time in a military campaign that has been immortalized by local historiography. The Carpatho-Dukla operation, initiated on September 8, was undertaken by the 38 1h Soviet Army, led by General Kyril Moskalenko, supported by the 1s i Czechoslovak Army Corps, led by General Ludvik Svoboda. Many of the troops of the Is 1 Army Corps were Rusyns. In the autumn of 1939, as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, the Soviets had annexed eastern Galicia and merged it with the Ukrainian S.S.R. An estimated 30,000 Rusyns who were disgruntled with Hungarian rule crossed the mountains into eastern Galicia, expecting to be cordially received by their Slavic brethren. Instead, every single one of them was arrested by the NKVD (Soviet State Security) and received an eight to ten year sentence for the illegal border crossing. A full sixty percent of them perished in the Gulag by the time Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. The survivors were released to join the I s i Czechoslovak Army Corps . Any Pan-Slav feeling- Russophile or Ukrainophi le alikewhich the Rusyn s may have had earlier had been beaten out of them in the Gulag. They merely wished to return home. In the autumn of 1944 it appeared that they would be the vanguard in the liberation of their homeland. Instead, they were committed to the meat-grinder of the Dukla Pass, where their casualties exceeded sixty percent. 65 The storming of the Duk la Pass was finally completed on October 6th. In the fighting which followed, the monastery community of Ladomirova was severely damaged. Most of the buildings, including the print shop but not the church, were destroyed. Now, too , the NKVD began rounding up Russian emigres in Slovakia. The monks fled to Bratislava, and from there fourteen of them emigrated to the United States. They entered the recently established Holy Trinity Monastery in Jordanville, in upstate New York, where Archbishop Maksimenko now served as archimandrite. They built a church that was a replica of its predecessor in Ladomirova. A young Rusyn novitiate from the village, Vasyl' Shkurla (born 1928), ultimately became Archbishop Lavrl' , one of the leading figures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. By the 1980s Holy Trinity had become a major 65 See Vladimir Baumgarten, "Fifty Years Later: An Inquiry into Soviet Military Policy During the Slovak Uprising" in Lewis White, ed., On All Fronts: Czechoslovaks During World War ff Part 2 (Washington , 1995), 2 19-28. SLOVAKIA 2019 117 cultural center for Russian emigres. When the cello virtuoso Mstislav Rostropovich defected to the United States, he chose to settle in Jordanville in order to be near Holy Trinity. 66 The Germans torched large areas in eastern Slovakia as they were forced to retreat, including the town of Svidnik. General Svoboda was nonetheless hailed as a hero and liberator when he entered it on October 28 .67 After the liberation of Svidnik, the Allies temporarily went on the defensive. KRASNO partisans continued fighting in the hills north of Presov. In October their adherents welcomed a declaration by the Slovak National Council that a resurrected Czechoslovakia would consist of three equal nations- Czechs, Slovaks and Rusyns. It must be understood that Rusyns did not fight in partisan units exclusively of their own nationality. Jozef Rodak, longtime director of the East Slovak Military Museum in Svidnik, asserted that most partisan groups in the region had a mixed composition of Slovaks and Rusyns.68 To this day many people in eastern Slovakia have a dual sense of identity : they consider themselves Rusyns by heritage and Slovaks by citizenship. The realities of liberation at the end of World War II disappointed the aspirations of many Rusyns, particularly Russophiles. It undoubtedly di sconcerted them to discover that Moscow now considered them to be Ukrainians. There was already a precedent for thi s aspect of Soviet policy . In 1923 the delegation of Rusyn Communists attended a Party Congress in Soviet Ukraine and declared their acceptance of Ukrainian nationality. It was altogether practical for Soviet authorities to reaffirm acceptance of this principle at the end of 66 See the entry " Ladomirova Monastery" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 266. 67 General Svoboda was designated as an honorary citizen of Svidnik. As president of Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968, Svoboda gave the town its first hospital. In I 979, the year of the old man's death, a statue of him was erected in Svidnik. Owing to the damage of autumn 1944, Svidnik is a modem town . Most of the buildings are constructed in the so-called "social realist" style. Svoboda ' s statue looks strangely at home among the imposing, unattractive concrete structures. 68 As a graduate student of Safarik University in Prefov who specialized in the history of his region during World War 11 , Rodak was frequently delegated to carry the briefcases of Soviet military visitors. He remained outwardly conformist throughout the Soviet era. After the 1989 revolution and the coll apse of the communist system, Rodak wrote a series of articles for newspapers in eastern Slovakia and southeas tern Poland in which he exonerated partisans who had fallen into disfa vor. 118 SLOVAKIA 2019 World War II. Throughout the war, the Soviets had pledged themselves to the recognition of Czechoslovakia' prewar frontiers . Yet now Moscow infom1ed the Czechoslovak government that it could not ignore "the will of the people." In the wake of the Red Army's occupation of Podkarpatska Rus ' , various National Committees were established to vote in favor of the province being merged with the Ukrainian S.S.R. In all fairness to these communities, they overall enjoyed popular support. 69 The region was officially ceded at the end of June, 1945. Across the Uz River, in the Presov Region , the Russophile leaders of the defunct KRASNO drew the politically correct conclusion. Now, they too, considered themselves Ukrainian. They reorganized themselves as the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region. They envisioned that the long disputed counties of eastern Slovakia would be included in the territorial transfer. Indeed, even before the war ended, Vasyl' Karaman and the Zhysov ' skyi brothers planned to stage a meeting in Presov in February 1945 calling for the merger. A Soviet military major explained to them that such a meeting would be inopportune. The war was still on, and the Soviet Union intended to honor its obligations to Czechoslovakia.70 With eastern Slovakia excluded from the territorial settlement, the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region now called for the resurrected Czechoslovakia to consist of three equal nations: Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. The Slovak National Council had already expressed itself in favor of autonomy for the Rusyns. Now, in light of Ukrainian irredentism, it declared its Ukrainian counter• 1·d 11 part as mva 1 . Even after the Rusyns were officially classified as Ukrainian, the Russophile tradition not only persisted but predominated in the Presov Region . It must be noted that the Soviet 3gth Army was composed of elite Guards regiments, the cream of the Soviet military. Its soldiers conducted themselves in a correct and disciplined manner in 69 Yaroslav Pylynsky, Rising Ethnic Self-Awareness. Carpatho-Rusyns- Birth of a New Nation or a Political Game? (Copenhagen, 1998), 20. 70 Memorandum on the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Slovakia. Kosice. February 16, 1945 , in Nemec and Modry, Th e Soviet Seizure of Ruthenia, Document no.77 , 359-60 71 Magocsi , "National Assimilation: The Case of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 262 . SLOVAKIA 2019 119 their interactions with the locals after forcing their way through the Dukla Pass. This was in striking contrast with the soldiers of the 4 th Ukrainian Front, who penetrated Slovakia from the south, and who engaged in rape and widespread looting. This author can personally attest to the fact that citizens of the Svidnik area remember the Russians fondly as having assisted them through a bitter winter, and afterwards helped the locals plant their spring crops. Historian Mykola Musynka, himself a Ukrainophi le, summarizes the local attitudes as follows: The culmination of Russophilism in the cultural life of the Rusyns of the Prefo v Region occurred in the years just after World War II, when due to the Red Army's defeat of German fascism, th e Soviet Union enjoyed considerable authority among Rusyn-Ukrainians as well as Czechs and Slovaks. Everything "Soviet" was perceived as "Russian." Political propaganda attempted to portray the Soviet Union as an ideal country in which all peoples were united around the "Great Russian people. " The Russian language, Russian culture, the Russian individual, and the "Russian Soul " all symbolized the acme ofp e,:fection. 72 Russian Elementary and secondary schools proliferated after World War II, in addition to the Russian gymnasium in Presov, an additional Russian gymnasium was established in Medzilaborce on February 23, 1945, and trade schoo ls were opened in which Russian was the language of instruction. According to official statistics for the 1948-49 school year, there were 43 kindergartens, 276 elementary schools, 38 incomplete and 6 complete secondary schools with instruction in the Russian language, totaling 23, 11 2 pupils.73 After the Ukrainian National Council of the Presov Region was abolished, it was replaced by a new organization, the cultural Union of Ukrainian Workers (Kul'tumy sojuz'ukrajans'kyi trudjascychKSUT), which was staunchly supportive of the Communist Party. KSUT initiated numerous publications in the Ukrainian language. 72 Mykola Musynka, "The Postwar Development of the Regional Culture of the Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia' in Paul Robert Magocsi, ed., The Persistence of Regional Cultures: Rusyns and Ukrainians in the Carpathian Hom eland and Abroad (New York, 1993), 55. 73 Ibid, 56. 120 SLOVAKIA 2019 Beginning on June 28, 1952, by decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, the language of instruction in all Russian elementary and secondary schools of Eastern Slovakia was changed to Ukrainian . The change in the school system was torturous for all parties. It was implemented too quickly. Instructors who had never studied literary Ukrainian were assigned to take month-long courses, after which they were expected to teach in that language. The vast majority of teachers detested it. There was a shortage of textbooks, dictionaries and other printed materials. Ukrainiazation nonetheless made significant strides in popular culture . In January 1953 , KSUT sponsored the first professional song and dance ensemble in Medzilaborce under the artistic direction of Jurij Kostjik. It was eventually reorganized as the Dukla Ukrainian Folk Ensemble. In September of that year, a Department of Ukrainian Language and Literature was established at the Presov Pedagogical Institute, which in 1959 became the Philosophical Faculty of Safarik University, under the direction of Petro Bungansyn. Literary works by Rusyns in the Presov Region reached an unprecedented level of publication in the course of a decade in the Ukrainian language. After 1959, the Ukrainian division of the Slovak Pedagogical Publishing House had a monopoly on the release of Ukrainian books in the Presov Region. During a thirty-year period it published 373 literary and scholarly works. Not all of them withstood the test of time. Many employed the so-called "socialist realist" style, reflecting a Marxist-Leninist ideological bent which conformed to Party dogma. Yet the Presov Region has produced works which have assumed a permanent place in the history of literature. 74 A number of former Russophiles moved with the times and adopted Ukrainian literary norms. Those Russophiles who remained outside the Communist Party could not expect a triumphal finish . Such was the case of Vasyl' Karaman, who, after the abolition of the body he had chaired, was accused of being a "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist." The allegation was blatantly absurd: Karaman steadfactly believed that the future of the Rusyns was closely bound to the Soviet Union . He was nonetheless removed from political and cultural life in the Presov Region. Similarily, Ivan P'ieshchak was ac74 Ibid, 65 . SLOVAKIA 2019 121 cused of bourgeois nationalism, driven from his home in 1952, and forbidden to practice law for nearly a decade. Ironically, some of the greatest beneficiaries of the new socialist order were those Rusyns of the 1st Czechoslovak Anny Corps who had survived the ordeal of the Dukla Pass. In spite of their suffering in the Gulag, they had fought bravely and well under General Svoboda, in fact becoming his favorite soldiers. 75 The treaty transferring Podkarpatska Rus ' to Soviet Ukraine contained a certain "exemption" clause. Those Rusyns with a record of service in the Czechoslovak Army could retain Czechoslovak citizenship. About half of them chose to do so, relocating west of the Uz. Svoboda redressed the balance for them as much as humanly possible, obtaining jobs for them in the military and especially in the security services. One might suppose that, after their experience in the Gulag, they would have been averse to serving as agents of repression. Instead, thanks to Svoboda' s generous patronage, they became overrepresented in the secret police, not only in eastern Slovakia but in Prague and Bratislava as well. This role fueled the hostility of their fellow citizens. Animosities smoldered beneath the surface for a full generation. During the Prague spring of 1968, the Slovak press suddenly became articulate in its denunciations: " ... this 15 year anti-Slovak movement in eastern ... Slovakia must be liquidated." 76 Slovak nationalists in particular resented the fact that the city of Presov served as a bastion of Ukrainophile activity. Slogans appeared on a number of buildings: "Presov was and will be only- and only- a Slovak city" and "Ukrainians, get out of Presov! " 77 The Slovak element of eastern Slovakia was not the only one which opposed the Ukrainian movement. Passive opposition was expressed by many Rusyns themselves . If they could not be themselves, the Rusyns opted for the closest thing, and voluntarily assimilated into the Slovak nationality. 78 The local dialect spoken was not foreign to them, unlike that of the Ukrainian textbooks imported from Kiev. Whenever local citizens were questioned by the police, they declared themselves as Slo75 Magocsi, "Magyars and Carpatho-Rusyns in Czechoslovakia" in Of the Making of Nationalities, 175. 76 Cited in Kulturny zivot (Bratislava) April 15, 1968 and Vychod (Kosice) November 29, 1968. 77 Magocsi, "National Assimilation", 283. 78 fbid, 264-70. 122 SLOVAKIA 2019 vak, fearing deportation to the Soviet Union. Finally, the relatively more advanced Slovak economy drew many to the industrial valleys farther south, where the process was completed. For those Rusyns who continued to consider themselves Ukrainian , yet another shock awaited in the following generation. After the 1989 revolutions and the collapse of communism in East Central Europe, first the Slovak and then the Polish government recognized the Carpatho-Rusyns as a distinct nationality. Many young Rusyns eagerly embraced the new orientation. 79 Conclusion. Unrepentant Russophiles: Yurkovsky, Kabuliak, Sidor and Karabelesh The demise of the Russophile orientation among the CarpathoRusyn people was undoubtedly, to employ a Marxist cliche, historically inevitable. An interesting story revealing the pathetic depths to which it had descended by World War II is provided by Marian Zgomiak, later a professor at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow , Poland. At the outbreak of World War II, Zgomiak was a 15 year-old Polish youth. When Poland was militarily crushed by Nazi Germany in September of 1939, Poli sh Army veterans hoped to escape to the West to fight again. Since most of the Polish soldiers fleeing abroad were between the ages of 17 and 30, two groups of people played disproportionately large roles in the domestic resistance movement organized by the Polish Home Army (Armija Krajowa- AK). One of them was Polish teenagers, who acted as couriers escorting the fugitive s to the border with Slovakia. Another was the Lemkos, who acted as guides. 79 The rejection of Ukrainian identity is by no means unanimous. On November 17, 1990, at the First Congress of the Ru syn Renaissance Society in Medzilaborce, spokesman Mychal Turok-Heter stressed that "while it is vital to preserve national pride, it is wrong to attack the Ukrai nians and the Ukrainian language . Gradually, the Ru syns will write and advance toward the common path which will lead them to fulfilling thei r mi ssive of peace for us all." See Myslenka, 75. Frequently, on the local level , there ex ists a certa in pluralism. In Svidnik, the Museu m of UkrainianRus'Culture acknowledges kinship with the former while stressing the regional identity of the latter. See the entry " Museum of Ukrainian Rus' Culture in Svidnik" in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusy n Histo1y and Cu lture, 337. SLOVAK.IA 2019 123 Young Zgorniak was active in these border expeditions. On July 2, 1942, he and his father were arrested by the Gestapo. After the usual beatings and interrogation in the basement of the Gestapo headquarters in Gorlice, Zgorniak was transferred to the prison in Jaslo. Here he bonded with a Lemko prisoner named Yurkovsky. This Yurkovsky was an unrepentant Russophile. During World War I he and his father were hauled off to internment in Talerhof. Yurkovsky senior died there during the typhus epidemic. Yurkovsky junior returned to the mountain districts of Lemkovyna to serve as a teacher in the interwar years. He did not consider himself a Rusyn or even a Lemko, but a Russian. He was not receptive to Polish efforts to sponsor a separate Lemko identity. After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June of I 941 , the Nazi Government General (to which Lemkos west of the San River where subject) rounded up Lemkos known for their pro-Russian sentiments. In this manner Yurkovsky found himself in the prison of Jaslo. Both the quality and quantity of food in the prison of Jaslo left much to be desired. In September of 1942 German authorities loosened the regime to the point where Lemkos (but not Poles) could receive food packages. Arrangements were made for Zgomiak's mother to send food to Yurkovsky, who shared it with her son. Working together in the hospital section of the prison, they had the opportunity to engage in intellectual discussions. Zgorniak records the following: During one of the discussions I asked whether or how he could coordinate the Carpatho-Rusyn orientation on the Russia ruled by the Tsar with an orientation on a Russia ruled by the Bolsheviks who had overthrown and murdered the Tsar and his family. He said he could do so because "after the death a/father in Talerhof I had the dream . In it my father appeared and said 'the cause for which both are fighting shall be successful! ' That dream I keep in mind and I believe it will prove to be true. "80 80 Marian Zgomiak, " Meeting with Lemko leaders who had been arrested by the Gestapo and who were in prison in Jaslo 1942" in Best and Moklak, eds ., The Lemko Region, /939-194 7, 129. 124 SLOVAKIA 2019 Zgomiak asserts that he was convinced Yurkovsky and other Lemkos could have been released had they declared themselves Ukrainians. They declined to do so. Eventually, Yurkovsky was transferred to a concentration camp in Pruszkow, from which he was liberated before the end of the war. Yurkovsky then became sold on the plan jointly agreed upon by the Polish and Soviet governments to encourage Lemkos to emigrate to the east. Those whose villages had been destroyed during the Carpatho-Dukla operation went willingly. Others followed Yurkovsky across the border. They were by no means satisfied with living conditions in Soviet Ukraine, and turned on Yurkovsky for encouraging them to leave in the first place. He suffered something akin to a nervous breakdown and developed heart disease. Zgomiak concluded: "I remember him as an intelligent fellow who despite hi s various interests was fatally attracted to the idea for which he fought." 81 In light of its ignominious end in the realm of politics, what remains of the Russophile tradition among the Carpatho-Rusyns in the realm of culture? Here the author wishes to turn to the areas of religion and literature. In the area of reli gion, the Orthodox faith has provided a certain legacy. It must be understood that the majority of Rusyns professing any religious belief adhere to the Greek Catholic rather than the Orthodox Church . Yet the Orthodox revival of the early twentieth century made an enduring impact which was embraced by the communist regimes after World War II. Its most enthusiastic protagonist was Aleksander Kabuliak. At the end of World War I he was released from prison and became a major figure of the Orthodox revival in Czechoslovakia. There was a sc hi sm within the Orthodox Church in the 1920s. Its adherents were subject to the Serbian patriarchate, whereas Czech converts to Orthodoxy wanted their own autocephalous Orthodox Church. They appealed to the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople. On March 4, 1923 he consecrated the archimandrite Savritij as bishop. Bi shop Savritij 's leadership was contested by Bishop Gorazd, the Serbian patriarch 's representative. Kabuliak sided with the Serbian patriarchate in this di spute. With the Orthodox Church temporarily paralyzed and depri ved of an acting bishop, Kabuliak assumed the role of administrator. The Hungar81 Ibid, 129. SLOVAKIA 2019 125 ians did not molest him during World War II, nor did he do anything to provoke them. But on November 18, 1944, on behalf of the Orthodox believers of Podkarpatska Rus ', Kabuliak wrote a letter to no less a personage than Soviet leader J. V. Stalin. He recommended the establishment of a Carpatho-Russian Soviet Republic encompassing territory extending "from Iasnyia to Poprad and from Uzhok Pass to Debrecen." 82 Since Moscow was already planning to incorporate Podkarpatska Rus' into the Ukrainian S.S.R., this was not an option. Yet in the following month Kabuliak led a delegation to Moscow requesting the transfer of episcopal jurisdiction from the Serbian to the Moscow patriarchate. Here his efforts were crowned with success. In posthumous recognition of his achievement, in 200 I the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate) canonized Kabuliak as the first Carpatho-Rusyn saint. Eastern Galicia, like Podkarpatska Rus ', was ceded to Soviet Ukraine at the end of the war. In both areas incoming communist regimes declared the Greek Catholic Church abolished and transferred its parishes to the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church. In Galicia most of the clergy accepted the formal change and retained their old parishes. The Ukrainian character of the church consequently survived . In Transcarpathia the Greek Catholic clergy was more resistant to Orthodoxy and it was imposed more forcefully. Bishop Teodor Romza of Mukachevo was brutally murdered, while lesser clergymen were arrested and deported.83 They were replaced by Russian priests di spatched from Moscow. The Orthodox Church here acquired an expressively Russian character. From the standpoint of Rusyn culture, inclusion into the Russian Orthodox Church was a double-edged sword. In America, Reverend Alexis Toth had sought to convince his flock that the best way to preserve their rite, tradition and identity was through conversion to Orthodoxy. Yet St. Alexis (He too was canonized) had a great love for the variety of liturgical music known as Carpathian plainchant. 82 See the entry "Kabuliak, Aleksander" in Magocsi and Pop, eds. , Encyclopedia of Rusyn Hist01:y and Culture, 223 . 83 Pekar, 151 -4. 126 SLOVAK.IA 2019 This and another native aspects of worship were submerged by Russian liturgical tradition .84 In Czechoslovakia the legal status of the Greek Catholic Church was restored as a result of the liberal reforms of the Prague spring of 1968. Yet it lost its Rusyn character and became a force for slovakization. Much church property has been restored since the collapse of the communist system in 1989. Yet there remain adherents of the Orthodox faith in northeastern Slovakia. This author has an endearing memory of a visit to an Orthodox church in Svidnik. It was a modest, prefabricated structure, erected in the L990s. The morning was cold. There was only room inside the church for elderly parishioners. Yet a sizable crowd of young people remained standing outside. They displayed enough reverence to refrain from smoking throughout the Divine Liturgy. If the Rusyns can no longer be considered Great Russians, then the Russian government, and especially the Orthodox Church, wishes to retain whatever bonds still exist. While seminarians of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church have received their education in Ukraine, those who adhere to the Moscow patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been educated in Russia. Such was the case of Dmitri Sidor, born March 29, 1955, currently rector of the Church of the Exaltation of the Cross in Uzhorod. Reverend Sidor heads a movement demanding autonomy for Rusyns of Ukraine. He stresses the religious character of his people, and the similarity of their language with Old Church Slavonic. On December 19, 2008 , the Rusyn issue was raised at an international conference held on the Don, southern Russia. The conference was entitled "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of the Rusyns of Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century]." A resolution was adopted. It stated that, alongside the Armenians, the Rusyns were the first victims of genocide in the twentieth century, thi s in reference to the policy of the Austro-Hungarian military during the First World War. Today, the resolution continued, Kiev engaged in a "policy of cultural ethno- 84 Paul Robert Magocsi, "Adaptati on Wi thout Assimilati on: The Genius of the Greek Catholic Church of Mukachevo" in Of the Making of Nationalities, Volume 11 , 202. SLOVAKIA 2019 127 cide." It pointed out that the Rusyns were recognized as a distinct nationality by numerous countries, but not Ukraine. 85 The Ukrainophile orientation responded to the Rostov conference. One articulate response may be found in the working paper "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem: A Ukrainian Perspective," by Natalya Belitzer of the Py lip Orlyk Institute for Democracy in Kiev. She outlines the tortutous, complex evolution of the history of a region which has been subject to numerous rulers. She echoes her colleague M. Lanchuk in asserting that the main issue at stake has not been the ethno-cultural identity of the Rusyns but rather what has been termed "political Ruthenianism," which many Ukrainians perceive as a threat. 86 According to Belitzer, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by an artificial politicization of the Rusyn question. Belitzer is not opposed to Ru syn autonomy in principle. Yet, as a Ukrainophile, she considers the Rusyn tongue as a mere dialect of the Ukrainian language. Belitzer makes a particularly revealing admission when she states that "Ukrainian democracy is ... quite benevolent to the ideas and practices of the restoration of minorities ' own identity, but at the same time strongly denies Rusyn identity as being separate from the Ukrainian.,,s1 Therein lies the rub. If the Rusyn tongue is a dialect of the Ukrainian language, why is its use not permitted in schools? Rusyn schoolchildren speak one way at home but are required to speak another way at school. Such practices are grist to Dmitri Sidor's mill. Aside from the fact that Ukraine has an army and the Rusyns do not, Father Dmitri's movement faces two serious obstacles. For one, he is an Orthodox priest, whereas the majority of Rusyns still profess (or have resumed professing) the Greek Catholic faith. Secondly, while a majority of the Rusyns in the Presov Region and Lemkovyna 85 Resolution of the International conference "Genocide and Cultural Ethnocide of Ru syns in Carpathian Rus' [from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twenty first century] Rostov on the Don, Russia. December 2 1, 2008 www.podkar~atskarus.eu 6 M. Panchuk, " Political Rutheni ani sm" in Demons of Peace and Messengers of War(Kiev, 1997), 323. 87 Natalya Belitzer, "Political and Ethno-Cultural Aspects of the Rusyns' Problem : A Ukrainian Perspective". Research paper prepared within the framework of the Programme on European Security (PROGRES) sponsored by the Center for European Security Studies and the University of Gronigen (Netherlands). Undated, 12. 128 SLOVAKIA 2019 consider themselves their own nationality, a majority of them in Transcarpathia consider themselves Ukrainian. Yet the movement has a growing popular appeal. In a state where bureaucratic centralism has had a constipating effect, autonomy can be a powerful laxative. Moreover, the Rusyns now possess a certain bargaining chip . A full eighty percent of all Russian petroleum and natural gas which is sold to Europe passes through pipelines in the area of Uzhorod. If the Rusyns were to succeed in establishing an independent state, they would be eligible to receive billions of dollars of gas transit profits from Kiev.88 In the realm of literature, the Russophile tradition has likewise established an enduring legacy. This is especially exemplified by the writings of Andrii Karabelesh ( 1906-1964). Karabelesh was born in the Transcarpathian village of Tibala, near Mukachevo. When he first attended the gymnasium in Mukachevo the language of instruction was still Magyar. This changed due to the arrival in Podkarpatska Rus ' of many Russian emigres fleeing the revolution. Karabelesh adapted to the russification of the school system so enthusiastically that he became the first secular writer among Rusyn Russophi les. He went on to study at the Theological Seminary in Uzhorod ( 1925-1928). While still a student he published- in Russian- two collections of poetry, lzbrany e stikhovtvorenia (1928) and V buchalh rassvieta ( 1929). These works have been characterized as "dominated by mysticism, a pessimistic outlook on life, and a love of Russian culture." 89 He did not complete his studies at the Theological Seminary because he converted to Orthodoxy. His conversion was less for religious than for cultural reasons. As literary historian Elaine Rusinko writes: "Karabelesh ' s deity is not the conventional God of the Greek Catholic catechism, but an amorphous, spiritual force that provides metaphysical potential and philosophical substance for the poet." 9 Karabelesh went on to Prague, where he obtained a degree in philosophy from Charles University in 1934. ° 88 See " Ukraine Laun ches Moderni zation of Urengog-Ponary-U zhorod Pipeline," Ukra inian News Agency, Jul y 19, 2011 . 89 See the entry " Karabelesh, Andrii " in Magocsi and Pop, eds., Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture, 223. 90 Ru sinko, 350. SLOVAKIA 2019 129 Karabelesh continued writing exclusively in standard Russian. Unlike earlier Russophiles, he did not look towards Russia for the deliverance of the Rusyn people. In his estimation, it was no longer a matter of what Holy Mother Russia could do for Podkarpatska Rus'. It was a matter of what Carpathian-Rus' could do for Holy Mother Russia. In his enthusiasm for the great Russian literary giants, Karabelesh exhibited a tendency towards plagiarism, using some of their phrases directly in his own poetry. Karabelesh 's special favorite was Mikhail Lennontov, who merits attention here. Like his predecessor, the great Russian Romantic Alexander Pushkin, Lermontov wrote passionately, lived wildly and was killed in a duel. Unlike Pushkin, Lermontov created a literary genre in which the psychology of the protagonist played a leading role. This served as a precedent for the great novels of Dostoyevsky later in the century.91 In his poem "Nevdol'strie" (Dissatisfaction), Karabelesh quotes Lermontov's Pechorin: "I was not born for happiness. " 92 Anyone who studies the course of Karabelesh 's life would probably agree. He taught secondary school for a time in Podkarpatska Rus ', but when the Hungarians reoccupied the region he fled to Bohemia. Karabelesh participated in the Czech Resistance against the Nazis, heading a small underground group in Litamsyl. In this capacity he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942. He passed the remainder of the war in the concentration camps of Mauthausen and Buchenwald. After the war he remained for a time in western Czechoslovakia, serving as principal of the gymnasium of Svitavy (19451953). Then he moved to the Presov Region, where he taught Russian language and literature at Safarik University. Although a member of the Ukrainian section of the Slovak Writers Union, he continued to write exclusively in Russian. It was not simply a case of Karabelesh being unwilling to move with the times. The red banner of the October Revolution replaced the grey skies in "V karpatikh osin" (Autumn in the Carpathians ). 93 Yet the apolitical, pessimistic tone of Karabelesh 's poetry became increasingly an object of attack by communist ideologues. In 1956, when the Soviet Communist Party was 91 See Semyon Eks hut, " Pushkin 's Heir" Russian Life, 42 , No, 6 (October/November 1999), 20-32. 92 Rusinko, 353. 93 Ibid, 362. 130 SLOVAKIA 2019 in a state of ideological crisis in the aftermath of Stalin's death , Karabelesh raised his voice in criticism of the imposed ukrainization of the Rusyn people. He was subsequently expelled from the Slovak Writers Union and returned to Bohemia. In the homeland, literary hi storian and defender of the "social realist" genre Iurii Bolega opened an ideological offensive against Karabelesh ' s work, condemning it as having a Russian chauvinist and anti-social character. One may ask why Karabelesh would wish to return home under such circumstances. Yet the years he spent in concentration camps had undennined hi s health, and Karabelesh was of the opinion "Where you are born, there you should die! " 94 Terminally ill, Karabelesh finally returned home in 1964. He died in Mukachevo on September 4 . In the post-communist era his poetry has experienced a revival of popularity. The Eastern Carpathians constitute an area of scenic beauty, but also in many places one of the depressing poverty. In his poem " Moi Narod" (My Nation), Karabelesh focuses on "fences and of abandoned gardens," "dried out grape vines," "bars of broken down churches," "unplowed fields," and so on. His writing reflects the mixture of beauty and melancholia that is essential to the brooding Slavic soul. If the Russophile tradition never reached the level of popularity that the Ukrainophile orientation attained, it nonetheless remains an essential part of the cultural landscape. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank and express his deep appreciation to Bob Broedel , president of the Tallahassee-Krasnodar Sister City Program, for hi s technical assistance in accessing material published in Russia and Ukraine. 94 Ibid, 359.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Russophiles without Russia Description An account of the resource R. Vladimir Baumgarten Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 83-130 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Baumgarten, R. Vladimir Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/989aea1ca9f085022dc25871553920c9.pdf 482921d8a99b9a8147575ead644d8335 PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 2019 133 Tiinde Lengyelova. Zivot na sl'achtickom dvore. Odev, strava, domacnost, hygenia, vo/'ny cas. Bratislava: Slovart, 2015 , 248pp. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, list of noble families , index of names and places. (Baron) PETER MARIASSY Kosice, Slovak Republic The author, who works for the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, specializes in the history of the nobility and of women in the early modem period. Her book on Life in the Court of the Nobility ... is an original contribution to a history of the 16th and 17th centuries in the Kingdom of Hungary, which at that time was partitioned between the Habsburgs, who controlled Upper Hungary and the Ottoman Turks, who occupied the Hungarian Plains and controlled its vassal province of Transylvania. Lengyelova's main contribution consists of a realistic and uncensored look into the life of Hungarian noble society, which at that time suffered from three heavy burdens : to maintain its existence vis-a-vis the Ottoman threat, the Germanizing Habsburg court, and the various wars with both powers. A major contribution of the book is a detailed description of the leading role of nobles ' wives in supporting their husbands who were running the Kingdom or had gone off to war. Based upon extensive archival research, the book reveals for the first time how noble women very capably functioned and supported their husbands in a patriarchal society where the men were much more educated and recognized. In a sense, the women were more than equal partners of their husbands. The reader will be rewarded by unique descriptions of noble life through their dress, their cuisine, the running of their households, questions of hygiene and leisure activities. All of these aspects of life had to function in a time of many wars and uprisings. This book illustrates how life carried on even in the hardest of times, because the noble men and women divided their tasks and admirably carried them out. I recommend this book not only to professional historians, but also to the general public which might be interested in life in early �134 SLOVAKIA 2019 modern Hungary, especially in its cuisine, its dress, and amusements in this very difficult era. In the future , I would like to see the author compare the dress and other aspects of life of the warring sides. It would also have been useful to have had a conclusion to the book, in which the author would not only summarize her findings , but also indicate her further direction of research. Kenneth Janda. The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 2018. X-277 pp. Illustrated, maps, charts, graphs, notes. bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a popular history of the Great War by a retired Professor of Political Science from Northwestern University. It concerns the Slovak peasant Samuel Mozolak from the village of Krajne in the Myjava region and Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef of AustriaHungary. Janda, a Czech-American, was motivated by the British television series Upstairs Downstairs and Downtown Abby to write the story of his Slovak wife's grandfather and his descendants and compare it with that of the second-last Habsburg Emperor. This is an engaging book. In fourteen well-written chapters, Janda traces the fortunes of Franz Josef and Samuel Mozolak from just before the outbreak of the Great War to its end. He traces Mozolak and his wife back to their voyage and marriage in New York City between 1902 and 1906, their return to Slovakia in 1906, where they dropped off their twins with Mozolaks mother and their return to America until 1914, when they once again returned to Slovakia. Soon after Franz Josef decided to declare war upon Serbia in July of 1914, Samuel Mozolak was drafted into the Hungarian 15 th Honved (Home Army) regiment, based in the city of Trencin, fought on the Russian, Romanian and Italian Fronts, and died in the Battle of the Piave on June 19, 1918. Emperor Franz Josef, on the other hand, declared war upon Serbia on July 28 , 1914, in retaliation for the assassination of his neph- �SLOVAKIA 2019 135 ew Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist exactly one month earlier. This precipitated the start of the First World War, with the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria supporting the Habsburgs while Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Romania opposed them. Since both Austria-Hungary and Germany failed in their objectives to defeat and conquer Serbia and France by December, 1914, they lost the war, Janda concluded, despite the fact that it dragged on for four more years. Jandas account is particularly good in describing the Habsburg armies, their ethnic composition, supplies and materials, and devastating defeats. He points out that the Eastern Front, which is often downplayed by Western historians, actually involved more soldiers than in the West, and counted 1,000,000 more casualties than on the Western Front. Janda concluded that, even though Samuel Mozolak died during the Great War, his family , like his countrymen, made great gains from the war, while the Habsburgs lost everything. By joining with the Czechs in creating the new Republic of Czechoslovakia upon the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Slovaks gained their independence, the use of their language in the public sphere and a democratic government. The Habsburgs, by contrast, lost not only their empire, but their thrones and even the right to live in their homeland, from which they were banned after the war. The descendants of Samuel Mozolak moved to the USA after the war and eventually prospered. Thus, the peasant triumphed over the emperor. Since Janda is not an historian, he made a few unfortunate mistakes, which a good editor should have spotted. Thus, on page 44 he mixed up Greek Catholics (Uniates) with the Orthodox; he mistakenly dated the codification of Slovak to 1852, when it was first codified in 1787 and a second time in 1846 (page 48); he was unaware of the existence of the weekly Slowik v Amerike in New York City before the Great War (page 82); he mistakenly referred to the Austrian province of Galicia as having been in Hungary's northeast region ; and he seemed to be unaware that the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1968, which was still in effect in 1992, allowed for the dissolution of the Republic (page 238). In spite of these shortcomings, The Emperor and the Peasant makes for good reading and the general public will undoubtedly �136 SLOVAKIA 2019 learn a lot from it about Slovak immigration to America, and the Habsburg Empire's decline and fall during the Great War. Janda is to be congratulated for this tribute to the Mozolak famly. John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation. Minneapolis: Kirk House Publishers, 2012. Paper, 424 pages, with illustrations, appendix, index. $24.95 . ISBN 978-1933794-55-6. KENNETH JANDA Emeritus, Northwestern University This book by a Slovak-American immigrant about his ancestors' homeland is remarkably different from others. It reflects life among the Slovak intelligentsia, rather than peasant roots . Both sides of John Palka's family not only belonged to the intelligentsia, but also played major roles in the literary, religious, economic, and political development of the Slovak nation and its people. Palka's book is divided into three parts with a substantial Appendix. Part I recounts his family's two escapes to America, first fleeing Fascism and then Communism. Part II intertwines his family's history with that of Slovakia. Part III resembles a diary, reporting Palka's contemporary connections with his Slovak heritage. His Appendix contains historical information, maps, genealogical charts, a Slovak language pronunciation guide, and thirty pages of color plates- each one keyed to the text. The research is solid and well-documented. In a way, John Palka is the unintentional chronicler of his forefathers. After retiring in 2002 as a distinguishedd Professor of Biology at the University of Washington, he benefitted from the Slovak government's belated recognition of grandfather Milan Hodza's contributions as Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938. The Slovak government invited John as an honored guest to the reburial of his grandfather's remains from Chicago's Bohemian National Cemetery to the Slovak National Cemetery in Martin. Inspiredd by that experience, unintentional benefactor became intentional historian and author of this absorbing volume. Part I begins in 1935-1938 Prague as Hitler exploited the Western powers' appeasement policies and dismembered and annexed the �SLOVAKIA 2019 137 Czech part of Czechoslovakia. Palka recounts Prime Minister Hodfa's helplessness as allies deserted hi s country. Drawing from family sources, Palka documents the family trauma that forced them to flee their homeland. Theys fled at midnight by train, despite hi s mother's advanced pregnancy. John was born in Paris in 1939, only two weeks after they escaped from Prague. After eluding the SS for nearly two years in occupied France, Palka's family made its way to neutral Portugal in 1941 , using fake passports. In Lisbon, they managed to board a Pan Am Clipper making one of its last flights from warring Europe to New York. Like the many thou sands of Slovak immigrants before them, the Palkas found it hard to adjust to America. Unlike most other Slovaks, they were well-educated and upper class. In Chicago, his multilingual father (Slovak, French, German, Hungarian) and former business owner in the Slovak leather industry was not employable in the American leather industry because he did not speak English. His work on the assembly line of a Slovak-owned electrical parts manufacturing plant produced little income. As Palka tells it, the arrival of his famous grandfather later in 1941 complicated rather than improved the family situation. Not only was Milan Hodza ill before he arrived, but Czechoslovakia's former Prime Minister clashed with its former President, Edvard Benes. Palka said that they divided over three issues : Hodza's insistence on Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia, hi s opposition to Soviet influence in hi s country, and hi s support for a federation of Central Europe. Despite speaking often and widely to emigre groups, Hodza failed to win them over before dyi ng in 1944. Obituaries in major world newspapers praised his life and hi s funeral in Chicago was widely attended. Palka says his family's hopes soared with the end of World War II . By 1946 the family was back in Slovakia and optimistic. Two years later, Communists took over the government, and soon the family again fled Czechoslovakia, this time from Bratislava. Palka was old enough to remember their escape. He described crawling under barbed wire, dodging searchlights, and dashing across a field to freedom in Austria. By the end of the year, the Palkas again found themselves on their way to America, this time to New York. �138 SLOVAKIA 2019 By Palka's account, the family fared better in New York than in Chicago. His mother became a translator for Radio Free Europe, and Johnny quickly learned English. He obtained a scholarship at a small private school in Connecticut before entering Swarthmore College, where he met his future wife, Yvonne. Both went to India to do research, married there, and subsequently earned PhDs in neurosciences at UCLA. They eventually landed in Seattle-John at the University of Washington and Yvonne at Antioch University. During that time, Palka had little contact with Slovaks (other than his parents) except for a trip to Czechoslovakia in 1976, where he re-experienced communist oppression. His last chapter in Part I tells how Palka eventually learned of his father's clandestine activities against the Nazis in Slovakia before fleeing in 1941 to join his family in Paris. Part II is primarily about Slovakia's history but also about the roles played by his maternal and paternal ancestors in that history. The first chapters outline his genealogical connections to the Hodfas and Palkas. Whereas most Slovak immigrants' ancestors were peasants, Palka's were also pastors and craftsmen in an emerging middle class. In three chapters, Palka links the personal lives of two special ancestors with the rise of Slovak nationalism in the mid-19 th century. Through his successful leatherworks business, Palka's great-great grand uncle, Ondrej Palka ( 1800-1877), financed the pastoral and cultural activities of Michal Miloslav Hodfa (1811-1870), a great grand uncle who-along with I:udovit Stur and Josef Miloslav Hurban-helped codify Slovak as a literary language. Michal Miloslav Hodfa also became famous for his revolutionary activities in the 1848 uprising against Magyar rule. Although the Austrian emperor pardoned him for his political activities, Slovak magyarones-those who curried favor with the Hungarian government- stripped Hodfa of his salary, his position, and drove him to the borderland. Long after his death, the Slovak government retrieved his remains for an honored burial in Liptovsky Mikulas, where he served as pastor. Ironically, one speaker at his funeral was his nephew, Milan Hodfa-who later would also die in exile and also be returned to Slovakia for reburial with honor. Palka's chapters about other distant relatives-Michael Miloslav's Hodfa's daughter Marina and the Bella family, kin to Palka's great-grandmother-portray accomplished women, which differs sharply from most accounts of Slovaks living in Austria-Hungary. �SLOVAKIA 2019 139 His longest chapter is on grandfather Jan Palka, labeled "the most captivating character" in his family. Inheriting his father's leather business, Jan Palka employed modem manufacturing techniques, and amassed a fortune large enough to own a sumptuous villa with a Bosendoerfer grand piano inside and a tennis court outside. Despite his wealth, he was a utopian socialist who instituted profitsharing, worker participation in management, limited work hours, paid vacations, and children's scholarships. Jan Palka's reforms cut into his company's profits, which also suffered from market losses in Austria-Hungary with the formation of Czechoslovakia. His grandfather lost virtually everything in the Great Depression. Whereas Palka's distant paternal ancestors distinguished themselves in business (and in support of Slovak national causes), his maternal ancestors-the Hodfas- distinguished themselves in "the nation's service"- in Slovak literary, religious, and political activities. Palka ends his chapter, "Four Generations of National Service" sadly, by recounting the high prices the Hodfas paid in jail, persecution, and exile . Palka concludes Part II by returning to grandfather Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister in the mid-1930s . He retraces Hodfa's life from birth, through school, as journalist, during military service, and in politics. Palka's final paragraph says, "And so the story that we began when Milan Hodfa's remains were finally transferred home to his beloved Slovakia, fifty-eight years after his death, is now complete." Part III concludes the book with six chapters providing insight into the author's personal "Slovak awakening." Palka admits to "an emotional experience" each time he returns to the homeland "of a family that has a place in national history." Understandably sentimental, he revisits places and people that played roles in his family's drama, and thus in the nation's history. John Palka assumed the responsibility of documenting his family's life and accomplishments. Not only did he do his duty, but he did it with distinction . �140 SLOVAKIA 2019 Jan Hirka: Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi. Presov: Greckokatolicka teologicka fakulta, 2013. 568 pp. Afterword by Andrej Rusnak. Index, abbreviations, bibliography, photos. DANIEL CERNY Kosice There is a Latin proverb, which probably best fits the review of the book Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi, by the late Bishop of Presov, the Most Reverend Jan Hirka (1923-2014). This proverb is as follows : Verba volant, scripta manent which means "spoken words fly away, written words remain. " History is not only about events and dates, but is also based on great personalities, true leaders, who leave behind them significant imprints and are thus remembered in the hearts of those who knew them . One of the greatest leaders of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in the 20 th century was Bishop Jan Hirka, who served as the Administrator of the then Eparchy of Presov from 1968 to 1989 and then as the resident bishop from 1989 to his retirement in 2002. Bishop Hirka is definitely worth remembering. This autobiography was finished in 2013 and Bishop Hirka gave the first copies to those who came to see him for his jubilee. It was a paradox that the one who was supposed to receive gifts, was distributing them. This book, which is so far the largest vo lume dedicated in Slovak to a single Greek Catholic person, was written towards the end of his life. On the positive side, the book covers almost the comth plete life span of Bishop Hirka, from his youth to his 90 birthday, which also serves as the occasion for its publication. This book deserves to be in the library of every historian who focuses on the life of the Church in 20 th century Central Europe. The title of the book reflects the inscription from the bishop ' s coat of arms of- Under the protection of Mary. Bishop Hirka mentions his devotion to the Mother of God throughout the book. He started to work on the manuscript, with the help of his personal secretary, Father Andrej Rusnak, only after his retirement in 2002. The entire volume is divided into several chapters, which could be summarized into three parts: The first part, which after a description of his early years, focuses on the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church in 1950, his secret pastoral ministry afterwards, his arrest, trial and imprisonment, fol- �SLOVAKIA 2019 141 lowed by exile from eastern Slovakia. He then worked as a simple electrician. His description of his imprisonment and the trial in Prague is stunning. So are his memories of prison work in a Czech mine, his time after release, when he was forced to stay outside of eastern Slovakia and needed to earn his daily bread through manual labor. The second part starts with the events of the Prague Spring and rebirth of the Greek Catholic Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1968. At this time Father Hirka was appointed to lead the Greek Catholic Church, but only as an Apostolic Administrator, as his episcopal ordination was not permitted by the communist regime. It contains a detailed list of events and places he visited, texts of several of his sermons and letters, a compilation of newspaper reports, sermons and homilies. The joy of the Prague Spring of 1968 was very quickly replaced with the foreign military invasion and the period of normalization with many restrictions on the religious life of the citizens. The third part follows Hirka, after he was appointed as the Greek Catholic Bishop of Presov, his memorable ordination in the sport hall of Presov, attended by bishops from all over the world and thousands of the faithful. The papal visit in 1995 to Presov and the beatification of Bishop Gojdic in 2001 are among the highlights of this time. This was a period of increased apostolic activity and marvelous building projects, where people were happy to see their Church free. Among the greatest successes dear to the heart of Bishop Hirka was the reestablishment of the Seminary and of the Theological faculty , which was accomplished in 1990, but for which he struggled from 1968. Bishop Hirka lived long enough to see many important changes in Slovak society at the end of the 20 th century. The Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1993 were important and affected the life of the Church. In 1996 a special Exarchate was created for Greek Catholics in the Czech Republic, who formerly belonged to the Eparchy in Presov, and in 1997 the Exarchate of Kosice was erected, creating a second Greek Catholic jurisdiction in Slovakia. All this led to the elevation of the Church to Metropolitan status, for which Bishop Hirka worked, and was able to see it happen (even though already in retirement) in 2008. Any reader of this book, who has at least some knowledge about �142 SLOVAKIA 2019 the history of the Greek Catholic Church in the former CzechoSlovakia, might feel at the end a bit perplexed. While the first part, speaking about the life and deeds of the young boy, later seminarian and young priest is absolutely stunning, the second and third parts following the path of Father Hirka, who became in 1968 Apostolic Administrator of the Eparchy of Presov and later a bishop--do not possess the quality of the first part. Many of the author's personal decisions, or inner opinions are omitted or hidden. Thus many conflicts or problems, which were publicly known, are not even mentioned. The book gives several wrong impressions. One of them is that the 1990's were a period of complete happiness and zeal. To a certain extent yes, but there were also several problems. It is wellknown that the author's personal relations with his former auxiliary and later Exarch of Kosice, the Most Reverend Milan Chautur, were after an initial period, not very positive, and this resulted in many strange situations, like the fact that, for a time the auxiliary bishop was denied the post of Vicar-General, but was instead appointed to administer a parish himself1 The reader does not need to know everything, but to pretend that there was no problem at all in an autobiography of more than 500 pages is a serious mistake and an injustice to its readers. There is also no mention of two additional phenomena. For instance, the priests of Zemplin lobbied for a second bishopric in Slovakia (the Exarchate of Kosice), which was another unpleasant surprise for Hirka. We know from other documents and publications that these efforts date back to December of 1989. There is also silence regarding those who, during the communist era were secretly ordained, including bishops of the underground church. This phenomenon was common to the Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia. Another negative example is the omission of several personalities who became legends. Among them was Father Jifi Novotny SJ, a Jesuit, who came in the early l 990's to help at the Theological Faculty in Presov and more than ten years after his departure everyone remembered stories about him. He taught numerous subjects, all of them on a very high level, thanks to his knowledge of several languages, his academic background and unique personality. In a book of more than 500 pages this is a serious omission. Yet, the overall impression is positive, as there is no other book �SLOVAKIA 2019 143 which could be compared to this one. Since Bishop Hirka was initially reluctant to put anything on paper, one has to admire the huge work done by Father Andrej Rusnak. To be fair, one has to say that Bishop Hirka was tired, almost exhausted, especially due to constant fighting with the communist authorities . But this is also one of the negatives of the book. It started to be written very late in the life of Bishop Jan, thus reducing several events and some details and depending too much on his declining health. Approximately 150 photos add great value to the book, as does a special chapter on the beatification of the new-martyrs P. P. Gojdic and B. Hopko, which were started in 1985 in the USA, but after the fall of the Iron Curtain transferred to the Eparchy of Presov. Resumes in several languages are a great plus, as is the final word by the editor, Father Andrej Rusnak. Thanks also to Father Marek Petro, who helped to finalize the creation of the book, and who provided footnotes to the text. The register of names will be appreciated by all. As Bishop Hirka wrote in the Preface, the famous professor and Roman Catholic priest Stefan Hlavac inspired him to write his memoirs. The latter said that if other nations had lived through such turbulent times, many books, plays and scholarly works would already be published. This book tries to fill this gap and offers a structured and detailed (although not perfect) account of events and deeds of one of the greatest personalities of the Greek Catholics in Slovakia the late Bishop Jan Hirka. Machacek, Michal. Gustav Husak. Praha: Vysehrad, 2017 . 631 pp. Notes, bibliography, photographs and index. JOZEFHYRJA Heidelberg University In order to understand the most rigid period of Czechoslovak history in the 20 th century, we need to know the person who was behind the so-called "normalization." For two decades Gustav Husak (19131991) represented cultural and economic stagnation, restrictions, repressions and an omnipresent fear in the population of that state. �144 SLOVAKIA 2019 Written by the young Czech historian Michal Machacek, this is the first complete biography of the long-time Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the country ' s last communist President. The author covered Husak's life from his birth in the little Slovak village of Dubravka (now part of the capital city Bratislava), until his death as a lonely, defeated and forgotten former communist leader. Machacek did extensive research in archives in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Canada, the USA and Russia, where he discovered new documents. His research led him to the private archives of Husak' s relatives, their oral testimonies and the reminiscences of his contemporaries. He worked on this monograph for almost ten years, which thus became one of the most anticipated books by Slovak and Czech historians. The biography consists of seven chapters listed in chronological order, which provide a detailed insight into the development of Husak's political career as well as his private life. Machacek was influenced neither by Marxist historiography nor by the dissident discourse, which tends to be too emotionally involved in anti-communist views. He represents a new generation of historians, not burdened by the shadows of the past. The result is an objective and wellbalanced biography. Despite coming from a Czech cultural environment, Machacek, is well-acquainted with contemporary Slovak realities, nationalist sentiments, national demands towards the government in Prague and with Slovak historiography. This asset, often lacking in Czech academic discourse, is important for understanding the complicated relations between the Slovak and Czech nations in their common state and it is definitely valuable to understanding Husak's role and involvement in the federalization of Czechoslovakia (January 1, 1969). The narrative's strongest part, the first chapter entitled Young Radical 1913-1938 (pp. 27-96), describes the interwar period, when Gustav Husak lived and studied in Bratislava. Machacek managed to accurately reconstruct those years of his life and he presents a very plastic image--not only of Husak's youth and activities--but also of Slovak intellectual life in Bratislava between the two World Wars and the development of the communist movement. However, he was part of the Slovak intellectual milieu not only in the communist scene but also in the wider spectrum, which included other political and non-political groups. Machacek emphasized the connections and �SLOVAKIA 2019 145 friendships Husak developed, which helped him on many future occasions. One out of many listed in the book was his friendship with the distinguished Slovak economist Imrich Karvas , who was Husak's professor at Comenius University in Bratislava. Husak attended his lectures and seminars and Karvas grew fond of his student. From this moment "their relationship grew in importance during World War II, when Karvas, now as Governor of the Slovak National Bank, many times helped Husak escape his troubles" (p. 72). An impressive element of Machacek's work is that he skilfully links politics, often on the highest level, with Husak's private life. He provides an interesting insight into Husak's relationship with his second wife Viera, who had a significant influence on his personality as well as his decision-making. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chnoupek, recalled how "Husak in general didn 't like official state visits, but precisely because of the initiative of Viera Husakova they, for example, managed to organize( ... ) a state visit to India, or the following June 1977 to Iraq" (pp. 460-61 ). After the tragic death of his wife in a helicopter crash, it appeared "as if [Husak had] lost his supporter and the visits ceased" (p. 461 ). Where the author could have been more specific and could have developed his arguments more, are the details about Husak's relations with the Church in the 1970s. Before that date, Machacek describes exhaustively not only Husak's attitude towards religion, but also that of his parents and his Catholic family background. However, in 1977, when Pope Paul VI elevated the Archdiocese of Tmava to metropolitan status (under the communist regime!), Machacek does not sufficiently explain Husak's role in this process. The creation of the Archdiocese was an important milestone in the history of Slovakia, which could have been examined in more detail, especially from the point of view church-state relations, but the author dedicates only one sentence to it (p. 466). Despite some minor unintentional factual errors, the overall impression of the book is favorable . The author provides the reader with a complete picture of the longest-serving Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It contains a wealth of new information and gives the reader an interesting insight not only into the political, but also the personal level. Machacek's grasp of the �146 SLOVAKIA 2019 topic is excellent, with more than 2,300 footnotes and an extensive bibliography at the end of the monograph. His book is very readable and contrary to a significant number of preceding scholarly works, it is objective and a valuable contribution to the study of the communist regimes in Central Europe. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 2019 133 Tiinde Lengyelova. Zivot na sl'achtickom dvore. Odev, strava, domacnost, hygenia, vo/'ny cas. Bratislava: Slovart, 2015 , 248pp. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, list of noble families , index of names and places. (Baron) PETER MARIASSY Kosice, Slovak Republic The author, who works for the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, specializes in the history of the nobility and of women in the early modem period. Her book on Life in the Court of the Nobility ... is an original contribution to a history of the 16th and 17th centuries in the Kingdom of Hungary, which at that time was partitioned between the Habsburgs, who controlled Upper Hungary and the Ottoman Turks, who occupied the Hungarian Plains and controlled its vassal province of Transylvania. Lengyelova's main contribution consists of a realistic and uncensored look into the life of Hungarian noble society, which at that time suffered from three heavy burdens : to maintain its existence vis-a-vis the Ottoman threat, the Germanizing Habsburg court, and the various wars with both powers. A major contribution of the book is a detailed description of the leading role of nobles ' wives in supporting their husbands who were running the Kingdom or had gone off to war. Based upon extensive archival research, the book reveals for the first time how noble women very capably functioned and supported their husbands in a patriarchal society where the men were much more educated and recognized. In a sense, the women were more than equal partners of their husbands. The reader will be rewarded by unique descriptions of noble life through their dress, their cuisine, the running of their households, questions of hygiene and leisure activities. All of these aspects of life had to function in a time of many wars and uprisings. This book illustrates how life carried on even in the hardest of times, because the noble men and women divided their tasks and admirably carried them out. I recommend this book not only to professional historians, but also to the general public which might be interested in life in early �134 SLOVAKIA 2019 modern Hungary, especially in its cuisine, its dress, and amusements in this very difficult era. In the future , I would like to see the author compare the dress and other aspects of life of the warring sides. It would also have been useful to have had a conclusion to the book, in which the author would not only summarize her findings , but also indicate her further direction of research. Kenneth Janda. The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 2018. X-277 pp. Illustrated, maps, charts, graphs, notes. bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a popular history of the Great War by a retired Professor of Political Science from Northwestern University. It concerns the Slovak peasant Samuel Mozolak from the village of Krajne in the Myjava region and Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef of AustriaHungary. Janda, a Czech-American, was motivated by the British television series Upstairs Downstairs and Downtown Abby to write the story of his Slovak wife's grandfather and his descendants and compare it with that of the second-last Habsburg Emperor. This is an engaging book. In fourteen well-written chapters, Janda traces the fortunes of Franz Josef and Samuel Mozolak from just before the outbreak of the Great War to its end. He traces Mozolak and his wife back to their voyage and marriage in New York City between 1902 and 1906, their return to Slovakia in 1906, where they dropped off their twins with Mozolaks mother and their return to America until 1914, when they once again returned to Slovakia. Soon after Franz Josef decided to declare war upon Serbia in July of 1914, Samuel Mozolak was drafted into the Hungarian 15 th Honved (Home Army) regiment, based in the city of Trencin, fought on the Russian, Romanian and Italian Fronts, and died in the Battle of the Piave on June 19, 1918. Emperor Franz Josef, on the other hand, declared war upon Serbia on July 28 , 1914, in retaliation for the assassination of his neph- �SLOVAKIA 2019 135 ew Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist exactly one month earlier. This precipitated the start of the First World War, with the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria supporting the Habsburgs while Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Romania opposed them. Since both Austria-Hungary and Germany failed in their objectives to defeat and conquer Serbia and France by December, 1914, they lost the war, Janda concluded, despite the fact that it dragged on for four more years. Jandas account is particularly good in describing the Habsburg armies, their ethnic composition, supplies and materials, and devastating defeats. He points out that the Eastern Front, which is often downplayed by Western historians, actually involved more soldiers than in the West, and counted 1,000,000 more casualties than on the Western Front. Janda concluded that, even though Samuel Mozolak died during the Great War, his family , like his countrymen, made great gains from the war, while the Habsburgs lost everything. By joining with the Czechs in creating the new Republic of Czechoslovakia upon the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Slovaks gained their independence, the use of their language in the public sphere and a democratic government. The Habsburgs, by contrast, lost not only their empire, but their thrones and even the right to live in their homeland, from which they were banned after the war. The descendants of Samuel Mozolak moved to the USA after the war and eventually prospered. Thus, the peasant triumphed over the emperor. Since Janda is not an historian, he made a few unfortunate mistakes, which a good editor should have spotted. Thus, on page 44 he mixed up Greek Catholics (Uniates) with the Orthodox; he mistakenly dated the codification of Slovak to 1852, when it was first codified in 1787 and a second time in 1846 (page 48); he was unaware of the existence of the weekly Slowik v Amerike in New York City before the Great War (page 82); he mistakenly referred to the Austrian province of Galicia as having been in Hungary's northeast region ; and he seemed to be unaware that the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1968, which was still in effect in 1992, allowed for the dissolution of the Republic (page 238). In spite of these shortcomings, The Emperor and the Peasant makes for good reading and the general public will undoubtedly �136 SLOVAKIA 2019 learn a lot from it about Slovak immigration to America, and the Habsburg Empire's decline and fall during the Great War. Janda is to be congratulated for this tribute to the Mozolak famly. John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation. Minneapolis: Kirk House Publishers, 2012. Paper, 424 pages, with illustrations, appendix, index. $24.95 . ISBN 978-1933794-55-6. KENNETH JANDA Emeritus, Northwestern University This book by a Slovak-American immigrant about his ancestors' homeland is remarkably different from others. It reflects life among the Slovak intelligentsia, rather than peasant roots . Both sides of John Palka's family not only belonged to the intelligentsia, but also played major roles in the literary, religious, economic, and political development of the Slovak nation and its people. Palka's book is divided into three parts with a substantial Appendix. Part I recounts his family's two escapes to America, first fleeing Fascism and then Communism. Part II intertwines his family's history with that of Slovakia. Part III resembles a diary, reporting Palka's contemporary connections with his Slovak heritage. His Appendix contains historical information, maps, genealogical charts, a Slovak language pronunciation guide, and thirty pages of color plates- each one keyed to the text. The research is solid and well-documented. In a way, John Palka is the unintentional chronicler of his forefathers. After retiring in 2002 as a distinguishedd Professor of Biology at the University of Washington, he benefitted from the Slovak government's belated recognition of grandfather Milan Hodza's contributions as Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938. The Slovak government invited John as an honored guest to the reburial of his grandfather's remains from Chicago's Bohemian National Cemetery to the Slovak National Cemetery in Martin. Inspiredd by that experience, unintentional benefactor became intentional historian and author of this absorbing volume. Part I begins in 1935-1938 Prague as Hitler exploited the Western powers' appeasement policies and dismembered and annexed the �SLOVAKIA 2019 137 Czech part of Czechoslovakia. Palka recounts Prime Minister Hodfa's helplessness as allies deserted hi s country. Drawing from family sources, Palka documents the family trauma that forced them to flee their homeland. Theys fled at midnight by train, despite hi s mother's advanced pregnancy. John was born in Paris in 1939, only two weeks after they escaped from Prague. After eluding the SS for nearly two years in occupied France, Palka's family made its way to neutral Portugal in 1941 , using fake passports. In Lisbon, they managed to board a Pan Am Clipper making one of its last flights from warring Europe to New York. Like the many thou sands of Slovak immigrants before them, the Palkas found it hard to adjust to America. Unlike most other Slovaks, they were well-educated and upper class. In Chicago, his multilingual father (Slovak, French, German, Hungarian) and former business owner in the Slovak leather industry was not employable in the American leather industry because he did not speak English. His work on the assembly line of a Slovak-owned electrical parts manufacturing plant produced little income. As Palka tells it, the arrival of his famous grandfather later in 1941 complicated rather than improved the family situation. Not only was Milan Hodza ill before he arrived, but Czechoslovakia's former Prime Minister clashed with its former President, Edvard Benes. Palka said that they divided over three issues : Hodza's insistence on Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia, hi s opposition to Soviet influence in hi s country, and hi s support for a federation of Central Europe. Despite speaking often and widely to emigre groups, Hodza failed to win them over before dyi ng in 1944. Obituaries in major world newspapers praised his life and hi s funeral in Chicago was widely attended. Palka says his family's hopes soared with the end of World War II . By 1946 the family was back in Slovakia and optimistic. Two years later, Communists took over the government, and soon the family again fled Czechoslovakia, this time from Bratislava. Palka was old enough to remember their escape. He described crawling under barbed wire, dodging searchlights, and dashing across a field to freedom in Austria. By the end of the year, the Palkas again found themselves on their way to America, this time to New York. �138 SLOVAKIA 2019 By Palka's account, the family fared better in New York than in Chicago. His mother became a translator for Radio Free Europe, and Johnny quickly learned English. He obtained a scholarship at a small private school in Connecticut before entering Swarthmore College, where he met his future wife, Yvonne. Both went to India to do research, married there, and subsequently earned PhDs in neurosciences at UCLA. They eventually landed in Seattle-John at the University of Washington and Yvonne at Antioch University. During that time, Palka had little contact with Slovaks (other than his parents) except for a trip to Czechoslovakia in 1976, where he re-experienced communist oppression. His last chapter in Part I tells how Palka eventually learned of his father's clandestine activities against the Nazis in Slovakia before fleeing in 1941 to join his family in Paris. Part II is primarily about Slovakia's history but also about the roles played by his maternal and paternal ancestors in that history. The first chapters outline his genealogical connections to the Hodfas and Palkas. Whereas most Slovak immigrants' ancestors were peasants, Palka's were also pastors and craftsmen in an emerging middle class. In three chapters, Palka links the personal lives of two special ancestors with the rise of Slovak nationalism in the mid-19 th century. Through his successful leatherworks business, Palka's great-great grand uncle, Ondrej Palka ( 1800-1877), financed the pastoral and cultural activities of Michal Miloslav Hodfa (1811-1870), a great grand uncle who-along with I:udovit Stur and Josef Miloslav Hurban-helped codify Slovak as a literary language. Michal Miloslav Hodfa also became famous for his revolutionary activities in the 1848 uprising against Magyar rule. Although the Austrian emperor pardoned him for his political activities, Slovak magyarones-those who curried favor with the Hungarian government- stripped Hodfa of his salary, his position, and drove him to the borderland. Long after his death, the Slovak government retrieved his remains for an honored burial in Liptovsky Mikulas, where he served as pastor. Ironically, one speaker at his funeral was his nephew, Milan Hodfa-who later would also die in exile and also be returned to Slovakia for reburial with honor. Palka's chapters about other distant relatives-Michael Miloslav's Hodfa's daughter Marina and the Bella family, kin to Palka's great-grandmother-portray accomplished women, which differs sharply from most accounts of Slovaks living in Austria-Hungary. �SLOVAKIA 2019 139 His longest chapter is on grandfather Jan Palka, labeled "the most captivating character" in his family. Inheriting his father's leather business, Jan Palka employed modem manufacturing techniques, and amassed a fortune large enough to own a sumptuous villa with a Bosendoerfer grand piano inside and a tennis court outside. Despite his wealth, he was a utopian socialist who instituted profitsharing, worker participation in management, limited work hours, paid vacations, and children's scholarships. Jan Palka's reforms cut into his company's profits, which also suffered from market losses in Austria-Hungary with the formation of Czechoslovakia. His grandfather lost virtually everything in the Great Depression. Whereas Palka's distant paternal ancestors distinguished themselves in business (and in support of Slovak national causes), his maternal ancestors-the Hodfas- distinguished themselves in "the nation's service"- in Slovak literary, religious, and political activities. Palka ends his chapter, "Four Generations of National Service" sadly, by recounting the high prices the Hodfas paid in jail, persecution, and exile . Palka concludes Part II by returning to grandfather Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister in the mid-1930s . He retraces Hodfa's life from birth, through school, as journalist, during military service, and in politics. Palka's final paragraph says, "And so the story that we began when Milan Hodfa's remains were finally transferred home to his beloved Slovakia, fifty-eight years after his death, is now complete." Part III concludes the book with six chapters providing insight into the author's personal "Slovak awakening." Palka admits to "an emotional experience" each time he returns to the homeland "of a family that has a place in national history." Understandably sentimental, he revisits places and people that played roles in his family's drama, and thus in the nation's history. John Palka assumed the responsibility of documenting his family's life and accomplishments. Not only did he do his duty, but he did it with distinction . �140 SLOVAKIA 2019 Jan Hirka: Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi. Presov: Greckokatolicka teologicka fakulta, 2013. 568 pp. Afterword by Andrej Rusnak. Index, abbreviations, bibliography, photos. DANIEL CERNY Kosice There is a Latin proverb, which probably best fits the review of the book Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi, by the late Bishop of Presov, the Most Reverend Jan Hirka (1923-2014). This proverb is as follows : Verba volant, scripta manent which means "spoken words fly away, written words remain. " History is not only about events and dates, but is also based on great personalities, true leaders, who leave behind them significant imprints and are thus remembered in the hearts of those who knew them . One of the greatest leaders of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in the 20 th century was Bishop Jan Hirka, who served as the Administrator of the then Eparchy of Presov from 1968 to 1989 and then as the resident bishop from 1989 to his retirement in 2002. Bishop Hirka is definitely worth remembering. This autobiography was finished in 2013 and Bishop Hirka gave the first copies to those who came to see him for his jubilee. It was a paradox that the one who was supposed to receive gifts, was distributing them. This book, which is so far the largest vo lume dedicated in Slovak to a single Greek Catholic person, was written towards the end of his life. On the positive side, the book covers almost the comth plete life span of Bishop Hirka, from his youth to his 90 birthday, which also serves as the occasion for its publication. This book deserves to be in the library of every historian who focuses on the life of the Church in 20 th century Central Europe. The title of the book reflects the inscription from the bishop ' s coat of arms of- Under the protection of Mary. Bishop Hirka mentions his devotion to the Mother of God throughout the book. He started to work on the manuscript, with the help of his personal secretary, Father Andrej Rusnak, only after his retirement in 2002. The entire volume is divided into several chapters, which could be summarized into three parts: The first part, which after a description of his early years, focuses on the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church in 1950, his secret pastoral ministry afterwards, his arrest, trial and imprisonment, fol- �SLOVAKIA 2019 141 lowed by exile from eastern Slovakia. He then worked as a simple electrician. His description of his imprisonment and the trial in Prague is stunning. So are his memories of prison work in a Czech mine, his time after release, when he was forced to stay outside of eastern Slovakia and needed to earn his daily bread through manual labor. The second part starts with the events of the Prague Spring and rebirth of the Greek Catholic Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1968. At this time Father Hirka was appointed to lead the Greek Catholic Church, but only as an Apostolic Administrator, as his episcopal ordination was not permitted by the communist regime. It contains a detailed list of events and places he visited, texts of several of his sermons and letters, a compilation of newspaper reports, sermons and homilies. The joy of the Prague Spring of 1968 was very quickly replaced with the foreign military invasion and the period of normalization with many restrictions on the religious life of the citizens. The third part follows Hirka, after he was appointed as the Greek Catholic Bishop of Presov, his memorable ordination in the sport hall of Presov, attended by bishops from all over the world and thousands of the faithful. The papal visit in 1995 to Presov and the beatification of Bishop Gojdic in 2001 are among the highlights of this time. This was a period of increased apostolic activity and marvelous building projects, where people were happy to see their Church free. Among the greatest successes dear to the heart of Bishop Hirka was the reestablishment of the Seminary and of the Theological faculty , which was accomplished in 1990, but for which he struggled from 1968. Bishop Hirka lived long enough to see many important changes in Slovak society at the end of the 20 th century. The Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1993 were important and affected the life of the Church. In 1996 a special Exarchate was created for Greek Catholics in the Czech Republic, who formerly belonged to the Eparchy in Presov, and in 1997 the Exarchate of Kosice was erected, creating a second Greek Catholic jurisdiction in Slovakia. All this led to the elevation of the Church to Metropolitan status, for which Bishop Hirka worked, and was able to see it happen (even though already in retirement) in 2008. Any reader of this book, who has at least some knowledge about �142 SLOVAKIA 2019 the history of the Greek Catholic Church in the former CzechoSlovakia, might feel at the end a bit perplexed. While the first part, speaking about the life and deeds of the young boy, later seminarian and young priest is absolutely stunning, the second and third parts following the path of Father Hirka, who became in 1968 Apostolic Administrator of the Eparchy of Presov and later a bishop--do not possess the quality of the first part. Many of the author's personal decisions, or inner opinions are omitted or hidden. Thus many conflicts or problems, which were publicly known, are not even mentioned. The book gives several wrong impressions. One of them is that the 1990's were a period of complete happiness and zeal. To a certain extent yes, but there were also several problems. It is wellknown that the author's personal relations with his former auxiliary and later Exarch of Kosice, the Most Reverend Milan Chautur, were after an initial period, not very positive, and this resulted in many strange situations, like the fact that, for a time the auxiliary bishop was denied the post of Vicar-General, but was instead appointed to administer a parish himself1 The reader does not need to know everything, but to pretend that there was no problem at all in an autobiography of more than 500 pages is a serious mistake and an injustice to its readers. There is also no mention of two additional phenomena. For instance, the priests of Zemplin lobbied for a second bishopric in Slovakia (the Exarchate of Kosice), which was another unpleasant surprise for Hirka. We know from other documents and publications that these efforts date back to December of 1989. There is also silence regarding those who, during the communist era were secretly ordained, including bishops of the underground church. This phenomenon was common to the Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia. Another negative example is the omission of several personalities who became legends. Among them was Father Jifi Novotny SJ, a Jesuit, who came in the early l 990's to help at the Theological Faculty in Presov and more than ten years after his departure everyone remembered stories about him. He taught numerous subjects, all of them on a very high level, thanks to his knowledge of several languages, his academic background and unique personality. In a book of more than 500 pages this is a serious omission. Yet, the overall impression is positive, as there is no other book �SLOVAKIA 2019 143 which could be compared to this one. Since Bishop Hirka was initially reluctant to put anything on paper, one has to admire the huge work done by Father Andrej Rusnak. To be fair, one has to say that Bishop Hirka was tired, almost exhausted, especially due to constant fighting with the communist authorities . But this is also one of the negatives of the book. It started to be written very late in the life of Bishop Jan, thus reducing several events and some details and depending too much on his declining health. Approximately 150 photos add great value to the book, as does a special chapter on the beatification of the new-martyrs P. P. Gojdic and B. Hopko, which were started in 1985 in the USA, but after the fall of the Iron Curtain transferred to the Eparchy of Presov. Resumes in several languages are a great plus, as is the final word by the editor, Father Andrej Rusnak. Thanks also to Father Marek Petro, who helped to finalize the creation of the book, and who provided footnotes to the text. The register of names will be appreciated by all. As Bishop Hirka wrote in the Preface, the famous professor and Roman Catholic priest Stefan Hlavac inspired him to write his memoirs. The latter said that if other nations had lived through such turbulent times, many books, plays and scholarly works would already be published. This book tries to fill this gap and offers a structured and detailed (although not perfect) account of events and deeds of one of the greatest personalities of the Greek Catholics in Slovakia the late Bishop Jan Hirka. Machacek, Michal. Gustav Husak. Praha: Vysehrad, 2017 . 631 pp. Notes, bibliography, photographs and index. JOZEFHYRJA Heidelberg University In order to understand the most rigid period of Czechoslovak history in the 20 th century, we need to know the person who was behind the so-called "normalization." For two decades Gustav Husak (19131991) represented cultural and economic stagnation, restrictions, repressions and an omnipresent fear in the population of that state. �144 SLOVAKIA 2019 Written by the young Czech historian Michal Machacek, this is the first complete biography of the long-time Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the country ' s last communist President. The author covered Husak's life from his birth in the little Slovak village of Dubravka (now part of the capital city Bratislava), until his death as a lonely, defeated and forgotten former communist leader. Machacek did extensive research in archives in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Canada, the USA and Russia, where he discovered new documents. His research led him to the private archives of Husak' s relatives, their oral testimonies and the reminiscences of his contemporaries. He worked on this monograph for almost ten years, which thus became one of the most anticipated books by Slovak and Czech historians. The biography consists of seven chapters listed in chronological order, which provide a detailed insight into the development of Husak's political career as well as his private life. Machacek was influenced neither by Marxist historiography nor by the dissident discourse, which tends to be too emotionally involved in anti-communist views. He represents a new generation of historians, not burdened by the shadows of the past. The result is an objective and wellbalanced biography. Despite coming from a Czech cultural environment, Machacek, is well-acquainted with contemporary Slovak realities, nationalist sentiments, national demands towards the government in Prague and with Slovak historiography. This asset, often lacking in Czech academic discourse, is important for understanding the complicated relations between the Slovak and Czech nations in their common state and it is definitely valuable to understanding Husak's role and involvement in the federalization of Czechoslovakia (January 1, 1969). The narrative's strongest part, the first chapter entitled Young Radical 1913-1938 (pp. 27-96), describes the interwar period, when Gustav Husak lived and studied in Bratislava. Machacek managed to accurately reconstruct those years of his life and he presents a very plastic image--not only of Husak's youth and activities--but also of Slovak intellectual life in Bratislava between the two World Wars and the development of the communist movement. However, he was part of the Slovak intellectual milieu not only in the communist scene but also in the wider spectrum, which included other political and non-political groups. Machacek emphasized the connections and �SLOVAKIA 2019 145 friendships Husak developed, which helped him on many future occasions. One out of many listed in the book was his friendship with the distinguished Slovak economist Imrich Karvas , who was Husak's professor at Comenius University in Bratislava. Husak attended his lectures and seminars and Karvas grew fond of his student. From this moment "their relationship grew in importance during World War II, when Karvas, now as Governor of the Slovak National Bank, many times helped Husak escape his troubles" (p. 72). An impressive element of Machacek's work is that he skilfully links politics, often on the highest level, with Husak's private life. He provides an interesting insight into Husak's relationship with his second wife Viera, who had a significant influence on his personality as well as his decision-making. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chnoupek, recalled how "Husak in general didn 't like official state visits, but precisely because of the initiative of Viera Husakova they, for example, managed to organize( ... ) a state visit to India, or the following June 1977 to Iraq" (pp. 460-61 ). After the tragic death of his wife in a helicopter crash, it appeared "as if [Husak had] lost his supporter and the visits ceased" (p. 461 ). Where the author could have been more specific and could have developed his arguments more, are the details about Husak's relations with the Church in the 1970s. Before that date, Machacek describes exhaustively not only Husak's attitude towards religion, but also that of his parents and his Catholic family background. However, in 1977, when Pope Paul VI elevated the Archdiocese of Tmava to metropolitan status (under the communist regime!), Machacek does not sufficiently explain Husak's role in this process. The creation of the Archdiocese was an important milestone in the history of Slovakia, which could have been examined in more detail, especially from the point of view church-state relations, but the author dedicates only one sentence to it (p. 466). Despite some minor unintentional factual errors, the overall impression of the book is favorable . The author provides the reader with a complete picture of the longest-serving Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It contains a wealth of new information and gives the reader an interesting insight not only into the political, but also the personal level. Machacek's grasp of the �146 SLOVAKIA 2019 topic is excellent, with more than 2,300 footnotes and an extensive bibliography at the end of the monograph. His book is very readable and contrary to a significant number of preceding scholarly works, it is objective and a valuable contribution to the study of the communist regimes in Central Europe. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA 2019 133 Tiinde Lengyelova. Zivot na sl'achtickom dvore. Odev, strava, domacnost, hygenia, vo/'ny cas. Bratislava: Slovart, 2015 , 248pp. Notes, bibliography, illustrations, list of noble families , index of names and places. (Baron) PETER MARIASSY Kosice, Slovak Republic The author, who works for the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, specializes in the history of the nobility and of women in the early modem period. Her book on Life in the Court of the Nobility ... is an original contribution to a history of the 16th and 17th centuries in the Kingdom of Hungary, which at that time was partitioned between the Habsburgs, who controlled Upper Hungary and the Ottoman Turks, who occupied the Hungarian Plains and controlled its vassal province of Transylvania. Lengyelova's main contribution consists of a realistic and uncensored look into the life of Hungarian noble society, which at that time suffered from three heavy burdens : to maintain its existence vis-a-vis the Ottoman threat, the Germanizing Habsburg court, and the various wars with both powers. A major contribution of the book is a detailed description of the leading role of nobles ' wives in supporting their husbands who were running the Kingdom or had gone off to war. Based upon extensive archival research, the book reveals for the first time how noble women very capably functioned and supported their husbands in a patriarchal society where the men were much more educated and recognized. In a sense, the women were more than equal partners of their husbands. The reader will be rewarded by unique descriptions of noble life through their dress, their cuisine, the running of their households, questions of hygiene and leisure activities. All of these aspects of life had to function in a time of many wars and uprisings. This book illustrates how life carried on even in the hardest of times, because the noble men and women divided their tasks and admirably carried them out. I recommend this book not only to professional historians, but also to the general public which might be interested in life in early 134 SLOVAKIA 2019 modern Hungary, especially in its cuisine, its dress, and amusements in this very difficult era. In the future , I would like to see the author compare the dress and other aspects of life of the warring sides. It would also have been useful to have had a conclusion to the book, in which the author would not only summarize her findings , but also indicate her further direction of research. Kenneth Janda. The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 2018. X-277 pp. Illustrated, maps, charts, graphs, notes. bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a popular history of the Great War by a retired Professor of Political Science from Northwestern University. It concerns the Slovak peasant Samuel Mozolak from the village of Krajne in the Myjava region and Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef of AustriaHungary. Janda, a Czech-American, was motivated by the British television series Upstairs Downstairs and Downtown Abby to write the story of his Slovak wife's grandfather and his descendants and compare it with that of the second-last Habsburg Emperor. This is an engaging book. In fourteen well-written chapters, Janda traces the fortunes of Franz Josef and Samuel Mozolak from just before the outbreak of the Great War to its end. He traces Mozolak and his wife back to their voyage and marriage in New York City between 1902 and 1906, their return to Slovakia in 1906, where they dropped off their twins with Mozolaks mother and their return to America until 1914, when they once again returned to Slovakia. Soon after Franz Josef decided to declare war upon Serbia in July of 1914, Samuel Mozolak was drafted into the Hungarian 15 th Honved (Home Army) regiment, based in the city of Trencin, fought on the Russian, Romanian and Italian Fronts, and died in the Battle of the Piave on June 19, 1918. Emperor Franz Josef, on the other hand, declared war upon Serbia on July 28 , 1914, in retaliation for the assassination of his neph- SLOVAKIA 2019 135 ew Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist exactly one month earlier. This precipitated the start of the First World War, with the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria supporting the Habsburgs while Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy and Romania opposed them. Since both Austria-Hungary and Germany failed in their objectives to defeat and conquer Serbia and France by December, 1914, they lost the war, Janda concluded, despite the fact that it dragged on for four more years. Jandas account is particularly good in describing the Habsburg armies, their ethnic composition, supplies and materials, and devastating defeats. He points out that the Eastern Front, which is often downplayed by Western historians, actually involved more soldiers than in the West, and counted 1,000,000 more casualties than on the Western Front. Janda concluded that, even though Samuel Mozolak died during the Great War, his family , like his countrymen, made great gains from the war, while the Habsburgs lost everything. By joining with the Czechs in creating the new Republic of Czechoslovakia upon the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Slovaks gained their independence, the use of their language in the public sphere and a democratic government. The Habsburgs, by contrast, lost not only their empire, but their thrones and even the right to live in their homeland, from which they were banned after the war. The descendants of Samuel Mozolak moved to the USA after the war and eventually prospered. Thus, the peasant triumphed over the emperor. Since Janda is not an historian, he made a few unfortunate mistakes, which a good editor should have spotted. Thus, on page 44 he mixed up Greek Catholics (Uniates) with the Orthodox; he mistakenly dated the codification of Slovak to 1852, when it was first codified in 1787 and a second time in 1846 (page 48); he was unaware of the existence of the weekly Slowik v Amerike in New York City before the Great War (page 82); he mistakenly referred to the Austrian province of Galicia as having been in Hungary's northeast region ; and he seemed to be unaware that the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1968, which was still in effect in 1992, allowed for the dissolution of the Republic (page 238). In spite of these shortcomings, The Emperor and the Peasant makes for good reading and the general public will undoubtedly 136 SLOVAKIA 2019 learn a lot from it about Slovak immigration to America, and the Habsburg Empire's decline and fall during the Great War. Janda is to be congratulated for this tribute to the Mozolak famly. John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation. Minneapolis: Kirk House Publishers, 2012. Paper, 424 pages, with illustrations, appendix, index. $24.95 . ISBN 978-1933794-55-6. KENNETH JANDA Emeritus, Northwestern University This book by a Slovak-American immigrant about his ancestors' homeland is remarkably different from others. It reflects life among the Slovak intelligentsia, rather than peasant roots . Both sides of John Palka's family not only belonged to the intelligentsia, but also played major roles in the literary, religious, economic, and political development of the Slovak nation and its people. Palka's book is divided into three parts with a substantial Appendix. Part I recounts his family's two escapes to America, first fleeing Fascism and then Communism. Part II intertwines his family's history with that of Slovakia. Part III resembles a diary, reporting Palka's contemporary connections with his Slovak heritage. His Appendix contains historical information, maps, genealogical charts, a Slovak language pronunciation guide, and thirty pages of color plates- each one keyed to the text. The research is solid and well-documented. In a way, John Palka is the unintentional chronicler of his forefathers. After retiring in 2002 as a distinguishedd Professor of Biology at the University of Washington, he benefitted from the Slovak government's belated recognition of grandfather Milan Hodza's contributions as Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to 1938. The Slovak government invited John as an honored guest to the reburial of his grandfather's remains from Chicago's Bohemian National Cemetery to the Slovak National Cemetery in Martin. Inspiredd by that experience, unintentional benefactor became intentional historian and author of this absorbing volume. Part I begins in 1935-1938 Prague as Hitler exploited the Western powers' appeasement policies and dismembered and annexed the SLOVAKIA 2019 137 Czech part of Czechoslovakia. Palka recounts Prime Minister Hodfa's helplessness as allies deserted hi s country. Drawing from family sources, Palka documents the family trauma that forced them to flee their homeland. Theys fled at midnight by train, despite hi s mother's advanced pregnancy. John was born in Paris in 1939, only two weeks after they escaped from Prague. After eluding the SS for nearly two years in occupied France, Palka's family made its way to neutral Portugal in 1941 , using fake passports. In Lisbon, they managed to board a Pan Am Clipper making one of its last flights from warring Europe to New York. Like the many thou sands of Slovak immigrants before them, the Palkas found it hard to adjust to America. Unlike most other Slovaks, they were well-educated and upper class. In Chicago, his multilingual father (Slovak, French, German, Hungarian) and former business owner in the Slovak leather industry was not employable in the American leather industry because he did not speak English. His work on the assembly line of a Slovak-owned electrical parts manufacturing plant produced little income. As Palka tells it, the arrival of his famous grandfather later in 1941 complicated rather than improved the family situation. Not only was Milan Hodza ill before he arrived, but Czechoslovakia's former Prime Minister clashed with its former President, Edvard Benes. Palka said that they divided over three issues : Hodza's insistence on Slovak autonomy within Czechoslovakia, hi s opposition to Soviet influence in hi s country, and hi s support for a federation of Central Europe. Despite speaking often and widely to emigre groups, Hodza failed to win them over before dyi ng in 1944. Obituaries in major world newspapers praised his life and hi s funeral in Chicago was widely attended. Palka says his family's hopes soared with the end of World War II . By 1946 the family was back in Slovakia and optimistic. Two years later, Communists took over the government, and soon the family again fled Czechoslovakia, this time from Bratislava. Palka was old enough to remember their escape. He described crawling under barbed wire, dodging searchlights, and dashing across a field to freedom in Austria. By the end of the year, the Palkas again found themselves on their way to America, this time to New York. 138 SLOVAKIA 2019 By Palka's account, the family fared better in New York than in Chicago. His mother became a translator for Radio Free Europe, and Johnny quickly learned English. He obtained a scholarship at a small private school in Connecticut before entering Swarthmore College, where he met his future wife, Yvonne. Both went to India to do research, married there, and subsequently earned PhDs in neurosciences at UCLA. They eventually landed in Seattle-John at the University of Washington and Yvonne at Antioch University. During that time, Palka had little contact with Slovaks (other than his parents) except for a trip to Czechoslovakia in 1976, where he re-experienced communist oppression. His last chapter in Part I tells how Palka eventually learned of his father's clandestine activities against the Nazis in Slovakia before fleeing in 1941 to join his family in Paris. Part II is primarily about Slovakia's history but also about the roles played by his maternal and paternal ancestors in that history. The first chapters outline his genealogical connections to the Hodfas and Palkas. Whereas most Slovak immigrants' ancestors were peasants, Palka's were also pastors and craftsmen in an emerging middle class. In three chapters, Palka links the personal lives of two special ancestors with the rise of Slovak nationalism in the mid-19 th century. Through his successful leatherworks business, Palka's great-great grand uncle, Ondrej Palka ( 1800-1877), financed the pastoral and cultural activities of Michal Miloslav Hodfa (1811-1870), a great grand uncle who-along with I:udovit Stur and Josef Miloslav Hurban-helped codify Slovak as a literary language. Michal Miloslav Hodfa also became famous for his revolutionary activities in the 1848 uprising against Magyar rule. Although the Austrian emperor pardoned him for his political activities, Slovak magyarones-those who curried favor with the Hungarian government- stripped Hodfa of his salary, his position, and drove him to the borderland. Long after his death, the Slovak government retrieved his remains for an honored burial in Liptovsky Mikulas, where he served as pastor. Ironically, one speaker at his funeral was his nephew, Milan Hodfa-who later would also die in exile and also be returned to Slovakia for reburial with honor. Palka's chapters about other distant relatives-Michael Miloslav's Hodfa's daughter Marina and the Bella family, kin to Palka's great-grandmother-portray accomplished women, which differs sharply from most accounts of Slovaks living in Austria-Hungary. SLOVAKIA 2019 139 His longest chapter is on grandfather Jan Palka, labeled "the most captivating character" in his family. Inheriting his father's leather business, Jan Palka employed modem manufacturing techniques, and amassed a fortune large enough to own a sumptuous villa with a Bosendoerfer grand piano inside and a tennis court outside. Despite his wealth, he was a utopian socialist who instituted profitsharing, worker participation in management, limited work hours, paid vacations, and children's scholarships. Jan Palka's reforms cut into his company's profits, which also suffered from market losses in Austria-Hungary with the formation of Czechoslovakia. His grandfather lost virtually everything in the Great Depression. Whereas Palka's distant paternal ancestors distinguished themselves in business (and in support of Slovak national causes), his maternal ancestors-the Hodfas- distinguished themselves in "the nation's service"- in Slovak literary, religious, and political activities. Palka ends his chapter, "Four Generations of National Service" sadly, by recounting the high prices the Hodfas paid in jail, persecution, and exile . Palka concludes Part II by returning to grandfather Milan Hodfa, Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister in the mid-1930s . He retraces Hodfa's life from birth, through school, as journalist, during military service, and in politics. Palka's final paragraph says, "And so the story that we began when Milan Hodfa's remains were finally transferred home to his beloved Slovakia, fifty-eight years after his death, is now complete." Part III concludes the book with six chapters providing insight into the author's personal "Slovak awakening." Palka admits to "an emotional experience" each time he returns to the homeland "of a family that has a place in national history." Understandably sentimental, he revisits places and people that played roles in his family's drama, and thus in the nation's history. John Palka assumed the responsibility of documenting his family's life and accomplishments. Not only did he do his duty, but he did it with distinction . 140 SLOVAKIA 2019 Jan Hirka: Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi. Presov: Greckokatolicka teologicka fakulta, 2013. 568 pp. Afterword by Andrej Rusnak. Index, abbreviations, bibliography, photos. DANIEL CERNY Kosice There is a Latin proverb, which probably best fits the review of the book Pod ochranou Marie - Pastier v sluzbe Cirkvi, by the late Bishop of Presov, the Most Reverend Jan Hirka (1923-2014). This proverb is as follows : Verba volant, scripta manent which means "spoken words fly away, written words remain. " History is not only about events and dates, but is also based on great personalities, true leaders, who leave behind them significant imprints and are thus remembered in the hearts of those who knew them . One of the greatest leaders of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in the 20 th century was Bishop Jan Hirka, who served as the Administrator of the then Eparchy of Presov from 1968 to 1989 and then as the resident bishop from 1989 to his retirement in 2002. Bishop Hirka is definitely worth remembering. This autobiography was finished in 2013 and Bishop Hirka gave the first copies to those who came to see him for his jubilee. It was a paradox that the one who was supposed to receive gifts, was distributing them. This book, which is so far the largest vo lume dedicated in Slovak to a single Greek Catholic person, was written towards the end of his life. On the positive side, the book covers almost the comth plete life span of Bishop Hirka, from his youth to his 90 birthday, which also serves as the occasion for its publication. This book deserves to be in the library of every historian who focuses on the life of the Church in 20 th century Central Europe. The title of the book reflects the inscription from the bishop ' s coat of arms of- Under the protection of Mary. Bishop Hirka mentions his devotion to the Mother of God throughout the book. He started to work on the manuscript, with the help of his personal secretary, Father Andrej Rusnak, only after his retirement in 2002. The entire volume is divided into several chapters, which could be summarized into three parts: The first part, which after a description of his early years, focuses on the abolition of the Greek Catholic Church in 1950, his secret pastoral ministry afterwards, his arrest, trial and imprisonment, fol- SLOVAKIA 2019 141 lowed by exile from eastern Slovakia. He then worked as a simple electrician. His description of his imprisonment and the trial in Prague is stunning. So are his memories of prison work in a Czech mine, his time after release, when he was forced to stay outside of eastern Slovakia and needed to earn his daily bread through manual labor. The second part starts with the events of the Prague Spring and rebirth of the Greek Catholic Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia in 1968. At this time Father Hirka was appointed to lead the Greek Catholic Church, but only as an Apostolic Administrator, as his episcopal ordination was not permitted by the communist regime. It contains a detailed list of events and places he visited, texts of several of his sermons and letters, a compilation of newspaper reports, sermons and homilies. The joy of the Prague Spring of 1968 was very quickly replaced with the foreign military invasion and the period of normalization with many restrictions on the religious life of the citizens. The third part follows Hirka, after he was appointed as the Greek Catholic Bishop of Presov, his memorable ordination in the sport hall of Presov, attended by bishops from all over the world and thousands of the faithful. The papal visit in 1995 to Presov and the beatification of Bishop Gojdic in 2001 are among the highlights of this time. This was a period of increased apostolic activity and marvelous building projects, where people were happy to see their Church free. Among the greatest successes dear to the heart of Bishop Hirka was the reestablishment of the Seminary and of the Theological faculty , which was accomplished in 1990, but for which he struggled from 1968. Bishop Hirka lived long enough to see many important changes in Slovak society at the end of the 20 th century. The Velvet Revolution in 1989 and the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1993 were important and affected the life of the Church. In 1996 a special Exarchate was created for Greek Catholics in the Czech Republic, who formerly belonged to the Eparchy in Presov, and in 1997 the Exarchate of Kosice was erected, creating a second Greek Catholic jurisdiction in Slovakia. All this led to the elevation of the Church to Metropolitan status, for which Bishop Hirka worked, and was able to see it happen (even though already in retirement) in 2008. Any reader of this book, who has at least some knowledge about 142 SLOVAKIA 2019 the history of the Greek Catholic Church in the former CzechoSlovakia, might feel at the end a bit perplexed. While the first part, speaking about the life and deeds of the young boy, later seminarian and young priest is absolutely stunning, the second and third parts following the path of Father Hirka, who became in 1968 Apostolic Administrator of the Eparchy of Presov and later a bishop--do not possess the quality of the first part. Many of the author's personal decisions, or inner opinions are omitted or hidden. Thus many conflicts or problems, which were publicly known, are not even mentioned. The book gives several wrong impressions. One of them is that the 1990's were a period of complete happiness and zeal. To a certain extent yes, but there were also several problems. It is wellknown that the author's personal relations with his former auxiliary and later Exarch of Kosice, the Most Reverend Milan Chautur, were after an initial period, not very positive, and this resulted in many strange situations, like the fact that, for a time the auxiliary bishop was denied the post of Vicar-General, but was instead appointed to administer a parish himself1 The reader does not need to know everything, but to pretend that there was no problem at all in an autobiography of more than 500 pages is a serious mistake and an injustice to its readers. There is also no mention of two additional phenomena. For instance, the priests of Zemplin lobbied for a second bishopric in Slovakia (the Exarchate of Kosice), which was another unpleasant surprise for Hirka. We know from other documents and publications that these efforts date back to December of 1989. There is also silence regarding those who, during the communist era were secretly ordained, including bishops of the underground church. This phenomenon was common to the Church in the former Czecho-Slovakia. Another negative example is the omission of several personalities who became legends. Among them was Father Jifi Novotny SJ, a Jesuit, who came in the early l 990's to help at the Theological Faculty in Presov and more than ten years after his departure everyone remembered stories about him. He taught numerous subjects, all of them on a very high level, thanks to his knowledge of several languages, his academic background and unique personality. In a book of more than 500 pages this is a serious omission. Yet, the overall impression is positive, as there is no other book SLOVAKIA 2019 143 which could be compared to this one. Since Bishop Hirka was initially reluctant to put anything on paper, one has to admire the huge work done by Father Andrej Rusnak. To be fair, one has to say that Bishop Hirka was tired, almost exhausted, especially due to constant fighting with the communist authorities . But this is also one of the negatives of the book. It started to be written very late in the life of Bishop Jan, thus reducing several events and some details and depending too much on his declining health. Approximately 150 photos add great value to the book, as does a special chapter on the beatification of the new-martyrs P. P. Gojdic and B. Hopko, which were started in 1985 in the USA, but after the fall of the Iron Curtain transferred to the Eparchy of Presov. Resumes in several languages are a great plus, as is the final word by the editor, Father Andrej Rusnak. Thanks also to Father Marek Petro, who helped to finalize the creation of the book, and who provided footnotes to the text. The register of names will be appreciated by all. As Bishop Hirka wrote in the Preface, the famous professor and Roman Catholic priest Stefan Hlavac inspired him to write his memoirs. The latter said that if other nations had lived through such turbulent times, many books, plays and scholarly works would already be published. This book tries to fill this gap and offers a structured and detailed (although not perfect) account of events and deeds of one of the greatest personalities of the Greek Catholics in Slovakia the late Bishop Jan Hirka. Machacek, Michal. Gustav Husak. Praha: Vysehrad, 2017 . 631 pp. Notes, bibliography, photographs and index. JOZEFHYRJA Heidelberg University In order to understand the most rigid period of Czechoslovak history in the 20 th century, we need to know the person who was behind the so-called "normalization." For two decades Gustav Husak (19131991) represented cultural and economic stagnation, restrictions, repressions and an omnipresent fear in the population of that state. 144 SLOVAKIA 2019 Written by the young Czech historian Michal Machacek, this is the first complete biography of the long-time Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the country ' s last communist President. The author covered Husak's life from his birth in the little Slovak village of Dubravka (now part of the capital city Bratislava), until his death as a lonely, defeated and forgotten former communist leader. Machacek did extensive research in archives in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Canada, the USA and Russia, where he discovered new documents. His research led him to the private archives of Husak' s relatives, their oral testimonies and the reminiscences of his contemporaries. He worked on this monograph for almost ten years, which thus became one of the most anticipated books by Slovak and Czech historians. The biography consists of seven chapters listed in chronological order, which provide a detailed insight into the development of Husak's political career as well as his private life. Machacek was influenced neither by Marxist historiography nor by the dissident discourse, which tends to be too emotionally involved in anti-communist views. He represents a new generation of historians, not burdened by the shadows of the past. The result is an objective and wellbalanced biography. Despite coming from a Czech cultural environment, Machacek, is well-acquainted with contemporary Slovak realities, nationalist sentiments, national demands towards the government in Prague and with Slovak historiography. This asset, often lacking in Czech academic discourse, is important for understanding the complicated relations between the Slovak and Czech nations in their common state and it is definitely valuable to understanding Husak's role and involvement in the federalization of Czechoslovakia (January 1, 1969). The narrative's strongest part, the first chapter entitled Young Radical 1913-1938 (pp. 27-96), describes the interwar period, when Gustav Husak lived and studied in Bratislava. Machacek managed to accurately reconstruct those years of his life and he presents a very plastic image--not only of Husak's youth and activities--but also of Slovak intellectual life in Bratislava between the two World Wars and the development of the communist movement. However, he was part of the Slovak intellectual milieu not only in the communist scene but also in the wider spectrum, which included other political and non-political groups. Machacek emphasized the connections and SLOVAKIA 2019 145 friendships Husak developed, which helped him on many future occasions. One out of many listed in the book was his friendship with the distinguished Slovak economist Imrich Karvas , who was Husak's professor at Comenius University in Bratislava. Husak attended his lectures and seminars and Karvas grew fond of his student. From this moment "their relationship grew in importance during World War II, when Karvas, now as Governor of the Slovak National Bank, many times helped Husak escape his troubles" (p. 72). An impressive element of Machacek's work is that he skilfully links politics, often on the highest level, with Husak's private life. He provides an interesting insight into Husak's relationship with his second wife Viera, who had a significant influence on his personality as well as his decision-making. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chnoupek, recalled how "Husak in general didn 't like official state visits, but precisely because of the initiative of Viera Husakova they, for example, managed to organize( ... ) a state visit to India, or the following June 1977 to Iraq" (pp. 460-61 ). After the tragic death of his wife in a helicopter crash, it appeared "as if [Husak had] lost his supporter and the visits ceased" (p. 461 ). Where the author could have been more specific and could have developed his arguments more, are the details about Husak's relations with the Church in the 1970s. Before that date, Machacek describes exhaustively not only Husak's attitude towards religion, but also that of his parents and his Catholic family background. However, in 1977, when Pope Paul VI elevated the Archdiocese of Tmava to metropolitan status (under the communist regime!), Machacek does not sufficiently explain Husak's role in this process. The creation of the Archdiocese was an important milestone in the history of Slovakia, which could have been examined in more detail, especially from the point of view church-state relations, but the author dedicates only one sentence to it (p. 466). Despite some minor unintentional factual errors, the overall impression of the book is favorable . The author provides the reader with a complete picture of the longest-serving Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It contains a wealth of new information and gives the reader an interesting insight not only into the political, but also the personal level. Machacek's grasp of the 146 SLOVAKIA 2019 topic is excellent, with more than 2,300 footnotes and an extensive bibliography at the end of the monograph. His book is very readable and contrary to a significant number of preceding scholarly works, it is objective and a valuable contribution to the study of the communist regimes in Central Europe.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Tünde Lengyelová, Život na šľachtickom dvore (Peter Máriássy), p. 133</li> <li>Kenneth Janda, The Emperor and the Peasant: Two Men at the Start of the Great War and End of the Habsburg Empire (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 134</li> <li>John Palka, My Slovakia, My Family: One Family's Role in the Birth of a Nation (Kenneth Janda), p. 136</li> <li>Ján Hirka, Pod ochranou Márie - Pastier v službe Cirkvi (Daniel Černý), p. 140</li> <li>Michal Macháček, Gustáv Husák (Jozef Hyrja), p. 143</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Černý. Daniel Hyrja, Jozef Janda, Kenneth Máriássy, Peter Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/56ea22ad8d0078dc9b4b9c7da02c584a.pdf 12ef72988562beccc44139ee467ae92e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 147 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN (Ph.D., Florida State University), is an independent scholar in Florida. He is co-author (with Joseph Stefka) of The National Slovak Society, a JOO Year History, 18901990 (Pittsburgh, 1990) as well as articles in popular and scholarly journals. MICHAEL CUDE (Ph.D. , Colorado) is an Assistant Professor in the history department at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas. He does research on Central and Eastern Europe and transatlantic migration, particularly on transatlantic Slovak national identity. FRANK HENSCHEL (Ph.D. , University of Leipzig) wrote his dissertation on multilingualism and magyarization in Kassa/Kosice in the period of dualism in Hungary, and it was published by the Collegium Carolinum in 2017. He is now doing post-doctoral research on the biopolitics of childhood in socialist Czehoslovakia at the University of Kiel. PETR KUBIK (Ph.D., Charles University, Prague) is an independent historian in the Czech Republic who focuses on the Second World War and Czechs and Slovaks in exile. He has published books on Soviet War Crimes (Prague, 2003) and Slovak-Italian Relationships, 1939-1945 (Bratislava, 2009). ELLEN L. PAUL (Ph.D. , University of Kansas), is an Associate Professor of History at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado, where she teaches modem European history. �148 SLOVAKIA 2019 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles wi ll be sent to an outside reader for evaluation . Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unso li cited book reviews are not encouraged. ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko st 1 Vice President Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3'd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson, Stephanie Seigel, John A. Holy, Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann. M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � SLOVAKIA 2019 147 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN (Ph.D., Florida State University), is an independent scholar in Florida. He is co-author (with Joseph Stefka) of The National Slovak Society, a JOO Year History, 18901990 (Pittsburgh, 1990) as well as articles in popular and scholarly journals. MICHAEL CUDE (Ph.D. , Colorado) is an Assistant Professor in the history department at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas. He does research on Central and Eastern Europe and transatlantic migration, particularly on transatlantic Slovak national identity. FRANK HENSCHEL (Ph.D. , University of Leipzig) wrote his dissertation on multilingualism and magyarization in Kassa/Kosice in the period of dualism in Hungary, and it was published by the Collegium Carolinum in 2017. He is now doing post-doctoral research on the biopolitics of childhood in socialist Czehoslovakia at the University of Kiel. PETR KUBIK (Ph.D., Charles University, Prague) is an independent historian in the Czech Republic who focuses on the Second World War and Czechs and Slovaks in exile. He has published books on Soviet War Crimes (Prague, 2003) and Slovak-Italian Relationships, 1939-1945 (Bratislava, 2009). ELLEN L. PAUL (Ph.D. , University of Kansas), is an Associate Professor of History at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado, where she teaches modem European history. �148 SLOVAKIA 2019 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles wi ll be sent to an outside reader for evaluation . Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unso li cited book reviews are not encouraged. ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko st 1 Vice President Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3'd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson, Stephanie Seigel, John A. Holy, Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann. M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 147 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN (Ph.D., Florida State University), is an independent scholar in Florida. He is co-author (with Joseph Stefka) of The National Slovak Society, a JOO Year History, 18901990 (Pittsburgh, 1990) as well as articles in popular and scholarly journals. MICHAEL CUDE (Ph.D. , Colorado) is an Assistant Professor in the history department at Schreiner University in Kerrville, Texas. He does research on Central and Eastern Europe and transatlantic migration, particularly on transatlantic Slovak national identity. FRANK HENSCHEL (Ph.D. , University of Leipzig) wrote his dissertation on multilingualism and magyarization in Kassa/Kosice in the period of dualism in Hungary, and it was published by the Collegium Carolinum in 2017. He is now doing post-doctoral research on the biopolitics of childhood in socialist Czehoslovakia at the University of Kiel. PETR KUBIK (Ph.D., Charles University, Prague) is an independent historian in the Czech Republic who focuses on the Second World War and Czechs and Slovaks in exile. He has published books on Soviet War Crimes (Prague, 2003) and Slovak-Italian Relationships, 1939-1945 (Bratislava, 2009). ELLEN L. PAUL (Ph.D. , University of Kansas), is an Associate Professor of History at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado, where she teaches modem European history. 148 SLOVAKIA 2019 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles wi ll be sent to an outside reader for evaluation . Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unso li cited book reviews are not encouraged. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko st 1 Vice President Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2 nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3'd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson, Stephanie Seigel, John A. Holy, Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann. M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83) Description An account of the resource includes Contributors; Guidelines for Manuscripts Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/14e533e17dbaf61aa52c3879dc28ee80.pdf 334a3f974c44765c01acae8e2bd879da PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA 2017 VOLUME XLIII NUMBERS 80-81 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERTK . EVANSON University of Missouri I MICHAEL NOV AK I American Enterprise Institute JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES More Slovaks in the U.S. than Czechs? Who Says? When and Where? Kenneth Janda ..... ..... .... .... ... ..... ........ ... .. ...... ...... ... ........................ 7 A Survey of Slovak Communities of the Byzantine Rite in Canada before they Received their Own Bishopric Daniel Cerny .. ... .... ... .. .. ...... ... .... ..... .. ... ........ ..... ... ... ..... ... ..... ..... .. 28 The Slovak Army on the Eastern Front During World War II Jan Rychlik ...... ................... ...... ... ... .... .... .. ....... ...... ... ... ........ ....... 61 Kicked Out: Czechoslovakia' s Postwar Policy Toward Ethnic Minorities and its Unintended Outcomes Marty Manor Mullins ....... .......... .... ... ......... .......... ............... ....... 81 Invoking the Nation, Strengthening Devotion: National Discourse at the Slovak National Pilgrimage Alexander Bie/icky ........ ................................... .. ...... .. .......... .... 105 LITERATURE Siberia: A Slovak Folk Tale R. Vladimir Baumgarten ..... ....... ...... ... ....... .................. ............ 133 REVIEWS Jozef Klempa, Maje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. M Mark Stolarik .......... .. .. ...... ........... ..... .......................... ........ 151 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova, Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Jan Lanicek .. .. .... ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .......... .. ............................. .... .. .... 152 �4 SLOVAKIA-2017 Paul Robert Magosci, With Their Backs to the Mountains. Keith P. Dyrud ......... ........ ......................................................... 156 Valerian Bystricky, Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu. Gregory C. Ference ......... .... .................................... .. ........... .... 15 8 Pal'o Carnogursky, Suboj s komunizmom. Jan Rychlik ..... .. ................................... ............................. ....... . 161 James Krapfl , Revolution with a human Face. Jura) Hocman ....... .................................................................... 166 Contributors ........................................... .... ..... ..... ........... ............... .. 169 Guidelines for Manuscripts .............. ............................................ ... 171 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA 2017 VOLUME XLIII NUMBERS 80-81 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERTK . EVANSON University of Missouri I MICHAEL NOV AK I American Enterprise Institute JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES More Slovaks in the U.S. than Czechs? Who Says? When and Where? Kenneth Janda ..... ..... .... .... ... ..... ........ ... .. ...... ...... ... ........................ 7 A Survey of Slovak Communities of the Byzantine Rite in Canada before they Received their Own Bishopric Daniel Cerny .. ... .... ... .. .. ...... ... .... ..... .. ... ........ ..... ... ... ..... ... ..... ..... .. 28 The Slovak Army on the Eastern Front During World War II Jan Rychlik ...... ................... ...... ... ... .... .... .. ....... ...... ... ... ........ ....... 61 Kicked Out: Czechoslovakia' s Postwar Policy Toward Ethnic Minorities and its Unintended Outcomes Marty Manor Mullins ....... .......... .... ... ......... .......... ............... ....... 81 Invoking the Nation, Strengthening Devotion: National Discourse at the Slovak National Pilgrimage Alexander Bie/icky ........ ................................... .. ...... .. .......... .... 105 LITERATURE Siberia: A Slovak Folk Tale R. Vladimir Baumgarten ..... ....... ...... ... ....... .................. ............ 133 REVIEWS Jozef Klempa, Maje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. M Mark Stolarik .......... .. .. ...... ........... ..... .......................... ........ 151 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova, Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Jan Lanicek .. .. .... ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .......... .. ............................. .... .. .... 152 �4 SLOVAKIA-2017 Paul Robert Magosci, With Their Backs to the Mountains. Keith P. Dyrud ......... ........ ......................................................... 156 Valerian Bystricky, Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu. Gregory C. Ference ......... .... .................................... .. ........... .... 15 8 Pal'o Carnogursky, Suboj s komunizmom. Jan Rychlik ..... .. ................................... ............................. ....... . 161 James Krapfl , Revolution with a human Face. Jura) Hocman ....... .................................................................... 166 Contributors ........................................... .... ..... ..... ........... ............... .. 169 Guidelines for Manuscripts .............. ............................................ ... 171 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA 2017 VOLUME XLIII NUMBERS 80-81 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERTK . EVANSON University of Missouri I MICHAEL NOV AK I American Enterprise Institute JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to the editor at 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca Table of Contents ARTICLES More Slovaks in the U.S. than Czechs? Who Says? When and Where? Kenneth Janda ..... ..... .... .... ... ..... ........ ... .. ...... ...... ... ........................ 7 A Survey of Slovak Communities of the Byzantine Rite in Canada before they Received their Own Bishopric Daniel Cerny .. ... .... ... .. .. ...... ... .... ..... .. ... ........ ..... ... ... ..... ... ..... ..... .. 28 The Slovak Army on the Eastern Front During World War II Jan Rychlik ...... ................... ...... ... ... .... .... .. ....... ...... ... ... ........ ....... 61 Kicked Out: Czechoslovakia' s Postwar Policy Toward Ethnic Minorities and its Unintended Outcomes Marty Manor Mullins ....... .......... .... ... ......... .......... ............... ....... 81 Invoking the Nation, Strengthening Devotion: National Discourse at the Slovak National Pilgrimage Alexander Bie/icky ........ ................................... .. ...... .. .......... .... 105 LITERATURE Siberia: A Slovak Folk Tale R. Vladimir Baumgarten ..... ....... ...... ... ....... .................. ............ 133 REVIEWS Jozef Klempa, Maje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. M Mark Stolarik .......... .. .. ...... ........... ..... .......................... ........ 151 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova, Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Jan Lanicek .. .. .... ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .......... .. ............................. .... .. .... 152 4 SLOVAKIA-2017 Paul Robert Magosci, With Their Backs to the Mountains. Keith P. Dyrud ......... ........ ......................................................... 156 Valerian Bystricky, Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu. Gregory C. Ference ......... .... .................................... .. ........... .... 15 8 Pal'o Carnogursky, Suboj s komunizmom. Jan Rychlik ..... .. ................................... ............................. ....... . 161 James Krapfl , Revolution with a human Face. Jura) Hocman ....... .................................................................... 166 Contributors ........................................... .... ..... ..... ........... ............... .. 169 Guidelines for Manuscripts .............. ............................................ ... 171 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d3aa6fe4c51573bc23c71490b485e7e8.pdf b5bb0c6a3fd49ab79860c5e6af26aeff PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA-2017 7 MORE SLOVAKS IN THE U.S. THAN CZECHS? WHO SAYS? WHEN AND WHERE? 1 Kenneth Janda Born in Chicago, Illinois, I am a third-generation Czech-American married to a second-generation Slovak-American, born Anna Mozolak in New York City. Ann's grandfather, Samuel Mozolak, is the peasant in my forthcoming book, The Emperor and the Peasant: The Start of the Great War and End of a Great Empire. 2 The emperor is, of course, Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary. The peasant, Samuel Mozolak, lived in Krajne, a Slovak village in Hungary, the eastern half of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Although they never met, Franz Joseph's life profoundly affected Samuel's. It is inconceivable that the peasant ever did anything to harm the emperor, but the emperor, did much to harm him. By declaring war against Serbia, Franz Joseph personally made the decision that led to Samuel's death. So began World War I, innocently known then as the Great War-the war to end all wars. Franz Joseph resided in his Austrian palaces and visited Hungary as little as possible. Living in different places and with no common acquaintances, the two men traveled together on non-intersecting paths toward World War I. The story about Franz Joseph is based entirely on historical records. Samuel Mozolak's story is based on family documents, histories of Slovaks in Hungary, reports of Slovaks emigrating to the United States, immigrants' personal accounts, and novels of the era. His story threads together the description of Slovaks' lives as subjects in Hungary and as immigrants in America. Chapter 1 begins the emperor's story, which continues over the odd-numbered chapters. Chapter 2 and subsequent even-numbered 1 Revision of a paper prepared for delivery at the 28th World Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts & Sciences (SVU),Vysoka skola zdravotnictva a socialnej prace, sv. Alzbety, Bratislava, Slovakia, September 1-4, 2016 ,_M. Mark Stolarik improved this paper with several useful suggestions . 2 Forthcoming in 2017 by McFarland Books, Box 611 , Jefferson, NC 28640, http: //www.mcfarlandbooks.com �8 SLOVAKIA-2017 chapters tell about the Slovak peasant who crossed the ocean at twenty years of age to work in New York City and who returned to Slovakia in time to serve the emperor. Those chapters also tell why hundreds of thousands of Slovaks fled the empire, how they traveled to the United States, and where they settled. In writing my manuscript, I learned far more about Ann's Slovak heritage than I did about my own Czech family background. My mother and father were first-generation bilingual Bohemians who impressed on me-who foolishly resisted learning Czech- that I was Bohemian too. I attended many events in Chicago's numerous Sokol halls, but I do not recall my parents ever saying that they had Slovak friends or even talking about Slovaks. When I met Ann Mozo lak in graduate school at Indiana University, she was the first genuine Slovak-American that I ever recall meeting. So imagine my surprise when I learned that the 1990 Census found 1.9 million United States residents professing Slovak ancestry compared with about 1.3 claiming Czech roots, whi le approximately 315,000 considering themselves "Czechoslovaks." How could that be? Did more Slovaks than Czechs really immigrate to the United States? What's the evidence? When did the immigration waves occur? Where did the Czechs and Slovaks settle in America? How could it be that I do not remember m~eting any Slovaks in Chicago? These are questions that I grappled with while writing The Emperor and the Peasant, and ones addressed more comprehensively in this paper. Anyone researching Czech and Slovak emigration from Austria-Hungary to the United States during the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20 th century encounters several facts: 1. Statistics on emigration from Austria-Hungary and immigra3 tion to the United States are seriously incomplete. Emigration statistics from Austria-Hungary had to be compiled from fragmentary government data on exit permits and from 4 more complete data on ships sailing from European ports. Immigration data in the United States came almost completely from 3 See Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volume I: Statistics (Washington: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), 55. 4 Wilcox, 89-90. �SLOVAKIA-2017 9 5 passenger lists of ship companies. 2. Over the years, the United States defined "immigrant" diff erently . From 1820 to 1867, data were reported for alien passengers ; from 1868 to 1900 for alien immigrants-those who intended to reside in the U.S. (including only third class passengers, not first or second class, until 1903); after 1906 for immigrant aliens admitted, excluding "all aliens admitted who avowed an intention not to settle in the United States, and all returning to resume domiciles formerly acquired in this country. 11 6 3. The U.S. Census Bureau did not separately classify residents fro m Austria-Hungary as Czechs or Slovaks until 1910, when it began asking p eople of ''foreign stock" about their "mother tongue." That year, Slovak leaders persuaded President Taft and Congress to add "mother tongue" to the 1910 Census a month before 7 it took the field on April 15. The Bureau hastily trained censustakers in asking people of foreign stock for their mother tongue-"that is, the language of customary speech in the home prior to immigration." "Foreign stock" included "the foreign-born white, the native white of foreign parentage (both parents foreign born), and the native white of mixed parentage (one parent native and the other foreign born).118 4. In 1924, the U. S. Congress imposed quotas on immigrants fro m central and southern Europe, which drastically reduced the number from the former Austria-Hungary. Whereas from 1904 to 1911 , Austria-Hungary accounted for 28 percent of millions of immigrants who poured into the United Sta9 tes, Congress set the 1925 immigration quota at only 785 for Austria 5 Wilcox, 374. Ibid. 7 Konstant in Cul en, Dejiny Slowikov v Amerike (Bratislava: Slovak League Publishing House, 1942) was translated by Daniel C. Necas and published as History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society International, 2007), 329-33. 8 Fifteenth Census of the United States - 1930 - Population, Vo lume JI: General Report, Statistics by Subject (Washington: U.S . Bureau of the Census, 1933), Chapter 6, p. 263 . 9 Willcox, Walter F. (ed.), International Migrations, Vo lum e JI: Interpretations (Washington: Nati onal Bureau of Economic Research, I 93 1), 400. 6 �10 SLOVAKIA-2017 10 and 473 for Hungary. 5. In 1930, the U.S. Census Bureau switched from asking residents of ''foreign stock" about their mother tongue to asking it only of residents who were ''foreign born." The 1930 Census reported 38,727,693 of foreign stock but only 13 ,366,407 foreign born-about one-third as many. These facts complicated estimating the numbers of Czech and Slovak immigrants to the United States. Historical Trend oflmmigration from Austria-Hungary, 1869-1924 What do we know generally about immigration from AustriaHungary? Imre Ferenczi in 1925 supervised an international effort in Europe at collecting migration data that was published in 1929 in the 11 United States under the general editorship of Walter F. Willcox. Thanks to that source, we have detailed estimates for Austro-Hungarian immigration to the United States by year from 1869 to 1924and often by country within the empire. These data are presented in Figure 1, which reports the place of origin for years when available. Certain years are marked by pronounced surges in immigration. The researchers contended that these surges coincided more with views of good economic ref otts in America than with poor conditions in Austria-Hungary. 1 Felix Klez! wrote, "There was a striking parallelism between Austrian emigration and the economic conditions in the United States," while Gustav Thirring said, "In Hungary, American business conditions also were of decisive influence." The data extend beyond the end of the empire to 1924, after which U.S. national quotas throttled the flow of immigrants. According to the data in Figure 1, immigration from Austria and Bohemia long preceded any substantial immigration from Hungary. 10 Ibid. , 410 and 433 . See Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volum e I: Statistics and International Migrations (Washington: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929). 12 Felix Klez!, "Austria," in Willcox, Volum e !I, p. 403 ; and Gustave Thirring, "Hungarian Migration of Modern Times," in Willcox, Volum e 11, p. 411 . 11 �11 SLOVAKIA-2017 Figure 1: Austro-Hungarian Immigration by Place of Origin, 1869-1924 350,000 300,000 Czechoslovakia 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 1874 1879 1884 1889 1894 1899 1904 1909 1914 191 9 1924 SOURCE: Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volum e I: Statistics (Washington : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), Tables II and III, pp. 384-393. Anecdotal evidence tells of Czechs immigrating earlier. Czech historian Stephanie Saxon-Ford said, "Bohemian intellectuals who had participated in the nationalist revival of the 1840s and 1850s . .. left their homeland by the score to escape the repression of Hapsburg �12 SLOVAKIA-2017 13 rule." By 1850 about 500 members of the Czech intelligentsiadoctors, professors, composers, and journalists-immigrated to the United States, and Czechs formed the Cesko-Slovanska Podporujici Spolecnost, or C.S.P.S., (the Czech-Slavic Protective Society) in St. 14 Louis in 1854. Furthermore, in volume II of International Migration, Felix Klez! referred to substantial immigration of Bohemians to California sparked by news of the 1849 gold strike. He wrote, "The movement was confined almost entirely to Bohemia. Of the 58,000 emigrants who registered in the years 1850-68, not less than 15 44,000, or 76 per cent, were from Bohemia. The evidence is less clear about emigration from Hungary after its 1848-49 revolution. Gustav Thirring said that any Hungarian arrivals in the United States before 1861 were "not treated in American statistics as immigration," saying "the first two immigrants from 16 Hungary being reported in 1861." Although Gregory Ference noted that a Slovak named Andrej Jelik arrived in the mid-1 s1h century and that Slovaks immigrated more frequently by the 1850s, "these immigrants usually were isolated cases ... . The beginnings of the mass 17 migration started around 1880." John Kosa agreed that Hungarian emigration was small prior to 1880, but then: "In the period from 1886 to 1890 an average of 22,000 persons left the country annually 18 for overseas, and the trend was increasing." Kosa continued: The total number of emigrants who left Hungary in the period from 1850 to 1920 is variously estimated as being between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000; the overseas emigration alone can be put between 2,200,000 13 Stephanie Saxon-Ford, The Czech Americans (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989), p. 47. 14 Gregory C. Ference, Sixteen months of indecision: Slovak American Viewpoints toward Compatriots and the Homeland from I 9 I 4 to I 915 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania. (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1995), 36. 15 Felix Klez! , "Austria," in Willcox, Volume 11, 399. 16 Gustave Thirring, "Hungarian Migration of Modern Times," in Willcox, Volum e II, 411. 17 Gregory C. Ference, "Slovak Immigration to the United States in Light of American, Czech, and Slovak History," Nebraska. History, 74 (Fall/Winter 1993): 13035 at p. 131. 18 John Kosa, "A Century of Hungarian Emigration, I 850-1950," The American Slavic and East European Review, 16 (December, I 957) : 501-514 at 504. �13 SLOVAKIA-2017 and 2,600,000 persons. For several reasons it seems to be almost impossible to reach an exact figure or to tie in the Hungarian data with the statistical figures supplied by the different countries of immigration. Thirring found that 98.5 percent of the overseas Hungarian emigrants went to the United States. 19 He estimated total Hungarian emigration from 1898 to 1913 at 1,391,000, of which 31 percent (432,000) were Slovaks. Thirring also stated, "[E]migration from Hungary was almost entirely Slovak during the early years, 1120 and from 1905 to 1913, Slovaks still had the highest emigration rate of all Hungarians- 98 .2 per 1,000. That was more than three times the Magyar rate and amounted to almost 10 percent of the Slovak popu. m . Hungary. 21 1atlon U.S. Census Data on Czechs and Slovaks in America What do U.S. Census data tell about Czech and Slovak presence in America? The evidence above in Figure 1 implies three conclusions: (1) Substantial Czech immigration from Austria-Hungary began in the 1850s; (2) Substantial Slovak immigration from AustriaHungary began later, in the 1880s; therefore (3) many thousands of Czech immigrants settled in the United States at least a full generation before comparable numbers of Slovaks. Moreover, those Czechs immigrants gave birth to many more thousands of Czech-Americans. It is not surprising that the 1910 Census reported far more residents of Czech "foreign stock" than Slovak. Those data are reported in Figure 2. Figure 2: 1910 U.S. Census of Foreign Stock: Czechs and Slovaks 1910 ~ - ~ 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 531 ,193 I I I 600,000 700,000 However, the very next census of foreign stock in 1920 revealed 19 Thirring, 419. Thirring, 424. 21 Thirring, 426. 20 �14 SLOVAKIA-2017 the surprising-even astounding- fact that the number of Slovaks in America was virtually tied with the number of Czechs! In just ten short years between the two Census counts, the number of Slovak residents in the United States jumped more than 338,000- an increase greater than all Slovaks counted in the 1910 Census. Moreover, this enormous increase occurred despite the nearly complete shutdown of immigration during the four-and-a-half years of World War I, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 3: 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses of Foreign Stock: Czechs and Slovaks What accounted for the huge increase in Slovaks between the 1910 and 1920 Censuses? Recall that Slovak leaders succeeded in adding the "mother tongue" question to the 1910 Census just one month before the count began. A U.S. Census website states: "Because the questionnaires had already been printed, enumerators were instructed to add this information to column 12 (birthplace) of the 22 form." The census-takers- many of whom were unfamiliar with Slavic groups in central Europe- had trouble recording responses to the question. That was admitted in the explanatory text of the I 920 Census, which stated that "contrary to the instructions given the enumerators" some persons who said they were 'Slavs,' 'Slavic,' 'Slavish," or 'Slavonian,' ... should doubtless have been reported as Slovak or Slovenian." 23 Apparently, the census-takers had less trouble accurately recording responses from Czechs or Bohemians, who had started settling in the United States sixty years earlier, had quickly affected American life, and were widely recognized. The Czech-Slavic Protective Society was founded in 1854; Budweiser Beer was imported in 1871 (Bohemian Crystal even earlier); and Antonin Dvorak wrote his New 22 U. S. Census, "History," at https: //www.census.gov/history/www/through the decades/overview/ 19 I O.htm I. 23 U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, Volum e II: General Report and Analytical Tables (Washington, DC : 1921), Chapter 12, p. 968. �15 SLOVAKIA-2017 World Symphony in 1893 . The Slovak newcomers were not known to Americarls for their beer, their crystal, or their symphonies. Slovaks were not generally familiar to Europeans either. In 1916, according to MacMillan, Britain's Prime Minister Lloyd George (not known to be up on his geography) asked, "Who are the Slovaks? I can't seem 24 to place them. " So the leap in Slovak speakers in 1920 appears to have come from better field procedures returning a more accurate count. Additional evidence that the 1910 Census erred in counting Slovaks comes from the 1930 Census, which switched to ask the "mother tongue" question of those only who were "foreign born." Retaining the original data from the two earlier Censuses, the Bureau of the Census in 1930 recalculated its 1910 and 1920 data to report as well on "foreign born." Later Censuses to 1970 continued asking those foreign born for their mother tongue. The full set of relevant data are portrayed in Figure 4. Figure 4: Slovak and Czech as "Mother Tongue" in Censuses, 1910-1970 700 ,000 Mother Tongues of Foreign Stock 619,866 600,000 S lovak S tock 500,000 Czech S tock S lovak Born 400 ,000 - Czech Born 274,948 300 ,000 200 ,000 166,474 100 ,000 Mother Tongue• of Foreign Born 70,564 O + - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - ~ - - - , - - - - - - - , - - - - - r -- - - - , 1910 1920 1930 1 940 1950 1960 1970 U.S . Census Bureau, "Mother Tongue of the Foreign-Born Population: 1910 to 1940, 1960, and 1970," (March 9, 1999), at https://www.census.go~opulation/www/documentation/twps0029/tab06.html. Figure 4 shows a much smaller difference between foreign born 24 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2002), 42 . �16 SLOVAKIA-2017 Czech or Slovak speakers and those of foreign stock. Czech immigration, which occurred earlier, certainly accounted for the preponderance of Czech foreign stock. Given the flawed nature of the 1910 count of Slovak speakers, one wonders whether the Bureau of the Census in 1930 corrected the counts of Slovak speakers when recalculating the 1910 data. In any event, Figure 4 clearly shows that in every Census from I 920 through 1970 there were more Slovak than Czech speakers among the foreign born. Because the 1920s immigration quotas virtually ended mass immigration of both Czechs and Slovaks, the downward slope of the mother tongue lines for both languages reflects the mortality rates of the foreign born. Other Data on Czech and Slovak Immigration to America As noted, the U.S. Census has severe shortcomings concerning Czech and Slovak ethnicity prior to World War I. Fortunately, there were other sources of information on immigration to the United States prior to the 1930s, and these were consulted in preparing the two-volumes of International Migrations. Imre Ferenczi, chief of the Migration Section of the International Labour Office in Geneva, wrote, The statistics for the United States have been compiled in European libraries supplemented by all the important American publications, including Bromwell, Young, the Monthly Summary of Comm erce and Finance for the United States and the Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration. With the assistance of the numerous documents which have been collected, the present series of American migration statistics is probably more nearly complete than any heretofore published in the United States . 25 Thanks to these additional sources, Volume I of International Migrations printed a twelve-page table on the "Distribution of Immi26 grant Aliens Admitted, by Sex and Race or People, 1899-1924." This remarkable table counted immigrants in forty different categories, including separate lines for "Bohemian and Moravian" and 25 Imre Ferenczi , "International Migration Statistics" in Willcox, International Mi- f[ ations, Volume I, 59. 6 - International Migrations, Volume !: Statistics, Table X, 432-43. �SLOVAKIA-2017 17 "Slovak." These data, rarely reported in accounts of Czech and Slovak immigration, were extracted for presentation in Figure 5. Figure 5: Czech and Slovak Immigrants to the U.S., 1899-1924 60 ,000 Slovak lmmlgranta: 524,348 total 52,368 50,000 40 ,000 36,934 38,221 32,41 6 Source: International Migrations, Vo lume I: Statistics, Table X, 432-43. Summing the annual data in Figure 5 over 26 years results in 524,348 Slovak versus 150,294 Czech immigrants arriving from 1899 through 1924. These annual counts are reassuringly consistent with Figure 1's data on annual immigration from Austria-Hungary, as Figure S's spikes in immigration for 1905-07, 1910, and 1913-14 match the spikes in Figure 1. While Czech immigrants to the United States certainly outnumbered Slovak immigrants throughout most of the 19 th century, the annual immigration data in Figure 5 establish that over three times as many Slovaks as Czechs immigrated to the U.S. in the first quarter of the 20 th . However, the data in Figure 5 are not comparable to U.S. Census data in Figure 4, even for the same years, 1910 and 1920. Figure 5 counted only annual immigrant arrivals. Both Censuses counted all residents of foreign stock and of foreign birth, classifying them as Czech or Slovak according to their mother tongues. By simple logic, �18 SLOVAKIA-2017 the number of Czech/Slovak of foreign stock counted in any Census year should exceed the number of Czech/Slovak who were foreign born. So too, the number of foreign born in 1910 should exceed the sum total of immigrants for the available years 1899 to 1910, and the number of foreign born in 1920 should exceed the total of immigrants from 1899 to 1920. Figure 6, which reprises the relevant foreign stock and foreign born data along with summed immigration data for 1899 to 1910 and for 1899 to 1920, shows those relationships hold for the Czech data, but not for the Slovak data. Figure 6: Comparing 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses with 18991924 Immigration Data 700,000 619,866 600,000 Czech stock 531, 193 500,000 Slovak Immigrants 1899-1920 400,000 1899-1910 300,000 Slovak stock C,ech bom 281 70 274,948 22 ,', 73 , r -34,564 200,000 Slovak born 166,474 100,000 Czech Immigrants 1899-1910 .-123,836 91 , 164 _______...-.---- Czech Immigrants 1899-1920 0---+-----------------~ 1910 1920 When comparing 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses with 1899-1924 immigration data, one should understand two facts and their implycations: �SLOVAKIA-2017 19 I . The data come from very different sources collected by very different methods. Do not expect exact matches; look instead for consistencies and impossibilities. 2. Caveat: summing annual immigrants overstates their counts in the Censuses. After arriving, many immigrants returned home. Concerning fact #1: All data for Czech foreign stock, foreign born, and immigrants are indeed logically consistent for 1910 and 1920. In both years, there were more residents of Czech foreign stock than those foreign born and those who immigrated since 1899. The Slovak figures for foreign stock and foreign born are also logically consistent. However, the data for Slovak foreign born are inconsistent with the number who immigrated in years preceding both Censuses. It is not possible for 358,056 Slovaks to arrive between 1899 and 1910 and yet have only 166,474 foreign born Slovaks in the 1910 Census. It is not possible for 460,530 Slovaks to immigrate between 1899 and 1920 and yet have only 274,948 Slovaks of foreign birth in 1920. Concerning fact #2: That immigrants often returned home requires some adjustment to the data summed from 1899 to 1910 and from 1899 to 1920. One source for 1908 to 1913 estimated that, respectively, 40 percent and 38 percent of Austrian and Hungarian 27 immigrants to the United States returned home. Other sources give 28 much lower repatriation percentages, almost half. Let us assume the highest figure, that 40 percent of the Slovak immigrants who came in the 12 years prior to 1910, returned home. That would still leave almost 215,000 immigrants, far more than the 166,000 Slovaks the 1910 Census counted as foreign born. Of course, many thousands who came before 1899 were also foreign born and still alive. Applying the same repatriation assumption to Slovak immigrants from 1899 to 1920 lowers the number to around 276,000-which is 27 Willcox, Volume I, 90 and 92. Culen estimated that about 25 percent of all Slovaks who left eventually returned (p. 42); Seton-Watson reported that Slovaks who returned in 1905 were 10 percent of those who left, and that returnees were 20 percent of emigrants in 1906, in R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972 edition, original ly published 1908) Appendix XIII, 470. 28 �20 SLOVAKIA-2017 close to the 1920 Census count of about 275,000 born abroad. Although the 1899-1920 count still does not include those who immigrated earlier, the much closer fit to the I 920 Census count supports the contention that the 1910 Census woefully undercounted Slovaks. More Slovaks than Czechs in America, Then and Now? To recap, the 1920 Census of foreign stock counted almost identical numbers of Czechs and Slovaks in the United States: 622,796 and 619,866 respectively. Without doubt, the Bureau of the Census had improved its counting of Slovaks substantially since the 1910 Census, but annual counts of Czech and Slovak immigration from 1899 to 1920 suggest that even the 1920 Census underestimated the number of Slovaks, given that large scale Slovak immigration oc29 curred two decades earlier. " By the 1930 Census, which asked mother tongue only for the foreign born, there were more Slovak than Czech speakers, 240,196 to 201,138. As census-takers recorded more familiar with Slovaks as an ethnic group, perhaps they found more Slovaks to count. In any event, it is reasonable to assume that by 1930 there were actually more United States residents of Slovak than Czech ancestry. Despite the fact that Slovak speakers equaled or exceeded Czech speakers by 1920, Slovaks remained largely invisible to the American public. In Francis Clark's 1913 book, Old Homes of New Americans, he reported on a conversation with "an intelligent American lady, who had traveled widely and was not unacquainted with the history and nationality of Austria-Hungary." He asked her to guess how many Slovaks were in the United States; she guessed twenty thousand. He wrote, "She was only five hundred and eighty thousand out of the way, but I have no doubt her guess was quite as near the truth as would be that of most of her countrywomen, or countrymen 30 either, for that matter. " Although the U.S. Census Bureau apparently stopped asking for the mother tongue of foreign born in 1970, the 1980 and 1990 Cen- 29 Ference, p. 131. ° Francis E. C lark, Old Homes of New Americans: The Country and the People of 3 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Their Contribution to the New World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 212-13 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 21 31 suses did attempt to measure ancestry. In 1990, the census-taker filled in a box for Question 13: "What is this person's ancestry or 32 ethnic origin?" Appendix B explained: The question was based on self-identification; the data on ancestry represent self-classification by people according to the ancestry group(s) with which they most closely identify. Ancestry refers to a person's ethnic origin or descent, "roots," or heritage or the place of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States .. .. The ancestry question allowed respondents to report one or more ancestry groups. While a large number of respondents listed a single ancestry, the majority of answers included more than one ethnic entry. Generally, only the first two responses reported were coded in 1990. Based on both responses to the ancestry question, the 1990 Cen33 sus produced these estimates: Slovak 1,882,897 Czech 1,296,411 Czechoslovakian 315,285 Of course, feelings of ancestry fade across generations as marriages occur across ethnic groups. Given that Czechs immigrated a generation earlier than Slovaks, their self-identification in 1990 as Czech-American or Bohemian-American should have faded somewhat more than Slovak-American. The exact numbers for ancestry in 1990 are less significant than their relative magnitudes. These data, even with their imperfections, support the case that Slovak immigrants outnumbered Czechs in the first quarter of the 20 th century, 31 Bureau of the Census, Census '90.- The Foreign-Born Population in the United States (Washington, DC: I 990 CP-3- I), 8-4. 32 Ibid. , E- 14. 33 Based on only people's first response for ancestry, the counts were lower: 1,2 10,652 Slovaks, 772,087 Czechs, and 240,489 Czechoslovakians. Only 3,781 people cited Moravian ancestry. See Bureau of the Census, Census '90: Ancestry of the Population in the United States (Washington, DC: 1990 CP-3-2), Table I: "General Characteristics of Selected Ancestry Groups by Nativity, Citizenship, and Year of Entry." �22 SLOVAKIA-2017 even including Moravians. That seems to be true as well today. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security reported the persons obtaining lawful permanent resident status by region and country of birth from fiscal years 2004 to 2013. The trend continued: 7,165 people from Slovakia soufht resident status in the U.S. versus 3,783 from the Czech Republic.3 Where Did Czechs and Slovak Settle in the United States? We do not inquire why immigrants chose where they settled in the United States. We look only at where they settled in the first decades of the 20 th century. To determine that, we rely on the 1920 Census, which asked for mother tongue of foreign white stockaccepting its likely undercount of Slovaks. Recall that the 1920 Census counted 622,796 Czechs and 619,866 Slovaks for a combined total of 1,242,662. Given that the amounts are essentially the same, readers can compare the counts directly, without converting them to percentages. Figure 7 displays where they chose to settle in nine Census regions of the United States, ranked by total number of Czechs and Slovaks. Figure 7: Distribution of Czech and Slovak Speakers in Census Regions, 1920• Total Czech• & Slovaka In each region Middle Atlantic 1 ~ 7 3,574 East North Central 425,623 These three regions had 1 , 140,043 of all Czechs & Slovaks (87% ) 180,483 West North Central 13,006 Texas a lone had 84% of all Czechs & Slovaks in this region West South Central 8,306 New England Only 8% of Czechs & Slovaks settled in the rest of the country; except for Texas , very few settled in southern states, 13 ,6 11 South Atlantic 14,996 Pacific Czechs= 622,786 • Slovaks'"' 619,866 Total Czechs & Slovaks = 1 ,242 ,662 934 East South Central 1 ,252 0 34 • 2,186 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 Department of Homeland Security," Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2013 Lawful Permanent Residents," https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-lawful-permanent-residents. �SLOVAKIA-2017 23 Fourteenth Census of the United State, 1920: Volume II, General Report and Analytical Tables, Table 7. The comments to the right of Figure 7 draw attention to three major conclusions: (1) almost 90% of all Czechs and Slovaks lived in relatively few states running westward from the Atlantic seaboard into the North Central region; (2) nearly all those in the West South Central region lived in Texas; and (3) relatively few Czechs and Slovaks ventured north to New England, west toward the Mountain and Pacific regions, or south-except for Texas, entering at Galveston. (One source estimated that some 200,000 immigrants entered there 5 between 1865 and 1924.)3 One last comment on Texas: according to the 1920 Census, Czechs outnumbered Slovaks 49,929 to 83 3 ! Figure 8 provides information on the states within three regions in which they settled. Figure 8: Distribution of Czech and Slovak Speakers by States within Regions (See next page) Figure 8 lists all fifteen states in 1920 having the most Czechs and Slovaks within the three regions . Only four of the fifteenPennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and Indiana-had more Slovaks than Czechs. Pennsylvania stands out as the most extraordinary: Slovaks outnumbered Czechs 296,219 to 19,839, and Pennsylvania-by itself- had 48 percent of all Slovaks counted in the 1920 Census! Pennsylvania drew so many Slovaks that some explanation is needed. In his History of Slovaks in America, Culen wrote: Most of the early Slovak immigrants settled in the industrial and mining areas of Pennsylvania. Here, two main centers developed. One was in the hard coal (anthracite) mining region (or in the Slovak slang "v tvardouholtnej okolici"- '"the hard coal circle"), the other in the soft coal mining region . The first settlements formed around the mines. Later, they formed around large industrial complexes, particularly around iron and steel mills. 36 35 See htt ://wv1w.chron.com/li fe/artic le/Waves-of-mi rants-made-Galveston-intoT~2(i!§_-L73)_~}?Jl'1p_. 36 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America [Translated from the 1942 Slovak edition by Daniel C. Necas] (St. Paul , MN: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society International, 2007), p. 67. �24 SLOVAKIA-2017 M. Mark Stolarik's more recent research found that Slovaks 316,058 Pennsylvania New York MIDDLE An.ANTIC New Jersey 184,021 Illinois 138,188 Ohio EAST NORTH CENTRAL 58,217 Wisconsin Michigan Indiana Nebraska 41 ,872 Minnesota 34,739 Iowa WEST NORTH CENTRAL 16,277 Missouri 13 ,263 Kansas 11 ,203 South Dakota ■ Czechs ■ Slovaks North Dakota 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 accounted for 13.1 percent of all steel workers in America and 12.8 37 percent of bituminous coal miners. New Jersey also had a preponderance of Slovaks over Czechs, as did Ohio, but neither rivaled Pennsylvania. Indiana also had more Slovaks than Czechs, but few of each. 37 Marian Mark Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 1870-1918 (New York: AMS Press, 1989), pp. 111-112, �SLOVAKIA-2017 25 The other eleven states had Czech majorities- often overwhelming majorities. Nebraska was home to 54,024 Czechs but only 281 Slovaks! That ratio even exceeded Texas' Czech majority. My home state of Illinois had-after Pennsylvania-the second largest number of Czech and Slovak immigrants. Where in Illinois did those Czechs and Slovaks live? Did they live in urban or rural areas? The 1920 Census did not classify the foreign stock by urban rural residence, but the 1930 Census did report urban-rural location for the foreign born, which means the more recent immigrants. At that time, "urban" meant incorporated areas of 2,500 or more inhabitants-places that we would not call urban today. Nevertheless, only 56 percent of the U.S. population lived in urban areas in 1930. 38 Although they had emigrated from rural lands, both Czechs (66 percent) and Slovaks (72 percent) gravitated to urban areas. 39 Only in certain states did Czechs and Slovaks congregate in large cities. The United States had only 73 cities with 100,000 or more population in 1920. Ten were in the three states with the largest number of Czechs and Slovaks combined-Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio. Because most mines and mills were located outside of Pennsylvania's large cities- Philadelphia, Scranton, and Pittsburgh. -merely 8 percent of its Czechs and Slovaks lived in its big cities. Ohio, with six cities over 100,000, presented a different case. Only Cleveland- a major steel and manufacturing center-attracted Czechs and Slovaks in droves, accounting for 52 percent of them, more Czechs than Slovaks. My home state of Illinois had only one city over 100,000 population-Chicago-and 72 percent of all Czechs and Slovaks in Illinois in 1920 lived in Chicago. The breakdown was 106,428 Czechs and 25 ,720 Slovaks. Given that Czechs outnumbered Slovaks by nearly 4 to 1 in Chicago, perhaps that explains why I never met any. Conclusion: Slovaks as the Silent Majority Certainly the preponderance of Czechs in Chicago partly explains why I was unaware of them. Probably more important was 38 Fifteenth Census of the United State, 1920: Volume II, General Report, Statistics b{ Subject, Chapter 1, Table 1. 3 Ibid. , Chapter 7, Table I. �26 SLOVAKIA-2017 that Slovaks were more silent than Czechs, so got little press compared to Czechs who- like the Irish in Boston and Italians in New York- soon became a force in city politics. Anton Cermak (originally Cermak) became a Chicago alderman, then president of the county board (1922), head of the county Democratic Party (1928), and mayor of the city (1931 ). His prominence allowed him to stand next to president-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami, where Cermak was killed by a bullet presumably aimed at the president. Slovaks also made less news than Czechs nationwide. Figure 9 shows how often articles in the Tim es, the leading newspaper in the nation's biggest city, mentioned either "Czechs" or "Slovaks.1140 From 1901 to 1910, the New York Times paid little attention to either group . Of only 88 articles during that decade that mentioned either, 75 percent were about Czechs. In the next decade, encompassing World War I and the creation of Czechoslovakia, the number of stories in the Times increased tenfold to 890, and the percentage mentioning Czechs increased to 81. By 1920, when Slovak equaled Czech as a mother tongue in census statistics, the Czech advantage in 689 Tim es' stories climbed to 84 percent. The Czech penumbra extended far over the Slovaks especially in the metropolitan media. Figure 9: "Czechs" and "Slovaks" in the News, 1900-1930 300 Number of articles in New York Tiines 250 Number mentioning Czechs 200 150 100 50 1905 40 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 "CHRONICLE. Visualizing language usage in New York Times news coverage throughout its history," at http ://chronicle.nvtlabs.com/. �SLOVAKIA-2017 27 Cermak's visible political career in Chicago, Tomas Masaryk's tireless campaigning across the country for the existence of Czechoslovakia as an independent nation, the nation's creation after World War I, and Edvard Benes' presidency, all, no doubt contributed to the many articles mentioning Czechs in the New York Times during this period. Slovaks lacked comparable political celebrities or events to gamer publicity. Finally, the fact that almost one-half of all Slovak immigrants to the United States settled in one state, Pennsylvania and outside its large cities no doubt contributed to Slovaks' neglect by the national press and to their invisibility to people living in other states. Despite the fact that Slovaks were often unrecognized and undercounted by census-takers, the 1990 Census confirmed that more Americans claimed Slovak than Czech ancestry. Even today, that fact surprises many people. � SLOVAKIA-2017 7 MORE SLOVAKS IN THE U.S. THAN CZECHS? WHO SAYS? WHEN AND WHERE? 1 Kenneth Janda Born in Chicago, Illinois, I am a third-generation Czech-American married to a second-generation Slovak-American, born Anna Mozolak in New York City. Ann's grandfather, Samuel Mozolak, is the peasant in my forthcoming book, The Emperor and the Peasant: The Start of the Great War and End of a Great Empire. 2 The emperor is, of course, Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary. The peasant, Samuel Mozolak, lived in Krajne, a Slovak village in Hungary, the eastern half of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Although they never met, Franz Joseph's life profoundly affected Samuel's. It is inconceivable that the peasant ever did anything to harm the emperor, but the emperor, did much to harm him. By declaring war against Serbia, Franz Joseph personally made the decision that led to Samuel's death. So began World War I, innocently known then as the Great War-the war to end all wars. Franz Joseph resided in his Austrian palaces and visited Hungary as little as possible. Living in different places and with no common acquaintances, the two men traveled together on non-intersecting paths toward World War I. The story about Franz Joseph is based entirely on historical records. Samuel Mozolak's story is based on family documents, histories of Slovaks in Hungary, reports of Slovaks emigrating to the United States, immigrants' personal accounts, and novels of the era. His story threads together the description of Slovaks' lives as subjects in Hungary and as immigrants in America. Chapter 1 begins the emperor's story, which continues over the odd-numbered chapters. Chapter 2 and subsequent even-numbered 1 Revision of a paper prepared for delivery at the 28th World Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts & Sciences (SVU),Vysoka skola zdravotnictva a socialnej prace, sv. Alzbety, Bratislava, Slovakia, September 1-4, 2016 ,_M. Mark Stolarik improved this paper with several useful suggestions . 2 Forthcoming in 2017 by McFarland Books, Box 611 , Jefferson, NC 28640, http: //www.mcfarlandbooks.com �8 SLOVAKIA-2017 chapters tell about the Slovak peasant who crossed the ocean at twenty years of age to work in New York City and who returned to Slovakia in time to serve the emperor. Those chapters also tell why hundreds of thousands of Slovaks fled the empire, how they traveled to the United States, and where they settled. In writing my manuscript, I learned far more about Ann's Slovak heritage than I did about my own Czech family background. My mother and father were first-generation bilingual Bohemians who impressed on me-who foolishly resisted learning Czech- that I was Bohemian too. I attended many events in Chicago's numerous Sokol halls, but I do not recall my parents ever saying that they had Slovak friends or even talking about Slovaks. When I met Ann Mozo lak in graduate school at Indiana University, she was the first genuine Slovak-American that I ever recall meeting. So imagine my surprise when I learned that the 1990 Census found 1.9 million United States residents professing Slovak ancestry compared with about 1.3 claiming Czech roots, whi le approximately 315,000 considering themselves "Czechoslovaks." How could that be? Did more Slovaks than Czechs really immigrate to the United States? What's the evidence? When did the immigration waves occur? Where did the Czechs and Slovaks settle in America? How could it be that I do not remember m~eting any Slovaks in Chicago? These are questions that I grappled with while writing The Emperor and the Peasant, and ones addressed more comprehensively in this paper. Anyone researching Czech and Slovak emigration from Austria-Hungary to the United States during the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20 th century encounters several facts: 1. Statistics on emigration from Austria-Hungary and immigra3 tion to the United States are seriously incomplete. Emigration statistics from Austria-Hungary had to be compiled from fragmentary government data on exit permits and from 4 more complete data on ships sailing from European ports. Immigration data in the United States came almost completely from 3 See Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volume I: Statistics (Washington: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), 55. 4 Wilcox, 89-90. �SLOVAKIA-2017 9 5 passenger lists of ship companies. 2. Over the years, the United States defined "immigrant" diff erently . From 1820 to 1867, data were reported for alien passengers ; from 1868 to 1900 for alien immigrants-those who intended to reside in the U.S. (including only third class passengers, not first or second class, until 1903); after 1906 for immigrant aliens admitted, excluding "all aliens admitted who avowed an intention not to settle in the United States, and all returning to resume domiciles formerly acquired in this country. 11 6 3. The U.S. Census Bureau did not separately classify residents fro m Austria-Hungary as Czechs or Slovaks until 1910, when it began asking p eople of ''foreign stock" about their "mother tongue." That year, Slovak leaders persuaded President Taft and Congress to add "mother tongue" to the 1910 Census a month before 7 it took the field on April 15. The Bureau hastily trained censustakers in asking people of foreign stock for their mother tongue-"that is, the language of customary speech in the home prior to immigration." "Foreign stock" included "the foreign-born white, the native white of foreign parentage (both parents foreign born), and the native white of mixed parentage (one parent native and the other foreign born).118 4. In 1924, the U. S. Congress imposed quotas on immigrants fro m central and southern Europe, which drastically reduced the number from the former Austria-Hungary. Whereas from 1904 to 1911 , Austria-Hungary accounted for 28 percent of millions of immigrants who poured into the United Sta9 tes, Congress set the 1925 immigration quota at only 785 for Austria 5 Wilcox, 374. Ibid. 7 Konstant in Cul en, Dejiny Slowikov v Amerike (Bratislava: Slovak League Publishing House, 1942) was translated by Daniel C. Necas and published as History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society International, 2007), 329-33. 8 Fifteenth Census of the United States - 1930 - Population, Vo lume JI: General Report, Statistics by Subject (Washington: U.S . Bureau of the Census, 1933), Chapter 6, p. 263 . 9 Willcox, Walter F. (ed.), International Migrations, Vo lum e JI: Interpretations (Washington: Nati onal Bureau of Economic Research, I 93 1), 400. 6 �10 SLOVAKIA-2017 10 and 473 for Hungary. 5. In 1930, the U.S. Census Bureau switched from asking residents of ''foreign stock" about their mother tongue to asking it only of residents who were ''foreign born." The 1930 Census reported 38,727,693 of foreign stock but only 13 ,366,407 foreign born-about one-third as many. These facts complicated estimating the numbers of Czech and Slovak immigrants to the United States. Historical Trend oflmmigration from Austria-Hungary, 1869-1924 What do we know generally about immigration from AustriaHungary? Imre Ferenczi in 1925 supervised an international effort in Europe at collecting migration data that was published in 1929 in the 11 United States under the general editorship of Walter F. Willcox. Thanks to that source, we have detailed estimates for Austro-Hungarian immigration to the United States by year from 1869 to 1924and often by country within the empire. These data are presented in Figure 1, which reports the place of origin for years when available. Certain years are marked by pronounced surges in immigration. The researchers contended that these surges coincided more with views of good economic ref otts in America than with poor conditions in Austria-Hungary. 1 Felix Klez! wrote, "There was a striking parallelism between Austrian emigration and the economic conditions in the United States," while Gustav Thirring said, "In Hungary, American business conditions also were of decisive influence." The data extend beyond the end of the empire to 1924, after which U.S. national quotas throttled the flow of immigrants. According to the data in Figure 1, immigration from Austria and Bohemia long preceded any substantial immigration from Hungary. 10 Ibid. , 410 and 433 . See Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volum e I: Statistics and International Migrations (Washington: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929). 12 Felix Klez!, "Austria," in Willcox, Volum e !I, p. 403 ; and Gustave Thirring, "Hungarian Migration of Modern Times," in Willcox, Volum e 11, p. 411 . 11 �11 SLOVAKIA-2017 Figure 1: Austro-Hungarian Immigration by Place of Origin, 1869-1924 350,000 300,000 Czechoslovakia 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 1874 1879 1884 1889 1894 1899 1904 1909 1914 191 9 1924 SOURCE: Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volum e I: Statistics (Washington : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), Tables II and III, pp. 384-393. Anecdotal evidence tells of Czechs immigrating earlier. Czech historian Stephanie Saxon-Ford said, "Bohemian intellectuals who had participated in the nationalist revival of the 1840s and 1850s . .. left their homeland by the score to escape the repression of Hapsburg �12 SLOVAKIA-2017 13 rule." By 1850 about 500 members of the Czech intelligentsiadoctors, professors, composers, and journalists-immigrated to the United States, and Czechs formed the Cesko-Slovanska Podporujici Spolecnost, or C.S.P.S., (the Czech-Slavic Protective Society) in St. 14 Louis in 1854. Furthermore, in volume II of International Migration, Felix Klez! referred to substantial immigration of Bohemians to California sparked by news of the 1849 gold strike. He wrote, "The movement was confined almost entirely to Bohemia. Of the 58,000 emigrants who registered in the years 1850-68, not less than 15 44,000, or 76 per cent, were from Bohemia. The evidence is less clear about emigration from Hungary after its 1848-49 revolution. Gustav Thirring said that any Hungarian arrivals in the United States before 1861 were "not treated in American statistics as immigration," saying "the first two immigrants from 16 Hungary being reported in 1861." Although Gregory Ference noted that a Slovak named Andrej Jelik arrived in the mid-1 s1h century and that Slovaks immigrated more frequently by the 1850s, "these immigrants usually were isolated cases ... . The beginnings of the mass 17 migration started around 1880." John Kosa agreed that Hungarian emigration was small prior to 1880, but then: "In the period from 1886 to 1890 an average of 22,000 persons left the country annually 18 for overseas, and the trend was increasing." Kosa continued: The total number of emigrants who left Hungary in the period from 1850 to 1920 is variously estimated as being between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000; the overseas emigration alone can be put between 2,200,000 13 Stephanie Saxon-Ford, The Czech Americans (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989), p. 47. 14 Gregory C. Ference, Sixteen months of indecision: Slovak American Viewpoints toward Compatriots and the Homeland from I 9 I 4 to I 915 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania. (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1995), 36. 15 Felix Klez! , "Austria," in Willcox, Volume 11, 399. 16 Gustave Thirring, "Hungarian Migration of Modern Times," in Willcox, Volum e II, 411. 17 Gregory C. Ference, "Slovak Immigration to the United States in Light of American, Czech, and Slovak History," Nebraska. History, 74 (Fall/Winter 1993): 13035 at p. 131. 18 John Kosa, "A Century of Hungarian Emigration, I 850-1950," The American Slavic and East European Review, 16 (December, I 957) : 501-514 at 504. �13 SLOVAKIA-2017 and 2,600,000 persons. For several reasons it seems to be almost impossible to reach an exact figure or to tie in the Hungarian data with the statistical figures supplied by the different countries of immigration. Thirring found that 98.5 percent of the overseas Hungarian emigrants went to the United States. 19 He estimated total Hungarian emigration from 1898 to 1913 at 1,391,000, of which 31 percent (432,000) were Slovaks. Thirring also stated, "[E]migration from Hungary was almost entirely Slovak during the early years, 1120 and from 1905 to 1913, Slovaks still had the highest emigration rate of all Hungarians- 98 .2 per 1,000. That was more than three times the Magyar rate and amounted to almost 10 percent of the Slovak popu. m . Hungary. 21 1atlon U.S. Census Data on Czechs and Slovaks in America What do U.S. Census data tell about Czech and Slovak presence in America? The evidence above in Figure 1 implies three conclusions: (1) Substantial Czech immigration from Austria-Hungary began in the 1850s; (2) Substantial Slovak immigration from AustriaHungary began later, in the 1880s; therefore (3) many thousands of Czech immigrants settled in the United States at least a full generation before comparable numbers of Slovaks. Moreover, those Czechs immigrants gave birth to many more thousands of Czech-Americans. It is not surprising that the 1910 Census reported far more residents of Czech "foreign stock" than Slovak. Those data are reported in Figure 2. Figure 2: 1910 U.S. Census of Foreign Stock: Czechs and Slovaks 1910 ~ - ~ 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 531 ,193 I I I 600,000 700,000 However, the very next census of foreign stock in 1920 revealed 19 Thirring, 419. Thirring, 424. 21 Thirring, 426. 20 �14 SLOVAKIA-2017 the surprising-even astounding- fact that the number of Slovaks in America was virtually tied with the number of Czechs! In just ten short years between the two Census counts, the number of Slovak residents in the United States jumped more than 338,000- an increase greater than all Slovaks counted in the 1910 Census. Moreover, this enormous increase occurred despite the nearly complete shutdown of immigration during the four-and-a-half years of World War I, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 3: 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses of Foreign Stock: Czechs and Slovaks What accounted for the huge increase in Slovaks between the 1910 and 1920 Censuses? Recall that Slovak leaders succeeded in adding the "mother tongue" question to the 1910 Census just one month before the count began. A U.S. Census website states: "Because the questionnaires had already been printed, enumerators were instructed to add this information to column 12 (birthplace) of the 22 form." The census-takers- many of whom were unfamiliar with Slavic groups in central Europe- had trouble recording responses to the question. That was admitted in the explanatory text of the I 920 Census, which stated that "contrary to the instructions given the enumerators" some persons who said they were 'Slavs,' 'Slavic,' 'Slavish," or 'Slavonian,' ... should doubtless have been reported as Slovak or Slovenian." 23 Apparently, the census-takers had less trouble accurately recording responses from Czechs or Bohemians, who had started settling in the United States sixty years earlier, had quickly affected American life, and were widely recognized. The Czech-Slavic Protective Society was founded in 1854; Budweiser Beer was imported in 1871 (Bohemian Crystal even earlier); and Antonin Dvorak wrote his New 22 U. S. Census, "History," at https: //www.census.gov/history/www/through the decades/overview/ 19 I O.htm I. 23 U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, Volum e II: General Report and Analytical Tables (Washington, DC : 1921), Chapter 12, p. 968. �15 SLOVAKIA-2017 World Symphony in 1893 . The Slovak newcomers were not known to Americarls for their beer, their crystal, or their symphonies. Slovaks were not generally familiar to Europeans either. In 1916, according to MacMillan, Britain's Prime Minister Lloyd George (not known to be up on his geography) asked, "Who are the Slovaks? I can't seem 24 to place them. " So the leap in Slovak speakers in 1920 appears to have come from better field procedures returning a more accurate count. Additional evidence that the 1910 Census erred in counting Slovaks comes from the 1930 Census, which switched to ask the "mother tongue" question of those only who were "foreign born." Retaining the original data from the two earlier Censuses, the Bureau of the Census in 1930 recalculated its 1910 and 1920 data to report as well on "foreign born." Later Censuses to 1970 continued asking those foreign born for their mother tongue. The full set of relevant data are portrayed in Figure 4. Figure 4: Slovak and Czech as "Mother Tongue" in Censuses, 1910-1970 700 ,000 Mother Tongues of Foreign Stock 619,866 600,000 S lovak S tock 500,000 Czech S tock S lovak Born 400 ,000 - Czech Born 274,948 300 ,000 200 ,000 166,474 100 ,000 Mother Tongue• of Foreign Born 70,564 O + - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - ~ - - - , - - - - - - - , - - - - - r -- - - - , 1910 1920 1930 1 940 1950 1960 1970 U.S . Census Bureau, "Mother Tongue of the Foreign-Born Population: 1910 to 1940, 1960, and 1970," (March 9, 1999), at https://www.census.go~opulation/www/documentation/twps0029/tab06.html. Figure 4 shows a much smaller difference between foreign born 24 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2002), 42 . �16 SLOVAKIA-2017 Czech or Slovak speakers and those of foreign stock. Czech immigration, which occurred earlier, certainly accounted for the preponderance of Czech foreign stock. Given the flawed nature of the 1910 count of Slovak speakers, one wonders whether the Bureau of the Census in 1930 corrected the counts of Slovak speakers when recalculating the 1910 data. In any event, Figure 4 clearly shows that in every Census from I 920 through 1970 there were more Slovak than Czech speakers among the foreign born. Because the 1920s immigration quotas virtually ended mass immigration of both Czechs and Slovaks, the downward slope of the mother tongue lines for both languages reflects the mortality rates of the foreign born. Other Data on Czech and Slovak Immigration to America As noted, the U.S. Census has severe shortcomings concerning Czech and Slovak ethnicity prior to World War I. Fortunately, there were other sources of information on immigration to the United States prior to the 1930s, and these were consulted in preparing the two-volumes of International Migrations. Imre Ferenczi, chief of the Migration Section of the International Labour Office in Geneva, wrote, The statistics for the United States have been compiled in European libraries supplemented by all the important American publications, including Bromwell, Young, the Monthly Summary of Comm erce and Finance for the United States and the Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration. With the assistance of the numerous documents which have been collected, the present series of American migration statistics is probably more nearly complete than any heretofore published in the United States . 25 Thanks to these additional sources, Volume I of International Migrations printed a twelve-page table on the "Distribution of Immi26 grant Aliens Admitted, by Sex and Race or People, 1899-1924." This remarkable table counted immigrants in forty different categories, including separate lines for "Bohemian and Moravian" and 25 Imre Ferenczi , "International Migration Statistics" in Willcox, International Mi- f[ ations, Volume I, 59. 6 - International Migrations, Volume !: Statistics, Table X, 432-43. �SLOVAKIA-2017 17 "Slovak." These data, rarely reported in accounts of Czech and Slovak immigration, were extracted for presentation in Figure 5. Figure 5: Czech and Slovak Immigrants to the U.S., 1899-1924 60 ,000 Slovak lmmlgranta: 524,348 total 52,368 50,000 40 ,000 36,934 38,221 32,41 6 Source: International Migrations, Vo lume I: Statistics, Table X, 432-43. Summing the annual data in Figure 5 over 26 years results in 524,348 Slovak versus 150,294 Czech immigrants arriving from 1899 through 1924. These annual counts are reassuringly consistent with Figure 1's data on annual immigration from Austria-Hungary, as Figure S's spikes in immigration for 1905-07, 1910, and 1913-14 match the spikes in Figure 1. While Czech immigrants to the United States certainly outnumbered Slovak immigrants throughout most of the 19 th century, the annual immigration data in Figure 5 establish that over three times as many Slovaks as Czechs immigrated to the U.S. in the first quarter of the 20 th . However, the data in Figure 5 are not comparable to U.S. Census data in Figure 4, even for the same years, 1910 and 1920. Figure 5 counted only annual immigrant arrivals. Both Censuses counted all residents of foreign stock and of foreign birth, classifying them as Czech or Slovak according to their mother tongues. By simple logic, �18 SLOVAKIA-2017 the number of Czech/Slovak of foreign stock counted in any Census year should exceed the number of Czech/Slovak who were foreign born. So too, the number of foreign born in 1910 should exceed the sum total of immigrants for the available years 1899 to 1910, and the number of foreign born in 1920 should exceed the total of immigrants from 1899 to 1920. Figure 6, which reprises the relevant foreign stock and foreign born data along with summed immigration data for 1899 to 1910 and for 1899 to 1920, shows those relationships hold for the Czech data, but not for the Slovak data. Figure 6: Comparing 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses with 18991924 Immigration Data 700,000 619,866 600,000 Czech stock 531, 193 500,000 Slovak Immigrants 1899-1920 400,000 1899-1910 300,000 Slovak stock C,ech bom 281 70 274,948 22 ,', 73 , r -34,564 200,000 Slovak born 166,474 100,000 Czech Immigrants 1899-1910 .-123,836 91 , 164 _______...-.---- Czech Immigrants 1899-1920 0---+-----------------~ 1910 1920 When comparing 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses with 1899-1924 immigration data, one should understand two facts and their implycations: �SLOVAKIA-2017 19 I . The data come from very different sources collected by very different methods. Do not expect exact matches; look instead for consistencies and impossibilities. 2. Caveat: summing annual immigrants overstates their counts in the Censuses. After arriving, many immigrants returned home. Concerning fact #1: All data for Czech foreign stock, foreign born, and immigrants are indeed logically consistent for 1910 and 1920. In both years, there were more residents of Czech foreign stock than those foreign born and those who immigrated since 1899. The Slovak figures for foreign stock and foreign born are also logically consistent. However, the data for Slovak foreign born are inconsistent with the number who immigrated in years preceding both Censuses. It is not possible for 358,056 Slovaks to arrive between 1899 and 1910 and yet have only 166,474 foreign born Slovaks in the 1910 Census. It is not possible for 460,530 Slovaks to immigrate between 1899 and 1920 and yet have only 274,948 Slovaks of foreign birth in 1920. Concerning fact #2: That immigrants often returned home requires some adjustment to the data summed from 1899 to 1910 and from 1899 to 1920. One source for 1908 to 1913 estimated that, respectively, 40 percent and 38 percent of Austrian and Hungarian 27 immigrants to the United States returned home. Other sources give 28 much lower repatriation percentages, almost half. Let us assume the highest figure, that 40 percent of the Slovak immigrants who came in the 12 years prior to 1910, returned home. That would still leave almost 215,000 immigrants, far more than the 166,000 Slovaks the 1910 Census counted as foreign born. Of course, many thousands who came before 1899 were also foreign born and still alive. Applying the same repatriation assumption to Slovak immigrants from 1899 to 1920 lowers the number to around 276,000-which is 27 Willcox, Volume I, 90 and 92. Culen estimated that about 25 percent of all Slovaks who left eventually returned (p. 42); Seton-Watson reported that Slovaks who returned in 1905 were 10 percent of those who left, and that returnees were 20 percent of emigrants in 1906, in R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972 edition, original ly published 1908) Appendix XIII, 470. 28 �20 SLOVAKIA-2017 close to the 1920 Census count of about 275,000 born abroad. Although the 1899-1920 count still does not include those who immigrated earlier, the much closer fit to the I 920 Census count supports the contention that the 1910 Census woefully undercounted Slovaks. More Slovaks than Czechs in America, Then and Now? To recap, the 1920 Census of foreign stock counted almost identical numbers of Czechs and Slovaks in the United States: 622,796 and 619,866 respectively. Without doubt, the Bureau of the Census had improved its counting of Slovaks substantially since the 1910 Census, but annual counts of Czech and Slovak immigration from 1899 to 1920 suggest that even the 1920 Census underestimated the number of Slovaks, given that large scale Slovak immigration oc29 curred two decades earlier. " By the 1930 Census, which asked mother tongue only for the foreign born, there were more Slovak than Czech speakers, 240,196 to 201,138. As census-takers recorded more familiar with Slovaks as an ethnic group, perhaps they found more Slovaks to count. In any event, it is reasonable to assume that by 1930 there were actually more United States residents of Slovak than Czech ancestry. Despite the fact that Slovak speakers equaled or exceeded Czech speakers by 1920, Slovaks remained largely invisible to the American public. In Francis Clark's 1913 book, Old Homes of New Americans, he reported on a conversation with "an intelligent American lady, who had traveled widely and was not unacquainted with the history and nationality of Austria-Hungary." He asked her to guess how many Slovaks were in the United States; she guessed twenty thousand. He wrote, "She was only five hundred and eighty thousand out of the way, but I have no doubt her guess was quite as near the truth as would be that of most of her countrywomen, or countrymen 30 either, for that matter. " Although the U.S. Census Bureau apparently stopped asking for the mother tongue of foreign born in 1970, the 1980 and 1990 Cen- 29 Ference, p. 131. ° Francis E. C lark, Old Homes of New Americans: The Country and the People of 3 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Their Contribution to the New World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 212-13 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 21 31 suses did attempt to measure ancestry. In 1990, the census-taker filled in a box for Question 13: "What is this person's ancestry or 32 ethnic origin?" Appendix B explained: The question was based on self-identification; the data on ancestry represent self-classification by people according to the ancestry group(s) with which they most closely identify. Ancestry refers to a person's ethnic origin or descent, "roots," or heritage or the place of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States .. .. The ancestry question allowed respondents to report one or more ancestry groups. While a large number of respondents listed a single ancestry, the majority of answers included more than one ethnic entry. Generally, only the first two responses reported were coded in 1990. Based on both responses to the ancestry question, the 1990 Cen33 sus produced these estimates: Slovak 1,882,897 Czech 1,296,411 Czechoslovakian 315,285 Of course, feelings of ancestry fade across generations as marriages occur across ethnic groups. Given that Czechs immigrated a generation earlier than Slovaks, their self-identification in 1990 as Czech-American or Bohemian-American should have faded somewhat more than Slovak-American. The exact numbers for ancestry in 1990 are less significant than their relative magnitudes. These data, even with their imperfections, support the case that Slovak immigrants outnumbered Czechs in the first quarter of the 20 th century, 31 Bureau of the Census, Census '90.- The Foreign-Born Population in the United States (Washington, DC: I 990 CP-3- I), 8-4. 32 Ibid. , E- 14. 33 Based on only people's first response for ancestry, the counts were lower: 1,2 10,652 Slovaks, 772,087 Czechs, and 240,489 Czechoslovakians. Only 3,781 people cited Moravian ancestry. See Bureau of the Census, Census '90: Ancestry of the Population in the United States (Washington, DC: 1990 CP-3-2), Table I: "General Characteristics of Selected Ancestry Groups by Nativity, Citizenship, and Year of Entry." �22 SLOVAKIA-2017 even including Moravians. That seems to be true as well today. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security reported the persons obtaining lawful permanent resident status by region and country of birth from fiscal years 2004 to 2013. The trend continued: 7,165 people from Slovakia soufht resident status in the U.S. versus 3,783 from the Czech Republic.3 Where Did Czechs and Slovak Settle in the United States? We do not inquire why immigrants chose where they settled in the United States. We look only at where they settled in the first decades of the 20 th century. To determine that, we rely on the 1920 Census, which asked for mother tongue of foreign white stockaccepting its likely undercount of Slovaks. Recall that the 1920 Census counted 622,796 Czechs and 619,866 Slovaks for a combined total of 1,242,662. Given that the amounts are essentially the same, readers can compare the counts directly, without converting them to percentages. Figure 7 displays where they chose to settle in nine Census regions of the United States, ranked by total number of Czechs and Slovaks. Figure 7: Distribution of Czech and Slovak Speakers in Census Regions, 1920• Total Czech• & Slovaka In each region Middle Atlantic 1 ~ 7 3,574 East North Central 425,623 These three regions had 1 , 140,043 of all Czechs & Slovaks (87% ) 180,483 West North Central 13,006 Texas a lone had 84% of all Czechs & Slovaks in this region West South Central 8,306 New England Only 8% of Czechs & Slovaks settled in the rest of the country; except for Texas , very few settled in southern states, 13 ,6 11 South Atlantic 14,996 Pacific Czechs= 622,786 • Slovaks'"' 619,866 Total Czechs & Slovaks = 1 ,242 ,662 934 East South Central 1 ,252 0 34 • 2,186 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 Department of Homeland Security," Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2013 Lawful Permanent Residents," https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-lawful-permanent-residents. �SLOVAKIA-2017 23 Fourteenth Census of the United State, 1920: Volume II, General Report and Analytical Tables, Table 7. The comments to the right of Figure 7 draw attention to three major conclusions: (1) almost 90% of all Czechs and Slovaks lived in relatively few states running westward from the Atlantic seaboard into the North Central region; (2) nearly all those in the West South Central region lived in Texas; and (3) relatively few Czechs and Slovaks ventured north to New England, west toward the Mountain and Pacific regions, or south-except for Texas, entering at Galveston. (One source estimated that some 200,000 immigrants entered there 5 between 1865 and 1924.)3 One last comment on Texas: according to the 1920 Census, Czechs outnumbered Slovaks 49,929 to 83 3 ! Figure 8 provides information on the states within three regions in which they settled. Figure 8: Distribution of Czech and Slovak Speakers by States within Regions (See next page) Figure 8 lists all fifteen states in 1920 having the most Czechs and Slovaks within the three regions . Only four of the fifteenPennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and Indiana-had more Slovaks than Czechs. Pennsylvania stands out as the most extraordinary: Slovaks outnumbered Czechs 296,219 to 19,839, and Pennsylvania-by itself- had 48 percent of all Slovaks counted in the 1920 Census! Pennsylvania drew so many Slovaks that some explanation is needed. In his History of Slovaks in America, Culen wrote: Most of the early Slovak immigrants settled in the industrial and mining areas of Pennsylvania. Here, two main centers developed. One was in the hard coal (anthracite) mining region (or in the Slovak slang "v tvardouholtnej okolici"- '"the hard coal circle"), the other in the soft coal mining region . The first settlements formed around the mines. Later, they formed around large industrial complexes, particularly around iron and steel mills. 36 35 See htt ://wv1w.chron.com/li fe/artic le/Waves-of-mi rants-made-Galveston-intoT~2(i!§_-L73)_~}?Jl'1p_. 36 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America [Translated from the 1942 Slovak edition by Daniel C. Necas] (St. Paul , MN: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society International, 2007), p. 67. �24 SLOVAKIA-2017 M. Mark Stolarik's more recent research found that Slovaks 316,058 Pennsylvania New York MIDDLE An.ANTIC New Jersey 184,021 Illinois 138,188 Ohio EAST NORTH CENTRAL 58,217 Wisconsin Michigan Indiana Nebraska 41 ,872 Minnesota 34,739 Iowa WEST NORTH CENTRAL 16,277 Missouri 13 ,263 Kansas 11 ,203 South Dakota ■ Czechs ■ Slovaks North Dakota 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 accounted for 13.1 percent of all steel workers in America and 12.8 37 percent of bituminous coal miners. New Jersey also had a preponderance of Slovaks over Czechs, as did Ohio, but neither rivaled Pennsylvania. Indiana also had more Slovaks than Czechs, but few of each. 37 Marian Mark Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 1870-1918 (New York: AMS Press, 1989), pp. 111-112, �SLOVAKIA-2017 25 The other eleven states had Czech majorities- often overwhelming majorities. Nebraska was home to 54,024 Czechs but only 281 Slovaks! That ratio even exceeded Texas' Czech majority. My home state of Illinois had-after Pennsylvania-the second largest number of Czech and Slovak immigrants. Where in Illinois did those Czechs and Slovaks live? Did they live in urban or rural areas? The 1920 Census did not classify the foreign stock by urban rural residence, but the 1930 Census did report urban-rural location for the foreign born, which means the more recent immigrants. At that time, "urban" meant incorporated areas of 2,500 or more inhabitants-places that we would not call urban today. Nevertheless, only 56 percent of the U.S. population lived in urban areas in 1930. 38 Although they had emigrated from rural lands, both Czechs (66 percent) and Slovaks (72 percent) gravitated to urban areas. 39 Only in certain states did Czechs and Slovaks congregate in large cities. The United States had only 73 cities with 100,000 or more population in 1920. Ten were in the three states with the largest number of Czechs and Slovaks combined-Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio. Because most mines and mills were located outside of Pennsylvania's large cities- Philadelphia, Scranton, and Pittsburgh. -merely 8 percent of its Czechs and Slovaks lived in its big cities. Ohio, with six cities over 100,000, presented a different case. Only Cleveland- a major steel and manufacturing center-attracted Czechs and Slovaks in droves, accounting for 52 percent of them, more Czechs than Slovaks. My home state of Illinois had only one city over 100,000 population-Chicago-and 72 percent of all Czechs and Slovaks in Illinois in 1920 lived in Chicago. The breakdown was 106,428 Czechs and 25 ,720 Slovaks. Given that Czechs outnumbered Slovaks by nearly 4 to 1 in Chicago, perhaps that explains why I never met any. Conclusion: Slovaks as the Silent Majority Certainly the preponderance of Czechs in Chicago partly explains why I was unaware of them. Probably more important was 38 Fifteenth Census of the United State, 1920: Volume II, General Report, Statistics b{ Subject, Chapter 1, Table 1. 3 Ibid. , Chapter 7, Table I. �26 SLOVAKIA-2017 that Slovaks were more silent than Czechs, so got little press compared to Czechs who- like the Irish in Boston and Italians in New York- soon became a force in city politics. Anton Cermak (originally Cermak) became a Chicago alderman, then president of the county board (1922), head of the county Democratic Party (1928), and mayor of the city (1931 ). His prominence allowed him to stand next to president-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami, where Cermak was killed by a bullet presumably aimed at the president. Slovaks also made less news than Czechs nationwide. Figure 9 shows how often articles in the Tim es, the leading newspaper in the nation's biggest city, mentioned either "Czechs" or "Slovaks.1140 From 1901 to 1910, the New York Times paid little attention to either group . Of only 88 articles during that decade that mentioned either, 75 percent were about Czechs. In the next decade, encompassing World War I and the creation of Czechoslovakia, the number of stories in the Times increased tenfold to 890, and the percentage mentioning Czechs increased to 81. By 1920, when Slovak equaled Czech as a mother tongue in census statistics, the Czech advantage in 689 Tim es' stories climbed to 84 percent. The Czech penumbra extended far over the Slovaks especially in the metropolitan media. Figure 9: "Czechs" and "Slovaks" in the News, 1900-1930 300 Number of articles in New York Tiines 250 Number mentioning Czechs 200 150 100 50 1905 40 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 "CHRONICLE. Visualizing language usage in New York Times news coverage throughout its history," at http ://chronicle.nvtlabs.com/. �SLOVAKIA-2017 27 Cermak's visible political career in Chicago, Tomas Masaryk's tireless campaigning across the country for the existence of Czechoslovakia as an independent nation, the nation's creation after World War I, and Edvard Benes' presidency, all, no doubt contributed to the many articles mentioning Czechs in the New York Times during this period. Slovaks lacked comparable political celebrities or events to gamer publicity. Finally, the fact that almost one-half of all Slovak immigrants to the United States settled in one state, Pennsylvania and outside its large cities no doubt contributed to Slovaks' neglect by the national press and to their invisibility to people living in other states. Despite the fact that Slovaks were often unrecognized and undercounted by census-takers, the 1990 Census confirmed that more Americans claimed Slovak than Czech ancestry. Even today, that fact surprises many people. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA-2017 7 MORE SLOVAKS IN THE U.S. THAN CZECHS? WHO SAYS? WHEN AND WHERE? 1 Kenneth Janda Born in Chicago, Illinois, I am a third-generation Czech-American married to a second-generation Slovak-American, born Anna Mozolak in New York City. Ann's grandfather, Samuel Mozolak, is the peasant in my forthcoming book, The Emperor and the Peasant: The Start of the Great War and End of a Great Empire. 2 The emperor is, of course, Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary. The peasant, Samuel Mozolak, lived in Krajne, a Slovak village in Hungary, the eastern half of the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Although they never met, Franz Joseph's life profoundly affected Samuel's. It is inconceivable that the peasant ever did anything to harm the emperor, but the emperor, did much to harm him. By declaring war against Serbia, Franz Joseph personally made the decision that led to Samuel's death. So began World War I, innocently known then as the Great War-the war to end all wars. Franz Joseph resided in his Austrian palaces and visited Hungary as little as possible. Living in different places and with no common acquaintances, the two men traveled together on non-intersecting paths toward World War I. The story about Franz Joseph is based entirely on historical records. Samuel Mozolak's story is based on family documents, histories of Slovaks in Hungary, reports of Slovaks emigrating to the United States, immigrants' personal accounts, and novels of the era. His story threads together the description of Slovaks' lives as subjects in Hungary and as immigrants in America. Chapter 1 begins the emperor's story, which continues over the odd-numbered chapters. Chapter 2 and subsequent even-numbered 1 Revision of a paper prepared for delivery at the 28th World Congress of the Czechoslovak Society of Arts & Sciences (SVU),Vysoka skola zdravotnictva a socialnej prace, sv. Alzbety, Bratislava, Slovakia, September 1-4, 2016 ,_M. Mark Stolarik improved this paper with several useful suggestions . 2 Forthcoming in 2017 by McFarland Books, Box 611 , Jefferson, NC 28640, http: //www.mcfarlandbooks.com 8 SLOVAKIA-2017 chapters tell about the Slovak peasant who crossed the ocean at twenty years of age to work in New York City and who returned to Slovakia in time to serve the emperor. Those chapters also tell why hundreds of thousands of Slovaks fled the empire, how they traveled to the United States, and where they settled. In writing my manuscript, I learned far more about Ann's Slovak heritage than I did about my own Czech family background. My mother and father were first-generation bilingual Bohemians who impressed on me-who foolishly resisted learning Czech- that I was Bohemian too. I attended many events in Chicago's numerous Sokol halls, but I do not recall my parents ever saying that they had Slovak friends or even talking about Slovaks. When I met Ann Mozo lak in graduate school at Indiana University, she was the first genuine Slovak-American that I ever recall meeting. So imagine my surprise when I learned that the 1990 Census found 1.9 million United States residents professing Slovak ancestry compared with about 1.3 claiming Czech roots, whi le approximately 315,000 considering themselves "Czechoslovaks." How could that be? Did more Slovaks than Czechs really immigrate to the United States? What's the evidence? When did the immigration waves occur? Where did the Czechs and Slovaks settle in America? How could it be that I do not remember m~eting any Slovaks in Chicago? These are questions that I grappled with while writing The Emperor and the Peasant, and ones addressed more comprehensively in this paper. Anyone researching Czech and Slovak emigration from Austria-Hungary to the United States during the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20 th century encounters several facts: 1. Statistics on emigration from Austria-Hungary and immigra3 tion to the United States are seriously incomplete. Emigration statistics from Austria-Hungary had to be compiled from fragmentary government data on exit permits and from 4 more complete data on ships sailing from European ports. Immigration data in the United States came almost completely from 3 See Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volume I: Statistics (Washington: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), 55. 4 Wilcox, 89-90. SLOVAKIA-2017 9 5 passenger lists of ship companies. 2. Over the years, the United States defined "immigrant" diff erently . From 1820 to 1867, data were reported for alien passengers ; from 1868 to 1900 for alien immigrants-those who intended to reside in the U.S. (including only third class passengers, not first or second class, until 1903); after 1906 for immigrant aliens admitted, excluding "all aliens admitted who avowed an intention not to settle in the United States, and all returning to resume domiciles formerly acquired in this country. 11 6 3. The U.S. Census Bureau did not separately classify residents fro m Austria-Hungary as Czechs or Slovaks until 1910, when it began asking p eople of ''foreign stock" about their "mother tongue." That year, Slovak leaders persuaded President Taft and Congress to add "mother tongue" to the 1910 Census a month before 7 it took the field on April 15. The Bureau hastily trained censustakers in asking people of foreign stock for their mother tongue-"that is, the language of customary speech in the home prior to immigration." "Foreign stock" included "the foreign-born white, the native white of foreign parentage (both parents foreign born), and the native white of mixed parentage (one parent native and the other foreign born).118 4. In 1924, the U. S. Congress imposed quotas on immigrants fro m central and southern Europe, which drastically reduced the number from the former Austria-Hungary. Whereas from 1904 to 1911 , Austria-Hungary accounted for 28 percent of millions of immigrants who poured into the United Sta9 tes, Congress set the 1925 immigration quota at only 785 for Austria 5 Wilcox, 374. Ibid. 7 Konstant in Cul en, Dejiny Slowikov v Amerike (Bratislava: Slovak League Publishing House, 1942) was translated by Daniel C. Necas and published as History of Slovaks in America (St. Paul : Czechoslovak Genealogical Society International, 2007), 329-33. 8 Fifteenth Census of the United States - 1930 - Population, Vo lume JI: General Report, Statistics by Subject (Washington: U.S . Bureau of the Census, 1933), Chapter 6, p. 263 . 9 Willcox, Walter F. (ed.), International Migrations, Vo lum e JI: Interpretations (Washington: Nati onal Bureau of Economic Research, I 93 1), 400. 6 10 SLOVAKIA-2017 10 and 473 for Hungary. 5. In 1930, the U.S. Census Bureau switched from asking residents of ''foreign stock" about their mother tongue to asking it only of residents who were ''foreign born." The 1930 Census reported 38,727,693 of foreign stock but only 13 ,366,407 foreign born-about one-third as many. These facts complicated estimating the numbers of Czech and Slovak immigrants to the United States. Historical Trend oflmmigration from Austria-Hungary, 1869-1924 What do we know generally about immigration from AustriaHungary? Imre Ferenczi in 1925 supervised an international effort in Europe at collecting migration data that was published in 1929 in the 11 United States under the general editorship of Walter F. Willcox. Thanks to that source, we have detailed estimates for Austro-Hungarian immigration to the United States by year from 1869 to 1924and often by country within the empire. These data are presented in Figure 1, which reports the place of origin for years when available. Certain years are marked by pronounced surges in immigration. The researchers contended that these surges coincided more with views of good economic ref otts in America than with poor conditions in Austria-Hungary. 1 Felix Klez! wrote, "There was a striking parallelism between Austrian emigration and the economic conditions in the United States," while Gustav Thirring said, "In Hungary, American business conditions also were of decisive influence." The data extend beyond the end of the empire to 1924, after which U.S. national quotas throttled the flow of immigrants. According to the data in Figure 1, immigration from Austria and Bohemia long preceded any substantial immigration from Hungary. 10 Ibid. , 410 and 433 . See Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volum e I: Statistics and International Migrations (Washington: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929). 12 Felix Klez!, "Austria," in Willcox, Volum e !I, p. 403 ; and Gustave Thirring, "Hungarian Migration of Modern Times," in Willcox, Volum e 11, p. 411 . 11 11 SLOVAKIA-2017 Figure 1: Austro-Hungarian Immigration by Place of Origin, 1869-1924 350,000 300,000 Czechoslovakia 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 1874 1879 1884 1889 1894 1899 1904 1909 1914 191 9 1924 SOURCE: Walter F. Willcox, (ed.), International Migrations, Volum e I: Statistics (Washington : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), Tables II and III, pp. 384-393. Anecdotal evidence tells of Czechs immigrating earlier. Czech historian Stephanie Saxon-Ford said, "Bohemian intellectuals who had participated in the nationalist revival of the 1840s and 1850s . .. left their homeland by the score to escape the repression of Hapsburg 12 SLOVAKIA-2017 13 rule." By 1850 about 500 members of the Czech intelligentsiadoctors, professors, composers, and journalists-immigrated to the United States, and Czechs formed the Cesko-Slovanska Podporujici Spolecnost, or C.S.P.S., (the Czech-Slavic Protective Society) in St. 14 Louis in 1854. Furthermore, in volume II of International Migration, Felix Klez! referred to substantial immigration of Bohemians to California sparked by news of the 1849 gold strike. He wrote, "The movement was confined almost entirely to Bohemia. Of the 58,000 emigrants who registered in the years 1850-68, not less than 15 44,000, or 76 per cent, were from Bohemia. The evidence is less clear about emigration from Hungary after its 1848-49 revolution. Gustav Thirring said that any Hungarian arrivals in the United States before 1861 were "not treated in American statistics as immigration," saying "the first two immigrants from 16 Hungary being reported in 1861." Although Gregory Ference noted that a Slovak named Andrej Jelik arrived in the mid-1 s1h century and that Slovaks immigrated more frequently by the 1850s, "these immigrants usually were isolated cases ... . The beginnings of the mass 17 migration started around 1880." John Kosa agreed that Hungarian emigration was small prior to 1880, but then: "In the period from 1886 to 1890 an average of 22,000 persons left the country annually 18 for overseas, and the trend was increasing." Kosa continued: The total number of emigrants who left Hungary in the period from 1850 to 1920 is variously estimated as being between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000; the overseas emigration alone can be put between 2,200,000 13 Stephanie Saxon-Ford, The Czech Americans (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989), p. 47. 14 Gregory C. Ference, Sixteen months of indecision: Slovak American Viewpoints toward Compatriots and the Homeland from I 9 I 4 to I 915 as Viewed by the Slovak Language Press in Pennsylvania. (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1995), 36. 15 Felix Klez! , "Austria," in Willcox, Volume 11, 399. 16 Gustave Thirring, "Hungarian Migration of Modern Times," in Willcox, Volum e II, 411. 17 Gregory C. Ference, "Slovak Immigration to the United States in Light of American, Czech, and Slovak History," Nebraska. History, 74 (Fall/Winter 1993): 13035 at p. 131. 18 John Kosa, "A Century of Hungarian Emigration, I 850-1950," The American Slavic and East European Review, 16 (December, I 957) : 501-514 at 504. 13 SLOVAKIA-2017 and 2,600,000 persons. For several reasons it seems to be almost impossible to reach an exact figure or to tie in the Hungarian data with the statistical figures supplied by the different countries of immigration. Thirring found that 98.5 percent of the overseas Hungarian emigrants went to the United States. 19 He estimated total Hungarian emigration from 1898 to 1913 at 1,391,000, of which 31 percent (432,000) were Slovaks. Thirring also stated, "[E]migration from Hungary was almost entirely Slovak during the early years, 1120 and from 1905 to 1913, Slovaks still had the highest emigration rate of all Hungarians- 98 .2 per 1,000. That was more than three times the Magyar rate and amounted to almost 10 percent of the Slovak popu. m . Hungary. 21 1atlon U.S. Census Data on Czechs and Slovaks in America What do U.S. Census data tell about Czech and Slovak presence in America? The evidence above in Figure 1 implies three conclusions: (1) Substantial Czech immigration from Austria-Hungary began in the 1850s; (2) Substantial Slovak immigration from AustriaHungary began later, in the 1880s; therefore (3) many thousands of Czech immigrants settled in the United States at least a full generation before comparable numbers of Slovaks. Moreover, those Czechs immigrants gave birth to many more thousands of Czech-Americans. It is not surprising that the 1910 Census reported far more residents of Czech "foreign stock" than Slovak. Those data are reported in Figure 2. Figure 2: 1910 U.S. Census of Foreign Stock: Czechs and Slovaks 1910 ~ - ~ 0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 531 ,193 I I I 600,000 700,000 However, the very next census of foreign stock in 1920 revealed 19 Thirring, 419. Thirring, 424. 21 Thirring, 426. 20 14 SLOVAKIA-2017 the surprising-even astounding- fact that the number of Slovaks in America was virtually tied with the number of Czechs! In just ten short years between the two Census counts, the number of Slovak residents in the United States jumped more than 338,000- an increase greater than all Slovaks counted in the 1910 Census. Moreover, this enormous increase occurred despite the nearly complete shutdown of immigration during the four-and-a-half years of World War I, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 3: 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses of Foreign Stock: Czechs and Slovaks What accounted for the huge increase in Slovaks between the 1910 and 1920 Censuses? Recall that Slovak leaders succeeded in adding the "mother tongue" question to the 1910 Census just one month before the count began. A U.S. Census website states: "Because the questionnaires had already been printed, enumerators were instructed to add this information to column 12 (birthplace) of the 22 form." The census-takers- many of whom were unfamiliar with Slavic groups in central Europe- had trouble recording responses to the question. That was admitted in the explanatory text of the I 920 Census, which stated that "contrary to the instructions given the enumerators" some persons who said they were 'Slavs,' 'Slavic,' 'Slavish," or 'Slavonian,' ... should doubtless have been reported as Slovak or Slovenian." 23 Apparently, the census-takers had less trouble accurately recording responses from Czechs or Bohemians, who had started settling in the United States sixty years earlier, had quickly affected American life, and were widely recognized. The Czech-Slavic Protective Society was founded in 1854; Budweiser Beer was imported in 1871 (Bohemian Crystal even earlier); and Antonin Dvorak wrote his New 22 U. S. Census, "History," at https: //www.census.gov/history/www/through the decades/overview/ 19 I O.htm I. 23 U.S. Census Bureau, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, Volum e II: General Report and Analytical Tables (Washington, DC : 1921), Chapter 12, p. 968. 15 SLOVAKIA-2017 World Symphony in 1893 . The Slovak newcomers were not known to Americarls for their beer, their crystal, or their symphonies. Slovaks were not generally familiar to Europeans either. In 1916, according to MacMillan, Britain's Prime Minister Lloyd George (not known to be up on his geography) asked, "Who are the Slovaks? I can't seem 24 to place them. " So the leap in Slovak speakers in 1920 appears to have come from better field procedures returning a more accurate count. Additional evidence that the 1910 Census erred in counting Slovaks comes from the 1930 Census, which switched to ask the "mother tongue" question of those only who were "foreign born." Retaining the original data from the two earlier Censuses, the Bureau of the Census in 1930 recalculated its 1910 and 1920 data to report as well on "foreign born." Later Censuses to 1970 continued asking those foreign born for their mother tongue. The full set of relevant data are portrayed in Figure 4. Figure 4: Slovak and Czech as "Mother Tongue" in Censuses, 1910-1970 700 ,000 Mother Tongues of Foreign Stock 619,866 600,000 S lovak S tock 500,000 Czech S tock S lovak Born 400 ,000 - Czech Born 274,948 300 ,000 200 ,000 166,474 100 ,000 Mother Tongue• of Foreign Born 70,564 O + - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - ~ - - - , - - - - - - - , - - - - - r -- - - - , 1910 1920 1930 1 940 1950 1960 1970 U.S . Census Bureau, "Mother Tongue of the Foreign-Born Population: 1910 to 1940, 1960, and 1970," (March 9, 1999), at https://www.census.go~opulation/www/documentation/twps0029/tab06.html. Figure 4 shows a much smaller difference between foreign born 24 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2002), 42 . 16 SLOVAKIA-2017 Czech or Slovak speakers and those of foreign stock. Czech immigration, which occurred earlier, certainly accounted for the preponderance of Czech foreign stock. Given the flawed nature of the 1910 count of Slovak speakers, one wonders whether the Bureau of the Census in 1930 corrected the counts of Slovak speakers when recalculating the 1910 data. In any event, Figure 4 clearly shows that in every Census from I 920 through 1970 there were more Slovak than Czech speakers among the foreign born. Because the 1920s immigration quotas virtually ended mass immigration of both Czechs and Slovaks, the downward slope of the mother tongue lines for both languages reflects the mortality rates of the foreign born. Other Data on Czech and Slovak Immigration to America As noted, the U.S. Census has severe shortcomings concerning Czech and Slovak ethnicity prior to World War I. Fortunately, there were other sources of information on immigration to the United States prior to the 1930s, and these were consulted in preparing the two-volumes of International Migrations. Imre Ferenczi, chief of the Migration Section of the International Labour Office in Geneva, wrote, The statistics for the United States have been compiled in European libraries supplemented by all the important American publications, including Bromwell, Young, the Monthly Summary of Comm erce and Finance for the United States and the Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration. With the assistance of the numerous documents which have been collected, the present series of American migration statistics is probably more nearly complete than any heretofore published in the United States . 25 Thanks to these additional sources, Volume I of International Migrations printed a twelve-page table on the "Distribution of Immi26 grant Aliens Admitted, by Sex and Race or People, 1899-1924." This remarkable table counted immigrants in forty different categories, including separate lines for "Bohemian and Moravian" and 25 Imre Ferenczi , "International Migration Statistics" in Willcox, International Mi- f[ ations, Volume I, 59. 6 - International Migrations, Volume !: Statistics, Table X, 432-43. SLOVAKIA-2017 17 "Slovak." These data, rarely reported in accounts of Czech and Slovak immigration, were extracted for presentation in Figure 5. Figure 5: Czech and Slovak Immigrants to the U.S., 1899-1924 60 ,000 Slovak lmmlgranta: 524,348 total 52,368 50,000 40 ,000 36,934 38,221 32,41 6 Source: International Migrations, Vo lume I: Statistics, Table X, 432-43. Summing the annual data in Figure 5 over 26 years results in 524,348 Slovak versus 150,294 Czech immigrants arriving from 1899 through 1924. These annual counts are reassuringly consistent with Figure 1's data on annual immigration from Austria-Hungary, as Figure S's spikes in immigration for 1905-07, 1910, and 1913-14 match the spikes in Figure 1. While Czech immigrants to the United States certainly outnumbered Slovak immigrants throughout most of the 19 th century, the annual immigration data in Figure 5 establish that over three times as many Slovaks as Czechs immigrated to the U.S. in the first quarter of the 20 th . However, the data in Figure 5 are not comparable to U.S. Census data in Figure 4, even for the same years, 1910 and 1920. Figure 5 counted only annual immigrant arrivals. Both Censuses counted all residents of foreign stock and of foreign birth, classifying them as Czech or Slovak according to their mother tongues. By simple logic, 18 SLOVAKIA-2017 the number of Czech/Slovak of foreign stock counted in any Census year should exceed the number of Czech/Slovak who were foreign born. So too, the number of foreign born in 1910 should exceed the sum total of immigrants for the available years 1899 to 1910, and the number of foreign born in 1920 should exceed the total of immigrants from 1899 to 1920. Figure 6, which reprises the relevant foreign stock and foreign born data along with summed immigration data for 1899 to 1910 and for 1899 to 1920, shows those relationships hold for the Czech data, but not for the Slovak data. Figure 6: Comparing 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses with 18991924 Immigration Data 700,000 619,866 600,000 Czech stock 531, 193 500,000 Slovak Immigrants 1899-1920 400,000 1899-1910 300,000 Slovak stock C,ech bom 281 70 274,948 22 ,', 73 , r -34,564 200,000 Slovak born 166,474 100,000 Czech Immigrants 1899-1910 .-123,836 91 , 164 _______...-.---- Czech Immigrants 1899-1920 0---+-----------------~ 1910 1920 When comparing 1910 and 1920 U.S. Censuses with 1899-1924 immigration data, one should understand two facts and their implycations: SLOVAKIA-2017 19 I . The data come from very different sources collected by very different methods. Do not expect exact matches; look instead for consistencies and impossibilities. 2. Caveat: summing annual immigrants overstates their counts in the Censuses. After arriving, many immigrants returned home. Concerning fact #1: All data for Czech foreign stock, foreign born, and immigrants are indeed logically consistent for 1910 and 1920. In both years, there were more residents of Czech foreign stock than those foreign born and those who immigrated since 1899. The Slovak figures for foreign stock and foreign born are also logically consistent. However, the data for Slovak foreign born are inconsistent with the number who immigrated in years preceding both Censuses. It is not possible for 358,056 Slovaks to arrive between 1899 and 1910 and yet have only 166,474 foreign born Slovaks in the 1910 Census. It is not possible for 460,530 Slovaks to immigrate between 1899 and 1920 and yet have only 274,948 Slovaks of foreign birth in 1920. Concerning fact #2: That immigrants often returned home requires some adjustment to the data summed from 1899 to 1910 and from 1899 to 1920. One source for 1908 to 1913 estimated that, respectively, 40 percent and 38 percent of Austrian and Hungarian 27 immigrants to the United States returned home. Other sources give 28 much lower repatriation percentages, almost half. Let us assume the highest figure, that 40 percent of the Slovak immigrants who came in the 12 years prior to 1910, returned home. That would still leave almost 215,000 immigrants, far more than the 166,000 Slovaks the 1910 Census counted as foreign born. Of course, many thousands who came before 1899 were also foreign born and still alive. Applying the same repatriation assumption to Slovak immigrants from 1899 to 1920 lowers the number to around 276,000-which is 27 Willcox, Volume I, 90 and 92. Culen estimated that about 25 percent of all Slovaks who left eventually returned (p. 42); Seton-Watson reported that Slovaks who returned in 1905 were 10 percent of those who left, and that returnees were 20 percent of emigrants in 1906, in R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (New York: Howard Fertig, 1972 edition, original ly published 1908) Appendix XIII, 470. 28 20 SLOVAKIA-2017 close to the 1920 Census count of about 275,000 born abroad. Although the 1899-1920 count still does not include those who immigrated earlier, the much closer fit to the I 920 Census count supports the contention that the 1910 Census woefully undercounted Slovaks. More Slovaks than Czechs in America, Then and Now? To recap, the 1920 Census of foreign stock counted almost identical numbers of Czechs and Slovaks in the United States: 622,796 and 619,866 respectively. Without doubt, the Bureau of the Census had improved its counting of Slovaks substantially since the 1910 Census, but annual counts of Czech and Slovak immigration from 1899 to 1920 suggest that even the 1920 Census underestimated the number of Slovaks, given that large scale Slovak immigration oc29 curred two decades earlier. " By the 1930 Census, which asked mother tongue only for the foreign born, there were more Slovak than Czech speakers, 240,196 to 201,138. As census-takers recorded more familiar with Slovaks as an ethnic group, perhaps they found more Slovaks to count. In any event, it is reasonable to assume that by 1930 there were actually more United States residents of Slovak than Czech ancestry. Despite the fact that Slovak speakers equaled or exceeded Czech speakers by 1920, Slovaks remained largely invisible to the American public. In Francis Clark's 1913 book, Old Homes of New Americans, he reported on a conversation with "an intelligent American lady, who had traveled widely and was not unacquainted with the history and nationality of Austria-Hungary." He asked her to guess how many Slovaks were in the United States; she guessed twenty thousand. He wrote, "She was only five hundred and eighty thousand out of the way, but I have no doubt her guess was quite as near the truth as would be that of most of her countrywomen, or countrymen 30 either, for that matter. " Although the U.S. Census Bureau apparently stopped asking for the mother tongue of foreign born in 1970, the 1980 and 1990 Cen- 29 Ference, p. 131. ° Francis E. C lark, Old Homes of New Americans: The Country and the People of 3 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Their Contribution to the New World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), 212-13 . SLOVAKIA-2017 21 31 suses did attempt to measure ancestry. In 1990, the census-taker filled in a box for Question 13: "What is this person's ancestry or 32 ethnic origin?" Appendix B explained: The question was based on self-identification; the data on ancestry represent self-classification by people according to the ancestry group(s) with which they most closely identify. Ancestry refers to a person's ethnic origin or descent, "roots," or heritage or the place of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors before their arrival in the United States .. .. The ancestry question allowed respondents to report one or more ancestry groups. While a large number of respondents listed a single ancestry, the majority of answers included more than one ethnic entry. Generally, only the first two responses reported were coded in 1990. Based on both responses to the ancestry question, the 1990 Cen33 sus produced these estimates: Slovak 1,882,897 Czech 1,296,411 Czechoslovakian 315,285 Of course, feelings of ancestry fade across generations as marriages occur across ethnic groups. Given that Czechs immigrated a generation earlier than Slovaks, their self-identification in 1990 as Czech-American or Bohemian-American should have faded somewhat more than Slovak-American. The exact numbers for ancestry in 1990 are less significant than their relative magnitudes. These data, even with their imperfections, support the case that Slovak immigrants outnumbered Czechs in the first quarter of the 20 th century, 31 Bureau of the Census, Census '90.- The Foreign-Born Population in the United States (Washington, DC: I 990 CP-3- I), 8-4. 32 Ibid. , E- 14. 33 Based on only people's first response for ancestry, the counts were lower: 1,2 10,652 Slovaks, 772,087 Czechs, and 240,489 Czechoslovakians. Only 3,781 people cited Moravian ancestry. See Bureau of the Census, Census '90: Ancestry of the Population in the United States (Washington, DC: 1990 CP-3-2), Table I: "General Characteristics of Selected Ancestry Groups by Nativity, Citizenship, and Year of Entry." 22 SLOVAKIA-2017 even including Moravians. That seems to be true as well today. In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security reported the persons obtaining lawful permanent resident status by region and country of birth from fiscal years 2004 to 2013. The trend continued: 7,165 people from Slovakia soufht resident status in the U.S. versus 3,783 from the Czech Republic.3 Where Did Czechs and Slovak Settle in the United States? We do not inquire why immigrants chose where they settled in the United States. We look only at where they settled in the first decades of the 20 th century. To determine that, we rely on the 1920 Census, which asked for mother tongue of foreign white stockaccepting its likely undercount of Slovaks. Recall that the 1920 Census counted 622,796 Czechs and 619,866 Slovaks for a combined total of 1,242,662. Given that the amounts are essentially the same, readers can compare the counts directly, without converting them to percentages. Figure 7 displays where they chose to settle in nine Census regions of the United States, ranked by total number of Czechs and Slovaks. Figure 7: Distribution of Czech and Slovak Speakers in Census Regions, 1920• Total Czech• & Slovaka In each region Middle Atlantic 1 ~ 7 3,574 East North Central 425,623 These three regions had 1 , 140,043 of all Czechs & Slovaks (87% ) 180,483 West North Central 13,006 Texas a lone had 84% of all Czechs & Slovaks in this region West South Central 8,306 New England Only 8% of Czechs & Slovaks settled in the rest of the country; except for Texas , very few settled in southern states, 13 ,6 11 South Atlantic 14,996 Pacific Czechs= 622,786 • Slovaks'"' 619,866 Total Czechs & Slovaks = 1 ,242 ,662 934 East South Central 1 ,252 0 34 • 2,186 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 Department of Homeland Security," Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2013 Lawful Permanent Residents," https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-lawful-permanent-residents. SLOVAKIA-2017 23 Fourteenth Census of the United State, 1920: Volume II, General Report and Analytical Tables, Table 7. The comments to the right of Figure 7 draw attention to three major conclusions: (1) almost 90% of all Czechs and Slovaks lived in relatively few states running westward from the Atlantic seaboard into the North Central region; (2) nearly all those in the West South Central region lived in Texas; and (3) relatively few Czechs and Slovaks ventured north to New England, west toward the Mountain and Pacific regions, or south-except for Texas, entering at Galveston. (One source estimated that some 200,000 immigrants entered there 5 between 1865 and 1924.)3 One last comment on Texas: according to the 1920 Census, Czechs outnumbered Slovaks 49,929 to 83 3 ! Figure 8 provides information on the states within three regions in which they settled. Figure 8: Distribution of Czech and Slovak Speakers by States within Regions (See next page) Figure 8 lists all fifteen states in 1920 having the most Czechs and Slovaks within the three regions . Only four of the fifteenPennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, and Indiana-had more Slovaks than Czechs. Pennsylvania stands out as the most extraordinary: Slovaks outnumbered Czechs 296,219 to 19,839, and Pennsylvania-by itself- had 48 percent of all Slovaks counted in the 1920 Census! Pennsylvania drew so many Slovaks that some explanation is needed. In his History of Slovaks in America, Culen wrote: Most of the early Slovak immigrants settled in the industrial and mining areas of Pennsylvania. Here, two main centers developed. One was in the hard coal (anthracite) mining region (or in the Slovak slang "v tvardouholtnej okolici"- '"the hard coal circle"), the other in the soft coal mining region . The first settlements formed around the mines. Later, they formed around large industrial complexes, particularly around iron and steel mills. 36 35 See htt ://wv1w.chron.com/li fe/artic le/Waves-of-mi rants-made-Galveston-intoT~2(i!§_-L73)_~}?Jl'1p_. 36 Konstantin Culen, History of Slovaks in America [Translated from the 1942 Slovak edition by Daniel C. Necas] (St. Paul , MN: Czechoslovak Genealogical Society International, 2007), p. 67. 24 SLOVAKIA-2017 M. Mark Stolarik's more recent research found that Slovaks 316,058 Pennsylvania New York MIDDLE An.ANTIC New Jersey 184,021 Illinois 138,188 Ohio EAST NORTH CENTRAL 58,217 Wisconsin Michigan Indiana Nebraska 41 ,872 Minnesota 34,739 Iowa WEST NORTH CENTRAL 16,277 Missouri 13 ,263 Kansas 11 ,203 South Dakota ■ Czechs ■ Slovaks North Dakota 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 accounted for 13.1 percent of all steel workers in America and 12.8 37 percent of bituminous coal miners. New Jersey also had a preponderance of Slovaks over Czechs, as did Ohio, but neither rivaled Pennsylvania. Indiana also had more Slovaks than Czechs, but few of each. 37 Marian Mark Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 1870-1918 (New York: AMS Press, 1989), pp. 111-112, SLOVAKIA-2017 25 The other eleven states had Czech majorities- often overwhelming majorities. Nebraska was home to 54,024 Czechs but only 281 Slovaks! That ratio even exceeded Texas' Czech majority. My home state of Illinois had-after Pennsylvania-the second largest number of Czech and Slovak immigrants. Where in Illinois did those Czechs and Slovaks live? Did they live in urban or rural areas? The 1920 Census did not classify the foreign stock by urban rural residence, but the 1930 Census did report urban-rural location for the foreign born, which means the more recent immigrants. At that time, "urban" meant incorporated areas of 2,500 or more inhabitants-places that we would not call urban today. Nevertheless, only 56 percent of the U.S. population lived in urban areas in 1930. 38 Although they had emigrated from rural lands, both Czechs (66 percent) and Slovaks (72 percent) gravitated to urban areas. 39 Only in certain states did Czechs and Slovaks congregate in large cities. The United States had only 73 cities with 100,000 or more population in 1920. Ten were in the three states with the largest number of Czechs and Slovaks combined-Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio. Because most mines and mills were located outside of Pennsylvania's large cities- Philadelphia, Scranton, and Pittsburgh. -merely 8 percent of its Czechs and Slovaks lived in its big cities. Ohio, with six cities over 100,000, presented a different case. Only Cleveland- a major steel and manufacturing center-attracted Czechs and Slovaks in droves, accounting for 52 percent of them, more Czechs than Slovaks. My home state of Illinois had only one city over 100,000 population-Chicago-and 72 percent of all Czechs and Slovaks in Illinois in 1920 lived in Chicago. The breakdown was 106,428 Czechs and 25 ,720 Slovaks. Given that Czechs outnumbered Slovaks by nearly 4 to 1 in Chicago, perhaps that explains why I never met any. Conclusion: Slovaks as the Silent Majority Certainly the preponderance of Czechs in Chicago partly explains why I was unaware of them. Probably more important was 38 Fifteenth Census of the United State, 1920: Volume II, General Report, Statistics b{ Subject, Chapter 1, Table 1. 3 Ibid. , Chapter 7, Table I. 26 SLOVAKIA-2017 that Slovaks were more silent than Czechs, so got little press compared to Czechs who- like the Irish in Boston and Italians in New York- soon became a force in city politics. Anton Cermak (originally Cermak) became a Chicago alderman, then president of the county board (1922), head of the county Democratic Party (1928), and mayor of the city (1931 ). His prominence allowed him to stand next to president-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in Miami, where Cermak was killed by a bullet presumably aimed at the president. Slovaks also made less news than Czechs nationwide. Figure 9 shows how often articles in the Tim es, the leading newspaper in the nation's biggest city, mentioned either "Czechs" or "Slovaks.1140 From 1901 to 1910, the New York Times paid little attention to either group . Of only 88 articles during that decade that mentioned either, 75 percent were about Czechs. In the next decade, encompassing World War I and the creation of Czechoslovakia, the number of stories in the Times increased tenfold to 890, and the percentage mentioning Czechs increased to 81. By 1920, when Slovak equaled Czech as a mother tongue in census statistics, the Czech advantage in 689 Tim es' stories climbed to 84 percent. The Czech penumbra extended far over the Slovaks especially in the metropolitan media. Figure 9: "Czechs" and "Slovaks" in the News, 1900-1930 300 Number of articles in New York Tiines 250 Number mentioning Czechs 200 150 100 50 1905 40 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 "CHRONICLE. Visualizing language usage in New York Times news coverage throughout its history," at http ://chronicle.nvtlabs.com/. SLOVAKIA-2017 27 Cermak's visible political career in Chicago, Tomas Masaryk's tireless campaigning across the country for the existence of Czechoslovakia as an independent nation, the nation's creation after World War I, and Edvard Benes' presidency, all, no doubt contributed to the many articles mentioning Czechs in the New York Times during this period. Slovaks lacked comparable political celebrities or events to gamer publicity. Finally, the fact that almost one-half of all Slovak immigrants to the United States settled in one state, Pennsylvania and outside its large cities no doubt contributed to Slovaks' neglect by the national press and to their invisibility to people living in other states. Despite the fact that Slovaks were often unrecognized and undercounted by census-takers, the 1990 Census confirmed that more Americans claimed Slovak than Czech ancestry. Even today, that fact surprises many people.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource More Slovaks in the U.S. than Czechs? Who Says? When and Where? Description An account of the resource Kenneth Janda Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017 pp. 7-27 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Janda, Kenneth Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0a4186c45f469a6e25c3397d9b2e72f1.pdf 8565f71f4a21fc7514fbf5cb042e30d2 PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKIA-2017 A SURVEY OF SLOVAK COMMUNITIES OF THE BYZANTINE RITE IN CANADA BEFORE THEY RECEIVED THEIR OWN BISHOPRIC Daniel Cerny When we look at Catholic immigration to the USA and Canada, only one bishopric in those coutries is called by the name of the nations of the so-called Visegrad Group- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Surprisingly, this ecclesiastical structure is not of the Latin rite. It is the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodious for Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite in Canada. When created in 1980, a postcard with a map of Slovak Greek Catholic settlements in Canada was published. The aim of this paper is to present a historical overview of these communities until the Eparchy was created. The late professor Michael Lacko, SJ wrote the first history of these par1 ishes. However, this paper adds some new information, making this survey more accurate and updated. Some of the reasons why these people immigrated to Canada were the changes to the immigration laws in the USA enacted by Congress in June of 1921 and also in July of 1924. 2 Our research on Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada shows that the majority were descendenats of immigrants who came to Canada between 1926 and 1939 (when the borders were open), to be joined by the immigration waves of 1945 - 1950 and of 1968. For the first immigrants the church was in many cases the most important part of their life. Here they were not forced to speak a foreign language, it was like being at home - the same rite, dialects, family, friends, sometimes even neighbors, the same customs. However this also could be harmful in the sense that it created an ethnic 1 Cf. Lacko, Michal, "A Brief Survey of the History of the Slovak Catholics of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite," Slovak Studies, III (1963), 199 - 224. 2 Based on these regulations, after June of 1921 only 14,269 Czechoslovak citizens were allowed to immigrate annually to the USA, and after July 1924, only 3,073. Cf. Bielik, Frantisek- Rakos, Elo: Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo (Dokumenty II. - 19191939) (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1975), 51, footnote 2. �SLOVAKIA-2017 29 ghetto - which was probably fine for the first generation, but no longer so for the following ones. Only those places which experienced large numbers of new immigrants in later years, or were open to new people from outside entering "their" church, were able to continue to flourish . The history of these communities includes the creation of their own Slovak deanery (1957) and the consecration of their own Slovak 3 bishop ( 1964) in the person of Michael Rusnak, CSsR, who was for many years an Apostolic Visitator of these communities. Only two Slovak Greek Catholics participated on the Vatican II Council. One layman and one clergyman. The layman was the Canadian-Slovak multimilllionaire Stephen B. Roman, who participated from the third session on and bishop Michal Rusnak, who participated in the fourth and final session. The use of the vernacular, which was encouraged by Vatican II, resulted in more and more celebrations in English among the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada (the translations were done by the Greek Catholics in the Ruthenian Church in the USA), but not so in modem Slovak. Thus the Church lost many people from 4 the immigration wave of 1968. 3 Michael Rusnak was born on August 21, 1921 in Beaverdale, Pennsylvania. His mother and siblings returned with him to Slovakia during the Great Depression. He was ordained a Redemptorist priest by Bishop Pau l Gojdic, OSBM in Jul y of 1949. After the forced liquidation of the Greek Catholic church in Czechoslovakia, Rusnak was arrested and placed in the Podolinec monastery, which was turned into a prison camp for the clergy . After fifteen months in vari ous prisons, he escaped and, thanks to his American citizenship, he was allowed to emigrate to America. Ru snak went to Canada in 1951 and started to establish Slovak Greek Catholic parishes. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Bishop of Toronto, the Most Reverend Isidore Borecky, named Father Rusnak dean for Slovak Greek-Catholic parishes belonging to his jurisdiction.in 1957. On October 5, 1964, Pope Paul VI elevated Father Rusnak to Auxiliary Bishop to Isidore Borecky and Apostolic Visitator for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada. The process of creating the Slovak Greek Catholic Church in Canada was completed when Pope John Paul II , in his bull Apostolicae Sedis of October 13, 1980, created the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada. At the same time, the pope appointed aux iliary bishop Michael Rusnak as the eparchi al bishop of this Eparchy . Rusnak retired in 1996 and died on January 16, 2003 and is buried at the Holy Cross Cemetery in Thornhill , Ontario. More about Bishop Michael Rusnak can be found in Cerny, Daniel, Biskup Michael Rusnak, CSsR (Diploma thesis), Presov: Greek Catho lic Theological Faculty of the University of Presov, 2008 . 4 Documents on this topic are in the personal archives of the author (hereafter PAA), and are based on letters from Father Fuga, Father Dubiak and Father Lacko. �30 SLOVAKIA-2017 The author of this article located important documents in various archives, and tiny pieces of the mosaic were found everywhere. Especially valuable were the articles in Maria magazine, which was published from 1955 to 1969 and then from 1976 to I 989; in the second period under the direction of a gifted editor - the late Jozef Suchy. In some cases, we can speak only about individuals, in other cases about a group of dedicated parishioners with only irregular services. The most advanced was the group of individual parishes, which we are about to describe. In 1980 these parishes were incorporated into the newly-created Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada,5 the only Slovak Greek Catholic eparchy in the world, which served as a beacon to the persecuted and oppressed brothers and sisters in Slovakia under the . yo ke. 6 communist PARISHES 1: Lethbridge, Alberta (1921) The oldest Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Canada was in Lethbridge, Alberta. In 1885 the first Slovaks came to Lethbridge from 7 Shelby, Montana. Among them was the Veselenak family, Greek 8 Catholics from Nizne Slovinky in Spis county. Local Slovaks formed branch 53 of the Canadian Slovak League (CSL) in 1946. The Slovak Greek Catholic parish of Sts. Peter and Paul was founded in 1921 by coal miners, who came mostly from the Spis villages of Ponic, Zavadka and Slovinky. Before the parish was erected, the faithful organized a branch of the American-based Greek Catholic 5 Cf. L ·o sservatore Romano, December 14, 1980, Articles entitled "Erezione di nuova Eparchia; Provvista di Chiesa; Eretta in Canada Eparchi a di rito bizantino per slovacch i", 1-2. 6 For more on the general history of the Slovak Greek Catholi cs in Canada see Cerny, Daniel , "From Unknown People to a Separate Diocese: Slovak Greek Catholics in Canad a," in Mazurkiewicz, Adam, ed ., East Central Europe in Exile Volum e 1: Transatlantic Migrations (Newcastle upon Tyne : Cam bridge Scholars Publishing, 20 13), 253-72. 7 Cf. "75 rokov lethbridzs kej slov. kol6nie," Kanadsk), Slovak, February 18, 1961 , p. 2. 8 Cf. The Bend: A History of West Lethbridge (Lethbridge: West Lethbridge History Book Soc iety, 1982), 218. �SLOVAKIA-2017 31 9 Union. One important document, a photocopy of the parish minutes from the years 1921-193 7 exists, deposited in the library of the Pon10 tifical Oriental Institute in Rome. These minutes were written by 11 Andrew Mihalik. They start with the explanation that the term "fonitika," mentioned in the minutes as a petition to the Ukrainian bishop of Edmonton Nikita Budka, is to be the language used in the church, and that meant the Slovak language. According to these minutes, the first meeting took place on May 30, 1921 in the presence of bishop Budka. The faithful asked to have the celebration of a lit12 urgy every Sunday. During Wold War II the parish counted some 13 200 adults and 300 children. It was founded and owned by lay people (trustees). This was quite common in the ecclesiastical history of the USA and Canada. According to historian Mark Stolarik, this system consisted of elected members of the parish (kuratori), who collected tithes once a year from all the parishioners. A priest was paid from this treasury and the faithful had the right to terminate their 14 contract with him. Before the blessing of the church, the trustees 15 negotiated with the bishop for a resident priest. The parish had 16 a choir, the first Slovak Greek Catholic Choir in Canada. During the first years of its existence, the pastors were predominately Ukrainian, with the exception of Father Nicholas Szilagy, who came from Subcarpathia. In 1948 Ukrainians established their own parish in Lethbridge, but Ukrainian priests continued to serve Sts. Peter and Paul. However a great joy for the Slovak parish was the 1953 or- 9 PAA, e-mail fro m Father David Petras, November 5, 2010. Parafialna zapisnica Sv. toho Petra i Pavla Greko Katolickoho Viznania.(further on only PIO). 11 In 2011 the author of thi s article contacted the son of the late Andrew Mihalik. The original of the minutes are now neither in the parish archive, nor among the f:osses ions of the Mihalik family. 2 Cf. PIO, 2. 13 PAA, Quinquennial report for Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada, 1973-1978 (November 151, 1978), 2. 14 Cf. Stolarik, M. Mark, " Slovak Immigrants Co me to Terms with Religious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , No . I (January, 20 I 0), 69. 15 Cf. PIO, 36. 16 Cf. PIO, 25 ; 62. 10 �32 SLOVAKJA-2017 17 daination of one of their own, Father Richard Zuback, who later 18 served also as their pastor. Some of the parishioners appeared 19 among the benefactors of Maria magazine. The first pastoral visit of Bishop Rusnak took place on June 27, 1965 , the parish 's feast day. Many people came to the celebration from as far away as British Columbia. In his homily, Bishop Rusnak said the following: "Do not correct the work of God. If God created you as Greek Catholics, stay firm , remain and work in this province. Do not run away from this rite. Do not leave behind your church and 20 rite. " In the 1960's Father John Zeman, OSB informed Bishop Rusnak about the local Slovak Greek Catholics, asking for a Slovak priest, as the young people were without a priest of their own and 1 ashamed of being Slovaks.2 Father Zeman volunteered to go to the 22 parish . This never happened . In 1967 Bishop Michael expressed his desire to send Father Zorvan, from Europe, to be the pastor of the 23 parish. In I 970's the parish was noted in his calendar several times. 24 Father Lacko, SJ visited the parish in August 1973. When the enthronement of Bishop Rusnak was organized in 1981, the Leth bridge pastor refused to participate, claiming to have only nineteen Slovak 25 families. On the contrary, in 1982, Bishop Rusnak informed the Papal Pro-Nuncio that there were forty-five Slovak families in Leth26 bridge. The parish was owned by the trustees almost for a record time. The official incorporation into the Ukrainian church happened 27 on ly after a plebiscite within the parish in the early 2000's. The 17 "Prve slov. gr. katol primicie v Lethbridge, Alta," Kanadsky Slovak, June 20, 1953, p. 2. The author is grateful for this information to Mark Stolarik. 18 Cf. " Zpravy," Maria, 5/1955 Gui), I 0. 19 Cf. Maria, 6-7/ 1964, third page of the cover; I 2/ 1966, third page of the cover. 20 "Cestujeme s p. biskupom ," Maria , 9-10/ 1965, 8. 21 Cf. PAA, Letter of Father John Zeman, C hri stmas 1964. Father John , who was born in Kenaston , Saskatchewan, joined th e Slovak Benedictine Order in Cleveland, Ohio, but always wished to return to Canada. 22 Cf. PAA, Letter of Father John Zeman, sen t on July 22 , 1966 . 23 Cf. PAA , Letter of Bi shop Michael of May 15, 1967. 24 Cf. PAA , Postcard "Srdecny pozdrav od Ticheho oceanu," Sent from San Francisco, July 20, 1973 . 25 Cf. PAA , Motiuk, D. Report on the Canonical status of Saint Peter and Paul Catholic Church. l ethbridge. Alberta. 26 27 Cf. PA A, Letter of Bishop Michael to the Pro- uncio, sent October 28, 1982. Archive of the Eparchy of Sts. Cyri l and Methodius, folder Lethbridge. �33 SLOVAKIA-2017 parish is thus nowadays Ukrainian, but its contribution to the history and culture of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada, especially in the first half of the 20 th century, is significant. 2: Montreal, Quebec (1930) 28 Many Slovaks settled in Montreal in the l 920's, forming branch 2 of the CSL in 1932. After Western Canada, Montreal became the second center of Slovak settlement in Canada. Slovaks in Montreal first established a Roman Catholic parish in 1928 and a 29 Lutheran one in 1929. The Slovak Greek Catholics joined several fraternal groups, such as the Greek Catholic Union. At one of the meetings of branch 959 of the Union, on October 18, 1930, discussions started and eventually led to the founding of the Slovak Greek 30 Catholic parish. The volunteers created a list of fifty families and 31 many individuals who would join the parish. Ukrainian Bishop Ladyka, visiting Montreal on November 21, 1930, welcomed the delegates and promised to do everything possible "in order to fulfill the request of this God-fearing people, who are organizing themselves in this foreign world, not forgetting God, and are willing to do such a 32 beautiful, but difficult task." The first liturgy was celebrated by Father Michal Gregorejchuk, OSBM on Sunday, December 7, 33 1930. Three days later a meeting was held and a parish council was elected. December I 0, 1930 is considered the date of the creation of 34 the parish. From the very beginning the parish was organized by Slovaks not only from Slovakia, but from Hungary, Romania or 35 elsewhere. A photo from 1931 testifies to the presence of a Slovak 36 school. In 1931 a "Membership Book" was published. This book, 28 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia - Nanebevstupenia Pana v Montreale - 50'h anniversary Slovak Catholic (E. R.) parish of Ascension Montreal (Montreal: Parish of the Ascension, 1980), 34. 29 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady, 34. 3 Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, I. 31 PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 3-4. 32 PAA Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 2. 33 Cf. PAA , Zapisn ica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 2. 34 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 30; 34. 35 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr kat. osady Voznesenia, 24. 36 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 23. ° �34 SLOVAKIA-2017 together with the first financial records, are an authoritative example 37 of the language of the first immigrants. The Basilian fathers took care of the parish until the arrival of 38 Father John Hawryluk in 1949. When the parish was created it was named the GR. KFT. RUSSKA CERKOV (Greek Catholic Russian Church). The change of name was moti vated by a schismatic movement and the rise of national awareness among the faithful. The name Slovak Gr. Cath. Church was used for the first time on October 39 15, 1935 . A youth orchestra nicely represented the parish. In 193 7 the parishioners started to use the chapel in the Notre Dame de Lourdes church as their place of worship until November, 1959. In 1938 the parish mission was granted permission to keep their own 40 parish records and thus gained greater internal autonomy. In these years the pari sh was still only a mission. The years following WW II brought a radical change into the lives of the Slovak Greek Catholics . With the arrival of thousands of Ukrainian refugees to Canada, the Ukrainian Exarchate, later the Eparchy of Toronto and all Eastern Canada, was founded. Its first bishop was Isidore Borecky. On October 10, 1949, Bishop Borecky named Father John Hawryluk as the pastor of the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Montreal. On December 20, 1949 the former mis41 sion was established as an independent parish. The presence of young people at the services was really appreciated as the youth was 42 "the real core of the new choir of our church." The choir even broadcast by radio to Slovakia. The people dreamt about getting a Slovak priest: 37 Original scans were published in 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 44. 38 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 37. And also : Souvenir book of the dedication of the Slovak Catholic E. R. Church of Ascension, Montreal, Jun e JO, 1962 - Pamiitnci kniha archijerejskeho blahoslovenia slovenskej katolickej V 0. cerkvi Voznesenia, Montreal, JO. juna 1962 (Montreal: Pari sh of the Ascension, 1962), 17-18 . 39 Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 32. 4 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 35; 37-39. 41 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 3 1; 40. 42 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 40. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 35 We firmly believe that, in a short time a priest of Slovak ethnicity wi ll be assigned to our parish and thus we will fulfill our long-time dream .... The faithfu l understands the announced Word of God more easily . .. There are obstacles in foreign objections and intentions that prevent us from achieving this goal of ours . .. "We do not long for something foreign, we just want to live our own life, but on the other hand we do not accept anyone trying to make fools of us, that we are Rusnaks or something similar, because those days are gone ... 43 In 1956 the trustees purchased properties at the comer of Legen45 44 dre and Clark streets, and erected a wooden cross . The construction of the new church started in Apri l and the basement was finished 46 in November of I 959 . Parishioners came in the evenings, and on their days off, to work on the construction of the church. The first liturgy in the hall in the basement was celebrated on November 29, 47 1959. The cornerstone was blessed by Bishop Borecky on October 48 2, 1960, and the construction was completed on December 17, 49 1961. An icon of Our Lady of Klokofov was displayed in the 50 church . The solemn blessing of the new church by Bishop Borecky 51 had to wait until June I 0, 1962. The main contractor was the parishioner, Mr. Andrej Midlick, originally from Ponic in Spis county. He even donated to the new church the main altar with a baldachino. The newly-ordained Bishop Rusnak came to visit his flock in 52 Montreal for the first time in May of 1965. Bishop Rusnak blessed 43 "Sv. misie pre gr.-kat. Slovakov v Montreali ," Kanadsky Slowik, Apri l 3, 1954, ff· 5, 8. Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Slovenskej Greko Katol'ickej Osadi Voznesefza Vo Montreale Jan Ihnat zapisnik Na rok 1956, 4-5. 45 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 32. The wooden cross still stands in 201 6. 46 Cf. Souvenir book, 34. 47 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 36. 48 Cf. "Z nasich fa rnosti," Maria , 9-10/1960, 226. 49 Souvenir book, 28 . so Cf. "Z nas ich farnosti," Maria, 3/ 1962, 67. 51 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 42. 52 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 42. �36 SLOVAKIA-2017 the altar on March 6, 1966. From Rome he brought some relics of Saint Cyril to be placed into the altar. The parish in Montreal thus became the first one in the North America to celebrate the liturgy on 53 the relics of this great saint. Bishop Rusnak expressed his desire that the Ascension Church would become "a site of pilgrimages in honor of Saint Cyril, the apostle of the Slovaks and Slavs in general. ,,54 • On October 15, 1966, Father Andrew Sinai' was named pastor. 55 For the first time in its history, the parish had its own Slovak priest. Father Sinai' served until 2006. The beginnings were very hard for Father Sinai', since the parish had a huge mortgage. The trustees gave their approval for reading of the Gospel in English and in Slovak to meet the needs of the younger generation, in order to bring them back to the church. From June 1, 1971 Slovak liturgies were cele56 brated in the parish. The golden jubilee was celebrated on Sunday, 57 September 28, 1980, with Bishop Rusnak present. More than twenty of the original founders of the parish survived for this celebration. Around 500 people attended the banquet. However, due to the death of Father Sinai in 2007 and to dwindling numbers, the Montreal parish was closed in 2010. 3: Windsor, Ontario (1950) The automobile industry attracted many Slovaks to the city of Windsor. So did some farms on the outskirts of town. In 1951 the 58 third largest group of Slovaks in Canada lived here. Slovak Lutherans in Windsor organized a parish in 1928, while the Slovak Greek Catholics had to wait until after WW II. Andrew Balint, acting as the secretary of a newly-formed parish committee, wrote to Bishop 59 Borecky on July 29, 1950. He asked for the bishop's permission to 53 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 42. Tomko, Vladimir, " Posviacka noveho hi. oltara v Montreale," Maria, 4-5/ 1966, 56. 55 PAA, Letter sent on October 4, 1966. 56 Cf. PAA, Zapisnica Slovenskej Greko Katol'ickej Osadi Vozneseiia Vo Montreale Jan Ihnat zapisnik Na rok 1956, 48. 57 Cf. "Oslava 50 rocneho jubilea nasej farnosti v Montreale," Maria , 12/1980, 7-8. 58 Cf. Kirschbaum, 137. 59 PAA , Letter from Jul y 29, 1950. 54 �SLOVAKIA-2017 37 establish a new parish. The name chosen was "St. Michael the Archangel Slovak and Subcarpathian Greek Catholic Parish in Windsor, 60 ON." The letter ended with the desire of the congregation to "soon 61 invite (the bishop) to the Slovak parish." Borecky agreed with the 62 organization of a Slovak parish. Father Andrew Krafcik also played a role in its establishment. Until his arrival in Windsor, the 63 parish was administered by Father Mina. The blessing of the cor64 nerstone took place on June 13 , 1954. The rectory, hall and the 65 church were blessed by Bishop Borecky on November 7, 1954. 66 Work with the youth led to establishing the parish choir. In 1956 67 Father George Perejda, CSsR, was ordained from the parish. From November of 1957 to February of 1958 the parish was served by Fa68 ther Fetsco. In 1958 a newly-ordained Slovak Greek Catholic priest, Anthony Zouzal, was appointed as the pastor of Windsor. His tenure could be 69 characterized as the "golden age" of the parish. Collaboration with the Byzantine Catholics on the American side of the border was intensified. 7° Thanks to many cantors, the parish was famous for its singing of Vespers and Liturgies. The popularity of Father Zouzal was so great that on his birthday the parishioners gave him a gift - a 71 car. In his letter to the chancery, dated August 1966, Father Zouzal suggested building a parish school, and even a new name for the parish: the Greek Catholic Parish of St. John - Michael, in order to 60 Sv. Micha/a Archandela Slov. a Podkrp.Gr.kt.paraphija vo Windsor Ont. PAA , Letter from July 29, 1950. 61 "Scoby mi Vas poklikali skoro na nasu Slovensku paraphiju. " PAA , Letter from Jul y 29, 1950. 62 27. Lipna /950. PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore from July 27, 1950. 63 Cf. "S lovenski greckokatolici v Ontariu," Kanadsky Slowik, September 4, 1954, p. 5. 64 Cf. "Cirkevna slavnost' vo Windsore, Ont.", Kanadsky Slowik, June 12, 1954, p. 8. 65 See the photo in Maria, I /1955 (March), 15. 66 Cf. "Zo zivota nasich farnosti ," Maria , 3/ 195 5 (June), I 6. 67 Cf. "Zpravy," Maria, 6/ 1956, 14. 68 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria , 3-4/ 1965, 15 . 69 Cf. "Zpravy z domova a z katolickeho sveta," Maria, 12/ 1958, 15-16. 7 Cf. " Den modlitieb vo Windsore," Kanadsky Slovak, September 19, 1959, p. 2; "Z nasich farnosti," Maria , I 2/ 1960, 282. 71 Cf. "Z nasich osad," Maria, 7-8/ 1960, 189. ° �38 SLOVAKIA-2017 72 avoid confusion within the city. The school project was never im73 plemented . In 1976 Father Zouzal was named an archpriest. However, his tenure was cut short with his premature death on July 14, 74 1976. An eyewitness remembers Bishop Borecky coming to the funeral and placing his own pectoral cross on the body in the coffin. Some 150 priests, as well as more than 1,500 laypeople, participated 75 in the funeral procession. In the following years the parish was served by Father Gregory Novak, CSsR, by Father James Lynch in 76 1978, and by Father Andrew Sipek in 1979. In 1980 some 400 77 people attended an anniversary banquet. The parish continues to exist to this day. 4: Toronto, Ontario (1951) Slovak settlement in Toronto is already mentioned towards the 78 end of the 19 th century, but large numbers came only after 1923. Many Slovak Greek Catholics in Toronto belonged to branch 7 of the CSL (1937). During their meetings the opportunity to establish an independent Slovak Greek Catholic parish was discussed. Until that time, Slovak Greek Catholics mostly attended the Slovak Roman Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius (1934), where they comprised a third, or maybe even half of the members . As a result, many people regarded very negatively attempts to establish another parish.79 The beginnings of the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Toronto 80 are connected with a Rusyn priest, Father Louis Mina. In the archives of the Ukrainian Eparchy of Toronto is a list of seventy-seven names of those who volunteered to join a "S lovak Greek Catholic 72 PA A, Letter of Father Zouzal to Bishop Isidore from August 12, 1966. Cf. "Vy znamenani e o. Antona Zouzala," Maria, 5/ 1976, I 0. 74 "Zomrel o. Anton Zouzal ," Maria, 9/ 1976, 11. 75 PAA , Comm uni cation with Mr. W. Zouzal , recorded on June 5, 20 11. 76 Cf. "Novy paroch vo Windsore," Maria, 12/ 1979, 7. 77 Cf. "Odpust" in Windsor, Maria, 12/ 1980, 9. 78 Cf. Kirschbaum , 132-5. 79 Mikula, Jan, " Hrst' rozpomienok na t'azke zaciatky," Kanadsky Slovak, March 28, 1981, p. 8. 8 Cf. "S lovenski greckokatolici v Ontariu," Kanadsky Slovak, September 4, 1954, p. 5. 73 ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 39 81 parish, if such were created." The parish was founded on October 82 29, 1951 as the Slovak Greek - Catholic Church of the Nativity of the B. V. Mary. A different date is indicated by a document dated November 29, 1951 based on a request for the founding of the parish, written and submitted in the name of the faithful from the Eparchies of Presov and Mukacevo, as well as the Apostolic Administra83 tion in Miskolc, Hungary by Father Mina. The term Slovak was of much wider sense than nowadays and it included almost all the Greek Catholic faithful coming from the Union of Uzhorod. The lit84 urgy was celebrated in the Ukrainian Church on Bathurst Street. On April I , 1952, Father Rusnak was named the new pastor of the church. The congregation gathered first on Bathurst Street, then moved to the Holy Eucharist church on King Street, where they worshiped until 1959, when their own church on Shaw Street was 85 blessed. The plans for the new Slovak Greek Catholic church in Toronto were approved on June 9, 1953 . The church was supposed to 86 be built at the comer of Roblock Avenue and Leeds, however this 87 attempt failed. The success of parish picnics led to the purchase of 89 St. Mary's Park. 88 The parish also acquired one part of a cemetery. However, none of these investments lasted. Towards the end of 1956 90 a choir was organized in the parish. A long-time cantor was Mr. 91 Joseph Kampu. At the end of 1959 the parish acquired a B' nai Is92 rael congregation synagogue, located at 257 Shaw Street. On De93 cember 27, 1959 Bishop Borecky blessed it as a church. Some 600 81 PAA, Copy of the signature li st. Cf. "25. vyroc ie nasej famost i," Maria, 9/ 1976, I 0. Jozef Suchy gives the date of October 2 1. 83 PAA, Letter from 28. XI. 1951. 84 Cf. Vasko, Andrej , "S lovenskf Grecko-katolfci," Kanadsky Slovak, October 11 , 1952, p. 2. 85 Cf. Ru snak, Michal , "Stvrt'storocie nasho rastu," Maria , 1/ 1980, 11. 86 Cf. Daily commercial news and building records, June 9 1953, I. 87 Cf. Ru snak, Michal , "Stvrt'storocie nasho rastu," Maria , 1/ 1980, 11 . 88 Cf. Maria, 5/ 1963 , third page of the cover. 89 Maria , 2/1963 , 16. 90 Cf. "Z nasich farnosti," Maria, 9-10/1956, 22. 91 Cf. Maria, 4/1963, 16. 92 Cf. "Time for rejoicing - Celebrate Opening of New Slovak Church," Toronto Daily Star, October 11 , 1959, p. 57 . 93 Cf. " Pozvanka na posviacku," Kanadsky Slovak, Christmas 1959, p. 4. 82 �40 SLOVAKIA-2017 94 people from near and far attended. The first English liturgy in the 95 parish was celebrated on March 22, 1964. The nomination of Father Rusnak as the Auxiliary Bishop of the Toronto Eparchy and the Apostolic Visitator for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada surely filled his parishioners with joy, for the church with its rectory became the official seat of the new bishop. Father John Fetsco became its new pastor. In 1972 Father John Pazak, CSsR, later the second bishop of the Slovak Eparchy, was 96 ordained a deacon in the parish. In 1974 Father Joseph Krafcik, SJ 97 helped out. The "odpust" celebration of 197 5 was highlighted by the priestly ordinations of three married deacons, at that time a rare 98 ordination in the Catholic world. On May 31, 1976, a Divine Litur99 gy was celebrated for the first time in Slovak. The arrival of Father Richard Boyle, ordained in the parish in 1978, brought new life to 100 the parish. This consisted not only of pilgrimages he organized, but all the parish activities, where he, together with a group of volun0 teers, cared for children as well as adults. ' ' He even installed a provisional iconostasis. On July 17, 1980, the first Slovak Greek Catholic Day in Bratislava Park near Hamilton took place, in an attempt to unite all the Slovak Greek Catholic parishes at a picnic. The "odpust" in 1980 was prepared jointly by all the parishes, and some 500 102 people attended. When the Slovak Eparchy was created, the 94 Cf. "Z nasich osad," Maria, 1-2/ 1960, 39. Cf. "Kronika," Maria , 3-411964, 16. 96 "Najdostojnej si o. Biskup Jan Pazak, C.Ss.R." in "Banquet in honour of His Excellency Most Reverend John S. Pazak, C.Ss.R." in The episcopal ordination and enthronement of the Most Reverend John S. Pazak, C.Ss. R., second Bishop of the Eparchy of Saints Cyril and Methodius for Byzantine Slovaks in Canada (Toronto: E;archy of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 2000). 9 Cf. PAA , Letter Vel'adostojny a mily Vlady ko! Sent from Rome, Jul y 3, 1974. 98 The whole story is described in the following: Pospishil , Victor, "The Toronto Tempest," in Compulsory celibacy fo r the Eastern Catholics in the Americas (Toronto: Ukrainian Catholic Women's League, 1977). 99 Cf. " Slovenska liturgia v Toronte," Maria, 7-8/ 1976, 13-14. 100 To Quebec and its sanctuaries, to the Holy Land or pilgrimages to Uniontown, PA. 101 Cf. Boy le, Richard, "First solemn reception of Holy Communion in Toronto," Maria , 9/ 1979, 11. 102 Cf. Boyle, Richard, "Alive and well on Shaw Street in Toronto," Maria , 11 / 1980, 8-9. 95 �SLOVAKIA-2017 41 church on Shaw Street became its cathedral. A bishop's throne was 103 installed in the cathedral on the orders of Bishop Rusnak. As time passed many parishioners from downtown Toronto (and from the vicinity of the church) moved to other areas of town. It would have been fitting to reach out to these people, especially in the western areas of the Greater Toronto Area. 5: Oshawa, Ontario (1952) Slovak settlement in Oshawa started in the l 920's and is closely related to the development of the automobile industry in the area. After their arrival, the Greek Catholic Slovaks started to attend ser104 vices in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church of Saint George. In 1951 an announcement was placed in Kanadsky Slovak asking people in the Oshawa region who were interested in establishing a Slo105 vak Greek Catholic church to gather for a meeting. Thanks to Mr. 106 Andrew Vasko, the first meeting took place in January of 1952. The chairman asked all those present to sign a document confirming their desire to establish a Slovak Greek Catholic Society. Some fifty signatures were collected. At this meeting a parish committee was elected and the possibility of celebrating the Greek Catholic services 107 in the Slovak Hall was discussed. The first pastor of the community was the Reverend Michael Rusnak. On July 13 , 1952 the very first Slovak Greek Catholic Day in Oshawa was organized with a field 108 liturgy. On January 11 , 1953, the potential parishioners sent a request to Bishop Borecky for a "Slovak Greek Catholic priest, who would be able to have divine services in Oshawa every other Sunday 103 PAA , Folder: Boyle, Letter of Bishop Michael , February 12, 1981. Cf. "Z peknej slovenskej svadby v Oshawe," Kanadsky Slovak, August I 0, 1950, p. 7; "SI. M. Korcinska a p. M. Karas v putach manzelstva," Kanadsky Slovak, October 19, 1950, p. 6. 105 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin famosti) ," Kanadsky Slovak, AJril 26, 1958, p. 3. 1 Cf. PAA , Lescisin, E. & C.: Slovenska greckokatolicka farnost Ochrany Presvdtej Bohorodicky Oshawa, Ontario, Canada - Slovak Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary Oshawa, Ontario, Canada. November 2001, not for sale description of the parish history, 5. 107 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin farnosti) ," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 108 Cf. Ibid. 104 �42 SLOVAKJA-2017 • a mont h ." 109 Some th.irty SI ova k s s1gne • d th e petition. • • 11 0 A or twice mission was established in February of 1953 . The Divine Liturgy was celebrated every other Sunday of the month in the Slovak Hall 111 and the solemn opening ofthe mission occurred on May 10, 1953. The liturgies were celebrated in the morning in Church Slavonic, but 11 2 always with a Slovak sermon. A property was purchased in 1953 11 3 right next to the Slovak Hall on Ritson Road. Really encouraging was the fact that the building process was started by only thirty-eight 114 families. Of great help was a six month-long strike by the United Auto Workers (UAW) labor union in the local General Motors Com11 5 pany, thus providing a ready labor force . The blessing of the cor11 6 nerstone occurred on July 31 , 1955 . The fini shed church was 117 blessed by Bishop Borecky on November 2, I 955 . Attendance was astounding, as according to one chronicler: "From some 800 mouths resounded the hierarchical hymn: " Vose) jesi Archijere11 8 1I 9 ju ..." The parish also offered religious education for the youth. 12 In the late 1950' s a Slovak choir also existed in Oshawa. From October of 1960 until September of 1963 , the parish was adminis12 1 tered by Father John Fetsco, CSsR. He was succeeded by Father 122 Andrew Krafcik. The first official visit of Bishop Rusnak to the 123 parish in Oshawa was on Sunday, May 2, I 965 . Father Michael ° 109 PAA , Without any signature. PAA , Without any signature. 11 1 Cf. " Slovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dej in fa rnosti )," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 11 2 C f. " Prvy slovensky grec ko-katolicky odpust," Kanadsky Slovak, November 14, 1953 , p. 2. 11 3 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin farn osti)," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 11 " Vzor jedn oty a spoluprace," Maria, 5/ 1957, 14. 115 Cf. Lescisin, 6. 11 6 Cf. "Oznamuj eme .. .," Mar ia, 5/ 1955 (Jul y), 15. 11 7 Cf. Oznamuj eme .. .," Maria , 7/ 1955 (September), 14-1 5. 118 Cf. " Posvateni e novej slovenskej gr.-kat cerkvi v Os hawe," Maria , 8/ 1955 (October), 15 119 Cf. Maria , 3/ 1957, photo on th e first page of th e cover. 120 "Vas kovci v Os hawe vydava li dceru," Kanadsky Slovak, January 9, 1960, p. 2. 121 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria , 3-4/ 1965 , 15. 122 Cf. Maria, 2/ 1963 , 16. 123 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Bi skupa M. Ru snaka," Maria, 3-4/ 1965, 16. 11 0 �SLOVAKIA-2017 43 Durisin from Slovakia served the parish in 1966. After him came 124 Father Stephen Adamiak. The need for a resident priest became urgent among the parishioners towards the end of 1960 's: " If we do not have a resident priest, ... then we and even more our children will 125 be in danger regarding our faith and keeping our pari sh." After dedicated efforts of the parishioners, a new rectory was blessed in 126 May of 1969. In 1970 Father Adamiak was replaced by Father Joseph Dubiak. Thanks to Father Dubiak the modem Slovak lan127 guage was introduced into the liturgy. Father Dubiak left the parish in 197 1, and his successor became Father Adolph Vateha, 128 CSsR. In 1972 a railroad overpass was built nearby, which changed the church surroundings. Later the parish was given some 129 compensation by the City of Oshawa. In later years, mostly Toronto priests served in the Oshawa parish. The parish in Oshawa was never large, but had a strong sense of community. According to the 200 I booklet about the pari sh, a majority of the parisioners were 130 from the former historic counties of Zemplin and Ugoca. The parish is still alive, being served by the Reverend Stephen Williams, an English-speaking convert to th e Byzantine-Slovak rite. 6: Hamilton, Ontario (1952) The first Slovaks arrived in the steel city of Hamilton, Ontario, 131 in the 1920's. They founded their own Roman Catholic Church in January of 1945 . Half of the fo unding families were Greek Catholics, and due to this fact the parish was named Sts. Cyril and Methodi132 us. Several Slovak Greek Catholic families also attended the local 133 Ukrainian church and some even the Polish church. The key mo124 Cf. "Z nasich osad - Oshawa," Maria , 9- I 0/ 1967, 17- I 8. PAA , Letter fro m Jul y 28, 1967. 126 Cf. "V izi tac ie preosv. o. biskupa Michala Rusnaka, CSsR," Maria , 5-6/ 1969, 5. 127 PAA , Letter of Father Joseph to Father Lacko, September 17, I 971. 128 PAA , Confirmation of the appointment as a pastor in the letter of Bi shop Isidore fro m September 20, 1973. 129 Cf. Lesc isin, 11 . 13 Cf. Lescisin, 13 . 13 1 Cf. Kirschbaum , 135-7. 132 Sts. Cyril and Methodius parish - History . htt ://www.s lovakchurch .com/historyh tm ( 11.5 .20 12 15 :00). b J Cf. "Nas rozhovor," Maria , 4/1 979, 9. 125 ° �44 SLOVAKIA-2017 ment for the founding of the Greek Catholic parish was a meeting on October 26, 1952 in the house of Mr. Michael Mati. During this meeting a deci sion was made to establish the parish of Sts . Peter and 134 Paul. The first liturgy was celebrated on December 14, 1952 in the 135 local Ukrainian church. Fathers Michael Rusnak and Louis Mina 136 took turns serving the community. The first anniversary of the mission was celebrated in the Hungarian church on December 13, 1953 , with Bishop Borecky attending, and everyone "was delighted 137 to hear him deliver a short sermon in Slovak. " 138 In 1954 Father Frantisek Fuga came to Hamilton from Rome. The parish changed its name due to a request by the Roman Catholic bishop of Hamilton, who already had in his diocese a parish dedicated to Sts. Peter and Paul. Ukrainian Bishop Isidore Borecky, who was in charge of Slovak Greek Catholics in Ontario, changed the name of the parish to the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary on 139 October 20, 1954. In a letter from the Oriental Congregation in Rome, Cardinal Coussa stated: "The veneration of the Mother of God of Klokocov will assure its success among Slovak Greek Catho40 lics." 1 A copy of the Klokocov icon was painted in the church thanks to the efforts of Father Lacko in 1955, and it was blessed by 14 1 the Pope himself. Also, some Slovenians came annualy in pil. h' . gnmages to t 1s icon. 142 The cornerstone of the sanctuary was blessed on October 20, 143 144 1957 . Inside was al so a bit of soil from Klokocov in Slovakia. The facade with three mountain peaks and a double cross (the Slovak 134 Cf. Yinansky, J. (F . Fuga), "Gr. K. Osada, Hamilton," Kalendar KSL 1977 (Toronto), 84. 135 Cf. " 25 . vyrocie nas ich farn osti," Maria, I 0/ 1977, 11. 136 Cf. Eli as, Jan, "Otec Fuga IO rokov v Hamiltone," Maria , 5/ 1964, 9. 137 Cf. " Po Gr.-kato lickej oslave v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, Fe bruary 20, 1954, p. 2. 138 "Zo zivota nas ich fa rnosti," Maria, 3/ 195 5 (May), 15. 139 Cf. " Hist6ri a odpustov Panny Marie Klokocovskej v Hamiltonskej svatyni ," Maria, 7-8/ 1965, 3. 14 Fuga, Franti sek, " Rozpomienka na prvy odpu st," Maria , 7-8/ 1965 , I 0. 14 1 Cf. " lkona kl okocovskej Matky Bozej v Hamiltone," Maria, 8/ 1958, 5-7. 142 Cf. " Hor' sa na putnicky odpust Panny Marie Klokococskej do Hamiltonu," Maria , 7-8/ 1969, 3. 143 Cf. Maria, 10/ 1957 , last page of the cover. 144 Cf. " Dej inn y den," Ma ria , 11 / 1957 , 11. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 45 national emblem) was painted by the noted Slovak artist Jozef 145 Cincik. Father Fuga was a skilled organizer, and the Hamilton 146 sanctuary was nicely decorated during his tenure. Fuga also supported the struggle for Slovak independence and created the modem Slovak flag (horizontal white, blue and red stripes with the Slovak emblem superimposed upon it!" In 197 4 he became the director of 47 the Matica Slovenska Abroad. Hamilton was also one of the first Greek Catholic parishes to have the Sunday readings done in modem Slovak. The church was dedicated on June 9, 1963, as part of the local Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations (the 1100 th anniversary of the 148 arrival of the Apostles of the Slavs on Slovak territory). In those days, the number of the faithful in Hamilton increased to almost 149 500. The first visit of Bishop Rusnak to Hamilton after his episco150 pal ordination took place on May 23 , 1965. At the beginning of 1975 Father Fuga became seriously ill. This was the price he paid for his printing apostolate, using lead ink. Some parishioners said to him: "Monsignor, please do not die! It would be better for us if the sanctuary burned to the ground, because you could build another one, but if you die, we will lose it in a few 151 years! " Father Fuga lived for another ten years. On October 3, 152 1975 a Slovak school opened in the parish. The "odpust" of 1976 included a blessing of the interior iconography, created by Igor 153 Suchacev, and the ceremony of presenting the miter to Monsignor Fuga. Suchacev painted Slovak saints in the apse, with their scrolls 145 PAA, Letter from Father Fuga to Father Lacko, January 31, 1975. Cf. "Z nasich osad - Hamilton," Maria, 3-4, 1968, 18-20; fourth page of the cover; "Odpust a cirkevne slavnosti v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, August 9, 1975, p. 5; "Vyrocity odpust a strieborne jubileum pastoracie Mons. Fr. Fugu v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, September 8, 1979, p. 3. 147 Cf. Elias, Jan, "Zahranicna MS ma protektora," Kanadsky Slovak, July 6, 1974, P,·48 5. Cf. "Kronika," Maria , 4/ 1963, 16. 149 Cf. Lacko, Michal, " Posviacka dvoch novych s lovenskyc h kostolov v Kanade," Kanadsky Slovak, June 29, 1963 , p. 5. 15 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Biskupa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 3-4/ 1965, 16. 151 "Nas rozhovor," Maria , 4/ 1979, 9. 152 Cf. "Skola slovenciny osady P. M. Klokocovskej , Kanadsky Slovak, October 18, 1975 , p. 5. 153 Born in Yugoslavia to Russian refugees . One of his works was the decoration of the throne in Ethiopia. 146 ° �46 SLOVAKIA-2017 written in Slovak. The church also has depictions of the blessed Sister Miriam T. Demjanovic and President Joseph Tiso. The beauty of the church was also enhanced by the iconostasis, being the only Slo154 vak church in Canada to have a permanent one. The parish exists to this day, although the glory days of Father Fuga are gone. 7: Welland, Ontario (1953) The first Slovaks settled in the Niagara peninsula around 1920; eventually there were some 3,000. Local branches of the CSL had these numbers : 23 in Welland (1940), 31 in St. Catharines (1942), 3 7 155 in Niagara Falls (1943) and 64 in Port Colborne ( 1952). A majority of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Welland and nearby places came to Canada in the last years prior to WW II, mostly from Zemplin County. Only after WW II, when new priests arrived, did the organization of spiritual life develop here. On November 22, 1953 a meeting was held in Welland for all those interested in establishing a Slovak Greek Catholic parish under the patronage of the Holy Spirit. The meeting was organized by Father Vincent Danco, SJ. Some twenty-eight members of the future parish appeared. The faithful wished to have the liturgy celebrated twice a month and to temporarily use the Gregorian calendar. They also produced a list of fifty-five people who wished to belong to the 156 parish. Bishop Borecky promised in his letter of December I 9, 157 1953 to send a Decree for the creation of this parish. The first pastor of the parish was Father Danco, whose name was inscribed with gold letters into the history of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada. On August 1, 1954, the Reverend Nicholas Chanat became the pastor of the Hol y Ghost parish in Welland and the "mission stations 158 of the Niagara Peninsula districts." The solemn groundbreaking 154 Cf. " Yysoka cirkevna hodnost' Mons. F. Fugovi," Kanadsky Slovak, September 4, 1976, pp . 1-2. 155 Cf. "S lovaci a ich organi zacia v dejinach oblasti N iagara," Kanadsky Slovak, January 31 , 198 1, p.5. 156 PAA , without a signature. 157 PAA , without a signature. 158 PAA, Letter from Bishop Borecky, without a signature. �47 SLOVAKIA-2017 159 took place on July 3, 1955 , and on May 20, 1956 the new church160 hall was blessed. However, the Reverend Chanat died in the morn161 ing of March 17, 1957 at the age of30. This was so devastating that the hall became a permanent church, as there was never any fur162 ther building activity. Father Mina succeeded him ; after him the 164 163 parish was served by Fathers Fetsco, Kra:fcik, Shogan, Chamey and Russin. Bishop Rusnak visited the parish for the first time as a • 165 bishop on June 6, 1965 . From November 1965, Father Smal' was 166 the pastor. After Father Russin resigned as pastor at the end of 167 I 971, Father Robert Keleher was named the new administrator. 168 He installed a temporary iconostasis. Father Keleher was replaced with a Slovak priest, Father Stephen Kundra, who served from Au169 gust of 1972 until February of 1973 . The parish was administered for a while by Father Fuga until the arrival of Father John Leso, SJ _110 Vo The parish financial report for the year 1980 showed that, were it not for bingo, the rental of the hall and kitchen, the parish would not 171 collect enough money to pay the priest's salary. This was due to the aging of the parish, the death of its founders , while their offspring either moved away or lost interest in this church. Thus, the parish slowly declined and did not survive the year 20 I 0. 159 In other sources the date for the groundbreaking by Father Chanat is listed as Jul y 4, 1954 . 16 Cf. "Zaznamenavame," Maria , 411956, 16. 161 Cf. "Za milovanym o. Nikolajom," Maria , 4/ 1957, 3-6. 162 PAA, Letter of April 3, 1957. 163 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria, 3-4/1965 , 15 . 164 PAA, Letter from Michael Kostik to Bi shop Isidore, November 9, 196 1. 165 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Biskupa M. Ru snaka," Maria , 3-4/ 1965 , 16. 166 PAA , Letter of th e Vicar General, the Right Reverend Basil Filevich, December 6, 1965 . 167 PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore to the Toronto-Dominion Bank, December 24, 197 1. 168 PAA, Letter of Father Keleher to Bishop Isidore, August 27, 1973. 169 PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore, February 23, 1973, addressed to the TorontoDomi nion Bank . 170 PAA , Lette r of February 17, 1976. 171 PAA, Annual statement - 1980. ° �48 SLOVAKIA-2017 8: Sudbury, Ontario (1954) This mining town in northern Ontario also attracted Slovak im172 migrants. In 1923 the first Slovaks arrived in Sudbury. Several of 173 them were Greek Catholics. The founding meeting of branch 16 of the CSL was held June 19, 1938 at the hall of the local Ukrainian Greek Catholic church, showing thus their religious affi liation. The local Greek Catholic Slovaks had quite a community life even before 174 their parish was founded , as testified by newspaper articles. On many of these occasions the Master of Ceremonies, or simply the Elder, presided over the event with both formal as well as religious 175 elements. A real start for the Slovak Greek Catholics was the Divine Liturgy celebrated on August 15, 1954 at the hall of the Canadian Slovak Benefit Society. It was celebrated by fathers Louis Mina and Nicholas Chanat and Father Dzurman, the local Ukrainian 176 priest. The parish received the title of Our Lady of Perpetual 178 177 Help. The entire ceremony was broadcast on local television. 179 Thereafter liturgies were celebrated on a monthly basis. The Sudbury parishioners were also subscribers and ~enerous benefactors of 1 the Slovak Greek Catholic magazine Maria. Father Fetsco became 18 1 the pastor for the first time in 1957. With several breaks and sev- ° 172 Cf. Urban, J., "Slovaks in Sudbury," Polyphony: Th e Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario - Sudbury 's People, Vol. 5 (No. I, 1983), p. 123 . 173 Cf. "Smutna sprava 23. zboru KSL," Kanadsk:y Slovak, August 9, 1980, p. 7; " Spravy z Toronta," Kanadsk:y Slovak, April 7, 1979, p. 2. 174 Cf. " Man zelia Strokovi jubilovali," Kanadsk:y Slovak, March 30, 1950, p. 6; "Manzelia Rani covi jubilovali, Kanadsk:y Slowik, August 17, 1950, p. 6; "Rani covi zenili syna Stefana," Kanadsk:y Slovak, September 9, 1950, p. 6; "S I. Johanka Simkova v putach manzelstva," Kanadsk:y Slovak November 9, 1950, p. 7; " Manzelia Koritko jubilovali, Kanadsk:y Slovak, November 8, 1952, p. 2. 175 Cf. " Mad'arovci 25 rokov v manzelstve, Kanadsk:y Slovak, December 2 1, 1950, p. 3. 176 Cf. Maria , 2/1955 , 15; "S lavnostne otvorenie slovenskej gr. kat. parafii v Sudbury, Ont. di\ a 15. augusta, Kanadsky Slovak, August 7, 1954, p. 8. 177 Cf Urban 124 178 Cf. Mari;, 2/ 1955 , 15. No such video recording cou ld be found. CTV does not have it in its archi ves, TYO did not exist and CBC did not answer my e-mails. 179 Cf. " Prvy slovensky krst v Sudburach," Kanadsk:y Slovak, November 6, 1954, p. 3. 18 Cf. Maria , 6/l 955 , 17; 5/ 1958, 22. 18 1 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria, 3-4/ 1965 , 15. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 49 182 era! priests substituting, he continued coming to the parish until 1972. On July I, 1964, a new pastor was named--Father Theoktist 183 Vidov, a Studite monk originally from Croatia. Bishop Rusnak 184 came to Sudbury on June 13, 1965 . Sadly, someone noted that the youth had little interest in its roots: "The whole ceremony was really nice. And it could be even nicer if our young Slovaks from Sudbury 185 would show up in bigger numbers for such a great ceremony." In 1965 Father Jules Riotte, a Greek Catholic priest of German origin is • d as t he pastor, commg • twice • a mont h . 186 B 1s . hop R usna' k menhone 187 also returned to Sudbury in the following years. We have a list 188 from the 1960's of 31 fam ilies who had their homes blessed following the blessing of the Jordan water. Another list of families who 189 appeared for All Souls Day celebrations is also preserved. One of the problems of the Slovak Greek Catholic community in Sudbury was the lack of a resident priest. Another important factor for the downfall of the parish were economic conditions. Around 1964, when their economic situation changed for the better, many people moved to southern Ontario, and since no new waves of immigrants appeared, a decline in the number of Slovaks (and Greek Catholics) began. At a parish meeting held on July 13, 1975, it was decided "to dismiss the parish ; the reason is that there is no one to keep it because there are no more parishioners, it is sad, but it could 191 190 not be changed." Bishop Rusnak responded on July 25, 1975, but another reply from the parishioners was dated August 1, 1977. Because of this correspondence, Maria magazine listed the parish in 182 Cf. Urban, 124. Cf. "Kronika," Maria, 6-7/ 1964, 16. 184 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp . Biskupa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 3-4/1965, 16. 185 "Cestujeme s p. biskupom ," Maria, 9-10/ 1965, 6. 186 Beskyd, J., Yearbook of the Eparchy of Toronto (In the vineyard of Christ) (Toro nto: Eparc hy of Toronto, 1964), 520. 187 Cf. "Z nas ich osad - Sudbury - Preosv. p. biskup Michal Rusnak CSsR medzi svojimi ," Maria, 11-12/ 1967, 18- 19; Stripay, J., "Preosv. o. bisk up Michal Rusnak CSsR v Sudburach," Maria, 9-10/1968, 6. 188 PAA, File: Sudbury. 189 PAA , File: Sudbury. 190 PAA , Letter from the ushers to Bishop Michael, dated July 17, 1975. 191 PAA, Letter from the ushers to Bishop Michael, dated August I, 1977. 183 �50 SLOVAKIA-2017 192 197 6 as still open, but that is no longer the case. Only sixty people 193 of Slovak origin remain in Sudbury. 9: Delhi (Simcoe - Delhi), Ontario (1955) Many Slovaks, especially from Eastern Slovakia, started to move into the area of Simcoe and Delhi, in southern Ontario, around 1930. 194 Most of them worked as tobacco farmers . The same people who founded branch 46 of the Canadian Slovak League in 1944 also founded St. Andrew's parish. In 1954 Father Frantisek Fuga of Hamilton heard about the Greek Catholic Slovaks at this location and contacted them. After a few weeks he celebrated a liturgy for 195 them. Since this took place around the feast of St. Andrew, the parish was named for this saint. It was officially created in Novem196 ber of 1955 . Father Fuga answered the spiritual needs of the parishioners working on farms and served them once a month in the 197 local Ukrainian church in Delhi. In 1965 only about thirty families 198 attended these services. The first pastoral visit of St. Andrew's parish by Bishop Michael Rusnak was conducted on December 18, 199 1966. The silver jubilee of the parish could also be called its swan 200 song. It was celebrated on October 19, 1980. The story of Simcoe - Delhi is the story of a small flock of the faithful, who wanted to 192 Cf. "Nase kostoly," Maria, 1/1976, third page of the cover. Census profile: http://wwwI2.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/20 I I/dpp_gfprQf1/<!eJ<1.ih/p_agt!,Sfo1'.?: Lang= E&Geo l =CSD&Cocle 1=3553005&Geo2=CD&Cocle2=3553&Data=Count&S t!archText=suclbur &SearchT e=Contains&SearchPR=0 l&B l =A ll &C ustom=&TA Bl D '."'J (27.8.2013 23:30) 194 Cf. Kirschbaum , J. M.: Slovaks in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Ethnic Press Association of Ontario, 1967), 128. 195 Cf. "Osada v Simcoe - Delhi jubiluje," Maria , 1-3/1966, 3-4. 196 See: Kirschbaum , 262 and Fuga, Frantisek, J., "Slovenska greckokatolicka farnost' sv. Andreja v Simcoe - Delhi , Ont. jubilovala," Kanadsky Slovak, November 29, 1980, p. 4. 197 Cf. Kirschbaum, 262. 198 Cf." Osada v Simcoe - Delhi jubiluje," Maria, 1-311966, 3-4. 199 Cf. "Prva vizitacia pana biskupa Michala Rusnaka v Simcoe-Delhi, Ont. ," Maria, 1-2/1967, 10-11. 200 Cf. Fuga, Frantisek J., "S lovenska greckokatolicka farnost' sv. Andreja v Simcoe - Delhi , Ont. jubilovala," Kanadsky Slovak, November 29, 1980, p. 4. 193 �SLOVAKIA-2017 51 praise God in Church Slavonic, as they did back home. However their small size prevented the parish from growing. The community literally died with the death of the last parishioner from among the original flock. This community was always listed as a parish, even though from the ecclesiastical point of view it would probably be called a mission, as in all juridical matters the parishioners belonged to the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Hamilton. 10: Kenaston, Saskatchewan (1967) The first Slovaks arrived in Kenaston in July of 1903 and were 20 1 followed by others who came to farm. Besides the Ukrainians, many Slovak Greek Catholics also settled in and around nearby Sas202 katoon, Saskatchewan. Bishop Rusnak came to Saskatoon on June 203 26, 1966, hoping to include these people within his jurisdiction, and to make of this place a permanent center of the Slovak religious presence in Canada. Before this visit, an invitation appeared in the press: Come all of you, who are able to come, because this will be the very first time, since our arrival here 50 years ago, that we will be able to welcome amongst us our first Slovak bishop in Canada and the first bishop who is a Greek Catholic, since the times of Sts. Cyril and Methodius .... This joyful news is written for you ... by Joseph Zeman, an 80 year-old Slovak, who after 65 years in Canada, lived long enough to 204 experience this great joy ... The Ukrainian Greek Catholics gave Rusnak permission to use their cathedral of St. George for the meeting. The organizational committee prepared 600 memorial ribbons - but they were not 205 206 . enough! Father John Kobelak, M.S.F. was entrusted with or- 20 1 Cf. "Na vyrocie slovenskych pociatkov v Saskatchewan a slovenskeho ~riekopnictva v Kanade, Kanadsky Slowik, June 25 , 1966, p. 2. 02 Cf. "S lovak so Slovakom sa zide," Kanadsky Slowik, March 10, 1962, p. 2; "Janko Purda graduoval ," Kanadsky Slovak, January 5, 1963, p. 2. 203 Cf." Pl anovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria , 4-5/1966, 16. 204 Cf. " Do pozornosti Slovakom v Saskatchewan," Kanadsky Slovak, May 28, 1966, ~- 2. os Cf. "Aj 600 bolo malo," Kanadsky Slovak, July 16, I 966, p. 3. �52 SLOVAKIA-2017 20 7 gamzmg this parish. The Slovak Greek Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Kenaston, Saskatchewan, was officially created during the Canadian centennial in 1967, after the trip of Bishop Rusnak to Saskatoon. The parish was part of the Ukrainian Eparchy of Saskatoon, having its own property, a gift of the recently-deceased Joseph Zeman. Bishop Rusnak planned to send the parish a Slovak priest - the Reverend Stephen Adamiak.208 In the archives are notes testifying that the Ukrainian Eparchy indeed received the property and also $1000 to be used to build a Slovak Greek Catholic church in Kenaston. However, the following year the heirs of the late Mr. Zeman changed their minds and requested that the $1,000 be re209 turned to them. In the fall of 1970 the parish ceased to exist. 2 10 The question remains: Would a Slovak parish have lasted in Saskatchewan, if it had been built in Saskatoon rather than in the small village of Kenaston? MISSIONS WITH IRREGULAR SERVICES Among the missions we list those places where we are sure that the Slovak Greek Catholic services were held: 11: Edmonton, Alberta The capital of the Province of Alberta attracted many Slovak immigrants in the 1930's, including Greek Catholics.2 11 Slovak 212 Greek Catholics present here never formed a separate parish or other type of organized community, but they still could be considered a part of the life of Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada. After his 206 Born in Poland in 1921 . He came to Canada in 1964, and worked in the Eastern rite. He died in 200 I. 207 Cf. "Z nasich osad - Kenaston - Nova slovenska greckokatolfcka osada sv. Cyrila a Metoda," Maria, 11-12/ 1967, 17. 208 PAA, Letter of Bishop Michael dated May 15, 1967. 209 PAA , E-mail from the Eparchy of Saskatoon, sent to the author on November 21, 2011 , 17:00. 210 PAA , Letter NM najdostojnejci Otce Vladyka! sent from Rome, 12. X. 1970. 211 Cf. Kirschbaum , 151. 212 Cf. Maria, 1/ 1963, 17. �SLOVAKIA-2017 53 Episcopal ordination, Bishop Michael Rusnak visited Edmonton on 213 June 27, I 965 . 12: Fernie, British Columbia Femie is one of the oldest settlements of Slovaks in Canada. The 214 first Slovak miners came here in 1898 from Pennsylvania. Many of them were Greek Catholics. Shortly after the start of the 20th cen215 tury, a branch of the Greek Catholic Union was founded here. Slovaks in Femie were also organized in branch 51 of the CSL. Fa2 16 ther Michal Lacko did a visitation here in 1973. Femie is mentioned as a mission in the report of the Apostolic Visitator in 217 1978. 13: New Westminster, British Columbia The first Slovaks came to the Canadian Pacific coast at the end 218 219 of the 19 th century. Larger numbers appeared only after WW 11. Branch 4 7 of the CSL was established here in 1944. The Slovak Roman Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius has existed in New 220 Westminster since 1960. Many of its parishioners were Greek 221 Catholics. From time to time, Greek Catholic services were also celebrated here. In 1959 there was a Slovak Greek Catholic wedding in the Ukrainian church, performed by a "good friend of Slovaks, 222 Father Bylik, who was ass isted in the ceremonies by Mr. Bodnar.'' 213 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Bisk upa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 5-611965, I 3. Cf. Kirschbaum , 70. 215 Cf. Palmer, Howard, Land of the Second Chance (A History of Ethnic Groups in Southern Alberta), (Lethbridge : Lethbridge Herald, 1972), 195. 216 Personal Archive of the Author (PAA) Letter of Bishop Michael to Father Lacko, May 28, 1973. 217 PAA , Quinquennial report for Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada, 19731978 (November 1st , 1978),2-3 . 218 Kanadsky Slovak, November 14, I 970. 219 Cf. Kirschbau m, 146-8. 220 Officiall y establ ished by Father Wi lliam Lacko, SJ in 1960. The first acti vities with local Slovaks date back to 1952. 22 1 Cf. " Klub za ujemcov o hist6riu Slovakov v Britskej Kolumbii v Kanade," http://www.sk-bc .ca/book/export/ html/I 98 (October 18, 20 11 , 20:00); Maria, 78/ 1965, 5; 12; 12/1965, 15. 222 " Pekna slovenska svadba v B.C.," Kanadsky Slovak, June 27, 1959, p. 2. 214 �54 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Slovak church of Sts. Cyril and Methodius was the home of Ukrainian Greek Catholics until they built their own church. In those days a certain Byzantine-rite priest - Father Kmec-- celebrated the services. Many times the Slovak Greek Catholics celebrated with the Ukrainians. ln 1970, the Reverend William Lacko wrote about the Greek Catholics: "the late Michael Bodnar with a beautiful voice, was an outstanding cantor." Already during the Cyrillo-Methodian jubilee in 1963 we learn that "many Slovak Greek Catholics are living in this area and because of this Father Michael Lacko went to the far west of Canada ... and celebrated services in the Church Slavonic 223 language .... " And during the Jubilee year, according to the words of the pastor, once a month instead of the sermon "we all sang "Moleben." The Impressive "Hospodi pomiluj" resounded in the church as a joint response to the petition of all the Catholics of both 224 rites." On the day of the Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations, July 7, 1963 , the Latin Mass was fo ll owed with the singing of sacred songs in Slovak and Church Slavonic by both Roman and Greek Catho225 lics. They sang lie Cheruvimi (Let us, who mystically represent 226 the Cherubim) and Otce nas (Our Father), led by Mr. Bodnar. Bishop Rusnak was quite frequentl y a welcome guest of the parish. On those occasions, the church was always filled to the very last seat or even overcrowded. His visit was a real "unique experience with lasting value .. .. Greek Catholics are coming from near and far to the services held in the Slovak church and it is a joy to see them, 227 when Bishop Michael is among them .. .'' In 1966 Bishop Rusnak 228 appeared on July 3. He officiated at the funeral of Mrs. Potoma on 229 July 6, 1970. For the local parishioners it became a tradition throughout the years to have Bishop Rusnak among them , always around the feast day of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, patrons of their 223 224 Cf. Maria , 7/ 1963 , 11. "Slovenski greckokatolici na Pacifiku," Kanadsky Slovak, September 14, 1970, p. 5. 225 Cf. "Cyril ometodske slav nosti v B.C.," Kanadsky Slovak, June 29, 1963, p. 8. Cf. "Cyrilometodske oslavy na Pacifickom pobrezi," Kanadsky Slovak, August 17, 1963, p. 2. 227 "Slovenski greckokatolici na Pacifiku," Kanadsky Slovak, September 14, 1970, p. 5. 228 Cf. " Planovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria , 4-5/ 1966, 16. 229 PAA , Folder: Vancouver. 226 �SLOVAKIA-2017 55 church. The bishop made such a good impression on the people that they left with the words: "Goodbye Most Reverend Bishop M. 230 Rusnak until next year." In 1973 the Byzantine liturgy was scheduled for August 5, with Father Michael Lacko, SJ as the main cele. . was a Iso the act o f a canomca . I v1s1tahon. . . . 232 brant. 23 1 H.1s v1s1t Among the benefactors of the Maria magazine were several people 233 from New Westminster. The visits of the Greek Catholic bishop to New Westminster stopped a long time ago, but the Greek Catholics there attend the Slovak Roman Catholic parish to thi s day. 14: Unionville (Markham), Ontario From the canonical point of view, Unionville Ontario, and the fa mily mansion of the billionaire Stephen B. Roman could not be considered either a parish, or a mission. However, to be fair to history, we have to note that services were held here more often than in some of th e other missions. Fron the 1950's until the 1980 's Bishop Rusnak celebrated a liturgy in the residence of Mr. Roman every 234 Sunday aftemoon. The bishop had become a good friend of the Greek Catholic Stephen Roman in the early 1950 's. Together they planned to build a huge Cathedral of the Transfiguration on Mr. Roman's property in Unionville and Pope John Paul II even blessed the 235 cornerstone in I 984. However, after Mr. Roman suddenly died in 1988, Bishop Rusnak and his successor Bishop Pazak, could not come to an agreement with Mr. Roman 's heirs as to the actual ownership of the cathedral. Therefore, Bishop Pazak deconsecrated the 23 °Korem, Albin, " Dve spravy z B. C.," Kanadsky Slowik, July 18, 1970, p. 5. 23 1 PAA , Postcard Srdecny pozdrav od Ticheho oceanu. Sent from San Francisco, Jul y 20, 1973. 232 PAA, Letter of Bishop Michae l to Father Lacko, May 28, 1973. 233 Cf. Maria, 2/ 1963, 17; 1/1964, third page of the cover; 2/ 1964, third page of the cover; 9-10/ 1964, third page of the cover; 1-2/ 1965, third page of the cover; 12/1965 , 16; 1-3/ 1966, third page of the cover; 1/ 1977, third page of the cover; 5/ 1978, 16;4/ 1979, 16; 7-8/ 1980, 24. 234 Litva, Felix, "Stefan B. Roman - clovek v rozdvojenom svete" (Cambridge, ON : Dobra kniha, 198 I). 235 See Our Heritage of Faith : Consecration of the Slovak Cathedral of the Transfiguration by His Holiness Pope John Paul II, September 15, 1984, ed. by Helen Roman-Barber and Anne C. R. Roman (Toronto: Eparchy of Saints Cyril and Methodius for Slovaks of the Byzantine Ri te in Canada, 1984). �56 SLOVAKIA-2017 church in 2006 and since then it has sat empty as the cornerstone of a 236 massive housing development called "Cathedraltown." 15: Winnipeg, Manitoba Slovak immigrants started coming to to Winnipeg before the First World War, but the largest group arrived in the interwar peri237 od. A Slovak Roman Catholic parish existed here since 1951. Father Alexander Baran, an historian and native of the Subcarpathian region, worked at the local univers ity. Because his dad had been a secretary to the first Slovak Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia- Dr. Milan Hodza--he knew Slovak and was a great friend to Slovak Greek Catholics, with whom he shared the same liturgical tradition.2 38 Before the end of the 19 th century, several families from Zemplin County arrived via Pennsylvania to the town of Neepawa, in the 239 Province of Manitoba. When the Canadian Slovak League (CS L) was established here in 1932, one of the founding members, Juraj Rond'os, was not ashamed of being not only Slovak, but also a Greek Catholic. The local branch of the CSL received the number 1. The Slovak Greek Catholics in town attended mostly the local Ukrainian church for their worship services. The priests even learned some 240 Slovak for special celebrations for these parishioners. The most vital period for Slovak Greek Catholics in Winnipeg 24 1 started after the episcopal ordination of Bishop Rusnak. He came to Winnipeg for the first time on Sunday, August 22, 1965, and assisted by the local Slovak Roman Catholic pastor, Msgr. John Re236 For more details see "The Cathedral that Toronto Forgot," Toronto Star, June 26, 201 1 and "Losing Faith in Cathedraltown," Toronto Star, January I 0, 2015. 237 Cf. Kirschbaum , 75 -76. 238 For more info on Baran see: htt ://um anitoba.ca/libraries/units/archi ves/collections/rad/baran.html 239 Cf. R~ ndos, Juraj, "V lete sli spat' na breh rieky," in Spomienky pionierov, ed. by lmrich Stolarik (Toronto: Kanadska Slovenska Liga, I 978), 2 19. Maria, 1/ 1963, 17; 10/ 1963, third page of the cover; 12/ 1965 , 16; 12/ 1966, third page of the cover. 24 Cf. " Mary Rondosova vydala sa za Janka Stretavskeho," Kanadsky Slovak, March I, 195 1, p. 4. " Pekna slovenska svadba vo Winnipegu," Kanadsky Slovak, Apri l 5, 1958, p. 2; "Opusti li nas dvaja Slovaci z nasej okolice v Dufresne, Man. ," Kanadsky Slovak, March 21, 198 1, p. I 0. 241 Cf. Kutka, J., " Historicky den manitobskych Slovakov," Kanadsky Slovak, Nove mber 13, 1965, p. 2. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 57 kem, as well as by Father Baran, he celebrated a Byzantine liturgy in 242 the local Slovak Roman Catholic church. His visit was prepared by Msgr. Rekem and Mr. J. Kutka. Beautiful liturgical Church Slavonic singing had a delicate impact on the people present, many of them hearing it probably for the very first time in their lives. The choir, directed by organist Cudovit (Louis) Besei\ovsky, sang both Slovak Greek and Latin liturgies. Even though the Greek and Latin Catholics sang together for the first time, they 243 were praised for their perforrnance. Bishop Rusnak also visited the Greek Catholic Slovaks in Win244 nipeg in the following years. Several Slovak Greek Catholics from Winnipeg and nearby settlements appeared among the supporters of ~"' • • 245 1V1arza magazme. OTHER SLOVAK GREEK CATHOLIC LOCATIONS 16: Flin Flon, Manitoba Many Slovaks found jobs in the mining industry here, among them quite a few Greek Catholics . Several Slovak farmers settled around the town as well. When the Canadian Slovak League was founded in 1932, its local branch was given the number 4. However, the best years for the community were the 1940's and 1950's. Several Greek Catholic Slovaks here attended the local Ukrainian 246 church. In 1966 Bishop Michael Rusnak intended to send the Revernd John Zeman, OSB as a Greek Catholic priest to Flin 247 Flon . However, this did not materialize. 242 Cf. "Cestujeme s p. biskupom," Maria , 9-10/1965, 9- I 0. 1bid., 9. 244 Cf. " Planovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria, 4-5/1966, 16. PAA, diaries. 245 Cf. Maria , 1/ 1964, third page of the cover; 2/ 1964, third page of the cover; 67/ 1964, third page of the cover; 12/1965, 16; 1-2/ 1967, fourth page of the cover; 78/ 1977, third page ofthe cover; 5/ 1978, 16; 3/1979, 16; 2/ 1980, 16; 12/1980, 16. 246 Cf. "Smutok sboru vo Flin Flon, Man. ," Kanadsky Slovak, February 4, 1956, p. 2; Kadas, V.: Brat Jozef Dubos na vecnosti," Kanadsky Slovak, July 23, 1966, p. 2; "Zlata svadba u Rujakov vo Flin Flon, Man.," Kanadsky Slovak, September 25, 1976, p. 6; "Zlata svadba manzelov Stefanik v B. C.," Kanadsky Slovak, October 18, 1975, p. 4. 247 PAA , Letter from Father John Zeman, August 2, 1966. 243 �58 SLOVAKIA-2017 17: Thunder Bay, Ontario The city of Thunder Bay came into existence on January 1, 1970, when Port Arthur and Fort William, were amalgamated. The majority of the Slovaks in this area were from the county of Orava. They started coming in the 1890's and built St. Peter's Slovak Roman 248 Catholic church in 1907. Slovak Lutherans built a church in 1927. 249 Newspapers confirm several Slovak Greek Catholics living here. The first journey after his ordination led Bishop Rusnak to the Cana250 dian West through Fort William. He almost certainly stopped here on his ways to the West, when traveling by car. Conclusion Besides the above mentioned cities, which were depicted on the map of the Eparchy, the Slovak Greek Catholic presence was also documented elsewhere in Canada. Benefactors of the magazine Maria appeared in a larger number of locations. One can observe from the life of the Canadian Slovak Greek Catholics that, to some degree, they were copying the ways of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, who first settled in the West of Canada, then moved to Quebec, with a hiatus in the interwar period and then focused on Southern Ontario. The settlements in Southern Ontario 25 1 shared similar fates , not only with Ukrainian Catholics, but to a 252 certain degree even more with the Hungarian Greek Catholics. 248 Cf. Kirschbaum , 77-79. Cf. " Smutime za nas imi bratmi," Kanadsky Slowi k, August 27, 1966, p. 3; "Jub ileum Bakovych v Niagara Falls," Kanadsky Slowik, August 15, 1959, p. 2. 25 Cf. Kutka, J., "Historicky dei\ Manitobskych Slovakov, Kanadsky Slowik, November 13, 1965 , p. 2. 251 Cf. Canada 's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity, ed. by Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: Uni versity of Toronto Press, 199 1). On the Ukrainian exr,erience around Winnipeg see pages 53 -80. 52 Slovak - Hungarian Greek Cath olic re lati ons in Canada are a topic fo r furth er research . The Slovak Greek Catholics were fo r a time guests of the Hungari an Greek Catholic Church in Hamilton. In Windsor, Father Krafcik served for a time both Greek Catholi c communities - Slovak as we ll as Hungari an. Similar plans were made fo r Welland, whi ch also had both Churches, using the same liturgical rite, the same melodi es (and when it came to English, exactl y the same melodies and texts)! Especially in Ontario, the Hungarian settlements were almost identical to the Slovak ones. Also from the letters of Father Michal Lacko, SJ, we learn that, before the Slovak eparchy was created, he hoped that a bishopric would be created whi ch 249 ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 59 Many people had relatives in other parishes, leading to frequent mutual visits of Slovak Greek Catholics, other than in their their own parishes, especially for parish feast days, or some great historic milestones. Many new friendships were thus started, and also some marriages arranged within the community. Places which really continued to blossom with the Slovak Greek Catholic population were the industrial towns of Eastern Canada. If the industry closed, or shrank, or farming was no longer attractive, the people moved out and then their parishes were closed (Sudbury 253 and Flin Flon). The same thing happened in the mining and steel 254 industry towns of Pennsylvania, Ohio and New Jersey. If a parish were to last, it had to have several zealous parishioners. Where there were only a few, such a parish had only a minimum chance of survival (Kenaston, Winnipeg, New Westminster). In such a case the Slovak Greek Catholics joined (or remained) either with local Slovak Roman Catholics or with Ukrainian Greek Catholics. The age of the parishioners when starting their parishes was also quite crucial, as when they were relatively old, and few in number, their parishes lasted for only a short while (Simcoe - Delhi). What is interesting is how the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada made picnics an important part of parish culture. These gatherings became so popular, that at some time the parishes of Toronto and Hamilton owned their own picnic grounds, while the other parishes used facilities of other groups. In almost all the parishes we note that the most active parishioners were born in Slovakia. The subsequent generations, born in Canada, began to lose interest in maintaining their parishes. This would include, not only Slovak, but Hungarian Greek Catholic parishes as well (PAA). The last pastor of the Slovak church in Welland (before it was closed in 20 I 0) was Father John Girhinyi, himself a Hungarian. For more information on Hungarian life in Canada (and how it resembled the Slovak experience), see Nandor Dreisziger, Church and Society in Hungary and in the Hungarian Diaspora (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), especially pages 261-4. 253 Cf. https: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Canadian muni c ipalities having experienced popula-tion decreases 254 Other existing parishes, which face serious challenges with changing industry in the USA include Braddock, Charleroi, Clarence and Clymer, Pennsylvania. See Byzantine-Ruthenian Metropolitan Church of Pittsburgh Directory (Pittsburgh: Byzantine Catholic Metropolitan Church of Pittsburgh, I 999). See also. https://en.wikipecl ia.org/wiki/Shrinking- cities in the United States �60 SLOVAKIA-2017 might be attributed to the relatively high percentage of the Slovak immigrants assimilating to English-Canadian culture. Indeed, many times the parents themselves wanted to have their children completely forget about their ancestral homeland . In some cases the parents were not even willing to speak with them in Slovak - so that they would not have an accent, and thus be more successful in the labor market. By 1980, only two Slovak Greek Catholic parishes in Canada were over 50 years old: Lethbridge - which was Ukrainianized, and Montreal, which also had its best years behind it. Sadly, even some of the younger parishes (Kenaston, Simcoe - Delhi, Sudbury) were already closed, or just about to be closed. At the creation of the Slovak Greek Catholic Eparchy in 1980, only parishes in southern Ontario, which were close to each other, and able to benefit from mutual visits, or even exchanges of the clergy, were flourishing. Even this was to change in the following years, as the parish of Montreal was closed shortly after 2010, and the Welland parish was also not able to live through 2010. Recently the Most Reverend John S. Pazak, Bishop of the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada was transferred by 255 the Vatican to Phoenix, Arizona in the USA. Thus, the future of Greek Catholic Slovaks in Canada remains uncertain. 255 Transfer announced on May 7 th 20 I 6. HOLY SEE PRESS OFFICE - Other Pontifical Acts: htt s:// ress.vatican.va/co nten t/sa lastam a/en/bo ll ettino/ ubblico/20 I 6/05/07 /16050 7h.html. See also "Bishop John S. Pazak named new Byzantine Eparch in Phoenix, Ariz. ," Slovak Catholic Falcon, June 15, 20 16, p.5. � 28 SLOVAKIA-2017 A SURVEY OF SLOVAK COMMUNITIES OF THE BYZANTINE RITE IN CANADA BEFORE THEY RECEIVED THEIR OWN BISHOPRIC Daniel Cerny When we look at Catholic immigration to the USA and Canada, only one bishopric in those coutries is called by the name of the nations of the so-called Visegrad Group- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Surprisingly, this ecclesiastical structure is not of the Latin rite. It is the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodious for Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite in Canada. When created in 1980, a postcard with a map of Slovak Greek Catholic settlements in Canada was published. The aim of this paper is to present a historical overview of these communities until the Eparchy was created. The late professor Michael Lacko, SJ wrote the first history of these par1 ishes. However, this paper adds some new information, making this survey more accurate and updated. Some of the reasons why these people immigrated to Canada were the changes to the immigration laws in the USA enacted by Congress in June of 1921 and also in July of 1924. 2 Our research on Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada shows that the majority were descendenats of immigrants who came to Canada between 1926 and 1939 (when the borders were open), to be joined by the immigration waves of 1945 - 1950 and of 1968. For the first immigrants the church was in many cases the most important part of their life. Here they were not forced to speak a foreign language, it was like being at home - the same rite, dialects, family, friends, sometimes even neighbors, the same customs. However this also could be harmful in the sense that it created an ethnic 1 Cf. Lacko, Michal, "A Brief Survey of the History of the Slovak Catholics of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite," Slovak Studies, III (1963), 199 - 224. 2 Based on these regulations, after June of 1921 only 14,269 Czechoslovak citizens were allowed to immigrate annually to the USA, and after July 1924, only 3,073. Cf. Bielik, Frantisek- Rakos, Elo: Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo (Dokumenty II. - 19191939) (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1975), 51, footnote 2. �SLOVAKIA-2017 29 ghetto - which was probably fine for the first generation, but no longer so for the following ones. Only those places which experienced large numbers of new immigrants in later years, or were open to new people from outside entering "their" church, were able to continue to flourish . The history of these communities includes the creation of their own Slovak deanery (1957) and the consecration of their own Slovak 3 bishop ( 1964) in the person of Michael Rusnak, CSsR, who was for many years an Apostolic Visitator of these communities. Only two Slovak Greek Catholics participated on the Vatican II Council. One layman and one clergyman. The layman was the Canadian-Slovak multimilllionaire Stephen B. Roman, who participated from the third session on and bishop Michal Rusnak, who participated in the fourth and final session. The use of the vernacular, which was encouraged by Vatican II, resulted in more and more celebrations in English among the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada (the translations were done by the Greek Catholics in the Ruthenian Church in the USA), but not so in modem Slovak. Thus the Church lost many people from 4 the immigration wave of 1968. 3 Michael Rusnak was born on August 21, 1921 in Beaverdale, Pennsylvania. His mother and siblings returned with him to Slovakia during the Great Depression. He was ordained a Redemptorist priest by Bishop Pau l Gojdic, OSBM in Jul y of 1949. After the forced liquidation of the Greek Catholic church in Czechoslovakia, Rusnak was arrested and placed in the Podolinec monastery, which was turned into a prison camp for the clergy . After fifteen months in vari ous prisons, he escaped and, thanks to his American citizenship, he was allowed to emigrate to America. Ru snak went to Canada in 1951 and started to establish Slovak Greek Catholic parishes. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Bishop of Toronto, the Most Reverend Isidore Borecky, named Father Rusnak dean for Slovak Greek-Catholic parishes belonging to his jurisdiction.in 1957. On October 5, 1964, Pope Paul VI elevated Father Rusnak to Auxiliary Bishop to Isidore Borecky and Apostolic Visitator for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada. The process of creating the Slovak Greek Catholic Church in Canada was completed when Pope John Paul II , in his bull Apostolicae Sedis of October 13, 1980, created the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada. At the same time, the pope appointed aux iliary bishop Michael Rusnak as the eparchi al bishop of this Eparchy . Rusnak retired in 1996 and died on January 16, 2003 and is buried at the Holy Cross Cemetery in Thornhill , Ontario. More about Bishop Michael Rusnak can be found in Cerny, Daniel, Biskup Michael Rusnak, CSsR (Diploma thesis), Presov: Greek Catho lic Theological Faculty of the University of Presov, 2008 . 4 Documents on this topic are in the personal archives of the author (hereafter PAA), and are based on letters from Father Fuga, Father Dubiak and Father Lacko. �30 SLOVAKIA-2017 The author of this article located important documents in various archives, and tiny pieces of the mosaic were found everywhere. Especially valuable were the articles in Maria magazine, which was published from 1955 to 1969 and then from 1976 to I 989; in the second period under the direction of a gifted editor - the late Jozef Suchy. In some cases, we can speak only about individuals, in other cases about a group of dedicated parishioners with only irregular services. The most advanced was the group of individual parishes, which we are about to describe. In 1980 these parishes were incorporated into the newly-created Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada,5 the only Slovak Greek Catholic eparchy in the world, which served as a beacon to the persecuted and oppressed brothers and sisters in Slovakia under the . yo ke. 6 communist PARISHES 1: Lethbridge, Alberta (1921) The oldest Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Canada was in Lethbridge, Alberta. In 1885 the first Slovaks came to Lethbridge from 7 Shelby, Montana. Among them was the Veselenak family, Greek 8 Catholics from Nizne Slovinky in Spis county. Local Slovaks formed branch 53 of the Canadian Slovak League (CSL) in 1946. The Slovak Greek Catholic parish of Sts. Peter and Paul was founded in 1921 by coal miners, who came mostly from the Spis villages of Ponic, Zavadka and Slovinky. Before the parish was erected, the faithful organized a branch of the American-based Greek Catholic 5 Cf. L ·o sservatore Romano, December 14, 1980, Articles entitled "Erezione di nuova Eparchia; Provvista di Chiesa; Eretta in Canada Eparchi a di rito bizantino per slovacch i", 1-2. 6 For more on the general history of the Slovak Greek Catholi cs in Canada see Cerny, Daniel , "From Unknown People to a Separate Diocese: Slovak Greek Catholics in Canad a," in Mazurkiewicz, Adam, ed ., East Central Europe in Exile Volum e 1: Transatlantic Migrations (Newcastle upon Tyne : Cam bridge Scholars Publishing, 20 13), 253-72. 7 Cf. "75 rokov lethbridzs kej slov. kol6nie," Kanadsk), Slovak, February 18, 1961 , p. 2. 8 Cf. The Bend: A History of West Lethbridge (Lethbridge: West Lethbridge History Book Soc iety, 1982), 218. �SLOVAKIA-2017 31 9 Union. One important document, a photocopy of the parish minutes from the years 1921-193 7 exists, deposited in the library of the Pon10 tifical Oriental Institute in Rome. These minutes were written by 11 Andrew Mihalik. They start with the explanation that the term "fonitika," mentioned in the minutes as a petition to the Ukrainian bishop of Edmonton Nikita Budka, is to be the language used in the church, and that meant the Slovak language. According to these minutes, the first meeting took place on May 30, 1921 in the presence of bishop Budka. The faithful asked to have the celebration of a lit12 urgy every Sunday. During Wold War II the parish counted some 13 200 adults and 300 children. It was founded and owned by lay people (trustees). This was quite common in the ecclesiastical history of the USA and Canada. According to historian Mark Stolarik, this system consisted of elected members of the parish (kuratori), who collected tithes once a year from all the parishioners. A priest was paid from this treasury and the faithful had the right to terminate their 14 contract with him. Before the blessing of the church, the trustees 15 negotiated with the bishop for a resident priest. The parish had 16 a choir, the first Slovak Greek Catholic Choir in Canada. During the first years of its existence, the pastors were predominately Ukrainian, with the exception of Father Nicholas Szilagy, who came from Subcarpathia. In 1948 Ukrainians established their own parish in Lethbridge, but Ukrainian priests continued to serve Sts. Peter and Paul. However a great joy for the Slovak parish was the 1953 or- 9 PAA, e-mail fro m Father David Petras, November 5, 2010. Parafialna zapisnica Sv. toho Petra i Pavla Greko Katolickoho Viznania.(further on only PIO). 11 In 2011 the author of thi s article contacted the son of the late Andrew Mihalik. The original of the minutes are now neither in the parish archive, nor among the f:osses ions of the Mihalik family. 2 Cf. PIO, 2. 13 PAA, Quinquennial report for Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada, 1973-1978 (November 151, 1978), 2. 14 Cf. Stolarik, M. Mark, " Slovak Immigrants Co me to Terms with Religious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , No . I (January, 20 I 0), 69. 15 Cf. PIO, 36. 16 Cf. PIO, 25 ; 62. 10 �32 SLOVAKJA-2017 17 daination of one of their own, Father Richard Zuback, who later 18 served also as their pastor. Some of the parishioners appeared 19 among the benefactors of Maria magazine. The first pastoral visit of Bishop Rusnak took place on June 27, 1965 , the parish 's feast day. Many people came to the celebration from as far away as British Columbia. In his homily, Bishop Rusnak said the following: "Do not correct the work of God. If God created you as Greek Catholics, stay firm , remain and work in this province. Do not run away from this rite. Do not leave behind your church and 20 rite. " In the 1960's Father John Zeman, OSB informed Bishop Rusnak about the local Slovak Greek Catholics, asking for a Slovak priest, as the young people were without a priest of their own and 1 ashamed of being Slovaks.2 Father Zeman volunteered to go to the 22 parish . This never happened . In 1967 Bishop Michael expressed his desire to send Father Zorvan, from Europe, to be the pastor of the 23 parish. In I 970's the parish was noted in his calendar several times. 24 Father Lacko, SJ visited the parish in August 1973. When the enthronement of Bishop Rusnak was organized in 1981, the Leth bridge pastor refused to participate, claiming to have only nineteen Slovak 25 families. On the contrary, in 1982, Bishop Rusnak informed the Papal Pro-Nuncio that there were forty-five Slovak families in Leth26 bridge. The parish was owned by the trustees almost for a record time. The official incorporation into the Ukrainian church happened 27 on ly after a plebiscite within the parish in the early 2000's. The 17 "Prve slov. gr. katol primicie v Lethbridge, Alta," Kanadsky Slovak, June 20, 1953, p. 2. The author is grateful for this information to Mark Stolarik. 18 Cf. " Zpravy," Maria, 5/1955 Gui), I 0. 19 Cf. Maria, 6-7/ 1964, third page of the cover; I 2/ 1966, third page of the cover. 20 "Cestujeme s p. biskupom ," Maria , 9-10/ 1965, 8. 21 Cf. PAA, Letter of Father John Zeman, C hri stmas 1964. Father John , who was born in Kenaston , Saskatchewan, joined th e Slovak Benedictine Order in Cleveland, Ohio, but always wished to return to Canada. 22 Cf. PAA, Letter of Father John Zeman, sen t on July 22 , 1966 . 23 Cf. PAA , Letter of Bi shop Michael of May 15, 1967. 24 Cf. PAA , Postcard "Srdecny pozdrav od Ticheho oceanu," Sent from San Francisco, July 20, 1973 . 25 Cf. PAA , Motiuk, D. Report on the Canonical status of Saint Peter and Paul Catholic Church. l ethbridge. Alberta. 26 27 Cf. PA A, Letter of Bishop Michael to the Pro- uncio, sent October 28, 1982. Archive of the Eparchy of Sts. Cyri l and Methodius, folder Lethbridge. �33 SLOVAKIA-2017 parish is thus nowadays Ukrainian, but its contribution to the history and culture of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada, especially in the first half of the 20 th century, is significant. 2: Montreal, Quebec (1930) 28 Many Slovaks settled in Montreal in the l 920's, forming branch 2 of the CSL in 1932. After Western Canada, Montreal became the second center of Slovak settlement in Canada. Slovaks in Montreal first established a Roman Catholic parish in 1928 and a 29 Lutheran one in 1929. The Slovak Greek Catholics joined several fraternal groups, such as the Greek Catholic Union. At one of the meetings of branch 959 of the Union, on October 18, 1930, discussions started and eventually led to the founding of the Slovak Greek 30 Catholic parish. The volunteers created a list of fifty families and 31 many individuals who would join the parish. Ukrainian Bishop Ladyka, visiting Montreal on November 21, 1930, welcomed the delegates and promised to do everything possible "in order to fulfill the request of this God-fearing people, who are organizing themselves in this foreign world, not forgetting God, and are willing to do such a 32 beautiful, but difficult task." The first liturgy was celebrated by Father Michal Gregorejchuk, OSBM on Sunday, December 7, 33 1930. Three days later a meeting was held and a parish council was elected. December I 0, 1930 is considered the date of the creation of 34 the parish. From the very beginning the parish was organized by Slovaks not only from Slovakia, but from Hungary, Romania or 35 elsewhere. A photo from 1931 testifies to the presence of a Slovak 36 school. In 1931 a "Membership Book" was published. This book, 28 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia - Nanebevstupenia Pana v Montreale - 50'h anniversary Slovak Catholic (E. R.) parish of Ascension Montreal (Montreal: Parish of the Ascension, 1980), 34. 29 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady, 34. 3 Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, I. 31 PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 3-4. 32 PAA Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 2. 33 Cf. PAA , Zapisn ica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 2. 34 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 30; 34. 35 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr kat. osady Voznesenia, 24. 36 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 23. ° �34 SLOVAKIA-2017 together with the first financial records, are an authoritative example 37 of the language of the first immigrants. The Basilian fathers took care of the parish until the arrival of 38 Father John Hawryluk in 1949. When the parish was created it was named the GR. KFT. RUSSKA CERKOV (Greek Catholic Russian Church). The change of name was moti vated by a schismatic movement and the rise of national awareness among the faithful. The name Slovak Gr. Cath. Church was used for the first time on October 39 15, 1935 . A youth orchestra nicely represented the parish. In 193 7 the parishioners started to use the chapel in the Notre Dame de Lourdes church as their place of worship until November, 1959. In 1938 the parish mission was granted permission to keep their own 40 parish records and thus gained greater internal autonomy. In these years the pari sh was still only a mission. The years following WW II brought a radical change into the lives of the Slovak Greek Catholics . With the arrival of thousands of Ukrainian refugees to Canada, the Ukrainian Exarchate, later the Eparchy of Toronto and all Eastern Canada, was founded. Its first bishop was Isidore Borecky. On October 10, 1949, Bishop Borecky named Father John Hawryluk as the pastor of the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Montreal. On December 20, 1949 the former mis41 sion was established as an independent parish. The presence of young people at the services was really appreciated as the youth was 42 "the real core of the new choir of our church." The choir even broadcast by radio to Slovakia. The people dreamt about getting a Slovak priest: 37 Original scans were published in 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 44. 38 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 37. And also : Souvenir book of the dedication of the Slovak Catholic E. R. Church of Ascension, Montreal, Jun e JO, 1962 - Pamiitnci kniha archijerejskeho blahoslovenia slovenskej katolickej V 0. cerkvi Voznesenia, Montreal, JO. juna 1962 (Montreal: Pari sh of the Ascension, 1962), 17-18 . 39 Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 32. 4 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 35; 37-39. 41 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 3 1; 40. 42 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 40. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 35 We firmly believe that, in a short time a priest of Slovak ethnicity wi ll be assigned to our parish and thus we will fulfill our long-time dream .... The faithfu l understands the announced Word of God more easily . .. There are obstacles in foreign objections and intentions that prevent us from achieving this goal of ours . .. "We do not long for something foreign, we just want to live our own life, but on the other hand we do not accept anyone trying to make fools of us, that we are Rusnaks or something similar, because those days are gone ... 43 In 1956 the trustees purchased properties at the comer of Legen45 44 dre and Clark streets, and erected a wooden cross . The construction of the new church started in Apri l and the basement was finished 46 in November of I 959 . Parishioners came in the evenings, and on their days off, to work on the construction of the church. The first liturgy in the hall in the basement was celebrated on November 29, 47 1959. The cornerstone was blessed by Bishop Borecky on October 48 2, 1960, and the construction was completed on December 17, 49 1961. An icon of Our Lady of Klokofov was displayed in the 50 church . The solemn blessing of the new church by Bishop Borecky 51 had to wait until June I 0, 1962. The main contractor was the parishioner, Mr. Andrej Midlick, originally from Ponic in Spis county. He even donated to the new church the main altar with a baldachino. The newly-ordained Bishop Rusnak came to visit his flock in 52 Montreal for the first time in May of 1965. Bishop Rusnak blessed 43 "Sv. misie pre gr.-kat. Slovakov v Montreali ," Kanadsky Slowik, Apri l 3, 1954, ff· 5, 8. Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Slovenskej Greko Katol'ickej Osadi Voznesefza Vo Montreale Jan Ihnat zapisnik Na rok 1956, 4-5. 45 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 32. The wooden cross still stands in 201 6. 46 Cf. Souvenir book, 34. 47 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 36. 48 Cf. "Z nasich fa rnosti," Maria , 9-10/1960, 226. 49 Souvenir book, 28 . so Cf. "Z nas ich farnosti," Maria, 3/ 1962, 67. 51 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 42. 52 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 42. �36 SLOVAKIA-2017 the altar on March 6, 1966. From Rome he brought some relics of Saint Cyril to be placed into the altar. The parish in Montreal thus became the first one in the North America to celebrate the liturgy on 53 the relics of this great saint. Bishop Rusnak expressed his desire that the Ascension Church would become "a site of pilgrimages in honor of Saint Cyril, the apostle of the Slovaks and Slavs in general. ,,54 • On October 15, 1966, Father Andrew Sinai' was named pastor. 55 For the first time in its history, the parish had its own Slovak priest. Father Sinai' served until 2006. The beginnings were very hard for Father Sinai', since the parish had a huge mortgage. The trustees gave their approval for reading of the Gospel in English and in Slovak to meet the needs of the younger generation, in order to bring them back to the church. From June 1, 1971 Slovak liturgies were cele56 brated in the parish. The golden jubilee was celebrated on Sunday, 57 September 28, 1980, with Bishop Rusnak present. More than twenty of the original founders of the parish survived for this celebration. Around 500 people attended the banquet. However, due to the death of Father Sinai in 2007 and to dwindling numbers, the Montreal parish was closed in 2010. 3: Windsor, Ontario (1950) The automobile industry attracted many Slovaks to the city of Windsor. So did some farms on the outskirts of town. In 1951 the 58 third largest group of Slovaks in Canada lived here. Slovak Lutherans in Windsor organized a parish in 1928, while the Slovak Greek Catholics had to wait until after WW II. Andrew Balint, acting as the secretary of a newly-formed parish committee, wrote to Bishop 59 Borecky on July 29, 1950. He asked for the bishop's permission to 53 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 42. Tomko, Vladimir, " Posviacka noveho hi. oltara v Montreale," Maria, 4-5/ 1966, 56. 55 PAA, Letter sent on October 4, 1966. 56 Cf. PAA, Zapisnica Slovenskej Greko Katol'ickej Osadi Vozneseiia Vo Montreale Jan Ihnat zapisnik Na rok 1956, 48. 57 Cf. "Oslava 50 rocneho jubilea nasej farnosti v Montreale," Maria , 12/1980, 7-8. 58 Cf. Kirschbaum, 137. 59 PAA , Letter from Jul y 29, 1950. 54 �SLOVAKIA-2017 37 establish a new parish. The name chosen was "St. Michael the Archangel Slovak and Subcarpathian Greek Catholic Parish in Windsor, 60 ON." The letter ended with the desire of the congregation to "soon 61 invite (the bishop) to the Slovak parish." Borecky agreed with the 62 organization of a Slovak parish. Father Andrew Krafcik also played a role in its establishment. Until his arrival in Windsor, the 63 parish was administered by Father Mina. The blessing of the cor64 nerstone took place on June 13 , 1954. The rectory, hall and the 65 church were blessed by Bishop Borecky on November 7, 1954. 66 Work with the youth led to establishing the parish choir. In 1956 67 Father George Perejda, CSsR, was ordained from the parish. From November of 1957 to February of 1958 the parish was served by Fa68 ther Fetsco. In 1958 a newly-ordained Slovak Greek Catholic priest, Anthony Zouzal, was appointed as the pastor of Windsor. His tenure could be 69 characterized as the "golden age" of the parish. Collaboration with the Byzantine Catholics on the American side of the border was intensified. 7° Thanks to many cantors, the parish was famous for its singing of Vespers and Liturgies. The popularity of Father Zouzal was so great that on his birthday the parishioners gave him a gift - a 71 car. In his letter to the chancery, dated August 1966, Father Zouzal suggested building a parish school, and even a new name for the parish: the Greek Catholic Parish of St. John - Michael, in order to 60 Sv. Micha/a Archandela Slov. a Podkrp.Gr.kt.paraphija vo Windsor Ont. PAA , Letter from July 29, 1950. 61 "Scoby mi Vas poklikali skoro na nasu Slovensku paraphiju. " PAA , Letter from Jul y 29, 1950. 62 27. Lipna /950. PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore from July 27, 1950. 63 Cf. "S lovenski greckokatolici v Ontariu," Kanadsky Slowik, September 4, 1954, p. 5. 64 Cf. "Cirkevna slavnost' vo Windsore, Ont.", Kanadsky Slowik, June 12, 1954, p. 8. 65 See the photo in Maria, I /1955 (March), 15. 66 Cf. "Zo zivota nasich farnosti ," Maria , 3/ 195 5 (June), I 6. 67 Cf. "Zpravy," Maria, 6/ 1956, 14. 68 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria , 3-4/ 1965, 15 . 69 Cf. "Zpravy z domova a z katolickeho sveta," Maria, 12/ 1958, 15-16. 7 Cf. " Den modlitieb vo Windsore," Kanadsky Slovak, September 19, 1959, p. 2; "Z nasich farnosti," Maria , I 2/ 1960, 282. 71 Cf. "Z nasich osad," Maria, 7-8/ 1960, 189. ° �38 SLOVAKIA-2017 72 avoid confusion within the city. The school project was never im73 plemented . In 1976 Father Zouzal was named an archpriest. However, his tenure was cut short with his premature death on July 14, 74 1976. An eyewitness remembers Bishop Borecky coming to the funeral and placing his own pectoral cross on the body in the coffin. Some 150 priests, as well as more than 1,500 laypeople, participated 75 in the funeral procession. In the following years the parish was served by Father Gregory Novak, CSsR, by Father James Lynch in 76 1978, and by Father Andrew Sipek in 1979. In 1980 some 400 77 people attended an anniversary banquet. The parish continues to exist to this day. 4: Toronto, Ontario (1951) Slovak settlement in Toronto is already mentioned towards the 78 end of the 19 th century, but large numbers came only after 1923. Many Slovak Greek Catholics in Toronto belonged to branch 7 of the CSL (1937). During their meetings the opportunity to establish an independent Slovak Greek Catholic parish was discussed. Until that time, Slovak Greek Catholics mostly attended the Slovak Roman Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius (1934), where they comprised a third, or maybe even half of the members . As a result, many people regarded very negatively attempts to establish another parish.79 The beginnings of the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Toronto 80 are connected with a Rusyn priest, Father Louis Mina. In the archives of the Ukrainian Eparchy of Toronto is a list of seventy-seven names of those who volunteered to join a "S lovak Greek Catholic 72 PA A, Letter of Father Zouzal to Bishop Isidore from August 12, 1966. Cf. "Vy znamenani e o. Antona Zouzala," Maria, 5/ 1976, I 0. 74 "Zomrel o. Anton Zouzal ," Maria, 9/ 1976, 11. 75 PAA , Comm uni cation with Mr. W. Zouzal , recorded on June 5, 20 11. 76 Cf. "Novy paroch vo Windsore," Maria, 12/ 1979, 7. 77 Cf. "Odpust" in Windsor, Maria, 12/ 1980, 9. 78 Cf. Kirschbaum , 132-5. 79 Mikula, Jan, " Hrst' rozpomienok na t'azke zaciatky," Kanadsky Slovak, March 28, 1981, p. 8. 8 Cf. "S lovenski greckokatolici v Ontariu," Kanadsky Slovak, September 4, 1954, p. 5. 73 ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 39 81 parish, if such were created." The parish was founded on October 82 29, 1951 as the Slovak Greek - Catholic Church of the Nativity of the B. V. Mary. A different date is indicated by a document dated November 29, 1951 based on a request for the founding of the parish, written and submitted in the name of the faithful from the Eparchies of Presov and Mukacevo, as well as the Apostolic Administra83 tion in Miskolc, Hungary by Father Mina. The term Slovak was of much wider sense than nowadays and it included almost all the Greek Catholic faithful coming from the Union of Uzhorod. The lit84 urgy was celebrated in the Ukrainian Church on Bathurst Street. On April I , 1952, Father Rusnak was named the new pastor of the church. The congregation gathered first on Bathurst Street, then moved to the Holy Eucharist church on King Street, where they worshiped until 1959, when their own church on Shaw Street was 85 blessed. The plans for the new Slovak Greek Catholic church in Toronto were approved on June 9, 1953 . The church was supposed to 86 be built at the comer of Roblock Avenue and Leeds, however this 87 attempt failed. The success of parish picnics led to the purchase of 89 St. Mary's Park. 88 The parish also acquired one part of a cemetery. However, none of these investments lasted. Towards the end of 1956 90 a choir was organized in the parish. A long-time cantor was Mr. 91 Joseph Kampu. At the end of 1959 the parish acquired a B' nai Is92 rael congregation synagogue, located at 257 Shaw Street. On De93 cember 27, 1959 Bishop Borecky blessed it as a church. Some 600 81 PAA, Copy of the signature li st. Cf. "25. vyroc ie nasej famost i," Maria, 9/ 1976, I 0. Jozef Suchy gives the date of October 2 1. 83 PAA, Letter from 28. XI. 1951. 84 Cf. Vasko, Andrej , "S lovenskf Grecko-katolfci," Kanadsky Slovak, October 11 , 1952, p. 2. 85 Cf. Ru snak, Michal , "Stvrt'storocie nasho rastu," Maria , 1/ 1980, 11. 86 Cf. Daily commercial news and building records, June 9 1953, I. 87 Cf. Ru snak, Michal , "Stvrt'storocie nasho rastu," Maria , 1/ 1980, 11 . 88 Cf. Maria, 5/ 1963 , third page of the cover. 89 Maria , 2/1963 , 16. 90 Cf. "Z nasich farnosti," Maria, 9-10/1956, 22. 91 Cf. Maria, 4/1963, 16. 92 Cf. "Time for rejoicing - Celebrate Opening of New Slovak Church," Toronto Daily Star, October 11 , 1959, p. 57 . 93 Cf. " Pozvanka na posviacku," Kanadsky Slovak, Christmas 1959, p. 4. 82 �40 SLOVAKIA-2017 94 people from near and far attended. The first English liturgy in the 95 parish was celebrated on March 22, 1964. The nomination of Father Rusnak as the Auxiliary Bishop of the Toronto Eparchy and the Apostolic Visitator for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada surely filled his parishioners with joy, for the church with its rectory became the official seat of the new bishop. Father John Fetsco became its new pastor. In 1972 Father John Pazak, CSsR, later the second bishop of the Slovak Eparchy, was 96 ordained a deacon in the parish. In 1974 Father Joseph Krafcik, SJ 97 helped out. The "odpust" celebration of 197 5 was highlighted by the priestly ordinations of three married deacons, at that time a rare 98 ordination in the Catholic world. On May 31, 1976, a Divine Litur99 gy was celebrated for the first time in Slovak. The arrival of Father Richard Boyle, ordained in the parish in 1978, brought new life to 100 the parish. This consisted not only of pilgrimages he organized, but all the parish activities, where he, together with a group of volun0 teers, cared for children as well as adults. ' ' He even installed a provisional iconostasis. On July 17, 1980, the first Slovak Greek Catholic Day in Bratislava Park near Hamilton took place, in an attempt to unite all the Slovak Greek Catholic parishes at a picnic. The "odpust" in 1980 was prepared jointly by all the parishes, and some 500 102 people attended. When the Slovak Eparchy was created, the 94 Cf. "Z nasich osad," Maria, 1-2/ 1960, 39. Cf. "Kronika," Maria , 3-411964, 16. 96 "Najdostojnej si o. Biskup Jan Pazak, C.Ss.R." in "Banquet in honour of His Excellency Most Reverend John S. Pazak, C.Ss.R." in The episcopal ordination and enthronement of the Most Reverend John S. Pazak, C.Ss. R., second Bishop of the Eparchy of Saints Cyril and Methodius for Byzantine Slovaks in Canada (Toronto: E;archy of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 2000). 9 Cf. PAA , Letter Vel'adostojny a mily Vlady ko! Sent from Rome, Jul y 3, 1974. 98 The whole story is described in the following: Pospishil , Victor, "The Toronto Tempest," in Compulsory celibacy fo r the Eastern Catholics in the Americas (Toronto: Ukrainian Catholic Women's League, 1977). 99 Cf. " Slovenska liturgia v Toronte," Maria, 7-8/ 1976, 13-14. 100 To Quebec and its sanctuaries, to the Holy Land or pilgrimages to Uniontown, PA. 101 Cf. Boy le, Richard, "First solemn reception of Holy Communion in Toronto," Maria , 9/ 1979, 11. 102 Cf. Boyle, Richard, "Alive and well on Shaw Street in Toronto," Maria , 11 / 1980, 8-9. 95 �SLOVAKIA-2017 41 church on Shaw Street became its cathedral. A bishop's throne was 103 installed in the cathedral on the orders of Bishop Rusnak. As time passed many parishioners from downtown Toronto (and from the vicinity of the church) moved to other areas of town. It would have been fitting to reach out to these people, especially in the western areas of the Greater Toronto Area. 5: Oshawa, Ontario (1952) Slovak settlement in Oshawa started in the l 920's and is closely related to the development of the automobile industry in the area. After their arrival, the Greek Catholic Slovaks started to attend ser104 vices in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church of Saint George. In 1951 an announcement was placed in Kanadsky Slovak asking people in the Oshawa region who were interested in establishing a Slo105 vak Greek Catholic church to gather for a meeting. Thanks to Mr. 106 Andrew Vasko, the first meeting took place in January of 1952. The chairman asked all those present to sign a document confirming their desire to establish a Slovak Greek Catholic Society. Some fifty signatures were collected. At this meeting a parish committee was elected and the possibility of celebrating the Greek Catholic services 107 in the Slovak Hall was discussed. The first pastor of the community was the Reverend Michael Rusnak. On July 13 , 1952 the very first Slovak Greek Catholic Day in Oshawa was organized with a field 108 liturgy. On January 11 , 1953, the potential parishioners sent a request to Bishop Borecky for a "Slovak Greek Catholic priest, who would be able to have divine services in Oshawa every other Sunday 103 PAA , Folder: Boyle, Letter of Bishop Michael , February 12, 1981. Cf. "Z peknej slovenskej svadby v Oshawe," Kanadsky Slovak, August I 0, 1950, p. 7; "SI. M. Korcinska a p. M. Karas v putach manzelstva," Kanadsky Slovak, October 19, 1950, p. 6. 105 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin famosti) ," Kanadsky Slovak, AJril 26, 1958, p. 3. 1 Cf. PAA , Lescisin, E. & C.: Slovenska greckokatolicka farnost Ochrany Presvdtej Bohorodicky Oshawa, Ontario, Canada - Slovak Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary Oshawa, Ontario, Canada. November 2001, not for sale description of the parish history, 5. 107 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin farnosti) ," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 108 Cf. Ibid. 104 �42 SLOVAKJA-2017 • a mont h ." 109 Some th.irty SI ova k s s1gne • d th e petition. • • 11 0 A or twice mission was established in February of 1953 . The Divine Liturgy was celebrated every other Sunday of the month in the Slovak Hall 111 and the solemn opening ofthe mission occurred on May 10, 1953. The liturgies were celebrated in the morning in Church Slavonic, but 11 2 always with a Slovak sermon. A property was purchased in 1953 11 3 right next to the Slovak Hall on Ritson Road. Really encouraging was the fact that the building process was started by only thirty-eight 114 families. Of great help was a six month-long strike by the United Auto Workers (UAW) labor union in the local General Motors Com11 5 pany, thus providing a ready labor force . The blessing of the cor11 6 nerstone occurred on July 31 , 1955 . The fini shed church was 117 blessed by Bishop Borecky on November 2, I 955 . Attendance was astounding, as according to one chronicler: "From some 800 mouths resounded the hierarchical hymn: " Vose) jesi Archijere11 8 1I 9 ju ..." The parish also offered religious education for the youth. 12 In the late 1950' s a Slovak choir also existed in Oshawa. From October of 1960 until September of 1963 , the parish was adminis12 1 tered by Father John Fetsco, CSsR. He was succeeded by Father 122 Andrew Krafcik. The first official visit of Bishop Rusnak to the 123 parish in Oshawa was on Sunday, May 2, I 965 . Father Michael ° 109 PAA , Without any signature. PAA , Without any signature. 11 1 Cf. " Slovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dej in fa rnosti )," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 11 2 C f. " Prvy slovensky grec ko-katolicky odpust," Kanadsky Slovak, November 14, 1953 , p. 2. 11 3 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin farn osti)," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 11 " Vzor jedn oty a spoluprace," Maria, 5/ 1957, 14. 115 Cf. Lescisin, 6. 11 6 Cf. "Oznamuj eme .. .," Mar ia, 5/ 1955 (Jul y), 15. 11 7 Cf. Oznamuj eme .. .," Maria , 7/ 1955 (September), 14-1 5. 118 Cf. " Posvateni e novej slovenskej gr.-kat cerkvi v Os hawe," Maria , 8/ 1955 (October), 15 119 Cf. Maria , 3/ 1957, photo on th e first page of th e cover. 120 "Vas kovci v Os hawe vydava li dceru," Kanadsky Slovak, January 9, 1960, p. 2. 121 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria , 3-4/ 1965 , 15. 122 Cf. Maria, 2/ 1963 , 16. 123 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Bi skupa M. Ru snaka," Maria, 3-4/ 1965, 16. 11 0 �SLOVAKIA-2017 43 Durisin from Slovakia served the parish in 1966. After him came 124 Father Stephen Adamiak. The need for a resident priest became urgent among the parishioners towards the end of 1960 's: " If we do not have a resident priest, ... then we and even more our children will 125 be in danger regarding our faith and keeping our pari sh." After dedicated efforts of the parishioners, a new rectory was blessed in 126 May of 1969. In 1970 Father Adamiak was replaced by Father Joseph Dubiak. Thanks to Father Dubiak the modem Slovak lan127 guage was introduced into the liturgy. Father Dubiak left the parish in 197 1, and his successor became Father Adolph Vateha, 128 CSsR. In 1972 a railroad overpass was built nearby, which changed the church surroundings. Later the parish was given some 129 compensation by the City of Oshawa. In later years, mostly Toronto priests served in the Oshawa parish. The parish in Oshawa was never large, but had a strong sense of community. According to the 200 I booklet about the pari sh, a majority of the parisioners were 130 from the former historic counties of Zemplin and Ugoca. The parish is still alive, being served by the Reverend Stephen Williams, an English-speaking convert to th e Byzantine-Slovak rite. 6: Hamilton, Ontario (1952) The first Slovaks arrived in the steel city of Hamilton, Ontario, 131 in the 1920's. They founded their own Roman Catholic Church in January of 1945 . Half of the fo unding families were Greek Catholics, and due to this fact the parish was named Sts. Cyril and Methodi132 us. Several Slovak Greek Catholic families also attended the local 133 Ukrainian church and some even the Polish church. The key mo124 Cf. "Z nasich osad - Oshawa," Maria , 9- I 0/ 1967, 17- I 8. PAA , Letter fro m Jul y 28, 1967. 126 Cf. "V izi tac ie preosv. o. biskupa Michala Rusnaka, CSsR," Maria , 5-6/ 1969, 5. 127 PAA , Letter of Father Joseph to Father Lacko, September 17, I 971. 128 PAA , Confirmation of the appointment as a pastor in the letter of Bi shop Isidore fro m September 20, 1973. 129 Cf. Lesc isin, 11 . 13 Cf. Lescisin, 13 . 13 1 Cf. Kirschbaum , 135-7. 132 Sts. Cyril and Methodius parish - History . htt ://www.s lovakchurch .com/historyh tm ( 11.5 .20 12 15 :00). b J Cf. "Nas rozhovor," Maria , 4/1 979, 9. 125 ° �44 SLOVAKIA-2017 ment for the founding of the Greek Catholic parish was a meeting on October 26, 1952 in the house of Mr. Michael Mati. During this meeting a deci sion was made to establish the parish of Sts . Peter and 134 Paul. The first liturgy was celebrated on December 14, 1952 in the 135 local Ukrainian church. Fathers Michael Rusnak and Louis Mina 136 took turns serving the community. The first anniversary of the mission was celebrated in the Hungarian church on December 13, 1953 , with Bishop Borecky attending, and everyone "was delighted 137 to hear him deliver a short sermon in Slovak. " 138 In 1954 Father Frantisek Fuga came to Hamilton from Rome. The parish changed its name due to a request by the Roman Catholic bishop of Hamilton, who already had in his diocese a parish dedicated to Sts. Peter and Paul. Ukrainian Bishop Isidore Borecky, who was in charge of Slovak Greek Catholics in Ontario, changed the name of the parish to the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary on 139 October 20, 1954. In a letter from the Oriental Congregation in Rome, Cardinal Coussa stated: "The veneration of the Mother of God of Klokocov will assure its success among Slovak Greek Catho40 lics." 1 A copy of the Klokocov icon was painted in the church thanks to the efforts of Father Lacko in 1955, and it was blessed by 14 1 the Pope himself. Also, some Slovenians came annualy in pil. h' . gnmages to t 1s icon. 142 The cornerstone of the sanctuary was blessed on October 20, 143 144 1957 . Inside was al so a bit of soil from Klokocov in Slovakia. The facade with three mountain peaks and a double cross (the Slovak 134 Cf. Yinansky, J. (F . Fuga), "Gr. K. Osada, Hamilton," Kalendar KSL 1977 (Toronto), 84. 135 Cf. " 25 . vyrocie nas ich farn osti," Maria, I 0/ 1977, 11. 136 Cf. Eli as, Jan, "Otec Fuga IO rokov v Hamiltone," Maria , 5/ 1964, 9. 137 Cf. " Po Gr.-kato lickej oslave v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, Fe bruary 20, 1954, p. 2. 138 "Zo zivota nas ich fa rnosti," Maria, 3/ 195 5 (May), 15. 139 Cf. " Hist6ri a odpustov Panny Marie Klokocovskej v Hamiltonskej svatyni ," Maria, 7-8/ 1965, 3. 14 Fuga, Franti sek, " Rozpomienka na prvy odpu st," Maria , 7-8/ 1965 , I 0. 14 1 Cf. " lkona kl okocovskej Matky Bozej v Hamiltone," Maria, 8/ 1958, 5-7. 142 Cf. " Hor' sa na putnicky odpust Panny Marie Klokococskej do Hamiltonu," Maria , 7-8/ 1969, 3. 143 Cf. Maria, 10/ 1957 , last page of the cover. 144 Cf. " Dej inn y den," Ma ria , 11 / 1957 , 11. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 45 national emblem) was painted by the noted Slovak artist Jozef 145 Cincik. Father Fuga was a skilled organizer, and the Hamilton 146 sanctuary was nicely decorated during his tenure. Fuga also supported the struggle for Slovak independence and created the modem Slovak flag (horizontal white, blue and red stripes with the Slovak emblem superimposed upon it!" In 197 4 he became the director of 47 the Matica Slovenska Abroad. Hamilton was also one of the first Greek Catholic parishes to have the Sunday readings done in modem Slovak. The church was dedicated on June 9, 1963, as part of the local Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations (the 1100 th anniversary of the 148 arrival of the Apostles of the Slavs on Slovak territory). In those days, the number of the faithful in Hamilton increased to almost 149 500. The first visit of Bishop Rusnak to Hamilton after his episco150 pal ordination took place on May 23 , 1965. At the beginning of 1975 Father Fuga became seriously ill. This was the price he paid for his printing apostolate, using lead ink. Some parishioners said to him: "Monsignor, please do not die! It would be better for us if the sanctuary burned to the ground, because you could build another one, but if you die, we will lose it in a few 151 years! " Father Fuga lived for another ten years. On October 3, 152 1975 a Slovak school opened in the parish. The "odpust" of 1976 included a blessing of the interior iconography, created by Igor 153 Suchacev, and the ceremony of presenting the miter to Monsignor Fuga. Suchacev painted Slovak saints in the apse, with their scrolls 145 PAA, Letter from Father Fuga to Father Lacko, January 31, 1975. Cf. "Z nasich osad - Hamilton," Maria, 3-4, 1968, 18-20; fourth page of the cover; "Odpust a cirkevne slavnosti v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, August 9, 1975, p. 5; "Vyrocity odpust a strieborne jubileum pastoracie Mons. Fr. Fugu v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, September 8, 1979, p. 3. 147 Cf. Elias, Jan, "Zahranicna MS ma protektora," Kanadsky Slovak, July 6, 1974, P,·48 5. Cf. "Kronika," Maria , 4/ 1963, 16. 149 Cf. Lacko, Michal, " Posviacka dvoch novych s lovenskyc h kostolov v Kanade," Kanadsky Slovak, June 29, 1963 , p. 5. 15 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Biskupa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 3-4/ 1965, 16. 151 "Nas rozhovor," Maria , 4/ 1979, 9. 152 Cf. "Skola slovenciny osady P. M. Klokocovskej , Kanadsky Slovak, October 18, 1975 , p. 5. 153 Born in Yugoslavia to Russian refugees . One of his works was the decoration of the throne in Ethiopia. 146 ° �46 SLOVAKIA-2017 written in Slovak. The church also has depictions of the blessed Sister Miriam T. Demjanovic and President Joseph Tiso. The beauty of the church was also enhanced by the iconostasis, being the only Slo154 vak church in Canada to have a permanent one. The parish exists to this day, although the glory days of Father Fuga are gone. 7: Welland, Ontario (1953) The first Slovaks settled in the Niagara peninsula around 1920; eventually there were some 3,000. Local branches of the CSL had these numbers : 23 in Welland (1940), 31 in St. Catharines (1942), 3 7 155 in Niagara Falls (1943) and 64 in Port Colborne ( 1952). A majority of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Welland and nearby places came to Canada in the last years prior to WW II, mostly from Zemplin County. Only after WW II, when new priests arrived, did the organization of spiritual life develop here. On November 22, 1953 a meeting was held in Welland for all those interested in establishing a Slovak Greek Catholic parish under the patronage of the Holy Spirit. The meeting was organized by Father Vincent Danco, SJ. Some twenty-eight members of the future parish appeared. The faithful wished to have the liturgy celebrated twice a month and to temporarily use the Gregorian calendar. They also produced a list of fifty-five people who wished to belong to the 156 parish. Bishop Borecky promised in his letter of December I 9, 157 1953 to send a Decree for the creation of this parish. The first pastor of the parish was Father Danco, whose name was inscribed with gold letters into the history of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada. On August 1, 1954, the Reverend Nicholas Chanat became the pastor of the Hol y Ghost parish in Welland and the "mission stations 158 of the Niagara Peninsula districts." The solemn groundbreaking 154 Cf. " Yysoka cirkevna hodnost' Mons. F. Fugovi," Kanadsky Slovak, September 4, 1976, pp . 1-2. 155 Cf. "S lovaci a ich organi zacia v dejinach oblasti N iagara," Kanadsky Slovak, January 31 , 198 1, p.5. 156 PAA , without a signature. 157 PAA , without a signature. 158 PAA, Letter from Bishop Borecky, without a signature. �47 SLOVAKIA-2017 159 took place on July 3, 1955 , and on May 20, 1956 the new church160 hall was blessed. However, the Reverend Chanat died in the morn161 ing of March 17, 1957 at the age of30. This was so devastating that the hall became a permanent church, as there was never any fur162 ther building activity. Father Mina succeeded him ; after him the 164 163 parish was served by Fathers Fetsco, Kra:fcik, Shogan, Chamey and Russin. Bishop Rusnak visited the parish for the first time as a • 165 bishop on June 6, 1965 . From November 1965, Father Smal' was 166 the pastor. After Father Russin resigned as pastor at the end of 167 I 971, Father Robert Keleher was named the new administrator. 168 He installed a temporary iconostasis. Father Keleher was replaced with a Slovak priest, Father Stephen Kundra, who served from Au169 gust of 1972 until February of 1973 . The parish was administered for a while by Father Fuga until the arrival of Father John Leso, SJ _110 Vo The parish financial report for the year 1980 showed that, were it not for bingo, the rental of the hall and kitchen, the parish would not 171 collect enough money to pay the priest's salary. This was due to the aging of the parish, the death of its founders , while their offspring either moved away or lost interest in this church. Thus, the parish slowly declined and did not survive the year 20 I 0. 159 In other sources the date for the groundbreaking by Father Chanat is listed as Jul y 4, 1954 . 16 Cf. "Zaznamenavame," Maria , 411956, 16. 161 Cf. "Za milovanym o. Nikolajom," Maria , 4/ 1957, 3-6. 162 PAA, Letter of April 3, 1957. 163 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria, 3-4/1965 , 15 . 164 PAA, Letter from Michael Kostik to Bi shop Isidore, November 9, 196 1. 165 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Biskupa M. Ru snaka," Maria , 3-4/ 1965 , 16. 166 PAA , Letter of th e Vicar General, the Right Reverend Basil Filevich, December 6, 1965 . 167 PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore to the Toronto-Dominion Bank, December 24, 197 1. 168 PAA, Letter of Father Keleher to Bishop Isidore, August 27, 1973. 169 PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore, February 23, 1973, addressed to the TorontoDomi nion Bank . 170 PAA , Lette r of February 17, 1976. 171 PAA, Annual statement - 1980. ° �48 SLOVAKIA-2017 8: Sudbury, Ontario (1954) This mining town in northern Ontario also attracted Slovak im172 migrants. In 1923 the first Slovaks arrived in Sudbury. Several of 173 them were Greek Catholics. The founding meeting of branch 16 of the CSL was held June 19, 1938 at the hall of the local Ukrainian Greek Catholic church, showing thus their religious affi liation. The local Greek Catholic Slovaks had quite a community life even before 174 their parish was founded , as testified by newspaper articles. On many of these occasions the Master of Ceremonies, or simply the Elder, presided over the event with both formal as well as religious 175 elements. A real start for the Slovak Greek Catholics was the Divine Liturgy celebrated on August 15, 1954 at the hall of the Canadian Slovak Benefit Society. It was celebrated by fathers Louis Mina and Nicholas Chanat and Father Dzurman, the local Ukrainian 176 priest. The parish received the title of Our Lady of Perpetual 178 177 Help. The entire ceremony was broadcast on local television. 179 Thereafter liturgies were celebrated on a monthly basis. The Sudbury parishioners were also subscribers and ~enerous benefactors of 1 the Slovak Greek Catholic magazine Maria. Father Fetsco became 18 1 the pastor for the first time in 1957. With several breaks and sev- ° 172 Cf. Urban, J., "Slovaks in Sudbury," Polyphony: Th e Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario - Sudbury 's People, Vol. 5 (No. I, 1983), p. 123 . 173 Cf. "Smutna sprava 23. zboru KSL," Kanadsk:y Slovak, August 9, 1980, p. 7; " Spravy z Toronta," Kanadsk:y Slovak, April 7, 1979, p. 2. 174 Cf. " Man zelia Strokovi jubilovali," Kanadsk:y Slovak, March 30, 1950, p. 6; "Manzelia Rani covi jubilovali, Kanadsk:y Slowik, August 17, 1950, p. 6; "Rani covi zenili syna Stefana," Kanadsk:y Slovak, September 9, 1950, p. 6; "S I. Johanka Simkova v putach manzelstva," Kanadsk:y Slovak November 9, 1950, p. 7; " Manzelia Koritko jubilovali, Kanadsk:y Slovak, November 8, 1952, p. 2. 175 Cf. " Mad'arovci 25 rokov v manzelstve, Kanadsk:y Slovak, December 2 1, 1950, p. 3. 176 Cf. Maria , 2/1955 , 15; "S lavnostne otvorenie slovenskej gr. kat. parafii v Sudbury, Ont. di\ a 15. augusta, Kanadsky Slovak, August 7, 1954, p. 8. 177 Cf Urban 124 178 Cf. Mari;, 2/ 1955 , 15. No such video recording cou ld be found. CTV does not have it in its archi ves, TYO did not exist and CBC did not answer my e-mails. 179 Cf. " Prvy slovensky krst v Sudburach," Kanadsk:y Slovak, November 6, 1954, p. 3. 18 Cf. Maria , 6/l 955 , 17; 5/ 1958, 22. 18 1 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria, 3-4/ 1965 , 15. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 49 182 era! priests substituting, he continued coming to the parish until 1972. On July I, 1964, a new pastor was named--Father Theoktist 183 Vidov, a Studite monk originally from Croatia. Bishop Rusnak 184 came to Sudbury on June 13, 1965 . Sadly, someone noted that the youth had little interest in its roots: "The whole ceremony was really nice. And it could be even nicer if our young Slovaks from Sudbury 185 would show up in bigger numbers for such a great ceremony." In 1965 Father Jules Riotte, a Greek Catholic priest of German origin is • d as t he pastor, commg • twice • a mont h . 186 B 1s . hop R usna' k menhone 187 also returned to Sudbury in the following years. We have a list 188 from the 1960's of 31 fam ilies who had their homes blessed following the blessing of the Jordan water. Another list of families who 189 appeared for All Souls Day celebrations is also preserved. One of the problems of the Slovak Greek Catholic community in Sudbury was the lack of a resident priest. Another important factor for the downfall of the parish were economic conditions. Around 1964, when their economic situation changed for the better, many people moved to southern Ontario, and since no new waves of immigrants appeared, a decline in the number of Slovaks (and Greek Catholics) began. At a parish meeting held on July 13, 1975, it was decided "to dismiss the parish ; the reason is that there is no one to keep it because there are no more parishioners, it is sad, but it could 191 190 not be changed." Bishop Rusnak responded on July 25, 1975, but another reply from the parishioners was dated August 1, 1977. Because of this correspondence, Maria magazine listed the parish in 182 Cf. Urban, 124. Cf. "Kronika," Maria, 6-7/ 1964, 16. 184 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp . Biskupa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 3-4/1965, 16. 185 "Cestujeme s p. biskupom ," Maria, 9-10/ 1965, 6. 186 Beskyd, J., Yearbook of the Eparchy of Toronto (In the vineyard of Christ) (Toro nto: Eparc hy of Toronto, 1964), 520. 187 Cf. "Z nas ich osad - Sudbury - Preosv. p. biskup Michal Rusnak CSsR medzi svojimi ," Maria, 11-12/ 1967, 18- 19; Stripay, J., "Preosv. o. bisk up Michal Rusnak CSsR v Sudburach," Maria, 9-10/1968, 6. 188 PAA, File: Sudbury. 189 PAA , File: Sudbury. 190 PAA , Letter from the ushers to Bishop Michael, dated July 17, 1975. 191 PAA, Letter from the ushers to Bishop Michael, dated August I, 1977. 183 �50 SLOVAKIA-2017 192 197 6 as still open, but that is no longer the case. Only sixty people 193 of Slovak origin remain in Sudbury. 9: Delhi (Simcoe - Delhi), Ontario (1955) Many Slovaks, especially from Eastern Slovakia, started to move into the area of Simcoe and Delhi, in southern Ontario, around 1930. 194 Most of them worked as tobacco farmers . The same people who founded branch 46 of the Canadian Slovak League in 1944 also founded St. Andrew's parish. In 1954 Father Frantisek Fuga of Hamilton heard about the Greek Catholic Slovaks at this location and contacted them. After a few weeks he celebrated a liturgy for 195 them. Since this took place around the feast of St. Andrew, the parish was named for this saint. It was officially created in Novem196 ber of 1955 . Father Fuga answered the spiritual needs of the parishioners working on farms and served them once a month in the 197 local Ukrainian church in Delhi. In 1965 only about thirty families 198 attended these services. The first pastoral visit of St. Andrew's parish by Bishop Michael Rusnak was conducted on December 18, 199 1966. The silver jubilee of the parish could also be called its swan 200 song. It was celebrated on October 19, 1980. The story of Simcoe - Delhi is the story of a small flock of the faithful, who wanted to 192 Cf. "Nase kostoly," Maria, 1/1976, third page of the cover. Census profile: http://wwwI2.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/20 I I/dpp_gfprQf1/<!eJ<1.ih/p_agt!,Sfo1'.?: Lang= E&Geo l =CSD&Cocle 1=3553005&Geo2=CD&Cocle2=3553&Data=Count&S t!archText=suclbur &SearchT e=Contains&SearchPR=0 l&B l =A ll &C ustom=&TA Bl D '."'J (27.8.2013 23:30) 194 Cf. Kirschbaum , J. M.: Slovaks in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Ethnic Press Association of Ontario, 1967), 128. 195 Cf. "Osada v Simcoe - Delhi jubiluje," Maria , 1-3/1966, 3-4. 196 See: Kirschbaum , 262 and Fuga, Frantisek, J., "Slovenska greckokatolicka farnost' sv. Andreja v Simcoe - Delhi , Ont. jubilovala," Kanadsky Slovak, November 29, 1980, p. 4. 197 Cf. Kirschbaum, 262. 198 Cf." Osada v Simcoe - Delhi jubiluje," Maria, 1-311966, 3-4. 199 Cf. "Prva vizitacia pana biskupa Michala Rusnaka v Simcoe-Delhi, Ont. ," Maria, 1-2/1967, 10-11. 200 Cf. Fuga, Frantisek J., "S lovenska greckokatolicka farnost' sv. Andreja v Simcoe - Delhi , Ont. jubilovala," Kanadsky Slovak, November 29, 1980, p. 4. 193 �SLOVAKIA-2017 51 praise God in Church Slavonic, as they did back home. However their small size prevented the parish from growing. The community literally died with the death of the last parishioner from among the original flock. This community was always listed as a parish, even though from the ecclesiastical point of view it would probably be called a mission, as in all juridical matters the parishioners belonged to the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Hamilton. 10: Kenaston, Saskatchewan (1967) The first Slovaks arrived in Kenaston in July of 1903 and were 20 1 followed by others who came to farm. Besides the Ukrainians, many Slovak Greek Catholics also settled in and around nearby Sas202 katoon, Saskatchewan. Bishop Rusnak came to Saskatoon on June 203 26, 1966, hoping to include these people within his jurisdiction, and to make of this place a permanent center of the Slovak religious presence in Canada. Before this visit, an invitation appeared in the press: Come all of you, who are able to come, because this will be the very first time, since our arrival here 50 years ago, that we will be able to welcome amongst us our first Slovak bishop in Canada and the first bishop who is a Greek Catholic, since the times of Sts. Cyril and Methodius .... This joyful news is written for you ... by Joseph Zeman, an 80 year-old Slovak, who after 65 years in Canada, lived long enough to 204 experience this great joy ... The Ukrainian Greek Catholics gave Rusnak permission to use their cathedral of St. George for the meeting. The organizational committee prepared 600 memorial ribbons - but they were not 205 206 . enough! Father John Kobelak, M.S.F. was entrusted with or- 20 1 Cf. "Na vyrocie slovenskych pociatkov v Saskatchewan a slovenskeho ~riekopnictva v Kanade, Kanadsky Slowik, June 25 , 1966, p. 2. 02 Cf. "S lovak so Slovakom sa zide," Kanadsky Slowik, March 10, 1962, p. 2; "Janko Purda graduoval ," Kanadsky Slovak, January 5, 1963, p. 2. 203 Cf." Pl anovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria , 4-5/1966, 16. 204 Cf. " Do pozornosti Slovakom v Saskatchewan," Kanadsky Slovak, May 28, 1966, ~- 2. os Cf. "Aj 600 bolo malo," Kanadsky Slovak, July 16, I 966, p. 3. �52 SLOVAKIA-2017 20 7 gamzmg this parish. The Slovak Greek Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Kenaston, Saskatchewan, was officially created during the Canadian centennial in 1967, after the trip of Bishop Rusnak to Saskatoon. The parish was part of the Ukrainian Eparchy of Saskatoon, having its own property, a gift of the recently-deceased Joseph Zeman. Bishop Rusnak planned to send the parish a Slovak priest - the Reverend Stephen Adamiak.208 In the archives are notes testifying that the Ukrainian Eparchy indeed received the property and also $1000 to be used to build a Slovak Greek Catholic church in Kenaston. However, the following year the heirs of the late Mr. Zeman changed their minds and requested that the $1,000 be re209 turned to them. In the fall of 1970 the parish ceased to exist. 2 10 The question remains: Would a Slovak parish have lasted in Saskatchewan, if it had been built in Saskatoon rather than in the small village of Kenaston? MISSIONS WITH IRREGULAR SERVICES Among the missions we list those places where we are sure that the Slovak Greek Catholic services were held: 11: Edmonton, Alberta The capital of the Province of Alberta attracted many Slovak immigrants in the 1930's, including Greek Catholics.2 11 Slovak 212 Greek Catholics present here never formed a separate parish or other type of organized community, but they still could be considered a part of the life of Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada. After his 206 Born in Poland in 1921 . He came to Canada in 1964, and worked in the Eastern rite. He died in 200 I. 207 Cf. "Z nasich osad - Kenaston - Nova slovenska greckokatolfcka osada sv. Cyrila a Metoda," Maria, 11-12/ 1967, 17. 208 PAA, Letter of Bishop Michael dated May 15, 1967. 209 PAA , E-mail from the Eparchy of Saskatoon, sent to the author on November 21, 2011 , 17:00. 210 PAA , Letter NM najdostojnejci Otce Vladyka! sent from Rome, 12. X. 1970. 211 Cf. Kirschbaum , 151. 212 Cf. Maria, 1/ 1963, 17. �SLOVAKIA-2017 53 Episcopal ordination, Bishop Michael Rusnak visited Edmonton on 213 June 27, I 965 . 12: Fernie, British Columbia Femie is one of the oldest settlements of Slovaks in Canada. The 214 first Slovak miners came here in 1898 from Pennsylvania. Many of them were Greek Catholics. Shortly after the start of the 20th cen215 tury, a branch of the Greek Catholic Union was founded here. Slovaks in Femie were also organized in branch 51 of the CSL. Fa2 16 ther Michal Lacko did a visitation here in 1973. Femie is mentioned as a mission in the report of the Apostolic Visitator in 217 1978. 13: New Westminster, British Columbia The first Slovaks came to the Canadian Pacific coast at the end 218 219 of the 19 th century. Larger numbers appeared only after WW 11. Branch 4 7 of the CSL was established here in 1944. The Slovak Roman Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius has existed in New 220 Westminster since 1960. Many of its parishioners were Greek 221 Catholics. From time to time, Greek Catholic services were also celebrated here. In 1959 there was a Slovak Greek Catholic wedding in the Ukrainian church, performed by a "good friend of Slovaks, 222 Father Bylik, who was ass isted in the ceremonies by Mr. Bodnar.'' 213 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Bisk upa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 5-611965, I 3. Cf. Kirschbaum , 70. 215 Cf. Palmer, Howard, Land of the Second Chance (A History of Ethnic Groups in Southern Alberta), (Lethbridge : Lethbridge Herald, 1972), 195. 216 Personal Archive of the Author (PAA) Letter of Bishop Michael to Father Lacko, May 28, 1973. 217 PAA , Quinquennial report for Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada, 19731978 (November 1st , 1978),2-3 . 218 Kanadsky Slovak, November 14, I 970. 219 Cf. Kirschbau m, 146-8. 220 Officiall y establ ished by Father Wi lliam Lacko, SJ in 1960. The first acti vities with local Slovaks date back to 1952. 22 1 Cf. " Klub za ujemcov o hist6riu Slovakov v Britskej Kolumbii v Kanade," http://www.sk-bc .ca/book/export/ html/I 98 (October 18, 20 11 , 20:00); Maria, 78/ 1965, 5; 12; 12/1965, 15. 222 " Pekna slovenska svadba v B.C.," Kanadsky Slovak, June 27, 1959, p. 2. 214 �54 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Slovak church of Sts. Cyril and Methodius was the home of Ukrainian Greek Catholics until they built their own church. In those days a certain Byzantine-rite priest - Father Kmec-- celebrated the services. Many times the Slovak Greek Catholics celebrated with the Ukrainians. ln 1970, the Reverend William Lacko wrote about the Greek Catholics: "the late Michael Bodnar with a beautiful voice, was an outstanding cantor." Already during the Cyrillo-Methodian jubilee in 1963 we learn that "many Slovak Greek Catholics are living in this area and because of this Father Michael Lacko went to the far west of Canada ... and celebrated services in the Church Slavonic 223 language .... " And during the Jubilee year, according to the words of the pastor, once a month instead of the sermon "we all sang "Moleben." The Impressive "Hospodi pomiluj" resounded in the church as a joint response to the petition of all the Catholics of both 224 rites." On the day of the Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations, July 7, 1963 , the Latin Mass was fo ll owed with the singing of sacred songs in Slovak and Church Slavonic by both Roman and Greek Catho225 lics. They sang lie Cheruvimi (Let us, who mystically represent 226 the Cherubim) and Otce nas (Our Father), led by Mr. Bodnar. Bishop Rusnak was quite frequentl y a welcome guest of the parish. On those occasions, the church was always filled to the very last seat or even overcrowded. His visit was a real "unique experience with lasting value .. .. Greek Catholics are coming from near and far to the services held in the Slovak church and it is a joy to see them, 227 when Bishop Michael is among them .. .'' In 1966 Bishop Rusnak 228 appeared on July 3. He officiated at the funeral of Mrs. Potoma on 229 July 6, 1970. For the local parishioners it became a tradition throughout the years to have Bishop Rusnak among them , always around the feast day of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, patrons of their 223 224 Cf. Maria , 7/ 1963 , 11. "Slovenski greckokatolici na Pacifiku," Kanadsky Slovak, September 14, 1970, p. 5. 225 Cf. "Cyril ometodske slav nosti v B.C.," Kanadsky Slovak, June 29, 1963, p. 8. Cf. "Cyrilometodske oslavy na Pacifickom pobrezi," Kanadsky Slovak, August 17, 1963, p. 2. 227 "Slovenski greckokatolici na Pacifiku," Kanadsky Slovak, September 14, 1970, p. 5. 228 Cf. " Planovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria , 4-5/ 1966, 16. 229 PAA , Folder: Vancouver. 226 �SLOVAKIA-2017 55 church. The bishop made such a good impression on the people that they left with the words: "Goodbye Most Reverend Bishop M. 230 Rusnak until next year." In 1973 the Byzantine liturgy was scheduled for August 5, with Father Michael Lacko, SJ as the main cele. . was a Iso the act o f a canomca . I v1s1tahon. . . . 232 brant. 23 1 H.1s v1s1t Among the benefactors of the Maria magazine were several people 233 from New Westminster. The visits of the Greek Catholic bishop to New Westminster stopped a long time ago, but the Greek Catholics there attend the Slovak Roman Catholic parish to thi s day. 14: Unionville (Markham), Ontario From the canonical point of view, Unionville Ontario, and the fa mily mansion of the billionaire Stephen B. Roman could not be considered either a parish, or a mission. However, to be fair to history, we have to note that services were held here more often than in some of th e other missions. Fron the 1950's until the 1980 's Bishop Rusnak celebrated a liturgy in the residence of Mr. Roman every 234 Sunday aftemoon. The bishop had become a good friend of the Greek Catholic Stephen Roman in the early 1950 's. Together they planned to build a huge Cathedral of the Transfiguration on Mr. Roman's property in Unionville and Pope John Paul II even blessed the 235 cornerstone in I 984. However, after Mr. Roman suddenly died in 1988, Bishop Rusnak and his successor Bishop Pazak, could not come to an agreement with Mr. Roman 's heirs as to the actual ownership of the cathedral. Therefore, Bishop Pazak deconsecrated the 23 °Korem, Albin, " Dve spravy z B. C.," Kanadsky Slowik, July 18, 1970, p. 5. 23 1 PAA , Postcard Srdecny pozdrav od Ticheho oceanu. Sent from San Francisco, Jul y 20, 1973. 232 PAA, Letter of Bishop Michae l to Father Lacko, May 28, 1973. 233 Cf. Maria, 2/ 1963, 17; 1/1964, third page of the cover; 2/ 1964, third page of the cover; 9-10/ 1964, third page of the cover; 1-2/ 1965, third page of the cover; 12/1965 , 16; 1-3/ 1966, third page of the cover; 1/ 1977, third page of the cover; 5/ 1978, 16;4/ 1979, 16; 7-8/ 1980, 24. 234 Litva, Felix, "Stefan B. Roman - clovek v rozdvojenom svete" (Cambridge, ON : Dobra kniha, 198 I). 235 See Our Heritage of Faith : Consecration of the Slovak Cathedral of the Transfiguration by His Holiness Pope John Paul II, September 15, 1984, ed. by Helen Roman-Barber and Anne C. R. Roman (Toronto: Eparchy of Saints Cyril and Methodius for Slovaks of the Byzantine Ri te in Canada, 1984). �56 SLOVAKIA-2017 church in 2006 and since then it has sat empty as the cornerstone of a 236 massive housing development called "Cathedraltown." 15: Winnipeg, Manitoba Slovak immigrants started coming to to Winnipeg before the First World War, but the largest group arrived in the interwar peri237 od. A Slovak Roman Catholic parish existed here since 1951. Father Alexander Baran, an historian and native of the Subcarpathian region, worked at the local univers ity. Because his dad had been a secretary to the first Slovak Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia- Dr. Milan Hodza--he knew Slovak and was a great friend to Slovak Greek Catholics, with whom he shared the same liturgical tradition.2 38 Before the end of the 19 th century, several families from Zemplin County arrived via Pennsylvania to the town of Neepawa, in the 239 Province of Manitoba. When the Canadian Slovak League (CS L) was established here in 1932, one of the founding members, Juraj Rond'os, was not ashamed of being not only Slovak, but also a Greek Catholic. The local branch of the CSL received the number 1. The Slovak Greek Catholics in town attended mostly the local Ukrainian church for their worship services. The priests even learned some 240 Slovak for special celebrations for these parishioners. The most vital period for Slovak Greek Catholics in Winnipeg 24 1 started after the episcopal ordination of Bishop Rusnak. He came to Winnipeg for the first time on Sunday, August 22, 1965, and assisted by the local Slovak Roman Catholic pastor, Msgr. John Re236 For more details see "The Cathedral that Toronto Forgot," Toronto Star, June 26, 201 1 and "Losing Faith in Cathedraltown," Toronto Star, January I 0, 2015. 237 Cf. Kirschbaum , 75 -76. 238 For more info on Baran see: htt ://um anitoba.ca/libraries/units/archi ves/collections/rad/baran.html 239 Cf. R~ ndos, Juraj, "V lete sli spat' na breh rieky," in Spomienky pionierov, ed. by lmrich Stolarik (Toronto: Kanadska Slovenska Liga, I 978), 2 19. Maria, 1/ 1963, 17; 10/ 1963, third page of the cover; 12/ 1965 , 16; 12/ 1966, third page of the cover. 24 Cf. " Mary Rondosova vydala sa za Janka Stretavskeho," Kanadsky Slovak, March I, 195 1, p. 4. " Pekna slovenska svadba vo Winnipegu," Kanadsky Slovak, Apri l 5, 1958, p. 2; "Opusti li nas dvaja Slovaci z nasej okolice v Dufresne, Man. ," Kanadsky Slovak, March 21, 198 1, p. I 0. 241 Cf. Kutka, J., " Historicky den manitobskych Slovakov," Kanadsky Slovak, Nove mber 13, 1965, p. 2. ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 57 kem, as well as by Father Baran, he celebrated a Byzantine liturgy in 242 the local Slovak Roman Catholic church. His visit was prepared by Msgr. Rekem and Mr. J. Kutka. Beautiful liturgical Church Slavonic singing had a delicate impact on the people present, many of them hearing it probably for the very first time in their lives. The choir, directed by organist Cudovit (Louis) Besei\ovsky, sang both Slovak Greek and Latin liturgies. Even though the Greek and Latin Catholics sang together for the first time, they 243 were praised for their perforrnance. Bishop Rusnak also visited the Greek Catholic Slovaks in Win244 nipeg in the following years. Several Slovak Greek Catholics from Winnipeg and nearby settlements appeared among the supporters of ~"' • • 245 1V1arza magazme. OTHER SLOVAK GREEK CATHOLIC LOCATIONS 16: Flin Flon, Manitoba Many Slovaks found jobs in the mining industry here, among them quite a few Greek Catholics . Several Slovak farmers settled around the town as well. When the Canadian Slovak League was founded in 1932, its local branch was given the number 4. However, the best years for the community were the 1940's and 1950's. Several Greek Catholic Slovaks here attended the local Ukrainian 246 church. In 1966 Bishop Michael Rusnak intended to send the Revernd John Zeman, OSB as a Greek Catholic priest to Flin 247 Flon . However, this did not materialize. 242 Cf. "Cestujeme s p. biskupom," Maria , 9-10/1965, 9- I 0. 1bid., 9. 244 Cf. " Planovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria, 4-5/1966, 16. PAA, diaries. 245 Cf. Maria , 1/ 1964, third page of the cover; 2/ 1964, third page of the cover; 67/ 1964, third page of the cover; 12/1965, 16; 1-2/ 1967, fourth page of the cover; 78/ 1977, third page ofthe cover; 5/ 1978, 16; 3/1979, 16; 2/ 1980, 16; 12/1980, 16. 246 Cf. "Smutok sboru vo Flin Flon, Man. ," Kanadsky Slovak, February 4, 1956, p. 2; Kadas, V.: Brat Jozef Dubos na vecnosti," Kanadsky Slovak, July 23, 1966, p. 2; "Zlata svadba u Rujakov vo Flin Flon, Man.," Kanadsky Slovak, September 25, 1976, p. 6; "Zlata svadba manzelov Stefanik v B. C.," Kanadsky Slovak, October 18, 1975, p. 4. 247 PAA , Letter from Father John Zeman, August 2, 1966. 243 �58 SLOVAKIA-2017 17: Thunder Bay, Ontario The city of Thunder Bay came into existence on January 1, 1970, when Port Arthur and Fort William, were amalgamated. The majority of the Slovaks in this area were from the county of Orava. They started coming in the 1890's and built St. Peter's Slovak Roman 248 Catholic church in 1907. Slovak Lutherans built a church in 1927. 249 Newspapers confirm several Slovak Greek Catholics living here. The first journey after his ordination led Bishop Rusnak to the Cana250 dian West through Fort William. He almost certainly stopped here on his ways to the West, when traveling by car. Conclusion Besides the above mentioned cities, which were depicted on the map of the Eparchy, the Slovak Greek Catholic presence was also documented elsewhere in Canada. Benefactors of the magazine Maria appeared in a larger number of locations. One can observe from the life of the Canadian Slovak Greek Catholics that, to some degree, they were copying the ways of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, who first settled in the West of Canada, then moved to Quebec, with a hiatus in the interwar period and then focused on Southern Ontario. The settlements in Southern Ontario 25 1 shared similar fates , not only with Ukrainian Catholics, but to a 252 certain degree even more with the Hungarian Greek Catholics. 248 Cf. Kirschbaum , 77-79. Cf. " Smutime za nas imi bratmi," Kanadsky Slowi k, August 27, 1966, p. 3; "Jub ileum Bakovych v Niagara Falls," Kanadsky Slowik, August 15, 1959, p. 2. 25 Cf. Kutka, J., "Historicky dei\ Manitobskych Slovakov, Kanadsky Slowik, November 13, 1965 , p. 2. 251 Cf. Canada 's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity, ed. by Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: Uni versity of Toronto Press, 199 1). On the Ukrainian exr,erience around Winnipeg see pages 53 -80. 52 Slovak - Hungarian Greek Cath olic re lati ons in Canada are a topic fo r furth er research . The Slovak Greek Catholics were fo r a time guests of the Hungari an Greek Catholic Church in Hamilton. In Windsor, Father Krafcik served for a time both Greek Catholi c communities - Slovak as we ll as Hungari an. Similar plans were made fo r Welland, whi ch also had both Churches, using the same liturgical rite, the same melodi es (and when it came to English, exactl y the same melodies and texts)! Especially in Ontario, the Hungarian settlements were almost identical to the Slovak ones. Also from the letters of Father Michal Lacko, SJ, we learn that, before the Slovak eparchy was created, he hoped that a bishopric would be created whi ch 249 ° �SLOVAKIA-2017 59 Many people had relatives in other parishes, leading to frequent mutual visits of Slovak Greek Catholics, other than in their their own parishes, especially for parish feast days, or some great historic milestones. Many new friendships were thus started, and also some marriages arranged within the community. Places which really continued to blossom with the Slovak Greek Catholic population were the industrial towns of Eastern Canada. If the industry closed, or shrank, or farming was no longer attractive, the people moved out and then their parishes were closed (Sudbury 253 and Flin Flon). The same thing happened in the mining and steel 254 industry towns of Pennsylvania, Ohio and New Jersey. If a parish were to last, it had to have several zealous parishioners. Where there were only a few, such a parish had only a minimum chance of survival (Kenaston, Winnipeg, New Westminster). In such a case the Slovak Greek Catholics joined (or remained) either with local Slovak Roman Catholics or with Ukrainian Greek Catholics. The age of the parishioners when starting their parishes was also quite crucial, as when they were relatively old, and few in number, their parishes lasted for only a short while (Simcoe - Delhi). What is interesting is how the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada made picnics an important part of parish culture. These gatherings became so popular, that at some time the parishes of Toronto and Hamilton owned their own picnic grounds, while the other parishes used facilities of other groups. In almost all the parishes we note that the most active parishioners were born in Slovakia. The subsequent generations, born in Canada, began to lose interest in maintaining their parishes. This would include, not only Slovak, but Hungarian Greek Catholic parishes as well (PAA). The last pastor of the Slovak church in Welland (before it was closed in 20 I 0) was Father John Girhinyi, himself a Hungarian. For more information on Hungarian life in Canada (and how it resembled the Slovak experience), see Nandor Dreisziger, Church and Society in Hungary and in the Hungarian Diaspora (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), especially pages 261-4. 253 Cf. https: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Canadian muni c ipalities having experienced popula-tion decreases 254 Other existing parishes, which face serious challenges with changing industry in the USA include Braddock, Charleroi, Clarence and Clymer, Pennsylvania. See Byzantine-Ruthenian Metropolitan Church of Pittsburgh Directory (Pittsburgh: Byzantine Catholic Metropolitan Church of Pittsburgh, I 999). See also. https://en.wikipecl ia.org/wiki/Shrinking- cities in the United States �60 SLOVAKIA-2017 might be attributed to the relatively high percentage of the Slovak immigrants assimilating to English-Canadian culture. Indeed, many times the parents themselves wanted to have their children completely forget about their ancestral homeland . In some cases the parents were not even willing to speak with them in Slovak - so that they would not have an accent, and thus be more successful in the labor market. By 1980, only two Slovak Greek Catholic parishes in Canada were over 50 years old: Lethbridge - which was Ukrainianized, and Montreal, which also had its best years behind it. Sadly, even some of the younger parishes (Kenaston, Simcoe - Delhi, Sudbury) were already closed, or just about to be closed. At the creation of the Slovak Greek Catholic Eparchy in 1980, only parishes in southern Ontario, which were close to each other, and able to benefit from mutual visits, or even exchanges of the clergy, were flourishing. Even this was to change in the following years, as the parish of Montreal was closed shortly after 2010, and the Welland parish was also not able to live through 2010. Recently the Most Reverend John S. Pazak, Bishop of the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada was transferred by 255 the Vatican to Phoenix, Arizona in the USA. Thus, the future of Greek Catholic Slovaks in Canada remains uncertain. 255 Transfer announced on May 7 th 20 I 6. HOLY SEE PRESS OFFICE - Other Pontifical Acts: htt s:// ress.vatican.va/co nten t/sa lastam a/en/bo ll ettino/ ubblico/20 I 6/05/07 /16050 7h.html. See also "Bishop John S. Pazak named new Byzantine Eparch in Phoenix, Ariz. ," Slovak Catholic Falcon, June 15, 20 16, p.5. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKIA-2017 A SURVEY OF SLOVAK COMMUNITIES OF THE BYZANTINE RITE IN CANADA BEFORE THEY RECEIVED THEIR OWN BISHOPRIC Daniel Cerny When we look at Catholic immigration to the USA and Canada, only one bishopric in those coutries is called by the name of the nations of the so-called Visegrad Group- the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Surprisingly, this ecclesiastical structure is not of the Latin rite. It is the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodious for Slovaks of the Byzantine Rite in Canada. When created in 1980, a postcard with a map of Slovak Greek Catholic settlements in Canada was published. The aim of this paper is to present a historical overview of these communities until the Eparchy was created. The late professor Michael Lacko, SJ wrote the first history of these par1 ishes. However, this paper adds some new information, making this survey more accurate and updated. Some of the reasons why these people immigrated to Canada were the changes to the immigration laws in the USA enacted by Congress in June of 1921 and also in July of 1924. 2 Our research on Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada shows that the majority were descendenats of immigrants who came to Canada between 1926 and 1939 (when the borders were open), to be joined by the immigration waves of 1945 - 1950 and of 1968. For the first immigrants the church was in many cases the most important part of their life. Here they were not forced to speak a foreign language, it was like being at home - the same rite, dialects, family, friends, sometimes even neighbors, the same customs. However this also could be harmful in the sense that it created an ethnic 1 Cf. Lacko, Michal, "A Brief Survey of the History of the Slovak Catholics of the Byzantine-Slavonic Rite," Slovak Studies, III (1963), 199 - 224. 2 Based on these regulations, after June of 1921 only 14,269 Czechoslovak citizens were allowed to immigrate annually to the USA, and after July 1924, only 3,073. Cf. Bielik, Frantisek- Rakos, Elo: Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo (Dokumenty II. - 19191939) (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1975), 51, footnote 2. SLOVAKIA-2017 29 ghetto - which was probably fine for the first generation, but no longer so for the following ones. Only those places which experienced large numbers of new immigrants in later years, or were open to new people from outside entering "their" church, were able to continue to flourish . The history of these communities includes the creation of their own Slovak deanery (1957) and the consecration of their own Slovak 3 bishop ( 1964) in the person of Michael Rusnak, CSsR, who was for many years an Apostolic Visitator of these communities. Only two Slovak Greek Catholics participated on the Vatican II Council. One layman and one clergyman. The layman was the Canadian-Slovak multimilllionaire Stephen B. Roman, who participated from the third session on and bishop Michal Rusnak, who participated in the fourth and final session. The use of the vernacular, which was encouraged by Vatican II, resulted in more and more celebrations in English among the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada (the translations were done by the Greek Catholics in the Ruthenian Church in the USA), but not so in modem Slovak. Thus the Church lost many people from 4 the immigration wave of 1968. 3 Michael Rusnak was born on August 21, 1921 in Beaverdale, Pennsylvania. His mother and siblings returned with him to Slovakia during the Great Depression. He was ordained a Redemptorist priest by Bishop Pau l Gojdic, OSBM in Jul y of 1949. After the forced liquidation of the Greek Catholic church in Czechoslovakia, Rusnak was arrested and placed in the Podolinec monastery, which was turned into a prison camp for the clergy . After fifteen months in vari ous prisons, he escaped and, thanks to his American citizenship, he was allowed to emigrate to America. Ru snak went to Canada in 1951 and started to establish Slovak Greek Catholic parishes. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Bishop of Toronto, the Most Reverend Isidore Borecky, named Father Rusnak dean for Slovak Greek-Catholic parishes belonging to his jurisdiction.in 1957. On October 5, 1964, Pope Paul VI elevated Father Rusnak to Auxiliary Bishop to Isidore Borecky and Apostolic Visitator for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada. The process of creating the Slovak Greek Catholic Church in Canada was completed when Pope John Paul II , in his bull Apostolicae Sedis of October 13, 1980, created the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada. At the same time, the pope appointed aux iliary bishop Michael Rusnak as the eparchi al bishop of this Eparchy . Rusnak retired in 1996 and died on January 16, 2003 and is buried at the Holy Cross Cemetery in Thornhill , Ontario. More about Bishop Michael Rusnak can be found in Cerny, Daniel, Biskup Michael Rusnak, CSsR (Diploma thesis), Presov: Greek Catho lic Theological Faculty of the University of Presov, 2008 . 4 Documents on this topic are in the personal archives of the author (hereafter PAA), and are based on letters from Father Fuga, Father Dubiak and Father Lacko. 30 SLOVAKIA-2017 The author of this article located important documents in various archives, and tiny pieces of the mosaic were found everywhere. Especially valuable were the articles in Maria magazine, which was published from 1955 to 1969 and then from 1976 to I 989; in the second period under the direction of a gifted editor - the late Jozef Suchy. In some cases, we can speak only about individuals, in other cases about a group of dedicated parishioners with only irregular services. The most advanced was the group of individual parishes, which we are about to describe. In 1980 these parishes were incorporated into the newly-created Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada,5 the only Slovak Greek Catholic eparchy in the world, which served as a beacon to the persecuted and oppressed brothers and sisters in Slovakia under the . yo ke. 6 communist PARISHES 1: Lethbridge, Alberta (1921) The oldest Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Canada was in Lethbridge, Alberta. In 1885 the first Slovaks came to Lethbridge from 7 Shelby, Montana. Among them was the Veselenak family, Greek 8 Catholics from Nizne Slovinky in Spis county. Local Slovaks formed branch 53 of the Canadian Slovak League (CSL) in 1946. The Slovak Greek Catholic parish of Sts. Peter and Paul was founded in 1921 by coal miners, who came mostly from the Spis villages of Ponic, Zavadka and Slovinky. Before the parish was erected, the faithful organized a branch of the American-based Greek Catholic 5 Cf. L ·o sservatore Romano, December 14, 1980, Articles entitled "Erezione di nuova Eparchia; Provvista di Chiesa; Eretta in Canada Eparchi a di rito bizantino per slovacch i", 1-2. 6 For more on the general history of the Slovak Greek Catholi cs in Canada see Cerny, Daniel , "From Unknown People to a Separate Diocese: Slovak Greek Catholics in Canad a," in Mazurkiewicz, Adam, ed ., East Central Europe in Exile Volum e 1: Transatlantic Migrations (Newcastle upon Tyne : Cam bridge Scholars Publishing, 20 13), 253-72. 7 Cf. "75 rokov lethbridzs kej slov. kol6nie," Kanadsk), Slovak, February 18, 1961 , p. 2. 8 Cf. The Bend: A History of West Lethbridge (Lethbridge: West Lethbridge History Book Soc iety, 1982), 218. SLOVAKIA-2017 31 9 Union. One important document, a photocopy of the parish minutes from the years 1921-193 7 exists, deposited in the library of the Pon10 tifical Oriental Institute in Rome. These minutes were written by 11 Andrew Mihalik. They start with the explanation that the term "fonitika," mentioned in the minutes as a petition to the Ukrainian bishop of Edmonton Nikita Budka, is to be the language used in the church, and that meant the Slovak language. According to these minutes, the first meeting took place on May 30, 1921 in the presence of bishop Budka. The faithful asked to have the celebration of a lit12 urgy every Sunday. During Wold War II the parish counted some 13 200 adults and 300 children. It was founded and owned by lay people (trustees). This was quite common in the ecclesiastical history of the USA and Canada. According to historian Mark Stolarik, this system consisted of elected members of the parish (kuratori), who collected tithes once a year from all the parishioners. A priest was paid from this treasury and the faithful had the right to terminate their 14 contract with him. Before the blessing of the church, the trustees 15 negotiated with the bishop for a resident priest. The parish had 16 a choir, the first Slovak Greek Catholic Choir in Canada. During the first years of its existence, the pastors were predominately Ukrainian, with the exception of Father Nicholas Szilagy, who came from Subcarpathia. In 1948 Ukrainians established their own parish in Lethbridge, but Ukrainian priests continued to serve Sts. Peter and Paul. However a great joy for the Slovak parish was the 1953 or- 9 PAA, e-mail fro m Father David Petras, November 5, 2010. Parafialna zapisnica Sv. toho Petra i Pavla Greko Katolickoho Viznania.(further on only PIO). 11 In 2011 the author of thi s article contacted the son of the late Andrew Mihalik. The original of the minutes are now neither in the parish archive, nor among the f:osses ions of the Mihalik family. 2 Cf. PIO, 2. 13 PAA, Quinquennial report for Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada, 1973-1978 (November 151, 1978), 2. 14 Cf. Stolarik, M. Mark, " Slovak Immigrants Co me to Terms with Religious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , No . I (January, 20 I 0), 69. 15 Cf. PIO, 36. 16 Cf. PIO, 25 ; 62. 10 32 SLOVAKJA-2017 17 daination of one of their own, Father Richard Zuback, who later 18 served also as their pastor. Some of the parishioners appeared 19 among the benefactors of Maria magazine. The first pastoral visit of Bishop Rusnak took place on June 27, 1965 , the parish 's feast day. Many people came to the celebration from as far away as British Columbia. In his homily, Bishop Rusnak said the following: "Do not correct the work of God. If God created you as Greek Catholics, stay firm , remain and work in this province. Do not run away from this rite. Do not leave behind your church and 20 rite. " In the 1960's Father John Zeman, OSB informed Bishop Rusnak about the local Slovak Greek Catholics, asking for a Slovak priest, as the young people were without a priest of their own and 1 ashamed of being Slovaks.2 Father Zeman volunteered to go to the 22 parish . This never happened . In 1967 Bishop Michael expressed his desire to send Father Zorvan, from Europe, to be the pastor of the 23 parish. In I 970's the parish was noted in his calendar several times. 24 Father Lacko, SJ visited the parish in August 1973. When the enthronement of Bishop Rusnak was organized in 1981, the Leth bridge pastor refused to participate, claiming to have only nineteen Slovak 25 families. On the contrary, in 1982, Bishop Rusnak informed the Papal Pro-Nuncio that there were forty-five Slovak families in Leth26 bridge. The parish was owned by the trustees almost for a record time. The official incorporation into the Ukrainian church happened 27 on ly after a plebiscite within the parish in the early 2000's. The 17 "Prve slov. gr. katol primicie v Lethbridge, Alta," Kanadsky Slovak, June 20, 1953, p. 2. The author is grateful for this information to Mark Stolarik. 18 Cf. " Zpravy," Maria, 5/1955 Gui), I 0. 19 Cf. Maria, 6-7/ 1964, third page of the cover; I 2/ 1966, third page of the cover. 20 "Cestujeme s p. biskupom ," Maria , 9-10/ 1965, 8. 21 Cf. PAA, Letter of Father John Zeman, C hri stmas 1964. Father John , who was born in Kenaston , Saskatchewan, joined th e Slovak Benedictine Order in Cleveland, Ohio, but always wished to return to Canada. 22 Cf. PAA, Letter of Father John Zeman, sen t on July 22 , 1966 . 23 Cf. PAA , Letter of Bi shop Michael of May 15, 1967. 24 Cf. PAA , Postcard "Srdecny pozdrav od Ticheho oceanu," Sent from San Francisco, July 20, 1973 . 25 Cf. PAA , Motiuk, D. Report on the Canonical status of Saint Peter and Paul Catholic Church. l ethbridge. Alberta. 26 27 Cf. PA A, Letter of Bishop Michael to the Pro- uncio, sent October 28, 1982. Archive of the Eparchy of Sts. Cyri l and Methodius, folder Lethbridge. 33 SLOVAKIA-2017 parish is thus nowadays Ukrainian, but its contribution to the history and culture of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada, especially in the first half of the 20 th century, is significant. 2: Montreal, Quebec (1930) 28 Many Slovaks settled in Montreal in the l 920's, forming branch 2 of the CSL in 1932. After Western Canada, Montreal became the second center of Slovak settlement in Canada. Slovaks in Montreal first established a Roman Catholic parish in 1928 and a 29 Lutheran one in 1929. The Slovak Greek Catholics joined several fraternal groups, such as the Greek Catholic Union. At one of the meetings of branch 959 of the Union, on October 18, 1930, discussions started and eventually led to the founding of the Slovak Greek 30 Catholic parish. The volunteers created a list of fifty families and 31 many individuals who would join the parish. Ukrainian Bishop Ladyka, visiting Montreal on November 21, 1930, welcomed the delegates and promised to do everything possible "in order to fulfill the request of this God-fearing people, who are organizing themselves in this foreign world, not forgetting God, and are willing to do such a 32 beautiful, but difficult task." The first liturgy was celebrated by Father Michal Gregorejchuk, OSBM on Sunday, December 7, 33 1930. Three days later a meeting was held and a parish council was elected. December I 0, 1930 is considered the date of the creation of 34 the parish. From the very beginning the parish was organized by Slovaks not only from Slovakia, but from Hungary, Romania or 35 elsewhere. A photo from 1931 testifies to the presence of a Slovak 36 school. In 1931 a "Membership Book" was published. This book, 28 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia - Nanebevstupenia Pana v Montreale - 50'h anniversary Slovak Catholic (E. R.) parish of Ascension Montreal (Montreal: Parish of the Ascension, 1980), 34. 29 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady, 34. 3 Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, I. 31 PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 3-4. 32 PAA Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 2. 33 Cf. PAA , Zapisn ica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 2. 34 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 30; 34. 35 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr kat. osady Voznesenia, 24. 36 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 23. ° 34 SLOVAKIA-2017 together with the first financial records, are an authoritative example 37 of the language of the first immigrants. The Basilian fathers took care of the parish until the arrival of 38 Father John Hawryluk in 1949. When the parish was created it was named the GR. KFT. RUSSKA CERKOV (Greek Catholic Russian Church). The change of name was moti vated by a schismatic movement and the rise of national awareness among the faithful. The name Slovak Gr. Cath. Church was used for the first time on October 39 15, 1935 . A youth orchestra nicely represented the parish. In 193 7 the parishioners started to use the chapel in the Notre Dame de Lourdes church as their place of worship until November, 1959. In 1938 the parish mission was granted permission to keep their own 40 parish records and thus gained greater internal autonomy. In these years the pari sh was still only a mission. The years following WW II brought a radical change into the lives of the Slovak Greek Catholics . With the arrival of thousands of Ukrainian refugees to Canada, the Ukrainian Exarchate, later the Eparchy of Toronto and all Eastern Canada, was founded. Its first bishop was Isidore Borecky. On October 10, 1949, Bishop Borecky named Father John Hawryluk as the pastor of the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Montreal. On December 20, 1949 the former mis41 sion was established as an independent parish. The presence of young people at the services was really appreciated as the youth was 42 "the real core of the new choir of our church." The choir even broadcast by radio to Slovakia. The people dreamt about getting a Slovak priest: 37 Original scans were published in 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 44. 38 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 37. And also : Souvenir book of the dedication of the Slovak Catholic E. R. Church of Ascension, Montreal, Jun e JO, 1962 - Pamiitnci kniha archijerejskeho blahoslovenia slovenskej katolickej V 0. cerkvi Voznesenia, Montreal, JO. juna 1962 (Montreal: Pari sh of the Ascension, 1962), 17-18 . 39 Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Gr. Kat. Osadi Voznesenie, 32. 4 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 35; 37-39. 41 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 3 1; 40. 42 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 40. ° SLOVAKIA-2017 35 We firmly believe that, in a short time a priest of Slovak ethnicity wi ll be assigned to our parish and thus we will fulfill our long-time dream .... The faithfu l understands the announced Word of God more easily . .. There are obstacles in foreign objections and intentions that prevent us from achieving this goal of ours . .. "We do not long for something foreign, we just want to live our own life, but on the other hand we do not accept anyone trying to make fools of us, that we are Rusnaks or something similar, because those days are gone ... 43 In 1956 the trustees purchased properties at the comer of Legen45 44 dre and Clark streets, and erected a wooden cross . The construction of the new church started in Apri l and the basement was finished 46 in November of I 959 . Parishioners came in the evenings, and on their days off, to work on the construction of the church. The first liturgy in the hall in the basement was celebrated on November 29, 47 1959. The cornerstone was blessed by Bishop Borecky on October 48 2, 1960, and the construction was completed on December 17, 49 1961. An icon of Our Lady of Klokofov was displayed in the 50 church . The solemn blessing of the new church by Bishop Borecky 51 had to wait until June I 0, 1962. The main contractor was the parishioner, Mr. Andrej Midlick, originally from Ponic in Spis county. He even donated to the new church the main altar with a baldachino. The newly-ordained Bishop Rusnak came to visit his flock in 52 Montreal for the first time in May of 1965. Bishop Rusnak blessed 43 "Sv. misie pre gr.-kat. Slovakov v Montreali ," Kanadsky Slowik, Apri l 3, 1954, ff· 5, 8. Cf. PAA , Zapisnica Slovenskej Greko Katol'ickej Osadi Voznesefza Vo Montreale Jan Ihnat zapisnik Na rok 1956, 4-5. 45 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 32. The wooden cross still stands in 201 6. 46 Cf. Souvenir book, 34. 47 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 36. 48 Cf. "Z nasich fa rnosti," Maria , 9-10/1960, 226. 49 Souvenir book, 28 . so Cf. "Z nas ich farnosti," Maria, 3/ 1962, 67. 51 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia, 42. 52 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 42. 36 SLOVAKIA-2017 the altar on March 6, 1966. From Rome he brought some relics of Saint Cyril to be placed into the altar. The parish in Montreal thus became the first one in the North America to celebrate the liturgy on 53 the relics of this great saint. Bishop Rusnak expressed his desire that the Ascension Church would become "a site of pilgrimages in honor of Saint Cyril, the apostle of the Slovaks and Slavs in general. ,,54 • On October 15, 1966, Father Andrew Sinai' was named pastor. 55 For the first time in its history, the parish had its own Slovak priest. Father Sinai' served until 2006. The beginnings were very hard for Father Sinai', since the parish had a huge mortgage. The trustees gave their approval for reading of the Gospel in English and in Slovak to meet the needs of the younger generation, in order to bring them back to the church. From June 1, 1971 Slovak liturgies were cele56 brated in the parish. The golden jubilee was celebrated on Sunday, 57 September 28, 1980, with Bishop Rusnak present. More than twenty of the original founders of the parish survived for this celebration. Around 500 people attended the banquet. However, due to the death of Father Sinai in 2007 and to dwindling numbers, the Montreal parish was closed in 2010. 3: Windsor, Ontario (1950) The automobile industry attracted many Slovaks to the city of Windsor. So did some farms on the outskirts of town. In 1951 the 58 third largest group of Slovaks in Canada lived here. Slovak Lutherans in Windsor organized a parish in 1928, while the Slovak Greek Catholics had to wait until after WW II. Andrew Balint, acting as the secretary of a newly-formed parish committee, wrote to Bishop 59 Borecky on July 29, 1950. He asked for the bishop's permission to 53 Cf. 50 vyrocie Slovenskej Gr. kat. osady Voznesenia , 42. Tomko, Vladimir, " Posviacka noveho hi. oltara v Montreale," Maria, 4-5/ 1966, 56. 55 PAA, Letter sent on October 4, 1966. 56 Cf. PAA, Zapisnica Slovenskej Greko Katol'ickej Osadi Vozneseiia Vo Montreale Jan Ihnat zapisnik Na rok 1956, 48. 57 Cf. "Oslava 50 rocneho jubilea nasej farnosti v Montreale," Maria , 12/1980, 7-8. 58 Cf. Kirschbaum, 137. 59 PAA , Letter from Jul y 29, 1950. 54 SLOVAKIA-2017 37 establish a new parish. The name chosen was "St. Michael the Archangel Slovak and Subcarpathian Greek Catholic Parish in Windsor, 60 ON." The letter ended with the desire of the congregation to "soon 61 invite (the bishop) to the Slovak parish." Borecky agreed with the 62 organization of a Slovak parish. Father Andrew Krafcik also played a role in its establishment. Until his arrival in Windsor, the 63 parish was administered by Father Mina. The blessing of the cor64 nerstone took place on June 13 , 1954. The rectory, hall and the 65 church were blessed by Bishop Borecky on November 7, 1954. 66 Work with the youth led to establishing the parish choir. In 1956 67 Father George Perejda, CSsR, was ordained from the parish. From November of 1957 to February of 1958 the parish was served by Fa68 ther Fetsco. In 1958 a newly-ordained Slovak Greek Catholic priest, Anthony Zouzal, was appointed as the pastor of Windsor. His tenure could be 69 characterized as the "golden age" of the parish. Collaboration with the Byzantine Catholics on the American side of the border was intensified. 7° Thanks to many cantors, the parish was famous for its singing of Vespers and Liturgies. The popularity of Father Zouzal was so great that on his birthday the parishioners gave him a gift - a 71 car. In his letter to the chancery, dated August 1966, Father Zouzal suggested building a parish school, and even a new name for the parish: the Greek Catholic Parish of St. John - Michael, in order to 60 Sv. Micha/a Archandela Slov. a Podkrp.Gr.kt.paraphija vo Windsor Ont. PAA , Letter from July 29, 1950. 61 "Scoby mi Vas poklikali skoro na nasu Slovensku paraphiju. " PAA , Letter from Jul y 29, 1950. 62 27. Lipna /950. PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore from July 27, 1950. 63 Cf. "S lovenski greckokatolici v Ontariu," Kanadsky Slowik, September 4, 1954, p. 5. 64 Cf. "Cirkevna slavnost' vo Windsore, Ont.", Kanadsky Slowik, June 12, 1954, p. 8. 65 See the photo in Maria, I /1955 (March), 15. 66 Cf. "Zo zivota nasich farnosti ," Maria , 3/ 195 5 (June), I 6. 67 Cf. "Zpravy," Maria, 6/ 1956, 14. 68 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria , 3-4/ 1965, 15 . 69 Cf. "Zpravy z domova a z katolickeho sveta," Maria, 12/ 1958, 15-16. 7 Cf. " Den modlitieb vo Windsore," Kanadsky Slovak, September 19, 1959, p. 2; "Z nasich farnosti," Maria , I 2/ 1960, 282. 71 Cf. "Z nasich osad," Maria, 7-8/ 1960, 189. ° 38 SLOVAKIA-2017 72 avoid confusion within the city. The school project was never im73 plemented . In 1976 Father Zouzal was named an archpriest. However, his tenure was cut short with his premature death on July 14, 74 1976. An eyewitness remembers Bishop Borecky coming to the funeral and placing his own pectoral cross on the body in the coffin. Some 150 priests, as well as more than 1,500 laypeople, participated 75 in the funeral procession. In the following years the parish was served by Father Gregory Novak, CSsR, by Father James Lynch in 76 1978, and by Father Andrew Sipek in 1979. In 1980 some 400 77 people attended an anniversary banquet. The parish continues to exist to this day. 4: Toronto, Ontario (1951) Slovak settlement in Toronto is already mentioned towards the 78 end of the 19 th century, but large numbers came only after 1923. Many Slovak Greek Catholics in Toronto belonged to branch 7 of the CSL (1937). During their meetings the opportunity to establish an independent Slovak Greek Catholic parish was discussed. Until that time, Slovak Greek Catholics mostly attended the Slovak Roman Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius (1934), where they comprised a third, or maybe even half of the members . As a result, many people regarded very negatively attempts to establish another parish.79 The beginnings of the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Toronto 80 are connected with a Rusyn priest, Father Louis Mina. In the archives of the Ukrainian Eparchy of Toronto is a list of seventy-seven names of those who volunteered to join a "S lovak Greek Catholic 72 PA A, Letter of Father Zouzal to Bishop Isidore from August 12, 1966. Cf. "Vy znamenani e o. Antona Zouzala," Maria, 5/ 1976, I 0. 74 "Zomrel o. Anton Zouzal ," Maria, 9/ 1976, 11. 75 PAA , Comm uni cation with Mr. W. Zouzal , recorded on June 5, 20 11. 76 Cf. "Novy paroch vo Windsore," Maria, 12/ 1979, 7. 77 Cf. "Odpust" in Windsor, Maria, 12/ 1980, 9. 78 Cf. Kirschbaum , 132-5. 79 Mikula, Jan, " Hrst' rozpomienok na t'azke zaciatky," Kanadsky Slovak, March 28, 1981, p. 8. 8 Cf. "S lovenski greckokatolici v Ontariu," Kanadsky Slovak, September 4, 1954, p. 5. 73 ° SLOVAKIA-2017 39 81 parish, if such were created." The parish was founded on October 82 29, 1951 as the Slovak Greek - Catholic Church of the Nativity of the B. V. Mary. A different date is indicated by a document dated November 29, 1951 based on a request for the founding of the parish, written and submitted in the name of the faithful from the Eparchies of Presov and Mukacevo, as well as the Apostolic Administra83 tion in Miskolc, Hungary by Father Mina. The term Slovak was of much wider sense than nowadays and it included almost all the Greek Catholic faithful coming from the Union of Uzhorod. The lit84 urgy was celebrated in the Ukrainian Church on Bathurst Street. On April I , 1952, Father Rusnak was named the new pastor of the church. The congregation gathered first on Bathurst Street, then moved to the Holy Eucharist church on King Street, where they worshiped until 1959, when their own church on Shaw Street was 85 blessed. The plans for the new Slovak Greek Catholic church in Toronto were approved on June 9, 1953 . The church was supposed to 86 be built at the comer of Roblock Avenue and Leeds, however this 87 attempt failed. The success of parish picnics led to the purchase of 89 St. Mary's Park. 88 The parish also acquired one part of a cemetery. However, none of these investments lasted. Towards the end of 1956 90 a choir was organized in the parish. A long-time cantor was Mr. 91 Joseph Kampu. At the end of 1959 the parish acquired a B' nai Is92 rael congregation synagogue, located at 257 Shaw Street. On De93 cember 27, 1959 Bishop Borecky blessed it as a church. Some 600 81 PAA, Copy of the signature li st. Cf. "25. vyroc ie nasej famost i," Maria, 9/ 1976, I 0. Jozef Suchy gives the date of October 2 1. 83 PAA, Letter from 28. XI. 1951. 84 Cf. Vasko, Andrej , "S lovenskf Grecko-katolfci," Kanadsky Slovak, October 11 , 1952, p. 2. 85 Cf. Ru snak, Michal , "Stvrt'storocie nasho rastu," Maria , 1/ 1980, 11. 86 Cf. Daily commercial news and building records, June 9 1953, I. 87 Cf. Ru snak, Michal , "Stvrt'storocie nasho rastu," Maria , 1/ 1980, 11 . 88 Cf. Maria, 5/ 1963 , third page of the cover. 89 Maria , 2/1963 , 16. 90 Cf. "Z nasich farnosti," Maria, 9-10/1956, 22. 91 Cf. Maria, 4/1963, 16. 92 Cf. "Time for rejoicing - Celebrate Opening of New Slovak Church," Toronto Daily Star, October 11 , 1959, p. 57 . 93 Cf. " Pozvanka na posviacku," Kanadsky Slovak, Christmas 1959, p. 4. 82 40 SLOVAKIA-2017 94 people from near and far attended. The first English liturgy in the 95 parish was celebrated on March 22, 1964. The nomination of Father Rusnak as the Auxiliary Bishop of the Toronto Eparchy and the Apostolic Visitator for the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada surely filled his parishioners with joy, for the church with its rectory became the official seat of the new bishop. Father John Fetsco became its new pastor. In 1972 Father John Pazak, CSsR, later the second bishop of the Slovak Eparchy, was 96 ordained a deacon in the parish. In 1974 Father Joseph Krafcik, SJ 97 helped out. The "odpust" celebration of 197 5 was highlighted by the priestly ordinations of three married deacons, at that time a rare 98 ordination in the Catholic world. On May 31, 1976, a Divine Litur99 gy was celebrated for the first time in Slovak. The arrival of Father Richard Boyle, ordained in the parish in 1978, brought new life to 100 the parish. This consisted not only of pilgrimages he organized, but all the parish activities, where he, together with a group of volun0 teers, cared for children as well as adults. ' ' He even installed a provisional iconostasis. On July 17, 1980, the first Slovak Greek Catholic Day in Bratislava Park near Hamilton took place, in an attempt to unite all the Slovak Greek Catholic parishes at a picnic. The "odpust" in 1980 was prepared jointly by all the parishes, and some 500 102 people attended. When the Slovak Eparchy was created, the 94 Cf. "Z nasich osad," Maria, 1-2/ 1960, 39. Cf. "Kronika," Maria , 3-411964, 16. 96 "Najdostojnej si o. Biskup Jan Pazak, C.Ss.R." in "Banquet in honour of His Excellency Most Reverend John S. Pazak, C.Ss.R." in The episcopal ordination and enthronement of the Most Reverend John S. Pazak, C.Ss. R., second Bishop of the Eparchy of Saints Cyril and Methodius for Byzantine Slovaks in Canada (Toronto: E;archy of Saints Cyril and Methodius, 2000). 9 Cf. PAA , Letter Vel'adostojny a mily Vlady ko! Sent from Rome, Jul y 3, 1974. 98 The whole story is described in the following: Pospishil , Victor, "The Toronto Tempest," in Compulsory celibacy fo r the Eastern Catholics in the Americas (Toronto: Ukrainian Catholic Women's League, 1977). 99 Cf. " Slovenska liturgia v Toronte," Maria, 7-8/ 1976, 13-14. 100 To Quebec and its sanctuaries, to the Holy Land or pilgrimages to Uniontown, PA. 101 Cf. Boy le, Richard, "First solemn reception of Holy Communion in Toronto," Maria , 9/ 1979, 11. 102 Cf. Boyle, Richard, "Alive and well on Shaw Street in Toronto," Maria , 11 / 1980, 8-9. 95 SLOVAKIA-2017 41 church on Shaw Street became its cathedral. A bishop's throne was 103 installed in the cathedral on the orders of Bishop Rusnak. As time passed many parishioners from downtown Toronto (and from the vicinity of the church) moved to other areas of town. It would have been fitting to reach out to these people, especially in the western areas of the Greater Toronto Area. 5: Oshawa, Ontario (1952) Slovak settlement in Oshawa started in the l 920's and is closely related to the development of the automobile industry in the area. After their arrival, the Greek Catholic Slovaks started to attend ser104 vices in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic church of Saint George. In 1951 an announcement was placed in Kanadsky Slovak asking people in the Oshawa region who were interested in establishing a Slo105 vak Greek Catholic church to gather for a meeting. Thanks to Mr. 106 Andrew Vasko, the first meeting took place in January of 1952. The chairman asked all those present to sign a document confirming their desire to establish a Slovak Greek Catholic Society. Some fifty signatures were collected. At this meeting a parish committee was elected and the possibility of celebrating the Greek Catholic services 107 in the Slovak Hall was discussed. The first pastor of the community was the Reverend Michael Rusnak. On July 13 , 1952 the very first Slovak Greek Catholic Day in Oshawa was organized with a field 108 liturgy. On January 11 , 1953, the potential parishioners sent a request to Bishop Borecky for a "Slovak Greek Catholic priest, who would be able to have divine services in Oshawa every other Sunday 103 PAA , Folder: Boyle, Letter of Bishop Michael , February 12, 1981. Cf. "Z peknej slovenskej svadby v Oshawe," Kanadsky Slovak, August I 0, 1950, p. 7; "SI. M. Korcinska a p. M. Karas v putach manzelstva," Kanadsky Slovak, October 19, 1950, p. 6. 105 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin famosti) ," Kanadsky Slovak, AJril 26, 1958, p. 3. 1 Cf. PAA , Lescisin, E. & C.: Slovenska greckokatolicka farnost Ochrany Presvdtej Bohorodicky Oshawa, Ontario, Canada - Slovak Greek Catholic Church of the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary Oshawa, Ontario, Canada. November 2001, not for sale description of the parish history, 5. 107 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin farnosti) ," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 108 Cf. Ibid. 104 42 SLOVAKJA-2017 • a mont h ." 109 Some th.irty SI ova k s s1gne • d th e petition. • • 11 0 A or twice mission was established in February of 1953 . The Divine Liturgy was celebrated every other Sunday of the month in the Slovak Hall 111 and the solemn opening ofthe mission occurred on May 10, 1953. The liturgies were celebrated in the morning in Church Slavonic, but 11 2 always with a Slovak sermon. A property was purchased in 1953 11 3 right next to the Slovak Hall on Ritson Road. Really encouraging was the fact that the building process was started by only thirty-eight 114 families. Of great help was a six month-long strike by the United Auto Workers (UAW) labor union in the local General Motors Com11 5 pany, thus providing a ready labor force . The blessing of the cor11 6 nerstone occurred on July 31 , 1955 . The fini shed church was 117 blessed by Bishop Borecky on November 2, I 955 . Attendance was astounding, as according to one chronicler: "From some 800 mouths resounded the hierarchical hymn: " Vose) jesi Archijere11 8 1I 9 ju ..." The parish also offered religious education for the youth. 12 In the late 1950' s a Slovak choir also existed in Oshawa. From October of 1960 until September of 1963 , the parish was adminis12 1 tered by Father John Fetsco, CSsR. He was succeeded by Father 122 Andrew Krafcik. The first official visit of Bishop Rusnak to the 123 parish in Oshawa was on Sunday, May 2, I 965 . Father Michael ° 109 PAA , Without any signature. PAA , Without any signature. 11 1 Cf. " Slovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dej in fa rnosti )," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 11 2 C f. " Prvy slovensky grec ko-katolicky odpust," Kanadsky Slovak, November 14, 1953 , p. 2. 11 3 Cf. "S lovaci grecko-katolici v Oshawe (z dejin farn osti)," Kanadsky Slovak, April 26, 1958, p. 3. 11 " Vzor jedn oty a spoluprace," Maria, 5/ 1957, 14. 115 Cf. Lescisin, 6. 11 6 Cf. "Oznamuj eme .. .," Mar ia, 5/ 1955 (Jul y), 15. 11 7 Cf. Oznamuj eme .. .," Maria , 7/ 1955 (September), 14-1 5. 118 Cf. " Posvateni e novej slovenskej gr.-kat cerkvi v Os hawe," Maria , 8/ 1955 (October), 15 119 Cf. Maria , 3/ 1957, photo on th e first page of th e cover. 120 "Vas kovci v Os hawe vydava li dceru," Kanadsky Slovak, January 9, 1960, p. 2. 121 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria , 3-4/ 1965 , 15. 122 Cf. Maria, 2/ 1963 , 16. 123 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Bi skupa M. Ru snaka," Maria, 3-4/ 1965, 16. 11 0 SLOVAKIA-2017 43 Durisin from Slovakia served the parish in 1966. After him came 124 Father Stephen Adamiak. The need for a resident priest became urgent among the parishioners towards the end of 1960 's: " If we do not have a resident priest, ... then we and even more our children will 125 be in danger regarding our faith and keeping our pari sh." After dedicated efforts of the parishioners, a new rectory was blessed in 126 May of 1969. In 1970 Father Adamiak was replaced by Father Joseph Dubiak. Thanks to Father Dubiak the modem Slovak lan127 guage was introduced into the liturgy. Father Dubiak left the parish in 197 1, and his successor became Father Adolph Vateha, 128 CSsR. In 1972 a railroad overpass was built nearby, which changed the church surroundings. Later the parish was given some 129 compensation by the City of Oshawa. In later years, mostly Toronto priests served in the Oshawa parish. The parish in Oshawa was never large, but had a strong sense of community. According to the 200 I booklet about the pari sh, a majority of the parisioners were 130 from the former historic counties of Zemplin and Ugoca. The parish is still alive, being served by the Reverend Stephen Williams, an English-speaking convert to th e Byzantine-Slovak rite. 6: Hamilton, Ontario (1952) The first Slovaks arrived in the steel city of Hamilton, Ontario, 131 in the 1920's. They founded their own Roman Catholic Church in January of 1945 . Half of the fo unding families were Greek Catholics, and due to this fact the parish was named Sts. Cyril and Methodi132 us. Several Slovak Greek Catholic families also attended the local 133 Ukrainian church and some even the Polish church. The key mo124 Cf. "Z nasich osad - Oshawa," Maria , 9- I 0/ 1967, 17- I 8. PAA , Letter fro m Jul y 28, 1967. 126 Cf. "V izi tac ie preosv. o. biskupa Michala Rusnaka, CSsR," Maria , 5-6/ 1969, 5. 127 PAA , Letter of Father Joseph to Father Lacko, September 17, I 971. 128 PAA , Confirmation of the appointment as a pastor in the letter of Bi shop Isidore fro m September 20, 1973. 129 Cf. Lesc isin, 11 . 13 Cf. Lescisin, 13 . 13 1 Cf. Kirschbaum , 135-7. 132 Sts. Cyril and Methodius parish - History . htt ://www.s lovakchurch .com/historyh tm ( 11.5 .20 12 15 :00). b J Cf. "Nas rozhovor," Maria , 4/1 979, 9. 125 ° 44 SLOVAKIA-2017 ment for the founding of the Greek Catholic parish was a meeting on October 26, 1952 in the house of Mr. Michael Mati. During this meeting a deci sion was made to establish the parish of Sts . Peter and 134 Paul. The first liturgy was celebrated on December 14, 1952 in the 135 local Ukrainian church. Fathers Michael Rusnak and Louis Mina 136 took turns serving the community. The first anniversary of the mission was celebrated in the Hungarian church on December 13, 1953 , with Bishop Borecky attending, and everyone "was delighted 137 to hear him deliver a short sermon in Slovak. " 138 In 1954 Father Frantisek Fuga came to Hamilton from Rome. The parish changed its name due to a request by the Roman Catholic bishop of Hamilton, who already had in his diocese a parish dedicated to Sts. Peter and Paul. Ukrainian Bishop Isidore Borecky, who was in charge of Slovak Greek Catholics in Ontario, changed the name of the parish to the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary on 139 October 20, 1954. In a letter from the Oriental Congregation in Rome, Cardinal Coussa stated: "The veneration of the Mother of God of Klokocov will assure its success among Slovak Greek Catho40 lics." 1 A copy of the Klokocov icon was painted in the church thanks to the efforts of Father Lacko in 1955, and it was blessed by 14 1 the Pope himself. Also, some Slovenians came annualy in pil. h' . gnmages to t 1s icon. 142 The cornerstone of the sanctuary was blessed on October 20, 143 144 1957 . Inside was al so a bit of soil from Klokocov in Slovakia. The facade with three mountain peaks and a double cross (the Slovak 134 Cf. Yinansky, J. (F . Fuga), "Gr. K. Osada, Hamilton," Kalendar KSL 1977 (Toronto), 84. 135 Cf. " 25 . vyrocie nas ich farn osti," Maria, I 0/ 1977, 11. 136 Cf. Eli as, Jan, "Otec Fuga IO rokov v Hamiltone," Maria , 5/ 1964, 9. 137 Cf. " Po Gr.-kato lickej oslave v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, Fe bruary 20, 1954, p. 2. 138 "Zo zivota nas ich fa rnosti," Maria, 3/ 195 5 (May), 15. 139 Cf. " Hist6ri a odpustov Panny Marie Klokocovskej v Hamiltonskej svatyni ," Maria, 7-8/ 1965, 3. 14 Fuga, Franti sek, " Rozpomienka na prvy odpu st," Maria , 7-8/ 1965 , I 0. 14 1 Cf. " lkona kl okocovskej Matky Bozej v Hamiltone," Maria, 8/ 1958, 5-7. 142 Cf. " Hor' sa na putnicky odpust Panny Marie Klokococskej do Hamiltonu," Maria , 7-8/ 1969, 3. 143 Cf. Maria, 10/ 1957 , last page of the cover. 144 Cf. " Dej inn y den," Ma ria , 11 / 1957 , 11. ° SLOVAKIA-2017 45 national emblem) was painted by the noted Slovak artist Jozef 145 Cincik. Father Fuga was a skilled organizer, and the Hamilton 146 sanctuary was nicely decorated during his tenure. Fuga also supported the struggle for Slovak independence and created the modem Slovak flag (horizontal white, blue and red stripes with the Slovak emblem superimposed upon it!" In 197 4 he became the director of 47 the Matica Slovenska Abroad. Hamilton was also one of the first Greek Catholic parishes to have the Sunday readings done in modem Slovak. The church was dedicated on June 9, 1963, as part of the local Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations (the 1100 th anniversary of the 148 arrival of the Apostles of the Slavs on Slovak territory). In those days, the number of the faithful in Hamilton increased to almost 149 500. The first visit of Bishop Rusnak to Hamilton after his episco150 pal ordination took place on May 23 , 1965. At the beginning of 1975 Father Fuga became seriously ill. This was the price he paid for his printing apostolate, using lead ink. Some parishioners said to him: "Monsignor, please do not die! It would be better for us if the sanctuary burned to the ground, because you could build another one, but if you die, we will lose it in a few 151 years! " Father Fuga lived for another ten years. On October 3, 152 1975 a Slovak school opened in the parish. The "odpust" of 1976 included a blessing of the interior iconography, created by Igor 153 Suchacev, and the ceremony of presenting the miter to Monsignor Fuga. Suchacev painted Slovak saints in the apse, with their scrolls 145 PAA, Letter from Father Fuga to Father Lacko, January 31, 1975. Cf. "Z nasich osad - Hamilton," Maria, 3-4, 1968, 18-20; fourth page of the cover; "Odpust a cirkevne slavnosti v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, August 9, 1975, p. 5; "Vyrocity odpust a strieborne jubileum pastoracie Mons. Fr. Fugu v Hamiltone," Kanadsky Slovak, September 8, 1979, p. 3. 147 Cf. Elias, Jan, "Zahranicna MS ma protektora," Kanadsky Slovak, July 6, 1974, P,·48 5. Cf. "Kronika," Maria , 4/ 1963, 16. 149 Cf. Lacko, Michal, " Posviacka dvoch novych s lovenskyc h kostolov v Kanade," Kanadsky Slovak, June 29, 1963 , p. 5. 15 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Biskupa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 3-4/ 1965, 16. 151 "Nas rozhovor," Maria , 4/ 1979, 9. 152 Cf. "Skola slovenciny osady P. M. Klokocovskej , Kanadsky Slovak, October 18, 1975 , p. 5. 153 Born in Yugoslavia to Russian refugees . One of his works was the decoration of the throne in Ethiopia. 146 ° 46 SLOVAKIA-2017 written in Slovak. The church also has depictions of the blessed Sister Miriam T. Demjanovic and President Joseph Tiso. The beauty of the church was also enhanced by the iconostasis, being the only Slo154 vak church in Canada to have a permanent one. The parish exists to this day, although the glory days of Father Fuga are gone. 7: Welland, Ontario (1953) The first Slovaks settled in the Niagara peninsula around 1920; eventually there were some 3,000. Local branches of the CSL had these numbers : 23 in Welland (1940), 31 in St. Catharines (1942), 3 7 155 in Niagara Falls (1943) and 64 in Port Colborne ( 1952). A majority of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Welland and nearby places came to Canada in the last years prior to WW II, mostly from Zemplin County. Only after WW II, when new priests arrived, did the organization of spiritual life develop here. On November 22, 1953 a meeting was held in Welland for all those interested in establishing a Slovak Greek Catholic parish under the patronage of the Holy Spirit. The meeting was organized by Father Vincent Danco, SJ. Some twenty-eight members of the future parish appeared. The faithful wished to have the liturgy celebrated twice a month and to temporarily use the Gregorian calendar. They also produced a list of fifty-five people who wished to belong to the 156 parish. Bishop Borecky promised in his letter of December I 9, 157 1953 to send a Decree for the creation of this parish. The first pastor of the parish was Father Danco, whose name was inscribed with gold letters into the history of the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada. On August 1, 1954, the Reverend Nicholas Chanat became the pastor of the Hol y Ghost parish in Welland and the "mission stations 158 of the Niagara Peninsula districts." The solemn groundbreaking 154 Cf. " Yysoka cirkevna hodnost' Mons. F. Fugovi," Kanadsky Slovak, September 4, 1976, pp . 1-2. 155 Cf. "S lovaci a ich organi zacia v dejinach oblasti N iagara," Kanadsky Slovak, January 31 , 198 1, p.5. 156 PAA , without a signature. 157 PAA , without a signature. 158 PAA, Letter from Bishop Borecky, without a signature. 47 SLOVAKIA-2017 159 took place on July 3, 1955 , and on May 20, 1956 the new church160 hall was blessed. However, the Reverend Chanat died in the morn161 ing of March 17, 1957 at the age of30. This was so devastating that the hall became a permanent church, as there was never any fur162 ther building activity. Father Mina succeeded him ; after him the 164 163 parish was served by Fathers Fetsco, Kra:fcik, Shogan, Chamey and Russin. Bishop Rusnak visited the parish for the first time as a • 165 bishop on June 6, 1965 . From November 1965, Father Smal' was 166 the pastor. After Father Russin resigned as pastor at the end of 167 I 971, Father Robert Keleher was named the new administrator. 168 He installed a temporary iconostasis. Father Keleher was replaced with a Slovak priest, Father Stephen Kundra, who served from Au169 gust of 1972 until February of 1973 . The parish was administered for a while by Father Fuga until the arrival of Father John Leso, SJ _110 Vo The parish financial report for the year 1980 showed that, were it not for bingo, the rental of the hall and kitchen, the parish would not 171 collect enough money to pay the priest's salary. This was due to the aging of the parish, the death of its founders , while their offspring either moved away or lost interest in this church. Thus, the parish slowly declined and did not survive the year 20 I 0. 159 In other sources the date for the groundbreaking by Father Chanat is listed as Jul y 4, 1954 . 16 Cf. "Zaznamenavame," Maria , 411956, 16. 161 Cf. "Za milovanym o. Nikolajom," Maria , 4/ 1957, 3-6. 162 PAA, Letter of April 3, 1957. 163 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria, 3-4/1965 , 15 . 164 PAA, Letter from Michael Kostik to Bi shop Isidore, November 9, 196 1. 165 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Biskupa M. Ru snaka," Maria , 3-4/ 1965 , 16. 166 PAA , Letter of th e Vicar General, the Right Reverend Basil Filevich, December 6, 1965 . 167 PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore to the Toronto-Dominion Bank, December 24, 197 1. 168 PAA, Letter of Father Keleher to Bishop Isidore, August 27, 1973. 169 PAA , Letter of Bishop Isidore, February 23, 1973, addressed to the TorontoDomi nion Bank . 170 PAA , Lette r of February 17, 1976. 171 PAA, Annual statement - 1980. ° 48 SLOVAKIA-2017 8: Sudbury, Ontario (1954) This mining town in northern Ontario also attracted Slovak im172 migrants. In 1923 the first Slovaks arrived in Sudbury. Several of 173 them were Greek Catholics. The founding meeting of branch 16 of the CSL was held June 19, 1938 at the hall of the local Ukrainian Greek Catholic church, showing thus their religious affi liation. The local Greek Catholic Slovaks had quite a community life even before 174 their parish was founded , as testified by newspaper articles. On many of these occasions the Master of Ceremonies, or simply the Elder, presided over the event with both formal as well as religious 175 elements. A real start for the Slovak Greek Catholics was the Divine Liturgy celebrated on August 15, 1954 at the hall of the Canadian Slovak Benefit Society. It was celebrated by fathers Louis Mina and Nicholas Chanat and Father Dzurman, the local Ukrainian 176 priest. The parish received the title of Our Lady of Perpetual 178 177 Help. The entire ceremony was broadcast on local television. 179 Thereafter liturgies were celebrated on a monthly basis. The Sudbury parishioners were also subscribers and ~enerous benefactors of 1 the Slovak Greek Catholic magazine Maria. Father Fetsco became 18 1 the pastor for the first time in 1957. With several breaks and sev- ° 172 Cf. Urban, J., "Slovaks in Sudbury," Polyphony: Th e Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario - Sudbury 's People, Vol. 5 (No. I, 1983), p. 123 . 173 Cf. "Smutna sprava 23. zboru KSL," Kanadsk:y Slovak, August 9, 1980, p. 7; " Spravy z Toronta," Kanadsk:y Slovak, April 7, 1979, p. 2. 174 Cf. " Man zelia Strokovi jubilovali," Kanadsk:y Slovak, March 30, 1950, p. 6; "Manzelia Rani covi jubilovali, Kanadsk:y Slowik, August 17, 1950, p. 6; "Rani covi zenili syna Stefana," Kanadsk:y Slovak, September 9, 1950, p. 6; "S I. Johanka Simkova v putach manzelstva," Kanadsk:y Slovak November 9, 1950, p. 7; " Manzelia Koritko jubilovali, Kanadsk:y Slovak, November 8, 1952, p. 2. 175 Cf. " Mad'arovci 25 rokov v manzelstve, Kanadsk:y Slovak, December 2 1, 1950, p. 3. 176 Cf. Maria , 2/1955 , 15; "S lavnostne otvorenie slovenskej gr. kat. parafii v Sudbury, Ont. di\ a 15. augusta, Kanadsky Slovak, August 7, 1954, p. 8. 177 Cf Urban 124 178 Cf. Mari;, 2/ 1955 , 15. No such video recording cou ld be found. CTV does not have it in its archi ves, TYO did not exist and CBC did not answer my e-mails. 179 Cf. " Prvy slovensky krst v Sudburach," Kanadsk:y Slovak, November 6, 1954, p. 3. 18 Cf. Maria , 6/l 955 , 17; 5/ 1958, 22. 18 1 Cf. "Novosti ," Maria, 3-4/ 1965 , 15. ° SLOVAKIA-2017 49 182 era! priests substituting, he continued coming to the parish until 1972. On July I, 1964, a new pastor was named--Father Theoktist 183 Vidov, a Studite monk originally from Croatia. Bishop Rusnak 184 came to Sudbury on June 13, 1965 . Sadly, someone noted that the youth had little interest in its roots: "The whole ceremony was really nice. And it could be even nicer if our young Slovaks from Sudbury 185 would show up in bigger numbers for such a great ceremony." In 1965 Father Jules Riotte, a Greek Catholic priest of German origin is • d as t he pastor, commg • twice • a mont h . 186 B 1s . hop R usna' k menhone 187 also returned to Sudbury in the following years. We have a list 188 from the 1960's of 31 fam ilies who had their homes blessed following the blessing of the Jordan water. Another list of families who 189 appeared for All Souls Day celebrations is also preserved. One of the problems of the Slovak Greek Catholic community in Sudbury was the lack of a resident priest. Another important factor for the downfall of the parish were economic conditions. Around 1964, when their economic situation changed for the better, many people moved to southern Ontario, and since no new waves of immigrants appeared, a decline in the number of Slovaks (and Greek Catholics) began. At a parish meeting held on July 13, 1975, it was decided "to dismiss the parish ; the reason is that there is no one to keep it because there are no more parishioners, it is sad, but it could 191 190 not be changed." Bishop Rusnak responded on July 25, 1975, but another reply from the parishioners was dated August 1, 1977. Because of this correspondence, Maria magazine listed the parish in 182 Cf. Urban, 124. Cf. "Kronika," Maria, 6-7/ 1964, 16. 184 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp . Biskupa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 3-4/1965, 16. 185 "Cestujeme s p. biskupom ," Maria, 9-10/ 1965, 6. 186 Beskyd, J., Yearbook of the Eparchy of Toronto (In the vineyard of Christ) (Toro nto: Eparc hy of Toronto, 1964), 520. 187 Cf. "Z nas ich osad - Sudbury - Preosv. p. biskup Michal Rusnak CSsR medzi svojimi ," Maria, 11-12/ 1967, 18- 19; Stripay, J., "Preosv. o. bisk up Michal Rusnak CSsR v Sudburach," Maria, 9-10/1968, 6. 188 PAA, File: Sudbury. 189 PAA , File: Sudbury. 190 PAA , Letter from the ushers to Bishop Michael, dated July 17, 1975. 191 PAA, Letter from the ushers to Bishop Michael, dated August I, 1977. 183 50 SLOVAKIA-2017 192 197 6 as still open, but that is no longer the case. Only sixty people 193 of Slovak origin remain in Sudbury. 9: Delhi (Simcoe - Delhi), Ontario (1955) Many Slovaks, especially from Eastern Slovakia, started to move into the area of Simcoe and Delhi, in southern Ontario, around 1930. 194 Most of them worked as tobacco farmers . The same people who founded branch 46 of the Canadian Slovak League in 1944 also founded St. Andrew's parish. In 1954 Father Frantisek Fuga of Hamilton heard about the Greek Catholic Slovaks at this location and contacted them. After a few weeks he celebrated a liturgy for 195 them. Since this took place around the feast of St. Andrew, the parish was named for this saint. It was officially created in Novem196 ber of 1955 . Father Fuga answered the spiritual needs of the parishioners working on farms and served them once a month in the 197 local Ukrainian church in Delhi. In 1965 only about thirty families 198 attended these services. The first pastoral visit of St. Andrew's parish by Bishop Michael Rusnak was conducted on December 18, 199 1966. The silver jubilee of the parish could also be called its swan 200 song. It was celebrated on October 19, 1980. The story of Simcoe - Delhi is the story of a small flock of the faithful, who wanted to 192 Cf. "Nase kostoly," Maria, 1/1976, third page of the cover. Census profile: http://wwwI2.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/20 I I/dpp_gfprQf1/<!eJ<1.ih/p_agt!,Sfo1'.?: Lang= E&Geo l =CSD&Cocle 1=3553005&Geo2=CD&Cocle2=3553&Data=Count&S t!archText=suclbur &SearchT e=Contains&SearchPR=0 l&B l =A ll &C ustom=&TA Bl D '."'J (27.8.2013 23:30) 194 Cf. Kirschbaum , J. M.: Slovaks in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Ethnic Press Association of Ontario, 1967), 128. 195 Cf. "Osada v Simcoe - Delhi jubiluje," Maria , 1-3/1966, 3-4. 196 See: Kirschbaum , 262 and Fuga, Frantisek, J., "Slovenska greckokatolicka farnost' sv. Andreja v Simcoe - Delhi , Ont. jubilovala," Kanadsky Slovak, November 29, 1980, p. 4. 197 Cf. Kirschbaum, 262. 198 Cf." Osada v Simcoe - Delhi jubiluje," Maria, 1-311966, 3-4. 199 Cf. "Prva vizitacia pana biskupa Michala Rusnaka v Simcoe-Delhi, Ont. ," Maria, 1-2/1967, 10-11. 200 Cf. Fuga, Frantisek J., "S lovenska greckokatolicka farnost' sv. Andreja v Simcoe - Delhi , Ont. jubilovala," Kanadsky Slovak, November 29, 1980, p. 4. 193 SLOVAKIA-2017 51 praise God in Church Slavonic, as they did back home. However their small size prevented the parish from growing. The community literally died with the death of the last parishioner from among the original flock. This community was always listed as a parish, even though from the ecclesiastical point of view it would probably be called a mission, as in all juridical matters the parishioners belonged to the Slovak Greek Catholic parish in Hamilton. 10: Kenaston, Saskatchewan (1967) The first Slovaks arrived in Kenaston in July of 1903 and were 20 1 followed by others who came to farm. Besides the Ukrainians, many Slovak Greek Catholics also settled in and around nearby Sas202 katoon, Saskatchewan. Bishop Rusnak came to Saskatoon on June 203 26, 1966, hoping to include these people within his jurisdiction, and to make of this place a permanent center of the Slovak religious presence in Canada. Before this visit, an invitation appeared in the press: Come all of you, who are able to come, because this will be the very first time, since our arrival here 50 years ago, that we will be able to welcome amongst us our first Slovak bishop in Canada and the first bishop who is a Greek Catholic, since the times of Sts. Cyril and Methodius .... This joyful news is written for you ... by Joseph Zeman, an 80 year-old Slovak, who after 65 years in Canada, lived long enough to 204 experience this great joy ... The Ukrainian Greek Catholics gave Rusnak permission to use their cathedral of St. George for the meeting. The organizational committee prepared 600 memorial ribbons - but they were not 205 206 . enough! Father John Kobelak, M.S.F. was entrusted with or- 20 1 Cf. "Na vyrocie slovenskych pociatkov v Saskatchewan a slovenskeho ~riekopnictva v Kanade, Kanadsky Slowik, June 25 , 1966, p. 2. 02 Cf. "S lovak so Slovakom sa zide," Kanadsky Slowik, March 10, 1962, p. 2; "Janko Purda graduoval ," Kanadsky Slovak, January 5, 1963, p. 2. 203 Cf." Pl anovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria , 4-5/1966, 16. 204 Cf. " Do pozornosti Slovakom v Saskatchewan," Kanadsky Slovak, May 28, 1966, ~- 2. os Cf. "Aj 600 bolo malo," Kanadsky Slovak, July 16, I 966, p. 3. 52 SLOVAKIA-2017 20 7 gamzmg this parish. The Slovak Greek Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Kenaston, Saskatchewan, was officially created during the Canadian centennial in 1967, after the trip of Bishop Rusnak to Saskatoon. The parish was part of the Ukrainian Eparchy of Saskatoon, having its own property, a gift of the recently-deceased Joseph Zeman. Bishop Rusnak planned to send the parish a Slovak priest - the Reverend Stephen Adamiak.208 In the archives are notes testifying that the Ukrainian Eparchy indeed received the property and also $1000 to be used to build a Slovak Greek Catholic church in Kenaston. However, the following year the heirs of the late Mr. Zeman changed their minds and requested that the $1,000 be re209 turned to them. In the fall of 1970 the parish ceased to exist. 2 10 The question remains: Would a Slovak parish have lasted in Saskatchewan, if it had been built in Saskatoon rather than in the small village of Kenaston? MISSIONS WITH IRREGULAR SERVICES Among the missions we list those places where we are sure that the Slovak Greek Catholic services were held: 11: Edmonton, Alberta The capital of the Province of Alberta attracted many Slovak immigrants in the 1930's, including Greek Catholics.2 11 Slovak 212 Greek Catholics present here never formed a separate parish or other type of organized community, but they still could be considered a part of the life of Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada. After his 206 Born in Poland in 1921 . He came to Canada in 1964, and worked in the Eastern rite. He died in 200 I. 207 Cf. "Z nasich osad - Kenaston - Nova slovenska greckokatolfcka osada sv. Cyrila a Metoda," Maria, 11-12/ 1967, 17. 208 PAA, Letter of Bishop Michael dated May 15, 1967. 209 PAA , E-mail from the Eparchy of Saskatoon, sent to the author on November 21, 2011 , 17:00. 210 PAA , Letter NM najdostojnejci Otce Vladyka! sent from Rome, 12. X. 1970. 211 Cf. Kirschbaum , 151. 212 Cf. Maria, 1/ 1963, 17. SLOVAKIA-2017 53 Episcopal ordination, Bishop Michael Rusnak visited Edmonton on 213 June 27, I 965 . 12: Fernie, British Columbia Femie is one of the oldest settlements of Slovaks in Canada. The 214 first Slovak miners came here in 1898 from Pennsylvania. Many of them were Greek Catholics. Shortly after the start of the 20th cen215 tury, a branch of the Greek Catholic Union was founded here. Slovaks in Femie were also organized in branch 51 of the CSL. Fa2 16 ther Michal Lacko did a visitation here in 1973. Femie is mentioned as a mission in the report of the Apostolic Visitator in 217 1978. 13: New Westminster, British Columbia The first Slovaks came to the Canadian Pacific coast at the end 218 219 of the 19 th century. Larger numbers appeared only after WW 11. Branch 4 7 of the CSL was established here in 1944. The Slovak Roman Catholic parish of Sts. Cyril and Methodius has existed in New 220 Westminster since 1960. Many of its parishioners were Greek 221 Catholics. From time to time, Greek Catholic services were also celebrated here. In 1959 there was a Slovak Greek Catholic wedding in the Ukrainian church, performed by a "good friend of Slovaks, 222 Father Bylik, who was ass isted in the ceremonies by Mr. Bodnar.'' 213 Cf. "Navstevy Ndp. Bisk upa M. Rusnaka," Maria, 5-611965, I 3. Cf. Kirschbaum , 70. 215 Cf. Palmer, Howard, Land of the Second Chance (A History of Ethnic Groups in Southern Alberta), (Lethbridge : Lethbridge Herald, 1972), 195. 216 Personal Archive of the Author (PAA) Letter of Bishop Michael to Father Lacko, May 28, 1973. 217 PAA , Quinquennial report for Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada, 19731978 (November 1st , 1978),2-3 . 218 Kanadsky Slovak, November 14, I 970. 219 Cf. Kirschbau m, 146-8. 220 Officiall y establ ished by Father Wi lliam Lacko, SJ in 1960. The first acti vities with local Slovaks date back to 1952. 22 1 Cf. " Klub za ujemcov o hist6riu Slovakov v Britskej Kolumbii v Kanade," http://www.sk-bc .ca/book/export/ html/I 98 (October 18, 20 11 , 20:00); Maria, 78/ 1965, 5; 12; 12/1965, 15. 222 " Pekna slovenska svadba v B.C.," Kanadsky Slovak, June 27, 1959, p. 2. 214 54 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Slovak church of Sts. Cyril and Methodius was the home of Ukrainian Greek Catholics until they built their own church. In those days a certain Byzantine-rite priest - Father Kmec-- celebrated the services. Many times the Slovak Greek Catholics celebrated with the Ukrainians. ln 1970, the Reverend William Lacko wrote about the Greek Catholics: "the late Michael Bodnar with a beautiful voice, was an outstanding cantor." Already during the Cyrillo-Methodian jubilee in 1963 we learn that "many Slovak Greek Catholics are living in this area and because of this Father Michael Lacko went to the far west of Canada ... and celebrated services in the Church Slavonic 223 language .... " And during the Jubilee year, according to the words of the pastor, once a month instead of the sermon "we all sang "Moleben." The Impressive "Hospodi pomiluj" resounded in the church as a joint response to the petition of all the Catholics of both 224 rites." On the day of the Cyrillo-Methodian celebrations, July 7, 1963 , the Latin Mass was fo ll owed with the singing of sacred songs in Slovak and Church Slavonic by both Roman and Greek Catho225 lics. They sang lie Cheruvimi (Let us, who mystically represent 226 the Cherubim) and Otce nas (Our Father), led by Mr. Bodnar. Bishop Rusnak was quite frequentl y a welcome guest of the parish. On those occasions, the church was always filled to the very last seat or even overcrowded. His visit was a real "unique experience with lasting value .. .. Greek Catholics are coming from near and far to the services held in the Slovak church and it is a joy to see them, 227 when Bishop Michael is among them .. .'' In 1966 Bishop Rusnak 228 appeared on July 3. He officiated at the funeral of Mrs. Potoma on 229 July 6, 1970. For the local parishioners it became a tradition throughout the years to have Bishop Rusnak among them , always around the feast day of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, patrons of their 223 224 Cf. Maria , 7/ 1963 , 11. "Slovenski greckokatolici na Pacifiku," Kanadsky Slovak, September 14, 1970, p. 5. 225 Cf. "Cyril ometodske slav nosti v B.C.," Kanadsky Slovak, June 29, 1963, p. 8. Cf. "Cyrilometodske oslavy na Pacifickom pobrezi," Kanadsky Slovak, August 17, 1963, p. 2. 227 "Slovenski greckokatolici na Pacifiku," Kanadsky Slovak, September 14, 1970, p. 5. 228 Cf. " Planovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria , 4-5/ 1966, 16. 229 PAA , Folder: Vancouver. 226 SLOVAKIA-2017 55 church. The bishop made such a good impression on the people that they left with the words: "Goodbye Most Reverend Bishop M. 230 Rusnak until next year." In 1973 the Byzantine liturgy was scheduled for August 5, with Father Michael Lacko, SJ as the main cele. . was a Iso the act o f a canomca . I v1s1tahon. . . . 232 brant. 23 1 H.1s v1s1t Among the benefactors of the Maria magazine were several people 233 from New Westminster. The visits of the Greek Catholic bishop to New Westminster stopped a long time ago, but the Greek Catholics there attend the Slovak Roman Catholic parish to thi s day. 14: Unionville (Markham), Ontario From the canonical point of view, Unionville Ontario, and the fa mily mansion of the billionaire Stephen B. Roman could not be considered either a parish, or a mission. However, to be fair to history, we have to note that services were held here more often than in some of th e other missions. Fron the 1950's until the 1980 's Bishop Rusnak celebrated a liturgy in the residence of Mr. Roman every 234 Sunday aftemoon. The bishop had become a good friend of the Greek Catholic Stephen Roman in the early 1950 's. Together they planned to build a huge Cathedral of the Transfiguration on Mr. Roman's property in Unionville and Pope John Paul II even blessed the 235 cornerstone in I 984. However, after Mr. Roman suddenly died in 1988, Bishop Rusnak and his successor Bishop Pazak, could not come to an agreement with Mr. Roman 's heirs as to the actual ownership of the cathedral. Therefore, Bishop Pazak deconsecrated the 23 °Korem, Albin, " Dve spravy z B. C.," Kanadsky Slowik, July 18, 1970, p. 5. 23 1 PAA , Postcard Srdecny pozdrav od Ticheho oceanu. Sent from San Francisco, Jul y 20, 1973. 232 PAA, Letter of Bishop Michae l to Father Lacko, May 28, 1973. 233 Cf. Maria, 2/ 1963, 17; 1/1964, third page of the cover; 2/ 1964, third page of the cover; 9-10/ 1964, third page of the cover; 1-2/ 1965, third page of the cover; 12/1965 , 16; 1-3/ 1966, third page of the cover; 1/ 1977, third page of the cover; 5/ 1978, 16;4/ 1979, 16; 7-8/ 1980, 24. 234 Litva, Felix, "Stefan B. Roman - clovek v rozdvojenom svete" (Cambridge, ON : Dobra kniha, 198 I). 235 See Our Heritage of Faith : Consecration of the Slovak Cathedral of the Transfiguration by His Holiness Pope John Paul II, September 15, 1984, ed. by Helen Roman-Barber and Anne C. R. Roman (Toronto: Eparchy of Saints Cyril and Methodius for Slovaks of the Byzantine Ri te in Canada, 1984). 56 SLOVAKIA-2017 church in 2006 and since then it has sat empty as the cornerstone of a 236 massive housing development called "Cathedraltown." 15: Winnipeg, Manitoba Slovak immigrants started coming to to Winnipeg before the First World War, but the largest group arrived in the interwar peri237 od. A Slovak Roman Catholic parish existed here since 1951. Father Alexander Baran, an historian and native of the Subcarpathian region, worked at the local univers ity. Because his dad had been a secretary to the first Slovak Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia- Dr. Milan Hodza--he knew Slovak and was a great friend to Slovak Greek Catholics, with whom he shared the same liturgical tradition.2 38 Before the end of the 19 th century, several families from Zemplin County arrived via Pennsylvania to the town of Neepawa, in the 239 Province of Manitoba. When the Canadian Slovak League (CS L) was established here in 1932, one of the founding members, Juraj Rond'os, was not ashamed of being not only Slovak, but also a Greek Catholic. The local branch of the CSL received the number 1. The Slovak Greek Catholics in town attended mostly the local Ukrainian church for their worship services. The priests even learned some 240 Slovak for special celebrations for these parishioners. The most vital period for Slovak Greek Catholics in Winnipeg 24 1 started after the episcopal ordination of Bishop Rusnak. He came to Winnipeg for the first time on Sunday, August 22, 1965, and assisted by the local Slovak Roman Catholic pastor, Msgr. John Re236 For more details see "The Cathedral that Toronto Forgot," Toronto Star, June 26, 201 1 and "Losing Faith in Cathedraltown," Toronto Star, January I 0, 2015. 237 Cf. Kirschbaum , 75 -76. 238 For more info on Baran see: htt ://um anitoba.ca/libraries/units/archi ves/collections/rad/baran.html 239 Cf. R~ ndos, Juraj, "V lete sli spat' na breh rieky," in Spomienky pionierov, ed. by lmrich Stolarik (Toronto: Kanadska Slovenska Liga, I 978), 2 19. Maria, 1/ 1963, 17; 10/ 1963, third page of the cover; 12/ 1965 , 16; 12/ 1966, third page of the cover. 24 Cf. " Mary Rondosova vydala sa za Janka Stretavskeho," Kanadsky Slovak, March I, 195 1, p. 4. " Pekna slovenska svadba vo Winnipegu," Kanadsky Slovak, Apri l 5, 1958, p. 2; "Opusti li nas dvaja Slovaci z nasej okolice v Dufresne, Man. ," Kanadsky Slovak, March 21, 198 1, p. I 0. 241 Cf. Kutka, J., " Historicky den manitobskych Slovakov," Kanadsky Slovak, Nove mber 13, 1965, p. 2. ° SLOVAKIA-2017 57 kem, as well as by Father Baran, he celebrated a Byzantine liturgy in 242 the local Slovak Roman Catholic church. His visit was prepared by Msgr. Rekem and Mr. J. Kutka. Beautiful liturgical Church Slavonic singing had a delicate impact on the people present, many of them hearing it probably for the very first time in their lives. The choir, directed by organist Cudovit (Louis) Besei\ovsky, sang both Slovak Greek and Latin liturgies. Even though the Greek and Latin Catholics sang together for the first time, they 243 were praised for their perforrnance. Bishop Rusnak also visited the Greek Catholic Slovaks in Win244 nipeg in the following years. Several Slovak Greek Catholics from Winnipeg and nearby settlements appeared among the supporters of ~"' • • 245 1V1arza magazme. OTHER SLOVAK GREEK CATHOLIC LOCATIONS 16: Flin Flon, Manitoba Many Slovaks found jobs in the mining industry here, among them quite a few Greek Catholics . Several Slovak farmers settled around the town as well. When the Canadian Slovak League was founded in 1932, its local branch was given the number 4. However, the best years for the community were the 1940's and 1950's. Several Greek Catholic Slovaks here attended the local Ukrainian 246 church. In 1966 Bishop Michael Rusnak intended to send the Revernd John Zeman, OSB as a Greek Catholic priest to Flin 247 Flon . However, this did not materialize. 242 Cf. "Cestujeme s p. biskupom," Maria , 9-10/1965, 9- I 0. 1bid., 9. 244 Cf. " Planovane vizitacne cesty p. biskupa," Maria, 4-5/1966, 16. PAA, diaries. 245 Cf. Maria , 1/ 1964, third page of the cover; 2/ 1964, third page of the cover; 67/ 1964, third page of the cover; 12/1965, 16; 1-2/ 1967, fourth page of the cover; 78/ 1977, third page ofthe cover; 5/ 1978, 16; 3/1979, 16; 2/ 1980, 16; 12/1980, 16. 246 Cf. "Smutok sboru vo Flin Flon, Man. ," Kanadsky Slovak, February 4, 1956, p. 2; Kadas, V.: Brat Jozef Dubos na vecnosti," Kanadsky Slovak, July 23, 1966, p. 2; "Zlata svadba u Rujakov vo Flin Flon, Man.," Kanadsky Slovak, September 25, 1976, p. 6; "Zlata svadba manzelov Stefanik v B. C.," Kanadsky Slovak, October 18, 1975, p. 4. 247 PAA , Letter from Father John Zeman, August 2, 1966. 243 58 SLOVAKIA-2017 17: Thunder Bay, Ontario The city of Thunder Bay came into existence on January 1, 1970, when Port Arthur and Fort William, were amalgamated. The majority of the Slovaks in this area were from the county of Orava. They started coming in the 1890's and built St. Peter's Slovak Roman 248 Catholic church in 1907. Slovak Lutherans built a church in 1927. 249 Newspapers confirm several Slovak Greek Catholics living here. The first journey after his ordination led Bishop Rusnak to the Cana250 dian West through Fort William. He almost certainly stopped here on his ways to the West, when traveling by car. Conclusion Besides the above mentioned cities, which were depicted on the map of the Eparchy, the Slovak Greek Catholic presence was also documented elsewhere in Canada. Benefactors of the magazine Maria appeared in a larger number of locations. One can observe from the life of the Canadian Slovak Greek Catholics that, to some degree, they were copying the ways of the Ukrainian Greek Catholics, who first settled in the West of Canada, then moved to Quebec, with a hiatus in the interwar period and then focused on Southern Ontario. The settlements in Southern Ontario 25 1 shared similar fates , not only with Ukrainian Catholics, but to a 252 certain degree even more with the Hungarian Greek Catholics. 248 Cf. Kirschbaum , 77-79. Cf. " Smutime za nas imi bratmi," Kanadsky Slowi k, August 27, 1966, p. 3; "Jub ileum Bakovych v Niagara Falls," Kanadsky Slowik, August 15, 1959, p. 2. 25 Cf. Kutka, J., "Historicky dei\ Manitobskych Slovakov, Kanadsky Slowik, November 13, 1965 , p. 2. 251 Cf. Canada 's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity, ed. by Lubomyr Luciuk and Stella Hryniuk (Toronto: Uni versity of Toronto Press, 199 1). On the Ukrainian exr,erience around Winnipeg see pages 53 -80. 52 Slovak - Hungarian Greek Cath olic re lati ons in Canada are a topic fo r furth er research . The Slovak Greek Catholics were fo r a time guests of the Hungari an Greek Catholic Church in Hamilton. In Windsor, Father Krafcik served for a time both Greek Catholi c communities - Slovak as we ll as Hungari an. Similar plans were made fo r Welland, whi ch also had both Churches, using the same liturgical rite, the same melodi es (and when it came to English, exactl y the same melodies and texts)! Especially in Ontario, the Hungarian settlements were almost identical to the Slovak ones. Also from the letters of Father Michal Lacko, SJ, we learn that, before the Slovak eparchy was created, he hoped that a bishopric would be created whi ch 249 ° SLOVAKIA-2017 59 Many people had relatives in other parishes, leading to frequent mutual visits of Slovak Greek Catholics, other than in their their own parishes, especially for parish feast days, or some great historic milestones. Many new friendships were thus started, and also some marriages arranged within the community. Places which really continued to blossom with the Slovak Greek Catholic population were the industrial towns of Eastern Canada. If the industry closed, or shrank, or farming was no longer attractive, the people moved out and then their parishes were closed (Sudbury 253 and Flin Flon). The same thing happened in the mining and steel 254 industry towns of Pennsylvania, Ohio and New Jersey. If a parish were to last, it had to have several zealous parishioners. Where there were only a few, such a parish had only a minimum chance of survival (Kenaston, Winnipeg, New Westminster). In such a case the Slovak Greek Catholics joined (or remained) either with local Slovak Roman Catholics or with Ukrainian Greek Catholics. The age of the parishioners when starting their parishes was also quite crucial, as when they were relatively old, and few in number, their parishes lasted for only a short while (Simcoe - Delhi). What is interesting is how the Slovak Greek Catholics in Canada made picnics an important part of parish culture. These gatherings became so popular, that at some time the parishes of Toronto and Hamilton owned their own picnic grounds, while the other parishes used facilities of other groups. In almost all the parishes we note that the most active parishioners were born in Slovakia. The subsequent generations, born in Canada, began to lose interest in maintaining their parishes. This would include, not only Slovak, but Hungarian Greek Catholic parishes as well (PAA). The last pastor of the Slovak church in Welland (before it was closed in 20 I 0) was Father John Girhinyi, himself a Hungarian. For more information on Hungarian life in Canada (and how it resembled the Slovak experience), see Nandor Dreisziger, Church and Society in Hungary and in the Hungarian Diaspora (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), especially pages 261-4. 253 Cf. https: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Canadian muni c ipalities having experienced popula-tion decreases 254 Other existing parishes, which face serious challenges with changing industry in the USA include Braddock, Charleroi, Clarence and Clymer, Pennsylvania. See Byzantine-Ruthenian Metropolitan Church of Pittsburgh Directory (Pittsburgh: Byzantine Catholic Metropolitan Church of Pittsburgh, I 999). See also. https://en.wikipecl ia.org/wiki/Shrinking- cities in the United States 60 SLOVAKIA-2017 might be attributed to the relatively high percentage of the Slovak immigrants assimilating to English-Canadian culture. Indeed, many times the parents themselves wanted to have their children completely forget about their ancestral homeland . In some cases the parents were not even willing to speak with them in Slovak - so that they would not have an accent, and thus be more successful in the labor market. By 1980, only two Slovak Greek Catholic parishes in Canada were over 50 years old: Lethbridge - which was Ukrainianized, and Montreal, which also had its best years behind it. Sadly, even some of the younger parishes (Kenaston, Simcoe - Delhi, Sudbury) were already closed, or just about to be closed. At the creation of the Slovak Greek Catholic Eparchy in 1980, only parishes in southern Ontario, which were close to each other, and able to benefit from mutual visits, or even exchanges of the clergy, were flourishing. Even this was to change in the following years, as the parish of Montreal was closed shortly after 2010, and the Welland parish was also not able to live through 2010. Recently the Most Reverend John S. Pazak, Bishop of the Slovaks of the Byzantine rite in Canada was transferred by 255 the Vatican to Phoenix, Arizona in the USA. Thus, the future of Greek Catholic Slovaks in Canada remains uncertain. 255 Transfer announced on May 7 th 20 I 6. HOLY SEE PRESS OFFICE - Other Pontifical Acts: htt s:// ress.vatican.va/co nten t/sa lastam a/en/bo ll ettino/ ubblico/20 I 6/05/07 /16050 7h.html. See also "Bishop John S. Pazak named new Byzantine Eparch in Phoenix, Ariz. ," Slovak Catholic Falcon, June 15, 20 16, p.5.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Survey of Slovak Communities of the Byzantine Rite in Canada before they Received their Own Bishopric Description An account of the resource Daniel Černý Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017 pp. 28-60 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Černý. Daniel Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/556f66aa5a56254d37021922fbe960aa.pdf e1ced8063ac13be2ba366e5222b17c0a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA-2017 61 THE SLOVAK ARMY ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING WORLD WAR II Jan Rychlik Attempts to build separate Slovak military units under the command of Slovak officers within the framework of the Czecho-S lovak Armed Forces already existed in the period of autonomy (6 October 1938 to 14 March 1939). The government in Prague refused such demands but despite that many conscripts and officers of Slovak nationality were allowed to serve in Slovakia, which later enabled the relatively rapid creation of Slovak army units. The ruling Hlinka Slovak People ' s Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS) already in this period had a party militia called the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova garda - HG). The HG-men (gardisti) belonged to radical separatists within the HSCS. Many of them were admirers of German National Socialism and later became known for their terrorist acts against Czechs, Jews and opponents of the regime. Units of the newly-established Slovak army and volunteers of the HG took part in the defence of the eastern border against the Hungarian invasion of Eastern Slovakia (23- 31 March 1939) known as the "little war" . However, regular army officers considered the HG as dangerous fanatics with poor fighting abilities and opposed their inclusion in the armed forces. Also, President Josef Tiso did not like them because of their radicalism . The newly-established Slovak Army was at the beginning only a smaller version of the Czechoslovak Army of the first Republic ( 19 I 8-1938), which the Germans dissolved. The departure from the Czechoslovak model (new ranks, new emblems and symbols etc.) was a relatively lengthy process. At the beginning the army used the old Czechoslovak uniforms and was equipped mainly with Czechoslovak weapons and machinery, which was later partly replaced by German ones. Like the Czechoslovak Army, it was based on the conscript system and made compulsory for all able-bodied men, usually two years. Reservists cou ld be summoned for military training in �62 SLOVAKIA-2017 case of emergency. 1 However, the Slovak army initially lacked officers. In August of 1938 there were only 435 officers of Slovak nationality in the Czechoslovak army, which represented 3.4% of the officer corps. 2 Some officers of Czech nationality, mainly those with Slovak wives, were allowed to continue their service in the Slovak army, as well as some ethnic Germans . New officers were recruited from the reserve-officers of the former Czechoslovak anny, who were mainly teachers. Some of them were in fact mobilized against their will. A Slovak military academy was opened in Banska Bystrica, and military schools in Bratislava and Nitra. In July of 1939 the Slovak army consisted of 29,683 men ; in February 1940 33, 41 (including 1,0 IO officers); and in June of I 94 I 33,676 men, including 1,347 officers, 42 of them Czechs. 3 Jews, according the government decree of 2 1 June 1939, served in military labour units and the same applied to Roma (Gypsies). Ethnic Germans living in Slovakia, who were Slovak citizens, served first in the Slovak army in special units but later they were allowed to fulfil their military service in the German army and the SS-corps. In 1944 their service in the SS-corps became mandatory. There were people of different political opinions in the officer corps of the Slovak army. Certainly, there were officers devoted to independent Slovakia and even to the close cooperation of Slovakia with Germany, like Colonel (later General) Jozef Turanec, Colonel Rudolf Pilfousek or Lieutenant-Colonel Michal Loksik4 . Generally speaking, however, the Slovak officers were usually not adherents of the HSCS regime and very often were even hostile or at least indifferent to the idea of independent Slovakia. Some Slovak officers even joined the resistance movement. The Czech underground organization National Defence (Obrana naroda - ON), which specialized in sabotage and military intelligence, and was based in the Protectorate, also operated in Slovakia and some officers of the Slovak army were members. The reason for such behaviour was rather simple: 1 Frantisek Csefa lvay et al. , Vojenske dejiny Slovenska [Military Hi story of Slovakia] V. 1939- 1945. Brati slava: Magnet Press, 2008, 16-24. 2 Ibid ., 14. 3 Ibi d. , p. 22-3 . 4 Frantisek Csefalvay et al., Vojenske osobnosri dejin Slovenska 1939-/945 [Military Personalities in the History of Slovakia 1939- 1945). Brati slava: Vojensky histori cky ustav, 2013 , 153-4, 197-8, 250-5 1. �SLOVAKIA-2017 63 former Czechoslovak officers, who graduated from the Czechoslovak military schools (most notably at the Military Academy in Hranice), were educated in a pro-Czechoslovak and pro-democratic spirit. Czechoslovak counter-intelligence screened every candidate applying to study at the Military Academy. Members of Communist and various separatist parties or even sympathisers of Communism or separatist movements were not accepted. The same restrictions applied in the school for reserve officers who were recruited from conscripts with higher education. In addition, the professional officers before 1938 were often stationed in the Czech Lands and their wives were often Czechs. 5 They were integrated into the Czech secular milieu and the clerical character of the Slovak Republic was strange to them. Some former Czechoslovak officers of Slovak nationality were originally also Legionaries, that is, volunteers who had fought for an independent Czechoslovakia on the side of the Allies, especially in Russia during World War I. 6 The ex-Legionaries formed the elite of the inter-war Czechoslovak army. It is true that even among the Legionaries it was possible to find supporters of the l'udak regime (like General Ferdinand Catlos), but in principle, former Legionaries were rather hostile to it. Some even deserted from the Slovak army and offered their services to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile represented by Edvard Benes and joined the Czechoslovak Army abroad. This was the case of General Rudolf Viest, the only general of Slovak nationality, who escaped to Paris and became commander of the Czechoslovak Army in France. This army fought the advancing Germans during the spring campaign on the western front in May and June of 1940 and after the defeat of France was evacuated to Great Britain. From 14 March 1939 Slovakia was an independent state with its own army and foreign representation . Slovak sovereignty was, how5 Pavel Micianik, Slovenskci armada v t'ai eni proti Sovietskemu zviizu ( /941-1944) . 1. V opercicii Barbarossa. [The Slovak Army in the Campaign aga inst the Soviet Uni on. I 941-1944. Part I. In Operation Barbarossa) (hereafter cited as Micianik, I.), Banska Bystrica: Dali-BB, 2007, 30-31. 6 The Czechoslovak Legions were formed during WW I from prisoners of war of the Austro-Hunga ri an army of Czech and S lovak nationality and also the Czech and Slovak vo lunteers li ving in Entente states (mainly Russia , France) or neutral states (mainl y the USA up to 191 7). The Legions were formed in Russia, Italy and France. They fought against Germany and A ustri a-Hunga ry. The Legions in Russia also later fought aga inst the Red Army in th e Ru ssian C ivi l war. �64 SLOVAKIA-2017 ever, severely limited by special relations with Germany. According the "Treaty of Protection" (in German: Schutzvertrag), signed preliminarily in Vienna on 18 March and definitively in Berlin on 23 March 1939, Germany obtained the right to build freely , and according to her own needs, military bases in the so-called "Zone of Protection" (Schutzzone) which was situated in Western Slovakia between the White Carpathians and the border of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia was also obliged to conduct her foreign and 7 defence policies according the interests of Germany. A secret protocol to the Schutzvertrag subordinated the Slovak economy to German needs. 8 The Treaty of Protection in fact meant that Slovakia could be forced to participate in war alongside Germany, if the German government so desired. On 2 1 August the German Auswdrtigesamt (Foreign Office) prepared a Note verbale informing the Slovak Government that German armed forces would enter Slovakia to protect her from the danger of a Polish attack.9 The content of the note (approved by Adolf Hitler) was first unofficially presented to the Slovak government by German Minister to Bratislava Hans Bernard on 24 August 1939 . 10 The Slovak government was also asked to take part in the military operations against Poland (the government was assured that the Slovak army would not be used outside of Slovak territory, 11 but this promise was broken). In exchange, Germany promised to guarantee the Slovak-Hungarian border. If Poland was defeated, Slovakia would regain the territories lost in the fall of 1938, and eventually those lost to Poland in 1920. 12 After some hesitation the Slovak government accepted the German demands. After that the German request was presented again officially on 27 August 13 and the Slovak government consented the next day. Mobilization started already on 26 August. Gradually 117,000 reservists were 7 Eduard Ni zi'i ansky et al. , Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1 94 1 v dokumentech/Slovakisch-deutsche Beziehungen in Dokumenten 1938-/ 94 1 [Slovak-German Relations 193 8-1941 in Documents] I. (hierafter cited as SDBD I.] , Presov: Universum , 2009, doc. 96, pp. 305-06. 8 Ibid ., 307-08. 9 SBDB I. , doc. 202, pp. 576-7 . 10 Ibid, doc . 209, pp. 589-90. 11 Ibid., doc. 205 , p. 583. 12 Ibid., doc. 210, pp. 590-1 . 13 Ibid., doc. 216, pp. 604-5 , p. 610. �SLOVAKIA-2017 65 called up, of whom about 51,000 were assigned to the field army "Bernolak," under the command of General Ferdinand Catlos. While the main military operations were carried out by the Wehrmacht, which launched its attack on Poland also from Slovak soil, three Slovak divisions between 3- 5 September crossed the border and occupied a small piece of territory on the Polish side of the Tatra Mountains. On 17 September Poland was attacked from the east by the Red army, and was defeated and the Slovak army returned to Slovakia. It should be noted that Slovakia never formally declared war on Poland. The Slovak government presented the war against Poland as a struggle for the liberation of the territories which were annexed by Poland in 1920, 1924 and in 1938 (Upper Orava, Upper Spis and part of Javorina in the High Tatra Mountains). Germany indeed returned 14 these territories to Slovakia on 21 November 1939. The reclaimed territories were partly inhabited by ethnic Slovaks and so the war had some justification. Pro-German elements in HSCS, and especially the HG, welcomed the defeat of Poland . Generally speaking, however, the war was not very popular among Slovaks because many of them considered the Poles Slavs, like the Slovaks, and in addition to speaking a similar language, their kinsmen and brothers. The war was extremely unpopular among Slovak Lutherans in the western part of the country. After the defeat of Poland, Germany no longer required Slovak participation in German operations and the Slovak army did not take part in the war in the West. In June of 1940 France was defeated. Berlin, having now "free hands," decided to purge the Slovak government of "unreliable elements" and to strengthen the influence of the Germanophiles. On July 27, Hitler summoned President Tiso to Salzburg and forced him to fire Minister of Foreign Affairs Ferdinand Durcansky, who in the Spring had tried to negotiate with the British behind Germany's back. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs became the Germanophile Vojtech Tuka, who since 26 October 1939 had already been the Prime Minister. Another Germanphile, Alexander Mach, was appointed Minister of the Interior. The new government was definitivel y and exclusively oriented towards Germany. On 24 November 1940 Slovakia, together with Hungary and Romania, 1 ~ SDBD, I., doc. 25 1, pp. 683 -4. �66 SLOVAKIA-2017 joined the Tripartite Pact (Berlin-Rome-Tokyo). 15 In April of 1941 Slovakia did not participate in the campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece. On the other hand, when the war stared on 6 April, Bratislava severed diplomatic relations with Belgrade and on 10 April expressed a willingness to recognize the Independent State of Croatia. On 21 June 1941 the Chief of the German General Staff, General Franz Halder, visited Bratislava incognito. He informed the head of the German military mission, General Paul von Otto, that Hitler expected the participation of the Slovak army in the war against the Soviet Union. 16. The war started the next day. The German Minister to Bratislava, Hans Eluard Ludin, visited Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vojtech Tuka and informed him about the German request for Slovak participation. Tuka agreed and offered (through Slovak Minister to Berlin Matus Cernak) military assistance to the German Foreign Office. 17 On the same afternoon diplomatic relations between the USSR and Slovakia were broken off 8 and Defence Minister Ferdinand Catlos summoned the reservists for "extraordinary military training. " Only on 24 June did the government approve Slovak participation in the war, which was officially announced on the radio. The Slovak Diet, which according the Constitution was the only body that could declare war, was not informed of the government's declaration . So, from the forma l point of view, the whole action was unconstitutional. It is worth mentioning that on 13 December 1941 , the Slovak government also formally declared war on Great Britain and the United States. 19 Again, the declaration of war was not presented to the Diet. Because the USA and Great Britain did not recognize Slovakia as an independent state, they ignored the declaration. No direct fighting took place between the Slovak army and the western allies, but both countries treated Slovakia as 15 SDBD, I. , doc. 359, pp. 270-2. SDBD, I. doc. 400, p. 1092. 17 Eduard Nizi\ansky et al. , Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 194 1-1945 v dokumentech/Slovakisch-deutsche Beziehungen in Dokumenten 1941-1945 [Slovak-German Relati ons 1941 - 1945 in documents] II. (hierafter cited as SDBD 11.), Presov: Universum , 20 11 , doc.1,p.95 . 18 Ibid, doc. 3, p. 98 . 19 SDBS II. , doc. 34, p. 184. The declaration was announ ced in th e daily Slovenskci politika on 13 December 1941. 16 �SLOVAKIA-2017 67 enemy territory. Slovakia, including Bratislava, was repeatedly bombed in 1944. Accord ing to the unpublished memoirs of Ferdinand Catlos, at first onl y ministers Tuka and Mach advocated immediate participation in the war, whi le other ministers and President Tiso had some doubts . But after some hesitation all agreed. 20 Despite the fact that it was Gennany who reque sted military ass istance from Slovakia, it should be noted that the Slovak government had no objections. The government saw participation in the war against the Soviet Union as a good opportunity to show to Berlin that Slovakia was a better frie nd than Hungary, which also took part in the military campaign. Tuka and Tiso wanted to contribute more and faster. They believed that it in future it might be possible, with German help, to rev ise the Vienna Arbitration Award of 2 November 193 8, which deprived Slovakia of part of her southern territory in favour of Hungary. The openl y anti-communist policy and rhetoric of the l'udak regime also played a role. 2 1 Mobilization of the reservists lasted until 5 July. A total of 68,0 18 reservists were ca ll ed to arms, of whom 56,8 58 were registered . The total number of Slovak soldiers reached 90,533 . General Ferd inand Catlos formed in Eastern Slovakia an Anny Group (in Slovak : armadna skupina - AS) which consisted of two divisions nd (the I st Division commanded by Colone l Jozef Turanec and the 2 Divi sion com manded by Co lonel Augustin Malar). From a part of the 2nd Division and sma ll er units of specialized weapons (two artillery regiments, tank units, automob ile unit etc.), Catlos formed the so-called Mobile Group (in Slovak: rychla skupina , i.e. , the fast or rapid group) under the command of Colonel Rudolf Pilfousek, an officer who claimed to be an ethnic German, but according hi s name was probably partly Czech. The Mobile Group was the only almost full y motorized Slovak military unit and it was expected to move quickly with the advancing German army. The Slovak forces were first situated in northeast Slovakia, near the border of occupied Poland (the Genera l Governorate). Slovakia did not border on the Sovi20 Archiv literatt'.try a um eni a Slovenskej narodnej kn iznice (ALU SNK) [Archives of the Li terature and Arts of the Slovak National Library] in Martin, mem oirs of Ferdinand Catlos, sig. 129 E2, pp. 65 -66. 21 I.:ubomir Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci [Slovakia in the 20th Century]. 2nd ed., Bratislava: Kalli gram, 1998, 189. �68 SLOVAKIA-2017 et Union but Soviet territory was very close to the place of assembly. After the beginning of the war, the Slovak forces crossed the border and assembled in the General Govemorate near Brzoz6w, a village west of the River San, from 28 September 1939 the border between Germany and Soviet Union. The Slovak division s and the Mobile Group were included in the forces of the German Army Group South (commander: Field Marchal Gerd von Rundstedt). Within this Army group the Mobile Group was first subordinated to the command of the I ih German army (Commander: General Carl Heinrich von Stiilpnagel), which was part of the Army Group South. One of the goals of the I ih Army was to cross the San River and to break through the so-called Molotov defence line, 22 i.e. the chain of light bunkers built on the new Soviet western border (established after the defeat of Poland). The Mobile Group crossed the San on 25 June and continued to attack Sambor. On I July the Soviet army started to retreat to the so-called Stalin line, the chain of fortre sses built on the old (pre-17 September 1939) Soviet-Polish border. This allowed the advancing German I ih Army to continue to attack the region of Lvov (in Polish Lw6w, in Ukrainian Lviv) and the mobile group was ordered to mop up the territory South of Lvov. On 2 July, without firing a shot, the mobile group captured Stryj (a town about 60 km south ofLvov), which the Red Arm y decided not to defend. 23 On 7 July the Mobile Group, which was temporally subordinated again directly to General Catlos, was reorganized into the Mobile Brigade (195 officers, 52 sergeants and 4,655 soldiers, a company of 43 tanks - two squads , one battalion of armoured vehicles and th trucks, the I I Artillery Regiment, one squad of machine-guns, a scouting squad) and the next day started to move Eastward alongside the main axis Sambor - Temopol - Vinnyca. On 19 July the I 7th the th German Army broke the Stalin line and the 49 Mountain Army Corps occupied Vinnyca, led by Major-General Ludwig von Kubler. The German command believed that now was the time to di sperse the Red Army. Kubler ordered Pilfousek on 19 July to move the Mobile Brigade to Vinnyca, which was reached on 2 1 July. Pilfousek was then ordered to take Lypovec, a small town about 50 km East of Vinnyca on the main road to Bila Cerkva and Kiev . The attack start22 23 Micianik, I. , pp. Micianik, I. pp. 62-83. �SLOVAKIA-2017 69 ed on 22 July. Pilfousek had less than 5,000 men, 43 tanks and part th of the 11 Artillery Regiment with 123 cannons. The tanks did not have enough fuel and ammunition and had to halt the attack in the vi llage Scaslyva, west of the town. Pilfousek then made a fatal error when he ordered the infantry to continue the attack. Slovak so ldiers reached the center of the town but they were stopped by a counterattack by a division of the lih Soviet Army, which sent 15,000 men to reconquer the lost positions. The Slovaks were unable to hold the city without tanks but were saved due to the support of the 11 h Artillery Regiment, which held back the attacking Soviets. Only the arri va l of fresh German forces saved the Mobile Brigade from total defeat. A total of 75 Slovak soldiers died, 167 were wounded and 19 were taken prisoner. The Mobile Brigade lost four tanks, one armored car and tens of trucks. The next day, on 23 July, Lypovec was th occupied by the German 295 Infantry Division of Lieutenant24 General Karl Glimbel. The Mobile Group had in fact been defeated and General Ferdinand Catlos ordered most of the armored vehicles to return to Slovakia. Most of the soldiers remained in the Vinnyca region, while only a small Slovak unit of the Mobile Group, supported by the 11 th Artilth lery Regiment, continued the attack with the German 295 Infantry Di vision and on 30 July reached Granovo, West of the Dnepr (Dnipro) River. After that even these soldiers were sent back to Vinnyca. Slovak official propaganda presented the defeat at Lypovec as a "great victory" and also as a "symbol of Slovak-German friendship in arms." In 1942 a granite monument was erected at the battlefield and a military cemetery was located there. The monument stands to this day. About 600 Slovak soldiers, who died in the fighting in the Soviet Union (not only at Lypovec), are buried here. The First and Second Slovak Infantry Divisions, forming the Slovak army group (Armadna skupina - AS) were created partly from reservists who were mobilized at the end of June. The infantry divisions were concentrated in northeast Slovakia, near Medzilaborce, and later moved to the region of Sanok and Chyrov (in Polish: Chyr6w, in Ukrainian Chyriv, 16 km to the east from the UkrainianPolish border), where the command of the AS was temporally situated . The troops moved slowl y because they usually had to walk. They 24 Ibid ., pp. 12 1-37. �70 SLOVAKIA-2017 were used in July mainly to mop up the regions of eastern Galicia (South of the line Rava Ruska - Ternopol) of the dispersed units of the Soviet army as a part of the hinterland forces of the German Army Group South. 25 The Mobile Division After the defeat of the Mobile Brigade at Lypovec General Catlos decided to reorganize the Slovak armed forces. On 25 July 1941 two new divisions were formed : the Mobile Division (in Slovak: rychla divizia - RD), which was in fact a strengthened Mobile Brigade and the Security Division (in Slovak: Zaist'ovacia divizia ZD) which was to serve as a security and guard service on occupied Soviet territories in Ukraine. Their main region of operations was around Zitomir (Zhitomir, ukr. Zytomyr), a town about 130 km west of Kiev. While at the beginning of war the Slovak government wanted to show that Slovakia's participation in comparison to its population was high, now the situation changed. Most of the reservists, mobilized at the end of June and beginning of July to the Army Group (I st and 2 nd Infantry Division), were sent home. In the autumn of 1941 the number of soldiers was reduced to only about one-third of that in July 1941. The RD and the ZD were now formed mainly from professional soldiers and conscripts. The reservists formed about 17% of the total. They were mainly specialists of various types and drivers. On 10 September 8,862 men served in the ZD, 26 while the Mobile Division had 8,451 men on 20 August (including 30 I officers). 27 Despite its name, the Mobile Divison commanded by Colonel Jozef Turanec, was not fully motorized. The motorized section took part in the battle of Kiev at the end of August I 941. After the fall of Kiev (20 September 1941) the Mobile Division moved to the South st and was part of the 1 Tanlc Army Group of Colonel-General Ewald von Kleist, which moved in the direction of the Don River. It fought 25 Ibid, pp. 142-53 . Micianik, I. , p. 245. See also: P. Micianik, Slovenska armada v t'ai eni proti So vietskemu zviizu (1941 -1944). II. Zaist'ovacia divizia a ieleznicni pionieri. [Security Division and Ra ilway Pioneers]. (hereafter cited as Micianik, 11. ) Banska Bystrica : Dal-BB, 2008, p. 37. 27 Micianik, I. , p. 191. 26 �SLOVAKIA-2017 71 successfully in the Donbas Area. At the end of October the Mobile Division reached Rostov-on-the Don and the Azov Sea. At that time the Mobile Division had 287 officers, 386 sergeants and 7,081 men. The Slovak units were situated between Rostov and the mouth of the Don. Slovak soldiers were not prepared for the winter, which started in the middle of November. 28 On 27 November 1941 Colonel Turanec was replaced by Colonel Augustin Malar. After his arrival, he recognized the decline in morale and discipline and fighting ability among his soldiers. Malar wanted to move the division back to Slovakia but the German High Command refused because of the start of a Soviet counter-offensive at the end of November. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the Commander of Army Group South, decided to retreat. On 28 November the Soviet army reconquered Rostov. Hitler recalled Rundstedt and substituted him with Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, but Reichenau did not change the order and continued the retreat behind the River Mius. Here the Slovak RD was ordered to defend positions near the town of Golodajevka on the bank of the River Mius. The Soviet counteroffensive was then successfully stopped. As a result, Colonel Malar was promoted to the rank of General and later awarded the German Iron Cross. By the end of 1941 the RD had suffered 84 deaths, 3 78 wounded or frozen, 26 missing and 11 captured. 29 Between January and the beginning of March 1942 the Red Army launched its winter offensive at the Mius River.30 At the beginning of March the snow started to melt and the Mius overflowed. The flood stopped the Soviet offensive and within the next six weeks the front where the RD was stationed was relatively quiet but still between 1 January and the end of April the RD lost 143 men ( 124 killed, 12 missing and 7 captured). 31 On 25 April 1942 Jozef Turanec, promoted to the rank of General on 1 January, again took command of the RD. The Mobile division took part first in the battle of Charkov (Charkiv, Kharkiv) in the 28 P. Micianik, Slovenskci armada v t'aieni pro ti Sovietskemu zvdzu (1941-1944). !If. Rychla divizia [The Slovak Army in the Attack upon the Soviet Union ( 1941-1944). Ill. The Mobile Divison] (hereafter cited as Micianik, 111. ), Banska Bystrica: Dal88, 2009, 35 . 29 F. Csefalvay et al. , op. cit. , pp. 80-7 , 30 Micianik, Ill. , pp. 37-46. 31 F. Csefalvay et. al. , op. cit., p. 93. �72 SLOVAKIA-2017 spring and then in the summer offensive in Southern Russia, which started on 28 June 1942. At the end of July the RD participated in the reconquest of Rostov (for this operation Jozef Turanec was awarded the German Iron Cross). 32 Because the Soviet army retreated east of the Don, Hitler mistakenly thought that it was already defeated and divided his forces into two groups: the "A" Army group was to destroy the Soviet forces between the rivers Don and Kuban , and after that to continue the attack along the axis Nal'cik - Vladikavkaz Groznyj - Machackala (at the coast of the Caspian Sea) . After reaching Machackala, the army was to continue along the sea coast to the Oil fields around Baku. The "B" group was to hold the line on the Central Don and simultaneously continue the attack on Stalingrad (now Volgograd), on the Volga River. The Mobile Division was included in the "A" group commanded by Colonel-General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist. While small units of the RD remained in Rostov, the main forces crossed the Don on 31 July and pursued the retreating Red Army across the Kuban Steppe. On 4 August the RD reached the Kuban River at Kropotkin (a town about 230 km east of Rostov) , crossed the river and continued to the rivers Laba and Psis (left inflows of the River Kuban). Here the RD reached the foot of the Caucasus Mountains, with their dense forests and small wild rivers and creeks. The roads were in very bad shape and narrow, and the retreating Red Army blew up the bridges. The tanks could not continue, and most of the armored cars and half-tracks were damaged and unable to continue. The troops of the RD, moving slowly and dispersed, were easy targets for small units of Russian partisans and raids by the Soviet Air Force. On 17 August Turanec received orders to move to the south and secure the territory around the town of Gorjacij Kljuc, with an important railway station on the main railway Rostov - Krasnodar. 33 The RD was again subordinated to the German I 7 th Army, which had orders to attack Novorossijsk and Tuapse on the Black Sea and to continue along the coast to the Turkish border. This attempt failed due to fierce Soviet resistance, and the RD was also stopped before Tuapse. 34 At the end of September Hitler ordered a new attack. The RD was included under the command of 32 33 34 P. Mi cianik, op. cit, pp. 11 8-24. Mi cianik, III. , pp. 146-70 . Ibid ., pp. 21 7-1 8. �SLOVAKIA-2017 73 Colonel Stefan Jurech, who replaced Jozef Turanec on 23 September. The attack of the RD started on 14 October but again failed. From 22 October the RD defended the right bank of the Psekups River. The Slovaks were under constant attack by the Soviet Air Force. ln August and September they lost 83 dead, 470 wounded, 10 missing and 3 captured; in November 19 dead and 97 wounded. 35 On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a two-pronged attack targeting the weaker Romanian and Hungarian forces protecting the German 6th Army's flanks. The Axis forces on the flanks were overrun and the 6th Army was cut off and surrounded in the Stalingrad area. Adolf Hitler ordered the army to stay in Stalingrad and make no attempt to break out; instead, attempts were made to supply the army by air and to break the encirclement from the outside. Heavy fighting continued for another two months. By the beginning of February 1943, the Axis forces in Stalingrad had exhausted their food and ammunition. The remnants of the 6th Army surrendered. th By Christmas of 1942 it became clear that the German 6 Army in Stalingrad was in big trouble and that the Soviets would soon launch an offensive against the German and Slovak armies in the th Caucasus. After completing the encirclement of the 6 Army, the Soviets moved to the west and reached a position 60 km east of Rostov. Colonel-General Erwald von Kleist, who replaced von Reichenau on 21 November, on 3 l December 1942 ordered an immediate retreat from Caucasus to Rostov. On 16 January 1943, the Soviet counteroffensive on the Caucasus front began. Due to this offensive, part of the Mobile Division was encircled in the village of Pencenskaja. Already during the Autumn of 1942, the Slovak soldiers were bombarded by propaganda leaflets. In them, Slovak soldiers who had deserted from the RD and also Slovak Communists wlio fled to the USSR after 1939, urged their fellow-soldiers not to fight the Russians but to surrender and cross-over to the Soviet side. This propaganda now increased. Colonel Stefan Jurech, promoted to the rank of General on I January 1943, in this new situation had no intention to st continue fighting . He secretly sent 1 Lieutenant Gustav Donoval to th the staff of the Soviet 60 Guard Rifle Army to negotiate a surrender. On 22 January 1943, the staff signed with Donoval an agreement 35 F. Csefal vay, op. cit. pp. 95-6. �74 SLOVAKIA-2017 by which the whole Mobile Division was to cross over to the Russians on 24 January. 36 This did not happen, however, because the German army broke the encirclement of Pencenskaja and the Slovaks retreated with the Germans. The Mobile Division then moved to the Kuban region from whence it was transported partly by boats and partly by air-lift to the Crimea and Perekop. During the Caucasus operations the RD lost 108 dead, 207 wounded and 157 were missing 37 and captured . During 1943 the Mobile Division lost its ability to fight due to low morale and defections. Many soldiers in Crimea established friendly relations with the locals, especially with women. Because the RD lost almost all its tanks and armored vehicles in the Caucast sus, it was reorganized as the 1 Infantry Division on 1 August 1943. At night from 29 to 30 October 1943, members of the division were suddenly attacked by the Red Army at Melitopol. The soldiers decided to surrender: 2300 soldiers and 45 officers were taken prisoner. st The German high command lost confidence in the I Division and argued that it should be used only as a labor unit. General Ferdinand Catlos agreed. On 4 May 1944 the 1st Division was transformed into the 1st Technical Division, which was moved to Romania and later to Hungary. The rest of the division was captured in March of 1945 by the Red Army. During 1941-1943, The Mobile Division suffered at least 600 dead, 2,400 wounded, 398 missing, and 88 captured. Only 42 men deserted to the Red Army. From the military point of view, it belonged to the elite of the Slovak army and even the German high command was satisfied with it. The Security Division The Security Division was stationed in the region of Northern Ukraine and Southern White Russia (Belarus) where it was to protect roads and railways, especially the line Pinsk - Gome), against attacks by partisan groups of different political affiliation. At the end of 1941 the only guerrilla fighters were those of Ukrainian nationalists, later known as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the rest 36 37 Micianik, Ill., pp. 305-6 F. Csefal vay, Voj enske dejiny Slovenska, op. cit., p. 13 2. �SLOVAKIA-2017 75 were dispersed units of the Red Army. Ukrainian nationalists fought against the Red Army, because their goal was to establish an independent Ukraine. When the German authorities rejected this idea, the UP A started to fight against the Germans as well. Generally speaking, the Slovak units did not have much contact with the UPA underground units because their main bases were situated in the western part of Ukraine. At the end of 1942 and mainly in 1943 Soviet partisans appeared nd in the area. The attitude of the officers and soldiers of the Slovak 2 Division towards the partisans was rather complicated. Regiments, battalions and even companies were stationed in different places in an area almost as big as Slovakia. Very often the squads of one battalion were situated along the railway lines many miles each from another. It was practically impossible to protect the railways under such circumstances. It is difficult to define the relations between the Slovaks, the local civilian population and the partisans. On the one hand, the units of the 102" Regiment took part in the "pacification" actions against the Red partisans. Special battalions of the regiment destroyed several villages in which the civilians supported the partisans. Some squads even executed the partisans and civilian suspects. "Punishable expeditions" were especially active under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Michal Loksik, the commander of the regit ment. 38 Quite different was the situation in the 101 s Regiment. Here most of the officers looked the other way when their soldiers established friendly relations with both the partisans and the local population. Some commanders of dislocated squads and even battalions concluded an unofficial armistice with the Red partisans. Captain Jan Nalepka, chief of staff of the l O1st Regiment, established contacts with partisan leader General Saburov. When his activity was disclosed, he and two other officers deserted on 15 May 1943 to partisans near the village of Remezy. 39 On the Soviet side Nalepka orgast nized the I Czechoslovak Partisan Unit. This troop, under the command of Jan Nalepka, took part in the attack against the town of Ov- 38 F. Csefalvay et al. , Vojenske osobnosti dejin Slovenska, pp. 153-4. Loksik, who was born in Vienna in 1897, later claimed to be an ethnic German and joined the Waffen-SS . After the war he escaped from Slovakia and his further fate is unknown. 39 Micianik, II ., p. 213. �76 SLOVAKIA-2017 rue. Nalepka died in this raid on 16 November 1943 and was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. 40 Despite the fact that Slovak desertions to the partisans were not very numerous - altogether only about 400 soldiers crossed over 41 they had military consequences: the German command started to consider the ZD unreliable and unable ( or unwilling) to fight against the partisans and decided to remove it from the UkrainianBelorussian borderland to Minsk and its surroundings. The transfer was completed in July of 1943 . On I August 1943 the ZD was transnd formed into the 2 Infantry Division, first under the command of Colonel Pilfousek, and later Colonel Karol Peknik. Soon it became clear that the division could not be effectively used against the partisans because most of the officers (including Colonel Peknik) and soldiers had lost confidence in a German victory. The German command did not agree with its return to Slovakia. Instead, it agreed to nd transform it into a labour unit named the 2 Technical Brigade (later nd the 2 Technical Division). At the end of October it numbered 3,413 and it was sent to Italy under the command of Colonel Jan Krnac. The Attitude of the Soldiers Towards the War Slovaks as a nation had no personal experience with Russia or the Soviet Union. Slovakia never coveted Russian or (later) Soviet territory and, except for the Russian " White" emigres, who came after 1918, there were no Russians in Slovakia. During World War I many Slovaks fought as soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Eastern (Russian) front; the war not popular among Czechs and Slovaks and many deserted to the Russians and later formed the Czechoslovak Legions that fought against Austria-Hungary and for Czechoslovakia's independence. In Slovakia, traditional pro-Russian sympathies dated back to the 19 th century based on their common Slavic origin and language proximity. Unlike in Poland, Hungary or Romania, Russians were always seen as friends, not as enemies in Slovakia. Despite its communist regime, inter-war Czechoslovakia, ° 4 F: Csefalvay, Voj enske osobnosti, p. 176. In 2004 Jan Nalepka was promoted by the Slovak government to the rank of Brigadier-General in Memoriam. 41 Martin Lacko, Dezercie a zajatia prislusn ikov zaist'ovacej divizie v ZSSR v rokoch 1942-1 943. [Desertions and Captures of the Security Division Members in the USSR 1941-1943], Bratislava: UPN , 2007, 63 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 77 like France, in 1935 signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia acted legally until its dissolution in the autumn of 1938 and was quite strong and influential in Slovakia. Many Slovak soldiers before the war were members or sympathizers. They were very often ready to accept the picture of the USSR as heaven on earth. For all these reasons the war was not popular among Slovaks. On the other hand, it should be said that most of the mobilized Slovak soldiers faithfully served in the Slovak army, although without any enthusiasm, until the end of the campaign in 1944. From a strictly professional point of view, Slovak soldiers were neither better nor worse than other soldiers fighting on the eastern front in the years 1941-1944 Justification of the war against the Soviet Union was a big problem for Slovak propaganda. While the "small war" against Hungary in March 1939 was popular, because the army was defending Slovak territory, and the war against Poland could be at least justified as a fi ght for the return of territories annexed by Poland, there was no good reason for the fight against the USSR. Relations between Slovakia and the USSR were initially good, despite the openly anticommunist stand of the Slovak government. Slovakia did not have a common border with the Soviet Union and, therefore, there were no border disputes. The Slovaks saw no reason why they should fight against Ukrainians and Russians, Slavonic people like them , for the interest of Germany. Officially, the war was directed against "JudeoBolshevism," not against Russia or the Russian nation. On 26 June 1941 Minister Ferdinand Catlos openly declared: "This is not a struggle against the Russian nation or against Slavdom ... The struggle is for a new Europe where the Russian nation will find a better future. " Catlos also recalled the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the Czechoslovak Legions during the Civil war in Russia. 42 After crossing the San River, the Slovak soldiers found themselves on former Eastern Polish territory annexed by the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939. Except for the Communists, the locals did not consider the USSR as their motherland and had no intention of defending it. The Ukrainian population hated Soviet rule and often welcomed German troops as liberators. Slovaks were welcomed even 42 Dagmar Cerna-Lantayova, Pohl'ady na vychod [The Outlooks to th e East] , Bratislava: Veda, 2002, I 86. �78 SLOVAKIA-2017 more cordially due to the language proximity; they were partly able communicate with the locals. The Slovak soldiers here also faced Soviet reality: unbelievable poverty, terrible roads, churches turned into warehouses or clubs (or simply destroyed). They also faced the evidence of massive terror when they found hundreds of dead bodies in the yards and cells of prisons in the towns near the border. These were the bodies of political prisoners who were executed by Soviet security forces before the retreat of the Red Army4 3 (the total number of those executed is today estimated to be around 15 ,000). All these facts improved the morale of the Slovak soldiers who could feel as liberators bringing freedom and a better life to the Ukrainian people. This did not last for long, however. Very soon the Slovak soldiers were confronted with the atrocities committed by advancing German forces against the Ukrainian and Russian civilians, and especially by the"Einsatzgruppen," which behind the front lines massively murdered Jews. In central and eastern Ukraine the local population did not welcome the Germans as liberators but fought against them. Morale and fighting ability fell mainly during the retreat in the Caucasus in the severe winter of 1942-1943 . By 1943 it became clear that Germany would not win the war and that Slovaks had no reason to participate in it. Similar developments met the Security Division in Ukraine and Belarus in 1943 . The Slovak government also gradually lost its enthusiasm for the war. By 1943 it became clear that the war would last for a long time and might exhaust Slovak human and economic reserves . Because Hungary also took part in the war, it was hi ghly unlikely that Germany would pressure Budapest to return to Slovakia the annexed territory of southern Slovakia. In this situation, the Minister of Defence decided to limit Slovak participation in the war to a bare minimum . The number of soldiers in both divisions on the Soviet front constantly shrank. From the end of 1941 only those Slovak so ldiers serving their basic military service, plus some specialists, were to be sent to the front and these, after finishing their two years of service, were to be replaced by newcomers. This practice was only partly enforced, 43 Martin Lacko (ed.), Dotyky s bolsevizmom. Dokumenty spravodaj srva slo venskej armcidy 1940-1941 [Contacts with Boshevism. Documents of th e Inteligence Service of the Slovak Army I 940-194 I] , Brati slava : Ustav pamati naroda, 2009, doc. 22 , pp. 124-5 , doc. 28, p. 15 1, doc. 3 1, pp. 155-6, doc. 38, pp. 188-98. �SLOVAKIA-2017 79 however: and some soldiers were not relieved because no newcomers arrived. Political Consequences of the War against the USSR The Soviet Union - unlike Great Britain44 and the USA - fully recognized Slovakia as an independent state on 16 September 1939.45 Slovak participation in the war against the USSR had its political consequences. On 8 July 1941 Soviet Ambassador to London Ivan Majskij announced to Czechoslovak-in-exile President Edvard Benes, that restitution of Czechoslovakia was one of the war aims of the USSR and that the Soviet government decided to recognize the Czechoslovak government de Jure as the legal government of the Czechoslovak Republic.46 On 18 July 1941 the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 16 May 1935 was renewed and the Soviet Union agreed with the formation of a Czechoslovak Anny in the Soviet Union. 47 The nucleus of this army was the Czechoslovak Legion established in Poland in the summer 1939, whose members were captured by the Soviets after the defeat of Poland. There were also escapees from Czechoslovakia who illegally crossed the border to the Soviet Union (such people were usuall y imprisoned by the Soviet infamous secret police NKVD and sent to labour camps for a minimum two years) . Later, some Slovak soldiers who were taken prisoner on the Russian front or who voluntarily crossed over to the Red Army, joined the Czechoslovak Army in the Soviet Union. In 1945 the Soviet army entered Slovakia and in May Czechoslovakia was restored. 44 Great Britain and France recognized Slovakia only ' de facto .' When Slovakia took part in the German invasion of Poland , they recalled their consuls from Bratislava. 45 Dokumenty vnesnej politiki SSSR [Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy), vol. 22, fart. I, Moskva [Moscow], 1992, doc. 585, p. 82. 6 • Dokumenty a materialy k dejinam ceskoslovensko-sovetskych vztahu [Documents and Materials on the History of Czechoslovak-Soviet Relations] , vol. 4, part. I, Praha: Academia, 1980, doc. 76, p. 136. 47 Libuse Otahalova - Milada Cervenkova (eds.) : Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske politiky I 939-1943 [Documents on the History of Czechoslovak Policy) , Vol. I. , Prague: Academia, 1966, Vol. I, doc. 204, pp. 248-9. On the same day ( 18 July 1941 ) the Czechoslovak gove rnm ent-in-exile was also recognized by Great Britain see ibid. , doc. 203 , pp. 247-8. �80 SLOVAKIA-2017 After the war, Slovak participation in the war against the Soviet was considered by Czechoslovak authorities as one of the biggest crimes of the "l'udak"war-time regime . It goes without saying that the communist regime, which lasted in Czechoslovakia for 41 years ( 1948-1989) had no use for it. Slovak emigres, i.e. prominent personalities of the Slovak State who managed to escape to the West, mainly to the USA and Canada, during the first part of the Cold war sometimes tried to present the war as Slovakia's fight against Communism .48 Later, in the l 960's, this explanation was abandoned and Slovak participation was explained rather as a result of German pressure. 49 Today, in the democratic independent Slovakia, mo st of Slovak historians consider participation in the Second World War on the side of Germany as a mistake and not something of which the Slovaks should be proud. so 48 Jozef Pauco, S/owici a komunizmus [Slovaks and Communi sm] , Middletown Pa.: Jednota Press, 1957, pp. I 07- 11 ; Andrej Cincura, " Duch slovenskej armady" [The Spirit of the Slovak Army] , in Mikulas Sprinc (ed.), S/ovenska repub/ika 1939-1949 [The Slovak Republic, 1939-1949], Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, 1949, pp. 130-32. 49 Milan Stanislav Durica, "S lovaki a During World War II" in Joseph M. Kirchbaum , Slovakia in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973, 183. 50 Julius Bartl , "M. S. Durica: Dejiny Slovenska a Slowikov" (A review article), in Historicky casopis, 45, 1997, No I, p. 120; Dagmar Ciem a-Lantayova, Poh/'ady na vychod, op. cit. , pp. 185-7, F. Csefalvay, Vojenske dejiny Slovenska, vo l. V. , op. cit., pp. 258-9; Valerian Bystri cky - Dusan Kovac - Jan Pesek a kol., K/'iicove prob/emy modernych s/ovenskych dejin 1848-1 992 (The Bas ic Problems of Modem Slovak Histo ry 1848- 1992], Bratislava: Veda, 20 12, pp. 225-6 ; Martin Lacko, Slovenska repub/ika 1939-45. Bratislava: UPN -Perfekt, 2008, pp. 93-5 ; I..:ubo mir Liptak, 2217 dni. S/ovensko v case druhej svetovej vojny (2217 Days . Slovaki a during WW 11] , Bratislava: Ka lligram , 20 11 , pp. 318-20; Katarin a Hradska - Ivan Kamenec et. al. , S/ovensko v 20. storoci. I V. S/ovenska Repub/ika 1939- 1945 [Slovakia in the 20 th Centu ry. IV . The Slovak Republic 1939- I 945] , Bratislava: Veda, 20 15, p. 331. � SLOVAKIA-2017 61 THE SLOVAK ARMY ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING WORLD WAR II Jan Rychlik Attempts to build separate Slovak military units under the command of Slovak officers within the framework of the Czecho-S lovak Armed Forces already existed in the period of autonomy (6 October 1938 to 14 March 1939). The government in Prague refused such demands but despite that many conscripts and officers of Slovak nationality were allowed to serve in Slovakia, which later enabled the relatively rapid creation of Slovak army units. The ruling Hlinka Slovak People ' s Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS) already in this period had a party militia called the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova garda - HG). The HG-men (gardisti) belonged to radical separatists within the HSCS. Many of them were admirers of German National Socialism and later became known for their terrorist acts against Czechs, Jews and opponents of the regime. Units of the newly-established Slovak army and volunteers of the HG took part in the defence of the eastern border against the Hungarian invasion of Eastern Slovakia (23- 31 March 1939) known as the "little war" . However, regular army officers considered the HG as dangerous fanatics with poor fighting abilities and opposed their inclusion in the armed forces. Also, President Josef Tiso did not like them because of their radicalism . The newly-established Slovak Army was at the beginning only a smaller version of the Czechoslovak Army of the first Republic ( 19 I 8-1938), which the Germans dissolved. The departure from the Czechoslovak model (new ranks, new emblems and symbols etc.) was a relatively lengthy process. At the beginning the army used the old Czechoslovak uniforms and was equipped mainly with Czechoslovak weapons and machinery, which was later partly replaced by German ones. Like the Czechoslovak Army, it was based on the conscript system and made compulsory for all able-bodied men, usually two years. Reservists cou ld be summoned for military training in �62 SLOVAKIA-2017 case of emergency. 1 However, the Slovak army initially lacked officers. In August of 1938 there were only 435 officers of Slovak nationality in the Czechoslovak army, which represented 3.4% of the officer corps. 2 Some officers of Czech nationality, mainly those with Slovak wives, were allowed to continue their service in the Slovak army, as well as some ethnic Germans . New officers were recruited from the reserve-officers of the former Czechoslovak anny, who were mainly teachers. Some of them were in fact mobilized against their will. A Slovak military academy was opened in Banska Bystrica, and military schools in Bratislava and Nitra. In July of 1939 the Slovak army consisted of 29,683 men ; in February 1940 33, 41 (including 1,0 IO officers); and in June of I 94 I 33,676 men, including 1,347 officers, 42 of them Czechs. 3 Jews, according the government decree of 2 1 June 1939, served in military labour units and the same applied to Roma (Gypsies). Ethnic Germans living in Slovakia, who were Slovak citizens, served first in the Slovak army in special units but later they were allowed to fulfil their military service in the German army and the SS-corps. In 1944 their service in the SS-corps became mandatory. There were people of different political opinions in the officer corps of the Slovak army. Certainly, there were officers devoted to independent Slovakia and even to the close cooperation of Slovakia with Germany, like Colonel (later General) Jozef Turanec, Colonel Rudolf Pilfousek or Lieutenant-Colonel Michal Loksik4 . Generally speaking, however, the Slovak officers were usually not adherents of the HSCS regime and very often were even hostile or at least indifferent to the idea of independent Slovakia. Some Slovak officers even joined the resistance movement. The Czech underground organization National Defence (Obrana naroda - ON), which specialized in sabotage and military intelligence, and was based in the Protectorate, also operated in Slovakia and some officers of the Slovak army were members. The reason for such behaviour was rather simple: 1 Frantisek Csefa lvay et al. , Vojenske dejiny Slovenska [Military Hi story of Slovakia] V. 1939- 1945. Brati slava: Magnet Press, 2008, 16-24. 2 Ibid ., 14. 3 Ibi d. , p. 22-3 . 4 Frantisek Csefalvay et al., Vojenske osobnosri dejin Slovenska 1939-/945 [Military Personalities in the History of Slovakia 1939- 1945). Brati slava: Vojensky histori cky ustav, 2013 , 153-4, 197-8, 250-5 1. �SLOVAKIA-2017 63 former Czechoslovak officers, who graduated from the Czechoslovak military schools (most notably at the Military Academy in Hranice), were educated in a pro-Czechoslovak and pro-democratic spirit. Czechoslovak counter-intelligence screened every candidate applying to study at the Military Academy. Members of Communist and various separatist parties or even sympathisers of Communism or separatist movements were not accepted. The same restrictions applied in the school for reserve officers who were recruited from conscripts with higher education. In addition, the professional officers before 1938 were often stationed in the Czech Lands and their wives were often Czechs. 5 They were integrated into the Czech secular milieu and the clerical character of the Slovak Republic was strange to them. Some former Czechoslovak officers of Slovak nationality were originally also Legionaries, that is, volunteers who had fought for an independent Czechoslovakia on the side of the Allies, especially in Russia during World War I. 6 The ex-Legionaries formed the elite of the inter-war Czechoslovak army. It is true that even among the Legionaries it was possible to find supporters of the l'udak regime (like General Ferdinand Catlos), but in principle, former Legionaries were rather hostile to it. Some even deserted from the Slovak army and offered their services to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile represented by Edvard Benes and joined the Czechoslovak Army abroad. This was the case of General Rudolf Viest, the only general of Slovak nationality, who escaped to Paris and became commander of the Czechoslovak Army in France. This army fought the advancing Germans during the spring campaign on the western front in May and June of 1940 and after the defeat of France was evacuated to Great Britain. From 14 March 1939 Slovakia was an independent state with its own army and foreign representation . Slovak sovereignty was, how5 Pavel Micianik, Slovenskci armada v t'ai eni proti Sovietskemu zviizu ( /941-1944) . 1. V opercicii Barbarossa. [The Slovak Army in the Campaign aga inst the Soviet Uni on. I 941-1944. Part I. In Operation Barbarossa) (hereafter cited as Micianik, I.), Banska Bystrica: Dali-BB, 2007, 30-31. 6 The Czechoslovak Legions were formed during WW I from prisoners of war of the Austro-Hunga ri an army of Czech and S lovak nationality and also the Czech and Slovak vo lunteers li ving in Entente states (mainly Russia , France) or neutral states (mainl y the USA up to 191 7). The Legions were formed in Russia, Italy and France. They fought against Germany and A ustri a-Hunga ry. The Legions in Russia also later fought aga inst the Red Army in th e Ru ssian C ivi l war. �64 SLOVAKIA-2017 ever, severely limited by special relations with Germany. According the "Treaty of Protection" (in German: Schutzvertrag), signed preliminarily in Vienna on 18 March and definitively in Berlin on 23 March 1939, Germany obtained the right to build freely , and according to her own needs, military bases in the so-called "Zone of Protection" (Schutzzone) which was situated in Western Slovakia between the White Carpathians and the border of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia was also obliged to conduct her foreign and 7 defence policies according the interests of Germany. A secret protocol to the Schutzvertrag subordinated the Slovak economy to German needs. 8 The Treaty of Protection in fact meant that Slovakia could be forced to participate in war alongside Germany, if the German government so desired. On 2 1 August the German Auswdrtigesamt (Foreign Office) prepared a Note verbale informing the Slovak Government that German armed forces would enter Slovakia to protect her from the danger of a Polish attack.9 The content of the note (approved by Adolf Hitler) was first unofficially presented to the Slovak government by German Minister to Bratislava Hans Bernard on 24 August 1939 . 10 The Slovak government was also asked to take part in the military operations against Poland (the government was assured that the Slovak army would not be used outside of Slovak territory, 11 but this promise was broken). In exchange, Germany promised to guarantee the Slovak-Hungarian border. If Poland was defeated, Slovakia would regain the territories lost in the fall of 1938, and eventually those lost to Poland in 1920. 12 After some hesitation the Slovak government accepted the German demands. After that the German request was presented again officially on 27 August 13 and the Slovak government consented the next day. Mobilization started already on 26 August. Gradually 117,000 reservists were 7 Eduard Ni zi'i ansky et al. , Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1 94 1 v dokumentech/Slovakisch-deutsche Beziehungen in Dokumenten 1938-/ 94 1 [Slovak-German Relations 193 8-1941 in Documents] I. (hierafter cited as SDBD I.] , Presov: Universum , 2009, doc. 96, pp. 305-06. 8 Ibid ., 307-08. 9 SBDB I. , doc. 202, pp. 576-7 . 10 Ibid, doc . 209, pp. 589-90. 11 Ibid., doc. 205 , p. 583. 12 Ibid., doc. 210, pp. 590-1 . 13 Ibid., doc. 216, pp. 604-5 , p. 610. �SLOVAKIA-2017 65 called up, of whom about 51,000 were assigned to the field army "Bernolak," under the command of General Ferdinand Catlos. While the main military operations were carried out by the Wehrmacht, which launched its attack on Poland also from Slovak soil, three Slovak divisions between 3- 5 September crossed the border and occupied a small piece of territory on the Polish side of the Tatra Mountains. On 17 September Poland was attacked from the east by the Red army, and was defeated and the Slovak army returned to Slovakia. It should be noted that Slovakia never formally declared war on Poland. The Slovak government presented the war against Poland as a struggle for the liberation of the territories which were annexed by Poland in 1920, 1924 and in 1938 (Upper Orava, Upper Spis and part of Javorina in the High Tatra Mountains). Germany indeed returned 14 these territories to Slovakia on 21 November 1939. The reclaimed territories were partly inhabited by ethnic Slovaks and so the war had some justification. Pro-German elements in HSCS, and especially the HG, welcomed the defeat of Poland . Generally speaking, however, the war was not very popular among Slovaks because many of them considered the Poles Slavs, like the Slovaks, and in addition to speaking a similar language, their kinsmen and brothers. The war was extremely unpopular among Slovak Lutherans in the western part of the country. After the defeat of Poland, Germany no longer required Slovak participation in German operations and the Slovak army did not take part in the war in the West. In June of 1940 France was defeated. Berlin, having now "free hands," decided to purge the Slovak government of "unreliable elements" and to strengthen the influence of the Germanophiles. On July 27, Hitler summoned President Tiso to Salzburg and forced him to fire Minister of Foreign Affairs Ferdinand Durcansky, who in the Spring had tried to negotiate with the British behind Germany's back. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs became the Germanophile Vojtech Tuka, who since 26 October 1939 had already been the Prime Minister. Another Germanphile, Alexander Mach, was appointed Minister of the Interior. The new government was definitivel y and exclusively oriented towards Germany. On 24 November 1940 Slovakia, together with Hungary and Romania, 1 ~ SDBD, I., doc. 25 1, pp. 683 -4. �66 SLOVAKIA-2017 joined the Tripartite Pact (Berlin-Rome-Tokyo). 15 In April of 1941 Slovakia did not participate in the campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece. On the other hand, when the war stared on 6 April, Bratislava severed diplomatic relations with Belgrade and on 10 April expressed a willingness to recognize the Independent State of Croatia. On 21 June 1941 the Chief of the German General Staff, General Franz Halder, visited Bratislava incognito. He informed the head of the German military mission, General Paul von Otto, that Hitler expected the participation of the Slovak army in the war against the Soviet Union. 16. The war started the next day. The German Minister to Bratislava, Hans Eluard Ludin, visited Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vojtech Tuka and informed him about the German request for Slovak participation. Tuka agreed and offered (through Slovak Minister to Berlin Matus Cernak) military assistance to the German Foreign Office. 17 On the same afternoon diplomatic relations between the USSR and Slovakia were broken off 8 and Defence Minister Ferdinand Catlos summoned the reservists for "extraordinary military training. " Only on 24 June did the government approve Slovak participation in the war, which was officially announced on the radio. The Slovak Diet, which according the Constitution was the only body that could declare war, was not informed of the government's declaration . So, from the forma l point of view, the whole action was unconstitutional. It is worth mentioning that on 13 December 1941 , the Slovak government also formally declared war on Great Britain and the United States. 19 Again, the declaration of war was not presented to the Diet. Because the USA and Great Britain did not recognize Slovakia as an independent state, they ignored the declaration. No direct fighting took place between the Slovak army and the western allies, but both countries treated Slovakia as 15 SDBD, I. , doc. 359, pp. 270-2. SDBD, I. doc. 400, p. 1092. 17 Eduard Nizi\ansky et al. , Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 194 1-1945 v dokumentech/Slovakisch-deutsche Beziehungen in Dokumenten 1941-1945 [Slovak-German Relati ons 1941 - 1945 in documents] II. (hierafter cited as SDBD 11.), Presov: Universum , 20 11 , doc.1,p.95 . 18 Ibid, doc. 3, p. 98 . 19 SDBS II. , doc. 34, p. 184. The declaration was announ ced in th e daily Slovenskci politika on 13 December 1941. 16 �SLOVAKIA-2017 67 enemy territory. Slovakia, including Bratislava, was repeatedly bombed in 1944. Accord ing to the unpublished memoirs of Ferdinand Catlos, at first onl y ministers Tuka and Mach advocated immediate participation in the war, whi le other ministers and President Tiso had some doubts . But after some hesitation all agreed. 20 Despite the fact that it was Gennany who reque sted military ass istance from Slovakia, it should be noted that the Slovak government had no objections. The government saw participation in the war against the Soviet Union as a good opportunity to show to Berlin that Slovakia was a better frie nd than Hungary, which also took part in the military campaign. Tuka and Tiso wanted to contribute more and faster. They believed that it in future it might be possible, with German help, to rev ise the Vienna Arbitration Award of 2 November 193 8, which deprived Slovakia of part of her southern territory in favour of Hungary. The openl y anti-communist policy and rhetoric of the l'udak regime also played a role. 2 1 Mobilization of the reservists lasted until 5 July. A total of 68,0 18 reservists were ca ll ed to arms, of whom 56,8 58 were registered . The total number of Slovak soldiers reached 90,533 . General Ferd inand Catlos formed in Eastern Slovakia an Anny Group (in Slovak : armadna skupina - AS) which consisted of two divisions nd (the I st Division commanded by Colone l Jozef Turanec and the 2 Divi sion com manded by Co lonel Augustin Malar). From a part of the 2nd Division and sma ll er units of specialized weapons (two artillery regiments, tank units, automob ile unit etc.), Catlos formed the so-called Mobile Group (in Slovak: rychla skupina , i.e. , the fast or rapid group) under the command of Colonel Rudolf Pilfousek, an officer who claimed to be an ethnic German, but according hi s name was probably partly Czech. The Mobile Group was the only almost full y motorized Slovak military unit and it was expected to move quickly with the advancing German army. The Slovak forces were first situated in northeast Slovakia, near the border of occupied Poland (the Genera l Governorate). Slovakia did not border on the Sovi20 Archiv literatt'.try a um eni a Slovenskej narodnej kn iznice (ALU SNK) [Archives of the Li terature and Arts of the Slovak National Library] in Martin, mem oirs of Ferdinand Catlos, sig. 129 E2, pp. 65 -66. 21 I.:ubomir Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci [Slovakia in the 20th Century]. 2nd ed., Bratislava: Kalli gram, 1998, 189. �68 SLOVAKIA-2017 et Union but Soviet territory was very close to the place of assembly. After the beginning of the war, the Slovak forces crossed the border and assembled in the General Govemorate near Brzoz6w, a village west of the River San, from 28 September 1939 the border between Germany and Soviet Union. The Slovak division s and the Mobile Group were included in the forces of the German Army Group South (commander: Field Marchal Gerd von Rundstedt). Within this Army group the Mobile Group was first subordinated to the command of the I ih German army (Commander: General Carl Heinrich von Stiilpnagel), which was part of the Army Group South. One of the goals of the I ih Army was to cross the San River and to break through the so-called Molotov defence line, 22 i.e. the chain of light bunkers built on the new Soviet western border (established after the defeat of Poland). The Mobile Group crossed the San on 25 June and continued to attack Sambor. On I July the Soviet army started to retreat to the so-called Stalin line, the chain of fortre sses built on the old (pre-17 September 1939) Soviet-Polish border. This allowed the advancing German I ih Army to continue to attack the region of Lvov (in Polish Lw6w, in Ukrainian Lviv) and the mobile group was ordered to mop up the territory South of Lvov. On 2 July, without firing a shot, the mobile group captured Stryj (a town about 60 km south ofLvov), which the Red Arm y decided not to defend. 23 On 7 July the Mobile Group, which was temporally subordinated again directly to General Catlos, was reorganized into the Mobile Brigade (195 officers, 52 sergeants and 4,655 soldiers, a company of 43 tanks - two squads , one battalion of armoured vehicles and th trucks, the I I Artillery Regiment, one squad of machine-guns, a scouting squad) and the next day started to move Eastward alongside the main axis Sambor - Temopol - Vinnyca. On 19 July the I 7th the th German Army broke the Stalin line and the 49 Mountain Army Corps occupied Vinnyca, led by Major-General Ludwig von Kubler. The German command believed that now was the time to di sperse the Red Army. Kubler ordered Pilfousek on 19 July to move the Mobile Brigade to Vinnyca, which was reached on 2 1 July. Pilfousek was then ordered to take Lypovec, a small town about 50 km East of Vinnyca on the main road to Bila Cerkva and Kiev . The attack start22 23 Micianik, I. , pp. Micianik, I. pp. 62-83. �SLOVAKIA-2017 69 ed on 22 July. Pilfousek had less than 5,000 men, 43 tanks and part th of the 11 Artillery Regiment with 123 cannons. The tanks did not have enough fuel and ammunition and had to halt the attack in the vi llage Scaslyva, west of the town. Pilfousek then made a fatal error when he ordered the infantry to continue the attack. Slovak so ldiers reached the center of the town but they were stopped by a counterattack by a division of the lih Soviet Army, which sent 15,000 men to reconquer the lost positions. The Slovaks were unable to hold the city without tanks but were saved due to the support of the 11 h Artillery Regiment, which held back the attacking Soviets. Only the arri va l of fresh German forces saved the Mobile Brigade from total defeat. A total of 75 Slovak soldiers died, 167 were wounded and 19 were taken prisoner. The Mobile Brigade lost four tanks, one armored car and tens of trucks. The next day, on 23 July, Lypovec was th occupied by the German 295 Infantry Division of Lieutenant24 General Karl Glimbel. The Mobile Group had in fact been defeated and General Ferdinand Catlos ordered most of the armored vehicles to return to Slovakia. Most of the soldiers remained in the Vinnyca region, while only a small Slovak unit of the Mobile Group, supported by the 11 th Artilth lery Regiment, continued the attack with the German 295 Infantry Di vision and on 30 July reached Granovo, West of the Dnepr (Dnipro) River. After that even these soldiers were sent back to Vinnyca. Slovak official propaganda presented the defeat at Lypovec as a "great victory" and also as a "symbol of Slovak-German friendship in arms." In 1942 a granite monument was erected at the battlefield and a military cemetery was located there. The monument stands to this day. About 600 Slovak soldiers, who died in the fighting in the Soviet Union (not only at Lypovec), are buried here. The First and Second Slovak Infantry Divisions, forming the Slovak army group (Armadna skupina - AS) were created partly from reservists who were mobilized at the end of June. The infantry divisions were concentrated in northeast Slovakia, near Medzilaborce, and later moved to the region of Sanok and Chyrov (in Polish: Chyr6w, in Ukrainian Chyriv, 16 km to the east from the UkrainianPolish border), where the command of the AS was temporally situated . The troops moved slowl y because they usually had to walk. They 24 Ibid ., pp. 12 1-37. �70 SLOVAKIA-2017 were used in July mainly to mop up the regions of eastern Galicia (South of the line Rava Ruska - Ternopol) of the dispersed units of the Soviet army as a part of the hinterland forces of the German Army Group South. 25 The Mobile Division After the defeat of the Mobile Brigade at Lypovec General Catlos decided to reorganize the Slovak armed forces. On 25 July 1941 two new divisions were formed : the Mobile Division (in Slovak: rychla divizia - RD), which was in fact a strengthened Mobile Brigade and the Security Division (in Slovak: Zaist'ovacia divizia ZD) which was to serve as a security and guard service on occupied Soviet territories in Ukraine. Their main region of operations was around Zitomir (Zhitomir, ukr. Zytomyr), a town about 130 km west of Kiev. While at the beginning of war the Slovak government wanted to show that Slovakia's participation in comparison to its population was high, now the situation changed. Most of the reservists, mobilized at the end of June and beginning of July to the Army Group (I st and 2 nd Infantry Division), were sent home. In the autumn of 1941 the number of soldiers was reduced to only about one-third of that in July 1941. The RD and the ZD were now formed mainly from professional soldiers and conscripts. The reservists formed about 17% of the total. They were mainly specialists of various types and drivers. On 10 September 8,862 men served in the ZD, 26 while the Mobile Division had 8,451 men on 20 August (including 30 I officers). 27 Despite its name, the Mobile Divison commanded by Colonel Jozef Turanec, was not fully motorized. The motorized section took part in the battle of Kiev at the end of August I 941. After the fall of Kiev (20 September 1941) the Mobile Division moved to the South st and was part of the 1 Tanlc Army Group of Colonel-General Ewald von Kleist, which moved in the direction of the Don River. It fought 25 Ibid, pp. 142-53 . Micianik, I. , p. 245. See also: P. Micianik, Slovenska armada v t'ai eni proti So vietskemu zviizu (1941 -1944). II. Zaist'ovacia divizia a ieleznicni pionieri. [Security Division and Ra ilway Pioneers]. (hereafter cited as Micianik, 11. ) Banska Bystrica : Dal-BB, 2008, p. 37. 27 Micianik, I. , p. 191. 26 �SLOVAKIA-2017 71 successfully in the Donbas Area. At the end of October the Mobile Division reached Rostov-on-the Don and the Azov Sea. At that time the Mobile Division had 287 officers, 386 sergeants and 7,081 men. The Slovak units were situated between Rostov and the mouth of the Don. Slovak soldiers were not prepared for the winter, which started in the middle of November. 28 On 27 November 1941 Colonel Turanec was replaced by Colonel Augustin Malar. After his arrival, he recognized the decline in morale and discipline and fighting ability among his soldiers. Malar wanted to move the division back to Slovakia but the German High Command refused because of the start of a Soviet counter-offensive at the end of November. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the Commander of Army Group South, decided to retreat. On 28 November the Soviet army reconquered Rostov. Hitler recalled Rundstedt and substituted him with Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, but Reichenau did not change the order and continued the retreat behind the River Mius. Here the Slovak RD was ordered to defend positions near the town of Golodajevka on the bank of the River Mius. The Soviet counteroffensive was then successfully stopped. As a result, Colonel Malar was promoted to the rank of General and later awarded the German Iron Cross. By the end of 1941 the RD had suffered 84 deaths, 3 78 wounded or frozen, 26 missing and 11 captured. 29 Between January and the beginning of March 1942 the Red Army launched its winter offensive at the Mius River.30 At the beginning of March the snow started to melt and the Mius overflowed. The flood stopped the Soviet offensive and within the next six weeks the front where the RD was stationed was relatively quiet but still between 1 January and the end of April the RD lost 143 men ( 124 killed, 12 missing and 7 captured). 31 On 25 April 1942 Jozef Turanec, promoted to the rank of General on 1 January, again took command of the RD. The Mobile division took part first in the battle of Charkov (Charkiv, Kharkiv) in the 28 P. Micianik, Slovenskci armada v t'aieni pro ti Sovietskemu zvdzu (1941-1944). !If. Rychla divizia [The Slovak Army in the Attack upon the Soviet Union ( 1941-1944). Ill. The Mobile Divison] (hereafter cited as Micianik, 111. ), Banska Bystrica: Dal88, 2009, 35 . 29 F. Csefalvay et al. , op. cit. , pp. 80-7 , 30 Micianik, Ill. , pp. 37-46. 31 F. Csefalvay et. al. , op. cit., p. 93. �72 SLOVAKIA-2017 spring and then in the summer offensive in Southern Russia, which started on 28 June 1942. At the end of July the RD participated in the reconquest of Rostov (for this operation Jozef Turanec was awarded the German Iron Cross). 32 Because the Soviet army retreated east of the Don, Hitler mistakenly thought that it was already defeated and divided his forces into two groups: the "A" Army group was to destroy the Soviet forces between the rivers Don and Kuban , and after that to continue the attack along the axis Nal'cik - Vladikavkaz Groznyj - Machackala (at the coast of the Caspian Sea) . After reaching Machackala, the army was to continue along the sea coast to the Oil fields around Baku. The "B" group was to hold the line on the Central Don and simultaneously continue the attack on Stalingrad (now Volgograd), on the Volga River. The Mobile Division was included in the "A" group commanded by Colonel-General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist. While small units of the RD remained in Rostov, the main forces crossed the Don on 31 July and pursued the retreating Red Army across the Kuban Steppe. On 4 August the RD reached the Kuban River at Kropotkin (a town about 230 km east of Rostov) , crossed the river and continued to the rivers Laba and Psis (left inflows of the River Kuban). Here the RD reached the foot of the Caucasus Mountains, with their dense forests and small wild rivers and creeks. The roads were in very bad shape and narrow, and the retreating Red Army blew up the bridges. The tanks could not continue, and most of the armored cars and half-tracks were damaged and unable to continue. The troops of the RD, moving slowly and dispersed, were easy targets for small units of Russian partisans and raids by the Soviet Air Force. On 17 August Turanec received orders to move to the south and secure the territory around the town of Gorjacij Kljuc, with an important railway station on the main railway Rostov - Krasnodar. 33 The RD was again subordinated to the German I 7 th Army, which had orders to attack Novorossijsk and Tuapse on the Black Sea and to continue along the coast to the Turkish border. This attempt failed due to fierce Soviet resistance, and the RD was also stopped before Tuapse. 34 At the end of September Hitler ordered a new attack. The RD was included under the command of 32 33 34 P. Mi cianik, op. cit, pp. 11 8-24. Mi cianik, III. , pp. 146-70 . Ibid ., pp. 21 7-1 8. �SLOVAKIA-2017 73 Colonel Stefan Jurech, who replaced Jozef Turanec on 23 September. The attack of the RD started on 14 October but again failed. From 22 October the RD defended the right bank of the Psekups River. The Slovaks were under constant attack by the Soviet Air Force. ln August and September they lost 83 dead, 470 wounded, 10 missing and 3 captured; in November 19 dead and 97 wounded. 35 On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a two-pronged attack targeting the weaker Romanian and Hungarian forces protecting the German 6th Army's flanks. The Axis forces on the flanks were overrun and the 6th Army was cut off and surrounded in the Stalingrad area. Adolf Hitler ordered the army to stay in Stalingrad and make no attempt to break out; instead, attempts were made to supply the army by air and to break the encirclement from the outside. Heavy fighting continued for another two months. By the beginning of February 1943, the Axis forces in Stalingrad had exhausted their food and ammunition. The remnants of the 6th Army surrendered. th By Christmas of 1942 it became clear that the German 6 Army in Stalingrad was in big trouble and that the Soviets would soon launch an offensive against the German and Slovak armies in the th Caucasus. After completing the encirclement of the 6 Army, the Soviets moved to the west and reached a position 60 km east of Rostov. Colonel-General Erwald von Kleist, who replaced von Reichenau on 21 November, on 3 l December 1942 ordered an immediate retreat from Caucasus to Rostov. On 16 January 1943, the Soviet counteroffensive on the Caucasus front began. Due to this offensive, part of the Mobile Division was encircled in the village of Pencenskaja. Already during the Autumn of 1942, the Slovak soldiers were bombarded by propaganda leaflets. In them, Slovak soldiers who had deserted from the RD and also Slovak Communists wlio fled to the USSR after 1939, urged their fellow-soldiers not to fight the Russians but to surrender and cross-over to the Soviet side. This propaganda now increased. Colonel Stefan Jurech, promoted to the rank of General on I January 1943, in this new situation had no intention to st continue fighting . He secretly sent 1 Lieutenant Gustav Donoval to th the staff of the Soviet 60 Guard Rifle Army to negotiate a surrender. On 22 January 1943, the staff signed with Donoval an agreement 35 F. Csefal vay, op. cit. pp. 95-6. �74 SLOVAKIA-2017 by which the whole Mobile Division was to cross over to the Russians on 24 January. 36 This did not happen, however, because the German army broke the encirclement of Pencenskaja and the Slovaks retreated with the Germans. The Mobile Division then moved to the Kuban region from whence it was transported partly by boats and partly by air-lift to the Crimea and Perekop. During the Caucasus operations the RD lost 108 dead, 207 wounded and 157 were missing 37 and captured . During 1943 the Mobile Division lost its ability to fight due to low morale and defections. Many soldiers in Crimea established friendly relations with the locals, especially with women. Because the RD lost almost all its tanks and armored vehicles in the Caucast sus, it was reorganized as the 1 Infantry Division on 1 August 1943. At night from 29 to 30 October 1943, members of the division were suddenly attacked by the Red Army at Melitopol. The soldiers decided to surrender: 2300 soldiers and 45 officers were taken prisoner. st The German high command lost confidence in the I Division and argued that it should be used only as a labor unit. General Ferdinand Catlos agreed. On 4 May 1944 the 1st Division was transformed into the 1st Technical Division, which was moved to Romania and later to Hungary. The rest of the division was captured in March of 1945 by the Red Army. During 1941-1943, The Mobile Division suffered at least 600 dead, 2,400 wounded, 398 missing, and 88 captured. Only 42 men deserted to the Red Army. From the military point of view, it belonged to the elite of the Slovak army and even the German high command was satisfied with it. The Security Division The Security Division was stationed in the region of Northern Ukraine and Southern White Russia (Belarus) where it was to protect roads and railways, especially the line Pinsk - Gome), against attacks by partisan groups of different political affiliation. At the end of 1941 the only guerrilla fighters were those of Ukrainian nationalists, later known as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the rest 36 37 Micianik, Ill., pp. 305-6 F. Csefal vay, Voj enske dejiny Slovenska, op. cit., p. 13 2. �SLOVAKIA-2017 75 were dispersed units of the Red Army. Ukrainian nationalists fought against the Red Army, because their goal was to establish an independent Ukraine. When the German authorities rejected this idea, the UP A started to fight against the Germans as well. Generally speaking, the Slovak units did not have much contact with the UPA underground units because their main bases were situated in the western part of Ukraine. At the end of 1942 and mainly in 1943 Soviet partisans appeared nd in the area. The attitude of the officers and soldiers of the Slovak 2 Division towards the partisans was rather complicated. Regiments, battalions and even companies were stationed in different places in an area almost as big as Slovakia. Very often the squads of one battalion were situated along the railway lines many miles each from another. It was practically impossible to protect the railways under such circumstances. It is difficult to define the relations between the Slovaks, the local civilian population and the partisans. On the one hand, the units of the 102" Regiment took part in the "pacification" actions against the Red partisans. Special battalions of the regiment destroyed several villages in which the civilians supported the partisans. Some squads even executed the partisans and civilian suspects. "Punishable expeditions" were especially active under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Michal Loksik, the commander of the regit ment. 38 Quite different was the situation in the 101 s Regiment. Here most of the officers looked the other way when their soldiers established friendly relations with both the partisans and the local population. Some commanders of dislocated squads and even battalions concluded an unofficial armistice with the Red partisans. Captain Jan Nalepka, chief of staff of the l O1st Regiment, established contacts with partisan leader General Saburov. When his activity was disclosed, he and two other officers deserted on 15 May 1943 to partisans near the village of Remezy. 39 On the Soviet side Nalepka orgast nized the I Czechoslovak Partisan Unit. This troop, under the command of Jan Nalepka, took part in the attack against the town of Ov- 38 F. Csefalvay et al. , Vojenske osobnosti dejin Slovenska, pp. 153-4. Loksik, who was born in Vienna in 1897, later claimed to be an ethnic German and joined the Waffen-SS . After the war he escaped from Slovakia and his further fate is unknown. 39 Micianik, II ., p. 213. �76 SLOVAKIA-2017 rue. Nalepka died in this raid on 16 November 1943 and was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. 40 Despite the fact that Slovak desertions to the partisans were not very numerous - altogether only about 400 soldiers crossed over 41 they had military consequences: the German command started to consider the ZD unreliable and unable ( or unwilling) to fight against the partisans and decided to remove it from the UkrainianBelorussian borderland to Minsk and its surroundings. The transfer was completed in July of 1943 . On I August 1943 the ZD was transnd formed into the 2 Infantry Division, first under the command of Colonel Pilfousek, and later Colonel Karol Peknik. Soon it became clear that the division could not be effectively used against the partisans because most of the officers (including Colonel Peknik) and soldiers had lost confidence in a German victory. The German command did not agree with its return to Slovakia. Instead, it agreed to nd transform it into a labour unit named the 2 Technical Brigade (later nd the 2 Technical Division). At the end of October it numbered 3,413 and it was sent to Italy under the command of Colonel Jan Krnac. The Attitude of the Soldiers Towards the War Slovaks as a nation had no personal experience with Russia or the Soviet Union. Slovakia never coveted Russian or (later) Soviet territory and, except for the Russian " White" emigres, who came after 1918, there were no Russians in Slovakia. During World War I many Slovaks fought as soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Eastern (Russian) front; the war not popular among Czechs and Slovaks and many deserted to the Russians and later formed the Czechoslovak Legions that fought against Austria-Hungary and for Czechoslovakia's independence. In Slovakia, traditional pro-Russian sympathies dated back to the 19 th century based on their common Slavic origin and language proximity. Unlike in Poland, Hungary or Romania, Russians were always seen as friends, not as enemies in Slovakia. Despite its communist regime, inter-war Czechoslovakia, ° 4 F: Csefalvay, Voj enske osobnosti, p. 176. In 2004 Jan Nalepka was promoted by the Slovak government to the rank of Brigadier-General in Memoriam. 41 Martin Lacko, Dezercie a zajatia prislusn ikov zaist'ovacej divizie v ZSSR v rokoch 1942-1 943. [Desertions and Captures of the Security Division Members in the USSR 1941-1943], Bratislava: UPN , 2007, 63 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 77 like France, in 1935 signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia acted legally until its dissolution in the autumn of 1938 and was quite strong and influential in Slovakia. Many Slovak soldiers before the war were members or sympathizers. They were very often ready to accept the picture of the USSR as heaven on earth. For all these reasons the war was not popular among Slovaks. On the other hand, it should be said that most of the mobilized Slovak soldiers faithfully served in the Slovak army, although without any enthusiasm, until the end of the campaign in 1944. From a strictly professional point of view, Slovak soldiers were neither better nor worse than other soldiers fighting on the eastern front in the years 1941-1944 Justification of the war against the Soviet Union was a big problem for Slovak propaganda. While the "small war" against Hungary in March 1939 was popular, because the army was defending Slovak territory, and the war against Poland could be at least justified as a fi ght for the return of territories annexed by Poland, there was no good reason for the fight against the USSR. Relations between Slovakia and the USSR were initially good, despite the openly anticommunist stand of the Slovak government. Slovakia did not have a common border with the Soviet Union and, therefore, there were no border disputes. The Slovaks saw no reason why they should fight against Ukrainians and Russians, Slavonic people like them , for the interest of Germany. Officially, the war was directed against "JudeoBolshevism," not against Russia or the Russian nation. On 26 June 1941 Minister Ferdinand Catlos openly declared: "This is not a struggle against the Russian nation or against Slavdom ... The struggle is for a new Europe where the Russian nation will find a better future. " Catlos also recalled the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the Czechoslovak Legions during the Civil war in Russia. 42 After crossing the San River, the Slovak soldiers found themselves on former Eastern Polish territory annexed by the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939. Except for the Communists, the locals did not consider the USSR as their motherland and had no intention of defending it. The Ukrainian population hated Soviet rule and often welcomed German troops as liberators. Slovaks were welcomed even 42 Dagmar Cerna-Lantayova, Pohl'ady na vychod [The Outlooks to th e East] , Bratislava: Veda, 2002, I 86. �78 SLOVAKIA-2017 more cordially due to the language proximity; they were partly able communicate with the locals. The Slovak soldiers here also faced Soviet reality: unbelievable poverty, terrible roads, churches turned into warehouses or clubs (or simply destroyed). They also faced the evidence of massive terror when they found hundreds of dead bodies in the yards and cells of prisons in the towns near the border. These were the bodies of political prisoners who were executed by Soviet security forces before the retreat of the Red Army4 3 (the total number of those executed is today estimated to be around 15 ,000). All these facts improved the morale of the Slovak soldiers who could feel as liberators bringing freedom and a better life to the Ukrainian people. This did not last for long, however. Very soon the Slovak soldiers were confronted with the atrocities committed by advancing German forces against the Ukrainian and Russian civilians, and especially by the"Einsatzgruppen," which behind the front lines massively murdered Jews. In central and eastern Ukraine the local population did not welcome the Germans as liberators but fought against them. Morale and fighting ability fell mainly during the retreat in the Caucasus in the severe winter of 1942-1943 . By 1943 it became clear that Germany would not win the war and that Slovaks had no reason to participate in it. Similar developments met the Security Division in Ukraine and Belarus in 1943 . The Slovak government also gradually lost its enthusiasm for the war. By 1943 it became clear that the war would last for a long time and might exhaust Slovak human and economic reserves . Because Hungary also took part in the war, it was hi ghly unlikely that Germany would pressure Budapest to return to Slovakia the annexed territory of southern Slovakia. In this situation, the Minister of Defence decided to limit Slovak participation in the war to a bare minimum . The number of soldiers in both divisions on the Soviet front constantly shrank. From the end of 1941 only those Slovak so ldiers serving their basic military service, plus some specialists, were to be sent to the front and these, after finishing their two years of service, were to be replaced by newcomers. This practice was only partly enforced, 43 Martin Lacko (ed.), Dotyky s bolsevizmom. Dokumenty spravodaj srva slo venskej armcidy 1940-1941 [Contacts with Boshevism. Documents of th e Inteligence Service of the Slovak Army I 940-194 I] , Brati slava : Ustav pamati naroda, 2009, doc. 22 , pp. 124-5 , doc. 28, p. 15 1, doc. 3 1, pp. 155-6, doc. 38, pp. 188-98. �SLOVAKIA-2017 79 however: and some soldiers were not relieved because no newcomers arrived. Political Consequences of the War against the USSR The Soviet Union - unlike Great Britain44 and the USA - fully recognized Slovakia as an independent state on 16 September 1939.45 Slovak participation in the war against the USSR had its political consequences. On 8 July 1941 Soviet Ambassador to London Ivan Majskij announced to Czechoslovak-in-exile President Edvard Benes, that restitution of Czechoslovakia was one of the war aims of the USSR and that the Soviet government decided to recognize the Czechoslovak government de Jure as the legal government of the Czechoslovak Republic.46 On 18 July 1941 the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 16 May 1935 was renewed and the Soviet Union agreed with the formation of a Czechoslovak Anny in the Soviet Union. 47 The nucleus of this army was the Czechoslovak Legion established in Poland in the summer 1939, whose members were captured by the Soviets after the defeat of Poland. There were also escapees from Czechoslovakia who illegally crossed the border to the Soviet Union (such people were usuall y imprisoned by the Soviet infamous secret police NKVD and sent to labour camps for a minimum two years) . Later, some Slovak soldiers who were taken prisoner on the Russian front or who voluntarily crossed over to the Red Army, joined the Czechoslovak Army in the Soviet Union. In 1945 the Soviet army entered Slovakia and in May Czechoslovakia was restored. 44 Great Britain and France recognized Slovakia only ' de facto .' When Slovakia took part in the German invasion of Poland , they recalled their consuls from Bratislava. 45 Dokumenty vnesnej politiki SSSR [Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy), vol. 22, fart. I, Moskva [Moscow], 1992, doc. 585, p. 82. 6 • Dokumenty a materialy k dejinam ceskoslovensko-sovetskych vztahu [Documents and Materials on the History of Czechoslovak-Soviet Relations] , vol. 4, part. I, Praha: Academia, 1980, doc. 76, p. 136. 47 Libuse Otahalova - Milada Cervenkova (eds.) : Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske politiky I 939-1943 [Documents on the History of Czechoslovak Policy) , Vol. I. , Prague: Academia, 1966, Vol. I, doc. 204, pp. 248-9. On the same day ( 18 July 1941 ) the Czechoslovak gove rnm ent-in-exile was also recognized by Great Britain see ibid. , doc. 203 , pp. 247-8. �80 SLOVAKIA-2017 After the war, Slovak participation in the war against the Soviet was considered by Czechoslovak authorities as one of the biggest crimes of the "l'udak"war-time regime . It goes without saying that the communist regime, which lasted in Czechoslovakia for 41 years ( 1948-1989) had no use for it. Slovak emigres, i.e. prominent personalities of the Slovak State who managed to escape to the West, mainly to the USA and Canada, during the first part of the Cold war sometimes tried to present the war as Slovakia's fight against Communism .48 Later, in the l 960's, this explanation was abandoned and Slovak participation was explained rather as a result of German pressure. 49 Today, in the democratic independent Slovakia, mo st of Slovak historians consider participation in the Second World War on the side of Germany as a mistake and not something of which the Slovaks should be proud. so 48 Jozef Pauco, S/owici a komunizmus [Slovaks and Communi sm] , Middletown Pa.: Jednota Press, 1957, pp. I 07- 11 ; Andrej Cincura, " Duch slovenskej armady" [The Spirit of the Slovak Army] , in Mikulas Sprinc (ed.), S/ovenska repub/ika 1939-1949 [The Slovak Republic, 1939-1949], Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, 1949, pp. 130-32. 49 Milan Stanislav Durica, "S lovaki a During World War II" in Joseph M. Kirchbaum , Slovakia in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973, 183. 50 Julius Bartl , "M. S. Durica: Dejiny Slovenska a Slowikov" (A review article), in Historicky casopis, 45, 1997, No I, p. 120; Dagmar Ciem a-Lantayova, Poh/'ady na vychod, op. cit. , pp. 185-7, F. Csefalvay, Vojenske dejiny Slovenska, vo l. V. , op. cit., pp. 258-9; Valerian Bystri cky - Dusan Kovac - Jan Pesek a kol., K/'iicove prob/emy modernych s/ovenskych dejin 1848-1 992 (The Bas ic Problems of Modem Slovak Histo ry 1848- 1992], Bratislava: Veda, 20 12, pp. 225-6 ; Martin Lacko, Slovenska repub/ika 1939-45. Bratislava: UPN -Perfekt, 2008, pp. 93-5 ; I..:ubo mir Liptak, 2217 dni. S/ovensko v case druhej svetovej vojny (2217 Days . Slovaki a during WW 11] , Bratislava: Ka lligram , 20 11 , pp. 318-20; Katarin a Hradska - Ivan Kamenec et. al. , S/ovensko v 20. storoci. I V. S/ovenska Repub/ika 1939- 1945 [Slovakia in the 20 th Centu ry. IV . The Slovak Republic 1939- I 945] , Bratislava: Veda, 20 15, p. 331. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA-2017 61 THE SLOVAK ARMY ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING WORLD WAR II Jan Rychlik Attempts to build separate Slovak military units under the command of Slovak officers within the framework of the Czecho-S lovak Armed Forces already existed in the period of autonomy (6 October 1938 to 14 March 1939). The government in Prague refused such demands but despite that many conscripts and officers of Slovak nationality were allowed to serve in Slovakia, which later enabled the relatively rapid creation of Slovak army units. The ruling Hlinka Slovak People ' s Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS) already in this period had a party militia called the Hlinka Guard (Hlinkova garda - HG). The HG-men (gardisti) belonged to radical separatists within the HSCS. Many of them were admirers of German National Socialism and later became known for their terrorist acts against Czechs, Jews and opponents of the regime. Units of the newly-established Slovak army and volunteers of the HG took part in the defence of the eastern border against the Hungarian invasion of Eastern Slovakia (23- 31 March 1939) known as the "little war" . However, regular army officers considered the HG as dangerous fanatics with poor fighting abilities and opposed their inclusion in the armed forces. Also, President Josef Tiso did not like them because of their radicalism . The newly-established Slovak Army was at the beginning only a smaller version of the Czechoslovak Army of the first Republic ( 19 I 8-1938), which the Germans dissolved. The departure from the Czechoslovak model (new ranks, new emblems and symbols etc.) was a relatively lengthy process. At the beginning the army used the old Czechoslovak uniforms and was equipped mainly with Czechoslovak weapons and machinery, which was later partly replaced by German ones. Like the Czechoslovak Army, it was based on the conscript system and made compulsory for all able-bodied men, usually two years. Reservists cou ld be summoned for military training in 62 SLOVAKIA-2017 case of emergency. 1 However, the Slovak army initially lacked officers. In August of 1938 there were only 435 officers of Slovak nationality in the Czechoslovak army, which represented 3.4% of the officer corps. 2 Some officers of Czech nationality, mainly those with Slovak wives, were allowed to continue their service in the Slovak army, as well as some ethnic Germans . New officers were recruited from the reserve-officers of the former Czechoslovak anny, who were mainly teachers. Some of them were in fact mobilized against their will. A Slovak military academy was opened in Banska Bystrica, and military schools in Bratislava and Nitra. In July of 1939 the Slovak army consisted of 29,683 men ; in February 1940 33, 41 (including 1,0 IO officers); and in June of I 94 I 33,676 men, including 1,347 officers, 42 of them Czechs. 3 Jews, according the government decree of 2 1 June 1939, served in military labour units and the same applied to Roma (Gypsies). Ethnic Germans living in Slovakia, who were Slovak citizens, served first in the Slovak army in special units but later they were allowed to fulfil their military service in the German army and the SS-corps. In 1944 their service in the SS-corps became mandatory. There were people of different political opinions in the officer corps of the Slovak army. Certainly, there were officers devoted to independent Slovakia and even to the close cooperation of Slovakia with Germany, like Colonel (later General) Jozef Turanec, Colonel Rudolf Pilfousek or Lieutenant-Colonel Michal Loksik4 . Generally speaking, however, the Slovak officers were usually not adherents of the HSCS regime and very often were even hostile or at least indifferent to the idea of independent Slovakia. Some Slovak officers even joined the resistance movement. The Czech underground organization National Defence (Obrana naroda - ON), which specialized in sabotage and military intelligence, and was based in the Protectorate, also operated in Slovakia and some officers of the Slovak army were members. The reason for such behaviour was rather simple: 1 Frantisek Csefa lvay et al. , Vojenske dejiny Slovenska [Military Hi story of Slovakia] V. 1939- 1945. Brati slava: Magnet Press, 2008, 16-24. 2 Ibid ., 14. 3 Ibi d. , p. 22-3 . 4 Frantisek Csefalvay et al., Vojenske osobnosri dejin Slovenska 1939-/945 [Military Personalities in the History of Slovakia 1939- 1945). Brati slava: Vojensky histori cky ustav, 2013 , 153-4, 197-8, 250-5 1. SLOVAKIA-2017 63 former Czechoslovak officers, who graduated from the Czechoslovak military schools (most notably at the Military Academy in Hranice), were educated in a pro-Czechoslovak and pro-democratic spirit. Czechoslovak counter-intelligence screened every candidate applying to study at the Military Academy. Members of Communist and various separatist parties or even sympathisers of Communism or separatist movements were not accepted. The same restrictions applied in the school for reserve officers who were recruited from conscripts with higher education. In addition, the professional officers before 1938 were often stationed in the Czech Lands and their wives were often Czechs. 5 They were integrated into the Czech secular milieu and the clerical character of the Slovak Republic was strange to them. Some former Czechoslovak officers of Slovak nationality were originally also Legionaries, that is, volunteers who had fought for an independent Czechoslovakia on the side of the Allies, especially in Russia during World War I. 6 The ex-Legionaries formed the elite of the inter-war Czechoslovak army. It is true that even among the Legionaries it was possible to find supporters of the l'udak regime (like General Ferdinand Catlos), but in principle, former Legionaries were rather hostile to it. Some even deserted from the Slovak army and offered their services to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile represented by Edvard Benes and joined the Czechoslovak Army abroad. This was the case of General Rudolf Viest, the only general of Slovak nationality, who escaped to Paris and became commander of the Czechoslovak Army in France. This army fought the advancing Germans during the spring campaign on the western front in May and June of 1940 and after the defeat of France was evacuated to Great Britain. From 14 March 1939 Slovakia was an independent state with its own army and foreign representation . Slovak sovereignty was, how5 Pavel Micianik, Slovenskci armada v t'ai eni proti Sovietskemu zviizu ( /941-1944) . 1. V opercicii Barbarossa. [The Slovak Army in the Campaign aga inst the Soviet Uni on. I 941-1944. Part I. In Operation Barbarossa) (hereafter cited as Micianik, I.), Banska Bystrica: Dali-BB, 2007, 30-31. 6 The Czechoslovak Legions were formed during WW I from prisoners of war of the Austro-Hunga ri an army of Czech and S lovak nationality and also the Czech and Slovak vo lunteers li ving in Entente states (mainly Russia , France) or neutral states (mainl y the USA up to 191 7). The Legions were formed in Russia, Italy and France. They fought against Germany and A ustri a-Hunga ry. The Legions in Russia also later fought aga inst the Red Army in th e Ru ssian C ivi l war. 64 SLOVAKIA-2017 ever, severely limited by special relations with Germany. According the "Treaty of Protection" (in German: Schutzvertrag), signed preliminarily in Vienna on 18 March and definitively in Berlin on 23 March 1939, Germany obtained the right to build freely , and according to her own needs, military bases in the so-called "Zone of Protection" (Schutzzone) which was situated in Western Slovakia between the White Carpathians and the border of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia was also obliged to conduct her foreign and 7 defence policies according the interests of Germany. A secret protocol to the Schutzvertrag subordinated the Slovak economy to German needs. 8 The Treaty of Protection in fact meant that Slovakia could be forced to participate in war alongside Germany, if the German government so desired. On 2 1 August the German Auswdrtigesamt (Foreign Office) prepared a Note verbale informing the Slovak Government that German armed forces would enter Slovakia to protect her from the danger of a Polish attack.9 The content of the note (approved by Adolf Hitler) was first unofficially presented to the Slovak government by German Minister to Bratislava Hans Bernard on 24 August 1939 . 10 The Slovak government was also asked to take part in the military operations against Poland (the government was assured that the Slovak army would not be used outside of Slovak territory, 11 but this promise was broken). In exchange, Germany promised to guarantee the Slovak-Hungarian border. If Poland was defeated, Slovakia would regain the territories lost in the fall of 1938, and eventually those lost to Poland in 1920. 12 After some hesitation the Slovak government accepted the German demands. After that the German request was presented again officially on 27 August 13 and the Slovak government consented the next day. Mobilization started already on 26 August. Gradually 117,000 reservists were 7 Eduard Ni zi'i ansky et al. , Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1 94 1 v dokumentech/Slovakisch-deutsche Beziehungen in Dokumenten 1938-/ 94 1 [Slovak-German Relations 193 8-1941 in Documents] I. (hierafter cited as SDBD I.] , Presov: Universum , 2009, doc. 96, pp. 305-06. 8 Ibid ., 307-08. 9 SBDB I. , doc. 202, pp. 576-7 . 10 Ibid, doc . 209, pp. 589-90. 11 Ibid., doc. 205 , p. 583. 12 Ibid., doc. 210, pp. 590-1 . 13 Ibid., doc. 216, pp. 604-5 , p. 610. SLOVAKIA-2017 65 called up, of whom about 51,000 were assigned to the field army "Bernolak," under the command of General Ferdinand Catlos. While the main military operations were carried out by the Wehrmacht, which launched its attack on Poland also from Slovak soil, three Slovak divisions between 3- 5 September crossed the border and occupied a small piece of territory on the Polish side of the Tatra Mountains. On 17 September Poland was attacked from the east by the Red army, and was defeated and the Slovak army returned to Slovakia. It should be noted that Slovakia never formally declared war on Poland. The Slovak government presented the war against Poland as a struggle for the liberation of the territories which were annexed by Poland in 1920, 1924 and in 1938 (Upper Orava, Upper Spis and part of Javorina in the High Tatra Mountains). Germany indeed returned 14 these territories to Slovakia on 21 November 1939. The reclaimed territories were partly inhabited by ethnic Slovaks and so the war had some justification. Pro-German elements in HSCS, and especially the HG, welcomed the defeat of Poland . Generally speaking, however, the war was not very popular among Slovaks because many of them considered the Poles Slavs, like the Slovaks, and in addition to speaking a similar language, their kinsmen and brothers. The war was extremely unpopular among Slovak Lutherans in the western part of the country. After the defeat of Poland, Germany no longer required Slovak participation in German operations and the Slovak army did not take part in the war in the West. In June of 1940 France was defeated. Berlin, having now "free hands," decided to purge the Slovak government of "unreliable elements" and to strengthen the influence of the Germanophiles. On July 27, Hitler summoned President Tiso to Salzburg and forced him to fire Minister of Foreign Affairs Ferdinand Durcansky, who in the Spring had tried to negotiate with the British behind Germany's back. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs became the Germanophile Vojtech Tuka, who since 26 October 1939 had already been the Prime Minister. Another Germanphile, Alexander Mach, was appointed Minister of the Interior. The new government was definitivel y and exclusively oriented towards Germany. On 24 November 1940 Slovakia, together with Hungary and Romania, 1 ~ SDBD, I., doc. 25 1, pp. 683 -4. 66 SLOVAKIA-2017 joined the Tripartite Pact (Berlin-Rome-Tokyo). 15 In April of 1941 Slovakia did not participate in the campaign against Yugoslavia and Greece. On the other hand, when the war stared on 6 April, Bratislava severed diplomatic relations with Belgrade and on 10 April expressed a willingness to recognize the Independent State of Croatia. On 21 June 1941 the Chief of the German General Staff, General Franz Halder, visited Bratislava incognito. He informed the head of the German military mission, General Paul von Otto, that Hitler expected the participation of the Slovak army in the war against the Soviet Union. 16. The war started the next day. The German Minister to Bratislava, Hans Eluard Ludin, visited Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vojtech Tuka and informed him about the German request for Slovak participation. Tuka agreed and offered (through Slovak Minister to Berlin Matus Cernak) military assistance to the German Foreign Office. 17 On the same afternoon diplomatic relations between the USSR and Slovakia were broken off 8 and Defence Minister Ferdinand Catlos summoned the reservists for "extraordinary military training. " Only on 24 June did the government approve Slovak participation in the war, which was officially announced on the radio. The Slovak Diet, which according the Constitution was the only body that could declare war, was not informed of the government's declaration . So, from the forma l point of view, the whole action was unconstitutional. It is worth mentioning that on 13 December 1941 , the Slovak government also formally declared war on Great Britain and the United States. 19 Again, the declaration of war was not presented to the Diet. Because the USA and Great Britain did not recognize Slovakia as an independent state, they ignored the declaration. No direct fighting took place between the Slovak army and the western allies, but both countries treated Slovakia as 15 SDBD, I. , doc. 359, pp. 270-2. SDBD, I. doc. 400, p. 1092. 17 Eduard Nizi\ansky et al. , Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 194 1-1945 v dokumentech/Slovakisch-deutsche Beziehungen in Dokumenten 1941-1945 [Slovak-German Relati ons 1941 - 1945 in documents] II. (hierafter cited as SDBD 11.), Presov: Universum , 20 11 , doc.1,p.95 . 18 Ibid, doc. 3, p. 98 . 19 SDBS II. , doc. 34, p. 184. The declaration was announ ced in th e daily Slovenskci politika on 13 December 1941. 16 SLOVAKIA-2017 67 enemy territory. Slovakia, including Bratislava, was repeatedly bombed in 1944. Accord ing to the unpublished memoirs of Ferdinand Catlos, at first onl y ministers Tuka and Mach advocated immediate participation in the war, whi le other ministers and President Tiso had some doubts . But after some hesitation all agreed. 20 Despite the fact that it was Gennany who reque sted military ass istance from Slovakia, it should be noted that the Slovak government had no objections. The government saw participation in the war against the Soviet Union as a good opportunity to show to Berlin that Slovakia was a better frie nd than Hungary, which also took part in the military campaign. Tuka and Tiso wanted to contribute more and faster. They believed that it in future it might be possible, with German help, to rev ise the Vienna Arbitration Award of 2 November 193 8, which deprived Slovakia of part of her southern territory in favour of Hungary. The openl y anti-communist policy and rhetoric of the l'udak regime also played a role. 2 1 Mobilization of the reservists lasted until 5 July. A total of 68,0 18 reservists were ca ll ed to arms, of whom 56,8 58 were registered . The total number of Slovak soldiers reached 90,533 . General Ferd inand Catlos formed in Eastern Slovakia an Anny Group (in Slovak : armadna skupina - AS) which consisted of two divisions nd (the I st Division commanded by Colone l Jozef Turanec and the 2 Divi sion com manded by Co lonel Augustin Malar). From a part of the 2nd Division and sma ll er units of specialized weapons (two artillery regiments, tank units, automob ile unit etc.), Catlos formed the so-called Mobile Group (in Slovak: rychla skupina , i.e. , the fast or rapid group) under the command of Colonel Rudolf Pilfousek, an officer who claimed to be an ethnic German, but according hi s name was probably partly Czech. The Mobile Group was the only almost full y motorized Slovak military unit and it was expected to move quickly with the advancing German army. The Slovak forces were first situated in northeast Slovakia, near the border of occupied Poland (the Genera l Governorate). Slovakia did not border on the Sovi20 Archiv literatt'.try a um eni a Slovenskej narodnej kn iznice (ALU SNK) [Archives of the Li terature and Arts of the Slovak National Library] in Martin, mem oirs of Ferdinand Catlos, sig. 129 E2, pp. 65 -66. 21 I.:ubomir Liptak, Slovensko v 20. storoci [Slovakia in the 20th Century]. 2nd ed., Bratislava: Kalli gram, 1998, 189. 68 SLOVAKIA-2017 et Union but Soviet territory was very close to the place of assembly. After the beginning of the war, the Slovak forces crossed the border and assembled in the General Govemorate near Brzoz6w, a village west of the River San, from 28 September 1939 the border between Germany and Soviet Union. The Slovak division s and the Mobile Group were included in the forces of the German Army Group South (commander: Field Marchal Gerd von Rundstedt). Within this Army group the Mobile Group was first subordinated to the command of the I ih German army (Commander: General Carl Heinrich von Stiilpnagel), which was part of the Army Group South. One of the goals of the I ih Army was to cross the San River and to break through the so-called Molotov defence line, 22 i.e. the chain of light bunkers built on the new Soviet western border (established after the defeat of Poland). The Mobile Group crossed the San on 25 June and continued to attack Sambor. On I July the Soviet army started to retreat to the so-called Stalin line, the chain of fortre sses built on the old (pre-17 September 1939) Soviet-Polish border. This allowed the advancing German I ih Army to continue to attack the region of Lvov (in Polish Lw6w, in Ukrainian Lviv) and the mobile group was ordered to mop up the territory South of Lvov. On 2 July, without firing a shot, the mobile group captured Stryj (a town about 60 km south ofLvov), which the Red Arm y decided not to defend. 23 On 7 July the Mobile Group, which was temporally subordinated again directly to General Catlos, was reorganized into the Mobile Brigade (195 officers, 52 sergeants and 4,655 soldiers, a company of 43 tanks - two squads , one battalion of armoured vehicles and th trucks, the I I Artillery Regiment, one squad of machine-guns, a scouting squad) and the next day started to move Eastward alongside the main axis Sambor - Temopol - Vinnyca. On 19 July the I 7th the th German Army broke the Stalin line and the 49 Mountain Army Corps occupied Vinnyca, led by Major-General Ludwig von Kubler. The German command believed that now was the time to di sperse the Red Army. Kubler ordered Pilfousek on 19 July to move the Mobile Brigade to Vinnyca, which was reached on 2 1 July. Pilfousek was then ordered to take Lypovec, a small town about 50 km East of Vinnyca on the main road to Bila Cerkva and Kiev . The attack start22 23 Micianik, I. , pp. Micianik, I. pp. 62-83. SLOVAKIA-2017 69 ed on 22 July. Pilfousek had less than 5,000 men, 43 tanks and part th of the 11 Artillery Regiment with 123 cannons. The tanks did not have enough fuel and ammunition and had to halt the attack in the vi llage Scaslyva, west of the town. Pilfousek then made a fatal error when he ordered the infantry to continue the attack. Slovak so ldiers reached the center of the town but they were stopped by a counterattack by a division of the lih Soviet Army, which sent 15,000 men to reconquer the lost positions. The Slovaks were unable to hold the city without tanks but were saved due to the support of the 11 h Artillery Regiment, which held back the attacking Soviets. Only the arri va l of fresh German forces saved the Mobile Brigade from total defeat. A total of 75 Slovak soldiers died, 167 were wounded and 19 were taken prisoner. The Mobile Brigade lost four tanks, one armored car and tens of trucks. The next day, on 23 July, Lypovec was th occupied by the German 295 Infantry Division of Lieutenant24 General Karl Glimbel. The Mobile Group had in fact been defeated and General Ferdinand Catlos ordered most of the armored vehicles to return to Slovakia. Most of the soldiers remained in the Vinnyca region, while only a small Slovak unit of the Mobile Group, supported by the 11 th Artilth lery Regiment, continued the attack with the German 295 Infantry Di vision and on 30 July reached Granovo, West of the Dnepr (Dnipro) River. After that even these soldiers were sent back to Vinnyca. Slovak official propaganda presented the defeat at Lypovec as a "great victory" and also as a "symbol of Slovak-German friendship in arms." In 1942 a granite monument was erected at the battlefield and a military cemetery was located there. The monument stands to this day. About 600 Slovak soldiers, who died in the fighting in the Soviet Union (not only at Lypovec), are buried here. The First and Second Slovak Infantry Divisions, forming the Slovak army group (Armadna skupina - AS) were created partly from reservists who were mobilized at the end of June. The infantry divisions were concentrated in northeast Slovakia, near Medzilaborce, and later moved to the region of Sanok and Chyrov (in Polish: Chyr6w, in Ukrainian Chyriv, 16 km to the east from the UkrainianPolish border), where the command of the AS was temporally situated . The troops moved slowl y because they usually had to walk. They 24 Ibid ., pp. 12 1-37. 70 SLOVAKIA-2017 were used in July mainly to mop up the regions of eastern Galicia (South of the line Rava Ruska - Ternopol) of the dispersed units of the Soviet army as a part of the hinterland forces of the German Army Group South. 25 The Mobile Division After the defeat of the Mobile Brigade at Lypovec General Catlos decided to reorganize the Slovak armed forces. On 25 July 1941 two new divisions were formed : the Mobile Division (in Slovak: rychla divizia - RD), which was in fact a strengthened Mobile Brigade and the Security Division (in Slovak: Zaist'ovacia divizia ZD) which was to serve as a security and guard service on occupied Soviet territories in Ukraine. Their main region of operations was around Zitomir (Zhitomir, ukr. Zytomyr), a town about 130 km west of Kiev. While at the beginning of war the Slovak government wanted to show that Slovakia's participation in comparison to its population was high, now the situation changed. Most of the reservists, mobilized at the end of June and beginning of July to the Army Group (I st and 2 nd Infantry Division), were sent home. In the autumn of 1941 the number of soldiers was reduced to only about one-third of that in July 1941. The RD and the ZD were now formed mainly from professional soldiers and conscripts. The reservists formed about 17% of the total. They were mainly specialists of various types and drivers. On 10 September 8,862 men served in the ZD, 26 while the Mobile Division had 8,451 men on 20 August (including 30 I officers). 27 Despite its name, the Mobile Divison commanded by Colonel Jozef Turanec, was not fully motorized. The motorized section took part in the battle of Kiev at the end of August I 941. After the fall of Kiev (20 September 1941) the Mobile Division moved to the South st and was part of the 1 Tanlc Army Group of Colonel-General Ewald von Kleist, which moved in the direction of the Don River. It fought 25 Ibid, pp. 142-53 . Micianik, I. , p. 245. See also: P. Micianik, Slovenska armada v t'ai eni proti So vietskemu zviizu (1941 -1944). II. Zaist'ovacia divizia a ieleznicni pionieri. [Security Division and Ra ilway Pioneers]. (hereafter cited as Micianik, 11. ) Banska Bystrica : Dal-BB, 2008, p. 37. 27 Micianik, I. , p. 191. 26 SLOVAKIA-2017 71 successfully in the Donbas Area. At the end of October the Mobile Division reached Rostov-on-the Don and the Azov Sea. At that time the Mobile Division had 287 officers, 386 sergeants and 7,081 men. The Slovak units were situated between Rostov and the mouth of the Don. Slovak soldiers were not prepared for the winter, which started in the middle of November. 28 On 27 November 1941 Colonel Turanec was replaced by Colonel Augustin Malar. After his arrival, he recognized the decline in morale and discipline and fighting ability among his soldiers. Malar wanted to move the division back to Slovakia but the German High Command refused because of the start of a Soviet counter-offensive at the end of November. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the Commander of Army Group South, decided to retreat. On 28 November the Soviet army reconquered Rostov. Hitler recalled Rundstedt and substituted him with Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, but Reichenau did not change the order and continued the retreat behind the River Mius. Here the Slovak RD was ordered to defend positions near the town of Golodajevka on the bank of the River Mius. The Soviet counteroffensive was then successfully stopped. As a result, Colonel Malar was promoted to the rank of General and later awarded the German Iron Cross. By the end of 1941 the RD had suffered 84 deaths, 3 78 wounded or frozen, 26 missing and 11 captured. 29 Between January and the beginning of March 1942 the Red Army launched its winter offensive at the Mius River.30 At the beginning of March the snow started to melt and the Mius overflowed. The flood stopped the Soviet offensive and within the next six weeks the front where the RD was stationed was relatively quiet but still between 1 January and the end of April the RD lost 143 men ( 124 killed, 12 missing and 7 captured). 31 On 25 April 1942 Jozef Turanec, promoted to the rank of General on 1 January, again took command of the RD. The Mobile division took part first in the battle of Charkov (Charkiv, Kharkiv) in the 28 P. Micianik, Slovenskci armada v t'aieni pro ti Sovietskemu zvdzu (1941-1944). !If. Rychla divizia [The Slovak Army in the Attack upon the Soviet Union ( 1941-1944). Ill. The Mobile Divison] (hereafter cited as Micianik, 111. ), Banska Bystrica: Dal88, 2009, 35 . 29 F. Csefalvay et al. , op. cit. , pp. 80-7 , 30 Micianik, Ill. , pp. 37-46. 31 F. Csefalvay et. al. , op. cit., p. 93. 72 SLOVAKIA-2017 spring and then in the summer offensive in Southern Russia, which started on 28 June 1942. At the end of July the RD participated in the reconquest of Rostov (for this operation Jozef Turanec was awarded the German Iron Cross). 32 Because the Soviet army retreated east of the Don, Hitler mistakenly thought that it was already defeated and divided his forces into two groups: the "A" Army group was to destroy the Soviet forces between the rivers Don and Kuban , and after that to continue the attack along the axis Nal'cik - Vladikavkaz Groznyj - Machackala (at the coast of the Caspian Sea) . After reaching Machackala, the army was to continue along the sea coast to the Oil fields around Baku. The "B" group was to hold the line on the Central Don and simultaneously continue the attack on Stalingrad (now Volgograd), on the Volga River. The Mobile Division was included in the "A" group commanded by Colonel-General Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist. While small units of the RD remained in Rostov, the main forces crossed the Don on 31 July and pursued the retreating Red Army across the Kuban Steppe. On 4 August the RD reached the Kuban River at Kropotkin (a town about 230 km east of Rostov) , crossed the river and continued to the rivers Laba and Psis (left inflows of the River Kuban). Here the RD reached the foot of the Caucasus Mountains, with their dense forests and small wild rivers and creeks. The roads were in very bad shape and narrow, and the retreating Red Army blew up the bridges. The tanks could not continue, and most of the armored cars and half-tracks were damaged and unable to continue. The troops of the RD, moving slowly and dispersed, were easy targets for small units of Russian partisans and raids by the Soviet Air Force. On 17 August Turanec received orders to move to the south and secure the territory around the town of Gorjacij Kljuc, with an important railway station on the main railway Rostov - Krasnodar. 33 The RD was again subordinated to the German I 7 th Army, which had orders to attack Novorossijsk and Tuapse on the Black Sea and to continue along the coast to the Turkish border. This attempt failed due to fierce Soviet resistance, and the RD was also stopped before Tuapse. 34 At the end of September Hitler ordered a new attack. The RD was included under the command of 32 33 34 P. Mi cianik, op. cit, pp. 11 8-24. Mi cianik, III. , pp. 146-70 . Ibid ., pp. 21 7-1 8. SLOVAKIA-2017 73 Colonel Stefan Jurech, who replaced Jozef Turanec on 23 September. The attack of the RD started on 14 October but again failed. From 22 October the RD defended the right bank of the Psekups River. The Slovaks were under constant attack by the Soviet Air Force. ln August and September they lost 83 dead, 470 wounded, 10 missing and 3 captured; in November 19 dead and 97 wounded. 35 On 19 November 1942, the Red Army launched Operation Uranus, a two-pronged attack targeting the weaker Romanian and Hungarian forces protecting the German 6th Army's flanks. The Axis forces on the flanks were overrun and the 6th Army was cut off and surrounded in the Stalingrad area. Adolf Hitler ordered the army to stay in Stalingrad and make no attempt to break out; instead, attempts were made to supply the army by air and to break the encirclement from the outside. Heavy fighting continued for another two months. By the beginning of February 1943, the Axis forces in Stalingrad had exhausted their food and ammunition. The remnants of the 6th Army surrendered. th By Christmas of 1942 it became clear that the German 6 Army in Stalingrad was in big trouble and that the Soviets would soon launch an offensive against the German and Slovak armies in the th Caucasus. After completing the encirclement of the 6 Army, the Soviets moved to the west and reached a position 60 km east of Rostov. Colonel-General Erwald von Kleist, who replaced von Reichenau on 21 November, on 3 l December 1942 ordered an immediate retreat from Caucasus to Rostov. On 16 January 1943, the Soviet counteroffensive on the Caucasus front began. Due to this offensive, part of the Mobile Division was encircled in the village of Pencenskaja. Already during the Autumn of 1942, the Slovak soldiers were bombarded by propaganda leaflets. In them, Slovak soldiers who had deserted from the RD and also Slovak Communists wlio fled to the USSR after 1939, urged their fellow-soldiers not to fight the Russians but to surrender and cross-over to the Soviet side. This propaganda now increased. Colonel Stefan Jurech, promoted to the rank of General on I January 1943, in this new situation had no intention to st continue fighting . He secretly sent 1 Lieutenant Gustav Donoval to th the staff of the Soviet 60 Guard Rifle Army to negotiate a surrender. On 22 January 1943, the staff signed with Donoval an agreement 35 F. Csefal vay, op. cit. pp. 95-6. 74 SLOVAKIA-2017 by which the whole Mobile Division was to cross over to the Russians on 24 January. 36 This did not happen, however, because the German army broke the encirclement of Pencenskaja and the Slovaks retreated with the Germans. The Mobile Division then moved to the Kuban region from whence it was transported partly by boats and partly by air-lift to the Crimea and Perekop. During the Caucasus operations the RD lost 108 dead, 207 wounded and 157 were missing 37 and captured . During 1943 the Mobile Division lost its ability to fight due to low morale and defections. Many soldiers in Crimea established friendly relations with the locals, especially with women. Because the RD lost almost all its tanks and armored vehicles in the Caucast sus, it was reorganized as the 1 Infantry Division on 1 August 1943. At night from 29 to 30 October 1943, members of the division were suddenly attacked by the Red Army at Melitopol. The soldiers decided to surrender: 2300 soldiers and 45 officers were taken prisoner. st The German high command lost confidence in the I Division and argued that it should be used only as a labor unit. General Ferdinand Catlos agreed. On 4 May 1944 the 1st Division was transformed into the 1st Technical Division, which was moved to Romania and later to Hungary. The rest of the division was captured in March of 1945 by the Red Army. During 1941-1943, The Mobile Division suffered at least 600 dead, 2,400 wounded, 398 missing, and 88 captured. Only 42 men deserted to the Red Army. From the military point of view, it belonged to the elite of the Slovak army and even the German high command was satisfied with it. The Security Division The Security Division was stationed in the region of Northern Ukraine and Southern White Russia (Belarus) where it was to protect roads and railways, especially the line Pinsk - Gome), against attacks by partisan groups of different political affiliation. At the end of 1941 the only guerrilla fighters were those of Ukrainian nationalists, later known as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the rest 36 37 Micianik, Ill., pp. 305-6 F. Csefal vay, Voj enske dejiny Slovenska, op. cit., p. 13 2. SLOVAKIA-2017 75 were dispersed units of the Red Army. Ukrainian nationalists fought against the Red Army, because their goal was to establish an independent Ukraine. When the German authorities rejected this idea, the UP A started to fight against the Germans as well. Generally speaking, the Slovak units did not have much contact with the UPA underground units because their main bases were situated in the western part of Ukraine. At the end of 1942 and mainly in 1943 Soviet partisans appeared nd in the area. The attitude of the officers and soldiers of the Slovak 2 Division towards the partisans was rather complicated. Regiments, battalions and even companies were stationed in different places in an area almost as big as Slovakia. Very often the squads of one battalion were situated along the railway lines many miles each from another. It was practically impossible to protect the railways under such circumstances. It is difficult to define the relations between the Slovaks, the local civilian population and the partisans. On the one hand, the units of the 102" Regiment took part in the "pacification" actions against the Red partisans. Special battalions of the regiment destroyed several villages in which the civilians supported the partisans. Some squads even executed the partisans and civilian suspects. "Punishable expeditions" were especially active under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Michal Loksik, the commander of the regit ment. 38 Quite different was the situation in the 101 s Regiment. Here most of the officers looked the other way when their soldiers established friendly relations with both the partisans and the local population. Some commanders of dislocated squads and even battalions concluded an unofficial armistice with the Red partisans. Captain Jan Nalepka, chief of staff of the l O1st Regiment, established contacts with partisan leader General Saburov. When his activity was disclosed, he and two other officers deserted on 15 May 1943 to partisans near the village of Remezy. 39 On the Soviet side Nalepka orgast nized the I Czechoslovak Partisan Unit. This troop, under the command of Jan Nalepka, took part in the attack against the town of Ov- 38 F. Csefalvay et al. , Vojenske osobnosti dejin Slovenska, pp. 153-4. Loksik, who was born in Vienna in 1897, later claimed to be an ethnic German and joined the Waffen-SS . After the war he escaped from Slovakia and his further fate is unknown. 39 Micianik, II ., p. 213. 76 SLOVAKIA-2017 rue. Nalepka died in this raid on 16 November 1943 and was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. 40 Despite the fact that Slovak desertions to the partisans were not very numerous - altogether only about 400 soldiers crossed over 41 they had military consequences: the German command started to consider the ZD unreliable and unable ( or unwilling) to fight against the partisans and decided to remove it from the UkrainianBelorussian borderland to Minsk and its surroundings. The transfer was completed in July of 1943 . On I August 1943 the ZD was transnd formed into the 2 Infantry Division, first under the command of Colonel Pilfousek, and later Colonel Karol Peknik. Soon it became clear that the division could not be effectively used against the partisans because most of the officers (including Colonel Peknik) and soldiers had lost confidence in a German victory. The German command did not agree with its return to Slovakia. Instead, it agreed to nd transform it into a labour unit named the 2 Technical Brigade (later nd the 2 Technical Division). At the end of October it numbered 3,413 and it was sent to Italy under the command of Colonel Jan Krnac. The Attitude of the Soldiers Towards the War Slovaks as a nation had no personal experience with Russia or the Soviet Union. Slovakia never coveted Russian or (later) Soviet territory and, except for the Russian " White" emigres, who came after 1918, there were no Russians in Slovakia. During World War I many Slovaks fought as soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Eastern (Russian) front; the war not popular among Czechs and Slovaks and many deserted to the Russians and later formed the Czechoslovak Legions that fought against Austria-Hungary and for Czechoslovakia's independence. In Slovakia, traditional pro-Russian sympathies dated back to the 19 th century based on their common Slavic origin and language proximity. Unlike in Poland, Hungary or Romania, Russians were always seen as friends, not as enemies in Slovakia. Despite its communist regime, inter-war Czechoslovakia, ° 4 F: Csefalvay, Voj enske osobnosti, p. 176. In 2004 Jan Nalepka was promoted by the Slovak government to the rank of Brigadier-General in Memoriam. 41 Martin Lacko, Dezercie a zajatia prislusn ikov zaist'ovacej divizie v ZSSR v rokoch 1942-1 943. [Desertions and Captures of the Security Division Members in the USSR 1941-1943], Bratislava: UPN , 2007, 63 . SLOVAKIA-2017 77 like France, in 1935 signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia acted legally until its dissolution in the autumn of 1938 and was quite strong and influential in Slovakia. Many Slovak soldiers before the war were members or sympathizers. They were very often ready to accept the picture of the USSR as heaven on earth. For all these reasons the war was not popular among Slovaks. On the other hand, it should be said that most of the mobilized Slovak soldiers faithfully served in the Slovak army, although without any enthusiasm, until the end of the campaign in 1944. From a strictly professional point of view, Slovak soldiers were neither better nor worse than other soldiers fighting on the eastern front in the years 1941-1944 Justification of the war against the Soviet Union was a big problem for Slovak propaganda. While the "small war" against Hungary in March 1939 was popular, because the army was defending Slovak territory, and the war against Poland could be at least justified as a fi ght for the return of territories annexed by Poland, there was no good reason for the fight against the USSR. Relations between Slovakia and the USSR were initially good, despite the openly anticommunist stand of the Slovak government. Slovakia did not have a common border with the Soviet Union and, therefore, there were no border disputes. The Slovaks saw no reason why they should fight against Ukrainians and Russians, Slavonic people like them , for the interest of Germany. Officially, the war was directed against "JudeoBolshevism," not against Russia or the Russian nation. On 26 June 1941 Minister Ferdinand Catlos openly declared: "This is not a struggle against the Russian nation or against Slavdom ... The struggle is for a new Europe where the Russian nation will find a better future. " Catlos also recalled the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the Czechoslovak Legions during the Civil war in Russia. 42 After crossing the San River, the Slovak soldiers found themselves on former Eastern Polish territory annexed by the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1939. Except for the Communists, the locals did not consider the USSR as their motherland and had no intention of defending it. The Ukrainian population hated Soviet rule and often welcomed German troops as liberators. Slovaks were welcomed even 42 Dagmar Cerna-Lantayova, Pohl'ady na vychod [The Outlooks to th e East] , Bratislava: Veda, 2002, I 86. 78 SLOVAKIA-2017 more cordially due to the language proximity; they were partly able communicate with the locals. The Slovak soldiers here also faced Soviet reality: unbelievable poverty, terrible roads, churches turned into warehouses or clubs (or simply destroyed). They also faced the evidence of massive terror when they found hundreds of dead bodies in the yards and cells of prisons in the towns near the border. These were the bodies of political prisoners who were executed by Soviet security forces before the retreat of the Red Army4 3 (the total number of those executed is today estimated to be around 15 ,000). All these facts improved the morale of the Slovak soldiers who could feel as liberators bringing freedom and a better life to the Ukrainian people. This did not last for long, however. Very soon the Slovak soldiers were confronted with the atrocities committed by advancing German forces against the Ukrainian and Russian civilians, and especially by the"Einsatzgruppen," which behind the front lines massively murdered Jews. In central and eastern Ukraine the local population did not welcome the Germans as liberators but fought against them. Morale and fighting ability fell mainly during the retreat in the Caucasus in the severe winter of 1942-1943 . By 1943 it became clear that Germany would not win the war and that Slovaks had no reason to participate in it. Similar developments met the Security Division in Ukraine and Belarus in 1943 . The Slovak government also gradually lost its enthusiasm for the war. By 1943 it became clear that the war would last for a long time and might exhaust Slovak human and economic reserves . Because Hungary also took part in the war, it was hi ghly unlikely that Germany would pressure Budapest to return to Slovakia the annexed territory of southern Slovakia. In this situation, the Minister of Defence decided to limit Slovak participation in the war to a bare minimum . The number of soldiers in both divisions on the Soviet front constantly shrank. From the end of 1941 only those Slovak so ldiers serving their basic military service, plus some specialists, were to be sent to the front and these, after finishing their two years of service, were to be replaced by newcomers. This practice was only partly enforced, 43 Martin Lacko (ed.), Dotyky s bolsevizmom. Dokumenty spravodaj srva slo venskej armcidy 1940-1941 [Contacts with Boshevism. Documents of th e Inteligence Service of the Slovak Army I 940-194 I] , Brati slava : Ustav pamati naroda, 2009, doc. 22 , pp. 124-5 , doc. 28, p. 15 1, doc. 3 1, pp. 155-6, doc. 38, pp. 188-98. SLOVAKIA-2017 79 however: and some soldiers were not relieved because no newcomers arrived. Political Consequences of the War against the USSR The Soviet Union - unlike Great Britain44 and the USA - fully recognized Slovakia as an independent state on 16 September 1939.45 Slovak participation in the war against the USSR had its political consequences. On 8 July 1941 Soviet Ambassador to London Ivan Majskij announced to Czechoslovak-in-exile President Edvard Benes, that restitution of Czechoslovakia was one of the war aims of the USSR and that the Soviet government decided to recognize the Czechoslovak government de Jure as the legal government of the Czechoslovak Republic.46 On 18 July 1941 the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 16 May 1935 was renewed and the Soviet Union agreed with the formation of a Czechoslovak Anny in the Soviet Union. 47 The nucleus of this army was the Czechoslovak Legion established in Poland in the summer 1939, whose members were captured by the Soviets after the defeat of Poland. There were also escapees from Czechoslovakia who illegally crossed the border to the Soviet Union (such people were usuall y imprisoned by the Soviet infamous secret police NKVD and sent to labour camps for a minimum two years) . Later, some Slovak soldiers who were taken prisoner on the Russian front or who voluntarily crossed over to the Red Army, joined the Czechoslovak Army in the Soviet Union. In 1945 the Soviet army entered Slovakia and in May Czechoslovakia was restored. 44 Great Britain and France recognized Slovakia only ' de facto .' When Slovakia took part in the German invasion of Poland , they recalled their consuls from Bratislava. 45 Dokumenty vnesnej politiki SSSR [Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy), vol. 22, fart. I, Moskva [Moscow], 1992, doc. 585, p. 82. 6 • Dokumenty a materialy k dejinam ceskoslovensko-sovetskych vztahu [Documents and Materials on the History of Czechoslovak-Soviet Relations] , vol. 4, part. I, Praha: Academia, 1980, doc. 76, p. 136. 47 Libuse Otahalova - Milada Cervenkova (eds.) : Dokumenty z historie ceskoslovenske politiky I 939-1943 [Documents on the History of Czechoslovak Policy) , Vol. I. , Prague: Academia, 1966, Vol. I, doc. 204, pp. 248-9. On the same day ( 18 July 1941 ) the Czechoslovak gove rnm ent-in-exile was also recognized by Great Britain see ibid. , doc. 203 , pp. 247-8. 80 SLOVAKIA-2017 After the war, Slovak participation in the war against the Soviet was considered by Czechoslovak authorities as one of the biggest crimes of the "l'udak"war-time regime . It goes without saying that the communist regime, which lasted in Czechoslovakia for 41 years ( 1948-1989) had no use for it. Slovak emigres, i.e. prominent personalities of the Slovak State who managed to escape to the West, mainly to the USA and Canada, during the first part of the Cold war sometimes tried to present the war as Slovakia's fight against Communism .48 Later, in the l 960's, this explanation was abandoned and Slovak participation was explained rather as a result of German pressure. 49 Today, in the democratic independent Slovakia, mo st of Slovak historians consider participation in the Second World War on the side of Germany as a mistake and not something of which the Slovaks should be proud. so 48 Jozef Pauco, S/owici a komunizmus [Slovaks and Communi sm] , Middletown Pa.: Jednota Press, 1957, pp. I 07- 11 ; Andrej Cincura, " Duch slovenskej armady" [The Spirit of the Slovak Army] , in Mikulas Sprinc (ed.), S/ovenska repub/ika 1939-1949 [The Slovak Republic, 1939-1949], Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, 1949, pp. 130-32. 49 Milan Stanislav Durica, "S lovaki a During World War II" in Joseph M. Kirchbaum , Slovakia in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1973, 183. 50 Julius Bartl , "M. S. Durica: Dejiny Slovenska a Slowikov" (A review article), in Historicky casopis, 45, 1997, No I, p. 120; Dagmar Ciem a-Lantayova, Poh/'ady na vychod, op. cit. , pp. 185-7, F. Csefalvay, Vojenske dejiny Slovenska, vo l. V. , op. cit., pp. 258-9; Valerian Bystri cky - Dusan Kovac - Jan Pesek a kol., K/'iicove prob/emy modernych s/ovenskych dejin 1848-1 992 (The Bas ic Problems of Modem Slovak Histo ry 1848- 1992], Bratislava: Veda, 20 12, pp. 225-6 ; Martin Lacko, Slovenska repub/ika 1939-45. Bratislava: UPN -Perfekt, 2008, pp. 93-5 ; I..:ubo mir Liptak, 2217 dni. S/ovensko v case druhej svetovej vojny (2217 Days . Slovaki a during WW 11] , Bratislava: Ka lligram , 20 11 , pp. 318-20; Katarin a Hradska - Ivan Kamenec et. al. , S/ovensko v 20. storoci. I V. S/ovenska Repub/ika 1939- 1945 [Slovakia in the 20 th Centu ry. IV . The Slovak Republic 1939- I 945] , Bratislava: Veda, 20 15, p. 331.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Army on the Eastern Front During World War II Description An account of the resource Jan Rychlík Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017 pp. 61-80 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Rychlík, Jan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d2db4d8655e8abef31a0e9895c34dfeb.pdf 8b471986ab2a4ecc3a4e8f29ecd9f7c3 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA-201 7 81 KICKED OUT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S POSTWAR POLICY TOW ARD ETHNIC MINORITIES AND ITS UNINTENDED OUTCOMES 1 Marty Manor Mullins Postwar Czechoslovakia was not a warm, friend ly place to be if you were a Hungarian or German in late 1945 to 1946. In fact, during his inaugural speech commemorating the reunifycation of the Czechoslovak Republic in April of 1945, President Edvard Benes proclaimed, "Our state will be a state of nations, a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else!" 2 In postwar Slovakia one could walk down the street and be confronted with slogans such as : "Kosice must be cleansed of Magyar lice!"3 or indications (such as the bullet holes riddling a local street sign named after Adolf Hitler) of widespread resentment toward the Nazi regime with which local German and Hungarian minorities were associated. Furthermore, caustic warnings appeared in the local newspaper such as the following, printed in the Demokrat daily of June 17, 1945: " ... whether the Hungarians of [the city ofJ Kosice like it or not, the Slovaks are now the masters .. . the mouths of those who do not want to speak Slovak must be shut." 4 Although many are familiar with the fate of Czechoslovakia's three million Sudeten Germans, what exactly was the situation that the country's Hungarian and Carpathian German minorities found themselves in as of late 1945? What was the cause of such vitriolic language used against them? Furthermore, how was this kind of abuse justified by their accusers? This article explores the back1 This article is based on a paper presented at the 2016 meeting of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies on a panel entitled " Kicked Out of Czechoslovakia: The Fate of Postwar German and Hungarian Refugees, Then and Now." 2 Quoted in "t\no, zaci name ozaj novy zivot," Demokrat, Apr. 4, 1945 . 3 Szabo Lajos, Utols6 szalmaszal (Budapest: Magyar Egy haztorteneti Enciklopedia Munkakiiziisseg, 2000). 4 Demokrat, June 7, 1945 ; Stefan Sutaj, "Ethnic Deve lopment in Kosice after 1945," Studia Historyczne 4 (20 13), 4 72. �82 SLOVAKIA-2017 ground and implementation of postwar Czechoslovak policy towards its Hungarian and German populations while also elucidating several unintended yet significant outcomes of this policy 's execution, particularly within southern and central Slovakia. Pho to 1: Bullet holes riddle this street sign, formerly posted in Slovakia's Spis region and now on display in a Kezmarok museum. Back round Recall that a united Czechoslovakia did not exist during the Second World War. At the Munich Conference in 1938, Hitler capita lized on complaints from Czechoslovakia's Sudeten German minority to convince the Allies to cede the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As of March 1939, the Czech Lands of Bohemia and Moravia became a Protectorate governed and occupied by Nazi Germany, while wartime Slovakia operated as a semi-independent authoritarian state led by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. However, over I 0,000 square kilometers (c. 3,800 square miles) including cities such as Kosice in southern Slovakia were not even under Slovak control during the war. Rather, southern Slovakia had been ceded to Hungary as part of the First Vienna Award of November 1938. Thus, the Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist for the duration of the war and southern Slovak territory came under Hungarian governance for six years. At the end of the war, when the Red Army marched across Ukraine and fought its way into eastern Slovakia, Kosice was the �SLOVAKIA-2017 83 first major city of the former Czechoslovak Republic to be liberated. Freed on January 19, 1945 , Kosice served as the temporary capital of reunited Czechoslovakia and the seat of President Benes. His time in the city is most associated with the "Kosice Program" which, among other objectives, outlined postwar policy toward the Hungarian and German minorities, who were declared collectively guilty for the breakup of the First Czechoslovak Republic. In the Kosice Program the postwar government reversed the generous policies of the interwar republic regarding minority populations. During the interwar period, Czechoslovakia's ethnic and religious groups were granted constitutional rights unparalleled at that time in the region, including the right to speak and educate children in their native languages as well as to form cultural associations and political parties. More importantly, they were granted equal status with Czechs and Slovaks before the law and protected from forced assimilation. 5 However, after the Second World War, these rights were rescinded. Germans and Hungarians were stripped of Czechoslovak citizenship, their property was nationalized and/or confiscated, minority schools were closed and they were ineligible to receive entitlements. 6 Of course, Czechoslovakia was not alone in its postwar forced relocation of Germans and Hungarians. In the years immediately following World War II, Europe witnessed the largest forced migration the world had ever seen .7 Resentment Czechoslovakia's German and Hungarian populations (some of whom had lived on this land for centuries) were pronounced collectively guilty by association with Nazi Germany and what became Nazi-controlled Hungary . At this time many Czechs and Slovaks sought revenge for wartime injustices and even atrocities still fresh in their memories . For instance, Slovaks in the eastern Slovak village of Nemecka Poruba (10 km north of Sobrance) endured what the Demokrat newspaper called the "eastern Slovak Lidice," referring to 5 Martin Pekar, et al., Ethnic Minorities in Slovakia in the Years 1918-1945: A Survey (Prefov : Un iversum-EU , 2011 ), 50-51 . 6 Kosicky Vladni Program Chs. VIII, X, XV . 7 For details see Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948 (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. �84 SLOVAKIA-2017 the German massacre of Czech men in the Bohemian town of Lid ice in retaliation for the assassination of Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich). 8 Towards the end of the war, the over 700 inhabitants of Nemecka Poruba had assisted partisan fighters living in the nearby forest by providing food and lodging during bad weather. Although the Germans stepped up patrols in the area, no one gave away the location of the partisans. After a surprise German raid on the village, resulting in the death of four German soldiers, most of the inhabitants fled, fearing Nazi retribution. It came swiftly when they burned the village to the ground the next day (November 2-3, 1944) and shot the eight men who remained behind. Villagers faced not only the loss of the victims but also their homes as they spent the 9 oncoming winter in underground dugouts. Photo 2: President Benes signed the Kosice Program here on April 5, 1945. Today the building houses the Eastern Slovak Art Gallery. As for their relationships with the Hungarians, Slovaks deeply 10 resented the years of forced assimilation to the Hungarian language 8 9 "Nemci vypalili obec a osem mu fov zastrelili ," Demokrat, 19 July, 1946. Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 85 and culture in the nineteenth century known as "magyarization," as well as the wartime massacres committed by the Hungarian Arrow Cross troops in southern Slovakia. What is more, Slovaks considered the Vienna Arbitration, which gave Hungary wartime control over southern Slovakia, to be an unjust occupation of land that had rightfully belonged to Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1938. Retribution With his April 1945 declaration that only Czechs and Slovaks deserved to remain in the republic, President Benes echoed and even gave credence to citizens' bitter sentiments toward minorities, as historian Eagle Glassheim notes. He states, "Though Benes abjured violence, his repeated public speeches on the collective guilt of the Germans must have carried great moral weight." 11 Benes' inaugural speech left little question regarding the country's forthcoming posture regarding remaining Hungarians and Germans: ... Our new home will not be new only in its relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. It must be rebuilt also in other respects.. .. This applies also towards its relationship with other nations and especially toward those Germans and Hungarians who before the war enjoyed full political rights as partners. After this war something similar is not possible. Our state will be a state of nations, a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else! 12 As is evident from the last lines of his speech, a sense of retribution for wartime injustice fueled his plan to recreate the republic as "a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else!" However, another key factor in Benes' goal of ridding Czechoslovakia of its German and Hungarian minorities was the belief that allowing sizeable numbers of either minority to remain could once more jeopardize the 10 Unlike Slovak, Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, etc., which are all members of the Slavic linguistic tree, Hungarian is a Uralic language, similar only to Finnish and Estonian. It is extremely difficult for Slovaks to learn Hungarian and vice versa, and the difficulty is compounded for the older language learner. 11 Eagle Glassheim , "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947" in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, eds. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 215 . 12 Quoted in "Ano, zaciname ozaj novy zivot," Dernokrat, Apr. 4, 1945 . �86 SLOVAKIA-2017 state. Benes employed this logic as early as 1941 to appeal to the Allied Powers that, unless the Germans were expelled from postwar Czechoslovakia en masse, they might again rally to return the Sudetenland to Germany. 13 After Nazi Germany surrendered in May of 1945, local retaliation against Germans and Hungarians, which had already begun during the war, intensified. Newly-legalized procedures enabled Czechs and Slovaks to enjoy personal gain at the expense of German and Hungarian minorities. For example, the nascent Benes administration established "national committees" (narodne vybory), popularly-elected regional boards charged with bringing local order to the chaos that was pervasive in the months following the end of the wa 14 One of the national committees' most cherished responsibilities was the distribution of vacated minority properties that had been confiscated by the state. An illustration of this played out in the eastern Slovak Spis region (at the base of the Carpathian Mountains), where Slovaks had no problem reallocating their German neighbors' former properties. An article in the post-1945 Slovak newspaper Narodna Obroda (National Revival) reports that by February 4, 1945 the entire German population had already vacated the Spis region. 15 It further discussed the way abandoned German properties were handled by the newly established "national committees:" The Spis districts remain practically without Germans, whom the retreating German army took with them . The national committees in Poprad, in Spisska Nova Ves, in Levoca, Kezmarok and Gelnica procured their properties and placed fugitives from villages in them[fugitives] who [were] victims of the events of war or of barbaric German destruction. 16 Slovak national committees willingly exercised their right to confiscate and redistribute German property to those they deemed to 13 Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 200. Ibid., "Ethnic Cleansing, Communism, and Environmental Devastation in Czechoslovakia's Borderlands, 1945- 1989," Journal of Modern History 78 (March 2006), 72. Ibid ., "National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945," Central European History 33 , no. 4 (2008), 473 . 15 "Spis bez emcov," Narodna Obroda, Feb. 4, 1945 . 14 16 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 87 be deserving. Slovak historians Sona Gabzdilova-Olejnikova and Milan Olejnik characterize this era as a time of "postwar euphoria" and note the following: Accompanying this atmosphere of elation was a ri se in radicalization . Germans and Hungarians had become synonymous with evil. A majority of Slovak inhabitants did not deny themselves such measures as, ... confiscation, [acti vating] national administrative boards (ncirodne sprcivy), 17 and stripping Germans and Hungarians of their Czechoslovak citizenship. 18 At times the "postwar euphoria" turned violent, as Glassheim details in his article on the atrocities committed by locals against their former German neighbors in Bohemia and Moravia. He describes the summer of 1945 as a time when "a Wild West atmosphere reigned" before the central governmental authority was capable of averting and arraigning pogrom perpetrators. 19 The multiple mass graves of German victims discovered in Slovakia alone (187 men in Sklene, 146 individuals in Rufomberok, 83 in Banska Stiavnica, etc.), indicate the extent of animosity expressed by Slovaks that summer. 20 One of the worst acts of violence occurred on June 18, 1945 in the Moravian town of Pferov where Czechoslovak soldiers massacred 247 Carpathian German men, women and children who were travelling home to central and eastern Slovakia. 21 17 Glass heim explains that, in borderland regions where there was not a sufficient number of Czechs to run for electi on in regional "nati ona l co mmittees," reliable candidates were sent from the Ministry of the Interior to staff " nat iona l administrative boards" (narodne spravy). When enough Czechs (and, perceivably, Slovaks) populated these regions, nati onal comm ittee elections were held and the administrative boards were abolished . See Glassheim , "Ethnic Cleansing, Communi sm, and Environmental Devastation," 72. 18 Soi\a Gabzdilova-Olejnikova and Milan O lej nik, Karpatski Nemci na Slovensku od druhej svetovej vojny do roku 1953 (Bratislava: Spolecenskovedny ustav SA V, 2004), 59 . 19 Glassheim , "National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing," 473. 20 Ondrej Poss, Dejiny a kultiira karpatskych Nemcov (Bratislava: Slovak Nati onal Museum/Muse um of Carpathian German Culture, 2005), 14. 21 Ibid., 16. �88 SLOVAKIA-2017 Photo 3: Kosice's Reformed (Calvinist) Church was established in 1644, indicating Calvinism's influence in the Hungarian lands after the Protestant Reformation. Its current location, adjacent to the ancient city wall, dates back to the early 19 th century. It is a nationally-registered cultural monument. Another instance of postwar retribution took place between Christian believers who held their reformed (Calvinist) faith in common yet stood on opposing ethnic sides. Since the sixteenth century, the Reformed Church in Slovakia had been largely composed of Hungarians. However, a small Slovak contingent also co-existed, and, after the Second World War, some Slovaks were zealous in asserting their language above that of their Hungarian brethren during church services. Thus, one of the biggest areas of contention between �SLOVAKIA-2017 89 Slovak and Hungarian believers was the issue of which language would be the language of worship after the war. Officially, the Hungarian language was forbidden in public in postwar Slovakia except in liturgical services where the pre-193 8 language had been Hungarian (although this law was often ignored by anti-Hungarian Slovak believers or by local authorities). 22 In practice the language of worship was determined on a church-bychurch basis. 23 The church linguistic dispute was especially intense because many Reformed pastors claimed that preaching in the language that the people could understand was one of the primary benefits of the Protestant Reformation itself. 24 The Reformed Church presbytery in the eastern Slovak village of Zarnov (just southwest of Kosice) provides an example. It employed the following reasoning in its debate regarding conducting services in Slovak or Hungarian : The liturgical language of the Reformed Church should be performed in the language of the people. It is the biggest achievement of the Reformation. One should also take into account that [although] a large part of the population registered for re-Slovakization, they do not actually forget their Hungarian mother tongue and are not able to adapt to the Slovak language. 25 Other Slovak Calvinists, however, seized the opportunity to only sanction the Slovak language during worship. Intriguingly, a 1948 issue of Kalvinske hlasy (Calvinist Voices) describes a ceremony, presumably held at the Reformed Church in Bidovce, 12 miles (19 km) east of Kosice . At thi s service the following poem lauding the Slovak language was recited: Oh, that Slovak languageSacred language, That language of faith, 22 James R. Felak, After Hitler, Before Stalin: Catholics, Communists, and Democrats in Slovakia, 1945-1948 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 20. 23 See Felak, 18-21. 24 Sutaj, Reslovakizacia: zmena narodnosti casti obyvatelstva Slovenska po fl. svetovej vojne (Kos ice: Spolocenskovedny ustav SA V, 199 1), 14. 25 Quoted in Sutaj, Reslovakizacia, 32. �90 SLOVAKIA-2017 I know there is none in the world [like it]. If however an angel in heaven Sings to God gratefully, He must not sing to Him other than in Slovak. 26 Hungarian Calvinists faced more than the prospect of being forced to worship in a foreign language. Further hardships affected them when believers' property was confiscated, when the state refused to pay Hungarian clergy's salaries, and when these clergy were not allowed to teach or correspond with each other in Hungarian. 27 The "Purging" At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, the Allies officially sanctioned the wholesale expulsion of Czechoslovakia's over three million Germans, as long as the expulsion was conducted in a "humane and orderly" manner. 28 They did not, however, agree to the complete removal of southern Slovakia's Hungarians, of whom historian Katalin Vadkerty estimates there were approximately 600,000 by the end of the war. 29 Instead, the Allied Powers believed the " Hungarian Question" should be worked out between the neighboring countries themselves. Therefore, Czechoslovakia had to find other means of cleansing itself from its Hungarian minority. The Benes administration thus proceeded with the expulsion of the German minority and crafted three measures by which to eliminate the Hungarians. This article addresses the methods by which the Hungarian and Carpathian German minorities were purged from Slovakia and concludes with an explanation of the unintended consequences of these policies . 26 "Odovzdanie resl ovakizacnych dekretov v Bidovciach," Kalvinske hlasy, Apr. 27, 1948. 27 Felak, I 8. 28 Philipp Ther, "A Century of Forced Migration," in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, eds. Ther and Ana Si lj ak (Lanh am, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 200 I), 55. 29 Katalin Vadkerty, " Hungari ans in Postwar Slovaki a," Hungarian Quarterly , vo l. 35 (Winter 1994): 11 5. �91 SLOVAKIA-2017 ' \t KAlViNSKE HLASY (lqlkava.nia, &ts l'Zru.~neho napatia, - da. si ootubl po slave ,·lastne~ Ones fa ubi) aj Pr~hadz:l na svet Pan neba i zeme. Aty sa te. tvoj slaromam. Al\'<>je dell sa ti ui tall 111/te. Ali I hho Dl'lcho<lu. Spomlnai nl lui.sne Jm· sia, aliO v ca..~h, ked' kai.dit .va[nu dlv!'lu ii viancene doby, prriite od det.stva. Vywoovaly venoval im, aby sl do ich &tycli srde IOlllml • ~ zvlutnyin kuzlom. A pripominaly tl, semienka pllvdy. dobra 3 krisy V ducliu Vet. my ii bol pl'lp-awny privi~t Pina. n& evanjella. l ~ treto cbvlle. Tlili po tom, Pre tvoj chlad a ducho111Y upadok, • a Photo 4: ln Kosice after the war, two-thirds of the city's Reformed Church reported themselves as Slovak and one third as Hungarian. This estimate appeared in the May 15, 1946 edition of Kalvinske hlasy (Calvinist Voices). �92 SLOVAKIA-2017 The first system of ridding southern Slovakia of unwanted Hungarians was by population exchange.Jo The plan proposed that Hungarians leave southern Slovakia for Hungary while Slovaks living in Hungary would return to Slovakia and free themselves of any "magyarizing tendencies" they had acquired while living in Hungary. The aim was to restore a Slavic majority to Czechoslovakia's southern borderland, which would also provide a buffer against any future Hungarian revanchist designs. JI What is interesting about the population exchange is that, while Slovaks were allowed to voluntarily apply to move back to Slovakia, Hungarians were designated by the Czechoslovak state to return to Hungary.J 2 In total, 89,660 Hungarians relocated from Czechoslovakia to Hungary between 1945 and 1948, whereas 73,273 people voluntarily moved from Hungary to Czechoslovakia.JJ The Czechoslovak government so badly wanted to reverse the ethnic ratio in southern Slovakia that it circulated propaganda advertisements such as the following: 30 The popul ati on exchange was accompani ed by numerous hardships, experi enced by both Slovaks and Hungarians- See Rast islav Karaba, " Postoj katolickej cirkvi k vymene obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom a k umi esti\ovaniu presidlencov do Ciech a na Moravu v rokoc h 1946-1 948," in Zlat ica Saposova and Sutaj , Povojnove migracie a vymena obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom (Presov : Uni versum , 20 I 0). 31 Sutaj, Mad'arska mensina na Slovensku v rokoch 1945-1948.· vychodiska a prax {olitiky k mad'arskej men.sine na Slovensku, (Brati slava: Veda, 1993), 59. 2 Ibid ., "The Magyar Minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War" in Slovakia in History , eds. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 20 I I), 276; Ibid ., " Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority between 1945 and 1948," in Key Issues of Slovak and Hungarian History (a View of Slovak Historians), eds. Stefan Sutaj, Stefan Franko, and Igor Baka (Presov: Uni versu m, 201 1), 233 . 33 lbid .,"S lovakia and the Hungari an Minori ty," 23 3-34; Ther, 57. Of the 89,660 Hungarians exchanged fro m Czechoslovakia to Hungary per the 1958 report by the Czechos lovak Ministry of Foreign Affa irs, this fi gure includes 34,000 who were re located outside the Popul ati on Exchange Agreemen t. For example, 3 I,780 Anyas Hungarians [those who moved to southern Slovakia after the First Vienna Award] were deported en masse in the summ er of 1945. Of the 73,273 individuals who moved from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, approx imate ly 12,000 did so outside the Population Exchange in order to partake of th e benefits the Czechoslovak state offered to those who would identify as Slovak. See Sutaj, "Ethni c Development in Kos ice after 1945," Studia Historyczne 4(20 13), 4 74. �SLOVAKIA-2017 93 Do you want to become a citi zen of the victori ous Czechos lovak state? Do yo u want well-paid work in factories? Hungarian Slovaks, the Czechos lovak Republi c will not only relocate you but assure you at least as quality if not an even better economic, cultural and social environm ent than you have li ved in until now. Slovak farm ers from Hungary will cultivate fertil e Slovak land , craftsmen and entrepreneurs w ill work in Slovak firm s, and workers in Sl ovak factori es and the intelligentsia in Slovak agencies .... 34 As will be explained below, the population exchange did not materi ali ze the way authoriti es had hoped. A second means of reducing the Hungarian contingent in southern Slovakia was to deport them to work in Bohemia, many times on Czech farm s in the interior or in borderland areas . One of the primary factors for determining which Hungarians would be sent to the Czech Lands was whether or not they were able-bodied workers.35 Although deportations were carried out in three waves, the main organized deportation began on November 19, 1946.36 In total, 44, 129 Hungarians were deported to Bohemia between 1946-194 7 .37 What was troublesome about the deportations is that they occurred mainly during the winter, with deportees transported in cold wagons, under military supervision. Furthermore, many times the Hungarians who were forced to relocate had to sell their property and possessions below value. 38 Re-Slovakization (reslovakizacia in Slovak) was the final measure taken against the Hungarians to reduce their number while at the same time increasing the Slovak presence in southern Slovakia. ReSlovakization meant that those of contested ethnicity or originally of 34 Zlati ca Saposova, "St'aznosti Slovakov k vymene obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom v dokum entoch MZV C R," in Povojnove migrcicie a vy mena obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom . eds. Saposova and Sutaj (Presov: Uni vers um , 20 I 0), 192-93. 35 Sutaj, Mad'arskci mensina, 63. Sutaj notes that all able-bodi ed Hungari ans fro m Kosice and nearby towns ages 14-60 were ordered to work camps. 36 However, already as of November I, 1945, Demokrat reported that 12,000 Hungarians had been sent to the Czech lands as part of the first transport of Hungari ans to Bohemi a and Moravia. Demokrat, Nov. I, 1945. 37 Sutaj, " Magyar minority in Slovaki a before and after the Second World War," 279. 38 Ibid., "Slovaki a and th e Hungari an Minority," 238. �94 SLOVAKIA-2017 Slovak nationality but who had declared themselves as Hungarian, could apply for Czechoslovak citizenship. 39 The intent of re-Slovakization was to "make Slovak again" those who had magyarized (assimilated to the Hungarian nationality), perhaps in order to survive the war years under Hungarian rule. Furthermore, minorities who could prove active resistance to the Slovak or Hungarian wartime regimes were also permitted to gain citizenship. 40 Re-Slovakization also allowed magyarized Slovaks to avoid population exchange to Hungary. 41 .... h " " " .,.,,.,, - ,.,.,, Jll9Shf papsl Jt~ee prlv ttall Slov4kov z Mad'araka V• ._.,_._ • ~ had.. r•ll'(lo prl~ a..t. . . ata Slovdkov 11: Mwd'.ar-&9'• v .......,lQ&a .-d4cetJo 01'id.rovacet koml•fo v Novon. M.~te p,l)d Statrt)<(D. a $prl•vod& Barlr:tf'.fr9 .orrila 4,.~ ..._ •Wlloo t!ut N .. • p.-ckro(!:fla bl.br•nke.. Po, ..-.v•wr ~ Y prfvttaJ• aw b"abltJo~k.>' o ~ d•Je.-•ctu po.aL z.,..mbo.-•. lltor4 ,... ~ ....-...u. ~ chvtl'u. kli:"dy •• Sloviict • M•~•rska •~•a.J4 • - • • .oa ..,.,, p6d9 • cJtcO • . ..,.. .t:1t • esr,t. l l r f f o • ~ 1 ' 1 okr. . prtvtbll d•,..•cru komJNr Lapf.611'.. z. ko&i,e.lk:f o11.r«t t»"lvO,al 4-,qcac:lu oblaat.. OIIIW•t. Jnls,ektor T . Kand.-. z ~ ltlNV .,, ,No'¥4)-m Mute pOd $fatrom prlvftaJ deloe6cJu • poto,n. ....i.oo.-•t ~ • • ~ # ...-,,mJ f ·r ~t.Jclamt. V Kr.lf..-C b1u~cl prtvlta.f delec'\c'- mt.-t. koml94.r lv•o.. po - , 4 ~ m Obede odObnd.a ... d•f•sllcla do Tor"Qffe.. ltd• tu prlvlt ■J ~ II04Ma ~ SnO'llkO,. z M•f•f Yoronw oc:fqhral• Ml dcteg:6cfa do Tr•bllov•~ odlcla.f po ,>rf..,... a po ob.!orstil'enf Ude>b,-.Ja sa delea:Acla aut0bu$0'ffl CSD do l(ollc. O ~~ hudbu1 veoor prSfa de1elll::1cla S l .;tv4 k(>v z- .'\1ad'1u·:>ikn ..-o Ko.lfc.. Oet..-llicha prfvlW .,,,....!!'ml •Fovafflf "" m.me z•••upJteh·t-v• me:&ta K,o~rc ,,odqr(?d~eda M~V Pod~ck~. letoc'# z.dOraznlt. ff na.~fm ch:rom nfo le MovamJ proeJivi..~at. ale shurkovJ?m 5lav,u:o.. orwto a&y dobrc O(N!;:ontvalf • pO::nutvaJJ 2.lvo-t u n~s a porovo4vttll • pome,-~n:tt v M•d'a.r. . . . 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'ktor$'-h h<e,d:no1• l♦ •stH'WUH't'tidgll.,_ T•k twt1>r, ,.., -.:~..-,,nk tla.,. 150 ttYU. pat;tJC6~ -.. vark• n . . . .t•tNf •• )la.V"f n.JmA v vaDftarl a v •~« •kl4!~ ttodf'l4ta ,.,._bfl •t1Je ti:t._.._ • dn,_ u• • M..ad'an.kw obleb-taJO 10 mllt6nov♦ tt-.nkovllrr, Photo 5: "Kosice Welcomes Slovaks from Hungary," Demokrat newspaper April 5, 1946. 39 Sutaj , "The Magyar Minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War " 277 40 Ibid. • 41 Ibid ., " Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority," 232 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 95 Historian Stefan Sutaj calculates that a total of 362,679 (or just over 50 percent) of Hungarians in southern Slovakia re-Slovakized, the majority out of fear of oppression. 42 For many Slovaks, postwar re-Slovakization of Hungarians was the logical payback for being forced to assimilate to the Hungarian language and culture both during "magyarization" and from 1938-1945 . Thus, on paper, Czechoslovakia got rid of its Hungarians by means of population exchange, deportation to the Czech lands and re-Slovakization. Reality proved a different matter and is addressed later. Carpathian Germans Unlike Bohemia's Sudeten Germans, the Carpathian Germans (or Germans residing in Slovakia and Ukraine's Carpathian Mountain region) did not inhabit a single territorial block. Rather, they were primarily concentrated in three areas-Bratislava, the Spis region and the Kremnica-Pravno area. 43 Carpathian Germans had worked in this territory as miners, merchants, artisans and clerics since the 11 th century and, by the 14 th and 15 th centuries, comprised between one-quarter to one-fifth of the population in what is now 44 known as Slovakia. However, German influence in the region waned and by the Second World War only 150,000 Carpathian Germans remained in Slovakia, according to Ondrej Poss, director of the Museum of Carpathian German Culture at the Slovak National Mu45 seum. The German minority living in Slovakia began to fear for their lives when the Red Army approached eastern Slovakia in 1944, and they left the country in systematic evacuations as of November 194446 Evacuation numbers vary widely, but author Ernst Hochber- 42 Ibid; Ibid , Mad'arska mensina, 142. Pekar, 4 7. 44 Ondrej Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 6. 45 Ibid. (Germans acco unted for approximately five percent of the Slovak population in the interwar period-Pekar, 47). Additionally, many Germans in eastern Slovakia magyarized in the second half of the nineteenth century. 46 Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 14. 43 �96 SLOVAKIA-2017 ger estimates that between 57 and 85 percent of Carpathian Germans left Slovakia before 1945.47 Photo 6: Print of German blacksmith by Wilhelm Gedeon. After the war 30,000 to 40,000 returned, hoping they could continue to live and work in what had been their ancestors' homeland for 800 years. 48 Many were interned in regional camps under inhumane conditions until roughly 32,000 were sent to Germany in 1946. 49 47 Ernst Hochberger, Die Karpatendeutschen in der Slowakei (Wien: bsterr. Landsmannschaft, 20 I 0), 76. 48 Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 16. 49 Ibid .; Hochberger, 77 . �97 SLOVAKIA-2017 However, not all of Slovakia's ethnic Germans were forced to leave at the end of the war. Approximately ten to fifteen percent remained, including skilled workers who were compelled to stay and work in state agricultural and industrial firms or those who could prove their wartime resistance to fascism. 50 Some of those who did not leave benefitted from exceptional circumstances, such as Wilhelm Gedeon and his family. 51 They lived in Medzev, a town just west of Kosice known as "the Mecca of Carpathian Germans in Slovakia. " 52 I Photo 7: Wilhelm Gedeon, spring 2012 50 Matej Spumy, " Political Authority and Popular Opinion: Czechos lovakia's German Population 1948-60," Social History Vol. 37, lss. 4, 2012, 458. 51 Poss, Karpatskonemecky spolok na Slovensku 20 rokov zaloienie, rozvoj (Kosice : Karpatskonemecky spolok na Slovensku, 2010), 12. 52 "Predseda Karpatskonemeckeho spolu Wilhelm Gedeon zaii l povojnove represie i roky normalizacie," Korzar/SME, Nov. 7, 2008 . Interestingly, former President of Slovakia Rudolf Schuster (1999-2004) hails from Medzev. �98 SLOVAKIA-2017 Born in Medzev in 1922, Gedeon was 23 years old at the end of the war. In October of 1945 an armed guard came to his family ' s home and informed them they had two hours to pack for deportation. Their belongings were to be placed in a wagon and they were to report to the school courtyard where other German families were assembled for relocation to Novaky, Slovakia, and interned until deportation to Germany. Gedeon, his uncle, grandmother and other family members dragged their wagon to the courtyard to join Medzev ' s sixth wave of deportations. However, while waiting in the courtyard, they were inspected by a doctor from the Swiss Red Cross who determined Gedeon's grandmother was too ill to go. He told the guards that Gedeon ' s whole family should be allowed to return home and stay in Medzev. The guards refused, arguing that only the grandmother and the other ill family member should stay; but the doctor persisted, asking the guards how the two elderly ones would survive by themselves. Thus the entire family was permitted to remain. Unfortunately , although they continued living in their family ' s homeland, the Germans who were not expelled faced discrimination for which they were unable to seek legal recourse. As Gedeon noted in his interview, "When we [Germans] lost our [Czechoslovak] citizenship, this was a very hard truth: if anyone beat or killed us, no penalty was levied because Germans were not citizens. " 53 Gedeon later moved to Kosice, where he worked as a civil engineer and eventually became head of the post-Communist Carpathian German Society in Kosice. 54 His story is the exception, yet it is also indicative of the unanticipated consequences of postwar Czechoslovakia' s attempt at ethnic cleansing. Unintended Outcomes What, then, were the significant unintended outcomes of the government's policies, which targeted Hungarians and Germans? First, concerning the population exchange of Slovaks and Hungarians, government officials clearly misjudged the situation when they mistakenly assumed that the number of Slovaks living in Hungary 53 Wilhelm Gedeon, interview by author, tape recording, 23-24 April 201 2, Kos ice, Slovakia. 54 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 99 was only slightly smaller than the number of Hungarians in southern Slovakia 55 In actuality, 16,387 more Hungarians vacated Czechoslovakia than Slovaks returned to inhabit southern Slovakia. 56 This resulted in a problem for Czechoslovak officials who had intended to populate the southern borderland with Slovaks so as to create a barrier against potential Hungarian irredentist aspirations. Secondly, the re-Slovakization campaign did not go as planned. Although over 362,000 people in southern Slovakia changed their reported ethnic identity from Hungarian to Slovak after the war, many of these did so insincerely, providing whatever documentation necessary to re-Slovakize and remain in Czechoslovakia. Expedient, "situational" self-identification led many to affiliate with whatever nationality would allow them to stay in their families ' generational hometown, searching for stability at a time of immense uncertainty. Thousands took a chance amidst postwar chaos, deciding to reSlovakize and face whatever future challenges lay ahead at least from the known quantities of their hometowns. To a certain extent, their "insincere" decisions to identify as Slovak can be measured by the 1950 and 1961 Czechoslovak censuses, which revealed that many in the postwar period who had chosen the re-Slovakization option were ethnically Hungarian but had re-Slovakized out of fear of retaliation. 57 Sutaj records that, although some Hungarians who had " insincerely" re-Slovakized after the war did identify again as Hungarian in the 1950 census, the majority continued to identify as "Slovak." 58 Just ten years later, however, the percentage of individual s reporting as "Hungarian" on the 1960 Czechoslovak census increased by 46.4 percent from 354,532 reporting as Hungarian on the 1950 census to 518,782 on the 1960 census.59 Cultural historian Veronika Gayer, of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, describes 55 Sutaj , "S lovakia and the Hungari an Minority," 23 1. Ther, 57 and Sutaj , "Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority," 233-234. However, it is quite plausible that many of these "Slovaks" had settled in Hun ga ry centuries ago. Thus it is questionable how " Slovak" they really were. 57 Sutaj , " Magyar minority in Slovaki a be fore and after the Seco nd World War," 279. 58 Ibid ., Mad'arska mensina, 144. 59 Ibid. 56 �100 SLOVAKIA-2017 this phenomenon as experienced by the citizens of Kosice during the 20 th century: The city changed control five times in the course of one generation .... These successive turns of state were [the] results of superpower decisions, so they could never reflect the actual will of citizens. A part of the citizens of thi s multi-lingual city always lost during these changes, while another part tried to align themselves with the changes, and changed language and nationality during official surveys. Many of the bilingual, dual-identity citizens could tum Czechoslovak from one year to the next, and then two decades later tum back into Hungarians, if the authorities wanted them to do so. 60 Many in southern Slovakia adjusted their ethnic affiliation as necessary, a practice which makes precise data comparisons and analyses nearly impossible for contemporary historians .6 1 Furthermore, after the Czechoslovak Communist coup in February 1948, many Hungarians (originally from southern Slovakia) who had been deported to work in Bohemia after the war, returned home and appealed for their property and rights.62 Consequently, southern Slovakia did not become purely Slovak after all. Sutaj concludes, "Despite the definite reduction of the number of Hungarian nationnality inhabitants, nonetheless the postwar measures were in vain, and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia maintained its compactness and ethnic identity." 63 Third, an entire reli gious denomination declined as a result of postwar anti-Hungarian measures and resulting linguistic battles. ReSlovakization drastically reduced the number of members in Slovakia 's Reformed Church since many could not worship in the Slovak language and, due to the state's removal of Hungarian clergy from their posts (those who did not re-Slovakize), there were not 60 Veronika Gayer, " From Kassa to Kosice, Kosice to Kassa," in Remembering 1he City: a Guide lhrough !he Pas/ of Kosice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Alapitvany, 20 13), 124. 61 See Sutaj , Mad'arska mensina, 143-144. 62 Sutaj , Mad'arskci mensina , 154. 63 Ibid. , 155 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 101 enough Reformed pastors who spoke Slovak. 64 For example, in 1946, out of 195 active Reformed pastors, only 23 claimed Slovak nationality. Yet for eight of these 23, their nationality was questionnable (meaning they were considered to be Hungarian and were removed from their posts). On the other hand, 172 of these 195 claimed to be Hungarian and only 80 of these re-Slovakized. 65 Photo 8: Cemetery in Banska Stiavnica Thus there were too many parishioners becoming Slovak through re-Slovakization (despite the fact that many were not proficient in the Slovak language) and too few pastors who could capably lead them in the Slovak language . 64 Sutaj, "Magyar minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War," 275; Sutaj, Reslovakizacia, 31. This same problem presented itself in the postwar Roman Catholic Church, among others. 65 Ibid. �102 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Slovak Reformed Church's experience is significant because, as the overwhelming majority of believers were Hungarian and lived in southern Slovak towns such as Kosice, they naturally became targets of re-Slovakization efforts, which severely impacted the denomination across Slovakia. Sutaj points out that postwar Reformed Church leaders often noted that the decline of Calvinists in the Slovak population happened at the same time as re-Slovakization.66 He adds that the chaotic situation between Slovaks and Hungarians in southern Slovakia during re-Slovakization greatly affected the situation in the Reformed Church after 1945 .67 On the whole, the number of Reformed believers in what is now Slovakia decreased from 145,829 in 1930 to 111,696 by 1950, an almost 25 · 68 percent re d uction. In addition to the blows dealt to Slovakia's Hungarian attenuating minority, only approximately 17,000 of the pre-war 150,000 Carpathian Germans remained in the country by 1947. 69 Moreover, as was also true of the Hungarian minority, a glaring consequence of their expulsion was the loss of skilled labor and business acumen. In the First Czechoslovak Republic, 44 percent of Slovakia's Germans 70 were involved in business, trade or industry. According to figures taken from the 1952 "Equalization of Burdens Law," the Carpathian Germans of Slovakia were forced to abandon an excess of 9,800 farms, over 8,000 residential estates, more than 2,000 commercial properties, and over 1,000 forestry operations as well as 1,000 wineries.71 The state realized its mistake when it lacked workers proficient in boosting Czechoslovakia's postwar industrialization campaign. Perhaps the most shocking unanticipated outcome of the administration ' s carefully-crafted efforts was the fact that, just three years after Czechoslovakia was liberated, local Communists seized control of the republic. They quickly enacted policies much more concerned 66 Sutaj , Reslovakizacia, 31. Ibid., 32. 68 Jan Pesek and Michal Barnovs ky, Staino Moc a Cirkvi na Slovensku. 1948- 1953 (Brati slava: Veda, 1997), 13-1 8. In Kosice after the war, two-thirds o f th e city 's Reformed Church reported themselves as Slovak and one third as Hungarian . " Kosice," Kalvinske hlasy, May 15, 1946. 69 Hochberger, 77. 70 Isidor Lasslob, Die Karpatendeutschen im Spiegelbild der Zahlen (Kes mark: Vi vit-Verl ag / Karpatendeutsche Landsmannschaft Stuttgart, 2004), 8. 71 Ibid., 7. 67 �SLOVAKIA-2017 103 with Czechoslovak citizens ' class status than with their ethnic affiliation.72 The Hungarian minority remaining in the country received the right to Czechoslovak citizenship in 1948 and the German minority as early as 1949 and by 1953 at the latest. 73 The change of policy from postwar discrimination against ethnic minorities to the Communist regime's obsession with class status freed many Hungarians who had expediently re-Slovakized after the war to again identify as Hungarian on the 1951 and 1960 Czechoslovak censuses. Conclusion Although many are familiar with the postwar fate of Czechoslovakia ' s three million Sudeten Germans, it is often overlooked that roughly 600,000 Hungarians and 32,000 Carpathian Germans were forced to leave the country or assimilate at that time. As a result of the Benes administration's April 1945 Kosice Program, Czechoslovakia's German and Hungarian populations (some of whom had lived on the land for centuries) were pronounced guilty by association with Nazi Gennany and what became Nazi-controlled Hungary. This verdict represented a sharp reversal from the generous rights minorities had enjoyed during the First Czechoslovak Republic from 1918 to 1938. After the Second World War, however, Czechs and Slovaks harbored resentment for wartime injustices, and many sought retribution among their German and Hungarian neighbors . Even the Benes administration petitioned the Allies for permission to expel the country' s German and Hungarian populations. When the Allies agreed to the wholesale expulsion of the German minority but not to that of the Hungarians, the government devised three methods to rid Czechoslovakia of its over half a million Hungarians. What the Benes admini stration could not see at the time was that its efforts to expel all Germans and force Hungarians to assimilate or be relocated out of Slovakia would either fail or backfire against the future welfare of the republic. Approximately ten to fifteen percent of the Carpathian Germans were permitted to stay in Slovakia for a 72 See Pekar, 53. Sutaj , " Magyar minority in Slovaki a befo re and after the Second World War," 279-28 1; Some Germ ans received citizenship as earl y as 1949. See Spumy, 462464. 73 �104 SLOVAKIA-2017 variety of reasons. Moreover, southern Slovakia remained largely Hungarian when the population exchange was shown to be lopsided , when those deported to the Czech lands returned home, and when over 360,000 Hungarians expediently chose to falsely identify as Slovak. They did so in order to avoid recrimination, to maintain their livelihoods, to remain with their families, and/or to face unknown future challenges from the security of their hometowns. The German and Hungarian minorities who were in fact expelled from Czechoslovakia took with them a rich tradition of culture, skilled labor and entrepreneurial expertise. Ultimately, it can be argued that Benes' policies proved incomplete, ineffective and even injurious to postwar Czechoslovakia. � SLOVAKIA-201 7 81 KICKED OUT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S POSTWAR POLICY TOW ARD ETHNIC MINORITIES AND ITS UNINTENDED OUTCOMES 1 Marty Manor Mullins Postwar Czechoslovakia was not a warm, friend ly place to be if you were a Hungarian or German in late 1945 to 1946. In fact, during his inaugural speech commemorating the reunifycation of the Czechoslovak Republic in April of 1945, President Edvard Benes proclaimed, "Our state will be a state of nations, a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else!" 2 In postwar Slovakia one could walk down the street and be confronted with slogans such as : "Kosice must be cleansed of Magyar lice!"3 or indications (such as the bullet holes riddling a local street sign named after Adolf Hitler) of widespread resentment toward the Nazi regime with which local German and Hungarian minorities were associated. Furthermore, caustic warnings appeared in the local newspaper such as the following, printed in the Demokrat daily of June 17, 1945: " ... whether the Hungarians of [the city ofJ Kosice like it or not, the Slovaks are now the masters .. . the mouths of those who do not want to speak Slovak must be shut." 4 Although many are familiar with the fate of Czechoslovakia's three million Sudeten Germans, what exactly was the situation that the country's Hungarian and Carpathian German minorities found themselves in as of late 1945? What was the cause of such vitriolic language used against them? Furthermore, how was this kind of abuse justified by their accusers? This article explores the back1 This article is based on a paper presented at the 2016 meeting of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies on a panel entitled " Kicked Out of Czechoslovakia: The Fate of Postwar German and Hungarian Refugees, Then and Now." 2 Quoted in "t\no, zaci name ozaj novy zivot," Demokrat, Apr. 4, 1945 . 3 Szabo Lajos, Utols6 szalmaszal (Budapest: Magyar Egy haztorteneti Enciklopedia Munkakiiziisseg, 2000). 4 Demokrat, June 7, 1945 ; Stefan Sutaj, "Ethnic Deve lopment in Kosice after 1945," Studia Historyczne 4 (20 13), 4 72. �82 SLOVAKIA-2017 ground and implementation of postwar Czechoslovak policy towards its Hungarian and German populations while also elucidating several unintended yet significant outcomes of this policy 's execution, particularly within southern and central Slovakia. Pho to 1: Bullet holes riddle this street sign, formerly posted in Slovakia's Spis region and now on display in a Kezmarok museum. Back round Recall that a united Czechoslovakia did not exist during the Second World War. At the Munich Conference in 1938, Hitler capita lized on complaints from Czechoslovakia's Sudeten German minority to convince the Allies to cede the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As of March 1939, the Czech Lands of Bohemia and Moravia became a Protectorate governed and occupied by Nazi Germany, while wartime Slovakia operated as a semi-independent authoritarian state led by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. However, over I 0,000 square kilometers (c. 3,800 square miles) including cities such as Kosice in southern Slovakia were not even under Slovak control during the war. Rather, southern Slovakia had been ceded to Hungary as part of the First Vienna Award of November 1938. Thus, the Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist for the duration of the war and southern Slovak territory came under Hungarian governance for six years. At the end of the war, when the Red Army marched across Ukraine and fought its way into eastern Slovakia, Kosice was the �SLOVAKIA-2017 83 first major city of the former Czechoslovak Republic to be liberated. Freed on January 19, 1945 , Kosice served as the temporary capital of reunited Czechoslovakia and the seat of President Benes. His time in the city is most associated with the "Kosice Program" which, among other objectives, outlined postwar policy toward the Hungarian and German minorities, who were declared collectively guilty for the breakup of the First Czechoslovak Republic. In the Kosice Program the postwar government reversed the generous policies of the interwar republic regarding minority populations. During the interwar period, Czechoslovakia's ethnic and religious groups were granted constitutional rights unparalleled at that time in the region, including the right to speak and educate children in their native languages as well as to form cultural associations and political parties. More importantly, they were granted equal status with Czechs and Slovaks before the law and protected from forced assimilation. 5 However, after the Second World War, these rights were rescinded. Germans and Hungarians were stripped of Czechoslovak citizenship, their property was nationalized and/or confiscated, minority schools were closed and they were ineligible to receive entitlements. 6 Of course, Czechoslovakia was not alone in its postwar forced relocation of Germans and Hungarians. In the years immediately following World War II, Europe witnessed the largest forced migration the world had ever seen .7 Resentment Czechoslovakia's German and Hungarian populations (some of whom had lived on this land for centuries) were pronounced collectively guilty by association with Nazi Germany and what became Nazi-controlled Hungary . At this time many Czechs and Slovaks sought revenge for wartime injustices and even atrocities still fresh in their memories . For instance, Slovaks in the eastern Slovak village of Nemecka Poruba (10 km north of Sobrance) endured what the Demokrat newspaper called the "eastern Slovak Lidice," referring to 5 Martin Pekar, et al., Ethnic Minorities in Slovakia in the Years 1918-1945: A Survey (Prefov : Un iversum-EU , 2011 ), 50-51 . 6 Kosicky Vladni Program Chs. VIII, X, XV . 7 For details see Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948 (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. �84 SLOVAKIA-2017 the German massacre of Czech men in the Bohemian town of Lid ice in retaliation for the assassination of Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich). 8 Towards the end of the war, the over 700 inhabitants of Nemecka Poruba had assisted partisan fighters living in the nearby forest by providing food and lodging during bad weather. Although the Germans stepped up patrols in the area, no one gave away the location of the partisans. After a surprise German raid on the village, resulting in the death of four German soldiers, most of the inhabitants fled, fearing Nazi retribution. It came swiftly when they burned the village to the ground the next day (November 2-3, 1944) and shot the eight men who remained behind. Villagers faced not only the loss of the victims but also their homes as they spent the 9 oncoming winter in underground dugouts. Photo 2: President Benes signed the Kosice Program here on April 5, 1945. Today the building houses the Eastern Slovak Art Gallery. As for their relationships with the Hungarians, Slovaks deeply 10 resented the years of forced assimilation to the Hungarian language 8 9 "Nemci vypalili obec a osem mu fov zastrelili ," Demokrat, 19 July, 1946. Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 85 and culture in the nineteenth century known as "magyarization," as well as the wartime massacres committed by the Hungarian Arrow Cross troops in southern Slovakia. What is more, Slovaks considered the Vienna Arbitration, which gave Hungary wartime control over southern Slovakia, to be an unjust occupation of land that had rightfully belonged to Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1938. Retribution With his April 1945 declaration that only Czechs and Slovaks deserved to remain in the republic, President Benes echoed and even gave credence to citizens' bitter sentiments toward minorities, as historian Eagle Glassheim notes. He states, "Though Benes abjured violence, his repeated public speeches on the collective guilt of the Germans must have carried great moral weight." 11 Benes' inaugural speech left little question regarding the country's forthcoming posture regarding remaining Hungarians and Germans: ... Our new home will not be new only in its relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. It must be rebuilt also in other respects.. .. This applies also towards its relationship with other nations and especially toward those Germans and Hungarians who before the war enjoyed full political rights as partners. After this war something similar is not possible. Our state will be a state of nations, a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else! 12 As is evident from the last lines of his speech, a sense of retribution for wartime injustice fueled his plan to recreate the republic as "a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else!" However, another key factor in Benes' goal of ridding Czechoslovakia of its German and Hungarian minorities was the belief that allowing sizeable numbers of either minority to remain could once more jeopardize the 10 Unlike Slovak, Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, etc., which are all members of the Slavic linguistic tree, Hungarian is a Uralic language, similar only to Finnish and Estonian. It is extremely difficult for Slovaks to learn Hungarian and vice versa, and the difficulty is compounded for the older language learner. 11 Eagle Glassheim , "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947" in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, eds. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 215 . 12 Quoted in "Ano, zaciname ozaj novy zivot," Dernokrat, Apr. 4, 1945 . �86 SLOVAKIA-2017 state. Benes employed this logic as early as 1941 to appeal to the Allied Powers that, unless the Germans were expelled from postwar Czechoslovakia en masse, they might again rally to return the Sudetenland to Germany. 13 After Nazi Germany surrendered in May of 1945, local retaliation against Germans and Hungarians, which had already begun during the war, intensified. Newly-legalized procedures enabled Czechs and Slovaks to enjoy personal gain at the expense of German and Hungarian minorities. For example, the nascent Benes administration established "national committees" (narodne vybory), popularly-elected regional boards charged with bringing local order to the chaos that was pervasive in the months following the end of the wa 14 One of the national committees' most cherished responsibilities was the distribution of vacated minority properties that had been confiscated by the state. An illustration of this played out in the eastern Slovak Spis region (at the base of the Carpathian Mountains), where Slovaks had no problem reallocating their German neighbors' former properties. An article in the post-1945 Slovak newspaper Narodna Obroda (National Revival) reports that by February 4, 1945 the entire German population had already vacated the Spis region. 15 It further discussed the way abandoned German properties were handled by the newly established "national committees:" The Spis districts remain practically without Germans, whom the retreating German army took with them . The national committees in Poprad, in Spisska Nova Ves, in Levoca, Kezmarok and Gelnica procured their properties and placed fugitives from villages in them[fugitives] who [were] victims of the events of war or of barbaric German destruction. 16 Slovak national committees willingly exercised their right to confiscate and redistribute German property to those they deemed to 13 Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 200. Ibid., "Ethnic Cleansing, Communism, and Environmental Devastation in Czechoslovakia's Borderlands, 1945- 1989," Journal of Modern History 78 (March 2006), 72. Ibid ., "National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945," Central European History 33 , no. 4 (2008), 473 . 15 "Spis bez emcov," Narodna Obroda, Feb. 4, 1945 . 14 16 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 87 be deserving. Slovak historians Sona Gabzdilova-Olejnikova and Milan Olejnik characterize this era as a time of "postwar euphoria" and note the following: Accompanying this atmosphere of elation was a ri se in radicalization . Germans and Hungarians had become synonymous with evil. A majority of Slovak inhabitants did not deny themselves such measures as, ... confiscation, [acti vating] national administrative boards (ncirodne sprcivy), 17 and stripping Germans and Hungarians of their Czechoslovak citizenship. 18 At times the "postwar euphoria" turned violent, as Glassheim details in his article on the atrocities committed by locals against their former German neighbors in Bohemia and Moravia. He describes the summer of 1945 as a time when "a Wild West atmosphere reigned" before the central governmental authority was capable of averting and arraigning pogrom perpetrators. 19 The multiple mass graves of German victims discovered in Slovakia alone (187 men in Sklene, 146 individuals in Rufomberok, 83 in Banska Stiavnica, etc.), indicate the extent of animosity expressed by Slovaks that summer. 20 One of the worst acts of violence occurred on June 18, 1945 in the Moravian town of Pferov where Czechoslovak soldiers massacred 247 Carpathian German men, women and children who were travelling home to central and eastern Slovakia. 21 17 Glass heim explains that, in borderland regions where there was not a sufficient number of Czechs to run for electi on in regional "nati ona l co mmittees," reliable candidates were sent from the Ministry of the Interior to staff " nat iona l administrative boards" (narodne spravy). When enough Czechs (and, perceivably, Slovaks) populated these regions, nati onal comm ittee elections were held and the administrative boards were abolished . See Glassheim , "Ethnic Cleansing, Communi sm, and Environmental Devastation," 72. 18 Soi\a Gabzdilova-Olejnikova and Milan O lej nik, Karpatski Nemci na Slovensku od druhej svetovej vojny do roku 1953 (Bratislava: Spolecenskovedny ustav SA V, 2004), 59 . 19 Glassheim , "National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing," 473. 20 Ondrej Poss, Dejiny a kultiira karpatskych Nemcov (Bratislava: Slovak Nati onal Museum/Muse um of Carpathian German Culture, 2005), 14. 21 Ibid., 16. �88 SLOVAKIA-2017 Photo 3: Kosice's Reformed (Calvinist) Church was established in 1644, indicating Calvinism's influence in the Hungarian lands after the Protestant Reformation. Its current location, adjacent to the ancient city wall, dates back to the early 19 th century. It is a nationally-registered cultural monument. Another instance of postwar retribution took place between Christian believers who held their reformed (Calvinist) faith in common yet stood on opposing ethnic sides. Since the sixteenth century, the Reformed Church in Slovakia had been largely composed of Hungarians. However, a small Slovak contingent also co-existed, and, after the Second World War, some Slovaks were zealous in asserting their language above that of their Hungarian brethren during church services. Thus, one of the biggest areas of contention between �SLOVAKIA-2017 89 Slovak and Hungarian believers was the issue of which language would be the language of worship after the war. Officially, the Hungarian language was forbidden in public in postwar Slovakia except in liturgical services where the pre-193 8 language had been Hungarian (although this law was often ignored by anti-Hungarian Slovak believers or by local authorities). 22 In practice the language of worship was determined on a church-bychurch basis. 23 The church linguistic dispute was especially intense because many Reformed pastors claimed that preaching in the language that the people could understand was one of the primary benefits of the Protestant Reformation itself. 24 The Reformed Church presbytery in the eastern Slovak village of Zarnov (just southwest of Kosice) provides an example. It employed the following reasoning in its debate regarding conducting services in Slovak or Hungarian : The liturgical language of the Reformed Church should be performed in the language of the people. It is the biggest achievement of the Reformation. One should also take into account that [although] a large part of the population registered for re-Slovakization, they do not actually forget their Hungarian mother tongue and are not able to adapt to the Slovak language. 25 Other Slovak Calvinists, however, seized the opportunity to only sanction the Slovak language during worship. Intriguingly, a 1948 issue of Kalvinske hlasy (Calvinist Voices) describes a ceremony, presumably held at the Reformed Church in Bidovce, 12 miles (19 km) east of Kosice . At thi s service the following poem lauding the Slovak language was recited: Oh, that Slovak languageSacred language, That language of faith, 22 James R. Felak, After Hitler, Before Stalin: Catholics, Communists, and Democrats in Slovakia, 1945-1948 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 20. 23 See Felak, 18-21. 24 Sutaj, Reslovakizacia: zmena narodnosti casti obyvatelstva Slovenska po fl. svetovej vojne (Kos ice: Spolocenskovedny ustav SA V, 199 1), 14. 25 Quoted in Sutaj, Reslovakizacia, 32. �90 SLOVAKIA-2017 I know there is none in the world [like it]. If however an angel in heaven Sings to God gratefully, He must not sing to Him other than in Slovak. 26 Hungarian Calvinists faced more than the prospect of being forced to worship in a foreign language. Further hardships affected them when believers' property was confiscated, when the state refused to pay Hungarian clergy's salaries, and when these clergy were not allowed to teach or correspond with each other in Hungarian. 27 The "Purging" At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, the Allies officially sanctioned the wholesale expulsion of Czechoslovakia's over three million Germans, as long as the expulsion was conducted in a "humane and orderly" manner. 28 They did not, however, agree to the complete removal of southern Slovakia's Hungarians, of whom historian Katalin Vadkerty estimates there were approximately 600,000 by the end of the war. 29 Instead, the Allied Powers believed the " Hungarian Question" should be worked out between the neighboring countries themselves. Therefore, Czechoslovakia had to find other means of cleansing itself from its Hungarian minority. The Benes administration thus proceeded with the expulsion of the German minority and crafted three measures by which to eliminate the Hungarians. This article addresses the methods by which the Hungarian and Carpathian German minorities were purged from Slovakia and concludes with an explanation of the unintended consequences of these policies . 26 "Odovzdanie resl ovakizacnych dekretov v Bidovciach," Kalvinske hlasy, Apr. 27, 1948. 27 Felak, I 8. 28 Philipp Ther, "A Century of Forced Migration," in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, eds. Ther and Ana Si lj ak (Lanh am, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 200 I), 55. 29 Katalin Vadkerty, " Hungari ans in Postwar Slovaki a," Hungarian Quarterly , vo l. 35 (Winter 1994): 11 5. �91 SLOVAKIA-2017 ' \t KAlViNSKE HLASY (lqlkava.nia, &ts l'Zru.~neho napatia, - da. si ootubl po slave ,·lastne~ Ones fa ubi) aj Pr~hadz:l na svet Pan neba i zeme. Aty sa te. tvoj slaromam. Al\'<>je dell sa ti ui tall 111/te. Ali I hho Dl'lcho<lu. Spomlnai nl lui.sne Jm· sia, aliO v ca..~h, ked' kai.dit .va[nu dlv!'lu ii viancene doby, prriite od det.stva. Vywoovaly venoval im, aby sl do ich &tycli srde IOlllml • ~ zvlutnyin kuzlom. A pripominaly tl, semienka pllvdy. dobra 3 krisy V ducliu Vet. my ii bol pl'lp-awny privi~t Pina. n& evanjella. l ~ treto cbvlle. Tlili po tom, Pre tvoj chlad a ducho111Y upadok, • a Photo 4: ln Kosice after the war, two-thirds of the city's Reformed Church reported themselves as Slovak and one third as Hungarian. This estimate appeared in the May 15, 1946 edition of Kalvinske hlasy (Calvinist Voices). �92 SLOVAKIA-2017 The first system of ridding southern Slovakia of unwanted Hungarians was by population exchange.Jo The plan proposed that Hungarians leave southern Slovakia for Hungary while Slovaks living in Hungary would return to Slovakia and free themselves of any "magyarizing tendencies" they had acquired while living in Hungary. The aim was to restore a Slavic majority to Czechoslovakia's southern borderland, which would also provide a buffer against any future Hungarian revanchist designs. JI What is interesting about the population exchange is that, while Slovaks were allowed to voluntarily apply to move back to Slovakia, Hungarians were designated by the Czechoslovak state to return to Hungary.J 2 In total, 89,660 Hungarians relocated from Czechoslovakia to Hungary between 1945 and 1948, whereas 73,273 people voluntarily moved from Hungary to Czechoslovakia.JJ The Czechoslovak government so badly wanted to reverse the ethnic ratio in southern Slovakia that it circulated propaganda advertisements such as the following: 30 The popul ati on exchange was accompani ed by numerous hardships, experi enced by both Slovaks and Hungarians- See Rast islav Karaba, " Postoj katolickej cirkvi k vymene obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom a k umi esti\ovaniu presidlencov do Ciech a na Moravu v rokoc h 1946-1 948," in Zlat ica Saposova and Sutaj , Povojnove migracie a vymena obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom (Presov : Uni versum , 20 I 0). 31 Sutaj, Mad'arska mensina na Slovensku v rokoch 1945-1948.· vychodiska a prax {olitiky k mad'arskej men.sine na Slovensku, (Brati slava: Veda, 1993), 59. 2 Ibid ., "The Magyar Minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War" in Slovakia in History , eds. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 20 I I), 276; Ibid ., " Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority between 1945 and 1948," in Key Issues of Slovak and Hungarian History (a View of Slovak Historians), eds. Stefan Sutaj, Stefan Franko, and Igor Baka (Presov: Uni versu m, 201 1), 233 . 33 lbid .,"S lovakia and the Hungari an Minori ty," 23 3-34; Ther, 57. Of the 89,660 Hungarians exchanged fro m Czechoslovakia to Hungary per the 1958 report by the Czechos lovak Ministry of Foreign Affa irs, this fi gure includes 34,000 who were re located outside the Popul ati on Exchange Agreemen t. For example, 3 I,780 Anyas Hungarians [those who moved to southern Slovakia after the First Vienna Award] were deported en masse in the summ er of 1945. Of the 73,273 individuals who moved from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, approx imate ly 12,000 did so outside the Population Exchange in order to partake of th e benefits the Czechoslovak state offered to those who would identify as Slovak. See Sutaj, "Ethni c Development in Kos ice after 1945," Studia Historyczne 4(20 13), 4 74. �SLOVAKIA-2017 93 Do you want to become a citi zen of the victori ous Czechos lovak state? Do yo u want well-paid work in factories? Hungarian Slovaks, the Czechos lovak Republi c will not only relocate you but assure you at least as quality if not an even better economic, cultural and social environm ent than you have li ved in until now. Slovak farm ers from Hungary will cultivate fertil e Slovak land , craftsmen and entrepreneurs w ill work in Slovak firm s, and workers in Sl ovak factori es and the intelligentsia in Slovak agencies .... 34 As will be explained below, the population exchange did not materi ali ze the way authoriti es had hoped. A second means of reducing the Hungarian contingent in southern Slovakia was to deport them to work in Bohemia, many times on Czech farm s in the interior or in borderland areas . One of the primary factors for determining which Hungarians would be sent to the Czech Lands was whether or not they were able-bodied workers.35 Although deportations were carried out in three waves, the main organized deportation began on November 19, 1946.36 In total, 44, 129 Hungarians were deported to Bohemia between 1946-194 7 .37 What was troublesome about the deportations is that they occurred mainly during the winter, with deportees transported in cold wagons, under military supervision. Furthermore, many times the Hungarians who were forced to relocate had to sell their property and possessions below value. 38 Re-Slovakization (reslovakizacia in Slovak) was the final measure taken against the Hungarians to reduce their number while at the same time increasing the Slovak presence in southern Slovakia. ReSlovakization meant that those of contested ethnicity or originally of 34 Zlati ca Saposova, "St'aznosti Slovakov k vymene obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom v dokum entoch MZV C R," in Povojnove migrcicie a vy mena obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom . eds. Saposova and Sutaj (Presov: Uni vers um , 20 I 0), 192-93. 35 Sutaj, Mad'arskci mensina, 63. Sutaj notes that all able-bodi ed Hungari ans fro m Kosice and nearby towns ages 14-60 were ordered to work camps. 36 However, already as of November I, 1945, Demokrat reported that 12,000 Hungarians had been sent to the Czech lands as part of the first transport of Hungari ans to Bohemi a and Moravia. Demokrat, Nov. I, 1945. 37 Sutaj, " Magyar minority in Slovaki a before and after the Second World War," 279. 38 Ibid., "Slovaki a and th e Hungari an Minority," 238. �94 SLOVAKIA-2017 Slovak nationality but who had declared themselves as Hungarian, could apply for Czechoslovak citizenship. 39 The intent of re-Slovakization was to "make Slovak again" those who had magyarized (assimilated to the Hungarian nationality), perhaps in order to survive the war years under Hungarian rule. 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'ktor$'-h h<e,d:no1• l♦ •stH'WUH't'tidgll.,_ T•k twt1>r, ,.., -.:~..-,,nk tla.,. 150 ttYU. pat;tJC6~ -.. vark• n . . . .t•tNf •• )la.V"f n.JmA v vaDftarl a v •~« •kl4!~ ttodf'l4ta ,.,._bfl •t1Je ti:t._.._ • dn,_ u• • M..ad'an.kw obleb-taJO 10 mllt6nov♦ tt-.nkovllrr, Photo 5: "Kosice Welcomes Slovaks from Hungary," Demokrat newspaper April 5, 1946. 39 Sutaj , "The Magyar Minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War " 277 40 Ibid. • 41 Ibid ., " Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority," 232 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 95 Historian Stefan Sutaj calculates that a total of 362,679 (or just over 50 percent) of Hungarians in southern Slovakia re-Slovakized, the majority out of fear of oppression. 42 For many Slovaks, postwar re-Slovakization of Hungarians was the logical payback for being forced to assimilate to the Hungarian language and culture both during "magyarization" and from 1938-1945 . Thus, on paper, Czechoslovakia got rid of its Hungarians by means of population exchange, deportation to the Czech lands and re-Slovakization. Reality proved a different matter and is addressed later. Carpathian Germans Unlike Bohemia's Sudeten Germans, the Carpathian Germans (or Germans residing in Slovakia and Ukraine's Carpathian Mountain region) did not inhabit a single territorial block. Rather, they were primarily concentrated in three areas-Bratislava, the Spis region and the Kremnica-Pravno area. 43 Carpathian Germans had worked in this territory as miners, merchants, artisans and clerics since the 11 th century and, by the 14 th and 15 th centuries, comprised between one-quarter to one-fifth of the population in what is now 44 known as Slovakia. However, German influence in the region waned and by the Second World War only 150,000 Carpathian Germans remained in Slovakia, according to Ondrej Poss, director of the Museum of Carpathian German Culture at the Slovak National Mu45 seum. The German minority living in Slovakia began to fear for their lives when the Red Army approached eastern Slovakia in 1944, and they left the country in systematic evacuations as of November 194446 Evacuation numbers vary widely, but author Ernst Hochber- 42 Ibid; Ibid , Mad'arska mensina, 142. Pekar, 4 7. 44 Ondrej Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 6. 45 Ibid. (Germans acco unted for approximately five percent of the Slovak population in the interwar period-Pekar, 47). Additionally, many Germans in eastern Slovakia magyarized in the second half of the nineteenth century. 46 Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 14. 43 �96 SLOVAKIA-2017 ger estimates that between 57 and 85 percent of Carpathian Germans left Slovakia before 1945.47 Photo 6: Print of German blacksmith by Wilhelm Gedeon. After the war 30,000 to 40,000 returned, hoping they could continue to live and work in what had been their ancestors' homeland for 800 years. 48 Many were interned in regional camps under inhumane conditions until roughly 32,000 were sent to Germany in 1946. 49 47 Ernst Hochberger, Die Karpatendeutschen in der Slowakei (Wien: bsterr. Landsmannschaft, 20 I 0), 76. 48 Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 16. 49 Ibid .; Hochberger, 77 . �97 SLOVAKIA-2017 However, not all of Slovakia's ethnic Germans were forced to leave at the end of the war. Approximately ten to fifteen percent remained, including skilled workers who were compelled to stay and work in state agricultural and industrial firms or those who could prove their wartime resistance to fascism. 50 Some of those who did not leave benefitted from exceptional circumstances, such as Wilhelm Gedeon and his family. 51 They lived in Medzev, a town just west of Kosice known as "the Mecca of Carpathian Germans in Slovakia. " 52 I Photo 7: Wilhelm Gedeon, spring 2012 50 Matej Spumy, " Political Authority and Popular Opinion: Czechos lovakia's German Population 1948-60," Social History Vol. 37, lss. 4, 2012, 458. 51 Poss, Karpatskonemecky spolok na Slovensku 20 rokov zaloienie, rozvoj (Kosice : Karpatskonemecky spolok na Slovensku, 2010), 12. 52 "Predseda Karpatskonemeckeho spolu Wilhelm Gedeon zaii l povojnove represie i roky normalizacie," Korzar/SME, Nov. 7, 2008 . Interestingly, former President of Slovakia Rudolf Schuster (1999-2004) hails from Medzev. �98 SLOVAKIA-2017 Born in Medzev in 1922, Gedeon was 23 years old at the end of the war. In October of 1945 an armed guard came to his family ' s home and informed them they had two hours to pack for deportation. Their belongings were to be placed in a wagon and they were to report to the school courtyard where other German families were assembled for relocation to Novaky, Slovakia, and interned until deportation to Germany. Gedeon, his uncle, grandmother and other family members dragged their wagon to the courtyard to join Medzev ' s sixth wave of deportations. However, while waiting in the courtyard, they were inspected by a doctor from the Swiss Red Cross who determined Gedeon's grandmother was too ill to go. He told the guards that Gedeon ' s whole family should be allowed to return home and stay in Medzev. The guards refused, arguing that only the grandmother and the other ill family member should stay; but the doctor persisted, asking the guards how the two elderly ones would survive by themselves. Thus the entire family was permitted to remain. Unfortunately , although they continued living in their family ' s homeland, the Germans who were not expelled faced discrimination for which they were unable to seek legal recourse. As Gedeon noted in his interview, "When we [Germans] lost our [Czechoslovak] citizenship, this was a very hard truth: if anyone beat or killed us, no penalty was levied because Germans were not citizens. " 53 Gedeon later moved to Kosice, where he worked as a civil engineer and eventually became head of the post-Communist Carpathian German Society in Kosice. 54 His story is the exception, yet it is also indicative of the unanticipated consequences of postwar Czechoslovakia' s attempt at ethnic cleansing. Unintended Outcomes What, then, were the significant unintended outcomes of the government's policies, which targeted Hungarians and Germans? First, concerning the population exchange of Slovaks and Hungarians, government officials clearly misjudged the situation when they mistakenly assumed that the number of Slovaks living in Hungary 53 Wilhelm Gedeon, interview by author, tape recording, 23-24 April 201 2, Kos ice, Slovakia. 54 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 99 was only slightly smaller than the number of Hungarians in southern Slovakia 55 In actuality, 16,387 more Hungarians vacated Czechoslovakia than Slovaks returned to inhabit southern Slovakia. 56 This resulted in a problem for Czechoslovak officials who had intended to populate the southern borderland with Slovaks so as to create a barrier against potential Hungarian irredentist aspirations. Secondly, the re-Slovakization campaign did not go as planned. Although over 362,000 people in southern Slovakia changed their reported ethnic identity from Hungarian to Slovak after the war, many of these did so insincerely, providing whatever documentation necessary to re-Slovakize and remain in Czechoslovakia. Expedient, "situational" self-identification led many to affiliate with whatever nationality would allow them to stay in their families ' generational hometown, searching for stability at a time of immense uncertainty. Thousands took a chance amidst postwar chaos, deciding to reSlovakize and face whatever future challenges lay ahead at least from the known quantities of their hometowns. To a certain extent, their "insincere" decisions to identify as Slovak can be measured by the 1950 and 1961 Czechoslovak censuses, which revealed that many in the postwar period who had chosen the re-Slovakization option were ethnically Hungarian but had re-Slovakized out of fear of retaliation. 57 Sutaj records that, although some Hungarians who had " insincerely" re-Slovakized after the war did identify again as Hungarian in the 1950 census, the majority continued to identify as "Slovak." 58 Just ten years later, however, the percentage of individual s reporting as "Hungarian" on the 1960 Czechoslovak census increased by 46.4 percent from 354,532 reporting as Hungarian on the 1950 census to 518,782 on the 1960 census.59 Cultural historian Veronika Gayer, of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, describes 55 Sutaj , "S lovakia and the Hungari an Minority," 23 1. Ther, 57 and Sutaj , "Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority," 233-234. However, it is quite plausible that many of these "Slovaks" had settled in Hun ga ry centuries ago. Thus it is questionable how " Slovak" they really were. 57 Sutaj , " Magyar minority in Slovaki a be fore and after the Seco nd World War," 279. 58 Ibid ., Mad'arska mensina, 144. 59 Ibid. 56 �100 SLOVAKIA-2017 this phenomenon as experienced by the citizens of Kosice during the 20 th century: The city changed control five times in the course of one generation .... These successive turns of state were [the] results of superpower decisions, so they could never reflect the actual will of citizens. A part of the citizens of thi s multi-lingual city always lost during these changes, while another part tried to align themselves with the changes, and changed language and nationality during official surveys. Many of the bilingual, dual-identity citizens could tum Czechoslovak from one year to the next, and then two decades later tum back into Hungarians, if the authorities wanted them to do so. 60 Many in southern Slovakia adjusted their ethnic affiliation as necessary, a practice which makes precise data comparisons and analyses nearly impossible for contemporary historians .6 1 Furthermore, after the Czechoslovak Communist coup in February 1948, many Hungarians (originally from southern Slovakia) who had been deported to work in Bohemia after the war, returned home and appealed for their property and rights.62 Consequently, southern Slovakia did not become purely Slovak after all. Sutaj concludes, "Despite the definite reduction of the number of Hungarian nationnality inhabitants, nonetheless the postwar measures were in vain, and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia maintained its compactness and ethnic identity." 63 Third, an entire reli gious denomination declined as a result of postwar anti-Hungarian measures and resulting linguistic battles. ReSlovakization drastically reduced the number of members in Slovakia 's Reformed Church since many could not worship in the Slovak language and, due to the state's removal of Hungarian clergy from their posts (those who did not re-Slovakize), there were not 60 Veronika Gayer, " From Kassa to Kosice, Kosice to Kassa," in Remembering 1he City: a Guide lhrough !he Pas/ of Kosice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Alapitvany, 20 13), 124. 61 See Sutaj , Mad'arska mensina, 143-144. 62 Sutaj , Mad'arskci mensina , 154. 63 Ibid. , 155 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 101 enough Reformed pastors who spoke Slovak. 64 For example, in 1946, out of 195 active Reformed pastors, only 23 claimed Slovak nationality. Yet for eight of these 23, their nationality was questionnable (meaning they were considered to be Hungarian and were removed from their posts). On the other hand, 172 of these 195 claimed to be Hungarian and only 80 of these re-Slovakized. 65 Photo 8: Cemetery in Banska Stiavnica Thus there were too many parishioners becoming Slovak through re-Slovakization (despite the fact that many were not proficient in the Slovak language) and too few pastors who could capably lead them in the Slovak language . 64 Sutaj, "Magyar minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War," 275; Sutaj, Reslovakizacia, 31. This same problem presented itself in the postwar Roman Catholic Church, among others. 65 Ibid. �102 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Slovak Reformed Church's experience is significant because, as the overwhelming majority of believers were Hungarian and lived in southern Slovak towns such as Kosice, they naturally became targets of re-Slovakization efforts, which severely impacted the denomination across Slovakia. Sutaj points out that postwar Reformed Church leaders often noted that the decline of Calvinists in the Slovak population happened at the same time as re-Slovakization.66 He adds that the chaotic situation between Slovaks and Hungarians in southern Slovakia during re-Slovakization greatly affected the situation in the Reformed Church after 1945 .67 On the whole, the number of Reformed believers in what is now Slovakia decreased from 145,829 in 1930 to 111,696 by 1950, an almost 25 · 68 percent re d uction. In addition to the blows dealt to Slovakia's Hungarian attenuating minority, only approximately 17,000 of the pre-war 150,000 Carpathian Germans remained in the country by 1947. 69 Moreover, as was also true of the Hungarian minority, a glaring consequence of their expulsion was the loss of skilled labor and business acumen. In the First Czechoslovak Republic, 44 percent of Slovakia's Germans 70 were involved in business, trade or industry. According to figures taken from the 1952 "Equalization of Burdens Law," the Carpathian Germans of Slovakia were forced to abandon an excess of 9,800 farms, over 8,000 residential estates, more than 2,000 commercial properties, and over 1,000 forestry operations as well as 1,000 wineries.71 The state realized its mistake when it lacked workers proficient in boosting Czechoslovakia's postwar industrialization campaign. Perhaps the most shocking unanticipated outcome of the administration ' s carefully-crafted efforts was the fact that, just three years after Czechoslovakia was liberated, local Communists seized control of the republic. They quickly enacted policies much more concerned 66 Sutaj , Reslovakizacia, 31. Ibid., 32. 68 Jan Pesek and Michal Barnovs ky, Staino Moc a Cirkvi na Slovensku. 1948- 1953 (Brati slava: Veda, 1997), 13-1 8. In Kosice after the war, two-thirds o f th e city 's Reformed Church reported themselves as Slovak and one third as Hungarian . " Kosice," Kalvinske hlasy, May 15, 1946. 69 Hochberger, 77. 70 Isidor Lasslob, Die Karpatendeutschen im Spiegelbild der Zahlen (Kes mark: Vi vit-Verl ag / Karpatendeutsche Landsmannschaft Stuttgart, 2004), 8. 71 Ibid., 7. 67 �SLOVAKIA-2017 103 with Czechoslovak citizens ' class status than with their ethnic affiliation.72 The Hungarian minority remaining in the country received the right to Czechoslovak citizenship in 1948 and the German minority as early as 1949 and by 1953 at the latest. 73 The change of policy from postwar discrimination against ethnic minorities to the Communist regime's obsession with class status freed many Hungarians who had expediently re-Slovakized after the war to again identify as Hungarian on the 1951 and 1960 Czechoslovak censuses. Conclusion Although many are familiar with the postwar fate of Czechoslovakia ' s three million Sudeten Germans, it is often overlooked that roughly 600,000 Hungarians and 32,000 Carpathian Germans were forced to leave the country or assimilate at that time. As a result of the Benes administration's April 1945 Kosice Program, Czechoslovakia's German and Hungarian populations (some of whom had lived on the land for centuries) were pronounced guilty by association with Nazi Gennany and what became Nazi-controlled Hungary. This verdict represented a sharp reversal from the generous rights minorities had enjoyed during the First Czechoslovak Republic from 1918 to 1938. After the Second World War, however, Czechs and Slovaks harbored resentment for wartime injustices, and many sought retribution among their German and Hungarian neighbors . Even the Benes administration petitioned the Allies for permission to expel the country' s German and Hungarian populations. When the Allies agreed to the wholesale expulsion of the German minority but not to that of the Hungarians, the government devised three methods to rid Czechoslovakia of its over half a million Hungarians. What the Benes admini stration could not see at the time was that its efforts to expel all Germans and force Hungarians to assimilate or be relocated out of Slovakia would either fail or backfire against the future welfare of the republic. Approximately ten to fifteen percent of the Carpathian Germans were permitted to stay in Slovakia for a 72 See Pekar, 53. Sutaj , " Magyar minority in Slovaki a befo re and after the Second World War," 279-28 1; Some Germ ans received citizenship as earl y as 1949. See Spumy, 462464. 73 �104 SLOVAKIA-2017 variety of reasons. Moreover, southern Slovakia remained largely Hungarian when the population exchange was shown to be lopsided , when those deported to the Czech lands returned home, and when over 360,000 Hungarians expediently chose to falsely identify as Slovak. They did so in order to avoid recrimination, to maintain their livelihoods, to remain with their families, and/or to face unknown future challenges from the security of their hometowns. The German and Hungarian minorities who were in fact expelled from Czechoslovakia took with them a rich tradition of culture, skilled labor and entrepreneurial expertise. Ultimately, it can be argued that Benes' policies proved incomplete, ineffective and even injurious to postwar Czechoslovakia. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA-201 7 81 KICKED OUT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S POSTWAR POLICY TOW ARD ETHNIC MINORITIES AND ITS UNINTENDED OUTCOMES 1 Marty Manor Mullins Postwar Czechoslovakia was not a warm, friend ly place to be if you were a Hungarian or German in late 1945 to 1946. In fact, during his inaugural speech commemorating the reunifycation of the Czechoslovak Republic in April of 1945, President Edvard Benes proclaimed, "Our state will be a state of nations, a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else!" 2 In postwar Slovakia one could walk down the street and be confronted with slogans such as : "Kosice must be cleansed of Magyar lice!"3 or indications (such as the bullet holes riddling a local street sign named after Adolf Hitler) of widespread resentment toward the Nazi regime with which local German and Hungarian minorities were associated. Furthermore, caustic warnings appeared in the local newspaper such as the following, printed in the Demokrat daily of June 17, 1945: " ... whether the Hungarians of [the city ofJ Kosice like it or not, the Slovaks are now the masters .. . the mouths of those who do not want to speak Slovak must be shut." 4 Although many are familiar with the fate of Czechoslovakia's three million Sudeten Germans, what exactly was the situation that the country's Hungarian and Carpathian German minorities found themselves in as of late 1945? What was the cause of such vitriolic language used against them? Furthermore, how was this kind of abuse justified by their accusers? This article explores the back1 This article is based on a paper presented at the 2016 meeting of the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies on a panel entitled " Kicked Out of Czechoslovakia: The Fate of Postwar German and Hungarian Refugees, Then and Now." 2 Quoted in "t\no, zaci name ozaj novy zivot," Demokrat, Apr. 4, 1945 . 3 Szabo Lajos, Utols6 szalmaszal (Budapest: Magyar Egy haztorteneti Enciklopedia Munkakiiziisseg, 2000). 4 Demokrat, June 7, 1945 ; Stefan Sutaj, "Ethnic Deve lopment in Kosice after 1945," Studia Historyczne 4 (20 13), 4 72. 82 SLOVAKIA-2017 ground and implementation of postwar Czechoslovak policy towards its Hungarian and German populations while also elucidating several unintended yet significant outcomes of this policy 's execution, particularly within southern and central Slovakia. Pho to 1: Bullet holes riddle this street sign, formerly posted in Slovakia's Spis region and now on display in a Kezmarok museum. Back round Recall that a united Czechoslovakia did not exist during the Second World War. At the Munich Conference in 1938, Hitler capita lized on complaints from Czechoslovakia's Sudeten German minority to convince the Allies to cede the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As of March 1939, the Czech Lands of Bohemia and Moravia became a Protectorate governed and occupied by Nazi Germany, while wartime Slovakia operated as a semi-independent authoritarian state led by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. However, over I 0,000 square kilometers (c. 3,800 square miles) including cities such as Kosice in southern Slovakia were not even under Slovak control during the war. Rather, southern Slovakia had been ceded to Hungary as part of the First Vienna Award of November 1938. Thus, the Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist for the duration of the war and southern Slovak territory came under Hungarian governance for six years. At the end of the war, when the Red Army marched across Ukraine and fought its way into eastern Slovakia, Kosice was the SLOVAKIA-2017 83 first major city of the former Czechoslovak Republic to be liberated. Freed on January 19, 1945 , Kosice served as the temporary capital of reunited Czechoslovakia and the seat of President Benes. His time in the city is most associated with the "Kosice Program" which, among other objectives, outlined postwar policy toward the Hungarian and German minorities, who were declared collectively guilty for the breakup of the First Czechoslovak Republic. In the Kosice Program the postwar government reversed the generous policies of the interwar republic regarding minority populations. During the interwar period, Czechoslovakia's ethnic and religious groups were granted constitutional rights unparalleled at that time in the region, including the right to speak and educate children in their native languages as well as to form cultural associations and political parties. More importantly, they were granted equal status with Czechs and Slovaks before the law and protected from forced assimilation. 5 However, after the Second World War, these rights were rescinded. Germans and Hungarians were stripped of Czechoslovak citizenship, their property was nationalized and/or confiscated, minority schools were closed and they were ineligible to receive entitlements. 6 Of course, Czechoslovakia was not alone in its postwar forced relocation of Germans and Hungarians. In the years immediately following World War II, Europe witnessed the largest forced migration the world had ever seen .7 Resentment Czechoslovakia's German and Hungarian populations (some of whom had lived on this land for centuries) were pronounced collectively guilty by association with Nazi Germany and what became Nazi-controlled Hungary . At this time many Czechs and Slovaks sought revenge for wartime injustices and even atrocities still fresh in their memories . For instance, Slovaks in the eastern Slovak village of Nemecka Poruba (10 km north of Sobrance) endured what the Demokrat newspaper called the "eastern Slovak Lidice," referring to 5 Martin Pekar, et al., Ethnic Minorities in Slovakia in the Years 1918-1945: A Survey (Prefov : Un iversum-EU , 2011 ), 50-51 . 6 Kosicky Vladni Program Chs. VIII, X, XV . 7 For details see Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, eds. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948 (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 84 SLOVAKIA-2017 the German massacre of Czech men in the Bohemian town of Lid ice in retaliation for the assassination of Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich). 8 Towards the end of the war, the over 700 inhabitants of Nemecka Poruba had assisted partisan fighters living in the nearby forest by providing food and lodging during bad weather. Although the Germans stepped up patrols in the area, no one gave away the location of the partisans. After a surprise German raid on the village, resulting in the death of four German soldiers, most of the inhabitants fled, fearing Nazi retribution. It came swiftly when they burned the village to the ground the next day (November 2-3, 1944) and shot the eight men who remained behind. Villagers faced not only the loss of the victims but also their homes as they spent the 9 oncoming winter in underground dugouts. Photo 2: President Benes signed the Kosice Program here on April 5, 1945. Today the building houses the Eastern Slovak Art Gallery. As for their relationships with the Hungarians, Slovaks deeply 10 resented the years of forced assimilation to the Hungarian language 8 9 "Nemci vypalili obec a osem mu fov zastrelili ," Demokrat, 19 July, 1946. Ibid. SLOVAKIA-2017 85 and culture in the nineteenth century known as "magyarization," as well as the wartime massacres committed by the Hungarian Arrow Cross troops in southern Slovakia. What is more, Slovaks considered the Vienna Arbitration, which gave Hungary wartime control over southern Slovakia, to be an unjust occupation of land that had rightfully belonged to Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1938. Retribution With his April 1945 declaration that only Czechs and Slovaks deserved to remain in the republic, President Benes echoed and even gave credence to citizens' bitter sentiments toward minorities, as historian Eagle Glassheim notes. He states, "Though Benes abjured violence, his repeated public speeches on the collective guilt of the Germans must have carried great moral weight." 11 Benes' inaugural speech left little question regarding the country's forthcoming posture regarding remaining Hungarians and Germans: ... Our new home will not be new only in its relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. It must be rebuilt also in other respects.. .. This applies also towards its relationship with other nations and especially toward those Germans and Hungarians who before the war enjoyed full political rights as partners. After this war something similar is not possible. Our state will be a state of nations, a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else! 12 As is evident from the last lines of his speech, a sense of retribution for wartime injustice fueled his plan to recreate the republic as "a state of only Czechs and Slovaks and no one else!" However, another key factor in Benes' goal of ridding Czechoslovakia of its German and Hungarian minorities was the belief that allowing sizeable numbers of either minority to remain could once more jeopardize the 10 Unlike Slovak, Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, etc., which are all members of the Slavic linguistic tree, Hungarian is a Uralic language, similar only to Finnish and Estonian. It is extremely difficult for Slovaks to learn Hungarian and vice versa, and the difficulty is compounded for the older language learner. 11 Eagle Glassheim , "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947" in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, eds. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 215 . 12 Quoted in "Ano, zaciname ozaj novy zivot," Dernokrat, Apr. 4, 1945 . 86 SLOVAKIA-2017 state. Benes employed this logic as early as 1941 to appeal to the Allied Powers that, unless the Germans were expelled from postwar Czechoslovakia en masse, they might again rally to return the Sudetenland to Germany. 13 After Nazi Germany surrendered in May of 1945, local retaliation against Germans and Hungarians, which had already begun during the war, intensified. Newly-legalized procedures enabled Czechs and Slovaks to enjoy personal gain at the expense of German and Hungarian minorities. For example, the nascent Benes administration established "national committees" (narodne vybory), popularly-elected regional boards charged with bringing local order to the chaos that was pervasive in the months following the end of the wa 14 One of the national committees' most cherished responsibilities was the distribution of vacated minority properties that had been confiscated by the state. An illustration of this played out in the eastern Slovak Spis region (at the base of the Carpathian Mountains), where Slovaks had no problem reallocating their German neighbors' former properties. An article in the post-1945 Slovak newspaper Narodna Obroda (National Revival) reports that by February 4, 1945 the entire German population had already vacated the Spis region. 15 It further discussed the way abandoned German properties were handled by the newly established "national committees:" The Spis districts remain practically without Germans, whom the retreating German army took with them . The national committees in Poprad, in Spisska Nova Ves, in Levoca, Kezmarok and Gelnica procured their properties and placed fugitives from villages in them[fugitives] who [were] victims of the events of war or of barbaric German destruction. 16 Slovak national committees willingly exercised their right to confiscate and redistribute German property to those they deemed to 13 Glassheim, "The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing," 200. Ibid., "Ethnic Cleansing, Communism, and Environmental Devastation in Czechoslovakia's Borderlands, 1945- 1989," Journal of Modern History 78 (March 2006), 72. Ibid ., "National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945," Central European History 33 , no. 4 (2008), 473 . 15 "Spis bez emcov," Narodna Obroda, Feb. 4, 1945 . 14 16 Ibid. SLOVAKIA-2017 87 be deserving. Slovak historians Sona Gabzdilova-Olejnikova and Milan Olejnik characterize this era as a time of "postwar euphoria" and note the following: Accompanying this atmosphere of elation was a ri se in radicalization . Germans and Hungarians had become synonymous with evil. A majority of Slovak inhabitants did not deny themselves such measures as, ... confiscation, [acti vating] national administrative boards (ncirodne sprcivy), 17 and stripping Germans and Hungarians of their Czechoslovak citizenship. 18 At times the "postwar euphoria" turned violent, as Glassheim details in his article on the atrocities committed by locals against their former German neighbors in Bohemia and Moravia. He describes the summer of 1945 as a time when "a Wild West atmosphere reigned" before the central governmental authority was capable of averting and arraigning pogrom perpetrators. 19 The multiple mass graves of German victims discovered in Slovakia alone (187 men in Sklene, 146 individuals in Rufomberok, 83 in Banska Stiavnica, etc.), indicate the extent of animosity expressed by Slovaks that summer. 20 One of the worst acts of violence occurred on June 18, 1945 in the Moravian town of Pferov where Czechoslovak soldiers massacred 247 Carpathian German men, women and children who were travelling home to central and eastern Slovakia. 21 17 Glass heim explains that, in borderland regions where there was not a sufficient number of Czechs to run for electi on in regional "nati ona l co mmittees," reliable candidates were sent from the Ministry of the Interior to staff " nat iona l administrative boards" (narodne spravy). When enough Czechs (and, perceivably, Slovaks) populated these regions, nati onal comm ittee elections were held and the administrative boards were abolished . See Glassheim , "Ethnic Cleansing, Communi sm, and Environmental Devastation," 72. 18 Soi\a Gabzdilova-Olejnikova and Milan O lej nik, Karpatski Nemci na Slovensku od druhej svetovej vojny do roku 1953 (Bratislava: Spolecenskovedny ustav SA V, 2004), 59 . 19 Glassheim , "National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing," 473. 20 Ondrej Poss, Dejiny a kultiira karpatskych Nemcov (Bratislava: Slovak Nati onal Museum/Muse um of Carpathian German Culture, 2005), 14. 21 Ibid., 16. 88 SLOVAKIA-2017 Photo 3: Kosice's Reformed (Calvinist) Church was established in 1644, indicating Calvinism's influence in the Hungarian lands after the Protestant Reformation. Its current location, adjacent to the ancient city wall, dates back to the early 19 th century. It is a nationally-registered cultural monument. Another instance of postwar retribution took place between Christian believers who held their reformed (Calvinist) faith in common yet stood on opposing ethnic sides. Since the sixteenth century, the Reformed Church in Slovakia had been largely composed of Hungarians. However, a small Slovak contingent also co-existed, and, after the Second World War, some Slovaks were zealous in asserting their language above that of their Hungarian brethren during church services. Thus, one of the biggest areas of contention between SLOVAKIA-2017 89 Slovak and Hungarian believers was the issue of which language would be the language of worship after the war. Officially, the Hungarian language was forbidden in public in postwar Slovakia except in liturgical services where the pre-193 8 language had been Hungarian (although this law was often ignored by anti-Hungarian Slovak believers or by local authorities). 22 In practice the language of worship was determined on a church-bychurch basis. 23 The church linguistic dispute was especially intense because many Reformed pastors claimed that preaching in the language that the people could understand was one of the primary benefits of the Protestant Reformation itself. 24 The Reformed Church presbytery in the eastern Slovak village of Zarnov (just southwest of Kosice) provides an example. It employed the following reasoning in its debate regarding conducting services in Slovak or Hungarian : The liturgical language of the Reformed Church should be performed in the language of the people. It is the biggest achievement of the Reformation. One should also take into account that [although] a large part of the population registered for re-Slovakization, they do not actually forget their Hungarian mother tongue and are not able to adapt to the Slovak language. 25 Other Slovak Calvinists, however, seized the opportunity to only sanction the Slovak language during worship. Intriguingly, a 1948 issue of Kalvinske hlasy (Calvinist Voices) describes a ceremony, presumably held at the Reformed Church in Bidovce, 12 miles (19 km) east of Kosice . At thi s service the following poem lauding the Slovak language was recited: Oh, that Slovak languageSacred language, That language of faith, 22 James R. Felak, After Hitler, Before Stalin: Catholics, Communists, and Democrats in Slovakia, 1945-1948 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 20. 23 See Felak, 18-21. 24 Sutaj, Reslovakizacia: zmena narodnosti casti obyvatelstva Slovenska po fl. svetovej vojne (Kos ice: Spolocenskovedny ustav SA V, 199 1), 14. 25 Quoted in Sutaj, Reslovakizacia, 32. 90 SLOVAKIA-2017 I know there is none in the world [like it]. If however an angel in heaven Sings to God gratefully, He must not sing to Him other than in Slovak. 26 Hungarian Calvinists faced more than the prospect of being forced to worship in a foreign language. Further hardships affected them when believers' property was confiscated, when the state refused to pay Hungarian clergy's salaries, and when these clergy were not allowed to teach or correspond with each other in Hungarian. 27 The "Purging" At the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, the Allies officially sanctioned the wholesale expulsion of Czechoslovakia's over three million Germans, as long as the expulsion was conducted in a "humane and orderly" manner. 28 They did not, however, agree to the complete removal of southern Slovakia's Hungarians, of whom historian Katalin Vadkerty estimates there were approximately 600,000 by the end of the war. 29 Instead, the Allied Powers believed the " Hungarian Question" should be worked out between the neighboring countries themselves. Therefore, Czechoslovakia had to find other means of cleansing itself from its Hungarian minority. The Benes administration thus proceeded with the expulsion of the German minority and crafted three measures by which to eliminate the Hungarians. This article addresses the methods by which the Hungarian and Carpathian German minorities were purged from Slovakia and concludes with an explanation of the unintended consequences of these policies . 26 "Odovzdanie resl ovakizacnych dekretov v Bidovciach," Kalvinske hlasy, Apr. 27, 1948. 27 Felak, I 8. 28 Philipp Ther, "A Century of Forced Migration," in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, eds. Ther and Ana Si lj ak (Lanh am, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 200 I), 55. 29 Katalin Vadkerty, " Hungari ans in Postwar Slovaki a," Hungarian Quarterly , vo l. 35 (Winter 1994): 11 5. 91 SLOVAKIA-2017 ' \t KAlViNSKE HLASY (lqlkava.nia, &ts l'Zru.~neho napatia, - da. si ootubl po slave ,·lastne~ Ones fa ubi) aj Pr~hadz:l na svet Pan neba i zeme. Aty sa te. tvoj slaromam. Al\'<>je dell sa ti ui tall 111/te. Ali I hho Dl'lcho<lu. Spomlnai nl lui.sne Jm· sia, aliO v ca..~h, ked' kai.dit .va[nu dlv!'lu ii viancene doby, prriite od det.stva. Vywoovaly venoval im, aby sl do ich &tycli srde IOlllml • ~ zvlutnyin kuzlom. A pripominaly tl, semienka pllvdy. dobra 3 krisy V ducliu Vet. my ii bol pl'lp-awny privi~t Pina. n& evanjella. l ~ treto cbvlle. Tlili po tom, Pre tvoj chlad a ducho111Y upadok, • a Photo 4: ln Kosice after the war, two-thirds of the city's Reformed Church reported themselves as Slovak and one third as Hungarian. This estimate appeared in the May 15, 1946 edition of Kalvinske hlasy (Calvinist Voices). 92 SLOVAKIA-2017 The first system of ridding southern Slovakia of unwanted Hungarians was by population exchange.Jo The plan proposed that Hungarians leave southern Slovakia for Hungary while Slovaks living in Hungary would return to Slovakia and free themselves of any "magyarizing tendencies" they had acquired while living in Hungary. The aim was to restore a Slavic majority to Czechoslovakia's southern borderland, which would also provide a buffer against any future Hungarian revanchist designs. JI What is interesting about the population exchange is that, while Slovaks were allowed to voluntarily apply to move back to Slovakia, Hungarians were designated by the Czechoslovak state to return to Hungary.J 2 In total, 89,660 Hungarians relocated from Czechoslovakia to Hungary between 1945 and 1948, whereas 73,273 people voluntarily moved from Hungary to Czechoslovakia.JJ The Czechoslovak government so badly wanted to reverse the ethnic ratio in southern Slovakia that it circulated propaganda advertisements such as the following: 30 The popul ati on exchange was accompani ed by numerous hardships, experi enced by both Slovaks and Hungarians- See Rast islav Karaba, " Postoj katolickej cirkvi k vymene obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom a k umi esti\ovaniu presidlencov do Ciech a na Moravu v rokoc h 1946-1 948," in Zlat ica Saposova and Sutaj , Povojnove migracie a vymena obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom (Presov : Uni versum , 20 I 0). 31 Sutaj, Mad'arska mensina na Slovensku v rokoch 1945-1948.· vychodiska a prax {olitiky k mad'arskej men.sine na Slovensku, (Brati slava: Veda, 1993), 59. 2 Ibid ., "The Magyar Minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War" in Slovakia in History , eds. Mikulas Teich, Dusan Kovac, and Martin D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 20 I I), 276; Ibid ., " Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority between 1945 and 1948," in Key Issues of Slovak and Hungarian History (a View of Slovak Historians), eds. Stefan Sutaj, Stefan Franko, and Igor Baka (Presov: Uni versu m, 201 1), 233 . 33 lbid .,"S lovakia and the Hungari an Minori ty," 23 3-34; Ther, 57. Of the 89,660 Hungarians exchanged fro m Czechoslovakia to Hungary per the 1958 report by the Czechos lovak Ministry of Foreign Affa irs, this fi gure includes 34,000 who were re located outside the Popul ati on Exchange Agreemen t. For example, 3 I,780 Anyas Hungarians [those who moved to southern Slovakia after the First Vienna Award] were deported en masse in the summ er of 1945. Of the 73,273 individuals who moved from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, approx imate ly 12,000 did so outside the Population Exchange in order to partake of th e benefits the Czechoslovak state offered to those who would identify as Slovak. See Sutaj, "Ethni c Development in Kos ice after 1945," Studia Historyczne 4(20 13), 4 74. SLOVAKIA-2017 93 Do you want to become a citi zen of the victori ous Czechos lovak state? Do yo u want well-paid work in factories? Hungarian Slovaks, the Czechos lovak Republi c will not only relocate you but assure you at least as quality if not an even better economic, cultural and social environm ent than you have li ved in until now. Slovak farm ers from Hungary will cultivate fertil e Slovak land , craftsmen and entrepreneurs w ill work in Slovak firm s, and workers in Sl ovak factori es and the intelligentsia in Slovak agencies .... 34 As will be explained below, the population exchange did not materi ali ze the way authoriti es had hoped. A second means of reducing the Hungarian contingent in southern Slovakia was to deport them to work in Bohemia, many times on Czech farm s in the interior or in borderland areas . One of the primary factors for determining which Hungarians would be sent to the Czech Lands was whether or not they were able-bodied workers.35 Although deportations were carried out in three waves, the main organized deportation began on November 19, 1946.36 In total, 44, 129 Hungarians were deported to Bohemia between 1946-194 7 .37 What was troublesome about the deportations is that they occurred mainly during the winter, with deportees transported in cold wagons, under military supervision. Furthermore, many times the Hungarians who were forced to relocate had to sell their property and possessions below value. 38 Re-Slovakization (reslovakizacia in Slovak) was the final measure taken against the Hungarians to reduce their number while at the same time increasing the Slovak presence in southern Slovakia. ReSlovakization meant that those of contested ethnicity or originally of 34 Zlati ca Saposova, "St'aznosti Slovakov k vymene obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom v dokum entoch MZV C R," in Povojnove migrcicie a vy mena obyvatel'stva medzi Ceskoslovenskom a Mad'arskom . eds. Saposova and Sutaj (Presov: Uni vers um , 20 I 0), 192-93. 35 Sutaj, Mad'arskci mensina, 63. Sutaj notes that all able-bodi ed Hungari ans fro m Kosice and nearby towns ages 14-60 were ordered to work camps. 36 However, already as of November I, 1945, Demokrat reported that 12,000 Hungarians had been sent to the Czech lands as part of the first transport of Hungari ans to Bohemi a and Moravia. Demokrat, Nov. I, 1945. 37 Sutaj, " Magyar minority in Slovaki a before and after the Second World War," 279. 38 Ibid., "Slovaki a and th e Hungari an Minority," 238. 94 SLOVAKIA-2017 Slovak nationality but who had declared themselves as Hungarian, could apply for Czechoslovak citizenship. 39 The intent of re-Slovakization was to "make Slovak again" those who had magyarized (assimilated to the Hungarian nationality), perhaps in order to survive the war years under Hungarian rule. Furthermore, minorities who could prove active resistance to the Slovak or Hungarian wartime regimes were also permitted to gain citizenship. 40 Re-Slovakization also allowed magyarized Slovaks to avoid population exchange to Hungary. 41 .... h " " " .,.,,.,, - ,.,.,, Jll9Shf papsl Jt~ee prlv ttall Slov4kov z Mad'araka V• ._.,_._ • ~ had.. r•ll'(lo prl~ a..t. . . ata Slovdkov 11: Mwd'.ar-&9'• v .......,lQ&a .-d4cetJo 01'id.rovacet koml•fo v Novon. M.~te p,l)d Statrt)<(D. a $prl•vod& Barlr:tf'.fr9 .orrila 4,.~ ..._ •Wlloo t!ut N .. • p.-ckro(!:fla bl.br•nke.. Po, ..-.v•wr ~ Y prfvttaJ• aw b"abltJo~k.>' o ~ d•Je.-•ctu po.aL z.,..mbo.-•. lltor4 ,... ~ ....-...u. ~ chvtl'u. kli:"dy •• Sloviict • M•~•rska •~•a.J4 • - • • .oa ..,.,, p6d9 • cJtcO • . ..,.. .t:1t • esr,t. l l r f f o • ~ 1 ' 1 okr. . prtvtbll d•,..•cru komJNr Lapf.611'.. z. ko&i,e.lk:f o11.r«t t»"lvO,al 4-,qcac:lu oblaat.. OIIIW•t. Jnls,ektor T . Kand.-. z ~ ltlNV .,, ,No'¥4)-m Mute pOd $fatrom prlvftaJ deloe6cJu • poto,n. ....i.oo.-•t ~ • • ~ # ...-,,mJ f ·r ~t.Jclamt. V Kr.lf..-C b1u~cl prtvlta.f delec'\c'- mt.-t. koml94.r lv•o.. po - , 4 ~ m Obede odObnd.a ... d•f•sllcla do Tor"Qffe.. ltd• tu prlvlt ■J ~ II04Ma ~ SnO'llkO,. z M•f•f Yoronw oc:fqhral• Ml dcteg:6cfa do Tr•bllov•~ odlcla.f po ,>rf..,... a po ob.!orstil'enf Ude>b,-.Ja sa delea:Acla aut0bu$0'ffl CSD do l(ollc. O ~~ hudbu1 veoor prSfa de1elll::1cla S l .;tv4 k(>v z- .'\1ad'1u·:>ikn ..-o Ko.lfc.. Oet..-llicha prfvlW .,,,....!!'ml •Fovafflf "" m.me z•••upJteh·t-v• me:&ta K,o~rc ,,odqr(?d~eda M~V Pod~ck~. letoc'# z.dOraznlt. ff na.~fm ch:rom nfo le MovamJ proeJivi..~at. ale shurkovJ?m 5lav,u:o.. orwto a&y dobrc O(N!;:ontvalf • pO::nutvaJJ 2.lvo-t u n~s a porovo4vttll • pome,-~n:tt v M•d'a.r. . . . NA.lou ~ Je. •by v•etc1 n••f braua. ktort do(era-e trpcU v Mact•nkv. 11.11 ,.,,..tlll _... 4t, va...tl. •e4:d svaJtch.- t.m kde od vekov p•h"S. • tlbJI" •vo..-110 spo,l u a n•0:tt po~ I v bq(fo,rat•r-11:-, J>r'•C'I T• h1:pltu budi.t enost Ropu.bUky_ Potom prhrfta1 a:eUY<:tt ~ z.. Ro. • M•d'llr!5lc• prHMlda ONV ,1un:n!fu.. h!rr# fnfp,. l(undur • f:aJw 0$ KoJ,,.k . V u-.ene 6.ra.dftlk osfdro,,,ncef kttrnlsrc Svehla. V d<.t..-.cU Sfnv.l.kn:v !Iii M111cf•r~k• fo Ya$fflpe ..-#d, 18 ob4-f ~ o,bla.-U SA.toTa11»'"1Jh•ly. De1e,x'd"" A :sdi'.lt $l<Wen.ak-t.1 ••t J dut. C!efom di!'J,eatd• Je ~C.tlf, •k• pom,e.. y •d • ., ••• 1~<::J•hi• tu• ~o,dr,,.om: $c1o.ctt;aku. Urn •m•NlG fl•fl :Sl-o• vCd • ob.ad S.Uon.ll•u.1b•1y.,J• \o JtOClhoi,tt•h• .. V .. . - . b'f'aUa, • Mad'.,a.r,.:k• ~- uuHm&IG MAt.ci. t'l! ~IMdmf ea., _ ... ·•Plilbbky• l ~ "6«> le ,......., rd!ov• f -.urnlna• ••fbllttt•~ Ct~ovta 40,..,a:4~1.,. •4 _.dea • itvftanirn. •f• .-J s vomcrmt o n.i,mu.lC.d, •fro to vfdtet « fcb :ll•da.t:lch tv4.rf_ -.,. $1"'4•Wom ,.~hovore. kt,Qrl •• vlcdc,! ~•.., .M.v_.m-, v•~a,e otl dp.rlmn• ~t•lt1vaU no '-.l:M.. •kir>ro n.-.no'lfu:rna PQt1t•ry v Ma(fatsko ta& v mbt•Joatl, •kc aJ drn...,_ "la n•fdf,:nnu:Ju alt.ti• - . 41v.J6 • uac:Uentm a t.&ra ••- -fe a.a $.tl,Qn.~r k,!i, •U11CD,1• Iii. lrar.eble . . bud~ t;ql!ict V7'ttlt m~dd « v - - . .,._ ~ .. HO .., df-.td Ma\fari na o.kl_fuvta,e'lu •~,;ia ~.-hr.IL I• maffusJc:~ oby~ 'lt'H.,.,.. ..,..tidc-;r t az.•vl&U,YQ a 6n4y. b~cl Wb-ffv-. .,,.<::h._..,._,_ •llctt v OstTety, . . dnthd ____, .,. ~ - a.Ito lfll " " ' ' · '11'0 Y~t•ttm. ...._ Y ......... ~ h P: 'd.u'IO., n•fl'ft• • IUt..,._ ~.. f♦ t,1-ch, kkk-f prihl.twnt ~ "dtfo oralotiff 4a ....ivaai-,_,,.,., ...., . . . , _ ,._4•nka. Y ~ 1 . - u ~ t'_... m•dar,. . . ~ . - - st fftlbh ~V,IIQv. v-Ok•t,- '"' . . . . . . . . . ..,,.,,., 4iU wdt $fe~d t0f'(t ~u\ta ......._ ':a t#M~ . . IN-6 fm afc;ty~lc- t~ul)" 4 ► ....., ............. ..,... 1<1) w,I • • ~ • l ) tom. • ............ ,....• ..._,..._._.~•altou kr4tlcym veriovao)'-w orfv•tom. d•to1 oav.de1¥""a4d~ Slov•kov z Mndarwk• zad'akov•t l'oJ:,yU 11'.Ultf:t-,. ddta. uvfr.d lt, la hoct POdl• drll!dneJ matla.T$lu1J 11-t•H-s ~l..kv o,a! bye n.-.,,r. "' ot••h<-.i fht.Jab1Ul.~\t. 1,r,n ted«n StO"'•k. ,=el• nMC , . . . 19venak'-. N-. otllriru <, bot-p,odl..rs.kyi;.h pom•r<teh , Nlad'w.~\r-u • ;ffYOU.Om Prf•me:r• t•MoJ.lhl'bQ ~lo• "1e-1'a. h,n 1'tn1.lllf"CV•n• k#vlt ,ui.tc:ov. Ta><: !faPr d¥"ra l'-1••~, ~ f 1h••hH1( v M•d&l"llh tn.f: d • - •f-..t _ , IIJ .-ttt. 1>•~.a. l!a t:tetn ~...-~ ~..,. •*•tw. lt-(h>lf tt!'dfhl .... 'l-'.t.14, ~fn•du• n.1• <-•14! dv• k1r Jflbllol f"l•J• konm• tn• p.->1n~• yy-.01t• h-od nr:ttu • '"'• c•"• ,:tAle "rdr,11. l"'t.h, ,,,.,d nechlvno"' ,to n:ia.!tch Jv}nJn sulln Jt,cff-n " i,o-t rn;lll~• i:te,n-3 dnc-~ 1,:1 c~n• 1M N;C. t• ta fflil. Ptm•6. Robot111k v Mad1ar-.skt1, 1ii;,,..r9 l)l>df• vl~becnel u,l•-olry I• M.•dar:f.kn J,e: rnftvo. HOU) v~•'"'"' "odn.lky •lok •tona ft-t!-U';'."1V1.eobocit• O:lolno p0V4td.a(, ... V ,taller,flc- pla,en:t, dois-·h1no okofo f.-den • -poJ rn._ ,. n4l!IO-O<h,fk4 •• ttl-m«T nit!. Nlk'lq nd'lvntute. lobo kattltliht nl.ot.. D<,my-.. lnor:i, bo1y rotv61::tw6, •tl o.. t,,tl$len~. v~21.de •d rllmqvl•k• *-kO tell une:c'hata val'na. O(,r,r•vr,d PQffl~r,• Ml V'lfrnl s!..,_ Mof1110 cwvodat. L♦ fd1tl•n tv~l>Odil'.tka •ltut.c.Jw. &J♦ i:~i-kov4 PMl'.htf y v4k~.. •-0 u;f talt._ •ls:• lw)ly • • ~'"""'•n•tr.v htt•d' v pr-vJ'c.b d.lt&etl 1lo v-t"-eltffatt.f fr°"tu. V•tfflt •tt ,. to o•Jma a olac..-vwnfm a it f)bn~. 'ktor$'-h h<e,d:no1• l♦ •stH'WUH't'tidgll.,_ T•k twt1>r, ,.., -.:~..-,,nk tla.,. 150 ttYU. pat;tJC6~ -.. vark• n . . . .t•tNf •• )la.V"f n.JmA v vaDftarl a v •~« •kl4!~ ttodf'l4ta ,.,._bfl •t1Je ti:t._.._ • dn,_ u• • M..ad'an.kw obleb-taJO 10 mllt6nov♦ tt-.nkovllrr, Photo 5: "Kosice Welcomes Slovaks from Hungary," Demokrat newspaper April 5, 1946. 39 Sutaj , "The Magyar Minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War " 277 40 Ibid. • 41 Ibid ., " Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority," 232 . SLOVAKIA-2017 95 Historian Stefan Sutaj calculates that a total of 362,679 (or just over 50 percent) of Hungarians in southern Slovakia re-Slovakized, the majority out of fear of oppression. 42 For many Slovaks, postwar re-Slovakization of Hungarians was the logical payback for being forced to assimilate to the Hungarian language and culture both during "magyarization" and from 1938-1945 . Thus, on paper, Czechoslovakia got rid of its Hungarians by means of population exchange, deportation to the Czech lands and re-Slovakization. Reality proved a different matter and is addressed later. Carpathian Germans Unlike Bohemia's Sudeten Germans, the Carpathian Germans (or Germans residing in Slovakia and Ukraine's Carpathian Mountain region) did not inhabit a single territorial block. Rather, they were primarily concentrated in three areas-Bratislava, the Spis region and the Kremnica-Pravno area. 43 Carpathian Germans had worked in this territory as miners, merchants, artisans and clerics since the 11 th century and, by the 14 th and 15 th centuries, comprised between one-quarter to one-fifth of the population in what is now 44 known as Slovakia. However, German influence in the region waned and by the Second World War only 150,000 Carpathian Germans remained in Slovakia, according to Ondrej Poss, director of the Museum of Carpathian German Culture at the Slovak National Mu45 seum. The German minority living in Slovakia began to fear for their lives when the Red Army approached eastern Slovakia in 1944, and they left the country in systematic evacuations as of November 194446 Evacuation numbers vary widely, but author Ernst Hochber- 42 Ibid; Ibid , Mad'arska mensina, 142. Pekar, 4 7. 44 Ondrej Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 6. 45 Ibid. (Germans acco unted for approximately five percent of the Slovak population in the interwar period-Pekar, 47). Additionally, many Germans in eastern Slovakia magyarized in the second half of the nineteenth century. 46 Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 14. 43 96 SLOVAKIA-2017 ger estimates that between 57 and 85 percent of Carpathian Germans left Slovakia before 1945.47 Photo 6: Print of German blacksmith by Wilhelm Gedeon. After the war 30,000 to 40,000 returned, hoping they could continue to live and work in what had been their ancestors' homeland for 800 years. 48 Many were interned in regional camps under inhumane conditions until roughly 32,000 were sent to Germany in 1946. 49 47 Ernst Hochberger, Die Karpatendeutschen in der Slowakei (Wien: bsterr. Landsmannschaft, 20 I 0), 76. 48 Poss, Dejiny a kultura, 16. 49 Ibid .; Hochberger, 77 . 97 SLOVAKIA-2017 However, not all of Slovakia's ethnic Germans were forced to leave at the end of the war. Approximately ten to fifteen percent remained, including skilled workers who were compelled to stay and work in state agricultural and industrial firms or those who could prove their wartime resistance to fascism. 50 Some of those who did not leave benefitted from exceptional circumstances, such as Wilhelm Gedeon and his family. 51 They lived in Medzev, a town just west of Kosice known as "the Mecca of Carpathian Germans in Slovakia. " 52 I Photo 7: Wilhelm Gedeon, spring 2012 50 Matej Spumy, " Political Authority and Popular Opinion: Czechos lovakia's German Population 1948-60," Social History Vol. 37, lss. 4, 2012, 458. 51 Poss, Karpatskonemecky spolok na Slovensku 20 rokov zaloienie, rozvoj (Kosice : Karpatskonemecky spolok na Slovensku, 2010), 12. 52 "Predseda Karpatskonemeckeho spolu Wilhelm Gedeon zaii l povojnove represie i roky normalizacie," Korzar/SME, Nov. 7, 2008 . Interestingly, former President of Slovakia Rudolf Schuster (1999-2004) hails from Medzev. 98 SLOVAKIA-2017 Born in Medzev in 1922, Gedeon was 23 years old at the end of the war. In October of 1945 an armed guard came to his family ' s home and informed them they had two hours to pack for deportation. Their belongings were to be placed in a wagon and they were to report to the school courtyard where other German families were assembled for relocation to Novaky, Slovakia, and interned until deportation to Germany. Gedeon, his uncle, grandmother and other family members dragged their wagon to the courtyard to join Medzev ' s sixth wave of deportations. However, while waiting in the courtyard, they were inspected by a doctor from the Swiss Red Cross who determined Gedeon's grandmother was too ill to go. He told the guards that Gedeon ' s whole family should be allowed to return home and stay in Medzev. The guards refused, arguing that only the grandmother and the other ill family member should stay; but the doctor persisted, asking the guards how the two elderly ones would survive by themselves. Thus the entire family was permitted to remain. Unfortunately , although they continued living in their family ' s homeland, the Germans who were not expelled faced discrimination for which they were unable to seek legal recourse. As Gedeon noted in his interview, "When we [Germans] lost our [Czechoslovak] citizenship, this was a very hard truth: if anyone beat or killed us, no penalty was levied because Germans were not citizens. " 53 Gedeon later moved to Kosice, where he worked as a civil engineer and eventually became head of the post-Communist Carpathian German Society in Kosice. 54 His story is the exception, yet it is also indicative of the unanticipated consequences of postwar Czechoslovakia' s attempt at ethnic cleansing. Unintended Outcomes What, then, were the significant unintended outcomes of the government's policies, which targeted Hungarians and Germans? First, concerning the population exchange of Slovaks and Hungarians, government officials clearly misjudged the situation when they mistakenly assumed that the number of Slovaks living in Hungary 53 Wilhelm Gedeon, interview by author, tape recording, 23-24 April 201 2, Kos ice, Slovakia. 54 Ibid. SLOVAKIA-2017 99 was only slightly smaller than the number of Hungarians in southern Slovakia 55 In actuality, 16,387 more Hungarians vacated Czechoslovakia than Slovaks returned to inhabit southern Slovakia. 56 This resulted in a problem for Czechoslovak officials who had intended to populate the southern borderland with Slovaks so as to create a barrier against potential Hungarian irredentist aspirations. Secondly, the re-Slovakization campaign did not go as planned. Although over 362,000 people in southern Slovakia changed their reported ethnic identity from Hungarian to Slovak after the war, many of these did so insincerely, providing whatever documentation necessary to re-Slovakize and remain in Czechoslovakia. Expedient, "situational" self-identification led many to affiliate with whatever nationality would allow them to stay in their families ' generational hometown, searching for stability at a time of immense uncertainty. Thousands took a chance amidst postwar chaos, deciding to reSlovakize and face whatever future challenges lay ahead at least from the known quantities of their hometowns. To a certain extent, their "insincere" decisions to identify as Slovak can be measured by the 1950 and 1961 Czechoslovak censuses, which revealed that many in the postwar period who had chosen the re-Slovakization option were ethnically Hungarian but had re-Slovakized out of fear of retaliation. 57 Sutaj records that, although some Hungarians who had " insincerely" re-Slovakized after the war did identify again as Hungarian in the 1950 census, the majority continued to identify as "Slovak." 58 Just ten years later, however, the percentage of individual s reporting as "Hungarian" on the 1960 Czechoslovak census increased by 46.4 percent from 354,532 reporting as Hungarian on the 1950 census to 518,782 on the 1960 census.59 Cultural historian Veronika Gayer, of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, describes 55 Sutaj , "S lovakia and the Hungari an Minority," 23 1. Ther, 57 and Sutaj , "Slovakia and the Hungarian Minority," 233-234. However, it is quite plausible that many of these "Slovaks" had settled in Hun ga ry centuries ago. Thus it is questionable how " Slovak" they really were. 57 Sutaj , " Magyar minority in Slovaki a be fore and after the Seco nd World War," 279. 58 Ibid ., Mad'arska mensina, 144. 59 Ibid. 56 100 SLOVAKIA-2017 this phenomenon as experienced by the citizens of Kosice during the 20 th century: The city changed control five times in the course of one generation .... These successive turns of state were [the] results of superpower decisions, so they could never reflect the actual will of citizens. A part of the citizens of thi s multi-lingual city always lost during these changes, while another part tried to align themselves with the changes, and changed language and nationality during official surveys. Many of the bilingual, dual-identity citizens could tum Czechoslovak from one year to the next, and then two decades later tum back into Hungarians, if the authorities wanted them to do so. 60 Many in southern Slovakia adjusted their ethnic affiliation as necessary, a practice which makes precise data comparisons and analyses nearly impossible for contemporary historians .6 1 Furthermore, after the Czechoslovak Communist coup in February 1948, many Hungarians (originally from southern Slovakia) who had been deported to work in Bohemia after the war, returned home and appealed for their property and rights.62 Consequently, southern Slovakia did not become purely Slovak after all. Sutaj concludes, "Despite the definite reduction of the number of Hungarian nationnality inhabitants, nonetheless the postwar measures were in vain, and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia maintained its compactness and ethnic identity." 63 Third, an entire reli gious denomination declined as a result of postwar anti-Hungarian measures and resulting linguistic battles. ReSlovakization drastically reduced the number of members in Slovakia 's Reformed Church since many could not worship in the Slovak language and, due to the state's removal of Hungarian clergy from their posts (those who did not re-Slovakize), there were not 60 Veronika Gayer, " From Kassa to Kosice, Kosice to Kassa," in Remembering 1he City: a Guide lhrough !he Pas/ of Kosice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Alapitvany, 20 13), 124. 61 See Sutaj , Mad'arska mensina, 143-144. 62 Sutaj , Mad'arskci mensina , 154. 63 Ibid. , 155 . SLOVAKIA-2017 101 enough Reformed pastors who spoke Slovak. 64 For example, in 1946, out of 195 active Reformed pastors, only 23 claimed Slovak nationality. Yet for eight of these 23, their nationality was questionnable (meaning they were considered to be Hungarian and were removed from their posts). On the other hand, 172 of these 195 claimed to be Hungarian and only 80 of these re-Slovakized. 65 Photo 8: Cemetery in Banska Stiavnica Thus there were too many parishioners becoming Slovak through re-Slovakization (despite the fact that many were not proficient in the Slovak language) and too few pastors who could capably lead them in the Slovak language . 64 Sutaj, "Magyar minority in Slovakia before and after the Second World War," 275; Sutaj, Reslovakizacia, 31. This same problem presented itself in the postwar Roman Catholic Church, among others. 65 Ibid. 102 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Slovak Reformed Church's experience is significant because, as the overwhelming majority of believers were Hungarian and lived in southern Slovak towns such as Kosice, they naturally became targets of re-Slovakization efforts, which severely impacted the denomination across Slovakia. Sutaj points out that postwar Reformed Church leaders often noted that the decline of Calvinists in the Slovak population happened at the same time as re-Slovakization.66 He adds that the chaotic situation between Slovaks and Hungarians in southern Slovakia during re-Slovakization greatly affected the situation in the Reformed Church after 1945 .67 On the whole, the number of Reformed believers in what is now Slovakia decreased from 145,829 in 1930 to 111,696 by 1950, an almost 25 · 68 percent re d uction. In addition to the blows dealt to Slovakia's Hungarian attenuating minority, only approximately 17,000 of the pre-war 150,000 Carpathian Germans remained in the country by 1947. 69 Moreover, as was also true of the Hungarian minority, a glaring consequence of their expulsion was the loss of skilled labor and business acumen. In the First Czechoslovak Republic, 44 percent of Slovakia's Germans 70 were involved in business, trade or industry. According to figures taken from the 1952 "Equalization of Burdens Law," the Carpathian Germans of Slovakia were forced to abandon an excess of 9,800 farms, over 8,000 residential estates, more than 2,000 commercial properties, and over 1,000 forestry operations as well as 1,000 wineries.71 The state realized its mistake when it lacked workers proficient in boosting Czechoslovakia's postwar industrialization campaign. Perhaps the most shocking unanticipated outcome of the administration ' s carefully-crafted efforts was the fact that, just three years after Czechoslovakia was liberated, local Communists seized control of the republic. They quickly enacted policies much more concerned 66 Sutaj , Reslovakizacia, 31. Ibid., 32. 68 Jan Pesek and Michal Barnovs ky, Staino Moc a Cirkvi na Slovensku. 1948- 1953 (Brati slava: Veda, 1997), 13-1 8. In Kosice after the war, two-thirds o f th e city 's Reformed Church reported themselves as Slovak and one third as Hungarian . " Kosice," Kalvinske hlasy, May 15, 1946. 69 Hochberger, 77. 70 Isidor Lasslob, Die Karpatendeutschen im Spiegelbild der Zahlen (Kes mark: Vi vit-Verl ag / Karpatendeutsche Landsmannschaft Stuttgart, 2004), 8. 71 Ibid., 7. 67 SLOVAKIA-2017 103 with Czechoslovak citizens ' class status than with their ethnic affiliation.72 The Hungarian minority remaining in the country received the right to Czechoslovak citizenship in 1948 and the German minority as early as 1949 and by 1953 at the latest. 73 The change of policy from postwar discrimination against ethnic minorities to the Communist regime's obsession with class status freed many Hungarians who had expediently re-Slovakized after the war to again identify as Hungarian on the 1951 and 1960 Czechoslovak censuses. Conclusion Although many are familiar with the postwar fate of Czechoslovakia ' s three million Sudeten Germans, it is often overlooked that roughly 600,000 Hungarians and 32,000 Carpathian Germans were forced to leave the country or assimilate at that time. As a result of the Benes administration's April 1945 Kosice Program, Czechoslovakia's German and Hungarian populations (some of whom had lived on the land for centuries) were pronounced guilty by association with Nazi Gennany and what became Nazi-controlled Hungary. This verdict represented a sharp reversal from the generous rights minorities had enjoyed during the First Czechoslovak Republic from 1918 to 1938. After the Second World War, however, Czechs and Slovaks harbored resentment for wartime injustices, and many sought retribution among their German and Hungarian neighbors . Even the Benes administration petitioned the Allies for permission to expel the country' s German and Hungarian populations. When the Allies agreed to the wholesale expulsion of the German minority but not to that of the Hungarians, the government devised three methods to rid Czechoslovakia of its over half a million Hungarians. What the Benes admini stration could not see at the time was that its efforts to expel all Germans and force Hungarians to assimilate or be relocated out of Slovakia would either fail or backfire against the future welfare of the republic. Approximately ten to fifteen percent of the Carpathian Germans were permitted to stay in Slovakia for a 72 See Pekar, 53. Sutaj , " Magyar minority in Slovaki a befo re and after the Second World War," 279-28 1; Some Germ ans received citizenship as earl y as 1949. See Spumy, 462464. 73 104 SLOVAKIA-2017 variety of reasons. Moreover, southern Slovakia remained largely Hungarian when the population exchange was shown to be lopsided , when those deported to the Czech lands returned home, and when over 360,000 Hungarians expediently chose to falsely identify as Slovak. They did so in order to avoid recrimination, to maintain their livelihoods, to remain with their families, and/or to face unknown future challenges from the security of their hometowns. The German and Hungarian minorities who were in fact expelled from Czechoslovakia took with them a rich tradition of culture, skilled labor and entrepreneurial expertise. Ultimately, it can be argued that Benes' policies proved incomplete, ineffective and even injurious to postwar Czechoslovakia.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Kicked Out: Czechoslovakia's Postwar Policy Toward Ethnic Minorities and its Unintended Outcomes Description An account of the resource Marty Manor Mullins Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017 pp. 81-104 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mullins, Marty Manor, 1976- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6fbf43c30ea1a69b8bf5ca4a38f7eaae.pdf e0bca1903ec8f6402c47e71ec1ec36a3 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA-2017 105 INVOKING THE NATION, STRENGTHENING DEVOTION: NATIONAL DISCOURSE AT THE SLOVAK NATIONAL PILGRIMAGE 1 Alexander Bielicki "At first glimpse it seems as if Catholicism and nationalism represent two opposite poles that can never level out or meet. And yet, nationalism finds its culmination point in Catholicism." - Jozef Tiso 2 The September 15 th Slovak National Pilgrimage to the National Basilica on the national holiday dedicated to the national patron offers Catholic leaders in Slovakia the rare opportunity to talk about the nation more or less freely in the public sphere. Since Slovakia's independence, several Slovak Catholic leaders have stirred up controversy regarding their stances on the activities of the Catholic Church and its clergy during the World War II semi-independent authoritarian Slovak state, as well as regarding some contemporary clergymen's tacit support for fascist organizations that commemorate the leaders of the WWII state, like the above-quoted President Jozef Tiso. 3 These instances have spurred perceptions of the Catholic Church in Slovakia as nationalist, a perception that reduces the public opportunities during which the Church may legitimately talk about the nation and reflect upon the connections between nation and Church. The annual Slovak national pilgrimage to Sastin provides a unique case study of how Catholic leaders discursively construct and use the concept of the nation in evangelization. Apart from the instances when Church leaders use nationalism in an attempt to reclaim or repaint the history of the Catholic Church during World 1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the ASN World Convention, Columbia University, 18-20 April 2013. 2 Miroslav Kocur, "For God and Nation: Christian National Populism" in National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006 - 2009 (Forum Minority Research Institute: Samorin - Samorja, 2009), 223 . 3 Ibid. , 221 - 45 . �106 SLOVAKIA-2017 4 War II , the nation is sometimes "talked and performed," not for what might be ca lled nati ona list goals, but instead, for what might be call ed reli gious goa ls. "Talking the nation" is not necessarily done in order to make the nat ion more sa li ent and make people more national. The inclusion of national discourse can be done in order to accomplish a wide variety of goa ls. In instances such as the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin , the nation may be used fo r evangelization. My intention here is not to offer a typology of national discourse in the re ligious field , but rather to point to some of the ways that the concept of the nation can be (and has been) used by Catho lic leaders in Slovakia. The examp les presented herein demonstrate not only the taken-for-granted nature of national frames for viewing and understanding the world, even in the g loba l Catholic Church; they a lso illustrate some of the ways the " nation" can be used . By analyzing materia l from the homili es presented each year at the Slovak National Pilgrim age, I wi ll illustrate these connections between religious devoti on and nationa l fidelity. In foc us are the homilies delivered from the independence of S lovakia in 1993 to 2011. 5 In the se speeches from the pulpit in Sasti n, bishops, archbishops, and occasionally cardina ls address the meaning of the holiday, the perce ived successes and fai lures of society, and the importance of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows for Slovak ia. Because of the nature of these homilies and the ritual focus of thi s holiday, I wi ll here look at the ways in w hi ch the Virgin Mary is connected to th e Slovak nation on these occas ions. Pilgrimage Context In Slovakia, pil grim ages and holidays are two of the most common events through which Marian theology is experienced by devotees and advanced by the c lergy. One can find about a dozen Marian holidays on the Slovak liturgica l ca lendar, but only one of them is connected w ith a state ho liday. The Slovak National Pilgrimage takes place every year on September 15, the Sviatok Sedembolestnej Panny Marie (O ur Lady of the Seven Sorrows Holid ay). It has been 4 The fo rmulati on of "talking, performing, consuming and choosing the nat ion" comes from Fox, Jon and Cynthi a Mil ler- Idriss, " Eve ryday Nati onh ood," Etlinicities, 8 (2008): 536 - 63. 5 This study is based on research an d fieldwork co mpl eted between 2008 and 20 12. �SLOVAKIA-2017 10 7 a national holiday since 1993 (first celebrated as such in 1994). The pilgrimage to the small western Slovak town of Sastin (Sastin-Straze since 1971) traces its roots to a founding miracle in 1564 and the subsequent carving of the Sastin pieta sculpture in thanks to the Virgin Mary, which would eventually become the ritual focus of later pilgrimages. The influence of this site grew rapidly under Empress Maria Theresa and her husband Francis of Lorraine, who partially funded the construction of a cathedral to house the Sastin pieta. In 1927, Pope Pius XI declared Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as Patron saint of the region of Slovakia. 6 In 1964, Pope Paul VI elevated the Sastin cathedral to the status of Basilica Minor, the first in Slovakia. 7 In the years following, the Sastin cathedral would come to be known as the National Basilica, and more recently, the September 15 event would come to be known as the Slovak National Pilgrimage. Recent pilgrimages at Sastin have drawn approximately 20,000 worshippers per year, the overwhelming majority of whom are Slovaks from Slovakia. In addition, several television and radio stations broadcast the day 's events so that individuals may participate without making the trek to this small town. The event even brings a number of influential clergy, politicians and cultural figures as guests of honor. In fact, one of my respondents stated that the attendance of politicians at Sastin was what set it apart from other pilgrimages: "state representatives even go to this pilgrimage - they do not go to other pilgrimage sites." 8 For all of the differences among the participants in the Sastin pilgrimage, they share a religiously-oriented habitus. 9 By this, I do not mean that they are all Catholic, but that the vast majority of them are socialized into a specifically conservative, Slovak version of Catholicism. It can be understood as an environment where social, moral and linguistic issues expressed in a certain idiom 6 She is referred to as patronka Slovenska (the patroness of Slovakia), though she is more common ly understood as the patron of the Slovak nation as opposed to the Slovak state, an important distinction given the multi-national character of Slovakia. 7 Peter Zubko, "Baziliky mensie na Slovensku: ich prava a povinnosti" (Basilica Minors in Slovakia: Their Rights and Obligations), Nave Horizonty, I (2009): 40 45 . 8 Alexander Bielicki, A Nation in Worship ? Constructing Nationhood and Devotion at the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin, Ph .D. dissertat ion, University of Oslo, 2012. 9 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I 99 I). �108 SLOVAKIA-2017 are easily understood to be a part of the regular (acceptable) di scourse, and are shaped by the conditions and conventions within this particular societal framework. Bourdieu, in his essays on language and power, 10 calls these types of factors "structured dispositions." One of these structured dispositions would be towards Marian devotion. While levels of devotion to Mary differ among Slovak Catholics, the vocabulary of Marianism is ubiquitous throughout the country, and Marian symbols can be easily understood by most Catholics. Throughout Slovakia, there are hundreds of churches and chapels dedicated to the Virgin, and the number of Marian shrines is countless. Controversia l historian Milan Durica places the number of Marian churches and chapels in Slovakia at over 1200, with more than 200 dedicated to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. 11 Slovak Cardinal Jozef Tomko, among others, places the number of churches and chapels dedicated to Our Lady of Seven Sorrows at around 250 12 Paintings, statues, prayers and songs heavily feature Mary, especially as the Sorrowful Mother, and she is a frequent subject of Slovak folk art of various media. The pieta is one of the more commonl y found Catholic images in the country. The Virgin Mary has become a powerful national symbol in many Catholic countries. While in Slovakia, the Virgin Mary does not receive any national titles as lofty as "Queen of Poland," "Queen of the Croats" or "Queen of Mexico," her status as national patron has been deeply woven into the fabric of the national canon. As Cardinal Tomko, the long-tenured Prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (the office responsible for all missionary activities of the Catholic Church), acknowledged in hi s 1997 homil y, For us Slovaks, Seven Sorrows Day goes ri ght to the heart . For us, the picture of the Sorrowful Mother is engraved on our soul since childhood . We saw it in churches as well as in homes, on the Calvaries and in the chape ls, on the Ways of the Cross, and finall y also on the pl ates and popular embroidery. We rece ived respect fo r Mary of the Seven 10 Ibid. Milan S. Durica, S/owici a Sedembolestna: Kulturno-historicky nacrt (Brati slava: Luc, ustav dej in krest'an stva, 2008). 12 Cardinal Jozef Tomko, Homil y presented at th e Nati onal Bas ili ca in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, Zivot Crkvi, 17, No. 37 (2010). 11 �SLOVAKIA-2017 109 Sorrows almost with our mother's milk. 13 The connection between Mary and the Slovak nation fostered in these words is very self-aware. Statues, paintings, plates, needlework and other material goods associated with Mary can be found in every comer of Slovakia. Cardinal Tomko notes that the connection between individuals and the Virgin Mary is fostered from childhood and the material reminders found throughout the country are no doubt partly responsible for this transmission between generations. Slovak church leaders use the Virgin Mary (specifically in her incarnation as Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows) in a variety of ways to reify, and even to symbolize, the nation. They use the history of Marian devotion in Slovakia to homogenize Slovak religiosity and to provide justification for the claims of Marianism as a fundamental characteristic of Slovak national identity. However, the Marian aspects of the national pilgrimage do not only relate to the ways in which national identity is portrayed. Many different levels of identity, beyond the national, are referenced in the event and many differrent social groupings find relevance. Gender, family, denomination, moral and social communities all play roles in this event, and they are all tied in one way or another to Marianism. 14 For the purposes of this article, though, I will focus primarily on the discursive connections between Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the Slovak nation. The inclusion of all these different roles-these different ways of identifying- demonstrates the clergy's reaction to late modernity. The homilies of the event highlight the challenges to various roles an individual may play in society: those connected with nation, with gender, with family, sometimes even with political affiliation. The Catholic Church, which in many ways appears to cling to out-offashion social models (although this has been somewhat challenged since the election of Pope Francis), utilizes the problems and language of late modernity to reinforce its claims, and one of the ways that this is accomplished is through the manner in which the politics 13 Cardinal Jozef Tomko, "Misijne poslanie a Sedembolestna." Homil y presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia. Katolicke noviny, 112, No. 40 (October 5, 1997). 14 Alexander Bielicki , A Nation in Worship ? Constructing Nationhood and Devotion at the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oslo, 20 12. �110 SLOVAKIA-2017 of identity are framed. If one of the markers of the "modem era" is the insistence on unitary identity, then the corresponding marker of the "late modem era" is the multiplicity of identity, and the fact that the successful person displays competence in navigating through all of their different identity roles. The inclusion of this multiplicity of identity roles in the pilgrimage homilies demonstrates the clergy ' s reaction to the so-called pathologies of the late-modem period, and demonstrates how the symbol of the Virgin Mary can be used as a modem tool to advance traditional goals: by providing a unitary self, guided by Marian devotion, that can be deployed in roles and situations. Suffering as Nexus What sets the Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows homilies apart from the homilies delivered for other Marian celebrations is that the biblical information presented in connection with the holiday and pilgrimage focuses on her sorrows and suffering and not on other aspects of her life and story. Suffering, whether revealed as a tragedy or a gift, is the lynchpin that binds the otherwise diverse elements, both catechismal and historical , of the event's homilies. The importance of this distinction is that it highlights a different side of Mary, a different face . Not that this particular interpretation of the Virgin Mary differs from the overall canon of Marian references, but that it selects certain aspects of it to be given primacy. The presentation of these aspects heightens specific types of responses to Mary: they promote a view of Mary as protector, specifically protecttor of the nation, and as picture of grace under suffering. Other roles such as mother, teacher, etc. are given relatively minor attention, expect for when they are related to suffering. The ubiquitous nature of the Virgin Mary not on ly serves as a constant reminder of the strong tradition of Marian devotion, it encourages her multivocality as a symbol. Religious historian Brian Porter notes that in the Polish Marian cult, one of Mary's most important roles is that of the Hetmanka, or military protector of the nation. 15 In the Netherlands, the Lady of All Nations devotional cult is 15 Brian Porter, " Hetmanka and Mother: Representing the Virgin Mary in Modern Poland," Contemporary European History, 14, No . 2 (2005) : 154 �SLOVAKJA-2017 111 centered on the idea of Mary as redeemer. 16 In the Slovak case, however, the suffering of the Virgin Mary is highlighted above all else when linking her to the nation. This type of discourse is used by the clergy not only for moral and religious lessons, but also to reify the nation by creating what I call a shared vocabulary of suffering, especially in reference to national history and the life of the Virgin Mary. From Bishop Gabris' 1984 homily, Our Slovak nation has suffered terribly. When things were bad for our nation, it could only beseech supernatural aid. Our believers also felt that no one in the world suffered such as Our Lady when she held in her arrn s the dead body of her own son. Therefore, no one in the world 17 18 could understand the suffering of our nation as she does. The theme of suffering creeps into the discourse and symbols of the Sastin pilgrimage, and this is one of the things that sets the event apart from others. In marked contrast to most other Marian events in Slovakia, the national pilgrimage to Sastin is thematically concentrated on suffering. While other pilgrimages may contain references to the suffering of Mary, only events specifically dedicated to the Mater Dolorosa, Our Lady of Sorrows, are discursively framed around suffering to this extent. Her pain peaked when she meets Jesus in the street, on the last day of his life, as a criminal amid a furious crowd, carrying the cross to the gallows-flogged, spat-upon, and crowned with thorns. How can she feel when she hears the sound of the murderous nails being hammered into his hands and feet , when she sees Him in immense pain stretched between heaven and earth? How can her heart endure the endless three hours of His agony? And yet, she, frail woman, standing beneath her son's cross, on whi ch she is also crucified. She stands unbroken in soul, not beaten down by the weight of the relentless pain . She stands under the cross, even when the terrible sword stabs a living wound in the 16 Peter Jan Margry, " Paradoxes of Marian Appariti onal Contestation: Networks, Ideology, Gender, and the Lady of All Nations," in Moved by Mary: The Power of Pilgrimage in the Modern World, Hermkens, Anna-Karina and Willy Jansen, and Catrien otermans, eds. ( Farnham: Ash gate, 2009), I 87 17 Bold typeface, mine. 18 Bishop Julius Gabris, Homily presented at the Natio nal Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September 16, 1984. <htt ://blo 0 .chri st-net.sk/? =node/340 >, accessed February 8, 2009. �112 SLOVAKIA-2017 heart. 19 The theme of suffering allows for discourse and symbols not only concerning Mary's suffering, but suffering in society as well: the crisis of the family, legalized abortion, moral relativism, the suffering of the nation, etc. This is one of the particularities of the Sastin pilgrimage: the focus on Marian suffering in connection with the suffering of everyday life opens up the door to a discussion of the many different forms of societal identity. The ways in which these forms of suffering are presented and the ways in which they are linked together offer some suggestions as to what the employment of Mary as a symbol of suffering might be meant to accomplish. Today we celebrate the holiday of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and here is an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of our national existence and to ask how is it that we Slovaks, through the long centuries, knew to resist so that the ferocious waves of history would not devour and bury us? We are of a nation who didn't have a kingly dynasty to rule in our castles, and we can ' t boast of famous victories. However, our nation reached one victory that, after a thousand years of silence and living without freedom we were able to overcome, so that today we find ourselves among the nations of Europe. We know from national history how difficult our ancestors fought for their existence, for their living space, for their language, for their faith , for their culture. They fought ; they won, because in this struggle they freely took refuge in the Mother of God. 20 In his 2007 homily (above), Bishop Secka offers the holiday as "an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of our national existence." This suggests that a salience of nation should exist for Slovak Catholics, and that a salience of Catholic identity should be present in Slovakia. His framing of "we" around an ethnic identity assumes an all ethnically Slovak audience, which is in fact not the case at Sastin. His words presume a long, uninterrupted history, but reduce that his19 Tomko, Cardinal Jozef. " Misijne poslanie a Sedembolestna," Homily presented at the National Basilica in SaWn-Straze, Slovakia, Katolicke noviny, 112, No. 40 (October 5, 1997). 20 Bishop Stefan Secka, Homily presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September 15, 2007. <http://www.magnificat.sk/htm02/homsas. htn_:i. >, accessed February 8, 2009 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 113 tory to a simple story of hard-working, oppressed, Catholic Slovaks who were victims of constant external pressure. This homily assigns an independent will and desire to the nation, not just individuals. The homily also speaks of a victory for the Slovak nation, a victory that can only be assumed to be the realization of the Slovak state, the ultimate reward for any national project. This type of rhetoric ignores the fact that the creation of the Slovak nation-state resulted from the intractable arguments of a small group of political elites and not from any plebiscite.21 This notion projects backwards in time the seemingly self-evident nature of the Slovak nation requiring a Slovak state, that this process was the unfaltering will and destiny of the nation. Furthermore, it portrays the realization of a Slovak state as an event that can be at least indirectly attributed to the intercession of Mary. Bishop Secka's 2007 homily is not unique among the Sedembolestna homilies. In many ways it echoes the 1984 homily given by Bishop Julius Gabris where he stated: Our nation, dear brothers and sisters, survived the hard times and was saved only because it relied upon Marian devotion. I mentioned only the three incidents: the extinction of the Great Moravian Empire, the invasion of the Tatars and the 150-year plundering of our territory by the Turks. In these times, all preconditions were met by which our Slovak nation should be completely devastated, torn from the earth. And yet still, it was not extinguished! Why not extinguished? Only because it relied on God's help and on the help of the Mother ofGod. 22 These words link the contemporary Catholic Church and the history of the Slovak nation in a chain of suffering. Furthermore, while the history detailed in the homily seeks to present the Slovak nation's suffering and its unwavering devotion to Mary, this version of history also reinforces the continuity and homogeneity of the Slovak nation. Anthropologist Richard Handler notes that a "negative vision of the struggle for survival presupposes the positive vision of collective unity and maturity - for how can an entity that does not in the first 21 Stefan Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 22 Bi shop Julius Gabris, Homily presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September I 6, I 984. <http: //blog.christ-net.sk/?q=node/340 >, accessed February 8, 2009. �114 SLOVAKIA-2017 place exist run the risk of disintegration?"23 However, this is not merely a simple reification of the nation through building a collection of past sufferings. This formulation not only reifies the nation, but it also reifies a contemporary vision of the Slovak nation, imagining it as an unchanged group occupying the same territory since before the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. While discursive use of the Virgin Mary might function to construct difference along national lines when these national boundaries also reflect religious boundaries, it is not so effective when constructing difference between Slovaks and non-Slovak coreligionists. Furthermore, discursively constructing the Slovak nation as devotees to Mary ignores the heterodox religious history of Slovakia. Most interestingly, though, the others who are constructed in these homilies are not the most salient ethnic others in the Slovak context. The nationalization of political life in Slovakia is often defined in reference to Slovak-Hungarian national divisions within the country; however, this doe s not appear to be the driving factor behind national differentiation for the Church, at least in regards to how difference is organized in the proceedings of the national pilgrimage to Sastin. In fact, it is not uncommon for homilists to invite ethnic Magyars [Hungarians] into the fold .24 That being said, the use of the national frame by church leaders at the national pilgrimage seems to be constructed in reference to Western Europe, conceived as a group of secular nations, as opposed to being constructed in reference to their Hungarian Catholi c neighbors. In this sense, devotion and devotional practices become a way for the Church to organize not on ly religious difference, but national difference as well. This orientation creates formulations whereby secularized Slovaks are ignored or considered agents of the secular " West. " In other words, these practices of national differentiation more resemble the politics of Slovaks differentiating themselves from Czechs at the beginning of the 1990s than they resemble the patterns of national differentiation from Magyar speakers throughout the 1990s and beyond. 23 Richard Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec (Madi son: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 5. 24 Ca rdinal Jan Chrzyostom Korec, "Tvorivou lasko u," Kato/icke noviny. I 15, No. 39 (September 24, 2000). �SLOVAKIA-2017 115 Let us entrust to our heavenly patron also the future of Slovakia in the community of European nations with the hope that Europe will be built with the recognition of its Christian roots, as the Holy Father relentlessly reminds us, and that in that our nation maintains its own identity based on Christian culture and its values. We do not want to lose ourselves and to be diluted in such a European community that would be governed by secularized humani sm and liberal individualism, without respect for the principle of Christian so lidarity.25 The further highlighting of issues presented within a national context attests to the way the Church in Slovakia has reacted and continues to react to various factors at the state, supranational and international level. Presenting the national, projecting the national, within the narrative of the Slovak nation as a Catholic nation acting as a minority, a righteous minority (especially against the backdrop of oppression throughout history at the hands of foreign powers), allows for the Church to talk about social issues of Catholic concern - abortion, chief among them - as an extension of the historical battle waged by the Catholic Slovak nation in the name of righteousness. The mill has been started, where they intend to grind the stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, the guide for the past and present life of our nation for more than one thousand years. For what is life if a man can kill the terminally ill and the unborn?26 National elements woven into the fabric of the devotional movement to Our Lady of Seven Sorrows recapture the idea of the Slovaks as a small nation , fundamentally Christian if not Catholic, being pushed around by larger powers: those that advocate a program that lessens the emphasis on a Judeo-Christian morality system as the defining characteristic of Europe. Using examples from proposed hi storical sufferings of the Slovak nation, whether at the hands of 25 Bishop Jozef Zlati\ansky, "Zverme sa Sedembolestnej." Homily presented at the National Bas ilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia. Katolicke noviny,. 11 8, No. 40 (October 5, 2003). <htt ://www.katnovin .sk/Kn 2003/40 2003/obnova. htm >, accessed on February 8, 2009. 26 Bishop Stefan Secka, "Matka viery, Matka nadeje," Homily presented at the Nati onal Basi lica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, September I 5, 2004. <http://www. blu me nta l. sk/caso is/rok 2004/10-2004/cl04.htm>, accessed on September 21 , 2009. �116 SLOVAKIA-2017 Turks, Tatars, Magyars, Czechs or others, homilists propose a continuity of oppression aimed at Slovaks, despite the realization of the ostensibly Slovak nation-state. Indeed, the role of religion and the politics of national identity in any society are heavily contingent upon the form of the state, and in this case, supranational governance. Without the split of Czechoslovakia or the entrance of Slovakia into the European Union, undoubtedly a different structure of whom the Slovak nation is defined against would emerge, thereby influencing how the boundaries between "us" and "them" are drawn. Even though some references to past injustices faced at the hands of European neighbors appear in the homilies, they are rare. Besides those few examples, the nationalizing language of the event is not overly exclusionary in nature. It is of course highly focused on positive portrayals of the in-group, but for the most part, the out-groups (i.e. Western Europe) appear as abstractions. In other words, even though much of the nationalizing language stemming from the homilists promotes something that I wou ld not call an inclusive vision of the nation, it is certainly more inclusive than the militant and chauvinistic national orientations found in some corners of Slovak society. For the homilists, ideology (i.e. religious orientation) seems to have been the primary division; however, religious differrentiation has been communicated through national differentiation - in essence, nationalizing religious life. National History or Catholic History? In many of the examples from the homilies, the historical Slovak nation is presented as in constant battle, or in a constant state of suffering. In 1928, Slovak Catholic priest and politician Ferdis Juriga posited seven sorrows of the Slovak nation to correspond with the seven sorrows of Mary27, and several Sastin homilies reference these periods of suffering, especially the Tatar and Turkish invasions. According to Juriga, the seven sorrows of the Slovak nation were (1) the migration of the Magyars to the Danubian Basin and their defeat of the Slavic peoples who lived there; (2) the repression of Catholics in the Kingdom of Hungary, 1044 - 1046; (3) the Tatar invasion, 27 Jana Moricova, "Sastinska Sedembolestna patr6nka Slovenska," Marianske Putnicke Miesta na Slovensku: Zbornik z vedeckej konferencie konanej (Rufomberok: Katolicka univerzita v Ru fo mberku, 2007), 20 - 26 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 117 1241 - 1242; (4) the Hussite incursions across Upper Hungary, 1431 - 1458; (5) the Turkish wars, 1526 - 1683; (6) the spread of Protestantism and the split of the nation between Catholic and Protestant faiths; (7) and the rampant poverty that led to mass emigration. 28 Mentioning any of these seven moments in the homilies for Our Lady of Seven Sorrows Day discursively connects national suffering and the Virgin Mary, specifically in her incarnation as Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. They also link historical struggles and the overcoming of those struggles with present day struggles and the possibility of overcoming them. According to tradition, during the Tatar invasion in I 241 our families fled into the forests, to where the hordes would not dare to go; our ancestors carried with them Marian pictures and statues, especially of the Sorrowful Mother. In the 15 th century, families in our lands possessed reliefs of the Sorrowful Virgin Mary, which at that time had been produced from baked clay at the command of King Matthias Corvin us. In 1470, when the Turkish invasion was already threatening, Jan Vitez, the archbishop of Esztergom, specifically recalled as an ancient, historical custom, that in difficult times our ancestors turned to the Sorrowful Virgin Mary for help and appealed to her so that they might devote themselves to her in the time of danger. His successor, Archbishop Juraj Selepceni, before the decisive battle with the Turks near Vienna in 1683, gave his soldiers medallions with a picture of the Sorrowful Mother in order to invoke her assistance. Even the old folk song from the Turkish wars " By Trencin's Gate" is a plea to the Virgin Mary from the Slovak heroes before leaving for battle: "God and Mary help us, to be a happy Slovak land." The tradition of devotion to the Sorrowful Mother stretches across our whole history ... 29 As can be seen in the above excerpt, the homilists construct history around a core of Marian devotion . Historical struggles, whether framed as national, Catholic or Christian, are layered around this central theme of Marian devotion. In Cardinal Tomko 's 2010 homily, the history of the region is portrayed as a series of invasions and invocations of Mary's assistance in prevailing despite the harsh conditions. While these invaders fell upon the Kingdom of Hungary, 28 Ibid. Cardinal Jozef Tomko, Homil y presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, Zivot Crkvi, 17, No. 37 (20 10). 29 �118 SLOVAKIA-2017 Cardinal Tomko refers repeatedly to the victims of the invasion as "our ancestors," framing the history of the Slovak lands as the history of the Slovaks. The tradition of Marian devotion is "recalled as an ancient, historical custom" of the Slovaks. Cardinal Tomko takes the negative histories of war and struggle and the positive histories of Marian devotion out of their historical context in the Kingdom of Hungary, and makes them exclusive property of the Slovak nation . In other words, the Slovak nation is written into history as a protagonist, even into historical periods during which the nation was not a salient category of identification. The Church, then, uses this opportunity to present a very specific Slovak Catholic version of national history, a version that portrays Marian devotion as a fundamental characteristic of Slovak national identity that is both consistent through time and ubiquitous through the territory of Slovakia. In other words, the national history presented in the Sedembolestna homilies is both essentializing and homogenizing, (so that a more coherent set of narratives can be easily presented). By-and-large, during the event, Slovak national identity and the Slovak nation is not portrayed as under siege, the way that nationalist politicians often paint the picture. Yet it is portrayed as a minority nation, and a suffering nation. Within the framework of Slovakia, those who consider themselves to be ethnically Slovak have a clear majority; however, during the pilgrimage the Slovak nation is often presented in the context of the world stage, or at least the European stage. In other words, the ethno-national situation of Slovaks in Slovakia is omitted from the discourse of the event, and the situation of Slovaks in a broader context is presented instead, so as to highlight Slovaks ' minority status in Europe. Therefore, the episodes of historical suffering mentioned earlier find a new context in which to be expressed in the present structure of governance. This extension of history, for the most part, is not malicious in intent towards its European neighbors (or against the faceless "society" mentioned often in the homilies). However, there are some Slovak nationalists, who use the rhetoric stemming from Church sources as a validation of their claims. Therefore, that is where the de facto national Church and some Slovak nationalists intersect. There is a crossover between their ranks, but these individuals and sub-groups do not usuall y act as the driving forces behind the Church in Slo- �SLOVAKIA-2017 119 vakia or Slovak nationalist organizations. Portraying the Church in Slovakia as nationalist, as often happens, is misleading, or rather, an oversimplification. They produce discourse that may aid some nationalists ( especially those nationalists who find importance in the Catholic nature of the nation), but this is not the primary goal of their discourse. Their primary goal seems to be evangelization and connecting various levels of social identity to the Church. In this process, the nation is just one of many leve ls of identity fostered and connected with the Church. By stepping away from simply labeling certain actions stemming from the Slovak Church as nationalist, and looking to the purpose and function of using the nation, a clearer picture emerges regarding the processes actually occurring. Shared System of Discourse In the celebration of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as national patron, the dominant themes of the event are that of suffering and sorrow. In a sense, we can envision this as a shared vocabulary of suffering within the larger shared system of discourse. Whether a detailed telling of the Seven Sorrows endured by Mary, the perceived one-thousand years of suffering of the Slovak nation since the end of the Great Moravian Empire or the evils of abortion, the dominant tropes are 'tragic' in nature. This accentuates "an economy that capitalizes on human suffering, valuing it not as the absence or disfavor of God, but as a grace or favor that viscerally connects the devout with the sufferings of Jesus, Mary, and the saints." 30 Essentially, suffering functions as the hub that links all of the spokes of the wheel; it is a gift given and a gift received; but most of all, suffering frames the introduction of social identities to the event. In the homilies of the event, the homilists demonstrate ways of talking about national identity, Catholic identity, Christian identity and even European identity. The ways in which the event is nationnally framed by church leaders- and the ways in which pilgrims talk, choose, perform and consume the nation-provide space for the nationalization of objects, spaces, bodies and symbols. This space 30 David Morgan, "Aura and the Inversion of Marian Pilgrimage: Fatima and Her Statues," Moved by Mary: The Power of Pilgrimage in the Modern World, Hermkens, Anna-Karina and Willy Jansen and Catrien Notermans, eds. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 63 . �120 SLOVAKJA-2017 allocated for nationalization does not exist at many other large-scale Catholic events in the country apart from Sastin, at least during the years surveyed in this study. Furthermore, the homilists build a history that intertwines Catholic and national pasts. They provide pilgrims with the discursive tools to deal with numerous societal issues in a Catholic way. They tum national life, political life and even family life into Catholic life. In other words, they demonstrate a Catholic way of talking about social life that is meant to be transferred outside of the religious field , or at least to broaden the religious field . Pilgrims and church leaders together contribute to the definition of social identities, not necessarily making agreements on how to live these identities, but how to articulate these identities. One elite project found in the discourse of the pilgrimage is the attempt to create a shared system of discourse in order to talk about devotional life and to discuss social issues within a Catholic framework. The pilgrimage at Sastin, then, is one of the large-scale events in which the Church does maintenance work to this shared system of discourse. I would suggest that a shared discourse could buttress the role of the Church and the role of Catholic identity in the country, even if membership in the Church is sometimes considered " lukewarm. " This type of maintenance work is done on every Sunday in the churches and at church-officiated events throughout the lives of people. The Slovak national pilgrimage to Sastin provides a stage on which to address the proposed importance of devotional identity to a large audience at the same time, and to construct a way for Catholics to talk about the social issues that affect them . This type of maintenance is accomplished through countless different pilgrimages; however, it is the peculiarities of the Sastin pilgrimage that allow for a greater opportunity to engage issues of identity outside of devotional identity. Creating a shared discursive system can be seen as one of the byproducts of evangelization, and this system is a prerequisite for most of the pastoral work in which the Church engages. In other words, the Church needs to have this shared discourse in place in order to navigate the challenges of its pastoral care effectively. The pilgrims need to be a part of constructing this discourse, because in order for the Church to be an important identity marker in their lives, they need to be able to find a way to articulate their place in the body of the Church, and likewise their position in society in relationship to �SLOVAKIA-2017 121 the Church. Such a system is created through evangelization and a general socialization into religion; in other words, through creating a religiously literate society. Cultural historian Callum Brown uses the idea of a collapse in shared discourse to explain the fate of Christianity in Britain. 3 1 In Britain, as well as across western and northern Europe, the socialization of young people into Christianity has largely stopped. The Christian cultural forces in society that socialize new generations into recognizing a Christian identity in themselves have lost their voices, with the result that many young people in those countries no longer acquire a basic literacy in Christian symbols and Christian history. In Slovakia, the opposite is the case. Basic cultural competencies in Christianity maintain a shared discourse between Church and society; and in Slovakia, there appears to be a relative strengthening of a shared discourse, which often frames issues, whether political or religious, as national. It is this shared discourse, especially about suffering, that allows for some of these connections between Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the Slovak nation. During the pilgrimage, Church leaders present suffering as a gateway to understanding Marian devotion; they extend Marian suffering as a metaphor onto their flock. Coupled with this presentation, the nationally framed aspects of the pilgrimage allow this suffering to be extended via relevant social groupings, like the nation, family and gender. It is presumeptuous to assume that homilists should reference social groupings based on gender, or kinship, or nation, and so on; that they are somehow more natural or salient than other social groupings. We do not see roles connected with class, or the idea of class at all enter into the homilies. However, in religious fields influenced by liberation theology in Central and South American, nothing would be more natural or salient than the reification of class identity. The ability to load Mary with meaning does not assume the successful transmission of those meanings; however, the ways in which Mary is discursively packed with meaning gives us a window into the uses of Marian symbols and the possible lived-in worlds where the symbols and words might have the ability to make an impact. Examining the way that the homilists use the concept of suffering in 31 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case (London : Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002), 20. �122 SLOVAKIA-2017 their reaction to the outcomes of modernity, presented in a context where the topic of identity is central to holiday and pilgrimage, shows how a vast number of different identities are related to Mary. The suffering of the nation, the crisis of the family , the widespread legal nature of abortion, the crisis of governance, the intrusion of consumerism, and the relativism of (Western) Europe are all connected to Mary's suffering. Any of these connections between perceived suffering of the individual and the perceived suffering of Mary can serve to reinforce the importance of Marian devotion in the life of the pilgrim. Modernization seems to accentuate the divides regarding gender, class, ethnicity, religion, etc ., and the homilists' discourse does not seek to attenuate them; instead, they are discursively reframed so that each of these identities are reified and simultaneously connected with Mary. The encouragement of communitarianism- be it in family , kin , social community, moral community, nation or other groups- is also consistent with the Church ' s stance against individualism. In that sense, one of the primary functions of this type of pastoralization and evangelization is to combat the so-called cult of the individual and to reinforce membership in social groups that are considered meaningful. By reinforcing membership in social groups consistent with the messages of the Church, so too may they encourage the ro le of Marian devotion in these groups, claiming Marian devotion not just as something which should be a fundamental characteristic of Catholics, but of Europeans, the Slovak nation, the family and even the body politic. Constructing a Theology of the Nation One of the things occurring during this pilgrimage event is that Church leaders are seeking to reinvigorate the societal influence of Catholic teaching and the Catholic Church. Their efforts at evangelization seek to make Catholic doctrine influential in society, and to make Catholicism matter for individuals and institutions beyond the religious field ; in other words, to move beyond the sphere of personal salvation. They are doing so by making Marianism important to social identities outside of religious identity, national identity being one of them . They are weaving national identity into the religious sphere, and in doing so, constructing what I call a theology of the �SLOVAKIA-2017 123 nation. "Grace does not destroy secular realities, or demand abandoning them for religious ones. Rather, grace includes, builds upon and potentially transfigures the sphere of the natural. The implication of this is that nationality can be one of the loci where responsible intelligence can ground theological consideration." 32 Dorian Llywelyn's, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality, 33 is one of the first of its kind to explore the connection between nationality and Catholicism in terms of theology. Llywelyn's treatment approaches nationnal identity not simply as subordinate to devotional identity, as has usually been the case in the Catholic Church, but as a locus of devotion. An academic exercise such as this would not have been possible in the past. Several factors account for the feasibi lity of Llywelyn's project in the present, one of which is the reforms of the Second Vatican Council that brought national practices, national languages and national discourse further into the Catholic Church. Perhaps another reason, although I do not have hard evidence to support the claim, is the election of Pope John Paul II in 1978. I would suggest that his election brought nationality into the Church by introducing a Central European, and specifically Polish, understanding of nationality to the papacy, one built on a long tradition of connecting the Church to the nation, which considered the Catholic Church as the repository of the nation in response to the Polish partitions between Orthodox neighbors to the east and Protestant neighbors to the west. In addition, the simple fact that John Paul II was the first non-Italian pope in hundreds of years, and was even commonly referred to as "the Polish pope," made nationality matter in the Church in a way it previously had not. For these reasons and others, positing a theology of nationality, or a theology of the nation as I would prefer to call it, becomes more plausible in the present day. In addition, I believe that Llywelyn ' s choice to academically engage the relationship between nation and religion supports the fact that the Catholic Church, specifically the Slovak Catholic Church, is increasingly engaging social identities outside of purely devotional ones; and that they first connect devotional identities to other social identities, and then must develop theology to substantiate these connections (in this case, the 32 Dori an Ll ywe lyn, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality (New York : Lexington Books, 20 I 0), 4. 33 Ibid . �124 SLOVAKIA-2017 nation and national identity). Church leaders foster a communitarian spirit based around many different types of identity, national among them, in order to fight against the crisis of the postmodern (and the relativism and secularism of Europe). In creating a theology of the nation, the Slovak church uses the nation as one of its primary loci for evangelization. This creates a situation where the nation is purported to be a natural place to locate and build devotion; however Church leaders connect the nation and Church in many other instances as we ll. In the media, in cross-border ecumenical counci ls and in other situations, church leaders may talk or act nationally, but that does not mean that they are creating a theology of the nation. A theology of the nation goes a step further, by writing national history, national characteristics and national practices into the teachings of the Church, indeed constructing national history, characteristics and practices in the process. Creating a theology of the nation involves producing the nation, not just using it in discourse. In the Slovak national pilgrimmage to Sastin, these national elements are sacralized in order to support forms of Marian devotion found in the event. As Llywe lyn notes, "revealed Christian truth" not only corresponds to national experience; national experience becomes part of "revealed Christian truth. "34 But this is more than simply sacralizing the nation : it collapses national and devotional values into one another, it creates a shared discourse and it writes the nation into the unofficial theology of the Church: "unofficial," because it cannot be realized in dogma or scriptural accounts, and "theology" because it becomes part of Church doctrine and teaching. "The task of a theology of nationality is to investigate the relationship between the mystery of Christ and the human experience of being a member of the nation."35 In the case of the Slovak national pilgrimage, a theology of the nation explores the connection between the nation and Mary, more so than between the nation and Jesus. The nation protects Mary, and vice-versa. The nation suffers with and for Mary. The nation embodies Mary . The nation becomes part of the Marian narrative, just as Mary has become part of the national narrative. This may seem unusual at first, but as Llywe lyn notes, human 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 125 experience can indeed be a source for theology.36 When church leaders construct a theology of the nation, something different is happening from when church leaders speak about the nation in other instances, as in the media. In the context of the holiday event, Church leaders can more freely speak about these things because they are addressing these issues in the religious field, not venturing outside their field of competence. But it is not only that. Church leaders act as authorized delegates of the Church, especially in their role during the Pontifical Mass, the ritual focus of the pilgrimage celebration. As such, the delegated authority of the Church is behind them when they connect Church and nation in the ritual event ( outside of Church matters, their authority may be questioned). Church leaders build complex connections between Church doctrine and the nation. Using Mary as a symbol, they connect her suffering with the suffering of the nation. In this sense, just as the Polish nation is often spoken of as the Christ among nations, the Slovak nation could easily be referred to as the Virgin Mary of nations because of the shared vocabulary of suffering. Church leaders intertwine Catholic history of the region with Slovak national history. They use the practices of ancestors to justify the national connection to the Catholic Church. They further justify the connection by citing the Slovak experience under communism, and show the present significance of the connection in relation to new European structures and programs. Homilists construct the national past in a way that it becomes part of a greater narrative of eventual salvation. In other words, national history is the middle part of the salvation story, after biblical accounts and before eventual salvation. In fact, the nation can be envisioned as a vehicle for salvation. The nation is framed as important for the survival of the Church and its values. Catholicism and Marian devotion are defining characteristics of the Slovak nation. Therefore, the event (and especially its discourse) creates a role for the nation in the life of the Church and a role for the Church in the life of the nation. The Church targets national units, as well as other social configurations, because it needs state, national and other established units to activate connections with the Church and connections with Catho36 Ibid. �126 SLOVAKIA-2017 lie identity in ways that are not just personal and refl ective. The Church needs groups to survive, not just individuals;37 therefore, it not only practices communitarianism, it attempts to ground its activation of comm unitarianism in theology. It deploys thi s communitarian discourse over many societal levels (national community, family/kin, gender, local community, the Catholic Church, the Christian world). It posits a relationship between these communities, a relationship that gives added importance to the Church. Therefore, the Church's activation of nationhood in an event such as this is not instigated by some inherent nationalism in the Slovak Church (or nationalist program), but it is mostly pragmatic. It is part of a comprehensive system that uses the discourse and practices of communitarianism across many (crosscutting) societal levels to achieve certain goals. In fact, such a comprehensive system that allows for identification across many levels is from where Mary, as a symbol , derives much of her power. Her multi-vocality is the key to her success as a symbol. But why organize on a national level given the multi-national nature of the country and the international nature of the Catholic Church? Partly, it is because the Church is already divided into territorial units such as dioceses and archdioceses that are frequently bounded within states, and sometimes within formal or informal national territories. In that sense, the Church is merely activating the already instituted divisions within its structure. Also, the language of living nationally has been used for various social projects in the Slovak lands since the mid- I 800s, and it was especially used by Church leaders for social projects in the 1930s and 1940s, and in reaction to Communism. But this construction does not just reflect the convention of using the nation as an organizing principle. The institution of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as national patron, and the institution of a state holiday celebrating her, give the Church a greater inroad to nationalize the sacred, and sacralize the nation (at least the aspects of the nation institutionally connected with Catholicism and the Church) . Yet another reason for Catholic leaders to organize nationally stems from the way power is distributed in the European environ37 Massimo Rosati , Ritual and the Sacred: A Neo -Durkheimian Analysis of Politics, Religion and the Self (Farnham : As hgate, 2009), 17. �SLOVAKIA-2017 127 ment and the way the nation is constituted in the pilgrimage event. Church leaders can see that successful social action in Europe need not be created through majority will; it can also be organized around minority nations, minority viewpoints, etc. The organization of projects, labeled as minority projects, can sometimes provide access to governmental power that is often otherwise lacking. The narrative of the Slovak nation as a minority (in Europe) despite its own (albeit contested) nation-state discursively creates a situation in which nationhood matters. Nationhood is not frequently salient for most of the population of Slovakia in everyday life, but it can be easily activated (partly because of the multinational nature of the state, which almost constantly reinforces the nation as an organizing principle in politics). Also, the nation is just one facet of this communitarian landscape employed by the church. Apparently, the Catholic Church in Slovakia finds it useful, because the Sastin pilgrimage is growing in numbers, and nationalizing language has become more frequent during the 2000s (not necessarily in connection with rising nationalism). Of course, Church leaders do not construct a theology of the nation in a vacuum. So what is the role of the celebrants of this holiday in the creation of a theology of the nation? I would suggest that they are involved in this process in the ways they talk the nation, perform the nation, choose the nation and consume the nation in relation to this religious event. One of the biggest ways they choose the nation is simply by choosing to take part in the Slovak national pilgrimage, but living nationally for the pilgrims is certainly not limited to that one choice. The nation is reflected and constituted in the symbols that the pilgrims use, in the objects and spaces with which they interact and in the ways that they talk about the event. In addition, they are crucial partners in the exchanges and negotiations between church leaders and pilgrims. Without them, the event has little to no importance. Without them, the voice from the pulpit has no real power, only delegated authority. Constructing a theology of the nation is about creating a future for the connection between nationhood and devotion . Even when church leaders cannot negotiate about the future of the nation or Catholic Church, as visions for both of these vary even among Slovak Catholics, they can manipulate the conditions so that nationhood and devotion will at least be a part of future public conversations and negotiations. Mainly, this is accomplished through the creation of a �128 SLOVAKIA-2017 shared discourse. Constructing a theology of the nation structures the conditions of future exchanges because it institutes national factors into devotional practices, thereby ensuring that these factors and practices will form and inform future discussions that involve national and devotional identity. In other words, constructing a theology of the nation is about organizing the past, legitimizing the present and framing the future. Conclusion I believe that developing concepts such as theology of the nation are important for a few interrelated reasons: one, they point towards the different uses and intentions behind national discourse stemming from the pulpit; two, they highlight that "talking the nation" is used not only for the purpose of making people more national ; and three, they provide conceptual tools with which we can compare the different ways of making the nation relevant across religions. Using national discourse is done for a variety of purposes, be it either to advance a political program, influence people to purchase a product, claim territory, contest space or resources, encourage tourism , justify actions, make historical occurrences relevant to contemporary choices, and countless others. In the case outlined in this article, the nation is invoked in order to strengthen religious devotion. Nationhood is not established and the nation is not constructed solely for its own end . Nationhood and attachment to national identity is always part of a greater project. Establishing nationhood and constructing the nation is not always done with the nation as its endgame. The purpose can usually be found elsewhere. If we look at the when of nationalism, in other words, when do nations matter for people, we find that the nation is only important in specific contexts and situations. The nation may be relevant in our framing of issues that involve family values, economy, immigration, environment, international politics or other issues . Outside of those issues, the nation is not usually our dominant framework for categorizing culture, life, relationships. When we emphasize the discursively constructed nature of the nation and the fact that it functions as a framework for categorizing difference, we view the nation as a project, a series of processes or a practical achievement. This makes it easy to believe that a reified nation is the goal of the national pro- �SLOVAKIA-2017 129 ject. However, I would argue that making the nation (and making people more national) is almost never the sole goal of a national project. The project at Sastin can be understood as a theology of the Slovak nation, created through use of the biblical narratives of Mary ' s suffering. In one sense, the theme of suffering keeps people talking about a connection between Church and nation. In another sense, it creates and recreates a system that structures choice so that the nation and Marian devotion are both valued. The visceral connection through suffering has the capacity of becoming especially strong, because it functions not only on the individual level but on the group level as well, whether one envisions the group as the body of the Church or the nation. For some of the pilgrims who attend the Slovak national pilgrimmage to Sastin, national identity is important, while others would rather emphasize the international nature of the Catholic Church. For some, the fight against abortion takes precedence, while for others the fight against secularization of Europe is the rallying cry that brings them to the event. For countless others, the pilgrimage is simply a celebration of Mary. It may be about sharing individual or group suffering with Mary. It may be about asking Mary for assistance or healing. However, any path chosen that leads the participant to the Slovak national pilgrimage, in the end, provides support for the Catholic Church, Marian devotion and the Slovak nation. Even if pilgrims contest specific aspects of Church power or the validity of certain Marian practices, their participation in the performance of the event makes the Church and Mary prominent focal points. In this specific instance where Catholic leaders claim authority over social life outside of the Church, the ideas of making Catholic teaching and values important in the lives of pilgrims and making the Church a focal point go hand in hand with using the nation as a locus for evangelization. ��LITERATURE �� SLOVAKIA-2017 105 INVOKING THE NATION, STRENGTHENING DEVOTION: NATIONAL DISCOURSE AT THE SLOVAK NATIONAL PILGRIMAGE 1 Alexander Bielicki "At first glimpse it seems as if Catholicism and nationalism represent two opposite poles that can never level out or meet. And yet, nationalism finds its culmination point in Catholicism." - Jozef Tiso 2 The September 15 th Slovak National Pilgrimage to the National Basilica on the national holiday dedicated to the national patron offers Catholic leaders in Slovakia the rare opportunity to talk about the nation more or less freely in the public sphere. Since Slovakia's independence, several Slovak Catholic leaders have stirred up controversy regarding their stances on the activities of the Catholic Church and its clergy during the World War II semi-independent authoritarian Slovak state, as well as regarding some contemporary clergymen's tacit support for fascist organizations that commemorate the leaders of the WWII state, like the above-quoted President Jozef Tiso. 3 These instances have spurred perceptions of the Catholic Church in Slovakia as nationalist, a perception that reduces the public opportunities during which the Church may legitimately talk about the nation and reflect upon the connections between nation and Church. The annual Slovak national pilgrimage to Sastin provides a unique case study of how Catholic leaders discursively construct and use the concept of the nation in evangelization. Apart from the instances when Church leaders use nationalism in an attempt to reclaim or repaint the history of the Catholic Church during World 1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the ASN World Convention, Columbia University, 18-20 April 2013. 2 Miroslav Kocur, "For God and Nation: Christian National Populism" in National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006 - 2009 (Forum Minority Research Institute: Samorin - Samorja, 2009), 223 . 3 Ibid. , 221 - 45 . �106 SLOVAKIA-2017 4 War II , the nation is sometimes "talked and performed," not for what might be ca lled nati ona list goals, but instead, for what might be call ed reli gious goa ls. "Talking the nation" is not necessarily done in order to make the nat ion more sa li ent and make people more national. The inclusion of national discourse can be done in order to accomplish a wide variety of goa ls. In instances such as the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin , the nation may be used fo r evangelization. My intention here is not to offer a typology of national discourse in the re ligious field , but rather to point to some of the ways that the concept of the nation can be (and has been) used by Catho lic leaders in Slovakia. The examp les presented herein demonstrate not only the taken-for-granted nature of national frames for viewing and understanding the world, even in the g loba l Catholic Church; they a lso illustrate some of the ways the " nation" can be used . By analyzing materia l from the homili es presented each year at the Slovak National Pilgrim age, I wi ll illustrate these connections between religious devoti on and nationa l fidelity. In foc us are the homilies delivered from the independence of S lovakia in 1993 to 2011. 5 In the se speeches from the pulpit in Sasti n, bishops, archbishops, and occasionally cardina ls address the meaning of the holiday, the perce ived successes and fai lures of society, and the importance of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows for Slovak ia. Because of the nature of these homilies and the ritual focus of thi s holiday, I wi ll here look at the ways in w hi ch the Virgin Mary is connected to th e Slovak nation on these occas ions. Pilgrimage Context In Slovakia, pil grim ages and holidays are two of the most common events through which Marian theology is experienced by devotees and advanced by the c lergy. One can find about a dozen Marian holidays on the Slovak liturgica l ca lendar, but only one of them is connected w ith a state ho liday. The Slovak National Pilgrimage takes place every year on September 15, the Sviatok Sedembolestnej Panny Marie (O ur Lady of the Seven Sorrows Holid ay). It has been 4 The fo rmulati on of "talking, performing, consuming and choosing the nat ion" comes from Fox, Jon and Cynthi a Mil ler- Idriss, " Eve ryday Nati onh ood," Etlinicities, 8 (2008): 536 - 63. 5 This study is based on research an d fieldwork co mpl eted between 2008 and 20 12. �SLOVAKIA-2017 10 7 a national holiday since 1993 (first celebrated as such in 1994). The pilgrimage to the small western Slovak town of Sastin (Sastin-Straze since 1971) traces its roots to a founding miracle in 1564 and the subsequent carving of the Sastin pieta sculpture in thanks to the Virgin Mary, which would eventually become the ritual focus of later pilgrimages. The influence of this site grew rapidly under Empress Maria Theresa and her husband Francis of Lorraine, who partially funded the construction of a cathedral to house the Sastin pieta. In 1927, Pope Pius XI declared Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as Patron saint of the region of Slovakia. 6 In 1964, Pope Paul VI elevated the Sastin cathedral to the status of Basilica Minor, the first in Slovakia. 7 In the years following, the Sastin cathedral would come to be known as the National Basilica, and more recently, the September 15 event would come to be known as the Slovak National Pilgrimage. Recent pilgrimages at Sastin have drawn approximately 20,000 worshippers per year, the overwhelming majority of whom are Slovaks from Slovakia. In addition, several television and radio stations broadcast the day 's events so that individuals may participate without making the trek to this small town. The event even brings a number of influential clergy, politicians and cultural figures as guests of honor. In fact, one of my respondents stated that the attendance of politicians at Sastin was what set it apart from other pilgrimages: "state representatives even go to this pilgrimage - they do not go to other pilgrimage sites." 8 For all of the differences among the participants in the Sastin pilgrimage, they share a religiously-oriented habitus. 9 By this, I do not mean that they are all Catholic, but that the vast majority of them are socialized into a specifically conservative, Slovak version of Catholicism. It can be understood as an environment where social, moral and linguistic issues expressed in a certain idiom 6 She is referred to as patronka Slovenska (the patroness of Slovakia), though she is more common ly understood as the patron of the Slovak nation as opposed to the Slovak state, an important distinction given the multi-national character of Slovakia. 7 Peter Zubko, "Baziliky mensie na Slovensku: ich prava a povinnosti" (Basilica Minors in Slovakia: Their Rights and Obligations), Nave Horizonty, I (2009): 40 45 . 8 Alexander Bielicki, A Nation in Worship ? Constructing Nationhood and Devotion at the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin, Ph .D. dissertat ion, University of Oslo, 2012. 9 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I 99 I). �108 SLOVAKIA-2017 are easily understood to be a part of the regular (acceptable) di scourse, and are shaped by the conditions and conventions within this particular societal framework. Bourdieu, in his essays on language and power, 10 calls these types of factors "structured dispositions." One of these structured dispositions would be towards Marian devotion. While levels of devotion to Mary differ among Slovak Catholics, the vocabulary of Marianism is ubiquitous throughout the country, and Marian symbols can be easily understood by most Catholics. Throughout Slovakia, there are hundreds of churches and chapels dedicated to the Virgin, and the number of Marian shrines is countless. Controversia l historian Milan Durica places the number of Marian churches and chapels in Slovakia at over 1200, with more than 200 dedicated to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. 11 Slovak Cardinal Jozef Tomko, among others, places the number of churches and chapels dedicated to Our Lady of Seven Sorrows at around 250 12 Paintings, statues, prayers and songs heavily feature Mary, especially as the Sorrowful Mother, and she is a frequent subject of Slovak folk art of various media. The pieta is one of the more commonl y found Catholic images in the country. The Virgin Mary has become a powerful national symbol in many Catholic countries. While in Slovakia, the Virgin Mary does not receive any national titles as lofty as "Queen of Poland," "Queen of the Croats" or "Queen of Mexico," her status as national patron has been deeply woven into the fabric of the national canon. As Cardinal Tomko, the long-tenured Prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (the office responsible for all missionary activities of the Catholic Church), acknowledged in hi s 1997 homil y, For us Slovaks, Seven Sorrows Day goes ri ght to the heart . For us, the picture of the Sorrowful Mother is engraved on our soul since childhood . We saw it in churches as well as in homes, on the Calvaries and in the chape ls, on the Ways of the Cross, and finall y also on the pl ates and popular embroidery. We rece ived respect fo r Mary of the Seven 10 Ibid. Milan S. Durica, S/owici a Sedembolestna: Kulturno-historicky nacrt (Brati slava: Luc, ustav dej in krest'an stva, 2008). 12 Cardinal Jozef Tomko, Homil y presented at th e Nati onal Bas ili ca in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, Zivot Crkvi, 17, No. 37 (2010). 11 �SLOVAKIA-2017 109 Sorrows almost with our mother's milk. 13 The connection between Mary and the Slovak nation fostered in these words is very self-aware. Statues, paintings, plates, needlework and other material goods associated with Mary can be found in every comer of Slovakia. Cardinal Tomko notes that the connection between individuals and the Virgin Mary is fostered from childhood and the material reminders found throughout the country are no doubt partly responsible for this transmission between generations. Slovak church leaders use the Virgin Mary (specifically in her incarnation as Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows) in a variety of ways to reify, and even to symbolize, the nation. They use the history of Marian devotion in Slovakia to homogenize Slovak religiosity and to provide justification for the claims of Marianism as a fundamental characteristic of Slovak national identity. However, the Marian aspects of the national pilgrimage do not only relate to the ways in which national identity is portrayed. Many different levels of identity, beyond the national, are referenced in the event and many differrent social groupings find relevance. Gender, family, denomination, moral and social communities all play roles in this event, and they are all tied in one way or another to Marianism. 14 For the purposes of this article, though, I will focus primarily on the discursive connections between Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the Slovak nation. The inclusion of all these different roles-these different ways of identifying- demonstrates the clergy's reaction to late modernity. The homilies of the event highlight the challenges to various roles an individual may play in society: those connected with nation, with gender, with family, sometimes even with political affiliation. The Catholic Church, which in many ways appears to cling to out-offashion social models (although this has been somewhat challenged since the election of Pope Francis), utilizes the problems and language of late modernity to reinforce its claims, and one of the ways that this is accomplished is through the manner in which the politics 13 Cardinal Jozef Tomko, "Misijne poslanie a Sedembolestna." Homil y presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia. Katolicke noviny, 112, No. 40 (October 5, 1997). 14 Alexander Bielicki , A Nation in Worship ? Constructing Nationhood and Devotion at the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oslo, 20 12. �110 SLOVAKIA-2017 of identity are framed. If one of the markers of the "modem era" is the insistence on unitary identity, then the corresponding marker of the "late modem era" is the multiplicity of identity, and the fact that the successful person displays competence in navigating through all of their different identity roles. The inclusion of this multiplicity of identity roles in the pilgrimage homilies demonstrates the clergy ' s reaction to the so-called pathologies of the late-modem period, and demonstrates how the symbol of the Virgin Mary can be used as a modem tool to advance traditional goals: by providing a unitary self, guided by Marian devotion, that can be deployed in roles and situations. Suffering as Nexus What sets the Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows homilies apart from the homilies delivered for other Marian celebrations is that the biblical information presented in connection with the holiday and pilgrimage focuses on her sorrows and suffering and not on other aspects of her life and story. Suffering, whether revealed as a tragedy or a gift, is the lynchpin that binds the otherwise diverse elements, both catechismal and historical , of the event's homilies. The importance of this distinction is that it highlights a different side of Mary, a different face . Not that this particular interpretation of the Virgin Mary differs from the overall canon of Marian references, but that it selects certain aspects of it to be given primacy. The presentation of these aspects heightens specific types of responses to Mary: they promote a view of Mary as protector, specifically protecttor of the nation, and as picture of grace under suffering. Other roles such as mother, teacher, etc. are given relatively minor attention, expect for when they are related to suffering. The ubiquitous nature of the Virgin Mary not on ly serves as a constant reminder of the strong tradition of Marian devotion, it encourages her multivocality as a symbol. Religious historian Brian Porter notes that in the Polish Marian cult, one of Mary's most important roles is that of the Hetmanka, or military protector of the nation. 15 In the Netherlands, the Lady of All Nations devotional cult is 15 Brian Porter, " Hetmanka and Mother: Representing the Virgin Mary in Modern Poland," Contemporary European History, 14, No . 2 (2005) : 154 �SLOVAKJA-2017 111 centered on the idea of Mary as redeemer. 16 In the Slovak case, however, the suffering of the Virgin Mary is highlighted above all else when linking her to the nation. This type of discourse is used by the clergy not only for moral and religious lessons, but also to reify the nation by creating what I call a shared vocabulary of suffering, especially in reference to national history and the life of the Virgin Mary. From Bishop Gabris' 1984 homily, Our Slovak nation has suffered terribly. When things were bad for our nation, it could only beseech supernatural aid. Our believers also felt that no one in the world suffered such as Our Lady when she held in her arrn s the dead body of her own son. Therefore, no one in the world 17 18 could understand the suffering of our nation as she does. The theme of suffering creeps into the discourse and symbols of the Sastin pilgrimage, and this is one of the things that sets the event apart from others. In marked contrast to most other Marian events in Slovakia, the national pilgrimage to Sastin is thematically concentrated on suffering. While other pilgrimages may contain references to the suffering of Mary, only events specifically dedicated to the Mater Dolorosa, Our Lady of Sorrows, are discursively framed around suffering to this extent. Her pain peaked when she meets Jesus in the street, on the last day of his life, as a criminal amid a furious crowd, carrying the cross to the gallows-flogged, spat-upon, and crowned with thorns. How can she feel when she hears the sound of the murderous nails being hammered into his hands and feet , when she sees Him in immense pain stretched between heaven and earth? How can her heart endure the endless three hours of His agony? And yet, she, frail woman, standing beneath her son's cross, on whi ch she is also crucified. She stands unbroken in soul, not beaten down by the weight of the relentless pain . She stands under the cross, even when the terrible sword stabs a living wound in the 16 Peter Jan Margry, " Paradoxes of Marian Appariti onal Contestation: Networks, Ideology, Gender, and the Lady of All Nations," in Moved by Mary: The Power of Pilgrimage in the Modern World, Hermkens, Anna-Karina and Willy Jansen, and Catrien otermans, eds. ( Farnham: Ash gate, 2009), I 87 17 Bold typeface, mine. 18 Bishop Julius Gabris, Homily presented at the Natio nal Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September 16, 1984. <htt ://blo 0 .chri st-net.sk/? =node/340 >, accessed February 8, 2009. �112 SLOVAKIA-2017 heart. 19 The theme of suffering allows for discourse and symbols not only concerning Mary's suffering, but suffering in society as well: the crisis of the family, legalized abortion, moral relativism, the suffering of the nation, etc. This is one of the particularities of the Sastin pilgrimage: the focus on Marian suffering in connection with the suffering of everyday life opens up the door to a discussion of the many different forms of societal identity. The ways in which these forms of suffering are presented and the ways in which they are linked together offer some suggestions as to what the employment of Mary as a symbol of suffering might be meant to accomplish. Today we celebrate the holiday of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and here is an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of our national existence and to ask how is it that we Slovaks, through the long centuries, knew to resist so that the ferocious waves of history would not devour and bury us? We are of a nation who didn't have a kingly dynasty to rule in our castles, and we can ' t boast of famous victories. However, our nation reached one victory that, after a thousand years of silence and living without freedom we were able to overcome, so that today we find ourselves among the nations of Europe. We know from national history how difficult our ancestors fought for their existence, for their living space, for their language, for their faith , for their culture. They fought ; they won, because in this struggle they freely took refuge in the Mother of God. 20 In his 2007 homily (above), Bishop Secka offers the holiday as "an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of our national existence." This suggests that a salience of nation should exist for Slovak Catholics, and that a salience of Catholic identity should be present in Slovakia. His framing of "we" around an ethnic identity assumes an all ethnically Slovak audience, which is in fact not the case at Sastin. His words presume a long, uninterrupted history, but reduce that his19 Tomko, Cardinal Jozef. " Misijne poslanie a Sedembolestna," Homily presented at the National Basilica in SaWn-Straze, Slovakia, Katolicke noviny, 112, No. 40 (October 5, 1997). 20 Bishop Stefan Secka, Homily presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September 15, 2007. <http://www.magnificat.sk/htm02/homsas. htn_:i. >, accessed February 8, 2009 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 113 tory to a simple story of hard-working, oppressed, Catholic Slovaks who were victims of constant external pressure. This homily assigns an independent will and desire to the nation, not just individuals. The homily also speaks of a victory for the Slovak nation, a victory that can only be assumed to be the realization of the Slovak state, the ultimate reward for any national project. This type of rhetoric ignores the fact that the creation of the Slovak nation-state resulted from the intractable arguments of a small group of political elites and not from any plebiscite.21 This notion projects backwards in time the seemingly self-evident nature of the Slovak nation requiring a Slovak state, that this process was the unfaltering will and destiny of the nation. Furthermore, it portrays the realization of a Slovak state as an event that can be at least indirectly attributed to the intercession of Mary. Bishop Secka's 2007 homily is not unique among the Sedembolestna homilies. In many ways it echoes the 1984 homily given by Bishop Julius Gabris where he stated: Our nation, dear brothers and sisters, survived the hard times and was saved only because it relied upon Marian devotion. I mentioned only the three incidents: the extinction of the Great Moravian Empire, the invasion of the Tatars and the 150-year plundering of our territory by the Turks. In these times, all preconditions were met by which our Slovak nation should be completely devastated, torn from the earth. And yet still, it was not extinguished! Why not extinguished? Only because it relied on God's help and on the help of the Mother ofGod. 22 These words link the contemporary Catholic Church and the history of the Slovak nation in a chain of suffering. Furthermore, while the history detailed in the homily seeks to present the Slovak nation's suffering and its unwavering devotion to Mary, this version of history also reinforces the continuity and homogeneity of the Slovak nation. Anthropologist Richard Handler notes that a "negative vision of the struggle for survival presupposes the positive vision of collective unity and maturity - for how can an entity that does not in the first 21 Stefan Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 22 Bi shop Julius Gabris, Homily presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September I 6, I 984. <http: //blog.christ-net.sk/?q=node/340 >, accessed February 8, 2009. �114 SLOVAKIA-2017 place exist run the risk of disintegration?"23 However, this is not merely a simple reification of the nation through building a collection of past sufferings. This formulation not only reifies the nation, but it also reifies a contemporary vision of the Slovak nation, imagining it as an unchanged group occupying the same territory since before the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. While discursive use of the Virgin Mary might function to construct difference along national lines when these national boundaries also reflect religious boundaries, it is not so effective when constructing difference between Slovaks and non-Slovak coreligionists. Furthermore, discursively constructing the Slovak nation as devotees to Mary ignores the heterodox religious history of Slovakia. Most interestingly, though, the others who are constructed in these homilies are not the most salient ethnic others in the Slovak context. The nationalization of political life in Slovakia is often defined in reference to Slovak-Hungarian national divisions within the country; however, this doe s not appear to be the driving factor behind national differentiation for the Church, at least in regards to how difference is organized in the proceedings of the national pilgrimage to Sastin. In fact, it is not uncommon for homilists to invite ethnic Magyars [Hungarians] into the fold .24 That being said, the use of the national frame by church leaders at the national pilgrimage seems to be constructed in reference to Western Europe, conceived as a group of secular nations, as opposed to being constructed in reference to their Hungarian Catholi c neighbors. In this sense, devotion and devotional practices become a way for the Church to organize not on ly religious difference, but national difference as well. This orientation creates formulations whereby secularized Slovaks are ignored or considered agents of the secular " West. " In other words, these practices of national differentiation more resemble the politics of Slovaks differentiating themselves from Czechs at the beginning of the 1990s than they resemble the patterns of national differentiation from Magyar speakers throughout the 1990s and beyond. 23 Richard Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec (Madi son: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 5. 24 Ca rdinal Jan Chrzyostom Korec, "Tvorivou lasko u," Kato/icke noviny. I 15, No. 39 (September 24, 2000). �SLOVAKIA-2017 115 Let us entrust to our heavenly patron also the future of Slovakia in the community of European nations with the hope that Europe will be built with the recognition of its Christian roots, as the Holy Father relentlessly reminds us, and that in that our nation maintains its own identity based on Christian culture and its values. We do not want to lose ourselves and to be diluted in such a European community that would be governed by secularized humani sm and liberal individualism, without respect for the principle of Christian so lidarity.25 The further highlighting of issues presented within a national context attests to the way the Church in Slovakia has reacted and continues to react to various factors at the state, supranational and international level. Presenting the national, projecting the national, within the narrative of the Slovak nation as a Catholic nation acting as a minority, a righteous minority (especially against the backdrop of oppression throughout history at the hands of foreign powers), allows for the Church to talk about social issues of Catholic concern - abortion, chief among them - as an extension of the historical battle waged by the Catholic Slovak nation in the name of righteousness. The mill has been started, where they intend to grind the stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, the guide for the past and present life of our nation for more than one thousand years. For what is life if a man can kill the terminally ill and the unborn?26 National elements woven into the fabric of the devotional movement to Our Lady of Seven Sorrows recapture the idea of the Slovaks as a small nation , fundamentally Christian if not Catholic, being pushed around by larger powers: those that advocate a program that lessens the emphasis on a Judeo-Christian morality system as the defining characteristic of Europe. Using examples from proposed hi storical sufferings of the Slovak nation, whether at the hands of 25 Bishop Jozef Zlati\ansky, "Zverme sa Sedembolestnej." Homily presented at the National Bas ilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia. Katolicke noviny,. 11 8, No. 40 (October 5, 2003). <htt ://www.katnovin .sk/Kn 2003/40 2003/obnova. htm >, accessed on February 8, 2009. 26 Bishop Stefan Secka, "Matka viery, Matka nadeje," Homily presented at the Nati onal Basi lica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, September I 5, 2004. <http://www. blu me nta l. sk/caso is/rok 2004/10-2004/cl04.htm>, accessed on September 21 , 2009. �116 SLOVAKIA-2017 Turks, Tatars, Magyars, Czechs or others, homilists propose a continuity of oppression aimed at Slovaks, despite the realization of the ostensibly Slovak nation-state. Indeed, the role of religion and the politics of national identity in any society are heavily contingent upon the form of the state, and in this case, supranational governance. Without the split of Czechoslovakia or the entrance of Slovakia into the European Union, undoubtedly a different structure of whom the Slovak nation is defined against would emerge, thereby influencing how the boundaries between "us" and "them" are drawn. Even though some references to past injustices faced at the hands of European neighbors appear in the homilies, they are rare. Besides those few examples, the nationalizing language of the event is not overly exclusionary in nature. It is of course highly focused on positive portrayals of the in-group, but for the most part, the out-groups (i.e. Western Europe) appear as abstractions. In other words, even though much of the nationalizing language stemming from the homilists promotes something that I wou ld not call an inclusive vision of the nation, it is certainly more inclusive than the militant and chauvinistic national orientations found in some corners of Slovak society. For the homilists, ideology (i.e. religious orientation) seems to have been the primary division; however, religious differrentiation has been communicated through national differentiation - in essence, nationalizing religious life. National History or Catholic History? In many of the examples from the homilies, the historical Slovak nation is presented as in constant battle, or in a constant state of suffering. In 1928, Slovak Catholic priest and politician Ferdis Juriga posited seven sorrows of the Slovak nation to correspond with the seven sorrows of Mary27, and several Sastin homilies reference these periods of suffering, especially the Tatar and Turkish invasions. According to Juriga, the seven sorrows of the Slovak nation were (1) the migration of the Magyars to the Danubian Basin and their defeat of the Slavic peoples who lived there; (2) the repression of Catholics in the Kingdom of Hungary, 1044 - 1046; (3) the Tatar invasion, 27 Jana Moricova, "Sastinska Sedembolestna patr6nka Slovenska," Marianske Putnicke Miesta na Slovensku: Zbornik z vedeckej konferencie konanej (Rufomberok: Katolicka univerzita v Ru fo mberku, 2007), 20 - 26 . �SLOVAKIA-2017 117 1241 - 1242; (4) the Hussite incursions across Upper Hungary, 1431 - 1458; (5) the Turkish wars, 1526 - 1683; (6) the spread of Protestantism and the split of the nation between Catholic and Protestant faiths; (7) and the rampant poverty that led to mass emigration. 28 Mentioning any of these seven moments in the homilies for Our Lady of Seven Sorrows Day discursively connects national suffering and the Virgin Mary, specifically in her incarnation as Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. They also link historical struggles and the overcoming of those struggles with present day struggles and the possibility of overcoming them. According to tradition, during the Tatar invasion in I 241 our families fled into the forests, to where the hordes would not dare to go; our ancestors carried with them Marian pictures and statues, especially of the Sorrowful Mother. In the 15 th century, families in our lands possessed reliefs of the Sorrowful Virgin Mary, which at that time had been produced from baked clay at the command of King Matthias Corvin us. In 1470, when the Turkish invasion was already threatening, Jan Vitez, the archbishop of Esztergom, specifically recalled as an ancient, historical custom, that in difficult times our ancestors turned to the Sorrowful Virgin Mary for help and appealed to her so that they might devote themselves to her in the time of danger. His successor, Archbishop Juraj Selepceni, before the decisive battle with the Turks near Vienna in 1683, gave his soldiers medallions with a picture of the Sorrowful Mother in order to invoke her assistance. Even the old folk song from the Turkish wars " By Trencin's Gate" is a plea to the Virgin Mary from the Slovak heroes before leaving for battle: "God and Mary help us, to be a happy Slovak land." The tradition of devotion to the Sorrowful Mother stretches across our whole history ... 29 As can be seen in the above excerpt, the homilists construct history around a core of Marian devotion . Historical struggles, whether framed as national, Catholic or Christian, are layered around this central theme of Marian devotion. In Cardinal Tomko 's 2010 homily, the history of the region is portrayed as a series of invasions and invocations of Mary's assistance in prevailing despite the harsh conditions. While these invaders fell upon the Kingdom of Hungary, 28 Ibid. Cardinal Jozef Tomko, Homil y presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, Zivot Crkvi, 17, No. 37 (20 10). 29 �118 SLOVAKIA-2017 Cardinal Tomko refers repeatedly to the victims of the invasion as "our ancestors," framing the history of the Slovak lands as the history of the Slovaks. The tradition of Marian devotion is "recalled as an ancient, historical custom" of the Slovaks. Cardinal Tomko takes the negative histories of war and struggle and the positive histories of Marian devotion out of their historical context in the Kingdom of Hungary, and makes them exclusive property of the Slovak nation . In other words, the Slovak nation is written into history as a protagonist, even into historical periods during which the nation was not a salient category of identification. The Church, then, uses this opportunity to present a very specific Slovak Catholic version of national history, a version that portrays Marian devotion as a fundamental characteristic of Slovak national identity that is both consistent through time and ubiquitous through the territory of Slovakia. In other words, the national history presented in the Sedembolestna homilies is both essentializing and homogenizing, (so that a more coherent set of narratives can be easily presented). By-and-large, during the event, Slovak national identity and the Slovak nation is not portrayed as under siege, the way that nationalist politicians often paint the picture. Yet it is portrayed as a minority nation, and a suffering nation. Within the framework of Slovakia, those who consider themselves to be ethnically Slovak have a clear majority; however, during the pilgrimage the Slovak nation is often presented in the context of the world stage, or at least the European stage. In other words, the ethno-national situation of Slovaks in Slovakia is omitted from the discourse of the event, and the situation of Slovaks in a broader context is presented instead, so as to highlight Slovaks ' minority status in Europe. Therefore, the episodes of historical suffering mentioned earlier find a new context in which to be expressed in the present structure of governance. This extension of history, for the most part, is not malicious in intent towards its European neighbors (or against the faceless "society" mentioned often in the homilies). However, there are some Slovak nationalists, who use the rhetoric stemming from Church sources as a validation of their claims. Therefore, that is where the de facto national Church and some Slovak nationalists intersect. There is a crossover between their ranks, but these individuals and sub-groups do not usuall y act as the driving forces behind the Church in Slo- �SLOVAKIA-2017 119 vakia or Slovak nationalist organizations. Portraying the Church in Slovakia as nationalist, as often happens, is misleading, or rather, an oversimplification. They produce discourse that may aid some nationalists ( especially those nationalists who find importance in the Catholic nature of the nation), but this is not the primary goal of their discourse. Their primary goal seems to be evangelization and connecting various levels of social identity to the Church. In this process, the nation is just one of many leve ls of identity fostered and connected with the Church. By stepping away from simply labeling certain actions stemming from the Slovak Church as nationalist, and looking to the purpose and function of using the nation, a clearer picture emerges regarding the processes actually occurring. Shared System of Discourse In the celebration of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as national patron, the dominant themes of the event are that of suffering and sorrow. In a sense, we can envision this as a shared vocabulary of suffering within the larger shared system of discourse. Whether a detailed telling of the Seven Sorrows endured by Mary, the perceived one-thousand years of suffering of the Slovak nation since the end of the Great Moravian Empire or the evils of abortion, the dominant tropes are 'tragic' in nature. This accentuates "an economy that capitalizes on human suffering, valuing it not as the absence or disfavor of God, but as a grace or favor that viscerally connects the devout with the sufferings of Jesus, Mary, and the saints." 30 Essentially, suffering functions as the hub that links all of the spokes of the wheel; it is a gift given and a gift received; but most of all, suffering frames the introduction of social identities to the event. In the homilies of the event, the homilists demonstrate ways of talking about national identity, Catholic identity, Christian identity and even European identity. The ways in which the event is nationnally framed by church leaders- and the ways in which pilgrims talk, choose, perform and consume the nation-provide space for the nationalization of objects, spaces, bodies and symbols. This space 30 David Morgan, "Aura and the Inversion of Marian Pilgrimage: Fatima and Her Statues," Moved by Mary: The Power of Pilgrimage in the Modern World, Hermkens, Anna-Karina and Willy Jansen and Catrien Notermans, eds. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 63 . �120 SLOVAKJA-2017 allocated for nationalization does not exist at many other large-scale Catholic events in the country apart from Sastin, at least during the years surveyed in this study. Furthermore, the homilists build a history that intertwines Catholic and national pasts. They provide pilgrims with the discursive tools to deal with numerous societal issues in a Catholic way. They tum national life, political life and even family life into Catholic life. In other words, they demonstrate a Catholic way of talking about social life that is meant to be transferred outside of the religious field , or at least to broaden the religious field . Pilgrims and church leaders together contribute to the definition of social identities, not necessarily making agreements on how to live these identities, but how to articulate these identities. One elite project found in the discourse of the pilgrimage is the attempt to create a shared system of discourse in order to talk about devotional life and to discuss social issues within a Catholic framework. The pilgrimage at Sastin, then, is one of the large-scale events in which the Church does maintenance work to this shared system of discourse. I would suggest that a shared discourse could buttress the role of the Church and the role of Catholic identity in the country, even if membership in the Church is sometimes considered " lukewarm. " This type of maintenance work is done on every Sunday in the churches and at church-officiated events throughout the lives of people. The Slovak national pilgrimage to Sastin provides a stage on which to address the proposed importance of devotional identity to a large audience at the same time, and to construct a way for Catholics to talk about the social issues that affect them . This type of maintenance is accomplished through countless different pilgrimages; however, it is the peculiarities of the Sastin pilgrimage that allow for a greater opportunity to engage issues of identity outside of devotional identity. Creating a shared discursive system can be seen as one of the byproducts of evangelization, and this system is a prerequisite for most of the pastoral work in which the Church engages. In other words, the Church needs to have this shared discourse in place in order to navigate the challenges of its pastoral care effectively. The pilgrims need to be a part of constructing this discourse, because in order for the Church to be an important identity marker in their lives, they need to be able to find a way to articulate their place in the body of the Church, and likewise their position in society in relationship to �SLOVAKIA-2017 121 the Church. Such a system is created through evangelization and a general socialization into religion; in other words, through creating a religiously literate society. Cultural historian Callum Brown uses the idea of a collapse in shared discourse to explain the fate of Christianity in Britain. 3 1 In Britain, as well as across western and northern Europe, the socialization of young people into Christianity has largely stopped. The Christian cultural forces in society that socialize new generations into recognizing a Christian identity in themselves have lost their voices, with the result that many young people in those countries no longer acquire a basic literacy in Christian symbols and Christian history. In Slovakia, the opposite is the case. Basic cultural competencies in Christianity maintain a shared discourse between Church and society; and in Slovakia, there appears to be a relative strengthening of a shared discourse, which often frames issues, whether political or religious, as national. It is this shared discourse, especially about suffering, that allows for some of these connections between Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the Slovak nation. During the pilgrimage, Church leaders present suffering as a gateway to understanding Marian devotion; they extend Marian suffering as a metaphor onto their flock. Coupled with this presentation, the nationally framed aspects of the pilgrimage allow this suffering to be extended via relevant social groupings, like the nation, family and gender. It is presumeptuous to assume that homilists should reference social groupings based on gender, or kinship, or nation, and so on; that they are somehow more natural or salient than other social groupings. We do not see roles connected with class, or the idea of class at all enter into the homilies. However, in religious fields influenced by liberation theology in Central and South American, nothing would be more natural or salient than the reification of class identity. The ability to load Mary with meaning does not assume the successful transmission of those meanings; however, the ways in which Mary is discursively packed with meaning gives us a window into the uses of Marian symbols and the possible lived-in worlds where the symbols and words might have the ability to make an impact. Examining the way that the homilists use the concept of suffering in 31 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case (London : Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002), 20. �122 SLOVAKIA-2017 their reaction to the outcomes of modernity, presented in a context where the topic of identity is central to holiday and pilgrimage, shows how a vast number of different identities are related to Mary. The suffering of the nation, the crisis of the family , the widespread legal nature of abortion, the crisis of governance, the intrusion of consumerism, and the relativism of (Western) Europe are all connected to Mary's suffering. Any of these connections between perceived suffering of the individual and the perceived suffering of Mary can serve to reinforce the importance of Marian devotion in the life of the pilgrim. Modernization seems to accentuate the divides regarding gender, class, ethnicity, religion, etc ., and the homilists' discourse does not seek to attenuate them; instead, they are discursively reframed so that each of these identities are reified and simultaneously connected with Mary. The encouragement of communitarianism- be it in family , kin , social community, moral community, nation or other groups- is also consistent with the Church ' s stance against individualism. In that sense, one of the primary functions of this type of pastoralization and evangelization is to combat the so-called cult of the individual and to reinforce membership in social groups that are considered meaningful. By reinforcing membership in social groups consistent with the messages of the Church, so too may they encourage the ro le of Marian devotion in these groups, claiming Marian devotion not just as something which should be a fundamental characteristic of Catholics, but of Europeans, the Slovak nation, the family and even the body politic. Constructing a Theology of the Nation One of the things occurring during this pilgrimage event is that Church leaders are seeking to reinvigorate the societal influence of Catholic teaching and the Catholic Church. Their efforts at evangelization seek to make Catholic doctrine influential in society, and to make Catholicism matter for individuals and institutions beyond the religious field ; in other words, to move beyond the sphere of personal salvation. They are doing so by making Marianism important to social identities outside of religious identity, national identity being one of them . They are weaving national identity into the religious sphere, and in doing so, constructing what I call a theology of the �SLOVAKIA-2017 123 nation. "Grace does not destroy secular realities, or demand abandoning them for religious ones. Rather, grace includes, builds upon and potentially transfigures the sphere of the natural. The implication of this is that nationality can be one of the loci where responsible intelligence can ground theological consideration." 32 Dorian Llywelyn's, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality, 33 is one of the first of its kind to explore the connection between nationality and Catholicism in terms of theology. Llywelyn's treatment approaches nationnal identity not simply as subordinate to devotional identity, as has usually been the case in the Catholic Church, but as a locus of devotion. An academic exercise such as this would not have been possible in the past. Several factors account for the feasibi lity of Llywelyn's project in the present, one of which is the reforms of the Second Vatican Council that brought national practices, national languages and national discourse further into the Catholic Church. Perhaps another reason, although I do not have hard evidence to support the claim, is the election of Pope John Paul II in 1978. I would suggest that his election brought nationality into the Church by introducing a Central European, and specifically Polish, understanding of nationality to the papacy, one built on a long tradition of connecting the Church to the nation, which considered the Catholic Church as the repository of the nation in response to the Polish partitions between Orthodox neighbors to the east and Protestant neighbors to the west. In addition, the simple fact that John Paul II was the first non-Italian pope in hundreds of years, and was even commonly referred to as "the Polish pope," made nationality matter in the Church in a way it previously had not. For these reasons and others, positing a theology of nationality, or a theology of the nation as I would prefer to call it, becomes more plausible in the present day. In addition, I believe that Llywelyn ' s choice to academically engage the relationship between nation and religion supports the fact that the Catholic Church, specifically the Slovak Catholic Church, is increasingly engaging social identities outside of purely devotional ones; and that they first connect devotional identities to other social identities, and then must develop theology to substantiate these connections (in this case, the 32 Dori an Ll ywe lyn, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality (New York : Lexington Books, 20 I 0), 4. 33 Ibid . �124 SLOVAKIA-2017 nation and national identity). Church leaders foster a communitarian spirit based around many different types of identity, national among them, in order to fight against the crisis of the postmodern (and the relativism and secularism of Europe). In creating a theology of the nation, the Slovak church uses the nation as one of its primary loci for evangelization. This creates a situation where the nation is purported to be a natural place to locate and build devotion; however Church leaders connect the nation and Church in many other instances as we ll. In the media, in cross-border ecumenical counci ls and in other situations, church leaders may talk or act nationally, but that does not mean that they are creating a theology of the nation. A theology of the nation goes a step further, by writing national history, national characteristics and national practices into the teachings of the Church, indeed constructing national history, characteristics and practices in the process. Creating a theology of the nation involves producing the nation, not just using it in discourse. In the Slovak national pilgrimmage to Sastin, these national elements are sacralized in order to support forms of Marian devotion found in the event. As Llywe lyn notes, "revealed Christian truth" not only corresponds to national experience; national experience becomes part of "revealed Christian truth. "34 But this is more than simply sacralizing the nation : it collapses national and devotional values into one another, it creates a shared discourse and it writes the nation into the unofficial theology of the Church: "unofficial," because it cannot be realized in dogma or scriptural accounts, and "theology" because it becomes part of Church doctrine and teaching. "The task of a theology of nationality is to investigate the relationship between the mystery of Christ and the human experience of being a member of the nation."35 In the case of the Slovak national pilgrimage, a theology of the nation explores the connection between the nation and Mary, more so than between the nation and Jesus. The nation protects Mary, and vice-versa. The nation suffers with and for Mary. The nation embodies Mary . The nation becomes part of the Marian narrative, just as Mary has become part of the national narrative. This may seem unusual at first, but as Llywe lyn notes, human 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. �SLOVAKIA-2017 125 experience can indeed be a source for theology.36 When church leaders construct a theology of the nation, something different is happening from when church leaders speak about the nation in other instances, as in the media. In the context of the holiday event, Church leaders can more freely speak about these things because they are addressing these issues in the religious field, not venturing outside their field of competence. But it is not only that. Church leaders act as authorized delegates of the Church, especially in their role during the Pontifical Mass, the ritual focus of the pilgrimage celebration. As such, the delegated authority of the Church is behind them when they connect Church and nation in the ritual event ( outside of Church matters, their authority may be questioned). Church leaders build complex connections between Church doctrine and the nation. Using Mary as a symbol, they connect her suffering with the suffering of the nation. In this sense, just as the Polish nation is often spoken of as the Christ among nations, the Slovak nation could easily be referred to as the Virgin Mary of nations because of the shared vocabulary of suffering. Church leaders intertwine Catholic history of the region with Slovak national history. They use the practices of ancestors to justify the national connection to the Catholic Church. They further justify the connection by citing the Slovak experience under communism, and show the present significance of the connection in relation to new European structures and programs. Homilists construct the national past in a way that it becomes part of a greater narrative of eventual salvation. In other words, national history is the middle part of the salvation story, after biblical accounts and before eventual salvation. In fact, the nation can be envisioned as a vehicle for salvation. The nation is framed as important for the survival of the Church and its values. Catholicism and Marian devotion are defining characteristics of the Slovak nation. Therefore, the event (and especially its discourse) creates a role for the nation in the life of the Church and a role for the Church in the life of the nation. The Church targets national units, as well as other social configurations, because it needs state, national and other established units to activate connections with the Church and connections with Catho36 Ibid. �126 SLOVAKIA-2017 lie identity in ways that are not just personal and refl ective. The Church needs groups to survive, not just individuals;37 therefore, it not only practices communitarianism, it attempts to ground its activation of comm unitarianism in theology. It deploys thi s communitarian discourse over many societal levels (national community, family/kin, gender, local community, the Catholic Church, the Christian world). It posits a relationship between these communities, a relationship that gives added importance to the Church. Therefore, the Church's activation of nationhood in an event such as this is not instigated by some inherent nationalism in the Slovak Church (or nationalist program), but it is mostly pragmatic. It is part of a comprehensive system that uses the discourse and practices of communitarianism across many (crosscutting) societal levels to achieve certain goals. In fact, such a comprehensive system that allows for identification across many levels is from where Mary, as a symbol , derives much of her power. Her multi-vocality is the key to her success as a symbol. But why organize on a national level given the multi-national nature of the country and the international nature of the Catholic Church? Partly, it is because the Church is already divided into territorial units such as dioceses and archdioceses that are frequently bounded within states, and sometimes within formal or informal national territories. In that sense, the Church is merely activating the already instituted divisions within its structure. Also, the language of living nationally has been used for various social projects in the Slovak lands since the mid- I 800s, and it was especially used by Church leaders for social projects in the 1930s and 1940s, and in reaction to Communism. But this construction does not just reflect the convention of using the nation as an organizing principle. The institution of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as national patron, and the institution of a state holiday celebrating her, give the Church a greater inroad to nationalize the sacred, and sacralize the nation (at least the aspects of the nation institutionally connected with Catholicism and the Church) . Yet another reason for Catholic leaders to organize nationally stems from the way power is distributed in the European environ37 Massimo Rosati , Ritual and the Sacred: A Neo -Durkheimian Analysis of Politics, Religion and the Self (Farnham : As hgate, 2009), 17. �SLOVAKIA-2017 127 ment and the way the nation is constituted in the pilgrimage event. Church leaders can see that successful social action in Europe need not be created through majority will; it can also be organized around minority nations, minority viewpoints, etc. The organization of projects, labeled as minority projects, can sometimes provide access to governmental power that is often otherwise lacking. The narrative of the Slovak nation as a minority (in Europe) despite its own (albeit contested) nation-state discursively creates a situation in which nationhood matters. Nationhood is not frequently salient for most of the population of Slovakia in everyday life, but it can be easily activated (partly because of the multinational nature of the state, which almost constantly reinforces the nation as an organizing principle in politics). Also, the nation is just one facet of this communitarian landscape employed by the church. Apparently, the Catholic Church in Slovakia finds it useful, because the Sastin pilgrimage is growing in numbers, and nationalizing language has become more frequent during the 2000s (not necessarily in connection with rising nationalism). Of course, Church leaders do not construct a theology of the nation in a vacuum. So what is the role of the celebrants of this holiday in the creation of a theology of the nation? I would suggest that they are involved in this process in the ways they talk the nation, perform the nation, choose the nation and consume the nation in relation to this religious event. One of the biggest ways they choose the nation is simply by choosing to take part in the Slovak national pilgrimage, but living nationally for the pilgrims is certainly not limited to that one choice. The nation is reflected and constituted in the symbols that the pilgrims use, in the objects and spaces with which they interact and in the ways that they talk about the event. In addition, they are crucial partners in the exchanges and negotiations between church leaders and pilgrims. Without them, the event has little to no importance. Without them, the voice from the pulpit has no real power, only delegated authority. Constructing a theology of the nation is about creating a future for the connection between nationhood and devotion . Even when church leaders cannot negotiate about the future of the nation or Catholic Church, as visions for both of these vary even among Slovak Catholics, they can manipulate the conditions so that nationhood and devotion will at least be a part of future public conversations and negotiations. Mainly, this is accomplished through the creation of a �128 SLOVAKIA-2017 shared discourse. Constructing a theology of the nation structures the conditions of future exchanges because it institutes national factors into devotional practices, thereby ensuring that these factors and practices will form and inform future discussions that involve national and devotional identity. In other words, constructing a theology of the nation is about organizing the past, legitimizing the present and framing the future. Conclusion I believe that developing concepts such as theology of the nation are important for a few interrelated reasons: one, they point towards the different uses and intentions behind national discourse stemming from the pulpit; two, they highlight that "talking the nation" is used not only for the purpose of making people more national ; and three, they provide conceptual tools with which we can compare the different ways of making the nation relevant across religions. Using national discourse is done for a variety of purposes, be it either to advance a political program, influence people to purchase a product, claim territory, contest space or resources, encourage tourism , justify actions, make historical occurrences relevant to contemporary choices, and countless others. In the case outlined in this article, the nation is invoked in order to strengthen religious devotion. Nationhood is not established and the nation is not constructed solely for its own end . Nationhood and attachment to national identity is always part of a greater project. Establishing nationhood and constructing the nation is not always done with the nation as its endgame. The purpose can usually be found elsewhere. If we look at the when of nationalism, in other words, when do nations matter for people, we find that the nation is only important in specific contexts and situations. The nation may be relevant in our framing of issues that involve family values, economy, immigration, environment, international politics or other issues . Outside of those issues, the nation is not usually our dominant framework for categorizing culture, life, relationships. When we emphasize the discursively constructed nature of the nation and the fact that it functions as a framework for categorizing difference, we view the nation as a project, a series of processes or a practical achievement. This makes it easy to believe that a reified nation is the goal of the national pro- �SLOVAKIA-2017 129 ject. However, I would argue that making the nation (and making people more national) is almost never the sole goal of a national project. The project at Sastin can be understood as a theology of the Slovak nation, created through use of the biblical narratives of Mary ' s suffering. In one sense, the theme of suffering keeps people talking about a connection between Church and nation. In another sense, it creates and recreates a system that structures choice so that the nation and Marian devotion are both valued. The visceral connection through suffering has the capacity of becoming especially strong, because it functions not only on the individual level but on the group level as well, whether one envisions the group as the body of the Church or the nation. For some of the pilgrims who attend the Slovak national pilgrimmage to Sastin, national identity is important, while others would rather emphasize the international nature of the Catholic Church. For some, the fight against abortion takes precedence, while for others the fight against secularization of Europe is the rallying cry that brings them to the event. For countless others, the pilgrimage is simply a celebration of Mary. It may be about sharing individual or group suffering with Mary. It may be about asking Mary for assistance or healing. However, any path chosen that leads the participant to the Slovak national pilgrimage, in the end, provides support for the Catholic Church, Marian devotion and the Slovak nation. Even if pilgrims contest specific aspects of Church power or the validity of certain Marian practices, their participation in the performance of the event makes the Church and Mary prominent focal points. In this specific instance where Catholic leaders claim authority over social life outside of the Church, the ideas of making Catholic teaching and values important in the lives of pilgrims and making the Church a focal point go hand in hand with using the nation as a locus for evangelization. ��LITERATURE �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA-2017 105 INVOKING THE NATION, STRENGTHENING DEVOTION: NATIONAL DISCOURSE AT THE SLOVAK NATIONAL PILGRIMAGE 1 Alexander Bielicki "At first glimpse it seems as if Catholicism and nationalism represent two opposite poles that can never level out or meet. And yet, nationalism finds its culmination point in Catholicism." - Jozef Tiso 2 The September 15 th Slovak National Pilgrimage to the National Basilica on the national holiday dedicated to the national patron offers Catholic leaders in Slovakia the rare opportunity to talk about the nation more or less freely in the public sphere. Since Slovakia's independence, several Slovak Catholic leaders have stirred up controversy regarding their stances on the activities of the Catholic Church and its clergy during the World War II semi-independent authoritarian Slovak state, as well as regarding some contemporary clergymen's tacit support for fascist organizations that commemorate the leaders of the WWII state, like the above-quoted President Jozef Tiso. 3 These instances have spurred perceptions of the Catholic Church in Slovakia as nationalist, a perception that reduces the public opportunities during which the Church may legitimately talk about the nation and reflect upon the connections between nation and Church. The annual Slovak national pilgrimage to Sastin provides a unique case study of how Catholic leaders discursively construct and use the concept of the nation in evangelization. Apart from the instances when Church leaders use nationalism in an attempt to reclaim or repaint the history of the Catholic Church during World 1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the ASN World Convention, Columbia University, 18-20 April 2013. 2 Miroslav Kocur, "For God and Nation: Christian National Populism" in National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006 - 2009 (Forum Minority Research Institute: Samorin - Samorja, 2009), 223 . 3 Ibid. , 221 - 45 . 106 SLOVAKIA-2017 4 War II , the nation is sometimes "talked and performed," not for what might be ca lled nati ona list goals, but instead, for what might be call ed reli gious goa ls. "Talking the nation" is not necessarily done in order to make the nat ion more sa li ent and make people more national. The inclusion of national discourse can be done in order to accomplish a wide variety of goa ls. In instances such as the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin , the nation may be used fo r evangelization. My intention here is not to offer a typology of national discourse in the re ligious field , but rather to point to some of the ways that the concept of the nation can be (and has been) used by Catho lic leaders in Slovakia. The examp les presented herein demonstrate not only the taken-for-granted nature of national frames for viewing and understanding the world, even in the g loba l Catholic Church; they a lso illustrate some of the ways the " nation" can be used . By analyzing materia l from the homili es presented each year at the Slovak National Pilgrim age, I wi ll illustrate these connections between religious devoti on and nationa l fidelity. In foc us are the homilies delivered from the independence of S lovakia in 1993 to 2011. 5 In the se speeches from the pulpit in Sasti n, bishops, archbishops, and occasionally cardina ls address the meaning of the holiday, the perce ived successes and fai lures of society, and the importance of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows for Slovak ia. Because of the nature of these homilies and the ritual focus of thi s holiday, I wi ll here look at the ways in w hi ch the Virgin Mary is connected to th e Slovak nation on these occas ions. Pilgrimage Context In Slovakia, pil grim ages and holidays are two of the most common events through which Marian theology is experienced by devotees and advanced by the c lergy. One can find about a dozen Marian holidays on the Slovak liturgica l ca lendar, but only one of them is connected w ith a state ho liday. The Slovak National Pilgrimage takes place every year on September 15, the Sviatok Sedembolestnej Panny Marie (O ur Lady of the Seven Sorrows Holid ay). It has been 4 The fo rmulati on of "talking, performing, consuming and choosing the nat ion" comes from Fox, Jon and Cynthi a Mil ler- Idriss, " Eve ryday Nati onh ood," Etlinicities, 8 (2008): 536 - 63. 5 This study is based on research an d fieldwork co mpl eted between 2008 and 20 12. SLOVAKIA-2017 10 7 a national holiday since 1993 (first celebrated as such in 1994). The pilgrimage to the small western Slovak town of Sastin (Sastin-Straze since 1971) traces its roots to a founding miracle in 1564 and the subsequent carving of the Sastin pieta sculpture in thanks to the Virgin Mary, which would eventually become the ritual focus of later pilgrimages. The influence of this site grew rapidly under Empress Maria Theresa and her husband Francis of Lorraine, who partially funded the construction of a cathedral to house the Sastin pieta. In 1927, Pope Pius XI declared Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as Patron saint of the region of Slovakia. 6 In 1964, Pope Paul VI elevated the Sastin cathedral to the status of Basilica Minor, the first in Slovakia. 7 In the years following, the Sastin cathedral would come to be known as the National Basilica, and more recently, the September 15 event would come to be known as the Slovak National Pilgrimage. Recent pilgrimages at Sastin have drawn approximately 20,000 worshippers per year, the overwhelming majority of whom are Slovaks from Slovakia. In addition, several television and radio stations broadcast the day 's events so that individuals may participate without making the trek to this small town. The event even brings a number of influential clergy, politicians and cultural figures as guests of honor. In fact, one of my respondents stated that the attendance of politicians at Sastin was what set it apart from other pilgrimages: "state representatives even go to this pilgrimage - they do not go to other pilgrimage sites." 8 For all of the differences among the participants in the Sastin pilgrimage, they share a religiously-oriented habitus. 9 By this, I do not mean that they are all Catholic, but that the vast majority of them are socialized into a specifically conservative, Slovak version of Catholicism. It can be understood as an environment where social, moral and linguistic issues expressed in a certain idiom 6 She is referred to as patronka Slovenska (the patroness of Slovakia), though she is more common ly understood as the patron of the Slovak nation as opposed to the Slovak state, an important distinction given the multi-national character of Slovakia. 7 Peter Zubko, "Baziliky mensie na Slovensku: ich prava a povinnosti" (Basilica Minors in Slovakia: Their Rights and Obligations), Nave Horizonty, I (2009): 40 45 . 8 Alexander Bielicki, A Nation in Worship ? Constructing Nationhood and Devotion at the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin, Ph .D. dissertat ion, University of Oslo, 2012. 9 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I 99 I). 108 SLOVAKIA-2017 are easily understood to be a part of the regular (acceptable) di scourse, and are shaped by the conditions and conventions within this particular societal framework. Bourdieu, in his essays on language and power, 10 calls these types of factors "structured dispositions." One of these structured dispositions would be towards Marian devotion. While levels of devotion to Mary differ among Slovak Catholics, the vocabulary of Marianism is ubiquitous throughout the country, and Marian symbols can be easily understood by most Catholics. Throughout Slovakia, there are hundreds of churches and chapels dedicated to the Virgin, and the number of Marian shrines is countless. Controversia l historian Milan Durica places the number of Marian churches and chapels in Slovakia at over 1200, with more than 200 dedicated to Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. 11 Slovak Cardinal Jozef Tomko, among others, places the number of churches and chapels dedicated to Our Lady of Seven Sorrows at around 250 12 Paintings, statues, prayers and songs heavily feature Mary, especially as the Sorrowful Mother, and she is a frequent subject of Slovak folk art of various media. The pieta is one of the more commonl y found Catholic images in the country. The Virgin Mary has become a powerful national symbol in many Catholic countries. While in Slovakia, the Virgin Mary does not receive any national titles as lofty as "Queen of Poland," "Queen of the Croats" or "Queen of Mexico," her status as national patron has been deeply woven into the fabric of the national canon. As Cardinal Tomko, the long-tenured Prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (the office responsible for all missionary activities of the Catholic Church), acknowledged in hi s 1997 homil y, For us Slovaks, Seven Sorrows Day goes ri ght to the heart . For us, the picture of the Sorrowful Mother is engraved on our soul since childhood . We saw it in churches as well as in homes, on the Calvaries and in the chape ls, on the Ways of the Cross, and finall y also on the pl ates and popular embroidery. We rece ived respect fo r Mary of the Seven 10 Ibid. Milan S. Durica, S/owici a Sedembolestna: Kulturno-historicky nacrt (Brati slava: Luc, ustav dej in krest'an stva, 2008). 12 Cardinal Jozef Tomko, Homil y presented at th e Nati onal Bas ili ca in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, Zivot Crkvi, 17, No. 37 (2010). 11 SLOVAKIA-2017 109 Sorrows almost with our mother's milk. 13 The connection between Mary and the Slovak nation fostered in these words is very self-aware. Statues, paintings, plates, needlework and other material goods associated with Mary can be found in every comer of Slovakia. Cardinal Tomko notes that the connection between individuals and the Virgin Mary is fostered from childhood and the material reminders found throughout the country are no doubt partly responsible for this transmission between generations. Slovak church leaders use the Virgin Mary (specifically in her incarnation as Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows) in a variety of ways to reify, and even to symbolize, the nation. They use the history of Marian devotion in Slovakia to homogenize Slovak religiosity and to provide justification for the claims of Marianism as a fundamental characteristic of Slovak national identity. However, the Marian aspects of the national pilgrimage do not only relate to the ways in which national identity is portrayed. Many different levels of identity, beyond the national, are referenced in the event and many differrent social groupings find relevance. Gender, family, denomination, moral and social communities all play roles in this event, and they are all tied in one way or another to Marianism. 14 For the purposes of this article, though, I will focus primarily on the discursive connections between Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the Slovak nation. The inclusion of all these different roles-these different ways of identifying- demonstrates the clergy's reaction to late modernity. The homilies of the event highlight the challenges to various roles an individual may play in society: those connected with nation, with gender, with family, sometimes even with political affiliation. The Catholic Church, which in many ways appears to cling to out-offashion social models (although this has been somewhat challenged since the election of Pope Francis), utilizes the problems and language of late modernity to reinforce its claims, and one of the ways that this is accomplished is through the manner in which the politics 13 Cardinal Jozef Tomko, "Misijne poslanie a Sedembolestna." Homil y presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia. Katolicke noviny, 112, No. 40 (October 5, 1997). 14 Alexander Bielicki , A Nation in Worship ? Constructing Nationhood and Devotion at the Slovak National Pilgrimage to Sastin, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oslo, 20 12. 110 SLOVAKIA-2017 of identity are framed. If one of the markers of the "modem era" is the insistence on unitary identity, then the corresponding marker of the "late modem era" is the multiplicity of identity, and the fact that the successful person displays competence in navigating through all of their different identity roles. The inclusion of this multiplicity of identity roles in the pilgrimage homilies demonstrates the clergy ' s reaction to the so-called pathologies of the late-modem period, and demonstrates how the symbol of the Virgin Mary can be used as a modem tool to advance traditional goals: by providing a unitary self, guided by Marian devotion, that can be deployed in roles and situations. Suffering as Nexus What sets the Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows homilies apart from the homilies delivered for other Marian celebrations is that the biblical information presented in connection with the holiday and pilgrimage focuses on her sorrows and suffering and not on other aspects of her life and story. Suffering, whether revealed as a tragedy or a gift, is the lynchpin that binds the otherwise diverse elements, both catechismal and historical , of the event's homilies. The importance of this distinction is that it highlights a different side of Mary, a different face . Not that this particular interpretation of the Virgin Mary differs from the overall canon of Marian references, but that it selects certain aspects of it to be given primacy. The presentation of these aspects heightens specific types of responses to Mary: they promote a view of Mary as protector, specifically protecttor of the nation, and as picture of grace under suffering. Other roles such as mother, teacher, etc. are given relatively minor attention, expect for when they are related to suffering. The ubiquitous nature of the Virgin Mary not on ly serves as a constant reminder of the strong tradition of Marian devotion, it encourages her multivocality as a symbol. Religious historian Brian Porter notes that in the Polish Marian cult, one of Mary's most important roles is that of the Hetmanka, or military protector of the nation. 15 In the Netherlands, the Lady of All Nations devotional cult is 15 Brian Porter, " Hetmanka and Mother: Representing the Virgin Mary in Modern Poland," Contemporary European History, 14, No . 2 (2005) : 154 SLOVAKJA-2017 111 centered on the idea of Mary as redeemer. 16 In the Slovak case, however, the suffering of the Virgin Mary is highlighted above all else when linking her to the nation. This type of discourse is used by the clergy not only for moral and religious lessons, but also to reify the nation by creating what I call a shared vocabulary of suffering, especially in reference to national history and the life of the Virgin Mary. From Bishop Gabris' 1984 homily, Our Slovak nation has suffered terribly. When things were bad for our nation, it could only beseech supernatural aid. Our believers also felt that no one in the world suffered such as Our Lady when she held in her arrn s the dead body of her own son. Therefore, no one in the world 17 18 could understand the suffering of our nation as she does. The theme of suffering creeps into the discourse and symbols of the Sastin pilgrimage, and this is one of the things that sets the event apart from others. In marked contrast to most other Marian events in Slovakia, the national pilgrimage to Sastin is thematically concentrated on suffering. While other pilgrimages may contain references to the suffering of Mary, only events specifically dedicated to the Mater Dolorosa, Our Lady of Sorrows, are discursively framed around suffering to this extent. Her pain peaked when she meets Jesus in the street, on the last day of his life, as a criminal amid a furious crowd, carrying the cross to the gallows-flogged, spat-upon, and crowned with thorns. How can she feel when she hears the sound of the murderous nails being hammered into his hands and feet , when she sees Him in immense pain stretched between heaven and earth? How can her heart endure the endless three hours of His agony? And yet, she, frail woman, standing beneath her son's cross, on whi ch she is also crucified. She stands unbroken in soul, not beaten down by the weight of the relentless pain . She stands under the cross, even when the terrible sword stabs a living wound in the 16 Peter Jan Margry, " Paradoxes of Marian Appariti onal Contestation: Networks, Ideology, Gender, and the Lady of All Nations," in Moved by Mary: The Power of Pilgrimage in the Modern World, Hermkens, Anna-Karina and Willy Jansen, and Catrien otermans, eds. ( Farnham: Ash gate, 2009), I 87 17 Bold typeface, mine. 18 Bishop Julius Gabris, Homily presented at the Natio nal Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September 16, 1984. <htt ://blo 0 .chri st-net.sk/? =node/340 >, accessed February 8, 2009. 112 SLOVAKIA-2017 heart. 19 The theme of suffering allows for discourse and symbols not only concerning Mary's suffering, but suffering in society as well: the crisis of the family, legalized abortion, moral relativism, the suffering of the nation, etc. This is one of the particularities of the Sastin pilgrimage: the focus on Marian suffering in connection with the suffering of everyday life opens up the door to a discussion of the many different forms of societal identity. The ways in which these forms of suffering are presented and the ways in which they are linked together offer some suggestions as to what the employment of Mary as a symbol of suffering might be meant to accomplish. Today we celebrate the holiday of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and here is an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of our national existence and to ask how is it that we Slovaks, through the long centuries, knew to resist so that the ferocious waves of history would not devour and bury us? We are of a nation who didn't have a kingly dynasty to rule in our castles, and we can ' t boast of famous victories. However, our nation reached one victory that, after a thousand years of silence and living without freedom we were able to overcome, so that today we find ourselves among the nations of Europe. We know from national history how difficult our ancestors fought for their existence, for their living space, for their language, for their faith , for their culture. They fought ; they won, because in this struggle they freely took refuge in the Mother of God. 20 In his 2007 homily (above), Bishop Secka offers the holiday as "an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of our national existence." This suggests that a salience of nation should exist for Slovak Catholics, and that a salience of Catholic identity should be present in Slovakia. His framing of "we" around an ethnic identity assumes an all ethnically Slovak audience, which is in fact not the case at Sastin. His words presume a long, uninterrupted history, but reduce that his19 Tomko, Cardinal Jozef. " Misijne poslanie a Sedembolestna," Homily presented at the National Basilica in SaWn-Straze, Slovakia, Katolicke noviny, 112, No. 40 (October 5, 1997). 20 Bishop Stefan Secka, Homily presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September 15, 2007. <http://www.magnificat.sk/htm02/homsas. htn_:i. >, accessed February 8, 2009 . SLOVAKIA-2017 113 tory to a simple story of hard-working, oppressed, Catholic Slovaks who were victims of constant external pressure. This homily assigns an independent will and desire to the nation, not just individuals. The homily also speaks of a victory for the Slovak nation, a victory that can only be assumed to be the realization of the Slovak state, the ultimate reward for any national project. This type of rhetoric ignores the fact that the creation of the Slovak nation-state resulted from the intractable arguments of a small group of political elites and not from any plebiscite.21 This notion projects backwards in time the seemingly self-evident nature of the Slovak nation requiring a Slovak state, that this process was the unfaltering will and destiny of the nation. Furthermore, it portrays the realization of a Slovak state as an event that can be at least indirectly attributed to the intercession of Mary. Bishop Secka's 2007 homily is not unique among the Sedembolestna homilies. In many ways it echoes the 1984 homily given by Bishop Julius Gabris where he stated: Our nation, dear brothers and sisters, survived the hard times and was saved only because it relied upon Marian devotion. I mentioned only the three incidents: the extinction of the Great Moravian Empire, the invasion of the Tatars and the 150-year plundering of our territory by the Turks. In these times, all preconditions were met by which our Slovak nation should be completely devastated, torn from the earth. And yet still, it was not extinguished! Why not extinguished? Only because it relied on God's help and on the help of the Mother ofGod. 22 These words link the contemporary Catholic Church and the history of the Slovak nation in a chain of suffering. Furthermore, while the history detailed in the homily seeks to present the Slovak nation's suffering and its unwavering devotion to Mary, this version of history also reinforces the continuity and homogeneity of the Slovak nation. Anthropologist Richard Handler notes that a "negative vision of the struggle for survival presupposes the positive vision of collective unity and maturity - for how can an entity that does not in the first 21 Stefan Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 22 Bi shop Julius Gabris, Homily presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia; September I 6, I 984. <http: //blog.christ-net.sk/?q=node/340 >, accessed February 8, 2009. 114 SLOVAKIA-2017 place exist run the risk of disintegration?"23 However, this is not merely a simple reification of the nation through building a collection of past sufferings. This formulation not only reifies the nation, but it also reifies a contemporary vision of the Slovak nation, imagining it as an unchanged group occupying the same territory since before the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. While discursive use of the Virgin Mary might function to construct difference along national lines when these national boundaries also reflect religious boundaries, it is not so effective when constructing difference between Slovaks and non-Slovak coreligionists. Furthermore, discursively constructing the Slovak nation as devotees to Mary ignores the heterodox religious history of Slovakia. Most interestingly, though, the others who are constructed in these homilies are not the most salient ethnic others in the Slovak context. The nationalization of political life in Slovakia is often defined in reference to Slovak-Hungarian national divisions within the country; however, this doe s not appear to be the driving factor behind national differentiation for the Church, at least in regards to how difference is organized in the proceedings of the national pilgrimage to Sastin. In fact, it is not uncommon for homilists to invite ethnic Magyars [Hungarians] into the fold .24 That being said, the use of the national frame by church leaders at the national pilgrimage seems to be constructed in reference to Western Europe, conceived as a group of secular nations, as opposed to being constructed in reference to their Hungarian Catholi c neighbors. In this sense, devotion and devotional practices become a way for the Church to organize not on ly religious difference, but national difference as well. This orientation creates formulations whereby secularized Slovaks are ignored or considered agents of the secular " West. " In other words, these practices of national differentiation more resemble the politics of Slovaks differentiating themselves from Czechs at the beginning of the 1990s than they resemble the patterns of national differentiation from Magyar speakers throughout the 1990s and beyond. 23 Richard Handler, Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec (Madi son: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 5. 24 Ca rdinal Jan Chrzyostom Korec, "Tvorivou lasko u," Kato/icke noviny. I 15, No. 39 (September 24, 2000). SLOVAKIA-2017 115 Let us entrust to our heavenly patron also the future of Slovakia in the community of European nations with the hope that Europe will be built with the recognition of its Christian roots, as the Holy Father relentlessly reminds us, and that in that our nation maintains its own identity based on Christian culture and its values. We do not want to lose ourselves and to be diluted in such a European community that would be governed by secularized humani sm and liberal individualism, without respect for the principle of Christian so lidarity.25 The further highlighting of issues presented within a national context attests to the way the Church in Slovakia has reacted and continues to react to various factors at the state, supranational and international level. Presenting the national, projecting the national, within the narrative of the Slovak nation as a Catholic nation acting as a minority, a righteous minority (especially against the backdrop of oppression throughout history at the hands of foreign powers), allows for the Church to talk about social issues of Catholic concern - abortion, chief among them - as an extension of the historical battle waged by the Catholic Slovak nation in the name of righteousness. The mill has been started, where they intend to grind the stone tablets of the Ten Commandments, the guide for the past and present life of our nation for more than one thousand years. For what is life if a man can kill the terminally ill and the unborn?26 National elements woven into the fabric of the devotional movement to Our Lady of Seven Sorrows recapture the idea of the Slovaks as a small nation , fundamentally Christian if not Catholic, being pushed around by larger powers: those that advocate a program that lessens the emphasis on a Judeo-Christian morality system as the defining characteristic of Europe. Using examples from proposed hi storical sufferings of the Slovak nation, whether at the hands of 25 Bishop Jozef Zlati\ansky, "Zverme sa Sedembolestnej." Homily presented at the National Bas ilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia. Katolicke noviny,. 11 8, No. 40 (October 5, 2003). <htt ://www.katnovin .sk/Kn 2003/40 2003/obnova. htm >, accessed on February 8, 2009. 26 Bishop Stefan Secka, "Matka viery, Matka nadeje," Homily presented at the Nati onal Basi lica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, September I 5, 2004. <http://www. blu me nta l. sk/caso is/rok 2004/10-2004/cl04.htm>, accessed on September 21 , 2009. 116 SLOVAKIA-2017 Turks, Tatars, Magyars, Czechs or others, homilists propose a continuity of oppression aimed at Slovaks, despite the realization of the ostensibly Slovak nation-state. Indeed, the role of religion and the politics of national identity in any society are heavily contingent upon the form of the state, and in this case, supranational governance. Without the split of Czechoslovakia or the entrance of Slovakia into the European Union, undoubtedly a different structure of whom the Slovak nation is defined against would emerge, thereby influencing how the boundaries between "us" and "them" are drawn. Even though some references to past injustices faced at the hands of European neighbors appear in the homilies, they are rare. Besides those few examples, the nationalizing language of the event is not overly exclusionary in nature. It is of course highly focused on positive portrayals of the in-group, but for the most part, the out-groups (i.e. Western Europe) appear as abstractions. In other words, even though much of the nationalizing language stemming from the homilists promotes something that I wou ld not call an inclusive vision of the nation, it is certainly more inclusive than the militant and chauvinistic national orientations found in some corners of Slovak society. For the homilists, ideology (i.e. religious orientation) seems to have been the primary division; however, religious differrentiation has been communicated through national differentiation - in essence, nationalizing religious life. National History or Catholic History? In many of the examples from the homilies, the historical Slovak nation is presented as in constant battle, or in a constant state of suffering. In 1928, Slovak Catholic priest and politician Ferdis Juriga posited seven sorrows of the Slovak nation to correspond with the seven sorrows of Mary27, and several Sastin homilies reference these periods of suffering, especially the Tatar and Turkish invasions. According to Juriga, the seven sorrows of the Slovak nation were (1) the migration of the Magyars to the Danubian Basin and their defeat of the Slavic peoples who lived there; (2) the repression of Catholics in the Kingdom of Hungary, 1044 - 1046; (3) the Tatar invasion, 27 Jana Moricova, "Sastinska Sedembolestna patr6nka Slovenska," Marianske Putnicke Miesta na Slovensku: Zbornik z vedeckej konferencie konanej (Rufomberok: Katolicka univerzita v Ru fo mberku, 2007), 20 - 26 . SLOVAKIA-2017 117 1241 - 1242; (4) the Hussite incursions across Upper Hungary, 1431 - 1458; (5) the Turkish wars, 1526 - 1683; (6) the spread of Protestantism and the split of the nation between Catholic and Protestant faiths; (7) and the rampant poverty that led to mass emigration. 28 Mentioning any of these seven moments in the homilies for Our Lady of Seven Sorrows Day discursively connects national suffering and the Virgin Mary, specifically in her incarnation as Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows. They also link historical struggles and the overcoming of those struggles with present day struggles and the possibility of overcoming them. According to tradition, during the Tatar invasion in I 241 our families fled into the forests, to where the hordes would not dare to go; our ancestors carried with them Marian pictures and statues, especially of the Sorrowful Mother. In the 15 th century, families in our lands possessed reliefs of the Sorrowful Virgin Mary, which at that time had been produced from baked clay at the command of King Matthias Corvin us. In 1470, when the Turkish invasion was already threatening, Jan Vitez, the archbishop of Esztergom, specifically recalled as an ancient, historical custom, that in difficult times our ancestors turned to the Sorrowful Virgin Mary for help and appealed to her so that they might devote themselves to her in the time of danger. His successor, Archbishop Juraj Selepceni, before the decisive battle with the Turks near Vienna in 1683, gave his soldiers medallions with a picture of the Sorrowful Mother in order to invoke her assistance. Even the old folk song from the Turkish wars " By Trencin's Gate" is a plea to the Virgin Mary from the Slovak heroes before leaving for battle: "God and Mary help us, to be a happy Slovak land." The tradition of devotion to the Sorrowful Mother stretches across our whole history ... 29 As can be seen in the above excerpt, the homilists construct history around a core of Marian devotion . Historical struggles, whether framed as national, Catholic or Christian, are layered around this central theme of Marian devotion. In Cardinal Tomko 's 2010 homily, the history of the region is portrayed as a series of invasions and invocations of Mary's assistance in prevailing despite the harsh conditions. While these invaders fell upon the Kingdom of Hungary, 28 Ibid. Cardinal Jozef Tomko, Homil y presented at the National Basilica in Sastin-Straze, Slovakia, Zivot Crkvi, 17, No. 37 (20 10). 29 118 SLOVAKIA-2017 Cardinal Tomko refers repeatedly to the victims of the invasion as "our ancestors," framing the history of the Slovak lands as the history of the Slovaks. The tradition of Marian devotion is "recalled as an ancient, historical custom" of the Slovaks. Cardinal Tomko takes the negative histories of war and struggle and the positive histories of Marian devotion out of their historical context in the Kingdom of Hungary, and makes them exclusive property of the Slovak nation . In other words, the Slovak nation is written into history as a protagonist, even into historical periods during which the nation was not a salient category of identification. The Church, then, uses this opportunity to present a very specific Slovak Catholic version of national history, a version that portrays Marian devotion as a fundamental characteristic of Slovak national identity that is both consistent through time and ubiquitous through the territory of Slovakia. In other words, the national history presented in the Sedembolestna homilies is both essentializing and homogenizing, (so that a more coherent set of narratives can be easily presented). By-and-large, during the event, Slovak national identity and the Slovak nation is not portrayed as under siege, the way that nationalist politicians often paint the picture. Yet it is portrayed as a minority nation, and a suffering nation. Within the framework of Slovakia, those who consider themselves to be ethnically Slovak have a clear majority; however, during the pilgrimage the Slovak nation is often presented in the context of the world stage, or at least the European stage. In other words, the ethno-national situation of Slovaks in Slovakia is omitted from the discourse of the event, and the situation of Slovaks in a broader context is presented instead, so as to highlight Slovaks ' minority status in Europe. Therefore, the episodes of historical suffering mentioned earlier find a new context in which to be expressed in the present structure of governance. This extension of history, for the most part, is not malicious in intent towards its European neighbors (or against the faceless "society" mentioned often in the homilies). However, there are some Slovak nationalists, who use the rhetoric stemming from Church sources as a validation of their claims. Therefore, that is where the de facto national Church and some Slovak nationalists intersect. There is a crossover between their ranks, but these individuals and sub-groups do not usuall y act as the driving forces behind the Church in Slo- SLOVAKIA-2017 119 vakia or Slovak nationalist organizations. Portraying the Church in Slovakia as nationalist, as often happens, is misleading, or rather, an oversimplification. They produce discourse that may aid some nationalists ( especially those nationalists who find importance in the Catholic nature of the nation), but this is not the primary goal of their discourse. Their primary goal seems to be evangelization and connecting various levels of social identity to the Church. In this process, the nation is just one of many leve ls of identity fostered and connected with the Church. By stepping away from simply labeling certain actions stemming from the Slovak Church as nationalist, and looking to the purpose and function of using the nation, a clearer picture emerges regarding the processes actually occurring. Shared System of Discourse In the celebration of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as national patron, the dominant themes of the event are that of suffering and sorrow. In a sense, we can envision this as a shared vocabulary of suffering within the larger shared system of discourse. Whether a detailed telling of the Seven Sorrows endured by Mary, the perceived one-thousand years of suffering of the Slovak nation since the end of the Great Moravian Empire or the evils of abortion, the dominant tropes are 'tragic' in nature. This accentuates "an economy that capitalizes on human suffering, valuing it not as the absence or disfavor of God, but as a grace or favor that viscerally connects the devout with the sufferings of Jesus, Mary, and the saints." 30 Essentially, suffering functions as the hub that links all of the spokes of the wheel; it is a gift given and a gift received; but most of all, suffering frames the introduction of social identities to the event. In the homilies of the event, the homilists demonstrate ways of talking about national identity, Catholic identity, Christian identity and even European identity. The ways in which the event is nationnally framed by church leaders- and the ways in which pilgrims talk, choose, perform and consume the nation-provide space for the nationalization of objects, spaces, bodies and symbols. This space 30 David Morgan, "Aura and the Inversion of Marian Pilgrimage: Fatima and Her Statues," Moved by Mary: The Power of Pilgrimage in the Modern World, Hermkens, Anna-Karina and Willy Jansen and Catrien Notermans, eds. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 63 . 120 SLOVAKJA-2017 allocated for nationalization does not exist at many other large-scale Catholic events in the country apart from Sastin, at least during the years surveyed in this study. Furthermore, the homilists build a history that intertwines Catholic and national pasts. They provide pilgrims with the discursive tools to deal with numerous societal issues in a Catholic way. They tum national life, political life and even family life into Catholic life. In other words, they demonstrate a Catholic way of talking about social life that is meant to be transferred outside of the religious field , or at least to broaden the religious field . Pilgrims and church leaders together contribute to the definition of social identities, not necessarily making agreements on how to live these identities, but how to articulate these identities. One elite project found in the discourse of the pilgrimage is the attempt to create a shared system of discourse in order to talk about devotional life and to discuss social issues within a Catholic framework. The pilgrimage at Sastin, then, is one of the large-scale events in which the Church does maintenance work to this shared system of discourse. I would suggest that a shared discourse could buttress the role of the Church and the role of Catholic identity in the country, even if membership in the Church is sometimes considered " lukewarm. " This type of maintenance work is done on every Sunday in the churches and at church-officiated events throughout the lives of people. The Slovak national pilgrimage to Sastin provides a stage on which to address the proposed importance of devotional identity to a large audience at the same time, and to construct a way for Catholics to talk about the social issues that affect them . This type of maintenance is accomplished through countless different pilgrimages; however, it is the peculiarities of the Sastin pilgrimage that allow for a greater opportunity to engage issues of identity outside of devotional identity. Creating a shared discursive system can be seen as one of the byproducts of evangelization, and this system is a prerequisite for most of the pastoral work in which the Church engages. In other words, the Church needs to have this shared discourse in place in order to navigate the challenges of its pastoral care effectively. The pilgrims need to be a part of constructing this discourse, because in order for the Church to be an important identity marker in their lives, they need to be able to find a way to articulate their place in the body of the Church, and likewise their position in society in relationship to SLOVAKIA-2017 121 the Church. Such a system is created through evangelization and a general socialization into religion; in other words, through creating a religiously literate society. Cultural historian Callum Brown uses the idea of a collapse in shared discourse to explain the fate of Christianity in Britain. 3 1 In Britain, as well as across western and northern Europe, the socialization of young people into Christianity has largely stopped. The Christian cultural forces in society that socialize new generations into recognizing a Christian identity in themselves have lost their voices, with the result that many young people in those countries no longer acquire a basic literacy in Christian symbols and Christian history. In Slovakia, the opposite is the case. Basic cultural competencies in Christianity maintain a shared discourse between Church and society; and in Slovakia, there appears to be a relative strengthening of a shared discourse, which often frames issues, whether political or religious, as national. It is this shared discourse, especially about suffering, that allows for some of these connections between Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows and the Slovak nation. During the pilgrimage, Church leaders present suffering as a gateway to understanding Marian devotion; they extend Marian suffering as a metaphor onto their flock. Coupled with this presentation, the nationally framed aspects of the pilgrimage allow this suffering to be extended via relevant social groupings, like the nation, family and gender. It is presumeptuous to assume that homilists should reference social groupings based on gender, or kinship, or nation, and so on; that they are somehow more natural or salient than other social groupings. We do not see roles connected with class, or the idea of class at all enter into the homilies. However, in religious fields influenced by liberation theology in Central and South American, nothing would be more natural or salient than the reification of class identity. The ability to load Mary with meaning does not assume the successful transmission of those meanings; however, the ways in which Mary is discursively packed with meaning gives us a window into the uses of Marian symbols and the possible lived-in worlds where the symbols and words might have the ability to make an impact. Examining the way that the homilists use the concept of suffering in 31 Grace Davie, Europe: The Exceptional Case (London : Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002), 20. 122 SLOVAKIA-2017 their reaction to the outcomes of modernity, presented in a context where the topic of identity is central to holiday and pilgrimage, shows how a vast number of different identities are related to Mary. The suffering of the nation, the crisis of the family , the widespread legal nature of abortion, the crisis of governance, the intrusion of consumerism, and the relativism of (Western) Europe are all connected to Mary's suffering. Any of these connections between perceived suffering of the individual and the perceived suffering of Mary can serve to reinforce the importance of Marian devotion in the life of the pilgrim. Modernization seems to accentuate the divides regarding gender, class, ethnicity, religion, etc ., and the homilists' discourse does not seek to attenuate them; instead, they are discursively reframed so that each of these identities are reified and simultaneously connected with Mary. The encouragement of communitarianism- be it in family , kin , social community, moral community, nation or other groups- is also consistent with the Church ' s stance against individualism. In that sense, one of the primary functions of this type of pastoralization and evangelization is to combat the so-called cult of the individual and to reinforce membership in social groups that are considered meaningful. By reinforcing membership in social groups consistent with the messages of the Church, so too may they encourage the ro le of Marian devotion in these groups, claiming Marian devotion not just as something which should be a fundamental characteristic of Catholics, but of Europeans, the Slovak nation, the family and even the body politic. Constructing a Theology of the Nation One of the things occurring during this pilgrimage event is that Church leaders are seeking to reinvigorate the societal influence of Catholic teaching and the Catholic Church. Their efforts at evangelization seek to make Catholic doctrine influential in society, and to make Catholicism matter for individuals and institutions beyond the religious field ; in other words, to move beyond the sphere of personal salvation. They are doing so by making Marianism important to social identities outside of religious identity, national identity being one of them . They are weaving national identity into the religious sphere, and in doing so, constructing what I call a theology of the SLOVAKIA-2017 123 nation. "Grace does not destroy secular realities, or demand abandoning them for religious ones. Rather, grace includes, builds upon and potentially transfigures the sphere of the natural. The implication of this is that nationality can be one of the loci where responsible intelligence can ground theological consideration." 32 Dorian Llywelyn's, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality, 33 is one of the first of its kind to explore the connection between nationality and Catholicism in terms of theology. Llywelyn's treatment approaches nationnal identity not simply as subordinate to devotional identity, as has usually been the case in the Catholic Church, but as a locus of devotion. An academic exercise such as this would not have been possible in the past. Several factors account for the feasibi lity of Llywelyn's project in the present, one of which is the reforms of the Second Vatican Council that brought national practices, national languages and national discourse further into the Catholic Church. Perhaps another reason, although I do not have hard evidence to support the claim, is the election of Pope John Paul II in 1978. I would suggest that his election brought nationality into the Church by introducing a Central European, and specifically Polish, understanding of nationality to the papacy, one built on a long tradition of connecting the Church to the nation, which considered the Catholic Church as the repository of the nation in response to the Polish partitions between Orthodox neighbors to the east and Protestant neighbors to the west. In addition, the simple fact that John Paul II was the first non-Italian pope in hundreds of years, and was even commonly referred to as "the Polish pope," made nationality matter in the Church in a way it previously had not. For these reasons and others, positing a theology of nationality, or a theology of the nation as I would prefer to call it, becomes more plausible in the present day. In addition, I believe that Llywelyn ' s choice to academically engage the relationship between nation and religion supports the fact that the Catholic Church, specifically the Slovak Catholic Church, is increasingly engaging social identities outside of purely devotional ones; and that they first connect devotional identities to other social identities, and then must develop theology to substantiate these connections (in this case, the 32 Dori an Ll ywe lyn, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality (New York : Lexington Books, 20 I 0), 4. 33 Ibid . 124 SLOVAKIA-2017 nation and national identity). Church leaders foster a communitarian spirit based around many different types of identity, national among them, in order to fight against the crisis of the postmodern (and the relativism and secularism of Europe). In creating a theology of the nation, the Slovak church uses the nation as one of its primary loci for evangelization. This creates a situation where the nation is purported to be a natural place to locate and build devotion; however Church leaders connect the nation and Church in many other instances as we ll. In the media, in cross-border ecumenical counci ls and in other situations, church leaders may talk or act nationally, but that does not mean that they are creating a theology of the nation. A theology of the nation goes a step further, by writing national history, national characteristics and national practices into the teachings of the Church, indeed constructing national history, characteristics and practices in the process. Creating a theology of the nation involves producing the nation, not just using it in discourse. In the Slovak national pilgrimmage to Sastin, these national elements are sacralized in order to support forms of Marian devotion found in the event. As Llywe lyn notes, "revealed Christian truth" not only corresponds to national experience; national experience becomes part of "revealed Christian truth. "34 But this is more than simply sacralizing the nation : it collapses national and devotional values into one another, it creates a shared discourse and it writes the nation into the unofficial theology of the Church: "unofficial," because it cannot be realized in dogma or scriptural accounts, and "theology" because it becomes part of Church doctrine and teaching. "The task of a theology of nationality is to investigate the relationship between the mystery of Christ and the human experience of being a member of the nation."35 In the case of the Slovak national pilgrimage, a theology of the nation explores the connection between the nation and Mary, more so than between the nation and Jesus. The nation protects Mary, and vice-versa. The nation suffers with and for Mary. The nation embodies Mary . The nation becomes part of the Marian narrative, just as Mary has become part of the national narrative. This may seem unusual at first, but as Llywe lyn notes, human 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. SLOVAKIA-2017 125 experience can indeed be a source for theology.36 When church leaders construct a theology of the nation, something different is happening from when church leaders speak about the nation in other instances, as in the media. In the context of the holiday event, Church leaders can more freely speak about these things because they are addressing these issues in the religious field, not venturing outside their field of competence. But it is not only that. Church leaders act as authorized delegates of the Church, especially in their role during the Pontifical Mass, the ritual focus of the pilgrimage celebration. As such, the delegated authority of the Church is behind them when they connect Church and nation in the ritual event ( outside of Church matters, their authority may be questioned). Church leaders build complex connections between Church doctrine and the nation. Using Mary as a symbol, they connect her suffering with the suffering of the nation. In this sense, just as the Polish nation is often spoken of as the Christ among nations, the Slovak nation could easily be referred to as the Virgin Mary of nations because of the shared vocabulary of suffering. Church leaders intertwine Catholic history of the region with Slovak national history. They use the practices of ancestors to justify the national connection to the Catholic Church. They further justify the connection by citing the Slovak experience under communism, and show the present significance of the connection in relation to new European structures and programs. Homilists construct the national past in a way that it becomes part of a greater narrative of eventual salvation. In other words, national history is the middle part of the salvation story, after biblical accounts and before eventual salvation. In fact, the nation can be envisioned as a vehicle for salvation. The nation is framed as important for the survival of the Church and its values. Catholicism and Marian devotion are defining characteristics of the Slovak nation. Therefore, the event (and especially its discourse) creates a role for the nation in the life of the Church and a role for the Church in the life of the nation. The Church targets national units, as well as other social configurations, because it needs state, national and other established units to activate connections with the Church and connections with Catho36 Ibid. 126 SLOVAKIA-2017 lie identity in ways that are not just personal and refl ective. The Church needs groups to survive, not just individuals;37 therefore, it not only practices communitarianism, it attempts to ground its activation of comm unitarianism in theology. It deploys thi s communitarian discourse over many societal levels (national community, family/kin, gender, local community, the Catholic Church, the Christian world). It posits a relationship between these communities, a relationship that gives added importance to the Church. Therefore, the Church's activation of nationhood in an event such as this is not instigated by some inherent nationalism in the Slovak Church (or nationalist program), but it is mostly pragmatic. It is part of a comprehensive system that uses the discourse and practices of communitarianism across many (crosscutting) societal levels to achieve certain goals. In fact, such a comprehensive system that allows for identification across many levels is from where Mary, as a symbol , derives much of her power. Her multi-vocality is the key to her success as a symbol. But why organize on a national level given the multi-national nature of the country and the international nature of the Catholic Church? Partly, it is because the Church is already divided into territorial units such as dioceses and archdioceses that are frequently bounded within states, and sometimes within formal or informal national territories. In that sense, the Church is merely activating the already instituted divisions within its structure. Also, the language of living nationally has been used for various social projects in the Slovak lands since the mid- I 800s, and it was especially used by Church leaders for social projects in the 1930s and 1940s, and in reaction to Communism. But this construction does not just reflect the convention of using the nation as an organizing principle. The institution of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows as national patron, and the institution of a state holiday celebrating her, give the Church a greater inroad to nationalize the sacred, and sacralize the nation (at least the aspects of the nation institutionally connected with Catholicism and the Church) . Yet another reason for Catholic leaders to organize nationally stems from the way power is distributed in the European environ37 Massimo Rosati , Ritual and the Sacred: A Neo -Durkheimian Analysis of Politics, Religion and the Self (Farnham : As hgate, 2009), 17. SLOVAKIA-2017 127 ment and the way the nation is constituted in the pilgrimage event. Church leaders can see that successful social action in Europe need not be created through majority will; it can also be organized around minority nations, minority viewpoints, etc. The organization of projects, labeled as minority projects, can sometimes provide access to governmental power that is often otherwise lacking. The narrative of the Slovak nation as a minority (in Europe) despite its own (albeit contested) nation-state discursively creates a situation in which nationhood matters. Nationhood is not frequently salient for most of the population of Slovakia in everyday life, but it can be easily activated (partly because of the multinational nature of the state, which almost constantly reinforces the nation as an organizing principle in politics). Also, the nation is just one facet of this communitarian landscape employed by the church. Apparently, the Catholic Church in Slovakia finds it useful, because the Sastin pilgrimage is growing in numbers, and nationalizing language has become more frequent during the 2000s (not necessarily in connection with rising nationalism). Of course, Church leaders do not construct a theology of the nation in a vacuum. So what is the role of the celebrants of this holiday in the creation of a theology of the nation? I would suggest that they are involved in this process in the ways they talk the nation, perform the nation, choose the nation and consume the nation in relation to this religious event. One of the biggest ways they choose the nation is simply by choosing to take part in the Slovak national pilgrimage, but living nationally for the pilgrims is certainly not limited to that one choice. The nation is reflected and constituted in the symbols that the pilgrims use, in the objects and spaces with which they interact and in the ways that they talk about the event. In addition, they are crucial partners in the exchanges and negotiations between church leaders and pilgrims. Without them, the event has little to no importance. Without them, the voice from the pulpit has no real power, only delegated authority. Constructing a theology of the nation is about creating a future for the connection between nationhood and devotion . Even when church leaders cannot negotiate about the future of the nation or Catholic Church, as visions for both of these vary even among Slovak Catholics, they can manipulate the conditions so that nationhood and devotion will at least be a part of future public conversations and negotiations. Mainly, this is accomplished through the creation of a 128 SLOVAKIA-2017 shared discourse. Constructing a theology of the nation structures the conditions of future exchanges because it institutes national factors into devotional practices, thereby ensuring that these factors and practices will form and inform future discussions that involve national and devotional identity. In other words, constructing a theology of the nation is about organizing the past, legitimizing the present and framing the future. Conclusion I believe that developing concepts such as theology of the nation are important for a few interrelated reasons: one, they point towards the different uses and intentions behind national discourse stemming from the pulpit; two, they highlight that "talking the nation" is used not only for the purpose of making people more national ; and three, they provide conceptual tools with which we can compare the different ways of making the nation relevant across religions. Using national discourse is done for a variety of purposes, be it either to advance a political program, influence people to purchase a product, claim territory, contest space or resources, encourage tourism , justify actions, make historical occurrences relevant to contemporary choices, and countless others. In the case outlined in this article, the nation is invoked in order to strengthen religious devotion. Nationhood is not established and the nation is not constructed solely for its own end . Nationhood and attachment to national identity is always part of a greater project. Establishing nationhood and constructing the nation is not always done with the nation as its endgame. The purpose can usually be found elsewhere. If we look at the when of nationalism, in other words, when do nations matter for people, we find that the nation is only important in specific contexts and situations. The nation may be relevant in our framing of issues that involve family values, economy, immigration, environment, international politics or other issues . Outside of those issues, the nation is not usually our dominant framework for categorizing culture, life, relationships. When we emphasize the discursively constructed nature of the nation and the fact that it functions as a framework for categorizing difference, we view the nation as a project, a series of processes or a practical achievement. This makes it easy to believe that a reified nation is the goal of the national pro- SLOVAKIA-2017 129 ject. However, I would argue that making the nation (and making people more national) is almost never the sole goal of a national project. The project at Sastin can be understood as a theology of the Slovak nation, created through use of the biblical narratives of Mary ' s suffering. In one sense, the theme of suffering keeps people talking about a connection between Church and nation. In another sense, it creates and recreates a system that structures choice so that the nation and Marian devotion are both valued. The visceral connection through suffering has the capacity of becoming especially strong, because it functions not only on the individual level but on the group level as well, whether one envisions the group as the body of the Church or the nation. For some of the pilgrims who attend the Slovak national pilgrimmage to Sastin, national identity is important, while others would rather emphasize the international nature of the Catholic Church. For some, the fight against abortion takes precedence, while for others the fight against secularization of Europe is the rallying cry that brings them to the event. For countless others, the pilgrimage is simply a celebration of Mary. It may be about sharing individual or group suffering with Mary. It may be about asking Mary for assistance or healing. However, any path chosen that leads the participant to the Slovak national pilgrimage, in the end, provides support for the Catholic Church, Marian devotion and the Slovak nation. Even if pilgrims contest specific aspects of Church power or the validity of certain Marian practices, their participation in the performance of the event makes the Church and Mary prominent focal points. In this specific instance where Catholic leaders claim authority over social life outside of the Church, the ideas of making Catholic teaching and values important in the lives of pilgrims and making the Church a focal point go hand in hand with using the nation as a locus for evangelization. LITERATURE  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Invoking the Nation, Strengthening Devotion: National Discourse at the Slovak National Pilgrimage Description An account of the resource Alexander Bielicki Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017 pp. 105-129 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bielicki, Alexander Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b532f2a1e78204582b3aab2458820e9e.pdf d29ab35a9185a585aee78369094a60db PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA-2017 133 SIBERIA: A SLOVAK TALE (A story based upon the life of the author's grandfather, Jan Janosko) R. Vladimir Baumgarten Jozef Zeleny, most recently an employee of United States Steel, headquartered in Homestead, Pennsylvania, decided that he no longer wished to live . This puzzled people, after it was all over. By Slovak-American standards, Jozef Zeleny was by no means a failure. Granted his wife had died, but six out of ten of his children had survived and landed on their feet. They were all responsible and functional adults. Yet, Jozef Zeleny wanted to die. He contacted a relative in the town of Monongahela, located on a river of that name and the border of Virginia. He intended to march from there, up and across the ridge line, and disappear into a snowstorm. Hypothermia is a benevolent death. After a while, you no longer feel the cold. You begin to feel warm and sensuous . You want to lie down and sleep. You go to sleep. Then you die. Why did Jozef Zeleny want to die? To answer this question, we must look into his background . It involved a drama which originated a full generation earlier. *** Jozef Zeleny was born near Svidnik, in northeastern Slovakia. Seven generations of his ancestors had served in the military as Hungarian Hussars. Zeleny began his adult life in this hereditary occupation. He was admitted to the Ludovika Military Academy in Budapest and graduated with the rank of sub-lieutenant on the eve of the Great War. In August of 1914 he was dispatched to the Eastern Front. Here he became infected with the spirit of Slovak nationalism , which resented Hungarian domination. Many Czechs and Slovaks in the Austro-Hungarian Army either deserted or were captured by the Russian army. In this way Zeleny became a member of the Czechoslovak Legion. �134 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was a curious organization. Colonies of Czechs and Slovaks had existed in Russia since the 19 th century. After the outbreak of the war, Czechs and Slovaks in Russia were allowed to organize themselves into a military unit called the Druiina, which served as an auxiliary to the Russian Army. Originally, the Drui ina engaged in reconnaissance and infiltration of Slavic units in the Austro-Hungarian army. As it demonstrated its competence, the Druiina, grew, with more captured Slavic prisoners. In March of 1917 revolution erupted in Petrograd and on March 15 th Tsar Nicholas II abdicated and a Provisional Government replaced him. Most Czech and Slovak Legionnaires disliked Tsarist rule and initially welcomed the Russian Revolution. They had chafed under the restrictions imposed upon them by the Tsarist government and looked forward to more freedom of action. Zeleny participated in the Czechoslovak Legion's baptism of fire at the battle of Zborov on July 2, 1917. Zborov (Zboriv in Ukrainian), is a village in the Carpathian foothills of western Ukraine, then part of the Austrian province of Galicia. In its vicinity, two fortified Austrian positions, Galish and Kalish, guarded the approaches to the city of Lviv (Lemberg, Lvov). Two Finnish Regiments of the Russian Army were ordered to effect a pincers movement around Galish. The Legionnaires were supposed to move in after the Finns. However, the Czechs and Slovaks were impatient for action and moved ahead of the Finns. Their opponents were largely Czechs or Bosnian Serbs, who were poorly-motivated. While the Russian command hesitated in the southern sector, the Legionnaires, led by Captain Radola Gajda, stormed the hills overlooking the battlefield. This breakthrough resulted in the capture of 62 Austro-Hungarian officers, 3,150 soldiers, 20 pieces of arti llery and 40 machine guns. Russian General Selichev then declared, "Czech eagles led Russian chickens ." After this victory, the Russian Provisional Government recognized the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia as an independent army, answerable to the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, led by T.G. Masaryk, Milan R. Stefanik and Edvard Benes. However, the Provisional Government was toppled by a military coup in Petrograd, led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin on November 7, 1917. Since the incoming Bolshevik government wanted peace with Germany in order to create a communist state in Russia, it inherited a large number �SLOVAKIA-2017 135 of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, many of whom were armed and roaming the countryside. The Czechoslovak Legionnaires were among them, and continued to support the Western Allies. On the other hand, many German and Hungarian prisoners of war had joined the newly-established Red Guards. They now controlled large areas of Siberia. On May 15, 1918, an incident occurred in Russia which had international ramifications. At the railway station in Chelyabinsk, in the Ural Mountains, a train carrying Czechoslovak Legionnaires drew alongside a train bearing repatriated Hungarian p.o.w. ' s headed in the opposite direction. The Bolsheviks had made peace with the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in December of 1917 and had agreed to repatriate each other's p.o.w.'s. As the trains passed each other, a shouting match ensued and one of the Hungarians hurled a lead pipe and fractured a Czech soldier's skull. The well-armed Legionnaires pulled the culprit off the train and hanged him on the spot. The local Soviet government demanded an inquiry and arrested three Czechoslovak officers who attended the inquiry. As soon as their comrades heard of this incident, they stormed the jail, freed their officers, and seized control of the town. In Moscow, Commissar of War Leon Trotsky, ordered that any armed Czechoslovak soldiers found along the Trans-Siberian Railway were to be shot on the spot. This was probably Trotsky ' s biggest mistake. Relieved of the necessity of negotiating with the Bolsheviks, the Legionnaires seized control of the Trans-Siberian railroad and blasted their way east all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific. For eighteen months this army without a country controlled the world ' s largest land mass. *** And so, Lieutenant Zeleny found himself in Siberia. It was a huge land of contrasts and contradictions. Covered in snow and frost during the long winter, it became a field of flowers in the summer. The land was rich in natural resources. Much of the timber was cut and the minerals were mined by convict labor. Tens of thousands of Russian men and women , convicted of crimes ranging from murder to petty theft or even simple vagrancy, had been deported there. Siberia boasted a penal system operated at a profit. On the other hand, Siberia also contained many Russians who had moved there in �136 SLOVAKIA-2017 search of land and greater liberty. It was a land of unlimited opportunity for those who were able to withstand its rigors. Peasants in Siberia became accustomed to thinking and acting more independently than their kinsmen in European Russia. This would have fateful consequences for the White side during the Russian Civil War. Although there were theaters and other forms of amusement in Omsk, Irkutsk and Vladivostok, the chief form of recreation in Siberia was the consumption of vodka. Harbing, a city the Russians built in Manchuria, on a stretch of land they obtained as a concession from China, boasted a distillery that produced thirty million gallons of vodka per year. Other distilleries in Siberia soon equaled this production . As in many frontier cultures, Siberia was more inclined to dispense alcohol than education. In the late 1880's the American journalist George Kennan observe that in each settlement, there were thirty saloons for every school. Jozef Zeleny liked to drink. He acclimatized to the local culture. He managed to digest kumis (fermented mare ' s milk), and cultivated a genuine fondness for another fermented beverage made of juice derived from reindeer antlers. But, serious drinking involved vodka. For this reason he visited a certain tavern in Omsk in the summer of 1918. There he was attracted to a very striking, brown-eyed blonde. As a rule, women did not frequent taverns unless they were prostitutes. Something in her bearing suggested that she was not. Jozef left her alone. Three days later he encountered her in the local park. She was walking a dog on a leash. It was said to be a Jack Russel , although it had the face of a Pit Bull. Suddenly, two larger unleashed dogs appeared . They bore down upon the little guy. Jozef seized a fallen tree branch and rushed into the fray. The little guy was way ahead of him. Roaring like a lion, he plunged forward and hit one of the bigger dogs with his head, causing it to bowl over. Meanwhile, Jozef hit to other dog with his switch. Both bigger dogs ran off. Man and small dog stood triumphantly on the field of battle. The blonde woman laughed delightedly. "Bravo! " she exclaimmed. "You were both magnificent." Jozef looked at her with narrowed eyes. "I saw you in the tavern a few days ago. I see that you are some kind of lady. You have no business in a place like that. Why did you go there?" �SLOVAKIA-2017 137 "Because I was waiting for someone to tell me that, instead of trying to pick me up. I need a friend ... and some help." Jozef was stunned by her answer. This is how he met Ludmilla Suslova. She was a schoolteacher. Her father worked for the Directorate, which claimed to be the government of Siberia. The Directorate consisted of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries and was opposed to the Bolsheviks in Moscow. The Directorate enjoyed the patronage of the Czechoslovak Legion. Ludmilla's husband had recently abandoned her. Their small house was in need of repair. She needed a good man around the house and Jozef qualified. She told him that he could move in rent-free if he maintained the house. He was amenable to such an arrangement because he currently occupied a tepluska, one of the railway boxcars attached to an armored train, along with other Legionnaires. A comer was set aside for games of cards or chess, but there was no privacy. Jozef and Ludmilla did not bond immediately. He was intimidated by her beauty. He initially bonded with her dog Yasha. He was useless as a watchdog since he barked only at other animals. This sad-eyed canine brought great joy to Jozef s life. Ultimately, nature took its course between Jozef and Ludmilla. One day, when working together in the house, their bodies pressed against each other. Mutually-suppressed desire spontaneously exploded. They did not even make it into the bedroom. Thereafter, they lived as man and wife. *** Both the Western Allies and Japan had long been seeking an excuse to intervene in Russia against the Bolsheviks. Now they had one. In the summer of 1918 they recognized the Czechoslovak Legionnaires as co-belligerents against Germany and Austria-Hungary and could justify landing troops in Siberia under the pretext of rendering aid to their allies. However, the paradigm shifted in the autumn months. The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary disintegrated in October and on the 28 th the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic emerged. Now the Legionnaires lost interest in fighting the Bolsheviks and just wanted to go home. Furthermore, on November 15 1\ just after the armistice which ended the Great War, the Directory in Omsk was toppled by a �138 SLOVAKIA-2017 military coup. A certain Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, who just two weeks earlier had been living in a cheap Tokyo hotel, claimed the title of Supreme Commander of all Russia. He was unequal to the task. Although personally honest and well-intentioned, Kolchak had little control over his subordinates, most of whom were thieves and bandits in the pay of the Japanese, and who committed various war crimes against the civilian population. About six months after Kolchak assumed power, just as the black flies and mosquitos in Siberia began to reassert themselves, Captain (yes, he had been promoted) Zeleny had a revealing experience. He passed through a barnyard in which wounded Russian soldiers lay in the hay. The insects attacked the pus oozing from their wounds. Distressed by what he saw, Zeleny approached an elegantlydressed White Russian officer, who was speaking in French to a lady on his arm. "These men are in bad shape!" Jozef exclaimed. "You should help them out!" "Please don ' t talk about things like that," the officer replied . "You' II upset the lady." When Jozef related the incident to Ludmilla, he declared "A regime built upon this kind of shit cannot survive." Ludmilla agreed. Yet, for a time, given the backing of the Western Allies and Japan, it looked as if Kolchak might win. On March 6, 1919, he launched a 700-mile offensive in the Urals that stretched from the forests of fir in the north to the steppes below Oren berg in the south. His armies reached Ufa, halfway between the Urals and the Volga. Here the Whites were met by the Army of Turkestan, as well as the I 51, 4 th and 8 th Red Armies, led by General Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze. Frunze was incapacitated by an artillery concussion while advancing on Ufa, but his subordinate, Vasily lvanovich Chapayev, in command of the 25 th Rifle Regiment, pressed ahead. Chapayev was already a legend among the Reds. As a partisan commander the previous year, he had tangled with the Czechoslovak Legionnaires in the Urals. He had since gone to Moscow for advanced military training. He then returned to the Urals front as a regular field commander. Chapayed was himself wounded in the storming of the city, but the Reds prevailed and captured Ufa on June 81\ Now the way was open for the Reds to cross the Urals. Kolchak's government, to say nothing of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires, prepared to evacuate Omsk. "Marry me," Jozef urged �SLOVAKIA-2017 139 Ludmilla. "As an officer's wife, you can return with me to our new country of Czechoslovakia. It will be a good place to live." Ludmilla shook her head sadly. "You Western Slavs can carry your country with you. It is different with us Russians. I can never be at home in another place, regardless of who rules it or how." And so, Jozef and Ludmilla parted ways. Omsk fell to the Red Army on November 14 th . Ludmilla was killed when a stray artillery shell hit her house. A Russian who fled the country later informed Jozef of her death. He never ceased to grieve for her. Happily, Yasha survived and found another home. While evacuating Siberia in 1919, the Czechs and Slovaks kept the best trains for themselves. An exasperated Kolchak cabled his erstwhile subordinate in eastern Siberia, the Kozak atman Grigorii Semyonov, urging him to halt the Czechoslovak trains at all cost. The Legionnaires intercepted the cable and then blocked Kolchak ' s trains at Irkutsk. The desperate Kolchak then abdicated as Supreme Commander of Russia and threw himself on the mercy of the Allies, who now included Czechoslovakia. The previous year the Legionnaires had captured Kazan on the Volga, where they found the tsarist gold reserves . They now negotiated with the Bolsheviks for free rite of passage in return for the gold reserves and the Bolsheviks eagerly accepted. As Kolchak's train, containing cocaine but not much else, reached Irkutsk on January 15, 1920, the Legionnaire guards abandoned him. The city council of Irkutsk then arrested Kolchak. The council consisted of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. However, Bolsheviks were also in town. Lenin wanted Kolchak brought to Moscow to stand trial. However, one of Kolchak's commanders tried to rescue him and, when the city council heard of this, it executed Kolchak by firing squad on February 7, 1920 and dumped his body into a hole in the ice on the river Angara. By the end of 1920 the last of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires withdrew by sea from Vladivostok. British and American ships transported them to either Vancouver in Canada or San Francisco in the USA . They then crossed both countries by rail and were shipped to Europe across the Atlantic. Most of them returned to the newlycreated Czechoslovakia. A few decided to remain in the USA. One of them was Jozef Zeleny. *** �140 SLOVAKIA-2017 Jozef had relatives in the Pittsburgh area. The found him employment in the local steel mill. Due to his education and service in the military, Jozko (his pet name) soon became a foreman . He also took an interest in the Slovak community and joined one of their fraternal-benefit societies . Slovak organizations in the Pittsburgh region had played a role in the creation of Czechoslovakia. In 1918 T.G. Masaryk, head of the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement, visited the Mecca of American Slovaks to seek a mandate for the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a future Czecho-Slovakia because the Slovaks back home were not free to speak their minds. His visit attracted large crowds, including South Slavs. His negotiations with the Slovaks on May 29-31 were quite tempestuous, but led to the signing of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which promised the Slovaks their own Diet, administration, courts, schools and the use of their own language. In other words, home-rule. Unfortunately, when Masaryk returned to the new Czechoslovakia, he first forgot and later repudiated the Pittsburgh Agreement, which led to a breakdown of relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the first Czechoslovak Republic. The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also populated by Carpatho-Rusyns from Hungary. In eastern Slovakia the distinction between Slovak and Rusyn remains somewhat nebulous. Indeed, Jozko qualified as a "Rusnak" (the popular term for Rusyn). Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Through these institutions the Rusyns acquired political awareness . One of their organizations was the Greek Catholic Union headquartered in the Homestead-Munhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, based in McKeesport, which contained both Greek Catholi c and Orthodox members. On July 23 , 1918, they merged to form the American National Council of UhroRusyns. They resolved to join Czechoslovakia in exchange for territorial autonomy. As in the case of the Slovaks, the Prague government decided that they were not ready for autonomy. During the course of his participation in the politics of the fraternals, Jozko bonded with the president of his lodge. Th is individual, Ivan Kosko, some twenty years Zeleny's senior, was personally affable but was hopelessly corrupt. He had been dipping into the treas- �SLOVAKIA-2017 141 ury for some time. He knew he would get caught sooner or later if he did not put the money back. Yet Kosko had a certain bargaining collateral. It consisted of a fifteen year-old daughter who was living back in the Old Country in Kosice with an aunt. This dark haired, wind-swept lass was comely to behold. Kosko showed Jozef Zeleny a picture of her as enticement. He indicated that he wanted to have a responsible husband for her in America, but this required money. Kosko pulled it off. In this manner Jozef Zeleny acquired a mailorder bride. Although he would not admit it , he was marrying her to drown the memory of Ludmilla. And, even though he and Marija produced a considerable number of youngsters between them, things did not work. Jozef Zeleny never ceased to mourn for Ludmilla. There were significant differences between man and wife . As a native of the Svidnik area, Jozef was considered a Rusnak, and definitely Pan-Slav. Marija, a native of Kosice, was culturally if not politically Magyarone. She was deeply religious. Jozef was more spiritual than religious. He loved the Old Church Slavonic liturgy of the Greek Catholic Church. But he never went to confession. Marija asked him why. He explained it to her: "When I was back there in Ludovika, I had to work in the summers, to pay for my arrears and the upkeep of my horse during the school year. I was employed on the property of an affluent priest. One day, when I went to pitch hay in the barn, I heard giggling coming from the haystack. His Reverence was having a romp in the hay with one of the local girls. Alright, this man might represent God when he stands before the altar. But when he steps back from the altar, he is as capable of sin and error as anyone else. I' ll be damned if I answer before him or anyone else." Jozef followed political developments in the New Czechoslovak Republic with great interest. Although he had seen the White side for what it was worth during the course of the Russian Civil War, he had a certain admiration for General Milan Rastislav Stefanik, who was definitely anti-Bolshevik. Stefanik hailed from a village called Kosariska, in the Brezova district of western Slovakia. During the 1848 revolution against Hungarian rule, a famous battle was fought at Brezova. Slovak mountaineers, fighting on their own terms and on their own terrain, defeated the Hungarian military in the otherwise disastrous September campaign. �142 SLOVAKIA-2017 Such was Stefanik ' s heritage. As the son of a Lutheran minister, he was raised in a particularly patriotic regional environment. To assure his son's advancement without the latter succumbing to the pressures of magyarization, his father helped Milan obtain a scholarship in Prague. The old man was utterly appalled with the results. Milan became an agnostic among a circle of Slovak intellectuals in Prague who rallied under Czech philosophy professor T.G. Masaryk. He became the president of the Slovak student organization in Prague known as Detvan. The students in Detvan tended to major in the mundane sciences. Although Stefanik attended Masaryk' s philosophy classes, he majored in astronomy. Upon graduation, he borrowed some money, emigrated to France, and found employment in the Medoun observatory near Paris. In this capacity he engaged in roughly a dozen learned expeditions to other countries. He acquired French citizenship in 1912. He also learned how to fly. Stefanik thus became an officer in the air corps of the French Army when the Great War began. Given his membership on the Czechoslovak National Council, the French eventually accorded Stefanik the rank of brigadiergeneral. He became the driving force in the creation of the Czechoslovak Legion . In this capacity he clashed with Edvard Benes, who soon became foreign minister in the new Czechoslovak Republic. On the other hand, Stefanik advocated pressing an offensive against the Bolsheviks in Siberia, whereas Benes followed Masaryk' s lead in avoiding intervention in Russia's internal affairs. Then there was the issue of Slovak autonomy. Stefanik came from a school of Slovaks who were considered more pro-Czech than the Czechs themselves . Yet, during the Great War, he had occasion to visit the United States, where he solicited American Slovak support. After his interactions with the fraternal leaders, Stefanik considered that, with their advice and financial support, Slovakia could be worthy of autonomy. He resented his name being inscribed to a declaration of independence for Czechoslovakia which made no provision for Slovakia's status . Stefanik and Benes hated each other. Stefanik regarded Benes as "this first grade socialist, this paper revolutionary, this distorted diplomat." Benes responded by labeling Stefanik as "this astronomer who thinks he is a soldier, this peasant who thinks he is an aristocrat, this politician who thinks he is a genius. " �SLOVAKIA-2017 143 Insofar as Benes was entrenched in Prague while Stefanik was with the Legion in Siberia, the Czech foreign minister had the upper hand. Benes had the ministry of defense bifurcated. Stefanik, as Minister of War, retained command of Czechoslovakia's armed forces abroad (the Legion in Siberia), while a clone of Benes, Vaclav Klofac, became the Minister of National Defense .. Stefanik nonetheless prepared to return home. He made official visits to France and Italy. On the morning of May 5, 1919, he boarded a Caproni aircraft in the north Italian city of Udine. It was a three hour flight to Bratislava, Stefanik's intended destination. As he circled the runway of Vajnory, his plane suddenly fell to the ground from a height of 500 meters. Some witnesses charged that Stefanik' s plane had been shot down by a Czech artillery battery. The incident was officially described as an accident. Indeed, this might well have been the case. No evidence has ever been found that Benes had Stefanik murdered. This unfortunate incident came at a time when the Czechoslovak Republic was experiencing border clashes with Hungary, at this time under a Bolshevik government. The markings on the Caproni aircraft (red, white and green) were identical to the Hungarian national colors, albeit in horizontal order. Yet, years afterward, members of the artillery battery maintained that they were given their orders and that there was no mistake. They were expecting that plane. It stood to reason that there would be an appropriate state funeral. Its proceedings were recorded by Robert W. Seton-Watson, a distinguished British historian, who attended. Being Scottish, SetonWatson had a certain romantic attraction for a people who were highlanders with a heroic attitude towards life. He had championed the Slovak cause when they were under Hungarian rule. During the Great War, R. W. Seton-Watson served as adviser to the British government on Eastern European affairs. He became a personal friend of T. G. Masaryk. If Masaryk is said to be the founding father of Czechoslovakia, then Seton-Watson qualifies as the godfather. Seton-Watson description of Stefanik's funeral remains poignant to this day. Bratislava had only recently been occupied by the Czechs. Seton-Watson noted that Skols - Czech gymnastic society members recently assuming para-military roles - kept perfect order during the funeral procession, which extended a mile and a half: "Considering that the Czechs have been here exactly three months in �144 SLOVAKIA-2017 occupation of the town ... it was a ceremony which must have duly impressed the naturally lukewarm Magyar and German citizens, as suggesting that the newcomers had come to stay and are perfectly capable of taking charge." In regard to the aftermath of the ceremonies, Seton-Watson noted: "the coffin left for Brezova ... where the Slovak peasants - this seems to me so typical of their good taste and feeling - have on their accord hewn a rock grave for him on the highest point of the Little Carpathians, overlooking the whole western district." *** A former Legionnaire sent an account of Stefanik' s funeral to Jozef. Jozef mourned for Stefanik. He also subscribed to the theory that Stefanik had been murdered at the instigation of the foreign ministry . He began brooding deeply on the relationship between his life and the recent historical events. He began having nightmares. Throughout the odyssey across Siberia, Jozef had observed atrocities. These not only consisted of the usual burned villages and the numerous hanging of peasants. The Legionnaires became desensitized to the likes of that. But Jozef also had occasion to witness the grisly mutilation of innocent peasants by Kozaks and Mongols. These haunted his dreams. In any case, he could no longer sleep without vodka. And he still grieved for Ludmilla. There are people who, following the death of a spouse or loved one, marry, produce children, yet still grieve for the deceased a full decade later. Jozef Zeleny was such an individual. Eventually, he began taking out his angst on family members. Three specific incidents merit scrutiny. The first of these concerned his eldest daughter, Margarite, when she was twelve years old. He was drinking heavily that day when he could no longer hold his alcohol as he had previously. Margarite was playing hop scotch with other girls. Her father summoned her home with a single whistle. "Ah, gee whiz, I always gotta go," she complained to her friends. Jozef overheard the remark and did not like it. He belabored his daughter with his razor strap repeatedly and with vigor. The next day (when he was sober), he saw Margarite disrobe to step into the wash tub . Her noted the black and blue marks on her back and her rump. �SLOVAKIA-2017 145 "Who did this to you?" he gasped. "You did!" Marija threw it back m his face. "When she was playing hop scotch." Jozko paled and lowered his head. "I'll never beat her again," he vowed. Indeed, on this he kept his word. But he was still capable of emotional excess. On one occasion, when Marija was out of the house, he was minding the youngsters. One infant daughter, Leona, messed her diapers. Her father flew into a rage. His eldest son, Janko, was now a big, strapping young man. Aware of his father's capacity for violence, he intervened decisively. He picked up a railroad tie and cracked his father across the ribs, breaking two of them. Father and son never got close to each other again. Yet the most egregious emotional excess of Jozef Zeleny was yet to come. It concerned one of his daughters, named Helena, the beauty of the litter. Endowed with long dark hair and green eyes, Helena looked more Magyar than Slovak. One could tell she would do well one day. One day, at age seventeen, Helena came home from school, at a time when her mother was not home. There had been a layoff in the steel mill, which extended to the level of foreman . Consequently Jozef Zeleny simply lay around the house, drinking and whittling wood. And now, his daughter was home. "Where is your mother?" he demanded. "I don ' t know," she responded. "You are lying! " her father bellowed. And he threw his knife at her. Here it should be noted that Jozef Zeleny, having been trained by Gypsies, was an excellent knife thrower, whether he was drunk or sober. If he wanted to impale his daughter, he definitely would have done so. The knife whizzed past her head and pinned a lock of her hair against the wall behind her. In a state of shock, Helena's head hit the wall, and she fell to the floor unconscious. When she woke, she could not walk for the next two months. The attending doctor legally petitioned for her to be taken out of the house. She was moved into the house of her elder sister Margarite, now married. As Helena recovered, Margarite made her scrub floors and generally worked her like a dog. �146 SLOVAKIA-2017 Helena Zelenova nonetheless became the most successful of Jozko ' s offspring. She became a cocktail waitress. In this capacity she encountered a piano player in a night club. Reinhard Wolfmeister, of Germanic origin, was not your ordinary piano player. He qualified as a genuine pianist. He began playing piano at age four, had an affection for Chopin, and progressed to Paderewski. He attained such a mastery of Paderewski that he qualified for a scholarship in music at the Sorbonne, in Paris. His mother wanted him to be a doctor. After three years of pre-med at the University of Pittsburgh, Reinhard decided he did not want to be a doctor. This being the era of the Great Depression, he could look down the bluff from Mount Washington and see the tin shantytowns. He decided people didn ' t have enough money to afford doctors. So, instead, he took two courses at the Robert Morris Business College, gained employment in a freight shipping company, and was eventually dragged, kicking and screaming, upstairs to the vice- presidency. Yet insofar as he still loved music, he played piano in nightclubs in the evenings. He worked two jobs. He made money and invested it wisely. Eventually, the Wolfmeister family moved to Florida. Here Helena integrated herself into the local society so well that her Slovak sisters came to describe her as the "Queen of the Jews." *** Jozef Zeleny had enough intelligence left to realize he was losing it. Marija passed away after a brief illness, and he mourned for her. But he still grieved for Ludmilla to an even greater extent. Then there was Helena's forthcoming marriage. Having a heroic attitude towards life, Jozef Zeleny could not appreciate that which was unheroic. His upcoming son-in-law could have been a concert pianist in Paris, yet opted to become the manager of a trucking company in Pittsburgh instead. It made no sense. Jozko once again began to brood deeply. He had worked long enough in the steel industry to benefit from the gains that labor unions made for steelworkers under the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He had a nice pension and began looking for an exit. �SLOVAKIA-2017 147 Jozef had a cousin who lived in Monongahela. He asked if he could visit there for several weeks "for reasons of mental health." His cousin replied in the affirmative. Jozef had yet to reach his dreadful decision when he first went to Monongahela. Yet it is worth nothing that he had one previous experience with hypothermia. Several years back, he had been three miles from home on the coldest night of the winter. The temperature was fifteen degrees below zero and accompanied by thirty mile-an-hour winds. It was snowing horizontally throughout the Monongahela valley. The public transportation system was paralyzed. Jozko was jumping up and down in a futile attempt to warm himself. Since it was too cold to walk, he ran and ran and ran. At the end of the second mile, he wasn't cold anymore. He began feeling like Ulysses hearing the calling of the Sirens. He experienced an erection. And he wanted to lie down and go to sleep. Then he realized what was happening. He was beginning to freeze. Jozef Zeleny resisted the temptation to succumb. He pushed on the last mile to the tavern, where he rented a room upstairs. Ice hung from his normally upturned moustaches. After four shots of vodka, he thawed out... except for his feet. Even though he had worn two pairs of socks, frostbite had gotten into his feet. It felt like he was walking on concrete blocks for the next sixteen hours. Aside from that, it had been a euphoric experience. And so, in Monongahela, Jozko frowned thoughtfully as the wind hit hard and it was obvious that a snowstorm was on the way. "I'm going for a walk," he announced. "JEE-zus Ker-RIST! " his cousin exclaimed. "It's colder than a well digger's ass out there! Have you lost your f'ck"n mind?" I have my reasons," Jozef replied cryptically. He commenced walking across the ridge in a westerly direction. The snowstorm blew into his face. In spite of the severity of the weather, he perceived the terrain as being beautiful. It reminded him of Siberia. As the delirium which accompanies hypothermia took hold, Jozef saw an image before him. It was Ludmilla. He staggered forward. *** �148 SLOVAKIA-2017 Most people who knew her agreed that Celeste Romanczykowa was a rough piece of work. Her house - little more than a cottage stood atop the ridge to which Jozef was ascending. Celeste was the product of a union between a Polish coal miner and a West Virginia hillbilly. So it stood to reason that she could be fractious at times. Auburn, brown eyed, and generously endowed in the breasts and the rump, she was comely to behold to men who are not obsessed with skinny women. Celeste was a widow. Her coal miner husband had died of black lung three years earlier. She was noted for a good heart, and loved dogs. But she did not suffer tyranny gracefully, and consequently ignored the overtures of her husband 's cronies among the coal miners. She lived alone and was lonely. As the snowstorm moved in, she went out on the hillside to gather wood. She saw the strange figure staggering up the hill. "Who are you?" she asked, pulling him by the sleeve. He muttered a few words in Slovak. Being half-Polish, she more or less understood. If she did not know who he was, she understood what he was. She dragged him into the house. Once he reached the couch, he collapsed unconscious. Through a neighbor, Celeste summoned the local doctor. After administering Jozef some medicine, he declared: "If you had discovered him an hour later, it would have been too late. But now I think he'll make it. Just keep him warm. Celeste gazed down at the man on the coach. She noticed the upturned moustaches. Her paternal side of the family had come from the Dukla Pass, between Poland and Slovakia. She perceived that he had at some point in his life been a cavalryman. Later, when his eyes opened, she became hypnotized by their ice blue, steel glaze. Jozko stirred. "Ludmilla, ... " he murmured. "You hush now," she said softly. "I' m going to take care of you." He opened his eyes. And smiled. � SLOVAKIA-2017 133 SIBERIA: A SLOVAK TALE (A story based upon the life of the author's grandfather, Jan Janosko) R. Vladimir Baumgarten Jozef Zeleny, most recently an employee of United States Steel, headquartered in Homestead, Pennsylvania, decided that he no longer wished to live . This puzzled people, after it was all over. By Slovak-American standards, Jozef Zeleny was by no means a failure. Granted his wife had died, but six out of ten of his children had survived and landed on their feet. They were all responsible and functional adults. Yet, Jozef Zeleny wanted to die. He contacted a relative in the town of Monongahela, located on a river of that name and the border of Virginia. He intended to march from there, up and across the ridge line, and disappear into a snowstorm. Hypothermia is a benevolent death. After a while, you no longer feel the cold. You begin to feel warm and sensuous . You want to lie down and sleep. You go to sleep. Then you die. Why did Jozef Zeleny want to die? To answer this question, we must look into his background . It involved a drama which originated a full generation earlier. *** Jozef Zeleny was born near Svidnik, in northeastern Slovakia. Seven generations of his ancestors had served in the military as Hungarian Hussars. Zeleny began his adult life in this hereditary occupation. He was admitted to the Ludovika Military Academy in Budapest and graduated with the rank of sub-lieutenant on the eve of the Great War. In August of 1914 he was dispatched to the Eastern Front. Here he became infected with the spirit of Slovak nationalism , which resented Hungarian domination. Many Czechs and Slovaks in the Austro-Hungarian Army either deserted or were captured by the Russian army. In this way Zeleny became a member of the Czechoslovak Legion. �134 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was a curious organization. Colonies of Czechs and Slovaks had existed in Russia since the 19 th century. After the outbreak of the war, Czechs and Slovaks in Russia were allowed to organize themselves into a military unit called the Druiina, which served as an auxiliary to the Russian Army. Originally, the Drui ina engaged in reconnaissance and infiltration of Slavic units in the Austro-Hungarian army. As it demonstrated its competence, the Druiina, grew, with more captured Slavic prisoners. In March of 1917 revolution erupted in Petrograd and on March 15 th Tsar Nicholas II abdicated and a Provisional Government replaced him. Most Czech and Slovak Legionnaires disliked Tsarist rule and initially welcomed the Russian Revolution. They had chafed under the restrictions imposed upon them by the Tsarist government and looked forward to more freedom of action. Zeleny participated in the Czechoslovak Legion's baptism of fire at the battle of Zborov on July 2, 1917. Zborov (Zboriv in Ukrainian), is a village in the Carpathian foothills of western Ukraine, then part of the Austrian province of Galicia. In its vicinity, two fortified Austrian positions, Galish and Kalish, guarded the approaches to the city of Lviv (Lemberg, Lvov). Two Finnish Regiments of the Russian Army were ordered to effect a pincers movement around Galish. The Legionnaires were supposed to move in after the Finns. However, the Czechs and Slovaks were impatient for action and moved ahead of the Finns. Their opponents were largely Czechs or Bosnian Serbs, who were poorly-motivated. While the Russian command hesitated in the southern sector, the Legionnaires, led by Captain Radola Gajda, stormed the hills overlooking the battlefield. This breakthrough resulted in the capture of 62 Austro-Hungarian officers, 3,150 soldiers, 20 pieces of arti llery and 40 machine guns. Russian General Selichev then declared, "Czech eagles led Russian chickens ." After this victory, the Russian Provisional Government recognized the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia as an independent army, answerable to the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, led by T.G. Masaryk, Milan R. Stefanik and Edvard Benes. However, the Provisional Government was toppled by a military coup in Petrograd, led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin on November 7, 1917. Since the incoming Bolshevik government wanted peace with Germany in order to create a communist state in Russia, it inherited a large number �SLOVAKIA-2017 135 of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, many of whom were armed and roaming the countryside. The Czechoslovak Legionnaires were among them, and continued to support the Western Allies. On the other hand, many German and Hungarian prisoners of war had joined the newly-established Red Guards. They now controlled large areas of Siberia. On May 15, 1918, an incident occurred in Russia which had international ramifications. At the railway station in Chelyabinsk, in the Ural Mountains, a train carrying Czechoslovak Legionnaires drew alongside a train bearing repatriated Hungarian p.o.w. ' s headed in the opposite direction. The Bolsheviks had made peace with the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in December of 1917 and had agreed to repatriate each other's p.o.w.'s. As the trains passed each other, a shouting match ensued and one of the Hungarians hurled a lead pipe and fractured a Czech soldier's skull. The well-armed Legionnaires pulled the culprit off the train and hanged him on the spot. The local Soviet government demanded an inquiry and arrested three Czechoslovak officers who attended the inquiry. As soon as their comrades heard of this incident, they stormed the jail, freed their officers, and seized control of the town. In Moscow, Commissar of War Leon Trotsky, ordered that any armed Czechoslovak soldiers found along the Trans-Siberian Railway were to be shot on the spot. This was probably Trotsky ' s biggest mistake. Relieved of the necessity of negotiating with the Bolsheviks, the Legionnaires seized control of the Trans-Siberian railroad and blasted their way east all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific. For eighteen months this army without a country controlled the world ' s largest land mass. *** And so, Lieutenant Zeleny found himself in Siberia. It was a huge land of contrasts and contradictions. Covered in snow and frost during the long winter, it became a field of flowers in the summer. The land was rich in natural resources. Much of the timber was cut and the minerals were mined by convict labor. Tens of thousands of Russian men and women , convicted of crimes ranging from murder to petty theft or even simple vagrancy, had been deported there. Siberia boasted a penal system operated at a profit. On the other hand, Siberia also contained many Russians who had moved there in �136 SLOVAKIA-2017 search of land and greater liberty. It was a land of unlimited opportunity for those who were able to withstand its rigors. Peasants in Siberia became accustomed to thinking and acting more independently than their kinsmen in European Russia. This would have fateful consequences for the White side during the Russian Civil War. Although there were theaters and other forms of amusement in Omsk, Irkutsk and Vladivostok, the chief form of recreation in Siberia was the consumption of vodka. Harbing, a city the Russians built in Manchuria, on a stretch of land they obtained as a concession from China, boasted a distillery that produced thirty million gallons of vodka per year. Other distilleries in Siberia soon equaled this production . As in many frontier cultures, Siberia was more inclined to dispense alcohol than education. In the late 1880's the American journalist George Kennan observe that in each settlement, there were thirty saloons for every school. Jozef Zeleny liked to drink. He acclimatized to the local culture. He managed to digest kumis (fermented mare ' s milk), and cultivated a genuine fondness for another fermented beverage made of juice derived from reindeer antlers. But, serious drinking involved vodka. For this reason he visited a certain tavern in Omsk in the summer of 1918. There he was attracted to a very striking, brown-eyed blonde. As a rule, women did not frequent taverns unless they were prostitutes. Something in her bearing suggested that she was not. Jozef left her alone. Three days later he encountered her in the local park. She was walking a dog on a leash. It was said to be a Jack Russel , although it had the face of a Pit Bull. Suddenly, two larger unleashed dogs appeared . They bore down upon the little guy. Jozef seized a fallen tree branch and rushed into the fray. The little guy was way ahead of him. Roaring like a lion, he plunged forward and hit one of the bigger dogs with his head, causing it to bowl over. Meanwhile, Jozef hit to other dog with his switch. Both bigger dogs ran off. Man and small dog stood triumphantly on the field of battle. The blonde woman laughed delightedly. "Bravo! " she exclaimmed. "You were both magnificent." Jozef looked at her with narrowed eyes. "I saw you in the tavern a few days ago. I see that you are some kind of lady. You have no business in a place like that. Why did you go there?" �SLOVAKIA-2017 137 "Because I was waiting for someone to tell me that, instead of trying to pick me up. I need a friend ... and some help." Jozef was stunned by her answer. This is how he met Ludmilla Suslova. She was a schoolteacher. Her father worked for the Directorate, which claimed to be the government of Siberia. The Directorate consisted of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries and was opposed to the Bolsheviks in Moscow. The Directorate enjoyed the patronage of the Czechoslovak Legion. Ludmilla's husband had recently abandoned her. Their small house was in need of repair. She needed a good man around the house and Jozef qualified. She told him that he could move in rent-free if he maintained the house. He was amenable to such an arrangement because he currently occupied a tepluska, one of the railway boxcars attached to an armored train, along with other Legionnaires. A comer was set aside for games of cards or chess, but there was no privacy. Jozef and Ludmilla did not bond immediately. He was intimidated by her beauty. He initially bonded with her dog Yasha. He was useless as a watchdog since he barked only at other animals. This sad-eyed canine brought great joy to Jozef s life. Ultimately, nature took its course between Jozef and Ludmilla. One day, when working together in the house, their bodies pressed against each other. Mutually-suppressed desire spontaneously exploded. They did not even make it into the bedroom. Thereafter, they lived as man and wife. *** Both the Western Allies and Japan had long been seeking an excuse to intervene in Russia against the Bolsheviks. Now they had one. In the summer of 1918 they recognized the Czechoslovak Legionnaires as co-belligerents against Germany and Austria-Hungary and could justify landing troops in Siberia under the pretext of rendering aid to their allies. However, the paradigm shifted in the autumn months. The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary disintegrated in October and on the 28 th the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic emerged. Now the Legionnaires lost interest in fighting the Bolsheviks and just wanted to go home. Furthermore, on November 15 1\ just after the armistice which ended the Great War, the Directory in Omsk was toppled by a �138 SLOVAKIA-2017 military coup. A certain Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, who just two weeks earlier had been living in a cheap Tokyo hotel, claimed the title of Supreme Commander of all Russia. He was unequal to the task. Although personally honest and well-intentioned, Kolchak had little control over his subordinates, most of whom were thieves and bandits in the pay of the Japanese, and who committed various war crimes against the civilian population. About six months after Kolchak assumed power, just as the black flies and mosquitos in Siberia began to reassert themselves, Captain (yes, he had been promoted) Zeleny had a revealing experience. He passed through a barnyard in which wounded Russian soldiers lay in the hay. The insects attacked the pus oozing from their wounds. Distressed by what he saw, Zeleny approached an elegantlydressed White Russian officer, who was speaking in French to a lady on his arm. "These men are in bad shape!" Jozef exclaimed. "You should help them out!" "Please don ' t talk about things like that," the officer replied . "You' II upset the lady." When Jozef related the incident to Ludmilla, he declared "A regime built upon this kind of shit cannot survive." Ludmilla agreed. Yet, for a time, given the backing of the Western Allies and Japan, it looked as if Kolchak might win. On March 6, 1919, he launched a 700-mile offensive in the Urals that stretched from the forests of fir in the north to the steppes below Oren berg in the south. His armies reached Ufa, halfway between the Urals and the Volga. Here the Whites were met by the Army of Turkestan, as well as the I 51, 4 th and 8 th Red Armies, led by General Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze. Frunze was incapacitated by an artillery concussion while advancing on Ufa, but his subordinate, Vasily lvanovich Chapayev, in command of the 25 th Rifle Regiment, pressed ahead. Chapayev was already a legend among the Reds. As a partisan commander the previous year, he had tangled with the Czechoslovak Legionnaires in the Urals. He had since gone to Moscow for advanced military training. He then returned to the Urals front as a regular field commander. Chapayed was himself wounded in the storming of the city, but the Reds prevailed and captured Ufa on June 81\ Now the way was open for the Reds to cross the Urals. Kolchak's government, to say nothing of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires, prepared to evacuate Omsk. "Marry me," Jozef urged �SLOVAKIA-2017 139 Ludmilla. "As an officer's wife, you can return with me to our new country of Czechoslovakia. It will be a good place to live." Ludmilla shook her head sadly. "You Western Slavs can carry your country with you. It is different with us Russians. I can never be at home in another place, regardless of who rules it or how." And so, Jozef and Ludmilla parted ways. Omsk fell to the Red Army on November 14 th . Ludmilla was killed when a stray artillery shell hit her house. A Russian who fled the country later informed Jozef of her death. He never ceased to grieve for her. Happily, Yasha survived and found another home. While evacuating Siberia in 1919, the Czechs and Slovaks kept the best trains for themselves. An exasperated Kolchak cabled his erstwhile subordinate in eastern Siberia, the Kozak atman Grigorii Semyonov, urging him to halt the Czechoslovak trains at all cost. The Legionnaires intercepted the cable and then blocked Kolchak ' s trains at Irkutsk. The desperate Kolchak then abdicated as Supreme Commander of Russia and threw himself on the mercy of the Allies, who now included Czechoslovakia. The previous year the Legionnaires had captured Kazan on the Volga, where they found the tsarist gold reserves . They now negotiated with the Bolsheviks for free rite of passage in return for the gold reserves and the Bolsheviks eagerly accepted. As Kolchak's train, containing cocaine but not much else, reached Irkutsk on January 15, 1920, the Legionnaire guards abandoned him. The city council of Irkutsk then arrested Kolchak. The council consisted of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. However, Bolsheviks were also in town. Lenin wanted Kolchak brought to Moscow to stand trial. However, one of Kolchak's commanders tried to rescue him and, when the city council heard of this, it executed Kolchak by firing squad on February 7, 1920 and dumped his body into a hole in the ice on the river Angara. By the end of 1920 the last of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires withdrew by sea from Vladivostok. British and American ships transported them to either Vancouver in Canada or San Francisco in the USA . They then crossed both countries by rail and were shipped to Europe across the Atlantic. Most of them returned to the newlycreated Czechoslovakia. A few decided to remain in the USA. One of them was Jozef Zeleny. *** �140 SLOVAKIA-2017 Jozef had relatives in the Pittsburgh area. The found him employment in the local steel mill. Due to his education and service in the military, Jozko (his pet name) soon became a foreman . He also took an interest in the Slovak community and joined one of their fraternal-benefit societies . Slovak organizations in the Pittsburgh region had played a role in the creation of Czechoslovakia. In 1918 T.G. Masaryk, head of the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement, visited the Mecca of American Slovaks to seek a mandate for the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a future Czecho-Slovakia because the Slovaks back home were not free to speak their minds. His visit attracted large crowds, including South Slavs. His negotiations with the Slovaks on May 29-31 were quite tempestuous, but led to the signing of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which promised the Slovaks their own Diet, administration, courts, schools and the use of their own language. In other words, home-rule. Unfortunately, when Masaryk returned to the new Czechoslovakia, he first forgot and later repudiated the Pittsburgh Agreement, which led to a breakdown of relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the first Czechoslovak Republic. The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also populated by Carpatho-Rusyns from Hungary. In eastern Slovakia the distinction between Slovak and Rusyn remains somewhat nebulous. Indeed, Jozko qualified as a "Rusnak" (the popular term for Rusyn). Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Through these institutions the Rusyns acquired political awareness . One of their organizations was the Greek Catholic Union headquartered in the Homestead-Munhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, based in McKeesport, which contained both Greek Catholi c and Orthodox members. On July 23 , 1918, they merged to form the American National Council of UhroRusyns. They resolved to join Czechoslovakia in exchange for territorial autonomy. As in the case of the Slovaks, the Prague government decided that they were not ready for autonomy. During the course of his participation in the politics of the fraternals, Jozko bonded with the president of his lodge. Th is individual, Ivan Kosko, some twenty years Zeleny's senior, was personally affable but was hopelessly corrupt. He had been dipping into the treas- �SLOVAKIA-2017 141 ury for some time. He knew he would get caught sooner or later if he did not put the money back. Yet Kosko had a certain bargaining collateral. It consisted of a fifteen year-old daughter who was living back in the Old Country in Kosice with an aunt. This dark haired, wind-swept lass was comely to behold. Kosko showed Jozef Zeleny a picture of her as enticement. He indicated that he wanted to have a responsible husband for her in America, but this required money. Kosko pulled it off. In this manner Jozef Zeleny acquired a mailorder bride. Although he would not admit it , he was marrying her to drown the memory of Ludmilla. And, even though he and Marija produced a considerable number of youngsters between them, things did not work. Jozef Zeleny never ceased to mourn for Ludmilla. There were significant differences between man and wife . As a native of the Svidnik area, Jozef was considered a Rusnak, and definitely Pan-Slav. Marija, a native of Kosice, was culturally if not politically Magyarone. She was deeply religious. Jozef was more spiritual than religious. He loved the Old Church Slavonic liturgy of the Greek Catholic Church. But he never went to confession. Marija asked him why. He explained it to her: "When I was back there in Ludovika, I had to work in the summers, to pay for my arrears and the upkeep of my horse during the school year. I was employed on the property of an affluent priest. One day, when I went to pitch hay in the barn, I heard giggling coming from the haystack. His Reverence was having a romp in the hay with one of the local girls. Alright, this man might represent God when he stands before the altar. But when he steps back from the altar, he is as capable of sin and error as anyone else. I' ll be damned if I answer before him or anyone else." Jozef followed political developments in the New Czechoslovak Republic with great interest. Although he had seen the White side for what it was worth during the course of the Russian Civil War, he had a certain admiration for General Milan Rastislav Stefanik, who was definitely anti-Bolshevik. Stefanik hailed from a village called Kosariska, in the Brezova district of western Slovakia. During the 1848 revolution against Hungarian rule, a famous battle was fought at Brezova. Slovak mountaineers, fighting on their own terms and on their own terrain, defeated the Hungarian military in the otherwise disastrous September campaign. �142 SLOVAKIA-2017 Such was Stefanik ' s heritage. As the son of a Lutheran minister, he was raised in a particularly patriotic regional environment. To assure his son's advancement without the latter succumbing to the pressures of magyarization, his father helped Milan obtain a scholarship in Prague. The old man was utterly appalled with the results. Milan became an agnostic among a circle of Slovak intellectuals in Prague who rallied under Czech philosophy professor T.G. Masaryk. He became the president of the Slovak student organization in Prague known as Detvan. The students in Detvan tended to major in the mundane sciences. Although Stefanik attended Masaryk' s philosophy classes, he majored in astronomy. Upon graduation, he borrowed some money, emigrated to France, and found employment in the Medoun observatory near Paris. In this capacity he engaged in roughly a dozen learned expeditions to other countries. He acquired French citizenship in 1912. He also learned how to fly. Stefanik thus became an officer in the air corps of the French Army when the Great War began. Given his membership on the Czechoslovak National Council, the French eventually accorded Stefanik the rank of brigadiergeneral. He became the driving force in the creation of the Czechoslovak Legion . In this capacity he clashed with Edvard Benes, who soon became foreign minister in the new Czechoslovak Republic. On the other hand, Stefanik advocated pressing an offensive against the Bolsheviks in Siberia, whereas Benes followed Masaryk' s lead in avoiding intervention in Russia's internal affairs. Then there was the issue of Slovak autonomy. Stefanik came from a school of Slovaks who were considered more pro-Czech than the Czechs themselves . Yet, during the Great War, he had occasion to visit the United States, where he solicited American Slovak support. After his interactions with the fraternal leaders, Stefanik considered that, with their advice and financial support, Slovakia could be worthy of autonomy. He resented his name being inscribed to a declaration of independence for Czechoslovakia which made no provision for Slovakia's status . Stefanik and Benes hated each other. Stefanik regarded Benes as "this first grade socialist, this paper revolutionary, this distorted diplomat." Benes responded by labeling Stefanik as "this astronomer who thinks he is a soldier, this peasant who thinks he is an aristocrat, this politician who thinks he is a genius. " �SLOVAKIA-2017 143 Insofar as Benes was entrenched in Prague while Stefanik was with the Legion in Siberia, the Czech foreign minister had the upper hand. Benes had the ministry of defense bifurcated. Stefanik, as Minister of War, retained command of Czechoslovakia's armed forces abroad (the Legion in Siberia), while a clone of Benes, Vaclav Klofac, became the Minister of National Defense .. Stefanik nonetheless prepared to return home. He made official visits to France and Italy. On the morning of May 5, 1919, he boarded a Caproni aircraft in the north Italian city of Udine. It was a three hour flight to Bratislava, Stefanik's intended destination. As he circled the runway of Vajnory, his plane suddenly fell to the ground from a height of 500 meters. Some witnesses charged that Stefanik' s plane had been shot down by a Czech artillery battery. The incident was officially described as an accident. Indeed, this might well have been the case. No evidence has ever been found that Benes had Stefanik murdered. This unfortunate incident came at a time when the Czechoslovak Republic was experiencing border clashes with Hungary, at this time under a Bolshevik government. The markings on the Caproni aircraft (red, white and green) were identical to the Hungarian national colors, albeit in horizontal order. Yet, years afterward, members of the artillery battery maintained that they were given their orders and that there was no mistake. They were expecting that plane. It stood to reason that there would be an appropriate state funeral. Its proceedings were recorded by Robert W. Seton-Watson, a distinguished British historian, who attended. Being Scottish, SetonWatson had a certain romantic attraction for a people who were highlanders with a heroic attitude towards life. He had championed the Slovak cause when they were under Hungarian rule. During the Great War, R. W. Seton-Watson served as adviser to the British government on Eastern European affairs. He became a personal friend of T. G. Masaryk. If Masaryk is said to be the founding father of Czechoslovakia, then Seton-Watson qualifies as the godfather. Seton-Watson description of Stefanik's funeral remains poignant to this day. Bratislava had only recently been occupied by the Czechs. Seton-Watson noted that Skols - Czech gymnastic society members recently assuming para-military roles - kept perfect order during the funeral procession, which extended a mile and a half: "Considering that the Czechs have been here exactly three months in �144 SLOVAKIA-2017 occupation of the town ... it was a ceremony which must have duly impressed the naturally lukewarm Magyar and German citizens, as suggesting that the newcomers had come to stay and are perfectly capable of taking charge." In regard to the aftermath of the ceremonies, Seton-Watson noted: "the coffin left for Brezova ... where the Slovak peasants - this seems to me so typical of their good taste and feeling - have on their accord hewn a rock grave for him on the highest point of the Little Carpathians, overlooking the whole western district." *** A former Legionnaire sent an account of Stefanik' s funeral to Jozef. Jozef mourned for Stefanik. He also subscribed to the theory that Stefanik had been murdered at the instigation of the foreign ministry . He began brooding deeply on the relationship between his life and the recent historical events. He began having nightmares. Throughout the odyssey across Siberia, Jozef had observed atrocities. These not only consisted of the usual burned villages and the numerous hanging of peasants. The Legionnaires became desensitized to the likes of that. But Jozef also had occasion to witness the grisly mutilation of innocent peasants by Kozaks and Mongols. These haunted his dreams. In any case, he could no longer sleep without vodka. And he still grieved for Ludmilla. There are people who, following the death of a spouse or loved one, marry, produce children, yet still grieve for the deceased a full decade later. Jozef Zeleny was such an individual. Eventually, he began taking out his angst on family members. Three specific incidents merit scrutiny. The first of these concerned his eldest daughter, Margarite, when she was twelve years old. He was drinking heavily that day when he could no longer hold his alcohol as he had previously. Margarite was playing hop scotch with other girls. Her father summoned her home with a single whistle. "Ah, gee whiz, I always gotta go," she complained to her friends. Jozef overheard the remark and did not like it. He belabored his daughter with his razor strap repeatedly and with vigor. The next day (when he was sober), he saw Margarite disrobe to step into the wash tub . Her noted the black and blue marks on her back and her rump. �SLOVAKIA-2017 145 "Who did this to you?" he gasped. "You did!" Marija threw it back m his face. "When she was playing hop scotch." Jozko paled and lowered his head. "I'll never beat her again," he vowed. Indeed, on this he kept his word. But he was still capable of emotional excess. On one occasion, when Marija was out of the house, he was minding the youngsters. One infant daughter, Leona, messed her diapers. Her father flew into a rage. His eldest son, Janko, was now a big, strapping young man. Aware of his father's capacity for violence, he intervened decisively. He picked up a railroad tie and cracked his father across the ribs, breaking two of them. Father and son never got close to each other again. Yet the most egregious emotional excess of Jozef Zeleny was yet to come. It concerned one of his daughters, named Helena, the beauty of the litter. Endowed with long dark hair and green eyes, Helena looked more Magyar than Slovak. One could tell she would do well one day. One day, at age seventeen, Helena came home from school, at a time when her mother was not home. There had been a layoff in the steel mill, which extended to the level of foreman . Consequently Jozef Zeleny simply lay around the house, drinking and whittling wood. And now, his daughter was home. "Where is your mother?" he demanded. "I don ' t know," she responded. "You are lying! " her father bellowed. And he threw his knife at her. Here it should be noted that Jozef Zeleny, having been trained by Gypsies, was an excellent knife thrower, whether he was drunk or sober. If he wanted to impale his daughter, he definitely would have done so. The knife whizzed past her head and pinned a lock of her hair against the wall behind her. In a state of shock, Helena's head hit the wall, and she fell to the floor unconscious. When she woke, she could not walk for the next two months. The attending doctor legally petitioned for her to be taken out of the house. She was moved into the house of her elder sister Margarite, now married. As Helena recovered, Margarite made her scrub floors and generally worked her like a dog. �146 SLOVAKIA-2017 Helena Zelenova nonetheless became the most successful of Jozko ' s offspring. She became a cocktail waitress. In this capacity she encountered a piano player in a night club. Reinhard Wolfmeister, of Germanic origin, was not your ordinary piano player. He qualified as a genuine pianist. He began playing piano at age four, had an affection for Chopin, and progressed to Paderewski. He attained such a mastery of Paderewski that he qualified for a scholarship in music at the Sorbonne, in Paris. His mother wanted him to be a doctor. After three years of pre-med at the University of Pittsburgh, Reinhard decided he did not want to be a doctor. This being the era of the Great Depression, he could look down the bluff from Mount Washington and see the tin shantytowns. He decided people didn ' t have enough money to afford doctors. So, instead, he took two courses at the Robert Morris Business College, gained employment in a freight shipping company, and was eventually dragged, kicking and screaming, upstairs to the vice- presidency. Yet insofar as he still loved music, he played piano in nightclubs in the evenings. He worked two jobs. He made money and invested it wisely. Eventually, the Wolfmeister family moved to Florida. Here Helena integrated herself into the local society so well that her Slovak sisters came to describe her as the "Queen of the Jews." *** Jozef Zeleny had enough intelligence left to realize he was losing it. Marija passed away after a brief illness, and he mourned for her. But he still grieved for Ludmilla to an even greater extent. Then there was Helena's forthcoming marriage. Having a heroic attitude towards life, Jozef Zeleny could not appreciate that which was unheroic. His upcoming son-in-law could have been a concert pianist in Paris, yet opted to become the manager of a trucking company in Pittsburgh instead. It made no sense. Jozko once again began to brood deeply. He had worked long enough in the steel industry to benefit from the gains that labor unions made for steelworkers under the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He had a nice pension and began looking for an exit. �SLOVAKIA-2017 147 Jozef had a cousin who lived in Monongahela. He asked if he could visit there for several weeks "for reasons of mental health." His cousin replied in the affirmative. Jozef had yet to reach his dreadful decision when he first went to Monongahela. Yet it is worth nothing that he had one previous experience with hypothermia. Several years back, he had been three miles from home on the coldest night of the winter. The temperature was fifteen degrees below zero and accompanied by thirty mile-an-hour winds. It was snowing horizontally throughout the Monongahela valley. The public transportation system was paralyzed. Jozko was jumping up and down in a futile attempt to warm himself. Since it was too cold to walk, he ran and ran and ran. At the end of the second mile, he wasn't cold anymore. He began feeling like Ulysses hearing the calling of the Sirens. He experienced an erection. And he wanted to lie down and go to sleep. Then he realized what was happening. He was beginning to freeze. Jozef Zeleny resisted the temptation to succumb. He pushed on the last mile to the tavern, where he rented a room upstairs. Ice hung from his normally upturned moustaches. After four shots of vodka, he thawed out... except for his feet. Even though he had worn two pairs of socks, frostbite had gotten into his feet. It felt like he was walking on concrete blocks for the next sixteen hours. Aside from that, it had been a euphoric experience. And so, in Monongahela, Jozko frowned thoughtfully as the wind hit hard and it was obvious that a snowstorm was on the way. "I'm going for a walk," he announced. "JEE-zus Ker-RIST! " his cousin exclaimed. "It's colder than a well digger's ass out there! Have you lost your f'ck"n mind?" I have my reasons," Jozef replied cryptically. He commenced walking across the ridge in a westerly direction. The snowstorm blew into his face. In spite of the severity of the weather, he perceived the terrain as being beautiful. It reminded him of Siberia. As the delirium which accompanies hypothermia took hold, Jozef saw an image before him. It was Ludmilla. He staggered forward. *** �148 SLOVAKIA-2017 Most people who knew her agreed that Celeste Romanczykowa was a rough piece of work. Her house - little more than a cottage stood atop the ridge to which Jozef was ascending. Celeste was the product of a union between a Polish coal miner and a West Virginia hillbilly. So it stood to reason that she could be fractious at times. Auburn, brown eyed, and generously endowed in the breasts and the rump, she was comely to behold to men who are not obsessed with skinny women. Celeste was a widow. Her coal miner husband had died of black lung three years earlier. She was noted for a good heart, and loved dogs. But she did not suffer tyranny gracefully, and consequently ignored the overtures of her husband 's cronies among the coal miners. She lived alone and was lonely. As the snowstorm moved in, she went out on the hillside to gather wood. She saw the strange figure staggering up the hill. "Who are you?" she asked, pulling him by the sleeve. He muttered a few words in Slovak. Being half-Polish, she more or less understood. If she did not know who he was, she understood what he was. She dragged him into the house. Once he reached the couch, he collapsed unconscious. Through a neighbor, Celeste summoned the local doctor. After administering Jozef some medicine, he declared: "If you had discovered him an hour later, it would have been too late. But now I think he'll make it. Just keep him warm. Celeste gazed down at the man on the coach. She noticed the upturned moustaches. Her paternal side of the family had come from the Dukla Pass, between Poland and Slovakia. She perceived that he had at some point in his life been a cavalryman. Later, when his eyes opened, she became hypnotized by their ice blue, steel glaze. Jozko stirred. "Ludmilla, ... " he murmured. "You hush now," she said softly. "I' m going to take care of you." He opened his eyes. And smiled. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA-2017 133 SIBERIA: A SLOVAK TALE (A story based upon the life of the author's grandfather, Jan Janosko) R. Vladimir Baumgarten Jozef Zeleny, most recently an employee of United States Steel, headquartered in Homestead, Pennsylvania, decided that he no longer wished to live . This puzzled people, after it was all over. By Slovak-American standards, Jozef Zeleny was by no means a failure. Granted his wife had died, but six out of ten of his children had survived and landed on their feet. They were all responsible and functional adults. Yet, Jozef Zeleny wanted to die. He contacted a relative in the town of Monongahela, located on a river of that name and the border of Virginia. He intended to march from there, up and across the ridge line, and disappear into a snowstorm. Hypothermia is a benevolent death. After a while, you no longer feel the cold. You begin to feel warm and sensuous . You want to lie down and sleep. You go to sleep. Then you die. Why did Jozef Zeleny want to die? To answer this question, we must look into his background . It involved a drama which originated a full generation earlier. *** Jozef Zeleny was born near Svidnik, in northeastern Slovakia. Seven generations of his ancestors had served in the military as Hungarian Hussars. Zeleny began his adult life in this hereditary occupation. He was admitted to the Ludovika Military Academy in Budapest and graduated with the rank of sub-lieutenant on the eve of the Great War. In August of 1914 he was dispatched to the Eastern Front. Here he became infected with the spirit of Slovak nationalism , which resented Hungarian domination. Many Czechs and Slovaks in the Austro-Hungarian Army either deserted or were captured by the Russian army. In this way Zeleny became a member of the Czechoslovak Legion. 134 SLOVAKIA-2017 The Czechoslovak Legion in Russia was a curious organization. Colonies of Czechs and Slovaks had existed in Russia since the 19 th century. After the outbreak of the war, Czechs and Slovaks in Russia were allowed to organize themselves into a military unit called the Druiina, which served as an auxiliary to the Russian Army. Originally, the Drui ina engaged in reconnaissance and infiltration of Slavic units in the Austro-Hungarian army. As it demonstrated its competence, the Druiina, grew, with more captured Slavic prisoners. In March of 1917 revolution erupted in Petrograd and on March 15 th Tsar Nicholas II abdicated and a Provisional Government replaced him. Most Czech and Slovak Legionnaires disliked Tsarist rule and initially welcomed the Russian Revolution. They had chafed under the restrictions imposed upon them by the Tsarist government and looked forward to more freedom of action. Zeleny participated in the Czechoslovak Legion's baptism of fire at the battle of Zborov on July 2, 1917. Zborov (Zboriv in Ukrainian), is a village in the Carpathian foothills of western Ukraine, then part of the Austrian province of Galicia. In its vicinity, two fortified Austrian positions, Galish and Kalish, guarded the approaches to the city of Lviv (Lemberg, Lvov). Two Finnish Regiments of the Russian Army were ordered to effect a pincers movement around Galish. The Legionnaires were supposed to move in after the Finns. However, the Czechs and Slovaks were impatient for action and moved ahead of the Finns. Their opponents were largely Czechs or Bosnian Serbs, who were poorly-motivated. While the Russian command hesitated in the southern sector, the Legionnaires, led by Captain Radola Gajda, stormed the hills overlooking the battlefield. This breakthrough resulted in the capture of 62 Austro-Hungarian officers, 3,150 soldiers, 20 pieces of arti llery and 40 machine guns. Russian General Selichev then declared, "Czech eagles led Russian chickens ." After this victory, the Russian Provisional Government recognized the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia as an independent army, answerable to the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris, led by T.G. Masaryk, Milan R. Stefanik and Edvard Benes. However, the Provisional Government was toppled by a military coup in Petrograd, led by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin on November 7, 1917. Since the incoming Bolshevik government wanted peace with Germany in order to create a communist state in Russia, it inherited a large number SLOVAKIA-2017 135 of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, many of whom were armed and roaming the countryside. The Czechoslovak Legionnaires were among them, and continued to support the Western Allies. On the other hand, many German and Hungarian prisoners of war had joined the newly-established Red Guards. They now controlled large areas of Siberia. On May 15, 1918, an incident occurred in Russia which had international ramifications. At the railway station in Chelyabinsk, in the Ural Mountains, a train carrying Czechoslovak Legionnaires drew alongside a train bearing repatriated Hungarian p.o.w. ' s headed in the opposite direction. The Bolsheviks had made peace with the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in December of 1917 and had agreed to repatriate each other's p.o.w.'s. As the trains passed each other, a shouting match ensued and one of the Hungarians hurled a lead pipe and fractured a Czech soldier's skull. The well-armed Legionnaires pulled the culprit off the train and hanged him on the spot. The local Soviet government demanded an inquiry and arrested three Czechoslovak officers who attended the inquiry. As soon as their comrades heard of this incident, they stormed the jail, freed their officers, and seized control of the town. In Moscow, Commissar of War Leon Trotsky, ordered that any armed Czechoslovak soldiers found along the Trans-Siberian Railway were to be shot on the spot. This was probably Trotsky ' s biggest mistake. Relieved of the necessity of negotiating with the Bolsheviks, the Legionnaires seized control of the Trans-Siberian railroad and blasted their way east all the way to Vladivostok on the Pacific. For eighteen months this army without a country controlled the world ' s largest land mass. *** And so, Lieutenant Zeleny found himself in Siberia. It was a huge land of contrasts and contradictions. Covered in snow and frost during the long winter, it became a field of flowers in the summer. The land was rich in natural resources. Much of the timber was cut and the minerals were mined by convict labor. Tens of thousands of Russian men and women , convicted of crimes ranging from murder to petty theft or even simple vagrancy, had been deported there. Siberia boasted a penal system operated at a profit. On the other hand, Siberia also contained many Russians who had moved there in 136 SLOVAKIA-2017 search of land and greater liberty. It was a land of unlimited opportunity for those who were able to withstand its rigors. Peasants in Siberia became accustomed to thinking and acting more independently than their kinsmen in European Russia. This would have fateful consequences for the White side during the Russian Civil War. Although there were theaters and other forms of amusement in Omsk, Irkutsk and Vladivostok, the chief form of recreation in Siberia was the consumption of vodka. Harbing, a city the Russians built in Manchuria, on a stretch of land they obtained as a concession from China, boasted a distillery that produced thirty million gallons of vodka per year. Other distilleries in Siberia soon equaled this production . As in many frontier cultures, Siberia was more inclined to dispense alcohol than education. In the late 1880's the American journalist George Kennan observe that in each settlement, there were thirty saloons for every school. Jozef Zeleny liked to drink. He acclimatized to the local culture. He managed to digest kumis (fermented mare ' s milk), and cultivated a genuine fondness for another fermented beverage made of juice derived from reindeer antlers. But, serious drinking involved vodka. For this reason he visited a certain tavern in Omsk in the summer of 1918. There he was attracted to a very striking, brown-eyed blonde. As a rule, women did not frequent taverns unless they were prostitutes. Something in her bearing suggested that she was not. Jozef left her alone. Three days later he encountered her in the local park. She was walking a dog on a leash. It was said to be a Jack Russel , although it had the face of a Pit Bull. Suddenly, two larger unleashed dogs appeared . They bore down upon the little guy. Jozef seized a fallen tree branch and rushed into the fray. The little guy was way ahead of him. Roaring like a lion, he plunged forward and hit one of the bigger dogs with his head, causing it to bowl over. Meanwhile, Jozef hit to other dog with his switch. Both bigger dogs ran off. Man and small dog stood triumphantly on the field of battle. The blonde woman laughed delightedly. "Bravo! " she exclaimmed. "You were both magnificent." Jozef looked at her with narrowed eyes. "I saw you in the tavern a few days ago. I see that you are some kind of lady. You have no business in a place like that. Why did you go there?" SLOVAKIA-2017 137 "Because I was waiting for someone to tell me that, instead of trying to pick me up. I need a friend ... and some help." Jozef was stunned by her answer. This is how he met Ludmilla Suslova. She was a schoolteacher. Her father worked for the Directorate, which claimed to be the government of Siberia. The Directorate consisted of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries and was opposed to the Bolsheviks in Moscow. The Directorate enjoyed the patronage of the Czechoslovak Legion. Ludmilla's husband had recently abandoned her. Their small house was in need of repair. She needed a good man around the house and Jozef qualified. She told him that he could move in rent-free if he maintained the house. He was amenable to such an arrangement because he currently occupied a tepluska, one of the railway boxcars attached to an armored train, along with other Legionnaires. A comer was set aside for games of cards or chess, but there was no privacy. Jozef and Ludmilla did not bond immediately. He was intimidated by her beauty. He initially bonded with her dog Yasha. He was useless as a watchdog since he barked only at other animals. This sad-eyed canine brought great joy to Jozef s life. Ultimately, nature took its course between Jozef and Ludmilla. One day, when working together in the house, their bodies pressed against each other. Mutually-suppressed desire spontaneously exploded. They did not even make it into the bedroom. Thereafter, they lived as man and wife. *** Both the Western Allies and Japan had long been seeking an excuse to intervene in Russia against the Bolsheviks. Now they had one. In the summer of 1918 they recognized the Czechoslovak Legionnaires as co-belligerents against Germany and Austria-Hungary and could justify landing troops in Siberia under the pretext of rendering aid to their allies. However, the paradigm shifted in the autumn months. The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary disintegrated in October and on the 28 th the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic emerged. Now the Legionnaires lost interest in fighting the Bolsheviks and just wanted to go home. Furthermore, on November 15 1\ just after the armistice which ended the Great War, the Directory in Omsk was toppled by a 138 SLOVAKIA-2017 military coup. A certain Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak, who just two weeks earlier had been living in a cheap Tokyo hotel, claimed the title of Supreme Commander of all Russia. He was unequal to the task. Although personally honest and well-intentioned, Kolchak had little control over his subordinates, most of whom were thieves and bandits in the pay of the Japanese, and who committed various war crimes against the civilian population. About six months after Kolchak assumed power, just as the black flies and mosquitos in Siberia began to reassert themselves, Captain (yes, he had been promoted) Zeleny had a revealing experience. He passed through a barnyard in which wounded Russian soldiers lay in the hay. The insects attacked the pus oozing from their wounds. Distressed by what he saw, Zeleny approached an elegantlydressed White Russian officer, who was speaking in French to a lady on his arm. "These men are in bad shape!" Jozef exclaimed. "You should help them out!" "Please don ' t talk about things like that," the officer replied . "You' II upset the lady." When Jozef related the incident to Ludmilla, he declared "A regime built upon this kind of shit cannot survive." Ludmilla agreed. Yet, for a time, given the backing of the Western Allies and Japan, it looked as if Kolchak might win. On March 6, 1919, he launched a 700-mile offensive in the Urals that stretched from the forests of fir in the north to the steppes below Oren berg in the south. His armies reached Ufa, halfway between the Urals and the Volga. Here the Whites were met by the Army of Turkestan, as well as the I 51, 4 th and 8 th Red Armies, led by General Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze. Frunze was incapacitated by an artillery concussion while advancing on Ufa, but his subordinate, Vasily lvanovich Chapayev, in command of the 25 th Rifle Regiment, pressed ahead. Chapayev was already a legend among the Reds. As a partisan commander the previous year, he had tangled with the Czechoslovak Legionnaires in the Urals. He had since gone to Moscow for advanced military training. He then returned to the Urals front as a regular field commander. Chapayed was himself wounded in the storming of the city, but the Reds prevailed and captured Ufa on June 81\ Now the way was open for the Reds to cross the Urals. Kolchak's government, to say nothing of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires, prepared to evacuate Omsk. "Marry me," Jozef urged SLOVAKIA-2017 139 Ludmilla. "As an officer's wife, you can return with me to our new country of Czechoslovakia. It will be a good place to live." Ludmilla shook her head sadly. "You Western Slavs can carry your country with you. It is different with us Russians. I can never be at home in another place, regardless of who rules it or how." And so, Jozef and Ludmilla parted ways. Omsk fell to the Red Army on November 14 th . Ludmilla was killed when a stray artillery shell hit her house. A Russian who fled the country later informed Jozef of her death. He never ceased to grieve for her. Happily, Yasha survived and found another home. While evacuating Siberia in 1919, the Czechs and Slovaks kept the best trains for themselves. An exasperated Kolchak cabled his erstwhile subordinate in eastern Siberia, the Kozak atman Grigorii Semyonov, urging him to halt the Czechoslovak trains at all cost. The Legionnaires intercepted the cable and then blocked Kolchak ' s trains at Irkutsk. The desperate Kolchak then abdicated as Supreme Commander of Russia and threw himself on the mercy of the Allies, who now included Czechoslovakia. The previous year the Legionnaires had captured Kazan on the Volga, where they found the tsarist gold reserves . They now negotiated with the Bolsheviks for free rite of passage in return for the gold reserves and the Bolsheviks eagerly accepted. As Kolchak's train, containing cocaine but not much else, reached Irkutsk on January 15, 1920, the Legionnaire guards abandoned him. The city council of Irkutsk then arrested Kolchak. The council consisted of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. However, Bolsheviks were also in town. Lenin wanted Kolchak brought to Moscow to stand trial. However, one of Kolchak's commanders tried to rescue him and, when the city council heard of this, it executed Kolchak by firing squad on February 7, 1920 and dumped his body into a hole in the ice on the river Angara. By the end of 1920 the last of the Czechoslovak Legionnaires withdrew by sea from Vladivostok. British and American ships transported them to either Vancouver in Canada or San Francisco in the USA . They then crossed both countries by rail and were shipped to Europe across the Atlantic. Most of them returned to the newlycreated Czechoslovakia. A few decided to remain in the USA. One of them was Jozef Zeleny. *** 140 SLOVAKIA-2017 Jozef had relatives in the Pittsburgh area. The found him employment in the local steel mill. Due to his education and service in the military, Jozko (his pet name) soon became a foreman . He also took an interest in the Slovak community and joined one of their fraternal-benefit societies . Slovak organizations in the Pittsburgh region had played a role in the creation of Czechoslovakia. In 1918 T.G. Masaryk, head of the Czecho-Slovak liberation movement, visited the Mecca of American Slovaks to seek a mandate for the union of the Czechs and Slovaks in a future Czecho-Slovakia because the Slovaks back home were not free to speak their minds. His visit attracted large crowds, including South Slavs. His negotiations with the Slovaks on May 29-31 were quite tempestuous, but led to the signing of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which promised the Slovaks their own Diet, administration, courts, schools and the use of their own language. In other words, home-rule. Unfortunately, when Masaryk returned to the new Czechoslovakia, he first forgot and later repudiated the Pittsburgh Agreement, which led to a breakdown of relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the first Czechoslovak Republic. The steel towns of the greater Pittsburgh area were also populated by Carpatho-Rusyns from Hungary. In eastern Slovakia the distinction between Slovak and Rusyn remains somewhat nebulous. Indeed, Jozko qualified as a "Rusnak" (the popular term for Rusyn). Following the lead of the Slovaks, many joined fraternal organizations, which not only provided benefits to workers but published newspapers as well. Through these institutions the Rusyns acquired political awareness . One of their organizations was the Greek Catholic Union headquartered in the Homestead-Munhall district. Another was the United Societies of America, based in McKeesport, which contained both Greek Catholi c and Orthodox members. On July 23 , 1918, they merged to form the American National Council of UhroRusyns. They resolved to join Czechoslovakia in exchange for territorial autonomy. As in the case of the Slovaks, the Prague government decided that they were not ready for autonomy. During the course of his participation in the politics of the fraternals, Jozko bonded with the president of his lodge. Th is individual, Ivan Kosko, some twenty years Zeleny's senior, was personally affable but was hopelessly corrupt. He had been dipping into the treas- SLOVAKIA-2017 141 ury for some time. He knew he would get caught sooner or later if he did not put the money back. Yet Kosko had a certain bargaining collateral. It consisted of a fifteen year-old daughter who was living back in the Old Country in Kosice with an aunt. This dark haired, wind-swept lass was comely to behold. Kosko showed Jozef Zeleny a picture of her as enticement. He indicated that he wanted to have a responsible husband for her in America, but this required money. Kosko pulled it off. In this manner Jozef Zeleny acquired a mailorder bride. Although he would not admit it , he was marrying her to drown the memory of Ludmilla. And, even though he and Marija produced a considerable number of youngsters between them, things did not work. Jozef Zeleny never ceased to mourn for Ludmilla. There were significant differences between man and wife . As a native of the Svidnik area, Jozef was considered a Rusnak, and definitely Pan-Slav. Marija, a native of Kosice, was culturally if not politically Magyarone. She was deeply religious. Jozef was more spiritual than religious. He loved the Old Church Slavonic liturgy of the Greek Catholic Church. But he never went to confession. Marija asked him why. He explained it to her: "When I was back there in Ludovika, I had to work in the summers, to pay for my arrears and the upkeep of my horse during the school year. I was employed on the property of an affluent priest. One day, when I went to pitch hay in the barn, I heard giggling coming from the haystack. His Reverence was having a romp in the hay with one of the local girls. Alright, this man might represent God when he stands before the altar. But when he steps back from the altar, he is as capable of sin and error as anyone else. I' ll be damned if I answer before him or anyone else." Jozef followed political developments in the New Czechoslovak Republic with great interest. Although he had seen the White side for what it was worth during the course of the Russian Civil War, he had a certain admiration for General Milan Rastislav Stefanik, who was definitely anti-Bolshevik. Stefanik hailed from a village called Kosariska, in the Brezova district of western Slovakia. During the 1848 revolution against Hungarian rule, a famous battle was fought at Brezova. Slovak mountaineers, fighting on their own terms and on their own terrain, defeated the Hungarian military in the otherwise disastrous September campaign. 142 SLOVAKIA-2017 Such was Stefanik ' s heritage. As the son of a Lutheran minister, he was raised in a particularly patriotic regional environment. To assure his son's advancement without the latter succumbing to the pressures of magyarization, his father helped Milan obtain a scholarship in Prague. The old man was utterly appalled with the results. Milan became an agnostic among a circle of Slovak intellectuals in Prague who rallied under Czech philosophy professor T.G. Masaryk. He became the president of the Slovak student organization in Prague known as Detvan. The students in Detvan tended to major in the mundane sciences. Although Stefanik attended Masaryk' s philosophy classes, he majored in astronomy. Upon graduation, he borrowed some money, emigrated to France, and found employment in the Medoun observatory near Paris. In this capacity he engaged in roughly a dozen learned expeditions to other countries. He acquired French citizenship in 1912. He also learned how to fly. Stefanik thus became an officer in the air corps of the French Army when the Great War began. Given his membership on the Czechoslovak National Council, the French eventually accorded Stefanik the rank of brigadiergeneral. He became the driving force in the creation of the Czechoslovak Legion . In this capacity he clashed with Edvard Benes, who soon became foreign minister in the new Czechoslovak Republic. On the other hand, Stefanik advocated pressing an offensive against the Bolsheviks in Siberia, whereas Benes followed Masaryk' s lead in avoiding intervention in Russia's internal affairs. Then there was the issue of Slovak autonomy. Stefanik came from a school of Slovaks who were considered more pro-Czech than the Czechs themselves . Yet, during the Great War, he had occasion to visit the United States, where he solicited American Slovak support. After his interactions with the fraternal leaders, Stefanik considered that, with their advice and financial support, Slovakia could be worthy of autonomy. He resented his name being inscribed to a declaration of independence for Czechoslovakia which made no provision for Slovakia's status . Stefanik and Benes hated each other. Stefanik regarded Benes as "this first grade socialist, this paper revolutionary, this distorted diplomat." Benes responded by labeling Stefanik as "this astronomer who thinks he is a soldier, this peasant who thinks he is an aristocrat, this politician who thinks he is a genius. " SLOVAKIA-2017 143 Insofar as Benes was entrenched in Prague while Stefanik was with the Legion in Siberia, the Czech foreign minister had the upper hand. Benes had the ministry of defense bifurcated. Stefanik, as Minister of War, retained command of Czechoslovakia's armed forces abroad (the Legion in Siberia), while a clone of Benes, Vaclav Klofac, became the Minister of National Defense .. Stefanik nonetheless prepared to return home. He made official visits to France and Italy. On the morning of May 5, 1919, he boarded a Caproni aircraft in the north Italian city of Udine. It was a three hour flight to Bratislava, Stefanik's intended destination. As he circled the runway of Vajnory, his plane suddenly fell to the ground from a height of 500 meters. Some witnesses charged that Stefanik' s plane had been shot down by a Czech artillery battery. The incident was officially described as an accident. Indeed, this might well have been the case. No evidence has ever been found that Benes had Stefanik murdered. This unfortunate incident came at a time when the Czechoslovak Republic was experiencing border clashes with Hungary, at this time under a Bolshevik government. The markings on the Caproni aircraft (red, white and green) were identical to the Hungarian national colors, albeit in horizontal order. Yet, years afterward, members of the artillery battery maintained that they were given their orders and that there was no mistake. They were expecting that plane. It stood to reason that there would be an appropriate state funeral. Its proceedings were recorded by Robert W. Seton-Watson, a distinguished British historian, who attended. Being Scottish, SetonWatson had a certain romantic attraction for a people who were highlanders with a heroic attitude towards life. He had championed the Slovak cause when they were under Hungarian rule. During the Great War, R. W. Seton-Watson served as adviser to the British government on Eastern European affairs. He became a personal friend of T. G. Masaryk. If Masaryk is said to be the founding father of Czechoslovakia, then Seton-Watson qualifies as the godfather. Seton-Watson description of Stefanik's funeral remains poignant to this day. Bratislava had only recently been occupied by the Czechs. Seton-Watson noted that Skols - Czech gymnastic society members recently assuming para-military roles - kept perfect order during the funeral procession, which extended a mile and a half: "Considering that the Czechs have been here exactly three months in 144 SLOVAKIA-2017 occupation of the town ... it was a ceremony which must have duly impressed the naturally lukewarm Magyar and German citizens, as suggesting that the newcomers had come to stay and are perfectly capable of taking charge." In regard to the aftermath of the ceremonies, Seton-Watson noted: "the coffin left for Brezova ... where the Slovak peasants - this seems to me so typical of their good taste and feeling - have on their accord hewn a rock grave for him on the highest point of the Little Carpathians, overlooking the whole western district." *** A former Legionnaire sent an account of Stefanik' s funeral to Jozef. Jozef mourned for Stefanik. He also subscribed to the theory that Stefanik had been murdered at the instigation of the foreign ministry . He began brooding deeply on the relationship between his life and the recent historical events. He began having nightmares. Throughout the odyssey across Siberia, Jozef had observed atrocities. These not only consisted of the usual burned villages and the numerous hanging of peasants. The Legionnaires became desensitized to the likes of that. But Jozef also had occasion to witness the grisly mutilation of innocent peasants by Kozaks and Mongols. These haunted his dreams. In any case, he could no longer sleep without vodka. And he still grieved for Ludmilla. There are people who, following the death of a spouse or loved one, marry, produce children, yet still grieve for the deceased a full decade later. Jozef Zeleny was such an individual. Eventually, he began taking out his angst on family members. Three specific incidents merit scrutiny. The first of these concerned his eldest daughter, Margarite, when she was twelve years old. He was drinking heavily that day when he could no longer hold his alcohol as he had previously. Margarite was playing hop scotch with other girls. Her father summoned her home with a single whistle. "Ah, gee whiz, I always gotta go," she complained to her friends. Jozef overheard the remark and did not like it. He belabored his daughter with his razor strap repeatedly and with vigor. The next day (when he was sober), he saw Margarite disrobe to step into the wash tub . Her noted the black and blue marks on her back and her rump. SLOVAKIA-2017 145 "Who did this to you?" he gasped. "You did!" Marija threw it back m his face. "When she was playing hop scotch." Jozko paled and lowered his head. "I'll never beat her again," he vowed. Indeed, on this he kept his word. But he was still capable of emotional excess. On one occasion, when Marija was out of the house, he was minding the youngsters. One infant daughter, Leona, messed her diapers. Her father flew into a rage. His eldest son, Janko, was now a big, strapping young man. Aware of his father's capacity for violence, he intervened decisively. He picked up a railroad tie and cracked his father across the ribs, breaking two of them. Father and son never got close to each other again. Yet the most egregious emotional excess of Jozef Zeleny was yet to come. It concerned one of his daughters, named Helena, the beauty of the litter. Endowed with long dark hair and green eyes, Helena looked more Magyar than Slovak. One could tell she would do well one day. One day, at age seventeen, Helena came home from school, at a time when her mother was not home. There had been a layoff in the steel mill, which extended to the level of foreman . Consequently Jozef Zeleny simply lay around the house, drinking and whittling wood. And now, his daughter was home. "Where is your mother?" he demanded. "I don ' t know," she responded. "You are lying! " her father bellowed. And he threw his knife at her. Here it should be noted that Jozef Zeleny, having been trained by Gypsies, was an excellent knife thrower, whether he was drunk or sober. If he wanted to impale his daughter, he definitely would have done so. The knife whizzed past her head and pinned a lock of her hair against the wall behind her. In a state of shock, Helena's head hit the wall, and she fell to the floor unconscious. When she woke, she could not walk for the next two months. The attending doctor legally petitioned for her to be taken out of the house. She was moved into the house of her elder sister Margarite, now married. As Helena recovered, Margarite made her scrub floors and generally worked her like a dog. 146 SLOVAKIA-2017 Helena Zelenova nonetheless became the most successful of Jozko ' s offspring. She became a cocktail waitress. In this capacity she encountered a piano player in a night club. Reinhard Wolfmeister, of Germanic origin, was not your ordinary piano player. He qualified as a genuine pianist. He began playing piano at age four, had an affection for Chopin, and progressed to Paderewski. He attained such a mastery of Paderewski that he qualified for a scholarship in music at the Sorbonne, in Paris. His mother wanted him to be a doctor. After three years of pre-med at the University of Pittsburgh, Reinhard decided he did not want to be a doctor. This being the era of the Great Depression, he could look down the bluff from Mount Washington and see the tin shantytowns. He decided people didn ' t have enough money to afford doctors. So, instead, he took two courses at the Robert Morris Business College, gained employment in a freight shipping company, and was eventually dragged, kicking and screaming, upstairs to the vice- presidency. Yet insofar as he still loved music, he played piano in nightclubs in the evenings. He worked two jobs. He made money and invested it wisely. Eventually, the Wolfmeister family moved to Florida. Here Helena integrated herself into the local society so well that her Slovak sisters came to describe her as the "Queen of the Jews." *** Jozef Zeleny had enough intelligence left to realize he was losing it. Marija passed away after a brief illness, and he mourned for her. But he still grieved for Ludmilla to an even greater extent. Then there was Helena's forthcoming marriage. Having a heroic attitude towards life, Jozef Zeleny could not appreciate that which was unheroic. His upcoming son-in-law could have been a concert pianist in Paris, yet opted to become the manager of a trucking company in Pittsburgh instead. It made no sense. Jozko once again began to brood deeply. He had worked long enough in the steel industry to benefit from the gains that labor unions made for steelworkers under the administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He had a nice pension and began looking for an exit. SLOVAKIA-2017 147 Jozef had a cousin who lived in Monongahela. He asked if he could visit there for several weeks "for reasons of mental health." His cousin replied in the affirmative. Jozef had yet to reach his dreadful decision when he first went to Monongahela. Yet it is worth nothing that he had one previous experience with hypothermia. Several years back, he had been three miles from home on the coldest night of the winter. The temperature was fifteen degrees below zero and accompanied by thirty mile-an-hour winds. It was snowing horizontally throughout the Monongahela valley. The public transportation system was paralyzed. Jozko was jumping up and down in a futile attempt to warm himself. Since it was too cold to walk, he ran and ran and ran. At the end of the second mile, he wasn't cold anymore. He began feeling like Ulysses hearing the calling of the Sirens. He experienced an erection. And he wanted to lie down and go to sleep. Then he realized what was happening. He was beginning to freeze. Jozef Zeleny resisted the temptation to succumb. He pushed on the last mile to the tavern, where he rented a room upstairs. Ice hung from his normally upturned moustaches. After four shots of vodka, he thawed out... except for his feet. Even though he had worn two pairs of socks, frostbite had gotten into his feet. It felt like he was walking on concrete blocks for the next sixteen hours. Aside from that, it had been a euphoric experience. And so, in Monongahela, Jozko frowned thoughtfully as the wind hit hard and it was obvious that a snowstorm was on the way. "I'm going for a walk," he announced. "JEE-zus Ker-RIST! " his cousin exclaimed. "It's colder than a well digger's ass out there! Have you lost your f'ck"n mind?" I have my reasons," Jozef replied cryptically. He commenced walking across the ridge in a westerly direction. The snowstorm blew into his face. In spite of the severity of the weather, he perceived the terrain as being beautiful. It reminded him of Siberia. As the delirium which accompanies hypothermia took hold, Jozef saw an image before him. It was Ludmilla. He staggered forward. *** 148 SLOVAKIA-2017 Most people who knew her agreed that Celeste Romanczykowa was a rough piece of work. Her house - little more than a cottage stood atop the ridge to which Jozef was ascending. Celeste was the product of a union between a Polish coal miner and a West Virginia hillbilly. So it stood to reason that she could be fractious at times. Auburn, brown eyed, and generously endowed in the breasts and the rump, she was comely to behold to men who are not obsessed with skinny women. Celeste was a widow. Her coal miner husband had died of black lung three years earlier. She was noted for a good heart, and loved dogs. But she did not suffer tyranny gracefully, and consequently ignored the overtures of her husband 's cronies among the coal miners. She lived alone and was lonely. As the snowstorm moved in, she went out on the hillside to gather wood. She saw the strange figure staggering up the hill. "Who are you?" she asked, pulling him by the sleeve. He muttered a few words in Slovak. Being half-Polish, she more or less understood. If she did not know who he was, she understood what he was. She dragged him into the house. Once he reached the couch, he collapsed unconscious. Through a neighbor, Celeste summoned the local doctor. After administering Jozef some medicine, he declared: "If you had discovered him an hour later, it would have been too late. But now I think he'll make it. Just keep him warm. Celeste gazed down at the man on the coach. She noticed the upturned moustaches. Her paternal side of the family had come from the Dukla Pass, between Poland and Slovakia. She perceived that he had at some point in his life been a cavalryman. Later, when his eyes opened, she became hypnotized by their ice blue, steel glaze. Jozko stirred. "Ludmilla, ... " he murmured. "You hush now," she said softly. "I' m going to take care of you." He opened his eyes. And smiled.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Siberia: A Slovak Folk Tale Description An account of the resource R. Vladimir Baumgarten Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017 pp. 133-148 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Baumgarten, R. Vladimir Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7d59c0e980cfd192af1ffe71e144d812.pdf 78a07daefd810834c32c8dd959cd86aa PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA-2017 151 Jozef Klempa. Moje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. Dennik ceskoslovenskeho legionara z rokov 1914-1920. Bratislava: Slovart, 2014. l 83pp. Afterword by Viera Meliskova. Maps. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a unique and fascinating diary of a Czechoslovak (Slovak) Legionnaire from the First World War. Jozef Klempa (18941980) was trained as a shoemaker who was drafted into the AustroHungarian Armed Forces when the Great War broke out in 1914. That same year he was captured by the Russians on the eastern front and, along with many other POW's shuttled from one Russian village to another, far from the front. Amazingly, the Russian authorities treated him and other POW's quite leniently, letting them wander into nearby villages to find odd jobs, earn some kopeks or rubles, and buy food and drink to supplement their meager rations. Klempa's training as a shoemaker stood him in good stead, as he repaired the boots of his fellow-soldiers as well as that of many villagers. Indeed, he found Russian civilians very friendly and hospitable and he quickly mastered the Russian language and Russian customs. In 1918, after Germany had defeated Russia on the battlefield and the Bolsheviks had seized power, the Czechoslovak Legions, established during the war by T.G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, rebelled against the Bolsheviks, who tried to disarm them. Jozef Klempa, and thousands of other Czech and Slovak PO W' s joined the Czechoslovak Legions, and while fighting off various attacks by the Red Army, they decided to flee Russia by seizing control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Ural Mountains all the way to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. Klempa recorded, almost on a daily basis, his experiences in crossing Siberia twice, once to flee the Bolsheviks and the second time to fight and try to defeat them, at the urging of the Allied and Associated powers. Indeed, Klempa and some of his fellow-Legionnaires were captured by the Bolsheviks on one occasion, but managed to escape. Klempa described in great detail the good relations the Czechoslovak Legionnaires had with various Kozak armies in Siberia, but denounced Admiral Kolchak and his officers. Klempa concluded that the "Whites" lost the war against the Bolsheviks because of the arrogance and cruelty of Admiral Kol- �152 SLOVAKIA-2017 chak and his officers towards Russian peasants. Indeed, it took a visit by General Stefanik in the fall of 1918 to prevent many of the Czechs and Slovaks from joining the Bolsheviks, who treated this foreign army on Russian soil better than did Admiral Kolchak. And, while Klempa had good things to say about Chinese merchants in Siberia, he had nothing but contempt for the Japanese soldiers in Vladivostok, who treated the Czechoslovak Legionnaires very badly. Finally, in May of 1920, Klempa and 3,000 other Legionnaires boarded a British ship that took them to Vancouver in Canada. They then crossed Canada by rail to the eastern port of Halifax, where they boarded another ship that took them to the German port of Zugshaven from whence they were shipped by rail to the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic at the end of July. As many other Legionnaires, Klempa was then released from the military, given a medal for his service, and eventually found a job on the Czechoslovak railroad. Over the years he regaled his family with memories of his exploits in Siberia. His granddaughter Vierka Meliskova managed to gather together his recollections, based on a detailed diary that he kept while in Russia and on the way home, and published this memoir of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire. Historians will mine it for information on this glorious chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia for many years to come. Rebekah Klein-Pejsova .. Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 194 pp., index, maps, tables. JAN LANiCEK University of New South Wales, Australia In September of 1943 , members of the civic resistance in Slovakia, led by Vavro Srobar, a founding father of the united Czechoslovak state in 1918, prepared a report that provided insights into the political loyalties of individual groups in Slovakia. Although they believed that in the case of a plebiscite, a majority of the population would decide for Czechoslovakia, the Jews, the authors suggested, would likely support the re-annexation of the Slovak territory to �SLOVAKIA-2017 153 1 Hungary. This report confirmed a problematic perception of the Jews' political loyalties twenty-five years after the creation of the independent state. It was a prelude to the Jewish predicament in post1945 Slovakia, where the accusation of the Jews ' affiliation with the Hungarian (Magyar) culture figured prominently in the public discourse and complicated the Jews ' reintegration into Slovak society. 2 The question of Jewish loyalties in Slovakia is the main theme of thi s monograph . The author focuses on the interwar period and analyzes the transformation of the Jews' loyalties from those associated with the Hungarian political and cultural-linguistic stream before 1918, to a closer alignment with the liberal Czechoslovak political regime, in what she calls the formation of the 'Slovak Jewry'. KleinPejsova defines the 'S lovak Jewry ' as "a communal category binding loyalty to Czechoslovakia with Slovak territoriality rather than an expression of emotional attachment to or identification with the Slovak nation" (p. 92) . This was a complicated process, influenced by the legacies of Hungarian rule and revisionist policies, the rise and collapse of the centralized Czechoslovak state, the emergence of the Slovak national movement closely aligned with the Catholic Church, and internal disputes in the fragmented Jewish communities. Over 135,000 Jews lived in interwar Slovakia. During the 19 th Century, the Hungarian regime emancipated the Jews and allowed them rapid social and economic progress, which led to an overwhelmming acculturation, even assimilation into the Hungarian culture. This trend was deeply resented by the nascent Slovak national movement. Already in the first months after the emergence of the Czechoslovak state - and in an atmosphere filled with anti-Jewish riots 3 - Vavro Srobar, the first Czechoslovak minister responsible for Slovakia, called on the "one hundred percent Magyarized" Jewish communities in Slovakia to seek ""the right path" and abandon their affiliation with the Hungarians (very similar words were repeated by the liberal President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk) (pp.2 and 22). Klein1 Vilem Precan, ed. , Slovenske narodne povstanie: Dokum enty (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury 1965), 89. 2 Anna Cichopek-Gajraj , Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia (Cambridge : Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2014). 3 This subj ect has been recently comprehen sively addressed by Michal Frankl and Miloslav Szabo, Budovani statu bez antisemitismu. Nasili, diskurz loajality a vznik Ceskoslovenska (Praha : NLN, 20 I 6) . �154 SLOVAKIA-2017 Pejsova 's excellent book debates how the Jews responded to these new challenges . Jewish loyalties were constantly under investigation in the interwar period . Although Czechoslovakia accepted the protection of minorities imposed by the Paris Peace Conference (though the government rejected the inclusion of the articles that specifically reiterated the rights of the Jews), the state attempted to prove the dominance of the 'Czechoslovak nation' in the country. The census became the main instrument by which to officially declare loyalties to the new state. The government used the declared "mother tongue" as the main determinant of nationality, and only the Jews were allowed to declare their belonging to the Jewish nationality, regardless of their mother tongue. Klein-Pejsova identifies two possible explanations for this concession: either a liberal vision which re-conceptualized nationality "as an internal conviction", or a less liberal vision, which granted this right to the Jews with the intention of weakening the territorial minorities in the state, namely the Germans and Hungarians. Regardless of the motivations, the number of 'Hungarians' among the Jews sharply decreased in the interwar era (also because of anti-Semitism in Hungary), which contributed to the Hungarians losing some minority rights in certain districts, including Bratislava. Henceforth Hungarians blamed the Jews for this lack of corporate cultural rights, in the same way that the Czechs blamed the Jews in other districts, where the German or Hungarian minority reached the 20% threshold and could use their language in public affairs. Both sides blamed the Jews. A large number of Jews in the country - Klein-Pejsova suggests - decided to follow their own path and declared Jewish nationality, demonstrating neutrality in the national conflict, but at the same time declaring their support for the Czechoslovak state. In 1930, 57% of the Jews across the republic chose this option, and their numbers were exceptionally high especially in the eastern territories, including Slovakia. This acceptance of Jewish nationality should not be confused with support for Jewish nationalism, in the modem sense, a point, which could have been stressed a bit more throughout the monograph. Large parts of the Orthodox and Hassidic communities declared themselves as belonging to the Jewish nationality in the census, but they overtly and consistently rejected modem Jewish nationalist politics. �SLOVAKIA-2017 155 Klein-Pejsova frequently compares the situation of the Jews in Slovakia to the Bohemian Lands, where the Jews largely acculturated into the Czech national stream. This comparative element could have developed differently if the author had focused on Moravia, where, especially in the major cities (Brno and Moravska Ostrava), the progress of cultural affiliation with the Czech nation was much slower and the German language dominated among the Jews until the end of the interwar period (though there was an increased effort to change the affiliation after 1933). Even here, the declaration of Jewish nationality offered a way out of the loyalty quandary for the Jews, who were affiliated with non-Slavic cultures. The Jews thus clearly aligned with the Czechoslovak political regime, at least in their public proclamations, though it is much more difficult to prove how the situation was perceived in daily contacts at the local level. Also, what did it mean for ordinary people - Jews and non-Jews alike - to declare a particular nationality in a decennial census? As Klein-Pejsova aptly concludes, '"'the tragic weakness of Jewish nationality lay in its illegibility", which opened it to interpretations (p.114). One can argue that ordinary people, but also state bureaucrats, were much more interested in the language that the Jews used in their daily contacts. Although the Jews believed that a declaration of Jewish nationality was sufficient proof of their loyalties, and continued to use the Hungarian language, this was an inadequate reorientation in the minds of Slovaks. The second problem was that the Jews tied their loyalties to the centralized Czechoslovak state and not the Slovak nation. The growing Slovak autonomous movement criticized the lack of Jewish support for their national ambitions, and the late 1930s witnessed new cases of anti-Jewish violence in Slovakia, with prominent Slovak politicians (Karol Sidor) even calling for the relocation of the Jews to the Soviet-Jewish Autonomous territory in Birobidzhan in the Far East. In November of 1938, shortly after gaining autonomy, but also after losing extensive territory to Hungary, the Slovak government organized one of the first mass deportations of the Jews in the pre-World War II period, when 7,500 'S lovak Jews ', blamed for the territorial losses, were chased across the new border to Hungary. This book makes a crucial contribution to the question of minority loyalties in Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. It points to a dramatic divergence of the constructions of loyalties �156 SLOVAKIA-2017 between the majority and minority populations. The question which remains is what was the ' right path' for the Jews in the interwar period which was filled with contradictory expectations from the Czechoslovak state, Slovak nation, Jewish nationalists, Jewish Orthodox, and Hungarian revisionists? It is possible to conclude that each path irreversibly led to a dead end. Paul Robert Magocsi. With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus '. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015 , 509 pp. including 34 maps, notes, bibliography and index plus a picture section. KEITH P. DYRUD Retired Professor Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota With Their Backs to the Mountains introduces the CarpathoRusyns and their homeland which the author calls Carpathian Rus ', the north and south slopes of the mountainous area between Poland, Slovakia and the region of Transcarpathia in Ukraine. Magocsi begins with a brief historical and geographical account of the land and people but provides more detail in the nineteenth century when a Ukrainian national movement started to develop with advocates who argued that Rus ' was the historical name for the Ukrainian people and their land. This argument would undercut Magocsi ' s thesis that Carpatho-Rusyns are a separate nationality. The other challenge to his thesis was posed by Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism . After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Hungarians (Magyars) adopted a policy of Magyarization, that is, the forcible assimilation of non-Magyar nationalities, including the Slovaks and Rusyns. Magocsi defines the Carpatho-Rusyn national identity as the culture expressed by the people originating in Carpathian Rus ' who followed Eastern Rite Christianity and spoke a unique language different from Ukrainian. Some emphasis is placed on "originating" in Carpathian Rus ' because as early as the mid-eighteenth century several thousand Carpatho-Rusyns were resettled in areas of Hungary, now parts of Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, which were lightly settled because of �SLOVAKIA-2017 157 the Ottoman retreat. To this day, these ex-Carpathians identify as Rusyns and, as part of Magocsi 's narrative, continue to maintain their unique culture and language. The emphasis on originating in Carpathian Rus ' justifies his inclusion of Rusyns also living in the United States and several South American countries. The Hungarian revolt in 1849 brought Russian armies through the Carpatho-Rusyns ' land and suggested to the the Rusyn intelligentsia that they could be Russians. Magocsi identifies the three decades that followed as the first national awakening. The options explored were uniting the Carpatho-Rusyns with the Galicians to the North, uniting only the Carpatho-Rusyns, or perhaps identifying themselves as a part of the Great Russian people. The Ukrainian option had a strong influence in Galicia and perhaps thwarted the Carpatho-Rusyn Galician option. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, an autonomous Hungary focused on Magyarizing its minorities. This movement had a major impact on the Carpatho-Rusyns as well as the Slovaks living within the Carpathian Rus ' area. The Lemkos on the North slope of the Carpathians were administratively in the Austrian province of Galicia and not subject to Magyarization. Here the Carpatho-Rusyn leaders lobbied to maintain their language in the schools where they were a majority of the village population. In Hungary the Rusyn effort was thwarted by the Greek Catholic Bishops who were often Magyarone Carpatho-Rusyns. Since World Wars I and II altered the map of Central Europe, Magocsi deals with each Carpathian Rus ' area separately. The second national awakening occurred during the interwar period and is covered in depth. Magocsi provides the names of Carpatho-Rusyn organizations, their publications and cultural activities and statistics on the school systems. Data is provided on how many schools used the local dialect and the percentage of the local populations that identified as Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, Magyar, or Slovak. The Lemkos are treated separately from the Carpatho-Rusyns to their south in the Presov region of Slovakia. The eastern portion of Carpathian Rus ' had several names in the twentieth century and is now called the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The CarpathoRusyns in Transcarpathia mostly identify as Ukrainians . In Table 1.1 Magocsi identifies 853 ,000 people who should be identified as Carpatho-Rusyns which includes 80,000 Lemkos forcibly resettled �158 SLOVAKIA-2017 there after WWII. Now only 10,100 of them self-identify as Carpatho-Rusyns. During World War II the Lemko region was made part of the Generalgouvernrnent of Nazi Germany and received better treatment than the other Carpatho-Rusyns. Shortly after the war ended, Poland disbursed over 80,000 Lemkos to Soviet Ukraine, leaving only 25 ,000 to 35,000 in their ancestral homeland. In the summer of 1947, the Polish army forcibly resettled about 35,000 Lemkos to the western areas of Poland recently cleared of Germans. Only about 7,300 Lemkos managed to avoid deportation. The final chapters of the book follow the Carpatho-Rusyns, wherever they settled, and describe their social, economic and political situations, and their third national awakening. In the final chapters, Magocsi is no longer describing the "shaping of a national identity" but rather documenting the shaping of a cultural identity. Magocsi himself has actively promoted establishing a literary language for each of the various Carpatho-Rusyn dialects. His effort has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian nationalists who insist that there is no Rusyn nationality, only various Ukrainian dialects and subcultures. Magocsi himself quotes one of many such detractors who call the movement "political Rusynism." "This nefarious phenomenon, so they said, was the work of a few ' intellectually misguided' or 'politically opportunistic' individuals 'paid' and, in some cases led by Carpatho-Rusyn 'protectors' in North America (especially the University of Toronto Professor Paul Robert Magocsi)." Valerian Bystricky. Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu 14. marca 1939. Bratislava: Veda, 2014, bibliography, name index, 464 pp. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University The Slovak historian Bystricky (born 1936), a member and former Director of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has a prodigious scholarly record with more than 120 works published at home and abroad. His latest book is very wellresearched, drawing upon contemporary newspaper articles, mem- �SLOVAKIA-2017 159 oirs, and archival materials from various countries. The author divided his seven-chapter monograph into numerous sub-chapters, making for easier navigation. Numerous footnotes also add information to help clarify the text. However, this is a dense volume that is not for everyday reading. Besides the myriad actors presented, a major flaw is that the author seems to want to include as much information as possible, resulting in many instances of repetition. Perhaps a more succinct volume would have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, this is an interesting book. It concentrates on how the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSCS) went from the struggle for autonomy, as outlined in the Pittsburgh Agreement, to the building of Slovak autonomy and a state within the framework of a federated Czecho-Slovakia after Munich. It also made preparations for the possibility of an independent country in the future, resulting in the unexpected proclamation of independence on March 14, 1939. When the HSCS did not get what it wanted from the Czechoslovak government in the late 1920's, it went into opposition . Slovak political parties prior to Slovak independence had little influence upon the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, although the democracy of the country gave Slovaks a desire to have a say in world affairs. With the exception of the Communists, no Slovak political parties had a clear-cut view of foreign policy. Foreign powers and enemies of Czechoslovakia would use Slovak rights and grievances to weaken the state. The members of the HSCS, or Cudaks, could not convince the Western Powers about the need to the transform the state into a federation , thereby causing the Cudaks to look for support elsewhere. The HSCS became the only Slovak political party to accept funds from abroad for its political program. The main threat to Czechoslovakia prior to 1936 remained irredentist Hungary. The rise of Hitler would prove to be a greater danger to the integrity of the state. At first the HSCS viewed the Nazis as non-threatening, then became reserved, while the younger generation of Cudaks began to admire Germany, causing democracy to weaken, both on the right and on the left. Slovakia was largely forgotten during the Munich Crisis, but it led to Slovakia receiving autonomy within a weakened CzechoSlovakia. With this autonomy, the HSCS quickly consolidated power by either banning or forcing the other national or Slovak political parties to merge with it, ending democracy and leading to an authori- �160 SLOVAKIA-2017 tarian regime with the Cudaks claiming to speak for all Slovaks, with independence becoming an eventual goal. Although the Cudaks initially looked to Poland as a possible ally and counterweight to Germany, they were disappointed by Poland ' s desire for Slovak territory and subsequent Czecho-Slovak territorial concessions to Poland. After the First Vienna Award in November of 1938, when Hungary annexed southern Slovakia, the HSCS realized its only friend and protector could be Germany. Radical Cudaks held numerous secret talks with various Nazis in the fall of I 938 and early 1939 without the knowledge of the moderates, including Slovak Premier Fr. Jozef Tiso. Except for Hitler, who felt he could not fight the Western Powers without first destroying CzechoSlovakia, no one knew what the future held for the country. The Nazis began to collaborate with the radical Cudaks to destabilize Czecho-Slovakia so that they could occupy Bohemia and Moravia without being labeled as aggressors. The key became Slovak independence, with the Nazis using the HSCS as their entry for the destruction of Czecho-S lovakia, but it had to be provoked by the Czechs. The so-called Homola putsch, when the Czecho-S lovak military occupied Slovakia on March 9, 1939 as a means to keep Slovakia in the republic, became a comedy of errors not only for Prague, but also for the Nazis . The dismissal of the autonomous Tiso government by Prague, and the ineffectual occupation led to the imprisonment of many Cudak radicals, upon whom the Germans had placed hopes for proclaiming independence during March 11-12. Although the Nazis had no advance knowledge of these Czech actions, they expected Karol Sidor, as the new Slovak premier and leader of the para-military Hlinka Guard, to do their bidding. The Polonophile Sidor refused. When bullying by a Nazi official produced no results, the Germans rebuffed "the soldier of Prague" Sidor as premier and turned to the only alternative, save military intervention, which would have shown Berlin to be the aggressor: Tiso, who no longer had any governmental authority. Like Sidor, Tiso refused to unilaterally proclaim independence, instead wanting to do so legally. Warned by Hitler that Hungary would swallow Slovakia unless independence was declared immediately, Tiso asked for and received the Slovak parliament' s approval on March 14, a few days later than the Nazis had wanted . This act gave the green light for �SLOVAKIA-2017 161 Germany to occupy Bohemia and Moravia the next day, claiming that Slovak independence came from the disintegration of CzechoSlovakia and that Germany had not destroyed it. Very few public manifestations greeted the new Slovak state while life went on as usual. Except for a handful of mostly radical l'.udaks, few Slovaks wanted an independent country in March, rather hoping for a gradual and evolutionary process than the unlawful revolutionary solution enacted. The bottom line and reoccurring theme of this work revolves around the fact that without Nazi support, Slovakia would not have gained independence in March of 1939. As such, Slovakia's fate was tied to German victory in the Second World War. Yet, as Bystricky notes, the Slovak government and its supporters largely underplayed and tried to ignore the Nazi connection to Slovak independence. Instead, the government presented Slovak independence as an act of the self-determination of nations, historic and natural rights, and the renewal of a long- ago medieval kingdom. This view persists among supporters of wartime Slovakia to this day. Pal'o Carnogursky. Suboj s komunizmom. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013 , 368 pp. Suboj s komunizmom 2. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Spolku slovenskych spisovatel'ov, 2015 , 367 pp. Jan Rychlik Charles University, Prague The well-known Latin expression habent sua fata libeli (books have their destinies) is true about the memoirs of the Catholic activist, politician, journalist and amateur historian Pavo) Carnogursky ( 1908-1992), which were posthumously published by his oldest son Ivan in two volumes in 2013 a 2015 under the title "Suboj s komunizmom" (The Duel with Communism). In the early 1970's Carnogursky wrote his memoirs on important events in modern Slovak history - the proclamation of Slovak autonomy on 6 October 1938 and the declaration of Slovakia' s independence on 14 March 1939. These materials were confiscated by State Security (Statna bezpecnost' - StB) in 1976 and returned only after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989. They were published by the Institute of History of the Slo- �162 SLOVAKIA-2017 vak Academy of Sciences in 1992 and 1993 .- In 1985-1986 Carnogursky, deprived of his personal notes, also tape-recorded his memoirs which, however, remained incomplete but were published posthumously by his younger son Jan in 1997 under the title Svedok cias (A Witness to the Times).- Now we have new, hitherto unknown, memoirs of Pavo) Carnogursky, which are an important testimony, not only about historical events and important personalities of Slovak political life, but also about the "soft" methods of persecution of political opponents during the regime of the so-called "normalization" ( 1969-1989). The texts presented in both volumes of Souboj s komunizmom were written between 1976 and1979, after Carnogursky's release from six weeks of custody (from November 8 to December 15, 1976). Carnogursky was imprisoned because he sent for publication to the West documents concerning the persecution of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. He was accused of "harming the interests of the Republic abroad" according to article 112 of the Penal Code of 1961 (this article was frequently used against opponents of the regime if they published their materials abroad). Carnogursky faced up to three years in prison. Fortunately, this did not happen. He was released from custody, interrogated from time-to-time for two more years about his activities and contacts abroad, and finally - at the end of 1979 - the criminal proceedings were suspended. After each interrogation, Carnogursky described what had happened. He also made a detailed list of the documents which were confiscated from his personal archive and tried to restore them from memory. In describing the " lost" materials, he always added his personal testimony to the event or person. Because he was afraid that the notes and materials might be confiscated again, he decided to hide them. He did so with his relative Michal Skokan in Poprad. It is not clear why Pavo) Carnogursky did not claim his materials after the fall of Communism in November of 1989. Skokan's family probably forgot about them . The documents were returned to Carnogursky' s oldest son Ivan only in 2011, nine years after his father's death. In addition, in 2013 Pal'o Carogursky's comments on Gustav Husak's book Svedectvo o Slovenskom narodnom povstani (1964) and his correspondence with Slovak Communist poet Laco Novomesky, were found in the Archive of the Office of the President in the Prague Castle among Gustav Husak's papers by the young Czech historian, Michal Machacek, a �SLOVAKIA-2017 163 postgraduate student of the author of this review. Machacek informed Carnogursky 's family about this through Slovak historian Pavo! Minarik (see Vol. 2, p. 364). Carnogursky 's comments were later added as an appendix to the second volume of memoirs. Unfortunately, the correspondence between Pavo! Carnogursky and Laco Novomesky was not published in extenso. To understand the memoires, it is necessary not only to know Slovak history of the 20 th Century, but also to know who was Pavo! Carnogursky. Originally a schoolteacher, young Carnogursky also studied law at the Charles University in Prague. From his youth he was an active member of the Slovak autonomist movement, closely associated with the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS), although officially (at least according to his memoirs) he never formally joined the party. He was the secretary of the Association of Catholic Youth and also a close collaborator of Karol Sidor (1901-1953), a leading figure of the HSCS and originally the designated successor to Andrej Hlinka. In autonomous Slovakia (1938-1939) Camogursky was a high official of the Ministry of Education. In December of 1938 he was elected to the Slovak autonomous Diet and, as a deputy of this law-making body, he voted on 14 March 1939 for Slovakia' s independence. Carnogursky, like his mentor Sidor, was a Polonophile and opposed the official proGerman orientation of Slovakia. Unlike Sidor, who, under German pressure was forced out of the Slovak government and sent as the Slovak minister to the Vatican, Carnogursky remained in Slovakia and took an active part in the political life of the wartime Slovak Republic. Unlike many other politicians of the Slovak Republic, Carnogursky did not flee the country in 1945 . He remained an adherent of independence for Slovakia but viewed it as unrealistic at the time. He accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as a matter of fact. As an editor of the weekly Katolicke noviny (1945-194 7) he again participated in Slovak political life. He collected money and hired lawyers to defend Dr. Jozef Tiso, former President of Slovakia, who was put on trial after the war. In 1946, Carnogursky helped negotiate the so-called April Agreement, a political pact between representatives of political Catholicism and the Protestant leaders of the Democratic Party. Due to this Agreement, the Democratic Party won the votes of the majority of Slovak Catholics and also the parliamentary �164 SLOVAKIA-2017 elections in Slovakia, which were held on May 26, 1946 . These elections were a political defeat for the Communist Party of Slovakia. However, the Democratic Party was not able - despite its electoral victory -- to stop the Communist takeover of power. For his anti-communist and pro-independence stance, Carnogursky was arrested several times: shortly in the summer of 1945 and 1946, and definitively in October of 194 7. After the communist takeover of February 25, I 948, he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for "anti-state conspiracy". More serious was his next arrest in January of 1951. After his release in I 953 , he lived in Bratislava and worked as a laborer. In the 1960s, during the period of liberalization, he started to cooperate with the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History of the Slovak Communist Party. He collected many materials dealing with modern Slovak history and published several articles. The period of the socalled "normalization," however, interrupted Carnogursky's cooperation with academic circles. After that he concentrated on the defence of religious freedom. His criticism of the anti-religious policy of the communist regime led to his last imprisonment and interrogation on November 8, 1976. Despite the fact that he was soon released and the proceedings were halted in 1979, he did not get back his personal archive, which was confiscated after his arrest. The confiscated documents were later handed over by the police to the Slovak State Central Archive (now the Slovak National Archives) and Carnogursky got them back in 1991 . It is very difficult to describe the contents of Pavo) Carnogursky's notes . He was a witness and often also a participant in many historical events. He also met many historical personalities and tried to describe them . The text is interesting and quite readable, despite the fact that the author often repeats himself. As always in memoirs, many of Carnogursky's standpoints are subjective and some explanations problematic and doubtful. Some of Carnogursky's conclusions contradict known facts . The main problem with the whole text is, however, the large number of factual errors. For example, in Volume 1, on page 4 7, in the summer of 1965 Gustav Husak was working as a researcher in the Institute of State and Law at the Slovak academy of Sciences (Ustav statu a prava SA V), not in Stavoindustria, as Carnogursky claims; on page 70, Vlado Clementis was executed on December 3, 1952, not on December 8; on page �SLOVAKIA-2017 165 231 - Milos Gosiorovsky sent his memorandum advocating the federalization of Czechoslovakia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on July 29, 1963 , not in the year 1955; on page 238 when the Slovak government stopped the deportations of Jews (on October 20, 1942), between 23 ,000 and 24,000 Jews remained in Slovakia, not 45 ,000 or even 50,000 (p.318); on page 242 - Andrej Hlinka died on August 16, 1938, not on August 15 ; on page 249 Stalin died on March 5, 1953, not on March 3rd; The Constitutional Law "On the Czechoslovak Federation" (No. 143/ 1968) was signed at Bratislava Castle on October 30, 1968 (on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin), not on October 23rd. In Vol. 2, on page 245 - the correct name of the provisional parliament in 1945-1946 was "Provisional National Assembly", not Revolutionary National Assembly (this was the name of the provisional parliament in 1918-1920). Camogursky also forgot many minor details, events or mixed them up. For example, in Volume 1, on page 33 the first name of Dr. Horakova, the hero of Czech anti-Nazi and antiCommunist resistance (and first woman sentenced to death and executed in modem Czech and Slovak history), was Milada, not Maria; In Vol. 2., page 124 - Camogursky mixed up "Slovenska obnova" with the daily "Narodna obroda", which was published by the Slovak National Council. Also in Vol. 2, page 194 - Frantisek Nemec, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government in exile and his staff settled in Carpathian Ruthenia in Chust, not in Sevl'us; Also in Vo. 2, on page 253 - Stefan Bast'ovansky did not commit suicide in prison in 1952. He committed suicide at home on 27 November, 1952, on the same day that the State Court in Prague sentenced to death eleven members of the "Rudolf Slansky anti-state group". These errors are perfectly understandable. Camogursky was describing events which happened several decades earlier and he did not have the opportunity to check the facts , either in published sources or in the archives. The editor or the publishing house should have hired a professional historian, who in the form of footnotes , would have corrected these obvious mistakes. In spite of these shortcomings, however, both volumes are a valuable contribution to modem Slovak history. �166 SLOVAKIA-2017 James Krapfl. Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, xxi-260 pp., figures, maps, tables, abbreviations, notes, chronology, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Bratislava This book examines the events that marked the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia and its transition to democracy from the fall of 1989 to the summer of 1992. As the classic expression goes, habent sua fata libelli - each book has a story behind it. In this particular case it is worth mentioning that the English edition of the book was preceded by its Slovak version, published in 2009, which usually happens the other way around. Krapfl provides an insightful, well-documented and convincing picture of the struggle of Czechoslovakia's citizens to find a new way for themselves and their future state. He suggests that what happened in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 was a true revolution from every angle. The book is based on very comprehensive research in Czechoslovakia and its sucessor states in the 1990s and 2000s. He searched primary sources , not only in the urban centers and major archives, but also in the regions. His sources included leaflets, pamphlets, internal reports and instructions issued by the newly-emerging political entities that had served as major agents of political transition in post-Communist Czechoslovakia -the Civic Forum in Prague (OF) and Public Against Violence in Bratislava (VPN)--along with their regional and local branches . Such sources are of crucial importance when examining the substance of any modem revolution, for they serve as the most authentic indicators of an atmosphere full of civic passion and enthusiasm that the replaced previous passivity and obedience to communist political authorities. The overall picture is broad, in some respects too broad. However, keeping in mind that the major protagonists of the story are not individuals, but communities and their little-known representatives, this does not constitute a problem. Krapfl' s deep faith in the humanness and civic spirit of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, who were determined to overcome all the dificulties that stemmed from a �SLOVAKIA-2017 167 political power-vacuum on the one hand, and uncertainty, as far as new institutional and constitutional designs were concerned, on the other hand, can be felt from beginning to end. Krapfl is perfectly aware of the sad fact that, two decades after the Velvet Revolution, skepticism by ordinary Slovaks and Czechs, and their displeasure with current political elites, is ubiquitous. More importantly, he has no doubt that the sudden rise of a civic movement in the fall of 1989 was authentic, spontaneous and true. Meanwhile, he avoids commenting on national conflict, which would otherwise lead to blaming either side or both for their mistakes on the thorny path to democracy. The first two chapters provide a theoretical framework of the civic movement in Czechoslovakia after the communist regime fell in November of 1989. As any other good book, this one culminates near its end. The central theme that shapes the book is a hearkening back to the reform movement of the 1960's in communist Czechoslovakia.. Krapfl is disciplined enough not to repeat variations of political and legal evolution of a joint state that was destined to fail since this subject had already been covered by prolific scholars such as Carol Skalnik Leff, Eric Stein, Shari J. Cohen, Abby Innes and Gil Eyal, to name just a few. Krapfl ' s analysis of the altercation between the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the almost exclusive representatives of their communities before the 1990 parliamentary elections belongs to the best discourses on the topic yet written by a western scholar on postCommunist Czechoslovakia. Two short observations are in order. In a future edition of the book the bibliography should be expanded to include new titles that emerged between its first Slovak and English editions. Also, to balance the period before the community of citizens began to fall apart, and their subsequent and inevitable transformation into political parties following the parliamentary elections of June 1990 and June 1992, more should have been written about the the period between the two elections. Due to Krapfl s masterly knowledge of the subject, thoughtful narrative, empathy for and respect toward the country and its peoples, his book represents a very informative and valuable contribution to the most recent scholarship on East Central Europe, not only from the perspective of cultural history, as the author �168 SLOVAKIA-2017 modestly claims, but also to sociology and political science. Today, when it seems that the glorious days of the Velvet Revolution and its legacy are numbered, as were the days of the French revolution (to which Krapfl in some aspects compares the former) , the importance of the book is significantly higher in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where the faith of the citizenry and civic movements have been substantially reduced, neglected or almost forgotten. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA-2017 151 Jozef Klempa. Moje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. Dennik ceskoslovenskeho legionara z rokov 1914-1920. Bratislava: Slovart, 2014. l 83pp. Afterword by Viera Meliskova. Maps. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a unique and fascinating diary of a Czechoslovak (Slovak) Legionnaire from the First World War. Jozef Klempa (18941980) was trained as a shoemaker who was drafted into the AustroHungarian Armed Forces when the Great War broke out in 1914. That same year he was captured by the Russians on the eastern front and, along with many other POW's shuttled from one Russian village to another, far from the front. Amazingly, the Russian authorities treated him and other POW's quite leniently, letting them wander into nearby villages to find odd jobs, earn some kopeks or rubles, and buy food and drink to supplement their meager rations. Klempa's training as a shoemaker stood him in good stead, as he repaired the boots of his fellow-soldiers as well as that of many villagers. Indeed, he found Russian civilians very friendly and hospitable and he quickly mastered the Russian language and Russian customs. In 1918, after Germany had defeated Russia on the battlefield and the Bolsheviks had seized power, the Czechoslovak Legions, established during the war by T.G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, rebelled against the Bolsheviks, who tried to disarm them. Jozef Klempa, and thousands of other Czech and Slovak PO W' s joined the Czechoslovak Legions, and while fighting off various attacks by the Red Army, they decided to flee Russia by seizing control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Ural Mountains all the way to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. Klempa recorded, almost on a daily basis, his experiences in crossing Siberia twice, once to flee the Bolsheviks and the second time to fight and try to defeat them, at the urging of the Allied and Associated powers. Indeed, Klempa and some of his fellow-Legionnaires were captured by the Bolsheviks on one occasion, but managed to escape. Klempa described in great detail the good relations the Czechoslovak Legionnaires had with various Kozak armies in Siberia, but denounced Admiral Kolchak and his officers. Klempa concluded that the "Whites" lost the war against the Bolsheviks because of the arrogance and cruelty of Admiral Kol- �152 SLOVAKIA-2017 chak and his officers towards Russian peasants. Indeed, it took a visit by General Stefanik in the fall of 1918 to prevent many of the Czechs and Slovaks from joining the Bolsheviks, who treated this foreign army on Russian soil better than did Admiral Kolchak. And, while Klempa had good things to say about Chinese merchants in Siberia, he had nothing but contempt for the Japanese soldiers in Vladivostok, who treated the Czechoslovak Legionnaires very badly. Finally, in May of 1920, Klempa and 3,000 other Legionnaires boarded a British ship that took them to Vancouver in Canada. They then crossed Canada by rail to the eastern port of Halifax, where they boarded another ship that took them to the German port of Zugshaven from whence they were shipped by rail to the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic at the end of July. As many other Legionnaires, Klempa was then released from the military, given a medal for his service, and eventually found a job on the Czechoslovak railroad. Over the years he regaled his family with memories of his exploits in Siberia. His granddaughter Vierka Meliskova managed to gather together his recollections, based on a detailed diary that he kept while in Russia and on the way home, and published this memoir of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire. Historians will mine it for information on this glorious chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia for many years to come. Rebekah Klein-Pejsova .. Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 194 pp., index, maps, tables. JAN LANiCEK University of New South Wales, Australia In September of 1943 , members of the civic resistance in Slovakia, led by Vavro Srobar, a founding father of the united Czechoslovak state in 1918, prepared a report that provided insights into the political loyalties of individual groups in Slovakia. Although they believed that in the case of a plebiscite, a majority of the population would decide for Czechoslovakia, the Jews, the authors suggested, would likely support the re-annexation of the Slovak territory to �SLOVAKIA-2017 153 1 Hungary. This report confirmed a problematic perception of the Jews' political loyalties twenty-five years after the creation of the independent state. It was a prelude to the Jewish predicament in post1945 Slovakia, where the accusation of the Jews ' affiliation with the Hungarian (Magyar) culture figured prominently in the public discourse and complicated the Jews ' reintegration into Slovak society. 2 The question of Jewish loyalties in Slovakia is the main theme of thi s monograph . The author focuses on the interwar period and analyzes the transformation of the Jews' loyalties from those associated with the Hungarian political and cultural-linguistic stream before 1918, to a closer alignment with the liberal Czechoslovak political regime, in what she calls the formation of the 'Slovak Jewry'. KleinPejsova defines the 'S lovak Jewry ' as "a communal category binding loyalty to Czechoslovakia with Slovak territoriality rather than an expression of emotional attachment to or identification with the Slovak nation" (p. 92) . This was a complicated process, influenced by the legacies of Hungarian rule and revisionist policies, the rise and collapse of the centralized Czechoslovak state, the emergence of the Slovak national movement closely aligned with the Catholic Church, and internal disputes in the fragmented Jewish communities. Over 135,000 Jews lived in interwar Slovakia. During the 19 th Century, the Hungarian regime emancipated the Jews and allowed them rapid social and economic progress, which led to an overwhelmming acculturation, even assimilation into the Hungarian culture. This trend was deeply resented by the nascent Slovak national movement. Already in the first months after the emergence of the Czechoslovak state - and in an atmosphere filled with anti-Jewish riots 3 - Vavro Srobar, the first Czechoslovak minister responsible for Slovakia, called on the "one hundred percent Magyarized" Jewish communities in Slovakia to seek ""the right path" and abandon their affiliation with the Hungarians (very similar words were repeated by the liberal President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk) (pp.2 and 22). Klein1 Vilem Precan, ed. , Slovenske narodne povstanie: Dokum enty (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury 1965), 89. 2 Anna Cichopek-Gajraj , Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia (Cambridge : Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2014). 3 This subj ect has been recently comprehen sively addressed by Michal Frankl and Miloslav Szabo, Budovani statu bez antisemitismu. Nasili, diskurz loajality a vznik Ceskoslovenska (Praha : NLN, 20 I 6) . �154 SLOVAKIA-2017 Pejsova 's excellent book debates how the Jews responded to these new challenges . Jewish loyalties were constantly under investigation in the interwar period . Although Czechoslovakia accepted the protection of minorities imposed by the Paris Peace Conference (though the government rejected the inclusion of the articles that specifically reiterated the rights of the Jews), the state attempted to prove the dominance of the 'Czechoslovak nation' in the country. The census became the main instrument by which to officially declare loyalties to the new state. The government used the declared "mother tongue" as the main determinant of nationality, and only the Jews were allowed to declare their belonging to the Jewish nationality, regardless of their mother tongue. Klein-Pejsova identifies two possible explanations for this concession: either a liberal vision which re-conceptualized nationality "as an internal conviction", or a less liberal vision, which granted this right to the Jews with the intention of weakening the territorial minorities in the state, namely the Germans and Hungarians. Regardless of the motivations, the number of 'Hungarians' among the Jews sharply decreased in the interwar era (also because of anti-Semitism in Hungary), which contributed to the Hungarians losing some minority rights in certain districts, including Bratislava. Henceforth Hungarians blamed the Jews for this lack of corporate cultural rights, in the same way that the Czechs blamed the Jews in other districts, where the German or Hungarian minority reached the 20% threshold and could use their language in public affairs. Both sides blamed the Jews. A large number of Jews in the country - Klein-Pejsova suggests - decided to follow their own path and declared Jewish nationality, demonstrating neutrality in the national conflict, but at the same time declaring their support for the Czechoslovak state. In 1930, 57% of the Jews across the republic chose this option, and their numbers were exceptionally high especially in the eastern territories, including Slovakia. This acceptance of Jewish nationality should not be confused with support for Jewish nationalism, in the modem sense, a point, which could have been stressed a bit more throughout the monograph. Large parts of the Orthodox and Hassidic communities declared themselves as belonging to the Jewish nationality in the census, but they overtly and consistently rejected modem Jewish nationalist politics. �SLOVAKIA-2017 155 Klein-Pejsova frequently compares the situation of the Jews in Slovakia to the Bohemian Lands, where the Jews largely acculturated into the Czech national stream. This comparative element could have developed differently if the author had focused on Moravia, where, especially in the major cities (Brno and Moravska Ostrava), the progress of cultural affiliation with the Czech nation was much slower and the German language dominated among the Jews until the end of the interwar period (though there was an increased effort to change the affiliation after 1933). Even here, the declaration of Jewish nationality offered a way out of the loyalty quandary for the Jews, who were affiliated with non-Slavic cultures. The Jews thus clearly aligned with the Czechoslovak political regime, at least in their public proclamations, though it is much more difficult to prove how the situation was perceived in daily contacts at the local level. Also, what did it mean for ordinary people - Jews and non-Jews alike - to declare a particular nationality in a decennial census? As Klein-Pejsova aptly concludes, '"'the tragic weakness of Jewish nationality lay in its illegibility", which opened it to interpretations (p.114). One can argue that ordinary people, but also state bureaucrats, were much more interested in the language that the Jews used in their daily contacts. Although the Jews believed that a declaration of Jewish nationality was sufficient proof of their loyalties, and continued to use the Hungarian language, this was an inadequate reorientation in the minds of Slovaks. The second problem was that the Jews tied their loyalties to the centralized Czechoslovak state and not the Slovak nation. The growing Slovak autonomous movement criticized the lack of Jewish support for their national ambitions, and the late 1930s witnessed new cases of anti-Jewish violence in Slovakia, with prominent Slovak politicians (Karol Sidor) even calling for the relocation of the Jews to the Soviet-Jewish Autonomous territory in Birobidzhan in the Far East. In November of 1938, shortly after gaining autonomy, but also after losing extensive territory to Hungary, the Slovak government organized one of the first mass deportations of the Jews in the pre-World War II period, when 7,500 'S lovak Jews ', blamed for the territorial losses, were chased across the new border to Hungary. This book makes a crucial contribution to the question of minority loyalties in Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. It points to a dramatic divergence of the constructions of loyalties �156 SLOVAKIA-2017 between the majority and minority populations. The question which remains is what was the ' right path' for the Jews in the interwar period which was filled with contradictory expectations from the Czechoslovak state, Slovak nation, Jewish nationalists, Jewish Orthodox, and Hungarian revisionists? It is possible to conclude that each path irreversibly led to a dead end. Paul Robert Magocsi. With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus '. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015 , 509 pp. including 34 maps, notes, bibliography and index plus a picture section. KEITH P. DYRUD Retired Professor Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota With Their Backs to the Mountains introduces the CarpathoRusyns and their homeland which the author calls Carpathian Rus ', the north and south slopes of the mountainous area between Poland, Slovakia and the region of Transcarpathia in Ukraine. Magocsi begins with a brief historical and geographical account of the land and people but provides more detail in the nineteenth century when a Ukrainian national movement started to develop with advocates who argued that Rus ' was the historical name for the Ukrainian people and their land. This argument would undercut Magocsi ' s thesis that Carpatho-Rusyns are a separate nationality. The other challenge to his thesis was posed by Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism . After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Hungarians (Magyars) adopted a policy of Magyarization, that is, the forcible assimilation of non-Magyar nationalities, including the Slovaks and Rusyns. Magocsi defines the Carpatho-Rusyn national identity as the culture expressed by the people originating in Carpathian Rus ' who followed Eastern Rite Christianity and spoke a unique language different from Ukrainian. Some emphasis is placed on "originating" in Carpathian Rus ' because as early as the mid-eighteenth century several thousand Carpatho-Rusyns were resettled in areas of Hungary, now parts of Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, which were lightly settled because of �SLOVAKIA-2017 157 the Ottoman retreat. To this day, these ex-Carpathians identify as Rusyns and, as part of Magocsi 's narrative, continue to maintain their unique culture and language. The emphasis on originating in Carpathian Rus ' justifies his inclusion of Rusyns also living in the United States and several South American countries. The Hungarian revolt in 1849 brought Russian armies through the Carpatho-Rusyns ' land and suggested to the the Rusyn intelligentsia that they could be Russians. Magocsi identifies the three decades that followed as the first national awakening. The options explored were uniting the Carpatho-Rusyns with the Galicians to the North, uniting only the Carpatho-Rusyns, or perhaps identifying themselves as a part of the Great Russian people. The Ukrainian option had a strong influence in Galicia and perhaps thwarted the Carpatho-Rusyn Galician option. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, an autonomous Hungary focused on Magyarizing its minorities. This movement had a major impact on the Carpatho-Rusyns as well as the Slovaks living within the Carpathian Rus ' area. The Lemkos on the North slope of the Carpathians were administratively in the Austrian province of Galicia and not subject to Magyarization. Here the Carpatho-Rusyn leaders lobbied to maintain their language in the schools where they were a majority of the village population. In Hungary the Rusyn effort was thwarted by the Greek Catholic Bishops who were often Magyarone Carpatho-Rusyns. Since World Wars I and II altered the map of Central Europe, Magocsi deals with each Carpathian Rus ' area separately. The second national awakening occurred during the interwar period and is covered in depth. Magocsi provides the names of Carpatho-Rusyn organizations, their publications and cultural activities and statistics on the school systems. Data is provided on how many schools used the local dialect and the percentage of the local populations that identified as Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, Magyar, or Slovak. The Lemkos are treated separately from the Carpatho-Rusyns to their south in the Presov region of Slovakia. The eastern portion of Carpathian Rus ' had several names in the twentieth century and is now called the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The CarpathoRusyns in Transcarpathia mostly identify as Ukrainians . In Table 1.1 Magocsi identifies 853 ,000 people who should be identified as Carpatho-Rusyns which includes 80,000 Lemkos forcibly resettled �158 SLOVAKIA-2017 there after WWII. Now only 10,100 of them self-identify as Carpatho-Rusyns. During World War II the Lemko region was made part of the Generalgouvernrnent of Nazi Germany and received better treatment than the other Carpatho-Rusyns. Shortly after the war ended, Poland disbursed over 80,000 Lemkos to Soviet Ukraine, leaving only 25 ,000 to 35,000 in their ancestral homeland. In the summer of 1947, the Polish army forcibly resettled about 35,000 Lemkos to the western areas of Poland recently cleared of Germans. Only about 7,300 Lemkos managed to avoid deportation. The final chapters of the book follow the Carpatho-Rusyns, wherever they settled, and describe their social, economic and political situations, and their third national awakening. In the final chapters, Magocsi is no longer describing the "shaping of a national identity" but rather documenting the shaping of a cultural identity. Magocsi himself has actively promoted establishing a literary language for each of the various Carpatho-Rusyn dialects. His effort has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian nationalists who insist that there is no Rusyn nationality, only various Ukrainian dialects and subcultures. Magocsi himself quotes one of many such detractors who call the movement "political Rusynism." "This nefarious phenomenon, so they said, was the work of a few ' intellectually misguided' or 'politically opportunistic' individuals 'paid' and, in some cases led by Carpatho-Rusyn 'protectors' in North America (especially the University of Toronto Professor Paul Robert Magocsi)." Valerian Bystricky. Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu 14. marca 1939. Bratislava: Veda, 2014, bibliography, name index, 464 pp. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University The Slovak historian Bystricky (born 1936), a member and former Director of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has a prodigious scholarly record with more than 120 works published at home and abroad. His latest book is very wellresearched, drawing upon contemporary newspaper articles, mem- �SLOVAKIA-2017 159 oirs, and archival materials from various countries. The author divided his seven-chapter monograph into numerous sub-chapters, making for easier navigation. Numerous footnotes also add information to help clarify the text. However, this is a dense volume that is not for everyday reading. Besides the myriad actors presented, a major flaw is that the author seems to want to include as much information as possible, resulting in many instances of repetition. Perhaps a more succinct volume would have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, this is an interesting book. It concentrates on how the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSCS) went from the struggle for autonomy, as outlined in the Pittsburgh Agreement, to the building of Slovak autonomy and a state within the framework of a federated Czecho-Slovakia after Munich. It also made preparations for the possibility of an independent country in the future, resulting in the unexpected proclamation of independence on March 14, 1939. When the HSCS did not get what it wanted from the Czechoslovak government in the late 1920's, it went into opposition . Slovak political parties prior to Slovak independence had little influence upon the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, although the democracy of the country gave Slovaks a desire to have a say in world affairs. With the exception of the Communists, no Slovak political parties had a clear-cut view of foreign policy. Foreign powers and enemies of Czechoslovakia would use Slovak rights and grievances to weaken the state. The members of the HSCS, or Cudaks, could not convince the Western Powers about the need to the transform the state into a federation , thereby causing the Cudaks to look for support elsewhere. The HSCS became the only Slovak political party to accept funds from abroad for its political program. The main threat to Czechoslovakia prior to 1936 remained irredentist Hungary. The rise of Hitler would prove to be a greater danger to the integrity of the state. At first the HSCS viewed the Nazis as non-threatening, then became reserved, while the younger generation of Cudaks began to admire Germany, causing democracy to weaken, both on the right and on the left. Slovakia was largely forgotten during the Munich Crisis, but it led to Slovakia receiving autonomy within a weakened CzechoSlovakia. With this autonomy, the HSCS quickly consolidated power by either banning or forcing the other national or Slovak political parties to merge with it, ending democracy and leading to an authori- �160 SLOVAKIA-2017 tarian regime with the Cudaks claiming to speak for all Slovaks, with independence becoming an eventual goal. Although the Cudaks initially looked to Poland as a possible ally and counterweight to Germany, they were disappointed by Poland ' s desire for Slovak territory and subsequent Czecho-Slovak territorial concessions to Poland. After the First Vienna Award in November of 1938, when Hungary annexed southern Slovakia, the HSCS realized its only friend and protector could be Germany. Radical Cudaks held numerous secret talks with various Nazis in the fall of I 938 and early 1939 without the knowledge of the moderates, including Slovak Premier Fr. Jozef Tiso. Except for Hitler, who felt he could not fight the Western Powers without first destroying CzechoSlovakia, no one knew what the future held for the country. The Nazis began to collaborate with the radical Cudaks to destabilize Czecho-Slovakia so that they could occupy Bohemia and Moravia without being labeled as aggressors. The key became Slovak independence, with the Nazis using the HSCS as their entry for the destruction of Czecho-S lovakia, but it had to be provoked by the Czechs. The so-called Homola putsch, when the Czecho-S lovak military occupied Slovakia on March 9, 1939 as a means to keep Slovakia in the republic, became a comedy of errors not only for Prague, but also for the Nazis . The dismissal of the autonomous Tiso government by Prague, and the ineffectual occupation led to the imprisonment of many Cudak radicals, upon whom the Germans had placed hopes for proclaiming independence during March 11-12. Although the Nazis had no advance knowledge of these Czech actions, they expected Karol Sidor, as the new Slovak premier and leader of the para-military Hlinka Guard, to do their bidding. The Polonophile Sidor refused. When bullying by a Nazi official produced no results, the Germans rebuffed "the soldier of Prague" Sidor as premier and turned to the only alternative, save military intervention, which would have shown Berlin to be the aggressor: Tiso, who no longer had any governmental authority. Like Sidor, Tiso refused to unilaterally proclaim independence, instead wanting to do so legally. Warned by Hitler that Hungary would swallow Slovakia unless independence was declared immediately, Tiso asked for and received the Slovak parliament' s approval on March 14, a few days later than the Nazis had wanted . This act gave the green light for �SLOVAKIA-2017 161 Germany to occupy Bohemia and Moravia the next day, claiming that Slovak independence came from the disintegration of CzechoSlovakia and that Germany had not destroyed it. Very few public manifestations greeted the new Slovak state while life went on as usual. Except for a handful of mostly radical l'.udaks, few Slovaks wanted an independent country in March, rather hoping for a gradual and evolutionary process than the unlawful revolutionary solution enacted. The bottom line and reoccurring theme of this work revolves around the fact that without Nazi support, Slovakia would not have gained independence in March of 1939. As such, Slovakia's fate was tied to German victory in the Second World War. Yet, as Bystricky notes, the Slovak government and its supporters largely underplayed and tried to ignore the Nazi connection to Slovak independence. Instead, the government presented Slovak independence as an act of the self-determination of nations, historic and natural rights, and the renewal of a long- ago medieval kingdom. This view persists among supporters of wartime Slovakia to this day. Pal'o Carnogursky. Suboj s komunizmom. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013 , 368 pp. Suboj s komunizmom 2. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Spolku slovenskych spisovatel'ov, 2015 , 367 pp. Jan Rychlik Charles University, Prague The well-known Latin expression habent sua fata libeli (books have their destinies) is true about the memoirs of the Catholic activist, politician, journalist and amateur historian Pavo) Carnogursky ( 1908-1992), which were posthumously published by his oldest son Ivan in two volumes in 2013 a 2015 under the title "Suboj s komunizmom" (The Duel with Communism). In the early 1970's Carnogursky wrote his memoirs on important events in modern Slovak history - the proclamation of Slovak autonomy on 6 October 1938 and the declaration of Slovakia' s independence on 14 March 1939. These materials were confiscated by State Security (Statna bezpecnost' - StB) in 1976 and returned only after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989. They were published by the Institute of History of the Slo- �162 SLOVAKIA-2017 vak Academy of Sciences in 1992 and 1993 .- In 1985-1986 Carnogursky, deprived of his personal notes, also tape-recorded his memoirs which, however, remained incomplete but were published posthumously by his younger son Jan in 1997 under the title Svedok cias (A Witness to the Times).- Now we have new, hitherto unknown, memoirs of Pavo) Carnogursky, which are an important testimony, not only about historical events and important personalities of Slovak political life, but also about the "soft" methods of persecution of political opponents during the regime of the so-called "normalization" ( 1969-1989). The texts presented in both volumes of Souboj s komunizmom were written between 1976 and1979, after Carnogursky's release from six weeks of custody (from November 8 to December 15, 1976). Carnogursky was imprisoned because he sent for publication to the West documents concerning the persecution of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. He was accused of "harming the interests of the Republic abroad" according to article 112 of the Penal Code of 1961 (this article was frequently used against opponents of the regime if they published their materials abroad). Carnogursky faced up to three years in prison. Fortunately, this did not happen. He was released from custody, interrogated from time-to-time for two more years about his activities and contacts abroad, and finally - at the end of 1979 - the criminal proceedings were suspended. After each interrogation, Carnogursky described what had happened. He also made a detailed list of the documents which were confiscated from his personal archive and tried to restore them from memory. In describing the " lost" materials, he always added his personal testimony to the event or person. Because he was afraid that the notes and materials might be confiscated again, he decided to hide them. He did so with his relative Michal Skokan in Poprad. It is not clear why Pavo) Carnogursky did not claim his materials after the fall of Communism in November of 1989. Skokan's family probably forgot about them . The documents were returned to Carnogursky' s oldest son Ivan only in 2011, nine years after his father's death. In addition, in 2013 Pal'o Carogursky's comments on Gustav Husak's book Svedectvo o Slovenskom narodnom povstani (1964) and his correspondence with Slovak Communist poet Laco Novomesky, were found in the Archive of the Office of the President in the Prague Castle among Gustav Husak's papers by the young Czech historian, Michal Machacek, a �SLOVAKIA-2017 163 postgraduate student of the author of this review. Machacek informed Carnogursky 's family about this through Slovak historian Pavo! Minarik (see Vol. 2, p. 364). Carnogursky 's comments were later added as an appendix to the second volume of memoirs. Unfortunately, the correspondence between Pavo! Carnogursky and Laco Novomesky was not published in extenso. To understand the memoires, it is necessary not only to know Slovak history of the 20 th Century, but also to know who was Pavo! Carnogursky. Originally a schoolteacher, young Carnogursky also studied law at the Charles University in Prague. From his youth he was an active member of the Slovak autonomist movement, closely associated with the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS), although officially (at least according to his memoirs) he never formally joined the party. He was the secretary of the Association of Catholic Youth and also a close collaborator of Karol Sidor (1901-1953), a leading figure of the HSCS and originally the designated successor to Andrej Hlinka. In autonomous Slovakia (1938-1939) Camogursky was a high official of the Ministry of Education. In December of 1938 he was elected to the Slovak autonomous Diet and, as a deputy of this law-making body, he voted on 14 March 1939 for Slovakia' s independence. Carnogursky, like his mentor Sidor, was a Polonophile and opposed the official proGerman orientation of Slovakia. Unlike Sidor, who, under German pressure was forced out of the Slovak government and sent as the Slovak minister to the Vatican, Carnogursky remained in Slovakia and took an active part in the political life of the wartime Slovak Republic. Unlike many other politicians of the Slovak Republic, Carnogursky did not flee the country in 1945 . He remained an adherent of independence for Slovakia but viewed it as unrealistic at the time. He accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as a matter of fact. As an editor of the weekly Katolicke noviny (1945-194 7) he again participated in Slovak political life. He collected money and hired lawyers to defend Dr. Jozef Tiso, former President of Slovakia, who was put on trial after the war. In 1946, Carnogursky helped negotiate the so-called April Agreement, a political pact between representatives of political Catholicism and the Protestant leaders of the Democratic Party. Due to this Agreement, the Democratic Party won the votes of the majority of Slovak Catholics and also the parliamentary �164 SLOVAKIA-2017 elections in Slovakia, which were held on May 26, 1946 . These elections were a political defeat for the Communist Party of Slovakia. However, the Democratic Party was not able - despite its electoral victory -- to stop the Communist takeover of power. For his anti-communist and pro-independence stance, Carnogursky was arrested several times: shortly in the summer of 1945 and 1946, and definitively in October of 194 7. After the communist takeover of February 25, I 948, he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for "anti-state conspiracy". More serious was his next arrest in January of 1951. After his release in I 953 , he lived in Bratislava and worked as a laborer. In the 1960s, during the period of liberalization, he started to cooperate with the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History of the Slovak Communist Party. He collected many materials dealing with modern Slovak history and published several articles. The period of the socalled "normalization," however, interrupted Carnogursky's cooperation with academic circles. After that he concentrated on the defence of religious freedom. His criticism of the anti-religious policy of the communist regime led to his last imprisonment and interrogation on November 8, 1976. Despite the fact that he was soon released and the proceedings were halted in 1979, he did not get back his personal archive, which was confiscated after his arrest. The confiscated documents were later handed over by the police to the Slovak State Central Archive (now the Slovak National Archives) and Carnogursky got them back in 1991 . It is very difficult to describe the contents of Pavo) Carnogursky's notes . He was a witness and often also a participant in many historical events. He also met many historical personalities and tried to describe them . The text is interesting and quite readable, despite the fact that the author often repeats himself. As always in memoirs, many of Carnogursky's standpoints are subjective and some explanations problematic and doubtful. Some of Carnogursky's conclusions contradict known facts . The main problem with the whole text is, however, the large number of factual errors. For example, in Volume 1, on page 4 7, in the summer of 1965 Gustav Husak was working as a researcher in the Institute of State and Law at the Slovak academy of Sciences (Ustav statu a prava SA V), not in Stavoindustria, as Carnogursky claims; on page 70, Vlado Clementis was executed on December 3, 1952, not on December 8; on page �SLOVAKIA-2017 165 231 - Milos Gosiorovsky sent his memorandum advocating the federalization of Czechoslovakia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on July 29, 1963 , not in the year 1955; on page 238 when the Slovak government stopped the deportations of Jews (on October 20, 1942), between 23 ,000 and 24,000 Jews remained in Slovakia, not 45 ,000 or even 50,000 (p.318); on page 242 - Andrej Hlinka died on August 16, 1938, not on August 15 ; on page 249 Stalin died on March 5, 1953, not on March 3rd; The Constitutional Law "On the Czechoslovak Federation" (No. 143/ 1968) was signed at Bratislava Castle on October 30, 1968 (on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin), not on October 23rd. In Vol. 2, on page 245 - the correct name of the provisional parliament in 1945-1946 was "Provisional National Assembly", not Revolutionary National Assembly (this was the name of the provisional parliament in 1918-1920). Camogursky also forgot many minor details, events or mixed them up. For example, in Volume 1, on page 33 the first name of Dr. Horakova, the hero of Czech anti-Nazi and antiCommunist resistance (and first woman sentenced to death and executed in modem Czech and Slovak history), was Milada, not Maria; In Vol. 2., page 124 - Camogursky mixed up "Slovenska obnova" with the daily "Narodna obroda", which was published by the Slovak National Council. Also in Vol. 2, page 194 - Frantisek Nemec, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government in exile and his staff settled in Carpathian Ruthenia in Chust, not in Sevl'us; Also in Vo. 2, on page 253 - Stefan Bast'ovansky did not commit suicide in prison in 1952. He committed suicide at home on 27 November, 1952, on the same day that the State Court in Prague sentenced to death eleven members of the "Rudolf Slansky anti-state group". These errors are perfectly understandable. Camogursky was describing events which happened several decades earlier and he did not have the opportunity to check the facts , either in published sources or in the archives. The editor or the publishing house should have hired a professional historian, who in the form of footnotes , would have corrected these obvious mistakes. In spite of these shortcomings, however, both volumes are a valuable contribution to modem Slovak history. �166 SLOVAKIA-2017 James Krapfl. Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, xxi-260 pp., figures, maps, tables, abbreviations, notes, chronology, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Bratislava This book examines the events that marked the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia and its transition to democracy from the fall of 1989 to the summer of 1992. As the classic expression goes, habent sua fata libelli - each book has a story behind it. In this particular case it is worth mentioning that the English edition of the book was preceded by its Slovak version, published in 2009, which usually happens the other way around. Krapfl provides an insightful, well-documented and convincing picture of the struggle of Czechoslovakia's citizens to find a new way for themselves and their future state. He suggests that what happened in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 was a true revolution from every angle. The book is based on very comprehensive research in Czechoslovakia and its sucessor states in the 1990s and 2000s. He searched primary sources , not only in the urban centers and major archives, but also in the regions. His sources included leaflets, pamphlets, internal reports and instructions issued by the newly-emerging political entities that had served as major agents of political transition in post-Communist Czechoslovakia -the Civic Forum in Prague (OF) and Public Against Violence in Bratislava (VPN)--along with their regional and local branches . Such sources are of crucial importance when examining the substance of any modem revolution, for they serve as the most authentic indicators of an atmosphere full of civic passion and enthusiasm that the replaced previous passivity and obedience to communist political authorities. The overall picture is broad, in some respects too broad. However, keeping in mind that the major protagonists of the story are not individuals, but communities and their little-known representatives, this does not constitute a problem. Krapfl' s deep faith in the humanness and civic spirit of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, who were determined to overcome all the dificulties that stemmed from a �SLOVAKIA-2017 167 political power-vacuum on the one hand, and uncertainty, as far as new institutional and constitutional designs were concerned, on the other hand, can be felt from beginning to end. Krapfl is perfectly aware of the sad fact that, two decades after the Velvet Revolution, skepticism by ordinary Slovaks and Czechs, and their displeasure with current political elites, is ubiquitous. More importantly, he has no doubt that the sudden rise of a civic movement in the fall of 1989 was authentic, spontaneous and true. Meanwhile, he avoids commenting on national conflict, which would otherwise lead to blaming either side or both for their mistakes on the thorny path to democracy. The first two chapters provide a theoretical framework of the civic movement in Czechoslovakia after the communist regime fell in November of 1989. As any other good book, this one culminates near its end. The central theme that shapes the book is a hearkening back to the reform movement of the 1960's in communist Czechoslovakia.. Krapfl is disciplined enough not to repeat variations of political and legal evolution of a joint state that was destined to fail since this subject had already been covered by prolific scholars such as Carol Skalnik Leff, Eric Stein, Shari J. Cohen, Abby Innes and Gil Eyal, to name just a few. Krapfl ' s analysis of the altercation between the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the almost exclusive representatives of their communities before the 1990 parliamentary elections belongs to the best discourses on the topic yet written by a western scholar on postCommunist Czechoslovakia. Two short observations are in order. In a future edition of the book the bibliography should be expanded to include new titles that emerged between its first Slovak and English editions. Also, to balance the period before the community of citizens began to fall apart, and their subsequent and inevitable transformation into political parties following the parliamentary elections of June 1990 and June 1992, more should have been written about the the period between the two elections. Due to Krapfl s masterly knowledge of the subject, thoughtful narrative, empathy for and respect toward the country and its peoples, his book represents a very informative and valuable contribution to the most recent scholarship on East Central Europe, not only from the perspective of cultural history, as the author �168 SLOVAKIA-2017 modestly claims, but also to sociology and political science. Today, when it seems that the glorious days of the Velvet Revolution and its legacy are numbered, as were the days of the French revolution (to which Krapfl in some aspects compares the former) , the importance of the book is significantly higher in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where the faith of the citizenry and civic movements have been substantially reduced, neglected or almost forgotten. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA-2017 151 Jozef Klempa. Moje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. Dennik ceskoslovenskeho legionara z rokov 1914-1920. Bratislava: Slovart, 2014. l 83pp. Afterword by Viera Meliskova. Maps. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a unique and fascinating diary of a Czechoslovak (Slovak) Legionnaire from the First World War. Jozef Klempa (18941980) was trained as a shoemaker who was drafted into the AustroHungarian Armed Forces when the Great War broke out in 1914. That same year he was captured by the Russians on the eastern front and, along with many other POW's shuttled from one Russian village to another, far from the front. Amazingly, the Russian authorities treated him and other POW's quite leniently, letting them wander into nearby villages to find odd jobs, earn some kopeks or rubles, and buy food and drink to supplement their meager rations. Klempa's training as a shoemaker stood him in good stead, as he repaired the boots of his fellow-soldiers as well as that of many villagers. Indeed, he found Russian civilians very friendly and hospitable and he quickly mastered the Russian language and Russian customs. In 1918, after Germany had defeated Russia on the battlefield and the Bolsheviks had seized power, the Czechoslovak Legions, established during the war by T.G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, rebelled against the Bolsheviks, who tried to disarm them. Jozef Klempa, and thousands of other Czech and Slovak PO W' s joined the Czechoslovak Legions, and while fighting off various attacks by the Red Army, they decided to flee Russia by seizing control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Ural Mountains all the way to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. Klempa recorded, almost on a daily basis, his experiences in crossing Siberia twice, once to flee the Bolsheviks and the second time to fight and try to defeat them, at the urging of the Allied and Associated powers. Indeed, Klempa and some of his fellow-Legionnaires were captured by the Bolsheviks on one occasion, but managed to escape. Klempa described in great detail the good relations the Czechoslovak Legionnaires had with various Kozak armies in Siberia, but denounced Admiral Kolchak and his officers. Klempa concluded that the "Whites" lost the war against the Bolsheviks because of the arrogance and cruelty of Admiral Kol- 152 SLOVAKIA-2017 chak and his officers towards Russian peasants. Indeed, it took a visit by General Stefanik in the fall of 1918 to prevent many of the Czechs and Slovaks from joining the Bolsheviks, who treated this foreign army on Russian soil better than did Admiral Kolchak. And, while Klempa had good things to say about Chinese merchants in Siberia, he had nothing but contempt for the Japanese soldiers in Vladivostok, who treated the Czechoslovak Legionnaires very badly. Finally, in May of 1920, Klempa and 3,000 other Legionnaires boarded a British ship that took them to Vancouver in Canada. They then crossed Canada by rail to the eastern port of Halifax, where they boarded another ship that took them to the German port of Zugshaven from whence they were shipped by rail to the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic at the end of July. As many other Legionnaires, Klempa was then released from the military, given a medal for his service, and eventually found a job on the Czechoslovak railroad. Over the years he regaled his family with memories of his exploits in Siberia. His granddaughter Vierka Meliskova managed to gather together his recollections, based on a detailed diary that he kept while in Russia and on the way home, and published this memoir of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire. Historians will mine it for information on this glorious chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia for many years to come. Rebekah Klein-Pejsova .. Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 194 pp., index, maps, tables. JAN LANiCEK University of New South Wales, Australia In September of 1943 , members of the civic resistance in Slovakia, led by Vavro Srobar, a founding father of the united Czechoslovak state in 1918, prepared a report that provided insights into the political loyalties of individual groups in Slovakia. Although they believed that in the case of a plebiscite, a majority of the population would decide for Czechoslovakia, the Jews, the authors suggested, would likely support the re-annexation of the Slovak territory to SLOVAKIA-2017 153 1 Hungary. This report confirmed a problematic perception of the Jews' political loyalties twenty-five years after the creation of the independent state. It was a prelude to the Jewish predicament in post1945 Slovakia, where the accusation of the Jews ' affiliation with the Hungarian (Magyar) culture figured prominently in the public discourse and complicated the Jews ' reintegration into Slovak society. 2 The question of Jewish loyalties in Slovakia is the main theme of thi s monograph . The author focuses on the interwar period and analyzes the transformation of the Jews' loyalties from those associated with the Hungarian political and cultural-linguistic stream before 1918, to a closer alignment with the liberal Czechoslovak political regime, in what she calls the formation of the 'Slovak Jewry'. KleinPejsova defines the 'S lovak Jewry ' as "a communal category binding loyalty to Czechoslovakia with Slovak territoriality rather than an expression of emotional attachment to or identification with the Slovak nation" (p. 92) . This was a complicated process, influenced by the legacies of Hungarian rule and revisionist policies, the rise and collapse of the centralized Czechoslovak state, the emergence of the Slovak national movement closely aligned with the Catholic Church, and internal disputes in the fragmented Jewish communities. Over 135,000 Jews lived in interwar Slovakia. During the 19 th Century, the Hungarian regime emancipated the Jews and allowed them rapid social and economic progress, which led to an overwhelmming acculturation, even assimilation into the Hungarian culture. This trend was deeply resented by the nascent Slovak national movement. Already in the first months after the emergence of the Czechoslovak state - and in an atmosphere filled with anti-Jewish riots 3 - Vavro Srobar, the first Czechoslovak minister responsible for Slovakia, called on the "one hundred percent Magyarized" Jewish communities in Slovakia to seek ""the right path" and abandon their affiliation with the Hungarians (very similar words were repeated by the liberal President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk) (pp.2 and 22). Klein1 Vilem Precan, ed. , Slovenske narodne povstanie: Dokum enty (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury 1965), 89. 2 Anna Cichopek-Gajraj , Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia (Cambridge : Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2014). 3 This subj ect has been recently comprehen sively addressed by Michal Frankl and Miloslav Szabo, Budovani statu bez antisemitismu. Nasili, diskurz loajality a vznik Ceskoslovenska (Praha : NLN, 20 I 6) . 154 SLOVAKIA-2017 Pejsova 's excellent book debates how the Jews responded to these new challenges . Jewish loyalties were constantly under investigation in the interwar period . Although Czechoslovakia accepted the protection of minorities imposed by the Paris Peace Conference (though the government rejected the inclusion of the articles that specifically reiterated the rights of the Jews), the state attempted to prove the dominance of the 'Czechoslovak nation' in the country. The census became the main instrument by which to officially declare loyalties to the new state. The government used the declared "mother tongue" as the main determinant of nationality, and only the Jews were allowed to declare their belonging to the Jewish nationality, regardless of their mother tongue. Klein-Pejsova identifies two possible explanations for this concession: either a liberal vision which re-conceptualized nationality "as an internal conviction", or a less liberal vision, which granted this right to the Jews with the intention of weakening the territorial minorities in the state, namely the Germans and Hungarians. Regardless of the motivations, the number of 'Hungarians' among the Jews sharply decreased in the interwar era (also because of anti-Semitism in Hungary), which contributed to the Hungarians losing some minority rights in certain districts, including Bratislava. Henceforth Hungarians blamed the Jews for this lack of corporate cultural rights, in the same way that the Czechs blamed the Jews in other districts, where the German or Hungarian minority reached the 20% threshold and could use their language in public affairs. Both sides blamed the Jews. A large number of Jews in the country - Klein-Pejsova suggests - decided to follow their own path and declared Jewish nationality, demonstrating neutrality in the national conflict, but at the same time declaring their support for the Czechoslovak state. In 1930, 57% of the Jews across the republic chose this option, and their numbers were exceptionally high especially in the eastern territories, including Slovakia. This acceptance of Jewish nationality should not be confused with support for Jewish nationalism, in the modem sense, a point, which could have been stressed a bit more throughout the monograph. Large parts of the Orthodox and Hassidic communities declared themselves as belonging to the Jewish nationality in the census, but they overtly and consistently rejected modem Jewish nationalist politics. SLOVAKIA-2017 155 Klein-Pejsova frequently compares the situation of the Jews in Slovakia to the Bohemian Lands, where the Jews largely acculturated into the Czech national stream. This comparative element could have developed differently if the author had focused on Moravia, where, especially in the major cities (Brno and Moravska Ostrava), the progress of cultural affiliation with the Czech nation was much slower and the German language dominated among the Jews until the end of the interwar period (though there was an increased effort to change the affiliation after 1933). Even here, the declaration of Jewish nationality offered a way out of the loyalty quandary for the Jews, who were affiliated with non-Slavic cultures. The Jews thus clearly aligned with the Czechoslovak political regime, at least in their public proclamations, though it is much more difficult to prove how the situation was perceived in daily contacts at the local level. Also, what did it mean for ordinary people - Jews and non-Jews alike - to declare a particular nationality in a decennial census? As Klein-Pejsova aptly concludes, '"'the tragic weakness of Jewish nationality lay in its illegibility", which opened it to interpretations (p.114). One can argue that ordinary people, but also state bureaucrats, were much more interested in the language that the Jews used in their daily contacts. Although the Jews believed that a declaration of Jewish nationality was sufficient proof of their loyalties, and continued to use the Hungarian language, this was an inadequate reorientation in the minds of Slovaks. The second problem was that the Jews tied their loyalties to the centralized Czechoslovak state and not the Slovak nation. The growing Slovak autonomous movement criticized the lack of Jewish support for their national ambitions, and the late 1930s witnessed new cases of anti-Jewish violence in Slovakia, with prominent Slovak politicians (Karol Sidor) even calling for the relocation of the Jews to the Soviet-Jewish Autonomous territory in Birobidzhan in the Far East. In November of 1938, shortly after gaining autonomy, but also after losing extensive territory to Hungary, the Slovak government organized one of the first mass deportations of the Jews in the pre-World War II period, when 7,500 'S lovak Jews ', blamed for the territorial losses, were chased across the new border to Hungary. This book makes a crucial contribution to the question of minority loyalties in Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. It points to a dramatic divergence of the constructions of loyalties 156 SLOVAKIA-2017 between the majority and minority populations. The question which remains is what was the ' right path' for the Jews in the interwar period which was filled with contradictory expectations from the Czechoslovak state, Slovak nation, Jewish nationalists, Jewish Orthodox, and Hungarian revisionists? It is possible to conclude that each path irreversibly led to a dead end. Paul Robert Magocsi. With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus '. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015 , 509 pp. including 34 maps, notes, bibliography and index plus a picture section. KEITH P. DYRUD Retired Professor Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota With Their Backs to the Mountains introduces the CarpathoRusyns and their homeland which the author calls Carpathian Rus ', the north and south slopes of the mountainous area between Poland, Slovakia and the region of Transcarpathia in Ukraine. Magocsi begins with a brief historical and geographical account of the land and people but provides more detail in the nineteenth century when a Ukrainian national movement started to develop with advocates who argued that Rus ' was the historical name for the Ukrainian people and their land. This argument would undercut Magocsi ' s thesis that Carpatho-Rusyns are a separate nationality. The other challenge to his thesis was posed by Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism . After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Hungarians (Magyars) adopted a policy of Magyarization, that is, the forcible assimilation of non-Magyar nationalities, including the Slovaks and Rusyns. Magocsi defines the Carpatho-Rusyn national identity as the culture expressed by the people originating in Carpathian Rus ' who followed Eastern Rite Christianity and spoke a unique language different from Ukrainian. Some emphasis is placed on "originating" in Carpathian Rus ' because as early as the mid-eighteenth century several thousand Carpatho-Rusyns were resettled in areas of Hungary, now parts of Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, which were lightly settled because of SLOVAKIA-2017 157 the Ottoman retreat. To this day, these ex-Carpathians identify as Rusyns and, as part of Magocsi 's narrative, continue to maintain their unique culture and language. The emphasis on originating in Carpathian Rus ' justifies his inclusion of Rusyns also living in the United States and several South American countries. The Hungarian revolt in 1849 brought Russian armies through the Carpatho-Rusyns ' land and suggested to the the Rusyn intelligentsia that they could be Russians. Magocsi identifies the three decades that followed as the first national awakening. The options explored were uniting the Carpatho-Rusyns with the Galicians to the North, uniting only the Carpatho-Rusyns, or perhaps identifying themselves as a part of the Great Russian people. The Ukrainian option had a strong influence in Galicia and perhaps thwarted the Carpatho-Rusyn Galician option. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, an autonomous Hungary focused on Magyarizing its minorities. This movement had a major impact on the Carpatho-Rusyns as well as the Slovaks living within the Carpathian Rus ' area. The Lemkos on the North slope of the Carpathians were administratively in the Austrian province of Galicia and not subject to Magyarization. Here the Carpatho-Rusyn leaders lobbied to maintain their language in the schools where they were a majority of the village population. In Hungary the Rusyn effort was thwarted by the Greek Catholic Bishops who were often Magyarone Carpatho-Rusyns. Since World Wars I and II altered the map of Central Europe, Magocsi deals with each Carpathian Rus ' area separately. The second national awakening occurred during the interwar period and is covered in depth. Magocsi provides the names of Carpatho-Rusyn organizations, their publications and cultural activities and statistics on the school systems. Data is provided on how many schools used the local dialect and the percentage of the local populations that identified as Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, Magyar, or Slovak. The Lemkos are treated separately from the Carpatho-Rusyns to their south in the Presov region of Slovakia. The eastern portion of Carpathian Rus ' had several names in the twentieth century and is now called the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The CarpathoRusyns in Transcarpathia mostly identify as Ukrainians . In Table 1.1 Magocsi identifies 853 ,000 people who should be identified as Carpatho-Rusyns which includes 80,000 Lemkos forcibly resettled 158 SLOVAKIA-2017 there after WWII. Now only 10,100 of them self-identify as Carpatho-Rusyns. During World War II the Lemko region was made part of the Generalgouvernrnent of Nazi Germany and received better treatment than the other Carpatho-Rusyns. Shortly after the war ended, Poland disbursed over 80,000 Lemkos to Soviet Ukraine, leaving only 25 ,000 to 35,000 in their ancestral homeland. In the summer of 1947, the Polish army forcibly resettled about 35,000 Lemkos to the western areas of Poland recently cleared of Germans. Only about 7,300 Lemkos managed to avoid deportation. The final chapters of the book follow the Carpatho-Rusyns, wherever they settled, and describe their social, economic and political situations, and their third national awakening. In the final chapters, Magocsi is no longer describing the "shaping of a national identity" but rather documenting the shaping of a cultural identity. Magocsi himself has actively promoted establishing a literary language for each of the various Carpatho-Rusyn dialects. His effort has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian nationalists who insist that there is no Rusyn nationality, only various Ukrainian dialects and subcultures. Magocsi himself quotes one of many such detractors who call the movement "political Rusynism." "This nefarious phenomenon, so they said, was the work of a few ' intellectually misguided' or 'politically opportunistic' individuals 'paid' and, in some cases led by Carpatho-Rusyn 'protectors' in North America (especially the University of Toronto Professor Paul Robert Magocsi)." Valerian Bystricky. Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu 14. marca 1939. Bratislava: Veda, 2014, bibliography, name index, 464 pp. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University The Slovak historian Bystricky (born 1936), a member and former Director of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has a prodigious scholarly record with more than 120 works published at home and abroad. His latest book is very wellresearched, drawing upon contemporary newspaper articles, mem- SLOVAKIA-2017 159 oirs, and archival materials from various countries. The author divided his seven-chapter monograph into numerous sub-chapters, making for easier navigation. Numerous footnotes also add information to help clarify the text. However, this is a dense volume that is not for everyday reading. Besides the myriad actors presented, a major flaw is that the author seems to want to include as much information as possible, resulting in many instances of repetition. Perhaps a more succinct volume would have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, this is an interesting book. It concentrates on how the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSCS) went from the struggle for autonomy, as outlined in the Pittsburgh Agreement, to the building of Slovak autonomy and a state within the framework of a federated Czecho-Slovakia after Munich. It also made preparations for the possibility of an independent country in the future, resulting in the unexpected proclamation of independence on March 14, 1939. When the HSCS did not get what it wanted from the Czechoslovak government in the late 1920's, it went into opposition . Slovak political parties prior to Slovak independence had little influence upon the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, although the democracy of the country gave Slovaks a desire to have a say in world affairs. With the exception of the Communists, no Slovak political parties had a clear-cut view of foreign policy. Foreign powers and enemies of Czechoslovakia would use Slovak rights and grievances to weaken the state. The members of the HSCS, or Cudaks, could not convince the Western Powers about the need to the transform the state into a federation , thereby causing the Cudaks to look for support elsewhere. The HSCS became the only Slovak political party to accept funds from abroad for its political program. The main threat to Czechoslovakia prior to 1936 remained irredentist Hungary. The rise of Hitler would prove to be a greater danger to the integrity of the state. At first the HSCS viewed the Nazis as non-threatening, then became reserved, while the younger generation of Cudaks began to admire Germany, causing democracy to weaken, both on the right and on the left. Slovakia was largely forgotten during the Munich Crisis, but it led to Slovakia receiving autonomy within a weakened CzechoSlovakia. With this autonomy, the HSCS quickly consolidated power by either banning or forcing the other national or Slovak political parties to merge with it, ending democracy and leading to an authori- 160 SLOVAKIA-2017 tarian regime with the Cudaks claiming to speak for all Slovaks, with independence becoming an eventual goal. Although the Cudaks initially looked to Poland as a possible ally and counterweight to Germany, they were disappointed by Poland ' s desire for Slovak territory and subsequent Czecho-Slovak territorial concessions to Poland. After the First Vienna Award in November of 1938, when Hungary annexed southern Slovakia, the HSCS realized its only friend and protector could be Germany. Radical Cudaks held numerous secret talks with various Nazis in the fall of I 938 and early 1939 without the knowledge of the moderates, including Slovak Premier Fr. Jozef Tiso. Except for Hitler, who felt he could not fight the Western Powers without first destroying CzechoSlovakia, no one knew what the future held for the country. The Nazis began to collaborate with the radical Cudaks to destabilize Czecho-Slovakia so that they could occupy Bohemia and Moravia without being labeled as aggressors. The key became Slovak independence, with the Nazis using the HSCS as their entry for the destruction of Czecho-S lovakia, but it had to be provoked by the Czechs. The so-called Homola putsch, when the Czecho-S lovak military occupied Slovakia on March 9, 1939 as a means to keep Slovakia in the republic, became a comedy of errors not only for Prague, but also for the Nazis . The dismissal of the autonomous Tiso government by Prague, and the ineffectual occupation led to the imprisonment of many Cudak radicals, upon whom the Germans had placed hopes for proclaiming independence during March 11-12. Although the Nazis had no advance knowledge of these Czech actions, they expected Karol Sidor, as the new Slovak premier and leader of the para-military Hlinka Guard, to do their bidding. The Polonophile Sidor refused. When bullying by a Nazi official produced no results, the Germans rebuffed "the soldier of Prague" Sidor as premier and turned to the only alternative, save military intervention, which would have shown Berlin to be the aggressor: Tiso, who no longer had any governmental authority. Like Sidor, Tiso refused to unilaterally proclaim independence, instead wanting to do so legally. Warned by Hitler that Hungary would swallow Slovakia unless independence was declared immediately, Tiso asked for and received the Slovak parliament' s approval on March 14, a few days later than the Nazis had wanted . This act gave the green light for SLOVAKIA-2017 161 Germany to occupy Bohemia and Moravia the next day, claiming that Slovak independence came from the disintegration of CzechoSlovakia and that Germany had not destroyed it. Very few public manifestations greeted the new Slovak state while life went on as usual. Except for a handful of mostly radical l'.udaks, few Slovaks wanted an independent country in March, rather hoping for a gradual and evolutionary process than the unlawful revolutionary solution enacted. The bottom line and reoccurring theme of this work revolves around the fact that without Nazi support, Slovakia would not have gained independence in March of 1939. As such, Slovakia's fate was tied to German victory in the Second World War. Yet, as Bystricky notes, the Slovak government and its supporters largely underplayed and tried to ignore the Nazi connection to Slovak independence. Instead, the government presented Slovak independence as an act of the self-determination of nations, historic and natural rights, and the renewal of a long- ago medieval kingdom. This view persists among supporters of wartime Slovakia to this day. Pal'o Carnogursky. Suboj s komunizmom. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013 , 368 pp. Suboj s komunizmom 2. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Spolku slovenskych spisovatel'ov, 2015 , 367 pp. Jan Rychlik Charles University, Prague The well-known Latin expression habent sua fata libeli (books have their destinies) is true about the memoirs of the Catholic activist, politician, journalist and amateur historian Pavo) Carnogursky ( 1908-1992), which were posthumously published by his oldest son Ivan in two volumes in 2013 a 2015 under the title "Suboj s komunizmom" (The Duel with Communism). In the early 1970's Carnogursky wrote his memoirs on important events in modern Slovak history - the proclamation of Slovak autonomy on 6 October 1938 and the declaration of Slovakia' s independence on 14 March 1939. These materials were confiscated by State Security (Statna bezpecnost' - StB) in 1976 and returned only after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989. They were published by the Institute of History of the Slo- 162 SLOVAKIA-2017 vak Academy of Sciences in 1992 and 1993 .- In 1985-1986 Carnogursky, deprived of his personal notes, also tape-recorded his memoirs which, however, remained incomplete but were published posthumously by his younger son Jan in 1997 under the title Svedok cias (A Witness to the Times).- Now we have new, hitherto unknown, memoirs of Pavo) Carnogursky, which are an important testimony, not only about historical events and important personalities of Slovak political life, but also about the "soft" methods of persecution of political opponents during the regime of the so-called "normalization" ( 1969-1989). The texts presented in both volumes of Souboj s komunizmom were written between 1976 and1979, after Carnogursky's release from six weeks of custody (from November 8 to December 15, 1976). Carnogursky was imprisoned because he sent for publication to the West documents concerning the persecution of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. He was accused of "harming the interests of the Republic abroad" according to article 112 of the Penal Code of 1961 (this article was frequently used against opponents of the regime if they published their materials abroad). Carnogursky faced up to three years in prison. Fortunately, this did not happen. He was released from custody, interrogated from time-to-time for two more years about his activities and contacts abroad, and finally - at the end of 1979 - the criminal proceedings were suspended. After each interrogation, Carnogursky described what had happened. He also made a detailed list of the documents which were confiscated from his personal archive and tried to restore them from memory. In describing the " lost" materials, he always added his personal testimony to the event or person. Because he was afraid that the notes and materials might be confiscated again, he decided to hide them. He did so with his relative Michal Skokan in Poprad. It is not clear why Pavo) Carnogursky did not claim his materials after the fall of Communism in November of 1989. Skokan's family probably forgot about them . The documents were returned to Carnogursky' s oldest son Ivan only in 2011, nine years after his father's death. In addition, in 2013 Pal'o Carogursky's comments on Gustav Husak's book Svedectvo o Slovenskom narodnom povstani (1964) and his correspondence with Slovak Communist poet Laco Novomesky, were found in the Archive of the Office of the President in the Prague Castle among Gustav Husak's papers by the young Czech historian, Michal Machacek, a SLOVAKIA-2017 163 postgraduate student of the author of this review. Machacek informed Carnogursky 's family about this through Slovak historian Pavo! Minarik (see Vol. 2, p. 364). Carnogursky 's comments were later added as an appendix to the second volume of memoirs. Unfortunately, the correspondence between Pavo! Carnogursky and Laco Novomesky was not published in extenso. To understand the memoires, it is necessary not only to know Slovak history of the 20 th Century, but also to know who was Pavo! Carnogursky. Originally a schoolteacher, young Carnogursky also studied law at the Charles University in Prague. From his youth he was an active member of the Slovak autonomist movement, closely associated with the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS), although officially (at least according to his memoirs) he never formally joined the party. He was the secretary of the Association of Catholic Youth and also a close collaborator of Karol Sidor (1901-1953), a leading figure of the HSCS and originally the designated successor to Andrej Hlinka. In autonomous Slovakia (1938-1939) Camogursky was a high official of the Ministry of Education. In December of 1938 he was elected to the Slovak autonomous Diet and, as a deputy of this law-making body, he voted on 14 March 1939 for Slovakia' s independence. Carnogursky, like his mentor Sidor, was a Polonophile and opposed the official proGerman orientation of Slovakia. Unlike Sidor, who, under German pressure was forced out of the Slovak government and sent as the Slovak minister to the Vatican, Carnogursky remained in Slovakia and took an active part in the political life of the wartime Slovak Republic. Unlike many other politicians of the Slovak Republic, Carnogursky did not flee the country in 1945 . He remained an adherent of independence for Slovakia but viewed it as unrealistic at the time. He accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as a matter of fact. As an editor of the weekly Katolicke noviny (1945-194 7) he again participated in Slovak political life. He collected money and hired lawyers to defend Dr. Jozef Tiso, former President of Slovakia, who was put on trial after the war. In 1946, Carnogursky helped negotiate the so-called April Agreement, a political pact between representatives of political Catholicism and the Protestant leaders of the Democratic Party. Due to this Agreement, the Democratic Party won the votes of the majority of Slovak Catholics and also the parliamentary 164 SLOVAKIA-2017 elections in Slovakia, which were held on May 26, 1946 . These elections were a political defeat for the Communist Party of Slovakia. However, the Democratic Party was not able - despite its electoral victory -- to stop the Communist takeover of power. For his anti-communist and pro-independence stance, Carnogursky was arrested several times: shortly in the summer of 1945 and 1946, and definitively in October of 194 7. After the communist takeover of February 25, I 948, he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for "anti-state conspiracy". More serious was his next arrest in January of 1951. After his release in I 953 , he lived in Bratislava and worked as a laborer. In the 1960s, during the period of liberalization, he started to cooperate with the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History of the Slovak Communist Party. He collected many materials dealing with modern Slovak history and published several articles. The period of the socalled "normalization," however, interrupted Carnogursky's cooperation with academic circles. After that he concentrated on the defence of religious freedom. His criticism of the anti-religious policy of the communist regime led to his last imprisonment and interrogation on November 8, 1976. Despite the fact that he was soon released and the proceedings were halted in 1979, he did not get back his personal archive, which was confiscated after his arrest. The confiscated documents were later handed over by the police to the Slovak State Central Archive (now the Slovak National Archives) and Carnogursky got them back in 1991 . It is very difficult to describe the contents of Pavo) Carnogursky's notes . He was a witness and often also a participant in many historical events. He also met many historical personalities and tried to describe them . The text is interesting and quite readable, despite the fact that the author often repeats himself. As always in memoirs, many of Carnogursky's standpoints are subjective and some explanations problematic and doubtful. Some of Carnogursky's conclusions contradict known facts . The main problem with the whole text is, however, the large number of factual errors. For example, in Volume 1, on page 4 7, in the summer of 1965 Gustav Husak was working as a researcher in the Institute of State and Law at the Slovak academy of Sciences (Ustav statu a prava SA V), not in Stavoindustria, as Carnogursky claims; on page 70, Vlado Clementis was executed on December 3, 1952, not on December 8; on page SLOVAKIA-2017 165 231 - Milos Gosiorovsky sent his memorandum advocating the federalization of Czechoslovakia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on July 29, 1963 , not in the year 1955; on page 238 when the Slovak government stopped the deportations of Jews (on October 20, 1942), between 23 ,000 and 24,000 Jews remained in Slovakia, not 45 ,000 or even 50,000 (p.318); on page 242 - Andrej Hlinka died on August 16, 1938, not on August 15 ; on page 249 Stalin died on March 5, 1953, not on March 3rd; The Constitutional Law "On the Czechoslovak Federation" (No. 143/ 1968) was signed at Bratislava Castle on October 30, 1968 (on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin), not on October 23rd. In Vol. 2, on page 245 - the correct name of the provisional parliament in 1945-1946 was "Provisional National Assembly", not Revolutionary National Assembly (this was the name of the provisional parliament in 1918-1920). Camogursky also forgot many minor details, events or mixed them up. For example, in Volume 1, on page 33 the first name of Dr. Horakova, the hero of Czech anti-Nazi and antiCommunist resistance (and first woman sentenced to death and executed in modem Czech and Slovak history), was Milada, not Maria; In Vol. 2., page 124 - Camogursky mixed up "Slovenska obnova" with the daily "Narodna obroda", which was published by the Slovak National Council. Also in Vol. 2, page 194 - Frantisek Nemec, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government in exile and his staff settled in Carpathian Ruthenia in Chust, not in Sevl'us; Also in Vo. 2, on page 253 - Stefan Bast'ovansky did not commit suicide in prison in 1952. He committed suicide at home on 27 November, 1952, on the same day that the State Court in Prague sentenced to death eleven members of the "Rudolf Slansky anti-state group". These errors are perfectly understandable. Camogursky was describing events which happened several decades earlier and he did not have the opportunity to check the facts , either in published sources or in the archives. The editor or the publishing house should have hired a professional historian, who in the form of footnotes , would have corrected these obvious mistakes. In spite of these shortcomings, however, both volumes are a valuable contribution to modem Slovak history. 166 SLOVAKIA-2017 James Krapfl. Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, xxi-260 pp., figures, maps, tables, abbreviations, notes, chronology, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Bratislava This book examines the events that marked the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia and its transition to democracy from the fall of 1989 to the summer of 1992. As the classic expression goes, habent sua fata libelli - each book has a story behind it. In this particular case it is worth mentioning that the English edition of the book was preceded by its Slovak version, published in 2009, which usually happens the other way around. Krapfl provides an insightful, well-documented and convincing picture of the struggle of Czechoslovakia's citizens to find a new way for themselves and their future state. He suggests that what happened in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 was a true revolution from every angle. The book is based on very comprehensive research in Czechoslovakia and its sucessor states in the 1990s and 2000s. He searched primary sources , not only in the urban centers and major archives, but also in the regions. His sources included leaflets, pamphlets, internal reports and instructions issued by the newly-emerging political entities that had served as major agents of political transition in post-Communist Czechoslovakia -the Civic Forum in Prague (OF) and Public Against Violence in Bratislava (VPN)--along with their regional and local branches . Such sources are of crucial importance when examining the substance of any modem revolution, for they serve as the most authentic indicators of an atmosphere full of civic passion and enthusiasm that the replaced previous passivity and obedience to communist political authorities. The overall picture is broad, in some respects too broad. However, keeping in mind that the major protagonists of the story are not individuals, but communities and their little-known representatives, this does not constitute a problem. Krapfl' s deep faith in the humanness and civic spirit of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, who were determined to overcome all the dificulties that stemmed from a SLOVAKIA-2017 167 political power-vacuum on the one hand, and uncertainty, as far as new institutional and constitutional designs were concerned, on the other hand, can be felt from beginning to end. Krapfl is perfectly aware of the sad fact that, two decades after the Velvet Revolution, skepticism by ordinary Slovaks and Czechs, and their displeasure with current political elites, is ubiquitous. More importantly, he has no doubt that the sudden rise of a civic movement in the fall of 1989 was authentic, spontaneous and true. Meanwhile, he avoids commenting on national conflict, which would otherwise lead to blaming either side or both for their mistakes on the thorny path to democracy. The first two chapters provide a theoretical framework of the civic movement in Czechoslovakia after the communist regime fell in November of 1989. As any other good book, this one culminates near its end. The central theme that shapes the book is a hearkening back to the reform movement of the 1960's in communist Czechoslovakia.. Krapfl is disciplined enough not to repeat variations of political and legal evolution of a joint state that was destined to fail since this subject had already been covered by prolific scholars such as Carol Skalnik Leff, Eric Stein, Shari J. Cohen, Abby Innes and Gil Eyal, to name just a few. Krapfl ' s analysis of the altercation between the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the almost exclusive representatives of their communities before the 1990 parliamentary elections belongs to the best discourses on the topic yet written by a western scholar on postCommunist Czechoslovakia. Two short observations are in order. In a future edition of the book the bibliography should be expanded to include new titles that emerged between its first Slovak and English editions. Also, to balance the period before the community of citizens began to fall apart, and their subsequent and inevitable transformation into political parties following the parliamentary elections of June 1990 and June 1992, more should have been written about the the period between the two elections. Due to Krapfl s masterly knowledge of the subject, thoughtful narrative, empathy for and respect toward the country and its peoples, his book represents a very informative and valuable contribution to the most recent scholarship on East Central Europe, not only from the perspective of cultural history, as the author 168 SLOVAKIA-2017 modestly claims, but also to sociology and political science. Today, when it seems that the glorious days of the Velvet Revolution and its legacy are numbered, as were the days of the French revolution (to which Krapfl in some aspects compares the former) , the importance of the book is significantly higher in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where the faith of the citizenry and civic movements have been substantially reduced, neglected or almost forgotten.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Jozef Klempa, Moje skúsenosti za svetovej voyny (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 151</li> <li>Rebekah Klein-Pejšová, Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia (Jan Lániček), p. 152</li> <li>Paul Robert Magosci, With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus' (Keith P. Dyrud), p. 156</li> <li>Valerián Bystrický, Zahraničnopolitické súvislosti vzniku Slovenského štátu 14. marca 1939 (Gregory C. Ference), p. 158</li> <li>Paľo Čarnogurský, Súboj s komunizmom (Jan Rychlík), p. 161</li> <li>James Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992 (Juraj Hocman), p. 166</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ference, Gregory Curtis, 1957- Hocman, Juraj Láníček, Jan, 1986- Rychlík, Jan Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9b7b2d97fa591717a181b318eaf4b08f.pdf 4c337dc78bfb1987f164a8649be19d65 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA-2017 169 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN, the grandson of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire, received his Ph.D. from Florida State University in 1982. He wrote his dissertation on "S lovakia's Role in the 1848 Revolutions," which won third prize in the Stephen B. Roman Scholarship competition. His subsequent research on the Polereczky Hussars aroused the interest of the Hungarian government, which gave him a grant to do research in Budapest in 1988. In partnership with Jan Shekitka, Baumgarten so-founded a small cultural foundation known as the "Friends of the Dukla Pass." He taught courses at the Florida State University until 2011 when government cutbacks ended this part of his career. Afterwards, he became disabled and lives on a small pension in Tallahassee, Florida. ALEXANDER BIELICKI is currently the Program Director and lead instructor of Th e New Norway: Globalization, National Identity and the Politics of Belonging, a study-abroad program based at the University of Oslo. He holds degrees in Anthropology (B.A. University of Pittsburgh), Nationalism Studies (M .A. Central European University) and Cultural History/History of Religions (Ph.D. University of Oslo). Having previously focused on Central Europe, especially Slovakia, Bielicki now mainly teaches courses on national identity and belonging, Norwegian society and the Scandinavian Welfare States. DANIEL CERNY finished his doctoral studies at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome, where in 2014 he defended his thesis "The History of the Slovak Greek Catholic Church in Canada until the Creation of the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. " His main interest is Slovak immigration abroad. For his thesis, he gathered materials in archives in Toronto, Rome, and the Vatican, Prague, and other places . He participated in several scholarly conferences (East Central Europe in Exile Volume, proceedings published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) and published a few articles, most recently in Slavica Slovaca 2/2015. He helped translate Andrej Bacinsky - Mukacevsky biskup (Kosice, 2015). While working for a private company, he continues as an independent historian. �170 SLOVAKIA-2017 MARTY MANOR MULLINS completed her Ph.D. in East Central European History at the University of Washington in 2013. With funding provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in conjunction with the Fulbright Program , she conducted research for her dissertation in Kosice, Slovakia, where she has lived and worked for seven years. Her published work focuses on Kosice and Eastern Slovakia's experience of Czechoslovakia's 1948 Communist takeover, the 1968 Soviet invasion, and the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Dr. Mullins currently teaches at Flathead Community College in Kalispell, Montana and serves as a Research Associate for the John Jay Institute. KENNETH JANDA is the Payson S. Wild Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Northwestern University. He has published in comparative party politics, research methodology, and early use of computer technology in teaching and research, for which he received support from Apple Computer. In 2009, he won the Frank J. Goodnow Award for distinguished service to the American Political Science Association. His most recent books are American Parties in Context (with others, Routledge, 2016) and The Challenge of Democracy (with others, Cengage Learning, 2017). His historical narrative, The Emperor and the Peasant: The Start of the Great War and End of a Great Empire, is schedule to be published by McFarland Books in 2018. It intertwines the lives of Emperor Franz Joseph and Samuel Mozolak, his wife's Slovak grandfather who died in 1918 during the Battle of the Piave River in Italy. JAN RYCHLIK is Professor of Modern Czech and Slovak History at Charles University in Prague and also an External Professor of Modern World History at the Technical University in Liberec. He is also a Senior Researcher at the Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. His principal publications include R. W. Seton-Watson and His Relations with Czechs and Slovaks. Documents 1906-1951 (two Vols., with Thomas D. Marzik and Miroslav Bielik, 1995-1996), The End of Czechoslovakia (with Jifi Musil and others, 1995), Th e Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th Century (in Czech - 3 editions, Bratislava and Prague, 19971998), and A History of Bulgaria (with Vladimir Pencev, in Czech, 2000,2002,2016) �SLOVAKIA-2017 171 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. �172 NOTES ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W.NINAHOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Jozef Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W.Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , John G. Duch, Esq., Stephanie Seigel , John A. Holy Cynthia M. Maleski, Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Martha Catalano, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association Beachwood, Ohio First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S. and Canada Independence, Ohio Slovak Catholic Sokol Passaic, New Jersey National Slovak Society of the U.S.A McMurray, Pennsylvania Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania The Slovak Newspapermen's Association of America SLOVAKIA $10.00 per issue � SLOVAKIA-2017 169 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN, the grandson of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire, received his Ph.D. from Florida State University in 1982. He wrote his dissertation on "S lovakia's Role in the 1848 Revolutions," which won third prize in the Stephen B. Roman Scholarship competition. His subsequent research on the Polereczky Hussars aroused the interest of the Hungarian government, which gave him a grant to do research in Budapest in 1988. In partnership with Jan Shekitka, Baumgarten so-founded a small cultural foundation known as the "Friends of the Dukla Pass." He taught courses at the Florida State University until 2011 when government cutbacks ended this part of his career. Afterwards, he became disabled and lives on a small pension in Tallahassee, Florida. ALEXANDER BIELICKI is currently the Program Director and lead instructor of Th e New Norway: Globalization, National Identity and the Politics of Belonging, a study-abroad program based at the University of Oslo. He holds degrees in Anthropology (B.A. University of Pittsburgh), Nationalism Studies (M .A. Central European University) and Cultural History/History of Religions (Ph.D. University of Oslo). Having previously focused on Central Europe, especially Slovakia, Bielicki now mainly teaches courses on national identity and belonging, Norwegian society and the Scandinavian Welfare States. DANIEL CERNY finished his doctoral studies at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome, where in 2014 he defended his thesis "The History of the Slovak Greek Catholic Church in Canada until the Creation of the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. " His main interest is Slovak immigration abroad. For his thesis, he gathered materials in archives in Toronto, Rome, and the Vatican, Prague, and other places . He participated in several scholarly conferences (East Central Europe in Exile Volume, proceedings published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) and published a few articles, most recently in Slavica Slovaca 2/2015. He helped translate Andrej Bacinsky - Mukacevsky biskup (Kosice, 2015). While working for a private company, he continues as an independent historian. �170 SLOVAKIA-2017 MARTY MANOR MULLINS completed her Ph.D. in East Central European History at the University of Washington in 2013. With funding provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in conjunction with the Fulbright Program , she conducted research for her dissertation in Kosice, Slovakia, where she has lived and worked for seven years. Her published work focuses on Kosice and Eastern Slovakia's experience of Czechoslovakia's 1948 Communist takeover, the 1968 Soviet invasion, and the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Dr. Mullins currently teaches at Flathead Community College in Kalispell, Montana and serves as a Research Associate for the John Jay Institute. KENNETH JANDA is the Payson S. Wild Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Northwestern University. He has published in comparative party politics, research methodology, and early use of computer technology in teaching and research, for which he received support from Apple Computer. In 2009, he won the Frank J. Goodnow Award for distinguished service to the American Political Science Association. His most recent books are American Parties in Context (with others, Routledge, 2016) and The Challenge of Democracy (with others, Cengage Learning, 2017). His historical narrative, The Emperor and the Peasant: The Start of the Great War and End of a Great Empire, is schedule to be published by McFarland Books in 2018. It intertwines the lives of Emperor Franz Joseph and Samuel Mozolak, his wife's Slovak grandfather who died in 1918 during the Battle of the Piave River in Italy. JAN RYCHLIK is Professor of Modern Czech and Slovak History at Charles University in Prague and also an External Professor of Modern World History at the Technical University in Liberec. He is also a Senior Researcher at the Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. His principal publications include R. W. Seton-Watson and His Relations with Czechs and Slovaks. Documents 1906-1951 (two Vols., with Thomas D. Marzik and Miroslav Bielik, 1995-1996), The End of Czechoslovakia (with Jifi Musil and others, 1995), Th e Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th Century (in Czech - 3 editions, Bratislava and Prague, 19971998), and A History of Bulgaria (with Vladimir Pencev, in Czech, 2000,2002,2016) �SLOVAKIA-2017 171 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. �172 NOTES ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W.NINAHOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Jozef Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W.Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , John G. Duch, Esq., Stephanie Seigel , John A. Holy Cynthia M. Maleski, Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Martha Catalano, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association Beachwood, Ohio First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S. and Canada Independence, Ohio Slovak Catholic Sokol Passaic, New Jersey National Slovak Society of the U.S.A McMurray, Pennsylvania Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania The Slovak Newspapermen's Association of America SLOVAKIA $10.00 per issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA-2017 169 CONTRIBUTORS R. VLADIMIR BAUMGARTEN, the grandson of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire, received his Ph.D. from Florida State University in 1982. He wrote his dissertation on "S lovakia's Role in the 1848 Revolutions," which won third prize in the Stephen B. Roman Scholarship competition. His subsequent research on the Polereczky Hussars aroused the interest of the Hungarian government, which gave him a grant to do research in Budapest in 1988. In partnership with Jan Shekitka, Baumgarten so-founded a small cultural foundation known as the "Friends of the Dukla Pass." He taught courses at the Florida State University until 2011 when government cutbacks ended this part of his career. Afterwards, he became disabled and lives on a small pension in Tallahassee, Florida. ALEXANDER BIELICKI is currently the Program Director and lead instructor of Th e New Norway: Globalization, National Identity and the Politics of Belonging, a study-abroad program based at the University of Oslo. He holds degrees in Anthropology (B.A. University of Pittsburgh), Nationalism Studies (M .A. Central European University) and Cultural History/History of Religions (Ph.D. University of Oslo). Having previously focused on Central Europe, especially Slovakia, Bielicki now mainly teaches courses on national identity and belonging, Norwegian society and the Scandinavian Welfare States. DANIEL CERNY finished his doctoral studies at the Pontifical Oriental Institute in Rome, where in 2014 he defended his thesis "The History of the Slovak Greek Catholic Church in Canada until the Creation of the Eparchy of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. " His main interest is Slovak immigration abroad. For his thesis, he gathered materials in archives in Toronto, Rome, and the Vatican, Prague, and other places . He participated in several scholarly conferences (East Central Europe in Exile Volume, proceedings published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013) and published a few articles, most recently in Slavica Slovaca 2/2015. He helped translate Andrej Bacinsky - Mukacevsky biskup (Kosice, 2015). While working for a private company, he continues as an independent historian. 170 SLOVAKIA-2017 MARTY MANOR MULLINS completed her Ph.D. in East Central European History at the University of Washington in 2013. With funding provided by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation in conjunction with the Fulbright Program , she conducted research for her dissertation in Kosice, Slovakia, where she has lived and worked for seven years. Her published work focuses on Kosice and Eastern Slovakia's experience of Czechoslovakia's 1948 Communist takeover, the 1968 Soviet invasion, and the 1989 Velvet Revolution. Dr. Mullins currently teaches at Flathead Community College in Kalispell, Montana and serves as a Research Associate for the John Jay Institute. KENNETH JANDA is the Payson S. Wild Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Northwestern University. He has published in comparative party politics, research methodology, and early use of computer technology in teaching and research, for which he received support from Apple Computer. In 2009, he won the Frank J. Goodnow Award for distinguished service to the American Political Science Association. His most recent books are American Parties in Context (with others, Routledge, 2016) and The Challenge of Democracy (with others, Cengage Learning, 2017). His historical narrative, The Emperor and the Peasant: The Start of the Great War and End of a Great Empire, is schedule to be published by McFarland Books in 2018. It intertwines the lives of Emperor Franz Joseph and Samuel Mozolak, his wife's Slovak grandfather who died in 1918 during the Battle of the Piave River in Italy. JAN RYCHLIK is Professor of Modern Czech and Slovak History at Charles University in Prague and also an External Professor of Modern World History at the Technical University in Liberec. He is also a Senior Researcher at the Masaryk Institute and Archives of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. His principal publications include R. W. Seton-Watson and His Relations with Czechs and Slovaks. Documents 1906-1951 (two Vols., with Thomas D. Marzik and Miroslav Bielik, 1995-1996), The End of Czechoslovakia (with Jifi Musil and others, 1995), Th e Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th Century (in Czech - 3 editions, Bratislava and Prague, 19971998), and A History of Bulgaria (with Vladimir Pencev, in Czech, 2000,2002,2016) SLOVAKIA-2017 171 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. 172 NOTES THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W.NINAHOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Jozef Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W.Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , John G. Duch, Esq., Stephanie Seigel , John A. Holy Cynthia M. Maleski, Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski, David M. Blazek, Sue Ann M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Martha Catalano, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association Beachwood, Ohio First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S. and Canada Independence, Ohio Slovak Catholic Sokol Passaic, New Jersey National Slovak Society of the U.S.A McMurray, Pennsylvania Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania The Slovak Newspapermen's Association of America SLOVAKIA $10.00 per issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81) Description An account of the resource includes Contributors; Guidelines for Manuscripts Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1b6aa8b60ef2073de9fe05b9e503ffae.pdf 0bb63d00d817c93fde2ecfc3ae9b90ef PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XLII NUMBERS 78- 79 2015 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Editor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa .ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The 1919 Census on the Territory of Slovakia Rebekah Klein-Pejsova ... .......... ..... ...... .... ..... ... ............ .... ........ .... 7 The Journey of Four Slovak Catholic Bi shops to the USA in 1926 Stefan Kucik .. ............. ................ ............ ........ ............................ 3 5 The Birth of Lexicographic Works in North America with Special Emphasis on J. J. Konus Dalibor Mikula§ .. ..... .. .... ... .... .. ... ...... .... ... ......... ...... ... .. ... .......... .. 50 The Development of Cu ltural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945 Miroslav Michela ....................... ... ..... .. ........ ........ .... .... .... .... .. .... 66 My Rocky Relationship with the Matica slovenska During the Second Era of Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1970-1989: A Personal Memoir M. Mark Stolarik .... ........ .. .. ... ...... ............... ......... ..... .......... ........ 87 Corruption in Slovakia: Time to Reclaim the State Tom Nicholson ........... .......... .... ... .......... ................. ........ ... ... .. .. 11 2 REVIEWS Jan Rychlik, Magdalena Rychlikova, Podkarpatska Rus 1919-1939 C. Winston Chrislock ... ........ ...... ......... ................. ... ....... ..... ... .. 129 David Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests Jam es Ramon Felak ........... ...... ...... .. ... ... .. ............... ..... .... ..... ... 132 James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator Gregory C. Ference .. ............ ............. .... ....................... .. .. ....... 134 �4 SLOV AKIA-2015 Miroslav Londak, Ekonomicke reformy Martin Pospisil ...... ............ ........... ....... ..... ............ ....... ....... ...... 13 7 Jan Carnogursky, Dennik, 1994-2007 Jan Rychlik ......... ................. .. .... .. .............. ............. .. .... ........ .... 141 Robert M. Zecker, Race and America 's Immigrant Press M Mark Stolarik .......... .......... ..... ......... .... ........ ..... ... .... ....... ..... . 143 M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Home ? William J Galush .......... .. ... .. ...... ..... .... ..... .. ......... ....... ....... ..... ... .. 145 Contributors .. ...... .... ............ ........... ....................... ... ...... .. .... ... .... .... . 148 Guidelines for Manuscripts ... ... ............... ....... .... .. ... .... ..... ...... ....... .. 150 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XLII NUMBERS 78- 79 2015 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Editor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa .ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The 1919 Census on the Territory of Slovakia Rebekah Klein-Pejsova ... .......... ..... ...... .... ..... ... ............ .... ........ .... 7 The Journey of Four Slovak Catholic Bi shops to the USA in 1926 Stefan Kucik .. ............. ................ ............ ........ ............................ 3 5 The Birth of Lexicographic Works in North America with Special Emphasis on J. J. Konus Dalibor Mikula§ .. ..... .. .... ... .... .. ... ...... .... ... ......... ...... ... .. ... .......... .. 50 The Development of Cu ltural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945 Miroslav Michela ....................... ... ..... .. ........ ........ .... .... .... .... .. .... 66 My Rocky Relationship with the Matica slovenska During the Second Era of Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1970-1989: A Personal Memoir M. Mark Stolarik .... ........ .. .. ... ...... ............... ......... ..... .......... ........ 87 Corruption in Slovakia: Time to Reclaim the State Tom Nicholson ........... .......... .... ... .......... ................. ........ ... ... .. .. 11 2 REVIEWS Jan Rychlik, Magdalena Rychlikova, Podkarpatska Rus 1919-1939 C. Winston Chrislock ... ........ ...... ......... ................. ... ....... ..... ... .. 129 David Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests Jam es Ramon Felak ........... ...... ...... .. ... ... .. ............... ..... .... ..... ... 132 James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator Gregory C. Ference .. ............ ............. .... ....................... .. .. ....... 134 �4 SLOV AKIA-2015 Miroslav Londak, Ekonomicke reformy Martin Pospisil ...... ............ ........... ....... ..... ............ ....... ....... ...... 13 7 Jan Carnogursky, Dennik, 1994-2007 Jan Rychlik ......... ................. .. .... .. .............. ............. .. .... ........ .... 141 Robert M. Zecker, Race and America 's Immigrant Press M Mark Stolarik .......... .......... ..... ......... .... ........ ..... ... .... ....... ..... . 143 M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Home ? William J Galush .......... .. ... .. ...... ..... .... ..... .. ......... ....... ....... ..... ... .. 145 Contributors .. ...... .... ............ ........... ....................... ... ...... .. .... ... .... .... . 148 Guidelines for Manuscripts ... ... ............... ....... .... .. ... .... ..... ...... ....... .. 150 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA VOLUME XLII NUMBERS 78- 79 2015 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Editor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa .ca Table of Contents ARTICLES The 1919 Census on the Territory of Slovakia Rebekah Klein-Pejsova ... .......... ..... ...... .... ..... ... ............ .... ........ .... 7 The Journey of Four Slovak Catholic Bi shops to the USA in 1926 Stefan Kucik .. ............. ................ ............ ........ ............................ 3 5 The Birth of Lexicographic Works in North America with Special Emphasis on J. J. Konus Dalibor Mikula§ .. ..... .. .... ... .... .. ... ...... .... ... ......... ...... ... .. ... .......... .. 50 The Development of Cu ltural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945 Miroslav Michela ....................... ... ..... .. ........ ........ .... .... .... .... .. .... 66 My Rocky Relationship with the Matica slovenska During the Second Era of Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1970-1989: A Personal Memoir M. Mark Stolarik .... ........ .. .. ... ...... ............... ......... ..... .......... ........ 87 Corruption in Slovakia: Time to Reclaim the State Tom Nicholson ........... .......... .... ... .......... ................. ........ ... ... .. .. 11 2 REVIEWS Jan Rychlik, Magdalena Rychlikova, Podkarpatska Rus 1919-1939 C. Winston Chrislock ... ........ ...... ......... ................. ... ....... ..... ... .. 129 David Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests Jam es Ramon Felak ........... ...... ...... .. ... ... .. ............... ..... .... ..... ... 132 James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator Gregory C. Ference .. ............ ............. .... ....................... .. .. ....... 134 4 SLOV AKIA-2015 Miroslav Londak, Ekonomicke reformy Martin Pospisil ...... ............ ........... ....... ..... ............ ....... ....... ...... 13 7 Jan Carnogursky, Dennik, 1994-2007 Jan Rychlik ......... ................. .. .... .. .............. ............. .. .... ........ .... 141 Robert M. Zecker, Race and America 's Immigrant Press M Mark Stolarik .......... .......... ..... ......... .... ........ ..... ... .... ....... ..... . 143 M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Home ? William J Galush .......... .. ... .. ...... ..... .... ..... .. ......... ....... ....... ..... ... .. 145 Contributors .. ...... .... ............ ........... ....................... ... ...... .. .... ... .... .... . 148 Guidelines for Manuscripts ... ... ............... ....... .... .. ... .... ..... ...... ....... .. 150 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e25920766948699563a0acbdefd75be7.pdf 311692e45aaaa2d1efd87f6847f19be0 PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA-2015 7 THE 1919 CENSUS ON THE TERRITORY OF SLOV AKIA 1 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova When the First World War ended in 1918, the four empires that had determined the shape of state and social relations within and beyond their borders - the Habsburg, the German, the Russian, and the Ottoman - had dissolved. A state system based on the principle of national self-determination took their place in East Central Europe, in which citizenship and state belonging were seen through a national lens. Unrest and anarchy were characteristic of the prevailing atmosphere in many regions of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the fall of 1918. In Slovakia, that instability was part of the larger struggle for the future of the newly bounded territory . Unlike other regions of former Hungary being incorporated into the new or transformed successor states, like Croatia (Yugoslavia) or Transylvania (Romania), Slovakia had never been administratively defined on its own, but solely as sixteen counties and four municipalities of northern Hungary. By the end of the war, the collapse of the old order without replacement by the new left Slovakia in a chaotic condition. Amid the upheaval, looting, and anti-Jewish excesses that typified the period, local National Councils had formed with the goal of consolidating the new state. But they were too weak to decisively resist regional Hungarian opposition and Budapest's efforts to maintain the territory. 2 While Czechoslovakia's birth was announced in Prague on October 28, 1918, the view from Slovakia was far less definitive. It was not a foregone conclusion that Slovakia would indeed be incorporated into the new state. Slovakia was in a precarious position, loosened from defeated Hungary, but not yet officially joined with Bohemia and Moravia. 1 This article is a version of a chapter originally published in my book Mapping Jewish Loyalties in !nterwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20 I 5). This material appears courtesy of Indiana University Press. All rights reserved. 2 Cubomir Liptak, "Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Elena Mannova, ed ., A Concise History of Slovakia. Studia Historica Slovaca XXI (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2000), 239 . �8 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovak historians characterize the unstable "Prevrat " era as the "Struggle for Slovakia," a view that highlights Slovakia's contested status between the Magyars and the Czechs. Save for a handful of Slovak national leaders, the Slovaks themselves moved through this picture as a frustrated underclass, taking advantage of the volatile, chaotic climate to set upon state administrators, notaries, policemen, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and the propertied . Slovaks found themselves in a moment of great release. It offered them a chance to vent their anger and frustration at the war and the Hungarian system . The newly-formed local National Councils sought to mitigate these widespread outbreaks of violence. Yet these local organs had little control, or the ability to quell Hungarian resistance to the power transfer, which was further impeded by the power structure of the old state, still in place . A Hungarian demand for a referendum on the changes surfaced, relying on the fragmentation of the population along regional and social lines, degrees of national consciousness, and lack of information about the political transformation . It was the first time Budapest asked Slovaks for their opinions . The views of ordinary people, "varied from enthusiastic welcoming of the new state and the 'liberation' of Slovakia, through apathy and desire for peace, to fear of a new unknown situation, of uncertain permanence and threaten3 ing new bloodshed and military solutions. " The Hungarian National Council in Budapest came into being only on October 25, 1918, somewhat later than those of the national minorities. It was established by Count Mihaly Karolyi, who was widely believed to be the emperor-king's obvious choice for the new Prime Minister. Oszkar Jaszi, the progressive Hungarian social scientist, historian, and politician, drafted the Hungarian National Council's twelve-point program. It called for Hungarian independence, an immediate and separate peace treaty with the Allies, universal suffrage with a secret ballot, land reform, and recognition of the 4 rights of the national minorities within a federalized Hungary . When Emperor-King Charles appointed Count Janos Hadik instead, massive anti-government demonstrations broke out, demanding Karolyi. 5 3 Ibid. Peter Hanak, ed. , The Corvina History of Hungary: From Earliest Times Until lhe Present Day (Budapest: Corvina Books, 1991 ), 164. 5 Laszl6 Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 328. 4 �SLOV AKIA-2015 9 It was October 28, the same day as the declaration of the new Czechoslovak Republic in Prague. By the night of October 30 through 31, crowds of soldiers and civilians demonstrated in the streets of Budapest. They later occupied public buildings, prevented troops loyal to Karolyi from moving out of the city, captured Budapest's military governor, and freed political prisoners as in 1848. Soldiers tore off the emblems on their uniforms and replaced them with asters and rosettes. Emperor-King Charles retreated and Karolyi formed a new independent Hungarian government. Vanquished Hungary appeared to be on the path to democratization. 6 Meanwhile, Slovak national leaders, mostly from central Slovakia converged in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and established the Slovak National Council. They had little news of what was happening in Prague, Budapest, or Europe more broadly . The Council wished, however, to take a stand on the dramatically unfolding events . The Slovak politician Milan Hodza had been negotiating with Karolyi in Budapest. He arrived in Martin on October 30 just as the Council was about to issue the Martin Declaration, announcing the secession of Slovakia from Hungary, Slovak self-determination and a desire for inclusion in the Czechoslovak state, which fulfilled Prague's wishes .7 The Slovak National Council had no army, so it could not enforce its program or maintain order. Individual militias sprang up in towns and cities across Slovakia, engaging in a power struggle with the newly-formed Hungarian National Councils. It was a highly unstable environment. Demobilized Slovak soldiers (from the Hungarian army) formed the mainstay of active Slovak participation in the evolving power struggle. They created paramilitary groups in the forests, especially in western Slovakia, with about four thousand soldiers active around Bratislava. To dispel the threat of anarchy and establish control over the territory, the Czechoslovak National Council brought Slovak representatives into the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in early November of 1918. 8 Slovakia's first provisional "Slovak Government" was set up in Western Slovakia near the Moravia-Slovak border by the Czechoslo6 Hanak, ed ., Corvino History of Hungary , 164-5. Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1 987 (New Jersey: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1988), 40-41 . 8 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in th e 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 239 . 7 �10 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak government in Prague, and began to function on November 6. It was led by Vavro Srobar, Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. On Decemberl2, it was replaced by a Ministry for Slovakia, which Srobar established in Zilina in the midst of a combined Czech, French and Italian effort to drive Hungarian troops out of Slovak territory. 9 Less than two weeks later, on December 21, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Benes successfully negotiated French 10 recognition of a demarcation line of the Slovak territory . Entente forces would drive Hungarian troops past the demarcation line on January 20, 1919. That line more or less became the country's official border with the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. 11 When Srobar's administration grew too large for Zilina, he deliberated with Samuel Zoch, a Lutheran clergyman from Modra near Pressburg (later Bratislava) who was the principal author of the Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918, on where Slovakia's central government should be moved . They decided in early January of 1919 to move the capital to Pressburg on February 4, 1919. Zoch was placed in charge of the Pressburg district administration (zupan), and orchestrated the Czechoslovak takeover of the city from January 1, 1919. "Bratislava" became the city's standard official name in March of 1919. 12 Hungary would make one more sustained military effort toward maintaining its prewar borders. Under Bela Kun's short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, lasting for 133 days beginning March 21, 1919, the Hungarian Red Army made significant inroads into Slovakia. It was driven out following an ultimatum by the Entente powers at the end of June 1919. The Hungarian Red Army finally retreated from Slovakia on June 30, 1919, and by July 24 the Czechoslovak government held the entire territory. 13 9 Peter Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City: The Czechoslovak Renaming of Pressburg/Pozsony/Presporok, I 918-19," Austrian History Yearbook 35 (2004 ): 221. IOibid ., 213. 11 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 243. 12 Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City," 221 . 13 For a detailed discussion of the series of revolutions in Hungary see: Laszlo Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) chapter VII "In Search of an Identity" , 324-344; Ivan Volgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-1919. Nine Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971 ); Andras Sikl6s, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the Multinational State 1918 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1988); Rudolf I. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian �SLOV AKIA-2015 11 On the Czechoslovak state level, the Struggle for Slovakia entailed not only the physical, geographic aspect of territorial incorporation, but also the more slippery aspect of drawing the multinational population of Slovakia into the mental landscape of the new state. Coming to terms with the World War I Czech argument that the Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation, and so should together form the dominant national group within the Czechoslovak nation-state, required a shift in direction . The events of the "Prevrat" underscore the tense relations between, first and foremost, Hungarians and Slovaks, and Jews and Slovaks, but also, increasingly between Czechs and Slovaks. These relationships would influence shifts in overall understandings of nationhood and nationality, as well as national political programs within the new state. Czechoslovakia was a nation-state in formation. Successful Czechoslovak state building required incorporating the territory and peoples of Slovakia. This was not to be accomplished by gradually building popular consensus, but through military engagement and diplomatic maneuvering. 14 Drawing the borders in this way would have significant implications for Czechoslovakia's domestic and international nationalities problems. Prague needed the Slovaks, a "state forming nation," 15 or there would be no independent Czechoslovakia. Without the Slovaks, the Czechs could not form a majority in the parliament and legitimately create a viable state. The Slovaks likewise needed the Czechs to help them leave Hungary. They needed the Czechs to help them establish a functioning civil and governmental infrastructure in Slovakia, and to create an educational system for producing Slovak national elites ready to take control of the developing infrastructure. The help the Slovaks desired was temporary_ 16 Soviet Republic (published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University by New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967). 14 Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires (Lo ndon, NY: Routledge, 200 I), I 62. 15 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. Czechs alone formed only 49 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population without the Slovaks. Whereas, accordin g to the 1921 Czechoslovak census, "Czechoslovaks" formed 65 .51 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population, and "Germans" 23.36 percent. 16 Liptak, "Vll. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. �12 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the introduction to hi s memoir on the formative years 1918 through 1920, Osvobodene Slovensko (Liberated Slovakia), Vavro Srobar recounted hi s first meeting with R.W. Seton-Watson, the influential British historian and political activist who brought nationality questions in Austria-Hungary to the world's attention. In 1907 Seton-Watson came to R6zsahegy (Ruzomberok) in the central Slovak Low Tatra region, where Srobar was then working, while researching the national question for what would be his first major work, Racial Problems in Hungary. 17 Due to the objectivity and calm with which Seton-Watson di scussed Magyarization, Srobar found himself unable to discern where his visitor stood on the issue. Before they parted, Seton-Watson surprised Srobar with a question : "And what is your state program?" he asked. After a moment's hesitation, Srobar replied, "Great Moravia, 18 with Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Pannonia," which Seton-Watson "accepted without commentary." "That [conversation] took place seven years before the outbreak of the world war," continued Srobar, "and eleven years afterward 'Great Moravia' received the name the 'Czechoslovak State."' 19 Language was the connection between the "Czechoslovak tribes" that Srobar professed in his memoir, from their ancient roots to the present. Even the establishment of a new literary language in Slovakia, thanks to I:udovit Stur's nineteenth century codification of the central Slovak dialect, "did not for a moment disturb the consciousness of Czechoslovak tribal unity," he asserted. "The longing for close cultural, economic, and political unity increased yearly in proportion to the growing pressure of brutal Magyarization," he added. 20 Srobar underscored a romantic one-thousand year story of the unitary Czechoslovak nation/tribe - focusing on shared language, history, 17 London : Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1908 . "Great Moravia," a large Slavic state that existed between 833 and 906, was an important component of the Czechoslovak romantic national idea as well as the development of Slovak nationalism. Considered to have bridged the western Slavs with the Slavonic tribes in the Balkans and with Byzantium, the weakening state collapsed under attack by the Magyar tribes who settled in the Danube Basin in approximately 896. The Czech and Slovak tribes then underwent separate development. For more on Great Moravia see Jan Dekan, Vel'ka Morava: Doba a umenie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1976). 19 Vavro Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko. Pamdti z rokov 191 8-1920, Svazok Prvy (Prague, 1928), 7-8. 20 Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko, 11. 18 �SLOV AKIA-2015 13 interests, and ancestral ties - that had been so successful in garnering international support for the Czechoslovak state building project during the war in his celebratory and didactic jubilee year volume. While the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation prevailed internationally, the most compelling connection between the Czechs and Slovaks for the prospects of independent statehood was demographic. Though Czechs constituted a majority in Bohemia and Moravia, they feared that the collapse of Austria-Hungary would spell their incorporation into a Greater Germany, due to the existence of a substantial German minority in these lands . At the beginning of the war, Czech leaders first sought a reorganization of the Monarchy along federal lines with a large degree of autonomy for the Czechs, though soon discarded the plan as unfeasib!e.21 In working toward the ultimate goal of independence, the idea of incorporating the estimated three million strong Slovak population became an increasingly attractive solution to counterbalancing the significant German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. 22 By the end of the war T.G. Masaryk and Benes had the commitment of the Entente powers to an independent Czechoslovakia. The Slovak population became the key to the Czechoslovak nation's demographic legitimacy in its new multinational national state. The Paris Peace Conference called upon the Czechoslovak delegation to statistically demonstrate the dominance of the Slovaks in the multinational territory of Slovakia. The viability of the Czechoslovak state depended upon it. In order to collect the necessary data, the Czechoslovak government organized a provisional census for Slovakia. Such a census could not be carried out until the borders of the territory were defined and secured, and military upheavals had ceased . This meant waiting until the ultimatum given by the Entente powers had driven Bela Kun's Red Army troops out of Slovakia at the end of June 1919, and until the Czechoslovak government had control over the territory at the end of July. While the change of regimes was not officially over, and the borders were not fixed by law until Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, I 920, Czechoslovakia held the de facto borders securely enough by August 1919 that it was feasible to set the census in motion. The primary goal of the census was : 21 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. A History o[. East Central Europe, vol. 9 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 76. 2 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 35. �14 SLOV AKIA-2015 [To gather] the necessary information for the Peace Conference concerning how many Slovaks there [were] in the occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary, so that it would be possible to correct and prove false the Hungarian census of 1910, as well as to ascertain other general national proportions in Slovak communities, namely the [extent of] the Magyarization of these communities, the Magyarization of schools and churches. "23 The 1919 census was the first attempt by the Czechoslovak government to map the territory of Slovakia for state building purposes. Mapping Slovakia meant reframing the national ratios of multinational/ethnic/linguistic Slovakia in terms of Slovak, and thus Czechoslovak, dominance. The Czechoslovak government had to prove that the former government sought to create Magyar demographic superiority in the same lands through forced assimilation and manipulation of statistics. The aim of the census was, in other words, to find the ethnic Slovaks whose numbers would prove that a "falsification," or deliberate Magyarization of the nationalities had taken place in the decades before the war. Josef Mraz of the newly-created Czechoslovak State Statistical Office24 set out from Prague to Zilina, 25 the provisional capital of Slovakia, in mid-January 1919 to propose his ideas for the upcoming Slovak census to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia.26 His talks with Srobar lasted an exhausting four days, during which time they debated how the structure, method, and concept of the census could best meet its chief goal: to find out how many Slovaks there were in Slovakia. Upon his arrival in Prague, he wrote up a report of the Zilina proceedings and the census instructions up23 Slovensky narodny archiv (hereafter SNA), file : Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, hereafter MPS, box 277, inv. no. 74. "Prozatimni scitani lidu na Slovensku." In this transitional period before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, Slovakia was often denoted as the "occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary." 24 Josef Mraz (1882-1934) was one of the co-founders of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office, who had begun his work as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom. He is noted for his work on the first census in Slovakia ( I 9 I 9), as well as on statistical theory and agricultural statistics. Federalni statisticky ui'ad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Praha, 1989), 194. 25 :Z:ilina was the provisional capital of Slovakia from December 12, 1918 through February 4, 1919, when Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) became the capital. 26 Vavro Srobar was the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (Ministers plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, MPS). �SLOV AKIA-2015 15 on which they had agreed. He sent the instructions to be translated into Slovak, Magyar, and German. 27 Mraz included in hi s report a new, subjective definition of nationality that would challenge prewar methods of counting and classifyi ng th e population based on language. This definition would be th e point of departure for fresh debates and reevaluations of nationhood in the evolving circumstances of the interwar Czechoslovak state. He argued that, "In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept 'nationality' means adherence to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambi guous way, similar to reli gious conviction," and that it follows from this conclusion that Jews should have the option of declaring either for their own Jewish nationality, or for the nationality of others, without regard for religious affiliation.28 Debates over "Jewish nationali ty" formed the centerpiece of the overall reevaluation of nationality and nationhood in Czechoslovakia. Jewi sh nationality came to be used as an exceptional example in formulating opposing positions on the meaning, classification, and function of nationality in the new state. Through it, Czechoslovakia shifted the concept of nationality closer to an ethnic or racial understanding of the term, rather than a linguistic or cultural one. The Czechoslovak government, together with the multinational population of the state, initiated th e process of actualizing theoretical concepts of nationality and nationhood through the 1919 census in Slovakia. Responses to the 1919 census gave nationality meaning in the postwar environment, in the context of new states created on the principle of national self-determination . In the process of creating the 1919 Slovak census, Czechoslovak demographers also came to a preliminary decision regarding how 29 Czechoslovakia would "see" and count Jewish nationality . The Jewish case was especially problematic because Czechoslovakia did not consider the Jewish population in Czechoslovakia to possess its own national language, even in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia where Yiddish language usage was more widespread, but never27 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. IOI. From the report by Josef Mraz, "Prozatfmnf scftanf lidu na Slovensku," February 8, 1919 . 28 SNA, f. MPS , box 277, inv. No. 76 . "Prozatfmnf scitani lidu na Slovensku" 29 See: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), for thinking about ways the state "sees" the populat ion and makes it "legible." �16 SLOV AKIA-2015 theless did not dispute Jewish national status within the state. An influential work on national questions published in Prague in early 1919 declared: "Language forms the distinguishing characteristic of the nation : a nation must have its own language, otherwise it is not a nation." 30 How would the Czechoslovak state square its recognition of Jewish national status with the alleged lack of a distinctive national language among the Jews of Czechoslovakia? Debates surrounding Jewish nationality and its codification for census purposes lay at the core of a Czechoslovak reevaluation of the overall meaning of nationality in the postwar period . Decisions regarding the meaning and function of Jewish nationality within the Czechoslovak context went hand in hand with the process of integrating Slovakia into the Czechoslovak state. The Jewish case illuminates the way the process of Czechoslovak state building - including the interrelated efforts to arrive at the true number of Slovaks and Czechs, and to reconcile the dissonant linguistic-national circumstances of the Jewish population so as to codify Jewish nationality within Czechoslovakia - led to an increased unbundling of language from nationality as an absolute indicator of national belonging, and movement toward a definition of nationality as an internal conviction. To begin, it is helpful to take a step back to look at the relationship between language, nationalism, and nationhood; and then to consider their relationship as applied to the institutionalized collection of data for census purposes. First of all, for the peoples of East Central Europe, including the Jews, the nation building process was a fundamental component of modem politics. Nation building required raising the national consciousness of the members of the group, as well as making a convincing case to the world that the group was indeed a real nationality. The most important proof of national existence was language: a special, unique language belonging to the national group alone.31 Nineteenth century nationalism deemed language the most important characteristic marking one nation from another. Language 30 Bohdan Klineberger, Ncirod a ncirodnost (Praha, 1919), 53 . Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 128. 31 �SLOV AKIA-2015 17 was the primary determinant of nationhood .32 Nationalism assumes that people naturally group themselves into nations, that these nations have identifiable characteristics, and that their only legitimate form of government is self-government. 33 Making language central to nationalism, argues Elie Kedourie, erases the distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism, because then the conception of nationalism itself contains all linguistic, racial, religious and other features. The connection between language and ethnicity is also heightened. 34 Nation - "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon" 35 - has been variously defined as dependent more on "objective" factors including language, religion and customs, territory and institutions; and alternatively as coalescing from "subjective" factors like attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. 36 The features deemed "objective" have been conceived to mark the boundaries of nations, and features deemed "subjective" to give it internal cohesion and solidarity. "Objective" criteria like language are not enough in and of themselves to establish whether a group is a nation or not. Rather, suggests Walker Connor, "the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way." 37 His conception closely agrees with Ernest Gellner's, where a common language does not bind a group into a nation without mutual recognition of each other. "A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to 32 "Let us fo llow our own path ... let all men speak we ll or ill of our nati on, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough," 8 . Suphan, ed. , Johann Gottfried Herder, Sdmmtliche Werke (Berlin: Weidmann), in Smith, Nationalism, 27. 33 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London : Hutchinson, 1961 ), 68. 34 1bid. 35 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975 ), 6. 36 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001 ), I I. 37 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994 ), 197. �18 SLOV AKIA-2015 each other in virtue of their shared membership in it. "38 A people must feel its nationhood. That feeling of nationhood, the condition of being a nation, has been theorized in two main ways in its European context. The first is considered to derive more from a sense of mutual belonging to a political community in which equal citizens participate in a common culture; while the second is regarded as more related to a sense of mutual belonging to an ethnocultural community of descent with political ambitions.39 Neither is exclusive, nor analogous to the state. States can be defined by their autonomous institutional activity, and by their "legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory," but the state itself is not the national political community. 40 Anthony Smith's paired conceptions of nation and ethnie highlight the group's internal cohesion, solidarity, and mutual loyalty. Smith defines nation as "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members;" as distinguished from ethnie "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites."41 Smith's concept of the ethnie is especially important in the Jewish case for understanding the coherence of the group without territory and without a special, unique, shared vernacular. Late nineteenth century Jewish nationalism relied on "subjective" characteristics for modem Jewish nation building; above all a common heritage and shared historical experience. Language was conspicuously absent from the short list. "Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance with Hebrew to ask for a railway ticket in that language?" Theodor Herzl famously asked in 1896.42 38 Ernest Geitner, Nations and Natio nalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 7. 39 Marsha L. Rozenblit, Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7. 40 Smith, Nationalism, 12. 41 Ibid ., 13 . 42 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946), 145. �SLOV AKIA-2015 19 How then do you count "nationality" on the census? What, in fact, is being counted? Census-creating demographers differ from theorists in their need to count and quantify, classify and categorize state populations. Definitions of nation push and pull against the institutional demands of the state. The real question here is how the complex and fluctuating "nation" is tagged and boxed and bureaucratized for use by the state. What does it mean and how is it used ? Nation indeed becomes, as Rogers Brubaker explains, a "practical category, institutionalized form, contingent event, and category of prac43 tice." "We should not ask 'what is a nation,"' he writes, "but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?" 44 The crystallization of Jewish nationality in Czechoslovakia exemplifies the process by which nation is bureaucratized and given institutional form in interwar East Central Europe. Jewish nationality became an exceptional category of practice within the borders of interwar Czechoslovakia; it was the only nationality in East Central Europe not bound by language . Demographers began to answer the question of how to count nationality on the census at the meeting of the International Statistical Congress in St. Petersburg in 1872. There, they agreed that language was the primary marker of nationality, and that counting nationality according to language was the most effective means of capturing and recording nationality for the interests of the state. The question of how to codify nationality in a state census had first been debated at the 1857 Congress in Vienna, but without conclusive results. The St. Petersburg Congress decided that language was the best objective indicator of nationality, the most reliable one, and the least confusing, as "each perfectly knows the language used since childhood to think and express oneself." 45 But how should the census ask about language? The conclusions of the St. Petersburg conference point to 43 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 44 1bid, 16. 45 Dominique Arel , "Language categories in censuses : backward- or forward-looking?" David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel , eds. , Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2002), 95. �20 SLOV AKIA-2015 an acceptance of mother tongue as the most valid language situation type to use in codifying nationality for the census. Other language situation types include, but are not limited to: language most commonly used, language of daily use, family language, language in which one prays, and the language that one speaks with one's children. 46 Language was first counted on the Austrian and the Hungarian census in 1880. In Austria, language was counted according to "language of daily use" (Umgangssprache); while in the Kingdom of Hungary, language was counted according to "mother tongue" (anyanyelv). When Czechoslovakia came into existence after the First World War, it brought together two traditions of national codification through language proxy.In discussing the relationship of language to nationality for the development of the census, Czechoslovak demographers favored "mother tongue," as nationality was counted in the Kingdom of Hungary, over "language of daily use," as it was done in Austria. They argued that counting according to language of daily use had led to an under representation of Czechs on the Austrian census, and inherently underestimated the numbers of minority national groups where the official language was that of the dominant national group . The dependent position of the Czechs had resulted in more Czechs declaring themselves as Germans when counted this way, they asserted, because a Czech in a German language environment would indeed have used that language on a daily basis. Counting according to mother tongue had led to even greater statistical manipulations in the Kingdom of Hungary. Czechoslovak demographers contended that corruption of the census process in Hungary for the purpose of statistically increasing the number of Magyars had resulted in a gross underestimation of the number of ethnic Slovaks. Consequently, Slovaks as a people suffered more in Hungary than the Czechs in Austria. Yet they agreed that if the census were carried out properly, counting nationality by mother tongue would yield the most accurate and objective picture of 46 David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, "Censuses, Identity formation and the struggle for political power," in Kertzer and Arel, eds., 26, and Dominique Arel, "Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?" in Kertzer and Arel, eds. , 97. �SLOVAKIA-2015 21 47 the demographic composition of the state. Czechoslovak demographers accepted the definition of mother tongue as "the language which is most familiar to a person since childhood and with which they think, or simply the language which their parents taught them in their earliest youth. "48 Josef Mraz worked with the definition of mother tongue as well as its caveat, used on the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary to make the mother tongue category as broad as possible, in reformulating the conception of nationality for the 1919 Slovak census. He did not dispute the Hungarian definition's core: mother tongue is the language "to which one confesses as one's own and with which one best and most gladly speaks. "49 It was the caveat that troubled him: Although mother tongue is identical with the language which everyone learned in their childhood in the majority of cases, usually from their mother, it can nevertheless happen that a child has another mother tongue than the mother, especially when the child acquired it in child-care (!), in school (!), or as a result of circumstances by which the parents have different mother tongues, another language than the language of the child's mother. 50 By broadening the definition of mother tongue so that it became disengaged from the language one's mother actually spoke, Hungarian demographers allowed for a greater number of people to declare for the Magyar mother tongue than would have otherwise been possible. While this definition may have obtained in a number of cases due to widespread linguistic assimilation in the Kingdom of Hungary, it left the door open for abuses . ... (Co ntinuation: Next page with Statistical Tables) 47 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" Ceskoslovensky statisticky vestnik (CSV) II ( 1921 ): 49, and Antonin Bohac, "Slovensko ve svetle statistiky -kniha Josefa Mraza," CSV II (1921): 225-6. 48 Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV II ( 1921 ): 187. 49 JosefMraz, Slovensko ve svetle statistiky (Praze, 1920), 33 . 50 Jbid. Exclamation marks in the original. �SLOV AKIA-2015 22 Table 2.1: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population According to Religion in 1910 According to Absolute Number Hungarian Total 10,888,138 5,924,665 Roman Catholic 304,570 2,025,508 Greek Catholic 2,573,683 2,621,329 Calvinist 418,449 1,340,143 Lutheran 2,987, 163 40,851 Greek Orthodox 74,296 73,267 Unitarian 932,458 705,488 Jewish 9,602 17,452 Other 20,886,487 10,050,5 75 Total Rusvn Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total German Slovak Romanian 1,372,103 1,406,207 8,531 1,785 79,338 1,133,671 26,964 429,687 2,494 10,645 463,912 706 1,412 1,592 1,799,255 168 203,230 1,004 2,037,435 64 5,830 1,268 1,967,9 70 559 991 3,021 2,949,032 Croatian Other Serbian 5,109 1,810,302 3,892 357,329 463,604 9,511 1,908 31,121 57 56 1,03 1 1,028 791 860 49 128 1,099,386 7,491 25,528 42,580 4 2,702 24 472,587 7 10,387 276 1,833,162 21 91 996 1,106,471 206 3,739 3,739 469,255 According to Absolute Percentage Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total Total 52.1 Hungarian 54.4 German 12.6 9.7 15.0 0.1 3.9 56.0 12.6 6.4 14.3 98.2 31.2 1.4 1.0 32.1 0.1 0.4 34.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 60.3 0.3 4.5 0.1 100 98.6 75.7 55.0 0.2 21.8 5.8 0.1 0.6 7.3 0.8 0.1 17.3 Slovak Romanian 12.9 0.1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other 23 0.1 16.6 0.0 3.3 22.9 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 0.3 1.9 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.3 0.4 7.2 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXIII. I 9 I 5 (Budapest, 1918), 20, chart 13, "A nepesseg anyanyelve vallasok szerint 1910-ben." Table 2.2: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population in 1900 and 1910 Total Population Mother Tongue of the Population Hungary Magyar Geman Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other Total non Magyar Total 1900 absolute number 1910 percentage 8,651,520 1,999,060 2,002,165 2,798,559 424,774 191,432 437,737 333,008 8,186,735 16,838,255 absolute number 51.4 11.9 11.9 16.6 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.0 48.6 100 Percentage 9,944,627 1,903,357 1,946,357 2,948,186 464,270 194,808 461,516 401,412 8,319,906 18,264,533 54.4 10.4 10.7 16.1 2.5 1.1 2.5 2.9 45.5 100 CroatiaSlavonia Magyar German Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other 90,781 136,121 17,476 920 4,673 1,490,672 610,908 64,753 3.8 5.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 61.7 25.3 2.7 105,948 134,078 21,613 846 8,317 1,638,354 644,955 67,843 4.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 62.5 24.6 2.6 �24 Total non-Magyar Total SLOV AKIA-2015 2,325,523 96.2 2,516,006 95.9 2,416,304 100 2,621,954 100 Hungarian Kingdom Magyar 8,742,301 45.4 10,050,575 48.1 German 2,135,181 2,037,435 11.1 9.8 Slovak 2,019.641 10.5 1,967,970 9.4 Romanian 2,799,479 2,949,032 14.5 14.1 Rusyn 429,447 2.2 472,587 2.3 Croatian 1,682,104 8.7 1,833,162 8.8 Serbian 1,048,645 1,106,471 5.5 5.3 Other 397,761 469,255 2.1 2.2 Total 10,512,258 54.6 10,835,912 51.9 non-Magyar Total 19,254,559 100 20,886,487 100 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXl/l. 1915 (Budapest, 1918), 15, chart 11 , "A nepesseg anyanyelve es magyarul tudasa 1900-ban es 19 I 0-ben." In their analysis, and in their own efforts to bolster Slovak mnnbers, Czechoslovak demographers were uninterested in linguistic assimilation, seeking instead to strip the inhabitants of Slovakia down to their national skins . Their efforts illustrate what Dominique Arel has explained as a backward looking orientation toward language categories in censuses. Arel argues that, even though nationalists portray linguistic assimilation as "forced, unnatural, and fundamentally illegitimate, the result of destructive policies by an 'imperialist' state," it is in reality a normal and expected occurrence. Among speakers of a less prestigious language, there are individuals who will choose to linguistically assimilate for social advancement. 51 In those cases declaration of mother tongue as the "language one best and most gladly speaks" may well differ from the language of one's mother. According to this reasoning, Czechoslovak demographers were backwards-looking because they sought to discover the "real" nationality of the inhabitants of Slovakia, their "true group belong- 51 Arel, "Language categories in censuses," in Census and Identity, Kertzer and Arel, eds., 93 . �SLOV AKIA-2015 25 ing" based on their ancestral origins, rather than linguistic assimilation: whether coerced, statistically falsified, or voluntary. Czechoslovak demographers sought to demonstrate the unreliability of the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary through critical comparative examination of the data collected within the language categories of "mother tongue" and "language knowledge. "52 In a typical example, Jan Auerhan 53 pointed to the 301,694 Magyars with knowledge of Slovak counted on the 1910 census within the sixteen counties and four municipalities of the Kingdom of Hungary which in whole or part became Slovakia. Two-thirds of them were likely to be ethnic Slovaks, he concluded. Counting them as Slovaks, instead of as Magyars with Slovak language knowledge, would raise the ethnic Slovak number from 1,708,592 to 1,900,000.54 The likelihood that a Slovak would be proficient in the Magyar language in an environment where Magyar was the official language - the language of instruction in schools, the language used in government offices and the court system - was incomparably greater than a Magyar proficient in Slovak. Mother tongue was not a perfect indicator of nationality, but what could be offered in its stead to collect national data? Mraz, in his Zilina report, strikingly concluded that "nationality" alone be used. Rather than employ language proxy, the census should ask the people directly for their nationality. This was a controversial method due its high level of subjectivity. Nationality declaration would not be linked to language as an external marker. Considering the ways in which Czechoslovak demographers regarded mother tongue to have been manipulated on the censuses of the Kingdom of Hungary, Mraz wrote: 52 Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?"; Mraz,"Dva dukazy o falesnosti mad'arskych dat o feci matefske na zaklade dat o znalosti feci," ; and Hora.eek, "Narodnostni statistika," all in CSV II (1921). 53 Jan Auerhan (1880-1942) worked as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom from 1906, and became the undersecretary to the president of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office at its founding in January 1919. He is most noted for his work in the demographic and anthro-geographic fields, the study of Czech and Slovak minorities abroad, and minority questions more generally. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky, 186. 54 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" CSV II ( 1921 ): 51 . �26 SLOV AKIA-2015 In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept "nationality" means confession to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambiguous way, similar to religious conviction . That confession to a certain nationality is the only correct one for ascertaining national ratios. "Mother tongue" has for this reason been eliminated from the demographic markers and as a surrogate question for "nationality." In connection with this is the question at hand, whether a separate "Jewish nationality" should be accepted without regard to religious affiliation. It follows from the concept of nationality described that it is not possible to force someone to declare a separate Jewish nationality, if [that declaration] is to express their internal conviction; because the Jews indeed form a separate race, there will, however, be no recommendation in the instructions for this procedure, except that Jewish nationality shall be left to the rubric of "Other nationality." The Jews should be left the option of declaring themselves either for their own separate nationality or for the nationality of others, which with the influence of environment and education or the like they have accepted as their own. For the stating of the Jewish race the remaining rules of the statement of affiliation to the Jewish confession shall suffice.55 Mraz's interpretation of nationality as an "internal conviction" was most closely related to the definition advanced by Karoly Keleti at the International Statistical Congress meeting in St. Petersburg in 1872. Keleti was the first director of the Hungarian Statistical Bureau founded one year earlier. He helped create the 1867 and the 1880 censuses for the Kingdom of Hungary. 56 The 1872 St. Petersburg Congress not only debated nationality enumeration on the census, but the meaning of nationality itself. Three conceptions of nationality emerged from the deliberations : I) political, in which nationality is equivalent to state belonging; 2) physical, in which nationality is defined racially; and 3) psychical, in which nationality is understood as a psychological community penetrating individual feeling and collective endeavors. 57 Keleti took the 55 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. 76. Italics added. Karoly Keleti (born 1833, Pozsony [Pressburg, Bratislava] - died 1892, Budapest) Eletrajzi lexikon. www.kereso.hu-yrk-Ryrgenwm/7502 accessed June 17, 2005 . 57 Bohac, "Narodnost ci jazyk?" CSV II (1921 ): 50. 56 �SLOV AKIA-2015 27 position that nationality cannot be equivalent to state belonging, as that is so-called political nationality, common in Western Europe, but not in the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe. Nor does ethnic (Stamm) belonging answer to nationality, even if its main marker is language. Nationality was best defined, according to Keleti, as a "subjective state internal to the individual, a feeling analogous to religion that depends on origin and the environment in which a person lives and grows ."58 Keleti's definition was based on social-psychological criteria for which it is difficult to secure an objective external marker. It moved away from language as a definite indicator of nationality, leav ing room for belonging to a nationality whose language one may not use daily or that is not considered a viable national language (like Hebrew or Yiddish in the view of the Czechoslovak state). This was a big plus for Mraz and hi s colleagues, but also ambiguous enough to allow for pressures and fal sifications, like those they presumed embedded in the last Hungarian census before the war. Yet Keleti 's definition was attractive to the Czechoslovak demographers preparing the 1919 Slovak census. This definition would enable the indivi dual to confess nationality as directly as religion, as an expression of his/her internal conviction and self-understanding. Czechoslovak demographers hoped it would un cover the numbers of ethnic Slovaks who had previously been hidden from view because they were counted as Magyar-speakers. They would now be recorded under the banner of their "real" nationality, free to directly profess their "true" group belonging. Jews, too, would be able to declare their "true" group belonging for the first time; not only as a religion, but also as a distinct nationality . Antonin Bohac 59 found Keleti's definition to coincide with concepts of ethno-racial group belonging. "Since the means for express58 Ibid. , 49. Keleti publ is hed his views on nationality in 1880 in the Stalistische Monatschrift under the title "Zur Frage der Volksziihlung." [Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV I ( 1920): 187.] 59 Antonin Bohac ( 1882-1 950) is regarded as the fo under of Czechoslovak demographics, especially with regard to questi ons of nationality. He was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 19 19, and worked fo r the Czechos lovak State Statistical Office upon his return. Bohac was the deputy chairman of the Society for the Study of Nationality Questi ons. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Prague, 1989), 195. Bohac was also associate professor of demography at the Charles Uni versity Faculty of Science where he lee- �28 SLOV AKIA-2015 ing psychological states is language," Bohac wrote, "as Keleti [elsewhere] has stated, the concept of nationality in this sense is quite close to the concept of nationality as ethnic/racial belonging (kmenova prislusnost), for which language is the main connecting bond and main external marker."60 Bohac was correct to observe that Keleti's definition bore a strong resemblance to a physical understanding of nationality, which gave race and/or ethnicity an expanded role. Language remained the main outward indicator of nationality, but was no longer considered identical to nationality itself. Espousing this conception moved nationality closer to ethnicity. It elevated ethnic understandings of the self and the group . The final formulation of the 1919 census shows that the Czechoslovak administration and its demographers accepted Mraz's definition of nationality, based on Keleti's: "an individual national-political conviction according to ethnic belonging to a certain national unit or nation ."61 Five sub-headings were placed under Nationality on the form: Slovaks and Czechs, Rusyns, Magyars, Germans, and Others .62 Czechoslovak demographers understood Jewish nationality to be included under the subheading "Others." While "Jewish nationality" was an available option, though not a requirement, for the Jewish population, the category remained invisible on the actual census form in 1919. The 1919 census asked directly for nationality without the intermediary of language. *** In the late August heat of 1919, census takers dispersed across the territory of Slovakia to ask the people about their nationality. Many complained that the whole endeavor was disorganized and insufficiently thought through. Census takers expressed frustration that they had not received the census forms with time enough to look tured on the "Basics of Population Science." He introduced the usage of punch card technology for processing Czechoslovak census data."Historie statistiky v Cechach po roce 1918," The Czech Statistical Office http ://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.ns£'i/historie_statistiky_ v_cechach_po_roce_ l 918 (accessed January 9, 2012). 60 Federalni statisticky urad, 50. 61 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77* (cast textova). 62 SNA, f. MPS, box 277 . This carton contains the original hand-written forms used for collecting the raw data for the 1919 census. �SLOV AKIA-2015 29 them over, nor so that they could fill one out to use as an example. Due to lack of funds and inadequate organization, many found themselves forced to sleep in train stations and on park benches during the census period, which surely affected their ability to fulfill their duties. One census taker reported that his census materials were stolen from him while he slept! The population, and oftentimes even local community officials, had not been informed about the purpose of the census, nor when it would take place.63 If these complaints are accurate, they undermine the seriousness with which the Czechoslovak administrators prepared the foundation of the 1919 census, as well as the importance they placed upon it as a means of accurately proving national ratios in Slovakia. Yet last minute pre-census agitation to prepare the Slovak population did take place. The prominent Slovak national newspaper Narodnie noviny called on Slovaks " ... to consciously and openly confess their Slovak stock ... to let the beautiful words: 'I am Slovak' 64 consciously and boldly sound from the mouths of loyal citizens. " This example is atypical, however, as the agitation took place in the central Slovak town of Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and home to the Matica slovenska, the Slovak cultural society. Narodnie noviny explained that the purpose of the census was to prove that Slovakia was Slovak, and that it was essential for building its own independent country. Every citizen could participate in building that independent state through the census, the article stressed, an idea meant to reinforce the democratic spirit of the new era.65 "You have no reason to be ashamed of [declaring Slovak nationality]," counseled the leading newspaper in Saris county, a region of eastern Slovakia where national consciousness remained weak, "the Czechoslovak name has the best reputation not only in Europe, but also in America and Asia." The paper ran boldface announcements at the foot of its pages urging all Slovaks to proudly declare to the census taker that they were Slovaks. 66 These reassurances did little to assuage prevalent Slovak fears about the real purpose of the census. This terribly urgent appeal itself 63 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. nos. 7, 8-9. Scitani lidu na Slovensku 1919. Anketa mezi popisujicimi povei'niky. 64 "Scitanie l'udu," Nizrodnie noviny (Turciansky Svaty Martin), August 22, 1919. 65 Ibid. 66 "Slovaci!" Sari.fake hlasy (Presov), August 24, 1919. �30 SLOVAKIA-2015 may have caused anxiety for a population with a low-level of national consciousness. Suspicions ranged from the belief that the goal was to raise or introduce new taxes, undertake military recruitment, or to carry out a plebiscite to divide the territory . The military rumor was the most widespread. Many Slovaks worried that a war would soon break out between the Poles and Magyars, and the job of the census takers was to find able-bodied men to fight. Whoever declared Slovak nationality would be conscripted to fight once again, while other nationalities would be freed from that duty. While it was later revealed that the rumor began in Magyar circles, many people in the border counties still held back from declaring themselves Slovak. Others believed the census to be connected to imminent requisitioning of cattle and grain. Some, more optimistically, believed more satisfactory food and fuel distribution would follow, and possibly a more advantageous land distribution. Still others imagined the census to be an exercise in identifying foreigners (especially Magyars, Poles, and Magyarone Slovaks) and expelling them from Czechoslovakia.67 Widespread fears and suspicions about the real intentions of the 1919 census underscored the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in Slovakia at the beginning of the Czechoslovak state building project, as well as contributed to a certain level of inaccuracy in the results. Of the four national groups which were the most interesting to the state: Slovaks, Magyars, Germans, and Jews, the greatest difficulties arose in recording the nationality of the Slovaks and the Jews. Magyars and Germans were by-and-large ready for the census and decisive in their national declarations. Within the ethnic Magyar population, only state and municipal employees exhibited uncertainty in their national declarations. 68 Magyar language use, national uncertainty, fear and mistrust accounted for the greatest difficulties in recording the highest possible number of Slovaks on the 1919 census. Magyar or Magyarone Slovak census takers were known to record entire ethnic Slovak or mixed nationality villages as Magyar, or count individuals as Magyar because they were able to communicate with Magyar-speaking cen67 Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921 ): 133134. 68 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "O Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech" �SLOV AKIA-2015 31 sus takers without the help of an interpreter. 69 The latter illustrates precisely what Mraz and his colleagues had hoped to avoid in bypassing language as identical with or as a surrogate for nationality . They did not want ethnic Slovaks counted as Magyars based on their Magyar language proficiency. Other problems stemmed from uncertainty surrounding the meaning of nationality (primarily in eastern Slovakia). Many Slovaks feared what might happen to them if they did not declare themselves as Magyars. They distrusted the "godless Czechs" and "false prophets from Prague" who came to their doors. 70 The Slovak population tended to be more religious than the highly secularized Czech one, and Slovak national leaders expressed wari71 ness about the "agnostic progressivism" of the Czech intelligentsia. Common answers among Slovaks when asked about their nationality included: Slovak and Magyar ("aji Slovak, aji Mad'ar"), it doesn't matter ("to vsetko jedno"), and Hungarian Slovak ("Uhorsky Slovak"). 72 In eastern Slovakia, other answers included : I speak Slovak and Magyar ("hutorim 73 po slovensky i po mad'arsky"), I pray in Slovak ("modlim sa po slovensky"), and Catholic ("katolik") . Mraz noted in his analysis of the results that Slovaks often confused religion with nationality. 74 Interestingly, this observation recalls the proximity of religious and national feeling within Czechoslovakia's re-conceptualization of nationality, as well as the fine distinction made between them in rec69 Ibid., 7. "O opravnych navrzich pro pfisti scitani. Ibid., 5. "O nepfistojnostech pfi scitani," and Josef Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921): 135 . 71 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 23. 72 All the Slavic languages differentiate the word "Hungarian" from ,,Magyar." The former refers to citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, whereas the latter refers to the predominant ethnic group in that Kingdom. In Slovak, these terms are "Mad'ar" (ethnic Hungarian), Uhorsko (the Kingdom of Hungary), and uhorsky (deriving from the Kingdom of Hungary) . In the early 19 th century, Magyar nationalists followed the lead of Count Istvan Szechenyi in equating "Magyar" and "Hungarian" in foreign languages as part of their drive to assimilate all the non-Magyar nationalities into Magyar language and culture. The non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary rejected the equating of "Magyar" with "Hungarian" and still do. For more on Szechyni ' s activities see Dejiny S/ovenska II ( 1526-1848), ed. Samuel Cambel (Bratislava: VEDA, 1987), 488-90. 73 "Hutorit'" is the Saris form of "hovorit'," to speak. 74 JosefMraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II ( 192 1): 135. II 70 �32 SLOV AKIA-2015 ognizing "Jewish nationality." Nationality was something to be understood and felt as an "internal conviction, similar to religious confession," but consciously separated, and given a higher position than religion in the hierarchy of self and group values of definition. One's nationality, not one's religion, was of the greatest interest to the state. One's nationality, not one's religion, was the primary indicator of one's most strongly held inner values and loyalties. For the Jewish population, answers to the question of nationality were most striking for their variety. Census takers disparaged the eclecticism of the Jewish response, attributing it to opportunism . In some cases, they remarked, national declarations among Jews reached comical proportions: the head of one household declared as a Slovak, his wife as a German, and the children as Hungarians . They noted, however, that often Jews stuck to Jewish nationality so that they would not have to affiliate with any of the other nationality choices.75 The majority of Jews in Slovakia chose the Jewish nationality option on the 1919 census, officially recorded as "Other." Census takers recommended that a separate column be made available on the next census for Jewish nationality because so many Jews had expressly asked for it. 76 In the uncertain environment which prevailed in Slovakia in August 1919, shortly after the rollback of Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army forces but before the de jure securing of the Czechoslovak borders, Jews in Slovakia wished to avoid a difficult and possibly treacherous national affiliation decision through declaring Jewish nationality. Many Jews viewed Jewish nationality as an escape from the nationality conflict. Choosing Jewish nationality appeared to be a good way to opt out, to take a neutral position, to make the safest bet on an unpredictable future. Basing the decision to declare for Jewish nationality on these criteria made it more a strategic and less a heart-felt choice. For the time being, at least, it had less to do with deep-seated feelings of belonging to a Jewish national group, and more to do with trying to make the best possible choice in 75 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech." JosefMniz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (192 1): 129. Unfortunately, the demographic breakdown of those who chose "Other" on the 1919 Slovak census is unavailable, so the conclusion that the majority of Jews declared for Jewish nationality comes from census taker reports and their insistence that it be included as a separate column on the next census. See footnote : Statni ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77*. 76 �SLOV AKIA-2015 33 a high-stakes gamble. The Jewish population in Slovakia overall, counted by religion and nationality, numbered 135,918 according to the 1921 statewide Czechoslovak census, and 354,342 in the state as a whole. 77 Slovaks, counted only under the nationality rubric "Czechoslovak" on the interwar censuses, numbered 1,954,446 in 1919 and 2,025,003 in 1921, a positive change of 3.61 percent. 78 The popularity of the Jewish nationality declaration on the 1919 Slovak census (as "Other"), combined with a majority of ethnic Slovaks declaring as "Slovak" 79 led to a significant decrease in the number of Magyars recorded in Slovakia compared with the last prewar census. This decline heightened the Czechoslovak administration's awareness of further potential benefits rendered to the state by Jewish nationality . If the Jews, who traditionally affiliated with Germanspeakers in Bohemia and Moravia, and Magyar-speakers in Slovakia, declared for Jewish nationality, then the statistical legitimacy of the Czechoslovak nation-state would rise as the numbers of Germans and Hungarians fell. "Jewish nationality" would work to the advantage of the dominant "Czechoslovak" nationality and national state. If, as this argument goes, Jewish nationality favored the Czechoslovak nationality in solving the state's nationalities problems, then declaring Jewish nationality was not really a way of opting out. It was not a neutral position. It could not be an escape from the nationality conflict if it meant - once again - casting one's lot with the dominant state nationality. Jewish nationality may have seemed like an exit, but this was an illusion. One could not avoid taking sides in the interwar nationality conflicts . *** It is a valid and important point that the Czechoslovak government would favor Jewish nationality for its ability to statistically reduce the number of Germans and Magyars in the state. But that con77 Antonin Bohac, Narodnostni mapa republiky ceskoslovenske. Podrobny popis narodnostnich hranic, ostrovu a mensin (Prague, 1926), pp. 148-155 . 78 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora I 92 / Prague, 19240, Table 74: Narodnosti na Slovensku podle scitani lidu z roku 1919 a 1921 . 79 Slovaks who declared as Slovak, according to the options presented on the 1919 Slovak census, were recorded as "Czechoslovak." Slovaks were not recorded as "Slovak" until the 1930 statewide census. �34 SLOV AKIA-2015 clusion neglects the deeper meaning of its inclusion beyond the statistical benefits it could render. Creating a Jewish nationality category manifested the ways in which the meaning of national affiliation had transformed through the cataclysm of the First World War and the establishment of East Central European successor states based on the national principle. Josef Mraz elegantly and succinctly summed up these changes when he stated that declaring for a certain nationality was an expression of internal conviction . Because the very meaning of national affiliation had changed, "Jewish nationality" emerged as a recognized nationality category . Nationality had taken on the problematic role of the manifestation of one's personal convictions, inner values, and ultimate loyalty . Nationality moved ever closer to an essential ethnic or racial understandings of "true" group belonging. The methods and results of the 1919 special census in Slovakia were useful in providing a tested model of nationality investigation based on subjective, internal, ethnic/racial criteria, already approved before an international body (the Paris Peace Conference). The 1919 census had been an experiment in bringing methods of counting and recording the population into line with the new postwar vision of the national state. The 1921 census would build on 1919 methods in circumstances which required more than securing the new borders; they required filling the demarcated territory with meaning, as well as answering the dual questions of what Czechoslovakia was and how nationality and nationhood would function in this state. Examining the 1919 Slovak census offers insight into how Czechoslovakia understood itself as the manifestation of Czechoslovak: self-determination, and the place of the rights of the other nationalities to their own self-determination within this framework. � SLOV AKIA-2015 7 THE 1919 CENSUS ON THE TERRITORY OF SLOV AKIA 1 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova When the First World War ended in 1918, the four empires that had determined the shape of state and social relations within and beyond their borders - the Habsburg, the German, the Russian, and the Ottoman - had dissolved. A state system based on the principle of national self-determination took their place in East Central Europe, in which citizenship and state belonging were seen through a national lens. Unrest and anarchy were characteristic of the prevailing atmosphere in many regions of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the fall of 1918. In Slovakia, that instability was part of the larger struggle for the future of the newly bounded territory . Unlike other regions of former Hungary being incorporated into the new or transformed successor states, like Croatia (Yugoslavia) or Transylvania (Romania), Slovakia had never been administratively defined on its own, but solely as sixteen counties and four municipalities of northern Hungary. By the end of the war, the collapse of the old order without replacement by the new left Slovakia in a chaotic condition. Amid the upheaval, looting, and anti-Jewish excesses that typified the period, local National Councils had formed with the goal of consolidating the new state. But they were too weak to decisively resist regional Hungarian opposition and Budapest's efforts to maintain the territory. 2 While Czechoslovakia's birth was announced in Prague on October 28, 1918, the view from Slovakia was far less definitive. It was not a foregone conclusion that Slovakia would indeed be incorporated into the new state. Slovakia was in a precarious position, loosened from defeated Hungary, but not yet officially joined with Bohemia and Moravia. 1 This article is a version of a chapter originally published in my book Mapping Jewish Loyalties in !nterwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20 I 5). This material appears courtesy of Indiana University Press. All rights reserved. 2 Cubomir Liptak, "Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Elena Mannova, ed ., A Concise History of Slovakia. Studia Historica Slovaca XXI (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2000), 239 . �8 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovak historians characterize the unstable "Prevrat " era as the "Struggle for Slovakia," a view that highlights Slovakia's contested status between the Magyars and the Czechs. Save for a handful of Slovak national leaders, the Slovaks themselves moved through this picture as a frustrated underclass, taking advantage of the volatile, chaotic climate to set upon state administrators, notaries, policemen, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and the propertied . Slovaks found themselves in a moment of great release. It offered them a chance to vent their anger and frustration at the war and the Hungarian system . The newly-formed local National Councils sought to mitigate these widespread outbreaks of violence. Yet these local organs had little control, or the ability to quell Hungarian resistance to the power transfer, which was further impeded by the power structure of the old state, still in place . A Hungarian demand for a referendum on the changes surfaced, relying on the fragmentation of the population along regional and social lines, degrees of national consciousness, and lack of information about the political transformation . It was the first time Budapest asked Slovaks for their opinions . The views of ordinary people, "varied from enthusiastic welcoming of the new state and the 'liberation' of Slovakia, through apathy and desire for peace, to fear of a new unknown situation, of uncertain permanence and threaten3 ing new bloodshed and military solutions. " The Hungarian National Council in Budapest came into being only on October 25, 1918, somewhat later than those of the national minorities. It was established by Count Mihaly Karolyi, who was widely believed to be the emperor-king's obvious choice for the new Prime Minister. Oszkar Jaszi, the progressive Hungarian social scientist, historian, and politician, drafted the Hungarian National Council's twelve-point program. It called for Hungarian independence, an immediate and separate peace treaty with the Allies, universal suffrage with a secret ballot, land reform, and recognition of the 4 rights of the national minorities within a federalized Hungary . When Emperor-King Charles appointed Count Janos Hadik instead, massive anti-government demonstrations broke out, demanding Karolyi. 5 3 Ibid. Peter Hanak, ed. , The Corvina History of Hungary: From Earliest Times Until lhe Present Day (Budapest: Corvina Books, 1991 ), 164. 5 Laszl6 Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 328. 4 �SLOV AKIA-2015 9 It was October 28, the same day as the declaration of the new Czechoslovak Republic in Prague. By the night of October 30 through 31, crowds of soldiers and civilians demonstrated in the streets of Budapest. They later occupied public buildings, prevented troops loyal to Karolyi from moving out of the city, captured Budapest's military governor, and freed political prisoners as in 1848. Soldiers tore off the emblems on their uniforms and replaced them with asters and rosettes. Emperor-King Charles retreated and Karolyi formed a new independent Hungarian government. Vanquished Hungary appeared to be on the path to democratization. 6 Meanwhile, Slovak national leaders, mostly from central Slovakia converged in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and established the Slovak National Council. They had little news of what was happening in Prague, Budapest, or Europe more broadly . The Council wished, however, to take a stand on the dramatically unfolding events . The Slovak politician Milan Hodza had been negotiating with Karolyi in Budapest. He arrived in Martin on October 30 just as the Council was about to issue the Martin Declaration, announcing the secession of Slovakia from Hungary, Slovak self-determination and a desire for inclusion in the Czechoslovak state, which fulfilled Prague's wishes .7 The Slovak National Council had no army, so it could not enforce its program or maintain order. Individual militias sprang up in towns and cities across Slovakia, engaging in a power struggle with the newly-formed Hungarian National Councils. It was a highly unstable environment. Demobilized Slovak soldiers (from the Hungarian army) formed the mainstay of active Slovak participation in the evolving power struggle. They created paramilitary groups in the forests, especially in western Slovakia, with about four thousand soldiers active around Bratislava. To dispel the threat of anarchy and establish control over the territory, the Czechoslovak National Council brought Slovak representatives into the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in early November of 1918. 8 Slovakia's first provisional "Slovak Government" was set up in Western Slovakia near the Moravia-Slovak border by the Czechoslo6 Hanak, ed ., Corvino History of Hungary , 164-5. Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1 987 (New Jersey: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1988), 40-41 . 8 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in th e 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 239 . 7 �10 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak government in Prague, and began to function on November 6. It was led by Vavro Srobar, Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. On Decemberl2, it was replaced by a Ministry for Slovakia, which Srobar established in Zilina in the midst of a combined Czech, French and Italian effort to drive Hungarian troops out of Slovak territory. 9 Less than two weeks later, on December 21, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Benes successfully negotiated French 10 recognition of a demarcation line of the Slovak territory . Entente forces would drive Hungarian troops past the demarcation line on January 20, 1919. That line more or less became the country's official border with the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. 11 When Srobar's administration grew too large for Zilina, he deliberated with Samuel Zoch, a Lutheran clergyman from Modra near Pressburg (later Bratislava) who was the principal author of the Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918, on where Slovakia's central government should be moved . They decided in early January of 1919 to move the capital to Pressburg on February 4, 1919. Zoch was placed in charge of the Pressburg district administration (zupan), and orchestrated the Czechoslovak takeover of the city from January 1, 1919. "Bratislava" became the city's standard official name in March of 1919. 12 Hungary would make one more sustained military effort toward maintaining its prewar borders. Under Bela Kun's short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, lasting for 133 days beginning March 21, 1919, the Hungarian Red Army made significant inroads into Slovakia. It was driven out following an ultimatum by the Entente powers at the end of June 1919. The Hungarian Red Army finally retreated from Slovakia on June 30, 1919, and by July 24 the Czechoslovak government held the entire territory. 13 9 Peter Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City: The Czechoslovak Renaming of Pressburg/Pozsony/Presporok, I 918-19," Austrian History Yearbook 35 (2004 ): 221. IOibid ., 213. 11 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 243. 12 Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City," 221 . 13 For a detailed discussion of the series of revolutions in Hungary see: Laszlo Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) chapter VII "In Search of an Identity" , 324-344; Ivan Volgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-1919. Nine Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971 ); Andras Sikl6s, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the Multinational State 1918 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1988); Rudolf I. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian �SLOV AKIA-2015 11 On the Czechoslovak state level, the Struggle for Slovakia entailed not only the physical, geographic aspect of territorial incorporation, but also the more slippery aspect of drawing the multinational population of Slovakia into the mental landscape of the new state. Coming to terms with the World War I Czech argument that the Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation, and so should together form the dominant national group within the Czechoslovak nation-state, required a shift in direction . The events of the "Prevrat" underscore the tense relations between, first and foremost, Hungarians and Slovaks, and Jews and Slovaks, but also, increasingly between Czechs and Slovaks. These relationships would influence shifts in overall understandings of nationhood and nationality, as well as national political programs within the new state. Czechoslovakia was a nation-state in formation. Successful Czechoslovak state building required incorporating the territory and peoples of Slovakia. This was not to be accomplished by gradually building popular consensus, but through military engagement and diplomatic maneuvering. 14 Drawing the borders in this way would have significant implications for Czechoslovakia's domestic and international nationalities problems. Prague needed the Slovaks, a "state forming nation," 15 or there would be no independent Czechoslovakia. Without the Slovaks, the Czechs could not form a majority in the parliament and legitimately create a viable state. The Slovaks likewise needed the Czechs to help them leave Hungary. They needed the Czechs to help them establish a functioning civil and governmental infrastructure in Slovakia, and to create an educational system for producing Slovak national elites ready to take control of the developing infrastructure. The help the Slovaks desired was temporary_ 16 Soviet Republic (published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University by New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967). 14 Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires (Lo ndon, NY: Routledge, 200 I), I 62. 15 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. Czechs alone formed only 49 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population without the Slovaks. Whereas, accordin g to the 1921 Czechoslovak census, "Czechoslovaks" formed 65 .51 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population, and "Germans" 23.36 percent. 16 Liptak, "Vll. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. �12 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the introduction to hi s memoir on the formative years 1918 through 1920, Osvobodene Slovensko (Liberated Slovakia), Vavro Srobar recounted hi s first meeting with R.W. Seton-Watson, the influential British historian and political activist who brought nationality questions in Austria-Hungary to the world's attention. In 1907 Seton-Watson came to R6zsahegy (Ruzomberok) in the central Slovak Low Tatra region, where Srobar was then working, while researching the national question for what would be his first major work, Racial Problems in Hungary. 17 Due to the objectivity and calm with which Seton-Watson di scussed Magyarization, Srobar found himself unable to discern where his visitor stood on the issue. Before they parted, Seton-Watson surprised Srobar with a question : "And what is your state program?" he asked. After a moment's hesitation, Srobar replied, "Great Moravia, 18 with Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Pannonia," which Seton-Watson "accepted without commentary." "That [conversation] took place seven years before the outbreak of the world war," continued Srobar, "and eleven years afterward 'Great Moravia' received the name the 'Czechoslovak State."' 19 Language was the connection between the "Czechoslovak tribes" that Srobar professed in his memoir, from their ancient roots to the present. Even the establishment of a new literary language in Slovakia, thanks to I:udovit Stur's nineteenth century codification of the central Slovak dialect, "did not for a moment disturb the consciousness of Czechoslovak tribal unity," he asserted. "The longing for close cultural, economic, and political unity increased yearly in proportion to the growing pressure of brutal Magyarization," he added. 20 Srobar underscored a romantic one-thousand year story of the unitary Czechoslovak nation/tribe - focusing on shared language, history, 17 London : Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1908 . "Great Moravia," a large Slavic state that existed between 833 and 906, was an important component of the Czechoslovak romantic national idea as well as the development of Slovak nationalism. Considered to have bridged the western Slavs with the Slavonic tribes in the Balkans and with Byzantium, the weakening state collapsed under attack by the Magyar tribes who settled in the Danube Basin in approximately 896. The Czech and Slovak tribes then underwent separate development. For more on Great Moravia see Jan Dekan, Vel'ka Morava: Doba a umenie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1976). 19 Vavro Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko. Pamdti z rokov 191 8-1920, Svazok Prvy (Prague, 1928), 7-8. 20 Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko, 11. 18 �SLOV AKIA-2015 13 interests, and ancestral ties - that had been so successful in garnering international support for the Czechoslovak state building project during the war in his celebratory and didactic jubilee year volume. While the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation prevailed internationally, the most compelling connection between the Czechs and Slovaks for the prospects of independent statehood was demographic. Though Czechs constituted a majority in Bohemia and Moravia, they feared that the collapse of Austria-Hungary would spell their incorporation into a Greater Germany, due to the existence of a substantial German minority in these lands . At the beginning of the war, Czech leaders first sought a reorganization of the Monarchy along federal lines with a large degree of autonomy for the Czechs, though soon discarded the plan as unfeasib!e.21 In working toward the ultimate goal of independence, the idea of incorporating the estimated three million strong Slovak population became an increasingly attractive solution to counterbalancing the significant German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. 22 By the end of the war T.G. Masaryk and Benes had the commitment of the Entente powers to an independent Czechoslovakia. The Slovak population became the key to the Czechoslovak nation's demographic legitimacy in its new multinational national state. The Paris Peace Conference called upon the Czechoslovak delegation to statistically demonstrate the dominance of the Slovaks in the multinational territory of Slovakia. The viability of the Czechoslovak state depended upon it. In order to collect the necessary data, the Czechoslovak government organized a provisional census for Slovakia. Such a census could not be carried out until the borders of the territory were defined and secured, and military upheavals had ceased . This meant waiting until the ultimatum given by the Entente powers had driven Bela Kun's Red Army troops out of Slovakia at the end of June 1919, and until the Czechoslovak government had control over the territory at the end of July. While the change of regimes was not officially over, and the borders were not fixed by law until Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, I 920, Czechoslovakia held the de facto borders securely enough by August 1919 that it was feasible to set the census in motion. The primary goal of the census was : 21 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. A History o[. East Central Europe, vol. 9 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 76. 2 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 35. �14 SLOV AKIA-2015 [To gather] the necessary information for the Peace Conference concerning how many Slovaks there [were] in the occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary, so that it would be possible to correct and prove false the Hungarian census of 1910, as well as to ascertain other general national proportions in Slovak communities, namely the [extent of] the Magyarization of these communities, the Magyarization of schools and churches. "23 The 1919 census was the first attempt by the Czechoslovak government to map the territory of Slovakia for state building purposes. Mapping Slovakia meant reframing the national ratios of multinational/ethnic/linguistic Slovakia in terms of Slovak, and thus Czechoslovak, dominance. The Czechoslovak government had to prove that the former government sought to create Magyar demographic superiority in the same lands through forced assimilation and manipulation of statistics. The aim of the census was, in other words, to find the ethnic Slovaks whose numbers would prove that a "falsification," or deliberate Magyarization of the nationalities had taken place in the decades before the war. Josef Mraz of the newly-created Czechoslovak State Statistical Office24 set out from Prague to Zilina, 25 the provisional capital of Slovakia, in mid-January 1919 to propose his ideas for the upcoming Slovak census to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia.26 His talks with Srobar lasted an exhausting four days, during which time they debated how the structure, method, and concept of the census could best meet its chief goal: to find out how many Slovaks there were in Slovakia. Upon his arrival in Prague, he wrote up a report of the Zilina proceedings and the census instructions up23 Slovensky narodny archiv (hereafter SNA), file : Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, hereafter MPS, box 277, inv. no. 74. "Prozatimni scitani lidu na Slovensku." In this transitional period before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, Slovakia was often denoted as the "occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary." 24 Josef Mraz (1882-1934) was one of the co-founders of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office, who had begun his work as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom. He is noted for his work on the first census in Slovakia ( I 9 I 9), as well as on statistical theory and agricultural statistics. Federalni statisticky ui'ad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Praha, 1989), 194. 25 :Z:ilina was the provisional capital of Slovakia from December 12, 1918 through February 4, 1919, when Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) became the capital. 26 Vavro Srobar was the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (Ministers plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, MPS). �SLOV AKIA-2015 15 on which they had agreed. He sent the instructions to be translated into Slovak, Magyar, and German. 27 Mraz included in hi s report a new, subjective definition of nationality that would challenge prewar methods of counting and classifyi ng th e population based on language. This definition would be th e point of departure for fresh debates and reevaluations of nationhood in the evolving circumstances of the interwar Czechoslovak state. He argued that, "In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept 'nationality' means adherence to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambi guous way, similar to reli gious conviction," and that it follows from this conclusion that Jews should have the option of declaring either for their own Jewish nationality, or for the nationality of others, without regard for religious affiliation.28 Debates over "Jewish nationali ty" formed the centerpiece of the overall reevaluation of nationality and nationhood in Czechoslovakia. Jewi sh nationality came to be used as an exceptional example in formulating opposing positions on the meaning, classification, and function of nationality in the new state. Through it, Czechoslovakia shifted the concept of nationality closer to an ethnic or racial understanding of the term, rather than a linguistic or cultural one. The Czechoslovak government, together with the multinational population of the state, initiated th e process of actualizing theoretical concepts of nationality and nationhood through the 1919 census in Slovakia. Responses to the 1919 census gave nationality meaning in the postwar environment, in the context of new states created on the principle of national self-determination . In the process of creating the 1919 Slovak census, Czechoslovak demographers also came to a preliminary decision regarding how 29 Czechoslovakia would "see" and count Jewish nationality . The Jewish case was especially problematic because Czechoslovakia did not consider the Jewish population in Czechoslovakia to possess its own national language, even in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia where Yiddish language usage was more widespread, but never27 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. IOI. From the report by Josef Mraz, "Prozatfmnf scftanf lidu na Slovensku," February 8, 1919 . 28 SNA, f. MPS , box 277, inv. No. 76 . "Prozatfmnf scitani lidu na Slovensku" 29 See: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), for thinking about ways the state "sees" the populat ion and makes it "legible." �16 SLOV AKIA-2015 theless did not dispute Jewish national status within the state. An influential work on national questions published in Prague in early 1919 declared: "Language forms the distinguishing characteristic of the nation : a nation must have its own language, otherwise it is not a nation." 30 How would the Czechoslovak state square its recognition of Jewish national status with the alleged lack of a distinctive national language among the Jews of Czechoslovakia? Debates surrounding Jewish nationality and its codification for census purposes lay at the core of a Czechoslovak reevaluation of the overall meaning of nationality in the postwar period . Decisions regarding the meaning and function of Jewish nationality within the Czechoslovak context went hand in hand with the process of integrating Slovakia into the Czechoslovak state. The Jewish case illuminates the way the process of Czechoslovak state building - including the interrelated efforts to arrive at the true number of Slovaks and Czechs, and to reconcile the dissonant linguistic-national circumstances of the Jewish population so as to codify Jewish nationality within Czechoslovakia - led to an increased unbundling of language from nationality as an absolute indicator of national belonging, and movement toward a definition of nationality as an internal conviction. To begin, it is helpful to take a step back to look at the relationship between language, nationalism, and nationhood; and then to consider their relationship as applied to the institutionalized collection of data for census purposes. First of all, for the peoples of East Central Europe, including the Jews, the nation building process was a fundamental component of modem politics. Nation building required raising the national consciousness of the members of the group, as well as making a convincing case to the world that the group was indeed a real nationality. The most important proof of national existence was language: a special, unique language belonging to the national group alone.31 Nineteenth century nationalism deemed language the most important characteristic marking one nation from another. Language 30 Bohdan Klineberger, Ncirod a ncirodnost (Praha, 1919), 53 . Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 128. 31 �SLOV AKIA-2015 17 was the primary determinant of nationhood .32 Nationalism assumes that people naturally group themselves into nations, that these nations have identifiable characteristics, and that their only legitimate form of government is self-government. 33 Making language central to nationalism, argues Elie Kedourie, erases the distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism, because then the conception of nationalism itself contains all linguistic, racial, religious and other features. The connection between language and ethnicity is also heightened. 34 Nation - "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon" 35 - has been variously defined as dependent more on "objective" factors including language, religion and customs, territory and institutions; and alternatively as coalescing from "subjective" factors like attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. 36 The features deemed "objective" have been conceived to mark the boundaries of nations, and features deemed "subjective" to give it internal cohesion and solidarity. "Objective" criteria like language are not enough in and of themselves to establish whether a group is a nation or not. Rather, suggests Walker Connor, "the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way." 37 His conception closely agrees with Ernest Gellner's, where a common language does not bind a group into a nation without mutual recognition of each other. "A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to 32 "Let us fo llow our own path ... let all men speak we ll or ill of our nati on, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough," 8 . Suphan, ed. , Johann Gottfried Herder, Sdmmtliche Werke (Berlin: Weidmann), in Smith, Nationalism, 27. 33 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London : Hutchinson, 1961 ), 68. 34 1bid. 35 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975 ), 6. 36 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001 ), I I. 37 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994 ), 197. �18 SLOV AKIA-2015 each other in virtue of their shared membership in it. "38 A people must feel its nationhood. That feeling of nationhood, the condition of being a nation, has been theorized in two main ways in its European context. The first is considered to derive more from a sense of mutual belonging to a political community in which equal citizens participate in a common culture; while the second is regarded as more related to a sense of mutual belonging to an ethnocultural community of descent with political ambitions.39 Neither is exclusive, nor analogous to the state. States can be defined by their autonomous institutional activity, and by their "legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory," but the state itself is not the national political community. 40 Anthony Smith's paired conceptions of nation and ethnie highlight the group's internal cohesion, solidarity, and mutual loyalty. Smith defines nation as "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members;" as distinguished from ethnie "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites."41 Smith's concept of the ethnie is especially important in the Jewish case for understanding the coherence of the group without territory and without a special, unique, shared vernacular. Late nineteenth century Jewish nationalism relied on "subjective" characteristics for modem Jewish nation building; above all a common heritage and shared historical experience. Language was conspicuously absent from the short list. "Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance with Hebrew to ask for a railway ticket in that language?" Theodor Herzl famously asked in 1896.42 38 Ernest Geitner, Nations and Natio nalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 7. 39 Marsha L. Rozenblit, Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7. 40 Smith, Nationalism, 12. 41 Ibid ., 13 . 42 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946), 145. �SLOV AKIA-2015 19 How then do you count "nationality" on the census? What, in fact, is being counted? Census-creating demographers differ from theorists in their need to count and quantify, classify and categorize state populations. Definitions of nation push and pull against the institutional demands of the state. The real question here is how the complex and fluctuating "nation" is tagged and boxed and bureaucratized for use by the state. What does it mean and how is it used ? Nation indeed becomes, as Rogers Brubaker explains, a "practical category, institutionalized form, contingent event, and category of prac43 tice." "We should not ask 'what is a nation,"' he writes, "but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?" 44 The crystallization of Jewish nationality in Czechoslovakia exemplifies the process by which nation is bureaucratized and given institutional form in interwar East Central Europe. Jewish nationality became an exceptional category of practice within the borders of interwar Czechoslovakia; it was the only nationality in East Central Europe not bound by language . Demographers began to answer the question of how to count nationality on the census at the meeting of the International Statistical Congress in St. Petersburg in 1872. There, they agreed that language was the primary marker of nationality, and that counting nationality according to language was the most effective means of capturing and recording nationality for the interests of the state. The question of how to codify nationality in a state census had first been debated at the 1857 Congress in Vienna, but without conclusive results. The St. Petersburg Congress decided that language was the best objective indicator of nationality, the most reliable one, and the least confusing, as "each perfectly knows the language used since childhood to think and express oneself." 45 But how should the census ask about language? The conclusions of the St. Petersburg conference point to 43 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 44 1bid, 16. 45 Dominique Arel , "Language categories in censuses : backward- or forward-looking?" David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel , eds. , Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2002), 95. �20 SLOV AKIA-2015 an acceptance of mother tongue as the most valid language situation type to use in codifying nationality for the census. Other language situation types include, but are not limited to: language most commonly used, language of daily use, family language, language in which one prays, and the language that one speaks with one's children. 46 Language was first counted on the Austrian and the Hungarian census in 1880. In Austria, language was counted according to "language of daily use" (Umgangssprache); while in the Kingdom of Hungary, language was counted according to "mother tongue" (anyanyelv). When Czechoslovakia came into existence after the First World War, it brought together two traditions of national codification through language proxy.In discussing the relationship of language to nationality for the development of the census, Czechoslovak demographers favored "mother tongue," as nationality was counted in the Kingdom of Hungary, over "language of daily use," as it was done in Austria. They argued that counting according to language of daily use had led to an under representation of Czechs on the Austrian census, and inherently underestimated the numbers of minority national groups where the official language was that of the dominant national group . The dependent position of the Czechs had resulted in more Czechs declaring themselves as Germans when counted this way, they asserted, because a Czech in a German language environment would indeed have used that language on a daily basis. Counting according to mother tongue had led to even greater statistical manipulations in the Kingdom of Hungary. Czechoslovak demographers contended that corruption of the census process in Hungary for the purpose of statistically increasing the number of Magyars had resulted in a gross underestimation of the number of ethnic Slovaks. Consequently, Slovaks as a people suffered more in Hungary than the Czechs in Austria. Yet they agreed that if the census were carried out properly, counting nationality by mother tongue would yield the most accurate and objective picture of 46 David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, "Censuses, Identity formation and the struggle for political power," in Kertzer and Arel, eds., 26, and Dominique Arel, "Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?" in Kertzer and Arel, eds. , 97. �SLOVAKIA-2015 21 47 the demographic composition of the state. Czechoslovak demographers accepted the definition of mother tongue as "the language which is most familiar to a person since childhood and with which they think, or simply the language which their parents taught them in their earliest youth. "48 Josef Mraz worked with the definition of mother tongue as well as its caveat, used on the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary to make the mother tongue category as broad as possible, in reformulating the conception of nationality for the 1919 Slovak census. He did not dispute the Hungarian definition's core: mother tongue is the language "to which one confesses as one's own and with which one best and most gladly speaks. "49 It was the caveat that troubled him: Although mother tongue is identical with the language which everyone learned in their childhood in the majority of cases, usually from their mother, it can nevertheless happen that a child has another mother tongue than the mother, especially when the child acquired it in child-care (!), in school (!), or as a result of circumstances by which the parents have different mother tongues, another language than the language of the child's mother. 50 By broadening the definition of mother tongue so that it became disengaged from the language one's mother actually spoke, Hungarian demographers allowed for a greater number of people to declare for the Magyar mother tongue than would have otherwise been possible. While this definition may have obtained in a number of cases due to widespread linguistic assimilation in the Kingdom of Hungary, it left the door open for abuses . ... (Co ntinuation: Next page with Statistical Tables) 47 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" Ceskoslovensky statisticky vestnik (CSV) II ( 1921 ): 49, and Antonin Bohac, "Slovensko ve svetle statistiky -kniha Josefa Mraza," CSV II (1921): 225-6. 48 Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV II ( 1921 ): 187. 49 JosefMraz, Slovensko ve svetle statistiky (Praze, 1920), 33 . 50 Jbid. Exclamation marks in the original. �SLOV AKIA-2015 22 Table 2.1: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population According to Religion in 1910 According to Absolute Number Hungarian Total 10,888,138 5,924,665 Roman Catholic 304,570 2,025,508 Greek Catholic 2,573,683 2,621,329 Calvinist 418,449 1,340,143 Lutheran 2,987, 163 40,851 Greek Orthodox 74,296 73,267 Unitarian 932,458 705,488 Jewish 9,602 17,452 Other 20,886,487 10,050,5 75 Total Rusvn Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total German Slovak Romanian 1,372,103 1,406,207 8,531 1,785 79,338 1,133,671 26,964 429,687 2,494 10,645 463,912 706 1,412 1,592 1,799,255 168 203,230 1,004 2,037,435 64 5,830 1,268 1,967,9 70 559 991 3,021 2,949,032 Croatian Other Serbian 5,109 1,810,302 3,892 357,329 463,604 9,511 1,908 31,121 57 56 1,03 1 1,028 791 860 49 128 1,099,386 7,491 25,528 42,580 4 2,702 24 472,587 7 10,387 276 1,833,162 21 91 996 1,106,471 206 3,739 3,739 469,255 According to Absolute Percentage Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total Total 52.1 Hungarian 54.4 German 12.6 9.7 15.0 0.1 3.9 56.0 12.6 6.4 14.3 98.2 31.2 1.4 1.0 32.1 0.1 0.4 34.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 60.3 0.3 4.5 0.1 100 98.6 75.7 55.0 0.2 21.8 5.8 0.1 0.6 7.3 0.8 0.1 17.3 Slovak Romanian 12.9 0.1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other 23 0.1 16.6 0.0 3.3 22.9 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 0.3 1.9 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.3 0.4 7.2 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXIII. I 9 I 5 (Budapest, 1918), 20, chart 13, "A nepesseg anyanyelve vallasok szerint 1910-ben." Table 2.2: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population in 1900 and 1910 Total Population Mother Tongue of the Population Hungary Magyar Geman Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other Total non Magyar Total 1900 absolute number 1910 percentage 8,651,520 1,999,060 2,002,165 2,798,559 424,774 191,432 437,737 333,008 8,186,735 16,838,255 absolute number 51.4 11.9 11.9 16.6 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.0 48.6 100 Percentage 9,944,627 1,903,357 1,946,357 2,948,186 464,270 194,808 461,516 401,412 8,319,906 18,264,533 54.4 10.4 10.7 16.1 2.5 1.1 2.5 2.9 45.5 100 CroatiaSlavonia Magyar German Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other 90,781 136,121 17,476 920 4,673 1,490,672 610,908 64,753 3.8 5.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 61.7 25.3 2.7 105,948 134,078 21,613 846 8,317 1,638,354 644,955 67,843 4.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 62.5 24.6 2.6 �24 Total non-Magyar Total SLOV AKIA-2015 2,325,523 96.2 2,516,006 95.9 2,416,304 100 2,621,954 100 Hungarian Kingdom Magyar 8,742,301 45.4 10,050,575 48.1 German 2,135,181 2,037,435 11.1 9.8 Slovak 2,019.641 10.5 1,967,970 9.4 Romanian 2,799,479 2,949,032 14.5 14.1 Rusyn 429,447 2.2 472,587 2.3 Croatian 1,682,104 8.7 1,833,162 8.8 Serbian 1,048,645 1,106,471 5.5 5.3 Other 397,761 469,255 2.1 2.2 Total 10,512,258 54.6 10,835,912 51.9 non-Magyar Total 19,254,559 100 20,886,487 100 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXl/l. 1915 (Budapest, 1918), 15, chart 11 , "A nepesseg anyanyelve es magyarul tudasa 1900-ban es 19 I 0-ben." In their analysis, and in their own efforts to bolster Slovak mnnbers, Czechoslovak demographers were uninterested in linguistic assimilation, seeking instead to strip the inhabitants of Slovakia down to their national skins . Their efforts illustrate what Dominique Arel has explained as a backward looking orientation toward language categories in censuses. Arel argues that, even though nationalists portray linguistic assimilation as "forced, unnatural, and fundamentally illegitimate, the result of destructive policies by an 'imperialist' state," it is in reality a normal and expected occurrence. Among speakers of a less prestigious language, there are individuals who will choose to linguistically assimilate for social advancement. 51 In those cases declaration of mother tongue as the "language one best and most gladly speaks" may well differ from the language of one's mother. According to this reasoning, Czechoslovak demographers were backwards-looking because they sought to discover the "real" nationality of the inhabitants of Slovakia, their "true group belong- 51 Arel, "Language categories in censuses," in Census and Identity, Kertzer and Arel, eds., 93 . �SLOV AKIA-2015 25 ing" based on their ancestral origins, rather than linguistic assimilation: whether coerced, statistically falsified, or voluntary. Czechoslovak demographers sought to demonstrate the unreliability of the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary through critical comparative examination of the data collected within the language categories of "mother tongue" and "language knowledge. "52 In a typical example, Jan Auerhan 53 pointed to the 301,694 Magyars with knowledge of Slovak counted on the 1910 census within the sixteen counties and four municipalities of the Kingdom of Hungary which in whole or part became Slovakia. Two-thirds of them were likely to be ethnic Slovaks, he concluded. Counting them as Slovaks, instead of as Magyars with Slovak language knowledge, would raise the ethnic Slovak number from 1,708,592 to 1,900,000.54 The likelihood that a Slovak would be proficient in the Magyar language in an environment where Magyar was the official language - the language of instruction in schools, the language used in government offices and the court system - was incomparably greater than a Magyar proficient in Slovak. Mother tongue was not a perfect indicator of nationality, but what could be offered in its stead to collect national data? Mraz, in his Zilina report, strikingly concluded that "nationality" alone be used. Rather than employ language proxy, the census should ask the people directly for their nationality. This was a controversial method due its high level of subjectivity. Nationality declaration would not be linked to language as an external marker. Considering the ways in which Czechoslovak demographers regarded mother tongue to have been manipulated on the censuses of the Kingdom of Hungary, Mraz wrote: 52 Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?"; Mraz,"Dva dukazy o falesnosti mad'arskych dat o feci matefske na zaklade dat o znalosti feci," ; and Hora.eek, "Narodnostni statistika," all in CSV II (1921). 53 Jan Auerhan (1880-1942) worked as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom from 1906, and became the undersecretary to the president of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office at its founding in January 1919. He is most noted for his work in the demographic and anthro-geographic fields, the study of Czech and Slovak minorities abroad, and minority questions more generally. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky, 186. 54 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" CSV II ( 1921 ): 51 . �26 SLOV AKIA-2015 In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept "nationality" means confession to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambiguous way, similar to religious conviction . That confession to a certain nationality is the only correct one for ascertaining national ratios. "Mother tongue" has for this reason been eliminated from the demographic markers and as a surrogate question for "nationality." In connection with this is the question at hand, whether a separate "Jewish nationality" should be accepted without regard to religious affiliation. It follows from the concept of nationality described that it is not possible to force someone to declare a separate Jewish nationality, if [that declaration] is to express their internal conviction; because the Jews indeed form a separate race, there will, however, be no recommendation in the instructions for this procedure, except that Jewish nationality shall be left to the rubric of "Other nationality." The Jews should be left the option of declaring themselves either for their own separate nationality or for the nationality of others, which with the influence of environment and education or the like they have accepted as their own. For the stating of the Jewish race the remaining rules of the statement of affiliation to the Jewish confession shall suffice.55 Mraz's interpretation of nationality as an "internal conviction" was most closely related to the definition advanced by Karoly Keleti at the International Statistical Congress meeting in St. Petersburg in 1872. Keleti was the first director of the Hungarian Statistical Bureau founded one year earlier. He helped create the 1867 and the 1880 censuses for the Kingdom of Hungary. 56 The 1872 St. Petersburg Congress not only debated nationality enumeration on the census, but the meaning of nationality itself. Three conceptions of nationality emerged from the deliberations : I) political, in which nationality is equivalent to state belonging; 2) physical, in which nationality is defined racially; and 3) psychical, in which nationality is understood as a psychological community penetrating individual feeling and collective endeavors. 57 Keleti took the 55 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. 76. Italics added. Karoly Keleti (born 1833, Pozsony [Pressburg, Bratislava] - died 1892, Budapest) Eletrajzi lexikon. www.kereso.hu-yrk-Ryrgenwm/7502 accessed June 17, 2005 . 57 Bohac, "Narodnost ci jazyk?" CSV II (1921 ): 50. 56 �SLOV AKIA-2015 27 position that nationality cannot be equivalent to state belonging, as that is so-called political nationality, common in Western Europe, but not in the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe. Nor does ethnic (Stamm) belonging answer to nationality, even if its main marker is language. Nationality was best defined, according to Keleti, as a "subjective state internal to the individual, a feeling analogous to religion that depends on origin and the environment in which a person lives and grows ."58 Keleti's definition was based on social-psychological criteria for which it is difficult to secure an objective external marker. It moved away from language as a definite indicator of nationality, leav ing room for belonging to a nationality whose language one may not use daily or that is not considered a viable national language (like Hebrew or Yiddish in the view of the Czechoslovak state). This was a big plus for Mraz and hi s colleagues, but also ambiguous enough to allow for pressures and fal sifications, like those they presumed embedded in the last Hungarian census before the war. Yet Keleti 's definition was attractive to the Czechoslovak demographers preparing the 1919 Slovak census. This definition would enable the indivi dual to confess nationality as directly as religion, as an expression of his/her internal conviction and self-understanding. Czechoslovak demographers hoped it would un cover the numbers of ethnic Slovaks who had previously been hidden from view because they were counted as Magyar-speakers. They would now be recorded under the banner of their "real" nationality, free to directly profess their "true" group belonging. Jews, too, would be able to declare their "true" group belonging for the first time; not only as a religion, but also as a distinct nationality . Antonin Bohac 59 found Keleti's definition to coincide with concepts of ethno-racial group belonging. "Since the means for express58 Ibid. , 49. Keleti publ is hed his views on nationality in 1880 in the Stalistische Monatschrift under the title "Zur Frage der Volksziihlung." [Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV I ( 1920): 187.] 59 Antonin Bohac ( 1882-1 950) is regarded as the fo under of Czechoslovak demographics, especially with regard to questi ons of nationality. He was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 19 19, and worked fo r the Czechos lovak State Statistical Office upon his return. Bohac was the deputy chairman of the Society for the Study of Nationality Questi ons. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Prague, 1989), 195. Bohac was also associate professor of demography at the Charles Uni versity Faculty of Science where he lee- �28 SLOV AKIA-2015 ing psychological states is language," Bohac wrote, "as Keleti [elsewhere] has stated, the concept of nationality in this sense is quite close to the concept of nationality as ethnic/racial belonging (kmenova prislusnost), for which language is the main connecting bond and main external marker."60 Bohac was correct to observe that Keleti's definition bore a strong resemblance to a physical understanding of nationality, which gave race and/or ethnicity an expanded role. Language remained the main outward indicator of nationality, but was no longer considered identical to nationality itself. Espousing this conception moved nationality closer to ethnicity. It elevated ethnic understandings of the self and the group . The final formulation of the 1919 census shows that the Czechoslovak administration and its demographers accepted Mraz's definition of nationality, based on Keleti's: "an individual national-political conviction according to ethnic belonging to a certain national unit or nation ."61 Five sub-headings were placed under Nationality on the form: Slovaks and Czechs, Rusyns, Magyars, Germans, and Others .62 Czechoslovak demographers understood Jewish nationality to be included under the subheading "Others." While "Jewish nationality" was an available option, though not a requirement, for the Jewish population, the category remained invisible on the actual census form in 1919. The 1919 census asked directly for nationality without the intermediary of language. *** In the late August heat of 1919, census takers dispersed across the territory of Slovakia to ask the people about their nationality. Many complained that the whole endeavor was disorganized and insufficiently thought through. Census takers expressed frustration that they had not received the census forms with time enough to look tured on the "Basics of Population Science." He introduced the usage of punch card technology for processing Czechoslovak census data."Historie statistiky v Cechach po roce 1918," The Czech Statistical Office http ://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.ns£'i/historie_statistiky_ v_cechach_po_roce_ l 918 (accessed January 9, 2012). 60 Federalni statisticky urad, 50. 61 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77* (cast textova). 62 SNA, f. MPS, box 277 . This carton contains the original hand-written forms used for collecting the raw data for the 1919 census. �SLOV AKIA-2015 29 them over, nor so that they could fill one out to use as an example. Due to lack of funds and inadequate organization, many found themselves forced to sleep in train stations and on park benches during the census period, which surely affected their ability to fulfill their duties. One census taker reported that his census materials were stolen from him while he slept! The population, and oftentimes even local community officials, had not been informed about the purpose of the census, nor when it would take place.63 If these complaints are accurate, they undermine the seriousness with which the Czechoslovak administrators prepared the foundation of the 1919 census, as well as the importance they placed upon it as a means of accurately proving national ratios in Slovakia. Yet last minute pre-census agitation to prepare the Slovak population did take place. The prominent Slovak national newspaper Narodnie noviny called on Slovaks " ... to consciously and openly confess their Slovak stock ... to let the beautiful words: 'I am Slovak' 64 consciously and boldly sound from the mouths of loyal citizens. " This example is atypical, however, as the agitation took place in the central Slovak town of Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and home to the Matica slovenska, the Slovak cultural society. Narodnie noviny explained that the purpose of the census was to prove that Slovakia was Slovak, and that it was essential for building its own independent country. Every citizen could participate in building that independent state through the census, the article stressed, an idea meant to reinforce the democratic spirit of the new era.65 "You have no reason to be ashamed of [declaring Slovak nationality]," counseled the leading newspaper in Saris county, a region of eastern Slovakia where national consciousness remained weak, "the Czechoslovak name has the best reputation not only in Europe, but also in America and Asia." The paper ran boldface announcements at the foot of its pages urging all Slovaks to proudly declare to the census taker that they were Slovaks. 66 These reassurances did little to assuage prevalent Slovak fears about the real purpose of the census. This terribly urgent appeal itself 63 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. nos. 7, 8-9. Scitani lidu na Slovensku 1919. Anketa mezi popisujicimi povei'niky. 64 "Scitanie l'udu," Nizrodnie noviny (Turciansky Svaty Martin), August 22, 1919. 65 Ibid. 66 "Slovaci!" Sari.fake hlasy (Presov), August 24, 1919. �30 SLOVAKIA-2015 may have caused anxiety for a population with a low-level of national consciousness. Suspicions ranged from the belief that the goal was to raise or introduce new taxes, undertake military recruitment, or to carry out a plebiscite to divide the territory . The military rumor was the most widespread. Many Slovaks worried that a war would soon break out between the Poles and Magyars, and the job of the census takers was to find able-bodied men to fight. Whoever declared Slovak nationality would be conscripted to fight once again, while other nationalities would be freed from that duty. While it was later revealed that the rumor began in Magyar circles, many people in the border counties still held back from declaring themselves Slovak. Others believed the census to be connected to imminent requisitioning of cattle and grain. Some, more optimistically, believed more satisfactory food and fuel distribution would follow, and possibly a more advantageous land distribution. Still others imagined the census to be an exercise in identifying foreigners (especially Magyars, Poles, and Magyarone Slovaks) and expelling them from Czechoslovakia.67 Widespread fears and suspicions about the real intentions of the 1919 census underscored the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in Slovakia at the beginning of the Czechoslovak state building project, as well as contributed to a certain level of inaccuracy in the results. Of the four national groups which were the most interesting to the state: Slovaks, Magyars, Germans, and Jews, the greatest difficulties arose in recording the nationality of the Slovaks and the Jews. Magyars and Germans were by-and-large ready for the census and decisive in their national declarations. Within the ethnic Magyar population, only state and municipal employees exhibited uncertainty in their national declarations. 68 Magyar language use, national uncertainty, fear and mistrust accounted for the greatest difficulties in recording the highest possible number of Slovaks on the 1919 census. Magyar or Magyarone Slovak census takers were known to record entire ethnic Slovak or mixed nationality villages as Magyar, or count individuals as Magyar because they were able to communicate with Magyar-speaking cen67 Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921 ): 133134. 68 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "O Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech" �SLOV AKIA-2015 31 sus takers without the help of an interpreter. 69 The latter illustrates precisely what Mraz and his colleagues had hoped to avoid in bypassing language as identical with or as a surrogate for nationality . They did not want ethnic Slovaks counted as Magyars based on their Magyar language proficiency. Other problems stemmed from uncertainty surrounding the meaning of nationality (primarily in eastern Slovakia). Many Slovaks feared what might happen to them if they did not declare themselves as Magyars. They distrusted the "godless Czechs" and "false prophets from Prague" who came to their doors. 70 The Slovak population tended to be more religious than the highly secularized Czech one, and Slovak national leaders expressed wari71 ness about the "agnostic progressivism" of the Czech intelligentsia. Common answers among Slovaks when asked about their nationality included: Slovak and Magyar ("aji Slovak, aji Mad'ar"), it doesn't matter ("to vsetko jedno"), and Hungarian Slovak ("Uhorsky Slovak"). 72 In eastern Slovakia, other answers included : I speak Slovak and Magyar ("hutorim 73 po slovensky i po mad'arsky"), I pray in Slovak ("modlim sa po slovensky"), and Catholic ("katolik") . Mraz noted in his analysis of the results that Slovaks often confused religion with nationality. 74 Interestingly, this observation recalls the proximity of religious and national feeling within Czechoslovakia's re-conceptualization of nationality, as well as the fine distinction made between them in rec69 Ibid., 7. "O opravnych navrzich pro pfisti scitani. Ibid., 5. "O nepfistojnostech pfi scitani," and Josef Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921): 135 . 71 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 23. 72 All the Slavic languages differentiate the word "Hungarian" from ,,Magyar." The former refers to citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, whereas the latter refers to the predominant ethnic group in that Kingdom. In Slovak, these terms are "Mad'ar" (ethnic Hungarian), Uhorsko (the Kingdom of Hungary), and uhorsky (deriving from the Kingdom of Hungary) . In the early 19 th century, Magyar nationalists followed the lead of Count Istvan Szechenyi in equating "Magyar" and "Hungarian" in foreign languages as part of their drive to assimilate all the non-Magyar nationalities into Magyar language and culture. The non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary rejected the equating of "Magyar" with "Hungarian" and still do. For more on Szechyni ' s activities see Dejiny S/ovenska II ( 1526-1848), ed. Samuel Cambel (Bratislava: VEDA, 1987), 488-90. 73 "Hutorit'" is the Saris form of "hovorit'," to speak. 74 JosefMraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II ( 192 1): 135. II 70 �32 SLOV AKIA-2015 ognizing "Jewish nationality." Nationality was something to be understood and felt as an "internal conviction, similar to religious confession," but consciously separated, and given a higher position than religion in the hierarchy of self and group values of definition. One's nationality, not one's religion, was of the greatest interest to the state. One's nationality, not one's religion, was the primary indicator of one's most strongly held inner values and loyalties. For the Jewish population, answers to the question of nationality were most striking for their variety. Census takers disparaged the eclecticism of the Jewish response, attributing it to opportunism . In some cases, they remarked, national declarations among Jews reached comical proportions: the head of one household declared as a Slovak, his wife as a German, and the children as Hungarians . They noted, however, that often Jews stuck to Jewish nationality so that they would not have to affiliate with any of the other nationality choices.75 The majority of Jews in Slovakia chose the Jewish nationality option on the 1919 census, officially recorded as "Other." Census takers recommended that a separate column be made available on the next census for Jewish nationality because so many Jews had expressly asked for it. 76 In the uncertain environment which prevailed in Slovakia in August 1919, shortly after the rollback of Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army forces but before the de jure securing of the Czechoslovak borders, Jews in Slovakia wished to avoid a difficult and possibly treacherous national affiliation decision through declaring Jewish nationality. Many Jews viewed Jewish nationality as an escape from the nationality conflict. Choosing Jewish nationality appeared to be a good way to opt out, to take a neutral position, to make the safest bet on an unpredictable future. Basing the decision to declare for Jewish nationality on these criteria made it more a strategic and less a heart-felt choice. For the time being, at least, it had less to do with deep-seated feelings of belonging to a Jewish national group, and more to do with trying to make the best possible choice in 75 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech." JosefMniz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (192 1): 129. Unfortunately, the demographic breakdown of those who chose "Other" on the 1919 Slovak census is unavailable, so the conclusion that the majority of Jews declared for Jewish nationality comes from census taker reports and their insistence that it be included as a separate column on the next census. See footnote : Statni ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77*. 76 �SLOV AKIA-2015 33 a high-stakes gamble. The Jewish population in Slovakia overall, counted by religion and nationality, numbered 135,918 according to the 1921 statewide Czechoslovak census, and 354,342 in the state as a whole. 77 Slovaks, counted only under the nationality rubric "Czechoslovak" on the interwar censuses, numbered 1,954,446 in 1919 and 2,025,003 in 1921, a positive change of 3.61 percent. 78 The popularity of the Jewish nationality declaration on the 1919 Slovak census (as "Other"), combined with a majority of ethnic Slovaks declaring as "Slovak" 79 led to a significant decrease in the number of Magyars recorded in Slovakia compared with the last prewar census. This decline heightened the Czechoslovak administration's awareness of further potential benefits rendered to the state by Jewish nationality . If the Jews, who traditionally affiliated with Germanspeakers in Bohemia and Moravia, and Magyar-speakers in Slovakia, declared for Jewish nationality, then the statistical legitimacy of the Czechoslovak nation-state would rise as the numbers of Germans and Hungarians fell. "Jewish nationality" would work to the advantage of the dominant "Czechoslovak" nationality and national state. If, as this argument goes, Jewish nationality favored the Czechoslovak nationality in solving the state's nationalities problems, then declaring Jewish nationality was not really a way of opting out. It was not a neutral position. It could not be an escape from the nationality conflict if it meant - once again - casting one's lot with the dominant state nationality. Jewish nationality may have seemed like an exit, but this was an illusion. One could not avoid taking sides in the interwar nationality conflicts . *** It is a valid and important point that the Czechoslovak government would favor Jewish nationality for its ability to statistically reduce the number of Germans and Magyars in the state. But that con77 Antonin Bohac, Narodnostni mapa republiky ceskoslovenske. Podrobny popis narodnostnich hranic, ostrovu a mensin (Prague, 1926), pp. 148-155 . 78 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora I 92 / Prague, 19240, Table 74: Narodnosti na Slovensku podle scitani lidu z roku 1919 a 1921 . 79 Slovaks who declared as Slovak, according to the options presented on the 1919 Slovak census, were recorded as "Czechoslovak." Slovaks were not recorded as "Slovak" until the 1930 statewide census. �34 SLOV AKIA-2015 clusion neglects the deeper meaning of its inclusion beyond the statistical benefits it could render. Creating a Jewish nationality category manifested the ways in which the meaning of national affiliation had transformed through the cataclysm of the First World War and the establishment of East Central European successor states based on the national principle. Josef Mraz elegantly and succinctly summed up these changes when he stated that declaring for a certain nationality was an expression of internal conviction . Because the very meaning of national affiliation had changed, "Jewish nationality" emerged as a recognized nationality category . Nationality had taken on the problematic role of the manifestation of one's personal convictions, inner values, and ultimate loyalty . Nationality moved ever closer to an essential ethnic or racial understandings of "true" group belonging. The methods and results of the 1919 special census in Slovakia were useful in providing a tested model of nationality investigation based on subjective, internal, ethnic/racial criteria, already approved before an international body (the Paris Peace Conference). The 1919 census had been an experiment in bringing methods of counting and recording the population into line with the new postwar vision of the national state. The 1921 census would build on 1919 methods in circumstances which required more than securing the new borders; they required filling the demarcated territory with meaning, as well as answering the dual questions of what Czechoslovakia was and how nationality and nationhood would function in this state. Examining the 1919 Slovak census offers insight into how Czechoslovakia understood itself as the manifestation of Czechoslovak: self-determination, and the place of the rights of the other nationalities to their own self-determination within this framework. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA-2015 7 THE 1919 CENSUS ON THE TERRITORY OF SLOV AKIA 1 Rebekah Klein-Pejsova When the First World War ended in 1918, the four empires that had determined the shape of state and social relations within and beyond their borders - the Habsburg, the German, the Russian, and the Ottoman - had dissolved. A state system based on the principle of national self-determination took their place in East Central Europe, in which citizenship and state belonging were seen through a national lens. Unrest and anarchy were characteristic of the prevailing atmosphere in many regions of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the fall of 1918. In Slovakia, that instability was part of the larger struggle for the future of the newly bounded territory . Unlike other regions of former Hungary being incorporated into the new or transformed successor states, like Croatia (Yugoslavia) or Transylvania (Romania), Slovakia had never been administratively defined on its own, but solely as sixteen counties and four municipalities of northern Hungary. By the end of the war, the collapse of the old order without replacement by the new left Slovakia in a chaotic condition. Amid the upheaval, looting, and anti-Jewish excesses that typified the period, local National Councils had formed with the goal of consolidating the new state. But they were too weak to decisively resist regional Hungarian opposition and Budapest's efforts to maintain the territory. 2 While Czechoslovakia's birth was announced in Prague on October 28, 1918, the view from Slovakia was far less definitive. It was not a foregone conclusion that Slovakia would indeed be incorporated into the new state. Slovakia was in a precarious position, loosened from defeated Hungary, but not yet officially joined with Bohemia and Moravia. 1 This article is a version of a chapter originally published in my book Mapping Jewish Loyalties in !nterwar Slovakia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20 I 5). This material appears courtesy of Indiana University Press. All rights reserved. 2 Cubomir Liptak, "Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Elena Mannova, ed ., A Concise History of Slovakia. Studia Historica Slovaca XXI (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2000), 239 . 8 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovak historians characterize the unstable "Prevrat " era as the "Struggle for Slovakia," a view that highlights Slovakia's contested status between the Magyars and the Czechs. Save for a handful of Slovak national leaders, the Slovaks themselves moved through this picture as a frustrated underclass, taking advantage of the volatile, chaotic climate to set upon state administrators, notaries, policemen, shopkeepers, innkeepers, and the propertied . Slovaks found themselves in a moment of great release. It offered them a chance to vent their anger and frustration at the war and the Hungarian system . The newly-formed local National Councils sought to mitigate these widespread outbreaks of violence. Yet these local organs had little control, or the ability to quell Hungarian resistance to the power transfer, which was further impeded by the power structure of the old state, still in place . A Hungarian demand for a referendum on the changes surfaced, relying on the fragmentation of the population along regional and social lines, degrees of national consciousness, and lack of information about the political transformation . It was the first time Budapest asked Slovaks for their opinions . The views of ordinary people, "varied from enthusiastic welcoming of the new state and the 'liberation' of Slovakia, through apathy and desire for peace, to fear of a new unknown situation, of uncertain permanence and threaten3 ing new bloodshed and military solutions. " The Hungarian National Council in Budapest came into being only on October 25, 1918, somewhat later than those of the national minorities. It was established by Count Mihaly Karolyi, who was widely believed to be the emperor-king's obvious choice for the new Prime Minister. Oszkar Jaszi, the progressive Hungarian social scientist, historian, and politician, drafted the Hungarian National Council's twelve-point program. It called for Hungarian independence, an immediate and separate peace treaty with the Allies, universal suffrage with a secret ballot, land reform, and recognition of the 4 rights of the national minorities within a federalized Hungary . When Emperor-King Charles appointed Count Janos Hadik instead, massive anti-government demonstrations broke out, demanding Karolyi. 5 3 Ibid. Peter Hanak, ed. , The Corvina History of Hungary: From Earliest Times Until lhe Present Day (Budapest: Corvina Books, 1991 ), 164. 5 Laszl6 Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 328. 4 SLOV AKIA-2015 9 It was October 28, the same day as the declaration of the new Czechoslovak Republic in Prague. By the night of October 30 through 31, crowds of soldiers and civilians demonstrated in the streets of Budapest. They later occupied public buildings, prevented troops loyal to Karolyi from moving out of the city, captured Budapest's military governor, and freed political prisoners as in 1848. Soldiers tore off the emblems on their uniforms and replaced them with asters and rosettes. Emperor-King Charles retreated and Karolyi formed a new independent Hungarian government. Vanquished Hungary appeared to be on the path to democratization. 6 Meanwhile, Slovak national leaders, mostly from central Slovakia converged in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and established the Slovak National Council. They had little news of what was happening in Prague, Budapest, or Europe more broadly . The Council wished, however, to take a stand on the dramatically unfolding events . The Slovak politician Milan Hodza had been negotiating with Karolyi in Budapest. He arrived in Martin on October 30 just as the Council was about to issue the Martin Declaration, announcing the secession of Slovakia from Hungary, Slovak self-determination and a desire for inclusion in the Czechoslovak state, which fulfilled Prague's wishes .7 The Slovak National Council had no army, so it could not enforce its program or maintain order. Individual militias sprang up in towns and cities across Slovakia, engaging in a power struggle with the newly-formed Hungarian National Councils. It was a highly unstable environment. Demobilized Slovak soldiers (from the Hungarian army) formed the mainstay of active Slovak participation in the evolving power struggle. They created paramilitary groups in the forests, especially in western Slovakia, with about four thousand soldiers active around Bratislava. To dispel the threat of anarchy and establish control over the territory, the Czechoslovak National Council brought Slovak representatives into the newly formed National Assembly in Prague in early November of 1918. 8 Slovakia's first provisional "Slovak Government" was set up in Western Slovakia near the Moravia-Slovak border by the Czechoslo6 Hanak, ed ., Corvino History of Hungary , 164-5. Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1 987 (New Jersey: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1988), 40-41 . 8 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in th e 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 239 . 7 10 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak government in Prague, and began to function on November 6. It was led by Vavro Srobar, Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia. On Decemberl2, it was replaced by a Ministry for Slovakia, which Srobar established in Zilina in the midst of a combined Czech, French and Italian effort to drive Hungarian troops out of Slovak territory. 9 Less than two weeks later, on December 21, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Benes successfully negotiated French 10 recognition of a demarcation line of the Slovak territory . Entente forces would drive Hungarian troops past the demarcation line on January 20, 1919. That line more or less became the country's official border with the signing of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. 11 When Srobar's administration grew too large for Zilina, he deliberated with Samuel Zoch, a Lutheran clergyman from Modra near Pressburg (later Bratislava) who was the principal author of the Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918, on where Slovakia's central government should be moved . They decided in early January of 1919 to move the capital to Pressburg on February 4, 1919. Zoch was placed in charge of the Pressburg district administration (zupan), and orchestrated the Czechoslovak takeover of the city from January 1, 1919. "Bratislava" became the city's standard official name in March of 1919. 12 Hungary would make one more sustained military effort toward maintaining its prewar borders. Under Bela Kun's short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, lasting for 133 days beginning March 21, 1919, the Hungarian Red Army made significant inroads into Slovakia. It was driven out following an ultimatum by the Entente powers at the end of June 1919. The Hungarian Red Army finally retreated from Slovakia on June 30, 1919, and by July 24 the Czechoslovak government held the entire territory. 13 9 Peter Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City: The Czechoslovak Renaming of Pressburg/Pozsony/Presporok, I 918-19," Austrian History Yearbook 35 (2004 ): 221. IOibid ., 213. 11 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20 th Century," in Concise History of Slovakia, 243. 12 Bugge, "The Making of a Slovak City," 221 . 13 For a detailed discussion of the series of revolutions in Hungary see: Laszlo Kontler, A History of Hungary (New York, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) chapter VII "In Search of an Identity" , 324-344; Ivan Volgyes, ed., Hungary in Revolution, 1918-1919. Nine Essays (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971 ); Andras Sikl6s, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the Multinational State 1918 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1988); Rudolf I. Tokes, Bela Kun and the Hungarian SLOV AKIA-2015 11 On the Czechoslovak state level, the Struggle for Slovakia entailed not only the physical, geographic aspect of territorial incorporation, but also the more slippery aspect of drawing the multinational population of Slovakia into the mental landscape of the new state. Coming to terms with the World War I Czech argument that the Czechs and Slovaks were two branches of the same Czechoslovak nation, and so should together form the dominant national group within the Czechoslovak nation-state, required a shift in direction . The events of the "Prevrat" underscore the tense relations between, first and foremost, Hungarians and Slovaks, and Jews and Slovaks, but also, increasingly between Czechs and Slovaks. These relationships would influence shifts in overall understandings of nationhood and nationality, as well as national political programs within the new state. Czechoslovakia was a nation-state in formation. Successful Czechoslovak state building required incorporating the territory and peoples of Slovakia. This was not to be accomplished by gradually building popular consensus, but through military engagement and diplomatic maneuvering. 14 Drawing the borders in this way would have significant implications for Czechoslovakia's domestic and international nationalities problems. Prague needed the Slovaks, a "state forming nation," 15 or there would be no independent Czechoslovakia. Without the Slovaks, the Czechs could not form a majority in the parliament and legitimately create a viable state. The Slovaks likewise needed the Czechs to help them leave Hungary. They needed the Czechs to help them establish a functioning civil and governmental infrastructure in Slovakia, and to create an educational system for producing Slovak national elites ready to take control of the developing infrastructure. The help the Slovaks desired was temporary_ 16 Soviet Republic (published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University by New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967). 14 Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires (Lo ndon, NY: Routledge, 200 I), I 62. 15 Liptak, "VII. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. Czechs alone formed only 49 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population without the Slovaks. Whereas, accordin g to the 1921 Czechoslovak census, "Czechoslovaks" formed 65 .51 percent of the total Czechoslovak state population, and "Germans" 23.36 percent. 16 Liptak, "Vll. Slovakia in the 20°1 Century," in A Concise History of Slovakia, 245. 12 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the introduction to hi s memoir on the formative years 1918 through 1920, Osvobodene Slovensko (Liberated Slovakia), Vavro Srobar recounted hi s first meeting with R.W. Seton-Watson, the influential British historian and political activist who brought nationality questions in Austria-Hungary to the world's attention. In 1907 Seton-Watson came to R6zsahegy (Ruzomberok) in the central Slovak Low Tatra region, where Srobar was then working, while researching the national question for what would be his first major work, Racial Problems in Hungary. 17 Due to the objectivity and calm with which Seton-Watson di scussed Magyarization, Srobar found himself unable to discern where his visitor stood on the issue. Before they parted, Seton-Watson surprised Srobar with a question : "And what is your state program?" he asked. After a moment's hesitation, Srobar replied, "Great Moravia, 18 with Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Slovakia, and Pannonia," which Seton-Watson "accepted without commentary." "That [conversation] took place seven years before the outbreak of the world war," continued Srobar, "and eleven years afterward 'Great Moravia' received the name the 'Czechoslovak State."' 19 Language was the connection between the "Czechoslovak tribes" that Srobar professed in his memoir, from their ancient roots to the present. Even the establishment of a new literary language in Slovakia, thanks to I:udovit Stur's nineteenth century codification of the central Slovak dialect, "did not for a moment disturb the consciousness of Czechoslovak tribal unity," he asserted. "The longing for close cultural, economic, and political unity increased yearly in proportion to the growing pressure of brutal Magyarization," he added. 20 Srobar underscored a romantic one-thousand year story of the unitary Czechoslovak nation/tribe - focusing on shared language, history, 17 London : Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1908 . "Great Moravia," a large Slavic state that existed between 833 and 906, was an important component of the Czechoslovak romantic national idea as well as the development of Slovak nationalism. Considered to have bridged the western Slavs with the Slavonic tribes in the Balkans and with Byzantium, the weakening state collapsed under attack by the Magyar tribes who settled in the Danube Basin in approximately 896. The Czech and Slovak tribes then underwent separate development. For more on Great Moravia see Jan Dekan, Vel'ka Morava: Doba a umenie (Bratislava: Tatran, 1976). 19 Vavro Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko. Pamdti z rokov 191 8-1920, Svazok Prvy (Prague, 1928), 7-8. 20 Srobar, Osvobodene Slovensko, 11. 18 SLOV AKIA-2015 13 interests, and ancestral ties - that had been so successful in garnering international support for the Czechoslovak state building project during the war in his celebratory and didactic jubilee year volume. While the idea of a unitary Czechoslovak nation prevailed internationally, the most compelling connection between the Czechs and Slovaks for the prospects of independent statehood was demographic. Though Czechs constituted a majority in Bohemia and Moravia, they feared that the collapse of Austria-Hungary would spell their incorporation into a Greater Germany, due to the existence of a substantial German minority in these lands . At the beginning of the war, Czech leaders first sought a reorganization of the Monarchy along federal lines with a large degree of autonomy for the Czechs, though soon discarded the plan as unfeasib!e.21 In working toward the ultimate goal of independence, the idea of incorporating the estimated three million strong Slovak population became an increasingly attractive solution to counterbalancing the significant German minority in Bohemia and Moravia. 22 By the end of the war T.G. Masaryk and Benes had the commitment of the Entente powers to an independent Czechoslovakia. The Slovak population became the key to the Czechoslovak nation's demographic legitimacy in its new multinational national state. The Paris Peace Conference called upon the Czechoslovak delegation to statistically demonstrate the dominance of the Slovaks in the multinational territory of Slovakia. The viability of the Czechoslovak state depended upon it. In order to collect the necessary data, the Czechoslovak government organized a provisional census for Slovakia. Such a census could not be carried out until the borders of the territory were defined and secured, and military upheavals had ceased . This meant waiting until the ultimatum given by the Entente powers had driven Bela Kun's Red Army troops out of Slovakia at the end of June 1919, and until the Czechoslovak government had control over the territory at the end of July. While the change of regimes was not officially over, and the borders were not fixed by law until Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, I 920, Czechoslovakia held the de facto borders securely enough by August 1919 that it was feasible to set the census in motion. The primary goal of the census was : 21 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. A History o[. East Central Europe, vol. 9 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 76. 2 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 35. 14 SLOV AKIA-2015 [To gather] the necessary information for the Peace Conference concerning how many Slovaks there [were] in the occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary, so that it would be possible to correct and prove false the Hungarian census of 1910, as well as to ascertain other general national proportions in Slovak communities, namely the [extent of] the Magyarization of these communities, the Magyarization of schools and churches. "23 The 1919 census was the first attempt by the Czechoslovak government to map the territory of Slovakia for state building purposes. Mapping Slovakia meant reframing the national ratios of multinational/ethnic/linguistic Slovakia in terms of Slovak, and thus Czechoslovak, dominance. The Czechoslovak government had to prove that the former government sought to create Magyar demographic superiority in the same lands through forced assimilation and manipulation of statistics. The aim of the census was, in other words, to find the ethnic Slovaks whose numbers would prove that a "falsification," or deliberate Magyarization of the nationalities had taken place in the decades before the war. Josef Mraz of the newly-created Czechoslovak State Statistical Office24 set out from Prague to Zilina, 25 the provisional capital of Slovakia, in mid-January 1919 to propose his ideas for the upcoming Slovak census to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia.26 His talks with Srobar lasted an exhausting four days, during which time they debated how the structure, method, and concept of the census could best meet its chief goal: to find out how many Slovaks there were in Slovakia. Upon his arrival in Prague, he wrote up a report of the Zilina proceedings and the census instructions up23 Slovensky narodny archiv (hereafter SNA), file : Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, hereafter MPS, box 277, inv. no. 74. "Prozatimni scitani lidu na Slovensku." In this transitional period before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, Slovakia was often denoted as the "occupied territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary." 24 Josef Mraz (1882-1934) was one of the co-founders of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office, who had begun his work as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom. He is noted for his work on the first census in Slovakia ( I 9 I 9), as well as on statistical theory and agricultural statistics. Federalni statisticky ui'ad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Praha, 1989), 194. 25 :Z:ilina was the provisional capital of Slovakia from December 12, 1918 through February 4, 1919, when Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) became the capital. 26 Vavro Srobar was the Minister Plenipotentiary for Slovakia (Ministers plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, MPS). SLOV AKIA-2015 15 on which they had agreed. He sent the instructions to be translated into Slovak, Magyar, and German. 27 Mraz included in hi s report a new, subjective definition of nationality that would challenge prewar methods of counting and classifyi ng th e population based on language. This definition would be th e point of departure for fresh debates and reevaluations of nationhood in the evolving circumstances of the interwar Czechoslovak state. He argued that, "In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept 'nationality' means adherence to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambi guous way, similar to reli gious conviction," and that it follows from this conclusion that Jews should have the option of declaring either for their own Jewish nationality, or for the nationality of others, without regard for religious affiliation.28 Debates over "Jewish nationali ty" formed the centerpiece of the overall reevaluation of nationality and nationhood in Czechoslovakia. Jewi sh nationality came to be used as an exceptional example in formulating opposing positions on the meaning, classification, and function of nationality in the new state. Through it, Czechoslovakia shifted the concept of nationality closer to an ethnic or racial understanding of the term, rather than a linguistic or cultural one. The Czechoslovak government, together with the multinational population of the state, initiated th e process of actualizing theoretical concepts of nationality and nationhood through the 1919 census in Slovakia. Responses to the 1919 census gave nationality meaning in the postwar environment, in the context of new states created on the principle of national self-determination . In the process of creating the 1919 Slovak census, Czechoslovak demographers also came to a preliminary decision regarding how 29 Czechoslovakia would "see" and count Jewish nationality . The Jewish case was especially problematic because Czechoslovakia did not consider the Jewish population in Czechoslovakia to possess its own national language, even in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia where Yiddish language usage was more widespread, but never27 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. IOI. From the report by Josef Mraz, "Prozatfmnf scftanf lidu na Slovensku," February 8, 1919 . 28 SNA, f. MPS , box 277, inv. No. 76 . "Prozatfmnf scitani lidu na Slovensku" 29 See: James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1998), for thinking about ways the state "sees" the populat ion and makes it "legible." 16 SLOV AKIA-2015 theless did not dispute Jewish national status within the state. An influential work on national questions published in Prague in early 1919 declared: "Language forms the distinguishing characteristic of the nation : a nation must have its own language, otherwise it is not a nation." 30 How would the Czechoslovak state square its recognition of Jewish national status with the alleged lack of a distinctive national language among the Jews of Czechoslovakia? Debates surrounding Jewish nationality and its codification for census purposes lay at the core of a Czechoslovak reevaluation of the overall meaning of nationality in the postwar period . Decisions regarding the meaning and function of Jewish nationality within the Czechoslovak context went hand in hand with the process of integrating Slovakia into the Czechoslovak state. The Jewish case illuminates the way the process of Czechoslovak state building - including the interrelated efforts to arrive at the true number of Slovaks and Czechs, and to reconcile the dissonant linguistic-national circumstances of the Jewish population so as to codify Jewish nationality within Czechoslovakia - led to an increased unbundling of language from nationality as an absolute indicator of national belonging, and movement toward a definition of nationality as an internal conviction. To begin, it is helpful to take a step back to look at the relationship between language, nationalism, and nationhood; and then to consider their relationship as applied to the institutionalized collection of data for census purposes. First of all, for the peoples of East Central Europe, including the Jews, the nation building process was a fundamental component of modem politics. Nation building required raising the national consciousness of the members of the group, as well as making a convincing case to the world that the group was indeed a real nationality. The most important proof of national existence was language: a special, unique language belonging to the national group alone.31 Nineteenth century nationalism deemed language the most important characteristic marking one nation from another. Language 30 Bohdan Klineberger, Ncirod a ncirodnost (Praha, 1919), 53 . Ezra Mendelsohn, On Modern Jewish Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 128. 31 SLOV AKIA-2015 17 was the primary determinant of nationhood .32 Nationalism assumes that people naturally group themselves into nations, that these nations have identifiable characteristics, and that their only legitimate form of government is self-government. 33 Making language central to nationalism, argues Elie Kedourie, erases the distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism, because then the conception of nationalism itself contains all linguistic, racial, religious and other features. The connection between language and ethnicity is also heightened. 34 Nation - "one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon" 35 - has been variously defined as dependent more on "objective" factors including language, religion and customs, territory and institutions; and alternatively as coalescing from "subjective" factors like attitudes, perceptions, and sentiments. 36 The features deemed "objective" have been conceived to mark the boundaries of nations, and features deemed "subjective" to give it internal cohesion and solidarity. "Objective" criteria like language are not enough in and of themselves to establish whether a group is a nation or not. Rather, suggests Walker Connor, "the essence of the nation is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all nonmembers in a most vital way." 37 His conception closely agrees with Ernest Gellner's, where a common language does not bind a group into a nation without mutual recognition of each other. "A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to 32 "Let us fo llow our own path ... let all men speak we ll or ill of our nati on, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves, and let that be enough," 8 . Suphan, ed. , Johann Gottfried Herder, Sdmmtliche Werke (Berlin: Weidmann), in Smith, Nationalism, 27. 33 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London : Hutchinson, 1961 ), 68. 34 1bid. 35 Charles Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975 ), 6. 36 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001 ), I I. 37 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r Understanding (Princeton University Press, 1994 ), 197. 18 SLOV AKIA-2015 each other in virtue of their shared membership in it. "38 A people must feel its nationhood. That feeling of nationhood, the condition of being a nation, has been theorized in two main ways in its European context. The first is considered to derive more from a sense of mutual belonging to a political community in which equal citizens participate in a common culture; while the second is regarded as more related to a sense of mutual belonging to an ethnocultural community of descent with political ambitions.39 Neither is exclusive, nor analogous to the state. States can be defined by their autonomous institutional activity, and by their "legitimate monopoly of coercion and extraction in a given territory," but the state itself is not the national political community. 40 Anthony Smith's paired conceptions of nation and ethnie highlight the group's internal cohesion, solidarity, and mutual loyalty. Smith defines nation as "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members;" as distinguished from ethnie "a named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites."41 Smith's concept of the ethnie is especially important in the Jewish case for understanding the coherence of the group without territory and without a special, unique, shared vernacular. Late nineteenth century Jewish nationalism relied on "subjective" characteristics for modem Jewish nation building; above all a common heritage and shared historical experience. Language was conspicuously absent from the short list. "Who amongst us has a sufficient acquaintance with Hebrew to ask for a railway ticket in that language?" Theodor Herzl famously asked in 1896.42 38 Ernest Geitner, Nations and Natio nalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 7. 39 Marsha L. Rozenblit, Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7. 40 Smith, Nationalism, 12. 41 Ibid ., 13 . 42 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946), 145. SLOV AKIA-2015 19 How then do you count "nationality" on the census? What, in fact, is being counted? Census-creating demographers differ from theorists in their need to count and quantify, classify and categorize state populations. Definitions of nation push and pull against the institutional demands of the state. The real question here is how the complex and fluctuating "nation" is tagged and boxed and bureaucratized for use by the state. What does it mean and how is it used ? Nation indeed becomes, as Rogers Brubaker explains, a "practical category, institutionalized form, contingent event, and category of prac43 tice." "We should not ask 'what is a nation,"' he writes, "but rather: how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states? How does nation work as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?" 44 The crystallization of Jewish nationality in Czechoslovakia exemplifies the process by which nation is bureaucratized and given institutional form in interwar East Central Europe. Jewish nationality became an exceptional category of practice within the borders of interwar Czechoslovakia; it was the only nationality in East Central Europe not bound by language . Demographers began to answer the question of how to count nationality on the census at the meeting of the International Statistical Congress in St. Petersburg in 1872. There, they agreed that language was the primary marker of nationality, and that counting nationality according to language was the most effective means of capturing and recording nationality for the interests of the state. The question of how to codify nationality in a state census had first been debated at the 1857 Congress in Vienna, but without conclusive results. The St. Petersburg Congress decided that language was the best objective indicator of nationality, the most reliable one, and the least confusing, as "each perfectly knows the language used since childhood to think and express oneself." 45 But how should the census ask about language? The conclusions of the St. Petersburg conference point to 43 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7. 44 1bid, 16. 45 Dominique Arel , "Language categories in censuses : backward- or forward-looking?" David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel , eds. , Census and Identity. The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. (Cambridge: Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2002), 95. 20 SLOV AKIA-2015 an acceptance of mother tongue as the most valid language situation type to use in codifying nationality for the census. Other language situation types include, but are not limited to: language most commonly used, language of daily use, family language, language in which one prays, and the language that one speaks with one's children. 46 Language was first counted on the Austrian and the Hungarian census in 1880. In Austria, language was counted according to "language of daily use" (Umgangssprache); while in the Kingdom of Hungary, language was counted according to "mother tongue" (anyanyelv). When Czechoslovakia came into existence after the First World War, it brought together two traditions of national codification through language proxy.In discussing the relationship of language to nationality for the development of the census, Czechoslovak demographers favored "mother tongue," as nationality was counted in the Kingdom of Hungary, over "language of daily use," as it was done in Austria. They argued that counting according to language of daily use had led to an under representation of Czechs on the Austrian census, and inherently underestimated the numbers of minority national groups where the official language was that of the dominant national group . The dependent position of the Czechs had resulted in more Czechs declaring themselves as Germans when counted this way, they asserted, because a Czech in a German language environment would indeed have used that language on a daily basis. Counting according to mother tongue had led to even greater statistical manipulations in the Kingdom of Hungary. Czechoslovak demographers contended that corruption of the census process in Hungary for the purpose of statistically increasing the number of Magyars had resulted in a gross underestimation of the number of ethnic Slovaks. Consequently, Slovaks as a people suffered more in Hungary than the Czechs in Austria. Yet they agreed that if the census were carried out properly, counting nationality by mother tongue would yield the most accurate and objective picture of 46 David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel, "Censuses, Identity formation and the struggle for political power," in Kertzer and Arel, eds., 26, and Dominique Arel, "Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?" in Kertzer and Arel, eds. , 97. SLOVAKIA-2015 21 47 the demographic composition of the state. Czechoslovak demographers accepted the definition of mother tongue as "the language which is most familiar to a person since childhood and with which they think, or simply the language which their parents taught them in their earliest youth. "48 Josef Mraz worked with the definition of mother tongue as well as its caveat, used on the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary to make the mother tongue category as broad as possible, in reformulating the conception of nationality for the 1919 Slovak census. He did not dispute the Hungarian definition's core: mother tongue is the language "to which one confesses as one's own and with which one best and most gladly speaks. "49 It was the caveat that troubled him: Although mother tongue is identical with the language which everyone learned in their childhood in the majority of cases, usually from their mother, it can nevertheless happen that a child has another mother tongue than the mother, especially when the child acquired it in child-care (!), in school (!), or as a result of circumstances by which the parents have different mother tongues, another language than the language of the child's mother. 50 By broadening the definition of mother tongue so that it became disengaged from the language one's mother actually spoke, Hungarian demographers allowed for a greater number of people to declare for the Magyar mother tongue than would have otherwise been possible. While this definition may have obtained in a number of cases due to widespread linguistic assimilation in the Kingdom of Hungary, it left the door open for abuses . ... (Co ntinuation: Next page with Statistical Tables) 47 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" Ceskoslovensky statisticky vestnik (CSV) II ( 1921 ): 49, and Antonin Bohac, "Slovensko ve svetle statistiky -kniha Josefa Mraza," CSV II (1921): 225-6. 48 Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV II ( 1921 ): 187. 49 JosefMraz, Slovensko ve svetle statistiky (Praze, 1920), 33 . 50 Jbid. Exclamation marks in the original. SLOV AKIA-2015 22 Table 2.1: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population According to Religion in 1910 According to Absolute Number Hungarian Total 10,888,138 5,924,665 Roman Catholic 304,570 2,025,508 Greek Catholic 2,573,683 2,621,329 Calvinist 418,449 1,340,143 Lutheran 2,987, 163 40,851 Greek Orthodox 74,296 73,267 Unitarian 932,458 705,488 Jewish 9,602 17,452 Other 20,886,487 10,050,5 75 Total Rusvn Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total German Slovak Romanian 1,372,103 1,406,207 8,531 1,785 79,338 1,133,671 26,964 429,687 2,494 10,645 463,912 706 1,412 1,592 1,799,255 168 203,230 1,004 2,037,435 64 5,830 1,268 1,967,9 70 559 991 3,021 2,949,032 Croatian Other Serbian 5,109 1,810,302 3,892 357,329 463,604 9,511 1,908 31,121 57 56 1,03 1 1,028 791 860 49 128 1,099,386 7,491 25,528 42,580 4 2,702 24 472,587 7 10,387 276 1,833,162 21 91 996 1,106,471 206 3,739 3,739 469,255 According to Absolute Percentage Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other Total Total 52.1 Hungarian 54.4 German 12.6 9.7 15.0 0.1 3.9 56.0 12.6 6.4 14.3 98.2 31.2 1.4 1.0 32.1 0.1 0.4 34.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 60.3 0.3 4.5 0.1 100 98.6 75.7 55.0 0.2 21.8 5.8 0.1 0.6 7.3 0.8 0.1 17.3 Slovak Romanian 12.9 0.1 SLOV AKIA-2015 Roman Catholic Greek Catholic Calvinist Lutheran Greek Orthodox Unitarian Jewish Other 23 0.1 16.6 0.0 3.3 22.9 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.8 0.3 1.9 1.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.6 0.0 0.0 5.7 0.3 0.4 7.2 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXIII. I 9 I 5 (Budapest, 1918), 20, chart 13, "A nepesseg anyanyelve vallasok szerint 1910-ben." Table 2.2: Mother Tongue of the Hungarian Population in 1900 and 1910 Total Population Mother Tongue of the Population Hungary Magyar Geman Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other Total non Magyar Total 1900 absolute number 1910 percentage 8,651,520 1,999,060 2,002,165 2,798,559 424,774 191,432 437,737 333,008 8,186,735 16,838,255 absolute number 51.4 11.9 11.9 16.6 2.5 1.1 2.6 2.0 48.6 100 Percentage 9,944,627 1,903,357 1,946,357 2,948,186 464,270 194,808 461,516 401,412 8,319,906 18,264,533 54.4 10.4 10.7 16.1 2.5 1.1 2.5 2.9 45.5 100 CroatiaSlavonia Magyar German Slovak Romanian Rusyn Croatian Serbian Other 90,781 136,121 17,476 920 4,673 1,490,672 610,908 64,753 3.8 5.6 0.7 0.0 0.2 61.7 25.3 2.7 105,948 134,078 21,613 846 8,317 1,638,354 644,955 67,843 4.1 5.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 62.5 24.6 2.6 24 Total non-Magyar Total SLOV AKIA-2015 2,325,523 96.2 2,516,006 95.9 2,416,304 100 2,621,954 100 Hungarian Kingdom Magyar 8,742,301 45.4 10,050,575 48.1 German 2,135,181 2,037,435 11.1 9.8 Slovak 2,019.641 10.5 1,967,970 9.4 Romanian 2,799,479 2,949,032 14.5 14.1 Rusyn 429,447 2.2 472,587 2.3 Croatian 1,682,104 8.7 1,833,162 8.8 Serbian 1,048,645 1,106,471 5.5 5.3 Other 397,761 469,255 2.1 2.2 Total 10,512,258 54.6 10,835,912 51.9 non-Magyar Total 19,254,559 100 20,886,487 100 Magyar Statisztikai Evkonyv. Uj Folyam XXl/l. 1915 (Budapest, 1918), 15, chart 11 , "A nepesseg anyanyelve es magyarul tudasa 1900-ban es 19 I 0-ben." In their analysis, and in their own efforts to bolster Slovak mnnbers, Czechoslovak demographers were uninterested in linguistic assimilation, seeking instead to strip the inhabitants of Slovakia down to their national skins . Their efforts illustrate what Dominique Arel has explained as a backward looking orientation toward language categories in censuses. Arel argues that, even though nationalists portray linguistic assimilation as "forced, unnatural, and fundamentally illegitimate, the result of destructive policies by an 'imperialist' state," it is in reality a normal and expected occurrence. Among speakers of a less prestigious language, there are individuals who will choose to linguistically assimilate for social advancement. 51 In those cases declaration of mother tongue as the "language one best and most gladly speaks" may well differ from the language of one's mother. According to this reasoning, Czechoslovak demographers were backwards-looking because they sought to discover the "real" nationality of the inhabitants of Slovakia, their "true group belong- 51 Arel, "Language categories in censuses," in Census and Identity, Kertzer and Arel, eds., 93 . SLOV AKIA-2015 25 ing" based on their ancestral origins, rather than linguistic assimilation: whether coerced, statistically falsified, or voluntary. Czechoslovak demographers sought to demonstrate the unreliability of the 1910 census of the Kingdom of Hungary through critical comparative examination of the data collected within the language categories of "mother tongue" and "language knowledge. "52 In a typical example, Jan Auerhan 53 pointed to the 301,694 Magyars with knowledge of Slovak counted on the 1910 census within the sixteen counties and four municipalities of the Kingdom of Hungary which in whole or part became Slovakia. Two-thirds of them were likely to be ethnic Slovaks, he concluded. Counting them as Slovaks, instead of as Magyars with Slovak language knowledge, would raise the ethnic Slovak number from 1,708,592 to 1,900,000.54 The likelihood that a Slovak would be proficient in the Magyar language in an environment where Magyar was the official language - the language of instruction in schools, the language used in government offices and the court system - was incomparably greater than a Magyar proficient in Slovak. Mother tongue was not a perfect indicator of nationality, but what could be offered in its stead to collect national data? Mraz, in his Zilina report, strikingly concluded that "nationality" alone be used. Rather than employ language proxy, the census should ask the people directly for their nationality. This was a controversial method due its high level of subjectivity. Nationality declaration would not be linked to language as an external marker. Considering the ways in which Czechoslovak demographers regarded mother tongue to have been manipulated on the censuses of the Kingdom of Hungary, Mraz wrote: 52 Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?"; Mraz,"Dva dukazy o falesnosti mad'arskych dat o feci matefske na zaklade dat o znalosti feci," ; and Hora.eek, "Narodnostni statistika," all in CSV II (1921). 53 Jan Auerhan (1880-1942) worked as a statistician for the Provincial Statistical Office of the Bohemian Kingdom from 1906, and became the undersecretary to the president of the Czechoslovak State Statistical Office at its founding in January 1919. He is most noted for his work in the demographic and anthro-geographic fields, the study of Czech and Slovak minorities abroad, and minority questions more generally. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky, 186. 54 Jan Auerhan, "Kolik je cechoslovaku?" CSV II ( 1921 ): 51 . 26 SLOV AKIA-2015 In contrast to [mother tongue], the concept "nationality" means confession to a certain internal conviction, which cannot be explained in an ambiguous way, similar to religious conviction . That confession to a certain nationality is the only correct one for ascertaining national ratios. "Mother tongue" has for this reason been eliminated from the demographic markers and as a surrogate question for "nationality." In connection with this is the question at hand, whether a separate "Jewish nationality" should be accepted without regard to religious affiliation. It follows from the concept of nationality described that it is not possible to force someone to declare a separate Jewish nationality, if [that declaration] is to express their internal conviction; because the Jews indeed form a separate race, there will, however, be no recommendation in the instructions for this procedure, except that Jewish nationality shall be left to the rubric of "Other nationality." The Jews should be left the option of declaring themselves either for their own separate nationality or for the nationality of others, which with the influence of environment and education or the like they have accepted as their own. For the stating of the Jewish race the remaining rules of the statement of affiliation to the Jewish confession shall suffice.55 Mraz's interpretation of nationality as an "internal conviction" was most closely related to the definition advanced by Karoly Keleti at the International Statistical Congress meeting in St. Petersburg in 1872. Keleti was the first director of the Hungarian Statistical Bureau founded one year earlier. He helped create the 1867 and the 1880 censuses for the Kingdom of Hungary. 56 The 1872 St. Petersburg Congress not only debated nationality enumeration on the census, but the meaning of nationality itself. Three conceptions of nationality emerged from the deliberations : I) political, in which nationality is equivalent to state belonging; 2) physical, in which nationality is defined racially; and 3) psychical, in which nationality is understood as a psychological community penetrating individual feeling and collective endeavors. 57 Keleti took the 55 SNA, f. MPS, box 277, inv. no. 76. Italics added. Karoly Keleti (born 1833, Pozsony [Pressburg, Bratislava] - died 1892, Budapest) Eletrajzi lexikon. www.kereso.hu-yrk-Ryrgenwm/7502 accessed June 17, 2005 . 57 Bohac, "Narodnost ci jazyk?" CSV II (1921 ): 50. 56 SLOV AKIA-2015 27 position that nationality cannot be equivalent to state belonging, as that is so-called political nationality, common in Western Europe, but not in the multinational states of Central and Eastern Europe. Nor does ethnic (Stamm) belonging answer to nationality, even if its main marker is language. Nationality was best defined, according to Keleti, as a "subjective state internal to the individual, a feeling analogous to religion that depends on origin and the environment in which a person lives and grows ."58 Keleti's definition was based on social-psychological criteria for which it is difficult to secure an objective external marker. It moved away from language as a definite indicator of nationality, leav ing room for belonging to a nationality whose language one may not use daily or that is not considered a viable national language (like Hebrew or Yiddish in the view of the Czechoslovak state). This was a big plus for Mraz and hi s colleagues, but also ambiguous enough to allow for pressures and fal sifications, like those they presumed embedded in the last Hungarian census before the war. Yet Keleti 's definition was attractive to the Czechoslovak demographers preparing the 1919 Slovak census. This definition would enable the indivi dual to confess nationality as directly as religion, as an expression of his/her internal conviction and self-understanding. Czechoslovak demographers hoped it would un cover the numbers of ethnic Slovaks who had previously been hidden from view because they were counted as Magyar-speakers. They would now be recorded under the banner of their "real" nationality, free to directly profess their "true" group belonging. Jews, too, would be able to declare their "true" group belonging for the first time; not only as a religion, but also as a distinct nationality . Antonin Bohac 59 found Keleti's definition to coincide with concepts of ethno-racial group belonging. "Since the means for express58 Ibid. , 49. Keleti publ is hed his views on nationality in 1880 in the Stalistische Monatschrift under the title "Zur Frage der Volksziihlung." [Cyril Horacek, "Narodnostni statistika," CSV I ( 1920): 187.] 59 Antonin Bohac ( 1882-1 950) is regarded as the fo under of Czechoslovak demographics, especially with regard to questi ons of nationality. He was a member of the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 19 19, and worked fo r the Czechos lovak State Statistical Office upon his return. Bohac was the deputy chairman of the Society for the Study of Nationality Questi ons. Federalni statisticky ufad, 70 let ceskoslovenske statni statistiky (Prague, 1989), 195. Bohac was also associate professor of demography at the Charles Uni versity Faculty of Science where he lee- 28 SLOV AKIA-2015 ing psychological states is language," Bohac wrote, "as Keleti [elsewhere] has stated, the concept of nationality in this sense is quite close to the concept of nationality as ethnic/racial belonging (kmenova prislusnost), for which language is the main connecting bond and main external marker."60 Bohac was correct to observe that Keleti's definition bore a strong resemblance to a physical understanding of nationality, which gave race and/or ethnicity an expanded role. Language remained the main outward indicator of nationality, but was no longer considered identical to nationality itself. Espousing this conception moved nationality closer to ethnicity. It elevated ethnic understandings of the self and the group . The final formulation of the 1919 census shows that the Czechoslovak administration and its demographers accepted Mraz's definition of nationality, based on Keleti's: "an individual national-political conviction according to ethnic belonging to a certain national unit or nation ."61 Five sub-headings were placed under Nationality on the form: Slovaks and Czechs, Rusyns, Magyars, Germans, and Others .62 Czechoslovak demographers understood Jewish nationality to be included under the subheading "Others." While "Jewish nationality" was an available option, though not a requirement, for the Jewish population, the category remained invisible on the actual census form in 1919. The 1919 census asked directly for nationality without the intermediary of language. *** In the late August heat of 1919, census takers dispersed across the territory of Slovakia to ask the people about their nationality. Many complained that the whole endeavor was disorganized and insufficiently thought through. Census takers expressed frustration that they had not received the census forms with time enough to look tured on the "Basics of Population Science." He introduced the usage of punch card technology for processing Czechoslovak census data."Historie statistiky v Cechach po roce 1918," The Czech Statistical Office http ://www.czso.cz/csu/redakce.ns£'i/historie_statistiky_ v_cechach_po_roce_ l 918 (accessed January 9, 2012). 60 Federalni statisticky urad, 50. 61 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77* (cast textova). 62 SNA, f. MPS, box 277 . This carton contains the original hand-written forms used for collecting the raw data for the 1919 census. SLOV AKIA-2015 29 them over, nor so that they could fill one out to use as an example. Due to lack of funds and inadequate organization, many found themselves forced to sleep in train stations and on park benches during the census period, which surely affected their ability to fulfill their duties. One census taker reported that his census materials were stolen from him while he slept! The population, and oftentimes even local community officials, had not been informed about the purpose of the census, nor when it would take place.63 If these complaints are accurate, they undermine the seriousness with which the Czechoslovak administrators prepared the foundation of the 1919 census, as well as the importance they placed upon it as a means of accurately proving national ratios in Slovakia. Yet last minute pre-census agitation to prepare the Slovak population did take place. The prominent Slovak national newspaper Narodnie noviny called on Slovaks " ... to consciously and openly confess their Slovak stock ... to let the beautiful words: 'I am Slovak' 64 consciously and boldly sound from the mouths of loyal citizens. " This example is atypical, however, as the agitation took place in the central Slovak town of Turciansky Svaty Martin, the seat of the Slovak national movement and home to the Matica slovenska, the Slovak cultural society. Narodnie noviny explained that the purpose of the census was to prove that Slovakia was Slovak, and that it was essential for building its own independent country. Every citizen could participate in building that independent state through the census, the article stressed, an idea meant to reinforce the democratic spirit of the new era.65 "You have no reason to be ashamed of [declaring Slovak nationality]," counseled the leading newspaper in Saris county, a region of eastern Slovakia where national consciousness remained weak, "the Czechoslovak name has the best reputation not only in Europe, but also in America and Asia." The paper ran boldface announcements at the foot of its pages urging all Slovaks to proudly declare to the census taker that they were Slovaks. 66 These reassurances did little to assuage prevalent Slovak fears about the real purpose of the census. This terribly urgent appeal itself 63 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. nos. 7, 8-9. Scitani lidu na Slovensku 1919. Anketa mezi popisujicimi povei'niky. 64 "Scitanie l'udu," Nizrodnie noviny (Turciansky Svaty Martin), August 22, 1919. 65 Ibid. 66 "Slovaci!" Sari.fake hlasy (Presov), August 24, 1919. 30 SLOVAKIA-2015 may have caused anxiety for a population with a low-level of national consciousness. Suspicions ranged from the belief that the goal was to raise or introduce new taxes, undertake military recruitment, or to carry out a plebiscite to divide the territory . The military rumor was the most widespread. Many Slovaks worried that a war would soon break out between the Poles and Magyars, and the job of the census takers was to find able-bodied men to fight. Whoever declared Slovak nationality would be conscripted to fight once again, while other nationalities would be freed from that duty. While it was later revealed that the rumor began in Magyar circles, many people in the border counties still held back from declaring themselves Slovak. Others believed the census to be connected to imminent requisitioning of cattle and grain. Some, more optimistically, believed more satisfactory food and fuel distribution would follow, and possibly a more advantageous land distribution. Still others imagined the census to be an exercise in identifying foreigners (especially Magyars, Poles, and Magyarone Slovaks) and expelling them from Czechoslovakia.67 Widespread fears and suspicions about the real intentions of the 1919 census underscored the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity in Slovakia at the beginning of the Czechoslovak state building project, as well as contributed to a certain level of inaccuracy in the results. Of the four national groups which were the most interesting to the state: Slovaks, Magyars, Germans, and Jews, the greatest difficulties arose in recording the nationality of the Slovaks and the Jews. Magyars and Germans were by-and-large ready for the census and decisive in their national declarations. Within the ethnic Magyar population, only state and municipal employees exhibited uncertainty in their national declarations. 68 Magyar language use, national uncertainty, fear and mistrust accounted for the greatest difficulties in recording the highest possible number of Slovaks on the 1919 census. Magyar or Magyarone Slovak census takers were known to record entire ethnic Slovak or mixed nationality villages as Magyar, or count individuals as Magyar because they were able to communicate with Magyar-speaking cen67 Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921 ): 133134. 68 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "O Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech" SLOV AKIA-2015 31 sus takers without the help of an interpreter. 69 The latter illustrates precisely what Mraz and his colleagues had hoped to avoid in bypassing language as identical with or as a surrogate for nationality . They did not want ethnic Slovaks counted as Magyars based on their Magyar language proficiency. Other problems stemmed from uncertainty surrounding the meaning of nationality (primarily in eastern Slovakia). Many Slovaks feared what might happen to them if they did not declare themselves as Magyars. They distrusted the "godless Czechs" and "false prophets from Prague" who came to their doors. 70 The Slovak population tended to be more religious than the highly secularized Czech one, and Slovak national leaders expressed wari71 ness about the "agnostic progressivism" of the Czech intelligentsia. Common answers among Slovaks when asked about their nationality included: Slovak and Magyar ("aji Slovak, aji Mad'ar"), it doesn't matter ("to vsetko jedno"), and Hungarian Slovak ("Uhorsky Slovak"). 72 In eastern Slovakia, other answers included : I speak Slovak and Magyar ("hutorim 73 po slovensky i po mad'arsky"), I pray in Slovak ("modlim sa po slovensky"), and Catholic ("katolik") . Mraz noted in his analysis of the results that Slovaks often confused religion with nationality. 74 Interestingly, this observation recalls the proximity of religious and national feeling within Czechoslovakia's re-conceptualization of nationality, as well as the fine distinction made between them in rec69 Ibid., 7. "O opravnych navrzich pro pfisti scitani. Ibid., 5. "O nepfistojnostech pfi scitani," and Josef Mraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (1921): 135 . 71 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, 23. 72 All the Slavic languages differentiate the word "Hungarian" from ,,Magyar." The former refers to citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, whereas the latter refers to the predominant ethnic group in that Kingdom. In Slovak, these terms are "Mad'ar" (ethnic Hungarian), Uhorsko (the Kingdom of Hungary), and uhorsky (deriving from the Kingdom of Hungary) . In the early 19 th century, Magyar nationalists followed the lead of Count Istvan Szechenyi in equating "Magyar" and "Hungarian" in foreign languages as part of their drive to assimilate all the non-Magyar nationalities into Magyar language and culture. The non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary rejected the equating of "Magyar" with "Hungarian" and still do. For more on Szechyni ' s activities see Dejiny S/ovenska II ( 1526-1848), ed. Samuel Cambel (Bratislava: VEDA, 1987), 488-90. 73 "Hutorit'" is the Saris form of "hovorit'," to speak. 74 JosefMraz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II ( 192 1): 135. II 70 32 SLOV AKIA-2015 ognizing "Jewish nationality." Nationality was something to be understood and felt as an "internal conviction, similar to religious confession," but consciously separated, and given a higher position than religion in the hierarchy of self and group values of definition. One's nationality, not one's religion, was of the greatest interest to the state. One's nationality, not one's religion, was the primary indicator of one's most strongly held inner values and loyalties. For the Jewish population, answers to the question of nationality were most striking for their variety. Census takers disparaged the eclecticism of the Jewish response, attributing it to opportunism . In some cases, they remarked, national declarations among Jews reached comical proportions: the head of one household declared as a Slovak, his wife as a German, and the children as Hungarians . They noted, however, that often Jews stuck to Jewish nationality so that they would not have to affiliate with any of the other nationality choices.75 The majority of Jews in Slovakia chose the Jewish nationality option on the 1919 census, officially recorded as "Other." Census takers recommended that a separate column be made available on the next census for Jewish nationality because so many Jews had expressly asked for it. 76 In the uncertain environment which prevailed in Slovakia in August 1919, shortly after the rollback of Bela Kun's Hungarian Red Army forces but before the de jure securing of the Czechoslovak borders, Jews in Slovakia wished to avoid a difficult and possibly treacherous national affiliation decision through declaring Jewish nationality. Many Jews viewed Jewish nationality as an escape from the nationality conflict. Choosing Jewish nationality appeared to be a good way to opt out, to take a neutral position, to make the safest bet on an unpredictable future. Basing the decision to declare for Jewish nationality on these criteria made it more a strategic and less a heart-felt choice. For the time being, at least, it had less to do with deep-seated feelings of belonging to a Jewish national group, and more to do with trying to make the best possible choice in 75 SNA, f. MPS , box 380, inv. no. 4. "Mad'arech, Nemcich a zidech." JosefMniz, "O pfedbeznem scitani lidu na Slovensku roku 1919," CSV II (192 1): 129. Unfortunately, the demographic breakdown of those who chose "Other" on the 1919 Slovak census is unavailable, so the conclusion that the majority of Jews declared for Jewish nationality comes from census taker reports and their insistence that it be included as a separate column on the next census. See footnote : Statni ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora 1921, 77*. 76 SLOV AKIA-2015 33 a high-stakes gamble. The Jewish population in Slovakia overall, counted by religion and nationality, numbered 135,918 according to the 1921 statewide Czechoslovak census, and 354,342 in the state as a whole. 77 Slovaks, counted only under the nationality rubric "Czechoslovak" on the interwar censuses, numbered 1,954,446 in 1919 and 2,025,003 in 1921, a positive change of 3.61 percent. 78 The popularity of the Jewish nationality declaration on the 1919 Slovak census (as "Other"), combined with a majority of ethnic Slovaks declaring as "Slovak" 79 led to a significant decrease in the number of Magyars recorded in Slovakia compared with the last prewar census. This decline heightened the Czechoslovak administration's awareness of further potential benefits rendered to the state by Jewish nationality . If the Jews, who traditionally affiliated with Germanspeakers in Bohemia and Moravia, and Magyar-speakers in Slovakia, declared for Jewish nationality, then the statistical legitimacy of the Czechoslovak nation-state would rise as the numbers of Germans and Hungarians fell. "Jewish nationality" would work to the advantage of the dominant "Czechoslovak" nationality and national state. If, as this argument goes, Jewish nationality favored the Czechoslovak nationality in solving the state's nationalities problems, then declaring Jewish nationality was not really a way of opting out. It was not a neutral position. It could not be an escape from the nationality conflict if it meant - once again - casting one's lot with the dominant state nationality. Jewish nationality may have seemed like an exit, but this was an illusion. One could not avoid taking sides in the interwar nationality conflicts . *** It is a valid and important point that the Czechoslovak government would favor Jewish nationality for its ability to statistically reduce the number of Germans and Magyars in the state. But that con77 Antonin Bohac, Narodnostni mapa republiky ceskoslovenske. Podrobny popis narodnostnich hranic, ostrovu a mensin (Prague, 1926), pp. 148-155 . 78 Ufad statisticky, Scitani lidu v republice ceskoslovenske ze dne 15. unora I 92 / Prague, 19240, Table 74: Narodnosti na Slovensku podle scitani lidu z roku 1919 a 1921 . 79 Slovaks who declared as Slovak, according to the options presented on the 1919 Slovak census, were recorded as "Czechoslovak." Slovaks were not recorded as "Slovak" until the 1930 statewide census. 34 SLOV AKIA-2015 clusion neglects the deeper meaning of its inclusion beyond the statistical benefits it could render. Creating a Jewish nationality category manifested the ways in which the meaning of national affiliation had transformed through the cataclysm of the First World War and the establishment of East Central European successor states based on the national principle. Josef Mraz elegantly and succinctly summed up these changes when he stated that declaring for a certain nationality was an expression of internal conviction . Because the very meaning of national affiliation had changed, "Jewish nationality" emerged as a recognized nationality category . Nationality had taken on the problematic role of the manifestation of one's personal convictions, inner values, and ultimate loyalty . Nationality moved ever closer to an essential ethnic or racial understandings of "true" group belonging. The methods and results of the 1919 special census in Slovakia were useful in providing a tested model of nationality investigation based on subjective, internal, ethnic/racial criteria, already approved before an international body (the Paris Peace Conference). The 1919 census had been an experiment in bringing methods of counting and recording the population into line with the new postwar vision of the national state. The 1921 census would build on 1919 methods in circumstances which required more than securing the new borders; they required filling the demarcated territory with meaning, as well as answering the dual questions of what Czechoslovakia was and how nationality and nationhood would function in this state. Examining the 1919 Slovak census offers insight into how Czechoslovakia understood itself as the manifestation of Czechoslovak: self-determination, and the place of the rights of the other nationalities to their own self-determination within this framework.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The 1919 Census on the Territory of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Rebekah Klein-Pejšová Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 7-34 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Klein-Pejšová, Rebekah, 1972- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/73f1cba28d10c7548fc3abdd7abba16e.pdf e7c785da5610033cef20d5b3ecab1907 PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA-2015 35 THE JOURNEY OFFOUR SLOVAK CATHOLIC BISHOPS TO THE USA IN 1926 1 Stefan Kucik In 1926, the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in the United States of America. This "country of unlimited possibilities" was generally expected to prepare a Congress that would surpass all previous International Eucharistic Congresses, both in terms of the number of participants and its grandiosity. The Congress itself was expected to become a forum to manifest the strength of American Catholicism. For Slovak-American Catholics, however, the forthcoming Congress had a significant added value. The four new Slovak Catholics bishops were to participate in it. While many authors have dealt with various aspects of the lives and activities of Slovak Catholic bishops in the interwar period, no one has yet provided us with a detailed account on their journey to the USA in 1926. This article will try to fill this gap. At the time of the International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, there were six Catholic bishops in Slovakia: Marian Blaha of Banska Bystrica, Jan Vojtassak of Spis, and Karol Kmet'ko of Nitra (all ordained on February 13, I 921 ); Jozef Carsky of Kos ice and Pavo I Jantausch of Trnava (both ordained on June 14, 1925); and Michal Bubnic of Roziiava (ordained on December 8, 1925). However, only four of them finally departed for America: Blaha, Vojtassak, Jantausch and Carsky. The number of Slovak Catholic bishops who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago initially fluctuated . On April 8, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague that all Slovak bishops would make the trip to the USA. 2 On April 14, 1926, the American Catholic 1 This is an English and slightly modified and updated version of my previous article entitled "Cesta slovenskych katolickych biskupov do slovenskej Ameriky v roku 1926," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 21-31 . 2 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), fond (hereinafter f.) Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, inventory �36 SLOV AKIA-2015 weekly Jednota published an article in which it announced the arrival of bishops Vojtassak, Kmet'ko, Blaha, Jantausch and, perhaps, Carsky as well, while bishop Bubnic was likely to stay at home due to his illness. 3 On May 16, 1926, the Bratislava daily Slowik men4 tioned five bishops, leaving Marian Blaha in Slovakia. The final decision on the number of bishops,who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress was made by the Bishop 's Conference only a few days before their planned departure. The Conference decided that the bishops of Nitra and Roziiava would remain at home. 5 The reason was the wish of the Papal Nuncio in Prague to have some representatives of the Slovak episcopate at his disposal. This was a time of tense negotiations with Czechoslovakia after the so-called "Marmaggi Affair." The Nuncio wanted Czech and Slovak bishops to submit a memorandum to Czechoslovak officials on the eve of Jan Hus Day (July 6). As a matter of fact, the memorandum was prepared by the Vatican's State Secretary in Rome and it demanded that the Czechoslovak government and President Masaryk refrain from participating in the Hus celebrations and from insulting Czechoslovakia's Catholics.6 Another reason for a part of the Slovak episcopate 's remaining at home was the preparation of an important law on 7 clergy salaries in Czechoslovakia. For the Slovak Catholic bishops it was the first, as well as the last, trip to America. Their requests for issuing or extending passports to the USA were met with no major obstructions, 8 even though in the case of bishop Blaha, as he said himself, the authorities exnumber (hereinafter i. no.) 22, folder (hereinafter fold .) 650. Letter of the Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 8, 1926. 3 Jednota (Middletown, PA), April 14, 1926, 4. 4 Slovak (Bratislava), May 16, 1926, 3. 5 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. 6Emilia Hrabovec, "Sviita stolica a slovenski biskupi v medzivojnovom obdobi," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 8. 7 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. The law was passed on June 25, 1926 . Zakon kongruovy c. 122/ 1926 Sb. z. an. zakon ze dne 25. cervna 1926 o uprave platu duchovenstva cirkvi a naboienskych spolecnosti statem uznanych, pfip. recipovanych [online]. Available at: http ://spcp.prf.cuni .cz/lex/ 122-26.htm. 8 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, April 8, 1926. �SLOV AKIA-2015 37 pressed "a strange sort of caution. " 9 Thus, the situation of 1923, when the Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue a passport to bishop Vojtassak for his intended journey to America, was not repeated. 10 In 1926 there were 228 Slovak Catholic parishes with 236 priests in the USA. 11 Therefore, the Slovak bishops intended to not only attend the Eucharistic Congress, but also to make a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. It was supposed to strengthen their Catholic identity which was threatened by the secularization influences of the American environment and the propaganda of the Czechoslovak Church 12 supported by the Czechoslovak government, as well as to raise some funds for Catholic institutions in Slovakia. 13 Czechoslovak representative offices in the USA, however, began to collect information on the plans of Slovak-American autonomists, largely consisting of the Catholic element, to make use of the presence of the Slovak Catholic bishops for their political goals. Indeed, Slovak bishops travelled to America at a time when the idea of Slovak autonomy on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement was supported by most American Slovaks, represented by the Slovak League of America (hereinafter SLA). Information on the intended political actions of SlovakAmerican autonomists on the occasion of the Slovak bishops ' visit raised fears in the offices of Czechoslovak representatives in the USA. Therefore, the anti-autonomist circles in America sought to 9 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 19 I 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Presidium of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, May 17, 1926. 10 For more on Jan Vojtassak's case, see Stefan Kucik, "The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923," in Slovakia 41 (Nos. 76-77, 2013), 7-36. 11 Jednota : Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 1927 (Middletown, PA), 161-72. 12 The Czechoslovak Church (after 1971 the Czechoslovak Hussite Church) is a Christian Church which separated from the Roman Catholic Church after World War I (January 8, 1920) in the former Czechoslovakia. Originally a Czech national church, its activities are now almost entirely limited to today's Czech and Slovak Republics. One such church existed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1926 and 1967. See Joseph P. Budd, "We do Know English: Philadelphia' s Czechoslovak Presbyterian Church of Jan Hus, 1926-1967," M.A. thesis, University of Delaware, 2009. I am grateful to M. Mark Stolarik for this citation. There may have been other such Czechoslovak churches in the USA, but so far no-one has studied them. 13 Hrabovec, 8. �38 SLOV AKIA-2015 blunt the political edge of these actions. For instance, the Rev. Jozef Murgas of Wilkes-Barre, PA, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, to question Slovak priests at their upcoming conference in eastern Pennsylvania whether they were interested in politics or in religion. According to Murgas, the Czech bishops travelling to the Eucharistic Congress allegedly called upon the Slovak bishops to represent themselves in the USA as Czechoslovak bishops. Reportedly, bishop Jan Vojtassak: replied on behalf of the Slovak episcopate that they would go to America as Slovak bishops. 14 Of greater concern to the Slovak-American "Czechoslovak" camp was the fact that the president of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, Andrej Hlinka himself, was also going to attend the Eucharistic Congress. Besides his trip to the Congress, Hlinka planned to use his stay in the USA to agitate for Slovak autonomy, fundraising and internationalization of the Slovak cause. 15 He also intended to settle personal disputes among Slovak-American Catholics. 16 On the initiative of the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, the Rev. Murgas decided to organize in his parish in Wilkes-Barre on June 27, 1926 a Cyrilo-Methodian ceremony on the occasion of the consecration of the new local school. He invited the whole Czech and Ruthenian episcopates, as well as the Slovak bishops Marian Blaha and Jozef Carsky. The ceremony was also to be held to commemorate the Order of the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, of which Rev. Murgas was a co-founder. The preparations were made in such a manner that Andrej Hlinka would not be present. Moreover, the occasion was to become a place where the Czech and Slovak bishops could demonstrate "Czechoslovak" solidarity. The organizers invited the Czechoslovak ambassador in Washington as well. 17 14 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Pra~ue, Marc5120, 1926. 5 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 30, 1926. 16 S!owik, May 23, 1926, 1. 17 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, March 20, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650 . Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs �SLOVAKIA-2015 39 However, Getting and Murgas were disappointed. Even Murgas' personal intercession with bishop Carsky immediately upon the arrival of Slovak bishops in New York ended in vain. 18 Bishop Blaha gave priority to attendance at the Slovak Day in St. Louis, Missouri on June 27, I 926 19 and bishop Carsky went to Cudahy, Wisconsin, to administer the sacrament of confirmation. 20 On the other hand, the Slovak bishops did visit the Sacred Heart of Jesus parish in WilkesBarre on different occasions, bishop Carsky even twice.21 The four Slovak bishops set out on their journey to the USA on May 31, 192622 and arrived in New York City on the steamship Aquitania on June 11, 1926. When they docked, they were welcomed by Slovak-American priests, representatives of Slovak-American organizations and newspapers, a representative of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, J. Lavicka, and other individuals. Accompanied by several dozen cars, the bishops were driven to the Slovak st Church of St. John Nepomucene at the comer 66 th Street and 1 Avenue. Its pastor since 1916 was the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. After a short prayer in the church, there was a banquet in the Commodore Hotel, hosted by Slovak priests in honor of the Slovak bishops. The banquet was chaired by Msgr. Viktor B lahunka of Chicago (originally from Lucky near Ruzomberok). 23 He also headed the committee 24 charged with the care of the Slovak bishops while in America. of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651 . Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 22, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 18 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 19 Jednota , July 7, 1926, I. 20 Jednota , July 14, 1926, I. 21 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 22 Slowik, June 1, 1926, I. 23 Jednota , June 16, 1926, 1; Slowik, July 2, 1926, 3. 24 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. �40 SLOV AKIA-2015 After greetings and words of welcome, bishop Marian Blaha addressed the audience. He said that they had arrived in America to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. However, the second very important goal of their journey was to visit and strengthen the faith of Slovak-American Catholics. He expressed pleasure at the fact that the Slovak Catholics in America had preserved both their faith and their Slovak language. Bishop Blaha informed the audience that they had brought a gift to the Slovak-American Catholics - the modem Slovak translation of the Bible. He did not forget to remark that the main credit for publishing it belonged to Andrej Hlinka, who was also present at the banquet. 25 In 1926 the first translation of the Bible into modem Slovak was completed. It was published by the Society of St. Adalbert (Spolok sv. Vojtecha) in Tmava. The preparatory phase had lasted for more than four decades. It was published between the years 1913 and 1926, with a long break due to World War I. The translation consisted of ten chapters: two for the New and eight for the Old Testament. After the whole first translation of the Bible appeared, Narodnie noviny in Turciansky Svaty Martin published a review (copied by other Slovak newspapers as well) that only the revision of the translation, done by the Rev. Frantisek R. Osvald, took a full eight years.26 After the Great War, the large amount of money needed by the Society of St. Adalbert to publish the Slovak translation of the bible was hard to raise in Slovakia. In 1920 generous gifts from America began to flow into Slovakia. Especially generous were the donations given by the Slovak bishops Karol Kmet'ko, Marian Blaha and Jan Vojtassak and Andrej Hlinka (100,000 crowns each). All this money was put into the shares of the Society of St. Adalbert for publishing purposes. In the critical situation (in 1923), the Society sent a threemember delegation, led by its director Jan Postenyi-Kysucky, to the USA. Within two and half months, the delegation visited more than one hundred Slovak-American parishes. At the very first meeting with the Slovak-American editors and the presidents of Slovak25 Jednota, June I 6, 1926, I. Jan Debnar, "Hist6ria prekladu a vydania prveho svatovojtesskeho Svateho pisma," in O prekladoch Biblie do slovenciny a do inych slovanskych j azykov, Jan Dorul'a, ed. (Bratislava: Slavisticky kabinet SA V, 1997), 247, 276-278 ; Jednota, June 16, 1926, 5. 26 �SLOVAKIA-2015 41 American Catholic organizations in Pittsburgh, $1,072 was collected and 2,156 new members joined the Society (the membership fee was $4 but twenty-five founding members contributed $100 each, while the American-Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak gave $600). 27 In 1926, the Society of St. Adalbert also sent its delegation to the USA. It consisted of the director Jan Postenyi, Alexander Sindelar, Stefan Zlatos and Robert Pobozny .28 The proposition to send a delegation to the USA during the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago was made by director Jan Postenyi at the meeting of the executive board in April of 1926. As a matter of fact, the Society issued the Slovak edition of the Bible at its own expense of 800,000 crowns. If the Society was not to fall into new debt (in Slovakia an expected interest in the Slovak bible failed to materialize), it had to turn to the SlovakAmerican Catholics. Moreover, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America still held 116,000 crowns belonging to the Society of St. Adalbert, which could be claimed only in person. 29 In the USA, the delegates sold 3,800 copies of the bible for $10 .00 each . At the same time, 1,500 new members joined the Society.30 The center of the mission of the Society of St. Adalbert in the USA was its own branch in Youngstown, Ohio, which since 1922 had been administered by the Rev . Stefan Kocis.31 Eventually, American Slovaks bought 6,800 copies of the Slovak bible.32 Bishop Marian Blaha's remarks on Andrej Hlinka's contribution to the publishing of the Slovak Bible were justified. Indeed, it is often referred to as the Hlinka translation or the Hlinka and Donoval translation, because both Andrej Hlinka and Jan Donoval greatly contributed to this work. It is shocking how little attention has been given to these two priests and their role in the translation of the bible and to their contribution to the development of Slovak spiritual, linguistic and national enlightenment. Andrej Hlinka also played a major role in publishing the bible by the Society of St. Adalbert, which 27 Debnar, 282. Jan Postenyi, Dejiny Spo/ku sv. Vojte cha (Tmava: Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 1930), 79. 29 ASSV. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia vyboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha konaneho 26. aprila r. 1926 . 30 Debnar, 283. 31 Postenyi, 80. 32 Debnar, 283 . 28 �42 SLOV AKIA-2015 he led as its president from November 14, 1920, together with director Jan Postenyi and secretary Juraj Hoda! (since 1923). 33 After attending the welcoming and gala dinner in the Commodore Hotel in New York City, the Slovak bishops went their own ways: Jan Vojtassak proceeded to Rev. Anton Gracik's St. Stephen's parish in Newark, New Jersey Pavol Jantausch joined Rev. Jan Kubasek at his Holy Trinity parish in Yonkers, New York; Jozef Carsky went to administer the sacrament of confirmation (we do not know to which parish) and Marian Blaha remained at Rev. Stefan Krasul'a's . h .34 pans On Sunday, June 13 , 1926, the four Slovak bishops attended a reception for the papal nuncio to the Eucharistic Congress, Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano, in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City. In the evening of the same day, the Slovak bishops were guests at a banquet hosted in their honor by the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. 35 The next day the Slovak bishops attended the first graduation ceremony at Danville Academy for Girls, founded by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Danville, Pennsylvania. 36 The order is the first and only Slovak religious order founded in honor of the Apostles of the Slavs. It was established on September 11, 1909 by four Slovak-American Roman-Catholic priests: Matus Jankola, Andrej Pavco, Alexander Dianiska and Jozef Murgas. The idea of a high school for Slovak girls originated in 1922, the same year as when the Slovak Benedictines in the USA decided to establish a high school for boys in Cleveland, Ohio. In the school year 1925-26, the girl's high school already had all four grades. Therefore, the Sisters asked the state authorities for accreditation. The latter was granted to the school on June 10, 1926. 37 So only four days later the first graduation ceremony of the first ten students was held in the presence of five bishops, three monsignors, fifty-one priests and a large number of spectators. 38 33 Jbid. , 280-28 I. Slowi k, July 2, 1926, 3. 35 Ibid. 36 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 1-2. 37 Frantisek Hrusovsky, Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Cleveland, OH.: Slovensky ustav pri Opatstve sv. Andreja-Svorada, 1955), 186-7, 202-03 . 38 "Prva Katolicka Slovenska Vyss ia Dievcenska Skola," in Pamatnica slovenskeho dna newyorkskych a new j erseyskych Slowikov: 5. jula, 1926. J. C. Sciranka, ed. (New York City: Vybor slovenskeho dila, s. d.), no pagination. 34 �SLOVAKIA-2015 43 On the same day, accompanied by Philip R. McDevitt, Bishop of Harrisburg, the Slovak bishops moved on to the Jednota Estates of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania.39 The First Catholic Slovak Union, a fraternal-benefit society, was founded in Cleveland in 1890 by the Reverend Stefan Furdek. On April 30, 1926, it had 629 active branches with 55 ,091 members . Established in 1906 to organize the youth, its Youth Division (Mladenecke oddelenie) had 446 active branches with 35,535 members . Altogether, the FCSU had 1,075 branches with 90,626 members . In 1926, the market value of the FCSU 's assets was $5,012,880.53 and its Youth Division 's assets totaled $157,202 .96, for a grand total of $5,170,083.65. It was the largest and strongest Slovak Catholic fraternal benefit society in the world. It also cared for orphaned children of its deceased members in an orphanage established in 1906 (opened in 1914) to this end in Middletown .40 Its editorial offices and printery were also located there.4 1 The next day, bishop Jozef Carsky left the group and went to administer the sacrament of confirmation to parishes in Houtzdale and Windburn, Pennsylvania. On June 16, 1926, the bishops left for Harrisburg, from whence they continued to 42 the Eucharistic Congress. In Chicago the bishops were officially welcomed by representatives of Slovak-American Catholic societies. Before the formal opening of the Congress, the Slovak bishops received visits by their countrymen and toured the city. In the Slovak Catholic parishes, they celebrated masses and held missionary sermons. The latter were purely apolitical. Only bishop Vojtassak complained in one of them that he could not come to America sooner, because in 1923 the Czechoslo43 vak authorities refused to issue him a passport. The Eucharistic Congress opened in the morning of June 20, 1926 with the reading of a papal bull and lasted until June 24, 1926 . 39 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I . 4-0Pamdtnik rimsko-katolickych slovenskych osad v zapad. Pennsylvanii vydany vyborom slovenskeho dna z prileiitosti navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska: v stredu dna 7. Ju/a 1926 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Vybor slovenskeho dna, s. d.), 122-3. 41 Jednota, June 23, 1926, 2. 42 /bid. 43 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People' s Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, July 30, 1926. �44 SLOV AKIA-2015 It was hosted by George Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago. The Holy See was represented by the papal nuncio Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano. The Congress took place in the local churches and auditoriums and in the recently opened Soldier Field Stadium. 44 On the last day of the Congress there was a pilgrimage to the city of Mundelein, Illinois, forty miles north of Chicago. The Congress was attended by representatives from all continents and thus it manifested the universality of the Catholic Church. In addition, it was the greatest pilgrimage in American history. The Chicago Daily News reported that the final mass in Mundelein was attended by an estimated half a million to a million of the faithful. 45 In addition, the Daily News reported interesting details on the pilgrimage to Mundelein, such as the consumption of ten tons of hot dogs by the pilgrims and the crush of passengers on the trains, which began running at two-minute intervals from 4 a.m. that day. It also rained, which then turned into hail, and the Daily News boasted that it managed to print photographs from Mundelein in its papers and got them on the street within two hours, thanks to swift delivery by airplane. 46 The choir during the opening of the mass consisted of 60,000 children. The Fox Film Corporation, which created a 96-minute film of the Congress (it premiered in New York on November 8, 1926), refused to accept any remuneration for its participation. An estimated 100,000 Slovaks attended the Eucharistic Congress (approximately sixty from Slovakia, including the bishops).47 The latter actively participated in the Congress by celebrating masses and delivering sermons. 48 Even though American newspapers did not pay any attention to the Slovak pilgrims at the Eucharistic Congress, 44 Soldier Field Stadium in Chicago serves as a memorial to American soldiers who died in past wars. It was designed in 1919 and opened on October 9, 1924 on the 53 rd anniversary of the Great Chicago Fire as Municipal Grant Park Stadium, changing its name to Soldier Field on November 11 , 1925. Its design is modeled on the Greco-Roman architectural tradition, with Doric columns rising above the entrance. After subsequent reconstructions, the modem grandstands diminish the impression of these columns. 45 The Chicago Daily News, June 24, 1926, I [online] . Available at: http ://encyclo£edia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ 11319.htm1. 6 Eucharistic Congress, Chicago Daily News, 1926 [online]. Available at: http: //enc clopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ I 1319 .html. 4 Jednota. Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7, 43-44. 48 Slovak, July 8, 1926, 3. 1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 45 in the program of church services, published in all newspapers by the organizational board of the Congress, the Slovaks were listed as a separate group. 49 After the Eucharistic Congress, the Slovak Catholic bishops stayed in the USA until August 4, 1926. In the meantime, they visited all the major and several minor Slovak Catholic parishes. They held missionary services and sermons and administered the sacrament of confirmation. They also attended Slovak Days, gatherings and meetings.50 On July 1, 1926, they were hosted by Michal Bosak in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 51 In their speeches, the Slovak bishops avoided political issues. The representatives of Slovak-American autonomists (Ivan Bielek, President of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek, editor of Jednota and others), however, made use of the Slovak Days for agitation for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops were very popular with the people. 52 For instance, the Jednota and Slowik newspapers reported an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 people at the 3rd Slovak Day in Pittsburgh on July 7, 1926. 53 On July 28, 1926, the weekly Jednota published an appeal by bishop Jozef Carsky, to Slovak-American Catholics from eastern Slovakia. The bishop stressed the importance of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava, which, however, still had very few members in the east. He decided, therefore, to appeal to their countrymen in America to pay the membership fees in the Society of St. Adalbert for them . Bishop Carsky also made an appeal to the Slovak49 AMZV CR, f. Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. Interestingly enough, June Granatir Alexander, in her Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jnterwar Era (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), fails to mention Slovak participation in the Eucharistic Congress. 50 Pauco, 209. 51 ASSV, fasc. 338/2. Jozef J. Dulik, Na pamiatku Vecierka usporiadaneho na pocest' osvietenych panov Biskupov zo Slovenska Micha/om Bosakom 1-ho ju/a 1926 v Scranton, Pa. The brochure reads that the bishops were treated to caviar, green turtle soup, cuts of Virginia ham, filet of beef, vanilla ice-cream and other specialties. 52 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 53 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 2; Slovak, August 4, 1926, 5. �46 SLOVAKIA-2015 American priests to raise public awareness of this issue or to set aside one Sunday for fundraising to create a branch of the Society of St. Adalbert in Kos ice.54 All four Slovak bishops made a similar speech on July 29, 1926. In their address, the bishops, as the protectors of the Society of St. Adalbert, stressed its importance for all Slovaks. They thanked Slovak-American Catholics for their support of the Society in the past and invited them to become members, to purchase its books, especially the bible, as well as to register their countrymen in Slovakia as its members. 55 On July 30, 1926, the Slovak bishops paid an official visit to the Czechoslovak legation in Washington. Since ambassador Zdenek Fierlinger had departed, they were received by proxy. At the embassy , the bishops expressed great satisfaction with the Slovak colony in the USA and noted that everywhere they had gained an impression of real national awareness and reliability. At the same time, they expressed the belief that, in terms of loyalty to Czechoslovakia, factual judgment refined by the school of life, acumen, as well as inborn skepticism, protected American Slovaks from excesses. 56 The Slovak bishops also visited the papal nuncio to the United States. 57 Before departure, the Slovak bishops addressed to SlovakAmerican Catholics a farewell letter in which they thanked them for their receptions and hospitality. They expressed admiration for what Slovak Catholics in America had achieved in a relatively short period of time, despite various difficulties. The proverbial Slovak tenaciousness in the national and religious fields had transformed itself into Slovak churches, schools and fraternal-benefit-societies and halls. The bishops wished the Slovak Catholics in America a good life with no obstacles in the future .58 On August 3, 1926, there was a farewell banquet for the bishops in the Astoria Hotel in New York City. The representative of the 54 Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. 55 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 56 ' AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 191 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 57 Pietro Fumasoni Biondi (1872- 1960) - papal legate in the USA from December 14, 1922 to March 16, 1933. 58Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. �SLOVAKIA-2015 47 Czechoslovak legation in Washington, J. Lavicka (otherwise the Czechoslovak Consul General in New York), also came to officially say farewell to the bishops. The main theme of the bishops' final speeches was an appeal to American Slovaks to save their youth because thus they would save the nation.59 The Slovak bishops left America on the steamship Aquitania on August 4, 1926.60 Therefore, it is apparent that the four Slovak Catholic bishops used their trip to the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago for a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. During their almost two-month stay in the USA (June I I- August 4, 1926), they visited many Slovak-American Catholic parishes. To visit all of them was physically impossible, because within one day they would have had to visit more than four. For the SlovakAmerican Catholics the Slovak bishops' journey had a certain specificity . Many of them, especially Catholic priests, had had a personal experience with the chauvinism of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, which was in many cases the main reason for their departure oversees. That is why they welcomed the Slovak bishops after the creation of Czechoslovakia. As to Andrej Hlinka's agitation tour, he and the bishops, except for the latter' s reception in New York City, never appeared together. After the Eucharistic Congress they parted ways. However, the bishops' presence in America, even if apolitical, significantly increased interest among American Slovaks in Andrej Hlinka's lectures. The authority of the Slovak bishops helped Hlinka in another respect as well. His lecture tour in the USA occurred in the atmosphere of numerous minor personal arguments in the Slovak Catholic community. The presence of the Slovak bishops helped to overcome these aversions and staved off the danger of public controversy.61 On the 59 Pauco, 209; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 60 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 61 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. For a detailed account on A. Hlinka's journey to the USA in 1926, see my "Andrej Hlinka' s Journey to the USA in 1926," in Slovakia, 40 (Nos. 74-75 , 2010), 32-46. �48 SLOV AKIA-2015 other hand, the Slovak-American autonomists did not hesitate to make use of the presence of the bishops to agitate for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops often expressed their surprise at and admiration for what they saw in the centers of Slovak Catholic life in America. At the graduation ceremony in Danville, Pennsylvania, bishop Blaha rejoiced at the fact that there was a Slovak girls' high school so far from home. 62 Similarly, on the farm of the FCSU in Middletown, he admired what the society had achieved and said that in Slovakia something similar would not be possible.63 Finally, at the Slovak Day in Pittsburgh he said that, on the basis of what he had seen and experienced in Slovak America, American Slovaks would nationally and culturally survive in the USA for another hundred years.64 The Slovak bishops used their trip to America to advertise the Society of St. Adalbert and its newly-released Slovak edition of the bible. The success of this mission was more than clear and for the Society of St. Adalbert it meant a high return on its investment in publishing the Slovak bible. Part of the Slovak bishops' goals, as well as that of Andrej Hlinka, in the USA was fund-raising. For the bishops it was organized by a committee headed by Monsignor Viktor Blahunka. 65 As early as in April of 1926, Karol Kmet'ko, bishop of Nitra, turned to the Slovak-American Catholics and asked them for funds for the Society of the Divine Word. 66 According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the FCSU's head office gave each of the bishops during their journey to the USA $1,000. 67 Unfortunately, we do not know how much money the Slovak bishops raised in America. Despite the fact that, according to the reports of the Czech62Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 2. Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I. 64 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 1. 65ASSV, fasc. 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 66 AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prafue, April 15, 1926. 1 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 63 �SLOV AKIA-2015 49 oslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the committees of festivals on the occasion of the visit of the Slovak Catholic bishops at some places showed a financial deficit, 68 the amount the bishops raised must have been relatively large. This is suggested by the letter of Andrej Hlinka to Jan Postenyi upon their return from America: "As you know, I have returned with fame, pennants and rings- but not many dollars . Business is business and I am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 69 68 /bid. ASSV, fasc. 156112b. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 69 � SLOV AKIA-2015 35 THE JOURNEY OFFOUR SLOVAK CATHOLIC BISHOPS TO THE USA IN 1926 1 Stefan Kucik In 1926, the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in the United States of America. This "country of unlimited possibilities" was generally expected to prepare a Congress that would surpass all previous International Eucharistic Congresses, both in terms of the number of participants and its grandiosity. The Congress itself was expected to become a forum to manifest the strength of American Catholicism. For Slovak-American Catholics, however, the forthcoming Congress had a significant added value. The four new Slovak Catholics bishops were to participate in it. While many authors have dealt with various aspects of the lives and activities of Slovak Catholic bishops in the interwar period, no one has yet provided us with a detailed account on their journey to the USA in 1926. This article will try to fill this gap. At the time of the International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, there were six Catholic bishops in Slovakia: Marian Blaha of Banska Bystrica, Jan Vojtassak of Spis, and Karol Kmet'ko of Nitra (all ordained on February 13, I 921 ); Jozef Carsky of Kos ice and Pavo I Jantausch of Trnava (both ordained on June 14, 1925); and Michal Bubnic of Roziiava (ordained on December 8, 1925). However, only four of them finally departed for America: Blaha, Vojtassak, Jantausch and Carsky. The number of Slovak Catholic bishops who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago initially fluctuated . On April 8, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague that all Slovak bishops would make the trip to the USA. 2 On April 14, 1926, the American Catholic 1 This is an English and slightly modified and updated version of my previous article entitled "Cesta slovenskych katolickych biskupov do slovenskej Ameriky v roku 1926," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 21-31 . 2 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), fond (hereinafter f.) Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, inventory �36 SLOV AKIA-2015 weekly Jednota published an article in which it announced the arrival of bishops Vojtassak, Kmet'ko, Blaha, Jantausch and, perhaps, Carsky as well, while bishop Bubnic was likely to stay at home due to his illness. 3 On May 16, 1926, the Bratislava daily Slowik men4 tioned five bishops, leaving Marian Blaha in Slovakia. The final decision on the number of bishops,who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress was made by the Bishop 's Conference only a few days before their planned departure. The Conference decided that the bishops of Nitra and Roziiava would remain at home. 5 The reason was the wish of the Papal Nuncio in Prague to have some representatives of the Slovak episcopate at his disposal. This was a time of tense negotiations with Czechoslovakia after the so-called "Marmaggi Affair." The Nuncio wanted Czech and Slovak bishops to submit a memorandum to Czechoslovak officials on the eve of Jan Hus Day (July 6). As a matter of fact, the memorandum was prepared by the Vatican's State Secretary in Rome and it demanded that the Czechoslovak government and President Masaryk refrain from participating in the Hus celebrations and from insulting Czechoslovakia's Catholics.6 Another reason for a part of the Slovak episcopate 's remaining at home was the preparation of an important law on 7 clergy salaries in Czechoslovakia. For the Slovak Catholic bishops it was the first, as well as the last, trip to America. Their requests for issuing or extending passports to the USA were met with no major obstructions, 8 even though in the case of bishop Blaha, as he said himself, the authorities exnumber (hereinafter i. no.) 22, folder (hereinafter fold .) 650. Letter of the Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 8, 1926. 3 Jednota (Middletown, PA), April 14, 1926, 4. 4 Slovak (Bratislava), May 16, 1926, 3. 5 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. 6Emilia Hrabovec, "Sviita stolica a slovenski biskupi v medzivojnovom obdobi," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 8. 7 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. The law was passed on June 25, 1926 . Zakon kongruovy c. 122/ 1926 Sb. z. an. zakon ze dne 25. cervna 1926 o uprave platu duchovenstva cirkvi a naboienskych spolecnosti statem uznanych, pfip. recipovanych [online]. Available at: http ://spcp.prf.cuni .cz/lex/ 122-26.htm. 8 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, April 8, 1926. �SLOV AKIA-2015 37 pressed "a strange sort of caution. " 9 Thus, the situation of 1923, when the Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue a passport to bishop Vojtassak for his intended journey to America, was not repeated. 10 In 1926 there were 228 Slovak Catholic parishes with 236 priests in the USA. 11 Therefore, the Slovak bishops intended to not only attend the Eucharistic Congress, but also to make a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. It was supposed to strengthen their Catholic identity which was threatened by the secularization influences of the American environment and the propaganda of the Czechoslovak Church 12 supported by the Czechoslovak government, as well as to raise some funds for Catholic institutions in Slovakia. 13 Czechoslovak representative offices in the USA, however, began to collect information on the plans of Slovak-American autonomists, largely consisting of the Catholic element, to make use of the presence of the Slovak Catholic bishops for their political goals. Indeed, Slovak bishops travelled to America at a time when the idea of Slovak autonomy on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement was supported by most American Slovaks, represented by the Slovak League of America (hereinafter SLA). Information on the intended political actions of SlovakAmerican autonomists on the occasion of the Slovak bishops ' visit raised fears in the offices of Czechoslovak representatives in the USA. Therefore, the anti-autonomist circles in America sought to 9 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 19 I 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Presidium of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, May 17, 1926. 10 For more on Jan Vojtassak's case, see Stefan Kucik, "The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923," in Slovakia 41 (Nos. 76-77, 2013), 7-36. 11 Jednota : Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 1927 (Middletown, PA), 161-72. 12 The Czechoslovak Church (after 1971 the Czechoslovak Hussite Church) is a Christian Church which separated from the Roman Catholic Church after World War I (January 8, 1920) in the former Czechoslovakia. Originally a Czech national church, its activities are now almost entirely limited to today's Czech and Slovak Republics. One such church existed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1926 and 1967. See Joseph P. Budd, "We do Know English: Philadelphia' s Czechoslovak Presbyterian Church of Jan Hus, 1926-1967," M.A. thesis, University of Delaware, 2009. I am grateful to M. Mark Stolarik for this citation. There may have been other such Czechoslovak churches in the USA, but so far no-one has studied them. 13 Hrabovec, 8. �38 SLOV AKIA-2015 blunt the political edge of these actions. For instance, the Rev. Jozef Murgas of Wilkes-Barre, PA, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, to question Slovak priests at their upcoming conference in eastern Pennsylvania whether they were interested in politics or in religion. According to Murgas, the Czech bishops travelling to the Eucharistic Congress allegedly called upon the Slovak bishops to represent themselves in the USA as Czechoslovak bishops. Reportedly, bishop Jan Vojtassak: replied on behalf of the Slovak episcopate that they would go to America as Slovak bishops. 14 Of greater concern to the Slovak-American "Czechoslovak" camp was the fact that the president of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, Andrej Hlinka himself, was also going to attend the Eucharistic Congress. Besides his trip to the Congress, Hlinka planned to use his stay in the USA to agitate for Slovak autonomy, fundraising and internationalization of the Slovak cause. 15 He also intended to settle personal disputes among Slovak-American Catholics. 16 On the initiative of the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, the Rev. Murgas decided to organize in his parish in Wilkes-Barre on June 27, 1926 a Cyrilo-Methodian ceremony on the occasion of the consecration of the new local school. He invited the whole Czech and Ruthenian episcopates, as well as the Slovak bishops Marian Blaha and Jozef Carsky. The ceremony was also to be held to commemorate the Order of the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, of which Rev. Murgas was a co-founder. The preparations were made in such a manner that Andrej Hlinka would not be present. Moreover, the occasion was to become a place where the Czech and Slovak bishops could demonstrate "Czechoslovak" solidarity. The organizers invited the Czechoslovak ambassador in Washington as well. 17 14 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Pra~ue, Marc5120, 1926. 5 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 30, 1926. 16 S!owik, May 23, 1926, 1. 17 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, March 20, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650 . Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs �SLOVAKIA-2015 39 However, Getting and Murgas were disappointed. Even Murgas' personal intercession with bishop Carsky immediately upon the arrival of Slovak bishops in New York ended in vain. 18 Bishop Blaha gave priority to attendance at the Slovak Day in St. Louis, Missouri on June 27, I 926 19 and bishop Carsky went to Cudahy, Wisconsin, to administer the sacrament of confirmation. 20 On the other hand, the Slovak bishops did visit the Sacred Heart of Jesus parish in WilkesBarre on different occasions, bishop Carsky even twice.21 The four Slovak bishops set out on their journey to the USA on May 31, 192622 and arrived in New York City on the steamship Aquitania on June 11, 1926. When they docked, they were welcomed by Slovak-American priests, representatives of Slovak-American organizations and newspapers, a representative of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, J. Lavicka, and other individuals. Accompanied by several dozen cars, the bishops were driven to the Slovak st Church of St. John Nepomucene at the comer 66 th Street and 1 Avenue. Its pastor since 1916 was the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. After a short prayer in the church, there was a banquet in the Commodore Hotel, hosted by Slovak priests in honor of the Slovak bishops. The banquet was chaired by Msgr. Viktor B lahunka of Chicago (originally from Lucky near Ruzomberok). 23 He also headed the committee 24 charged with the care of the Slovak bishops while in America. of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651 . Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 22, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 18 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 19 Jednota , July 7, 1926, I. 20 Jednota , July 14, 1926, I. 21 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 22 Slowik, June 1, 1926, I. 23 Jednota , June 16, 1926, 1; Slowik, July 2, 1926, 3. 24 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. �40 SLOV AKIA-2015 After greetings and words of welcome, bishop Marian Blaha addressed the audience. He said that they had arrived in America to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. However, the second very important goal of their journey was to visit and strengthen the faith of Slovak-American Catholics. He expressed pleasure at the fact that the Slovak Catholics in America had preserved both their faith and their Slovak language. Bishop Blaha informed the audience that they had brought a gift to the Slovak-American Catholics - the modem Slovak translation of the Bible. He did not forget to remark that the main credit for publishing it belonged to Andrej Hlinka, who was also present at the banquet. 25 In 1926 the first translation of the Bible into modem Slovak was completed. It was published by the Society of St. Adalbert (Spolok sv. Vojtecha) in Tmava. The preparatory phase had lasted for more than four decades. It was published between the years 1913 and 1926, with a long break due to World War I. The translation consisted of ten chapters: two for the New and eight for the Old Testament. After the whole first translation of the Bible appeared, Narodnie noviny in Turciansky Svaty Martin published a review (copied by other Slovak newspapers as well) that only the revision of the translation, done by the Rev. Frantisek R. Osvald, took a full eight years.26 After the Great War, the large amount of money needed by the Society of St. Adalbert to publish the Slovak translation of the bible was hard to raise in Slovakia. In 1920 generous gifts from America began to flow into Slovakia. Especially generous were the donations given by the Slovak bishops Karol Kmet'ko, Marian Blaha and Jan Vojtassak and Andrej Hlinka (100,000 crowns each). All this money was put into the shares of the Society of St. Adalbert for publishing purposes. In the critical situation (in 1923), the Society sent a threemember delegation, led by its director Jan Postenyi-Kysucky, to the USA. Within two and half months, the delegation visited more than one hundred Slovak-American parishes. At the very first meeting with the Slovak-American editors and the presidents of Slovak25 Jednota, June I 6, 1926, I. Jan Debnar, "Hist6ria prekladu a vydania prveho svatovojtesskeho Svateho pisma," in O prekladoch Biblie do slovenciny a do inych slovanskych j azykov, Jan Dorul'a, ed. (Bratislava: Slavisticky kabinet SA V, 1997), 247, 276-278 ; Jednota, June 16, 1926, 5. 26 �SLOVAKIA-2015 41 American Catholic organizations in Pittsburgh, $1,072 was collected and 2,156 new members joined the Society (the membership fee was $4 but twenty-five founding members contributed $100 each, while the American-Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak gave $600). 27 In 1926, the Society of St. Adalbert also sent its delegation to the USA. It consisted of the director Jan Postenyi, Alexander Sindelar, Stefan Zlatos and Robert Pobozny .28 The proposition to send a delegation to the USA during the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago was made by director Jan Postenyi at the meeting of the executive board in April of 1926. As a matter of fact, the Society issued the Slovak edition of the Bible at its own expense of 800,000 crowns. If the Society was not to fall into new debt (in Slovakia an expected interest in the Slovak bible failed to materialize), it had to turn to the SlovakAmerican Catholics. Moreover, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America still held 116,000 crowns belonging to the Society of St. Adalbert, which could be claimed only in person. 29 In the USA, the delegates sold 3,800 copies of the bible for $10 .00 each . At the same time, 1,500 new members joined the Society.30 The center of the mission of the Society of St. Adalbert in the USA was its own branch in Youngstown, Ohio, which since 1922 had been administered by the Rev . Stefan Kocis.31 Eventually, American Slovaks bought 6,800 copies of the Slovak bible.32 Bishop Marian Blaha's remarks on Andrej Hlinka's contribution to the publishing of the Slovak Bible were justified. Indeed, it is often referred to as the Hlinka translation or the Hlinka and Donoval translation, because both Andrej Hlinka and Jan Donoval greatly contributed to this work. It is shocking how little attention has been given to these two priests and their role in the translation of the bible and to their contribution to the development of Slovak spiritual, linguistic and national enlightenment. Andrej Hlinka also played a major role in publishing the bible by the Society of St. Adalbert, which 27 Debnar, 282. Jan Postenyi, Dejiny Spo/ku sv. Vojte cha (Tmava: Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 1930), 79. 29 ASSV. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia vyboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha konaneho 26. aprila r. 1926 . 30 Debnar, 283. 31 Postenyi, 80. 32 Debnar, 283 . 28 �42 SLOV AKIA-2015 he led as its president from November 14, 1920, together with director Jan Postenyi and secretary Juraj Hoda! (since 1923). 33 After attending the welcoming and gala dinner in the Commodore Hotel in New York City, the Slovak bishops went their own ways: Jan Vojtassak proceeded to Rev. Anton Gracik's St. Stephen's parish in Newark, New Jersey Pavol Jantausch joined Rev. Jan Kubasek at his Holy Trinity parish in Yonkers, New York; Jozef Carsky went to administer the sacrament of confirmation (we do not know to which parish) and Marian Blaha remained at Rev. Stefan Krasul'a's . h .34 pans On Sunday, June 13 , 1926, the four Slovak bishops attended a reception for the papal nuncio to the Eucharistic Congress, Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano, in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City. In the evening of the same day, the Slovak bishops were guests at a banquet hosted in their honor by the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. 35 The next day the Slovak bishops attended the first graduation ceremony at Danville Academy for Girls, founded by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Danville, Pennsylvania. 36 The order is the first and only Slovak religious order founded in honor of the Apostles of the Slavs. It was established on September 11, 1909 by four Slovak-American Roman-Catholic priests: Matus Jankola, Andrej Pavco, Alexander Dianiska and Jozef Murgas. The idea of a high school for Slovak girls originated in 1922, the same year as when the Slovak Benedictines in the USA decided to establish a high school for boys in Cleveland, Ohio. In the school year 1925-26, the girl's high school already had all four grades. Therefore, the Sisters asked the state authorities for accreditation. The latter was granted to the school on June 10, 1926. 37 So only four days later the first graduation ceremony of the first ten students was held in the presence of five bishops, three monsignors, fifty-one priests and a large number of spectators. 38 33 Jbid. , 280-28 I. Slowi k, July 2, 1926, 3. 35 Ibid. 36 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 1-2. 37 Frantisek Hrusovsky, Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Cleveland, OH.: Slovensky ustav pri Opatstve sv. Andreja-Svorada, 1955), 186-7, 202-03 . 38 "Prva Katolicka Slovenska Vyss ia Dievcenska Skola," in Pamatnica slovenskeho dna newyorkskych a new j erseyskych Slowikov: 5. jula, 1926. J. C. Sciranka, ed. (New York City: Vybor slovenskeho dila, s. d.), no pagination. 34 �SLOVAKIA-2015 43 On the same day, accompanied by Philip R. McDevitt, Bishop of Harrisburg, the Slovak bishops moved on to the Jednota Estates of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania.39 The First Catholic Slovak Union, a fraternal-benefit society, was founded in Cleveland in 1890 by the Reverend Stefan Furdek. On April 30, 1926, it had 629 active branches with 55 ,091 members . Established in 1906 to organize the youth, its Youth Division (Mladenecke oddelenie) had 446 active branches with 35,535 members . Altogether, the FCSU had 1,075 branches with 90,626 members . In 1926, the market value of the FCSU 's assets was $5,012,880.53 and its Youth Division 's assets totaled $157,202 .96, for a grand total of $5,170,083.65. It was the largest and strongest Slovak Catholic fraternal benefit society in the world. It also cared for orphaned children of its deceased members in an orphanage established in 1906 (opened in 1914) to this end in Middletown .40 Its editorial offices and printery were also located there.4 1 The next day, bishop Jozef Carsky left the group and went to administer the sacrament of confirmation to parishes in Houtzdale and Windburn, Pennsylvania. On June 16, 1926, the bishops left for Harrisburg, from whence they continued to 42 the Eucharistic Congress. In Chicago the bishops were officially welcomed by representatives of Slovak-American Catholic societies. Before the formal opening of the Congress, the Slovak bishops received visits by their countrymen and toured the city. In the Slovak Catholic parishes, they celebrated masses and held missionary sermons. The latter were purely apolitical. Only bishop Vojtassak complained in one of them that he could not come to America sooner, because in 1923 the Czechoslo43 vak authorities refused to issue him a passport. The Eucharistic Congress opened in the morning of June 20, 1926 with the reading of a papal bull and lasted until June 24, 1926 . 39 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I . 4-0Pamdtnik rimsko-katolickych slovenskych osad v zapad. Pennsylvanii vydany vyborom slovenskeho dna z prileiitosti navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska: v stredu dna 7. Ju/a 1926 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Vybor slovenskeho dna, s. d.), 122-3. 41 Jednota, June 23, 1926, 2. 42 /bid. 43 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People' s Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, July 30, 1926. �44 SLOV AKIA-2015 It was hosted by George Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago. The Holy See was represented by the papal nuncio Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano. The Congress took place in the local churches and auditoriums and in the recently opened Soldier Field Stadium. 44 On the last day of the Congress there was a pilgrimage to the city of Mundelein, Illinois, forty miles north of Chicago. The Congress was attended by representatives from all continents and thus it manifested the universality of the Catholic Church. In addition, it was the greatest pilgrimage in American history. The Chicago Daily News reported that the final mass in Mundelein was attended by an estimated half a million to a million of the faithful. 45 In addition, the Daily News reported interesting details on the pilgrimage to Mundelein, such as the consumption of ten tons of hot dogs by the pilgrims and the crush of passengers on the trains, which began running at two-minute intervals from 4 a.m. that day. It also rained, which then turned into hail, and the Daily News boasted that it managed to print photographs from Mundelein in its papers and got them on the street within two hours, thanks to swift delivery by airplane. 46 The choir during the opening of the mass consisted of 60,000 children. The Fox Film Corporation, which created a 96-minute film of the Congress (it premiered in New York on November 8, 1926), refused to accept any remuneration for its participation. An estimated 100,000 Slovaks attended the Eucharistic Congress (approximately sixty from Slovakia, including the bishops).47 The latter actively participated in the Congress by celebrating masses and delivering sermons. 48 Even though American newspapers did not pay any attention to the Slovak pilgrims at the Eucharistic Congress, 44 Soldier Field Stadium in Chicago serves as a memorial to American soldiers who died in past wars. It was designed in 1919 and opened on October 9, 1924 on the 53 rd anniversary of the Great Chicago Fire as Municipal Grant Park Stadium, changing its name to Soldier Field on November 11 , 1925. Its design is modeled on the Greco-Roman architectural tradition, with Doric columns rising above the entrance. After subsequent reconstructions, the modem grandstands diminish the impression of these columns. 45 The Chicago Daily News, June 24, 1926, I [online] . Available at: http ://encyclo£edia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ 11319.htm1. 6 Eucharistic Congress, Chicago Daily News, 1926 [online]. Available at: http: //enc clopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ I 1319 .html. 4 Jednota. Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7, 43-44. 48 Slovak, July 8, 1926, 3. 1 �SLOV AKIA-2015 45 in the program of church services, published in all newspapers by the organizational board of the Congress, the Slovaks were listed as a separate group. 49 After the Eucharistic Congress, the Slovak Catholic bishops stayed in the USA until August 4, 1926. In the meantime, they visited all the major and several minor Slovak Catholic parishes. They held missionary services and sermons and administered the sacrament of confirmation. They also attended Slovak Days, gatherings and meetings.50 On July 1, 1926, they were hosted by Michal Bosak in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 51 In their speeches, the Slovak bishops avoided political issues. The representatives of Slovak-American autonomists (Ivan Bielek, President of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek, editor of Jednota and others), however, made use of the Slovak Days for agitation for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops were very popular with the people. 52 For instance, the Jednota and Slowik newspapers reported an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 people at the 3rd Slovak Day in Pittsburgh on July 7, 1926. 53 On July 28, 1926, the weekly Jednota published an appeal by bishop Jozef Carsky, to Slovak-American Catholics from eastern Slovakia. The bishop stressed the importance of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava, which, however, still had very few members in the east. He decided, therefore, to appeal to their countrymen in America to pay the membership fees in the Society of St. Adalbert for them . Bishop Carsky also made an appeal to the Slovak49 AMZV CR, f. Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. Interestingly enough, June Granatir Alexander, in her Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jnterwar Era (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), fails to mention Slovak participation in the Eucharistic Congress. 50 Pauco, 209. 51 ASSV, fasc. 338/2. Jozef J. Dulik, Na pamiatku Vecierka usporiadaneho na pocest' osvietenych panov Biskupov zo Slovenska Micha/om Bosakom 1-ho ju/a 1926 v Scranton, Pa. The brochure reads that the bishops were treated to caviar, green turtle soup, cuts of Virginia ham, filet of beef, vanilla ice-cream and other specialties. 52 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 53 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 2; Slovak, August 4, 1926, 5. �46 SLOVAKIA-2015 American priests to raise public awareness of this issue or to set aside one Sunday for fundraising to create a branch of the Society of St. Adalbert in Kos ice.54 All four Slovak bishops made a similar speech on July 29, 1926. In their address, the bishops, as the protectors of the Society of St. Adalbert, stressed its importance for all Slovaks. They thanked Slovak-American Catholics for their support of the Society in the past and invited them to become members, to purchase its books, especially the bible, as well as to register their countrymen in Slovakia as its members. 55 On July 30, 1926, the Slovak bishops paid an official visit to the Czechoslovak legation in Washington. Since ambassador Zdenek Fierlinger had departed, they were received by proxy. At the embassy , the bishops expressed great satisfaction with the Slovak colony in the USA and noted that everywhere they had gained an impression of real national awareness and reliability. At the same time, they expressed the belief that, in terms of loyalty to Czechoslovakia, factual judgment refined by the school of life, acumen, as well as inborn skepticism, protected American Slovaks from excesses. 56 The Slovak bishops also visited the papal nuncio to the United States. 57 Before departure, the Slovak bishops addressed to SlovakAmerican Catholics a farewell letter in which they thanked them for their receptions and hospitality. They expressed admiration for what Slovak Catholics in America had achieved in a relatively short period of time, despite various difficulties. The proverbial Slovak tenaciousness in the national and religious fields had transformed itself into Slovak churches, schools and fraternal-benefit-societies and halls. The bishops wished the Slovak Catholics in America a good life with no obstacles in the future .58 On August 3, 1926, there was a farewell banquet for the bishops in the Astoria Hotel in New York City. The representative of the 54 Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. 55 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 56 ' AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 191 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 57 Pietro Fumasoni Biondi (1872- 1960) - papal legate in the USA from December 14, 1922 to March 16, 1933. 58Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. �SLOVAKIA-2015 47 Czechoslovak legation in Washington, J. Lavicka (otherwise the Czechoslovak Consul General in New York), also came to officially say farewell to the bishops. The main theme of the bishops' final speeches was an appeal to American Slovaks to save their youth because thus they would save the nation.59 The Slovak bishops left America on the steamship Aquitania on August 4, 1926.60 Therefore, it is apparent that the four Slovak Catholic bishops used their trip to the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago for a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. During their almost two-month stay in the USA (June I I- August 4, 1926), they visited many Slovak-American Catholic parishes. To visit all of them was physically impossible, because within one day they would have had to visit more than four. For the SlovakAmerican Catholics the Slovak bishops' journey had a certain specificity . Many of them, especially Catholic priests, had had a personal experience with the chauvinism of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, which was in many cases the main reason for their departure oversees. That is why they welcomed the Slovak bishops after the creation of Czechoslovakia. As to Andrej Hlinka's agitation tour, he and the bishops, except for the latter' s reception in New York City, never appeared together. After the Eucharistic Congress they parted ways. However, the bishops' presence in America, even if apolitical, significantly increased interest among American Slovaks in Andrej Hlinka's lectures. The authority of the Slovak bishops helped Hlinka in another respect as well. His lecture tour in the USA occurred in the atmosphere of numerous minor personal arguments in the Slovak Catholic community. The presence of the Slovak bishops helped to overcome these aversions and staved off the danger of public controversy.61 On the 59 Pauco, 209; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 60 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 61 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. For a detailed account on A. Hlinka's journey to the USA in 1926, see my "Andrej Hlinka' s Journey to the USA in 1926," in Slovakia, 40 (Nos. 74-75 , 2010), 32-46. �48 SLOV AKIA-2015 other hand, the Slovak-American autonomists did not hesitate to make use of the presence of the bishops to agitate for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops often expressed their surprise at and admiration for what they saw in the centers of Slovak Catholic life in America. At the graduation ceremony in Danville, Pennsylvania, bishop Blaha rejoiced at the fact that there was a Slovak girls' high school so far from home. 62 Similarly, on the farm of the FCSU in Middletown, he admired what the society had achieved and said that in Slovakia something similar would not be possible.63 Finally, at the Slovak Day in Pittsburgh he said that, on the basis of what he had seen and experienced in Slovak America, American Slovaks would nationally and culturally survive in the USA for another hundred years.64 The Slovak bishops used their trip to America to advertise the Society of St. Adalbert and its newly-released Slovak edition of the bible. The success of this mission was more than clear and for the Society of St. Adalbert it meant a high return on its investment in publishing the Slovak bible. Part of the Slovak bishops' goals, as well as that of Andrej Hlinka, in the USA was fund-raising. For the bishops it was organized by a committee headed by Monsignor Viktor Blahunka. 65 As early as in April of 1926, Karol Kmet'ko, bishop of Nitra, turned to the Slovak-American Catholics and asked them for funds for the Society of the Divine Word. 66 According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the FCSU's head office gave each of the bishops during their journey to the USA $1,000. 67 Unfortunately, we do not know how much money the Slovak bishops raised in America. Despite the fact that, according to the reports of the Czech62Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 2. Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I. 64 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 1. 65ASSV, fasc. 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 66 AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prafue, April 15, 1926. 1 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 63 �SLOV AKIA-2015 49 oslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the committees of festivals on the occasion of the visit of the Slovak Catholic bishops at some places showed a financial deficit, 68 the amount the bishops raised must have been relatively large. This is suggested by the letter of Andrej Hlinka to Jan Postenyi upon their return from America: "As you know, I have returned with fame, pennants and rings- but not many dollars . Business is business and I am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 69 68 /bid. ASSV, fasc. 156112b. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 69 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA-2015 35 THE JOURNEY OFFOUR SLOVAK CATHOLIC BISHOPS TO THE USA IN 1926 1 Stefan Kucik In 1926, the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in the United States of America. This "country of unlimited possibilities" was generally expected to prepare a Congress that would surpass all previous International Eucharistic Congresses, both in terms of the number of participants and its grandiosity. The Congress itself was expected to become a forum to manifest the strength of American Catholicism. For Slovak-American Catholics, however, the forthcoming Congress had a significant added value. The four new Slovak Catholics bishops were to participate in it. While many authors have dealt with various aspects of the lives and activities of Slovak Catholic bishops in the interwar period, no one has yet provided us with a detailed account on their journey to the USA in 1926. This article will try to fill this gap. At the time of the International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, there were six Catholic bishops in Slovakia: Marian Blaha of Banska Bystrica, Jan Vojtassak of Spis, and Karol Kmet'ko of Nitra (all ordained on February 13, I 921 ); Jozef Carsky of Kos ice and Pavo I Jantausch of Trnava (both ordained on June 14, 1925); and Michal Bubnic of Roziiava (ordained on December 8, 1925). However, only four of them finally departed for America: Blaha, Vojtassak, Jantausch and Carsky. The number of Slovak Catholic bishops who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago initially fluctuated . On April 8, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague that all Slovak bishops would make the trip to the USA. 2 On April 14, 1926, the American Catholic 1 This is an English and slightly modified and updated version of my previous article entitled "Cesta slovenskych katolickych biskupov do slovenskej Ameriky v roku 1926," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 21-31 . 2 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnich veci Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), fond (hereinafter f.) Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, inventory 36 SLOV AKIA-2015 weekly Jednota published an article in which it announced the arrival of bishops Vojtassak, Kmet'ko, Blaha, Jantausch and, perhaps, Carsky as well, while bishop Bubnic was likely to stay at home due to his illness. 3 On May 16, 1926, the Bratislava daily Slowik men4 tioned five bishops, leaving Marian Blaha in Slovakia. The final decision on the number of bishops,who were to attend the Eucharistic Congress was made by the Bishop 's Conference only a few days before their planned departure. The Conference decided that the bishops of Nitra and Roziiava would remain at home. 5 The reason was the wish of the Papal Nuncio in Prague to have some representatives of the Slovak episcopate at his disposal. This was a time of tense negotiations with Czechoslovakia after the so-called "Marmaggi Affair." The Nuncio wanted Czech and Slovak bishops to submit a memorandum to Czechoslovak officials on the eve of Jan Hus Day (July 6). As a matter of fact, the memorandum was prepared by the Vatican's State Secretary in Rome and it demanded that the Czechoslovak government and President Masaryk refrain from participating in the Hus celebrations and from insulting Czechoslovakia's Catholics.6 Another reason for a part of the Slovak episcopate 's remaining at home was the preparation of an important law on 7 clergy salaries in Czechoslovakia. For the Slovak Catholic bishops it was the first, as well as the last, trip to America. Their requests for issuing or extending passports to the USA were met with no major obstructions, 8 even though in the case of bishop Blaha, as he said himself, the authorities exnumber (hereinafter i. no.) 22, folder (hereinafter fold .) 650. Letter of the Ministry of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 8, 1926. 3 Jednota (Middletown, PA), April 14, 1926, 4. 4 Slovak (Bratislava), May 16, 1926, 3. 5 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. 6Emilia Hrabovec, "Sviita stolica a slovenski biskupi v medzivojnovom obdobi," in Duchovny pastier, 93 (Nos. 1-2, 2012), 8. 7 Slovak, June I, 1926, I. The law was passed on June 25, 1926 . Zakon kongruovy c. 122/ 1926 Sb. z. an. zakon ze dne 25. cervna 1926 o uprave platu duchovenstva cirkvi a naboienskych spolecnosti statem uznanych, pfip. recipovanych [online]. Available at: http ://spcp.prf.cuni .cz/lex/ 122-26.htm. 8 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, April 8, 1926. SLOV AKIA-2015 37 pressed "a strange sort of caution. " 9 Thus, the situation of 1923, when the Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue a passport to bishop Vojtassak for his intended journey to America, was not repeated. 10 In 1926 there were 228 Slovak Catholic parishes with 236 priests in the USA. 11 Therefore, the Slovak bishops intended to not only attend the Eucharistic Congress, but also to make a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. It was supposed to strengthen their Catholic identity which was threatened by the secularization influences of the American environment and the propaganda of the Czechoslovak Church 12 supported by the Czechoslovak government, as well as to raise some funds for Catholic institutions in Slovakia. 13 Czechoslovak representative offices in the USA, however, began to collect information on the plans of Slovak-American autonomists, largely consisting of the Catholic element, to make use of the presence of the Slovak Catholic bishops for their political goals. Indeed, Slovak bishops travelled to America at a time when the idea of Slovak autonomy on the basis of the Pittsburgh Agreement was supported by most American Slovaks, represented by the Slovak League of America (hereinafter SLA). Information on the intended political actions of SlovakAmerican autonomists on the occasion of the Slovak bishops ' visit raised fears in the offices of Czechoslovak representatives in the USA. Therefore, the anti-autonomist circles in America sought to 9 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 19 I 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Presidium of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, May 17, 1926. 10 For more on Jan Vojtassak's case, see Stefan Kucik, "The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923," in Slovakia 41 (Nos. 76-77, 2013), 7-36. 11 Jednota : Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 1927 (Middletown, PA), 161-72. 12 The Czechoslovak Church (after 1971 the Czechoslovak Hussite Church) is a Christian Church which separated from the Roman Catholic Church after World War I (January 8, 1920) in the former Czechoslovakia. Originally a Czech national church, its activities are now almost entirely limited to today's Czech and Slovak Republics. One such church existed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania between 1926 and 1967. See Joseph P. Budd, "We do Know English: Philadelphia' s Czechoslovak Presbyterian Church of Jan Hus, 1926-1967," M.A. thesis, University of Delaware, 2009. I am grateful to M. Mark Stolarik for this citation. There may have been other such Czechoslovak churches in the USA, but so far no-one has studied them. 13 Hrabovec, 8. 38 SLOV AKIA-2015 blunt the political edge of these actions. For instance, the Rev. Jozef Murgas of Wilkes-Barre, PA, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, to question Slovak priests at their upcoming conference in eastern Pennsylvania whether they were interested in politics or in religion. According to Murgas, the Czech bishops travelling to the Eucharistic Congress allegedly called upon the Slovak bishops to represent themselves in the USA as Czechoslovak bishops. Reportedly, bishop Jan Vojtassak: replied on behalf of the Slovak episcopate that they would go to America as Slovak bishops. 14 Of greater concern to the Slovak-American "Czechoslovak" camp was the fact that the president of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, Andrej Hlinka himself, was also going to attend the Eucharistic Congress. Besides his trip to the Congress, Hlinka planned to use his stay in the USA to agitate for Slovak autonomy, fundraising and internationalization of the Slovak cause. 15 He also intended to settle personal disputes among Slovak-American Catholics. 16 On the initiative of the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, the Rev. Murgas decided to organize in his parish in Wilkes-Barre on June 27, 1926 a Cyrilo-Methodian ceremony on the occasion of the consecration of the new local school. He invited the whole Czech and Ruthenian episcopates, as well as the Slovak bishops Marian Blaha and Jozef Carsky. The ceremony was also to be held to commemorate the Order of the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, of which Rev. Murgas was a co-founder. The preparations were made in such a manner that Andrej Hlinka would not be present. Moreover, the occasion was to become a place where the Czech and Slovak bishops could demonstrate "Czechoslovak" solidarity. The organizers invited the Czechoslovak ambassador in Washington as well. 17 14 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Pra~ue, Marc5120, 1926. 5 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 30, 1926. 16 S!owik, May 23, 1926, 1. 17 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, March 20, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650 . Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs SLOVAKIA-2015 39 However, Getting and Murgas were disappointed. Even Murgas' personal intercession with bishop Carsky immediately upon the arrival of Slovak bishops in New York ended in vain. 18 Bishop Blaha gave priority to attendance at the Slovak Day in St. Louis, Missouri on June 27, I 926 19 and bishop Carsky went to Cudahy, Wisconsin, to administer the sacrament of confirmation. 20 On the other hand, the Slovak bishops did visit the Sacred Heart of Jesus parish in WilkesBarre on different occasions, bishop Carsky even twice.21 The four Slovak bishops set out on their journey to the USA on May 31, 192622 and arrived in New York City on the steamship Aquitania on June 11, 1926. When they docked, they were welcomed by Slovak-American priests, representatives of Slovak-American organizations and newspapers, a representative of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, J. Lavicka, and other individuals. Accompanied by several dozen cars, the bishops were driven to the Slovak st Church of St. John Nepomucene at the comer 66 th Street and 1 Avenue. Its pastor since 1916 was the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. After a short prayer in the church, there was a banquet in the Commodore Hotel, hosted by Slovak priests in honor of the Slovak bishops. The banquet was chaired by Msgr. Viktor B lahunka of Chicago (originally from Lucky near Ruzomberok). 23 He also headed the committee 24 charged with the care of the Slovak bishops while in America. of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651 . Letter of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 15, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 22, 1926; AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 18 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 19 Jednota , July 7, 1926, I. 20 Jednota , July 14, 1926, I. 21 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 22 Slowik, June 1, 1926, I. 23 Jednota , June 16, 1926, 1; Slowik, July 2, 1926, 3. 24 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 40 SLOV AKIA-2015 After greetings and words of welcome, bishop Marian Blaha addressed the audience. He said that they had arrived in America to attend the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago. However, the second very important goal of their journey was to visit and strengthen the faith of Slovak-American Catholics. He expressed pleasure at the fact that the Slovak Catholics in America had preserved both their faith and their Slovak language. Bishop Blaha informed the audience that they had brought a gift to the Slovak-American Catholics - the modem Slovak translation of the Bible. He did not forget to remark that the main credit for publishing it belonged to Andrej Hlinka, who was also present at the banquet. 25 In 1926 the first translation of the Bible into modem Slovak was completed. It was published by the Society of St. Adalbert (Spolok sv. Vojtecha) in Tmava. The preparatory phase had lasted for more than four decades. It was published between the years 1913 and 1926, with a long break due to World War I. The translation consisted of ten chapters: two for the New and eight for the Old Testament. After the whole first translation of the Bible appeared, Narodnie noviny in Turciansky Svaty Martin published a review (copied by other Slovak newspapers as well) that only the revision of the translation, done by the Rev. Frantisek R. Osvald, took a full eight years.26 After the Great War, the large amount of money needed by the Society of St. Adalbert to publish the Slovak translation of the bible was hard to raise in Slovakia. In 1920 generous gifts from America began to flow into Slovakia. Especially generous were the donations given by the Slovak bishops Karol Kmet'ko, Marian Blaha and Jan Vojtassak and Andrej Hlinka (100,000 crowns each). All this money was put into the shares of the Society of St. Adalbert for publishing purposes. In the critical situation (in 1923), the Society sent a threemember delegation, led by its director Jan Postenyi-Kysucky, to the USA. Within two and half months, the delegation visited more than one hundred Slovak-American parishes. At the very first meeting with the Slovak-American editors and the presidents of Slovak25 Jednota, June I 6, 1926, I. Jan Debnar, "Hist6ria prekladu a vydania prveho svatovojtesskeho Svateho pisma," in O prekladoch Biblie do slovenciny a do inych slovanskych j azykov, Jan Dorul'a, ed. (Bratislava: Slavisticky kabinet SA V, 1997), 247, 276-278 ; Jednota, June 16, 1926, 5. 26 SLOVAKIA-2015 41 American Catholic organizations in Pittsburgh, $1,072 was collected and 2,156 new members joined the Society (the membership fee was $4 but twenty-five founding members contributed $100 each, while the American-Slovak millionaire Michal Bosak gave $600). 27 In 1926, the Society of St. Adalbert also sent its delegation to the USA. It consisted of the director Jan Postenyi, Alexander Sindelar, Stefan Zlatos and Robert Pobozny .28 The proposition to send a delegation to the USA during the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago was made by director Jan Postenyi at the meeting of the executive board in April of 1926. As a matter of fact, the Society issued the Slovak edition of the Bible at its own expense of 800,000 crowns. If the Society was not to fall into new debt (in Slovakia an expected interest in the Slovak bible failed to materialize), it had to turn to the SlovakAmerican Catholics. Moreover, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America still held 116,000 crowns belonging to the Society of St. Adalbert, which could be claimed only in person. 29 In the USA, the delegates sold 3,800 copies of the bible for $10 .00 each . At the same time, 1,500 new members joined the Society.30 The center of the mission of the Society of St. Adalbert in the USA was its own branch in Youngstown, Ohio, which since 1922 had been administered by the Rev . Stefan Kocis.31 Eventually, American Slovaks bought 6,800 copies of the Slovak bible.32 Bishop Marian Blaha's remarks on Andrej Hlinka's contribution to the publishing of the Slovak Bible were justified. Indeed, it is often referred to as the Hlinka translation or the Hlinka and Donoval translation, because both Andrej Hlinka and Jan Donoval greatly contributed to this work. It is shocking how little attention has been given to these two priests and their role in the translation of the bible and to their contribution to the development of Slovak spiritual, linguistic and national enlightenment. Andrej Hlinka also played a major role in publishing the bible by the Society of St. Adalbert, which 27 Debnar, 282. Jan Postenyi, Dejiny Spo/ku sv. Vojte cha (Tmava: Spolok sv. Vojtecha, 1930), 79. 29 ASSV. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia vyboru Spolku sv. Vojtecha konaneho 26. aprila r. 1926 . 30 Debnar, 283. 31 Postenyi, 80. 32 Debnar, 283 . 28 42 SLOV AKIA-2015 he led as its president from November 14, 1920, together with director Jan Postenyi and secretary Juraj Hoda! (since 1923). 33 After attending the welcoming and gala dinner in the Commodore Hotel in New York City, the Slovak bishops went their own ways: Jan Vojtassak proceeded to Rev. Anton Gracik's St. Stephen's parish in Newark, New Jersey Pavol Jantausch joined Rev. Jan Kubasek at his Holy Trinity parish in Yonkers, New York; Jozef Carsky went to administer the sacrament of confirmation (we do not know to which parish) and Marian Blaha remained at Rev. Stefan Krasul'a's . h .34 pans On Sunday, June 13 , 1926, the four Slovak bishops attended a reception for the papal nuncio to the Eucharistic Congress, Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano, in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York City. In the evening of the same day, the Slovak bishops were guests at a banquet hosted in their honor by the Rev. Stefan Krasul'a. 35 The next day the Slovak bishops attended the first graduation ceremony at Danville Academy for Girls, founded by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in Danville, Pennsylvania. 36 The order is the first and only Slovak religious order founded in honor of the Apostles of the Slavs. It was established on September 11, 1909 by four Slovak-American Roman-Catholic priests: Matus Jankola, Andrej Pavco, Alexander Dianiska and Jozef Murgas. The idea of a high school for Slovak girls originated in 1922, the same year as when the Slovak Benedictines in the USA decided to establish a high school for boys in Cleveland, Ohio. In the school year 1925-26, the girl's high school already had all four grades. Therefore, the Sisters asked the state authorities for accreditation. The latter was granted to the school on June 10, 1926. 37 So only four days later the first graduation ceremony of the first ten students was held in the presence of five bishops, three monsignors, fifty-one priests and a large number of spectators. 38 33 Jbid. , 280-28 I. Slowi k, July 2, 1926, 3. 35 Ibid. 36 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 1-2. 37 Frantisek Hrusovsky, Slovenske rehole v Amerike (Cleveland, OH.: Slovensky ustav pri Opatstve sv. Andreja-Svorada, 1955), 186-7, 202-03 . 38 "Prva Katolicka Slovenska Vyss ia Dievcenska Skola," in Pamatnica slovenskeho dna newyorkskych a new j erseyskych Slowikov: 5. jula, 1926. J. C. Sciranka, ed. (New York City: Vybor slovenskeho dila, s. d.), no pagination. 34 SLOVAKIA-2015 43 On the same day, accompanied by Philip R. McDevitt, Bishop of Harrisburg, the Slovak bishops moved on to the Jednota Estates of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania.39 The First Catholic Slovak Union, a fraternal-benefit society, was founded in Cleveland in 1890 by the Reverend Stefan Furdek. On April 30, 1926, it had 629 active branches with 55 ,091 members . Established in 1906 to organize the youth, its Youth Division (Mladenecke oddelenie) had 446 active branches with 35,535 members . Altogether, the FCSU had 1,075 branches with 90,626 members . In 1926, the market value of the FCSU 's assets was $5,012,880.53 and its Youth Division 's assets totaled $157,202 .96, for a grand total of $5,170,083.65. It was the largest and strongest Slovak Catholic fraternal benefit society in the world. It also cared for orphaned children of its deceased members in an orphanage established in 1906 (opened in 1914) to this end in Middletown .40 Its editorial offices and printery were also located there.4 1 The next day, bishop Jozef Carsky left the group and went to administer the sacrament of confirmation to parishes in Houtzdale and Windburn, Pennsylvania. On June 16, 1926, the bishops left for Harrisburg, from whence they continued to 42 the Eucharistic Congress. In Chicago the bishops were officially welcomed by representatives of Slovak-American Catholic societies. Before the formal opening of the Congress, the Slovak bishops received visits by their countrymen and toured the city. In the Slovak Catholic parishes, they celebrated masses and held missionary sermons. The latter were purely apolitical. Only bishop Vojtassak complained in one of them that he could not come to America sooner, because in 1923 the Czechoslo43 vak authorities refused to issue him a passport. The Eucharistic Congress opened in the morning of June 20, 1926 with the reading of a papal bull and lasted until June 24, 1926 . 39 Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I . 4-0Pamdtnik rimsko-katolickych slovenskych osad v zapad. Pennsylvanii vydany vyborom slovenskeho dna z prileiitosti navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska: v stredu dna 7. Ju/a 1926 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Vybor slovenskeho dna, s. d.), 122-3. 41 Jednota, June 23, 1926, 2. 42 /bid. 43 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People' s Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CS R in Prague, July 30, 1926. 44 SLOV AKIA-2015 It was hosted by George Cardinal Mundelein, Archbishop of Chicago. The Holy See was represented by the papal nuncio Giovanni Vincenzo Cardinal Bonzano. The Congress took place in the local churches and auditoriums and in the recently opened Soldier Field Stadium. 44 On the last day of the Congress there was a pilgrimage to the city of Mundelein, Illinois, forty miles north of Chicago. The Congress was attended by representatives from all continents and thus it manifested the universality of the Catholic Church. In addition, it was the greatest pilgrimage in American history. The Chicago Daily News reported that the final mass in Mundelein was attended by an estimated half a million to a million of the faithful. 45 In addition, the Daily News reported interesting details on the pilgrimage to Mundelein, such as the consumption of ten tons of hot dogs by the pilgrims and the crush of passengers on the trains, which began running at two-minute intervals from 4 a.m. that day. It also rained, which then turned into hail, and the Daily News boasted that it managed to print photographs from Mundelein in its papers and got them on the street within two hours, thanks to swift delivery by airplane. 46 The choir during the opening of the mass consisted of 60,000 children. The Fox Film Corporation, which created a 96-minute film of the Congress (it premiered in New York on November 8, 1926), refused to accept any remuneration for its participation. An estimated 100,000 Slovaks attended the Eucharistic Congress (approximately sixty from Slovakia, including the bishops).47 The latter actively participated in the Congress by celebrating masses and delivering sermons. 48 Even though American newspapers did not pay any attention to the Slovak pilgrims at the Eucharistic Congress, 44 Soldier Field Stadium in Chicago serves as a memorial to American soldiers who died in past wars. It was designed in 1919 and opened on October 9, 1924 on the 53 rd anniversary of the Great Chicago Fire as Municipal Grant Park Stadium, changing its name to Soldier Field on November 11 , 1925. Its design is modeled on the Greco-Roman architectural tradition, with Doric columns rising above the entrance. After subsequent reconstructions, the modem grandstands diminish the impression of these columns. 45 The Chicago Daily News, June 24, 1926, I [online] . Available at: http ://encyclo£edia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ 11319.htm1. 6 Eucharistic Congress, Chicago Daily News, 1926 [online]. Available at: http: //enc clopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/ I 1319 .html. 4 Jednota. Kato/icky kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7, 43-44. 48 Slovak, July 8, 1926, 3. 1 SLOV AKIA-2015 45 in the program of church services, published in all newspapers by the organizational board of the Congress, the Slovaks were listed as a separate group. 49 After the Eucharistic Congress, the Slovak Catholic bishops stayed in the USA until August 4, 1926. In the meantime, they visited all the major and several minor Slovak Catholic parishes. They held missionary services and sermons and administered the sacrament of confirmation. They also attended Slovak Days, gatherings and meetings.50 On July 1, 1926, they were hosted by Michal Bosak in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 51 In their speeches, the Slovak bishops avoided political issues. The representatives of Slovak-American autonomists (Ivan Bielek, President of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek, editor of Jednota and others), however, made use of the Slovak Days for agitation for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops were very popular with the people. 52 For instance, the Jednota and Slowik newspapers reported an estimated 75,000 to 80,000 people at the 3rd Slovak Day in Pittsburgh on July 7, 1926. 53 On July 28, 1926, the weekly Jednota published an appeal by bishop Jozef Carsky, to Slovak-American Catholics from eastern Slovakia. The bishop stressed the importance of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava, which, however, still had very few members in the east. He decided, therefore, to appeal to their countrymen in America to pay the membership fees in the Society of St. Adalbert for them . Bishop Carsky also made an appeal to the Slovak49 AMZV CR, f. Ill . sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago district. Attachment of the letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. Interestingly enough, June Granatir Alexander, in her Ethnic Pride, American Patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Jnterwar Era (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), fails to mention Slovak participation in the Eucharistic Congress. 50 Pauco, 209. 51 ASSV, fasc. 338/2. Jozef J. Dulik, Na pamiatku Vecierka usporiadaneho na pocest' osvietenych panov Biskupov zo Slovenska Micha/om Bosakom 1-ho ju/a 1926 v Scranton, Pa. The brochure reads that the bishops were treated to caviar, green turtle soup, cuts of Virginia ham, filet of beef, vanilla ice-cream and other specialties. 52 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 53 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 2; Slovak, August 4, 1926, 5. 46 SLOVAKIA-2015 American priests to raise public awareness of this issue or to set aside one Sunday for fundraising to create a branch of the Society of St. Adalbert in Kos ice.54 All four Slovak bishops made a similar speech on July 29, 1926. In their address, the bishops, as the protectors of the Society of St. Adalbert, stressed its importance for all Slovaks. They thanked Slovak-American Catholics for their support of the Society in the past and invited them to become members, to purchase its books, especially the bible, as well as to register their countrymen in Slovakia as its members. 55 On July 30, 1926, the Slovak bishops paid an official visit to the Czechoslovak legation in Washington. Since ambassador Zdenek Fierlinger had departed, they were received by proxy. At the embassy , the bishops expressed great satisfaction with the Slovak colony in the USA and noted that everywhere they had gained an impression of real national awareness and reliability. At the same time, they expressed the belief that, in terms of loyalty to Czechoslovakia, factual judgment refined by the school of life, acumen, as well as inborn skepticism, protected American Slovaks from excesses. 56 The Slovak bishops also visited the papal nuncio to the United States. 57 Before departure, the Slovak bishops addressed to SlovakAmerican Catholics a farewell letter in which they thanked them for their receptions and hospitality. They expressed admiration for what Slovak Catholics in America had achieved in a relatively short period of time, despite various difficulties. The proverbial Slovak tenaciousness in the national and religious fields had transformed itself into Slovak churches, schools and fraternal-benefit-societies and halls. The bishops wished the Slovak Catholics in America a good life with no obstacles in the future .58 On August 3, 1926, there was a farewell banquet for the bishops in the Astoria Hotel in New York City. The representative of the 54 Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. 55 Jednota , August 11 , 1926, I. 56 ' AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 191 8- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 57 Pietro Fumasoni Biondi (1872- 1960) - papal legate in the USA from December 14, 1922 to March 16, 1933. 58Jednota , July 28, 1926, 4. SLOVAKIA-2015 47 Czechoslovak legation in Washington, J. Lavicka (otherwise the Czechoslovak Consul General in New York), also came to officially say farewell to the bishops. The main theme of the bishops' final speeches was an appeal to American Slovaks to save their youth because thus they would save the nation.59 The Slovak bishops left America on the steamship Aquitania on August 4, 1926.60 Therefore, it is apparent that the four Slovak Catholic bishops used their trip to the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago for a pastoral journey among Slovak Catholics in America. During their almost two-month stay in the USA (June I I- August 4, 1926), they visited many Slovak-American Catholic parishes. To visit all of them was physically impossible, because within one day they would have had to visit more than four. For the SlovakAmerican Catholics the Slovak bishops' journey had a certain specificity . Many of them, especially Catholic priests, had had a personal experience with the chauvinism of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, which was in many cases the main reason for their departure oversees. That is why they welcomed the Slovak bishops after the creation of Czechoslovakia. As to Andrej Hlinka's agitation tour, he and the bishops, except for the latter' s reception in New York City, never appeared together. After the Eucharistic Congress they parted ways. However, the bishops' presence in America, even if apolitical, significantly increased interest among American Slovaks in Andrej Hlinka's lectures. The authority of the Slovak bishops helped Hlinka in another respect as well. His lecture tour in the USA occurred in the atmosphere of numerous minor personal arguments in the Slovak Catholic community. The presence of the Slovak bishops helped to overcome these aversions and staved off the danger of public controversy.61 On the 59 Pauco, 209; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 60 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 651. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, July 30, 1926. 61 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. For a detailed account on A. Hlinka's journey to the USA in 1926, see my "Andrej Hlinka' s Journey to the USA in 1926," in Slovakia, 40 (Nos. 74-75 , 2010), 32-46. 48 SLOV AKIA-2015 other hand, the Slovak-American autonomists did not hesitate to make use of the presence of the bishops to agitate for Slovak autonomy. The Slovak bishops often expressed their surprise at and admiration for what they saw in the centers of Slovak Catholic life in America. At the graduation ceremony in Danville, Pennsylvania, bishop Blaha rejoiced at the fact that there was a Slovak girls' high school so far from home. 62 Similarly, on the farm of the FCSU in Middletown, he admired what the society had achieved and said that in Slovakia something similar would not be possible.63 Finally, at the Slovak Day in Pittsburgh he said that, on the basis of what he had seen and experienced in Slovak America, American Slovaks would nationally and culturally survive in the USA for another hundred years.64 The Slovak bishops used their trip to America to advertise the Society of St. Adalbert and its newly-released Slovak edition of the bible. The success of this mission was more than clear and for the Society of St. Adalbert it meant a high return on its investment in publishing the Slovak bible. Part of the Slovak bishops' goals, as well as that of Andrej Hlinka, in the USA was fund-raising. For the bishops it was organized by a committee headed by Monsignor Viktor Blahunka. 65 As early as in April of 1926, Karol Kmet'ko, bishop of Nitra, turned to the Slovak-American Catholics and asked them for funds for the Society of the Divine Word. 66 According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the FCSU's head office gave each of the bishops during their journey to the USA $1,000. 67 Unfortunately, we do not know how much money the Slovak bishops raised in America. Despite the fact that, according to the reports of the Czech62Jednota, June 23 , 1926, 2. Jednota, June 23 , 1926, I. 64 Jednota, July 14, 1926, 1. 65ASSV, fasc. 336/5b. Program navstevy osv. biskupov zo Slovenska v Pittsburghu a na okolici od 6. do 16. jula 1926. 66 AMZV CR , f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prafue, April 15, 1926. 1 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918- 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, October 5, 1926. 63 SLOV AKIA-2015 49 oslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the committees of festivals on the occasion of the visit of the Slovak Catholic bishops at some places showed a financial deficit, 68 the amount the bishops raised must have been relatively large. This is suggested by the letter of Andrej Hlinka to Jan Postenyi upon their return from America: "As you know, I have returned with fame, pennants and rings- but not many dollars . Business is business and I am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 69 68 /bid. ASSV, fasc. 156112b. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 69  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Journey of Four Slovak Catholic Bishops to the USA in 1926 Description An account of the resource Štefan Kucík Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 35-49 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kucík, Štefan, 1979- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c9f3421fefc835397e1825fe1d41f08b.pdf e4b7ca934a2cb12d830a6397fb72344d PDF Text Text 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. �SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. �52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. �SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. �54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. �SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 �56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° �SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. �58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. �SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . �60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: �SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. �62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 �SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 �64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. �SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995) � 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. �SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. �52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. �SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. �54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. �SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 �56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° �SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. �58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. �SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . �60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: �SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. �62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 �SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 �64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. �SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE BIRTH OF LEXICOGRAPHIC WORKS IN NORTH AMERICA WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON J. J. KONUS Dalibor Mikulas Slovak immigration to the United States of America and Canada has been of great importance for the history of Slovaks since the 1870s. In this context special attention should be paid to the SlovakAmerican press, analyzed by such scholars as Konstantin Culen, or by Marian Mark Stolarik. One of the many important contributions made by Slovak immigrants to North America was their creation of Slovak-English dictionaries. The main goal of this article is to survey Slovak emigration/immigration, the Slovak-American press and specifically the role and situation of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America between 1887 and 1990, with a special focus on one of the most significant Slovak-American personalities in this field, Joseph James Konus. Slovaks were among many nations, which for various reasons (economic, political, ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.), decided to move to the New World in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. Francis Raska subdivided the waves of immigration to the United States of America as follows: the Colonial Era (1609-1775), the Open Door Era (1776-1881 ); the Era of Regulation ( 1882-1916); the Era of Restriction (1917-1964); and the Era of Liberalization (1965) .1 As Francis Raska specified in the context of the Immigration Act passed by the United States Congress in 1965 (The Hart-Celler Act), preferring the immigration of people with skills on the one hand and family members of American citizens on the other, the consequences of the aforementioned Act were fundamental. While in the period before 1970 the proportion of three major immigrant groups in the USA consisted of 41% from Europe, 15% from Mexico and 10% from Asia, in the 1970s the representation was as follows : less than 12% from Europe, 30.2% from Mexico and 25% from Asia. 2 The last 1 See Francis Raska, "An Historical Overview of United States Immigration Policy since 1965," Journal of Interdisciplinary Philology 2, no. 1 (20 11 ): 6-9. 2rbid., 16 - 17. SLOV AKIA-2015 51 decades of the 20 th century continued on this trend . Thus, it is possible to consider the year 1965 as a significant breakpoint for immigration to the USA not just generally, but to a certain extent also with respect to the immigration of the Slovaks into the USA and to the volume of their activities in the new environment. However, Slovak immigration to the USA had started much earlier. It became a mass movement in the last decades of the 19 th century. As shown by M. Mark Stolarik, in the period of 1870-1914, approximately half a million Slovaks immigrated to North America searching for work in the coal mines, steel mills and oil refineries . They mainly concentrated in the American Northeast and Midwest: Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. According to Stolarik, Slovak immigrants established in the New World three pillars of their communities: fraternal-benefit societies; parish churches; and a newspaper press .3 As far as the newspaper press was concerned, at least 220 Slovak different newspapers were published in the United States between 1885 and 1970, representing a wide variety of genres and subclasses.4 Informed by the classification of Konstantin Culen, 5 Stolarik subdivided the Slovak- American press into eleven kinds of publications that reflected four distinct political orientations: Slovak nationalist, Magyarone, Czechoslovak, and socialist or communist. The newspapers appeared in the principal areas of Slovak settlement in the United States, and they mirrored the religious composition of the Slovak people (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Greek Catholic). The Slovak press in America, therefore, was as complex as that of any other group in this country. 6 While dealing with this particular study by M. M. Stolarik, it is especially useful to pay attention to the provided details with all the 3 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak Lea=gue in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907 - 1992," Emigration to the English Speaking World, ed. Janka Kascakova - Dalibor Mikulas (Rufomberok,Catholic University in Rufomberok, 2006), 186. 4 M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press, 1885 - 1984," The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook, ed . Sally M. Miller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 353 . 5 Konstantin Culen, Slovenske casopisy v Amerike (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1970). 6 Stolarik, "The Slovak American Press," 353. 52 SLOV AKIA-2015 corresponding titles and size of newspapers and magazines, names of editors, period and circulation data, etc. as well as to the methodological and thematic subdivision of the press. The above mentioned eleven kinds of publications refer to the following thematic categories: the independent, commercial, general news press (approximately 40 % of the overall number); the religious press; the fraternal press; the socialist and communist press; literary journals; family magazines; humor magazines; organizational publications; and periodicals for the youth and students The overall enumeration and subdivision of the above mentioned periodicals would be inadequate without mentioning the generations of Slovak personalities, editors and journalists. As Stolarik puts it, by the mid-80s of the 20 th century it is possible to speak about three generations of editors of the Slovak-American press in the United States. The first generation was represented by such pioneers as the fraternalist, editor and businessman P. V. Rovnianek, the fratemalist and editor Reverend Stefan Furdek, the writer and editor Jan A. Feriencik and the writer and editor Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, who came to the United States as educated adults. The second consisted of immigrants who came to the States as children or as young adults in the 1890s, or at the beginning of the 20 th century, e.g. the fraternalist and editor Jan Pankuch, the editor Jozef Husek, the editor Ivan Bielek, the fraternalist and Lutheran pastor Jaroslav Pelikan, Sr., the editor Milan Getting, and so on. The third generation consisted of those who were born in the United States as children of Slovak parents, and were fully bilingual: the fratemalist and editor John C. Sciranka, the editor Edward Kovac, Jr., the fratemalist and editor Peter P. Hletko, the teacher and editor Philip Hrobak, the teacher and editor Andrew V. Pier, and the teacher and editor Joseph C. Krajsa, among others, represent this generation. 7 An analysis of these sources in relation to individual Slovak editors and journalists also helps us to properly understand the authorship of Slovak lexicographic works, which were published in the United States in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. Many of these persons compiled their dictionaries because they were sure that these lexicographic works were needed and important for thousands of Slovak immigrants. Among such compilers were the journalists Janko Slov7 Ibid., 359-60. SLOV AKIA-2015 53 ensky, Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky, Paul K. Kadak, Albert Mamatey, Edward Kovac, Jr. and Philip Hrobak. With respect to this issue in the first decades of the 20 th century, Ada Bohmerova, the author of several studies related to Slovak lexicographic Anglicist works, states that, at the time the great Slovak poet Pavol Orszagh Hviezdoslav was translating Shakespeare into Slovak, English-Slovak dictionaries had been in existence in the United States for at least four decades. However, they were unknown in Slovakia.8 Bohmerova added that these works were created where their need was acute. Knowledge of English became an existential necessity for American Slovaks, a condicio sine qua non, to get a job and secure an everyday existence outside the Slovak, or Slavic community .9 A question which remains unanswered is the number and exact specification of Slovak dictionaries published in North America. The early historian of American Slovaks, Konstatntin Culen, while writing about the first Slovak dictionary published in the USA in an eastern Slovak dialect in 1887 stated, among other things, that this dictionary was the most essential Slovak book, since it had been written by the pioneer Janko Slovensky, because it enabled Slovaks to show what they knew. 10 However, Culen added that after this dictionary, 11 various authors published in various editions at least 50 to70 more. Even though Konstantin Culen had direct contact with pioneering American Slovaks, he did not have the advantages we enjoy in doing research today. For example, he did not have contact with North American libraries and related institutions, the Internet, or the IT digitalizing potential. So, if he estimated such a large number of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America, current 8 Ada Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexiktilnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika). Na pocesr Alexandry Jarosovej, ed. Klara Buzzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicola Janockova (Bratislava:Veda, 20 12), 246. 9 Ibid. 1 °Konstantin Culen. J. S/ovensky. Zivotopis zakladatefa prvych slovenskych novin v Amerike (Winnipeg: Kanadsky Slovak, 1954), 160-1. Janko Slovensky. Americky Tlumac ku naucenu se najpotrebnejsich zacatecnych znamoscoch z ang/'ickej reci pre uherskych S/ovakach v Amerike i ijucich (Pittsburgh: Author' s publication, 1887). For more on Janko Slovensky see Slovensky biograjicky slovnik V, R-S (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1992), 296. 11 Culen, 160. 54 SLOV AKIA-2015 research should confirm or disprove such a hypothesis . David E. Washburn listed only nine such works in the following order: Julius Bucko. Dictionary of the English and Slovak Languages (Chicago: Rovnost' /'udu,1920). 612 pp; Philip A. Hrobak. Hrobak's EnglishSlovak Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Jednota Printery, 1944). 702 pp; Paul K. Kadak. Prakticny slovensko-anglicky tlumac (and) The Practical English-Slovak Dictionary (New York: Slovak v Amerike, 1905), 204 and 263 pp; Joseph J. Konus, New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Kon us, 1941 ), 646 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary (Passaic, NJ: Slovak Catholic Sokol, 1969), 1664 pp; Joseph J. Konus. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA: Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), 628 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Prakticky slovensko-anglicky slovnik (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1950), 240 pp; Edward Kovac, Jr. Slovensko-anglicky tlmac. Prakticky anglicko-slovensky a slovensko-anglicky. 2nd ed. (Scranton, PA: Obrana Press, 1951), 489 pp; and Emil Nitray. Slovensko-anglicky a anglickoslovensky vreckovy slovnik (New York: Emil Nyitray, n.d), 139 andl I 6 pp. 12 As we can see, the list does not include the oldest Slovak dictionary by Janko Slovensky, and in fact, this particular book was published in large numbers and several editions. 13A critical linguistic analysis of this dictionary was provided by Adela Bohmerova. 14 Other quite well-known Slovak works of lexicography are absent in the 12 David. E. Washburn. The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), 204. [online]. Available at: http://books .google.sk/books?id=06rnKYe2KK wC&pg=PA204&1pg=PA204&dq =BU%C4%8CKO,+J%C3 %BAlius :+Slovn%C3%ADk+anglicko-slovensk%C3 %BD, +Chicago,+Illinois+ I 920&source=bl&ots=Kk4jp 112y &sig=3mSiiNHfpucr2Baww7t6zworOWY&hl=sk&sa=X&ei=ymTUU9rkF8iZyA T324KgDg&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=BU%C4%8CKO%2C%20J% C3%BAlius%3A %20Slovn%C3%ADk%20anglicko-slovensk%C3%BD%2C%20Chicago%2C%20Illinois%201920&f=false 13 See Frantisek Bielik a kol. Slovaci vo svete 2 (Martin: Matica Slovenska, 1980), 141-2. The same source adds that in 1895 the newspaper Slovak v Amerike published the first edition of the new American interpreter, Novy slovensko-anglicky tlmocnik, which by 1920 had been published in ten editions. 14 Adela Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," Slovo v slovniku. Aspekty lexikalnej semantiky - gramatika - stylistika (pragmatika) . Na pocest' Alexandry Jarosovej. ed. Klara Buzassyova, Bronislava Chocholova, Nicol Janockova (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 245 - 53. SLOV AKIA-2015 55 above list as well. These were the works of Gustav Marsal-Petrovsky (his dictionary Novy anglicky tlumac was published in many editions), the fratemalist Albert Mamatey (the practical dictionary he prepared was published in ten editions), or the works of the editor C. 15 L. Orbach . While enumerating Slovak lexicographic work in North America, it is important to focus also on student books and grammars of the Slovak language. For instance, Slavo Moravek's Slovak (Slavish) Self-Taught was published for Americans who were in daily contact with Slovaks (inappropriately called "Slavish people") almost every day, and who wanted to speak the Slovak language in their business or employment. 16 This book contains a Slovak-English and English-Slovak dictionary on pages 96-125 . Quite a similar situation is connected with the grammar books published by Philip Hrobak. The above mentioned book "The Peoples of Pennsylvania: An Annotated Bibliography of Resource Materials" introduces in the column "Slovak Language Books-Texts, etc. published in the United States of America" altogether nineteen books written by such authors as the educator Stefan Blasko, the Rev. Bonaventura Bue, Charles Dixon, the Rev. Stefan Furdek, the Rev. Stanislav F. Gmuca, Sr. M. G. Hricko, the educator Filip A. Hrobak, the lexicologist Jozef J. Konus, H.A. Macko, the lexicographer Slavo Moravek, M. M. E. Petrasek and the Rev. Gregor K. Vaniscak. Even this list seems incomplete. While working with this bibliographic book and the Slovak dictionaries listed there (the book is still a very important source for the proper understanding of Slovak lexicographic works published in North America), it is necessary to notice the absence of Slovak lexicographic works appearing in North America after the death of Konstantin Culen. In this respect we must mention such outstanding works as the Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, written by E. Klein, 17 or Jan Simko' s EnglishSlovak Dictionary. 18 15 Bielik, Slowici vo svete, 142 Slavo Moravek. Slovak (slavish) self-taught (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Bratstvo Publishing, 1917). 17 E. Klein. Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language (Amsterdam, London, New York: Elsevier Publishing Co., 1966). 18 Jan Simko. English-Slovak Dictionary; Anglicko-slovensky slovnik (Waudonda: IL, Bolchazy-Carducci, 1991 ). 16 56 SLOV AKIA-2015 As we have seen, Slovak lexicographic works published in North America in the two previous centuries represent a large and unique area of study. Joseph James Konus is unique in this respect, because his publications represent the high point in the lexicographic work of Slovaks in North America. J. J. Konus and his Lexicographic Efforts As Joseph Konus himself put it in his larger New English-Slovak Dictionary, This English-Slovak dictionary is the answer to the persistent clamor of some one million Slovak-born Americans for an adequate tool with which the better to comprehend their adopted tongue. In defining more than 80,000 words, as well as many thousands of phrases and technical terms, the book is of such scope as to enable Slovaks both here and abroad better to appreciate the richness of the English language and the beauty of English literature. Moreover, it will especially enable the Slovak editors in the United States and Canada more accurately to interpret American intellectual and social values to the Slovak-reading public. 19 Konus privately published the book in 1941 . However, he had started working on it in the first half of the l 920s .20 In March of 1924, while responding to the second letter written to him by Stefan Krcmery, the secretary of the Matica slovenska, Konus, as a young intellectual raised in the United States, was seriously concerned with the question of an appropriate and up-to-date system of orthography that he was planning to use in his lexicographic works.21 In the first half of 1924, he wanted to complete his work on a purely SlovakEnglish dictionary . In addition, Konus asked the secretary for some 19 Joseph J. Konus . New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA : J. J. Konus, 1941 ), V. 2 Konus, the son of Slovak immigrants, was born on February 25, 1904 and died in Boca Raton, Florida on April 12, 1995 at age 91. He was educated in American schools and for a time in the l 930 's taught at the Slovak Benedictine High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Cf. Bielik, Slovaci vo sve/e 2, 143 . No-one has yet written his bio~raphy. 1 Letter from J. J. Konus dated March 3, 1924 to the secretary of the Matica slovenska in Frantisek Bielik. Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo. Dokumenty Ill. Korespondencia z rokov 1893-1939 (Martin : Matica Slovenska, 1976), 207-8 . ° SLOV AKIA-2015 57 advice about the pronunciation of every Slovak word and he also sought advice as to whether it would not be better to prepare a Slovak- English and English-Slovak dictionary. In the same letter he asked if the Matica slovenska would be willing to publish his work, since he had not found any publishing house in the United States which would accept his dictionary. Finally, what seems to be quite important for a proper understanding of his lexicographic work is that J. J. Konus explicitly expressed his desire to write and address his thoughts in English, since he would then have an opportunity to express himself more clearly . Konus continued in his lexicographic work while reading literary masterpieces by such distinguished writers as Pavo! OrszaghHviezdoslav, Martin Kukucin, Jozef Skultety, Svetozar HurbanVajansky and Jozef Gregor - Tajovsky. In April of 1928, he wrote to the American Slovak editor Karol Stiasny concerning cultural life among the American Slovaks.22 Konus complained that Slovak newspapers in the USA (namely the weekly Obrana) informed their readers that a group of Slovak students, supported by editors Pavo! Kavulic, J. Gessay and H. Macko, were planning to publish a Slovak-English dictionary. However, after contacting them, Konus discovered that the aforementioned individuals were neither theoretically nor practically capable of such a demanding task. Meanwhile, Konus did mention that, in his six years of lexicographic work, he had collected more than 45,000 Slovak words, although they were not yet properly catalogued. The letter to Stiasny also revealed two things. First, that Konus was supposedly the only person with such a collection of words. Secondly, J. J. Konus expressed certain uneasiness about the activities of Slovak leaders living in the United States. In September of 1930, the Slovak Catholic Federation of America published the Slovak-English Dictionary compiled by J. J. Konus. The book was dedicated to the wealthy Michal Bosak of Scranton, Pennsylvanisa, patron of Slovak writings in America. In its Preface Konus stated that, before the publication of this dictionary, there had been a few small dictionaries which had fulfilled the objectives and needs of their time.23 However, by 1930 these works were no longer 22 Bielik, Slovenske vysrahovalectvo. Dokumenty III., 220-2. Letter from J. J. Konus to Karol Stiasny, April 18, 1928. 23 Konus, Joseph J. Slovensko-anglicky slovnik. Slovak-English Dictionary (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1930), no pagination in the Preface. 58 SLOV AKIA-2015 available and if they were, they were rather dated. That is why his dictionary met the requirements of the public for a richer source of Slovak words and expressions. Konus stated that words in his dictionary originated in Slovak literature and, if positively accepted by the public, a second edition would soon be under way and would contain up to 100,000 words. Konus expressed his gratitude to several individuals who helped him by reviewing and giving him advice. The Russian-American scholar O.D. Koreff reviewed the English part of the dictionary. The editors Jozef Zary, Jozef Husek, the Rev. Jozef Dulik, and Ivan Bielek supported him as well. Konus gave special thanks to Jozef Chill, a Slovak in Whiting in Indiana, who provided him with favorable working conditions. As already indicated, in 1941 J. J. Konus self-published the New English-Slovak Dictionary. It contained more than 80,000 words, so it approached the l 00,000 promised in 1930. The author sacrificed his own time and money to produce the dictionary and spent 19351937 in Slovakia, checking the accuracy of his research. With respect to the quality of his work, Kon us stated that Typographically the work may seem a bit odd because capital letters are used for entries. This form economy dictated, since there had to be different type left in the same type face to distinguish the setup of the phraseology. Economy also dictated the methodology, but not, it is hoped, at the expense of clarity or scholarship. English adverbial forms ending in -ly appended to an adjective are for the most part omitted in this dictionary, except when changes of spelling or meaning render their inclusion necessary. Abbreviations appear at the end of the book. The pronunciation of only 5,000 basic words is given; with the mastery of those, the student is ready to refer to a standard dictionary. 24 Konus continued working on Slovak and English lexicographic works, but at the same time he had other duties. In a letter written to Dr. Frantisek Subik (alias Andrej Zarnov), in 1955, Konus admitted that he had worked for the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI). He went on, 24 Konus, Joseph J. New English-Slovak Dictionary (Pittsburgh, PA: J. J. Konus, 1941 ), v-vi. SLOV AKIA-2015 59 Yes, I was lucky in obtaining the transfer to Florida. But I was determined to leave Washington just the same. My budding arthritis and allergy headaches were such that I was getting desperate . One thing is sure now: even if there is no improvement in my health, things will certainly not get worse. In Washington I was sinking. (Dr. Mikus saw the letter of transfer I received from the FBI Director himself; he thought it was awfully nice. I had no chance to show it to you. It is presumed that the Bureau was reluctant to lose a Slavonic expert.) Since no Slovak knows of my connection with the FBI, I would ask you not to disclose this to any of our countrymen [ ... ] I probably would not even have told you about my Government work had I not been determined to quit last summer. You know there can be plenty of jealousy and what-not. Don 't even tell anyone about my living in Florida_2s It seems that Konus had a very close relationship with Dr. Subik, who was known as a living voice of the Slovak nation in the free world. 26 Speaking about his further lexicographic works, Konus, wrote in the same letter, again in a very cautious manner: As to my cooperation with the Slovak Institute, etc., I feel that at the present time, in view of my health, the only contribution I can make to the Slovak cause (so dear to you and me) is my continued work on the Slovak-English dictionary of which there is a dire need everywhere. I'm going to make several copies of letters A and B to show Dr. Hrusovsky and others as samples of my work. If I see enough interest in such an all-inclusive or comprehensive dictionary, then I'll continue the project. That is, interest in getting or helping it to be published. I can't for the 25 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik, October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16. 26 Subik had been a Professor of Pathology at the Slovak University in Bratislava and Chief of the Department of Health. He was one of the experts who joined Red Cross representatives from Switzerland to examine the thousands of bodies found by the German Army in the Katyn forest, in the Soviet Union, where the NKVD had executed around 15,000-20,000 Polish officers and intellectuals in April of 1940. Subik was also famous for his collection of patriotic poems . After 1945 he was twice imprisoned by the Communists and in 1952 escaped and ended up living in the USA . 60 SLOV AKIA-2015 world of me see how anyone can properly translate Slovak literature without a good dictionary. For instance, that poem of yours in "Most", concerning your escape from Slovakia, could and should be translated for some important literary journal. If it's already translated, I didn 't see it. But I was toying with the idea of rendering it into English, even ifl'm not much of a poet. 27 Konus described his work on his large Slovak-English dictionary in another letter to Dr. Subik, written in November 1957. In it he asked Subik for help with the definitions of such words or expressions as: NARKOTIZACNY APARAT OZUBICA (chrupka okolo zubov) INDIKACNA T ABlEKA (medical chart?) OSETROVNE (fee for professional services?) PREDPA TNA KOST KRIMINALKA (za naivny toast pri majalesi recnik dostal k-u; k-u z veci robit') PREZIDIALKA (board meeting?) PRiPATNA KOST GYC (Dial.) MANZELSKA POSTEi: (marriage bed? twin bed?)28 . Konus mentioned that, thanks to the U. S. government' s decision to send him to Florida, he was able to complete his work on a so needed dictionary. In this respect Kon us appreciated the help provided by Dr. Janko Mihal, who was then a pensioner in Slovakia and had enough time to focus on lexicographic details. Nevertheless, it wasn't until 1969 that the Slovak Catholic Sokol finally published his Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary. A critical review of this book by Zlata P. Meyerstein, a contemporary Lexicographer, appeared in the Slavic and East European Journa/. 29 27 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955 . University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2, 206.16 28 Letter from J. J. Konus to Dr. Frantisek Subik of October 24, 1955. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Joseph Stasko Fonds, X20-2 , 206.16. 29 Zlata P Meyerstein, "Slovak-English Phraseological Dictionary by Jozef J. Konus," The Slavic and East European Journal 17, no. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. I 09-111. Available at: SLOV AKIA-2015 61 In the 1970s, on the advice of the historian-artist Dr. Joseph Cincik, 30 J. J. Konus contacted the writer-editor Jan Oka!' in Berwyn Illinois and continued: "[I have] a sort of a favor to ask of you, compliance with which would be very much appreciated by the undersigned (whom you have met several times in Slovakia back in the thirties)." 31 While thinking of his other lexicographic work, Konus added : Enclosed herewith are two pages of a manuscript of my Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary, which please set up as follows on your linotype: Width of line: 3 inches Size of type:7-point type for all entries 6 points for the rest of the text except that all underlined matter must be in bold . The 6-point type ' s accents may necessitate a 61/2-slug. You figure it out. 32 He explained the reason for his avoidance of italics as follows: I hate to have the dictionary phraseology in italics because that's hard on old folks ' eyesight. My plan requires no italics whatsoever. The enclosed Xerox copy will illustrate what I mean and would like to see. 33 http ://www.jstor.org/discover/ l 0.2307/306571 ?uid=2&uid=60&uid=2490 I 34643&u id=70&uid=21 34&uid=3&uid=3739024&uid=2490 I 34653&purchasetype=article&accessType=none&sid=2 1I 05932295323&showMy J storPss=false&se ~= I &showAccess=false 0 or. Cincik was the former Director of the Artistic Division of the Matica slovenska in the 1930' s and during World War II. He fled to the West in 1945 and emigrated to the United States, and was later known as an author and editor of publications concerned with the old and modem paintings and sculptures in Slovakia. As a resident in Cleveland, Ohio he specialized in reli gious art and worked in the field of church painting and decorating. 1 Letter from J.J. Konus to Jan Okal' of October 14, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20- 16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 62 SLOV AKIA-2015 Even more significant is the size of his manuscript. Konus wrote that his dictionary manuscript consisted of 3037 pages. As far as the publishing of such a large work was concerned, the author wrote: It is supposed to be published by SAV in Bratislava, but its officials are still waiting for a political decision for a green light. Hence, I'm making plans to have the work published in the States, depending on who funds the project, your shop may even be asked to bid on the work. 34 That is why J. J.Konus needed from Jan Okal' those two pages of the manuscript "A Comprehensive Slovak-English Dictionary" printed, so that he would be able to send them as samples to potential publishing houses in the United States.35 Jan Okal' remembered J. J. Konus very well. He considered him as a great Slovak scholar, comparable to Anton Bemolak, or the American Noah Webster. He liked to recall regular lunch meetings on Saturdays with such distinguished Slovak leaders as the Rev. Jan J. Lach, Msgr. Milos Mlynarovic and Joseph Chill when they discussed how they admired and respected the enormous energy and skill that J. J. Konus put into his lexicographic activities .36 However, Jan Okal' faced serious difficulties with Konus's request. First of all, he no longer had his own printery. Due to severe health problems, he had to sell it. Nonetheless, after recovering, he started working for some other printeries to earn a living. One of them was printing publications for a larger Czech organization and thus it might have been useful for J. J. Konus's purposes . But the Czech printery was just then modernizing and transforming the whole process of hot metal typesetting to cold type. In addition, the modem type lacked Slavonic characters as well as a Slovak keyboard. On the other hand, those printeries which did not modernize suffered from the poor condition of their machinery. Factories in the USA stopped manufacturing the old type of printing machinery, together with spare parts. Printeries with the old technology had to order spare parts from Europe, which was very costly. Jan Okal' even added that he did not possess the 34 Ibid. Ibid. November 3, 1974. 36 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus of November 11 , 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. Jozef Konus Fonds, X20-16, 1571.6 35 SLOV AKIA-2015 63 skills necessary for working with the new technology and that is why he was unable to help. Nevertheless, Okal' was familiar with possibilities which were still available such as the printeries of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, New Jersey, and the Slavia Printery in Cleveland. So, he promised J. J. Konus to search for options once in Cleveland. In his letter of November 17, 1974, after trying to get some support in Cleveland, Oka!' had to admit that he failed and thus could not help with printing the samples for Konus. 37 For political reasons, even the Slovak Academy of Science in Bratislava did not help. A more favorable condition for the publishing of Konus's large dictionary appeared in the 1980s. Ladislav G. Bolchazy, of the Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers in W aucondia, Illinois, showed some interest in reprinting his dictionary. In a letter of June 23, 1988, J. J. Konus had written to Bolchazy the following: Dear Sir; Just arrived from a vacation in Australia, hence the delay in answering your interesting letter. Well, I could cooperate in having my "New English-Slovak Dictionary" reprinted as for your suggestion or plan . My only conditions are here: Since the book should be updated because it is a mediumsized collecting English vocabulary, I (or someone else) should prepare a typed-up addenda and some corrigenda. The work could take some six months [ ... ] There are many new and popular items to add [ ... ] and thus make the book more interesting and valuable. 38 By then, however, Konus was 85 years old and concerned with his health. In addition to the delay in answering the initial letter from Bolchazy, Konus also needed more time to prepare an addenda for the dictionary. There were also other issues related to editing and 37 Letter from Jan Okal' to J. J. Konus ofNovember 17, 1974. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, JozefKonus Fonds, 1571.6 38 Letter from J. J. Konus to L. G. Bolchazy (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers) of June 23, 1988. University of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections. X20-16, Jan Okal' Fonds, 1572.3 0 64 SLOV AKIA-2015 corrections, and there also were those technical facets of the work, which had been troublesome in the 1970s. Meanwhile, by the 1980's Slovaks in the United States had in their midst another lexicographer. This time it was a Slovak-born and professionally-trained linguist, a scholar, and much younger Anglicist-Dr. Jan Simko. He had come to the USA in 1967 to study at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, D. C. and decided to remain after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Simko had published an English-Slovak dictionary in Slovakia in 1967, 1968 and 1971. Unfortunately, Konus and Simko never got together to possibly cooperate in publishing a joint dictionary. Instead, Bolchazy ended up publishing a reprint of Simko ' s 1971 dictionary in 1991. 39 The publication of Simko's dictionary, however, does not diminish the important role that J. J. Konus had played in the field of Slovak-American lexicography throughout the 20 th century. We must remain grateful for his enormous efforts in this field and his work still calls for a deeper examination. Conclusion Slovak lexicographic works published in North America represent a unique contribution to Slovak cultural heritage. "The indisputable role in the beginnings of learning English, and in the birth of Slovak Anglicist lexicography on the American continent as well, was played by the first Slovak book printed in the United States, and at the same time one of the most precious of rare specimens of Slovak books." 40 The dictionary written by Janko Slovensky in 1887 was followed by dozens of other works by amateur Slovak lexicographers in the USA and their numerous editions served the purposes of thousands of ordinary people. The highpoint in the field of lexicographic erudition was reached in the works of Joseph James Konus. Slovak dictionaries mentioned in this short contribution by a number of authors point at the robustness of the books written by Slovak immigrants and their descendants in North America. Without any doubt they deserve (and they should have also deserved in the past) our respect and deep appreciation. The government of the independ39 40 Jan Simko, English-Slovak Dictionary (Wauconda, IL : Bolchazi-Carducci, 1991 ). Bohmerova, "Rane dielo slovenskej anglistickej lexikografie," p. 247. SLOV AKIA-2015 65 ent Slovak Republic should do all that it can do to protect and preserve the Slovak heritage on the soil of the United States of America. Joseph James Konus (1904 - 1995)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Birth of Lexicographic Works in North America with Special Emphasis on J. J. Konuš Description An account of the resource Dalibor Mikuláš Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 50-65 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuláš, Dalibor Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b418d6362b5374e999cecdce2273fecc.pdf 44016909e30ed47f43f76d674c578c5b PDF Text Text 66 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA, 1941-1945 1 Miroslav Michela The foreign policy of Slovakia in the years 1939 - 1945 has been quite a popular research topic of Slovak historians over the last ten to twenty years. 2 Significant achievements in this regard relate primarily to research on Slovak-German relations,3 but there are also several 1 1 would like to express my gratitude to prof. Mark Stolarik and his family for significant help in my research on Slovak emigres, and especially on the biography of Slovak journalist and politician Karol Murgas. My research in the Slovak collections in the Archives and Special Collections of the University of Ottawa Library would not have been possible without the support of the Helen and John lvanco Memorial Research Bursary. 2 Here I would like to list a few publications, which appeared in recent years, mostly as a result of long-term academic interest: Michal Schvarc, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945 a jej postavenie v ramci nemeckej sfery vplyvu," in Kfucove problemy modernych slovenskych dejin 1848-1992, ed. Valerian Bystricky et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 231-52; Edita lvanickova et. al. , Slovenslui republika 1939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2012); Pavo! Petruf, Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945: nacrt problematiky (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2011); James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 3 For example: Sicherheitsdienst a Slovens/ca v rokach 1938-1944: od auton6mie po Povstanie. Slovensky stat vo vybranych spravach SD od jesene 1943 do septembra 1944, ed. Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Slovenske narodne muzeum-Muzeum karpatskych Nemcov, 2006) ; "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu;dokumenty. /., ed. Michal Schvarc, Martin Holak and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, SNM- Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2008); "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu : dokumenty. II. ed. Michal Schvarc and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, Historicky ustav SAV, SNM - Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2010) ; Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1941 v dokumentoch I.:od Mnichova k vojne proti ZSSR , ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky et. al. (Presov: Universum, 2009); Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1941-1945 v dokumentoch II. :od vojny proti ZSSR po zanik Slovenskej republiky v roku 1945, ed. Eduard Niznansky et. al. (Presov: Universum-EU, 20 11); Von Munchen bis Salzburg 1938- 1940. Dokumente und Essay. Buch 1. Buch 2. Slovensko v jeseni 1944, ed. Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Luc, 2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politi- �SLOVAKIA 67 studies concerning the relationship between Slovakia and the Great Powers .4 In the context of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, plenty of studies are oriented on the Slovak-Polish and Slovak-Hungarian relationships at different levels of politics.5 In the last decade studies relating to Slovak-Croatian diplomatic relations have also appeared. 6 Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politischer Al/tag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn (Paderbom : Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003 ). 4 For example: Politicke vzt'ahy medzi Francuzskom a Ceskoslovenskom a Francuzskom a Slovenskom (1 939-1948): vyber dokumentov, ed. Pavo! Petruf (Martin: Matica slovenska, 2003); Dagmar Ciema-Lantayova, Pohfady na vychod: Postoje k Rusku v slovenskej politike 1934-1944 (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Slavomir Michalek, "Niekol'ko problemov slovensko-americkych vzt'ahov pocas druhej svetovej vojny," in Edita Ivanickova et. al. Slovenska republiko /939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach, 139-61 ; Petr Kubik, Slovensko-talianske vzt'ahy 1939-1945 (Bratislava: Ustav pamiiti naroda, 20 IO); Edita Ivanickova, "Zapadne vel'moci a slovensky stat 1939-1945," in Slovensky stat 1939-1945: predstavy a reality, eds. Martina Fiamova, Jan Hlavinka and Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2014), 8193 . 5 Here is a sample of some interesting works by young scholars: Aliaksandr Piahanau, "Slovak-Hungarian Relations in the Mirror of the German-Soviet Conflictive Alliance (1939-1941 )," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 16 (2012): 144-63; Isvtan Janek, "The Issue of Hungarian- Slovak Diplomatic Connections in the Hungarian Parliament in 1939- 1940," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 18 (2014): 128-41 ; Istvan Janek, "Mad'arsko-slovenske diplomaticke vzt'ahy v rokoch 1939-1941 , " in Slovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, IV. , eds. Michal Smigel' and Peter Micko (Banska Bystrica: Katedra hist6rie Fakulty humanitnych vied Univerzity Mateja Bela, 2005 ), 334-51 ; Mateusz Gniazdowski, "Kontakty PHsudczyk6w ze Slowakami w latach 19391945," Niepodleglosi: 55 (2005): I 07-50; Dusan Seges, "The Slovak Question and its International Context during World War Two," in 1945 - A Break with the Past, ed. Zdenko Cepic (Ljubljana: Institut za novejso zgodovino, 2008), 213-26; Dusan Seges, Dvojkrii v silociarach bieleho or/a. Slovenska otazka v politike pol'skej exi/ovej vlady za 2. svetovej vojny (Bratislava: Veda, 2009); Holy Case, "The Holocaust in Regional Perspective: Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia," in Varieties of Anti-Semitism, eds . Peter Kenez and Bruce Thompson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009), 76-92. 6 Jan Rychlik, "Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy v letech 1941-1945 ," Slovanske historicke studie 26 (2000): 265-83 ; Miroslav Michela, "Vznik slovenskeho vyslanectva v Chorvatsku a cinnost' Karola Murgasa, charge d 'affaires v Zahrebe v roku 1941 ," in Slovenska republika 1939 - 1945 ocami mladych historikov fl , ed. Martin Lacko (Bratislava: Merkury, 2003), 97-123 ; Miroslav Michela, "K otazke slovensko-chorvatskej kulturnej spoluprace v rokoch 1941-45," Slavica Slovaca 38 (2003): 112-22; Jan Tkac, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske a slovensko-chorvatske vzt'ahy �68 SLOVAKIA-2015 se works are mainly focused on the issues of diplomacy and the traditional history of politics. They describe the ideas and activities of major political players, thus complementing our knowledge about the process of negotiating and building the "New Europe." 7 The present study aims primarily to explain a few basic factors in the context of building official Slovak-Croatian cultural cooperation in the period from 1941 to 1945 . The foundation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska - NDH) on April 10th, 1941 resulted in the expansion of cultural interaction between it and the newly- independent Slovak Republic, as the representatives of both states shared similar experiences of national struggles and now ideological and political interests. The Slovak Republic officially recognized the NDH on v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Historicky zbornik 19 (2009): 154-68; Jan Tkac, "Chorvatsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941-1945," Historicky casopis 58 (2010): 659-83 ; Alena Bartlova, "Dr. Jozef Cieker, vyslanec Slovenskej republiky," in Dr. Jozef Cieker: seminar pri prileiitosti nedoi itym 90. narodenincim Jozefa Ciekera v Tvrdosine 20. juna 1997, ed. Juraj Chovan-Rehak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2000), 71-92; Jan Jankovic, Chorvcitska literatura v slovenskej kulture If. (19391948), (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Jan Jankovic, Stanis/av Meciar - chorvatofil (Bratislava: Ustav svetovej literatury SAV, 2001); Martin Jarinkovic, "Pohl'ad slovenskej dennej tlace na chorvatsku otazku v rokoch 1941-1944," in Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov VIII, ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2009), 261-88; Martin Jarinkovic, "Spolkovy zivot v prvej Slovenskej republike na priklade Slovenskochorvatskej spolocnosti v rokoch 1942-1944," in Zivot v Slovenskej republike. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov 9., ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda 2010), 305-24; Oldfich Pejs, "Nakup koni v Chorvatsku pro slovenskou armadu v roce 1944," Vojenskci hist6ria 8 (2004): 87-95; Oldfich Pejs, "Na okraj dodavky slovenskych zbrani do Chorvatska v roce 1942," Historie a vojenstvi 45 (1996): 56-73 . 7 See the following : Michal Schvarc, "Statna suverenita len ako fasada? Zasahy Nemecka do slovenskeho zakonodarstva v rokoch 1939-1940," in Slovensko v labyrinte modernych eur6pskych dejin : pocta historikov Milanovi Zemkovi, ed . Slavomir Michalek (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 20 14), 641-57; Pavo) Petruf, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskeho statu 1939-1945 : niekol'ko poznamok o jej vzniku, zamerani a kratkodobej existencii," in Riesenie iidovskej otcizky v spojeneckych krajincich nacistickeho Nemecka, ed. Viera Kovacova et. al. (Banska Bystrica: Muzeum Slovenskeho narodneho povstania, 20 12), 17-29; Pavo I Petruf, "Terna "novej Eur6py", "noveho eur6pskeho poriadku" a "zivotneho priestoru" na strankach novin Slovak ( I 939-1940)," in Kapitoly z hist6rie stredoeur6pskeho priestoru v 19. a 20. storoci: pocta k 70-rocnemu jubileu Dusana Kovcica, ed. Edita Ivanickova et. al. (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 201 I), 338-54. �SLOVAKIA 69 May 5th, 194 l along with other Axis members and satellites - Germany, Italy and Hungary. 8 The NDH's political role in the "New Europe" was outlined in the Treaty of Rome, signed on May 18, 194 l, which established long-term Italian patronage. After Croatia gained its sovereignty, this subordination was immediately subject to much domestic criticism. During the following Croatian-Slovak diplomatic discussions, both parties set out a preferred vision of German rather than Italian supervision, seeing in Nazi Germany a common protector and liberator and also admiring the state and the Flihrer. In May of 194 l the government of the Slovak Republic surprisingly appointed the radical Karol Murgas, as its charge d'affaires to Croatia. The request was officially delivered by German authorities, as there was no direct contact between the two parties at that time. 9 Murgas had no diplomatic experience and was known for his awkward and hot-tempered behavior in public, which might have caused some hesitation, but his paramilitary experience in the Hlinka Guard and his demonstrated sympathy for Croatian nationalists made their mark. Murgas himself saw the move as an attempt to remove him from Slovak domestic politics, as he had previously enjoyed the prominent post of head of the Department of Propaganda. 10 In May of 194 l Viliam Kovar, the distinguished Slovak journalist, visited Croatia. During his stay he met influential statesmen and leaders of the Ustasha movement and examined the potential for mu- 8 Croatia - Congratulations of president Jozef Tiso, file 1300/41 , box 61 , collection Kancelaria prezidenta republiky - Slovensky narodny archiv (SNA) - Bratislava. For more about Slovak-Yugoslav relations see: Jan Nemecek, "K slovensko-jugoslavskym vztahum 1939-45," in Evropa mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem. Sbornik praci k sedmdesatinam Jaroslava Valenty, eds. Miroslav Sestak and Emil Voracek (Praha: Historicky ustav Akademie ved Ceske republiky, 2000), 385-98; Martin Jarinkovic, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske hospodarske a obchodne kontakty v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Pamdt' naroda 7 (20 11 ): 4-17. 9 S/ovak, May 11, I 941, 3. Zagreb's official approval of Murgas's mission came on May 15, but information ' s about it had already appeared in Grenzebote on the 4th of May 1941. For this question see also: File 79/41 , Box 1155 and File 77/41 , Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 10 See: Miroslav Michela, "Miesto a uloha Karola Murgasa v radikalnom prude slovenskej politiky v obdobi rokov 1939-1941 ," in S/ovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, ed. Martin Lacko (Trnava : Katedra hist6rie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Cyrila a Metoda, 2002), 77-105 . �70 SLOVAKIA-2015 tual cultural cooperation. 11 In a letter to his colleague Stanislav Meciar, the editor- in-chief of the journal Slovenske pohl'ady, Kovar suggested sending a series of congratulatory letters on Croatia's independence to demonstrate Slovak sympathy and support. 12 Meciar was known to be a Croatophile and ardent admirer of writer and politician Mile Budak, who later became Minister of Education and Religion of the newly-founded NDH. 13 In a letter dated May 23, Meciar asserted the brotherhood of both nations and expressed satisfaction with both countries' successful completion of the struggle for independence. In his words, "Croats were a sincere nation close to us" and "the future of Slovakia will be much safer when developed in tandem with the present beautiful reality of Croatia." 14 Such declarations of sympathy were common in contemporary formal communications and were not deemed awkward . The Slovak press continuously monitored the Croatian struggle for independence and dedicated significant space to discussions with Croat emancipation activists : the Ustasha and Hlinka Guard officials; and to both nations' notable historical figures, such as Ljudevit Gaj , Ban Jelacic and Ante Starcevic on the one hand, and Jan Kollar, Stefan Moyzes and Andrej Hlinka on the other. A lot of attention was also paid to contemporary figures such as Mile Budak, Milo Urban and Alexander Mach, the commander-in-chief of the Hlinka Guard. Andrej Vrbacky, the Slovak translator, deserves credit for this written presentation. On May 26, 1941, Karol Murgas paid an official visit to Ante Pavelic, Croatia's supreme leader - poglavnik. In his formal address, Murgas pointed to the similarities of both nation's histories and suggested close cooperation in future political and cultural activities. 15 After this the Slovak embassy was officially opened. Interestingly, although an embassy agreement was offered to Murgas, he came to Zagreb with the official status of an envoy, which the Croatian side considered insufficient and demanded diplomatic representation at 11 Croatia trip reports. Box 4, Papers of Viliam Kovar, Literarny archiv Slovenskej narodnej kniznici V Martine (LA SNK). 12 Letter of V. Kovar to S. Meciar, August 26, 1941 . File 164 E 20, LA SNK. 13 See for example: Stanislav Meciar, "Chorvatsky klasik Mile Budak," Slovenske pohl'ady 56 ( 1940): 429-44. 14 Letter of S. Meciar to M. Budak, May 21 , 1941. File 164 N 17, LA SNK. 15 File 8/41 , Box 1155, MZV, SNA; Karol Murgas, "Pred tridsiatimi rokmi v Zahrebe," Slovak a svet I (Chicago, 1971 ): 15. �SLOVAKIA 71 the top level. A month later, on June 25, Slovak president Jozef Tiso accepted the nomination of Dragutin Toth as Croatian charge d' affaires to Slovakia. 16 Murgas objected to this nomination, rating Toth as a liberal-orientated leftist. Toth's first audience with President Tiso took place on August l st, and his opening statement was dedicated again to both nations' independence. It is worth mentioning that he gave the speech in his native tongue, yet the president answered him in Slovak. This established a precedent for Tiso's interactions with envoys of Slavic states. 17 The newly-established Slovak embassy in Zagreb attracted broad interest and numerous appeals for bilateral cooperation. Both parties declared their intention to closely coordinate their political, economic, social and cultural activities. NOH officials wanted information on the organization of economic and social life in Slovakia. A common topic of bilateral talks was the means of settling the debts of former parent states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). After initial negotiations with Murgas, Anton Bonifacic, head of the Croatian Department of Culture of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked out a "Proposal for Establishing Cultural Cooperation between the NOH and the Slovak Republic". Its aim was to build economic, social and cultural ties based on the mutual exchange of publications, translations of literature, the exchange of students, writers and task groups; and organizing art exhibitions, concerts etc. The proposal included a suggestion for the legal recognition and protec18 tion of Croats living in Slovakia and Slovaks in the NOH. The position of the latter was at that time far from satisfactory. Slovak minority rights gained during the former Yugoslavia were largely ignored by the Ustasha regime. 19 The first objective of the Slovak representatives in Croatia was to improve this situation. Within the Slo16 File 4961 /41 , Box 213, MZV, SNA. Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 270. 18 File 244/41 , Box 1157, MZV, SNA. 19 About the Slovak minority in Croatia, see: Vit Usak, Slovcici v Chorvcitsku - historicky ncicrt (C leveland-Rim : Historicky ustav, 1978); Sprievodca slovenskym zahranicim, ed. I.'.ubica Bartalska (Bratislava: Dom zahranicnych Slovakov, 2001), 8790; Report of J. Cieker, February 12, 1942. File 27/48 JozefCieker papers, Okresny l'udovy sud v Bratislave 1945-1947 (O1..'.S BA), Statny oblastny archiv Bratislava (SABa). Information about the exact number of Slovaks in Croatia at that time differed. The daily Slovak, on October 22, 1941 , page 3, estimated a maximum of 22,000 countrymen ; other sources gave higher numbers . 17 �72 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak community itself, there were further differences related to religious orientation. The Catholic population lacked education and schools, and its national identity was rapidly disappearing. On the other hand, Lutheran villages were keeping their traditions alive, with much of the work done by local pastors.20 However, the Lutheran community had stronger ties to the former Yugoslav regime and was treated with suspicion by Ustasha authorities. In numerous cases the Slovak embassy had to intervene to help individuals (conscripts of the Yugoslav army) who had been captured in the previous war with Germany. The chaos and scarcities following the transition of power also forced a lot of Slovaks to seek help at the embassy. Ever since the foundation of the NDH, leaders of the Slovak expatriate community were planning to set up a minority organization, the so-called Slovak National Group in Croatia, with a common official statute recognized by the Croatian regime. The eventual failure of this initiative was largely due to the fact that they were not coordinated with the Croatian side, which feared a potential precedent that wou ld allow other minorities to raise similar claims. The only minority to achieve the privilege of an officially recognized status was the German one, with a population up to 150,000 and enjoying the benefits of the parent country ' s political dominance. Following the negotiations of June 25, 1941 , Croatia and Slovakia announced a mutual settlement of their claims regarding real estate belonging to their predecessor states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).21 Murgas managed to obtain the property of the former Czech-Slovak society Beseda in Lipovljani for the Slovak side.22 The issue of schools for the Slovak minority was a frequently negotiated topic from early on. In spite of the initial mistrust by the Ustasha authorities, which culminated in the arrests of several Slovak teachers, Slovak primary education was preserved. 23 Mutual contacts also developed in the field of pedagogy and science. A visit by Croatian medics and an Ustasha Youth delegation to °File 36, Box 266, MZV, SNA . 2 21 File 217/41 , Box 1157 and File 217/41 , Box 1155 , MZV, SNA . The society officially dissolved on July 30, 1941. See Slovak Beseda in Bratislava. Box 207, f. Policajne riaditel'stvo v Bratislave (PR Ba), SNA; File 325/41 , Box 214 and File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. 23 File 33880/41 , Box 213 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. Gardista, September 21 , 1941 , 3; Gardista, October 22, 1941 , 3. 22 �SLOVAKIA 73 Slovakia was met by great domestic publicity. 24 A program of student exchange and scholarship financing was launched by numerous institutions: The Science Society for Foreign Slovaks (mainly focused on student exchange, support of Slovak foreign education and distribution of Slovak literature abroad), the Matica slovenska, The Society of St. Adalbert, the Slovak University, and the Hlinka Youth. The Croatian partner organizations included the Saint Jerome Society, the Matica Hrvatska, and later the new Croatian-Slovak Society. The pace at which interest in Croatia spread was almost overwhelming for the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which decided to halt the uncontrolled influx of NDH visitors . The Ministry then published a directive stating that it must approve all Croatian visits. 25 The founding of the already mentioned Croatian-Slovak Society (August 13, 1941) was a milestone in cultural interaction. The Slovak envoy requested the speedy assignment of a cultural attache to Croatia, recommending Jozef Ambrus, who had been studying in Zagreb. This request was turned down, as was his later proposal of founding an office of the Society in Bratislava. 26 A fact worth mentioning is that Murgas proposed Alexander Mach, the Minister of the Interior, to be the chairman of this branch. 27 The Slovak authorities, however, took a rather cautious approach and decided to wait until their Croatian counterparts founded a similar branch of the Society in Zagreb. 28 These facts indicate a kind of cautiousness on the Slovak part, caused primarily by foreign political factors. Contrary to their cordial relations and shared long-term plans, practical cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia was difficult from the beginning. Later on, such cooperation was also damaged by the Ustasha regime's inability to make good on its commitments. Meanwhile, the Croatian and Slovak Society was founded in Zagreb. Franjo Dujmovic, 29 the editor-in-chief of the daily Nova Hrvat24 See for example: Gardista, July 26, 1941, 3; Gardista , July 27, 1941, 3; Gardista, August 26, 1941, 3; File 32595/41, Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 25 Ibid, File 6978/41. 26 Reports of K. Murgas, August 19, 1941 and August 26, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA; File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. See also: Jarinkovic, Spolkovy i ivot v frvej Slovenskej republike ... , 305-24. 7 File 544/41, Box 1155 and File 137/41, Box 1160, MZV, SNA. 28 File 32.702/41, Box 118, MZV, SNA. 29 Initially led by the Croatian Minister of the Interior and well-known Ustasha activist Adrija Artukovic. �74 SLOVAKIA-2015 ska (New Croatia) , was appointed its President, with Mile Starcevic and Eugen Ftillop as Vice-Presidents, and Zlatko Milkovic as Secretary. The Society ' s Board included a number of significant individuals whose positions suggested strong links with Croatian state institutions .3° The Society's goal was to develop cultural relations and to promote the Slovak Republic in the NDH. Stanislav Meciar also hoped to expand cultural cooperation, with special focus on the new Croatian literature. When asked about which Slovak novelists he would recommend for translation, he included Jozef Ciger Hronsky, Milo Urban, Tido J. Gaspar, Julius Horvath, and Margita Figuli. He rejected Peter Jilemnicky, whom he labelled a Czech and a Communist. Among Slovak poets he suggested Valentin Beniak, Andrej Zamov, Emil Boleslav Lukac, Jan Smrek, Rudolf Dilong, I:udo Ondrejov, Ladislav Novomesky, Jan R. Ponican and Jan Kostra, with the comment that "the last three were Communists, but have written valuable Slovak poems; here you ought to make your own decision." 31 He also decided to publish a special issue of the Slovenske pohl'ady on the subject of Croatia. 32 As early as 1941 discussions began about the possibility of closer cooperation between Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia, a project designed to raise the profile of all three states. The incentive to establish this bloc came from Romania, mainly as a reaction to Hungarian irredentism. At the same time, the three states intended to revisit their territorial losses to Hungary between 193 8 and 1941. Agreement to create the bloc was soon disclosed and the Hungarian Government protested against "reviving the spirit of the Little Entente," referring to the interwar East-Central European military alliance against Hungary. In spite of the initial hesitation of Slovak politicians, by early 1942 Vojtech Tuka, the Slovak Foreign Minister, showed great interest in such cooperation. He emphasized that the alliance could not be labelled with the "stigma of Pan-Slavism," referring to criticism raised by some representatives of the Slovak government. On the one hand, as soon as the Germans indicated that no such efforts would be tolerated within their sphere of influence, the 30 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 155 . Letter of S. Meciar to Zlatko Milkovic from August 26, I 941. File 164 P 17, LA SNK. 32 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 52-83. 31 �SLOVAKIA 75 Slovak Republic 's activities declined rapidly . On the other hand, the Slovaks discovered that the NDH was not a reliable partner. 33 In the fall of 1941 some changes were made to the charge d' affaires positions in both countries. Jozef Cieker replaced the undisciplined Karol Murgas. Cieker had previously worked in Yugoslavia and was knowledgeable about Croatian affairs. He presented his credentials in Zagreb on December 12, 1941. At the same time, there was also a change in the Croatian diplomatic posting in Bratislava. Josip Berkovic, the new envoy, presented his credentials on December 19. These changes had no impact on the mutual convergence, and the Croatian Embassy in Bratislava appointed a cultural attache, Geno Sencic who energetically participated in the development of Slovak and Croatian cultural relations. In January of 1942, Tido J. Gaspar, Head of the Propaganda Office, charged Jozef Ambrus with preparing the ground for establishing the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia. The general assembly of this cultural institution took place on March 13, 1942, in the Slovak University ' s amphitheater. Slovak Ministers Alexander Mach, Gejza Medricky and Ferdinand Catlos, as well as other major figures of political and cultural life attended, as did a numerous Croatian delegation. This meeting received broad media coverage. This general assembly prescribed uniforms as a part of the dress code. The Society set as its goal to unite all Croatophiles, spread the Croatian culture and develop mutual relationships. Political issues were to be avoided. Alexander Mach was acclaimed as the Society 's President. In his acceptance speech he pointed out the parallels between the Autonomists ' first paramilitary organization, the Rodobrana (Native Defense), the subsequent Hlinka Guards and the Croatian Ustasha movement. He added that cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia "is not based on the pharisaical chimera of the notorious Slavic solidarity," which had led to humiliation, suffering and disappointment for both nations. These contacts, he continued, "are supported by a good tradition, the present struggle for a common goal, which we all have before our eyes in the New Europe." Mach's 33 See Miroslav Tejchman, "Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace v letech druhe svetove valley a Mad'arsko," Slovansky pfehled 78 (1992) : 161-71 ; Cubomir Liptak, "Mad'arsko v slovenskej politike za druhej svetovej vojny," in Prispevky k dejinam fasizmu v Ceskos/ovensku a v Mad'arsku, ed. Gyorgy Ranki (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1969), 222-30. �76 SLOVAKIA-2015 speech marked the boundaries of the cultural society. He also delegated Stanislav Meciar, Anton Misik, Jozef Ambrus as its VicePresidents, Viliam Kovar, Eduard Urban as its Secretaries, and Belo Franc as the Treasurer. Many important people working in the area of culture and politics became board members .34 The next day, the first issue of the Slovak-and-Croatian literary review entitled Tatre i Velebit appeared.35 Josip Andric became the editor-in-chief. He had visited Slovakia since the 1920s, and maintained good contacts with the representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party. In the first issue's introductory address, Ferdinand Catlos, Slovak Minister of Defense, noted : "With the help of the Germans, both our nations have become autonomous and integrated as state actors among the nations of young Europe." He praised the shared destiny and goals, desires and hopes of both nations who required no written agreements to confirm their mutual relationships.36 It is evident that both societies had ideologically compatible people in the leadership, with close links to the official regime. It was typical of both states to infuse culture with politics, especially with propaganda. However, as Jan Jankovic pointed out, in spite of major ideological links, there was also much freedom, which he demonstrated by using literature translations that often avoided an ideological undertone. Once the Slovak Croatian Society was founded, the organization of commonly-held events grew in intensity, and the Society substantially participated in promoting cooperation with other cultural institutions. Contacts were developed in the area of sports as well, but did not exceed the norm. At that time, the establishment of the autonomy of Slovakia in October of 1938 was celebrated. The cultural program focused on Slovak popular sonfs and included lectures given by the country's major personalities.3 In Bratislava on April 9, 1942, the Society celebrated the first anniversary of the NDH' s inception by arranging a red-carpet procession in the highly representative build34 For example: Stefan Bella, Juraj Cecetka, Alojz Macek, Jozef Kutnik-Smalov, Valentin Beniak, Aladar Kocis, Karol Klinovsky, Karol Studenc, Alexander Moyzes and honorsry members included Jozef Skultety, Tido J. Gaspar, Rudolf Vavra, Ferdinand Catlos and Gejza Medricky. Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 204, PR-BA, SNA. 35 More precisely about the revue Tatre i Velebit, see: Jankovic, Chorwitska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 39-51. 36 Tatre i Velebit, March 14, 1942, 5. 31 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, 1942, 156. �SLOVAKIA 77 ing of the Reduta. On the next day, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by Bishop Michal Buzalka in Saint Martin's Cathedral, and on this occasion the Slovak dailies published special issues. 38 At that time a numerous group of Slovak journalists, cultural workers and politicians set off to Croatia to celebrate the first anniversary of the state. Besides Minister Mach and Secretary Kovar, the group included prominent Hlinka guard officers Otomar Kubala, Alexander Cunderlik, Frantisek Galan, and other persons who also discussed mutual cooperation in the area of culture. Within the context of the cooperation of Slovakia, Romania and Croatia, a meeting was held on May 13 in Bucharest, where the participants agreed to compile national bibliographies of major works, to organize regular visits, to promote each other and to organize so-called weeks of reciprocal culture. An Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the NDH was signed in Zagreb, which dealt with the foundation of a Chair of the Croatian Language, Literature and History and a Department of the Croatian Language and Literature at the Slovak University, with similar Slovak institutes in Zagreb. An important clause focused on maintaining and extending elementary schools for minorities. Both partners committed to support reciprocal visits and a minimum of two student scholarships. 39 The Agreement also included a clause on the recognition of academic titles, scientific education benefits for young people, and book exchanges. They also promised not to permit the publication of things "which could present the other state in a bad light." The Agreement established a Slovak and Croatian Cultural Committee to observe the provisions of the mutual agreements and to deepen relationships. The Agreement was for a period of five years and based on the principle of reciprocity .40 In spite of the fact that similar plans had existed since 1941, and that the final agreement was prepared in 1942, neither this Agreement, nor another cultural Agreement between the Slovak Republic and NDH came into force . This was due to their inability to make and perform agreements, and a certain inflexibility characteristic of both parties, which were the basic problems associated with the development of relations between Slovakia and Croatia. Some of these problems were caused by the fact that the NDH was not con38 /bid, 164-5 . Slovak-Croatian reciprocal scholarships. File 255/43, Box 2 14, MZV, SNA . 40 File 8/ 100/43 , Box 118, MZV, SNA. 39 �78 SLOVAKIA-2015 solidated politically and economically, that both countries were involved in the war, in a complicated foreign-policy situation, and also in the relationship of satellite states with their protector, Germany . The issue of the legal status of the Slovak minority in the NDH was perceived in a very sensitive way, and tackled unsuccessfully throughout the entire existence of the NDH. Frequent excesses of the Ustasha towards Slovak inhabitants in Croatia did not contribute to mutual trust. It is well-known that from the beginning some Slovaks rejected Croatian citizenship because they had supported the previous regime, they had to deal with poor living conditions and showed increased interest in repatriation to Slovakia. Viliam Kovar's visit to Lipovljany on June 14, 1941 created a stir. During his visit, Kovar showed concern about the situation of the local Slovaks and suggested repatriation in exchange for Croats living in Slovakia. This proposal resonated and some Slovaks in Croatia appealed to the embassy for help. 41 However, charge d'affaires Murgas viewed Kovar's initiative very critically. Croatians intended to repatriate the Slovak minority to the Slovak Republic, which Murgas found detrimental to the state.42 In any case, official Slovak circles showed no serious interest in repatriation to Slovakia. What did not make such a big stir was settling the issue of the validity of Jewish travel documents. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged their validity (until March 31, 1942), but at the same time the Ministry told Murgas not to intervene in these matters, to which he would agree. 43 The legation had the right to decide each Jewish case, but their objective was to ensure that these Jews would not return to Slovakia because they were "a useless and harmful element, " 44 which corresponded to the official policy of the Slovak Republic. 45 In the NDH 41 File 116/41 , Box 1160, MZV, SNA; Report written by representatives of the Slovak minority in the NDH regarding the visit of Viliam Kovar, June 16, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA. See also: Oldfich Pejs, "Slovenska diplomacie a valecni zajatci slovenske narodnosti (1939-1942)," Vojenska hist6ria 15 (2011), 122-41. 42 '1n today's situation we don't have the space and employment opportunities for returnees ... " Report ofK. Murgas, August 19, 1941 , Box 143 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. 43 File 903/41 and 1347/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 44 File 62/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 45 For a comparison of the Slovak and Croatian anti-Jewish policies, see: Eduard Niznansky and Jana Mnahoncakova, "Vymedzenie pojmu Zid na Slovensku a v �SLOVAKIA 79 the Jewish issue was "promptly resolved," and Serbs also became an "unwanted element." 46 The greatest boom of cultural relations between Slovakia and Croatia occurred in 1942. Numerous visits and social events were organized in order to strengthen this cooperation. For example, during the summer several Croatian delegations visited the Slovak Republic. From June 28 until July 4, a "Croatian Week" in Slovakia was organized to promote Croatian culture. Slovak Radio participated very actively by broadcasting Croatian music and a series of interviews by a number of major figures in culture and politics.47 At that time an ensemble of amateur actors form Croatia toured Slovakia with their theater program dedicated to Croatian dances.48 Reciprocal visits and presentations became the most typical component of Slovak-Croatian cultural policy, most frequently realized through national theatrical and music productions. As in Slovakia, various events were held in the NDH which concentrated on mutual convergence, such as the presentation of the Articles of Association of the Slovak National Unity (Slovenska narodna jednota) to the relevant Croatian authorities who promised their recognition. The Slovak Reading Club in Ilok organized Slovaks in the NDH. In spite of promises made, the Croatian administration did nothing. 49 The Slovak Day planned for August 30, 1942, in Stara Pazova, where Vladimir Hurban Vladimirov, a famous descendant of the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, served as a Protestant minister, was postponed because of guerilla warfare.50 Jozef Cieker constantly pointed out the complicated situation in the country and the Ustasha's excesses. "The scope of action of ministers is limited to minis- Chorvatsku - pokus o porovnanie," in Z dejin holokaustu ajeho popierania, ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky (Bratislava: Stimul, 2007), 107-30. 46 See Nevenko Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 47 Alexander Mach, Mladen Lorkovic, Stanislav Meciar, Jozef Ambrus, Valentin Beniak, Alexander Moyzes, Viliam Kovar, Mile Starcevic, Zlatko Milkovic, Franjo Dujmovic, Mile Budak, Viliam Peros, Josip Horvat, Geno Senecic and others. 48 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, I 942, p.165. 49 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, I 943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 50 Slovaks in Yugoslavia. File 6452/41-1 , Box 143, MZV, SNA. �80 SLOV AKIA-2015 terial buildings and a small region around Zagreb." 51 He perceived Slovak-Croatian relations as weak and suggested that it would be unwise to limit mutual relations to Ustasha Croatia and suggested that the two nations should relate to one another as wholes. The Ustasha were not pleased with the activities of the Slovak charge d'affaires in Zagreb, and therefore they suggested that he should be removed. Cieker often met with opposition groups, members of the higher clergy and criticized the situation in the country. These statements show that there were certain differences between Slovakia and Croatia. Conservative representatives in Croatia were the more moderate Catholics of a nationalist orientation, represented in the past by the Croatian Popular Peasant Party (the Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka). In that sense, they were competitors of the Ustasha. The Slovak Republic supported the regular Croatian army - the militia, with supplies of arms and equipment. However, much more evident were the contacts between the radical representatives of the Hlinka Guard and the Ustasha. They were ideologically close, and strongly involved in the development of mutual relations, for instance between the Hlinka Youth and the Ustasha Youth. Despite these differences, cultural contacts continued to evolve. Each autumn international commercial fairs were held in both Bratislava and Zagreb. Both states sent delegations of major figures of economic and political life to the fairs. In June of 1942, an agreement between Croatia and Slovakia was signed in Bratislava on the regulation of mutual contact under civil law. At the end of October, the Minister of Justice, Gejza Fritz, signed in Zagreb an interstate agreement on extradition and propertylaw assistance in criminal issues. Like the economic agreement entered into in October of 1941, these agreements came into force too late, and therefore had no significant impact on the actual relationship between the Slovak Republic and the NDH. 52 Also, an agreement was concluded on cooperation between the Slovak and Croatian academic youth.53 This cooperation seemed promising from the summer of 1941 and many young people from Croatia visited Slovakia. The Hlinka Youth, jointly with the Ustasha Youth and 51 Report of J. Cieker, August 28, 1942. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 52 Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 273-74. 53 Medunarodni ugovori 1943, p. 208-10. Box 214, MZV, SNA. �SLOVAKIA 81 Hitlerjugend, organized camps for their members . In this regard, there was a significant involvement by Alojz Macek and lvo Orsanic, the leaders of organizations in the Slovak Republic and the NDH, . As in the preceding year, the autumn of 1942 witnessed certain changes in Slovak- Croatian relations. Activist Viliam Kovar enlisted in the Slovak army and treasurer Belo Fronc replaced him. The NDH Government underwent a major reorganization which resolved the conflict between the Poglavnik and the Minister of Defense, Marshall Slavko Kvaternik. Kvaternik came to recover to Slovakia, when he probably sought some political support. However, the Government's reconstruction did not disturb the NDH's relations with the Slovak Republic. Promoting one another continued, which is evident in the Slovak Culture Week held in Zagreb from November 29, 1942, to December 5, 1942. 54 This event had some response. Besides abundant musical performances, several contributions were made on the present and the past of the relationships between Slovaks and Croatians. At that time, Andric's Slovak Language Grammar was published.55 By the end of that year, yet another change took place in diplomatic postings. Charge d'affaires Berkovic was dismissed and replaced with Blaz Lorkovic, who presented his credentials to President Tiso on December 22. In his speech, he remarked: "The Poglavnik appointed me as the charge d'affaires in Slovakia in his belief that our brother Slovaks wish to have an old and well-proven Ustasha as the charge d'affaires of the NDH."56 In 1943 further talks were held on cooperation between Romania, Slovakia and the NDH . It was evident that Ante Pavelic's Croatia was very weak as a partner, and, therefore, the Slovak representatives focused mainly on negotiations with the Romanians. In the end, however, these attempts also failed to improve cooperation and the idea of a tightly-bound Slovak and Croatian bloc against Hungary was unsuccessful. 57 In January of 1943, a full length propaganda film 54 At that time the following Slovaks visited Croatia: Stanislav Meciar, Andrej Mraz, Karol Ki:irper, Jan Pi:istenyi, Jozef Pauco, Jan Doransky as we ll as representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Matica slovenska, the Slovak-Croatian Society, the Society of St. Adalbert and the Bratislava Chamber Quintet. 55 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 157-159; File Slovaks in Yugoslavia, Box 143, MZV, SNA. 56 File 35.591 /42, Box 219, MZV, SNA. 57 Tejchman, Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace ... , 166-67 . �82 SLOV AKIA-2015 From the Tatras to the Sea of Azov was shown in the NDH, which highlighted the Slovak Army's activity on the Eastern Front in order to strengthen the idea of a joint struggle against Bolshevism . In the field of news reporting, a regular exchange of newsreels took place and a number of contributions on Croatian topics were broadcast over Slovak Radio. The fourth anniversary celebrations of independence in Zagreb were not as spectacular as in the preceding year. In addition to compulsory lectures and articles in the Croatian press, the Croatian and Slovak Society organized a tea party on March 13th. The next morning, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated and attended by representatives of the Croatian Government. 58 On March 25, 1943 the second general assembly of the Slovak and Croatian Society was held . Once again, this event became a manifestation of fondness for each other. Many prominent people of that period's political and cultural life participated, headed by ministers Mach, Medricky and charge d'affaires Blaz Lorkovic, who was elected an honorary member. A declaration of efforts to extend the statutes of the Society was made since there was an interest in establishing branches in other towns of Slovakia (it was planned to establish branches in Presov, Zilina and Banska Bystrica), and to extend activities in the field of culture.59 The general assembly also launched the celebration of Croatian independence, which was accompanied by a number of cultural events including a gala concert of the Slovak Radio on April 9th. Employees of Mach's Ministry of the Interior were invited to turn out in strength. A Croatian issue of the newspaper Gardista (Guardsman) was published to celebrate the third anniversary of the NDH's creation. During his visit to Slovakia in May, 1943, Ivan Veres, a Protestant minister, reported on the difficult situation of Slovaks in the NDH. Again, the unresolved issues emerged, especially those regarding culture. Based on this information Alexander Mach invited the Croatian charge d'affaires to an audience and gave him notice that the situation of Slovaks in the NDH could directly affect the future relations between Slovakia and Croatia. In this respect, Mach even intended to stop honoring Josip Andric, the writer, with a high 58 Tatre i Velebit, June 15, 1943, 61. The Slovak-Croatian Society - Minutes of the Second General Assembly. File 38/68, Box 204, PR Ba, SNA. 59 �SLOVAKIA 83 state award, and issued a command to suspend the establishment of the Slovak and Croatian Society's branches. Jozef Cieker also made a statement on the nature of the mutual relationships by pointing out that people in Bratislava had too many illusions, but the reality was much more complicated. 60 In spite of the fact that the negotiations on signing the Slovak and Croatian Cultural Convention continued, no consensus was reached. Croatia refused to recognize the special status of Slovaks in the NDH because of other minorities, who would then demand similar rights. However, the Croats were willing to guarantee Slovak education through separate legislation. They also demanded that the SNU should not be a political organization to represent Slovaks in the NDH and should not claim the property of former Czechoslovak: associations. However, at that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic was more interested in concluding the Slovak and Italian cultural convention, after which the Ministry would be willing to continue negotiations about the convention with Croatia.61 The fall of Mussolini in 1943 brought about an "unpleasant awakening" in the NDH. Nevertheless, Ante Pavelic, with Germany's support, managed to hold on to power and maintain the illusion of the existence of an independent Croatian state, and on September 10, 1943, he announced that previous Italian and Croatian agreements were no longer valid, as the Italians had failed to fulfil their obligations and agreed to an armistice with the enemy. 62 At that time, a number of Croatian politicians and their families, who refused to stay in the NDH for various reasons, were in Slovakia. This is very interesting, because the Slovak Republic granted asylum to persons whose blood-stained careers were inscribed in the NDH' s infamous history. For instance, this applied to Eugen "Dido" Kvaternik, the former commander of the Croatian secret police! Jozef Cieker tried unsuccessfully to reject entry visas to exponents of the Ustasha re• 63 g1me. 60 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 61 Report of J. Cieker from July 7, 1943. Box 143, MZV, SNA. 62 Jbid, File 313 2/43 . 63 Report of J. Cieker, September 9, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. �84 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the reality of that time, Slovak and Croatian cultural cooperation decreased and in 1943 the Tatre i Velebit cultural review folded . The Slovak Embassy in Zagreb pointed to the unbearable problems of the NDH, which were also reflected in its failure to fulfil economic contractual obligations. The embassy also dealt with propertyrelated sanctions and the loss of freedom which Slovaks in the NDH had to struggle with every day. Despite plans for further cooperation, the mutual relationships had reached their zenith. Their abovestandard scope in the period between 1939 and 1944 is shown by the fact that nineteen translated Croatian fiction titles were published in Slovakia, which is more than in the case of most Allied countries. In addition, popular and scientific, political and religious literature was published, although their numbers are difficult to reconstruct. 64 At the beginning of February, 1944, Jozef Cieker was replaced in Zagreb by charge d'affaires Viktor Becko. 65 However, he would not bring any changes to Slovak-Croat relations. From his reports we learn that actual power in Croatia was shared by guerilla and German and Ustasha troops, and about the oppression of the population. As regards Slovak-Croatian relations, Becko noted that higher state authorities had an interest and a positive approach, which, however, faded at lower positions. Therefore, he suggested, that Croatians should be promised economic concessions in return for cultural and social offsets for Slovaks in the NDH. 66 In his report he summarized the mutual contacts which he considered to be less developed than expected and pointed out that a certain platform could be found as a support. In spite of that, he labelled the cultural and political relations as very good. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, he criticized the absence of a trade representative "whom the Croatians have in the Protectorate as well." 67 As regards the issue of the Slovaks in the NDH, he underscored the fact that Slovaks were transported to concentration camps based on the principle of collective guilt. Some Croatians hated the Slovaks because they were not obliged to join the army or the Ustasha, and local personal and prop64 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 166-176. Slovak, February 2, 1944, p. 4; Slovak, February 9, 1944, p. 3. 66 Report of V. Becka, March 20, 1944. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1.'.S BA, SABa. 67 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, April 25, 1944. Box 213, MZV, SNA. 65 �SLOVAKIA 85 erty-related conflicts played an important role as well. He pointed to the nationalist attitudes of the Ustasha, who did not like "foreign elements" in their country. 68 However, the repatriation of Slovaks was technically impossible at that time.69 Contacts between Slovaks and Croats were not limited to the official political position, which I intended to describe in this paper. There was also significant cooperation among anti-fascist forces in the Slovak Republic, the NDH and elsewhere in Europe. Tomislav Poglajen-Kolakovic, a Catholic priest who worked in Slovakia from September of 1943 and joined the anti-fascist forces, was an outstanding person involved in this convergence. 70 In the last stages of the existence of both states, mutual contacts died out completely, and the dissolution of the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia on May 25th, 1945, 71 was just a formality, because most of the Society's representatives had fled abroad, where they continued to develop contacts with the Croats. Relationships between Slovakia and Croatia from 1941 to 1945 were affected by the political climate. Despite comparable efforts by Slovaks and Croats to attain national emancipation in the inter-war period and deep historical roots of mutual cooperation multiplied at that time by the concept of "historical inevitability," it was the ideological adherence of political representatives and their mentors (especially Germany) which played an important role in the mutual convergence. Cultural cooperation took a similar path, but it could not overcome the ideological framework. Due to both practical and political obstacles, such cooperation would not reach the desired form, and it peaked between 1942 and the first half of 1943 . However, as Viliam Kovar wrote about the activities of the Slovak and Croatian Society, which was supposed to reflect these relationships : 68 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, January 8, 1945 . Box 213, MZV, SNA . 69 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to V. Becka, January 26, 1945. Box I 160, MZV, SNA. 70 More precisely see: Jozef Jablonicky, Podoby nasilia (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2000), 9-27. For the official Croatian reaction to the uprising in Slovakia, see: Jan Rychlik, "Obdobie pred Slovenskym narodnym povstanim v spravach chorvatskeho vyslanca v Bratislave," Historicky casopis 56 (2008): 349-84. ; Jan Rychlik, "Slovenske narodne povstanie v spravach chorvatskeho diplomata," Historicky casopis 54 (2006) : 315-52. 71 Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 20 14, PR Ba, SNA . �86 SLOV AKIA-2015 " ... (the Society) failed to do as much as one could possibly expect, but did not miss one chance to inform the Slovak public and make it familiar with the life of Croatia and its representatives." 72 It was clear before the end of World War II, which both countries entered on the side of Germany, that neither state would outlive it. However, this did not mean the end of mutual cultural contacts, which after the War took place in a brand new geopolitical and ideological environment. 72 Report of the Society' s secretary. File 38/68, Box 2014, PR Ba, SNA. � 66 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA, 1941-1945 1 Miroslav Michela The foreign policy of Slovakia in the years 1939 - 1945 has been quite a popular research topic of Slovak historians over the last ten to twenty years. 2 Significant achievements in this regard relate primarily to research on Slovak-German relations,3 but there are also several 1 1 would like to express my gratitude to prof. Mark Stolarik and his family for significant help in my research on Slovak emigres, and especially on the biography of Slovak journalist and politician Karol Murgas. My research in the Slovak collections in the Archives and Special Collections of the University of Ottawa Library would not have been possible without the support of the Helen and John lvanco Memorial Research Bursary. 2 Here I would like to list a few publications, which appeared in recent years, mostly as a result of long-term academic interest: Michal Schvarc, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945 a jej postavenie v ramci nemeckej sfery vplyvu," in Kfucove problemy modernych slovenskych dejin 1848-1992, ed. Valerian Bystricky et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 231-52; Edita lvanickova et. al. , Slovenslui republika 1939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2012); Pavo! Petruf, Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945: nacrt problematiky (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2011); James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 3 For example: Sicherheitsdienst a Slovens/ca v rokach 1938-1944: od auton6mie po Povstanie. Slovensky stat vo vybranych spravach SD od jesene 1943 do septembra 1944, ed. Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Slovenske narodne muzeum-Muzeum karpatskych Nemcov, 2006) ; "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu;dokumenty. /., ed. Michal Schvarc, Martin Holak and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, SNM- Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2008); "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu : dokumenty. II. ed. Michal Schvarc and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, Historicky ustav SAV, SNM - Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2010) ; Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1941 v dokumentoch I.:od Mnichova k vojne proti ZSSR , ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky et. al. (Presov: Universum, 2009); Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1941-1945 v dokumentoch II. :od vojny proti ZSSR po zanik Slovenskej republiky v roku 1945, ed. Eduard Niznansky et. al. (Presov: Universum-EU, 20 11); Von Munchen bis Salzburg 1938- 1940. Dokumente und Essay. Buch 1. Buch 2. Slovensko v jeseni 1944, ed. Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Luc, 2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politi- �SLOVAKIA 67 studies concerning the relationship between Slovakia and the Great Powers .4 In the context of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, plenty of studies are oriented on the Slovak-Polish and Slovak-Hungarian relationships at different levels of politics.5 In the last decade studies relating to Slovak-Croatian diplomatic relations have also appeared. 6 Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politischer Al/tag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn (Paderbom : Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003 ). 4 For example: Politicke vzt'ahy medzi Francuzskom a Ceskoslovenskom a Francuzskom a Slovenskom (1 939-1948): vyber dokumentov, ed. Pavo! Petruf (Martin: Matica slovenska, 2003); Dagmar Ciema-Lantayova, Pohfady na vychod: Postoje k Rusku v slovenskej politike 1934-1944 (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Slavomir Michalek, "Niekol'ko problemov slovensko-americkych vzt'ahov pocas druhej svetovej vojny," in Edita Ivanickova et. al. Slovenska republiko /939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach, 139-61 ; Petr Kubik, Slovensko-talianske vzt'ahy 1939-1945 (Bratislava: Ustav pamiiti naroda, 20 IO); Edita Ivanickova, "Zapadne vel'moci a slovensky stat 1939-1945," in Slovensky stat 1939-1945: predstavy a reality, eds. Martina Fiamova, Jan Hlavinka and Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2014), 8193 . 5 Here is a sample of some interesting works by young scholars: Aliaksandr Piahanau, "Slovak-Hungarian Relations in the Mirror of the German-Soviet Conflictive Alliance (1939-1941 )," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 16 (2012): 144-63; Isvtan Janek, "The Issue of Hungarian- Slovak Diplomatic Connections in the Hungarian Parliament in 1939- 1940," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 18 (2014): 128-41 ; Istvan Janek, "Mad'arsko-slovenske diplomaticke vzt'ahy v rokoch 1939-1941 , " in Slovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, IV. , eds. Michal Smigel' and Peter Micko (Banska Bystrica: Katedra hist6rie Fakulty humanitnych vied Univerzity Mateja Bela, 2005 ), 334-51 ; Mateusz Gniazdowski, "Kontakty PHsudczyk6w ze Slowakami w latach 19391945," Niepodleglosi: 55 (2005): I 07-50; Dusan Seges, "The Slovak Question and its International Context during World War Two," in 1945 - A Break with the Past, ed. Zdenko Cepic (Ljubljana: Institut za novejso zgodovino, 2008), 213-26; Dusan Seges, Dvojkrii v silociarach bieleho or/a. Slovenska otazka v politike pol'skej exi/ovej vlady za 2. svetovej vojny (Bratislava: Veda, 2009); Holy Case, "The Holocaust in Regional Perspective: Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia," in Varieties of Anti-Semitism, eds . Peter Kenez and Bruce Thompson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009), 76-92. 6 Jan Rychlik, "Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy v letech 1941-1945 ," Slovanske historicke studie 26 (2000): 265-83 ; Miroslav Michela, "Vznik slovenskeho vyslanectva v Chorvatsku a cinnost' Karola Murgasa, charge d 'affaires v Zahrebe v roku 1941 ," in Slovenska republika 1939 - 1945 ocami mladych historikov fl , ed. Martin Lacko (Bratislava: Merkury, 2003), 97-123 ; Miroslav Michela, "K otazke slovensko-chorvatskej kulturnej spoluprace v rokoch 1941-45," Slavica Slovaca 38 (2003): 112-22; Jan Tkac, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske a slovensko-chorvatske vzt'ahy �68 SLOVAKIA-2015 se works are mainly focused on the issues of diplomacy and the traditional history of politics. They describe the ideas and activities of major political players, thus complementing our knowledge about the process of negotiating and building the "New Europe." 7 The present study aims primarily to explain a few basic factors in the context of building official Slovak-Croatian cultural cooperation in the period from 1941 to 1945 . The foundation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska - NDH) on April 10th, 1941 resulted in the expansion of cultural interaction between it and the newly- independent Slovak Republic, as the representatives of both states shared similar experiences of national struggles and now ideological and political interests. The Slovak Republic officially recognized the NDH on v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Historicky zbornik 19 (2009): 154-68; Jan Tkac, "Chorvatsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941-1945," Historicky casopis 58 (2010): 659-83 ; Alena Bartlova, "Dr. Jozef Cieker, vyslanec Slovenskej republiky," in Dr. Jozef Cieker: seminar pri prileiitosti nedoi itym 90. narodenincim Jozefa Ciekera v Tvrdosine 20. juna 1997, ed. Juraj Chovan-Rehak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2000), 71-92; Jan Jankovic, Chorvcitska literatura v slovenskej kulture If. (19391948), (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Jan Jankovic, Stanis/av Meciar - chorvatofil (Bratislava: Ustav svetovej literatury SAV, 2001); Martin Jarinkovic, "Pohl'ad slovenskej dennej tlace na chorvatsku otazku v rokoch 1941-1944," in Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov VIII, ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2009), 261-88; Martin Jarinkovic, "Spolkovy zivot v prvej Slovenskej republike na priklade Slovenskochorvatskej spolocnosti v rokoch 1942-1944," in Zivot v Slovenskej republike. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov 9., ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda 2010), 305-24; Oldfich Pejs, "Nakup koni v Chorvatsku pro slovenskou armadu v roce 1944," Vojenskci hist6ria 8 (2004): 87-95; Oldfich Pejs, "Na okraj dodavky slovenskych zbrani do Chorvatska v roce 1942," Historie a vojenstvi 45 (1996): 56-73 . 7 See the following : Michal Schvarc, "Statna suverenita len ako fasada? Zasahy Nemecka do slovenskeho zakonodarstva v rokoch 1939-1940," in Slovensko v labyrinte modernych eur6pskych dejin : pocta historikov Milanovi Zemkovi, ed . Slavomir Michalek (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 20 14), 641-57; Pavo) Petruf, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskeho statu 1939-1945 : niekol'ko poznamok o jej vzniku, zamerani a kratkodobej existencii," in Riesenie iidovskej otcizky v spojeneckych krajincich nacistickeho Nemecka, ed. Viera Kovacova et. al. (Banska Bystrica: Muzeum Slovenskeho narodneho povstania, 20 12), 17-29; Pavo I Petruf, "Terna "novej Eur6py", "noveho eur6pskeho poriadku" a "zivotneho priestoru" na strankach novin Slovak ( I 939-1940)," in Kapitoly z hist6rie stredoeur6pskeho priestoru v 19. a 20. storoci: pocta k 70-rocnemu jubileu Dusana Kovcica, ed. Edita Ivanickova et. al. (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 201 I), 338-54. �SLOVAKIA 69 May 5th, 194 l along with other Axis members and satellites - Germany, Italy and Hungary. 8 The NDH's political role in the "New Europe" was outlined in the Treaty of Rome, signed on May 18, 194 l, which established long-term Italian patronage. After Croatia gained its sovereignty, this subordination was immediately subject to much domestic criticism. During the following Croatian-Slovak diplomatic discussions, both parties set out a preferred vision of German rather than Italian supervision, seeing in Nazi Germany a common protector and liberator and also admiring the state and the Flihrer. In May of 194 l the government of the Slovak Republic surprisingly appointed the radical Karol Murgas, as its charge d'affaires to Croatia. The request was officially delivered by German authorities, as there was no direct contact between the two parties at that time. 9 Murgas had no diplomatic experience and was known for his awkward and hot-tempered behavior in public, which might have caused some hesitation, but his paramilitary experience in the Hlinka Guard and his demonstrated sympathy for Croatian nationalists made their mark. Murgas himself saw the move as an attempt to remove him from Slovak domestic politics, as he had previously enjoyed the prominent post of head of the Department of Propaganda. 10 In May of 194 l Viliam Kovar, the distinguished Slovak journalist, visited Croatia. During his stay he met influential statesmen and leaders of the Ustasha movement and examined the potential for mu- 8 Croatia - Congratulations of president Jozef Tiso, file 1300/41 , box 61 , collection Kancelaria prezidenta republiky - Slovensky narodny archiv (SNA) - Bratislava. For more about Slovak-Yugoslav relations see: Jan Nemecek, "K slovensko-jugoslavskym vztahum 1939-45," in Evropa mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem. Sbornik praci k sedmdesatinam Jaroslava Valenty, eds. Miroslav Sestak and Emil Voracek (Praha: Historicky ustav Akademie ved Ceske republiky, 2000), 385-98; Martin Jarinkovic, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske hospodarske a obchodne kontakty v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Pamdt' naroda 7 (20 11 ): 4-17. 9 S/ovak, May 11, I 941, 3. Zagreb's official approval of Murgas's mission came on May 15, but information ' s about it had already appeared in Grenzebote on the 4th of May 1941. For this question see also: File 79/41 , Box 1155 and File 77/41 , Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 10 See: Miroslav Michela, "Miesto a uloha Karola Murgasa v radikalnom prude slovenskej politiky v obdobi rokov 1939-1941 ," in S/ovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, ed. Martin Lacko (Trnava : Katedra hist6rie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Cyrila a Metoda, 2002), 77-105 . �70 SLOVAKIA-2015 tual cultural cooperation. 11 In a letter to his colleague Stanislav Meciar, the editor- in-chief of the journal Slovenske pohl'ady, Kovar suggested sending a series of congratulatory letters on Croatia's independence to demonstrate Slovak sympathy and support. 12 Meciar was known to be a Croatophile and ardent admirer of writer and politician Mile Budak, who later became Minister of Education and Religion of the newly-founded NDH. 13 In a letter dated May 23, Meciar asserted the brotherhood of both nations and expressed satisfaction with both countries' successful completion of the struggle for independence. In his words, "Croats were a sincere nation close to us" and "the future of Slovakia will be much safer when developed in tandem with the present beautiful reality of Croatia." 14 Such declarations of sympathy were common in contemporary formal communications and were not deemed awkward . The Slovak press continuously monitored the Croatian struggle for independence and dedicated significant space to discussions with Croat emancipation activists : the Ustasha and Hlinka Guard officials; and to both nations' notable historical figures, such as Ljudevit Gaj , Ban Jelacic and Ante Starcevic on the one hand, and Jan Kollar, Stefan Moyzes and Andrej Hlinka on the other. A lot of attention was also paid to contemporary figures such as Mile Budak, Milo Urban and Alexander Mach, the commander-in-chief of the Hlinka Guard. Andrej Vrbacky, the Slovak translator, deserves credit for this written presentation. On May 26, 1941, Karol Murgas paid an official visit to Ante Pavelic, Croatia's supreme leader - poglavnik. In his formal address, Murgas pointed to the similarities of both nation's histories and suggested close cooperation in future political and cultural activities. 15 After this the Slovak embassy was officially opened. Interestingly, although an embassy agreement was offered to Murgas, he came to Zagreb with the official status of an envoy, which the Croatian side considered insufficient and demanded diplomatic representation at 11 Croatia trip reports. Box 4, Papers of Viliam Kovar, Literarny archiv Slovenskej narodnej kniznici V Martine (LA SNK). 12 Letter of V. Kovar to S. Meciar, August 26, 1941 . File 164 E 20, LA SNK. 13 See for example: Stanislav Meciar, "Chorvatsky klasik Mile Budak," Slovenske pohl'ady 56 ( 1940): 429-44. 14 Letter of S. Meciar to M. Budak, May 21 , 1941. File 164 N 17, LA SNK. 15 File 8/41 , Box 1155, MZV, SNA; Karol Murgas, "Pred tridsiatimi rokmi v Zahrebe," Slovak a svet I (Chicago, 1971 ): 15. �SLOVAKIA 71 the top level. A month later, on June 25, Slovak president Jozef Tiso accepted the nomination of Dragutin Toth as Croatian charge d' affaires to Slovakia. 16 Murgas objected to this nomination, rating Toth as a liberal-orientated leftist. Toth's first audience with President Tiso took place on August l st, and his opening statement was dedicated again to both nations' independence. It is worth mentioning that he gave the speech in his native tongue, yet the president answered him in Slovak. This established a precedent for Tiso's interactions with envoys of Slavic states. 17 The newly-established Slovak embassy in Zagreb attracted broad interest and numerous appeals for bilateral cooperation. Both parties declared their intention to closely coordinate their political, economic, social and cultural activities. NOH officials wanted information on the organization of economic and social life in Slovakia. A common topic of bilateral talks was the means of settling the debts of former parent states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). After initial negotiations with Murgas, Anton Bonifacic, head of the Croatian Department of Culture of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked out a "Proposal for Establishing Cultural Cooperation between the NOH and the Slovak Republic". Its aim was to build economic, social and cultural ties based on the mutual exchange of publications, translations of literature, the exchange of students, writers and task groups; and organizing art exhibitions, concerts etc. The proposal included a suggestion for the legal recognition and protec18 tion of Croats living in Slovakia and Slovaks in the NOH. The position of the latter was at that time far from satisfactory. Slovak minority rights gained during the former Yugoslavia were largely ignored by the Ustasha regime. 19 The first objective of the Slovak representatives in Croatia was to improve this situation. Within the Slo16 File 4961 /41 , Box 213, MZV, SNA. Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 270. 18 File 244/41 , Box 1157, MZV, SNA. 19 About the Slovak minority in Croatia, see: Vit Usak, Slovcici v Chorvcitsku - historicky ncicrt (C leveland-Rim : Historicky ustav, 1978); Sprievodca slovenskym zahranicim, ed. I.'.ubica Bartalska (Bratislava: Dom zahranicnych Slovakov, 2001), 8790; Report of J. Cieker, February 12, 1942. File 27/48 JozefCieker papers, Okresny l'udovy sud v Bratislave 1945-1947 (O1..'.S BA), Statny oblastny archiv Bratislava (SABa). Information about the exact number of Slovaks in Croatia at that time differed. The daily Slovak, on October 22, 1941 , page 3, estimated a maximum of 22,000 countrymen ; other sources gave higher numbers . 17 �72 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak community itself, there were further differences related to religious orientation. The Catholic population lacked education and schools, and its national identity was rapidly disappearing. On the other hand, Lutheran villages were keeping their traditions alive, with much of the work done by local pastors.20 However, the Lutheran community had stronger ties to the former Yugoslav regime and was treated with suspicion by Ustasha authorities. In numerous cases the Slovak embassy had to intervene to help individuals (conscripts of the Yugoslav army) who had been captured in the previous war with Germany. The chaos and scarcities following the transition of power also forced a lot of Slovaks to seek help at the embassy. Ever since the foundation of the NDH, leaders of the Slovak expatriate community were planning to set up a minority organization, the so-called Slovak National Group in Croatia, with a common official statute recognized by the Croatian regime. The eventual failure of this initiative was largely due to the fact that they were not coordinated with the Croatian side, which feared a potential precedent that wou ld allow other minorities to raise similar claims. The only minority to achieve the privilege of an officially recognized status was the German one, with a population up to 150,000 and enjoying the benefits of the parent country ' s political dominance. Following the negotiations of June 25, 1941 , Croatia and Slovakia announced a mutual settlement of their claims regarding real estate belonging to their predecessor states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).21 Murgas managed to obtain the property of the former Czech-Slovak society Beseda in Lipovljani for the Slovak side.22 The issue of schools for the Slovak minority was a frequently negotiated topic from early on. In spite of the initial mistrust by the Ustasha authorities, which culminated in the arrests of several Slovak teachers, Slovak primary education was preserved. 23 Mutual contacts also developed in the field of pedagogy and science. A visit by Croatian medics and an Ustasha Youth delegation to °File 36, Box 266, MZV, SNA . 2 21 File 217/41 , Box 1157 and File 217/41 , Box 1155 , MZV, SNA . The society officially dissolved on July 30, 1941. See Slovak Beseda in Bratislava. Box 207, f. Policajne riaditel'stvo v Bratislave (PR Ba), SNA; File 325/41 , Box 214 and File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. 23 File 33880/41 , Box 213 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. Gardista, September 21 , 1941 , 3; Gardista, October 22, 1941 , 3. 22 �SLOVAKIA 73 Slovakia was met by great domestic publicity. 24 A program of student exchange and scholarship financing was launched by numerous institutions: The Science Society for Foreign Slovaks (mainly focused on student exchange, support of Slovak foreign education and distribution of Slovak literature abroad), the Matica slovenska, The Society of St. Adalbert, the Slovak University, and the Hlinka Youth. The Croatian partner organizations included the Saint Jerome Society, the Matica Hrvatska, and later the new Croatian-Slovak Society. The pace at which interest in Croatia spread was almost overwhelming for the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which decided to halt the uncontrolled influx of NDH visitors . The Ministry then published a directive stating that it must approve all Croatian visits. 25 The founding of the already mentioned Croatian-Slovak Society (August 13, 1941) was a milestone in cultural interaction. The Slovak envoy requested the speedy assignment of a cultural attache to Croatia, recommending Jozef Ambrus, who had been studying in Zagreb. This request was turned down, as was his later proposal of founding an office of the Society in Bratislava. 26 A fact worth mentioning is that Murgas proposed Alexander Mach, the Minister of the Interior, to be the chairman of this branch. 27 The Slovak authorities, however, took a rather cautious approach and decided to wait until their Croatian counterparts founded a similar branch of the Society in Zagreb. 28 These facts indicate a kind of cautiousness on the Slovak part, caused primarily by foreign political factors. Contrary to their cordial relations and shared long-term plans, practical cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia was difficult from the beginning. Later on, such cooperation was also damaged by the Ustasha regime's inability to make good on its commitments. Meanwhile, the Croatian and Slovak Society was founded in Zagreb. Franjo Dujmovic, 29 the editor-in-chief of the daily Nova Hrvat24 See for example: Gardista, July 26, 1941, 3; Gardista , July 27, 1941, 3; Gardista, August 26, 1941, 3; File 32595/41, Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 25 Ibid, File 6978/41. 26 Reports of K. Murgas, August 19, 1941 and August 26, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA; File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. See also: Jarinkovic, Spolkovy i ivot v frvej Slovenskej republike ... , 305-24. 7 File 544/41, Box 1155 and File 137/41, Box 1160, MZV, SNA. 28 File 32.702/41, Box 118, MZV, SNA. 29 Initially led by the Croatian Minister of the Interior and well-known Ustasha activist Adrija Artukovic. �74 SLOVAKIA-2015 ska (New Croatia) , was appointed its President, with Mile Starcevic and Eugen Ftillop as Vice-Presidents, and Zlatko Milkovic as Secretary. The Society ' s Board included a number of significant individuals whose positions suggested strong links with Croatian state institutions .3° The Society's goal was to develop cultural relations and to promote the Slovak Republic in the NDH. Stanislav Meciar also hoped to expand cultural cooperation, with special focus on the new Croatian literature. When asked about which Slovak novelists he would recommend for translation, he included Jozef Ciger Hronsky, Milo Urban, Tido J. Gaspar, Julius Horvath, and Margita Figuli. He rejected Peter Jilemnicky, whom he labelled a Czech and a Communist. Among Slovak poets he suggested Valentin Beniak, Andrej Zamov, Emil Boleslav Lukac, Jan Smrek, Rudolf Dilong, I:udo Ondrejov, Ladislav Novomesky, Jan R. Ponican and Jan Kostra, with the comment that "the last three were Communists, but have written valuable Slovak poems; here you ought to make your own decision." 31 He also decided to publish a special issue of the Slovenske pohl'ady on the subject of Croatia. 32 As early as 1941 discussions began about the possibility of closer cooperation between Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia, a project designed to raise the profile of all three states. The incentive to establish this bloc came from Romania, mainly as a reaction to Hungarian irredentism. At the same time, the three states intended to revisit their territorial losses to Hungary between 193 8 and 1941. Agreement to create the bloc was soon disclosed and the Hungarian Government protested against "reviving the spirit of the Little Entente," referring to the interwar East-Central European military alliance against Hungary. In spite of the initial hesitation of Slovak politicians, by early 1942 Vojtech Tuka, the Slovak Foreign Minister, showed great interest in such cooperation. He emphasized that the alliance could not be labelled with the "stigma of Pan-Slavism," referring to criticism raised by some representatives of the Slovak government. On the one hand, as soon as the Germans indicated that no such efforts would be tolerated within their sphere of influence, the 30 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 155 . Letter of S. Meciar to Zlatko Milkovic from August 26, I 941. File 164 P 17, LA SNK. 32 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 52-83. 31 �SLOVAKIA 75 Slovak Republic 's activities declined rapidly . On the other hand, the Slovaks discovered that the NDH was not a reliable partner. 33 In the fall of 1941 some changes were made to the charge d' affaires positions in both countries. Jozef Cieker replaced the undisciplined Karol Murgas. Cieker had previously worked in Yugoslavia and was knowledgeable about Croatian affairs. He presented his credentials in Zagreb on December 12, 1941. At the same time, there was also a change in the Croatian diplomatic posting in Bratislava. Josip Berkovic, the new envoy, presented his credentials on December 19. These changes had no impact on the mutual convergence, and the Croatian Embassy in Bratislava appointed a cultural attache, Geno Sencic who energetically participated in the development of Slovak and Croatian cultural relations. In January of 1942, Tido J. Gaspar, Head of the Propaganda Office, charged Jozef Ambrus with preparing the ground for establishing the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia. The general assembly of this cultural institution took place on March 13, 1942, in the Slovak University ' s amphitheater. Slovak Ministers Alexander Mach, Gejza Medricky and Ferdinand Catlos, as well as other major figures of political and cultural life attended, as did a numerous Croatian delegation. This meeting received broad media coverage. This general assembly prescribed uniforms as a part of the dress code. The Society set as its goal to unite all Croatophiles, spread the Croatian culture and develop mutual relationships. Political issues were to be avoided. Alexander Mach was acclaimed as the Society 's President. In his acceptance speech he pointed out the parallels between the Autonomists ' first paramilitary organization, the Rodobrana (Native Defense), the subsequent Hlinka Guards and the Croatian Ustasha movement. He added that cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia "is not based on the pharisaical chimera of the notorious Slavic solidarity," which had led to humiliation, suffering and disappointment for both nations. These contacts, he continued, "are supported by a good tradition, the present struggle for a common goal, which we all have before our eyes in the New Europe." Mach's 33 See Miroslav Tejchman, "Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace v letech druhe svetove valley a Mad'arsko," Slovansky pfehled 78 (1992) : 161-71 ; Cubomir Liptak, "Mad'arsko v slovenskej politike za druhej svetovej vojny," in Prispevky k dejinam fasizmu v Ceskos/ovensku a v Mad'arsku, ed. Gyorgy Ranki (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1969), 222-30. �76 SLOVAKIA-2015 speech marked the boundaries of the cultural society. He also delegated Stanislav Meciar, Anton Misik, Jozef Ambrus as its VicePresidents, Viliam Kovar, Eduard Urban as its Secretaries, and Belo Franc as the Treasurer. Many important people working in the area of culture and politics became board members .34 The next day, the first issue of the Slovak-and-Croatian literary review entitled Tatre i Velebit appeared.35 Josip Andric became the editor-in-chief. He had visited Slovakia since the 1920s, and maintained good contacts with the representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party. In the first issue's introductory address, Ferdinand Catlos, Slovak Minister of Defense, noted : "With the help of the Germans, both our nations have become autonomous and integrated as state actors among the nations of young Europe." He praised the shared destiny and goals, desires and hopes of both nations who required no written agreements to confirm their mutual relationships.36 It is evident that both societies had ideologically compatible people in the leadership, with close links to the official regime. It was typical of both states to infuse culture with politics, especially with propaganda. However, as Jan Jankovic pointed out, in spite of major ideological links, there was also much freedom, which he demonstrated by using literature translations that often avoided an ideological undertone. Once the Slovak Croatian Society was founded, the organization of commonly-held events grew in intensity, and the Society substantially participated in promoting cooperation with other cultural institutions. Contacts were developed in the area of sports as well, but did not exceed the norm. At that time, the establishment of the autonomy of Slovakia in October of 1938 was celebrated. The cultural program focused on Slovak popular sonfs and included lectures given by the country's major personalities.3 In Bratislava on April 9, 1942, the Society celebrated the first anniversary of the NDH' s inception by arranging a red-carpet procession in the highly representative build34 For example: Stefan Bella, Juraj Cecetka, Alojz Macek, Jozef Kutnik-Smalov, Valentin Beniak, Aladar Kocis, Karol Klinovsky, Karol Studenc, Alexander Moyzes and honorsry members included Jozef Skultety, Tido J. Gaspar, Rudolf Vavra, Ferdinand Catlos and Gejza Medricky. Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 204, PR-BA, SNA. 35 More precisely about the revue Tatre i Velebit, see: Jankovic, Chorwitska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 39-51. 36 Tatre i Velebit, March 14, 1942, 5. 31 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, 1942, 156. �SLOVAKIA 77 ing of the Reduta. On the next day, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by Bishop Michal Buzalka in Saint Martin's Cathedral, and on this occasion the Slovak dailies published special issues. 38 At that time a numerous group of Slovak journalists, cultural workers and politicians set off to Croatia to celebrate the first anniversary of the state. Besides Minister Mach and Secretary Kovar, the group included prominent Hlinka guard officers Otomar Kubala, Alexander Cunderlik, Frantisek Galan, and other persons who also discussed mutual cooperation in the area of culture. Within the context of the cooperation of Slovakia, Romania and Croatia, a meeting was held on May 13 in Bucharest, where the participants agreed to compile national bibliographies of major works, to organize regular visits, to promote each other and to organize so-called weeks of reciprocal culture. An Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the NDH was signed in Zagreb, which dealt with the foundation of a Chair of the Croatian Language, Literature and History and a Department of the Croatian Language and Literature at the Slovak University, with similar Slovak institutes in Zagreb. An important clause focused on maintaining and extending elementary schools for minorities. Both partners committed to support reciprocal visits and a minimum of two student scholarships. 39 The Agreement also included a clause on the recognition of academic titles, scientific education benefits for young people, and book exchanges. They also promised not to permit the publication of things "which could present the other state in a bad light." The Agreement established a Slovak and Croatian Cultural Committee to observe the provisions of the mutual agreements and to deepen relationships. The Agreement was for a period of five years and based on the principle of reciprocity .40 In spite of the fact that similar plans had existed since 1941, and that the final agreement was prepared in 1942, neither this Agreement, nor another cultural Agreement between the Slovak Republic and NDH came into force . This was due to their inability to make and perform agreements, and a certain inflexibility characteristic of both parties, which were the basic problems associated with the development of relations between Slovakia and Croatia. Some of these problems were caused by the fact that the NDH was not con38 /bid, 164-5 . Slovak-Croatian reciprocal scholarships. File 255/43, Box 2 14, MZV, SNA . 40 File 8/ 100/43 , Box 118, MZV, SNA. 39 �78 SLOVAKIA-2015 solidated politically and economically, that both countries were involved in the war, in a complicated foreign-policy situation, and also in the relationship of satellite states with their protector, Germany . The issue of the legal status of the Slovak minority in the NDH was perceived in a very sensitive way, and tackled unsuccessfully throughout the entire existence of the NDH. Frequent excesses of the Ustasha towards Slovak inhabitants in Croatia did not contribute to mutual trust. It is well-known that from the beginning some Slovaks rejected Croatian citizenship because they had supported the previous regime, they had to deal with poor living conditions and showed increased interest in repatriation to Slovakia. Viliam Kovar's visit to Lipovljany on June 14, 1941 created a stir. During his visit, Kovar showed concern about the situation of the local Slovaks and suggested repatriation in exchange for Croats living in Slovakia. This proposal resonated and some Slovaks in Croatia appealed to the embassy for help. 41 However, charge d'affaires Murgas viewed Kovar's initiative very critically. Croatians intended to repatriate the Slovak minority to the Slovak Republic, which Murgas found detrimental to the state.42 In any case, official Slovak circles showed no serious interest in repatriation to Slovakia. What did not make such a big stir was settling the issue of the validity of Jewish travel documents. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged their validity (until March 31, 1942), but at the same time the Ministry told Murgas not to intervene in these matters, to which he would agree. 43 The legation had the right to decide each Jewish case, but their objective was to ensure that these Jews would not return to Slovakia because they were "a useless and harmful element, " 44 which corresponded to the official policy of the Slovak Republic. 45 In the NDH 41 File 116/41 , Box 1160, MZV, SNA; Report written by representatives of the Slovak minority in the NDH regarding the visit of Viliam Kovar, June 16, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA. See also: Oldfich Pejs, "Slovenska diplomacie a valecni zajatci slovenske narodnosti (1939-1942)," Vojenska hist6ria 15 (2011), 122-41. 42 '1n today's situation we don't have the space and employment opportunities for returnees ... " Report ofK. Murgas, August 19, 1941 , Box 143 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. 43 File 903/41 and 1347/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 44 File 62/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 45 For a comparison of the Slovak and Croatian anti-Jewish policies, see: Eduard Niznansky and Jana Mnahoncakova, "Vymedzenie pojmu Zid na Slovensku a v �SLOVAKIA 79 the Jewish issue was "promptly resolved," and Serbs also became an "unwanted element." 46 The greatest boom of cultural relations between Slovakia and Croatia occurred in 1942. Numerous visits and social events were organized in order to strengthen this cooperation. For example, during the summer several Croatian delegations visited the Slovak Republic. From June 28 until July 4, a "Croatian Week" in Slovakia was organized to promote Croatian culture. Slovak Radio participated very actively by broadcasting Croatian music and a series of interviews by a number of major figures in culture and politics.47 At that time an ensemble of amateur actors form Croatia toured Slovakia with their theater program dedicated to Croatian dances.48 Reciprocal visits and presentations became the most typical component of Slovak-Croatian cultural policy, most frequently realized through national theatrical and music productions. As in Slovakia, various events were held in the NDH which concentrated on mutual convergence, such as the presentation of the Articles of Association of the Slovak National Unity (Slovenska narodna jednota) to the relevant Croatian authorities who promised their recognition. The Slovak Reading Club in Ilok organized Slovaks in the NDH. In spite of promises made, the Croatian administration did nothing. 49 The Slovak Day planned for August 30, 1942, in Stara Pazova, where Vladimir Hurban Vladimirov, a famous descendant of the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, served as a Protestant minister, was postponed because of guerilla warfare.50 Jozef Cieker constantly pointed out the complicated situation in the country and the Ustasha's excesses. "The scope of action of ministers is limited to minis- Chorvatsku - pokus o porovnanie," in Z dejin holokaustu ajeho popierania, ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky (Bratislava: Stimul, 2007), 107-30. 46 See Nevenko Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 47 Alexander Mach, Mladen Lorkovic, Stanislav Meciar, Jozef Ambrus, Valentin Beniak, Alexander Moyzes, Viliam Kovar, Mile Starcevic, Zlatko Milkovic, Franjo Dujmovic, Mile Budak, Viliam Peros, Josip Horvat, Geno Senecic and others. 48 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, I 942, p.165. 49 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, I 943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 50 Slovaks in Yugoslavia. File 6452/41-1 , Box 143, MZV, SNA. �80 SLOV AKIA-2015 terial buildings and a small region around Zagreb." 51 He perceived Slovak-Croatian relations as weak and suggested that it would be unwise to limit mutual relations to Ustasha Croatia and suggested that the two nations should relate to one another as wholes. The Ustasha were not pleased with the activities of the Slovak charge d'affaires in Zagreb, and therefore they suggested that he should be removed. Cieker often met with opposition groups, members of the higher clergy and criticized the situation in the country. These statements show that there were certain differences between Slovakia and Croatia. Conservative representatives in Croatia were the more moderate Catholics of a nationalist orientation, represented in the past by the Croatian Popular Peasant Party (the Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka). In that sense, they were competitors of the Ustasha. The Slovak Republic supported the regular Croatian army - the militia, with supplies of arms and equipment. However, much more evident were the contacts between the radical representatives of the Hlinka Guard and the Ustasha. They were ideologically close, and strongly involved in the development of mutual relations, for instance between the Hlinka Youth and the Ustasha Youth. Despite these differences, cultural contacts continued to evolve. Each autumn international commercial fairs were held in both Bratislava and Zagreb. Both states sent delegations of major figures of economic and political life to the fairs. In June of 1942, an agreement between Croatia and Slovakia was signed in Bratislava on the regulation of mutual contact under civil law. At the end of October, the Minister of Justice, Gejza Fritz, signed in Zagreb an interstate agreement on extradition and propertylaw assistance in criminal issues. Like the economic agreement entered into in October of 1941, these agreements came into force too late, and therefore had no significant impact on the actual relationship between the Slovak Republic and the NDH. 52 Also, an agreement was concluded on cooperation between the Slovak and Croatian academic youth.53 This cooperation seemed promising from the summer of 1941 and many young people from Croatia visited Slovakia. The Hlinka Youth, jointly with the Ustasha Youth and 51 Report of J. Cieker, August 28, 1942. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 52 Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 273-74. 53 Medunarodni ugovori 1943, p. 208-10. Box 214, MZV, SNA. �SLOVAKIA 81 Hitlerjugend, organized camps for their members . In this regard, there was a significant involvement by Alojz Macek and lvo Orsanic, the leaders of organizations in the Slovak Republic and the NDH, . As in the preceding year, the autumn of 1942 witnessed certain changes in Slovak- Croatian relations. Activist Viliam Kovar enlisted in the Slovak army and treasurer Belo Fronc replaced him. The NDH Government underwent a major reorganization which resolved the conflict between the Poglavnik and the Minister of Defense, Marshall Slavko Kvaternik. Kvaternik came to recover to Slovakia, when he probably sought some political support. However, the Government's reconstruction did not disturb the NDH's relations with the Slovak Republic. Promoting one another continued, which is evident in the Slovak Culture Week held in Zagreb from November 29, 1942, to December 5, 1942. 54 This event had some response. Besides abundant musical performances, several contributions were made on the present and the past of the relationships between Slovaks and Croatians. At that time, Andric's Slovak Language Grammar was published.55 By the end of that year, yet another change took place in diplomatic postings. Charge d'affaires Berkovic was dismissed and replaced with Blaz Lorkovic, who presented his credentials to President Tiso on December 22. In his speech, he remarked: "The Poglavnik appointed me as the charge d'affaires in Slovakia in his belief that our brother Slovaks wish to have an old and well-proven Ustasha as the charge d'affaires of the NDH."56 In 1943 further talks were held on cooperation between Romania, Slovakia and the NDH . It was evident that Ante Pavelic's Croatia was very weak as a partner, and, therefore, the Slovak representatives focused mainly on negotiations with the Romanians. In the end, however, these attempts also failed to improve cooperation and the idea of a tightly-bound Slovak and Croatian bloc against Hungary was unsuccessful. 57 In January of 1943, a full length propaganda film 54 At that time the following Slovaks visited Croatia: Stanislav Meciar, Andrej Mraz, Karol Ki:irper, Jan Pi:istenyi, Jozef Pauco, Jan Doransky as we ll as representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Matica slovenska, the Slovak-Croatian Society, the Society of St. Adalbert and the Bratislava Chamber Quintet. 55 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 157-159; File Slovaks in Yugoslavia, Box 143, MZV, SNA. 56 File 35.591 /42, Box 219, MZV, SNA. 57 Tejchman, Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace ... , 166-67 . �82 SLOV AKIA-2015 From the Tatras to the Sea of Azov was shown in the NDH, which highlighted the Slovak Army's activity on the Eastern Front in order to strengthen the idea of a joint struggle against Bolshevism . In the field of news reporting, a regular exchange of newsreels took place and a number of contributions on Croatian topics were broadcast over Slovak Radio. The fourth anniversary celebrations of independence in Zagreb were not as spectacular as in the preceding year. In addition to compulsory lectures and articles in the Croatian press, the Croatian and Slovak Society organized a tea party on March 13th. The next morning, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated and attended by representatives of the Croatian Government. 58 On March 25, 1943 the second general assembly of the Slovak and Croatian Society was held . Once again, this event became a manifestation of fondness for each other. Many prominent people of that period's political and cultural life participated, headed by ministers Mach, Medricky and charge d'affaires Blaz Lorkovic, who was elected an honorary member. A declaration of efforts to extend the statutes of the Society was made since there was an interest in establishing branches in other towns of Slovakia (it was planned to establish branches in Presov, Zilina and Banska Bystrica), and to extend activities in the field of culture.59 The general assembly also launched the celebration of Croatian independence, which was accompanied by a number of cultural events including a gala concert of the Slovak Radio on April 9th. Employees of Mach's Ministry of the Interior were invited to turn out in strength. A Croatian issue of the newspaper Gardista (Guardsman) was published to celebrate the third anniversary of the NDH's creation. During his visit to Slovakia in May, 1943, Ivan Veres, a Protestant minister, reported on the difficult situation of Slovaks in the NDH. Again, the unresolved issues emerged, especially those regarding culture. Based on this information Alexander Mach invited the Croatian charge d'affaires to an audience and gave him notice that the situation of Slovaks in the NDH could directly affect the future relations between Slovakia and Croatia. In this respect, Mach even intended to stop honoring Josip Andric, the writer, with a high 58 Tatre i Velebit, June 15, 1943, 61. The Slovak-Croatian Society - Minutes of the Second General Assembly. File 38/68, Box 204, PR Ba, SNA. 59 �SLOVAKIA 83 state award, and issued a command to suspend the establishment of the Slovak and Croatian Society's branches. Jozef Cieker also made a statement on the nature of the mutual relationships by pointing out that people in Bratislava had too many illusions, but the reality was much more complicated. 60 In spite of the fact that the negotiations on signing the Slovak and Croatian Cultural Convention continued, no consensus was reached. Croatia refused to recognize the special status of Slovaks in the NDH because of other minorities, who would then demand similar rights. However, the Croats were willing to guarantee Slovak education through separate legislation. They also demanded that the SNU should not be a political organization to represent Slovaks in the NDH and should not claim the property of former Czechoslovak: associations. However, at that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic was more interested in concluding the Slovak and Italian cultural convention, after which the Ministry would be willing to continue negotiations about the convention with Croatia.61 The fall of Mussolini in 1943 brought about an "unpleasant awakening" in the NDH. Nevertheless, Ante Pavelic, with Germany's support, managed to hold on to power and maintain the illusion of the existence of an independent Croatian state, and on September 10, 1943, he announced that previous Italian and Croatian agreements were no longer valid, as the Italians had failed to fulfil their obligations and agreed to an armistice with the enemy. 62 At that time, a number of Croatian politicians and their families, who refused to stay in the NDH for various reasons, were in Slovakia. This is very interesting, because the Slovak Republic granted asylum to persons whose blood-stained careers were inscribed in the NDH' s infamous history. For instance, this applied to Eugen "Dido" Kvaternik, the former commander of the Croatian secret police! Jozef Cieker tried unsuccessfully to reject entry visas to exponents of the Ustasha re• 63 g1me. 60 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 61 Report of J. Cieker from July 7, 1943. Box 143, MZV, SNA. 62 Jbid, File 313 2/43 . 63 Report of J. Cieker, September 9, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. �84 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the reality of that time, Slovak and Croatian cultural cooperation decreased and in 1943 the Tatre i Velebit cultural review folded . The Slovak Embassy in Zagreb pointed to the unbearable problems of the NDH, which were also reflected in its failure to fulfil economic contractual obligations. The embassy also dealt with propertyrelated sanctions and the loss of freedom which Slovaks in the NDH had to struggle with every day. Despite plans for further cooperation, the mutual relationships had reached their zenith. Their abovestandard scope in the period between 1939 and 1944 is shown by the fact that nineteen translated Croatian fiction titles were published in Slovakia, which is more than in the case of most Allied countries. In addition, popular and scientific, political and religious literature was published, although their numbers are difficult to reconstruct. 64 At the beginning of February, 1944, Jozef Cieker was replaced in Zagreb by charge d'affaires Viktor Becko. 65 However, he would not bring any changes to Slovak-Croat relations. From his reports we learn that actual power in Croatia was shared by guerilla and German and Ustasha troops, and about the oppression of the population. As regards Slovak-Croatian relations, Becko noted that higher state authorities had an interest and a positive approach, which, however, faded at lower positions. Therefore, he suggested, that Croatians should be promised economic concessions in return for cultural and social offsets for Slovaks in the NDH. 66 In his report he summarized the mutual contacts which he considered to be less developed than expected and pointed out that a certain platform could be found as a support. In spite of that, he labelled the cultural and political relations as very good. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, he criticized the absence of a trade representative "whom the Croatians have in the Protectorate as well." 67 As regards the issue of the Slovaks in the NDH, he underscored the fact that Slovaks were transported to concentration camps based on the principle of collective guilt. Some Croatians hated the Slovaks because they were not obliged to join the army or the Ustasha, and local personal and prop64 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 166-176. Slovak, February 2, 1944, p. 4; Slovak, February 9, 1944, p. 3. 66 Report of V. Becka, March 20, 1944. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1.'.S BA, SABa. 67 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, April 25, 1944. Box 213, MZV, SNA. 65 �SLOVAKIA 85 erty-related conflicts played an important role as well. He pointed to the nationalist attitudes of the Ustasha, who did not like "foreign elements" in their country. 68 However, the repatriation of Slovaks was technically impossible at that time.69 Contacts between Slovaks and Croats were not limited to the official political position, which I intended to describe in this paper. There was also significant cooperation among anti-fascist forces in the Slovak Republic, the NDH and elsewhere in Europe. Tomislav Poglajen-Kolakovic, a Catholic priest who worked in Slovakia from September of 1943 and joined the anti-fascist forces, was an outstanding person involved in this convergence. 70 In the last stages of the existence of both states, mutual contacts died out completely, and the dissolution of the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia on May 25th, 1945, 71 was just a formality, because most of the Society's representatives had fled abroad, where they continued to develop contacts with the Croats. Relationships between Slovakia and Croatia from 1941 to 1945 were affected by the political climate. Despite comparable efforts by Slovaks and Croats to attain national emancipation in the inter-war period and deep historical roots of mutual cooperation multiplied at that time by the concept of "historical inevitability," it was the ideological adherence of political representatives and their mentors (especially Germany) which played an important role in the mutual convergence. Cultural cooperation took a similar path, but it could not overcome the ideological framework. Due to both practical and political obstacles, such cooperation would not reach the desired form, and it peaked between 1942 and the first half of 1943 . However, as Viliam Kovar wrote about the activities of the Slovak and Croatian Society, which was supposed to reflect these relationships : 68 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, January 8, 1945 . Box 213, MZV, SNA . 69 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to V. Becka, January 26, 1945. Box I 160, MZV, SNA. 70 More precisely see: Jozef Jablonicky, Podoby nasilia (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2000), 9-27. For the official Croatian reaction to the uprising in Slovakia, see: Jan Rychlik, "Obdobie pred Slovenskym narodnym povstanim v spravach chorvatskeho vyslanca v Bratislave," Historicky casopis 56 (2008): 349-84. ; Jan Rychlik, "Slovenske narodne povstanie v spravach chorvatskeho diplomata," Historicky casopis 54 (2006) : 315-52. 71 Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 20 14, PR Ba, SNA . �86 SLOV AKIA-2015 " ... (the Society) failed to do as much as one could possibly expect, but did not miss one chance to inform the Slovak public and make it familiar with the life of Croatia and its representatives." 72 It was clear before the end of World War II, which both countries entered on the side of Germany, that neither state would outlive it. However, this did not mean the end of mutual cultural contacts, which after the War took place in a brand new geopolitical and ideological environment. 72 Report of the Society' s secretary. File 38/68, Box 2014, PR Ba, SNA. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 66 SLOV AKIA-2015 THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA, 1941-1945 1 Miroslav Michela The foreign policy of Slovakia in the years 1939 - 1945 has been quite a popular research topic of Slovak historians over the last ten to twenty years. 2 Significant achievements in this regard relate primarily to research on Slovak-German relations,3 but there are also several 1 1 would like to express my gratitude to prof. Mark Stolarik and his family for significant help in my research on Slovak emigres, and especially on the biography of Slovak journalist and politician Karol Murgas. My research in the Slovak collections in the Archives and Special Collections of the University of Ottawa Library would not have been possible without the support of the Helen and John lvanco Memorial Research Bursary. 2 Here I would like to list a few publications, which appeared in recent years, mostly as a result of long-term academic interest: Michal Schvarc, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945 a jej postavenie v ramci nemeckej sfery vplyvu," in Kfucove problemy modernych slovenskych dejin 1848-1992, ed. Valerian Bystricky et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2012), 231-52; Edita lvanickova et. al. , Slovenslui republika 1939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2012); Pavo! Petruf, Zahranicna politika Slovenskej republiky 1939-1945: nacrt problematiky (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2011); James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 3 For example: Sicherheitsdienst a Slovens/ca v rokach 1938-1944: od auton6mie po Povstanie. Slovensky stat vo vybranych spravach SD od jesene 1943 do septembra 1944, ed. Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Slovenske narodne muzeum-Muzeum karpatskych Nemcov, 2006) ; "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu;dokumenty. /., ed. Michal Schvarc, Martin Holak and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, SNM- Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2008); "Tretia risa" a vznik Slovenskeho statu : dokumenty. II. ed. Michal Schvarc and David Schriftl (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, Historicky ustav SAV, SNM - Muzeum kultury Karpatskych Nemcov, 2010) ; Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1938-1941 v dokumentoch I.:od Mnichova k vojne proti ZSSR , ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky et. al. (Presov: Universum, 2009); Slovensko-nemecke vzt'ahy 1941-1945 v dokumentoch II. :od vojny proti ZSSR po zanik Slovenskej republiky v roku 1945, ed. Eduard Niznansky et. al. (Presov: Universum-EU, 20 11); Von Munchen bis Salzburg 1938- 1940. Dokumente und Essay. Buch 1. Buch 2. Slovensko v jeseni 1944, ed. Ladislav Susko (Bratislava: Luc, 2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politi- SLOVAKIA 67 studies concerning the relationship between Slovakia and the Great Powers .4 In the context of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, plenty of studies are oriented on the Slovak-Polish and Slovak-Hungarian relationships at different levels of politics.5 In the last decade studies relating to Slovak-Croatian diplomatic relations have also appeared. 6 Generally speaking, with a few exceptions, the2008); Tatjana Tonsmeyer, Das Dritte Reich und die Slowakei, 1939-1945. Politischer Al/tag zwischen Kooperation und Eigensinn (Paderbom : Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003 ). 4 For example: Politicke vzt'ahy medzi Francuzskom a Ceskoslovenskom a Francuzskom a Slovenskom (1 939-1948): vyber dokumentov, ed. Pavo! Petruf (Martin: Matica slovenska, 2003); Dagmar Ciema-Lantayova, Pohfady na vychod: Postoje k Rusku v slovenskej politike 1934-1944 (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Slavomir Michalek, "Niekol'ko problemov slovensko-americkych vzt'ahov pocas druhej svetovej vojny," in Edita Ivanickova et. al. Slovenska republiko /939-1945 v medzinarodnych suvislostiach, 139-61 ; Petr Kubik, Slovensko-talianske vzt'ahy 1939-1945 (Bratislava: Ustav pamiiti naroda, 20 IO); Edita Ivanickova, "Zapadne vel'moci a slovensky stat 1939-1945," in Slovensky stat 1939-1945: predstavy a reality, eds. Martina Fiamova, Jan Hlavinka and Michal Schvarc (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V, 2014), 8193 . 5 Here is a sample of some interesting works by young scholars: Aliaksandr Piahanau, "Slovak-Hungarian Relations in the Mirror of the German-Soviet Conflictive Alliance (1939-1941 )," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 16 (2012): 144-63; Isvtan Janek, "The Issue of Hungarian- Slovak Diplomatic Connections in the Hungarian Parliament in 1939- 1940," Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 18 (2014): 128-41 ; Istvan Janek, "Mad'arsko-slovenske diplomaticke vzt'ahy v rokoch 1939-1941 , " in Slovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, IV. , eds. Michal Smigel' and Peter Micko (Banska Bystrica: Katedra hist6rie Fakulty humanitnych vied Univerzity Mateja Bela, 2005 ), 334-51 ; Mateusz Gniazdowski, "Kontakty PHsudczyk6w ze Slowakami w latach 19391945," Niepodleglosi: 55 (2005): I 07-50; Dusan Seges, "The Slovak Question and its International Context during World War Two," in 1945 - A Break with the Past, ed. Zdenko Cepic (Ljubljana: Institut za novejso zgodovino, 2008), 213-26; Dusan Seges, Dvojkrii v silociarach bieleho or/a. Slovenska otazka v politike pol'skej exi/ovej vlady za 2. svetovej vojny (Bratislava: Veda, 2009); Holy Case, "The Holocaust in Regional Perspective: Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia," in Varieties of Anti-Semitism, eds . Peter Kenez and Bruce Thompson (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2009), 76-92. 6 Jan Rychlik, "Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy v letech 1941-1945 ," Slovanske historicke studie 26 (2000): 265-83 ; Miroslav Michela, "Vznik slovenskeho vyslanectva v Chorvatsku a cinnost' Karola Murgasa, charge d 'affaires v Zahrebe v roku 1941 ," in Slovenska republika 1939 - 1945 ocami mladych historikov fl , ed. Martin Lacko (Bratislava: Merkury, 2003), 97-123 ; Miroslav Michela, "K otazke slovensko-chorvatskej kulturnej spoluprace v rokoch 1941-45," Slavica Slovaca 38 (2003): 112-22; Jan Tkac, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske a slovensko-chorvatske vzt'ahy 68 SLOVAKIA-2015 se works are mainly focused on the issues of diplomacy and the traditional history of politics. They describe the ideas and activities of major political players, thus complementing our knowledge about the process of negotiating and building the "New Europe." 7 The present study aims primarily to explain a few basic factors in the context of building official Slovak-Croatian cultural cooperation in the period from 1941 to 1945 . The foundation of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska - NDH) on April 10th, 1941 resulted in the expansion of cultural interaction between it and the newly- independent Slovak Republic, as the representatives of both states shared similar experiences of national struggles and now ideological and political interests. The Slovak Republic officially recognized the NDH on v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Historicky zbornik 19 (2009): 154-68; Jan Tkac, "Chorvatsko v politike Slovenskej republiky v rokoch 1941-1945," Historicky casopis 58 (2010): 659-83 ; Alena Bartlova, "Dr. Jozef Cieker, vyslanec Slovenskej republiky," in Dr. Jozef Cieker: seminar pri prileiitosti nedoi itym 90. narodenincim Jozefa Ciekera v Tvrdosine 20. juna 1997, ed. Juraj Chovan-Rehak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2000), 71-92; Jan Jankovic, Chorvcitska literatura v slovenskej kulture If. (19391948), (Bratislava: Veda, 2002); Jan Jankovic, Stanis/av Meciar - chorvatofil (Bratislava: Ustav svetovej literatury SAV, 2001); Martin Jarinkovic, "Pohl'ad slovenskej dennej tlace na chorvatsku otazku v rokoch 1941-1944," in Od Salzburgu do vypuknutia Povstania. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov VIII, ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2009), 261-88; Martin Jarinkovic, "Spolkovy zivot v prvej Slovenskej republike na priklade Slovenskochorvatskej spolocnosti v rokoch 1942-1944," in Zivot v Slovenskej republike. Slovenskci republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov 9., ed. Peter Sokolovic (Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda 2010), 305-24; Oldfich Pejs, "Nakup koni v Chorvatsku pro slovenskou armadu v roce 1944," Vojenskci hist6ria 8 (2004): 87-95; Oldfich Pejs, "Na okraj dodavky slovenskych zbrani do Chorvatska v roce 1942," Historie a vojenstvi 45 (1996): 56-73 . 7 See the following : Michal Schvarc, "Statna suverenita len ako fasada? Zasahy Nemecka do slovenskeho zakonodarstva v rokoch 1939-1940," in Slovensko v labyrinte modernych eur6pskych dejin : pocta historikov Milanovi Zemkovi, ed . Slavomir Michalek (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 20 14), 641-57; Pavo) Petruf, "Zahranicna politika Slovenskeho statu 1939-1945 : niekol'ko poznamok o jej vzniku, zamerani a kratkodobej existencii," in Riesenie iidovskej otcizky v spojeneckych krajincich nacistickeho Nemecka, ed. Viera Kovacova et. al. (Banska Bystrica: Muzeum Slovenskeho narodneho povstania, 20 12), 17-29; Pavo I Petruf, "Terna "novej Eur6py", "noveho eur6pskeho poriadku" a "zivotneho priestoru" na strankach novin Slovak ( I 939-1940)," in Kapitoly z hist6rie stredoeur6pskeho priestoru v 19. a 20. storoci: pocta k 70-rocnemu jubileu Dusana Kovcica, ed. Edita Ivanickova et. al. (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 201 I), 338-54. SLOVAKIA 69 May 5th, 194 l along with other Axis members and satellites - Germany, Italy and Hungary. 8 The NDH's political role in the "New Europe" was outlined in the Treaty of Rome, signed on May 18, 194 l, which established long-term Italian patronage. After Croatia gained its sovereignty, this subordination was immediately subject to much domestic criticism. During the following Croatian-Slovak diplomatic discussions, both parties set out a preferred vision of German rather than Italian supervision, seeing in Nazi Germany a common protector and liberator and also admiring the state and the Flihrer. In May of 194 l the government of the Slovak Republic surprisingly appointed the radical Karol Murgas, as its charge d'affaires to Croatia. The request was officially delivered by German authorities, as there was no direct contact between the two parties at that time. 9 Murgas had no diplomatic experience and was known for his awkward and hot-tempered behavior in public, which might have caused some hesitation, but his paramilitary experience in the Hlinka Guard and his demonstrated sympathy for Croatian nationalists made their mark. Murgas himself saw the move as an attempt to remove him from Slovak domestic politics, as he had previously enjoyed the prominent post of head of the Department of Propaganda. 10 In May of 194 l Viliam Kovar, the distinguished Slovak journalist, visited Croatia. During his stay he met influential statesmen and leaders of the Ustasha movement and examined the potential for mu- 8 Croatia - Congratulations of president Jozef Tiso, file 1300/41 , box 61 , collection Kancelaria prezidenta republiky - Slovensky narodny archiv (SNA) - Bratislava. For more about Slovak-Yugoslav relations see: Jan Nemecek, "K slovensko-jugoslavskym vztahum 1939-45," in Evropa mezi Nemeckem a Ruskem. Sbornik praci k sedmdesatinam Jaroslava Valenty, eds. Miroslav Sestak and Emil Voracek (Praha: Historicky ustav Akademie ved Ceske republiky, 2000), 385-98; Martin Jarinkovic, "Slovensko-juhoslovanske hospodarske a obchodne kontakty v rokoch 1939-1941 ," Pamdt' naroda 7 (20 11 ): 4-17. 9 S/ovak, May 11, I 941, 3. Zagreb's official approval of Murgas's mission came on May 15, but information ' s about it had already appeared in Grenzebote on the 4th of May 1941. For this question see also: File 79/41 , Box 1155 and File 77/41 , Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 10 See: Miroslav Michela, "Miesto a uloha Karola Murgasa v radikalnom prude slovenskej politiky v obdobi rokov 1939-1941 ," in S/ovenska republika 1939-1945 ocami mladych historikov, ed. Martin Lacko (Trnava : Katedra hist6rie Filozofickej fakulty Univerzity Cyrila a Metoda, 2002), 77-105 . 70 SLOVAKIA-2015 tual cultural cooperation. 11 In a letter to his colleague Stanislav Meciar, the editor- in-chief of the journal Slovenske pohl'ady, Kovar suggested sending a series of congratulatory letters on Croatia's independence to demonstrate Slovak sympathy and support. 12 Meciar was known to be a Croatophile and ardent admirer of writer and politician Mile Budak, who later became Minister of Education and Religion of the newly-founded NDH. 13 In a letter dated May 23, Meciar asserted the brotherhood of both nations and expressed satisfaction with both countries' successful completion of the struggle for independence. In his words, "Croats were a sincere nation close to us" and "the future of Slovakia will be much safer when developed in tandem with the present beautiful reality of Croatia." 14 Such declarations of sympathy were common in contemporary formal communications and were not deemed awkward . The Slovak press continuously monitored the Croatian struggle for independence and dedicated significant space to discussions with Croat emancipation activists : the Ustasha and Hlinka Guard officials; and to both nations' notable historical figures, such as Ljudevit Gaj , Ban Jelacic and Ante Starcevic on the one hand, and Jan Kollar, Stefan Moyzes and Andrej Hlinka on the other. A lot of attention was also paid to contemporary figures such as Mile Budak, Milo Urban and Alexander Mach, the commander-in-chief of the Hlinka Guard. Andrej Vrbacky, the Slovak translator, deserves credit for this written presentation. On May 26, 1941, Karol Murgas paid an official visit to Ante Pavelic, Croatia's supreme leader - poglavnik. In his formal address, Murgas pointed to the similarities of both nation's histories and suggested close cooperation in future political and cultural activities. 15 After this the Slovak embassy was officially opened. Interestingly, although an embassy agreement was offered to Murgas, he came to Zagreb with the official status of an envoy, which the Croatian side considered insufficient and demanded diplomatic representation at 11 Croatia trip reports. Box 4, Papers of Viliam Kovar, Literarny archiv Slovenskej narodnej kniznici V Martine (LA SNK). 12 Letter of V. Kovar to S. Meciar, August 26, 1941 . File 164 E 20, LA SNK. 13 See for example: Stanislav Meciar, "Chorvatsky klasik Mile Budak," Slovenske pohl'ady 56 ( 1940): 429-44. 14 Letter of S. Meciar to M. Budak, May 21 , 1941. File 164 N 17, LA SNK. 15 File 8/41 , Box 1155, MZV, SNA; Karol Murgas, "Pred tridsiatimi rokmi v Zahrebe," Slovak a svet I (Chicago, 1971 ): 15. SLOVAKIA 71 the top level. A month later, on June 25, Slovak president Jozef Tiso accepted the nomination of Dragutin Toth as Croatian charge d' affaires to Slovakia. 16 Murgas objected to this nomination, rating Toth as a liberal-orientated leftist. Toth's first audience with President Tiso took place on August l st, and his opening statement was dedicated again to both nations' independence. It is worth mentioning that he gave the speech in his native tongue, yet the president answered him in Slovak. This established a precedent for Tiso's interactions with envoys of Slavic states. 17 The newly-established Slovak embassy in Zagreb attracted broad interest and numerous appeals for bilateral cooperation. Both parties declared their intention to closely coordinate their political, economic, social and cultural activities. NOH officials wanted information on the organization of economic and social life in Slovakia. A common topic of bilateral talks was the means of settling the debts of former parent states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). After initial negotiations with Murgas, Anton Bonifacic, head of the Croatian Department of Culture of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked out a "Proposal for Establishing Cultural Cooperation between the NOH and the Slovak Republic". Its aim was to build economic, social and cultural ties based on the mutual exchange of publications, translations of literature, the exchange of students, writers and task groups; and organizing art exhibitions, concerts etc. The proposal included a suggestion for the legal recognition and protec18 tion of Croats living in Slovakia and Slovaks in the NOH. The position of the latter was at that time far from satisfactory. Slovak minority rights gained during the former Yugoslavia were largely ignored by the Ustasha regime. 19 The first objective of the Slovak representatives in Croatia was to improve this situation. Within the Slo16 File 4961 /41 , Box 213, MZV, SNA. Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 270. 18 File 244/41 , Box 1157, MZV, SNA. 19 About the Slovak minority in Croatia, see: Vit Usak, Slovcici v Chorvcitsku - historicky ncicrt (C leveland-Rim : Historicky ustav, 1978); Sprievodca slovenskym zahranicim, ed. I.'.ubica Bartalska (Bratislava: Dom zahranicnych Slovakov, 2001), 8790; Report of J. Cieker, February 12, 1942. File 27/48 JozefCieker papers, Okresny l'udovy sud v Bratislave 1945-1947 (O1..'.S BA), Statny oblastny archiv Bratislava (SABa). Information about the exact number of Slovaks in Croatia at that time differed. The daily Slovak, on October 22, 1941 , page 3, estimated a maximum of 22,000 countrymen ; other sources gave higher numbers . 17 72 SLOV AKIA-2015 vak community itself, there were further differences related to religious orientation. The Catholic population lacked education and schools, and its national identity was rapidly disappearing. On the other hand, Lutheran villages were keeping their traditions alive, with much of the work done by local pastors.20 However, the Lutheran community had stronger ties to the former Yugoslav regime and was treated with suspicion by Ustasha authorities. In numerous cases the Slovak embassy had to intervene to help individuals (conscripts of the Yugoslav army) who had been captured in the previous war with Germany. The chaos and scarcities following the transition of power also forced a lot of Slovaks to seek help at the embassy. Ever since the foundation of the NDH, leaders of the Slovak expatriate community were planning to set up a minority organization, the so-called Slovak National Group in Croatia, with a common official statute recognized by the Croatian regime. The eventual failure of this initiative was largely due to the fact that they were not coordinated with the Croatian side, which feared a potential precedent that wou ld allow other minorities to raise similar claims. The only minority to achieve the privilege of an officially recognized status was the German one, with a population up to 150,000 and enjoying the benefits of the parent country ' s political dominance. Following the negotiations of June 25, 1941 , Croatia and Slovakia announced a mutual settlement of their claims regarding real estate belonging to their predecessor states (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).21 Murgas managed to obtain the property of the former Czech-Slovak society Beseda in Lipovljani for the Slovak side.22 The issue of schools for the Slovak minority was a frequently negotiated topic from early on. In spite of the initial mistrust by the Ustasha authorities, which culminated in the arrests of several Slovak teachers, Slovak primary education was preserved. 23 Mutual contacts also developed in the field of pedagogy and science. A visit by Croatian medics and an Ustasha Youth delegation to °File 36, Box 266, MZV, SNA . 2 21 File 217/41 , Box 1157 and File 217/41 , Box 1155 , MZV, SNA . The society officially dissolved on July 30, 1941. See Slovak Beseda in Bratislava. Box 207, f. Policajne riaditel'stvo v Bratislave (PR Ba), SNA; File 325/41 , Box 214 and File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. 23 File 33880/41 , Box 213 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. Gardista, September 21 , 1941 , 3; Gardista, October 22, 1941 , 3. 22 SLOVAKIA 73 Slovakia was met by great domestic publicity. 24 A program of student exchange and scholarship financing was launched by numerous institutions: The Science Society for Foreign Slovaks (mainly focused on student exchange, support of Slovak foreign education and distribution of Slovak literature abroad), the Matica slovenska, The Society of St. Adalbert, the Slovak University, and the Hlinka Youth. The Croatian partner organizations included the Saint Jerome Society, the Matica Hrvatska, and later the new Croatian-Slovak Society. The pace at which interest in Croatia spread was almost overwhelming for the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which decided to halt the uncontrolled influx of NDH visitors . The Ministry then published a directive stating that it must approve all Croatian visits. 25 The founding of the already mentioned Croatian-Slovak Society (August 13, 1941) was a milestone in cultural interaction. The Slovak envoy requested the speedy assignment of a cultural attache to Croatia, recommending Jozef Ambrus, who had been studying in Zagreb. This request was turned down, as was his later proposal of founding an office of the Society in Bratislava. 26 A fact worth mentioning is that Murgas proposed Alexander Mach, the Minister of the Interior, to be the chairman of this branch. 27 The Slovak authorities, however, took a rather cautious approach and decided to wait until their Croatian counterparts founded a similar branch of the Society in Zagreb. 28 These facts indicate a kind of cautiousness on the Slovak part, caused primarily by foreign political factors. Contrary to their cordial relations and shared long-term plans, practical cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia was difficult from the beginning. Later on, such cooperation was also damaged by the Ustasha regime's inability to make good on its commitments. Meanwhile, the Croatian and Slovak Society was founded in Zagreb. Franjo Dujmovic, 29 the editor-in-chief of the daily Nova Hrvat24 See for example: Gardista, July 26, 1941, 3; Gardista , July 27, 1941, 3; Gardista, August 26, 1941, 3; File 32595/41, Box 213 , MZV, SNA. 25 Ibid, File 6978/41. 26 Reports of K. Murgas, August 19, 1941 and August 26, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA; File 20518/41 , Box 48, MZV, SNA. See also: Jarinkovic, Spolkovy i ivot v frvej Slovenskej republike ... , 305-24. 7 File 544/41, Box 1155 and File 137/41, Box 1160, MZV, SNA. 28 File 32.702/41, Box 118, MZV, SNA. 29 Initially led by the Croatian Minister of the Interior and well-known Ustasha activist Adrija Artukovic. 74 SLOVAKIA-2015 ska (New Croatia) , was appointed its President, with Mile Starcevic and Eugen Ftillop as Vice-Presidents, and Zlatko Milkovic as Secretary. The Society ' s Board included a number of significant individuals whose positions suggested strong links with Croatian state institutions .3° The Society's goal was to develop cultural relations and to promote the Slovak Republic in the NDH. Stanislav Meciar also hoped to expand cultural cooperation, with special focus on the new Croatian literature. When asked about which Slovak novelists he would recommend for translation, he included Jozef Ciger Hronsky, Milo Urban, Tido J. Gaspar, Julius Horvath, and Margita Figuli. He rejected Peter Jilemnicky, whom he labelled a Czech and a Communist. Among Slovak poets he suggested Valentin Beniak, Andrej Zamov, Emil Boleslav Lukac, Jan Smrek, Rudolf Dilong, I:udo Ondrejov, Ladislav Novomesky, Jan R. Ponican and Jan Kostra, with the comment that "the last three were Communists, but have written valuable Slovak poems; here you ought to make your own decision." 31 He also decided to publish a special issue of the Slovenske pohl'ady on the subject of Croatia. 32 As early as 1941 discussions began about the possibility of closer cooperation between Romania, Slovakia, and Croatia, a project designed to raise the profile of all three states. The incentive to establish this bloc came from Romania, mainly as a reaction to Hungarian irredentism. At the same time, the three states intended to revisit their territorial losses to Hungary between 193 8 and 1941. Agreement to create the bloc was soon disclosed and the Hungarian Government protested against "reviving the spirit of the Little Entente," referring to the interwar East-Central European military alliance against Hungary. In spite of the initial hesitation of Slovak politicians, by early 1942 Vojtech Tuka, the Slovak Foreign Minister, showed great interest in such cooperation. He emphasized that the alliance could not be labelled with the "stigma of Pan-Slavism," referring to criticism raised by some representatives of the Slovak government. On the one hand, as soon as the Germans indicated that no such efforts would be tolerated within their sphere of influence, the 30 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 155 . Letter of S. Meciar to Zlatko Milkovic from August 26, I 941. File 164 P 17, LA SNK. 32 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 52-83. 31 SLOVAKIA 75 Slovak Republic 's activities declined rapidly . On the other hand, the Slovaks discovered that the NDH was not a reliable partner. 33 In the fall of 1941 some changes were made to the charge d' affaires positions in both countries. Jozef Cieker replaced the undisciplined Karol Murgas. Cieker had previously worked in Yugoslavia and was knowledgeable about Croatian affairs. He presented his credentials in Zagreb on December 12, 1941. At the same time, there was also a change in the Croatian diplomatic posting in Bratislava. Josip Berkovic, the new envoy, presented his credentials on December 19. These changes had no impact on the mutual convergence, and the Croatian Embassy in Bratislava appointed a cultural attache, Geno Sencic who energetically participated in the development of Slovak and Croatian cultural relations. In January of 1942, Tido J. Gaspar, Head of the Propaganda Office, charged Jozef Ambrus with preparing the ground for establishing the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia. The general assembly of this cultural institution took place on March 13, 1942, in the Slovak University ' s amphitheater. Slovak Ministers Alexander Mach, Gejza Medricky and Ferdinand Catlos, as well as other major figures of political and cultural life attended, as did a numerous Croatian delegation. This meeting received broad media coverage. This general assembly prescribed uniforms as a part of the dress code. The Society set as its goal to unite all Croatophiles, spread the Croatian culture and develop mutual relationships. Political issues were to be avoided. Alexander Mach was acclaimed as the Society 's President. In his acceptance speech he pointed out the parallels between the Autonomists ' first paramilitary organization, the Rodobrana (Native Defense), the subsequent Hlinka Guards and the Croatian Ustasha movement. He added that cooperation between Slovakia and Croatia "is not based on the pharisaical chimera of the notorious Slavic solidarity," which had led to humiliation, suffering and disappointment for both nations. These contacts, he continued, "are supported by a good tradition, the present struggle for a common goal, which we all have before our eyes in the New Europe." Mach's 33 See Miroslav Tejchman, "Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace v letech druhe svetove valley a Mad'arsko," Slovansky pfehled 78 (1992) : 161-71 ; Cubomir Liptak, "Mad'arsko v slovenskej politike za druhej svetovej vojny," in Prispevky k dejinam fasizmu v Ceskos/ovensku a v Mad'arsku, ed. Gyorgy Ranki (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Slovenskej akademie vied, 1969), 222-30. 76 SLOVAKIA-2015 speech marked the boundaries of the cultural society. He also delegated Stanislav Meciar, Anton Misik, Jozef Ambrus as its VicePresidents, Viliam Kovar, Eduard Urban as its Secretaries, and Belo Franc as the Treasurer. Many important people working in the area of culture and politics became board members .34 The next day, the first issue of the Slovak-and-Croatian literary review entitled Tatre i Velebit appeared.35 Josip Andric became the editor-in-chief. He had visited Slovakia since the 1920s, and maintained good contacts with the representatives of the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party. In the first issue's introductory address, Ferdinand Catlos, Slovak Minister of Defense, noted : "With the help of the Germans, both our nations have become autonomous and integrated as state actors among the nations of young Europe." He praised the shared destiny and goals, desires and hopes of both nations who required no written agreements to confirm their mutual relationships.36 It is evident that both societies had ideologically compatible people in the leadership, with close links to the official regime. It was typical of both states to infuse culture with politics, especially with propaganda. However, as Jan Jankovic pointed out, in spite of major ideological links, there was also much freedom, which he demonstrated by using literature translations that often avoided an ideological undertone. Once the Slovak Croatian Society was founded, the organization of commonly-held events grew in intensity, and the Society substantially participated in promoting cooperation with other cultural institutions. Contacts were developed in the area of sports as well, but did not exceed the norm. At that time, the establishment of the autonomy of Slovakia in October of 1938 was celebrated. The cultural program focused on Slovak popular sonfs and included lectures given by the country's major personalities.3 In Bratislava on April 9, 1942, the Society celebrated the first anniversary of the NDH' s inception by arranging a red-carpet procession in the highly representative build34 For example: Stefan Bella, Juraj Cecetka, Alojz Macek, Jozef Kutnik-Smalov, Valentin Beniak, Aladar Kocis, Karol Klinovsky, Karol Studenc, Alexander Moyzes and honorsry members included Jozef Skultety, Tido J. Gaspar, Rudolf Vavra, Ferdinand Catlos and Gejza Medricky. Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 204, PR-BA, SNA. 35 More precisely about the revue Tatre i Velebit, see: Jankovic, Chorwitska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 39-51. 36 Tatre i Velebit, March 14, 1942, 5. 31 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, 1942, 156. SLOVAKIA 77 ing of the Reduta. On the next day, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated by Bishop Michal Buzalka in Saint Martin's Cathedral, and on this occasion the Slovak dailies published special issues. 38 At that time a numerous group of Slovak journalists, cultural workers and politicians set off to Croatia to celebrate the first anniversary of the state. Besides Minister Mach and Secretary Kovar, the group included prominent Hlinka guard officers Otomar Kubala, Alexander Cunderlik, Frantisek Galan, and other persons who also discussed mutual cooperation in the area of culture. Within the context of the cooperation of Slovakia, Romania and Croatia, a meeting was held on May 13 in Bucharest, where the participants agreed to compile national bibliographies of major works, to organize regular visits, to promote each other and to organize so-called weeks of reciprocal culture. An Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the NDH was signed in Zagreb, which dealt with the foundation of a Chair of the Croatian Language, Literature and History and a Department of the Croatian Language and Literature at the Slovak University, with similar Slovak institutes in Zagreb. An important clause focused on maintaining and extending elementary schools for minorities. Both partners committed to support reciprocal visits and a minimum of two student scholarships. 39 The Agreement also included a clause on the recognition of academic titles, scientific education benefits for young people, and book exchanges. They also promised not to permit the publication of things "which could present the other state in a bad light." The Agreement established a Slovak and Croatian Cultural Committee to observe the provisions of the mutual agreements and to deepen relationships. The Agreement was for a period of five years and based on the principle of reciprocity .40 In spite of the fact that similar plans had existed since 1941, and that the final agreement was prepared in 1942, neither this Agreement, nor another cultural Agreement between the Slovak Republic and NDH came into force . This was due to their inability to make and perform agreements, and a certain inflexibility characteristic of both parties, which were the basic problems associated with the development of relations between Slovakia and Croatia. Some of these problems were caused by the fact that the NDH was not con38 /bid, 164-5 . Slovak-Croatian reciprocal scholarships. File 255/43, Box 2 14, MZV, SNA . 40 File 8/ 100/43 , Box 118, MZV, SNA. 39 78 SLOVAKIA-2015 solidated politically and economically, that both countries were involved in the war, in a complicated foreign-policy situation, and also in the relationship of satellite states with their protector, Germany . The issue of the legal status of the Slovak minority in the NDH was perceived in a very sensitive way, and tackled unsuccessfully throughout the entire existence of the NDH. Frequent excesses of the Ustasha towards Slovak inhabitants in Croatia did not contribute to mutual trust. It is well-known that from the beginning some Slovaks rejected Croatian citizenship because they had supported the previous regime, they had to deal with poor living conditions and showed increased interest in repatriation to Slovakia. Viliam Kovar's visit to Lipovljany on June 14, 1941 created a stir. During his visit, Kovar showed concern about the situation of the local Slovaks and suggested repatriation in exchange for Croats living in Slovakia. This proposal resonated and some Slovaks in Croatia appealed to the embassy for help. 41 However, charge d'affaires Murgas viewed Kovar's initiative very critically. Croatians intended to repatriate the Slovak minority to the Slovak Republic, which Murgas found detrimental to the state.42 In any case, official Slovak circles showed no serious interest in repatriation to Slovakia. What did not make such a big stir was settling the issue of the validity of Jewish travel documents. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs had acknowledged their validity (until March 31, 1942), but at the same time the Ministry told Murgas not to intervene in these matters, to which he would agree. 43 The legation had the right to decide each Jewish case, but their objective was to ensure that these Jews would not return to Slovakia because they were "a useless and harmful element, " 44 which corresponded to the official policy of the Slovak Republic. 45 In the NDH 41 File 116/41 , Box 1160, MZV, SNA; Report written by representatives of the Slovak minority in the NDH regarding the visit of Viliam Kovar, June 16, 1941. Box 143, MZV, SNA. See also: Oldfich Pejs, "Slovenska diplomacie a valecni zajatci slovenske narodnosti (1939-1942)," Vojenska hist6ria 15 (2011), 122-41. 42 '1n today's situation we don't have the space and employment opportunities for returnees ... " Report ofK. Murgas, August 19, 1941 , Box 143 and File 20518/41 , Box 48 , MZV, SNA. 43 File 903/41 and 1347/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 44 File 62/41 , Box 1158, MZV, SNA. 45 For a comparison of the Slovak and Croatian anti-Jewish policies, see: Eduard Niznansky and Jana Mnahoncakova, "Vymedzenie pojmu Zid na Slovensku a v SLOVAKIA 79 the Jewish issue was "promptly resolved," and Serbs also became an "unwanted element." 46 The greatest boom of cultural relations between Slovakia and Croatia occurred in 1942. Numerous visits and social events were organized in order to strengthen this cooperation. For example, during the summer several Croatian delegations visited the Slovak Republic. From June 28 until July 4, a "Croatian Week" in Slovakia was organized to promote Croatian culture. Slovak Radio participated very actively by broadcasting Croatian music and a series of interviews by a number of major figures in culture and politics.47 At that time an ensemble of amateur actors form Croatia toured Slovakia with their theater program dedicated to Croatian dances.48 Reciprocal visits and presentations became the most typical component of Slovak-Croatian cultural policy, most frequently realized through national theatrical and music productions. As in Slovakia, various events were held in the NDH which concentrated on mutual convergence, such as the presentation of the Articles of Association of the Slovak National Unity (Slovenska narodna jednota) to the relevant Croatian authorities who promised their recognition. The Slovak Reading Club in Ilok organized Slovaks in the NDH. In spite of promises made, the Croatian administration did nothing. 49 The Slovak Day planned for August 30, 1942, in Stara Pazova, where Vladimir Hurban Vladimirov, a famous descendant of the writer Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, served as a Protestant minister, was postponed because of guerilla warfare.50 Jozef Cieker constantly pointed out the complicated situation in the country and the Ustasha's excesses. "The scope of action of ministers is limited to minis- Chorvatsku - pokus o porovnanie," in Z dejin holokaustu ajeho popierania, ed. Eduard Nizi\.ansky (Bratislava: Stimul, 2007), 107-30. 46 See Nevenko Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 47 Alexander Mach, Mladen Lorkovic, Stanislav Meciar, Jozef Ambrus, Valentin Beniak, Alexander Moyzes, Viliam Kovar, Mile Starcevic, Zlatko Milkovic, Franjo Dujmovic, Mile Budak, Viliam Peros, Josip Horvat, Geno Senecic and others. 48 Tatre i Velebit, December 25, I 942, p.165. 49 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, I 943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 50 Slovaks in Yugoslavia. File 6452/41-1 , Box 143, MZV, SNA. 80 SLOV AKIA-2015 terial buildings and a small region around Zagreb." 51 He perceived Slovak-Croatian relations as weak and suggested that it would be unwise to limit mutual relations to Ustasha Croatia and suggested that the two nations should relate to one another as wholes. The Ustasha were not pleased with the activities of the Slovak charge d'affaires in Zagreb, and therefore they suggested that he should be removed. Cieker often met with opposition groups, members of the higher clergy and criticized the situation in the country. These statements show that there were certain differences between Slovakia and Croatia. Conservative representatives in Croatia were the more moderate Catholics of a nationalist orientation, represented in the past by the Croatian Popular Peasant Party (the Hrvatska pucka seljacka stranka). In that sense, they were competitors of the Ustasha. The Slovak Republic supported the regular Croatian army - the militia, with supplies of arms and equipment. However, much more evident were the contacts between the radical representatives of the Hlinka Guard and the Ustasha. They were ideologically close, and strongly involved in the development of mutual relations, for instance between the Hlinka Youth and the Ustasha Youth. Despite these differences, cultural contacts continued to evolve. Each autumn international commercial fairs were held in both Bratislava and Zagreb. Both states sent delegations of major figures of economic and political life to the fairs. In June of 1942, an agreement between Croatia and Slovakia was signed in Bratislava on the regulation of mutual contact under civil law. At the end of October, the Minister of Justice, Gejza Fritz, signed in Zagreb an interstate agreement on extradition and propertylaw assistance in criminal issues. Like the economic agreement entered into in October of 1941, these agreements came into force too late, and therefore had no significant impact on the actual relationship between the Slovak Republic and the NDH. 52 Also, an agreement was concluded on cooperation between the Slovak and Croatian academic youth.53 This cooperation seemed promising from the summer of 1941 and many young people from Croatia visited Slovakia. The Hlinka Youth, jointly with the Ustasha Youth and 51 Report of J. Cieker, August 28, 1942. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1:S BA, SABa. 52 Rychlik, Slovensko-chorvatske vztahy ... , 273-74. 53 Medunarodni ugovori 1943, p. 208-10. Box 214, MZV, SNA. SLOVAKIA 81 Hitlerjugend, organized camps for their members . In this regard, there was a significant involvement by Alojz Macek and lvo Orsanic, the leaders of organizations in the Slovak Republic and the NDH, . As in the preceding year, the autumn of 1942 witnessed certain changes in Slovak- Croatian relations. Activist Viliam Kovar enlisted in the Slovak army and treasurer Belo Fronc replaced him. The NDH Government underwent a major reorganization which resolved the conflict between the Poglavnik and the Minister of Defense, Marshall Slavko Kvaternik. Kvaternik came to recover to Slovakia, when he probably sought some political support. However, the Government's reconstruction did not disturb the NDH's relations with the Slovak Republic. Promoting one another continued, which is evident in the Slovak Culture Week held in Zagreb from November 29, 1942, to December 5, 1942. 54 This event had some response. Besides abundant musical performances, several contributions were made on the present and the past of the relationships between Slovaks and Croatians. At that time, Andric's Slovak Language Grammar was published.55 By the end of that year, yet another change took place in diplomatic postings. Charge d'affaires Berkovic was dismissed and replaced with Blaz Lorkovic, who presented his credentials to President Tiso on December 22. In his speech, he remarked: "The Poglavnik appointed me as the charge d'affaires in Slovakia in his belief that our brother Slovaks wish to have an old and well-proven Ustasha as the charge d'affaires of the NDH."56 In 1943 further talks were held on cooperation between Romania, Slovakia and the NDH . It was evident that Ante Pavelic's Croatia was very weak as a partner, and, therefore, the Slovak representatives focused mainly on negotiations with the Romanians. In the end, however, these attempts also failed to improve cooperation and the idea of a tightly-bound Slovak and Croatian bloc against Hungary was unsuccessful. 57 In January of 1943, a full length propaganda film 54 At that time the following Slovaks visited Croatia: Stanislav Meciar, Andrej Mraz, Karol Ki:irper, Jan Pi:istenyi, Jozef Pauco, Jan Doransky as we ll as representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Education, the Matica slovenska, the Slovak-Croatian Society, the Society of St. Adalbert and the Bratislava Chamber Quintet. 55 Tatre i Velebit, December 25 , 1942, 157-159; File Slovaks in Yugoslavia, Box 143, MZV, SNA. 56 File 35.591 /42, Box 219, MZV, SNA. 57 Tejchman, Slovensko-rumunsko-chorvatska spoluprace ... , 166-67 . 82 SLOV AKIA-2015 From the Tatras to the Sea of Azov was shown in the NDH, which highlighted the Slovak Army's activity on the Eastern Front in order to strengthen the idea of a joint struggle against Bolshevism . In the field of news reporting, a regular exchange of newsreels took place and a number of contributions on Croatian topics were broadcast over Slovak Radio. The fourth anniversary celebrations of independence in Zagreb were not as spectacular as in the preceding year. In addition to compulsory lectures and articles in the Croatian press, the Croatian and Slovak Society organized a tea party on March 13th. The next morning, a Pontifical High Mass was celebrated and attended by representatives of the Croatian Government. 58 On March 25, 1943 the second general assembly of the Slovak and Croatian Society was held . Once again, this event became a manifestation of fondness for each other. Many prominent people of that period's political and cultural life participated, headed by ministers Mach, Medricky and charge d'affaires Blaz Lorkovic, who was elected an honorary member. A declaration of efforts to extend the statutes of the Society was made since there was an interest in establishing branches in other towns of Slovakia (it was planned to establish branches in Presov, Zilina and Banska Bystrica), and to extend activities in the field of culture.59 The general assembly also launched the celebration of Croatian independence, which was accompanied by a number of cultural events including a gala concert of the Slovak Radio on April 9th. Employees of Mach's Ministry of the Interior were invited to turn out in strength. A Croatian issue of the newspaper Gardista (Guardsman) was published to celebrate the third anniversary of the NDH's creation. During his visit to Slovakia in May, 1943, Ivan Veres, a Protestant minister, reported on the difficult situation of Slovaks in the NDH. Again, the unresolved issues emerged, especially those regarding culture. Based on this information Alexander Mach invited the Croatian charge d'affaires to an audience and gave him notice that the situation of Slovaks in the NDH could directly affect the future relations between Slovakia and Croatia. In this respect, Mach even intended to stop honoring Josip Andric, the writer, with a high 58 Tatre i Velebit, June 15, 1943, 61. The Slovak-Croatian Society - Minutes of the Second General Assembly. File 38/68, Box 204, PR Ba, SNA. 59 SLOVAKIA 83 state award, and issued a command to suspend the establishment of the Slovak and Croatian Society's branches. Jozef Cieker also made a statement on the nature of the mutual relationships by pointing out that people in Bratislava had too many illusions, but the reality was much more complicated. 60 In spite of the fact that the negotiations on signing the Slovak and Croatian Cultural Convention continued, no consensus was reached. Croatia refused to recognize the special status of Slovaks in the NDH because of other minorities, who would then demand similar rights. However, the Croats were willing to guarantee Slovak education through separate legislation. They also demanded that the SNU should not be a political organization to represent Slovaks in the NDH and should not claim the property of former Czechoslovak: associations. However, at that time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic was more interested in concluding the Slovak and Italian cultural convention, after which the Ministry would be willing to continue negotiations about the convention with Croatia.61 The fall of Mussolini in 1943 brought about an "unpleasant awakening" in the NDH. Nevertheless, Ante Pavelic, with Germany's support, managed to hold on to power and maintain the illusion of the existence of an independent Croatian state, and on September 10, 1943, he announced that previous Italian and Croatian agreements were no longer valid, as the Italians had failed to fulfil their obligations and agreed to an armistice with the enemy. 62 At that time, a number of Croatian politicians and their families, who refused to stay in the NDH for various reasons, were in Slovakia. This is very interesting, because the Slovak Republic granted asylum to persons whose blood-stained careers were inscribed in the NDH' s infamous history. For instance, this applied to Eugen "Dido" Kvaternik, the former commander of the Croatian secret police! Jozef Cieker tried unsuccessfully to reject entry visas to exponents of the Ustasha re• 63 g1me. 60 Report of J. Cieker, May 24, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 61 Report of J. Cieker from July 7, 1943. Box 143, MZV, SNA. 62 Jbid, File 313 2/43 . 63 Report of J. Cieker, September 9, 1943. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, 01.'.S BA, SABa. 84 SLOV AKIA-2015 In the reality of that time, Slovak and Croatian cultural cooperation decreased and in 1943 the Tatre i Velebit cultural review folded . The Slovak Embassy in Zagreb pointed to the unbearable problems of the NDH, which were also reflected in its failure to fulfil economic contractual obligations. The embassy also dealt with propertyrelated sanctions and the loss of freedom which Slovaks in the NDH had to struggle with every day. Despite plans for further cooperation, the mutual relationships had reached their zenith. Their abovestandard scope in the period between 1939 and 1944 is shown by the fact that nineteen translated Croatian fiction titles were published in Slovakia, which is more than in the case of most Allied countries. In addition, popular and scientific, political and religious literature was published, although their numbers are difficult to reconstruct. 64 At the beginning of February, 1944, Jozef Cieker was replaced in Zagreb by charge d'affaires Viktor Becko. 65 However, he would not bring any changes to Slovak-Croat relations. From his reports we learn that actual power in Croatia was shared by guerilla and German and Ustasha troops, and about the oppression of the population. As regards Slovak-Croatian relations, Becko noted that higher state authorities had an interest and a positive approach, which, however, faded at lower positions. Therefore, he suggested, that Croatians should be promised economic concessions in return for cultural and social offsets for Slovaks in the NDH. 66 In his report he summarized the mutual contacts which he considered to be less developed than expected and pointed out that a certain platform could be found as a support. In spite of that, he labelled the cultural and political relations as very good. As far as economic cooperation was concerned, he criticized the absence of a trade representative "whom the Croatians have in the Protectorate as well." 67 As regards the issue of the Slovaks in the NDH, he underscored the fact that Slovaks were transported to concentration camps based on the principle of collective guilt. Some Croatians hated the Slovaks because they were not obliged to join the army or the Ustasha, and local personal and prop64 See Jankovic, Chorvatska literatura v slovenskej kulture II. (1939-1948), 166-176. Slovak, February 2, 1944, p. 4; Slovak, February 9, 1944, p. 3. 66 Report of V. Becka, March 20, 1944. File 27/48 Jozef Cieker papers, O1.'.S BA, SABa. 67 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, April 25, 1944. Box 213, MZV, SNA. 65 SLOVAKIA 85 erty-related conflicts played an important role as well. He pointed to the nationalist attitudes of the Ustasha, who did not like "foreign elements" in their country. 68 However, the repatriation of Slovaks was technically impossible at that time.69 Contacts between Slovaks and Croats were not limited to the official political position, which I intended to describe in this paper. There was also significant cooperation among anti-fascist forces in the Slovak Republic, the NDH and elsewhere in Europe. Tomislav Poglajen-Kolakovic, a Catholic priest who worked in Slovakia from September of 1943 and joined the anti-fascist forces, was an outstanding person involved in this convergence. 70 In the last stages of the existence of both states, mutual contacts died out completely, and the dissolution of the Slovak and Croatian Society in Slovakia on May 25th, 1945, 71 was just a formality, because most of the Society's representatives had fled abroad, where they continued to develop contacts with the Croats. Relationships between Slovakia and Croatia from 1941 to 1945 were affected by the political climate. Despite comparable efforts by Slovaks and Croats to attain national emancipation in the inter-war period and deep historical roots of mutual cooperation multiplied at that time by the concept of "historical inevitability," it was the ideological adherence of political representatives and their mentors (especially Germany) which played an important role in the mutual convergence. Cultural cooperation took a similar path, but it could not overcome the ideological framework. Due to both practical and political obstacles, such cooperation would not reach the desired form, and it peaked between 1942 and the first half of 1943 . However, as Viliam Kovar wrote about the activities of the Slovak and Croatian Society, which was supposed to reflect these relationships : 68 Political reports from Zagreb - 1944, Report of V. Becka, January 8, 1945 . Box 213, MZV, SNA . 69 Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to V. Becka, January 26, 1945. Box I 160, MZV, SNA. 70 More precisely see: Jozef Jablonicky, Podoby nasilia (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2000), 9-27. For the official Croatian reaction to the uprising in Slovakia, see: Jan Rychlik, "Obdobie pred Slovenskym narodnym povstanim v spravach chorvatskeho vyslanca v Bratislave," Historicky casopis 56 (2008): 349-84. ; Jan Rychlik, "Slovenske narodne povstanie v spravach chorvatskeho diplomata," Historicky casopis 54 (2006) : 315-52. 71 Slovak-Croatian Society. File 38/68, Box 20 14, PR Ba, SNA . 86 SLOV AKIA-2015 " ... (the Society) failed to do as much as one could possibly expect, but did not miss one chance to inform the Slovak public and make it familiar with the life of Croatia and its representatives." 72 It was clear before the end of World War II, which both countries entered on the side of Germany, that neither state would outlive it. However, this did not mean the end of mutual cultural contacts, which after the War took place in a brand new geopolitical and ideological environment. 72 Report of the Society' s secretary. File 38/68, Box 2014, PR Ba, SNA.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Development of Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Independent State of Croatia, 1941-1945 Description An account of the resource Miroslav Michela Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 66-86 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Michela, Miroslav, 1978- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5daeb5886d2db173574ea0230273ca70.pdf 811db6938405321f6af578fbb5e18ef3 PDF Text Text SLOV AKIA-2015 87 MY ROCKY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MATICA SLOVENSKA. DURING THE SECOND ERA OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1970-1989: A PERSONAL MEMOIR M. Mark Stolarik When I first visited Slovakia in the summer of 1968, I established friendly contacts with the Matica slovenska in Martin . 1 Never did I dream that, a short while later, one of its employees would publicly attack me. This happened because the political situation in Czechoslovakia changed as a result of the Warsaw Pact invasion of August, 1968. The so-called "Prague Spring," led by the Slovak reformer Alexander Dubcek, who wished to transform Czech and Slovak society into "socialism with a human face," was crushed under the weight of Warsaw Pact tanks. Less than a year later, Dubcek was replaced as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by the turncoat Gustav Husak, who proceeded to "normalize" the state. What started out as a year of high hopes turned into one of great disappointment. 2 Even though I was born in Slovakia in 1943, my parents decided to evacuate the whole family into Austria before the Russian front came through in January of 1945 . I did not return to my home town of Martin until July of 1968. 3 Dr. Jozef Telgarsky, the Director of the National Library, which then belonged to the Matica slovenska, 1 A shorter, Slovak version of this article first appeared as "Matica slovenska pod dohl'adom Statnej bezpecnosti," in Matica slovenska v narodnych dejinach, ed. by Imrich Sedlak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2013), 174-78. I initially described this trip in greater detail as "My Memories of Slovakia under Communism (S ummer of 1968)," in Narodny kalendar CVII (Pittsburgh, 1999), 96-99 . 2 For the latest scholarship on the " Prague Spring" see The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later, ed. by M. Mark Stolarik (Mundelein, IL: Bolchazi-Carducci, 2010). For the period of "normalization" in Slovakia see Norbert Kmet' and Juraj Marusiak, comp., S/ovensko a reiim normalizacii (Presov: Michal Vasko, 2002). 3 1 described my family's Odyssey, as well as Slovak emigration in general, in Where is my Home? Slovak Emigration to North America (1870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). �88 SLOV AKIA-2015 heartily welcomed me. He was delighted that, after so many years of being cut off from the West, he could once again establish contacts with Slovaks in the West. 4 I had come to Slovakia in the summer of 1968 as a Ph.D. student from the University of Minnesota in order to study the villaie origins of Slovak emigration to North America in the 19 th and 20 centuries. I had already studied the parish records of various Slovak communities in the United States and Canada and wished to link them with those in Slovakia. At the same time, I had started to collect archival materials for the newly-established Immigrant Archives at the University of Minnesota. When I finished my research in Slovakia in September of 1968, I promised Telgarsky, that I would begin to send duplicate archival and library materials concerning Slovaks in the USA and Canada to the Slovak National Library in return for the SNL sending me the latest publications of historians in Slovakia. 5 After I finished my doctoral studies at the University of Minnesota, I was employed by several professional institutions but never lost contact with the Matica slovenska. At first I was employed by the Cleveland State University as a Lecturer and Assistant Professor (1972-76), then as an Historical Researcher at the National Museum of Man in Ottawa (1977-78), then as President and CEO of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia (1979-91) and finally as Professor and Chairholder of the only Chair in Slovak History and Culture in the Western World at the University of Ottawa (1992 to the present). During all of these years I continued my program of exchange with the Matica slovenska. I wish that I could say that our relations were always good, but it was not to be. While I worked at the National Museum of Man in Ottawa, I took the initiative to establish a new scholarly organization. In 1975 a Czechoslovak History Conference had been founded by a group of historians in the United States. 6 From my study of Czech and Slovak history, I knew that, as always, Slovak history, and Slovak scholars, 4 When I returned to the USA, it occurred to me that Jozef Telgarsky was the author of my favorite children's book - Zirafa [The Giraffe] (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1946). While we were refugees in Austria from 1945-1950, my mother often read me sections of this book. I still have it and cherish it. 5 JozefTelgarsky to Marian Stolarik, May 13, 1969, NK 289 20/69-St. See Appendix 1, page 97. 6The history of this organization can be found in its Czechoslovak History Ne wsletter, founded in 1979. �SLOV AKIA-2015 89 would play "second fiddle" in such an organization. Therefore, at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Washington, D.C. in October of 1977, I persuaded half a dozen scholars in the USA and Canada to create our own Slovak Studies Association. Since I took the initiative in founding this organization, I was elected its first Secretary-Treasurer and Newsletter Editor. I then contacted as many scholars as I knew had an interest in Slovak studies and invited them to join. By 1983 our ranks had grown to 120 members. Meanwhile, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies accepted us as an affiliated organization and the officers and I organized regular sessions of the Slovak Studies Association at the annual meetings of the AAASS. 7 As Newsletter Editor, I also informed our members of recent scholarly developments in Slovakia, as well as of the activities and publications of our members. Meanwhile, in 1968 the Matica slovenska began to publish a semi-weekly newspaper entitled Maticne citanie and put me on its mailing list. 8 At the beginning this newspaper reflected a good dose of Slovak nationalism and on its masthead carried a stylized Slovak national emblem, which had been banned by the Communists. 9 However, under the weight of Gustav Husak's, "normalization" campaign, in 1973 the Slovak emblem disappeared from the Matica's letterhead and in 1978 the Maticne citanie folded . It was then replaced by the glossy monthly Slovensko. At the same time, Jozef Telgarsky no longer corresponded with me. Instead, two hard-line Communists, at first Jaroslav Celko and later Stefan Krivus, both Directors of the Matica, continued the correspondence. The masthead of their letters no longer carried the Slovak emblem; it was replaced by the letters MS , for the Matica slovenska. 10 It was clear from these changes that the Matica was being purged . Nevertheless, I kept exchanging materials with the Matica and hoped for the best. 7 The history of the Slovak Studies Association can be found in the Newsletter of the Slovak Studies Association, published since October, 1977. Recently the AAASS changed its name to the American Association for Slavic and Eurasian Studies. 8 A complete run of this newspaper can be found in the Slovak Archives, Archives and Special Collections, University of Ottawa. 9 See the first issue of Maticne citanie dated October 28, 1968, Appendix 2, pages 98-99. 10 See the letters of Jaroslav Celko, dated March 27, 1973 and Stefan Krivus, dated October 23, 1974 to Mark Stolarik, Appendices 3, page 100, and App 4, page 10 I. �90 SLOV AKIA-2015 Unfortunately, in the 1980's my relations with the Matica slovenska took a tum for the worse. The first sign that something was amiss came in 1980 when the "Oddelenie pre zahranicnych Slovakov" (the Department for Slovaks Abroad) of the Matica slovenska sponsored an international scholarly conference on "Vyst'ahovalectvo a zivot krajanov vo svete" (Emigration and the Life of Countrymen Abroad) and published the papers.11 Even though I had met and befriended Jan Siracky, the Director, and Frantisek Bielek, one of their researchers in 1968 when the Department was established in Bratislava, and they knew that I specialized in the history of the immigration of Slovaks to North America, they did not invite me to this conference. Instead, they invited my good friend and colleague Thomas D. Marzik (originally Mrazik), an Associate Professor of history at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia. A scholar of Central Europe, Marzik specialized on T.G. Masaryk and the Slovakophile Czech Karel Kalal. He had done no archival research on Slovak immigration. Nevertheless, the conference organizers asked him to present a paper on "The State of American Scholarly Research on Slovak Emigration and on American Slovaks," which he read in English, since he could not speak Slovak. He must have taken the conference organizers by surprise when he asserted, among other things, that "M. Mark Stolarik is currently the most productive scholar concerning the history American Slovaks," and then added, "currently, he is the Executive Director of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia... .In this capacity, he can be very helpful in encouraging further research on American Slovaks." 12 When I received a copy of the Proceedings of this conference, I no longer regretted not having been invited. As I leafed through the book, I noticed that the conference had been opened by Viliam Salgovic, at that time the Chairman of the Slovak National Council, but formerly the Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1968, who betrayed his colleagues in the "Prague Spring" by collaborating with the invading Warsaw Pact forces . It turns out that Salgovic had been an agent of the Soviet KGB and was one of the most hated individu11 Vyst'ahova/ectvo a iivot krajanov vo svete. K storocnici masoveho vyst'ahova/ectva s/ovenskeho /'udu do zamoria. Zbornik prispevkov k vedeckej konferencii. Zost. Frantisek Bielik, Jan Siracky a Claude Balaz (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1982). 12 Ibid., 131-32. The compilers arranged for Marzik's article to be translated into Slovak. �SLOVAKIA-2015 91 als in Slovakia. 13 Furthermore, the conference organizers also invited the retired grade-school teacher and communist activist Helen Vrabel-Saunders of Los Angeles and the Canadian Slovak communist activist Jan Rumisek to present papers on the Slovak communities in their respective countries. 14 These individuals reflected poorly on the scholarly level of this conference. When Marzik returned to Philadelphia and described the conference to me, he mocked the presentations of these so-called "experts." However, when the Proceedings arrived in the mail in 1982, I mocked Marzik for the company he had kept. The second bad sign from Czechoslovakia came in 1982. At that time my wife and I had decided that, even though the Matica did not invite me to its scholarly conference, we would visit our native Slovakia on our own. As was required at that time, we applied for a visitor 's visa to Czechoslovakia, but, much to our surprise, the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington denied our application, without any explanation. 15 When we had visited Czechoslovakia in the summers of 1968 and 1970, we had acquired visas without any difficulty. The third bad sign occurred in 1983 when, to my great surprise, a certain writer for the Matica's monthly Slovensko, began to attack me. Even though he signed his articles as Milos Biel, he was, in fact, Miroslav Andreansky, a collaborator of the STB (State Security), who edited the Cudzojazicnu prilohu (Foreign-Language Supplement) of Slovensko. 16 In the 1970's, using the cover name Tacovsky, he had served a spy for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in West Germany. 17 13 For Salgovic's welcoming remarks see Ibid., 12-16. For his role in the "Prague Spring" see William Shawcross, Dubcek (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), 154. Soon after the Communists relinquished power during the "Velvet Revolution" in I 989, Salgovic committed suicide. 14 For their papers see Vyst'ahova/ectvo, 270-87 and 340-42. 15 Chief of the Visa Section (unreadable signature), Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to Mark Stolarik, June 4, 1982 (in author's personal papers) . 16 Dr. Tomas Klubert, an employee of the Ustav pamdti naroda (The Nation 's Memory Institute) of the Slovak Republic, in a reply to my query dated September 3, 2010, confirmed that Andreansky was indeed a collaborator of the STB. His cover name was "Korunka." Unfortunately, his file was shredded on October 8t11, 1988. 17 See the article"Co na to pan Prokes?" published in the monthly Svedectvo: Casopis politickych vdznov na Slovensku, I, no. 4 (April 1992), page 18. �92 SLOV AKIA-2015 Andreansky/Biel had learned about the Slovak Studies Association from Thomas D. Marzik. The Matica slovenska had invited the latter to another international conference in Martin on July 5-7, 1983, on the occasion of the Matica's 120th anniversary. Knowing that the Matica had once again failed to invite Stolarik to this conference, Marzik urged it to establish formal relations with the Slovak Studies Association and also to invite "more American experts" to future conferences.18 Andreansky/Biel replied to Marzik's appeal in the Foreign Language Supplement of the August issue of Slovensko. In an article entitled "?Slovak Studies Association?" Andreansky/Biel wrote: "Direct contact with such leading personalities in the SSA as Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, M. Mark Stolarik and Renee Mikus, because of their hostility [towards the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] are, at the moment, impossible." 19 This reply was laughable, because neither Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, nor Renee Mikus, held any office in the SSA! I suspect that Stan Kirschbaum was on the "black list" of Czechoslovak authorities because he was the son of Jozef Kirschbaum, who at that time was one of the Executive VicePresidents of the Slovak World Congress and Renee Mikus was married to Jozef Mikus, who also held a high office in the SWC. Indeed, both the elderly Kirschbaum and his colleague Mikus were former diplomats in the service of the first Slovak Republic (1939-1945) as well as members of the Slovak People 's Party, and, as such, supporters of Slovak independence. 20 Thus, they were anathema to the Husak regime. Andreansky/Biel probably did not like Mark Stolarik because he was the son of Imrich Stolarik, also a former member of the Slovak People's Party and, therefore a "separatist" who often wrote articles advocating Slovak independence in the weekly 18 Thomas D. Marzik, "K problematike Slovensko-americkych akademickych vzt'ahov," in Zahranicni S/ovaci a narodne kulturne dedictvo: Zbornik prispevkov z vedeckeho seminara k 120. vyrociu zaloienia Matice s/ovenskej, compiled by Frantisek Bielik, Jan Siracky and Claude Balaz (Martin : Matica slovenska, 1984), 10109. Once again, the Matica arranged to translate Marzik' s article into Slovak. 19 Slovensko, 8 (August, 1983), Foreign Language Supplement. See Appendix 5, gage 102. °For the history of the first ten years of the Slovak World Congress, see Desat' rokov cinnosti SKS, comp . by JozefM. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1981). For the struggle for Slovak independence, see J. M . Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovensko (Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1958; reprinted by the Matica slovenska, Martin, 2000). �SLOVAKIA-2015 93 Kanadsky Slovak. For this reason Andreansky/Biel wrote to Mark Stolarik on November 14, 1983 and asked the latter to repudiate an article written by his father in Kanadsky Slovak on September 24, 1983, which had criticized the August issue of Slovensko.2 1 Andreansky/Biel even promised to publish Stolarik' s reply in the next issue of Slovensko! Instead, Mark Stolarik wrote to Andreansky/Biel as follows : "I will not polemicize with you . Your job is to create propaganda. Mine is to write history. In this instance, I will have the last word." 22 Andreansky/Biel ' s letter showed that, at that time he had more power in the Matica slovenska than its president, the "Narodny umelec" (national artist) and writer Vladimir Mi nae, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. After having read Andrensky/Biel's attack upon me in Slovensko, I complained to Mi nae in a letter dated September 3, 1983 .23 In his reply of October 4, 1983, Minac wrote the following: "I am sorry about what happened in the periodical Slovensko . I have no direct control over the editorial content of the magazine, but, as much as I can, I will try to prevent such future misunderstandings." 24 Meanwhile, Victor S. Mamatey, considered the "dean" of Czech and Slovak historians in the United States, also reacted to the machinations of the Matica slovenska. In the Slovak monthly Horizont, published by emigres in Switzerland, he wrote the following: Slovaks abroad need cultural contacts with their homeland and Slovakia needs contacts with Slovaks abroad . Unfortunately, at the moment such contacts are weak and inadequate. The Matica and the entire regime need to understand that not they, but Slovaks abroad have the right to decide who will represent them at conferences and who will properly interpret their needs. 25 Vladimir Minac could not have been sincere in his reply to Mark Stolarik's complaint because, as indicated above, Andreansky/Biel wrote me again on November 141\ Furthermore, in 1988, during the 21 Milos Biel to Mark Stolarik, November 14, 1983 . See Appendix 6, page 103 . See also Appendix 7, page I 04, for the article in Kanadsky Slowik, September 24, 1983 . 22 Mark Stolarik to Milos Biel, November 29, 1983. See Appendix 8, page 105 . 23 Mark Stolarik to Vladimir Mimic, September 3, 1983 . See Appendix 9, pages 106 and 107. 24 Vladimir Minac to Mark Stolarik, October 4, 1983 . See Appendix 10, page 108. 25 Horizon/ (Zurich), September-October, 1983. �94 SLOV AKIA-2015 era of "Glasnost" and "Perestrojka," as promoted in the Soviet Union and its satellites by General Secretary Mikhail Goobachev in the late 1980's,2.6 I was finally invited to attend another Matica conference in Bratislava. There I met Vladimir Mimic at a Matica-sponsored reception at Bratislava Castle. After the opening ceremonies ended, a tipsy Mimic approached me and asked in a voice reeking of wine "ci vas otec stale serie do toho Kanadskeho Slovaka?" (Is your father still crapping into Kanadsky Slovak?) .27 This vulgar question revealed what was really bothering Minac (and Andreansky/Biel): that my father was freely advocating independence for Slovakia in Kanadsky Slovak. Another reason why Andreansky/Biel attacked me in Slovensko is that I revealed the truth about how it was published. When Tom Marzik returned from the second Matica conference in 1983, he promptly informed me that Slovensko was published in two versions : one for domestic consumption and one for Slovaks abroad. Only the foreign version contained a "Foreign Language Supplement," which carried news about the activities of Slovaks in the wider world. I informed the readers of the Newsletter of the Slovak Studies Association of these two versions in the June, I 984 issue.28 In its August 22 nd issue, the largest-circulation Slovak-American newspaper, the Jednota, official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, congratulated me for having provided this information. It pointed out that the Matica slovenska was sending Slovensko for free to Slovaks all over the world, and they had no idea that it was published in two versions.29 This information so infuriated Andreansky/Biel that he reacted with a full-page response in the January, 1985 issue of Slovensko. The jist of his response was that the publishers of Slovensko did not have enough paper to offer the "Foreign Language Supplement" to domestic readers.30 The best reaction to this absurd excuse came from Juraj Virsik, editor of the Slovak-Australian Monitor. In an article beginning with the Slovak proverb "Trafena hus zagaga," (A Struck Goose 26 For the Gorbachev era see Angus Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin (London : BBC Books, 1991). 27 1 described this episode in greater detail under the pseudonym Leo Carpenter in "Looking for Mr. Glasnost in Today ' s Czechoslovakia," in the monthly Crisis: A Journal of Lay Catholic Opinion, 7, no. 7 (July-August, 1989), 33-39. 28 "Slovensko for Two Audiences," SSA Newsletter, 8, no. 1 (June, 1984), p. 13. 29 Jednota (Middletown, PA), August 22, 1984. 30 Slovensko, 1 (1985), "Cudzojazycna priloha.," Appendix 11 , pages 109 and 110. �SLOVAKIA-2015 95 will Squawk), Virsik provocatively suggested that, if Slovakia indeed suffered from a shortage of paper, it could easily turn to the Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, published in Canada, which had an abundance of newsprint, and the Bulletin would willingly publish any news that the Matica might send it. 31 Andreansky-Biel did not react to Virsik's article. Finally, in 1988, probably as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's "Glasnost," which also penetrated into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Matica slovenska invited Mark Stolarik to another of its scholarly conferences, this time to be held in Bratislava on July 46. When I arrived in Bratislava and met with Frantisek Bielik, whom I had not seen since 1970, I asked him who was Miloslav Andreansky/Milos Biel? A surprised Bielik answered, "Don't you know?" "No, I don ' t," I replied. "But, you must know, he continued ." "No I don ' t, I answered." He was still afraid to openly tell me. I then asked where was Andreansky/Biel? Bielik answered, "in Martin." Perhaps Andreansky/ Biel did not attend the conference for fear that I would confront him . As a result, I never met him. After the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, I inquired about his whereabouts and discovered that Andreansky/ Biel had left the Matica and was living in Vrutky, a small railroad town north of Martin. He had apparently joined the ultra-nationalist Slovak National Party and was its representative in that town. Since I had met and befriended Jozef Prokes, one of the founders of the Slovak National Party, when he had visited Canada in 1992, I wrote to Prokes and asked him how it was that a former collaborator of the STB was now working for the Slovak National Party?32 Prokes did not answer my letter. Meanwhile, many interesting individuals attended the Bratislava conference. After I presented my paper on the declining use of the Slovak language in the United States, 33 an elderly gentleman ap31 Slovak-Australian Monitor (March, 1985). See Appendix 12, page 111. Mark Stolarik to Jozef Prokes, August 27, 1992 (author's archive). When I visited the Matica at another conference in February of 2013, and once again inquired about the whereabouts of Andreansky/Biel, the older employees, who had known him, sheepishly answered that a few years earlier he had passed away. 33 "A Historical Perspective on the Declining Use of the Slovak Language in the United States of America," in Zahranicni Slowici a materinsky jazyk. Zbornik prispevkov z vedeckeho symposia k 125. vyrociu zaloienia Matice slovenskej, " comp. by Frantisek Bielik and Claude Balaz (Martin : Matica slovenska, 1990), I 7277. 32 �96 SLOVAKIA-2015 proached me. He was Dr. Belo Polla, an employee of the Matica in the l 940's, who had been purged and later found himself working for the Archaeological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Nitra, approached me. He was delighted that, in my presentation, I had mentioned his former colleagues at the Matica such as its director J.C. Hronsky and the publicist Konstantin Culen, as well as the historian Frantisek Hrusovsky and the journalist Jozef Pauco. He added that those names had been "taboo" in Czechoslovakia in the previous years. He was also delighted that emigres such as the linguist I:ubomir Durovic of Sweden and the political scientist Milan Durica of Italy were able to participate in the conference. Such was the influence of Mikhail Gorbachev's "Glasnost," which would eventually lead to the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe during the summer and fall of 1989.34 After the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia in November of 1989, the situation in the Matica slovenska immediately improved. The "old guard" either retired or was fired and the new leaders of the Matica immediately re-established friendly contacts with Slovaks in the West. There were no longer any attacks in the monthly Slovensko against me or any other members of the Slovak Studies Association. Indeed, in 1991 the Matica signed a formal agreement between the University of Ottawa and itself in which it pledged to supply the newly-established Chair in Slovak History and Culture all the books that it needed in order to properly function .35 As a result, in January, 1992, the Chair received hundreds of recently-published books from the Matica and this program of exchange continues to this day. Thus, since 1989 the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa and the Matica slovenska (and its National Library, which split off in 2000), continue to have good relations. 36 34 For the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia see Jozef Zatkuliak et. al., Nove mber '89: Medznik vo vyvoji slovenskej spolocnosti a jeho medzinarodny kontext (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V vo vydavatel'stve Prodama, 2009). 35 Agreement between the Matica slovenska in Martin and the University of Ottawa (Chair in Slovak History and Culture), signed by Marcel Hamelin, Rector, University of Ottawa, September 4, 1991 and Imrich Sedlak, Director, Matica slovenska, November 18, 1991 (author's archive). 36 The National Library of Slovakia split off from the Matica slovenska on July 1, 2000. E-mail from Maria Kurhajcova to Mark Stolarik, July 21, 2000 (author's archive). �SLOV AKIA-2015 97 APPENDIX 1 L C V C: N S K A ,'J • )S1;'ELK A A AOU RE P UHLth Y M A ls1:TIN. Mudrol"lova ,e . 3:i. t e lefOn 2348. 2347 , 2340, :it34Q , 3 197 University of Minnesota, College of Liberal ArtsDepartment of History, Mr. M. St O l 8 r i k M_i_n_n_e_a_e_o_l_i_s Minnesota 55455 - US A v•l i l:111 :rn.a.6k,y1:a, o d,'\.-. 30.III.1969 Na" :an•~k.:i r:r:""maja 1969 l>'K .t.'7 20/69-St Voe Vazen:f pan Stolarik, Na VaA list z 30. marca 1969, ktory ate p!sali Dr . Sir ackemu , oznamujeme V!lm, l!e mikrofillll.Y lfosopisov "Obzor" a "Dom a 1!kol'l" sa ul! r-obia a koncom ~ Vam ich po!!leme. Obzor od roku 1863 do roku 1905 /41 ro~n!kov/ a Dom a Akola od roku 1885 do roku 1897 /13 ro~nikov/. Z ~asopisu Dom a §kola Vam zasielame 4 ro~n!lcy ~ascpisu, kedze mame viac exemplarov. Dufame, l!e Vam to vyhovie. PokiaY ide o pletenie, snhlasime a tym, aby ate nam poslsli mikrofil111.Y: Amerikansko-Slovenske noviny, Slovak v Amerike, Jednota a Narodne noviny, pretol!e ni~ v uplnosti nemAme. MOzete nam tiel! oznami t, kde v USA sa tieto ~asopisy na.cMdzaju v uplnosti. Sme radi, ze ste sa ohlasili a ponukame Vam aj dal§iu spolupracu. Ochotne Vam yoaleme zo Slovenska vAetko, ~o potrebujete z novej literatucy a mOze prist do uvahy aj star§ia literatllra, pretoze mame dost dubletov. Boli by sme radi, keby sa na University of Minnesota vybudovalo slu§ne oddelenie slovenskej historickej /alebo inej, podYa potreby/ literatllry. Te§ime ea ns spolupracu s Vsmi a srde~ne Vas pozdravujeme .J ,;R I 1} /lflftl,,\ riadi teY ,N&J-.~nej ' knHnice Ma ti,ce i-'~ lovenske j Dr. J. 'Telgarslcy ~ List bol vrateny, dl\a 27. VI.1969! neznemy �~ \ 1 ~, ' j •t . 1 t ► rr-• .-.... 1..-.••........~-, }:,.\,,_" ·, 1 .. -~·\·.t Propa1atd i!lslo ~"i'darr ... -- J} •~\i ~ · ,, ... .,i\ 1-, ~.c 1·1 •• -~ '; ::;, ' {:,:~ ."1'. •%·"'" ,, __ ~~. • -~ \l ' if ::, ,_ l.;.t.•~~·~ ! ,, '... . · f }If n•Yhno1U 1141- • n« lrult6ru v61:»c, l kullt\rn, ,1:1tvrat ma• .:.zmi. ~~:,,,d:.n.tuh~':!~:.!P~I~,,f ~6,an11 T~PI opqitl~ -,:a b ~ I ,tart JJlllOd' f:111V1tov1J price, • luqttry, lap ako J,)q-lSWCn61µt ~tDltela. lkO ntitro)a. 1, aOC(&llatlc);QIZ\ n•dt-ln,U •Yte' Jebb dobr<d. tradld u, rw n11 t'.'!: =:r.u~~:mi:"!4~• 9!:-=~~::;~ •:~;VJ~~, J• to ~~•~~,b(~~~•v:d;:,,:i=!t~1 = I ~ ron9J1 1l4rodMt, U1f6rr, na prOdeate dn1f ill'1Mtt d.lliliom• fta,ahl1 • napokon l • llltwtdfctou D6~J\:-:a~·":iii!:;,:*..:r::r.' ~~~=·~l: :~~~ • _,,1 ' OT,VA·RAM.E\J,i:\i- ~l, T MeM ~• ''f'iW'• Hu If VfcW..o p,~ ftf'1 chr4'f"M ,q .t~ •.rl#ttf• ~awo po~o, .Jl«)fjatqj ~J\lt~ tUl&V, pred'Htn4lt# 4 mu 6-u,,:Ericuc/1'«/l ~' I ~ ltc&1ic ~,ut OfH'.:UjN Mprifie' ,o. N-.i6~ ho ~,=~~~.;::; ,1,ottt P"lhl¥• 100/•j ,uutl o ptttflduoei• •"' tu4tlto«I t4t, •••,-. :i:siltf~i!'"~:~ ntl11pr())flrtotnf; ,,aop; ml tltlm~Hftw k,. Off llocl 11 opak. ·'Ct potort r>0ff t•Jto irdnU &it =:::r:~~,,. bot, Cn. tr~ dt•"" ·no.:iptllf~ hdllj 01'D~QBIE ~-., l · .& -· ·1 ..•t<,., ~~ ,:.•m ·~t.·~c .j '!Ii~. h l'udslwstt,,. ,,: .. ---- N0,V;£ · l ·- . ,' . -__:_ - ...,.. t l . --= U P I , .-,/J ~ ~ ••~___..,...:..,.. ~- 0'i.~~, Uv~pk ,1,, 'l VY_D(,..VA, MATICA SLOVENS"f V M ' "';~ ~·z., N ~ 0 z --= --= tr! > I (ll .... N 0 < > e:> 0 t""' r:,, '° = �SLOV AKIA-2015 99 APPENDIX2 Za prava ,slo,enciny okrecov dfla e. 10. 19et •yledaJ• •• taJto bttl. nojbo dr.tmla prlaclp Ttato Lueencl praeanf YO . .reJaal runkctl arladiC fu.akcla •lc•prHldan · OceftuJema. te \I 10vls.l ta • tuakclu prdbo pod • •l•bo • 6ra.de., Polladnky tederActou nOho At , aa s1ov,a1 .. a.by Maduo•, .. by ktor6 •IUJ, predHdu ktortl k 50. vtroCJu CSR to ■ t• ta:■Jllf atllf ( •I .. aJoobsahoull podobae aka H • tame, iloat4ve H na progt H ■at"fdl 1Jrol6cb) po mad'■ r• •tnhu itlan6bo dko ■ a ■ awrbuJ• ob1■ daova.al• t-■ kel• •kJ~ •Y d01taU afton.a1 -ped- •I othb postavenla nar noltl. Konltatujema v1ek , kl••· mJ ■ lalra • tt6taaho tajoaud• ~.1K• •,~~:r:1.!:~~~n~;f.~U• na Jkodu vecl n,hrh IA.k1 VycbHsa•• a dotereJlfch Ila. n·ebol vopred pred uvere) ufml trpkfcb ak6Hao1U Slo4. Poprl hlatorlclry a•HI• · L S6b1Hfm■ so He ■lm ti. Y6kov • tobto A•em.Ja. Ul ,Ill.a- nlm 1Dterne konzultovanf I. ala pokl ■ dime ae newy- a fcb a6nocb 'Slovenaki ••· l.rajlla daada • d!ollasyt■ oa- organlUlcleml N•rod. tro1 haulnA doplal( ho b ■ ltalo • rodnl rad• a Cnll:6 ••rodal ti H prett SlovUom aeutf• Term.Io vereJn•J dlskusle rad• l nalogld:y podra lafch n ■ fm, I ■ ..• CSSR .. •16 eet15. 10. 198& Ja prfllJ kri Hl■ tat, la ◄ 6 povlnDf nlln a a 1lonntlaa tlob11 ro•· ■ •now Cl1tno1 dd CSSR. na to, abJ n mohll nlekt dla( po matfanlrf, t,yt tda 116taych )HJ' · vlld• Sloveaalr■ I 1oclallatlc■ oprh ■ ycb kGY ... naJasn~ mlesla n•vrhu nl dvojJ ■ aytaf. Kedle ahtb 6 kel republllry, wllda Cukaj 1CuU.be stllooa • t!I. ◄ IZ u - 11te vysvttllt u kompetl ■oclall•llclr■ J rapubllkJ ( Ire• nych mletaach. Tfmto kooltatonalm .. be • 1 ■ -te dltoaa poulluf lraz■ J• nblC ■ ltl•k aa n6 • IH potwrdzoj■ skul0Cao1f, alto oflcl61ae n6ny \Nirodnfl Predodetkfw Ide o f rodaosU • •m•,.. odllirodttio.-aala lllllllle a■ lo Dripecl• nhrhu zJikona, ktorf hov ktod objektl-ue Je1h,1je, I• rada Sloun•kel ■oc lall1Ucltal fllruje, taUe H m6h delltotlt Jnykml lt6taJcb ora• · rapubllky ■ Nlrodn6 rada 0 prhach prlslu!n"lkov 101 na vzdelanlt nArodnostt n6tlalr) takfto u •Jb16tlt eo repullll• aoclell1llclcaJ CeskaJ ••• 11 tdll•• • •alowneloa, svoJom jnyku a O poutJv SlovUov nlj ■ kf dkon • alto M to koolt ■ taje •I • ti. kf. tohto Juyka v styku • Qr, pt.. takfmto nflllakom vf· S. Uplalnlt • celo,n dkoae I ■hrhu flttHnlho dkona. ml bei akfihOkotvek da lll( 'tittlDJml 1 ■ s1kmJ led■ ai ■ d o fader•Udcll CSSR 1.hatlu, alov ■- ■-cbri.D1, je ta N!l'1ne urCenla. Sme toho nboru, aebe1petanstwo, l• Slodcl tH1kJ nirodaosU jlf6cich • -te •letlry n•tanonnl• tfk•· f6ce u arlad'ovnla federil • , oa tomto 6aemf, ktorf an•• , prho na vrdelenle u m, essa.. die aleb11 aa oeneutl■ per konkrettzovaf na ,1upel\ l Z. NHrbuJean ■, ahy .. prl nycb orahoY, lch komp■ l ■a· ly 1 ,oeesne u mall staJ mad'anlry, aiel1111.h u nebu pliant atuu n ■ l■ I republlky, cl• • unlu lch organh:lcl• vlt podmlenky, za akfch m a prhomocl n mHu menlt dO mGcf doma vo •ereJ011j 1polo•nflt fC&1ko· poulf• ■ l t:l ■ aostl uplatolt, ala bud6 Slonn1kol ; to plall ■ I o pl· Iba oa Uklad• d'allfcb 61ln• 00 uladovaf !koly vyUle ako Uklad.n~ho typu. 1 w,-ranlll •J bez-treala6mu IJ~ prfshalnfbo prfdantbo ofch 1'ko110-... n ■I mH ■ f be1ko-1lovell&kf: Cu• U. I( ni't'rhu 6atua6bo al - kauovaalu. Stovky raaol6CII lsto u1 ~ v 1omto nivrhu t ko .. lonnsk, republlka, t:H• Ilona • a6rodao,tlacb : be konlm:itlzovat, akfm SJ • ,talnoat[. lrtori polltlckfm • 11'taJ• l!laltafom • or1• · sobom sa mA uplatnlt 'l>ti pod.J. ko-alon- ■ lrf lltc • menttnovfch n8.rodnostf %iada111e, ■ bJ H • ■ hrbu ao• SloY6cl • toblo 6.nmla ,.;~:.~D•;::111,~:.:~b\ed::-:.~ VJ'PU&tll ,ad, v kloro ■ •• vlastoibo Jazy poutfvaole po1lelaJ6.. d •«llml ,.,Ntl!afm J•I•• arladlt funkci• pradH- bo•or1, la atrodao1II m•l6 v st_yFu s dradml. n;~:.,.~:- .. undHt bod lllu • podpn ...du, lrllrri by .,prho poalfnf nol Juyk • Tleto ltyllzicle n8.\'rhu .a dkooa VJ"••ch, aHaka •• obudaouU alternaU••• dradnom 1tyku". auje u poutl-..ote • mad'artl • s1avn6ho zakona sQ v roz1 Uthapcom C•sbJ aoc:la.Uatlc· re •J s akentm program1 rato pr•vo by utml pre ■J t• laayko• ltltnych "'· kll r1pub1Jky aJtbo Slo•en • Ov KSS. lebo n4vrb z6ko Slodkov lijliclcb • 1111lela· rodnoaU) • lllradnom ,tylta. ebJ eoclall•tiek•I repu•UlrJ, 511 nez.mleftuJe o povtnno v alJku H nojlml prad•t• · 1lovao1ko•m ■ dar1kfch prltom tty aa afrodn6 nsli· a:fcb n6rodnostof vllarml ,. pollllckfch • ltit• prtslu~nrkov peoie v tfchlo fankdich oblutlach malo nfml ••· aby s ! pomocou t mentin, • nirod m.lH:u uycb orgjnocb priualv6 d6tledkJ. Praklicky atrltdalo podf• funktnfch znaloatJ. osvoJo,'all v~erko t 081 u poull-...C not IHJk. No by soemol6ou1o Slodkom r obdobt. ,:iemolao _ doko ■ ca dko - hatstvo ees kej II slovens• • ttm prlsplev kulrGry .aoru _ n6Uf Slodko• uClf k -\ldjomn6mu s1>0z.ntvar ■a po mad'llhk.) , aby M•cf•rl ,. ■lyku • aJml mohli upl•t · • spolutll1u nirodov • r ubaapeCe11A rodno1H v CSSR . dfJoaom alt Konlunu1eme. ta Slov6cl prflu. Moho tu mlmocbo• IOChtO oblbtlach, kde stl dom upuoralC na krlkfno odchodd poataY■nie Slod • n61 v memlln e, mohll by doataf podra do1erejleJ p1 lrov • Mad'araku, ktort• u xe • poclporou dstavn6ho , • podobnfch prhacb a ■ I 1- ■ kona ' do 11tuAcle, ktora ,, k .o1 .. t nnmia. mo dbsledkoch Tole 1tale •t ■ aoviako ■ a- neentch aaaff. ta by •m• boll proll vlHf k odn6rodf'iovaolu p prfiv a,.ro4aostf, aluJnfkov llitotvorn6bo n.61 :a■ ru~a■ la •I• aem&hme a6bl•alf I poi- da, prfpad ne k lcb 1lteku kodzonnlm Slodkov, lclol"f tfc bto iUemf ■ IovensUbo o , by malo by1 dO.lellltom ale• roda. -. kforjtb _prt• urul!e ■ fch ••- • .J)rginy, lriorf ad nlnter tovan6 na pTlpr,\'e Qstevn .rodaostiHn .,. predlolenom bo zalcooa, by mall uvUlf. ahrbu d•tndbo dkona. by nebolo vbodn6 ,,yhlheci .. tobto Ukona Casove navl * Pracovalcl Matice slovenskej ut na ust1nov11n1e zAkoaa ate · ho odlol federallrAcll. v Martine dt'Ja 8. 10. 196'1 vyslovlU k vl4dnemu ntvrhu • ltylldcle dOsledneftle pr • prekonzultowaf • myallef o postavent nirod• Ukon■ nostl v C:SSR Ueto prlpo• vtetkfcb zlotktch N• rodn ho tronru. mleoky: Publtktcle nivrhu astavntMatt e• slovenska ako c ho Ulkooa -vyvolalo n1Jml v lon4rodn.6 ustanovl.Zeft al p mlestnycb odboroch Matice ldada u morllnu povtnno 1lovenskt1J 01 futnom Sloven- ur,ozornlf na tao.to probl61 sku a.naent ohlaa. Vframe ut •I preto, lebo se 01 ru sa to l)teJavtlo •I ·n, porade v teJto vttel obraceJO tlensl ■ Joie/ Smrhoikj L /Ulo 196& no ndolteoc v Uortln~. m1111tn~bo ~~~1~~. oraanlz.tde 1 cel61 predstavltefov v Mahci ,tovenskeJ, ,nwe:I odpoot.4111 no aktwtlne: otdik~. l'I~"~"'" " ,.............. - .. .. - ~ Foto: A. V. H•id• (Vrouo sprduca MS 4r. Jd,t Mart4k.J Jaqko,adaf '"•• tudowft• lt6ta SAV prlJal k abrbu dkOH O flNf•nlldcH .CS51 ■ atnba filtHatbo dkDDI • ■ trodaC¥,tlacb 1taoo•lako, _. ktorAllo ')'llertme. �SLOVAKIA-2015 100 APPENDIX3 , MATICA SLOVENSK A 1863 1973 NOS!Tlr.RA IADtl IIPl11tlltY The Cleveland Stete University DepArtment of History - College of Arts et Sciences Mr . Marien St olarik C 1 e_v_e_l_ a_n_d_, Ohio 44115 U.S. A. VU li,t anatlty Vee: 10 d6a 26/II/73 Na la I natlta 4-63/1157/35 4/73 - St Martin 27. marca 1973 Vaieny pan Stolarik, ~akuje me za Va§ list, ktory nam umoihuje nadvi azat medzinarodny vymenny styk s The Cleveland State University , Department of History , Cleveland, Ohio prostrednictvom Va§ej pOaobnosti na tejto univerzi te. Avizovam1 publikaciu sme este zatial' ned ostali, nakol'ko doru~enie zasielky trva v priemere tri mesiace. Matice slovenska, Martin s radostou pr!jme predpletne na ~asopis v ramci vymeny "The International Migration Review", ako aj vybavenie na§ich objednavok ns publikacie, ktore Vam budeme postupne, taktiez v remci vymeny posiela t, Vyme nn~ rekepitulacie si budeme viest individuelne na zaklade Va si ch zasielok s cenemi a prip ! §eme v prospech Va§ho vymenneho konte , ako aj z naAej strany zasielane potvrdenky s uvedenim cien pre Va§u evidenciu. Zatial' sme Varn po slali 9 publikacii z oblasti historie su~~snej produkcie podl'a Va§ej po~iadavky dha 15.III,1973 a dal'sie publikacie , tykajuce sa tejto obla sti Vam postupne po~leme, Dufame , te s tymto postu~om budete s uhlbsit a roz s!ri sa fond o slovacika na Va§ej univerzite, ako aj f ond Matice slovenskej s publika ciami , o ktore bud eme ziadat na zaklsde excerpt z Cumulative Book Index s zoznamov vydani j ednotlivych vydavatel'ov. Tymto by sme pokladali dohodu z nasej strany za uzavretu a prosime Vas o pisomny suhlas, Te§ime sa na Va §u odpoved ~ sme / s pozdravom ~ -=- Prof.dr.Ing . Jarosl ov .~ELKO , CSc, / Spravco Matice slovenskej v,b .. •i" Stuchlikova Tclt:r6n 2Sf6, 2547, 2548, 25+9, 5197 Oalekopi1 0755:SI 0)6 5 2Martin, Mud ro6ova M �SLOVAKIA-2015 101 APPENDIX4 , MATICA SLOVENSKA NOSIT£t K A RADU RIP U B LIKY Kr. Ph. D. KarU.n Stol6rii: The Cleveland State Univereity CLEVELAND, Ohio 44115 U SA V' j Ii SI I.oa t ")' zo d na Ma r tin Nala znal': K a 5-63 /1JtlJ/Ff l14-U Vee: 23.10.1974 ~ai:)lje■ e Vma Ba list a vr,ten,y ponui:ovy zozJ:lUl. Poaielee Vo !iadan4 knihy a! na tri tituly, i:tor4 eu •! rocobra• n41 1. Ju!n4 Slovenako 2. Ratkoil1 Pra■ ene k dejinmn Vel'kej Koravy 3e Sedla1 Preilovek4 kolegium v elovenekych dejin,ch Dll:fame, !e oetatn4 knihy dostanete ~o najekar av poriadku. ~akujeme Vu aj za aaaopia "Ethnicity•. Sudame ve:rmi r~ di, ked ho pre n,a objean,te. S pozdravo■ / ~f~ Stefan Krivuil spr,vca Matice slovenakej Vy b ovujec Ulbr ichtov, Kiria Tcler6n 2346, 2347, 2548, 2349, 3197 Oalek.opi1 0753,1 0'652 Mar tin, Mu d r ufi ova 35 �102 SLOV AKIA-2015 APPENDIXS a Cudzojazycnci priloha Sefredali:to, Stefan Hovlo r. Zosto vi l M iloslo v And re6nsky Vydalo Mati ce slo.,en 1k6 v Ma rti ne. Tlotili TSNP, z6 v< Neogrofla , Martin, CSSR v m6Ji 1983. fllowcnal:o a 1983 roku u ma konat' 14. d: 17. okt6bra vo Washing• tone, na budud rok v Kansas City). Madzl elenml SSA je I nlalcorko vyznamnych 7 SLOVAK STUDIES ASSOCIATION 7 Tato apoloalosf ui 120 vedec:kych p.-.covnikov s1ov..-.. p6vodu a priatefov slovenekef vedy, lwttury • umenla nielen z USA• Kanady, ale I z cfalilch lblitov ..,_ zlskava prootrednfo. tvom The Balch lnstitut vo Phlladelphll, USA, od Matice olovaMkef, Slovenakej akademle vied a cfalilch . - k y c h kultumych inititudl e.aoplsy, zbomlky a knlhy. VosvoJom ,,Newsletter", ktory ut po 8 rolcov vyd6va dvakrU do roka, oboznamuje avofich Benov • prostrednk:tvom nlch I sV9tOvu vect.cku verejnosf • knlhaml ■ zbomflcml a upozoffluje na zaujfm■Ye ~Hinley v tasoplsoch. Okrem toho Jnfonnuje •J o knihKfl a - - V 6uopi9och O Slovikoch, a alovenakef problematlke, ktore vytll v cudzlne. Bohutlar napriek evidentnaJ snahe po objekttvnom, nezaujatom rwferovanf prmu len pravlida zimer uprlamlf pozomosf na publlkacle a ttanky a obuhom niilmu lblitu a zrladenlu naprlatersky orlentovanych. SSA mi •I vl■-u edialu l!lnnosf preva!ne V apolupr6cl - ao Slovanakjm Ustavom v Clevelande, oriento-v■ nU nepri■tal'slry voa n,m. Zatlar eo predaada a elenovla vyboru sa vprlebehu rokov - pokier am■ to mall mofnost ■ ledovat menlli, trvalU pozldu ta)omnfka a pokladnlka od r. 1978 mi M . Marl< Stolarik. ktory je aj Ndalctorom .,Newsletter" . SSA je lnltttucionlilnym aenom American Assoclation for Advenc:ement of Slavic Studies • aktivne aa zututiluje na Jej nirodnych konvandich (toho kn)anakych vadeckych p.-.covnlkov, lctori ma)u s Matlcou alovenskou dobre kontalcty. Medzl inyml Mrs. Nonna Rudlnski, Gerald J . Sabo, June Alexander, John Berta, Saly Staruch, Tom Marzik • d'alif z USA.. prof. Peter Petro a Yvonne Grabowski z Kanady ako I J . M. Rydlo zo avajaarska a dalil. AJctfvna Bnn~ tychto k spoluprild • Maticou lllovenskou na kuttumom poff ochotnych llanov SSA, vytvira perapektivu, le v buducnostf aa bude m6ct' celkom aeri6zne uva!ovaf I o konkretnej prlamej apoluprid Matice alovenekej ao Slovak Studies Anoclatlon v oblastl propagicle vyaledkov alovanokef vacly, kultury • umenla vo . - .. Zatlar, • vyhradou propagide nim naprlat.rokej litera• tury, pozltlvna hodnotima snahu SSA oboznamovat svetoW vededc:U vsejnost o nallch uspechoch v oblutl vedy, literatury • umanla. Priame kontalctyvtak vzhradom na neprlat.rsky postoj preclovtetkym takych vplyvnych oaobnostf v SSA ako SU Stanislav J . IOrachbaum, M. Mark Stolarik ■ Renee Mikus, nie SU v SUbsnoatl mOZ"'. Je to aamozrejme na ikodu vecf, ktor.6 nim je opolol!ni: propagidl slovan■kaj vacly. lfteratury a umenla na svatovom f6rw. MILOS BIEL �SLOV AKIA-2015 103 APPENDIX6 VYD/..VA MA.TICA SLOVlNSK/.. no&luil'b bdu repubUky MARTIN 14. Dovembra 1983. VAS LIST ZNA<'!KY Valent pe p~. lla.rlc K. Stolarik The i!lalch lMtit~te 18 S., 1th Street ZO Di'IA N~A ZNA<'!KA Philadelphia, Pa. 19106 VYBAVUJE Kiloll Bie]l. VEC: Vll!eny pain pro:f'e aorl V pr:!10118 Vllm zasielam :f'otokopiu a aajho l!lilnlcu, a SSA v nallom l!aeopiae Slovenako l!.6/83 a :f'otokopiu replilcy z Kanadak4ho Sloviika l!.37, rot. 42 z 24.9.1983, hoci J>Nldpoklaau, !e ich ob11ah d poznate. Ak oba l!llllllcy poromllte a apoaeaiete ei na to1 l!o ate nap1aali predaedovi Matice alovenalcej DIU'o 111119lcovi Vlatia!rovi Kinal!ovi i na jeho odpoved, bude Vu zre,im4, !e Vu Va6i priatelia z Kanadak4ho SlovlUca (Vall otec??) poalcytli aedvadiu alu!bu. Ol!akav.,._, !a ea nad oboma l!lllnkud zllJIIYalite, najd nad ich doaahoa v elovenalalj varejnoati za hranicaai, zaujaete jednoznaln4 a pravde zodpovedaj uce etanoviako a po!iadate redalcciu Kanadak4ho Sloviika o opravu. Ky v Slovensku ame tie! oohotn1 Valle atanoviako publikova~. �SLOVAKIA-2015 104 APPENDIX 7 kor..ne s mojfm prt,dpllllnym . Zarove~ pr1p•J11m MO na 23 dolarov, t. J. 20 11ko predplatne 11 3 na podporu. Zarovel\ m1pr11vde , ktor4 oko!0 nM 11li:1(l _ _______ _ ne. No to si pocnete s eecno- _ ........_,,.;,;._..;..,.....;...,._,,.. slovakm i a podobnymi pobhi- nerobl dobru slufbu medzl sh,denymi oveckami? . venskyml vyst'ahovalcaml na amerlckom konllnente. To by . sl mall uvedomll' af II, ktorl 1:: chcli hfadaf spolupracu so I~sJovenskym exllom v slobod- r-----------------------7 , Mm citatelia opiitovne Vas chceme poprosit', aby ste si prezreli zaznam pri Vasej adrese. Ak mate este stale na konci dvojku (2). tak Vase predplatne vyprsalo. Nedavno sme poslali cfalsfch vyse sto (100) iiadosti o vyrovnanie si predplatneho. Prosfme aj tych, ktori maju na konci trojku (3) a mesiac ai po okt6ber, nech si laskavo vyrovnaju predplatne, lebo im sa uz t' · k c ·1 UI' h • a •d k 1ez s on_ '. o a . c1 1e nam pr cu a vy a_v Y na znamky t1ez. riakureme Varn za porozum~nie Admin1strac1a K . S. I nom svete. I Je zfavne, fe reflm na SloI vensku podnlk6 11 bude podI' nlkaf kroky, aby potupoval sloI venskych ntlrodovcov v exlle a 1' aby podryvallch f"dnotu a akll- J I vltu " 11 kafdom poN. Bolo by ., pod nalu d0stofnosl', aby sme 115 komunlstlckyml ldeol6gml debatovall II vledll s nlml dla16gy. Tym bysme Im roblll sluf- -------------------------• - bu, uzn6vall lch za parlnerov, s kloryml stofl ZII lo sedl ..t' ZII USA a pollllkov sa nezaobera. PIie vedecke prtlce O sloven• skom vyst'ahov,.1lectve do USA _-_·-- •-=;-- ' ~ 11 fe uzntivanou uutorltou medzl amerlckyml hlstorlkml II vedeckyml lnAlllliclaml Podra Andrnansk~ho-Blela Pod tltulom .Ohlasy" uverejnl,. ~ b._g.rof. Sto"rlka,.Je.Jt lo ,.Slovensko'", klore mt! byt' f ·srov ~Sludle._!. kulllirno-spolotenskym s _~ c 18 11 0 ,. 11 b y t 8 t •0 mesatnlkom a je vydavane Ma- ";iiofot!nosr mor.t'a reprezentollcou slovenskou v Turtlan- ,vat' Slovakov medzl amerlckyskom Svlltom Marline, vo svo- ml hlstorlkml a v Slavic Stujom tlsle z flila 1983 naslrane6 dies Association 8 teda Slov,icl utok na Msgr. F. Fugu , ktory je n e b O II p O ne ch an I p O d slovenskym narodovcom a patronatom ,.Czechoslovak predsedom Zahranltnef Mall- Studies Assoclnllon'". Ide O tisce slovenskej, ktora nle je mar- te vedeckli spolotnosl" hlstoxlsllcka ako hi na Slovensku. rlkov slovensl<eho p0vodu, Clanok .Kio klame a dezlnfor- ktorl sa hlasla k slovenskemu muje'" naplsal Mlloslav Andre- rodu a pf§u o slovenskef otazansky. ke vedeckym spOsobom, teda Ten lsty Mlloslav Andretln- objektlvne. sky (alias MIiot Blel) v augusToto sa pravdafe, M. Andretovom tisle Slovenska uveref- tlnskemu-Blelovl nep6tl, lebo nil znova lltok na dr. M. Stoia- sa tam nechvall techoslovaklzrlka, klory fe najkvallflkovanef- mus a marx-lenlnlzmus. !Im slovenskym hlslorlkom v Taketo plsanle Sloyenska spolotnym stolom. J" nam Nto, fe na amerlc• kom konllnenle mtl komunls!Icky reflm na Slovensku svoflch obdlvovatel'ov a kolaborantov, ale tych my anl nepresvedtlme, anl neziskame. Tleto litoky, krltlky, alebo I za. lletanl■ tasoplsu Slovensko nas e§te vlac upevnla v tom, f~ budeme mOcr dOsledne br6nlt a chranlt' mravne a narodne hodnoty slovenskeho exllu a P.rllva slov:en~ e~~9 , .n_a,[.(1da pra~ neAl'astna_~~ ! slovenska v Tufe1anskom Svlltom Martine t~k ne~_f.!)eba Z[pdlla a zre_d.,u. Y m me vel'a svojlch vlaslnej§lch a nallehavejAlch liloh. (R) s/itort �SLOV AKIA-2015 105 APPENDIX8 lHE BALCH INSTITLJrE for ElHNIC STUDIES 18 South Seventh Street, Philadelphia, PA. Or M. Men STOlorik Uecutive Director Boord cJ Trustees Samuel H 8olklm. .k Ch011mon .JohnC Hoen ViceCr'\Otlmon AlexO:"'1010 8 Goloslu 19106 November 29, 1983 P4'n MiloS Biel Reda'kcia Slovensko 036 52 M a ~ Mudroifo va 35 Czechoslovakia Europe DrahY pcln Biel: Secrelo,y v.f$ .John F White heosu16' wo11er ~ Afooe, t0w1ence J 9ornh0'\T r, oc:e,1 C Cho01n MOn Beo111ce K Chemock lh90CJOl8 H Cov11 Th0m01 J F111oei-010 list zo dn'a 14 . novembra, 1983, som dO.e s obdrZal. Mlt~ yravdu ,/ed p{sete Z\ pozn~ obsah ~lo":,enskfch C:asop1;sov. Ako h isto ri k c!tam vsetke Slovenske tasopisy ktore vychadzaju na zapade. Aj niektore' zo Slovenska. Mam tiez' p{somne sty'ky zo Slovak.mi po celom svete. Pre mXa ti e to tasopisy a li s t y su pramene pre deji ny Slova'kov v 20. storoc'i. Lis t y od v;{s pa tt:i a mc dz i nima. Or Muffov J:.11eomon WdhOmL GfolO Dr Roso Bo~e Green Pl"Ol A W~liom Hogiuno Rooe,tM HOwe Moue A ledeler Corv L8Ylnson. Esci Mri- Fronk P louchheln'\ Set C Mo-npon MictlOel Novak Vrvion W Piosoc:k1 Mrs Meve, P Potomlun Em11vC m1ev Prof Timothy l. Smith Consiontine S. Sosongells Dr Jomes Ton11 1-1on Pou! A TroncMellO hOn Mno Cibott1 Ve,no Dr tv'torvin Wocnmon Ho~, Notnan1e1Wos.,1ngton c ec,110 Mov veo Polemizovaf s valmi neb1;,dem. \'1Sa tfloha je robi'! '!,ropa gandu . Mo'ja j e p{sal de jiny. V tomto pripade budem ~ ma'E posledne slovo. Ked chcete da~o uverejni'f v c!as opise Sl ovensk o , zasi ela'm vfm Clanok z Horizontu, o semin.iri v Martine. Vi k t or M.amatey , n.JS by'vali predseda, ho napisal a celkom s nlm s\Jhlasim. P{sat mOtete Co chcete. Historici budu vSetko posudzo vat. "Pravda vitazi," ako hovoril Masaryk. S k rajansk[m pozdrav om , /~ Emet1tu1 Prot fo.....o'O p HuTC""l1nson / (215) 925-8090 /-r?'i / v -~ Maria'n Stolclri k 0-< �SLOV AKIA-2015 106 APPENDIX 9 Slovak Studies Association Affiliated with the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 700 Pe nfie ld Ave. , Havertown , PA 19083 Septemb e r 3 , 1983 Dr . Vladimfr !tinll! Predseda Matice slovenakej 812 51 Bratislava Pugai!"evova 2 Czechoslovakia 1968, I have of scholarly asked for my agreed . Over thousands of exchange. Since my first research tri p to Slovakia in the summe r of actively cooperated with the Matica elovensk8 in the exchange materials . Dr. Jan Martak and Dr. ~tefan Krivulf wrote me and cooperation in this program of cultural exchange and I gladly the last fifteen years I have sent the Mat i ca slovenska dollars worth of book.a and periodicals as a part of this You can imagine what a s hock and aurprise it was to me, therefore , to open your monthly magazine Slovensko (No.8, 1983) and to find, on page 6 of your supplement, 11 Slovensko krajanom, 11 an attack upon me by a certain MiloJ Biel. He accuses me, aa editor of the Slovak Studies Newsletter , of bringing to people's attention articles and publications "whose contents are hostile to our state I a political system," of working "in cooperation 11 with the Slovak Institute in Cleveland, 11 and of taking an unfriendly s tand" towards Slovakia. Cont'd on page 107 �SLOV AKIA-2015 107 APPENDIX9 Besides being false, these charges betray a certain naivte by Mr. Biel about historical scholarship and conditions in the West. You, as a scholar and poet, must realize that serious historians have to consider all sources when writing their history, not just those that a certain political philosophy calls for. That i s the very essence of objectivity. Furthermore, it is the duty of true scholars to have contacts with all institutions that contain historical meterials, whether they be located ~Slovakia or in the United States. Finally, we in the West believe in openness and pluralism. For instance, the Slovak Studies Association, of which I am the founder and Secretary-Treasurer, has among its members Slovak Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Greek Catholics, Jews, nationalis ts, 'Czechoslovaks' and Marxists. We do not exclude people because of their religion or political orientation. We are open to all scholars who are interested in promoting Slovak studies the world over . Therefore, Mr. Biel' s clumsy attempt to list 1 'friendly 11 and "unfriendly" members of the Slovak Studies Association is going to backfire and hurt the good contacts that the Hatica slovenska has developed with Slovaks in the West over the last several years. I s uggest that you have Mr. Biel retract his crude and unwarranted attack upon me in the next issue of Slovensko . If he does not, I have a feeling that most of the goodwill that the Hatica slovensklhas built up with young scholars in the Western World will very quickly disappear. Yours Sincerely, l ·f i~ �108 SLOV AKIA-2015 APPENDIX 10 Bratislava, 4,10,1983 Vazeny pan Stolarik! Iste Vas nemusfm ubezpe ~ovaf o tom, ako Matici slovenskej zalezf na vsetkom, co sa aotyka dejin i su~asnosti slovenskej narodnej kultury, ako nam teda zalezi aj na kazdom, kto s nami chce v mene buducnosti tejto kultury spo lupracovaf, To sa dotyka aj Slovak Studies newsletter i Vas osobne, Mrzf ma to, co sa stale v ~asopise Slovensko, Nemam priam_y vplyv na redigovania ~asopisu, ale pokia! to bude v mojich silach., zabranim v buducnosti moznym nedorozumeniam . Rozumia sa, za mame rozliCne nazory na zivot spolocnosti a na jej buducnost . Ale mame aj spoloCnu starost, ktorou je slovenska narodna kultura, jej dejiey a osudy - na celom svete, Dufam teda, ze nam v oalse.j spolupraci nezabrania malichernosti a ostavam so srdeCnym pozaravom dJ.l~-t~~ / t/ • Vazeny pan M,Mark Stolarik 7U0 Penfiela Ave. Havertown, ~A 19083 ~~~U Narodny umelec Vladimir Minal! �SLOV AKIA-2015 109 APPENDIX 11 - s--!.. =■ ~ S:io'-'6,1,~Ko t /tJ.,~f. HIOll4CIIKl:1:t c::==s ilowc11td::~ ► --. 5: Slovensko pre ,,dva druhy citatefov" Pod tymto Hver•vr•vnYffl .. l&IVom uv--tnM p6n M...Wn Mtt Stolarik. tajomnlk • po-. ......· - - • e t ipolotnOfll (Slovak StudlN \Noc:Ultion) v USA vo •vojom "MWUetter rot. I , tWo 1/iun 1114, str. I . nuledujUCU pomemku : ,Sloven•ko, oflcialny meu~ "Ilk M•tH» •lov•n•k• J vych'· dz.a vo dvoch veni,ch, p,-. dv• r,dliln4 titat•l•k4 ve,.jna.rl. Predpok/adal aom, I • ..,,•tci nd i ~novla to vedill, • I• n• d4vn o .am zlstil l e to tak nle ,._ Vlalna 1. v,. J. v domienk•. h Slo~o. tron dost'"'• t• Vy ■Jja, jetenl•tvtuop/a, lrto,Y cirltulu}9 ,,. Slowm•ku. f•li•. Aku pozome adlv■ t• n• lcror,hofvek 8•/o V"h o U•ooi•u SloVM1•ko, vlimnite al, le mtKUi 16. • 17. atranou hlevnej t..•ti ~nopi•u je Cudzofuytn' prf/ohe, r,ro Cudzoj•~n, prlloha znaman, oval• vlec n#Jl vyzer,. ObuhuJ• tiel ~,,,.. ky v •loventine, ilu•troven4 ,, Toho tuu ,,.jchUlo•tiwjjoo ....cou je otbb •lav•n•k•J prl• lo hy Sloven.Ice. v,1ho m • ~ nib, wnov• MJ Jcr• Janom v u hr•ni8, ,,. ktof'U m• upozornlll •i vlac»rl )ednotllvcl. PodobM elco Stol• rilc v Slov• lc Studi• ._ Pouvelu;t• a WICI, uda t•ru ul r,ro prlloh• v •lowrwt.•f rKi b y mohl• by( •U~•fou rl•dM otlaloven'(Ch .rr, n Slovt1M ka, • to •i pre 6it•t• l ov v • t•rom kr•JI. Cudzojuytry prllohe by u moh/M vloli( do ~•oplsu Hp■ r,rne. Predillo by u zbytotn•J krltilce, nedtr wre, yYSmelnYm • ultll)«:nYm pozn,mlcem • Jcont,..ver• zil, I• u Ju ,ob4v• t• uUnf titetefom dome '. S.m ozre/m, w c, Je potombyste melivybe,..f • pr'vy od 01db v,m pr!Jat111nych.,, Ne dldede tohoto llstu sm• pochopHI, le naM nepriatalls v auf•l•J sneh• dlskredftova! n'6 tasopls. c:hytaJU N kaJdel prildfto.tl, aby naMI Umlen• 2) bu<f vy va ml moriadtis!■ Sk>vensb 2 X do roka • ru u rok Magufn, ako •m• to uroblll v rokoch 1811 s 1NZ. 3) elebo prUollt NmostatnU prflohu ku kald,mu tulu Slovenska, 1rtor• bud• ••· pedov•n• U.,enom. Bolo n,m Ja.sn',, le form• pristupu ku luajanom vytadu}11. ■by ttat.M slovo, ktorym .. bud•m• obraca! ku krajaq_om. bolo vy,obeM najmodern9llou tachn.lkou • na kv■• litnom ps.,...-1. preto.le all.nm toho, le bude plnft' nu-odnouvedomovadu • fflformKnU funk.du, bude slutff •J ako ,.._ pruenUda nai•J SUtesnosd. Preto rozhoduJUdml taktorml, ~ urtlll tretlu alt.emaUvu ako opdmilnu • reelb.ovstel'nU, boll: pridal kvalhMho pa• piera a Aulomberka, ftnentn. prostriedky poa«ytovan, Ml• nlst.erstvom lwlturf SSA. pwaoniln• ubupet:enl• redak• tn't'ch pnc bu zvylenla at.aw redaktorov • konetne 11..padta tlatlarM. NaN Slovensko •ko Matupc:a MatitMho ffianlll vych6du ul 6smy roll. Ptvyc:h I rokov vyc:hadulo i.k ako teraz n• 32 stnMc:h, ale z toho Ian na I farebnych. Nlekol'ko stovik vytlatkov Slov•nslta :uslelalo byval4 Oddelenle MS ~ U· hranltnjch Slov,kov I n■JJm knjanom predovletkym do Fnl'tCUului, Juhosljvle • Kanady. 11M I do USA• Auatr611e. 0d roku 1813, v a&JvlslMtl • I► ho vlalm umeranhn do uhran~•• rodlriM sme fa,.bnU ten' n11 11 atrin. bez avylenla cany Ka 5, - :u a.Jo. To ale znamenelo t1atH oety tuopfs na kvalftnom ,,..,_... Nale tov,,.I\ v Rulombertc.u vyr6ba skutotne kv•lltnY pepler, ktory Je yYZ.namnYffl exportn,;m ;rovania • udriovania kontak tov • lu■janml • v ""•ha po m6d im v kh Ualll o udrianll sloven~o n,rodn~ pov• dornla a podtu •~upatrit nosd • Jedrom n6rods P04 T atraml, alto I umo.t:ntr Im YU )omn, poznanl• krsjan~ livota v r6znyc:h tastiac:h sva ta Itek ako sma to uv&edl v 1/14 Bale Slov•nslui). Ak by sm• chcall dod6v• prilohu Slovansko krajanon I na domic:I trh, potrebovaU b• ame prlnajmen9' o 30 % vyt.t pridel p,aJNer•. to u daneJ vj robne4 sftuKM v n.&J:ombe, • k•J tov6rni nle }e moln4i. Tak ti&I by sme muMII ;rvyi,lt' cani tasopisu na dom6com trhu, 6t tlel v sutasnoati Ne Je ul.alM TNI• •ko vldlta, m ill luaja nl a, calkom proukk6 flnant " '• ma....Ulna • techrdck, d6 vody Mt pntinou, pre&t tj ta.Slovenaka, ktor6 Ja ur6en6 kni janom • :uoberi N prevs.tn. luajanskou problematikou nil Je k dlt,poddl I domkam1 Btat.rovl. Cudzojuyl"' priloha J• tla 6an, na obytajnom 1.-.bnon novl novom pepl■ rt, aby ZyY ru.nlla a oddelllll prlohu 0< ostat,,..,o taxtu . Talrto nie J4 ponJien6 kontlnulta taxtu pr1 domidch tltatelov • kr■J•n sky at.atel' dOSUva svoj u prflo hu komp,aktnU. Konettla treba p. Mar5'nov Stolarikovl prlpomenut', h pr avojef vedlajiej tinnostl altc r.dsktor • vydav■tel' Nawalet• tar al mohol (ubudol alebo nec:hcel1) Yilmnuf, le sko oudzolazytni prilohe, tak I Slo· vansko lu■Janom majU NmoatatnU tlril. to v novin6rskej praxl anama"'-, la hod Je Jedan vydav■ W I Ufr.daktor. prMaa to, to do.Uvs, SU vlast• ne tri Nmostatn4i periodlld (hod I spolu zoliU). ktor6 m~ tu byf upedov•M • rodlro• Cont'd on page 110 �SLOV AKIA-2015 110 APPENDIX 11 • ~ • to priMU a , nky o s1ov, lcoch na UpatH. Slovkl dom• tuto prllohu niltdy navkl~ . Vla•tMUwry .iurobteMml." Nepovdov•II •m• dopot,lal' uWM ,-govat' na alee dot.. .nultov•n&i. ... pNdu len U'9jmU domyeel'noet' uv.. defMlpmNlmlryvNew.iett:•. Medd6uo,n u I\U v I.ta opjul llnjan a NSR. pr.ea nedoetaf v CSSR i!uopla SbveMlco • prilohou 8&ovenako lulljanom. Odpovadal am• mu p&.omne pnllmo • on naM vywetaenieakoeptoval. Oo.teM ..,... vlak d'.U 19t a USA od vjzn,amrwho krajanakMto kutbimeho Bnltel'-. v ktorom bol nuledufQd od- u ......, dWttod &u ndavnutomli, PN koho taeopl• vycUvama ■ v ■ tom rouahu, roahod.W .me N podllf ilrokej knjanilk•J Y«9jnoatl vywedanie. 0 d6vodoch, ktcri nN • nM nadrtadenf Ol'Pn - Mlnlnera:tvo 11.ulb;ry 8SR - vleclll le tomu, ■by am• vycMv■ II tlHMM alovo pre lualanov, MM plull oblim• ne tomto m'-te v 9/M a.le Slovanaka. Tu tr..bll objaantt' Iba technldw .trinJa.i rulldde. Z Uvah, ■ ko rHll.zov■t i.nto dme,, vykryttall.zovall J ■har­ t111tfvy: 1) bud' vydjvaf Nmo.tab'tf fuopl■ pre knjaftOV (kvr(.-O<J. vyN>ba, Ide na uport. Napatr"' Ullf' aoaUiva pre, tuumsko ■ ,. prfen■ llmH.ovan6. N•t tuopq doetaval tie.I urtfty prid.a tohoto papi.,.. (n■ I _,.n). 0d roku 1N3 bol prklel r,ylent na pokrytM I farebnych strin (d'.tlkh) ■ I rilin prflohy PN lu■Janov. baopta 810¥'9ftN0 I• WWnY' ..........................ho atatel'■ : 70 % Nlldadu Ide na dom'4:il trh ■ len 25 % ,. prilohou) pre lnjanov ■ I % pre on.atnu GUdzlnu. Tyoh 21 "' "'ldadu. apolu • c:uckoluy6nou p,9ohou • prlohou Slownako kntrlanom IMnC:1Ujeme a~Matloe.aov.n•uJ dotovaMho ~om kuhury &SR v UUJm• Na UV..- .. t ied.a podotknUf, ta ,ri..,.a tych rucMckofaM.tkkych luuhov, kto" •ita necMvno qltovall, aby Mm lln)ani• Slovenako vrac.all Cnapr. tt.nadaky Slodk), .. aruu DZYV• fartzajsk.6 atarost• lfvo.t o nilho do""oeho tltaWa. la nav&dl iu.JaN116 priohu. :Um..- Je fun'i' • jednoanat:nj . Cheu Mm polllodK, otrevovaf vzfahy nwwdal narnl • krajanml. lrtoN .. 1 naprielc lch lntria'm .,.,.,.. • Ua,pe,tn• roMJaJ'I . .... anahy hod~ nflnonn, • hod I n• Cpeaudo) ved41Ckej Oroml aem,ow"' prukn6 alto myclo"' bubllna. pr.tole pr■ vda )e ,.. n-■J nadvA- Cud1oja1yCnd prnoha Rlowcnallo ~ S...- Htl.i.., Z -fll M ,i.,1 .. A ~,t--AOI V~MMl1lcaoi...-U• • " " ' -· 'i.t.llTS""'.••"' .w(- "-9,_fJa. MolniA, (l.$a • - 1,n . . . , . �SLOV AKIA-2015 111 APPENDIX 12 TRAFENA HUS ZAGAGA is a Slovak saying meaning literally •the goose that is hit will maJce a loud cackle• . .I t caoos to one's mind when reading the article in SLOVENSKO *) ,tbe.:.official monthly publication of'Hatica slovenska (Czecho-Slovakia) attacking Hark H. Stolarik, Secretary-Treasurer of the SlovaJc Studies' Asscr ciation (USA) far his brief remark in the Association's Newsletter (June 1984, see also SM 5 &6, p.28). Stolarik informed about the non-availability of SLCNENSKO' s supplement SLDIENSKO XRAJANOH (aimed at Slovaks outside Sl~ vakia) to readers in J;lovakia. According to SLOIENSXO,the re~ sons f.or this non-availability are econcmi c : paper . shortage• •though no mention •is made of the fact that they are flooding the West with 'canplimentary copies' of their books printed on very expensive paper. I t takes them the best part of a page to say this, when a simple ,sentence •because of economic reasQllS we cannot supply the Supplement for no extra cost to readers in Slovakia, however they can obtain i t· ·e asily for an additional subscription . & . Kcs ... • would have been sufficient. But ·this they dia ..cot want tD say! By the way, one is concerned~ bout access to SLCNENSKO KRAJANOH not as i f this was the best way to inform people in Slovakia . - about Slovak life in the West, but because Hatica slovenska herself has been encouraging Slovaks in the -west to establish contactJwith their old homeland through h'Z"iting ·to SLCNENSKO. I f the only obstacles to establishing such contacts were economic , a simple solution would be this : The BULI£TIN of the SLCNAX WCRLD CONGRESS states that it: "is available to readers in Slovakia free of charge• (there is no paper shortage in Canada !J. Why does not Hatica slovenska undertaJce to distribute the BULI£TIN free .of charge among the subscribers of SLOVENSKO in .Slovakia, and have in exchange the Slovak World Congress distribute SWVENSKO KRAJANOH free of charge to the readers of their BULLETIN in the West. Nobody could then canplain about lack of contacts : •I t was too much of a temptation to resist, namely to present to our readers the final part of the article in SWVENSKO with ·al:1 -its orwellian beauty (their English sUD1Dary contains neither this nor the vitriolic attaak .on H. Stolarik) : Those who dared to question the availability of SLOVENSKO KRAJANOH are •fascists• and "pharisees• (what a combination !) who "want to damage and poison the r~ lationship between us [i.e. Hatica] and our countrymen, which shows a premising and successful development despite their [i. e. the fascists' and pharisees' J intrigues. Their attempts, though cunning and presented on a {pseudo) scientific level .will burst like a soap bubble because .the truth is on our side.• � SLOV AKIA-2015 87 MY ROCKY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MATICA SLOVENSKA. DURING THE SECOND ERA OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1970-1989: A PERSONAL MEMOIR M. Mark Stolarik When I first visited Slovakia in the summer of 1968, I established friendly contacts with the Matica slovenska in Martin . 1 Never did I dream that, a short while later, one of its employees would publicly attack me. This happened because the political situation in Czechoslovakia changed as a result of the Warsaw Pact invasion of August, 1968. The so-called "Prague Spring," led by the Slovak reformer Alexander Dubcek, who wished to transform Czech and Slovak society into "socialism with a human face," was crushed under the weight of Warsaw Pact tanks. Less than a year later, Dubcek was replaced as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by the turncoat Gustav Husak, who proceeded to "normalize" the state. What started out as a year of high hopes turned into one of great disappointment. 2 Even though I was born in Slovakia in 1943, my parents decided to evacuate the whole family into Austria before the Russian front came through in January of 1945 . I did not return to my home town of Martin until July of 1968. 3 Dr. Jozef Telgarsky, the Director of the National Library, which then belonged to the Matica slovenska, 1 A shorter, Slovak version of this article first appeared as "Matica slovenska pod dohl'adom Statnej bezpecnosti," in Matica slovenska v narodnych dejinach, ed. by Imrich Sedlak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2013), 174-78. I initially described this trip in greater detail as "My Memories of Slovakia under Communism (S ummer of 1968)," in Narodny kalendar CVII (Pittsburgh, 1999), 96-99 . 2 For the latest scholarship on the " Prague Spring" see The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later, ed. by M. Mark Stolarik (Mundelein, IL: Bolchazi-Carducci, 2010). For the period of "normalization" in Slovakia see Norbert Kmet' and Juraj Marusiak, comp., S/ovensko a reiim normalizacii (Presov: Michal Vasko, 2002). 3 1 described my family's Odyssey, as well as Slovak emigration in general, in Where is my Home? Slovak Emigration to North America (1870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). �88 SLOV AKIA-2015 heartily welcomed me. He was delighted that, after so many years of being cut off from the West, he could once again establish contacts with Slovaks in the West. 4 I had come to Slovakia in the summer of 1968 as a Ph.D. student from the University of Minnesota in order to study the villaie origins of Slovak emigration to North America in the 19 th and 20 centuries. I had already studied the parish records of various Slovak communities in the United States and Canada and wished to link them with those in Slovakia. At the same time, I had started to collect archival materials for the newly-established Immigrant Archives at the University of Minnesota. When I finished my research in Slovakia in September of 1968, I promised Telgarsky, that I would begin to send duplicate archival and library materials concerning Slovaks in the USA and Canada to the Slovak National Library in return for the SNL sending me the latest publications of historians in Slovakia. 5 After I finished my doctoral studies at the University of Minnesota, I was employed by several professional institutions but never lost contact with the Matica slovenska. At first I was employed by the Cleveland State University as a Lecturer and Assistant Professor (1972-76), then as an Historical Researcher at the National Museum of Man in Ottawa (1977-78), then as President and CEO of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia (1979-91) and finally as Professor and Chairholder of the only Chair in Slovak History and Culture in the Western World at the University of Ottawa (1992 to the present). During all of these years I continued my program of exchange with the Matica slovenska. I wish that I could say that our relations were always good, but it was not to be. While I worked at the National Museum of Man in Ottawa, I took the initiative to establish a new scholarly organization. In 1975 a Czechoslovak History Conference had been founded by a group of historians in the United States. 6 From my study of Czech and Slovak history, I knew that, as always, Slovak history, and Slovak scholars, 4 When I returned to the USA, it occurred to me that Jozef Telgarsky was the author of my favorite children's book - Zirafa [The Giraffe] (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1946). While we were refugees in Austria from 1945-1950, my mother often read me sections of this book. I still have it and cherish it. 5 JozefTelgarsky to Marian Stolarik, May 13, 1969, NK 289 20/69-St. See Appendix 1, page 97. 6The history of this organization can be found in its Czechoslovak History Ne wsletter, founded in 1979. �SLOV AKIA-2015 89 would play "second fiddle" in such an organization. Therefore, at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Washington, D.C. in October of 1977, I persuaded half a dozen scholars in the USA and Canada to create our own Slovak Studies Association. Since I took the initiative in founding this organization, I was elected its first Secretary-Treasurer and Newsletter Editor. I then contacted as many scholars as I knew had an interest in Slovak studies and invited them to join. By 1983 our ranks had grown to 120 members. Meanwhile, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies accepted us as an affiliated organization and the officers and I organized regular sessions of the Slovak Studies Association at the annual meetings of the AAASS. 7 As Newsletter Editor, I also informed our members of recent scholarly developments in Slovakia, as well as of the activities and publications of our members. Meanwhile, in 1968 the Matica slovenska began to publish a semi-weekly newspaper entitled Maticne citanie and put me on its mailing list. 8 At the beginning this newspaper reflected a good dose of Slovak nationalism and on its masthead carried a stylized Slovak national emblem, which had been banned by the Communists. 9 However, under the weight of Gustav Husak's, "normalization" campaign, in 1973 the Slovak emblem disappeared from the Matica's letterhead and in 1978 the Maticne citanie folded . It was then replaced by the glossy monthly Slovensko. At the same time, Jozef Telgarsky no longer corresponded with me. Instead, two hard-line Communists, at first Jaroslav Celko and later Stefan Krivus, both Directors of the Matica, continued the correspondence. The masthead of their letters no longer carried the Slovak emblem; it was replaced by the letters MS , for the Matica slovenska. 10 It was clear from these changes that the Matica was being purged . Nevertheless, I kept exchanging materials with the Matica and hoped for the best. 7 The history of the Slovak Studies Association can be found in the Newsletter of the Slovak Studies Association, published since October, 1977. Recently the AAASS changed its name to the American Association for Slavic and Eurasian Studies. 8 A complete run of this newspaper can be found in the Slovak Archives, Archives and Special Collections, University of Ottawa. 9 See the first issue of Maticne citanie dated October 28, 1968, Appendix 2, pages 98-99. 10 See the letters of Jaroslav Celko, dated March 27, 1973 and Stefan Krivus, dated October 23, 1974 to Mark Stolarik, Appendices 3, page 100, and App 4, page 10 I. �90 SLOV AKIA-2015 Unfortunately, in the 1980's my relations with the Matica slovenska took a tum for the worse. The first sign that something was amiss came in 1980 when the "Oddelenie pre zahranicnych Slovakov" (the Department for Slovaks Abroad) of the Matica slovenska sponsored an international scholarly conference on "Vyst'ahovalectvo a zivot krajanov vo svete" (Emigration and the Life of Countrymen Abroad) and published the papers.11 Even though I had met and befriended Jan Siracky, the Director, and Frantisek Bielek, one of their researchers in 1968 when the Department was established in Bratislava, and they knew that I specialized in the history of the immigration of Slovaks to North America, they did not invite me to this conference. Instead, they invited my good friend and colleague Thomas D. Marzik (originally Mrazik), an Associate Professor of history at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia. A scholar of Central Europe, Marzik specialized on T.G. Masaryk and the Slovakophile Czech Karel Kalal. He had done no archival research on Slovak immigration. Nevertheless, the conference organizers asked him to present a paper on "The State of American Scholarly Research on Slovak Emigration and on American Slovaks," which he read in English, since he could not speak Slovak. He must have taken the conference organizers by surprise when he asserted, among other things, that "M. Mark Stolarik is currently the most productive scholar concerning the history American Slovaks," and then added, "currently, he is the Executive Director of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia... .In this capacity, he can be very helpful in encouraging further research on American Slovaks." 12 When I received a copy of the Proceedings of this conference, I no longer regretted not having been invited. As I leafed through the book, I noticed that the conference had been opened by Viliam Salgovic, at that time the Chairman of the Slovak National Council, but formerly the Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1968, who betrayed his colleagues in the "Prague Spring" by collaborating with the invading Warsaw Pact forces . It turns out that Salgovic had been an agent of the Soviet KGB and was one of the most hated individu11 Vyst'ahova/ectvo a iivot krajanov vo svete. K storocnici masoveho vyst'ahova/ectva s/ovenskeho /'udu do zamoria. Zbornik prispevkov k vedeckej konferencii. Zost. Frantisek Bielik, Jan Siracky a Claude Balaz (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1982). 12 Ibid., 131-32. The compilers arranged for Marzik's article to be translated into Slovak. �SLOVAKIA-2015 91 als in Slovakia. 13 Furthermore, the conference organizers also invited the retired grade-school teacher and communist activist Helen Vrabel-Saunders of Los Angeles and the Canadian Slovak communist activist Jan Rumisek to present papers on the Slovak communities in their respective countries. 14 These individuals reflected poorly on the scholarly level of this conference. When Marzik returned to Philadelphia and described the conference to me, he mocked the presentations of these so-called "experts." However, when the Proceedings arrived in the mail in 1982, I mocked Marzik for the company he had kept. The second bad sign from Czechoslovakia came in 1982. At that time my wife and I had decided that, even though the Matica did not invite me to its scholarly conference, we would visit our native Slovakia on our own. As was required at that time, we applied for a visitor 's visa to Czechoslovakia, but, much to our surprise, the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington denied our application, without any explanation. 15 When we had visited Czechoslovakia in the summers of 1968 and 1970, we had acquired visas without any difficulty. The third bad sign occurred in 1983 when, to my great surprise, a certain writer for the Matica's monthly Slovensko, began to attack me. Even though he signed his articles as Milos Biel, he was, in fact, Miroslav Andreansky, a collaborator of the STB (State Security), who edited the Cudzojazicnu prilohu (Foreign-Language Supplement) of Slovensko. 16 In the 1970's, using the cover name Tacovsky, he had served a spy for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in West Germany. 17 13 For Salgovic's welcoming remarks see Ibid., 12-16. For his role in the "Prague Spring" see William Shawcross, Dubcek (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), 154. Soon after the Communists relinquished power during the "Velvet Revolution" in I 989, Salgovic committed suicide. 14 For their papers see Vyst'ahova/ectvo, 270-87 and 340-42. 15 Chief of the Visa Section (unreadable signature), Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to Mark Stolarik, June 4, 1982 (in author's personal papers) . 16 Dr. Tomas Klubert, an employee of the Ustav pamdti naroda (The Nation 's Memory Institute) of the Slovak Republic, in a reply to my query dated September 3, 2010, confirmed that Andreansky was indeed a collaborator of the STB. His cover name was "Korunka." Unfortunately, his file was shredded on October 8t11, 1988. 17 See the article"Co na to pan Prokes?" published in the monthly Svedectvo: Casopis politickych vdznov na Slovensku, I, no. 4 (April 1992), page 18. �92 SLOV AKIA-2015 Andreansky/Biel had learned about the Slovak Studies Association from Thomas D. Marzik. The Matica slovenska had invited the latter to another international conference in Martin on July 5-7, 1983, on the occasion of the Matica's 120th anniversary. Knowing that the Matica had once again failed to invite Stolarik to this conference, Marzik urged it to establish formal relations with the Slovak Studies Association and also to invite "more American experts" to future conferences.18 Andreansky/Biel replied to Marzik's appeal in the Foreign Language Supplement of the August issue of Slovensko. In an article entitled "?Slovak Studies Association?" Andreansky/Biel wrote: "Direct contact with such leading personalities in the SSA as Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, M. Mark Stolarik and Renee Mikus, because of their hostility [towards the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] are, at the moment, impossible." 19 This reply was laughable, because neither Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, nor Renee Mikus, held any office in the SSA! I suspect that Stan Kirschbaum was on the "black list" of Czechoslovak authorities because he was the son of Jozef Kirschbaum, who at that time was one of the Executive VicePresidents of the Slovak World Congress and Renee Mikus was married to Jozef Mikus, who also held a high office in the SWC. Indeed, both the elderly Kirschbaum and his colleague Mikus were former diplomats in the service of the first Slovak Republic (1939-1945) as well as members of the Slovak People 's Party, and, as such, supporters of Slovak independence. 20 Thus, they were anathema to the Husak regime. Andreansky/Biel probably did not like Mark Stolarik because he was the son of Imrich Stolarik, also a former member of the Slovak People's Party and, therefore a "separatist" who often wrote articles advocating Slovak independence in the weekly 18 Thomas D. Marzik, "K problematike Slovensko-americkych akademickych vzt'ahov," in Zahranicni S/ovaci a narodne kulturne dedictvo: Zbornik prispevkov z vedeckeho seminara k 120. vyrociu zaloienia Matice s/ovenskej, compiled by Frantisek Bielik, Jan Siracky and Claude Balaz (Martin : Matica slovenska, 1984), 10109. Once again, the Matica arranged to translate Marzik' s article into Slovak. 19 Slovensko, 8 (August, 1983), Foreign Language Supplement. See Appendix 5, gage 102. °For the history of the first ten years of the Slovak World Congress, see Desat' rokov cinnosti SKS, comp . by JozefM. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1981). For the struggle for Slovak independence, see J. M . Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovensko (Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1958; reprinted by the Matica slovenska, Martin, 2000). �SLOVAKIA-2015 93 Kanadsky Slovak. For this reason Andreansky/Biel wrote to Mark Stolarik on November 14, 1983 and asked the latter to repudiate an article written by his father in Kanadsky Slovak on September 24, 1983, which had criticized the August issue of Slovensko.2 1 Andreansky/Biel even promised to publish Stolarik' s reply in the next issue of Slovensko! Instead, Mark Stolarik wrote to Andreansky/Biel as follows : "I will not polemicize with you . Your job is to create propaganda. Mine is to write history. In this instance, I will have the last word." 22 Andreansky/Biel ' s letter showed that, at that time he had more power in the Matica slovenska than its president, the "Narodny umelec" (national artist) and writer Vladimir Mi nae, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. After having read Andrensky/Biel's attack upon me in Slovensko, I complained to Mi nae in a letter dated September 3, 1983 .23 In his reply of October 4, 1983, Minac wrote the following: "I am sorry about what happened in the periodical Slovensko . I have no direct control over the editorial content of the magazine, but, as much as I can, I will try to prevent such future misunderstandings." 24 Meanwhile, Victor S. Mamatey, considered the "dean" of Czech and Slovak historians in the United States, also reacted to the machinations of the Matica slovenska. In the Slovak monthly Horizont, published by emigres in Switzerland, he wrote the following: Slovaks abroad need cultural contacts with their homeland and Slovakia needs contacts with Slovaks abroad . Unfortunately, at the moment such contacts are weak and inadequate. The Matica and the entire regime need to understand that not they, but Slovaks abroad have the right to decide who will represent them at conferences and who will properly interpret their needs. 25 Vladimir Minac could not have been sincere in his reply to Mark Stolarik's complaint because, as indicated above, Andreansky/Biel wrote me again on November 141\ Furthermore, in 1988, during the 21 Milos Biel to Mark Stolarik, November 14, 1983 . See Appendix 6, page 103 . See also Appendix 7, page I 04, for the article in Kanadsky Slowik, September 24, 1983 . 22 Mark Stolarik to Milos Biel, November 29, 1983. See Appendix 8, page 105 . 23 Mark Stolarik to Vladimir Mimic, September 3, 1983 . See Appendix 9, pages 106 and 107. 24 Vladimir Minac to Mark Stolarik, October 4, 1983 . See Appendix 10, page 108. 25 Horizon/ (Zurich), September-October, 1983. �94 SLOV AKIA-2015 era of "Glasnost" and "Perestrojka," as promoted in the Soviet Union and its satellites by General Secretary Mikhail Goobachev in the late 1980's,2.6 I was finally invited to attend another Matica conference in Bratislava. There I met Vladimir Mimic at a Matica-sponsored reception at Bratislava Castle. After the opening ceremonies ended, a tipsy Mimic approached me and asked in a voice reeking of wine "ci vas otec stale serie do toho Kanadskeho Slovaka?" (Is your father still crapping into Kanadsky Slovak?) .27 This vulgar question revealed what was really bothering Minac (and Andreansky/Biel): that my father was freely advocating independence for Slovakia in Kanadsky Slovak. Another reason why Andreansky/Biel attacked me in Slovensko is that I revealed the truth about how it was published. When Tom Marzik returned from the second Matica conference in 1983, he promptly informed me that Slovensko was published in two versions : one for domestic consumption and one for Slovaks abroad. Only the foreign version contained a "Foreign Language Supplement," which carried news about the activities of Slovaks in the wider world. I informed the readers of the Newsletter of the Slovak Studies Association of these two versions in the June, I 984 issue.28 In its August 22 nd issue, the largest-circulation Slovak-American newspaper, the Jednota, official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, congratulated me for having provided this information. It pointed out that the Matica slovenska was sending Slovensko for free to Slovaks all over the world, and they had no idea that it was published in two versions.29 This information so infuriated Andreansky/Biel that he reacted with a full-page response in the January, 1985 issue of Slovensko. The jist of his response was that the publishers of Slovensko did not have enough paper to offer the "Foreign Language Supplement" to domestic readers.30 The best reaction to this absurd excuse came from Juraj Virsik, editor of the Slovak-Australian Monitor. In an article beginning with the Slovak proverb "Trafena hus zagaga," (A Struck Goose 26 For the Gorbachev era see Angus Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin (London : BBC Books, 1991). 27 1 described this episode in greater detail under the pseudonym Leo Carpenter in "Looking for Mr. Glasnost in Today ' s Czechoslovakia," in the monthly Crisis: A Journal of Lay Catholic Opinion, 7, no. 7 (July-August, 1989), 33-39. 28 "Slovensko for Two Audiences," SSA Newsletter, 8, no. 1 (June, 1984), p. 13. 29 Jednota (Middletown, PA), August 22, 1984. 30 Slovensko, 1 (1985), "Cudzojazycna priloha.," Appendix 11 , pages 109 and 110. �SLOVAKIA-2015 95 will Squawk), Virsik provocatively suggested that, if Slovakia indeed suffered from a shortage of paper, it could easily turn to the Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, published in Canada, which had an abundance of newsprint, and the Bulletin would willingly publish any news that the Matica might send it. 31 Andreansky-Biel did not react to Virsik's article. Finally, in 1988, probably as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's "Glasnost," which also penetrated into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Matica slovenska invited Mark Stolarik to another of its scholarly conferences, this time to be held in Bratislava on July 46. When I arrived in Bratislava and met with Frantisek Bielik, whom I had not seen since 1970, I asked him who was Miloslav Andreansky/Milos Biel? A surprised Bielik answered, "Don't you know?" "No, I don ' t," I replied. "But, you must know, he continued ." "No I don ' t, I answered." He was still afraid to openly tell me. I then asked where was Andreansky/Biel? Bielik answered, "in Martin." Perhaps Andreansky/ Biel did not attend the conference for fear that I would confront him . As a result, I never met him. After the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, I inquired about his whereabouts and discovered that Andreansky/ Biel had left the Matica and was living in Vrutky, a small railroad town north of Martin. He had apparently joined the ultra-nationalist Slovak National Party and was its representative in that town. Since I had met and befriended Jozef Prokes, one of the founders of the Slovak National Party, when he had visited Canada in 1992, I wrote to Prokes and asked him how it was that a former collaborator of the STB was now working for the Slovak National Party?32 Prokes did not answer my letter. Meanwhile, many interesting individuals attended the Bratislava conference. After I presented my paper on the declining use of the Slovak language in the United States, 33 an elderly gentleman ap31 Slovak-Australian Monitor (March, 1985). See Appendix 12, page 111. Mark Stolarik to Jozef Prokes, August 27, 1992 (author's archive). When I visited the Matica at another conference in February of 2013, and once again inquired about the whereabouts of Andreansky/Biel, the older employees, who had known him, sheepishly answered that a few years earlier he had passed away. 33 "A Historical Perspective on the Declining Use of the Slovak Language in the United States of America," in Zahranicni Slowici a materinsky jazyk. Zbornik prispevkov z vedeckeho symposia k 125. vyrociu zaloienia Matice slovenskej, " comp. by Frantisek Bielik and Claude Balaz (Martin : Matica slovenska, 1990), I 7277. 32 �96 SLOVAKIA-2015 proached me. He was Dr. Belo Polla, an employee of the Matica in the l 940's, who had been purged and later found himself working for the Archaeological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Nitra, approached me. He was delighted that, in my presentation, I had mentioned his former colleagues at the Matica such as its director J.C. Hronsky and the publicist Konstantin Culen, as well as the historian Frantisek Hrusovsky and the journalist Jozef Pauco. He added that those names had been "taboo" in Czechoslovakia in the previous years. He was also delighted that emigres such as the linguist I:ubomir Durovic of Sweden and the political scientist Milan Durica of Italy were able to participate in the conference. Such was the influence of Mikhail Gorbachev's "Glasnost," which would eventually lead to the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe during the summer and fall of 1989.34 After the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia in November of 1989, the situation in the Matica slovenska immediately improved. The "old guard" either retired or was fired and the new leaders of the Matica immediately re-established friendly contacts with Slovaks in the West. There were no longer any attacks in the monthly Slovensko against me or any other members of the Slovak Studies Association. Indeed, in 1991 the Matica signed a formal agreement between the University of Ottawa and itself in which it pledged to supply the newly-established Chair in Slovak History and Culture all the books that it needed in order to properly function .35 As a result, in January, 1992, the Chair received hundreds of recently-published books from the Matica and this program of exchange continues to this day. Thus, since 1989 the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa and the Matica slovenska (and its National Library, which split off in 2000), continue to have good relations. 36 34 For the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia see Jozef Zatkuliak et. al., Nove mber '89: Medznik vo vyvoji slovenskej spolocnosti a jeho medzinarodny kontext (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V vo vydavatel'stve Prodama, 2009). 35 Agreement between the Matica slovenska in Martin and the University of Ottawa (Chair in Slovak History and Culture), signed by Marcel Hamelin, Rector, University of Ottawa, September 4, 1991 and Imrich Sedlak, Director, Matica slovenska, November 18, 1991 (author's archive). 36 The National Library of Slovakia split off from the Matica slovenska on July 1, 2000. E-mail from Maria Kurhajcova to Mark Stolarik, July 21, 2000 (author's archive). �SLOV AKIA-2015 97 APPENDIX 1 L C V C: N S K A ,'J • )S1;'ELK A A AOU RE P UHLth Y M A ls1:TIN. Mudrol"lova ,e . 3:i. t e lefOn 2348. 2347 , 2340, :it34Q , 3 197 University of Minnesota, College of Liberal ArtsDepartment of History, Mr. M. St O l 8 r i k M_i_n_n_e_a_e_o_l_i_s Minnesota 55455 - US A v•l i l:111 :rn.a.6k,y1:a, o d,'\.-. 30.III.1969 Na" :an•~k.:i r:r:""maja 1969 l>'K .t.'7 20/69-St Voe Vazen:f pan Stolarik, Na VaA list z 30. marca 1969, ktory ate p!sali Dr . Sir ackemu , oznamujeme V!lm, l!e mikrofillll.Y lfosopisov "Obzor" a "Dom a 1!kol'l" sa ul! r-obia a koncom ~ Vam ich po!!leme. Obzor od roku 1863 do roku 1905 /41 ro~n!kov/ a Dom a Akola od roku 1885 do roku 1897 /13 ro~nikov/. Z ~asopisu Dom a §kola Vam zasielame 4 ro~n!lcy ~ascpisu, kedze mame viac exemplarov. Dufame, l!e Vam to vyhovie. PokiaY ide o pletenie, snhlasime a tym, aby ate nam poslsli mikrofil111.Y: Amerikansko-Slovenske noviny, Slovak v Amerike, Jednota a Narodne noviny, pretol!e ni~ v uplnosti nemAme. MOzete nam tiel! oznami t, kde v USA sa tieto ~asopisy na.cMdzaju v uplnosti. Sme radi, ze ste sa ohlasili a ponukame Vam aj dal§iu spolupracu. Ochotne Vam yoaleme zo Slovenska vAetko, ~o potrebujete z novej literatucy a mOze prist do uvahy aj star§ia literatllra, pretoze mame dost dubletov. Boli by sme radi, keby sa na University of Minnesota vybudovalo slu§ne oddelenie slovenskej historickej /alebo inej, podYa potreby/ literatllry. Te§ime ea ns spolupracu s Vsmi a srde~ne Vas pozdravujeme .J ,;R I 1} /lflftl,,\ riadi teY ,N&J-.~nej ' knHnice Ma ti,ce i-'~ lovenske j Dr. J. 'Telgarslcy ~ List bol vrateny, dl\a 27. VI.1969! neznemy �~ \ 1 ~, ' j •t . 1 t ► rr-• .-.... 1..-.••........~-, }:,.\,,_" ·, 1 .. -~·\·.t Propa1atd i!lslo ~"i'darr ... -- J} •~\i ~ · ,, ... .,i\ 1-, ~.c 1·1 •• -~ '; ::;, ' {:,:~ ."1'. •%·"'" ,, __ ~~. • -~ \l ' if ::, ,_ l.;.t.•~~·~ ! ,, '... . · f }If n•Yhno1U 1141- • n« lrult6ru v61:»c, l kullt\rn, ,1:1tvrat ma• .:.zmi. ~~:,,,d:.n.tuh~':!~:.!P~I~,,f ~6,an11 T~PI opqitl~ -,:a b ~ I ,tart JJlllOd' f:111V1tov1J price, • luqttry, lap ako J,)q-lSWCn61µt ~tDltela. lkO ntitro)a. 1, aOC(&llatlc);QIZ\ n•dt-ln,U •Yte' Jebb dobr<d. tradld u, rw n11 t'.'!: =:r.u~~:mi:"!4~• 9!:-=~~::;~ •:~;VJ~~, J• to ~~•~~,b(~~~•v:d;:,,:i=!t~1 = I ~ ron9J1 1l4rodMt, U1f6rr, na prOdeate dn1f ill'1Mtt d.lliliom• fta,ahl1 • napokon l • llltwtdfctou D6~J\:-:a~·":iii!:;,:*..:r::r.' ~~~=·~l: :~~~ • _,,1 ' OT,VA·RAM.E\J,i:\i- ~l, T MeM ~• ''f'iW'• Hu If VfcW..o p,~ ftf'1 chr4'f"M ,q .t~ •.rl#ttf• ~awo po~o, .Jl«)fjatqj ~J\lt~ tUl&V, pred'Htn4lt# 4 mu 6-u,,:Ericuc/1'«/l ~' I ~ ltc&1ic ~,ut OfH'.:UjN Mprifie' ,o. N-.i6~ ho ~,=~~~.;::; ,1,ottt P"lhl¥• 100/•j ,uutl o ptttflduoei• •"' tu4tlto«I t4t, •••,-. :i:siltf~i!'"~:~ ntl11pr())flrtotnf; ,,aop; ml tltlm~Hftw k,. Off llocl 11 opak. ·'Ct potort r>0ff t•Jto irdnU &it =:::r:~~,,. bot, Cn. tr~ dt•"" ·no.:iptllf~ hdllj 01'D~QBIE ~-., l · .& -· ·1 ..•t<,., ~~ ,:.•m ·~t.·~c .j '!Ii~. h l'udslwstt,,. ,,: .. ---- N0,V;£ · l ·- . ,' . -__:_ - ...,.. t l . --= U P I , .-,/J ~ ~ ••~___..,...:..,.. ~- 0'i.~~, Uv~pk ,1,, 'l VY_D(,..VA, MATICA SLOVENS"f V M ' "';~ ~·z., N ~ 0 z --= --= tr! > I (ll .... N 0 < > e:> 0 t""' r:,, '° = �SLOV AKIA-2015 99 APPENDIX2 Za prava ,slo,enciny okrecov dfla e. 10. 19et •yledaJ• •• taJto bttl. nojbo dr.tmla prlaclp Ttato Lueencl praeanf YO . .reJaal runkctl arladiC fu.akcla •lc•prHldan · OceftuJema. te \I 10vls.l ta • tuakclu prdbo pod • •l•bo • 6ra.de., Polladnky tederActou nOho At , aa s1ov,a1 .. a.by Maduo•, .. by ktor6 •IUJ, predHdu ktortl k 50. vtroCJu CSR to ■ t• ta:■Jllf atllf ( •I .. aJoobsahoull podobae aka H • tame, iloat4ve H na progt H ■at"fdl 1Jrol6cb) po mad'■ r• •tnhu itlan6bo dko ■ a ■ awrbuJ• ob1■ daova.al• t-■ kel• •kJ~ •Y d01taU afton.a1 -ped- •I othb postavenla nar noltl. Konltatujema v1ek , kl••· mJ ■ lalra • tt6taaho tajoaud• ~.1K• •,~~:r:1.!:~~~n~;f.~U• na Jkodu vecl n,hrh IA.k1 VycbHsa•• a dotereJlfch Ila. n·ebol vopred pred uvere) ufml trpkfcb ak6Hao1U Slo4. Poprl hlatorlclry a•HI• · L S6b1Hfm■ so He ■lm ti. Y6kov • tobto A•em.Ja. Ul ,Ill.a- nlm 1Dterne konzultovanf I. ala pokl ■ dime ae newy- a fcb a6nocb 'Slovenaki ••· l.rajlla daada • d!ollasyt■ oa- organlUlcleml N•rod. tro1 haulnA doplal( ho b ■ ltalo • rodnl rad• a Cnll:6 ••rodal ti H prett SlovUom aeutf• Term.Io vereJn•J dlskusle rad• l nalogld:y podra lafch n ■ fm, I ■ ..• CSSR .. •16 eet15. 10. 198& Ja prfllJ kri Hl■ tat, la ◄ 6 povlnDf nlln a a 1lonntlaa tlob11 ro•· ■ •now Cl1tno1 dd CSSR. na to, abJ n mohll nlekt dla( po matfanlrf, t,yt tda 116taych )HJ' · vlld• Sloveaalr■ I 1oclallatlc■ oprh ■ ycb kGY ... naJasn~ mlesla n•vrhu nl dvojJ ■ aytaf. Kedle ahtb 6 kel republllry, wllda Cukaj 1CuU.be stllooa • t!I. ◄ IZ u - 11te vysvttllt u kompetl ■oclall•llclr■ J rapubllkJ ( Ire• nych mletaach. Tfmto kooltatonalm .. be • 1 ■ -te dltoaa poulluf lraz■ J• nblC ■ ltl•k aa n6 • IH potwrdzoj■ skul0Cao1f, alto oflcl61ae n6ny \Nirodnfl Predodetkfw Ide o f rodaosU • •m•,.. odllirodttio.-aala lllllllle a■ lo Dripecl• nhrhu zJikona, ktorf hov ktod objektl-ue Je1h,1je, I• rada Sloun•kel ■oc lall1Ucltal fllruje, taUe H m6h delltotlt Jnykml lt6taJcb ora• · rapubllky ■ Nlrodn6 rada 0 prhach prlslu!n"lkov 101 na vzdelanlt nArodnostt n6tlalr) takfto u •Jb16tlt eo repullll• aoclell1llclcaJ CeskaJ ••• 11 tdll•• • •alowneloa, svoJom jnyku a O poutJv SlovUov nlj ■ kf dkon • alto M to koolt ■ taje •I • ti. kf. tohto Juyka v styku • Qr, pt.. takfmto nflllakom vf· S. Uplalnlt • celo,n dkoae I ■hrhu flttHnlho dkona. ml bei akfihOkotvek da lll( 'tittlDJml 1 ■ s1kmJ led■ ai ■ d o fader•Udcll CSSR 1.hatlu, alov ■- ■-cbri.D1, je ta N!l'1ne urCenla. Sme toho nboru, aebe1petanstwo, l• Slodcl tH1kJ nirodaosU jlf6cich • -te •letlry n•tanonnl• tfk•· f6ce u arlad'ovnla federil • , oa tomto 6aemf, ktorf an•• , prho na vrdelenle u m, essa.. die aleb11 aa oeneutl■ per konkrettzovaf na ,1upel\ l Z. NHrbuJean ■, ahy .. prl nycb orahoY, lch komp■ l ■a· ly 1 ,oeesne u mall staJ mad'anlry, aiel1111.h u nebu pliant atuu n ■ l■ I republlky, cl• • unlu lch organh:lcl• vlt podmlenky, za akfch m a prhomocl n mHu menlt dO mGcf doma vo •ereJ011j 1polo•nflt fC&1ko· poulf• ■ l t:l ■ aostl uplatolt, ala bud6 Slonn1kol ; to plall ■ I o pl· Iba oa Uklad• d'allfcb 61ln• 00 uladovaf !koly vyUle ako Uklad.n~ho typu. 1 w,-ranlll •J bez-treala6mu IJ~ prfshalnfbo prfdantbo ofch 1'ko110-... n ■I mH ■ f be1ko-1lovell&kf: Cu• U. I( ni't'rhu 6atua6bo al - kauovaalu. Stovky raaol6CII lsto u1 ~ v 1omto nivrhu t ko .. lonnsk, republlka, t:H• Ilona • a6rodao,tlacb : be konlm:itlzovat, akfm SJ • ,talnoat[. lrtori polltlckfm • 11'taJ• l!laltafom • or1• · sobom sa mA uplatnlt 'l>ti pod.J. ko-alon- ■ lrf lltc • menttnovfch n8.rodnostf %iada111e, ■ bJ H • ■ hrbu ao• SloY6cl • toblo 6.nmla ,.;~:.~D•;::111,~:.:~b\ed::-:.~ VJ'PU&tll ,ad, v kloro ■ •• vlastoibo Jazy poutfvaole po1lelaJ6.. d •«llml ,.,Ntl!afm J•I•• arladlt funkci• pradH- bo•or1, la atrodao1II m•l6 v st_yFu s dradml. n;~:.,.~:- .. undHt bod lllu • podpn ...du, lrllrri by .,prho poalfnf nol Juyk • Tleto ltyllzicle n8.\'rhu .a dkooa VJ"••ch, aHaka •• obudaouU alternaU••• dradnom 1tyku". auje u poutl-..ote • mad'artl • s1avn6ho zakona sQ v roz1 Uthapcom C•sbJ aoc:la.Uatlc· re •J s akentm program1 rato pr•vo by utml pre ■J t• laayko• ltltnych "'· kll r1pub1Jky aJtbo Slo•en • Ov KSS. lebo n4vrb z6ko Slodkov lijliclcb • 1111lela· rodnoaU) • lllradnom ,tylta. ebJ eoclall•tiek•I repu•UlrJ, 511 nez.mleftuJe o povtnno v alJku H nojlml prad•t• · 1lovao1ko•m ■ dar1kfch prltom tty aa afrodn6 nsli· a:fcb n6rodnostof vllarml ,. pollllckfch • ltit• prtslu~nrkov peoie v tfchlo fankdich oblutlach malo nfml ••· aby s ! pomocou t mentin, • nirod m.lH:u uycb orgjnocb priualv6 d6tledkJ. Praklicky atrltdalo podf• funktnfch znaloatJ. osvoJo,'all v~erko t 081 u poull-...C not IHJk. No by soemol6ou1o Slodkom r obdobt. ,:iemolao _ doko ■ ca dko - hatstvo ees kej II slovens• • ttm prlsplev kulrGry .aoru _ n6Uf Slodko• uClf k -\ldjomn6mu s1>0z.ntvar ■a po mad'llhk.) , aby M•cf•rl ,. ■lyku • aJml mohli upl•t · • spolutll1u nirodov • r ubaapeCe11A rodno1H v CSSR . dfJoaom alt Konlunu1eme. ta Slov6cl prflu. Moho tu mlmocbo• IOChtO oblbtlach, kde stl dom upuoralC na krlkfno odchodd poataY■nie Slod • n61 v memlln e, mohll by doataf podra do1erejleJ p1 lrov • Mad'araku, ktort• u xe • poclporou dstavn6ho , • podobnfch prhacb a ■ I 1- ■ kona ' do 11tuAcle, ktora ,, k .o1 .. t nnmia. mo dbsledkoch Tole 1tale •t ■ aoviako ■ a- neentch aaaff. ta by •m• boll proll vlHf k odn6rodf'iovaolu p prfiv a,.ro4aostf, aluJnfkov llitotvorn6bo n.61 :a■ ru~a■ la •I• aem&hme a6bl•alf I poi- da, prfpad ne k lcb 1lteku kodzonnlm Slodkov, lclol"f tfc bto iUemf ■ IovensUbo o , by malo by1 dO.lellltom ale• roda. -. kforjtb _prt• urul!e ■ fch ••- • .J)rginy, lriorf ad nlnter tovan6 na pTlpr,\'e Qstevn .rodaostiHn .,. predlolenom bo zalcooa, by mall uvUlf. ahrbu d•tndbo dkona. by nebolo vbodn6 ,,yhlheci .. tobto Ukona Casove navl * Pracovalcl Matice slovenskej ut na ust1nov11n1e zAkoaa ate · ho odlol federallrAcll. v Martine dt'Ja 8. 10. 196'1 vyslovlU k vl4dnemu ntvrhu • ltylldcle dOsledneftle pr • prekonzultowaf • myallef o postavent nirod• Ukon■ nostl v C:SSR Ueto prlpo• vtetkfcb zlotktch N• rodn ho tronru. mleoky: Publtktcle nivrhu astavntMatt e• slovenska ako c ho Ulkooa -vyvolalo n1Jml v lon4rodn.6 ustanovl.Zeft al p mlestnycb odboroch Matice ldada u morllnu povtnno 1lovenskt1J 01 futnom Sloven- ur,ozornlf na tao.to probl61 sku a.naent ohlaa. Vframe ut •I preto, lebo se 01 ru sa to l)teJavtlo •I ·n, porade v teJto vttel obraceJO tlensl ■ Joie/ Smrhoikj L /Ulo 196& no ndolteoc v Uortln~. m1111tn~bo ~~~1~~. oraanlz.tde 1 cel61 predstavltefov v Mahci ,tovenskeJ, ,nwe:I odpoot.4111 no aktwtlne: otdik~. l'I~"~"'" " ,.............. - .. .. - ~ Foto: A. V. H•id• (Vrouo sprduca MS 4r. Jd,t Mart4k.J Jaqko,adaf '"•• tudowft• lt6ta SAV prlJal k abrbu dkOH O flNf•nlldcH .CS51 ■ atnba filtHatbo dkDDI • ■ trodaC¥,tlacb 1taoo•lako, _. ktorAllo ')'llertme. �SLOVAKIA-2015 100 APPENDIX3 , MATICA SLOVENSK A 1863 1973 NOS!Tlr.RA IADtl IIPl11tlltY The Cleveland Stete University DepArtment of History - College of Arts et Sciences Mr . Marien St olarik C 1 e_v_e_l_ a_n_d_, Ohio 44115 U.S. A. VU li,t anatlty Vee: 10 d6a 26/II/73 Na la I natlta 4-63/1157/35 4/73 - St Martin 27. marca 1973 Vaieny pan Stolarik, ~akuje me za Va§ list, ktory nam umoihuje nadvi azat medzinarodny vymenny styk s The Cleveland State University , Department of History , Cleveland, Ohio prostrednictvom Va§ej pOaobnosti na tejto univerzi te. Avizovam1 publikaciu sme este zatial' ned ostali, nakol'ko doru~enie zasielky trva v priemere tri mesiace. Matice slovenska, Martin s radostou pr!jme predpletne na ~asopis v ramci vymeny "The International Migration Review", ako aj vybavenie na§ich objednavok ns publikacie, ktore Vam budeme postupne, taktiez v remci vymeny posiela t, Vyme nn~ rekepitulacie si budeme viest individuelne na zaklade Va si ch zasielok s cenemi a prip ! §eme v prospech Va§ho vymenneho konte , ako aj z naAej strany zasielane potvrdenky s uvedenim cien pre Va§u evidenciu. Zatial' sme Varn po slali 9 publikacii z oblasti historie su~~snej produkcie podl'a Va§ej po~iadavky dha 15.III,1973 a dal'sie publikacie , tykajuce sa tejto obla sti Vam postupne po~leme, Dufame , te s tymto postu~om budete s uhlbsit a roz s!ri sa fond o slovacika na Va§ej univerzite, ako aj f ond Matice slovenskej s publika ciami , o ktore bud eme ziadat na zaklsde excerpt z Cumulative Book Index s zoznamov vydani j ednotlivych vydavatel'ov. Tymto by sme pokladali dohodu z nasej strany za uzavretu a prosime Vas o pisomny suhlas, Te§ime sa na Va §u odpoved ~ sme / s pozdravom ~ -=- Prof.dr.Ing . Jarosl ov .~ELKO , CSc, / Spravco Matice slovenskej v,b .. •i" Stuchlikova Tclt:r6n 2Sf6, 2547, 2548, 25+9, 5197 Oalekopi1 0755:SI 0)6 5 2Martin, Mud ro6ova M �SLOVAKIA-2015 101 APPENDIX4 , MATICA SLOVENSKA NOSIT£t K A RADU RIP U B LIKY Kr. Ph. D. KarU.n Stol6rii: The Cleveland State Univereity CLEVELAND, Ohio 44115 U SA V' j Ii SI I.oa t ")' zo d na Ma r tin Nala znal': K a 5-63 /1JtlJ/Ff l14-U Vee: 23.10.1974 ~ai:)lje■ e Vma Ba list a vr,ten,y ponui:ovy zozJ:lUl. Poaielee Vo !iadan4 knihy a! na tri tituly, i:tor4 eu •! rocobra• n41 1. Ju!n4 Slovenako 2. Ratkoil1 Pra■ ene k dejinmn Vel'kej Koravy 3e Sedla1 Preilovek4 kolegium v elovenekych dejin,ch Dll:fame, !e oetatn4 knihy dostanete ~o najekar av poriadku. ~akujeme Vu aj za aaaopia "Ethnicity•. Sudame ve:rmi r~ di, ked ho pre n,a objean,te. S pozdravo■ / ~f~ Stefan Krivuil spr,vca Matice slovenakej Vy b ovujec Ulbr ichtov, Kiria Tcler6n 2346, 2347, 2548, 2349, 3197 Oalek.opi1 0753,1 0'652 Mar tin, Mu d r ufi ova 35 �102 SLOV AKIA-2015 APPENDIXS a Cudzojazycnci priloha Sefredali:to, Stefan Hovlo r. Zosto vi l M iloslo v And re6nsky Vydalo Mati ce slo.,en 1k6 v Ma rti ne. Tlotili TSNP, z6 v< Neogrofla , Martin, CSSR v m6Ji 1983. fllowcnal:o a 1983 roku u ma konat' 14. d: 17. okt6bra vo Washing• tone, na budud rok v Kansas City). Madzl elenml SSA je I nlalcorko vyznamnych 7 SLOVAK STUDIES ASSOCIATION 7 Tato apoloalosf ui 120 vedec:kych p.-.covnikov s1ov..-.. p6vodu a priatefov slovenekef vedy, lwttury • umenla nielen z USA• Kanady, ale I z cfalilch lblitov ..,_ zlskava prootrednfo. tvom The Balch lnstitut vo Phlladelphll, USA, od Matice olovaMkef, Slovenakej akademle vied a cfalilch . - k y c h kultumych inititudl e.aoplsy, zbomlky a knlhy. VosvoJom ,,Newsletter", ktory ut po 8 rolcov vyd6va dvakrU do roka, oboznamuje avofich Benov • prostrednk:tvom nlch I sV9tOvu vect.cku verejnosf • knlhaml ■ zbomflcml a upozoffluje na zaujfm■Ye ~Hinley v tasoplsoch. Okrem toho Jnfonnuje •J o knihKfl a - - V 6uopi9och O Slovikoch, a alovenakef problematlke, ktore vytll v cudzlne. Bohutlar napriek evidentnaJ snahe po objekttvnom, nezaujatom rwferovanf prmu len pravlida zimer uprlamlf pozomosf na publlkacle a ttanky a obuhom niilmu lblitu a zrladenlu naprlatersky orlentovanych. SSA mi •I vl■-u edialu l!lnnosf preva!ne V apolupr6cl - ao Slovanakjm Ustavom v Clevelande, oriento-v■ nU nepri■tal'slry voa n,m. Zatlar eo predaada a elenovla vyboru sa vprlebehu rokov - pokier am■ to mall mofnost ■ ledovat menlli, trvalU pozldu ta)omnfka a pokladnlka od r. 1978 mi M . Marl< Stolarik. ktory je aj Ndalctorom .,Newsletter" . SSA je lnltttucionlilnym aenom American Assoclation for Advenc:ement of Slavic Studies • aktivne aa zututiluje na Jej nirodnych konvandich (toho kn)anakych vadeckych p.-.covnlkov, lctori ma)u s Matlcou alovenskou dobre kontalcty. Medzl inyml Mrs. Nonna Rudlnski, Gerald J . Sabo, June Alexander, John Berta, Saly Staruch, Tom Marzik • d'alif z USA.. prof. Peter Petro a Yvonne Grabowski z Kanady ako I J . M. Rydlo zo avajaarska a dalil. AJctfvna Bnn~ tychto k spoluprild • Maticou lllovenskou na kuttumom poff ochotnych llanov SSA, vytvira perapektivu, le v buducnostf aa bude m6ct' celkom aeri6zne uva!ovaf I o konkretnej prlamej apoluprid Matice alovenekej ao Slovak Studies Anoclatlon v oblastl propagicle vyaledkov alovanokef vacly, kultury • umenla vo . - .. Zatlar, • vyhradou propagide nim naprlat.rokej litera• tury, pozltlvna hodnotima snahu SSA oboznamovat svetoW vededc:U vsejnost o nallch uspechoch v oblutl vedy, literatury • umanla. Priame kontalctyvtak vzhradom na neprlat.rsky postoj preclovtetkym takych vplyvnych oaobnostf v SSA ako SU Stanislav J . IOrachbaum, M. Mark Stolarik ■ Renee Mikus, nie SU v SUbsnoatl mOZ"'. Je to aamozrejme na ikodu vecf, ktor.6 nim je opolol!ni: propagidl slovan■kaj vacly. lfteratury a umenla na svatovom f6rw. MILOS BIEL �SLOV AKIA-2015 103 APPENDIX6 VYD/..VA MA.TICA SLOVlNSK/.. no&luil'b bdu repubUky MARTIN 14. Dovembra 1983. VAS LIST ZNA<'!KY Valent pe p~. lla.rlc K. Stolarik The i!lalch lMtit~te 18 S., 1th Street ZO Di'IA N~A ZNA<'!KA Philadelphia, Pa. 19106 VYBAVUJE Kiloll Bie]l. VEC: Vll!eny pain pro:f'e aorl V pr:!10118 Vllm zasielam :f'otokopiu a aajho l!lilnlcu, a SSA v nallom l!aeopiae Slovenako l!.6/83 a :f'otokopiu replilcy z Kanadak4ho Sloviika l!.37, rot. 42 z 24.9.1983, hoci J>Nldpoklaau, !e ich ob11ah d poznate. Ak oba l!llllllcy poromllte a apoaeaiete ei na to1 l!o ate nap1aali predaedovi Matice alovenalcej DIU'o 111119lcovi Vlatia!rovi Kinal!ovi i na jeho odpoved, bude Vu zre,im4, !e Vu Va6i priatelia z Kanadak4ho SlovlUca (Vall otec??) poalcytli aedvadiu alu!bu. Ol!akav.,._, !a ea nad oboma l!lllnkud zllJIIYalite, najd nad ich doaahoa v elovenalalj varejnoati za hranicaai, zaujaete jednoznaln4 a pravde zodpovedaj uce etanoviako a po!iadate redalcciu Kanadak4ho Sloviika o opravu. Ky v Slovensku ame tie! oohotn1 Valle atanoviako publikova~. �SLOVAKIA-2015 104 APPENDIX 7 kor..ne s mojfm prt,dpllllnym . Zarove~ pr1p•J11m MO na 23 dolarov, t. J. 20 11ko predplatne 11 3 na podporu. Zarovel\ m1pr11vde , ktor4 oko!0 nM 11li:1(l _ _______ _ ne. No to si pocnete s eecno- _ ........_,,.;,;._..;..,.....;...,._,,.. slovakm i a podobnymi pobhi- nerobl dobru slufbu medzl sh,denymi oveckami? . venskyml vyst'ahovalcaml na amerlckom konllnente. To by . sl mall uvedomll' af II, ktorl 1:: chcli hfadaf spolupracu so I~sJovenskym exllom v slobod- r-----------------------7 , Mm citatelia opiitovne Vas chceme poprosit', aby ste si prezreli zaznam pri Vasej adrese. Ak mate este stale na konci dvojku (2). tak Vase predplatne vyprsalo. Nedavno sme poslali cfalsfch vyse sto (100) iiadosti o vyrovnanie si predplatneho. Prosfme aj tych, ktori maju na konci trojku (3) a mesiac ai po okt6ber, nech si laskavo vyrovnaju predplatne, lebo im sa uz t' · k c ·1 UI' h • a •d k 1ez s on_ '. o a . c1 1e nam pr cu a vy a_v Y na znamky t1ez. riakureme Varn za porozum~nie Admin1strac1a K . S. I nom svete. I Je zfavne, fe reflm na SloI vensku podnlk6 11 bude podI' nlkaf kroky, aby potupoval sloI venskych ntlrodovcov v exlle a 1' aby podryvallch f"dnotu a akll- J I vltu " 11 kafdom poN. Bolo by ., pod nalu d0stofnosl', aby sme 115 komunlstlckyml ldeol6gml debatovall II vledll s nlml dla16gy. Tym bysme Im roblll sluf- -------------------------• - bu, uzn6vall lch za parlnerov, s kloryml stofl ZII lo sedl ..t' ZII USA a pollllkov sa nezaobera. PIie vedecke prtlce O sloven• skom vyst'ahov,.1lectve do USA _-_·-- •-=;-- ' ~ 11 fe uzntivanou uutorltou medzl amerlckyml hlstorlkml II vedeckyml lnAlllliclaml Podra Andrnansk~ho-Blela Pod tltulom .Ohlasy" uverejnl,. ~ b._g.rof. Sto"rlka,.Je.Jt lo ,.Slovensko'", klore mt! byt' f ·srov ~Sludle._!. kulllirno-spolotenskym s _~ c 18 11 0 ,. 11 b y t 8 t •0 mesatnlkom a je vydavane Ma- ";iiofot!nosr mor.t'a reprezentollcou slovenskou v Turtlan- ,vat' Slovakov medzl amerlckyskom Svlltom Marline, vo svo- ml hlstorlkml a v Slavic Stujom tlsle z flila 1983 naslrane6 dies Association 8 teda Slov,icl utok na Msgr. F. Fugu , ktory je n e b O II p O ne ch an I p O d slovenskym narodovcom a patronatom ,.Czechoslovak predsedom Zahranltnef Mall- Studies Assoclnllon'". Ide O tisce slovenskej, ktora nle je mar- te vedeckli spolotnosl" hlstoxlsllcka ako hi na Slovensku. rlkov slovensl<eho p0vodu, Clanok .Kio klame a dezlnfor- ktorl sa hlasla k slovenskemu muje'" naplsal Mlloslav Andre- rodu a pf§u o slovenskef otazansky. ke vedeckym spOsobom, teda Ten lsty Mlloslav Andretln- objektlvne. sky (alias MIiot Blel) v augusToto sa pravdafe, M. Andretovom tisle Slovenska uveref- tlnskemu-Blelovl nep6tl, lebo nil znova lltok na dr. M. Stoia- sa tam nechvall techoslovaklzrlka, klory fe najkvallflkovanef- mus a marx-lenlnlzmus. !Im slovenskym hlslorlkom v Taketo plsanle Sloyenska spolotnym stolom. J" nam Nto, fe na amerlc• kom konllnenle mtl komunls!Icky reflm na Slovensku svoflch obdlvovatel'ov a kolaborantov, ale tych my anl nepresvedtlme, anl neziskame. Tleto litoky, krltlky, alebo I za. lletanl■ tasoplsu Slovensko nas e§te vlac upevnla v tom, f~ budeme mOcr dOsledne br6nlt a chranlt' mravne a narodne hodnoty slovenskeho exllu a P.rllva slov:en~ e~~9 , .n_a,[.(1da pra~ neAl'astna_~~ ! slovenska v Tufe1anskom Svlltom Martine t~k ne~_f.!)eba Z[pdlla a zre_d.,u. Y m me vel'a svojlch vlaslnej§lch a nallehavejAlch liloh. (R) s/itort �SLOV AKIA-2015 105 APPENDIX8 lHE BALCH INSTITLJrE for ElHNIC STUDIES 18 South Seventh Street, Philadelphia, PA. Or M. Men STOlorik Uecutive Director Boord cJ Trustees Samuel H 8olklm. .k Ch011mon .JohnC Hoen ViceCr'\Otlmon AlexO:"'1010 8 Goloslu 19106 November 29, 1983 P4'n MiloS Biel Reda'kcia Slovensko 036 52 M a ~ Mudroifo va 35 Czechoslovakia Europe DrahY pcln Biel: Secrelo,y v.f$ .John F White heosu16' wo11er ~ Afooe, t0w1ence J 9ornh0'\T r, oc:e,1 C Cho01n MOn Beo111ce K Chemock lh90CJOl8 H Cov11 Th0m01 J F111oei-010 list zo dn'a 14 . novembra, 1983, som dO.e s obdrZal. Mlt~ yravdu ,/ed p{sete Z\ pozn~ obsah ~lo":,enskfch C:asop1;sov. Ako h isto ri k c!tam vsetke Slovenske tasopisy ktore vychadzaju na zapade. Aj niektore' zo Slovenska. Mam tiez' p{somne sty'ky zo Slovak.mi po celom svete. Pre mXa ti e to tasopisy a li s t y su pramene pre deji ny Slova'kov v 20. storoc'i. Lis t y od v;{s pa tt:i a mc dz i nima. Or Muffov J:.11eomon WdhOmL GfolO Dr Roso Bo~e Green Pl"Ol A W~liom Hogiuno Rooe,tM HOwe Moue A ledeler Corv L8Ylnson. Esci Mri- Fronk P louchheln'\ Set C Mo-npon MictlOel Novak Vrvion W Piosoc:k1 Mrs Meve, P Potomlun Em11vC m1ev Prof Timothy l. Smith Consiontine S. Sosongells Dr Jomes Ton11 1-1on Pou! A TroncMellO hOn Mno Cibott1 Ve,no Dr tv'torvin Wocnmon Ho~, Notnan1e1Wos.,1ngton c ec,110 Mov veo Polemizovaf s valmi neb1;,dem. \'1Sa tfloha je robi'! '!,ropa gandu . Mo'ja j e p{sal de jiny. V tomto pripade budem ~ ma'E posledne slovo. Ked chcete da~o uverejni'f v c!as opise Sl ovensk o , zasi ela'm vfm Clanok z Horizontu, o semin.iri v Martine. Vi k t or M.amatey , n.JS by'vali predseda, ho napisal a celkom s nlm s\Jhlasim. P{sat mOtete Co chcete. Historici budu vSetko posudzo vat. "Pravda vitazi," ako hovoril Masaryk. S k rajansk[m pozdrav om , /~ Emet1tu1 Prot fo.....o'O p HuTC""l1nson / (215) 925-8090 /-r?'i / v -~ Maria'n Stolclri k 0-< �SLOV AKIA-2015 106 APPENDIX 9 Slovak Studies Association Affiliated with the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 700 Pe nfie ld Ave. , Havertown , PA 19083 Septemb e r 3 , 1983 Dr . Vladimfr !tinll! Predseda Matice slovenakej 812 51 Bratislava Pugai!"evova 2 Czechoslovakia 1968, I have of scholarly asked for my agreed . Over thousands of exchange. Since my first research tri p to Slovakia in the summe r of actively cooperated with the Matica elovensk8 in the exchange materials . Dr. Jan Martak and Dr. ~tefan Krivulf wrote me and cooperation in this program of cultural exchange and I gladly the last fifteen years I have sent the Mat i ca slovenska dollars worth of book.a and periodicals as a part of this You can imagine what a s hock and aurprise it was to me, therefore , to open your monthly magazine Slovensko (No.8, 1983) and to find, on page 6 of your supplement, 11 Slovensko krajanom, 11 an attack upon me by a certain MiloJ Biel. He accuses me, aa editor of the Slovak Studies Newsletter , of bringing to people's attention articles and publications "whose contents are hostile to our state I a political system," of working "in cooperation 11 with the Slovak Institute in Cleveland, 11 and of taking an unfriendly s tand" towards Slovakia. Cont'd on page 107 �SLOV AKIA-2015 107 APPENDIX9 Besides being false, these charges betray a certain naivte by Mr. Biel about historical scholarship and conditions in the West. You, as a scholar and poet, must realize that serious historians have to consider all sources when writing their history, not just those that a certain political philosophy calls for. That i s the very essence of objectivity. Furthermore, it is the duty of true scholars to have contacts with all institutions that contain historical meterials, whether they be located ~Slovakia or in the United States. Finally, we in the West believe in openness and pluralism. For instance, the Slovak Studies Association, of which I am the founder and Secretary-Treasurer, has among its members Slovak Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Greek Catholics, Jews, nationalis ts, 'Czechoslovaks' and Marxists. We do not exclude people because of their religion or political orientation. We are open to all scholars who are interested in promoting Slovak studies the world over . Therefore, Mr. Biel' s clumsy attempt to list 1 'friendly 11 and "unfriendly" members of the Slovak Studies Association is going to backfire and hurt the good contacts that the Hatica slovenska has developed with Slovaks in the West over the last several years. I s uggest that you have Mr. Biel retract his crude and unwarranted attack upon me in the next issue of Slovensko . If he does not, I have a feeling that most of the goodwill that the Hatica slovensklhas built up with young scholars in the Western World will very quickly disappear. Yours Sincerely, l ·f i~ �108 SLOV AKIA-2015 APPENDIX 10 Bratislava, 4,10,1983 Vazeny pan Stolarik! Iste Vas nemusfm ubezpe ~ovaf o tom, ako Matici slovenskej zalezf na vsetkom, co sa aotyka dejin i su~asnosti slovenskej narodnej kultury, ako nam teda zalezi aj na kazdom, kto s nami chce v mene buducnosti tejto kultury spo lupracovaf, To sa dotyka aj Slovak Studies newsletter i Vas osobne, Mrzf ma to, co sa stale v ~asopise Slovensko, Nemam priam_y vplyv na redigovania ~asopisu, ale pokia! to bude v mojich silach., zabranim v buducnosti moznym nedorozumeniam . Rozumia sa, za mame rozliCne nazory na zivot spolocnosti a na jej buducnost . Ale mame aj spoloCnu starost, ktorou je slovenska narodna kultura, jej dejiey a osudy - na celom svete, Dufam teda, ze nam v oalse.j spolupraci nezabrania malichernosti a ostavam so srdeCnym pozaravom dJ.l~-t~~ / t/ • Vazeny pan M,Mark Stolarik 7U0 Penfiela Ave. Havertown, ~A 19083 ~~~U Narodny umelec Vladimir Minal! �SLOV AKIA-2015 109 APPENDIX 11 - s--!.. =■ ~ S:io'-'6,1,~Ko t /tJ.,~f. HIOll4CIIKl:1:t c::==s ilowc11td::~ ► --. 5: Slovensko pre ,,dva druhy citatefov" Pod tymto Hver•vr•vnYffl .. l&IVom uv--tnM p6n M...Wn Mtt Stolarik. tajomnlk • po-. ......· - - • e t ipolotnOfll (Slovak StudlN \Noc:Ultion) v USA vo •vojom "MWUetter rot. I , tWo 1/iun 1114, str. I . nuledujUCU pomemku : ,Sloven•ko, oflcialny meu~ "Ilk M•tH» •lov•n•k• J vych'· dz.a vo dvoch veni,ch, p,-. dv• r,dliln4 titat•l•k4 ve,.jna.rl. Predpok/adal aom, I • ..,,•tci nd i ~novla to vedill, • I• n• d4vn o .am zlstil l e to tak nle ,._ Vlalna 1. v,. J. v domienk•. h Slo~o. tron dost'"'• t• Vy ■Jja, jetenl•tvtuop/a, lrto,Y cirltulu}9 ,,. Slowm•ku. f•li•. Aku pozome adlv■ t• n• lcror,hofvek 8•/o V"h o U•ooi•u SloVM1•ko, vlimnite al, le mtKUi 16. • 17. atranou hlevnej t..•ti ~nopi•u je Cudzofuytn' prf/ohe, r,ro Cudzoj•~n, prlloha znaman, oval• vlec n#Jl vyzer,. ObuhuJ• tiel ~,,,.. ky v •loventine, ilu•troven4 ,, Toho tuu ,,.jchUlo•tiwjjoo ....cou je otbb •lav•n•k•J prl• lo hy Sloven.Ice. v,1ho m • ~ nib, wnov• MJ Jcr• Janom v u hr•ni8, ,,. ktof'U m• upozornlll •i vlac»rl )ednotllvcl. PodobM elco Stol• rilc v Slov• lc Studi• ._ Pouvelu;t• a WICI, uda t•ru ul r,ro prlloh• v •lowrwt.•f rKi b y mohl• by( •U~•fou rl•dM otlaloven'(Ch .rr, n Slovt1M ka, • to •i pre 6it•t• l ov v • t•rom kr•JI. Cudzojuytry prllohe by u moh/M vloli( do ~•oplsu Hp■ r,rne. Predillo by u zbytotn•J krltilce, nedtr wre, yYSmelnYm • ultll)«:nYm pozn,mlcem • Jcont,..ver• zil, I• u Ju ,ob4v• t• uUnf titetefom dome '. S.m ozre/m, w c, Je potombyste melivybe,..f • pr'vy od 01db v,m pr!Jat111nych.,, Ne dldede tohoto llstu sm• pochopHI, le naM nepriatalls v auf•l•J sneh• dlskredftova! n'6 tasopls. c:hytaJU N kaJdel prildfto.tl, aby naMI Umlen• 2) bu<f vy va ml moriadtis!■ Sk>vensb 2 X do roka • ru u rok Magufn, ako •m• to uroblll v rokoch 1811 s 1NZ. 3) elebo prUollt NmostatnU prflohu ku kald,mu tulu Slovenska, 1rtor• bud• ••· pedov•n• U.,enom. Bolo n,m Ja.sn',, le form• pristupu ku luajanom vytadu}11. ■by ttat.M slovo, ktorym .. bud•m• obraca! ku krajaq_om. bolo vy,obeM najmodern9llou tachn.lkou • na kv■• litnom ps.,...-1. preto.le all.nm toho, le bude plnft' nu-odnouvedomovadu • fflformKnU funk.du, bude slutff •J ako ,.._ pruenUda nai•J SUtesnosd. Preto rozhoduJUdml taktorml, ~ urtlll tretlu alt.emaUvu ako opdmilnu • reelb.ovstel'nU, boll: pridal kvalhMho pa• piera a Aulomberka, ftnentn. prostriedky poa«ytovan, Ml• nlst.erstvom lwlturf SSA. pwaoniln• ubupet:enl• redak• tn't'ch pnc bu zvylenla at.aw redaktorov • konetne 11..padta tlatlarM. NaN Slovensko •ko Matupc:a MatitMho ffianlll vych6du ul 6smy roll. Ptvyc:h I rokov vyc:hadulo i.k ako teraz n• 32 stnMc:h, ale z toho Ian na I farebnych. Nlekol'ko stovik vytlatkov Slov•nslta :uslelalo byval4 Oddelenle MS ~ U· hranltnjch Slov,kov I n■JJm knjanom predovletkym do Fnl'tCUului, Juhosljvle • Kanady. 11M I do USA• Auatr611e. 0d roku 1813, v a&JvlslMtl • I► ho vlalm umeranhn do uhran~•• rodlriM sme fa,.bnU ten' n11 11 atrin. bez avylenla cany Ka 5, - :u a.Jo. To ale znamenelo t1atH oety tuopfs na kvalftnom ,,..,_... Nale tov,,.I\ v Rulombertc.u vyr6ba skutotne kv•lltnY pepler, ktory Je yYZ.namnYffl exportn,;m ;rovania • udriovania kontak tov • lu■janml • v ""•ha po m6d im v kh Ualll o udrianll sloven~o n,rodn~ pov• dornla a podtu •~upatrit nosd • Jedrom n6rods P04 T atraml, alto I umo.t:ntr Im YU )omn, poznanl• krsjan~ livota v r6znyc:h tastiac:h sva ta Itek ako sma to uv&edl v 1/14 Bale Slov•nslui). Ak by sm• chcall dod6v• prilohu Slovansko krajanon I na domic:I trh, potrebovaU b• ame prlnajmen9' o 30 % vyt.t pridel p,aJNer•. to u daneJ vj robne4 sftuKM v n.&J:ombe, • k•J tov6rni nle }e moln4i. Tak ti&I by sme muMII ;rvyi,lt' cani tasopisu na dom6com trhu, 6t tlel v sutasnoati Ne Je ul.alM TNI• •ko vldlta, m ill luaja nl a, calkom proukk6 flnant " '• ma....Ulna • techrdck, d6 vody Mt pntinou, pre&t tj ta.Slovenaka, ktor6 Ja ur6en6 kni janom • :uoberi N prevs.tn. luajanskou problematikou nil Je k dlt,poddl I domkam1 Btat.rovl. Cudzojuyl"' priloha J• tla 6an, na obytajnom 1.-.bnon novl novom pepl■ rt, aby ZyY ru.nlla a oddelllll prlohu 0< ostat,,..,o taxtu . Talrto nie J4 ponJien6 kontlnulta taxtu pr1 domidch tltatelov • kr■J•n sky at.atel' dOSUva svoj u prflo hu komp,aktnU. Konettla treba p. Mar5'nov Stolarikovl prlpomenut', h pr avojef vedlajiej tinnostl altc r.dsktor • vydav■tel' Nawalet• tar al mohol (ubudol alebo nec:hcel1) Yilmnuf, le sko oudzolazytni prilohe, tak I Slo· vansko lu■Janom majU NmoatatnU tlril. to v novin6rskej praxl anama"'-, la hod Je Jedan vydav■ W I Ufr.daktor. prMaa to, to do.Uvs, SU vlast• ne tri Nmostatn4i periodlld (hod I spolu zoliU). ktor6 m~ tu byf upedov•M • rodlro• Cont'd on page 110 �SLOV AKIA-2015 110 APPENDIX 11 • ~ • to priMU a , nky o s1ov, lcoch na UpatH. Slovkl dom• tuto prllohu niltdy navkl~ . Vla•tMUwry .iurobteMml." Nepovdov•II •m• dopot,lal' uWM ,-govat' na alee dot.. .nultov•n&i. ... pNdu len U'9jmU domyeel'noet' uv.. defMlpmNlmlryvNew.iett:•. Medd6uo,n u I\U v I.ta opjul llnjan a NSR. pr.ea nedoetaf v CSSR i!uopla SbveMlco • prilohou 8&ovenako lulljanom. Odpovadal am• mu p&.omne pnllmo • on naM vywetaenieakoeptoval. Oo.teM ..,... vlak d'.U 19t a USA od vjzn,amrwho krajanakMto kutbimeho Bnltel'-. v ktorom bol nuledufQd od- u ......, dWttod &u ndavnutomli, PN koho taeopl• vycUvama ■ v ■ tom rouahu, roahod.W .me N podllf ilrokej knjanilk•J Y«9jnoatl vywedanie. 0 d6vodoch, ktcri nN • nM nadrtadenf Ol'Pn - Mlnlnera:tvo 11.ulb;ry 8SR - vleclll le tomu, ■by am• vycMv■ II tlHMM alovo pre lualanov, MM plull oblim• ne tomto m'-te v 9/M a.le Slovanaka. Tu tr..bll objaantt' Iba technldw .trinJa.i rulldde. Z Uvah, ■ ko rHll.zov■t i.nto dme,, vykryttall.zovall J ■har­ t111tfvy: 1) bud' vydjvaf Nmo.tab'tf fuopl■ pre knjaftOV (kvr(.-O<J. vyN>ba, Ide na uport. Napatr"' Ullf' aoaUiva pre, tuumsko ■ ,. prfen■ llmH.ovan6. N•t tuopq doetaval tie.I urtfty prid.a tohoto papi.,.. (n■ I _,.n). 0d roku 1N3 bol prklel r,ylent na pokrytM I farebnych strin (d'.tlkh) ■ I rilin prflohy PN lu■Janov. baopta 810¥'9ftN0 I• WWnY' ..........................ho atatel'■ : 70 % Nlldadu Ide na dom'4:il trh ■ len 25 % ,. prilohou) pre lnjanov ■ I % pre on.atnu GUdzlnu. Tyoh 21 "' "'ldadu. apolu • c:uckoluy6nou p,9ohou • prlohou Slownako kntrlanom IMnC:1Ujeme a~Matloe.aov.n•uJ dotovaMho ~om kuhury &SR v UUJm• Na UV..- .. t ied.a podotknUf, ta ,ri..,.a tych rucMckofaM.tkkych luuhov, kto" •ita necMvno qltovall, aby Mm lln)ani• Slovenako vrac.all Cnapr. tt.nadaky Slodk), .. aruu DZYV• fartzajsk.6 atarost• lfvo.t o nilho do""oeho tltaWa. la nav&dl iu.JaN116 priohu. :Um..- Je fun'i' • jednoanat:nj . Cheu Mm polllodK, otrevovaf vzfahy nwwdal narnl • krajanml. lrtoN .. 1 naprielc lch lntria'm .,.,.,.. • Ua,pe,tn• roMJaJ'I . .... anahy hod~ nflnonn, • hod I n• Cpeaudo) ved41Ckej Oroml aem,ow"' prukn6 alto myclo"' bubllna. pr.tole pr■ vda )e ,.. n-■J nadvA- Cud1oja1yCnd prnoha Rlowcnallo ~ S...- Htl.i.., Z -fll M ,i.,1 .. A ~,t--AOI V~MMl1lcaoi...-U• • " " ' -· 'i.t.llTS""'.••"' .w(- "-9,_fJa. MolniA, (l.$a • - 1,n . . . , . �SLOV AKIA-2015 111 APPENDIX 12 TRAFENA HUS ZAGAGA is a Slovak saying meaning literally •the goose that is hit will maJce a loud cackle• . .I t caoos to one's mind when reading the article in SLOVENSKO *) ,tbe.:.official monthly publication of'Hatica slovenska (Czecho-Slovakia) attacking Hark H. Stolarik, Secretary-Treasurer of the SlovaJc Studies' Asscr ciation (USA) far his brief remark in the Association's Newsletter (June 1984, see also SM 5 &6, p.28). Stolarik informed about the non-availability of SLCNENSKO' s supplement SLDIENSKO XRAJANOH (aimed at Slovaks outside Sl~ vakia) to readers in J;lovakia. According to SLOIENSXO,the re~ sons f.or this non-availability are econcmi c : paper . shortage• •though no mention •is made of the fact that they are flooding the West with 'canplimentary copies' of their books printed on very expensive paper. I t takes them the best part of a page to say this, when a simple ,sentence •because of economic reasQllS we cannot supply the Supplement for no extra cost to readers in Slovakia, however they can obtain i t· ·e asily for an additional subscription . & . Kcs ... • would have been sufficient. But ·this they dia ..cot want tD say! By the way, one is concerned~ bout access to SLCNENSKO KRAJANOH not as i f this was the best way to inform people in Slovakia . - about Slovak life in the West, but because Hatica slovenska herself has been encouraging Slovaks in the -west to establish contactJwith their old homeland through h'Z"iting ·to SLCNENSKO. I f the only obstacles to establishing such contacts were economic , a simple solution would be this : The BULI£TIN of the SLCNAX WCRLD CONGRESS states that it: "is available to readers in Slovakia free of charge• (there is no paper shortage in Canada !J. Why does not Hatica slovenska undertaJce to distribute the BULI£TIN free .of charge among the subscribers of SLOVENSKO in .Slovakia, and have in exchange the Slovak World Congress distribute SWVENSKO KRAJANOH free of charge to the readers of their BULLETIN in the West. Nobody could then canplain about lack of contacts : •I t was too much of a temptation to resist, namely to present to our readers the final part of the article in SWVENSKO with ·al:1 -its orwellian beauty (their English sUD1Dary contains neither this nor the vitriolic attaak .on H. Stolarik) : Those who dared to question the availability of SLOVENSKO KRAJANOH are •fascists• and "pharisees• (what a combination !) who "want to damage and poison the r~ lationship between us [i.e. Hatica] and our countrymen, which shows a premising and successful development despite their [i. e. the fascists' and pharisees' J intrigues. Their attempts, though cunning and presented on a {pseudo) scientific level .will burst like a soap bubble because .the truth is on our side.• � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOV AKIA-2015 87 MY ROCKY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MATICA SLOVENSKA. DURING THE SECOND ERA OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1970-1989: A PERSONAL MEMOIR M. Mark Stolarik When I first visited Slovakia in the summer of 1968, I established friendly contacts with the Matica slovenska in Martin . 1 Never did I dream that, a short while later, one of its employees would publicly attack me. This happened because the political situation in Czechoslovakia changed as a result of the Warsaw Pact invasion of August, 1968. The so-called "Prague Spring," led by the Slovak reformer Alexander Dubcek, who wished to transform Czech and Slovak society into "socialism with a human face," was crushed under the weight of Warsaw Pact tanks. Less than a year later, Dubcek was replaced as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by the turncoat Gustav Husak, who proceeded to "normalize" the state. What started out as a year of high hopes turned into one of great disappointment. 2 Even though I was born in Slovakia in 1943, my parents decided to evacuate the whole family into Austria before the Russian front came through in January of 1945 . I did not return to my home town of Martin until July of 1968. 3 Dr. Jozef Telgarsky, the Director of the National Library, which then belonged to the Matica slovenska, 1 A shorter, Slovak version of this article first appeared as "Matica slovenska pod dohl'adom Statnej bezpecnosti," in Matica slovenska v narodnych dejinach, ed. by Imrich Sedlak (Martin : Matica slovenska, 2013), 174-78. I initially described this trip in greater detail as "My Memories of Slovakia under Communism (S ummer of 1968)," in Narodny kalendar CVII (Pittsburgh, 1999), 96-99 . 2 For the latest scholarship on the " Prague Spring" see The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later, ed. by M. Mark Stolarik (Mundelein, IL: Bolchazi-Carducci, 2010). For the period of "normalization" in Slovakia see Norbert Kmet' and Juraj Marusiak, comp., S/ovensko a reiim normalizacii (Presov: Michal Vasko, 2002). 3 1 described my family's Odyssey, as well as Slovak emigration in general, in Where is my Home? Slovak Emigration to North America (1870-2010) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). 88 SLOV AKIA-2015 heartily welcomed me. He was delighted that, after so many years of being cut off from the West, he could once again establish contacts with Slovaks in the West. 4 I had come to Slovakia in the summer of 1968 as a Ph.D. student from the University of Minnesota in order to study the villaie origins of Slovak emigration to North America in the 19 th and 20 centuries. I had already studied the parish records of various Slovak communities in the United States and Canada and wished to link them with those in Slovakia. At the same time, I had started to collect archival materials for the newly-established Immigrant Archives at the University of Minnesota. When I finished my research in Slovakia in September of 1968, I promised Telgarsky, that I would begin to send duplicate archival and library materials concerning Slovaks in the USA and Canada to the Slovak National Library in return for the SNL sending me the latest publications of historians in Slovakia. 5 After I finished my doctoral studies at the University of Minnesota, I was employed by several professional institutions but never lost contact with the Matica slovenska. At first I was employed by the Cleveland State University as a Lecturer and Assistant Professor (1972-76), then as an Historical Researcher at the National Museum of Man in Ottawa (1977-78), then as President and CEO of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia (1979-91) and finally as Professor and Chairholder of the only Chair in Slovak History and Culture in the Western World at the University of Ottawa (1992 to the present). During all of these years I continued my program of exchange with the Matica slovenska. I wish that I could say that our relations were always good, but it was not to be. While I worked at the National Museum of Man in Ottawa, I took the initiative to establish a new scholarly organization. In 1975 a Czechoslovak History Conference had been founded by a group of historians in the United States. 6 From my study of Czech and Slovak history, I knew that, as always, Slovak history, and Slovak scholars, 4 When I returned to the USA, it occurred to me that Jozef Telgarsky was the author of my favorite children's book - Zirafa [The Giraffe] (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1946). While we were refugees in Austria from 1945-1950, my mother often read me sections of this book. I still have it and cherish it. 5 JozefTelgarsky to Marian Stolarik, May 13, 1969, NK 289 20/69-St. See Appendix 1, page 97. 6The history of this organization can be found in its Czechoslovak History Ne wsletter, founded in 1979. SLOV AKIA-2015 89 would play "second fiddle" in such an organization. Therefore, at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Washington, D.C. in October of 1977, I persuaded half a dozen scholars in the USA and Canada to create our own Slovak Studies Association. Since I took the initiative in founding this organization, I was elected its first Secretary-Treasurer and Newsletter Editor. I then contacted as many scholars as I knew had an interest in Slovak studies and invited them to join. By 1983 our ranks had grown to 120 members. Meanwhile, the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies accepted us as an affiliated organization and the officers and I organized regular sessions of the Slovak Studies Association at the annual meetings of the AAASS. 7 As Newsletter Editor, I also informed our members of recent scholarly developments in Slovakia, as well as of the activities and publications of our members. Meanwhile, in 1968 the Matica slovenska began to publish a semi-weekly newspaper entitled Maticne citanie and put me on its mailing list. 8 At the beginning this newspaper reflected a good dose of Slovak nationalism and on its masthead carried a stylized Slovak national emblem, which had been banned by the Communists. 9 However, under the weight of Gustav Husak's, "normalization" campaign, in 1973 the Slovak emblem disappeared from the Matica's letterhead and in 1978 the Maticne citanie folded . It was then replaced by the glossy monthly Slovensko. At the same time, Jozef Telgarsky no longer corresponded with me. Instead, two hard-line Communists, at first Jaroslav Celko and later Stefan Krivus, both Directors of the Matica, continued the correspondence. The masthead of their letters no longer carried the Slovak emblem; it was replaced by the letters MS , for the Matica slovenska. 10 It was clear from these changes that the Matica was being purged . Nevertheless, I kept exchanging materials with the Matica and hoped for the best. 7 The history of the Slovak Studies Association can be found in the Newsletter of the Slovak Studies Association, published since October, 1977. Recently the AAASS changed its name to the American Association for Slavic and Eurasian Studies. 8 A complete run of this newspaper can be found in the Slovak Archives, Archives and Special Collections, University of Ottawa. 9 See the first issue of Maticne citanie dated October 28, 1968, Appendix 2, pages 98-99. 10 See the letters of Jaroslav Celko, dated March 27, 1973 and Stefan Krivus, dated October 23, 1974 to Mark Stolarik, Appendices 3, page 100, and App 4, page 10 I. 90 SLOV AKIA-2015 Unfortunately, in the 1980's my relations with the Matica slovenska took a tum for the worse. The first sign that something was amiss came in 1980 when the "Oddelenie pre zahranicnych Slovakov" (the Department for Slovaks Abroad) of the Matica slovenska sponsored an international scholarly conference on "Vyst'ahovalectvo a zivot krajanov vo svete" (Emigration and the Life of Countrymen Abroad) and published the papers.11 Even though I had met and befriended Jan Siracky, the Director, and Frantisek Bielek, one of their researchers in 1968 when the Department was established in Bratislava, and they knew that I specialized in the history of the immigration of Slovaks to North America, they did not invite me to this conference. Instead, they invited my good friend and colleague Thomas D. Marzik (originally Mrazik), an Associate Professor of history at St. Joseph's University in Philadelphia. A scholar of Central Europe, Marzik specialized on T.G. Masaryk and the Slovakophile Czech Karel Kalal. He had done no archival research on Slovak immigration. Nevertheless, the conference organizers asked him to present a paper on "The State of American Scholarly Research on Slovak Emigration and on American Slovaks," which he read in English, since he could not speak Slovak. He must have taken the conference organizers by surprise when he asserted, among other things, that "M. Mark Stolarik is currently the most productive scholar concerning the history American Slovaks," and then added, "currently, he is the Executive Director of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia... .In this capacity, he can be very helpful in encouraging further research on American Slovaks." 12 When I received a copy of the Proceedings of this conference, I no longer regretted not having been invited. As I leafed through the book, I noticed that the conference had been opened by Viliam Salgovic, at that time the Chairman of the Slovak National Council, but formerly the Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1968, who betrayed his colleagues in the "Prague Spring" by collaborating with the invading Warsaw Pact forces . It turns out that Salgovic had been an agent of the Soviet KGB and was one of the most hated individu11 Vyst'ahova/ectvo a iivot krajanov vo svete. K storocnici masoveho vyst'ahova/ectva s/ovenskeho /'udu do zamoria. Zbornik prispevkov k vedeckej konferencii. Zost. Frantisek Bielik, Jan Siracky a Claude Balaz (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1982). 12 Ibid., 131-32. The compilers arranged for Marzik's article to be translated into Slovak. SLOVAKIA-2015 91 als in Slovakia. 13 Furthermore, the conference organizers also invited the retired grade-school teacher and communist activist Helen Vrabel-Saunders of Los Angeles and the Canadian Slovak communist activist Jan Rumisek to present papers on the Slovak communities in their respective countries. 14 These individuals reflected poorly on the scholarly level of this conference. When Marzik returned to Philadelphia and described the conference to me, he mocked the presentations of these so-called "experts." However, when the Proceedings arrived in the mail in 1982, I mocked Marzik for the company he had kept. The second bad sign from Czechoslovakia came in 1982. At that time my wife and I had decided that, even though the Matica did not invite me to its scholarly conference, we would visit our native Slovakia on our own. As was required at that time, we applied for a visitor 's visa to Czechoslovakia, but, much to our surprise, the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington denied our application, without any explanation. 15 When we had visited Czechoslovakia in the summers of 1968 and 1970, we had acquired visas without any difficulty. The third bad sign occurred in 1983 when, to my great surprise, a certain writer for the Matica's monthly Slovensko, began to attack me. Even though he signed his articles as Milos Biel, he was, in fact, Miroslav Andreansky, a collaborator of the STB (State Security), who edited the Cudzojazicnu prilohu (Foreign-Language Supplement) of Slovensko. 16 In the 1970's, using the cover name Tacovsky, he had served a spy for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in West Germany. 17 13 For Salgovic's welcoming remarks see Ibid., 12-16. For his role in the "Prague Spring" see William Shawcross, Dubcek (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970), 154. Soon after the Communists relinquished power during the "Velvet Revolution" in I 989, Salgovic committed suicide. 14 For their papers see Vyst'ahova/ectvo, 270-87 and 340-42. 15 Chief of the Visa Section (unreadable signature), Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to Mark Stolarik, June 4, 1982 (in author's personal papers) . 16 Dr. Tomas Klubert, an employee of the Ustav pamdti naroda (The Nation 's Memory Institute) of the Slovak Republic, in a reply to my query dated September 3, 2010, confirmed that Andreansky was indeed a collaborator of the STB. His cover name was "Korunka." Unfortunately, his file was shredded on October 8t11, 1988. 17 See the article"Co na to pan Prokes?" published in the monthly Svedectvo: Casopis politickych vdznov na Slovensku, I, no. 4 (April 1992), page 18. 92 SLOV AKIA-2015 Andreansky/Biel had learned about the Slovak Studies Association from Thomas D. Marzik. The Matica slovenska had invited the latter to another international conference in Martin on July 5-7, 1983, on the occasion of the Matica's 120th anniversary. Knowing that the Matica had once again failed to invite Stolarik to this conference, Marzik urged it to establish formal relations with the Slovak Studies Association and also to invite "more American experts" to future conferences.18 Andreansky/Biel replied to Marzik's appeal in the Foreign Language Supplement of the August issue of Slovensko. In an article entitled "?Slovak Studies Association?" Andreansky/Biel wrote: "Direct contact with such leading personalities in the SSA as Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, M. Mark Stolarik and Renee Mikus, because of their hostility [towards the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] are, at the moment, impossible." 19 This reply was laughable, because neither Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, nor Renee Mikus, held any office in the SSA! I suspect that Stan Kirschbaum was on the "black list" of Czechoslovak authorities because he was the son of Jozef Kirschbaum, who at that time was one of the Executive VicePresidents of the Slovak World Congress and Renee Mikus was married to Jozef Mikus, who also held a high office in the SWC. Indeed, both the elderly Kirschbaum and his colleague Mikus were former diplomats in the service of the first Slovak Republic (1939-1945) as well as members of the Slovak People 's Party, and, as such, supporters of Slovak independence. 20 Thus, they were anathema to the Husak regime. Andreansky/Biel probably did not like Mark Stolarik because he was the son of Imrich Stolarik, also a former member of the Slovak People's Party and, therefore a "separatist" who often wrote articles advocating Slovak independence in the weekly 18 Thomas D. Marzik, "K problematike Slovensko-americkych akademickych vzt'ahov," in Zahranicni S/ovaci a narodne kulturne dedictvo: Zbornik prispevkov z vedeckeho seminara k 120. vyrociu zaloienia Matice s/ovenskej, compiled by Frantisek Bielik, Jan Siracky and Claude Balaz (Martin : Matica slovenska, 1984), 10109. Once again, the Matica arranged to translate Marzik' s article into Slovak. 19 Slovensko, 8 (August, 1983), Foreign Language Supplement. See Appendix 5, gage 102. °For the history of the first ten years of the Slovak World Congress, see Desat' rokov cinnosti SKS, comp . by JozefM. Kirschbaum (Toronto: Slovak World Congress, 1981). For the struggle for Slovak independence, see J. M . Kirschbaum, Nas boj o samostatnost' Slovensko (Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1958; reprinted by the Matica slovenska, Martin, 2000). SLOVAKIA-2015 93 Kanadsky Slovak. For this reason Andreansky/Biel wrote to Mark Stolarik on November 14, 1983 and asked the latter to repudiate an article written by his father in Kanadsky Slovak on September 24, 1983, which had criticized the August issue of Slovensko.2 1 Andreansky/Biel even promised to publish Stolarik' s reply in the next issue of Slovensko! Instead, Mark Stolarik wrote to Andreansky/Biel as follows : "I will not polemicize with you . Your job is to create propaganda. Mine is to write history. In this instance, I will have the last word." 22 Andreansky/Biel ' s letter showed that, at that time he had more power in the Matica slovenska than its president, the "Narodny umelec" (national artist) and writer Vladimir Mi nae, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. After having read Andrensky/Biel's attack upon me in Slovensko, I complained to Mi nae in a letter dated September 3, 1983 .23 In his reply of October 4, 1983, Minac wrote the following: "I am sorry about what happened in the periodical Slovensko . I have no direct control over the editorial content of the magazine, but, as much as I can, I will try to prevent such future misunderstandings." 24 Meanwhile, Victor S. Mamatey, considered the "dean" of Czech and Slovak historians in the United States, also reacted to the machinations of the Matica slovenska. In the Slovak monthly Horizont, published by emigres in Switzerland, he wrote the following: Slovaks abroad need cultural contacts with their homeland and Slovakia needs contacts with Slovaks abroad . Unfortunately, at the moment such contacts are weak and inadequate. The Matica and the entire regime need to understand that not they, but Slovaks abroad have the right to decide who will represent them at conferences and who will properly interpret their needs. 25 Vladimir Minac could not have been sincere in his reply to Mark Stolarik's complaint because, as indicated above, Andreansky/Biel wrote me again on November 141\ Furthermore, in 1988, during the 21 Milos Biel to Mark Stolarik, November 14, 1983 . See Appendix 6, page 103 . See also Appendix 7, page I 04, for the article in Kanadsky Slowik, September 24, 1983 . 22 Mark Stolarik to Milos Biel, November 29, 1983. See Appendix 8, page 105 . 23 Mark Stolarik to Vladimir Mimic, September 3, 1983 . See Appendix 9, pages 106 and 107. 24 Vladimir Minac to Mark Stolarik, October 4, 1983 . See Appendix 10, page 108. 25 Horizon/ (Zurich), September-October, 1983. 94 SLOV AKIA-2015 era of "Glasnost" and "Perestrojka," as promoted in the Soviet Union and its satellites by General Secretary Mikhail Goobachev in the late 1980's,2.6 I was finally invited to attend another Matica conference in Bratislava. There I met Vladimir Mimic at a Matica-sponsored reception at Bratislava Castle. After the opening ceremonies ended, a tipsy Mimic approached me and asked in a voice reeking of wine "ci vas otec stale serie do toho Kanadskeho Slovaka?" (Is your father still crapping into Kanadsky Slovak?) .27 This vulgar question revealed what was really bothering Minac (and Andreansky/Biel): that my father was freely advocating independence for Slovakia in Kanadsky Slovak. Another reason why Andreansky/Biel attacked me in Slovensko is that I revealed the truth about how it was published. When Tom Marzik returned from the second Matica conference in 1983, he promptly informed me that Slovensko was published in two versions : one for domestic consumption and one for Slovaks abroad. Only the foreign version contained a "Foreign Language Supplement," which carried news about the activities of Slovaks in the wider world. I informed the readers of the Newsletter of the Slovak Studies Association of these two versions in the June, I 984 issue.28 In its August 22 nd issue, the largest-circulation Slovak-American newspaper, the Jednota, official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, congratulated me for having provided this information. It pointed out that the Matica slovenska was sending Slovensko for free to Slovaks all over the world, and they had no idea that it was published in two versions.29 This information so infuriated Andreansky/Biel that he reacted with a full-page response in the January, 1985 issue of Slovensko. The jist of his response was that the publishers of Slovensko did not have enough paper to offer the "Foreign Language Supplement" to domestic readers.30 The best reaction to this absurd excuse came from Juraj Virsik, editor of the Slovak-Australian Monitor. In an article beginning with the Slovak proverb "Trafena hus zagaga," (A Struck Goose 26 For the Gorbachev era see Angus Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution: The Struggle for Power in the Kremlin (London : BBC Books, 1991). 27 1 described this episode in greater detail under the pseudonym Leo Carpenter in "Looking for Mr. Glasnost in Today ' s Czechoslovakia," in the monthly Crisis: A Journal of Lay Catholic Opinion, 7, no. 7 (July-August, 1989), 33-39. 28 "Slovensko for Two Audiences," SSA Newsletter, 8, no. 1 (June, 1984), p. 13. 29 Jednota (Middletown, PA), August 22, 1984. 30 Slovensko, 1 (1985), "Cudzojazycna priloha.," Appendix 11 , pages 109 and 110. SLOVAKIA-2015 95 will Squawk), Virsik provocatively suggested that, if Slovakia indeed suffered from a shortage of paper, it could easily turn to the Bulletin of the Slovak World Congress, published in Canada, which had an abundance of newsprint, and the Bulletin would willingly publish any news that the Matica might send it. 31 Andreansky-Biel did not react to Virsik's article. Finally, in 1988, probably as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's "Glasnost," which also penetrated into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Matica slovenska invited Mark Stolarik to another of its scholarly conferences, this time to be held in Bratislava on July 46. When I arrived in Bratislava and met with Frantisek Bielik, whom I had not seen since 1970, I asked him who was Miloslav Andreansky/Milos Biel? A surprised Bielik answered, "Don't you know?" "No, I don ' t," I replied. "But, you must know, he continued ." "No I don ' t, I answered." He was still afraid to openly tell me. I then asked where was Andreansky/Biel? Bielik answered, "in Martin." Perhaps Andreansky/ Biel did not attend the conference for fear that I would confront him . As a result, I never met him. After the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia, I inquired about his whereabouts and discovered that Andreansky/ Biel had left the Matica and was living in Vrutky, a small railroad town north of Martin. He had apparently joined the ultra-nationalist Slovak National Party and was its representative in that town. Since I had met and befriended Jozef Prokes, one of the founders of the Slovak National Party, when he had visited Canada in 1992, I wrote to Prokes and asked him how it was that a former collaborator of the STB was now working for the Slovak National Party?32 Prokes did not answer my letter. Meanwhile, many interesting individuals attended the Bratislava conference. After I presented my paper on the declining use of the Slovak language in the United States, 33 an elderly gentleman ap31 Slovak-Australian Monitor (March, 1985). See Appendix 12, page 111. Mark Stolarik to Jozef Prokes, August 27, 1992 (author's archive). When I visited the Matica at another conference in February of 2013, and once again inquired about the whereabouts of Andreansky/Biel, the older employees, who had known him, sheepishly answered that a few years earlier he had passed away. 33 "A Historical Perspective on the Declining Use of the Slovak Language in the United States of America," in Zahranicni Slowici a materinsky jazyk. Zbornik prispevkov z vedeckeho symposia k 125. vyrociu zaloienia Matice slovenskej, " comp. by Frantisek Bielik and Claude Balaz (Martin : Matica slovenska, 1990), I 7277. 32 96 SLOVAKIA-2015 proached me. He was Dr. Belo Polla, an employee of the Matica in the l 940's, who had been purged and later found himself working for the Archaeological Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Nitra, approached me. He was delighted that, in my presentation, I had mentioned his former colleagues at the Matica such as its director J.C. Hronsky and the publicist Konstantin Culen, as well as the historian Frantisek Hrusovsky and the journalist Jozef Pauco. He added that those names had been "taboo" in Czechoslovakia in the previous years. He was also delighted that emigres such as the linguist I:ubomir Durovic of Sweden and the political scientist Milan Durica of Italy were able to participate in the conference. Such was the influence of Mikhail Gorbachev's "Glasnost," which would eventually lead to the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe during the summer and fall of 1989.34 After the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia in November of 1989, the situation in the Matica slovenska immediately improved. The "old guard" either retired or was fired and the new leaders of the Matica immediately re-established friendly contacts with Slovaks in the West. There were no longer any attacks in the monthly Slovensko against me or any other members of the Slovak Studies Association. Indeed, in 1991 the Matica signed a formal agreement between the University of Ottawa and itself in which it pledged to supply the newly-established Chair in Slovak History and Culture all the books that it needed in order to properly function .35 As a result, in January, 1992, the Chair received hundreds of recently-published books from the Matica and this program of exchange continues to this day. Thus, since 1989 the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa and the Matica slovenska (and its National Library, which split off in 2000), continue to have good relations. 36 34 For the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia see Jozef Zatkuliak et. al., Nove mber '89: Medznik vo vyvoji slovenskej spolocnosti a jeho medzinarodny kontext (Bratislava: Historicky ustav SA V vo vydavatel'stve Prodama, 2009). 35 Agreement between the Matica slovenska in Martin and the University of Ottawa (Chair in Slovak History and Culture), signed by Marcel Hamelin, Rector, University of Ottawa, September 4, 1991 and Imrich Sedlak, Director, Matica slovenska, November 18, 1991 (author's archive). 36 The National Library of Slovakia split off from the Matica slovenska on July 1, 2000. E-mail from Maria Kurhajcova to Mark Stolarik, July 21, 2000 (author's archive). SLOV AKIA-2015 97 APPENDIX 1 L C V C: N S K A ,'J • )S1;'ELK A A AOU RE P UHLth Y M A ls1:TIN. Mudrol"lova ,e . 3:i. t e lefOn 2348. 2347 , 2340, :it34Q , 3 197 University of Minnesota, College of Liberal ArtsDepartment of History, Mr. M. St O l 8 r i k M_i_n_n_e_a_e_o_l_i_s Minnesota 55455 - US A v•l i l:111 :rn.a.6k,y1:a, o d,'\.-. 30.III.1969 Na" :an•~k.:i r:r:""maja 1969 l>'K .t.'7 20/69-St Voe Vazen:f pan Stolarik, Na VaA list z 30. marca 1969, ktory ate p!sali Dr . Sir ackemu , oznamujeme V!lm, l!e mikrofillll.Y lfosopisov "Obzor" a "Dom a 1!kol'l" sa ul! r-obia a koncom ~ Vam ich po!!leme. Obzor od roku 1863 do roku 1905 /41 ro~n!kov/ a Dom a Akola od roku 1885 do roku 1897 /13 ro~nikov/. Z ~asopisu Dom a §kola Vam zasielame 4 ro~n!lcy ~ascpisu, kedze mame viac exemplarov. Dufame, l!e Vam to vyhovie. PokiaY ide o pletenie, snhlasime a tym, aby ate nam poslsli mikrofil111.Y: Amerikansko-Slovenske noviny, Slovak v Amerike, Jednota a Narodne noviny, pretol!e ni~ v uplnosti nemAme. MOzete nam tiel! oznami t, kde v USA sa tieto ~asopisy na.cMdzaju v uplnosti. Sme radi, ze ste sa ohlasili a ponukame Vam aj dal§iu spolupracu. Ochotne Vam yoaleme zo Slovenska vAetko, ~o potrebujete z novej literatucy a mOze prist do uvahy aj star§ia literatllra, pretoze mame dost dubletov. Boli by sme radi, keby sa na University of Minnesota vybudovalo slu§ne oddelenie slovenskej historickej /alebo inej, podYa potreby/ literatllry. Te§ime ea ns spolupracu s Vsmi a srde~ne Vas pozdravujeme .J ,;R I 1} /lflftl,,\ riadi teY ,N&J-.~nej ' knHnice Ma ti,ce i-'~ lovenske j Dr. J. 'Telgarslcy ~ List bol vrateny, dl\a 27. VI.1969! neznemy ~ \ 1 ~, ' j •t . 1 t ► rr-• .-.... 1..-.••........~-, }:,.\,,_" ·, 1 .. -~·\·.t Propa1atd i!lslo ~"i'darr ... -- J} •~\i ~ · ,, ... .,i\ 1-, ~.c 1·1 •• -~ '; ::;, ' {:,:~ ."1'. •%·"'" ,, __ ~~. • -~ \l ' if ::, ,_ l.;.t.•~~·~ ! ,, '... . · f }If n•Yhno1U 1141- • n« lrult6ru v61:»c, l kullt\rn, ,1:1tvrat ma• .:.zmi. ~~:,,,d:.n.tuh~':!~:.!P~I~,,f ~6,an11 T~PI opqitl~ -,:a b ~ I ,tart JJlllOd' f:111V1tov1J price, • luqttry, lap ako J,)q-lSWCn61µt ~tDltela. lkO ntitro)a. 1, aOC(&llatlc);QIZ\ n•dt-ln,U •Yte' Jebb dobr<d. tradld u, rw n11 t'.'!: =:r.u~~:mi:"!4~• 9!:-=~~::;~ •:~;VJ~~, J• to ~~•~~,b(~~~•v:d;:,,:i=!t~1 = I ~ ron9J1 1l4rodMt, U1f6rr, na prOdeate dn1f ill'1Mtt d.lliliom• fta,ahl1 • napokon l • llltwtdfctou D6~J\:-:a~·":iii!:;,:*..:r::r.' ~~~=·~l: :~~~ • _,,1 ' OT,VA·RAM.E\J,i:\i- ~l, T MeM ~• ''f'iW'• Hu If VfcW..o p,~ ftf'1 chr4'f"M ,q .t~ •.rl#ttf• ~awo po~o, .Jl«)fjatqj ~J\lt~ tUl&V, pred'Htn4lt# 4 mu 6-u,,:Ericuc/1'«/l ~' I ~ ltc&1ic ~,ut OfH'.:UjN Mprifie' ,o. N-.i6~ ho ~,=~~~.;::; ,1,ottt P"lhl¥• 100/•j ,uutl o ptttflduoei• •"' tu4tlto«I t4t, •••,-. :i:siltf~i!'"~:~ ntl11pr())flrtotnf; ,,aop; ml tltlm~Hftw k,. Off llocl 11 opak. ·'Ct potort r>0ff t•Jto irdnU &it =:::r:~~,,. bot, Cn. tr~ dt•"" ·no.:iptllf~ hdllj 01'D~QBIE ~-., l · .& -· ·1 ..•t<,., ~~ ,:.•m ·~t.·~c .j '!Ii~. h l'udslwstt,,. ,,: .. ---- N0,V;£ · l ·- . ,' . -__:_ - ...,.. t l . --= U P I , .-,/J ~ ~ ••~___..,...:..,.. ~- 0'i.~~, Uv~pk ,1,, 'l VY_D(,..VA, MATICA SLOVENS"f V M ' "';~ ~·z., N ~ 0 z --= --= tr! > I (ll .... N 0 < > e:> 0 t""' r:,, '° = SLOV AKIA-2015 99 APPENDIX2 Za prava ,slo,enciny okrecov dfla e. 10. 19et •yledaJ• •• taJto bttl. nojbo dr.tmla prlaclp Ttato Lueencl praeanf YO . .reJaal runkctl arladiC fu.akcla •lc•prHldan · OceftuJema. te \I 10vls.l ta • tuakclu prdbo pod • •l•bo • 6ra.de., Polladnky tederActou nOho At , aa s1ov,a1 .. a.by Maduo•, .. by ktor6 •IUJ, predHdu ktortl k 50. vtroCJu CSR to ■ t• ta:■Jllf atllf ( •I .. aJoobsahoull podobae aka H • tame, iloat4ve H na progt H ■at"fdl 1Jrol6cb) po mad'■ r• •tnhu itlan6bo dko ■ a ■ awrbuJ• ob1■ daova.al• t-■ kel• •kJ~ •Y d01taU afton.a1 -ped- •I othb postavenla nar noltl. Konltatujema v1ek , kl••· mJ ■ lalra • tt6taaho tajoaud• ~.1K• •,~~:r:1.!:~~~n~;f.~U• na Jkodu vecl n,hrh IA.k1 VycbHsa•• a dotereJlfch Ila. n·ebol vopred pred uvere) ufml trpkfcb ak6Hao1U Slo4. Poprl hlatorlclry a•HI• · L S6b1Hfm■ so He ■lm ti. Y6kov • tobto A•em.Ja. Ul ,Ill.a- nlm 1Dterne konzultovanf I. ala pokl ■ dime ae newy- a fcb a6nocb 'Slovenaki ••· l.rajlla daada • d!ollasyt■ oa- organlUlcleml N•rod. tro1 haulnA doplal( ho b ■ ltalo • rodnl rad• a Cnll:6 ••rodal ti H prett SlovUom aeutf• Term.Io vereJn•J dlskusle rad• l nalogld:y podra lafch n ■ fm, I ■ ..• CSSR .. •16 eet15. 10. 198& Ja prfllJ kri Hl■ tat, la ◄ 6 povlnDf nlln a a 1lonntlaa tlob11 ro•· ■ •now Cl1tno1 dd CSSR. na to, abJ n mohll nlekt dla( po matfanlrf, t,yt tda 116taych )HJ' · vlld• Sloveaalr■ I 1oclallatlc■ oprh ■ ycb kGY ... naJasn~ mlesla n•vrhu nl dvojJ ■ aytaf. Kedle ahtb 6 kel republllry, wllda Cukaj 1CuU.be stllooa • t!I. ◄ IZ u - 11te vysvttllt u kompetl ■oclall•llclr■ J rapubllkJ ( Ire• nych mletaach. Tfmto kooltatonalm .. be • 1 ■ -te dltoaa poulluf lraz■ J• nblC ■ ltl•k aa n6 • IH potwrdzoj■ skul0Cao1f, alto oflcl61ae n6ny \Nirodnfl Predodetkfw Ide o f rodaosU • •m•,.. odllirodttio.-aala lllllllle a■ lo Dripecl• nhrhu zJikona, ktorf hov ktod objektl-ue Je1h,1je, I• rada Sloun•kel ■oc lall1Ucltal fllruje, taUe H m6h delltotlt Jnykml lt6taJcb ora• · rapubllky ■ Nlrodn6 rada 0 prhach prlslu!n"lkov 101 na vzdelanlt nArodnostt n6tlalr) takfto u •Jb16tlt eo repullll• aoclell1llclcaJ CeskaJ ••• 11 tdll•• • •alowneloa, svoJom jnyku a O poutJv SlovUov nlj ■ kf dkon • alto M to koolt ■ taje •I • ti. kf. tohto Juyka v styku • Qr, pt.. takfmto nflllakom vf· S. Uplalnlt • celo,n dkoae I ■hrhu flttHnlho dkona. ml bei akfihOkotvek da lll( 'tittlDJml 1 ■ s1kmJ led■ ai ■ d o fader•Udcll CSSR 1.hatlu, alov ■- ■-cbri.D1, je ta N!l'1ne urCenla. Sme toho nboru, aebe1petanstwo, l• Slodcl tH1kJ nirodaosU jlf6cich • -te •letlry n•tanonnl• tfk•· f6ce u arlad'ovnla federil • , oa tomto 6aemf, ktorf an•• , prho na vrdelenle u m, essa.. die aleb11 aa oeneutl■ per konkrettzovaf na ,1upel\ l Z. NHrbuJean ■, ahy .. prl nycb orahoY, lch komp■ l ■a· ly 1 ,oeesne u mall staJ mad'anlry, aiel1111.h u nebu pliant atuu n ■ l■ I republlky, cl• • unlu lch organh:lcl• vlt podmlenky, za akfch m a prhomocl n mHu menlt dO mGcf doma vo •ereJ011j 1polo•nflt fC&1ko· poulf• ■ l t:l ■ aostl uplatolt, ala bud6 Slonn1kol ; to plall ■ I o pl· Iba oa Uklad• d'allfcb 61ln• 00 uladovaf !koly vyUle ako Uklad.n~ho typu. 1 w,-ranlll •J bez-treala6mu IJ~ prfshalnfbo prfdantbo ofch 1'ko110-... n ■I mH ■ f be1ko-1lovell&kf: Cu• U. I( ni't'rhu 6atua6bo al - kauovaalu. Stovky raaol6CII lsto u1 ~ v 1omto nivrhu t ko .. lonnsk, republlka, t:H• Ilona • a6rodao,tlacb : be konlm:itlzovat, akfm SJ • ,talnoat[. lrtori polltlckfm • 11'taJ• l!laltafom • or1• · sobom sa mA uplatnlt 'l>ti pod.J. ko-alon- ■ lrf lltc • menttnovfch n8.rodnostf %iada111e, ■ bJ H • ■ hrbu ao• SloY6cl • toblo 6.nmla ,.;~:.~D•;::111,~:.:~b\ed::-:.~ VJ'PU&tll ,ad, v kloro ■ •• vlastoibo Jazy poutfvaole po1lelaJ6.. d •«llml ,.,Ntl!afm J•I•• arladlt funkci• pradH- bo•or1, la atrodao1II m•l6 v st_yFu s dradml. n;~:.,.~:- .. undHt bod lllu • podpn ...du, lrllrri by .,prho poalfnf nol Juyk • Tleto ltyllzicle n8.\'rhu .a dkooa VJ"••ch, aHaka •• obudaouU alternaU••• dradnom 1tyku". auje u poutl-..ote • mad'artl • s1avn6ho zakona sQ v roz1 Uthapcom C•sbJ aoc:la.Uatlc· re •J s akentm program1 rato pr•vo by utml pre ■J t• laayko• ltltnych "'· kll r1pub1Jky aJtbo Slo•en • Ov KSS. lebo n4vrb z6ko Slodkov lijliclcb • 1111lela· rodnoaU) • lllradnom ,tylta. ebJ eoclall•tiek•I repu•UlrJ, 511 nez.mleftuJe o povtnno v alJku H nojlml prad•t• · 1lovao1ko•m ■ dar1kfch prltom tty aa afrodn6 nsli· a:fcb n6rodnostof vllarml ,. pollllckfch • ltit• prtslu~nrkov peoie v tfchlo fankdich oblutlach malo nfml ••· aby s ! pomocou t mentin, • nirod m.lH:u uycb orgjnocb priualv6 d6tledkJ. Praklicky atrltdalo podf• funktnfch znaloatJ. osvoJo,'all v~erko t 081 u poull-...C not IHJk. No by soemol6ou1o Slodkom r obdobt. ,:iemolao _ doko ■ ca dko - hatstvo ees kej II slovens• • ttm prlsplev kulrGry .aoru _ n6Uf Slodko• uClf k -\ldjomn6mu s1>0z.ntvar ■a po mad'llhk.) , aby M•cf•rl ,. ■lyku • aJml mohli upl•t · • spolutll1u nirodov • r ubaapeCe11A rodno1H v CSSR . dfJoaom alt Konlunu1eme. ta Slov6cl prflu. Moho tu mlmocbo• IOChtO oblbtlach, kde stl dom upuoralC na krlkfno odchodd poataY■nie Slod • n61 v memlln e, mohll by doataf podra do1erejleJ p1 lrov • Mad'araku, ktort• u xe • poclporou dstavn6ho , • podobnfch prhacb a ■ I 1- ■ kona ' do 11tuAcle, ktora ,, k .o1 .. t nnmia. mo dbsledkoch Tole 1tale •t ■ aoviako ■ a- neentch aaaff. ta by •m• boll proll vlHf k odn6rodf'iovaolu p prfiv a,.ro4aostf, aluJnfkov llitotvorn6bo n.61 :a■ ru~a■ la •I• aem&hme a6bl•alf I poi- da, prfpad ne k lcb 1lteku kodzonnlm Slodkov, lclol"f tfc bto iUemf ■ IovensUbo o , by malo by1 dO.lellltom ale• roda. -. kforjtb _prt• urul!e ■ fch ••- • .J)rginy, lriorf ad nlnter tovan6 na pTlpr,\'e Qstevn .rodaostiHn .,. predlolenom bo zalcooa, by mall uvUlf. ahrbu d•tndbo dkona. by nebolo vbodn6 ,,yhlheci .. tobto Ukona Casove navl * Pracovalcl Matice slovenskej ut na ust1nov11n1e zAkoaa ate · ho odlol federallrAcll. v Martine dt'Ja 8. 10. 196'1 vyslovlU k vl4dnemu ntvrhu • ltylldcle dOsledneftle pr • prekonzultowaf • myallef o postavent nirod• Ukon■ nostl v C:SSR Ueto prlpo• vtetkfcb zlotktch N• rodn ho tronru. mleoky: Publtktcle nivrhu astavntMatt e• slovenska ako c ho Ulkooa -vyvolalo n1Jml v lon4rodn.6 ustanovl.Zeft al p mlestnycb odboroch Matice ldada u morllnu povtnno 1lovenskt1J 01 futnom Sloven- ur,ozornlf na tao.to probl61 sku a.naent ohlaa. Vframe ut •I preto, lebo se 01 ru sa to l)teJavtlo •I ·n, porade v teJto vttel obraceJO tlensl ■ Joie/ Smrhoikj L /Ulo 196& no ndolteoc v Uortln~. m1111tn~bo ~~~1~~. oraanlz.tde 1 cel61 predstavltefov v Mahci ,tovenskeJ, ,nwe:I odpoot.4111 no aktwtlne: otdik~. l'I~"~"'" " ,.............. - .. .. - ~ Foto: A. V. H•id• (Vrouo sprduca MS 4r. Jd,t Mart4k.J Jaqko,adaf '"•• tudowft• lt6ta SAV prlJal k abrbu dkOH O flNf•nlldcH .CS51 ■ atnba filtHatbo dkDDI • ■ trodaC¥,tlacb 1taoo•lako, _. ktorAllo ')'llertme. SLOVAKIA-2015 100 APPENDIX3 , MATICA SLOVENSK A 1863 1973 NOS!Tlr.RA IADtl IIPl11tlltY The Cleveland Stete University DepArtment of History - College of Arts et Sciences Mr . Marien St olarik C 1 e_v_e_l_ a_n_d_, Ohio 44115 U.S. A. VU li,t anatlty Vee: 10 d6a 26/II/73 Na la I natlta 4-63/1157/35 4/73 - St Martin 27. marca 1973 Vaieny pan Stolarik, ~akuje me za Va§ list, ktory nam umoihuje nadvi azat medzinarodny vymenny styk s The Cleveland State University , Department of History , Cleveland, Ohio prostrednictvom Va§ej pOaobnosti na tejto univerzi te. Avizovam1 publikaciu sme este zatial' ned ostali, nakol'ko doru~enie zasielky trva v priemere tri mesiace. Matice slovenska, Martin s radostou pr!jme predpletne na ~asopis v ramci vymeny "The International Migration Review", ako aj vybavenie na§ich objednavok ns publikacie, ktore Vam budeme postupne, taktiez v remci vymeny posiela t, Vyme nn~ rekepitulacie si budeme viest individuelne na zaklade Va si ch zasielok s cenemi a prip ! §eme v prospech Va§ho vymenneho konte , ako aj z naAej strany zasielane potvrdenky s uvedenim cien pre Va§u evidenciu. Zatial' sme Varn po slali 9 publikacii z oblasti historie su~~snej produkcie podl'a Va§ej po~iadavky dha 15.III,1973 a dal'sie publikacie , tykajuce sa tejto obla sti Vam postupne po~leme, Dufame , te s tymto postu~om budete s uhlbsit a roz s!ri sa fond o slovacika na Va§ej univerzite, ako aj f ond Matice slovenskej s publika ciami , o ktore bud eme ziadat na zaklsde excerpt z Cumulative Book Index s zoznamov vydani j ednotlivych vydavatel'ov. Tymto by sme pokladali dohodu z nasej strany za uzavretu a prosime Vas o pisomny suhlas, Te§ime sa na Va §u odpoved ~ sme / s pozdravom ~ -=- Prof.dr.Ing . Jarosl ov .~ELKO , CSc, / Spravco Matice slovenskej v,b .. •i" Stuchlikova Tclt:r6n 2Sf6, 2547, 2548, 25+9, 5197 Oalekopi1 0755:SI 0)6 5 2Martin, Mud ro6ova M SLOVAKIA-2015 101 APPENDIX4 , MATICA SLOVENSKA NOSIT£t K A RADU RIP U B LIKY Kr. Ph. D. KarU.n Stol6rii: The Cleveland State Univereity CLEVELAND, Ohio 44115 U SA V' j Ii SI I.oa t ")' zo d na Ma r tin Nala znal': K a 5-63 /1JtlJ/Ff l14-U Vee: 23.10.1974 ~ai:)lje■ e Vma Ba list a vr,ten,y ponui:ovy zozJ:lUl. Poaielee Vo !iadan4 knihy a! na tri tituly, i:tor4 eu •! rocobra• n41 1. Ju!n4 Slovenako 2. Ratkoil1 Pra■ ene k dejinmn Vel'kej Koravy 3e Sedla1 Preilovek4 kolegium v elovenekych dejin,ch Dll:fame, !e oetatn4 knihy dostanete ~o najekar av poriadku. ~akujeme Vu aj za aaaopia "Ethnicity•. Sudame ve:rmi r~ di, ked ho pre n,a objean,te. S pozdravo■ / ~f~ Stefan Krivuil spr,vca Matice slovenakej Vy b ovujec Ulbr ichtov, Kiria Tcler6n 2346, 2347, 2548, 2349, 3197 Oalek.opi1 0753,1 0'652 Mar tin, Mu d r ufi ova 35 102 SLOV AKIA-2015 APPENDIXS a Cudzojazycnci priloha Sefredali:to, Stefan Hovlo r. Zosto vi l M iloslo v And re6nsky Vydalo Mati ce slo.,en 1k6 v Ma rti ne. Tlotili TSNP, z6 v< Neogrofla , Martin, CSSR v m6Ji 1983. fllowcnal:o a 1983 roku u ma konat' 14. d: 17. okt6bra vo Washing• tone, na budud rok v Kansas City). Madzl elenml SSA je I nlalcorko vyznamnych 7 SLOVAK STUDIES ASSOCIATION 7 Tato apoloalosf ui 120 vedec:kych p.-.covnikov s1ov..-.. p6vodu a priatefov slovenekef vedy, lwttury • umenla nielen z USA• Kanady, ale I z cfalilch lblitov ..,_ zlskava prootrednfo. tvom The Balch lnstitut vo Phlladelphll, USA, od Matice olovaMkef, Slovenakej akademle vied a cfalilch . - k y c h kultumych inititudl e.aoplsy, zbomlky a knlhy. VosvoJom ,,Newsletter", ktory ut po 8 rolcov vyd6va dvakrU do roka, oboznamuje avofich Benov • prostrednk:tvom nlch I sV9tOvu vect.cku verejnosf • knlhaml ■ zbomflcml a upozoffluje na zaujfm■Ye ~Hinley v tasoplsoch. Okrem toho Jnfonnuje •J o knihKfl a - - V 6uopi9och O Slovikoch, a alovenakef problematlke, ktore vytll v cudzlne. Bohutlar napriek evidentnaJ snahe po objekttvnom, nezaujatom rwferovanf prmu len pravlida zimer uprlamlf pozomosf na publlkacle a ttanky a obuhom niilmu lblitu a zrladenlu naprlatersky orlentovanych. SSA mi •I vl■-u edialu l!lnnosf preva!ne V apolupr6cl - ao Slovanakjm Ustavom v Clevelande, oriento-v■ nU nepri■tal'slry voa n,m. Zatlar eo predaada a elenovla vyboru sa vprlebehu rokov - pokier am■ to mall mofnost ■ ledovat menlli, trvalU pozldu ta)omnfka a pokladnlka od r. 1978 mi M . Marl< Stolarik. ktory je aj Ndalctorom .,Newsletter" . SSA je lnltttucionlilnym aenom American Assoclation for Advenc:ement of Slavic Studies • aktivne aa zututiluje na Jej nirodnych konvandich (toho kn)anakych vadeckych p.-.covnlkov, lctori ma)u s Matlcou alovenskou dobre kontalcty. Medzl inyml Mrs. Nonna Rudlnski, Gerald J . Sabo, June Alexander, John Berta, Saly Staruch, Tom Marzik • d'alif z USA.. prof. Peter Petro a Yvonne Grabowski z Kanady ako I J . M. Rydlo zo avajaarska a dalil. AJctfvna Bnn~ tychto k spoluprild • Maticou lllovenskou na kuttumom poff ochotnych llanov SSA, vytvira perapektivu, le v buducnostf aa bude m6ct' celkom aeri6zne uva!ovaf I o konkretnej prlamej apoluprid Matice alovenekej ao Slovak Studies Anoclatlon v oblastl propagicle vyaledkov alovanokef vacly, kultury • umenla vo . - .. Zatlar, • vyhradou propagide nim naprlat.rokej litera• tury, pozltlvna hodnotima snahu SSA oboznamovat svetoW vededc:U vsejnost o nallch uspechoch v oblutl vedy, literatury • umanla. Priame kontalctyvtak vzhradom na neprlat.rsky postoj preclovtetkym takych vplyvnych oaobnostf v SSA ako SU Stanislav J . IOrachbaum, M. Mark Stolarik ■ Renee Mikus, nie SU v SUbsnoatl mOZ"'. Je to aamozrejme na ikodu vecf, ktor.6 nim je opolol!ni: propagidl slovan■kaj vacly. lfteratury a umenla na svatovom f6rw. MILOS BIEL SLOV AKIA-2015 103 APPENDIX6 VYD/..VA MA.TICA SLOVlNSK/.. no&luil'b bdu repubUky MARTIN 14. Dovembra 1983. VAS LIST ZNA<'!KY Valent pe p~. lla.rlc K. Stolarik The i!lalch lMtit~te 18 S., 1th Street ZO Di'IA N~A ZNA<'!KA Philadelphia, Pa. 19106 VYBAVUJE Kiloll Bie]l. VEC: Vll!eny pain pro:f'e aorl V pr:!10118 Vllm zasielam :f'otokopiu a aajho l!lilnlcu, a SSA v nallom l!aeopiae Slovenako l!.6/83 a :f'otokopiu replilcy z Kanadak4ho Sloviika l!.37, rot. 42 z 24.9.1983, hoci J>Nldpoklaau, !e ich ob11ah d poznate. Ak oba l!llllllcy poromllte a apoaeaiete ei na to1 l!o ate nap1aali predaedovi Matice alovenalcej DIU'o 111119lcovi Vlatia!rovi Kinal!ovi i na jeho odpoved, bude Vu zre,im4, !e Vu Va6i priatelia z Kanadak4ho SlovlUca (Vall otec??) poalcytli aedvadiu alu!bu. Ol!akav.,._, !a ea nad oboma l!lllnkud zllJIIYalite, najd nad ich doaahoa v elovenalalj varejnoati za hranicaai, zaujaete jednoznaln4 a pravde zodpovedaj uce etanoviako a po!iadate redalcciu Kanadak4ho Sloviika o opravu. Ky v Slovensku ame tie! oohotn1 Valle atanoviako publikova~. SLOVAKIA-2015 104 APPENDIX 7 kor..ne s mojfm prt,dpllllnym . Zarove~ pr1p•J11m MO na 23 dolarov, t. J. 20 11ko predplatne 11 3 na podporu. Zarovel\ m1pr11vde , ktor4 oko!0 nM 11li:1(l _ _______ _ ne. No to si pocnete s eecno- _ ........_,,.;,;._..;..,.....;...,._,,.. slovakm i a podobnymi pobhi- nerobl dobru slufbu medzl sh,denymi oveckami? . venskyml vyst'ahovalcaml na amerlckom konllnente. To by . sl mall uvedomll' af II, ktorl 1:: chcli hfadaf spolupracu so I~sJovenskym exllom v slobod- r-----------------------7 , Mm citatelia opiitovne Vas chceme poprosit', aby ste si prezreli zaznam pri Vasej adrese. Ak mate este stale na konci dvojku (2). tak Vase predplatne vyprsalo. Nedavno sme poslali cfalsfch vyse sto (100) iiadosti o vyrovnanie si predplatneho. Prosfme aj tych, ktori maju na konci trojku (3) a mesiac ai po okt6ber, nech si laskavo vyrovnaju predplatne, lebo im sa uz t' · k c ·1 UI' h • a •d k 1ez s on_ '. o a . c1 1e nam pr cu a vy a_v Y na znamky t1ez. riakureme Varn za porozum~nie Admin1strac1a K . S. I nom svete. I Je zfavne, fe reflm na SloI vensku podnlk6 11 bude podI' nlkaf kroky, aby potupoval sloI venskych ntlrodovcov v exlle a 1' aby podryvallch f"dnotu a akll- J I vltu " 11 kafdom poN. Bolo by ., pod nalu d0stofnosl', aby sme 115 komunlstlckyml ldeol6gml debatovall II vledll s nlml dla16gy. Tym bysme Im roblll sluf- -------------------------• - bu, uzn6vall lch za parlnerov, s kloryml stofl ZII lo sedl ..t' ZII USA a pollllkov sa nezaobera. PIie vedecke prtlce O sloven• skom vyst'ahov,.1lectve do USA _-_·-- •-=;-- ' ~ 11 fe uzntivanou uutorltou medzl amerlckyml hlstorlkml II vedeckyml lnAlllliclaml Podra Andrnansk~ho-Blela Pod tltulom .Ohlasy" uverejnl,. ~ b._g.rof. Sto"rlka,.Je.Jt lo ,.Slovensko'", klore mt! byt' f ·srov ~Sludle._!. kulllirno-spolotenskym s _~ c 18 11 0 ,. 11 b y t 8 t •0 mesatnlkom a je vydavane Ma- ";iiofot!nosr mor.t'a reprezentollcou slovenskou v Turtlan- ,vat' Slovakov medzl amerlckyskom Svlltom Marline, vo svo- ml hlstorlkml a v Slavic Stujom tlsle z flila 1983 naslrane6 dies Association 8 teda Slov,icl utok na Msgr. F. Fugu , ktory je n e b O II p O ne ch an I p O d slovenskym narodovcom a patronatom ,.Czechoslovak predsedom Zahranltnef Mall- Studies Assoclnllon'". Ide O tisce slovenskej, ktora nle je mar- te vedeckli spolotnosl" hlstoxlsllcka ako hi na Slovensku. rlkov slovensl<eho p0vodu, Clanok .Kio klame a dezlnfor- ktorl sa hlasla k slovenskemu muje'" naplsal Mlloslav Andre- rodu a pf§u o slovenskef otazansky. ke vedeckym spOsobom, teda Ten lsty Mlloslav Andretln- objektlvne. sky (alias MIiot Blel) v augusToto sa pravdafe, M. Andretovom tisle Slovenska uveref- tlnskemu-Blelovl nep6tl, lebo nil znova lltok na dr. M. Stoia- sa tam nechvall techoslovaklzrlka, klory fe najkvallflkovanef- mus a marx-lenlnlzmus. !Im slovenskym hlslorlkom v Taketo plsanle Sloyenska spolotnym stolom. J" nam Nto, fe na amerlc• kom konllnenle mtl komunls!Icky reflm na Slovensku svoflch obdlvovatel'ov a kolaborantov, ale tych my anl nepresvedtlme, anl neziskame. Tleto litoky, krltlky, alebo I za. lletanl■ tasoplsu Slovensko nas e§te vlac upevnla v tom, f~ budeme mOcr dOsledne br6nlt a chranlt' mravne a narodne hodnoty slovenskeho exllu a P.rllva slov:en~ e~~9 , .n_a,[.(1da pra~ neAl'astna_~~ ! slovenska v Tufe1anskom Svlltom Martine t~k ne~_f.!)eba Z[pdlla a zre_d.,u. Y m me vel'a svojlch vlaslnej§lch a nallehavejAlch liloh. (R) s/itort SLOV AKIA-2015 105 APPENDIX8 lHE BALCH INSTITLJrE for ElHNIC STUDIES 18 South Seventh Street, Philadelphia, PA. Or M. Men STOlorik Uecutive Director Boord cJ Trustees Samuel H 8olklm. .k Ch011mon .JohnC Hoen ViceCr'\Otlmon AlexO:"'1010 8 Goloslu 19106 November 29, 1983 P4'n MiloS Biel Reda'kcia Slovensko 036 52 M a ~ Mudroifo va 35 Czechoslovakia Europe DrahY pcln Biel: Secrelo,y v.f$ .John F White heosu16' wo11er ~ Afooe, t0w1ence J 9ornh0'\T r, oc:e,1 C Cho01n MOn Beo111ce K Chemock lh90CJOl8 H Cov11 Th0m01 J F111oei-010 list zo dn'a 14 . novembra, 1983, som dO.e s obdrZal. Mlt~ yravdu ,/ed p{sete Z\ pozn~ obsah ~lo":,enskfch C:asop1;sov. Ako h isto ri k c!tam vsetke Slovenske tasopisy ktore vychadzaju na zapade. Aj niektore' zo Slovenska. Mam tiez' p{somne sty'ky zo Slovak.mi po celom svete. Pre mXa ti e to tasopisy a li s t y su pramene pre deji ny Slova'kov v 20. storoc'i. Lis t y od v;{s pa tt:i a mc dz i nima. Or Muffov J:.11eomon WdhOmL GfolO Dr Roso Bo~e Green Pl"Ol A W~liom Hogiuno Rooe,tM HOwe Moue A ledeler Corv L8Ylnson. Esci Mri- Fronk P louchheln'\ Set C Mo-npon MictlOel Novak Vrvion W Piosoc:k1 Mrs Meve, P Potomlun Em11vC m1ev Prof Timothy l. Smith Consiontine S. Sosongells Dr Jomes Ton11 1-1on Pou! A TroncMellO hOn Mno Cibott1 Ve,no Dr tv'torvin Wocnmon Ho~, Notnan1e1Wos.,1ngton c ec,110 Mov veo Polemizovaf s valmi neb1;,dem. \'1Sa tfloha je robi'! '!,ropa gandu . Mo'ja j e p{sal de jiny. V tomto pripade budem ~ ma'E posledne slovo. Ked chcete da~o uverejni'f v c!as opise Sl ovensk o , zasi ela'm vfm Clanok z Horizontu, o semin.iri v Martine. Vi k t or M.amatey , n.JS by'vali predseda, ho napisal a celkom s nlm s\Jhlasim. P{sat mOtete Co chcete. Historici budu vSetko posudzo vat. "Pravda vitazi," ako hovoril Masaryk. S k rajansk[m pozdrav om , /~ Emet1tu1 Prot fo.....o'O p HuTC""l1nson / (215) 925-8090 /-r?'i / v -~ Maria'n Stolclri k 0-< SLOV AKIA-2015 106 APPENDIX 9 Slovak Studies Association Affiliated with the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 700 Pe nfie ld Ave. , Havertown , PA 19083 Septemb e r 3 , 1983 Dr . Vladimfr !tinll! Predseda Matice slovenakej 812 51 Bratislava Pugai!"evova 2 Czechoslovakia 1968, I have of scholarly asked for my agreed . Over thousands of exchange. Since my first research tri p to Slovakia in the summe r of actively cooperated with the Matica elovensk8 in the exchange materials . Dr. Jan Martak and Dr. ~tefan Krivulf wrote me and cooperation in this program of cultural exchange and I gladly the last fifteen years I have sent the Mat i ca slovenska dollars worth of book.a and periodicals as a part of this You can imagine what a s hock and aurprise it was to me, therefore , to open your monthly magazine Slovensko (No.8, 1983) and to find, on page 6 of your supplement, 11 Slovensko krajanom, 11 an attack upon me by a certain MiloJ Biel. He accuses me, aa editor of the Slovak Studies Newsletter , of bringing to people's attention articles and publications "whose contents are hostile to our state I a political system," of working "in cooperation 11 with the Slovak Institute in Cleveland, 11 and of taking an unfriendly s tand" towards Slovakia. Cont'd on page 107 SLOV AKIA-2015 107 APPENDIX9 Besides being false, these charges betray a certain naivte by Mr. Biel about historical scholarship and conditions in the West. You, as a scholar and poet, must realize that serious historians have to consider all sources when writing their history, not just those that a certain political philosophy calls for. That i s the very essence of objectivity. Furthermore, it is the duty of true scholars to have contacts with all institutions that contain historical meterials, whether they be located ~Slovakia or in the United States. Finally, we in the West believe in openness and pluralism. For instance, the Slovak Studies Association, of which I am the founder and Secretary-Treasurer, has among its members Slovak Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Greek Catholics, Jews, nationalis ts, 'Czechoslovaks' and Marxists. We do not exclude people because of their religion or political orientation. We are open to all scholars who are interested in promoting Slovak studies the world over . Therefore, Mr. Biel' s clumsy attempt to list 1 'friendly 11 and "unfriendly" members of the Slovak Studies Association is going to backfire and hurt the good contacts that the Hatica slovenska has developed with Slovaks in the West over the last several years. I s uggest that you have Mr. Biel retract his crude and unwarranted attack upon me in the next issue of Slovensko . If he does not, I have a feeling that most of the goodwill that the Hatica slovensklhas built up with young scholars in the Western World will very quickly disappear. Yours Sincerely, l ·f i~ 108 SLOV AKIA-2015 APPENDIX 10 Bratislava, 4,10,1983 Vazeny pan Stolarik! Iste Vas nemusfm ubezpe ~ovaf o tom, ako Matici slovenskej zalezf na vsetkom, co sa aotyka dejin i su~asnosti slovenskej narodnej kultury, ako nam teda zalezi aj na kazdom, kto s nami chce v mene buducnosti tejto kultury spo lupracovaf, To sa dotyka aj Slovak Studies newsletter i Vas osobne, Mrzf ma to, co sa stale v ~asopise Slovensko, Nemam priam_y vplyv na redigovania ~asopisu, ale pokia! to bude v mojich silach., zabranim v buducnosti moznym nedorozumeniam . Rozumia sa, za mame rozliCne nazory na zivot spolocnosti a na jej buducnost . Ale mame aj spoloCnu starost, ktorou je slovenska narodna kultura, jej dejiey a osudy - na celom svete, Dufam teda, ze nam v oalse.j spolupraci nezabrania malichernosti a ostavam so srdeCnym pozaravom dJ.l~-t~~ / t/ • Vazeny pan M,Mark Stolarik 7U0 Penfiela Ave. Havertown, ~A 19083 ~~~U Narodny umelec Vladimir Minal! SLOV AKIA-2015 109 APPENDIX 11 - s--!.. =■ ~ S:io'-'6,1,~Ko t /tJ.,~f. HIOll4CIIKl:1:t c::==s ilowc11td::~ ► --. 5: Slovensko pre ,,dva druhy citatefov" Pod tymto Hver•vr•vnYffl .. l&IVom uv--tnM p6n M...Wn Mtt Stolarik. tajomnlk • po-. ......· - - • e t ipolotnOfll (Slovak StudlN \Noc:Ultion) v USA vo •vojom "MWUetter rot. I , tWo 1/iun 1114, str. I . nuledujUCU pomemku : ,Sloven•ko, oflcialny meu~ "Ilk M•tH» •lov•n•k• J vych'· dz.a vo dvoch veni,ch, p,-. dv• r,dliln4 titat•l•k4 ve,.jna.rl. Predpok/adal aom, I • ..,,•tci nd i ~novla to vedill, • I• n• d4vn o .am zlstil l e to tak nle ,._ Vlalna 1. v,. J. v domienk•. h Slo~o. tron dost'"'• t• Vy ■Jja, jetenl•tvtuop/a, lrto,Y cirltulu}9 ,,. Slowm•ku. f•li•. Aku pozome adlv■ t• n• lcror,hofvek 8•/o V"h o U•ooi•u SloVM1•ko, vlimnite al, le mtKUi 16. • 17. atranou hlevnej t..•ti ~nopi•u je Cudzofuytn' prf/ohe, r,ro Cudzoj•~n, prlloha znaman, oval• vlec n#Jl vyzer,. ObuhuJ• tiel ~,,,.. ky v •loventine, ilu•troven4 ,, Toho tuu ,,.jchUlo•tiwjjoo ....cou je otbb •lav•n•k•J prl• lo hy Sloven.Ice. v,1ho m • ~ nib, wnov• MJ Jcr• Janom v u hr•ni8, ,,. ktof'U m• upozornlll •i vlac»rl )ednotllvcl. PodobM elco Stol• rilc v Slov• lc Studi• ._ Pouvelu;t• a WICI, uda t•ru ul r,ro prlloh• v •lowrwt.•f rKi b y mohl• by( •U~•fou rl•dM otlaloven'(Ch .rr, n Slovt1M ka, • to •i pre 6it•t• l ov v • t•rom kr•JI. Cudzojuytry prllohe by u moh/M vloli( do ~•oplsu Hp■ r,rne. Predillo by u zbytotn•J krltilce, nedtr wre, yYSmelnYm • ultll)«:nYm pozn,mlcem • Jcont,..ver• zil, I• u Ju ,ob4v• t• uUnf titetefom dome '. S.m ozre/m, w c, Je potombyste melivybe,..f • pr'vy od 01db v,m pr!Jat111nych.,, Ne dldede tohoto llstu sm• pochopHI, le naM nepriatalls v auf•l•J sneh• dlskredftova! n'6 tasopls. c:hytaJU N kaJdel prildfto.tl, aby naMI Umlen• 2) bu<f vy va ml moriadtis!■ Sk>vensb 2 X do roka • ru u rok Magufn, ako •m• to uroblll v rokoch 1811 s 1NZ. 3) elebo prUollt NmostatnU prflohu ku kald,mu tulu Slovenska, 1rtor• bud• ••· pedov•n• U.,enom. Bolo n,m Ja.sn',, le form• pristupu ku luajanom vytadu}11. ■by ttat.M slovo, ktorym .. bud•m• obraca! ku krajaq_om. bolo vy,obeM najmodern9llou tachn.lkou • na kv■• litnom ps.,...-1. preto.le all.nm toho, le bude plnft' nu-odnouvedomovadu • fflformKnU funk.du, bude slutff •J ako ,.._ pruenUda nai•J SUtesnosd. Preto rozhoduJUdml taktorml, ~ urtlll tretlu alt.emaUvu ako opdmilnu • reelb.ovstel'nU, boll: pridal kvalhMho pa• piera a Aulomberka, ftnentn. prostriedky poa«ytovan, Ml• nlst.erstvom lwlturf SSA. pwaoniln• ubupet:enl• redak• tn't'ch pnc bu zvylenla at.aw redaktorov • konetne 11..padta tlatlarM. NaN Slovensko •ko Matupc:a MatitMho ffianlll vych6du ul 6smy roll. Ptvyc:h I rokov vyc:hadulo i.k ako teraz n• 32 stnMc:h, ale z toho Ian na I farebnych. Nlekol'ko stovik vytlatkov Slov•nslta :uslelalo byval4 Oddelenle MS ~ U· hranltnjch Slov,kov I n■JJm knjanom predovletkym do Fnl'tCUului, Juhosljvle • Kanady. 11M I do USA• Auatr611e. 0d roku 1813, v a&JvlslMtl • I► ho vlalm umeranhn do uhran~•• rodlriM sme fa,.bnU ten' n11 11 atrin. bez avylenla cany Ka 5, - :u a.Jo. To ale znamenelo t1atH oety tuopfs na kvalftnom ,,..,_... Nale tov,,.I\ v Rulombertc.u vyr6ba skutotne kv•lltnY pepler, ktory Je yYZ.namnYffl exportn,;m ;rovania • udriovania kontak tov • lu■janml • v ""•ha po m6d im v kh Ualll o udrianll sloven~o n,rodn~ pov• dornla a podtu •~upatrit nosd • Jedrom n6rods P04 T atraml, alto I umo.t:ntr Im YU )omn, poznanl• krsjan~ livota v r6znyc:h tastiac:h sva ta Itek ako sma to uv&edl v 1/14 Bale Slov•nslui). Ak by sm• chcall dod6v• prilohu Slovansko krajanon I na domic:I trh, potrebovaU b• ame prlnajmen9' o 30 % vyt.t pridel p,aJNer•. to u daneJ vj robne4 sftuKM v n.&J:ombe, • k•J tov6rni nle }e moln4i. Tak ti&I by sme muMII ;rvyi,lt' cani tasopisu na dom6com trhu, 6t tlel v sutasnoati Ne Je ul.alM TNI• •ko vldlta, m ill luaja nl a, calkom proukk6 flnant " '• ma....Ulna • techrdck, d6 vody Mt pntinou, pre&t tj ta.Slovenaka, ktor6 Ja ur6en6 kni janom • :uoberi N prevs.tn. luajanskou problematikou nil Je k dlt,poddl I domkam1 Btat.rovl. Cudzojuyl"' priloha J• tla 6an, na obytajnom 1.-.bnon novl novom pepl■ rt, aby ZyY ru.nlla a oddelllll prlohu 0< ostat,,..,o taxtu . Talrto nie J4 ponJien6 kontlnulta taxtu pr1 domidch tltatelov • kr■J•n sky at.atel' dOSUva svoj u prflo hu komp,aktnU. Konettla treba p. Mar5'nov Stolarikovl prlpomenut', h pr avojef vedlajiej tinnostl altc r.dsktor • vydav■tel' Nawalet• tar al mohol (ubudol alebo nec:hcel1) Yilmnuf, le sko oudzolazytni prilohe, tak I Slo· vansko lu■Janom majU NmoatatnU tlril. to v novin6rskej praxl anama"'-, la hod Je Jedan vydav■ W I Ufr.daktor. prMaa to, to do.Uvs, SU vlast• ne tri Nmostatn4i periodlld (hod I spolu zoliU). ktor6 m~ tu byf upedov•M • rodlro• Cont'd on page 110 SLOV AKIA-2015 110 APPENDIX 11 • ~ • to priMU a , nky o s1ov, lcoch na UpatH. Slovkl dom• tuto prllohu niltdy navkl~ . Vla•tMUwry .iurobteMml." Nepovdov•II •m• dopot,lal' uWM ,-govat' na alee dot.. .nultov•n&i. ... pNdu len U'9jmU domyeel'noet' uv.. defMlpmNlmlryvNew.iett:•. Medd6uo,n u I\U v I.ta opjul llnjan a NSR. pr.ea nedoetaf v CSSR i!uopla SbveMlco • prilohou 8&ovenako lulljanom. Odpovadal am• mu p&.omne pnllmo • on naM vywetaenieakoeptoval. Oo.teM ..,... vlak d'.U 19t a USA od vjzn,amrwho krajanakMto kutbimeho Bnltel'-. v ktorom bol nuledufQd od- u ......, dWttod &u ndavnutomli, PN koho taeopl• vycUvama ■ v ■ tom rouahu, roahod.W .me N podllf ilrokej knjanilk•J Y«9jnoatl vywedanie. 0 d6vodoch, ktcri nN • nM nadrtadenf Ol'Pn - Mlnlnera:tvo 11.ulb;ry 8SR - vleclll le tomu, ■by am• vycMv■ II tlHMM alovo pre lualanov, MM plull oblim• ne tomto m'-te v 9/M a.le Slovanaka. Tu tr..bll objaantt' Iba technldw .trinJa.i rulldde. Z Uvah, ■ ko rHll.zov■t i.nto dme,, vykryttall.zovall J ■har­ t111tfvy: 1) bud' vydjvaf Nmo.tab'tf fuopl■ pre knjaftOV (kvr(.-O<J. vyN>ba, Ide na uport. Napatr"' Ullf' aoaUiva pre, tuumsko ■ ,. prfen■ llmH.ovan6. N•t tuopq doetaval tie.I urtfty prid.a tohoto papi.,.. (n■ I _,.n). 0d roku 1N3 bol prklel r,ylent na pokrytM I farebnych strin (d'.tlkh) ■ I rilin prflohy PN lu■Janov. baopta 810¥'9ftN0 I• WWnY' ..........................ho atatel'■ : 70 % Nlldadu Ide na dom'4:il trh ■ len 25 % ,. prilohou) pre lnjanov ■ I % pre on.atnu GUdzlnu. Tyoh 21 "' "'ldadu. apolu • c:uckoluy6nou p,9ohou • prlohou Slownako kntrlanom IMnC:1Ujeme a~Matloe.aov.n•uJ dotovaMho ~om kuhury &SR v UUJm• Na UV..- .. t ied.a podotknUf, ta ,ri..,.a tych rucMckofaM.tkkych luuhov, kto" •ita necMvno qltovall, aby Mm lln)ani• Slovenako vrac.all Cnapr. tt.nadaky Slodk), .. aruu DZYV• fartzajsk.6 atarost• lfvo.t o nilho do""oeho tltaWa. la nav&dl iu.JaN116 priohu. :Um..- Je fun'i' • jednoanat:nj . Cheu Mm polllodK, otrevovaf vzfahy nwwdal narnl • krajanml. lrtoN .. 1 naprielc lch lntria'm .,.,.,.. • Ua,pe,tn• roMJaJ'I . .... anahy hod~ nflnonn, • hod I n• Cpeaudo) ved41Ckej Oroml aem,ow"' prukn6 alto myclo"' bubllna. pr.tole pr■ vda )e ,.. n-■J nadvA- Cud1oja1yCnd prnoha Rlowcnallo ~ S...- Htl.i.., Z -fll M ,i.,1 .. A ~,t--AOI V~MMl1lcaoi...-U• • " " ' -· 'i.t.llTS""'.••"' .w(- "-9,_fJa. MolniA, (l.$a • - 1,n . . . , . SLOV AKIA-2015 111 APPENDIX 12 TRAFENA HUS ZAGAGA is a Slovak saying meaning literally •the goose that is hit will maJce a loud cackle• . .I t caoos to one's mind when reading the article in SLOVENSKO *) ,tbe.:.official monthly publication of'Hatica slovenska (Czecho-Slovakia) attacking Hark H. Stolarik, Secretary-Treasurer of the SlovaJc Studies' Asscr ciation (USA) far his brief remark in the Association's Newsletter (June 1984, see also SM 5 &6, p.28). Stolarik informed about the non-availability of SLCNENSKO' s supplement SLDIENSKO XRAJANOH (aimed at Slovaks outside Sl~ vakia) to readers in J;lovakia. According to SLOIENSXO,the re~ sons f.or this non-availability are econcmi c : paper . shortage• •though no mention •is made of the fact that they are flooding the West with 'canplimentary copies' of their books printed on very expensive paper. I t takes them the best part of a page to say this, when a simple ,sentence •because of economic reasQllS we cannot supply the Supplement for no extra cost to readers in Slovakia, however they can obtain i t· ·e asily for an additional subscription . & . Kcs ... • would have been sufficient. But ·this they dia ..cot want tD say! By the way, one is concerned~ bout access to SLCNENSKO KRAJANOH not as i f this was the best way to inform people in Slovakia . - about Slovak life in the West, but because Hatica slovenska herself has been encouraging Slovaks in the -west to establish contactJwith their old homeland through h'Z"iting ·to SLCNENSKO. I f the only obstacles to establishing such contacts were economic , a simple solution would be this : The BULI£TIN of the SLCNAX WCRLD CONGRESS states that it: "is available to readers in Slovakia free of charge• (there is no paper shortage in Canada !J. Why does not Hatica slovenska undertaJce to distribute the BULI£TIN free .of charge among the subscribers of SLOVENSKO in .Slovakia, and have in exchange the Slovak World Congress distribute SWVENSKO KRAJANOH free of charge to the readers of their BULLETIN in the West. Nobody could then canplain about lack of contacts : •I t was too much of a temptation to resist, namely to present to our readers the final part of the article in SWVENSKO with ·al:1 -its orwellian beauty (their English sUD1Dary contains neither this nor the vitriolic attaak .on H. Stolarik) : Those who dared to question the availability of SLOVENSKO KRAJANOH are •fascists• and "pharisees• (what a combination !) who "want to damage and poison the r~ lationship between us [i.e. Hatica] and our countrymen, which shows a premising and successful development despite their [i. e. the fascists' and pharisees' J intrigues. Their attempts, though cunning and presented on a {pseudo) scientific level .will burst like a soap bubble because .the truth is on our side.•  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource My Rocky Relationship with the Matica slovenská During the Second Era of Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1970-1989: A Personal Memoir Description An account of the resource M. Mark Stolarik Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 87-111 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3713ef3cc29fa218ec421bdfd7454552.pdf e8b954324f7ce1bf2097ef4c3d59ab5b PDF Text Text 112 SLOVAKIA-2015 CORRUPTION IN SLOVAKIA: TIME TO RECLAIM THE STATE 1 Tom Nicholson On the way home one March night, I lost a hubcap. I heard it pop off the front right wheel of my car as I smashed into a massive pothole on the main road from Bratislava to Svaty Jur. The impact was so severe that it bent the wheel rim and punctured the tire. If my son had been present he might have learned a few new English cusswords to go with his rich Slovak collection. I didn't own a car when I first came to Slovakia in 1992, so I can't say whether there are more potholes now than then. But it seems to me there are altogether too many potholes here for a European Union member country (the closest comparison I can come to Slovak roads in the spring is Moldova, or maybe rural Cuba). And there are definitely way too many potholes - and it takes way too long to fill them in - for a country that has had twenty years to get its shit together. Sure, they have potholes in Canada (I can no longer say 'we' because I have long since transferred my allegiance to Slovak potholes). But even though the winters in the Great White North are far more severe, and Canada has about a quintillion miles more roads, potholes are infrequent, and drivers are alerted to them with a homey Canadian solicitousness - a SO-meter flashing DANGER sign, say, or a cordon of Mounties in reflecto-vests. Not here. Even on Racianska ulica, a four-lane artery into the heart of the capital, the worst holes after three weeks get a perfunctory monocle of paint, promising a pending repair in the indefinite future (that paint is the Slovak equivalent of the Mexican 'manana'). For me, Slovakia's potholes are another entry on the list of basic Slovak things that don't work as they should. It's a depressingly long list - education, health care, justice, politics (especially politics). And it provides a starting point for understanding why corruption continues to flourish in this country. 1 This is a revised and updated version ofmy original article "Je cas dat tomuto statu zmysel," in Odkial' a kam ? Dvadsat' rokov samostatnosti, ed. by Martin Butora et. al. (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013), 281-304. �SLOV AKIA-2015 113 *** If I had been asked to write an essay about corruption in Slovakia a few years ago, I know what I would have come up with - a rogues' gallery of powerful figures who had abused other people's trust over the years to enrich themselves. But last year I was swept up in the Gori/a scandal, a political tempest that challenged my certainties and changed my life. As much as I wanted to remain detached as a journalist, I found myself speaking at public rallies and giving interviews . Suddenly, I was expected to tell people not just where corruption could be found , but how to defeat it as well. And I discovered that I actually knew very little about it. For starters, the story of corruption in Slovakia is not just one of rich people gaming the system. Corruption takes many forms and has many causes - such as that the country presents innumerable small but vexing barriers to living one's life without vexation. Some of these barriers encourage people to give small bribes (the box of chocolates for the doctor, the cash envelope for the building permit officer). Others - a plague of potholes, for example - just let everyone know that public servants could care less about serving the public interest, creating an atmosphere that indirectly encourages bribery. But none of these stories, it seems to me, answer the key question: why corruption flourishes after twenty years of independence and a decade of EU membership, six general elections and countless devastating political scandals. We now know, thanks to Gori/a, exactly what high- level corruption looks like. We see oligarchs enriching themselves, we see politicians and civil servants abusing their offices and neglecting their duties to us. And still it continues, and still the potholes proliferate. So why don't Slovaks do something about it? *** Over the past year, I've often been told how ironic it is that a foreigner had to bring the Gori/a scandal to light, as if a Slovak journalist would have done differently. This does a great disservice to the probity of my colleagues, and greatly exaggerates my own. If a foreigner can be of service here, it is perhaps to see things in a context that is not available to Slovaks, not having grown up elsewhere. �114 SLOV AKIA-2015 Now, I' ve read enough foreign descriptions of Slovak life to know how flawed this 'vision' can be, especially when delivered to foreign audiences that have no opportunity to verify its authenticity (the film Hostel comes to mind). But I'm hoping I can be an exception. As a transplanted Canadian who has spent twenty years in this country, I am still struck by the loyalty that people feel to their tribes - to family, to friends, to old classmates, to other people who come from their hometowns. These tribal bonds are what Slovaks living abroad miss most about their country . In modem Slovakia, there are still no higher loyalties. This is striking for a Canadian because our country does not run on informal networks. Sure, we have tribal loyalties, but they often divide us - there isn't much that Greek Canadians have in common with Chinese Canadians, say, or with Jamaican Canadians, except the fact that we all live in Canada. Perhaps that's why Canada has such a strong political identity: without ethnic, cultural or other natural bonds, we need it to hold us together. After all, we have few common traditions or national dishes in the sense that Slovaks have bryndzove halusky. But I'm pretty sure most Canadians could tell you what values the country stands for - tolerance, social solidarity, respect for human rights, and caring more about the rest of the world than Americans, for starters. How many Slovaks could do the same? While I'm sure people could name traits that Slovaks have as an ethnic nation - you can't live here for twenty years without hearing a thing or two about zavist or pohostinnost', for example - what about the ideals and principles their country is founded on? Slovaks can be forgiven for not having a clear idea of what values the modem Slovak state stands for. The average person, after all, was not consulted before the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, despite repeated promises of a referendum, and probably regarded the project of an independent Slovakia as something foisted on him from above. And because he had no hand in creating the state - and in many cases probably hadn't even wanted it, or at least hadn ' t wanted it yet - it's understandable that the average person might have felt that the modem Slovak state was someone else's responsibility. Common ideals, like the Constitution, would be scripted by old, grey men behind closed doors, while Slovakia's tribes would go about their business as they always had. �SLOV AKIA-2015 115 You could say that 'the state', on Slovak territory, had always been someone else's responsibility. Magyars, Austrians, Czechs, Germans, Russians, then Czechs again . After centuries of having someone else to fill in the potholes and make sure people paid their taxes, it's understandable that Slovaks were slow to respond to the call to administer their own affairs. But everything might have worked out differently if the Slovak Republic had come into being from a statotvorny akt, by which I mean an experience that unites a people as a political nation rather than just an ethnic one. Americans had their War of Independence, the Brits had Napoleon, while early Canadians ran a cruel gauntlet of Constitutional Conferences (a punishment that continues to be imposed on Canadian history students as an object lesson in the burning sincerity of all boredom). Slovaks, meanwhile, had no birthing experience that could rival the moral, economic and civilizational value of Czechoslovakia. They had nothing to comfort or inspire them when Czechoslovakia was dismantled, beyond the sour nationalism of pubs and football matches. The way Slovakia came into the world, as a child welcomed only by nationalists and political opportunists, left a dangerous vacuum at the center of the Slovak body politic. People naturally shrank from any new duties towards a state they hadn't wanted or had a hand in creating. In doing so, they abandoned public affairs to anyone claiming to want the responsibility. And there was no shortage of applicants. Twenty years later, this vacuum is still full of dark matter, dead stars and other space junk - stuff that absorbs light rather than produces it. It is responsible for many of the ills that afflict Slovakia, among them the indifference that ordinary people feel towards their state and towards the millions of strangers who inhabit it. If I had to give this ailment a name, I would call it the "mam v pici" disease. *** Let me describe some of the symptoms of this disease. Slovaks rarely sing their national anthem at sporting events, even at important internationals in front of tens of thousands of people (compare that to British football fans or Canadian hockey fans) . People complain incessantly about corruption in politics, and according to a recent survey trust their leaders less than almost any country on earth - but few �116 SLOVAKIA-2015 are willing to even get off the couch to attend a protest rally. More than half of each secondary school graduating class intends to emigrate, rather than stay home and help fix what ails the country. Or, if you prefer a local perspective: truck drivers in my village regularly make their deliveries while blocking traffic in both directions, reasoning that they have work to do so everyone else can just wait. People shovel snow from in front of their houses into the street, apparently indifferent to the inconvenience of other drivers. Private homes are beautifully renovated and tenderly cared for, while discarded bottles and other garbage litter the edges of public streets and walkways. In the summer, even though signs claim the forest above the village is a protected area and off-limits to vehicles, motorcycles and A TVs constantly disturb the peace of man and beast. And the potholes would be a disgrace anywhere. I know that a great many objections can be raised to each example I have mentioned . Maybe Slovaks don't know the words to their national anthem; maybe it's just not a very sing-able song. And Slovakia hardly has a monopoly on apathy, selfishness and bad roads . But after twenty years in this country, I'm convinced there is something else going on here. For a country to work, it has to inspire its citizens with an idea that is bigger than themselves individually. It has to give them areason to look beyond their tribes and take an interest in public affairs. It has to give people a sense of political community, of mutual responsibility to each other as citizens. Without this sense of community, people will rarely have the confidence to resist social diseases like corruption, or to stand up for unwritten standards of public behavior. I got a taste of this in 1984 as a tipsy 17-year-old returning by train from a baseball game in Toronto. They had been giving away free bars of soap that day, and my friend and I thought it would be fun to mark up the backs of the seats in front of us. As I scrawled away, an older man behind me leaned over and told me to stop . Cowed, but still insolent, I asked why I should. "Because he told you to," said another man, and I had the feeling the entire train carriage was sharing in and approving my humiliation. As much as the public embarrassment stung at the time, the experience left a deeper impression - that in Canada, you could stand up to bullies and miscreants, and other people would have your back. �SLOVAKIA-2015 117 A decade later, in late 1992, I was sitting in the U Kuba pub in Senec with my best friend Sean Ellacott. We were both in our 20s, university graduates taking a year off to teach English in Czechoslovakia. At a nearby table were two dark-skinned men whom we wouldn't have noticed if not for the fact that they were slowly getting beaten up. Twice I had seen a young man from a party of youths come over and punch one of the dark-skinned men in the face - hard, repeatedly, drawing blood. The victim made no attempt to protect himself, and no one else seemed to pay the slightest attention. As the young puncher approached for a third round, I had had enough and grabbed him from behind by the shoulders. He wasn't big, and seemed more surprised than belligerent, so we wrestled to a standoff and he went back to his chair and I to mine. At no point did anyone else in the bar intervene in our little drama or give any sign they supported my actions. On the contrary, as the waiter brought me a brandy ordered by the battered victim, an older patron drew up a chair at our table. The men who had been attacked were Gypsies, he said, and in Slovakia one didn't help them. We should be wary of the young attacker and his friends . It didn't occur to me at the time, but as the years passed, I came to see that incident as illustrative of an important difference between Canadian and Slovak society. At home, if something similar had happened, I would have been risking much less because most patrons of the bar would have approved of what I did, and would presumably have come to my aid if the young man had put up more resistance. But in Slovakia, you are on your own in such situations. As much as other people may sympathize with you, and may be sickened by what is happening, they will rarely do anything to help a stranger in trouble (especially if the stranger is a Gypsy). It's not a matter of cowardice or indifference to another's fate - it's that people aren't sure of what they can expect from one another when the chips are down. They lack the confidence you derive from a shared community and shared values, such as that one does not suffer a weaker person to be hurt. In Slovakia, no such glue binds strangers together. No social contract exists. *** �118 SLOV AKIA-2015 Again, it's hopelessly anecdotal, but I came to believe that I learned something fundamental about Slovaks in U Kuba that day in 1992. Confronted with an obnoxious teenager on a train, people will tend to look out the window rather than intervene, even if they are no fonder of public vandalism or casual violence than Canadians. The problem is that such incidents leave you with a horrible feeling inside if you don 't do anything. Whether you like it or not, you are involved, and looking out the window causes your soul to ache in a way that no punch on the nose can. Is it the same with corruption? Are we all like passengers on a train, every day witnessing gross misconduct by strangers and yet somehow failing to protest? Hating the offenders, but hating ourselves as well for looking out the window? For me, this is as good an explanation as any . Think back for a minute on the modem history of corruption in Slovakia: First came authoritarian PM Vladimir Meciar, who was captain of the ship when Czechoslovakia went down. Deciding not to risk a referendum on Slovak independence, Meciar soon revealed his hand. Everything revolved around privatization, around the use of public assets to create a "domestic capital group" that was politically loyal to the prime minister and his HZDS party . As we were later told by Stefan Gavomik, head of the FNM privatization agency, every Wednesday the Meciar government met privately to decide who would be allowed to buy what companies (Monday's regular cabinet meetings were devoted to public matters). Most sales were announced only after they had happened, leaving the media scrambling to find out who really stood behind "white horse" purchasers. In many instances, the purchase price was only a fraction of the real worth of the shares (onesixth, in the case of gas storage company Nafta Gbely, for instance). And even then, agreed purchase prices were often spread over many years, or could be paid in the form of unverifiable ' investments' into the privatized company. Information on privatization was closely guarded, none more so than by the secret service, whose director, Ivan Lexa, had been Meciar's first choice as privatization minister before President Michal Kovac refused to appoint him to the post. Understandably, privatization was a major campaign issue in the 1998 elections, which proved so crucial to Slovakia's future direction as a country. Mikulas Dzurinda, who defeated Meciar, promised that his government would go after malefactors, and ministers in the �SLOV AKIA-2015 119 first Dzurinda government began compiling 'black books' of misdeeds by their predecessors. And then - silence. The new leadership of the FNM, we were told, had realized there was little point in launching some 700 legal challenges to past privatization deals victory would take many years and countless man-hours, it was far from certain that the courts would side with the government, while the fall-out in terms of social unrest and damage to the principle of legal certainty might be severe. And so the first Dzurinda government reached 'an accommodation' with Meciar's privatizers, allowing almost all of them to keep their assets. Knowledge of human nature tells us that this detente must have been built on payoffs by privatizers to the new stewards of state property. Regardless, the Dzurinda administration soon had privatization scandals of its own, including some involving ' financial groups' that had arisen at the end of the 1990s. While these groups featured a few names from the past - the son of a Meciar-era state bank chief (Patrik Tkcic), for example, or the last boss of the Communist-era secret police (Aloiz Lorenz) - on the whole they were far more sophisticated than Meciar's crude privatizers, and invested far more in public relations. When these groups bought state assets for suspiciously little money, stripped them down and achieved enormous profits - Penta group boss Jaroslav Hascak once said he wouldn't look at a deal that did not yield at least a 30 percent annual return on investment - they were actually bringing efficiency to the business environment, we were told. Their partnership with the first and second Dzurinda administrations was so close that, according to leaked cables from the US embassy in Bratislava, they helped draft legislation and bribed MPs to pass it (which is the very definition of 'state capture '). And when the second Dzurinda government fell in 2005, leaving undone some key privatization deals, Penta financed the purchase of a new parliamentary majority from independent MPs. Meanwhile, a professed social democrat named Robert Fico was waiting in the wings . Fico's Smer party was reportedly sponsored by people who had become rich under Meciar, and who had changed horses following his defeat in 1998 after realizing that the authoritarian former PM would never again lead a government. Fico finally came to power in 2006 by criticizing insensitive economic reforms and corruption under Dzurinda. But again, no further action was tak- �120 SLOV AKIA-2015 en against the alleged malefactors, while Fico himself battled charges of massive corruption in public procurement to the benefit of his alleged sponsors. And so it went, through another change in government in 2010, and back to Fico two years later. At the end of December in 2011 , on one of the darkest days of the year, a file was uploaded to the Internet containing transcripts of conversations that took place in a Bratislava apartment in 2006 . Dubbed "the Gorilla file," the document was the result of a secret service surveillance operation that had monitored meetings between top government officials and politicians on the one hand, and Hascak of Penta on the other. The transcripts suggested that financial groups were not only benefiting from privatization decisions but in some cases were also helping to make them; that they had managed to have their own employees named to key state posts; and that they used a sophisticated system of bribery and kickbacks to get what they wanted from public servants. The Gorilla file also revealed that incumbent officials had refused to aid police investigations of their predecessors, a practice in keeping with what Interior Minister Daniel Lipsie described as an "unspoken agreement" among the political elite that no one important would ever go to jail in Slovakia. When I first read the Gorilla file over five years ago, I was struck not just by the extent of the corruption, but also by how well organized it was, how brisk and businesslike. Now I am more amazed at the lack of public response - for all the anger and disgust people felt on reading the Gorilla file , for all the suspicions confirmed and then exceeded, the largest public demonstration at the height of the Gorilla scandal in February 2012 still only drew a few thousand people to SNP Square in Bratislava. What was everyone else doing? *** All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good people to do nothing, the saying goes, and the modem history of Slovakia is as good a case as any . So what will it take to get people to act? I am confident the problem is not one of indifference. A book I wrote in 2012 on the Gorilla case sold over 50,000 copies, a record for nonfiction in this country, which is a pretty reliable sign that people wanted to know about it. And having met with thousands of people around Slovakia over the past two years, I know that they are still �SLOVAKIA-2015 121 angry and upset. But for some reason all that emotion remains bottled up . One popular and very persuasive explanation goes as follows: the reason that Slovaks don't respond more vigorously to corruption is that most people, if they had the opportunity, would behave exactly the same as the main actors in the Gorilla file. Lacking that opportunity, most people are just as likely to be corrupt in their daily lives. Corruption may be technically illegal in Slovakia, but it is far from clear that it violates the informal rules that govern how Slovak society actually works. On the surface this argument makes sense, but upon examination it has important flaws . I have taught at a dozen Slovak postsecondary schools over the past twenty years (currently I teach at five). I have always had problems with cheating and plagiarism in my courses, despite the fact that in the first lesson I always warn my students against it (even this year, I had to fail seven out of twentyeight students in an investigative journalism course because they plagiarized their term papers). So yes, I would say students here cheat more than they do in Canada. In trying to get Slovak students to stop cheating, however, I have never had the support of a single school administratr beyond the obligatory verbal commitments. Once, in 2009, a student submitted as his term paper a 500-word article that had been published in the SME newspaper that I worked for at the time. He hadn't bothered to do more than change the font, perhaps believing that as the brother of a Slovak film producer he didn't need to break a sweat. A couple of queries established that he had done the same to other course instructors. But even a joint submission before the disciplinary commission failed to produce more than a promise to supervise the student's future work. A few years ago I had a chance to ask a student and a university professor about plagiarism over a few beers. The student admitted that she and many of her peers did it, but asked why they should behave differently given that their teachers never read their papers. Why make the effort, if no one cares one way or another? For his part, the professor admitted that full-time teaching duties at three different universities - a load he had to carry in order to support his family - left him with no time to do more than make sure students met the formal requirements to hand in an essay and attend class. No �122 SLOV AKIA-2015 time, that is, to actually read anything beyond exam papers and dissertation theses. I'm convinced that while it may appear that ordinary Slovaks are as corrupt as their political and economic leaders, their corruption has different roots. It springs from the fact that basic things don ' t work in this country, which turns 'low-level' corruption into a coping mechanism. Rather than waste three hours at the doctor's office, or risk an indifferent diagnosis or treatment, people go through informal, tribal channels to get what they need . Rather than spend several hours at a police station to get a car registered, they may give a cop friend twenty euros to speed things up. Rather than spend two weeks on a school assignment that will end up in the waste bin, unread, they copy and paste from Wikipedia . 'High-level' corruption, on the other hand, is not a coping mechanism. It is a strategy to capture the state, to hijack democratic mechanisms for personal gain. It is not the result of a malfunctioning public sector; it is the direct cause of it. Clearly, if the Slovak state could be rescued from the hijackers, several things would happen. First, ordinary people would have fewer reasons to cheat or offer bribes, because basic services would improve. Without the massive financial drain of systemic corruption, teachers and medical staff could be paid more; free from its captors, the state and its servants could once again serve the public interest, including making sure that teachers and doctors did their (now better-paid) jobs properly. There would be more money for fixing potholes and building better roads, and more pressure on civil servants to provide them . The garbage littering public spaces, in a figurative sense, would be cleaned up, improving everyone's mood and challenging the belief that "things don't work" in Slovakia. In other words - if we could fix high-level corruption, we would at the same time be eliminating the largest cause of low-level corruption. Easier said than done, of course. But perhaps not impossible. *** One thing you learn from reading about successful anticorruption fights around the world is that there is no magic formula. Successful strategies do have common elements, however: they engage the widest possible spectrum of society by giving people small, �SLOVAKIA-2015 123 non-confrontational tasks that allow them to participate without fear of sanction. In Slovakia, if the objective is to retake the state from the oligarchs who captured it, the battle will have to be fought on several fronts. First, we need to create a community of people united by other than ethnic or tribal loyalties; one that is united by shared beliefs, such as that the Slovak state belongs to its people. Building this community requires more than just putting people in touch with each other, however. It requires a statotvorny akt of the kind that was lacking before 1993 . Then, we have to offer this community small but tangible acts of resistance that they can perform. We have to enable them to recapture their state through a kind of guerilla warfare, which while peaceful must be fought on multiple fronts at the same time. After Slovakia's gold medal victory in 2002 at the World Hockey Championships in Sweden, it did indeed seem, as sociologist Sona Szomolanyi claimed, that in the ensuing celebration we were witnessing the birth of the modem Slovak nation. People were finally assembling on city squares for reasons other than political protest; the winning team had a multi-ethnic roster; and team captain Miroslav Satan was even scolding politicians for betraying the interests of the nation : "this is what we can achieve when we play as a team," he said during a parliamentary address. How brief and how shallow that moment of triumph now seems. A hockey championship could never have triggered the birth of the modem Slovak nation because the brilliant play of the hockey team was in such stark contrast to the dysfunction of the rest of the country. Calling it a statotvorny moment was thus merely wishful thinking; in reality, states arise when a critical mass of people agrees that they need it, want it and can run it themselves. This year, the 25 th anniversary of the end of Communism, we are officially too old for wishful thinking. We know now that our state has been kidnapped and is being used by wealthy men hidden from our sight. We lack a community of like-minded people to oppose them, and to take their state back. Can one be created, before this second coming of normalizacia entrenches the oligarchs in power for a generation to come? This is the challenge facing all third-sector (non-profit) actors whose focus is on corruption and public activism. One thing we have �124 SLOVAKIA-2015 learned is that people need to be better informed - it is not enough to simply expect that they will be able to decipher politics from the occasional evening news broadcast or from their morning tabloids. They must be shown how power is used in this country - how politics really works. They need - and incredibly, still do not have - a history of the past twenty years that puts all the scandals and the disappointments and the betrayals in a context that will help voters make better choices at election time. Above all, they need to be connected to each other. Everyone who despairs at the state of Slovakia and wants to do something about it needs to feel part of a community of likeminded strangers. Only then will they be able to overcome the apathy that they feel as individuals. Shortly after the 2012 elections I founded a civic association, Pod povrchom, that aims to do these things - educate people about politics and public affairs, and provide an Internet platform for them to associate with each other. Through regular meetings with secondary school and university students (sixty-two schools so far), we are slowly building up a database of contacts to people who are concerned about corruption and want to do something about it (over 2,000 to date). We have also set up a Center for Independent Journalism that publishes investigative articles and provides training and mentoring for young would-be journalists. But as the months go by, it has become clear to me that the people leading the fight against corruption - NGOs, journalists, political activists - must themselves unite if we can hope to create a strong and lasting community of concerned Slovaks. Because on the other side of the barriers, the process of state capture is accelerating, not only in politics but everywhere that society remains open and independent. In a development that would have been inconceivable at the height of the Gorilla demonstrations, the giant holding company Penta and its managing partner Jaroslav Hascak have rolled out an aggressive strategy to buy up over half a dozen Slovak TV, online and print media assets. In early September of 2014 he announced the capture of the tabloid publisher 7 Plus (which gives him the mostread weekly Plus 7 dni and the second-most read daily Plus 1 den), as well as of the respected business weekly Trend. Later in the month Hascak admitted he had bid for a controlling share in Petit Press, �SLOV AKIA-2015 125 publisher of over thirty titles including the iconic and feisty Sme broadsheet, which remains a symbol of journalistic independence. If his bid is accepted - and at the time of writing this essay there was nothing standing in his way - the Sme newsroom and management will be gutted, which was perhaps Hascak:' s true purpose in buying the paper in the first place. After all, it was Petit Press that published my book on the Gorilla scandal - and Petit Press that Penta sued, unsuccessfully, to keep the book off the shelves. �� 112 SLOVAKIA-2015 CORRUPTION IN SLOVAKIA: TIME TO RECLAIM THE STATE 1 Tom Nicholson On the way home one March night, I lost a hubcap. I heard it pop off the front right wheel of my car as I smashed into a massive pothole on the main road from Bratislava to Svaty Jur. The impact was so severe that it bent the wheel rim and punctured the tire. If my son had been present he might have learned a few new English cusswords to go with his rich Slovak collection. I didn't own a car when I first came to Slovakia in 1992, so I can't say whether there are more potholes now than then. But it seems to me there are altogether too many potholes here for a European Union member country (the closest comparison I can come to Slovak roads in the spring is Moldova, or maybe rural Cuba). And there are definitely way too many potholes - and it takes way too long to fill them in - for a country that has had twenty years to get its shit together. Sure, they have potholes in Canada (I can no longer say 'we' because I have long since transferred my allegiance to Slovak potholes). But even though the winters in the Great White North are far more severe, and Canada has about a quintillion miles more roads, potholes are infrequent, and drivers are alerted to them with a homey Canadian solicitousness - a SO-meter flashing DANGER sign, say, or a cordon of Mounties in reflecto-vests. Not here. Even on Racianska ulica, a four-lane artery into the heart of the capital, the worst holes after three weeks get a perfunctory monocle of paint, promising a pending repair in the indefinite future (that paint is the Slovak equivalent of the Mexican 'manana'). For me, Slovakia's potholes are another entry on the list of basic Slovak things that don't work as they should. It's a depressingly long list - education, health care, justice, politics (especially politics). And it provides a starting point for understanding why corruption continues to flourish in this country. 1 This is a revised and updated version ofmy original article "Je cas dat tomuto statu zmysel," in Odkial' a kam ? Dvadsat' rokov samostatnosti, ed. by Martin Butora et. al. (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013), 281-304. �SLOV AKIA-2015 113 *** If I had been asked to write an essay about corruption in Slovakia a few years ago, I know what I would have come up with - a rogues' gallery of powerful figures who had abused other people's trust over the years to enrich themselves. But last year I was swept up in the Gori/a scandal, a political tempest that challenged my certainties and changed my life. As much as I wanted to remain detached as a journalist, I found myself speaking at public rallies and giving interviews . Suddenly, I was expected to tell people not just where corruption could be found , but how to defeat it as well. And I discovered that I actually knew very little about it. For starters, the story of corruption in Slovakia is not just one of rich people gaming the system. Corruption takes many forms and has many causes - such as that the country presents innumerable small but vexing barriers to living one's life without vexation. Some of these barriers encourage people to give small bribes (the box of chocolates for the doctor, the cash envelope for the building permit officer). Others - a plague of potholes, for example - just let everyone know that public servants could care less about serving the public interest, creating an atmosphere that indirectly encourages bribery. But none of these stories, it seems to me, answer the key question: why corruption flourishes after twenty years of independence and a decade of EU membership, six general elections and countless devastating political scandals. We now know, thanks to Gori/a, exactly what high- level corruption looks like. We see oligarchs enriching themselves, we see politicians and civil servants abusing their offices and neglecting their duties to us. And still it continues, and still the potholes proliferate. So why don't Slovaks do something about it? *** Over the past year, I've often been told how ironic it is that a foreigner had to bring the Gori/a scandal to light, as if a Slovak journalist would have done differently. This does a great disservice to the probity of my colleagues, and greatly exaggerates my own. If a foreigner can be of service here, it is perhaps to see things in a context that is not available to Slovaks, not having grown up elsewhere. �114 SLOV AKIA-2015 Now, I' ve read enough foreign descriptions of Slovak life to know how flawed this 'vision' can be, especially when delivered to foreign audiences that have no opportunity to verify its authenticity (the film Hostel comes to mind). But I'm hoping I can be an exception. As a transplanted Canadian who has spent twenty years in this country, I am still struck by the loyalty that people feel to their tribes - to family, to friends, to old classmates, to other people who come from their hometowns. These tribal bonds are what Slovaks living abroad miss most about their country . In modem Slovakia, there are still no higher loyalties. This is striking for a Canadian because our country does not run on informal networks. Sure, we have tribal loyalties, but they often divide us - there isn't much that Greek Canadians have in common with Chinese Canadians, say, or with Jamaican Canadians, except the fact that we all live in Canada. Perhaps that's why Canada has such a strong political identity: without ethnic, cultural or other natural bonds, we need it to hold us together. After all, we have few common traditions or national dishes in the sense that Slovaks have bryndzove halusky. But I'm pretty sure most Canadians could tell you what values the country stands for - tolerance, social solidarity, respect for human rights, and caring more about the rest of the world than Americans, for starters. How many Slovaks could do the same? While I'm sure people could name traits that Slovaks have as an ethnic nation - you can't live here for twenty years without hearing a thing or two about zavist or pohostinnost', for example - what about the ideals and principles their country is founded on? Slovaks can be forgiven for not having a clear idea of what values the modem Slovak state stands for. The average person, after all, was not consulted before the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, despite repeated promises of a referendum, and probably regarded the project of an independent Slovakia as something foisted on him from above. And because he had no hand in creating the state - and in many cases probably hadn't even wanted it, or at least hadn ' t wanted it yet - it's understandable that the average person might have felt that the modem Slovak state was someone else's responsibility. Common ideals, like the Constitution, would be scripted by old, grey men behind closed doors, while Slovakia's tribes would go about their business as they always had. �SLOV AKIA-2015 115 You could say that 'the state', on Slovak territory, had always been someone else's responsibility. Magyars, Austrians, Czechs, Germans, Russians, then Czechs again . After centuries of having someone else to fill in the potholes and make sure people paid their taxes, it's understandable that Slovaks were slow to respond to the call to administer their own affairs. But everything might have worked out differently if the Slovak Republic had come into being from a statotvorny akt, by which I mean an experience that unites a people as a political nation rather than just an ethnic one. Americans had their War of Independence, the Brits had Napoleon, while early Canadians ran a cruel gauntlet of Constitutional Conferences (a punishment that continues to be imposed on Canadian history students as an object lesson in the burning sincerity of all boredom). Slovaks, meanwhile, had no birthing experience that could rival the moral, economic and civilizational value of Czechoslovakia. They had nothing to comfort or inspire them when Czechoslovakia was dismantled, beyond the sour nationalism of pubs and football matches. The way Slovakia came into the world, as a child welcomed only by nationalists and political opportunists, left a dangerous vacuum at the center of the Slovak body politic. People naturally shrank from any new duties towards a state they hadn't wanted or had a hand in creating. In doing so, they abandoned public affairs to anyone claiming to want the responsibility. And there was no shortage of applicants. Twenty years later, this vacuum is still full of dark matter, dead stars and other space junk - stuff that absorbs light rather than produces it. It is responsible for many of the ills that afflict Slovakia, among them the indifference that ordinary people feel towards their state and towards the millions of strangers who inhabit it. If I had to give this ailment a name, I would call it the "mam v pici" disease. *** Let me describe some of the symptoms of this disease. Slovaks rarely sing their national anthem at sporting events, even at important internationals in front of tens of thousands of people (compare that to British football fans or Canadian hockey fans) . People complain incessantly about corruption in politics, and according to a recent survey trust their leaders less than almost any country on earth - but few �116 SLOVAKIA-2015 are willing to even get off the couch to attend a protest rally. More than half of each secondary school graduating class intends to emigrate, rather than stay home and help fix what ails the country. Or, if you prefer a local perspective: truck drivers in my village regularly make their deliveries while blocking traffic in both directions, reasoning that they have work to do so everyone else can just wait. People shovel snow from in front of their houses into the street, apparently indifferent to the inconvenience of other drivers. Private homes are beautifully renovated and tenderly cared for, while discarded bottles and other garbage litter the edges of public streets and walkways. In the summer, even though signs claim the forest above the village is a protected area and off-limits to vehicles, motorcycles and A TVs constantly disturb the peace of man and beast. And the potholes would be a disgrace anywhere. I know that a great many objections can be raised to each example I have mentioned . Maybe Slovaks don't know the words to their national anthem; maybe it's just not a very sing-able song. And Slovakia hardly has a monopoly on apathy, selfishness and bad roads . But after twenty years in this country, I'm convinced there is something else going on here. For a country to work, it has to inspire its citizens with an idea that is bigger than themselves individually. It has to give them areason to look beyond their tribes and take an interest in public affairs. It has to give people a sense of political community, of mutual responsibility to each other as citizens. Without this sense of community, people will rarely have the confidence to resist social diseases like corruption, or to stand up for unwritten standards of public behavior. I got a taste of this in 1984 as a tipsy 17-year-old returning by train from a baseball game in Toronto. They had been giving away free bars of soap that day, and my friend and I thought it would be fun to mark up the backs of the seats in front of us. As I scrawled away, an older man behind me leaned over and told me to stop . Cowed, but still insolent, I asked why I should. "Because he told you to," said another man, and I had the feeling the entire train carriage was sharing in and approving my humiliation. As much as the public embarrassment stung at the time, the experience left a deeper impression - that in Canada, you could stand up to bullies and miscreants, and other people would have your back. �SLOVAKIA-2015 117 A decade later, in late 1992, I was sitting in the U Kuba pub in Senec with my best friend Sean Ellacott. We were both in our 20s, university graduates taking a year off to teach English in Czechoslovakia. At a nearby table were two dark-skinned men whom we wouldn't have noticed if not for the fact that they were slowly getting beaten up. Twice I had seen a young man from a party of youths come over and punch one of the dark-skinned men in the face - hard, repeatedly, drawing blood. The victim made no attempt to protect himself, and no one else seemed to pay the slightest attention. As the young puncher approached for a third round, I had had enough and grabbed him from behind by the shoulders. He wasn't big, and seemed more surprised than belligerent, so we wrestled to a standoff and he went back to his chair and I to mine. At no point did anyone else in the bar intervene in our little drama or give any sign they supported my actions. On the contrary, as the waiter brought me a brandy ordered by the battered victim, an older patron drew up a chair at our table. The men who had been attacked were Gypsies, he said, and in Slovakia one didn't help them. We should be wary of the young attacker and his friends . It didn't occur to me at the time, but as the years passed, I came to see that incident as illustrative of an important difference between Canadian and Slovak society. At home, if something similar had happened, I would have been risking much less because most patrons of the bar would have approved of what I did, and would presumably have come to my aid if the young man had put up more resistance. But in Slovakia, you are on your own in such situations. As much as other people may sympathize with you, and may be sickened by what is happening, they will rarely do anything to help a stranger in trouble (especially if the stranger is a Gypsy). It's not a matter of cowardice or indifference to another's fate - it's that people aren't sure of what they can expect from one another when the chips are down. They lack the confidence you derive from a shared community and shared values, such as that one does not suffer a weaker person to be hurt. In Slovakia, no such glue binds strangers together. No social contract exists. *** �118 SLOV AKIA-2015 Again, it's hopelessly anecdotal, but I came to believe that I learned something fundamental about Slovaks in U Kuba that day in 1992. Confronted with an obnoxious teenager on a train, people will tend to look out the window rather than intervene, even if they are no fonder of public vandalism or casual violence than Canadians. The problem is that such incidents leave you with a horrible feeling inside if you don 't do anything. Whether you like it or not, you are involved, and looking out the window causes your soul to ache in a way that no punch on the nose can. Is it the same with corruption? Are we all like passengers on a train, every day witnessing gross misconduct by strangers and yet somehow failing to protest? Hating the offenders, but hating ourselves as well for looking out the window? For me, this is as good an explanation as any . Think back for a minute on the modem history of corruption in Slovakia: First came authoritarian PM Vladimir Meciar, who was captain of the ship when Czechoslovakia went down. Deciding not to risk a referendum on Slovak independence, Meciar soon revealed his hand. Everything revolved around privatization, around the use of public assets to create a "domestic capital group" that was politically loyal to the prime minister and his HZDS party . As we were later told by Stefan Gavomik, head of the FNM privatization agency, every Wednesday the Meciar government met privately to decide who would be allowed to buy what companies (Monday's regular cabinet meetings were devoted to public matters). Most sales were announced only after they had happened, leaving the media scrambling to find out who really stood behind "white horse" purchasers. In many instances, the purchase price was only a fraction of the real worth of the shares (onesixth, in the case of gas storage company Nafta Gbely, for instance). And even then, agreed purchase prices were often spread over many years, or could be paid in the form of unverifiable ' investments' into the privatized company. Information on privatization was closely guarded, none more so than by the secret service, whose director, Ivan Lexa, had been Meciar's first choice as privatization minister before President Michal Kovac refused to appoint him to the post. Understandably, privatization was a major campaign issue in the 1998 elections, which proved so crucial to Slovakia's future direction as a country. Mikulas Dzurinda, who defeated Meciar, promised that his government would go after malefactors, and ministers in the �SLOV AKIA-2015 119 first Dzurinda government began compiling 'black books' of misdeeds by their predecessors. And then - silence. The new leadership of the FNM, we were told, had realized there was little point in launching some 700 legal challenges to past privatization deals victory would take many years and countless man-hours, it was far from certain that the courts would side with the government, while the fall-out in terms of social unrest and damage to the principle of legal certainty might be severe. And so the first Dzurinda government reached 'an accommodation' with Meciar's privatizers, allowing almost all of them to keep their assets. Knowledge of human nature tells us that this detente must have been built on payoffs by privatizers to the new stewards of state property. Regardless, the Dzurinda administration soon had privatization scandals of its own, including some involving ' financial groups' that had arisen at the end of the 1990s. While these groups featured a few names from the past - the son of a Meciar-era state bank chief (Patrik Tkcic), for example, or the last boss of the Communist-era secret police (Aloiz Lorenz) - on the whole they were far more sophisticated than Meciar's crude privatizers, and invested far more in public relations. When these groups bought state assets for suspiciously little money, stripped them down and achieved enormous profits - Penta group boss Jaroslav Hascak once said he wouldn't look at a deal that did not yield at least a 30 percent annual return on investment - they were actually bringing efficiency to the business environment, we were told. Their partnership with the first and second Dzurinda administrations was so close that, according to leaked cables from the US embassy in Bratislava, they helped draft legislation and bribed MPs to pass it (which is the very definition of 'state capture '). And when the second Dzurinda government fell in 2005, leaving undone some key privatization deals, Penta financed the purchase of a new parliamentary majority from independent MPs. Meanwhile, a professed social democrat named Robert Fico was waiting in the wings . Fico's Smer party was reportedly sponsored by people who had become rich under Meciar, and who had changed horses following his defeat in 1998 after realizing that the authoritarian former PM would never again lead a government. Fico finally came to power in 2006 by criticizing insensitive economic reforms and corruption under Dzurinda. But again, no further action was tak- �120 SLOV AKIA-2015 en against the alleged malefactors, while Fico himself battled charges of massive corruption in public procurement to the benefit of his alleged sponsors. And so it went, through another change in government in 2010, and back to Fico two years later. At the end of December in 2011 , on one of the darkest days of the year, a file was uploaded to the Internet containing transcripts of conversations that took place in a Bratislava apartment in 2006 . Dubbed "the Gorilla file," the document was the result of a secret service surveillance operation that had monitored meetings between top government officials and politicians on the one hand, and Hascak of Penta on the other. The transcripts suggested that financial groups were not only benefiting from privatization decisions but in some cases were also helping to make them; that they had managed to have their own employees named to key state posts; and that they used a sophisticated system of bribery and kickbacks to get what they wanted from public servants. The Gorilla file also revealed that incumbent officials had refused to aid police investigations of their predecessors, a practice in keeping with what Interior Minister Daniel Lipsie described as an "unspoken agreement" among the political elite that no one important would ever go to jail in Slovakia. When I first read the Gorilla file over five years ago, I was struck not just by the extent of the corruption, but also by how well organized it was, how brisk and businesslike. Now I am more amazed at the lack of public response - for all the anger and disgust people felt on reading the Gorilla file , for all the suspicions confirmed and then exceeded, the largest public demonstration at the height of the Gorilla scandal in February 2012 still only drew a few thousand people to SNP Square in Bratislava. What was everyone else doing? *** All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good people to do nothing, the saying goes, and the modem history of Slovakia is as good a case as any . So what will it take to get people to act? I am confident the problem is not one of indifference. A book I wrote in 2012 on the Gorilla case sold over 50,000 copies, a record for nonfiction in this country, which is a pretty reliable sign that people wanted to know about it. And having met with thousands of people around Slovakia over the past two years, I know that they are still �SLOVAKIA-2015 121 angry and upset. But for some reason all that emotion remains bottled up . One popular and very persuasive explanation goes as follows: the reason that Slovaks don't respond more vigorously to corruption is that most people, if they had the opportunity, would behave exactly the same as the main actors in the Gorilla file. Lacking that opportunity, most people are just as likely to be corrupt in their daily lives. Corruption may be technically illegal in Slovakia, but it is far from clear that it violates the informal rules that govern how Slovak society actually works. On the surface this argument makes sense, but upon examination it has important flaws . I have taught at a dozen Slovak postsecondary schools over the past twenty years (currently I teach at five). I have always had problems with cheating and plagiarism in my courses, despite the fact that in the first lesson I always warn my students against it (even this year, I had to fail seven out of twentyeight students in an investigative journalism course because they plagiarized their term papers). So yes, I would say students here cheat more than they do in Canada. In trying to get Slovak students to stop cheating, however, I have never had the support of a single school administratr beyond the obligatory verbal commitments. Once, in 2009, a student submitted as his term paper a 500-word article that had been published in the SME newspaper that I worked for at the time. He hadn't bothered to do more than change the font, perhaps believing that as the brother of a Slovak film producer he didn't need to break a sweat. A couple of queries established that he had done the same to other course instructors. But even a joint submission before the disciplinary commission failed to produce more than a promise to supervise the student's future work. A few years ago I had a chance to ask a student and a university professor about plagiarism over a few beers. The student admitted that she and many of her peers did it, but asked why they should behave differently given that their teachers never read their papers. Why make the effort, if no one cares one way or another? For his part, the professor admitted that full-time teaching duties at three different universities - a load he had to carry in order to support his family - left him with no time to do more than make sure students met the formal requirements to hand in an essay and attend class. No �122 SLOV AKIA-2015 time, that is, to actually read anything beyond exam papers and dissertation theses. I'm convinced that while it may appear that ordinary Slovaks are as corrupt as their political and economic leaders, their corruption has different roots. It springs from the fact that basic things don ' t work in this country, which turns 'low-level' corruption into a coping mechanism. Rather than waste three hours at the doctor's office, or risk an indifferent diagnosis or treatment, people go through informal, tribal channels to get what they need . Rather than spend several hours at a police station to get a car registered, they may give a cop friend twenty euros to speed things up. Rather than spend two weeks on a school assignment that will end up in the waste bin, unread, they copy and paste from Wikipedia . 'High-level' corruption, on the other hand, is not a coping mechanism. It is a strategy to capture the state, to hijack democratic mechanisms for personal gain. It is not the result of a malfunctioning public sector; it is the direct cause of it. Clearly, if the Slovak state could be rescued from the hijackers, several things would happen. First, ordinary people would have fewer reasons to cheat or offer bribes, because basic services would improve. Without the massive financial drain of systemic corruption, teachers and medical staff could be paid more; free from its captors, the state and its servants could once again serve the public interest, including making sure that teachers and doctors did their (now better-paid) jobs properly. There would be more money for fixing potholes and building better roads, and more pressure on civil servants to provide them . The garbage littering public spaces, in a figurative sense, would be cleaned up, improving everyone's mood and challenging the belief that "things don't work" in Slovakia. In other words - if we could fix high-level corruption, we would at the same time be eliminating the largest cause of low-level corruption. Easier said than done, of course. But perhaps not impossible. *** One thing you learn from reading about successful anticorruption fights around the world is that there is no magic formula. Successful strategies do have common elements, however: they engage the widest possible spectrum of society by giving people small, �SLOVAKIA-2015 123 non-confrontational tasks that allow them to participate without fear of sanction. In Slovakia, if the objective is to retake the state from the oligarchs who captured it, the battle will have to be fought on several fronts. First, we need to create a community of people united by other than ethnic or tribal loyalties; one that is united by shared beliefs, such as that the Slovak state belongs to its people. Building this community requires more than just putting people in touch with each other, however. It requires a statotvorny akt of the kind that was lacking before 1993 . Then, we have to offer this community small but tangible acts of resistance that they can perform. We have to enable them to recapture their state through a kind of guerilla warfare, which while peaceful must be fought on multiple fronts at the same time. After Slovakia's gold medal victory in 2002 at the World Hockey Championships in Sweden, it did indeed seem, as sociologist Sona Szomolanyi claimed, that in the ensuing celebration we were witnessing the birth of the modem Slovak nation. People were finally assembling on city squares for reasons other than political protest; the winning team had a multi-ethnic roster; and team captain Miroslav Satan was even scolding politicians for betraying the interests of the nation : "this is what we can achieve when we play as a team," he said during a parliamentary address. How brief and how shallow that moment of triumph now seems. A hockey championship could never have triggered the birth of the modem Slovak nation because the brilliant play of the hockey team was in such stark contrast to the dysfunction of the rest of the country. Calling it a statotvorny moment was thus merely wishful thinking; in reality, states arise when a critical mass of people agrees that they need it, want it and can run it themselves. This year, the 25 th anniversary of the end of Communism, we are officially too old for wishful thinking. We know now that our state has been kidnapped and is being used by wealthy men hidden from our sight. We lack a community of like-minded people to oppose them, and to take their state back. Can one be created, before this second coming of normalizacia entrenches the oligarchs in power for a generation to come? This is the challenge facing all third-sector (non-profit) actors whose focus is on corruption and public activism. One thing we have �124 SLOVAKIA-2015 learned is that people need to be better informed - it is not enough to simply expect that they will be able to decipher politics from the occasional evening news broadcast or from their morning tabloids. They must be shown how power is used in this country - how politics really works. They need - and incredibly, still do not have - a history of the past twenty years that puts all the scandals and the disappointments and the betrayals in a context that will help voters make better choices at election time. Above all, they need to be connected to each other. Everyone who despairs at the state of Slovakia and wants to do something about it needs to feel part of a community of likeminded strangers. Only then will they be able to overcome the apathy that they feel as individuals. Shortly after the 2012 elections I founded a civic association, Pod povrchom, that aims to do these things - educate people about politics and public affairs, and provide an Internet platform for them to associate with each other. Through regular meetings with secondary school and university students (sixty-two schools so far), we are slowly building up a database of contacts to people who are concerned about corruption and want to do something about it (over 2,000 to date). We have also set up a Center for Independent Journalism that publishes investigative articles and provides training and mentoring for young would-be journalists. But as the months go by, it has become clear to me that the people leading the fight against corruption - NGOs, journalists, political activists - must themselves unite if we can hope to create a strong and lasting community of concerned Slovaks. Because on the other side of the barriers, the process of state capture is accelerating, not only in politics but everywhere that society remains open and independent. In a development that would have been inconceivable at the height of the Gorilla demonstrations, the giant holding company Penta and its managing partner Jaroslav Hascak have rolled out an aggressive strategy to buy up over half a dozen Slovak TV, online and print media assets. In early September of 2014 he announced the capture of the tabloid publisher 7 Plus (which gives him the mostread weekly Plus 7 dni and the second-most read daily Plus 1 den), as well as of the respected business weekly Trend. Later in the month Hascak admitted he had bid for a controlling share in Petit Press, �SLOV AKIA-2015 125 publisher of over thirty titles including the iconic and feisty Sme broadsheet, which remains a symbol of journalistic independence. If his bid is accepted - and at the time of writing this essay there was nothing standing in his way - the Sme newsroom and management will be gutted, which was perhaps Hascak:' s true purpose in buying the paper in the first place. After all, it was Petit Press that published my book on the Gorilla scandal - and Petit Press that Penta sued, unsuccessfully, to keep the book off the shelves. �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 112 SLOVAKIA-2015 CORRUPTION IN SLOVAKIA: TIME TO RECLAIM THE STATE 1 Tom Nicholson On the way home one March night, I lost a hubcap. I heard it pop off the front right wheel of my car as I smashed into a massive pothole on the main road from Bratislava to Svaty Jur. The impact was so severe that it bent the wheel rim and punctured the tire. If my son had been present he might have learned a few new English cusswords to go with his rich Slovak collection. I didn't own a car when I first came to Slovakia in 1992, so I can't say whether there are more potholes now than then. But it seems to me there are altogether too many potholes here for a European Union member country (the closest comparison I can come to Slovak roads in the spring is Moldova, or maybe rural Cuba). And there are definitely way too many potholes - and it takes way too long to fill them in - for a country that has had twenty years to get its shit together. Sure, they have potholes in Canada (I can no longer say 'we' because I have long since transferred my allegiance to Slovak potholes). But even though the winters in the Great White North are far more severe, and Canada has about a quintillion miles more roads, potholes are infrequent, and drivers are alerted to them with a homey Canadian solicitousness - a SO-meter flashing DANGER sign, say, or a cordon of Mounties in reflecto-vests. Not here. Even on Racianska ulica, a four-lane artery into the heart of the capital, the worst holes after three weeks get a perfunctory monocle of paint, promising a pending repair in the indefinite future (that paint is the Slovak equivalent of the Mexican 'manana'). For me, Slovakia's potholes are another entry on the list of basic Slovak things that don't work as they should. It's a depressingly long list - education, health care, justice, politics (especially politics). And it provides a starting point for understanding why corruption continues to flourish in this country. 1 This is a revised and updated version ofmy original article "Je cas dat tomuto statu zmysel," in Odkial' a kam ? Dvadsat' rokov samostatnosti, ed. by Martin Butora et. al. (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013), 281-304. SLOV AKIA-2015 113 *** If I had been asked to write an essay about corruption in Slovakia a few years ago, I know what I would have come up with - a rogues' gallery of powerful figures who had abused other people's trust over the years to enrich themselves. But last year I was swept up in the Gori/a scandal, a political tempest that challenged my certainties and changed my life. As much as I wanted to remain detached as a journalist, I found myself speaking at public rallies and giving interviews . Suddenly, I was expected to tell people not just where corruption could be found , but how to defeat it as well. And I discovered that I actually knew very little about it. For starters, the story of corruption in Slovakia is not just one of rich people gaming the system. Corruption takes many forms and has many causes - such as that the country presents innumerable small but vexing barriers to living one's life without vexation. Some of these barriers encourage people to give small bribes (the box of chocolates for the doctor, the cash envelope for the building permit officer). Others - a plague of potholes, for example - just let everyone know that public servants could care less about serving the public interest, creating an atmosphere that indirectly encourages bribery. But none of these stories, it seems to me, answer the key question: why corruption flourishes after twenty years of independence and a decade of EU membership, six general elections and countless devastating political scandals. We now know, thanks to Gori/a, exactly what high- level corruption looks like. We see oligarchs enriching themselves, we see politicians and civil servants abusing their offices and neglecting their duties to us. And still it continues, and still the potholes proliferate. So why don't Slovaks do something about it? *** Over the past year, I've often been told how ironic it is that a foreigner had to bring the Gori/a scandal to light, as if a Slovak journalist would have done differently. This does a great disservice to the probity of my colleagues, and greatly exaggerates my own. If a foreigner can be of service here, it is perhaps to see things in a context that is not available to Slovaks, not having grown up elsewhere. 114 SLOV AKIA-2015 Now, I' ve read enough foreign descriptions of Slovak life to know how flawed this 'vision' can be, especially when delivered to foreign audiences that have no opportunity to verify its authenticity (the film Hostel comes to mind). But I'm hoping I can be an exception. As a transplanted Canadian who has spent twenty years in this country, I am still struck by the loyalty that people feel to their tribes - to family, to friends, to old classmates, to other people who come from their hometowns. These tribal bonds are what Slovaks living abroad miss most about their country . In modem Slovakia, there are still no higher loyalties. This is striking for a Canadian because our country does not run on informal networks. Sure, we have tribal loyalties, but they often divide us - there isn't much that Greek Canadians have in common with Chinese Canadians, say, or with Jamaican Canadians, except the fact that we all live in Canada. Perhaps that's why Canada has such a strong political identity: without ethnic, cultural or other natural bonds, we need it to hold us together. After all, we have few common traditions or national dishes in the sense that Slovaks have bryndzove halusky. But I'm pretty sure most Canadians could tell you what values the country stands for - tolerance, social solidarity, respect for human rights, and caring more about the rest of the world than Americans, for starters. How many Slovaks could do the same? While I'm sure people could name traits that Slovaks have as an ethnic nation - you can't live here for twenty years without hearing a thing or two about zavist or pohostinnost', for example - what about the ideals and principles their country is founded on? Slovaks can be forgiven for not having a clear idea of what values the modem Slovak state stands for. The average person, after all, was not consulted before the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, despite repeated promises of a referendum, and probably regarded the project of an independent Slovakia as something foisted on him from above. And because he had no hand in creating the state - and in many cases probably hadn't even wanted it, or at least hadn ' t wanted it yet - it's understandable that the average person might have felt that the modem Slovak state was someone else's responsibility. Common ideals, like the Constitution, would be scripted by old, grey men behind closed doors, while Slovakia's tribes would go about their business as they always had. SLOV AKIA-2015 115 You could say that 'the state', on Slovak territory, had always been someone else's responsibility. Magyars, Austrians, Czechs, Germans, Russians, then Czechs again . After centuries of having someone else to fill in the potholes and make sure people paid their taxes, it's understandable that Slovaks were slow to respond to the call to administer their own affairs. But everything might have worked out differently if the Slovak Republic had come into being from a statotvorny akt, by which I mean an experience that unites a people as a political nation rather than just an ethnic one. Americans had their War of Independence, the Brits had Napoleon, while early Canadians ran a cruel gauntlet of Constitutional Conferences (a punishment that continues to be imposed on Canadian history students as an object lesson in the burning sincerity of all boredom). Slovaks, meanwhile, had no birthing experience that could rival the moral, economic and civilizational value of Czechoslovakia. They had nothing to comfort or inspire them when Czechoslovakia was dismantled, beyond the sour nationalism of pubs and football matches. The way Slovakia came into the world, as a child welcomed only by nationalists and political opportunists, left a dangerous vacuum at the center of the Slovak body politic. People naturally shrank from any new duties towards a state they hadn't wanted or had a hand in creating. In doing so, they abandoned public affairs to anyone claiming to want the responsibility. And there was no shortage of applicants. Twenty years later, this vacuum is still full of dark matter, dead stars and other space junk - stuff that absorbs light rather than produces it. It is responsible for many of the ills that afflict Slovakia, among them the indifference that ordinary people feel towards their state and towards the millions of strangers who inhabit it. If I had to give this ailment a name, I would call it the "mam v pici" disease. *** Let me describe some of the symptoms of this disease. Slovaks rarely sing their national anthem at sporting events, even at important internationals in front of tens of thousands of people (compare that to British football fans or Canadian hockey fans) . People complain incessantly about corruption in politics, and according to a recent survey trust their leaders less than almost any country on earth - but few 116 SLOVAKIA-2015 are willing to even get off the couch to attend a protest rally. More than half of each secondary school graduating class intends to emigrate, rather than stay home and help fix what ails the country. Or, if you prefer a local perspective: truck drivers in my village regularly make their deliveries while blocking traffic in both directions, reasoning that they have work to do so everyone else can just wait. People shovel snow from in front of their houses into the street, apparently indifferent to the inconvenience of other drivers. Private homes are beautifully renovated and tenderly cared for, while discarded bottles and other garbage litter the edges of public streets and walkways. In the summer, even though signs claim the forest above the village is a protected area and off-limits to vehicles, motorcycles and A TVs constantly disturb the peace of man and beast. And the potholes would be a disgrace anywhere. I know that a great many objections can be raised to each example I have mentioned . Maybe Slovaks don't know the words to their national anthem; maybe it's just not a very sing-able song. And Slovakia hardly has a monopoly on apathy, selfishness and bad roads . But after twenty years in this country, I'm convinced there is something else going on here. For a country to work, it has to inspire its citizens with an idea that is bigger than themselves individually. It has to give them areason to look beyond their tribes and take an interest in public affairs. It has to give people a sense of political community, of mutual responsibility to each other as citizens. Without this sense of community, people will rarely have the confidence to resist social diseases like corruption, or to stand up for unwritten standards of public behavior. I got a taste of this in 1984 as a tipsy 17-year-old returning by train from a baseball game in Toronto. They had been giving away free bars of soap that day, and my friend and I thought it would be fun to mark up the backs of the seats in front of us. As I scrawled away, an older man behind me leaned over and told me to stop . Cowed, but still insolent, I asked why I should. "Because he told you to," said another man, and I had the feeling the entire train carriage was sharing in and approving my humiliation. As much as the public embarrassment stung at the time, the experience left a deeper impression - that in Canada, you could stand up to bullies and miscreants, and other people would have your back. SLOVAKIA-2015 117 A decade later, in late 1992, I was sitting in the U Kuba pub in Senec with my best friend Sean Ellacott. We were both in our 20s, university graduates taking a year off to teach English in Czechoslovakia. At a nearby table were two dark-skinned men whom we wouldn't have noticed if not for the fact that they were slowly getting beaten up. Twice I had seen a young man from a party of youths come over and punch one of the dark-skinned men in the face - hard, repeatedly, drawing blood. The victim made no attempt to protect himself, and no one else seemed to pay the slightest attention. As the young puncher approached for a third round, I had had enough and grabbed him from behind by the shoulders. He wasn't big, and seemed more surprised than belligerent, so we wrestled to a standoff and he went back to his chair and I to mine. At no point did anyone else in the bar intervene in our little drama or give any sign they supported my actions. On the contrary, as the waiter brought me a brandy ordered by the battered victim, an older patron drew up a chair at our table. The men who had been attacked were Gypsies, he said, and in Slovakia one didn't help them. We should be wary of the young attacker and his friends . It didn't occur to me at the time, but as the years passed, I came to see that incident as illustrative of an important difference between Canadian and Slovak society. At home, if something similar had happened, I would have been risking much less because most patrons of the bar would have approved of what I did, and would presumably have come to my aid if the young man had put up more resistance. But in Slovakia, you are on your own in such situations. As much as other people may sympathize with you, and may be sickened by what is happening, they will rarely do anything to help a stranger in trouble (especially if the stranger is a Gypsy). It's not a matter of cowardice or indifference to another's fate - it's that people aren't sure of what they can expect from one another when the chips are down. They lack the confidence you derive from a shared community and shared values, such as that one does not suffer a weaker person to be hurt. In Slovakia, no such glue binds strangers together. No social contract exists. *** 118 SLOV AKIA-2015 Again, it's hopelessly anecdotal, but I came to believe that I learned something fundamental about Slovaks in U Kuba that day in 1992. Confronted with an obnoxious teenager on a train, people will tend to look out the window rather than intervene, even if they are no fonder of public vandalism or casual violence than Canadians. The problem is that such incidents leave you with a horrible feeling inside if you don 't do anything. Whether you like it or not, you are involved, and looking out the window causes your soul to ache in a way that no punch on the nose can. Is it the same with corruption? Are we all like passengers on a train, every day witnessing gross misconduct by strangers and yet somehow failing to protest? Hating the offenders, but hating ourselves as well for looking out the window? For me, this is as good an explanation as any . Think back for a minute on the modem history of corruption in Slovakia: First came authoritarian PM Vladimir Meciar, who was captain of the ship when Czechoslovakia went down. Deciding not to risk a referendum on Slovak independence, Meciar soon revealed his hand. Everything revolved around privatization, around the use of public assets to create a "domestic capital group" that was politically loyal to the prime minister and his HZDS party . As we were later told by Stefan Gavomik, head of the FNM privatization agency, every Wednesday the Meciar government met privately to decide who would be allowed to buy what companies (Monday's regular cabinet meetings were devoted to public matters). Most sales were announced only after they had happened, leaving the media scrambling to find out who really stood behind "white horse" purchasers. In many instances, the purchase price was only a fraction of the real worth of the shares (onesixth, in the case of gas storage company Nafta Gbely, for instance). And even then, agreed purchase prices were often spread over many years, or could be paid in the form of unverifiable ' investments' into the privatized company. Information on privatization was closely guarded, none more so than by the secret service, whose director, Ivan Lexa, had been Meciar's first choice as privatization minister before President Michal Kovac refused to appoint him to the post. Understandably, privatization was a major campaign issue in the 1998 elections, which proved so crucial to Slovakia's future direction as a country. Mikulas Dzurinda, who defeated Meciar, promised that his government would go after malefactors, and ministers in the SLOV AKIA-2015 119 first Dzurinda government began compiling 'black books' of misdeeds by their predecessors. And then - silence. The new leadership of the FNM, we were told, had realized there was little point in launching some 700 legal challenges to past privatization deals victory would take many years and countless man-hours, it was far from certain that the courts would side with the government, while the fall-out in terms of social unrest and damage to the principle of legal certainty might be severe. And so the first Dzurinda government reached 'an accommodation' with Meciar's privatizers, allowing almost all of them to keep their assets. Knowledge of human nature tells us that this detente must have been built on payoffs by privatizers to the new stewards of state property. Regardless, the Dzurinda administration soon had privatization scandals of its own, including some involving ' financial groups' that had arisen at the end of the 1990s. While these groups featured a few names from the past - the son of a Meciar-era state bank chief (Patrik Tkcic), for example, or the last boss of the Communist-era secret police (Aloiz Lorenz) - on the whole they were far more sophisticated than Meciar's crude privatizers, and invested far more in public relations. When these groups bought state assets for suspiciously little money, stripped them down and achieved enormous profits - Penta group boss Jaroslav Hascak once said he wouldn't look at a deal that did not yield at least a 30 percent annual return on investment - they were actually bringing efficiency to the business environment, we were told. Their partnership with the first and second Dzurinda administrations was so close that, according to leaked cables from the US embassy in Bratislava, they helped draft legislation and bribed MPs to pass it (which is the very definition of 'state capture '). And when the second Dzurinda government fell in 2005, leaving undone some key privatization deals, Penta financed the purchase of a new parliamentary majority from independent MPs. Meanwhile, a professed social democrat named Robert Fico was waiting in the wings . Fico's Smer party was reportedly sponsored by people who had become rich under Meciar, and who had changed horses following his defeat in 1998 after realizing that the authoritarian former PM would never again lead a government. Fico finally came to power in 2006 by criticizing insensitive economic reforms and corruption under Dzurinda. But again, no further action was tak- 120 SLOV AKIA-2015 en against the alleged malefactors, while Fico himself battled charges of massive corruption in public procurement to the benefit of his alleged sponsors. And so it went, through another change in government in 2010, and back to Fico two years later. At the end of December in 2011 , on one of the darkest days of the year, a file was uploaded to the Internet containing transcripts of conversations that took place in a Bratislava apartment in 2006 . Dubbed "the Gorilla file," the document was the result of a secret service surveillance operation that had monitored meetings between top government officials and politicians on the one hand, and Hascak of Penta on the other. The transcripts suggested that financial groups were not only benefiting from privatization decisions but in some cases were also helping to make them; that they had managed to have their own employees named to key state posts; and that they used a sophisticated system of bribery and kickbacks to get what they wanted from public servants. The Gorilla file also revealed that incumbent officials had refused to aid police investigations of their predecessors, a practice in keeping with what Interior Minister Daniel Lipsie described as an "unspoken agreement" among the political elite that no one important would ever go to jail in Slovakia. When I first read the Gorilla file over five years ago, I was struck not just by the extent of the corruption, but also by how well organized it was, how brisk and businesslike. Now I am more amazed at the lack of public response - for all the anger and disgust people felt on reading the Gorilla file , for all the suspicions confirmed and then exceeded, the largest public demonstration at the height of the Gorilla scandal in February 2012 still only drew a few thousand people to SNP Square in Bratislava. What was everyone else doing? *** All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good people to do nothing, the saying goes, and the modem history of Slovakia is as good a case as any . So what will it take to get people to act? I am confident the problem is not one of indifference. A book I wrote in 2012 on the Gorilla case sold over 50,000 copies, a record for nonfiction in this country, which is a pretty reliable sign that people wanted to know about it. And having met with thousands of people around Slovakia over the past two years, I know that they are still SLOVAKIA-2015 121 angry and upset. But for some reason all that emotion remains bottled up . One popular and very persuasive explanation goes as follows: the reason that Slovaks don't respond more vigorously to corruption is that most people, if they had the opportunity, would behave exactly the same as the main actors in the Gorilla file. Lacking that opportunity, most people are just as likely to be corrupt in their daily lives. Corruption may be technically illegal in Slovakia, but it is far from clear that it violates the informal rules that govern how Slovak society actually works. On the surface this argument makes sense, but upon examination it has important flaws . I have taught at a dozen Slovak postsecondary schools over the past twenty years (currently I teach at five). I have always had problems with cheating and plagiarism in my courses, despite the fact that in the first lesson I always warn my students against it (even this year, I had to fail seven out of twentyeight students in an investigative journalism course because they plagiarized their term papers). So yes, I would say students here cheat more than they do in Canada. In trying to get Slovak students to stop cheating, however, I have never had the support of a single school administratr beyond the obligatory verbal commitments. Once, in 2009, a student submitted as his term paper a 500-word article that had been published in the SME newspaper that I worked for at the time. He hadn't bothered to do more than change the font, perhaps believing that as the brother of a Slovak film producer he didn't need to break a sweat. A couple of queries established that he had done the same to other course instructors. But even a joint submission before the disciplinary commission failed to produce more than a promise to supervise the student's future work. A few years ago I had a chance to ask a student and a university professor about plagiarism over a few beers. The student admitted that she and many of her peers did it, but asked why they should behave differently given that their teachers never read their papers. Why make the effort, if no one cares one way or another? For his part, the professor admitted that full-time teaching duties at three different universities - a load he had to carry in order to support his family - left him with no time to do more than make sure students met the formal requirements to hand in an essay and attend class. No 122 SLOV AKIA-2015 time, that is, to actually read anything beyond exam papers and dissertation theses. I'm convinced that while it may appear that ordinary Slovaks are as corrupt as their political and economic leaders, their corruption has different roots. It springs from the fact that basic things don ' t work in this country, which turns 'low-level' corruption into a coping mechanism. Rather than waste three hours at the doctor's office, or risk an indifferent diagnosis or treatment, people go through informal, tribal channels to get what they need . Rather than spend several hours at a police station to get a car registered, they may give a cop friend twenty euros to speed things up. Rather than spend two weeks on a school assignment that will end up in the waste bin, unread, they copy and paste from Wikipedia . 'High-level' corruption, on the other hand, is not a coping mechanism. It is a strategy to capture the state, to hijack democratic mechanisms for personal gain. It is not the result of a malfunctioning public sector; it is the direct cause of it. Clearly, if the Slovak state could be rescued from the hijackers, several things would happen. First, ordinary people would have fewer reasons to cheat or offer bribes, because basic services would improve. Without the massive financial drain of systemic corruption, teachers and medical staff could be paid more; free from its captors, the state and its servants could once again serve the public interest, including making sure that teachers and doctors did their (now better-paid) jobs properly. There would be more money for fixing potholes and building better roads, and more pressure on civil servants to provide them . The garbage littering public spaces, in a figurative sense, would be cleaned up, improving everyone's mood and challenging the belief that "things don't work" in Slovakia. In other words - if we could fix high-level corruption, we would at the same time be eliminating the largest cause of low-level corruption. Easier said than done, of course. But perhaps not impossible. *** One thing you learn from reading about successful anticorruption fights around the world is that there is no magic formula. Successful strategies do have common elements, however: they engage the widest possible spectrum of society by giving people small, SLOVAKIA-2015 123 non-confrontational tasks that allow them to participate without fear of sanction. In Slovakia, if the objective is to retake the state from the oligarchs who captured it, the battle will have to be fought on several fronts. First, we need to create a community of people united by other than ethnic or tribal loyalties; one that is united by shared beliefs, such as that the Slovak state belongs to its people. Building this community requires more than just putting people in touch with each other, however. It requires a statotvorny akt of the kind that was lacking before 1993 . Then, we have to offer this community small but tangible acts of resistance that they can perform. We have to enable them to recapture their state through a kind of guerilla warfare, which while peaceful must be fought on multiple fronts at the same time. After Slovakia's gold medal victory in 2002 at the World Hockey Championships in Sweden, it did indeed seem, as sociologist Sona Szomolanyi claimed, that in the ensuing celebration we were witnessing the birth of the modem Slovak nation. People were finally assembling on city squares for reasons other than political protest; the winning team had a multi-ethnic roster; and team captain Miroslav Satan was even scolding politicians for betraying the interests of the nation : "this is what we can achieve when we play as a team," he said during a parliamentary address. How brief and how shallow that moment of triumph now seems. A hockey championship could never have triggered the birth of the modem Slovak nation because the brilliant play of the hockey team was in such stark contrast to the dysfunction of the rest of the country. Calling it a statotvorny moment was thus merely wishful thinking; in reality, states arise when a critical mass of people agrees that they need it, want it and can run it themselves. This year, the 25 th anniversary of the end of Communism, we are officially too old for wishful thinking. We know now that our state has been kidnapped and is being used by wealthy men hidden from our sight. We lack a community of like-minded people to oppose them, and to take their state back. Can one be created, before this second coming of normalizacia entrenches the oligarchs in power for a generation to come? This is the challenge facing all third-sector (non-profit) actors whose focus is on corruption and public activism. One thing we have 124 SLOVAKIA-2015 learned is that people need to be better informed - it is not enough to simply expect that they will be able to decipher politics from the occasional evening news broadcast or from their morning tabloids. They must be shown how power is used in this country - how politics really works. They need - and incredibly, still do not have - a history of the past twenty years that puts all the scandals and the disappointments and the betrayals in a context that will help voters make better choices at election time. Above all, they need to be connected to each other. Everyone who despairs at the state of Slovakia and wants to do something about it needs to feel part of a community of likeminded strangers. Only then will they be able to overcome the apathy that they feel as individuals. Shortly after the 2012 elections I founded a civic association, Pod povrchom, that aims to do these things - educate people about politics and public affairs, and provide an Internet platform for them to associate with each other. Through regular meetings with secondary school and university students (sixty-two schools so far), we are slowly building up a database of contacts to people who are concerned about corruption and want to do something about it (over 2,000 to date). We have also set up a Center for Independent Journalism that publishes investigative articles and provides training and mentoring for young would-be journalists. But as the months go by, it has become clear to me that the people leading the fight against corruption - NGOs, journalists, political activists - must themselves unite if we can hope to create a strong and lasting community of concerned Slovaks. Because on the other side of the barriers, the process of state capture is accelerating, not only in politics but everywhere that society remains open and independent. In a development that would have been inconceivable at the height of the Gorilla demonstrations, the giant holding company Penta and its managing partner Jaroslav Hascak have rolled out an aggressive strategy to buy up over half a dozen Slovak TV, online and print media assets. In early September of 2014 he announced the capture of the tabloid publisher 7 Plus (which gives him the mostread weekly Plus 7 dni and the second-most read daily Plus 1 den), as well as of the respected business weekly Trend. Later in the month Hascak admitted he had bid for a controlling share in Petit Press, SLOV AKIA-2015 125 publisher of over thirty titles including the iconic and feisty Sme broadsheet, which remains a symbol of journalistic independence. If his bid is accepted - and at the time of writing this essay there was nothing standing in his way - the Sme newsroom and management will be gutted, which was perhaps Hascak:' s true purpose in buying the paper in the first place. After all, it was Petit Press that published my book on the Gorilla scandal - and Petit Press that Penta sued, unsuccessfully, to keep the book off the shelves.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Corruption in Slovakia: Time to Reclaim the State Description An account of the resource Tom Nicholson Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015 pp. 112-125 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Nicholson, Tom, 1966- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/64f4bba079e4a745db1df0f78718e873.pdf adfff0d895f78dba279e225328f214ff PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOV AKIA-2015 129 Jan Rychlik, Magdalena Rychlfkova. Hospodafsky, socialni, kulturni a politicky vyvoj Podkarpatske Rusi 1919 - 1939 (Prague: Studie Narodohospodarskeho ustavu Josefa Hlavky, 2013), 184 pages. Notes, maps, illustrations, along with a German and English Summary. C. WINSTON CHRISLOCK Professor Emeritus University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota Transcarpathian Rus' formed the eastern tip of the First Czechoslovak Republic from 1919 to 1938 and, briefly of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic from October 1938 to mid-March 1939. On November 2, 1939, Hungary annexed the southern, mostly Magyar regions of a by then autonomous Transcarpathian Rus' . On March 16, after the demise of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary annexed the remainder of the region . Soviet forces occupied the area during the final stages of World War II in Europe. In June of 1945 Czechoslovakia agreed to allow the U.S.S.R. to annex Transcarpathian Rus' and both countries ratified the treaty of transfer in November of 1945. From 1945 until 1991 it was part of the Soviet Union's Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 , it remained a province of independent Ukraine. The purpose of the Rychliks' monograph is to describe and evaluate the region during its association with Czechoslovakia in the inner-war period. There was no doubt that the Czechoslovak government took over administration of a very complex and economically primitive province. The Rychliks' account begins with a pre-1919 backround in which they summarize Czech, Magyar and Ukranian sources. They then continue with an historical survey up to 1919. We learn that Transcarpathian Rus' consisted of four Hungarian counties, and that the Rusyn population had not yet developed any sense of national consciousness. The northern half of Transcarpathian Rus' was mountainous and heavily forested while the south was flatter and more suited for agriculture. About two-thirds of of the population were Rusyns who spoke dialects closely related to Ukrainian. Minorities consisted of Magyars, Jews, Romanians, Germans and Roma. Prior to World War I any attempt to codify the Rusyn language was prob- �130 SLOVAKIA-2015 lematic. While Rusyn dialects were close to Ukrainian, the tsarist regime in Russia looked upon Ukrainian as a Russian dialect. That would make Rusyn dialects dialects of a dialect! Austria-Hungary's collapse in 1918 brought political and economic chaos . Rusyn Americans had developed national consciousness by 1914, modelled somewhat on the Slovak experience. In the wake of Austria-Hungary's collapse their leaders lobbied T. G. Masaryk, leader of the Czecho-Slovak independence movement, and President Woodrow Wilson, for a Rusyn association with the new Czechoslovak state, with the understanding that Subcarpathian Rus' would have a large degree of autonomy. Masaryk agreed to this and after military confrontations with Hungary, Poland and indigenous Magyars, the Czechoslovak army, with the support of the United Kingdom, France and the U.S .A., successfully occupied the region by the end of 1919 and maintained sovereignty over it until the German annexation of the Czech lands in March of 1939. The Rychliks' objective was to describe the social, cultural and political problems of the region and then evaluate how the Czechoslovak government dealt with and responded to them. Given the complexity of a region that was blessed (cursed?) with a plethora of nationalities and languages, religions, hostile neighbors, and underdeveloped economy and national consciousness, the Czechoslovak government faced a monumental task. The political problem revolved around autonomy for the area. The 1920 Czechoslovak constitution provided for Subcarpathian Rus ' to send four senators and nine representatives to Czechoslovakia's National Assembly. Czechoslovakia's president, upon recommendation of the government, appointed a governor, whose power was limited, and a vicegovemor, who exercised most administrative powers. Rusyns, both at home and in the U.S.A., were dissatisfied with the lack of autonomy. Complicating the political situation were conflicts among Rusyns, Ukrainofiles, Russofiles, Jews, and Magyars and further conflicts between Russian Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Christians. Economic and infrastructure underdevelopment were also major problems. Before World War I, commerce and transit were basically north and south, while after 1919 these were oriented east-west. Destruction brought on by the war exacerbated these problems. The Rychliks provide maps, railway timetables, and agricultural and eco- �SLOVAKIA-2015 131 nomic data to embellish their account of economic and infrastructure development. The book devotes substantial space to language and education. As both religious and public schools evolved, language became a thorny issue. The Rychliks pointed out that literary languages are artificial, and that was certainly true in Subcarpathian Rus'. Rusyns had not developed a literary language that everybody could agree upon. How could this state establish a network of Schools when Rusyns could not agree if the language and textbooks of instruction should be in Ukranian, Russian, or in a local dialect? What should be the policy toward the minority Ukranian, Russian, Slovak, Czech, Magyar, Hebrew, Yiddish, German, Romanian, Roma Slovak and Czech speakers? The authors concluded that by 1938 there was no final resolution of the language issue. The authors concluded, with reservations, that Subcarpathian Rus' progressed under the first Czechoslovak Republic. However, from the standpoint of political maturity, economic and infrastructure development, literacy, and steps towards the codification of language, the formidable problems listed above retarded its progress. The Rychliks' work is a good companion to Paul R. Magocsi's excellent The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus ', 1848-1948 (1978). The former gives a data-filled account of a twenty-year period in 183 pages, thirty of which are notes, railroad timetables, maps and pictures, while Magocsi provides us with a very readable overview of the development of Subcarpathian Rus' over 100 years, along with a substantial, nearly 100-page, appendix and numerous notes. �132 SLOV AKIA-2015 David Doellinger. Turning Prayers into Based Activism and its Challenge to State Slovakia and East Germany. Budapest: Central Press, 2013. xii-288 pp. Glossary, bibliography, Protests: ReligiousPower in Socialist European University index. JAMES RAMON PELAK University of Washington Poland, no doubt, comes to mind first when one considers the role played by religion and religious institutions in the events and processes leading up to the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe in 1989. David Doellinger reminds us, in his Turning Prayers into Protests, that there were other places in the region where religion was an active and significant force of social mobilization in the fateful developments of the 1980s, most notably Slovakia and East Germany. Doellinger juxtaposes the cases of Slovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in what is a truly comparative work. The focus is on the activists themselves, and the work is organized both thematically and chronologically. Each chapter gives sufficient attention to each situation, examining both cases in terms of a particular aspect of the issue, and establishing the impact and the limitations of the role of religion as a mobilizing force in each locale. Though an historian, Doellinger draws generously from sociology and political science. The author establishes the context for his case studies, attuned to the differences and similarities between them. In Slovakia, he examines the Roman Catholic Church, especially its underground branch, while in the GDR he looks at the official Evangelical Church, a primarily Lutheran institution. Doellinger notes for both cases the differences with regard to the degree of institutional autonomy for the Church, the level of religiosity among the population, and the type of activism . He examines for each state such factors as the social and informational networks established among activists and the processes whereby prayers were transformed into protests in the 1980s. Doellinger decided to do an in-depth study of the Slovak situation after two former Czech dissidents remarked that Slovakia �SLOVAKIA-2015 133 had had no dissidents or independent activism during the communist period, a far cry from reality. As a corrective to such ill-informed views, the author presents the Slovak case in great detail, analyzing the operations of the underground church, situating Catholic activism within the broader context of independent activity in Slovakia, and providing excellent descriptions and analyses of such critical examples of public mobilization as the Velehrad pilgrimage of 1985 (drawing from 100,000 to 250,000 participants), the petition for religious freedom of 1988 (signed by 300,000 to 400,000 Slovaks), and the Good Friday demonstration of March 25 , 1988 in Bratislava. Doellinger notes the crucial role played by Karol Wojtila who, as Archbishop of Krakow, was a friend and supporter of the underground church in Slovakia, ordaining secret clergy in the 1970s. As Pope John Paul II, he gave a voice to the persecuted Church, condemned the government-sponsored Pacem in Terris organization of Czechoslovak clergy, successfully encouraged Prague ' s Archbishop Frantisek Tomasek to become more assertive on behalf of religious freedom, and energized Catholics in Slovakia and elsewhere . With respect to the GDR, Doellinger notes the strong influence of the Evangelical Church, made possible by its considerable autonomy, which enabled it to provide crucial support for independent activity. The church promoted and defended the so-called Bausoldaten, young men who served in non-combat units beside the East German military on grounds of conscientious objection to war and militarism . It provided meeting space, access to publishing, and other supports for peace, environmental, and social justice-oriented groups. Doellinger notes both the advantages enjoyed and constraints faced by activists on account of this close connection with the Evangelical Church. Doellinger's work is especially valuable thanks to the type and array of sources he uses. Along with reports on religious activism and a large and diverse amount of religious samizdat found in more than a dozen archives, he has interviewed scores of activists, examined local church and government records for the GDR, and gained access to at least four private collections of former activists. A few relatively minor criticisms are in order. Though this book is expressly not a study of the inner-workings of the regime in its dealings with religion, the author might have done more with the records of the Czechoslovak Office for Church Affairs. This �134 SLOV AKIA-2015 organization did a competent job in monitoring religion in Czechoslovakia and might contain useful information about the underground church and other forms of Catholic activism. And the subsections marked "Summary" near the end of each chapter sometimes do much more than summarize, but rather introduce important new material and perspectives not found earlier. Doellinger's work is an extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of the late communist period in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to the processes that brought about the collapse of communist regimes in 1989, and to the important role played by religion in these developments. Though genuinely comparative, and insightfully so, the book does maintain the distinction between the two states, so a reader whose interest lies more in Slovakia than in the GDR would have no problem accessing the parts of the book specific to the Slovak Socialist Republic. James Mace Ward. Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia. Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 2013. xii, 362 pp., ill., notes, index. $39 .95 . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University James Mace Ward has written a first-rate biography of Jozef Tiso, the only Roman Catholic priest, aside from the pope, to lead a modem European country. For his efforts, Ward received Honorable Mention in a 2014 competition of the premier North American scholarly organization, the Association for Slavic, East European, & Eurasian Studies Reginald Zelnik Book Prize. It is awarded annually for an outstanding monograph published on Russia, Eastern Europe or Eurasia in the field of history in the previous year. In his Preface, the author avers that he is "deeply committed to providing as accurate an account of this life as I can." (xi) He has accomplished this task by conducting extensive research using Czech, English, German, Hungarian, and Slovak sources. Yet, Ward modestly apologizes that he did not have enough time to conduct more research for his book. As Ward shows, the life of Father Jozef Tiso remains multi-faceted, complicated, and controversial. One can characterize his ca- �SLOV AKIA-2015 135 reer as opportunistic and full of contradictions. Before 1918, Tiso seemed destined to rise in the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, and, as such, proved to be a loyal Hungarian - a charge that would haunt him for the rest of his life. By the conclusion of the First World War he became more nationally astute, and with the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia, he turned to politics with a Catholic and Christian social agenda subsumed by Slovak nationalism. Throughout his political life, Tiso became a master at organization, infighting, outmaneuvering, playing the various sides, and skillfully deflecting criticism by blaming others for his own faults and actions. He preferred to be ambiguous rather than take responsibility . Despite being a political animal, Tiso found time almost every Sunday from the 1920s until 1945 to celebrate Mass. In 1918, Ward continues, with the state in flux, Tiso became the secretary of the Slovak National Council in Nitra, and helped coordinate its occupation by Czecho-Slovak forces while attacking Jews as usurers, war profiteers, and revolutionaries. As the situation stabilized, Tiso joined Father Andrej Hlinka' s Slovak People ' s ("I:udak") Party, abandoned his anti-Semitism, and became a political moderate who feared secularization. He served first in the Czechoslovak Parliament and then as Minister of Public Health and Physical Education (1927-1929) where his accomplishments were modest. By the early 1930s, Tiso became Hlinka' s heir, but had to fend off a new generation of radical I:udak rivals who often thwarted his goals. Until 1938, he attempted to reconcile the I:udaks with the government and outflank "Godless" socialists. By then, since he realized he would no longer serve in the government, Tiso turned on Czechoslovakia by demanding greater autonomy for Slovakia. With the Republic failing, he conducted talks with Hungary and Poland about Slovakia' s future while still maintaining a dialogue with Prague. After the 1938 Munich Crisis, Ward continues, Tiso blamed the Jews and the Czechs for the diktat while tightening his control over his party . He vacillated on Slovak independence since he did not want to be viewed as the person who destroyed Czechoslovakia, but when it became inevitable, he embraced it and took control of Slovakia despite opposition from the Holy See. Tiso saw the Slovak State as a step forward for national consciousness and confidence. As vodca, or leader of independent Slovakia, he ordered no political executions and traveled freely with few bodyguards. Yet, he allied with �136 SLOV AKIA-2015 Nazi Germany and occasionally resisted its demands, but backed the deportation of two-thirds of Slovakia's Jews. By 1943, as the war seemed lost, Tiso became conciliatory towards a reconstituted Czechoslovakia but did not understand the strength of the underground plotting the Slovak National Uprising (SNP) in the summer of 1944. Deeply hurt by the thought that Slovaks opposed his regime, Tiso nonetheless ordered the suppression of the SNP that resulted in the German occupation of Slovakia. In his last radio address as his government crumbled, Tiso portrayed himself as a martyr. Arrested by the Americans, and turned over to the Czechoslovak authorities, Tiso's trial, according to Ward, became a travesty of justice dominated by unprofessional judges, packed courts, and political manipulations that assured a negative judgment. During the show trial, Tiso received the blame for, among other things, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the Holocaust, and the failure of the SNP. Sentenced to death, and despite a popular outcry in Slovakia, the court and central government denied his and influential requests for clemency while his co-defendants and counterparts in the Czech Lands received lesser sentences. The Communists used Tiso ' s trial and execution as a political tool against the Slovak Democrats in their bid for power. After Tiso ' s death in 194 7, Ward continues, Tiso remained controversial. Slovak emigres turned him into an anti-Communist patriot martyr who was a victim of circumstances. Meanwhile, communist Czechoslovakia portrayed him as a clerical-fascist war criminal. After the fall of Communism in 1989, Tiso resurfaced as a destabilizing factor in Czechoslovak politics. Emigres, supported by the cultural institution Matica slovenska and, sometimes, the Ministry of Education, attempted to rehabilitate Tiso, but historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences parried this effort after reasserting their independent academic credentials, thereby presenting a more balanced and scholarly perspective. The issue in today's Slovakia remains a "grey" topic in which Tiso is neither popular nor condemned. This objective biography will remain a classic in English as Tiso will no longer be presented in simple black and white terms as in the past. It is an excellent source for students of nationalism, political Catholicism, the history of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia, and postCommunism. It is a shame that Ward ' s book did not win the Zelnik �SLOV AKIA-2015 137 Book Prize which would have given it greater notoriety and exposure. Miroslav Londak. Ekonomicke reformy v Ceskoslovensku v 50. a 60. Rokoch 20. storocia a slovenskti ekonomika. Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2010 . 295pp. Bibliography, English summary, index of names. MARTIN POSPISIL CERGE-EI, and Charles University, Prague Ever since the communist and capitalist economic systems began competing in the 1920s, economists and historians have explored the efficiency, performance, and stability of these systems. Today, there is a general consensus that Soviet-style Communism failed. At the same time, there is still a limited understanding of how the communist economic system was built, especially in smaller countries . Miroslav Londak tries to bridge this gap and focuses on economic development in Slovakia after the 2nd World War. Londak's book is a well-researched publication aimed at better understanding of the Slovak industrialization, economic system-building, and reconstruction within the Czechoslovakia of the 1950s and 1960s. To explain the Slovak post-war economic reforms, Londak adopted a descriptive methodology that required an analysis of a long list of statistical publications, documents, and speeches. Like a good historian, he picked up a great deal about the concerns and problems that drove the building of the economic system of the time. For the novice there is much to be learned here. For example, in the Introduction (p.9), he rightly notes that it is often forgotten how much of today ' s economic development of Slovakia is linked to the decades of the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia. The book notes the astonishing pace of communist socioeconomic reforms. For example, the author describes the amazing speed of post-War Czechoslovak asset nationalization and collectivization. Londak rightly stresses an important point (sometimes forgotten in related debates) that many policies associated with the Communists (e.g. nationalization) had actually been introduced by President Benes during 1945-1948, before the Communists fully took power. The publication also analyses federalization tendencies in �138 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovakia and various efforts to reform the inefficient Soviet-style economic system: e.g. the First and Second economic reforms in the 1950s and 1960s, reform ideas related to the Prague Spring, as well as the hopeless attempts to reform the economy in the 1980s. Londak's book contains a lot of statistical data and references to original documents to illustrate the point. In his research, the author includes documents - often very rare ones - to show the development of various sectors of the economy, the level of industrialization, or employment. Certain statistics are telling: While in 1947, 80% of Czechoslovak exports went to the West, this share gradually decreased to 12-25% in only one decade. Another statistic nicely illustrates the continuous emigration from Slovakia. Around 220,000 people left Slovakia between WW I and WW II, which created a large job market mismatch . Despite providing a lot of information, however, the book suffers from several drawbacks. First, it stops short of where it should ideally begin. In the Introduction, Londak asks an important question: Is it possible to successfully reform Soviet-Style Communism? While the consensus today is that such a reform is not possible, Londak does not try to answer the question. In many ways, a descriptive approach based on statistical data produced by communist state agencies is not appropriate to explain the development and the failure of Czech and Slovak communist economies. Good examples are the flawed data on employment in sectors. Due to enormous overemployment in the economy, information on sectoral employment does not bring much value apart from a simple description of how the communist planners wanted to allocate the labor force across various sectors of the economy . Second, the monograph devotes only limited space to analyzing why Czechoslovakia adopted that particular set of economic reforms. While it is clear that Stalin was pushing for certain policies, not all Central and Eastern European satellites built the same socioeconomic system . There were strong differences, for example, between Polish, Hungarian, but naturally also between Yugoslav and Czechoslovak systems. It would have been useful to analyze why Czechoslovakia adopted the implemented the set of policies it adopted. In this respect, the book could also better analyze the "starting blocks" of Czechoslovak reforms. As these reforms were mainly coming from Soviet blueprints, the book would deserve at least a �SLOV AKIA-2015 139 short summary of the Soviet pre-1945 legacy: e.g. the Russian Civil War, the New Economic Policy, the Five Year Plans, Stalinism, collectivization, or central planning which were all part of this new Soviet experience, instrumental for Czechoslovak post-war policy making. Third, the book relies solely on Czech or Slovak literature. Of 234 items in the bibliography, only nine have been published outside (the former) Czechoslovakia. While it is natural that local literature serves as the primary source of this type of research, it would have been more than appropriate to also refer to e.g. Soviet or Polish literature. Moreover, as the book is narrowly focused on Slovak economic development, the question of the Hungarian minority would deserve better analysis again with a reference to Hungarian scholars in this area. The reader also feels overwhelmed by the amount of statistical data presented in the book. The strong emphasis on descriptive statistics without a clear message is often confusing (e.g. on pp.115-120). Some tables might have been better explained as figures, graphs, or even better maps. Crucially, while presenting many tables, Londak devotes too little space to linking the data with the story in the text and he misses the opportunity to explain why things happened the way they happened. Why were Czechs and Slovaks so willing to introduce communist measures, which in a few decades ruined the economy? How was it possible to establish the totalitarian regime so effectively and so quickly? Why were Communists not able to implement their economic plans? These are questions that can hardly be explained using communist statistical data, whose reliability is uncertain. The book would deserve a disclaimer at the beginning noting the limitations of the use of these data. Moreover, while Czech and Slovak economic disparities are analyzed sufficiently, more focus could have been put on regional, within-country variation. For example, how did Bratislava compare with the east of Slovakia over time? Which were the poorest regions and did they pick up over time? Which regions benefitted from industrialization, which did not, and why? And most of all, how did the life of an ordinary citizen look? These questions are unanswered. To supplement the collection of statistical data, Londak's publication would benefit from interviews with those concerned. These could have been either communist decision makers, their relatives, or �140 SLOV AKIA-2015 those affected by the decisions. Londa.k' s book contains only a few of these "human" elements: for example, to illustrate the absurd bureaucratic decision-making within the communist economic system, the book mentions the story of a director who had to sign 100,000 documents in one month (p.127). The publication would benefit from more of these little stories to illustrate the point. Doing so would make the book less dry and more "human" (A good example of this approach is Anne Applebaum ' s Iron Curtain: The Crushing Of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956) . Finally, the book lacks a clear motivation for any international reader. How is the economic development of Slovakia in the 1950s and 1960s relevant for today? There are at least several issues that matter beyond Slovakia: the distribution of power, subsidiarity and local nationalism (e.g. relevant for the EU today), the limits of government strategy planning and supply side economic policy (relevant for any policy-makers, especially in post-Soviet countries), or the analysis of Slovak industrialization (relevant for many developing countries). Unfortunately, none of this is mentioned in the book. When reading Londa.k' s monograph, one does not - and cannot understand the cruelty, violence and targeted threats to political opponents, which all were associated with the economic reforms. The communist economy was built on terror, propaganda, harassment, and persecution. Londak presents the era of Czechoslovak communist-building of the 1950s and 1960s as a game of statistical numbers and often failed economic policy-making. This is a dangerous approach as too many lives were lost during this era. So why did the communist economic system fail, including in Slovakia? Let's mention two factors . First, the explanation is actually presented in the words of economist Ota Sik (p.132) who noted in the 1960s that communist enterprises would not become efficient or innovative unless or until the consumer drove the production process. This key point, which helps to explain the inherent inefficiency of the communist economic system, would deserve a better analysis. Another factor (briefly mentioned on p.151) is that price in a centrally planned economy is completely unrelated to objective economic conditions. In a market economy, price is a result of equality between supply and demand and as a result it provides the key information to consumers and producers. Consumers can compare products based on price and producers can compete on producing with �SLOV AKIA-2015 141 the lowest costs so that their price is low. Finally, market price is information to potential producers who know that if they are able to produce the same product with a lower price, they will succeed. As such, market price is the ultimate driver of economic development. However, in a centrally planned economy, price fulfils none of these functions as it is administratively set with no reference to market conditions. This leads to the ultimate failure of the system. To conclude, Ekonomicke reformy is a well-researched book, which analyzes an important topic using a large number of original Czechoslovak sources. Londak has tried to tell the story of the Slovak post-war economy, which has an impact on today's economic structure and performance. However, the main message of the publication gets lost in dubious communist statistical data, and the story is not well connected. Regrettably, while being a good reference point, the publication misses an important opportunity to probe why the post-war economy of Slovakia was built the way it was built, why it failed, and why it matters for today. The descriptive approach based on flawed communist statistics left the most important questions unanswered . Jan Carnogursky. Dennik,1994-2007. Presov: Michal Vasko, 2013, 190 pp. Afterword by Ondrej Podolec, index of names. JANRYCHLIK Charles University, Prague Jan Carnogursky (b. 1944) was one of the leading figures of the anti-Communist dissident movement in Czechoslovakia between 1969 and 1989 and also an important personality in Slovak politics after November of 1989. In February of 1990 he founded the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the right-of the center political party which became part of the Slovak government coalition after the first free elections in June of 1990. After the so-called "Velvet Revolution" (November, 1990) he was a Deputy Prime Minister in the Federal government of Marian Calfa and simultaneously a Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak government of Milan Cic. After the first free elections (8 - 9 June 1990), when the KDH joined in a coalition with the Public Against Violence (VPN), Carnogursky was a Deputy Prime Minister in the first government of Vladimir Meciar �142 SLOV AKIA-2015 (than a nominee of the VPN), and after the split of the VPN and the fall of Meciar, he was appointed Slovak Prime Minister (April 23 , 1991). After the second free elections (5 - 6 June 1992) which Meciar's new party - the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) won, the KDH ended in opposition . Carnogursky was the leading figure of the opposition against Meciar' s non-democratic and autocratic rule which sometimes even used criminal methods and violence against its opponents and led to the international isolation of Slovakia. Carnogursky participated in the establishment of a new party - the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) led by Mikulas Dzurinda and was appointed Minister of Justice in Dzurinda's broad anti-Meciar coalition government (October 30, 1998 - October 15, 2002). Throughout this period Carnogursky was a deputy in the Slovak National Council (the Slovak Parliament) for the KDH (with the exception of the period when he was the Minister of Justice). Carnogursky ' s diary covers the period from August 27, 1994 to June 24, 2007. His notes of the events are usually short and illustrate the attitude of Slovakia towards some important international events. However, the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Dayton agreement in 1995 and the bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999 are surprisingly missing. It is difficult to say whether Carnogursky did not consider these events worthy of notice or whether they were in the diary but he decided not to publish them . Carnogursky noted his discussions with various political leaders, diplomats and church functionaries . The diary sheds some light on new and important facts about the background of important events in the history of Slovakia of the past two decades, mainly : the political struggle against the HZDS and Vladimir Meciar, the formation of a broad anti-Meciar coalition; and international problems, mainly Slovak relations with Hungary, the USA and Russia. However, from the diary we can learn more about Carnogursky's standpoints than about the events themselves. To understand the diary properly, it is not only necessary to know Slovak political history of the past twenty-five years, but also to know something about Carnogursky 's political and family backgrounds and his ideas and thinking. Carnogursky is a conservative Catholic politician who, on the one hand was active in the dissident movement and struggle against Communism, but on the other hand he has always been critical of �SLOVAKIA-2015 143 American foreign policy and Western liberalism and secularism. While he criticized and opposed the policy of the former Soviet Union, after the fall of Communism Carnogursky advocated cooperation with Russia and saw Russian Orthodox Christianity as a source of spiritual revival of the western Christian world. His views, however, are not always accepted in today's Slovakia. Knowing this, it cannot surprise anyone that the diary reveals Carnogursky's opposition to Slovakia'a admittance to NATO and his friendly relations with Russia. Carnogursky ' s diary is certainly worth reading and may be useful for historians trying to understand the history of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and of Central Europe in general in the period 1994-2007. Robert M. Zecker. Race and America 's Immigrant Press: How the Slovaks were Taught to Think Like White People. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013. 348pp. Notes, illustrations, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Robet M. Zecker claims that "This is the book I didn ' t want to write. At least not at first" (page 1). Since Zecker is of partial Slovak-American heritage, he was shocked by the racial references he found in the Slovak-American press from the l 890's to the l 940's while working on his University of Pennsylvania dissertation on the Slovak-American community in Philadelphia. After some reflection, and more research, he decided to document the rise of racism among Slovaks and Rusyns (and Eastern Europeans in general) in the United States, as reflected in their newspaper press. He felt that this side of the story had not previously been covered by scholars of Eastern European immigration to the United States of America. Zecker traced the rise of racism in the Slavic-American press to the enaction of Jim Crow laws in the American South in the l 890's and the subsequent lynching of several thousand Black-Americans. Initially, editors of ethnic newspapers were horrified by reports of lynchings in the South, but, within a decade, the horror changed to mere reporting or even agreement with the lynchings . Why? Zecker argues that Slavic-Americans, fearful of their own status as unskilled �144 SLOV AKIA-2015 laborers almost at the bottom of the social ladder, were glad that Blacks and Asians were below them still, and therefore, more inferior than themselves. Indeed, Slavic-Americans soon bought into the theory of "whiteness," whereby they (or their children) would eventually become respected members of the middle-class, which, of course, was white. Once they bought into America's racist society and its social hierarchy, Slavic Americans began to "ape the WASPS," as the expression goes. Their newspapers approvingly reproduced not only reports of lynchings of Blacks in the American South, but also advertisements that featured gross stereotypes of Blacks, which portrayed them as primitive savages. Furthermore, most Slavic-American neighborhoods, which often had Slovak Halls, Rusyn Halls, Polish Halls, etc. staged minstrel shows in the l 920's and l 930's, as did "mainstream" American neighborhood theaters. Finally, most Slavic Americans, like those who came before them, did not want Blacks to move into their neighborhoods and resisted government-led integration efforts in the 1960's and 1970's. In becoming "Americans," Slavic-Americans adopted the racist attitudes of their white predecessors. As Zecker predicted, this is a disturbing book. Most of the histories of the Southern and Eastern Europeans, who came to the United States in search of work and a better life in the l 870's to the l 920's, have focused on their slow, but steady rise on the American social ladder. Unfortunately, most historians have also ignored how these immigrants and their children had to adapt to American society by adopting the racist attitudes of their predecessors and become "white" in the process. The book suffers from only two deficiencies, perhaps caused by the publisher. The first is that the copious footnotes (pp. 253-308) appear at the back of the book, making it extremely tedious for the historian to read. The second is that Zecker did not separate his listing of periodicals from books and articles in the bibliography. It would have been instructive to discover, for instance, how many years (and which years) of Jednota, or Amerikansky russky viestnik, and other ethnic newspapers he had read. On the other hand, Zecker fulfilled very well his duties as an historian. He deeply mined the rich archival resources of the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota, the archives of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies at the Pennsylvania �SLOV AKIA-2015 145 Historical Society in Philadelphia, the New York Public Library, and several others. Finally, Zecker read most of the important books and articles relating to immigration to North America in the last 130 years. He is to be commended for a job well-done. M . Mark Stolarik. Where is My Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (1870-2010) . [Immigration from Europe to North America, Vol. l] Bern : Peter Lang, 2012 . xix, 392 pp. Notes, illustrations, bibliography, index . $99.95. WILLIAM J. GALUSH Loyola University of Chicago (retired) This is an excellent overview of Slovaks in the tumultuous period from the late nineteenth century to the present, thoughtfully and engagingly portrayed through the experiences of one family. Mark Stolarik seeks to combine the personal with the general in history and succeeds admirably. The fami li al dimension benefits from numerous interviews by the author while he relies on his extensive reading and archival research on Slovak immigration for the larger narrative. The story of Slovaks, an oppresed minority within the multiethnic Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, shows them seeking improvement both by departure elsewhere and striving to develop a sense of common identity in the homeland in the face of strenuous efforts by their Hungarian overlords to magyarize them . The transoceanic aspect is important and the author demonstrates enduring connections which significantly influenced the homeland. About a third of immigrants to North America returned, and as with the Poles in my own research, brought back a heightened sense of Slovak identity and a desire for a more modem lifestyle which stimulated their viII ages. Lacking the equivalent of Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian province essentially under Polish control from the late nineteenth century, Slovaks in America took on a greater role in supporting nationalism in the homeland through their fraternalbenefit societies and the Slovak League of Amerca (f. 1907). �146 SLOV AKIA-2015 The theme of Slovak nationalism infonns the narrative. The World War I agreements to create a federal Czecho-Slovakia were subverted by T. G. Masaryk and his followers. The variations among the diaspora, with the Roman Catholics being the most nationalistic, emerge clearly and the author gives a nuanced and sympathetic account of interwar patriotism and the emergence of an independent Slovakia in 1939. With reunification after 1945, Slovaks abroad were the only ones able to articulate a nationalist position. Support for the united country came mainly from a tiny leftist element and from some Lutheran Slovaks . The post-1989 era offered the opportunity for the reappearance of an independent Slovakia and Stolarik clearly rejoices at the success of the effort. The Stolariks were strivers. Some went to the United States while others remained at home, seeking through education and white collar employment to elevate their status. Imrich, father of Mark, became the city assessor of Martin and led a comfortable existence even during World War II, continuing government employment under the newly independent Slovak Republic. The defeat of their Gennan sponsors and fears of a communist Czechoslovakia prompted Imrich and his family to flee to Austria, where Mark and his siblings lived until they were able to move to Canada. The author's parents had a strong interest in education and nationalism and encouraged participation in ethnic activities in the new land . This speaks to the question of identity in the title wherein ethnic consciousness sustained a sense of self and group despite multiple changes of government and location. Family was also a major factor in making a living, with aid in getting jobs and infonnation on the new land helpful in adjustment and upward mobility. One of the most engaging aspects of the book is the use of familial anecdote to bring life to history . For example, during World War II female relatives of the author, needing to milk goats in a time of food scarcity, persuaded nearby soldiers to stop shelling so the animals would calm down! Stolarik also offers accounts of misleading meddling communist officials while his homeland relatives provided shelter, assistance and advice during his research in Slovakia. The larger narrative would benefit from greater acknowledgement of variety . The author likely overstates the general persistence of the immigrant vision of an enclosed Slovak identity in the �SLOVAKIA-2015 147 second generation. In Minneapolis, with five Polish (and one Slovak) Catholic parishes, marriages at the largest Polish congregation by 1940 recorded over 50% with one non-Polish spouse, and the greater paucity of Slovaks might well have fostered such patterns there or elsewhere. In this regard Stolarik is better in the helpful comparison of American and Canadian Slovak development, noting contrasts as well as similarities and offering plausible interpretations for variety. The book is a stimulating study which will repay the attention of scholars and interesting laypersons alike. � REVIEWS ��SLOV AKIA-2015 129 Jan Rychlik, Magdalena Rychlfkova. Hospodafsky, socialni, kulturni a politicky vyvoj Podkarpatske Rusi 1919 - 1939 (Prague: Studie Narodohospodarskeho ustavu Josefa Hlavky, 2013), 184 pages. Notes, maps, illustrations, along with a German and English Summary. C. WINSTON CHRISLOCK Professor Emeritus University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota Transcarpathian Rus' formed the eastern tip of the First Czechoslovak Republic from 1919 to 1938 and, briefly of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic from October 1938 to mid-March 1939. On November 2, 1939, Hungary annexed the southern, mostly Magyar regions of a by then autonomous Transcarpathian Rus' . On March 16, after the demise of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary annexed the remainder of the region . Soviet forces occupied the area during the final stages of World War II in Europe. In June of 1945 Czechoslovakia agreed to allow the U.S.S.R. to annex Transcarpathian Rus' and both countries ratified the treaty of transfer in November of 1945. From 1945 until 1991 it was part of the Soviet Union's Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 , it remained a province of independent Ukraine. The purpose of the Rychliks' monograph is to describe and evaluate the region during its association with Czechoslovakia in the inner-war period. There was no doubt that the Czechoslovak government took over administration of a very complex and economically primitive province. The Rychliks' account begins with a pre-1919 backround in which they summarize Czech, Magyar and Ukranian sources. They then continue with an historical survey up to 1919. We learn that Transcarpathian Rus' consisted of four Hungarian counties, and that the Rusyn population had not yet developed any sense of national consciousness. The northern half of Transcarpathian Rus' was mountainous and heavily forested while the south was flatter and more suited for agriculture. About two-thirds of of the population were Rusyns who spoke dialects closely related to Ukrainian. Minorities consisted of Magyars, Jews, Romanians, Germans and Roma. Prior to World War I any attempt to codify the Rusyn language was prob- �130 SLOVAKIA-2015 lematic. While Rusyn dialects were close to Ukrainian, the tsarist regime in Russia looked upon Ukrainian as a Russian dialect. That would make Rusyn dialects dialects of a dialect! Austria-Hungary's collapse in 1918 brought political and economic chaos . Rusyn Americans had developed national consciousness by 1914, modelled somewhat on the Slovak experience. In the wake of Austria-Hungary's collapse their leaders lobbied T. G. Masaryk, leader of the Czecho-Slovak independence movement, and President Woodrow Wilson, for a Rusyn association with the new Czechoslovak state, with the understanding that Subcarpathian Rus' would have a large degree of autonomy. Masaryk agreed to this and after military confrontations with Hungary, Poland and indigenous Magyars, the Czechoslovak army, with the support of the United Kingdom, France and the U.S .A., successfully occupied the region by the end of 1919 and maintained sovereignty over it until the German annexation of the Czech lands in March of 1939. The Rychliks' objective was to describe the social, cultural and political problems of the region and then evaluate how the Czechoslovak government dealt with and responded to them. Given the complexity of a region that was blessed (cursed?) with a plethora of nationalities and languages, religions, hostile neighbors, and underdeveloped economy and national consciousness, the Czechoslovak government faced a monumental task. The political problem revolved around autonomy for the area. The 1920 Czechoslovak constitution provided for Subcarpathian Rus ' to send four senators and nine representatives to Czechoslovakia's National Assembly. Czechoslovakia's president, upon recommendation of the government, appointed a governor, whose power was limited, and a vicegovemor, who exercised most administrative powers. Rusyns, both at home and in the U.S.A., were dissatisfied with the lack of autonomy. Complicating the political situation were conflicts among Rusyns, Ukrainofiles, Russofiles, Jews, and Magyars and further conflicts between Russian Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Christians. Economic and infrastructure underdevelopment were also major problems. Before World War I, commerce and transit were basically north and south, while after 1919 these were oriented east-west. Destruction brought on by the war exacerbated these problems. The Rychliks provide maps, railway timetables, and agricultural and eco- �SLOVAKIA-2015 131 nomic data to embellish their account of economic and infrastructure development. The book devotes substantial space to language and education. As both religious and public schools evolved, language became a thorny issue. The Rychliks pointed out that literary languages are artificial, and that was certainly true in Subcarpathian Rus'. Rusyns had not developed a literary language that everybody could agree upon. How could this state establish a network of Schools when Rusyns could not agree if the language and textbooks of instruction should be in Ukranian, Russian, or in a local dialect? What should be the policy toward the minority Ukranian, Russian, Slovak, Czech, Magyar, Hebrew, Yiddish, German, Romanian, Roma Slovak and Czech speakers? The authors concluded that by 1938 there was no final resolution of the language issue. The authors concluded, with reservations, that Subcarpathian Rus' progressed under the first Czechoslovak Republic. However, from the standpoint of political maturity, economic and infrastructure development, literacy, and steps towards the codification of language, the formidable problems listed above retarded its progress. The Rychliks' work is a good companion to Paul R. Magocsi's excellent The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus ', 1848-1948 (1978). The former gives a data-filled account of a twenty-year period in 183 pages, thirty of which are notes, railroad timetables, maps and pictures, while Magocsi provides us with a very readable overview of the development of Subcarpathian Rus' over 100 years, along with a substantial, nearly 100-page, appendix and numerous notes. �132 SLOV AKIA-2015 David Doellinger. Turning Prayers into Based Activism and its Challenge to State Slovakia and East Germany. Budapest: Central Press, 2013. xii-288 pp. Glossary, bibliography, Protests: ReligiousPower in Socialist European University index. JAMES RAMON PELAK University of Washington Poland, no doubt, comes to mind first when one considers the role played by religion and religious institutions in the events and processes leading up to the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe in 1989. David Doellinger reminds us, in his Turning Prayers into Protests, that there were other places in the region where religion was an active and significant force of social mobilization in the fateful developments of the 1980s, most notably Slovakia and East Germany. Doellinger juxtaposes the cases of Slovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in what is a truly comparative work. The focus is on the activists themselves, and the work is organized both thematically and chronologically. Each chapter gives sufficient attention to each situation, examining both cases in terms of a particular aspect of the issue, and establishing the impact and the limitations of the role of religion as a mobilizing force in each locale. Though an historian, Doellinger draws generously from sociology and political science. The author establishes the context for his case studies, attuned to the differences and similarities between them. In Slovakia, he examines the Roman Catholic Church, especially its underground branch, while in the GDR he looks at the official Evangelical Church, a primarily Lutheran institution. Doellinger notes for both cases the differences with regard to the degree of institutional autonomy for the Church, the level of religiosity among the population, and the type of activism . He examines for each state such factors as the social and informational networks established among activists and the processes whereby prayers were transformed into protests in the 1980s. Doellinger decided to do an in-depth study of the Slovak situation after two former Czech dissidents remarked that Slovakia �SLOVAKIA-2015 133 had had no dissidents or independent activism during the communist period, a far cry from reality. As a corrective to such ill-informed views, the author presents the Slovak case in great detail, analyzing the operations of the underground church, situating Catholic activism within the broader context of independent activity in Slovakia, and providing excellent descriptions and analyses of such critical examples of public mobilization as the Velehrad pilgrimage of 1985 (drawing from 100,000 to 250,000 participants), the petition for religious freedom of 1988 (signed by 300,000 to 400,000 Slovaks), and the Good Friday demonstration of March 25 , 1988 in Bratislava. Doellinger notes the crucial role played by Karol Wojtila who, as Archbishop of Krakow, was a friend and supporter of the underground church in Slovakia, ordaining secret clergy in the 1970s. As Pope John Paul II, he gave a voice to the persecuted Church, condemned the government-sponsored Pacem in Terris organization of Czechoslovak clergy, successfully encouraged Prague ' s Archbishop Frantisek Tomasek to become more assertive on behalf of religious freedom, and energized Catholics in Slovakia and elsewhere . With respect to the GDR, Doellinger notes the strong influence of the Evangelical Church, made possible by its considerable autonomy, which enabled it to provide crucial support for independent activity. The church promoted and defended the so-called Bausoldaten, young men who served in non-combat units beside the East German military on grounds of conscientious objection to war and militarism . It provided meeting space, access to publishing, and other supports for peace, environmental, and social justice-oriented groups. Doellinger notes both the advantages enjoyed and constraints faced by activists on account of this close connection with the Evangelical Church. Doellinger's work is especially valuable thanks to the type and array of sources he uses. Along with reports on religious activism and a large and diverse amount of religious samizdat found in more than a dozen archives, he has interviewed scores of activists, examined local church and government records for the GDR, and gained access to at least four private collections of former activists. A few relatively minor criticisms are in order. Though this book is expressly not a study of the inner-workings of the regime in its dealings with religion, the author might have done more with the records of the Czechoslovak Office for Church Affairs. This �134 SLOV AKIA-2015 organization did a competent job in monitoring religion in Czechoslovakia and might contain useful information about the underground church and other forms of Catholic activism. And the subsections marked "Summary" near the end of each chapter sometimes do much more than summarize, but rather introduce important new material and perspectives not found earlier. Doellinger's work is an extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of the late communist period in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to the processes that brought about the collapse of communist regimes in 1989, and to the important role played by religion in these developments. Though genuinely comparative, and insightfully so, the book does maintain the distinction between the two states, so a reader whose interest lies more in Slovakia than in the GDR would have no problem accessing the parts of the book specific to the Slovak Socialist Republic. James Mace Ward. Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia. Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 2013. xii, 362 pp., ill., notes, index. $39 .95 . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University James Mace Ward has written a first-rate biography of Jozef Tiso, the only Roman Catholic priest, aside from the pope, to lead a modem European country. For his efforts, Ward received Honorable Mention in a 2014 competition of the premier North American scholarly organization, the Association for Slavic, East European, & Eurasian Studies Reginald Zelnik Book Prize. It is awarded annually for an outstanding monograph published on Russia, Eastern Europe or Eurasia in the field of history in the previous year. In his Preface, the author avers that he is "deeply committed to providing as accurate an account of this life as I can." (xi) He has accomplished this task by conducting extensive research using Czech, English, German, Hungarian, and Slovak sources. Yet, Ward modestly apologizes that he did not have enough time to conduct more research for his book. As Ward shows, the life of Father Jozef Tiso remains multi-faceted, complicated, and controversial. One can characterize his ca- �SLOV AKIA-2015 135 reer as opportunistic and full of contradictions. Before 1918, Tiso seemed destined to rise in the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, and, as such, proved to be a loyal Hungarian - a charge that would haunt him for the rest of his life. By the conclusion of the First World War he became more nationally astute, and with the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia, he turned to politics with a Catholic and Christian social agenda subsumed by Slovak nationalism. Throughout his political life, Tiso became a master at organization, infighting, outmaneuvering, playing the various sides, and skillfully deflecting criticism by blaming others for his own faults and actions. He preferred to be ambiguous rather than take responsibility . Despite being a political animal, Tiso found time almost every Sunday from the 1920s until 1945 to celebrate Mass. In 1918, Ward continues, with the state in flux, Tiso became the secretary of the Slovak National Council in Nitra, and helped coordinate its occupation by Czecho-Slovak forces while attacking Jews as usurers, war profiteers, and revolutionaries. As the situation stabilized, Tiso joined Father Andrej Hlinka' s Slovak People ' s ("I:udak") Party, abandoned his anti-Semitism, and became a political moderate who feared secularization. He served first in the Czechoslovak Parliament and then as Minister of Public Health and Physical Education (1927-1929) where his accomplishments were modest. By the early 1930s, Tiso became Hlinka' s heir, but had to fend off a new generation of radical I:udak rivals who often thwarted his goals. Until 1938, he attempted to reconcile the I:udaks with the government and outflank "Godless" socialists. By then, since he realized he would no longer serve in the government, Tiso turned on Czechoslovakia by demanding greater autonomy for Slovakia. With the Republic failing, he conducted talks with Hungary and Poland about Slovakia' s future while still maintaining a dialogue with Prague. After the 1938 Munich Crisis, Ward continues, Tiso blamed the Jews and the Czechs for the diktat while tightening his control over his party . He vacillated on Slovak independence since he did not want to be viewed as the person who destroyed Czechoslovakia, but when it became inevitable, he embraced it and took control of Slovakia despite opposition from the Holy See. Tiso saw the Slovak State as a step forward for national consciousness and confidence. As vodca, or leader of independent Slovakia, he ordered no political executions and traveled freely with few bodyguards. Yet, he allied with �136 SLOV AKIA-2015 Nazi Germany and occasionally resisted its demands, but backed the deportation of two-thirds of Slovakia's Jews. By 1943, as the war seemed lost, Tiso became conciliatory towards a reconstituted Czechoslovakia but did not understand the strength of the underground plotting the Slovak National Uprising (SNP) in the summer of 1944. Deeply hurt by the thought that Slovaks opposed his regime, Tiso nonetheless ordered the suppression of the SNP that resulted in the German occupation of Slovakia. In his last radio address as his government crumbled, Tiso portrayed himself as a martyr. Arrested by the Americans, and turned over to the Czechoslovak authorities, Tiso's trial, according to Ward, became a travesty of justice dominated by unprofessional judges, packed courts, and political manipulations that assured a negative judgment. During the show trial, Tiso received the blame for, among other things, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the Holocaust, and the failure of the SNP. Sentenced to death, and despite a popular outcry in Slovakia, the court and central government denied his and influential requests for clemency while his co-defendants and counterparts in the Czech Lands received lesser sentences. The Communists used Tiso ' s trial and execution as a political tool against the Slovak Democrats in their bid for power. After Tiso ' s death in 194 7, Ward continues, Tiso remained controversial. Slovak emigres turned him into an anti-Communist patriot martyr who was a victim of circumstances. Meanwhile, communist Czechoslovakia portrayed him as a clerical-fascist war criminal. After the fall of Communism in 1989, Tiso resurfaced as a destabilizing factor in Czechoslovak politics. Emigres, supported by the cultural institution Matica slovenska and, sometimes, the Ministry of Education, attempted to rehabilitate Tiso, but historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences parried this effort after reasserting their independent academic credentials, thereby presenting a more balanced and scholarly perspective. The issue in today's Slovakia remains a "grey" topic in which Tiso is neither popular nor condemned. This objective biography will remain a classic in English as Tiso will no longer be presented in simple black and white terms as in the past. It is an excellent source for students of nationalism, political Catholicism, the history of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia, and postCommunism. It is a shame that Ward ' s book did not win the Zelnik �SLOV AKIA-2015 137 Book Prize which would have given it greater notoriety and exposure. Miroslav Londak. Ekonomicke reformy v Ceskoslovensku v 50. a 60. Rokoch 20. storocia a slovenskti ekonomika. Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2010 . 295pp. Bibliography, English summary, index of names. MARTIN POSPISIL CERGE-EI, and Charles University, Prague Ever since the communist and capitalist economic systems began competing in the 1920s, economists and historians have explored the efficiency, performance, and stability of these systems. Today, there is a general consensus that Soviet-style Communism failed. At the same time, there is still a limited understanding of how the communist economic system was built, especially in smaller countries . Miroslav Londak tries to bridge this gap and focuses on economic development in Slovakia after the 2nd World War. Londak's book is a well-researched publication aimed at better understanding of the Slovak industrialization, economic system-building, and reconstruction within the Czechoslovakia of the 1950s and 1960s. To explain the Slovak post-war economic reforms, Londak adopted a descriptive methodology that required an analysis of a long list of statistical publications, documents, and speeches. Like a good historian, he picked up a great deal about the concerns and problems that drove the building of the economic system of the time. For the novice there is much to be learned here. For example, in the Introduction (p.9), he rightly notes that it is often forgotten how much of today ' s economic development of Slovakia is linked to the decades of the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia. The book notes the astonishing pace of communist socioeconomic reforms. For example, the author describes the amazing speed of post-War Czechoslovak asset nationalization and collectivization. Londak rightly stresses an important point (sometimes forgotten in related debates) that many policies associated with the Communists (e.g. nationalization) had actually been introduced by President Benes during 1945-1948, before the Communists fully took power. The publication also analyses federalization tendencies in �138 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovakia and various efforts to reform the inefficient Soviet-style economic system: e.g. the First and Second economic reforms in the 1950s and 1960s, reform ideas related to the Prague Spring, as well as the hopeless attempts to reform the economy in the 1980s. Londak's book contains a lot of statistical data and references to original documents to illustrate the point. In his research, the author includes documents - often very rare ones - to show the development of various sectors of the economy, the level of industrialization, or employment. Certain statistics are telling: While in 1947, 80% of Czechoslovak exports went to the West, this share gradually decreased to 12-25% in only one decade. Another statistic nicely illustrates the continuous emigration from Slovakia. Around 220,000 people left Slovakia between WW I and WW II, which created a large job market mismatch . Despite providing a lot of information, however, the book suffers from several drawbacks. First, it stops short of where it should ideally begin. In the Introduction, Londak asks an important question: Is it possible to successfully reform Soviet-Style Communism? While the consensus today is that such a reform is not possible, Londak does not try to answer the question. In many ways, a descriptive approach based on statistical data produced by communist state agencies is not appropriate to explain the development and the failure of Czech and Slovak communist economies. Good examples are the flawed data on employment in sectors. Due to enormous overemployment in the economy, information on sectoral employment does not bring much value apart from a simple description of how the communist planners wanted to allocate the labor force across various sectors of the economy . Second, the monograph devotes only limited space to analyzing why Czechoslovakia adopted that particular set of economic reforms. While it is clear that Stalin was pushing for certain policies, not all Central and Eastern European satellites built the same socioeconomic system . There were strong differences, for example, between Polish, Hungarian, but naturally also between Yugoslav and Czechoslovak systems. It would have been useful to analyze why Czechoslovakia adopted the implemented the set of policies it adopted. In this respect, the book could also better analyze the "starting blocks" of Czechoslovak reforms. As these reforms were mainly coming from Soviet blueprints, the book would deserve at least a �SLOV AKIA-2015 139 short summary of the Soviet pre-1945 legacy: e.g. the Russian Civil War, the New Economic Policy, the Five Year Plans, Stalinism, collectivization, or central planning which were all part of this new Soviet experience, instrumental for Czechoslovak post-war policy making. Third, the book relies solely on Czech or Slovak literature. Of 234 items in the bibliography, only nine have been published outside (the former) Czechoslovakia. While it is natural that local literature serves as the primary source of this type of research, it would have been more than appropriate to also refer to e.g. Soviet or Polish literature. Moreover, as the book is narrowly focused on Slovak economic development, the question of the Hungarian minority would deserve better analysis again with a reference to Hungarian scholars in this area. The reader also feels overwhelmed by the amount of statistical data presented in the book. The strong emphasis on descriptive statistics without a clear message is often confusing (e.g. on pp.115-120). Some tables might have been better explained as figures, graphs, or even better maps. Crucially, while presenting many tables, Londak devotes too little space to linking the data with the story in the text and he misses the opportunity to explain why things happened the way they happened. Why were Czechs and Slovaks so willing to introduce communist measures, which in a few decades ruined the economy? How was it possible to establish the totalitarian regime so effectively and so quickly? Why were Communists not able to implement their economic plans? These are questions that can hardly be explained using communist statistical data, whose reliability is uncertain. The book would deserve a disclaimer at the beginning noting the limitations of the use of these data. Moreover, while Czech and Slovak economic disparities are analyzed sufficiently, more focus could have been put on regional, within-country variation. For example, how did Bratislava compare with the east of Slovakia over time? Which were the poorest regions and did they pick up over time? Which regions benefitted from industrialization, which did not, and why? And most of all, how did the life of an ordinary citizen look? These questions are unanswered. To supplement the collection of statistical data, Londak's publication would benefit from interviews with those concerned. These could have been either communist decision makers, their relatives, or �140 SLOV AKIA-2015 those affected by the decisions. Londa.k' s book contains only a few of these "human" elements: for example, to illustrate the absurd bureaucratic decision-making within the communist economic system, the book mentions the story of a director who had to sign 100,000 documents in one month (p.127). The publication would benefit from more of these little stories to illustrate the point. Doing so would make the book less dry and more "human" (A good example of this approach is Anne Applebaum ' s Iron Curtain: The Crushing Of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956) . Finally, the book lacks a clear motivation for any international reader. How is the economic development of Slovakia in the 1950s and 1960s relevant for today? There are at least several issues that matter beyond Slovakia: the distribution of power, subsidiarity and local nationalism (e.g. relevant for the EU today), the limits of government strategy planning and supply side economic policy (relevant for any policy-makers, especially in post-Soviet countries), or the analysis of Slovak industrialization (relevant for many developing countries). Unfortunately, none of this is mentioned in the book. When reading Londa.k' s monograph, one does not - and cannot understand the cruelty, violence and targeted threats to political opponents, which all were associated with the economic reforms. The communist economy was built on terror, propaganda, harassment, and persecution. Londak presents the era of Czechoslovak communist-building of the 1950s and 1960s as a game of statistical numbers and often failed economic policy-making. This is a dangerous approach as too many lives were lost during this era. So why did the communist economic system fail, including in Slovakia? Let's mention two factors . First, the explanation is actually presented in the words of economist Ota Sik (p.132) who noted in the 1960s that communist enterprises would not become efficient or innovative unless or until the consumer drove the production process. This key point, which helps to explain the inherent inefficiency of the communist economic system, would deserve a better analysis. Another factor (briefly mentioned on p.151) is that price in a centrally planned economy is completely unrelated to objective economic conditions. In a market economy, price is a result of equality between supply and demand and as a result it provides the key information to consumers and producers. Consumers can compare products based on price and producers can compete on producing with �SLOV AKIA-2015 141 the lowest costs so that their price is low. Finally, market price is information to potential producers who know that if they are able to produce the same product with a lower price, they will succeed. As such, market price is the ultimate driver of economic development. However, in a centrally planned economy, price fulfils none of these functions as it is administratively set with no reference to market conditions. This leads to the ultimate failure of the system. To conclude, Ekonomicke reformy is a well-researched book, which analyzes an important topic using a large number of original Czechoslovak sources. Londak has tried to tell the story of the Slovak post-war economy, which has an impact on today's economic structure and performance. However, the main message of the publication gets lost in dubious communist statistical data, and the story is not well connected. Regrettably, while being a good reference point, the publication misses an important opportunity to probe why the post-war economy of Slovakia was built the way it was built, why it failed, and why it matters for today. The descriptive approach based on flawed communist statistics left the most important questions unanswered . Jan Carnogursky. Dennik,1994-2007. Presov: Michal Vasko, 2013, 190 pp. Afterword by Ondrej Podolec, index of names. JANRYCHLIK Charles University, Prague Jan Carnogursky (b. 1944) was one of the leading figures of the anti-Communist dissident movement in Czechoslovakia between 1969 and 1989 and also an important personality in Slovak politics after November of 1989. In February of 1990 he founded the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the right-of the center political party which became part of the Slovak government coalition after the first free elections in June of 1990. After the so-called "Velvet Revolution" (November, 1990) he was a Deputy Prime Minister in the Federal government of Marian Calfa and simultaneously a Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak government of Milan Cic. After the first free elections (8 - 9 June 1990), when the KDH joined in a coalition with the Public Against Violence (VPN), Carnogursky was a Deputy Prime Minister in the first government of Vladimir Meciar �142 SLOV AKIA-2015 (than a nominee of the VPN), and after the split of the VPN and the fall of Meciar, he was appointed Slovak Prime Minister (April 23 , 1991). After the second free elections (5 - 6 June 1992) which Meciar's new party - the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) won, the KDH ended in opposition . Carnogursky was the leading figure of the opposition against Meciar' s non-democratic and autocratic rule which sometimes even used criminal methods and violence against its opponents and led to the international isolation of Slovakia. Carnogursky participated in the establishment of a new party - the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) led by Mikulas Dzurinda and was appointed Minister of Justice in Dzurinda's broad anti-Meciar coalition government (October 30, 1998 - October 15, 2002). Throughout this period Carnogursky was a deputy in the Slovak National Council (the Slovak Parliament) for the KDH (with the exception of the period when he was the Minister of Justice). Carnogursky ' s diary covers the period from August 27, 1994 to June 24, 2007. His notes of the events are usually short and illustrate the attitude of Slovakia towards some important international events. However, the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Dayton agreement in 1995 and the bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999 are surprisingly missing. It is difficult to say whether Carnogursky did not consider these events worthy of notice or whether they were in the diary but he decided not to publish them . Carnogursky noted his discussions with various political leaders, diplomats and church functionaries . The diary sheds some light on new and important facts about the background of important events in the history of Slovakia of the past two decades, mainly : the political struggle against the HZDS and Vladimir Meciar, the formation of a broad anti-Meciar coalition; and international problems, mainly Slovak relations with Hungary, the USA and Russia. However, from the diary we can learn more about Carnogursky's standpoints than about the events themselves. To understand the diary properly, it is not only necessary to know Slovak political history of the past twenty-five years, but also to know something about Carnogursky 's political and family backgrounds and his ideas and thinking. Carnogursky is a conservative Catholic politician who, on the one hand was active in the dissident movement and struggle against Communism, but on the other hand he has always been critical of �SLOVAKIA-2015 143 American foreign policy and Western liberalism and secularism. While he criticized and opposed the policy of the former Soviet Union, after the fall of Communism Carnogursky advocated cooperation with Russia and saw Russian Orthodox Christianity as a source of spiritual revival of the western Christian world. His views, however, are not always accepted in today's Slovakia. Knowing this, it cannot surprise anyone that the diary reveals Carnogursky's opposition to Slovakia'a admittance to NATO and his friendly relations with Russia. Carnogursky ' s diary is certainly worth reading and may be useful for historians trying to understand the history of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and of Central Europe in general in the period 1994-2007. Robert M. Zecker. Race and America 's Immigrant Press: How the Slovaks were Taught to Think Like White People. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013. 348pp. Notes, illustrations, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Robet M. Zecker claims that "This is the book I didn ' t want to write. At least not at first" (page 1). Since Zecker is of partial Slovak-American heritage, he was shocked by the racial references he found in the Slovak-American press from the l 890's to the l 940's while working on his University of Pennsylvania dissertation on the Slovak-American community in Philadelphia. After some reflection, and more research, he decided to document the rise of racism among Slovaks and Rusyns (and Eastern Europeans in general) in the United States, as reflected in their newspaper press. He felt that this side of the story had not previously been covered by scholars of Eastern European immigration to the United States of America. Zecker traced the rise of racism in the Slavic-American press to the enaction of Jim Crow laws in the American South in the l 890's and the subsequent lynching of several thousand Black-Americans. Initially, editors of ethnic newspapers were horrified by reports of lynchings in the South, but, within a decade, the horror changed to mere reporting or even agreement with the lynchings . Why? Zecker argues that Slavic-Americans, fearful of their own status as unskilled �144 SLOV AKIA-2015 laborers almost at the bottom of the social ladder, were glad that Blacks and Asians were below them still, and therefore, more inferior than themselves. Indeed, Slavic-Americans soon bought into the theory of "whiteness," whereby they (or their children) would eventually become respected members of the middle-class, which, of course, was white. Once they bought into America's racist society and its social hierarchy, Slavic Americans began to "ape the WASPS," as the expression goes. Their newspapers approvingly reproduced not only reports of lynchings of Blacks in the American South, but also advertisements that featured gross stereotypes of Blacks, which portrayed them as primitive savages. Furthermore, most Slavic-American neighborhoods, which often had Slovak Halls, Rusyn Halls, Polish Halls, etc. staged minstrel shows in the l 920's and l 930's, as did "mainstream" American neighborhood theaters. Finally, most Slavic Americans, like those who came before them, did not want Blacks to move into their neighborhoods and resisted government-led integration efforts in the 1960's and 1970's. In becoming "Americans," Slavic-Americans adopted the racist attitudes of their white predecessors. As Zecker predicted, this is a disturbing book. Most of the histories of the Southern and Eastern Europeans, who came to the United States in search of work and a better life in the l 870's to the l 920's, have focused on their slow, but steady rise on the American social ladder. Unfortunately, most historians have also ignored how these immigrants and their children had to adapt to American society by adopting the racist attitudes of their predecessors and become "white" in the process. The book suffers from only two deficiencies, perhaps caused by the publisher. The first is that the copious footnotes (pp. 253-308) appear at the back of the book, making it extremely tedious for the historian to read. The second is that Zecker did not separate his listing of periodicals from books and articles in the bibliography. It would have been instructive to discover, for instance, how many years (and which years) of Jednota, or Amerikansky russky viestnik, and other ethnic newspapers he had read. On the other hand, Zecker fulfilled very well his duties as an historian. He deeply mined the rich archival resources of the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota, the archives of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies at the Pennsylvania �SLOV AKIA-2015 145 Historical Society in Philadelphia, the New York Public Library, and several others. Finally, Zecker read most of the important books and articles relating to immigration to North America in the last 130 years. He is to be commended for a job well-done. M . Mark Stolarik. Where is My Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (1870-2010) . [Immigration from Europe to North America, Vol. l] Bern : Peter Lang, 2012 . xix, 392 pp. Notes, illustrations, bibliography, index . $99.95. WILLIAM J. GALUSH Loyola University of Chicago (retired) This is an excellent overview of Slovaks in the tumultuous period from the late nineteenth century to the present, thoughtfully and engagingly portrayed through the experiences of one family. Mark Stolarik seeks to combine the personal with the general in history and succeeds admirably. The fami li al dimension benefits from numerous interviews by the author while he relies on his extensive reading and archival research on Slovak immigration for the larger narrative. The story of Slovaks, an oppresed minority within the multiethnic Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, shows them seeking improvement both by departure elsewhere and striving to develop a sense of common identity in the homeland in the face of strenuous efforts by their Hungarian overlords to magyarize them . The transoceanic aspect is important and the author demonstrates enduring connections which significantly influenced the homeland. About a third of immigrants to North America returned, and as with the Poles in my own research, brought back a heightened sense of Slovak identity and a desire for a more modem lifestyle which stimulated their viII ages. Lacking the equivalent of Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian province essentially under Polish control from the late nineteenth century, Slovaks in America took on a greater role in supporting nationalism in the homeland through their fraternalbenefit societies and the Slovak League of Amerca (f. 1907). �146 SLOV AKIA-2015 The theme of Slovak nationalism infonns the narrative. The World War I agreements to create a federal Czecho-Slovakia were subverted by T. G. Masaryk and his followers. The variations among the diaspora, with the Roman Catholics being the most nationalistic, emerge clearly and the author gives a nuanced and sympathetic account of interwar patriotism and the emergence of an independent Slovakia in 1939. With reunification after 1945, Slovaks abroad were the only ones able to articulate a nationalist position. Support for the united country came mainly from a tiny leftist element and from some Lutheran Slovaks . The post-1989 era offered the opportunity for the reappearance of an independent Slovakia and Stolarik clearly rejoices at the success of the effort. The Stolariks were strivers. Some went to the United States while others remained at home, seeking through education and white collar employment to elevate their status. Imrich, father of Mark, became the city assessor of Martin and led a comfortable existence even during World War II, continuing government employment under the newly independent Slovak Republic. The defeat of their Gennan sponsors and fears of a communist Czechoslovakia prompted Imrich and his family to flee to Austria, where Mark and his siblings lived until they were able to move to Canada. The author's parents had a strong interest in education and nationalism and encouraged participation in ethnic activities in the new land . This speaks to the question of identity in the title wherein ethnic consciousness sustained a sense of self and group despite multiple changes of government and location. Family was also a major factor in making a living, with aid in getting jobs and infonnation on the new land helpful in adjustment and upward mobility. One of the most engaging aspects of the book is the use of familial anecdote to bring life to history . For example, during World War II female relatives of the author, needing to milk goats in a time of food scarcity, persuaded nearby soldiers to stop shelling so the animals would calm down! Stolarik also offers accounts of misleading meddling communist officials while his homeland relatives provided shelter, assistance and advice during his research in Slovakia. The larger narrative would benefit from greater acknowledgement of variety . The author likely overstates the general persistence of the immigrant vision of an enclosed Slovak identity in the �SLOVAKIA-2015 147 second generation. In Minneapolis, with five Polish (and one Slovak) Catholic parishes, marriages at the largest Polish congregation by 1940 recorded over 50% with one non-Polish spouse, and the greater paucity of Slovaks might well have fostered such patterns there or elsewhere. In this regard Stolarik is better in the helpful comparison of American and Canadian Slovak development, noting contrasts as well as similarities and offering plausible interpretations for variety. The book is a stimulating study which will repay the attention of scholars and interesting laypersons alike. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOV AKIA-2015 129 Jan Rychlik, Magdalena Rychlfkova. Hospodafsky, socialni, kulturni a politicky vyvoj Podkarpatske Rusi 1919 - 1939 (Prague: Studie Narodohospodarskeho ustavu Josefa Hlavky, 2013), 184 pages. Notes, maps, illustrations, along with a German and English Summary. C. WINSTON CHRISLOCK Professor Emeritus University of St. Thomas St. Paul, Minnesota Transcarpathian Rus' formed the eastern tip of the First Czechoslovak Republic from 1919 to 1938 and, briefly of the Second Czecho-Slovak Republic from October 1938 to mid-March 1939. On November 2, 1939, Hungary annexed the southern, mostly Magyar regions of a by then autonomous Transcarpathian Rus' . On March 16, after the demise of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary annexed the remainder of the region . Soviet forces occupied the area during the final stages of World War II in Europe. In June of 1945 Czechoslovakia agreed to allow the U.S.S.R. to annex Transcarpathian Rus' and both countries ratified the treaty of transfer in November of 1945. From 1945 until 1991 it was part of the Soviet Union's Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 , it remained a province of independent Ukraine. The purpose of the Rychliks' monograph is to describe and evaluate the region during its association with Czechoslovakia in the inner-war period. There was no doubt that the Czechoslovak government took over administration of a very complex and economically primitive province. The Rychliks' account begins with a pre-1919 backround in which they summarize Czech, Magyar and Ukranian sources. They then continue with an historical survey up to 1919. We learn that Transcarpathian Rus' consisted of four Hungarian counties, and that the Rusyn population had not yet developed any sense of national consciousness. The northern half of Transcarpathian Rus' was mountainous and heavily forested while the south was flatter and more suited for agriculture. About two-thirds of of the population were Rusyns who spoke dialects closely related to Ukrainian. Minorities consisted of Magyars, Jews, Romanians, Germans and Roma. Prior to World War I any attempt to codify the Rusyn language was prob- 130 SLOVAKIA-2015 lematic. While Rusyn dialects were close to Ukrainian, the tsarist regime in Russia looked upon Ukrainian as a Russian dialect. That would make Rusyn dialects dialects of a dialect! Austria-Hungary's collapse in 1918 brought political and economic chaos . Rusyn Americans had developed national consciousness by 1914, modelled somewhat on the Slovak experience. In the wake of Austria-Hungary's collapse their leaders lobbied T. G. Masaryk, leader of the Czecho-Slovak independence movement, and President Woodrow Wilson, for a Rusyn association with the new Czechoslovak state, with the understanding that Subcarpathian Rus' would have a large degree of autonomy. Masaryk agreed to this and after military confrontations with Hungary, Poland and indigenous Magyars, the Czechoslovak army, with the support of the United Kingdom, France and the U.S .A., successfully occupied the region by the end of 1919 and maintained sovereignty over it until the German annexation of the Czech lands in March of 1939. The Rychliks' objective was to describe the social, cultural and political problems of the region and then evaluate how the Czechoslovak government dealt with and responded to them. Given the complexity of a region that was blessed (cursed?) with a plethora of nationalities and languages, religions, hostile neighbors, and underdeveloped economy and national consciousness, the Czechoslovak government faced a monumental task. The political problem revolved around autonomy for the area. The 1920 Czechoslovak constitution provided for Subcarpathian Rus ' to send four senators and nine representatives to Czechoslovakia's National Assembly. Czechoslovakia's president, upon recommendation of the government, appointed a governor, whose power was limited, and a vicegovemor, who exercised most administrative powers. Rusyns, both at home and in the U.S.A., were dissatisfied with the lack of autonomy. Complicating the political situation were conflicts among Rusyns, Ukrainofiles, Russofiles, Jews, and Magyars and further conflicts between Russian Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Christians. Economic and infrastructure underdevelopment were also major problems. Before World War I, commerce and transit were basically north and south, while after 1919 these were oriented east-west. Destruction brought on by the war exacerbated these problems. The Rychliks provide maps, railway timetables, and agricultural and eco- SLOVAKIA-2015 131 nomic data to embellish their account of economic and infrastructure development. The book devotes substantial space to language and education. As both religious and public schools evolved, language became a thorny issue. The Rychliks pointed out that literary languages are artificial, and that was certainly true in Subcarpathian Rus'. Rusyns had not developed a literary language that everybody could agree upon. How could this state establish a network of Schools when Rusyns could not agree if the language and textbooks of instruction should be in Ukranian, Russian, or in a local dialect? What should be the policy toward the minority Ukranian, Russian, Slovak, Czech, Magyar, Hebrew, Yiddish, German, Romanian, Roma Slovak and Czech speakers? The authors concluded that by 1938 there was no final resolution of the language issue. The authors concluded, with reservations, that Subcarpathian Rus' progressed under the first Czechoslovak Republic. However, from the standpoint of political maturity, economic and infrastructure development, literacy, and steps towards the codification of language, the formidable problems listed above retarded its progress. The Rychliks' work is a good companion to Paul R. Magocsi's excellent The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus ', 1848-1948 (1978). The former gives a data-filled account of a twenty-year period in 183 pages, thirty of which are notes, railroad timetables, maps and pictures, while Magocsi provides us with a very readable overview of the development of Subcarpathian Rus' over 100 years, along with a substantial, nearly 100-page, appendix and numerous notes. 132 SLOV AKIA-2015 David Doellinger. Turning Prayers into Based Activism and its Challenge to State Slovakia and East Germany. Budapest: Central Press, 2013. xii-288 pp. Glossary, bibliography, Protests: ReligiousPower in Socialist European University index. JAMES RAMON PELAK University of Washington Poland, no doubt, comes to mind first when one considers the role played by religion and religious institutions in the events and processes leading up to the collapse of Communism in East Central Europe in 1989. David Doellinger reminds us, in his Turning Prayers into Protests, that there were other places in the region where religion was an active and significant force of social mobilization in the fateful developments of the 1980s, most notably Slovakia and East Germany. Doellinger juxtaposes the cases of Slovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in what is a truly comparative work. The focus is on the activists themselves, and the work is organized both thematically and chronologically. Each chapter gives sufficient attention to each situation, examining both cases in terms of a particular aspect of the issue, and establishing the impact and the limitations of the role of religion as a mobilizing force in each locale. Though an historian, Doellinger draws generously from sociology and political science. The author establishes the context for his case studies, attuned to the differences and similarities between them. In Slovakia, he examines the Roman Catholic Church, especially its underground branch, while in the GDR he looks at the official Evangelical Church, a primarily Lutheran institution. Doellinger notes for both cases the differences with regard to the degree of institutional autonomy for the Church, the level of religiosity among the population, and the type of activism . He examines for each state such factors as the social and informational networks established among activists and the processes whereby prayers were transformed into protests in the 1980s. Doellinger decided to do an in-depth study of the Slovak situation after two former Czech dissidents remarked that Slovakia SLOVAKIA-2015 133 had had no dissidents or independent activism during the communist period, a far cry from reality. As a corrective to such ill-informed views, the author presents the Slovak case in great detail, analyzing the operations of the underground church, situating Catholic activism within the broader context of independent activity in Slovakia, and providing excellent descriptions and analyses of such critical examples of public mobilization as the Velehrad pilgrimage of 1985 (drawing from 100,000 to 250,000 participants), the petition for religious freedom of 1988 (signed by 300,000 to 400,000 Slovaks), and the Good Friday demonstration of March 25 , 1988 in Bratislava. Doellinger notes the crucial role played by Karol Wojtila who, as Archbishop of Krakow, was a friend and supporter of the underground church in Slovakia, ordaining secret clergy in the 1970s. As Pope John Paul II, he gave a voice to the persecuted Church, condemned the government-sponsored Pacem in Terris organization of Czechoslovak clergy, successfully encouraged Prague ' s Archbishop Frantisek Tomasek to become more assertive on behalf of religious freedom, and energized Catholics in Slovakia and elsewhere . With respect to the GDR, Doellinger notes the strong influence of the Evangelical Church, made possible by its considerable autonomy, which enabled it to provide crucial support for independent activity. The church promoted and defended the so-called Bausoldaten, young men who served in non-combat units beside the East German military on grounds of conscientious objection to war and militarism . It provided meeting space, access to publishing, and other supports for peace, environmental, and social justice-oriented groups. Doellinger notes both the advantages enjoyed and constraints faced by activists on account of this close connection with the Evangelical Church. Doellinger's work is especially valuable thanks to the type and array of sources he uses. Along with reports on religious activism and a large and diverse amount of religious samizdat found in more than a dozen archives, he has interviewed scores of activists, examined local church and government records for the GDR, and gained access to at least four private collections of former activists. A few relatively minor criticisms are in order. Though this book is expressly not a study of the inner-workings of the regime in its dealings with religion, the author might have done more with the records of the Czechoslovak Office for Church Affairs. This 134 SLOV AKIA-2015 organization did a competent job in monitoring religion in Czechoslovakia and might contain useful information about the underground church and other forms of Catholic activism. And the subsections marked "Summary" near the end of each chapter sometimes do much more than summarize, but rather introduce important new material and perspectives not found earlier. Doellinger's work is an extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of the late communist period in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to the processes that brought about the collapse of communist regimes in 1989, and to the important role played by religion in these developments. Though genuinely comparative, and insightfully so, the book does maintain the distinction between the two states, so a reader whose interest lies more in Slovakia than in the GDR would have no problem accessing the parts of the book specific to the Slovak Socialist Republic. James Mace Ward. Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia. Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 2013. xii, 362 pp., ill., notes, index. $39 .95 . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University James Mace Ward has written a first-rate biography of Jozef Tiso, the only Roman Catholic priest, aside from the pope, to lead a modem European country. For his efforts, Ward received Honorable Mention in a 2014 competition of the premier North American scholarly organization, the Association for Slavic, East European, & Eurasian Studies Reginald Zelnik Book Prize. It is awarded annually for an outstanding monograph published on Russia, Eastern Europe or Eurasia in the field of history in the previous year. In his Preface, the author avers that he is "deeply committed to providing as accurate an account of this life as I can." (xi) He has accomplished this task by conducting extensive research using Czech, English, German, Hungarian, and Slovak sources. Yet, Ward modestly apologizes that he did not have enough time to conduct more research for his book. As Ward shows, the life of Father Jozef Tiso remains multi-faceted, complicated, and controversial. One can characterize his ca- SLOV AKIA-2015 135 reer as opportunistic and full of contradictions. Before 1918, Tiso seemed destined to rise in the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, and, as such, proved to be a loyal Hungarian - a charge that would haunt him for the rest of his life. By the conclusion of the First World War he became more nationally astute, and with the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia, he turned to politics with a Catholic and Christian social agenda subsumed by Slovak nationalism. Throughout his political life, Tiso became a master at organization, infighting, outmaneuvering, playing the various sides, and skillfully deflecting criticism by blaming others for his own faults and actions. He preferred to be ambiguous rather than take responsibility . Despite being a political animal, Tiso found time almost every Sunday from the 1920s until 1945 to celebrate Mass. In 1918, Ward continues, with the state in flux, Tiso became the secretary of the Slovak National Council in Nitra, and helped coordinate its occupation by Czecho-Slovak forces while attacking Jews as usurers, war profiteers, and revolutionaries. As the situation stabilized, Tiso joined Father Andrej Hlinka' s Slovak People ' s ("I:udak") Party, abandoned his anti-Semitism, and became a political moderate who feared secularization. He served first in the Czechoslovak Parliament and then as Minister of Public Health and Physical Education (1927-1929) where his accomplishments were modest. By the early 1930s, Tiso became Hlinka' s heir, but had to fend off a new generation of radical I:udak rivals who often thwarted his goals. Until 1938, he attempted to reconcile the I:udaks with the government and outflank "Godless" socialists. By then, since he realized he would no longer serve in the government, Tiso turned on Czechoslovakia by demanding greater autonomy for Slovakia. With the Republic failing, he conducted talks with Hungary and Poland about Slovakia' s future while still maintaining a dialogue with Prague. After the 1938 Munich Crisis, Ward continues, Tiso blamed the Jews and the Czechs for the diktat while tightening his control over his party . He vacillated on Slovak independence since he did not want to be viewed as the person who destroyed Czechoslovakia, but when it became inevitable, he embraced it and took control of Slovakia despite opposition from the Holy See. Tiso saw the Slovak State as a step forward for national consciousness and confidence. As vodca, or leader of independent Slovakia, he ordered no political executions and traveled freely with few bodyguards. Yet, he allied with 136 SLOV AKIA-2015 Nazi Germany and occasionally resisted its demands, but backed the deportation of two-thirds of Slovakia's Jews. By 1943, as the war seemed lost, Tiso became conciliatory towards a reconstituted Czechoslovakia but did not understand the strength of the underground plotting the Slovak National Uprising (SNP) in the summer of 1944. Deeply hurt by the thought that Slovaks opposed his regime, Tiso nonetheless ordered the suppression of the SNP that resulted in the German occupation of Slovakia. In his last radio address as his government crumbled, Tiso portrayed himself as a martyr. Arrested by the Americans, and turned over to the Czechoslovak authorities, Tiso's trial, according to Ward, became a travesty of justice dominated by unprofessional judges, packed courts, and political manipulations that assured a negative judgment. During the show trial, Tiso received the blame for, among other things, the destruction of Czechoslovakia, the Holocaust, and the failure of the SNP. Sentenced to death, and despite a popular outcry in Slovakia, the court and central government denied his and influential requests for clemency while his co-defendants and counterparts in the Czech Lands received lesser sentences. The Communists used Tiso ' s trial and execution as a political tool against the Slovak Democrats in their bid for power. After Tiso ' s death in 194 7, Ward continues, Tiso remained controversial. Slovak emigres turned him into an anti-Communist patriot martyr who was a victim of circumstances. Meanwhile, communist Czechoslovakia portrayed him as a clerical-fascist war criminal. After the fall of Communism in 1989, Tiso resurfaced as a destabilizing factor in Czechoslovak politics. Emigres, supported by the cultural institution Matica slovenska and, sometimes, the Ministry of Education, attempted to rehabilitate Tiso, but historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences parried this effort after reasserting their independent academic credentials, thereby presenting a more balanced and scholarly perspective. The issue in today's Slovakia remains a "grey" topic in which Tiso is neither popular nor condemned. This objective biography will remain a classic in English as Tiso will no longer be presented in simple black and white terms as in the past. It is an excellent source for students of nationalism, political Catholicism, the history of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia, and postCommunism. It is a shame that Ward ' s book did not win the Zelnik SLOV AKIA-2015 137 Book Prize which would have given it greater notoriety and exposure. Miroslav Londak. Ekonomicke reformy v Ceskoslovensku v 50. a 60. Rokoch 20. storocia a slovenskti ekonomika. Bratislava: Historicky ustav SAV, 2010 . 295pp. Bibliography, English summary, index of names. MARTIN POSPISIL CERGE-EI, and Charles University, Prague Ever since the communist and capitalist economic systems began competing in the 1920s, economists and historians have explored the efficiency, performance, and stability of these systems. Today, there is a general consensus that Soviet-style Communism failed. At the same time, there is still a limited understanding of how the communist economic system was built, especially in smaller countries . Miroslav Londak tries to bridge this gap and focuses on economic development in Slovakia after the 2nd World War. Londak's book is a well-researched publication aimed at better understanding of the Slovak industrialization, economic system-building, and reconstruction within the Czechoslovakia of the 1950s and 1960s. To explain the Slovak post-war economic reforms, Londak adopted a descriptive methodology that required an analysis of a long list of statistical publications, documents, and speeches. Like a good historian, he picked up a great deal about the concerns and problems that drove the building of the economic system of the time. For the novice there is much to be learned here. For example, in the Introduction (p.9), he rightly notes that it is often forgotten how much of today ' s economic development of Slovakia is linked to the decades of the post-war situation in Czechoslovakia. The book notes the astonishing pace of communist socioeconomic reforms. For example, the author describes the amazing speed of post-War Czechoslovak asset nationalization and collectivization. Londak rightly stresses an important point (sometimes forgotten in related debates) that many policies associated with the Communists (e.g. nationalization) had actually been introduced by President Benes during 1945-1948, before the Communists fully took power. The publication also analyses federalization tendencies in 138 SLOV AKIA-2015 Slovakia and various efforts to reform the inefficient Soviet-style economic system: e.g. the First and Second economic reforms in the 1950s and 1960s, reform ideas related to the Prague Spring, as well as the hopeless attempts to reform the economy in the 1980s. Londak's book contains a lot of statistical data and references to original documents to illustrate the point. In his research, the author includes documents - often very rare ones - to show the development of various sectors of the economy, the level of industrialization, or employment. Certain statistics are telling: While in 1947, 80% of Czechoslovak exports went to the West, this share gradually decreased to 12-25% in only one decade. Another statistic nicely illustrates the continuous emigration from Slovakia. Around 220,000 people left Slovakia between WW I and WW II, which created a large job market mismatch . Despite providing a lot of information, however, the book suffers from several drawbacks. First, it stops short of where it should ideally begin. In the Introduction, Londak asks an important question: Is it possible to successfully reform Soviet-Style Communism? While the consensus today is that such a reform is not possible, Londak does not try to answer the question. In many ways, a descriptive approach based on statistical data produced by communist state agencies is not appropriate to explain the development and the failure of Czech and Slovak communist economies. Good examples are the flawed data on employment in sectors. Due to enormous overemployment in the economy, information on sectoral employment does not bring much value apart from a simple description of how the communist planners wanted to allocate the labor force across various sectors of the economy . Second, the monograph devotes only limited space to analyzing why Czechoslovakia adopted that particular set of economic reforms. While it is clear that Stalin was pushing for certain policies, not all Central and Eastern European satellites built the same socioeconomic system . There were strong differences, for example, between Polish, Hungarian, but naturally also between Yugoslav and Czechoslovak systems. It would have been useful to analyze why Czechoslovakia adopted the implemented the set of policies it adopted. In this respect, the book could also better analyze the "starting blocks" of Czechoslovak reforms. As these reforms were mainly coming from Soviet blueprints, the book would deserve at least a SLOV AKIA-2015 139 short summary of the Soviet pre-1945 legacy: e.g. the Russian Civil War, the New Economic Policy, the Five Year Plans, Stalinism, collectivization, or central planning which were all part of this new Soviet experience, instrumental for Czechoslovak post-war policy making. Third, the book relies solely on Czech or Slovak literature. Of 234 items in the bibliography, only nine have been published outside (the former) Czechoslovakia. While it is natural that local literature serves as the primary source of this type of research, it would have been more than appropriate to also refer to e.g. Soviet or Polish literature. Moreover, as the book is narrowly focused on Slovak economic development, the question of the Hungarian minority would deserve better analysis again with a reference to Hungarian scholars in this area. The reader also feels overwhelmed by the amount of statistical data presented in the book. The strong emphasis on descriptive statistics without a clear message is often confusing (e.g. on pp.115-120). Some tables might have been better explained as figures, graphs, or even better maps. Crucially, while presenting many tables, Londak devotes too little space to linking the data with the story in the text and he misses the opportunity to explain why things happened the way they happened. Why were Czechs and Slovaks so willing to introduce communist measures, which in a few decades ruined the economy? How was it possible to establish the totalitarian regime so effectively and so quickly? Why were Communists not able to implement their economic plans? These are questions that can hardly be explained using communist statistical data, whose reliability is uncertain. The book would deserve a disclaimer at the beginning noting the limitations of the use of these data. Moreover, while Czech and Slovak economic disparities are analyzed sufficiently, more focus could have been put on regional, within-country variation. For example, how did Bratislava compare with the east of Slovakia over time? Which were the poorest regions and did they pick up over time? Which regions benefitted from industrialization, which did not, and why? And most of all, how did the life of an ordinary citizen look? These questions are unanswered. To supplement the collection of statistical data, Londak's publication would benefit from interviews with those concerned. These could have been either communist decision makers, their relatives, or 140 SLOV AKIA-2015 those affected by the decisions. Londa.k' s book contains only a few of these "human" elements: for example, to illustrate the absurd bureaucratic decision-making within the communist economic system, the book mentions the story of a director who had to sign 100,000 documents in one month (p.127). The publication would benefit from more of these little stories to illustrate the point. Doing so would make the book less dry and more "human" (A good example of this approach is Anne Applebaum ' s Iron Curtain: The Crushing Of Eastern Europe, 1944-1956) . Finally, the book lacks a clear motivation for any international reader. How is the economic development of Slovakia in the 1950s and 1960s relevant for today? There are at least several issues that matter beyond Slovakia: the distribution of power, subsidiarity and local nationalism (e.g. relevant for the EU today), the limits of government strategy planning and supply side economic policy (relevant for any policy-makers, especially in post-Soviet countries), or the analysis of Slovak industrialization (relevant for many developing countries). Unfortunately, none of this is mentioned in the book. When reading Londa.k' s monograph, one does not - and cannot understand the cruelty, violence and targeted threats to political opponents, which all were associated with the economic reforms. The communist economy was built on terror, propaganda, harassment, and persecution. Londak presents the era of Czechoslovak communist-building of the 1950s and 1960s as a game of statistical numbers and often failed economic policy-making. This is a dangerous approach as too many lives were lost during this era. So why did the communist economic system fail, including in Slovakia? Let's mention two factors . First, the explanation is actually presented in the words of economist Ota Sik (p.132) who noted in the 1960s that communist enterprises would not become efficient or innovative unless or until the consumer drove the production process. This key point, which helps to explain the inherent inefficiency of the communist economic system, would deserve a better analysis. Another factor (briefly mentioned on p.151) is that price in a centrally planned economy is completely unrelated to objective economic conditions. In a market economy, price is a result of equality between supply and demand and as a result it provides the key information to consumers and producers. Consumers can compare products based on price and producers can compete on producing with SLOV AKIA-2015 141 the lowest costs so that their price is low. Finally, market price is information to potential producers who know that if they are able to produce the same product with a lower price, they will succeed. As such, market price is the ultimate driver of economic development. However, in a centrally planned economy, price fulfils none of these functions as it is administratively set with no reference to market conditions. This leads to the ultimate failure of the system. To conclude, Ekonomicke reformy is a well-researched book, which analyzes an important topic using a large number of original Czechoslovak sources. Londak has tried to tell the story of the Slovak post-war economy, which has an impact on today's economic structure and performance. However, the main message of the publication gets lost in dubious communist statistical data, and the story is not well connected. Regrettably, while being a good reference point, the publication misses an important opportunity to probe why the post-war economy of Slovakia was built the way it was built, why it failed, and why it matters for today. The descriptive approach based on flawed communist statistics left the most important questions unanswered . Jan Carnogursky. Dennik,1994-2007. Presov: Michal Vasko, 2013, 190 pp. Afterword by Ondrej Podolec, index of names. JANRYCHLIK Charles University, Prague Jan Carnogursky (b. 1944) was one of the leading figures of the anti-Communist dissident movement in Czechoslovakia between 1969 and 1989 and also an important personality in Slovak politics after November of 1989. In February of 1990 he founded the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the right-of the center political party which became part of the Slovak government coalition after the first free elections in June of 1990. After the so-called "Velvet Revolution" (November, 1990) he was a Deputy Prime Minister in the Federal government of Marian Calfa and simultaneously a Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak government of Milan Cic. After the first free elections (8 - 9 June 1990), when the KDH joined in a coalition with the Public Against Violence (VPN), Carnogursky was a Deputy Prime Minister in the first government of Vladimir Meciar 142 SLOV AKIA-2015 (than a nominee of the VPN), and after the split of the VPN and the fall of Meciar, he was appointed Slovak Prime Minister (April 23 , 1991). After the second free elections (5 - 6 June 1992) which Meciar's new party - the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) won, the KDH ended in opposition . Carnogursky was the leading figure of the opposition against Meciar' s non-democratic and autocratic rule which sometimes even used criminal methods and violence against its opponents and led to the international isolation of Slovakia. Carnogursky participated in the establishment of a new party - the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) led by Mikulas Dzurinda and was appointed Minister of Justice in Dzurinda's broad anti-Meciar coalition government (October 30, 1998 - October 15, 2002). Throughout this period Carnogursky was a deputy in the Slovak National Council (the Slovak Parliament) for the KDH (with the exception of the period when he was the Minister of Justice). Carnogursky ' s diary covers the period from August 27, 1994 to June 24, 2007. His notes of the events are usually short and illustrate the attitude of Slovakia towards some important international events. However, the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Dayton agreement in 1995 and the bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999 are surprisingly missing. It is difficult to say whether Carnogursky did not consider these events worthy of notice or whether they were in the diary but he decided not to publish them . Carnogursky noted his discussions with various political leaders, diplomats and church functionaries . The diary sheds some light on new and important facts about the background of important events in the history of Slovakia of the past two decades, mainly : the political struggle against the HZDS and Vladimir Meciar, the formation of a broad anti-Meciar coalition; and international problems, mainly Slovak relations with Hungary, the USA and Russia. However, from the diary we can learn more about Carnogursky's standpoints than about the events themselves. To understand the diary properly, it is not only necessary to know Slovak political history of the past twenty-five years, but also to know something about Carnogursky 's political and family backgrounds and his ideas and thinking. Carnogursky is a conservative Catholic politician who, on the one hand was active in the dissident movement and struggle against Communism, but on the other hand he has always been critical of SLOVAKIA-2015 143 American foreign policy and Western liberalism and secularism. While he criticized and opposed the policy of the former Soviet Union, after the fall of Communism Carnogursky advocated cooperation with Russia and saw Russian Orthodox Christianity as a source of spiritual revival of the western Christian world. His views, however, are not always accepted in today's Slovakia. Knowing this, it cannot surprise anyone that the diary reveals Carnogursky's opposition to Slovakia'a admittance to NATO and his friendly relations with Russia. Carnogursky ' s diary is certainly worth reading and may be useful for historians trying to understand the history of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia and of Central Europe in general in the period 1994-2007. Robert M. Zecker. Race and America 's Immigrant Press: How the Slovaks were Taught to Think Like White People. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013. 348pp. Notes, illustrations, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Robet M. Zecker claims that "This is the book I didn ' t want to write. At least not at first" (page 1). Since Zecker is of partial Slovak-American heritage, he was shocked by the racial references he found in the Slovak-American press from the l 890's to the l 940's while working on his University of Pennsylvania dissertation on the Slovak-American community in Philadelphia. After some reflection, and more research, he decided to document the rise of racism among Slovaks and Rusyns (and Eastern Europeans in general) in the United States, as reflected in their newspaper press. He felt that this side of the story had not previously been covered by scholars of Eastern European immigration to the United States of America. Zecker traced the rise of racism in the Slavic-American press to the enaction of Jim Crow laws in the American South in the l 890's and the subsequent lynching of several thousand Black-Americans. Initially, editors of ethnic newspapers were horrified by reports of lynchings in the South, but, within a decade, the horror changed to mere reporting or even agreement with the lynchings . Why? Zecker argues that Slavic-Americans, fearful of their own status as unskilled 144 SLOV AKIA-2015 laborers almost at the bottom of the social ladder, were glad that Blacks and Asians were below them still, and therefore, more inferior than themselves. Indeed, Slavic-Americans soon bought into the theory of "whiteness," whereby they (or their children) would eventually become respected members of the middle-class, which, of course, was white. Once they bought into America's racist society and its social hierarchy, Slavic Americans began to "ape the WASPS," as the expression goes. Their newspapers approvingly reproduced not only reports of lynchings of Blacks in the American South, but also advertisements that featured gross stereotypes of Blacks, which portrayed them as primitive savages. Furthermore, most Slavic-American neighborhoods, which often had Slovak Halls, Rusyn Halls, Polish Halls, etc. staged minstrel shows in the l 920's and l 930's, as did "mainstream" American neighborhood theaters. Finally, most Slavic Americans, like those who came before them, did not want Blacks to move into their neighborhoods and resisted government-led integration efforts in the 1960's and 1970's. In becoming "Americans," Slavic-Americans adopted the racist attitudes of their white predecessors. As Zecker predicted, this is a disturbing book. Most of the histories of the Southern and Eastern Europeans, who came to the United States in search of work and a better life in the l 870's to the l 920's, have focused on their slow, but steady rise on the American social ladder. Unfortunately, most historians have also ignored how these immigrants and their children had to adapt to American society by adopting the racist attitudes of their predecessors and become "white" in the process. The book suffers from only two deficiencies, perhaps caused by the publisher. The first is that the copious footnotes (pp. 253-308) appear at the back of the book, making it extremely tedious for the historian to read. The second is that Zecker did not separate his listing of periodicals from books and articles in the bibliography. It would have been instructive to discover, for instance, how many years (and which years) of Jednota, or Amerikansky russky viestnik, and other ethnic newspapers he had read. On the other hand, Zecker fulfilled very well his duties as an historian. He deeply mined the rich archival resources of the Immigration History Research Center at the University of Minnesota, the archives of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies at the Pennsylvania SLOV AKIA-2015 145 Historical Society in Philadelphia, the New York Public Library, and several others. Finally, Zecker read most of the important books and articles relating to immigration to North America in the last 130 years. He is to be commended for a job well-done. M . Mark Stolarik. Where is My Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America (1870-2010) . [Immigration from Europe to North America, Vol. l] Bern : Peter Lang, 2012 . xix, 392 pp. Notes, illustrations, bibliography, index . $99.95. WILLIAM J. GALUSH Loyola University of Chicago (retired) This is an excellent overview of Slovaks in the tumultuous period from the late nineteenth century to the present, thoughtfully and engagingly portrayed through the experiences of one family. Mark Stolarik seeks to combine the personal with the general in history and succeeds admirably. The fami li al dimension benefits from numerous interviews by the author while he relies on his extensive reading and archival research on Slovak immigration for the larger narrative. The story of Slovaks, an oppresed minority within the multiethnic Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, shows them seeking improvement both by departure elsewhere and striving to develop a sense of common identity in the homeland in the face of strenuous efforts by their Hungarian overlords to magyarize them . The transoceanic aspect is important and the author demonstrates enduring connections which significantly influenced the homeland. About a third of immigrants to North America returned, and as with the Poles in my own research, brought back a heightened sense of Slovak identity and a desire for a more modem lifestyle which stimulated their viII ages. Lacking the equivalent of Galicia, the Austro-Hungarian province essentially under Polish control from the late nineteenth century, Slovaks in America took on a greater role in supporting nationalism in the homeland through their fraternalbenefit societies and the Slovak League of Amerca (f. 1907). 146 SLOV AKIA-2015 The theme of Slovak nationalism infonns the narrative. The World War I agreements to create a federal Czecho-Slovakia were subverted by T. G. Masaryk and his followers. The variations among the diaspora, with the Roman Catholics being the most nationalistic, emerge clearly and the author gives a nuanced and sympathetic account of interwar patriotism and the emergence of an independent Slovakia in 1939. With reunification after 1945, Slovaks abroad were the only ones able to articulate a nationalist position. Support for the united country came mainly from a tiny leftist element and from some Lutheran Slovaks . The post-1989 era offered the opportunity for the reappearance of an independent Slovakia and Stolarik clearly rejoices at the success of the effort. The Stolariks were strivers. Some went to the United States while others remained at home, seeking through education and white collar employment to elevate their status. Imrich, father of Mark, became the city assessor of Martin and led a comfortable existence even during World War II, continuing government employment under the newly independent Slovak Republic. The defeat of their Gennan sponsors and fears of a communist Czechoslovakia prompted Imrich and his family to flee to Austria, where Mark and his siblings lived until they were able to move to Canada. The author's parents had a strong interest in education and nationalism and encouraged participation in ethnic activities in the new land . This speaks to the question of identity in the title wherein ethnic consciousness sustained a sense of self and group despite multiple changes of government and location. Family was also a major factor in making a living, with aid in getting jobs and infonnation on the new land helpful in adjustment and upward mobility. One of the most engaging aspects of the book is the use of familial anecdote to bring life to history . For example, during World War II female relatives of the author, needing to milk goats in a time of food scarcity, persuaded nearby soldiers to stop shelling so the animals would calm down! Stolarik also offers accounts of misleading meddling communist officials while his homeland relatives provided shelter, assistance and advice during his research in Slovakia. The larger narrative would benefit from greater acknowledgement of variety . The author likely overstates the general persistence of the immigrant vision of an enclosed Slovak identity in the SLOVAKIA-2015 147 second generation. In Minneapolis, with five Polish (and one Slovak) Catholic parishes, marriages at the largest Polish congregation by 1940 recorded over 50% with one non-Polish spouse, and the greater paucity of Slovaks might well have fostered such patterns there or elsewhere. In this regard Stolarik is better in the helpful comparison of American and Canadian Slovak development, noting contrasts as well as similarities and offering plausible interpretations for variety. The book is a stimulating study which will repay the attention of scholars and interesting laypersons alike.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Jan Rychlík, Magdaléna Rychlíková, Hospodářský, sociální, kulturní a politický vývoj Podkarpatské Rusi 1919-1939 (C. Winston Chrislock), p. 129</li> <li>David Doellinger, Turning Prayers into Protests: Religious-Based Activitism and its Challenge to State Power in Socialist Slovakia and East Germany (James Ramon Felak), p. 132</li> <li>James Mace Ward, Priest, Politician, Collaborator: Jozef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia (Gregory C. Ference), p. 134</li> <li>Miroslav Londák, Ekonomické reformy v Československu v 50. a 60. Rokoch 20. storočia a slovenská ekonomika (Martin Pospíšil), p. 137</li> <li>Ján Čarnogurský, Dennik, 1994-2007 (Jan Rychlík), p. 141</li> <li>Robert M. Zecker, Race and America's Immigrant Press (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 143</li> <li>M. Mark Stolarik, Where is my Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (1870-2010) (William J. Galush), p. 145</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Chrislock, Winston, 1940- Felak, James Ramon, 1957- Ference, Gregory Curtis, 1957- Galush, William J. (William John), 1942- Pospíšil, Martin Rychlík, Jan Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 LCNAF name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/aeda756a5fcd1d40a85e0e254f46199a.pdf 23aed8587408ab251913c8486a378df0 PDF Text Text 148 SLOV AKIA-2015 CONTRIBUTORS REBEKAH KLEIN-PEJSOV A is an Assistant Professor of History at Purdue University specializing in modem Jewish and East Central European History. She is the author of Mapping Jewish Loyalties in lnterwar Slovakia (Indiana University Press, 2015), and articles in the Austrian History Yearbook, and the AJS Review. She received her Ph.D. from Columbia University. Her research interests span transnational approaches to the social and political history of East Central European Jewry, comparative nationalism, and refugee studies. STEFAN KUCiK (Ph.D., Presov) is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education, Catholic University in Ruzomberok. He is the editor of Mytus a realita : Zbornik prispevkov z medzinarodnej vedeckej konferencie organizovanej Historickym ustavom Katolickej univerzity v Ruiomberku pri prileiitosti steho vyrocia Cernovskej tragedie (Ruzomberok, 2008), the author of Podiel americkych Slovakov na autonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku (1918 - 1938) (Martin, 2011) and co-author of Slovenske a ceske krajanske hnutie v USA (do roku 1918) (Presov, 2014). He has also published a number of articles in scholarly journals. MIROSLAV MICHELA (Ph.D., Komarno) is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Czech and Slovak History at Charles University in Prague and a Senior Researcher at the Institute of History, Slovak Academy of sciences in Bratislava. His research interests include the politics of memory and nationalism in Czechoslovakia and East-Central Europe. He has written many scholarly articles and chapters in books and the monograph Pod hes/om integrity: Slovenska otazka v politike Mad'arska 1918-1921 (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2009). DALIBOR MIKULAS, (PhD . Comenius University) is a linguist who specializes in English. He teaches in the Department of English Language and Literature, University of Zilina. He research interests are in English lexicology and lexicography. He has pub- �SLOVAKIA-2015 149 lished over thirty articles and book chapters in his area of expertise. Recently, he has focused his attention on lexicographic works published by Slovak authors in North America. TOM NICHOLSON (M.A. Queen' s University) is an investigative journalist for the daily Sme (Bratislava). He is author of the best-selling non-fiction book Gori/a (2012) and co-editor of the Global Report on Slovakia (1999-2008) . Mr. Nicholson has taught English at various Slovak universities, and teaches investigative journalism and history at the Pan-European University and the University of Economics in Bratislava. He was editor-in-chief and publisher of The Slovak Spectator (Bratislava) from 1998 through 2007. MARIAN MARK STOLARIK, (Ph.D., Minnesota), is Professor of History and holder of the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa. From 1979 to 1991 he was President and CEO of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia, and director of its press. He specializes in the history of Slovak immigration to North America. He has published nine books and over sixty articles in the field, including Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America, 1870-2010 (Berne: Peter Lang, 2012). �150 SLOVAKIA-2015 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either Microsofl:Word or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All submitted articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. �Notes �Notes ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W.NINAHOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Jozef Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W.Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , John G. Duch , Esq ., Stephanie Seigel , John A. Holy Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski , David M. Blazek, Sue Ann M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Martha Catalano , Joseph Goda , Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association Beachwood , Ohio First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S. and Canada Independence, Ohio Slovak Catholic Sokol Passaic, New Jersey National Slovak Society of the U.S.A McMurray, Pennsylvania Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania The Slovak Newspapermen's Association of America SLOVAKIA $10.00 per issue � 148 SLOV AKIA-2015 CONTRIBUTORS REBEKAH KLEIN-PEJSOV A is an Assistant Professor of History at Purdue University specializing in modem Jewish and East Central European History. She is the author of Mapping Jewish Loyalties in lnterwar Slovakia (Indiana University Press, 2015), and articles in the Austrian History Yearbook, and the AJS Review. She received her Ph.D. from Columbia University. Her research interests span transnational approaches to the social and political history of East Central European Jewry, comparative nationalism, and refugee studies. STEFAN KUCiK (Ph.D., Presov) is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education, Catholic University in Ruzomberok. He is the editor of Mytus a realita : Zbornik prispevkov z medzinarodnej vedeckej konferencie organizovanej Historickym ustavom Katolickej univerzity v Ruiomberku pri prileiitosti steho vyrocia Cernovskej tragedie (Ruzomberok, 2008), the author of Podiel americkych Slovakov na autonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku (1918 - 1938) (Martin, 2011) and co-author of Slovenske a ceske krajanske hnutie v USA (do roku 1918) (Presov, 2014). He has also published a number of articles in scholarly journals. MIROSLAV MICHELA (Ph.D., Komarno) is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Czech and Slovak History at Charles University in Prague and a Senior Researcher at the Institute of History, Slovak Academy of sciences in Bratislava. His research interests include the politics of memory and nationalism in Czechoslovakia and East-Central Europe. He has written many scholarly articles and chapters in books and the monograph Pod hes/om integrity: Slovenska otazka v politike Mad'arska 1918-1921 (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2009). DALIBOR MIKULAS, (PhD . Comenius University) is a linguist who specializes in English. He teaches in the Department of English Language and Literature, University of Zilina. He research interests are in English lexicology and lexicography. He has pub- �SLOVAKIA-2015 149 lished over thirty articles and book chapters in his area of expertise. Recently, he has focused his attention on lexicographic works published by Slovak authors in North America. TOM NICHOLSON (M.A. Queen' s University) is an investigative journalist for the daily Sme (Bratislava). He is author of the best-selling non-fiction book Gori/a (2012) and co-editor of the Global Report on Slovakia (1999-2008) . Mr. Nicholson has taught English at various Slovak universities, and teaches investigative journalism and history at the Pan-European University and the University of Economics in Bratislava. He was editor-in-chief and publisher of The Slovak Spectator (Bratislava) from 1998 through 2007. MARIAN MARK STOLARIK, (Ph.D., Minnesota), is Professor of History and holder of the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa. From 1979 to 1991 he was President and CEO of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia, and director of its press. He specializes in the history of Slovak immigration to North America. He has published nine books and over sixty articles in the field, including Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America, 1870-2010 (Berne: Peter Lang, 2012). �150 SLOVAKIA-2015 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either Microsofl:Word or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All submitted articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. �Notes �Notes ��THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W.NINAHOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Jozef Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W.Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , John G. Duch , Esq ., Stephanie Seigel , John A. Holy Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski , David M. Blazek, Sue Ann M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Martha Catalano , Joseph Goda , Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association Beachwood , Ohio First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S. and Canada Independence, Ohio Slovak Catholic Sokol Passaic, New Jersey National Slovak Society of the U.S.A McMurray, Pennsylvania Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania The Slovak Newspapermen's Association of America SLOVAKIA $10.00 per issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2015, Vol. 42 Description An account of the resource Vol. 42 (No. 78-79), 2015. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 148 SLOV AKIA-2015 CONTRIBUTORS REBEKAH KLEIN-PEJSOV A is an Assistant Professor of History at Purdue University specializing in modem Jewish and East Central European History. She is the author of Mapping Jewish Loyalties in lnterwar Slovakia (Indiana University Press, 2015), and articles in the Austrian History Yearbook, and the AJS Review. She received her Ph.D. from Columbia University. Her research interests span transnational approaches to the social and political history of East Central European Jewry, comparative nationalism, and refugee studies. STEFAN KUCiK (Ph.D., Presov) is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education, Catholic University in Ruzomberok. He is the editor of Mytus a realita : Zbornik prispevkov z medzinarodnej vedeckej konferencie organizovanej Historickym ustavom Katolickej univerzity v Ruiomberku pri prileiitosti steho vyrocia Cernovskej tragedie (Ruzomberok, 2008), the author of Podiel americkych Slovakov na autonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku (1918 - 1938) (Martin, 2011) and co-author of Slovenske a ceske krajanske hnutie v USA (do roku 1918) (Presov, 2014). He has also published a number of articles in scholarly journals. MIROSLAV MICHELA (Ph.D., Komarno) is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Czech and Slovak History at Charles University in Prague and a Senior Researcher at the Institute of History, Slovak Academy of sciences in Bratislava. His research interests include the politics of memory and nationalism in Czechoslovakia and East-Central Europe. He has written many scholarly articles and chapters in books and the monograph Pod hes/om integrity: Slovenska otazka v politike Mad'arska 1918-1921 (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2009). DALIBOR MIKULAS, (PhD . Comenius University) is a linguist who specializes in English. He teaches in the Department of English Language and Literature, University of Zilina. He research interests are in English lexicology and lexicography. He has pub- SLOVAKIA-2015 149 lished over thirty articles and book chapters in his area of expertise. Recently, he has focused his attention on lexicographic works published by Slovak authors in North America. TOM NICHOLSON (M.A. Queen' s University) is an investigative journalist for the daily Sme (Bratislava). He is author of the best-selling non-fiction book Gori/a (2012) and co-editor of the Global Report on Slovakia (1999-2008) . Mr. Nicholson has taught English at various Slovak universities, and teaches investigative journalism and history at the Pan-European University and the University of Economics in Bratislava. He was editor-in-chief and publisher of The Slovak Spectator (Bratislava) from 1998 through 2007. MARIAN MARK STOLARIK, (Ph.D., Minnesota), is Professor of History and holder of the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at the University of Ottawa. From 1979 to 1991 he was President and CEO of the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies in Philadelphia, and director of its press. He specializes in the history of Slovak immigration to North America. He has published nine books and over sixty articles in the field, including Where is my Hom e? Slovak Immigration to North America, 1870-2010 (Berne: Peter Lang, 2012). 150 SLOVAKIA-2015 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either Microsofl:Word or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. All submitted articles will be sent to an outside reader for evaluation. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. Notes Notes THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W.NINAHOLY Secretary-Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Jozef Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W.Nina Holy, Dr. Mikulas A. Halko, Eileen S. Wilson , John G. Duch , Esq ., Stephanie Seigel , John A. Holy Cynthia M. Maleski , Andrew M. Rajec, Michael J. Horvath, Theresa M. Kluchinski , David M. Blazek, Sue Ann M. Seich , Kenneth A. Arendt, Scott T. Pogorelec, Linda M. Strom , Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Martha Catalano , Joseph Goda , Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA First Catholic Slovak Ladies Association Beachwood , Ohio First Catholic Slovak Union of the U.S. and Canada Independence, Ohio Slovak Catholic Sokol Passaic, New Jersey National Slovak Society of the U.S.A McMurray, Pennsylvania Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania The Slovak Newspapermen's Association of America SLOVAKIA $10.00 per issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 42 (No. 78-79) Description An account of the resource includes Contributors; Guidelines for Manuscripts Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f7f6eb6179eda6cadc47a27c860b9cb4.pdf 968ea5dbf41a3aec290ab96c620a5066 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLI NUMBERS 76-77 2013 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROLS . LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Editor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923 Stefan Kucik .............. ... ...... ...... .. ........ ... ........ ........ .......... ... .. ... .. ... 7 An Unwelcome Guest: Milan Hodza in American Documents Between 1941 and 1944 Roman Licko ..... ............... .... ............................ ....... .... ..... .... ...... 37 Seeming and Being: Contextualizing the History of PostCommunist Slovakia Juraj Hocman ......... ..................................................... ...... ... ...... 73 Vladimir Meciar and the Politics of Privatization, 1992-1998 John A. Gould ............................ ... ................................... .. ...... 102 Hungarian Minority Politics in Slovakia: Under Fico, After EU Accession Carol Skalnik Leff ........... .. ............ ... .................. ........ ...... ........ 145 Slovakia 2010 Election and Its Aftermath Kevin Deegan-Krause ... ............. ... ... ...... ....... .. ...... .. ... ......... .... . 164 DOCUMENTATION The Military Missions of Milan R. Stefanik in Russia on Behalf of the Czech and Slovak Cause Evgeny F. Firsov .............. .... ... ... .... .... ... ........... ........ ..... .... ....... 179 REVIEWS Robert M. Zecker, Streetcar Parishes M Mark Stolarik .................... .................................... ........ ...... 195 �4 SLOVAKIA Valerian Bystricky et al., Rozbi tie alebo rozpad Stanis/av J. Kirschbaum ... ... ........ ...... ........ ..... ......... ...... ........... 197 Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, iandar troch reiimov Yeshayahu J. Jelinek ......... ... ....... ....... ......... ..... .......... .. .... ......... 200 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov Paul R. Magocsi .. ....... ... ..... ... ... ... ................. ....... ....... .......... .... 203 M. Mark Stolarik, comp and ed., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Gregory C. Ference ........ ........ .............. .............. ......... ... .. ...... ..206 Contributors ........... .... ....... ..... .... ..... .......... ..... .. .. .. ........... ..... ... ..209 Guidelines for Manuscripts .... ... .... ............. ..... ........ ...... ... ... .....211 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLI NUMBERS 76-77 2013 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROLS . LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Editor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923 Stefan Kucik .............. ... ...... ...... .. ........ ... ........ ........ .......... ... .. ... .. ... 7 An Unwelcome Guest: Milan Hodza in American Documents Between 1941 and 1944 Roman Licko ..... ............... .... ............................ ....... .... ..... .... ...... 37 Seeming and Being: Contextualizing the History of PostCommunist Slovakia Juraj Hocman ......... ..................................................... ...... ... ...... 73 Vladimir Meciar and the Politics of Privatization, 1992-1998 John A. Gould ............................ ... ................................... .. ...... 102 Hungarian Minority Politics in Slovakia: Under Fico, After EU Accession Carol Skalnik Leff ........... .. ............ ... .................. ........ ...... ........ 145 Slovakia 2010 Election and Its Aftermath Kevin Deegan-Krause ... ............. ... ... ...... ....... .. ...... .. ... ......... .... . 164 DOCUMENTATION The Military Missions of Milan R. Stefanik in Russia on Behalf of the Czech and Slovak Cause Evgeny F. Firsov .............. .... ... ... .... .... ... ........... ........ ..... .... ....... 179 REVIEWS Robert M. Zecker, Streetcar Parishes M Mark Stolarik .................... .................................... ........ ...... 195 �4 SLOVAKIA Valerian Bystricky et al., Rozbi tie alebo rozpad Stanis/av J. Kirschbaum ... ... ........ ...... ........ ..... ......... ...... ........... 197 Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, iandar troch reiimov Yeshayahu J. Jelinek ......... ... ....... ....... ......... ..... .......... .. .... ......... 200 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov Paul R. Magocsi .. ....... ... ..... ... ... ... ................. ....... ....... .......... .... 203 M. Mark Stolarik, comp and ed., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Gregory C. Ference ........ ........ .............. .............. ......... ... .. ...... ..206 Contributors ........... .... ....... ..... .... ..... .......... ..... .. .. .. ........... ..... ... ..209 Guidelines for Manuscripts .... ... .... ............. ..... ........ ...... ... ... .....211 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA VOLUMEXLI NUMBERS 76-77 2013 A scholarly annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Editorial Board MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROLS . LEFF University of Illinois PATRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak League of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055, USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions should be sent to the above address. The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Editor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa.ca Table of Contents ARTICLES The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Jan Vojtassak's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923 Stefan Kucik .............. ... ...... ...... .. ........ ... ........ ........ .......... ... .. ... .. ... 7 An Unwelcome Guest: Milan Hodza in American Documents Between 1941 and 1944 Roman Licko ..... ............... .... ............................ ....... .... ..... .... ...... 37 Seeming and Being: Contextualizing the History of PostCommunist Slovakia Juraj Hocman ......... ..................................................... ...... ... ...... 73 Vladimir Meciar and the Politics of Privatization, 1992-1998 John A. Gould ............................ ... ................................... .. ...... 102 Hungarian Minority Politics in Slovakia: Under Fico, After EU Accession Carol Skalnik Leff ........... .. ............ ... .................. ........ ...... ........ 145 Slovakia 2010 Election and Its Aftermath Kevin Deegan-Krause ... ............. ... ... ...... ....... .. ...... .. ... ......... .... . 164 DOCUMENTATION The Military Missions of Milan R. Stefanik in Russia on Behalf of the Czech and Slovak Cause Evgeny F. Firsov .............. .... ... ... .... .... ... ........... ........ ..... .... ....... 179 REVIEWS Robert M. Zecker, Streetcar Parishes M Mark Stolarik .................... .................................... ........ ...... 195 4 SLOVAKIA Valerian Bystricky et al., Rozbi tie alebo rozpad Stanis/av J. Kirschbaum ... ... ........ ...... ........ ..... ......... ...... ........... 197 Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, iandar troch reiimov Yeshayahu J. Jelinek ......... ... ....... ....... ......... ..... .......... .. .... ......... 200 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov Paul R. Magocsi .. ....... ... ..... ... ... ... ................. ....... ....... .......... .... 203 M. Mark Stolarik, comp and ed., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Gregory C. Ference ........ ........ .............. .............. ......... ... .. ...... ..206 Contributors ........... .... ....... ..... .... ..... .......... ..... .. .. .. ........... ..... ... ..209 Guidelines for Manuscripts .... ... .... ............. ..... ........ ...... ... ... .....211 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/57e722dd66721df48d670064e04aa791.pdf 3d6c95dfd0761ce55e93b680ab7c1546 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS: BISHOP JAN VOJTASSAK'S ABORTED JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1923 r V V r Stefan Kucik In 1923 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak, bishop of the diocese of Spis in Slovakia, decided to undertake a pastoral journey to Slovak Catholics in the United States of America. However, Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue him a passport. They considered his trip to be political. It turns out that Vojtassak's planned journey conflicted with Czechoslovak government plans to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Upon hearing of this refusal, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America published an open letter to Tomas G. Masaryk, president of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which they expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the president and his government. To counteract the impact of this letter, the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter to the president, ostensibly by a group of American Slovaks who supported him and his government. Interestingly, this "anti-letter" was written by an official of Czechoslovak intelligence. While many scholars have dealt with the biography of bishop Jan Vojtassak, only Robert Letz has provided us with a thorough explanation of the reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant him passport in 1923 .1 In this context, however, no one has pointed to the open letters addressed to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation and the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York. The present article will try to fill this gap, as well as to put the matter into a broader context. I Robert Letz, "Bi skup Jan Vojtassak a slovenska politika V medzi vojnovom obdobi," in Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, Ivan Chalupecky, ed. (Spisska KapitulaSpisske Podhradie: Ki\azsky seminar biskupa Jana Vojtassaka, 2003 ), 25 -52. �8 SLOVAKIA After Jan Vojtassak had been appointed bishop of Spis towards the end of 1920,2 along with Marian Blaha for the diocese of Banska Bystrica and Karol Kmet'ko for the diocese of Nitra, American Slovaks rejoiced. As early as December 22, 1920, editor Jozef Husek wrote in the Catholic weekly Jednota : "Only those who look at the deep religious sentiment of our people, and their simple faith and devotion to the Holy Church, can understand what it means for Catholic Slovaks to have apostles of their own flesh and blood, of their national sentiment and outlook. " 3 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak was ordained a bishop in Nitra on February 13, 1921. In a fortnight he assumed his office in Spisska Kapitula. In his first pastoral letter, Vojtassak outlined a program of his future activities. He was aware of the negative consequences of the Great War. He realized that the war had caused many to lose their faith in God, and felt that the war's ravages threatened the very basis of love for one 's neighbours. It not only produced a lot of cripples, but largely devastated people' s spiritual values . At war's end materialism and the class struggle began to appear and hatred toward the Catholic Church grew. In Czechoslovakia, the strong anti-Catholic character of the new political system was evident right after the war. The Czechs did not show much consideration for the religiosity of Slovakia. They also tended to undervalue the contribution of the Slovak Catholic clergy in the creation of the common independent state,4 whether in Slovakia or in the USA, and tended to forget that Roman Catholics constituted the vast majority of both populations. The Czechoslovak government, however, was not satisfied with just the secularization of the new country. It also decided to transfer its anti-Catholicism to Czech and Slovak communities in America. In order to promote the newly established Czechoslovak Church among American compatriots, it sent a mission led by its first bishop Gorazd Pavlik to the USA. In connection with this mission, which 2 For the appointment, ordination and enthronement of bishop Jan Vojta~~ak see Ivan Chalupecky, "Obsadenie spi~skeho biskupskeho stolca po roku 19 18," in Chalupecky, Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, 7-24. 3 Jozef Paufo, 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, I 965), 165 . 4 Ivan Chalupecky, Biskup Jan Vojtassak: K jeho verejnej a politickej cinnosti (Rufo mberok: Katolicka univerzita v Rufo mberku, Filozofi cka fakulta, 2009), 2 1-25. �SLOVAKIA 9 was carried out between June 1922 and January 1923,5 an incident which became infamous in the history of the Slovak Catholic Church occurred. It filled both Slovak Catholics in Czechoslovakia and in America with much indignation. The incident lay behind the refusal of Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to the bishop of Spis. Jan Vojtassak had decided to travel to America as early as December of 1922. He had reached his decision on the basis of a circular letter issued by Antonin Cyril Stojan, Archbishop of Olomouc. Addressed to all ordinaries in Slovakia, the letter was based upon an earlier one sent by Czech Catholic priests in America on the basis of instructions received from the Czech episcopate. They had been asked to try to paralyze Gorazd Pavlik's activities, because some Slovak priests in America had begun to affiliate with the new Czechoslovak Church. The Czech priests emphasized that they had not succeeded in their work among American Slovaks because they were Czechs and not Slovaks. Had the episcopate sent Slovak priests among American Slovaks, these would have been more successful. 6 This circular letter, as well as reports published in Slovak-American newspapers and republished in Slovakia, plus a number of private letters received from individuals across the United States, led bishop Vojtassak to decide to lead a mission to the USA. 7 He was also aware that many Slovak Catholics in America came from his diocese. Vojtassak's mission was fully supported by the Czech mission of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the USA, as well as by Archbishop A. C. Stojan and other Slovak and Czech bishops, along with the former apostolic nuncio Clemente Micara. The Holy See also agreed with Vojtassak' s planned journey to America. 8 Bishop Vojtassak began to prepare for his trip in April of 1923. Slovak organizations in the USA were informed of his coming.9 In May of the same year, Vojtassak applied for a passport. Although at that time passports were usually granted by district authorities, Vojtassak's application was forwarded to the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava. Thence it was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, whence it was 5 Letz, " Bi skup ... ," 47 . Slovak (Bratislava), July 5, 1923, 1; Jednota (Middletown, PA), July 25 , 1923, 4. 7 Slovak, July 5, 1923, 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Letz, "Biskup ... ," 44. 6 �SLOVAKIA returned back to Bratislava. This kind of procrastination continued for a month. To try to expedite matters, Vojtassak travelled to Bratislava and even to Prague, but his efforts proved fruitless . The parliamentary deputy of the Czechoslovak People's Party Vaclav Myslivec, as well as some parliamentary deputies of the Slovak People's Party, intervened with the Minister of the Interior Jan Malypetr. The latter, however, refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport with the comment that "he knows Catholic bishops who lie. " 10 In order to comprehend such a rude refusal, one needs to understand the situation in the Slovak-American community in the first years after the creation of Czechoslovakia. After Tomas G. Masaryk had left America in the fall 1918, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Cleveland to decide on sending a delegation to Slovakia. 11 According to Albert P. Mamatey, president of the League, 12 the delegates were to make contact with political leaders in the old country and to let them know about the Pittsburgh Agreement concluded with T. G. Masaryk in May of 1918. 13 Upon their arrival in Slovakia, the delegates acted impartially. In their Privet delegacie Slovenskej ligy v Amerike [Address of the Delegation of the Slovak League of America] dated April 9, 1919, they expressed their surprise at the growing political struggles in Slovakia. Therefore, they initially hesitated to give the Pittsburgh Agreement to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Responsible for Slovakia, or to Ferdis Juriga or Andrej Hlinka, the most popular priests and politicians in the Slovak People ' s Party. 14 They considered the political squabbles among the many new political parties a waste of energy for a small nation. 15 Upon their return to the USA, two of the delegates, Jozef Rusek, the editor of Jednota and Milan Getting, the editor of New Yorksky dennik, reported on the situation in Slovakia at the 12th Congress of the Slovak League held in Scranton, PA, on May 29, 1919. Jozef 10 Slowik, July 5, 1923, 1. Nave Slo vensko (Pittsburgh, PA), December 2, 19 18, 2-3. 12 Albert Pavo! Mamatey was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1911 to 1920. 13 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slav. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., dna 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, PA: Slovak League of America), 9. 14 Karol Sidor, Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava, 1929), 226-227. 15 Slovak, May 3, 1919, I. 11 �SLOVAKIA 11 Husek advised American Slovaks to be careful in pressing for the autonomy of Slovakia as promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, because at that time it might help Magyar efforts to re-annex Slovakia to Hungary. However, he did not abandon his claim to the autonomy of Slovakia. He postponed it to a time when the situation in Slovakia would improve. 16 Milan Getting, on the other hand, did not even mention the autonomy of Slovakia. He reported on his plan of agitation against Magyarization in Slovakia. He worked out this plan on the basis of a suggestion made by Minister V. Srobar. Since Srobar was short of funds, Getting returned to the USA to ask American Slovaks to purchase a printing press for Minister Srobar's agitation. 17 Despite Jozef Husek's advice not to immediately press for the autonomy of Slovakia and Milan Getting's ignoring of the issue, American Slovaks began to very heatedly discuss this matter. 18 On July 31, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Pittsburgh and accepted the brochure Politicka nauka vzh/'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat [Political Perspective Regarding the Czecho-Slovak State] 19 as the basis of its future activities. The brochure stated that the Slovak League of America decided to support its program of autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. The final arrangement of the Czecho-Slovak state, however, it left to the Slovaks in the old country. 20 Another representative of the Slovak League of America, who reported on the situation in Slovakia right after the World War I, was Ignac Gessay. However, he did not belong to the above mentioned delegation. This renowned Slovak-American editor was sent to Slovakia somewhat later. The reason for his mission was a lack of reliable information from Europe at the beginning of 1919. 21 American 16 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slov. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., diia 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, 19 19), 24. 17 Ibid. , 30-31. 18 Sidor, Slovaci... , 231. 19 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Trnave, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 299K3. Zapisnica zo sch6dze Ustrednej spravy Slovenskej Ligy vydrziavanej di\a 31. jula 191 9 v Henry Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. The brochure was written by editor Jan A. Feriencik and published by the Slovak League of America in 19 19. Informally, it was called .. Politicky Katechismus " [Political Catechism]. 20 Jan A. Feriencik, Politicka nauka vzhl'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat (Pittsburgh: Slovenska liga v Amerike, 19 19), 7. 21 Dobry Pastier, April 19 19, 7. �12 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, therefore, decided to establish an information office, at first in Paris, and once regular postal service had been established between Czecho-Slovakia and the USA, in Slovakia too.22 This task was entrusted to lgnac Gessay, at that time an editor of Nave Slovensko, 23 official organ of the Slovak League of America.24 In his report to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League held in Pittsburgh on October 24, 1919, Gessay recommended that American Slovaks take a neutral stand on the issue of Slovak autonomy. He suggested a gradual implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement and warned radical Slovak-American autonomists that immediate autonomy would have been fatal for the new republic. 25 Both Gessay's and Husek's initial reports had a huge impact on the official stand of the Slovak League towards autonomy. Jozef Rusek, however, would gradually change his mind and then would support the autonomist movement in Slovakia. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League on October 24, 1919, two delegates of the Slovak People's Party, the Rev. Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala, also appeared. Jozef Rudinsky had been sent to the USA by several leaders of the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka in August of 1919. He had been chosen as a trustworthy person whose task it was to defend the idea of Slovak autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Republic among American Slovaks, and to inform them of the Party's activities. In addition, Rudinsky was supposed to raise funds for the autonomist movement. On the suggestion of the Rev. Frantisek Jehlicska, Jozef Kubala, a merchant from Vrbove, joined Rudinsky before his departure to the USA. In Poland, however, they both joined the Rev. Hlinka's delegation to Paris, in an attempt to have autonomy for Slovakia included in the Paris Peace Treaties. After a week's stay in the capital of France and the delegation's expulsion from that country, Ru- 22 Slovensky narodny archiv, Brati slava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter SNA), fund (hereinafter f.) Slovenska liga v Amerike [Slovak League of America], folder (hereinafter fold .) 2. Albert Mamatey to Frantisek Stas, April 17, 191 9. 23 Nave Slovensko, official organ of the Slovak League of America in 1918-1922. 24 Jgnac Gessay, S/ovensko po oslobodeni (Cleveland: Slovenska liga v Amerike), 4; ASSV, fasc . 236CI0. Authorization for Ignac Gessay, April 26, 1919. 25 Gessay, S/ovensko ... , 26-28, 37-38. �SLOVAKIA 13 dinsky and Kubala continued on their original journey to the United States, where they arrived on October 13, 1919. 26 At the time of the delegates' trip to the USA the majority of American Slovaks felt distaste for the policy of the Slovak People's Party.27 This aversion arose mainly from the reports of Jozef Husek and Ignac Gessay, as well as Andrej Hlinka' s faux pas in connection with his rash journey to the Paris Peace Conference. Another reason was the fact that the delegates arrived in America with Polish passports and Polish visas, and not Czecho-Slovak. 28 Having presented their credentials to the League, Jozef Rudinsky was asked to explain his mission to America. He clarified the position of the Slovak People's Party at length. Like the Slovak League of America, the People's Party demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. It also wanted autonomy for Slovakia to be included in the Paris Peace Treaties. Therefore, he had come to the USA, along with Jozef Kubala, to agitate for autonomy and to raise funds towards this end. 29 Although the Executive Committee of the Slovak League did not find anything contrary to its program in the Rudinsky mission, it nevertheless took a negative stand towards it. Rudinsky and Kubala did not have any credentials from the Czecho-Slovak government and the League did not agree with Hlinka's journey to the Paris Peace Conference. The League accused the delegates of driving a wedge between the Slovaks and Czechs in America, which might have had a negative impact on their coexistence in the USA, as well as in Czecho-Slovakia. 30 On the other hand, the Executive Commit26 Robert Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky - vyznamna osobnost' Turzovky," in Turzovka kriiom-kraiom, Ivan Gajdiciar ed. (Turzovka: Spolok priatel'ov Turzovky, 2010), 328329. 27 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Rufomberok: Lev, 1921 ), 11 . 28 Karol Sidor, "Zasahy Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike do politickeho vyvinu slovenskeho (1914 - 1939)," in Slovenska liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna, Mikulas Sprinc, ed. (Scranton, PA : Slovenska liga v Amerike, 1947), 54. 29 ASSV, fasc . 299A6. Zapisnica zo schodze Ustredneho vyboru Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydrziavanej di\a 24. okt6bra I 919 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli v Pittsburgh, Penna. JO Masarykuv ustav a Archiv Akademie ved Ceske republiky, V. V. i., Archiv UTGM, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter MUA AV CR, AUTGM), f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 459. Rezolucia Slovenskej Ligy prijata na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednyrn vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., di\a 24. a 25. okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919. (For the letter without attachments see Slovenske �14 SLOVAKIA tee issued a memorandum, in which American Slovaks demanded the gradual implementation of the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement in the newly-created Czecho-Slovakia. 31The resolution against Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala and the League's subsequent memorandum expressed American Slovaks' efforts to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the other hand, it also reflected their efforts to maintain their neutral stand and not to be drawn into political affairs in Slovakia. In such a situation, the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party could not rely on the authority of the Slovak League of America. They, therefore, approached two Slovak-American organizations which disagreed with the League 's stand: the Slovak Catholic Federation and the First Catholic Slovak Union. Jozef Rudinsky expressed his ideas mainly in the weekly Jednota , where he was assisted by Jozef Husek, and in the newspaper Obrana, which was edited by the Rev. Jan Metod Liscinsky.32 While Rudinsky and Kubala, assisted by Slovak-American Catholic organizations, were agitating in the USA for Slovak autonomy, Albert Mamatey left on a three-month journey (December 10, 1919 March 14, 1920) to Czecho-Slovakia. His intentions were very much the same as that of the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party in the USA, i.e. that the Pittsburgh Agreement should be incorporated into the future Czecho-Slovak Constitution. Upon his return to the United States, Mamatey reported to a meeting of the Executive Committee in Pittsburgh on April 8, 1920. 33 He had traveled to Czecho-Slovakia via France and Switzerland. In Paris, he had met with Stefan Osusky, the general secretary of the Czecho-Slovak delegation to the Peace Conference and a vyst'ahovalectvo: Dokumenty 3, Frantisek Bielik, Elo Rakos, eds. (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1976), 165-172, document no. 325); ASSV, fasc . 299A9. Prehlas a verejne osvedcenie Slov. Ligy. 31 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R- republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 45 9. Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy Prijate na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednym vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., dna 24. a 25 . okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919; Jednota, October 29, 1919, I. 32 Sidor, Slovaci... , 235; Letz, "JozefRudinsky ...," 329-330. 33 ASSV, fasc . 299A4. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia ustr. a vyko. vyboru Slov. ligy 8. apr. 1920 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli, Pittsburgh, Pa. �SLOVAKIA 15 delegate of the Slovak League of America to Masaryk in 1916. 34 When Mamatey suggested that the Slovaks should have been contractually guaranteed their home rule at the Paris Peace Conference in the same way as had the Ruthenians, Osusky offered the following explanation: "During the whole war, we cooperated and worked with our brothers the Czechs for our independence as a UNIT, as two branches of one nation that belong together. Thanks to this UNIFIED stand with our brothers the Czechs, the Allies recognized our independence, our separation from the Magyars and our joining with the Czechs. "35 Osusky, however, was not worried about the future of the Slovaks. He promised that they would get everything that they asked for and that they wished, except for things that might be detrimental to them: "Because what we do not want, what would be detrimental or destructive for Slovakia, as for instance, a separate Diet at this time, nobody from the outside wi 11 force upon us nor put into our minds." 36 After this meeting, the intervention of Albert Mamatey on behalf of the autonomy of Slovakia sounded unconvincing. He had met with T. G. Masaryk, the President of Czecho-Slovakia, with Edvard Benes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Vavro Srobar, the Minister with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia, and others. In February of 1920, Mamatey had also taken part in the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies. Almost all with whom he had negotiated, had agreed with the view that at that time the autonomy of Slovakia with a separate Diet would have been fatal for Slovakia. Mamatey, however, had negotiated only with the members of 34 For more on Osusky, his earlier life in America and his mission to Europe, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia," Slovak Studies, 8 (1968), 27-30 and 57-66. 35 Zprava Predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana Ustrednemu Vyboru Slov. ligy v Pittsburghu, Pa. dna 8. aprila 1920 o Jeho ceste a missi v Cesko-slovenskej republike (Pittsburgh, 1920), 8. 36 Ibid. �16 SLOVAKIA the centralist Czechoslovak political parties and opponents of the legislative autonomy of Slovakia. In connection with the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies a regrettable incident occurred. The Club had passed a resolution which was supposed to confirm that in the draft Constitution there be included everything that had been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, except for a separate Diet. However, the signatures of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party (Alois Kalisek, Jan Kovalik, Stefan Onderco, Jozef Sivak and Florian Tomanek) on the resolution had been forged. This affair came to light only after the resolution had been cited in full in the Memorandum of the Slovak League of America addressed to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1922.37 Even if the resolution significantly influenced the future attitudes of American Slovaks to the issue of the autonomy of Slovakia, it seems that it did not have a great impact on the views of Albert Mamatey. On February 28, 1920, one day before he left Czecho-Slovakia, Albert Mamatey received a letter from Milan Hodza, the Minister for the Unification of Laws and one of the main Slovak political leaders. In this letter, Hodza had also rejected a separate Slovak Diet. Despite the unwillingness of the main political representatives to accept the claim to a Slovak Diet, Albert Mamatey did not hesitate to conclude his report with the words: "Slovakia may look forward to a great future," although he added that "it would take some time." 38 However, it is well-known how important a separate Diet was for American Slovaks. Jozef Rusek expressed their outlook very clearly: "Autonomy without a Diet, without legislation, is no autonomy. Indeed, autonomy is a Diet and a Diet is autonomy! Without a Diet there is no autonomy!" 39 Albert Mamatey must have been aware of the importance of a separate Slovak Diet to fulfill the promise of autonomy. He must have also known that if the requirement of a separate Slovak Diet had been deleted from the Pittsburgh Agreement, the latter would have been worthless. His attitude on the issue of the autonomy of 37 Memorandum Slovenskej ligy v Amerike upravene na vladu a Narodne Shromaidenie Cesko-Slovenskej Republiky v zaujime vtelenia Pittsburghskej Dohody do iistavy C-S Republiky (Pittsburgh : Slovak League of America, 1922). 38 Ibid. , 26. 39 Jednota, February 18, 1920, 4. �SLOVAKIA 17 Slovakia began to change by the beginning of 1919. In one of his letters addressed to Dr. Miloslav Francisci of Cleveland, son of a famous Slovak revolutionary hero of 1848, Mamatey wrote: "I have been fighting for the national individuality of the Slovak nation for over four years. I have insisted that the Slovaks are not just an "appendix" of the Czech nation, but the Slovaks are as independent a nation as the Czechs. However, I have gotten tired of the constant fighting. Anyways, the fate of the Slovak nation will not be determined by us from America, but by those back home. - You, I and hundreds of others here in America have done our duty. " 40 In accordance with his changed attitude towards autonomy for Slovakia and his hardly concealable inclination towards government policy, which was fuelled by the promise of the office of Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, Albert Mamatey decided to paralyze the agitation of Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala among American Slovaks. To this end he arranged that two delegates of the Czechoslovak government were sent to America. The mission of the Roman Catholic priest Ladislav Moys and the social democrat Jan Pocisk, did not bear fruit. They failed to persuade American Slovaks to approve of the Czechoslovak Constitution and their activities in the USA were deplored by the "Response" [Ohlas] of the Slovak Catholic Federation. 41 In response to the steps taken by Albert Mamatey and by the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek announced his resignation from the League. He accused the leading League officials of having knowingly and intentionally missed the opportunity to have Slovakia constitutionally guaranteed the right to 40 Aibert Mamatey to M . Francisci, January 22, 1919. It was published in Konstantin Culen, "Zo zaviatych listov (Z korespondencie A. Mamateya s Dr. M. Franciscim)," in Literarny almanach Slovaka v Amerike na rok 1962 (Middletown, Pa.: Hrobak Publications), 147. 41 Dobry Pastier (Middletown, PA), April 1920, 14-15; Jan Pankuch, Dejiny clevelandskych a lakewoodskych Slovakov (Cleveland, 1930), 188; Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Andreja, 1937), 274; Paufo, 162163; Natalia Krajfovicova, "Americki Slovaci a slovenski autonomisti v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR," in Miroslav Peknik et al. , Ferdinand Juriga: /'udovy smer slovenskej politiky (Bratislava: VEDA, 2009), 260. �18 SLOVAKIA home rule and individual national, cultural and economic life within the Czechoslovak Republic. Moreover, he accused the League's officials of morally and financially supporting agitation against the Pittsburgh Agreement. 42 As a result, no Slovak-American Catholic organization attended the 13th Congress of the Slovak League held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 24-25, 1920. 43 After the Congress, the Slovak League of America was subjected to a lot of criticism by Jozef Husek. The latter concluded that the League "ceases to be the moral and official representative of the Slovak-American colony."44 As a result, the role that had been played in the promotion of Slovak national demands by the Slovak League of America began to be played by representatives of Slovak American Catholics led by the Slovak Catholic Federation and those organizations with which the Federation closely co-operated.45 However, after the Slovak National Party had split from the Slovak National and Agrarian Party in March of 192 I in order to be able more vigorously to demand the legislative autonomy of Slovakia, the Slovak League of America, led by its new president Ivan Bielek,46 began to change its stand. One of the first consequences of the creation of the Slovak National Party was the adoption of a compromise declaration requesting the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement at the conference of the representatives of American Slovaks in Washington, DC, on May 21 , 1921 . In this declaration, American Slovaks demanded that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also requested the gradual autonomy of Slovakia. 47 Another event that influenced the Slovak League of America was the secession of the Slovak People's 42 Jednota, June 19, 1920, 4. Pauco, 160. 44 Jednota , Jul y 7, 1920, 4. 45 Pauco, 160. 46 Ivan Bielek, a fo rmer newspaper editor, was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1920 to 1934. As the first vice-president of the League, Bielek became its president after Albert Mamatey resigned in September of 1920 due to his appointment as a consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Pittsburgh. Jednota, September 22, 1920, 2; Slovak Institute and Reference Library in Cleveland (hereinafter SIRL), fasc. Mamatey, Albert 1870 - 1923. "Pan Mamatey sa vzdava predsednictva Slov. Ligy," newspaper clipping, September 17, 1920. 47 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 317, 320. 43 �SLOVAKIA 19 Party from the common parliamentary club of the Czechoslovak People 's Party in November of 1921. 48 On June 28-30 1922, the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Pittsburgh. The Congress was attended by the vice-president of the Slovak National Party and the Rev. Anton Kompanek. The latter called uJ'on American Slovaks not to give up on the Pittsburgh Agreement. 4 His mission in the USA was to rally autonomist forces , both in America and in Slovakia. 50 The congress then split into two camps - autonomists and centralists. Nevertheless, the delegates supported the Pittsburgh Agreement almost unanimously and they ordered the Executive Board "to write to Prague."51 The Executive Board then sent a Memorandum to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic requesting that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Czechoslovak Constitution. They also demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia. 52 The 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was very important for the future orientation of this organization. In spite of expectations that the crisis within the League would deepen, the Congress became a new concentration of autonomist forces . However, the concentration was only reached with great effort. The June 29, 1922 debate about the Pittsburgh Agreement was long and lasted until 11 :00 p.m.53 The discussion on the Pittsburgh Agreement at the Congress was significantly influenced by Anton Kompanek. Once in America, he began to create a united front for the recognition of the Pittsburgh 48 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnfch vecf Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), f. rn. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, inventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report "Hlinkovci v Amerike" by M. Getting, director ofCSTK in Washington, DC, January 24, 1922. 49 Zapisnica XIV. Kongressu Slovenskej Lfgy vydi iavaneho v dnoch 28., 29. a 30. juna /922 v Moose Temple, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Pittsburgh, 1922), 83. 50 Krajcovicova, 262. 51 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report " Slovenske veci v Amerike", July 1, 1922 by M . Getting, director of CSTK in Washington, DC, July 7, 1922; Archfv Krajanskeho muzea Matice slovenskej, Bratislava (hereinafter AKM MS), f. Ignac Gessay, fold. I. Telegram to I. Gessay (torso, without sender, undated). 52 See footnote 3 7. 53 Robert Letz, "Slovenska liga v Amerike a Slovenska liga na Slovensku," in Historicky zbornfk, 19 (No. 1, 2009), 65 ; Obrana, June 27, 1922, 3 and Jul y 4, 1922, 1. �20 SLOVAKIA Agreement through his articles, which were published in the Slovak American press. In a series of articles in Obrana, Kompanek recommended that Slovak autonomy be achieved gradually, and only within the Czechoslovak Republic. As for American Slovaks, he was convinced that there was not as much disunity over the issue of autonomy as in the old country. He admitted, on the other hand, that there were also some personal antipathies (Bielek versus Husek, with the former favoring the Slovak National Party over the Slovak People's Party) .54 Anton Kompanek tried to eliminate these disagreements and he invited supporters of Slovak autonomy to a conference in Pittsburgh on October 12, 1922. At this conference, he stressed that the fate of the Pittsburgh Agreement was in the hands of American Slovaks. He stated that it was not enough to issue resolutions, but it was necessary to work systematically and support materially the movement for the autonomy of Slovakia directly in Slovakia. At the conference, a five-member committee was elected to coordinate the work on behalf of the Pittsburgh Agreement. It was named the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom and its members were Stefan Kocis, Jan Pankuch, Ivan Bielek, Jan Bibza and Jozef Husek. The latter was elected its president. The aim of the Committee was to unite all Slovak American organizations, their newspapers and public officials in the struggle for the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Another goal of the new organization was to try to create a coalition of all autonomist parties in Slovakia. 55 Even though Ivan Bielek had attended the conference in Pittsburgh as a private person, 56 once the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom was established, the "centralists" were expelled from the Slovak League of America. 57 This happened at the meeting of the Executive Committee with the Executive Board held on June 27-28 in Cleveland, 58 and was completed and approved at the 15th Con54 Krajcovicova, 262-263. Jednota, October 18, 1922, 4; Krajcovicova, 263 . 56 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0., 13. 57 Jednota, July 4, 1923, 4; Krajcovicova, 264. 58 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0 ., 73 . 55 �SLOVAKIA 21 gress of the League held on May 27-29, 1924 in Binghamton, New York. 59 In terms of the resolution of its 14th congress, the Slovak League of America reacted negatively to the new activities of Jozef Rudinsky in the USA in 1923. This time, contrary to his first mission among American Slovaks, Rudinsky, who had switched sides, and had become a major supporter of Milan Hodza, came to the USA in the service of the Czechoslovak government. The League also rejected a similar mission by Vavro Srobar and Vaclav Maule, a Czech professor and head of the branch of the Ministry of Education in Bratislava. They came in the same year to lecture on behalf of Czechoslovak national unity and against the autonomy of Slovakia.60 Their mission, however, failed among Slovak American autonomists. 61 Upon his return to Czechoslovakia in November of 1920, Jozef Rudinsky's relationship with Andrej Hlinka deteriorated and they eventually parted company.62 As early as the beginning of 1923, Rudinsky and Vavro Srobar began to talk. These conversations were probably initiated by Srobar, who was preparing for his own journey to the USA 63 in order to counteract the results of the 14th congress of the Slovak League of America. 64 Rudinsky and Srobar discussed Rudinsky' s planned new journey to America and concluded that the latter should use the contacts that he had made in his previous mission. They particularly counted upon Rudinsky's past friendship with Jozef Husek. To make his mission more successful, Rudinsky decided to depart alone, without Srobar. The latter would come after him and would finish what Rudinsky had started. 65 Rudinsky ' s and Srobar' s trips were intended to appear as two completely unrelated and independent initiatives. However, that same year bishop Vojtassak was also preparing for his journey to the USA. Vojtassak was not aware of Srobar' s and Rudinsky' s plans. If 59 Zapisnica XV. kongressu S/o venskej ligy vydri iavaneho v diioch 27., 28. a 29. maja / 924, v Bennett Hoteli, Binghamton, N. Y. (Pittsburgh), 16-17, 20. 60 Zap isnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v diioch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.M C.A ., Cleveland, 0 ., 14. 61 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864 - 1926), 504-505. 62 For a detailed analysis of their breakup see Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 334-337. 63 Ibid. , 33 7. 64 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 383. 65 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ...," 337. �22 SLOVAKIA he had gone, Vojtassak would have certainly strengthened the position of Slovak Catholics in the USA, as well as that of his friend Andrej Hlinka and the whole autonomist movement. Therefore, Rudinsky in his letters referring to Vojtassak' s planned journey to the USA, found it extremely undesirable. Upon his arrival in the USA, Rudinsky wrote to Srobar: "I was almost dejected by the news that Vojtassak was already aboard ship and was about to arrive any day. If it is true, there is nothing left but to pack my bags and return home. I will be not able to counteract his influence."66 Of course, bishop Vojtassak was not aboard the ship Majestic, which was to arrive in the USA on July 6, 1923. 67 However, the information that came to Rudinsky must have been based upon Vojtassak's planned arrival in America. In New York City, a reception had been prepared on that day to which representatives of the city council were invited. A welcome committee consisting of Catholic priests must have blushed with shame when Vojtassak did not arrive on the Majestic, . 68 nor on any ot h er sh 1ps. Thus, the main reason why the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. The refusal had to do with the timing of his journey. It was planned at exactly the time when the Czechoslovak government was preparing to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Vojtassak' s trip could have thwarted these plans. In addition, the Czechoslovak government harbored suspicions about Vojtassak as a supporter of the Slovak People's Party. It feared that he would make use of his journey to raise funds for the Party just before municipal and county elections (September, 1923) were to take place. They also speculated that Vojtassak' s trip might have helped the Eudova banka [People's Bank], since it was in financial difficulty.69 Slovak Catholics in the USA, on the other hand, looked upon Vojtassak's trip as a pastoral journey, and not a political one. They pointed this out in their press . Bishop Vojtassak had been invited by the Slovak Catholic Federation in America. The news of such a rude and offensive refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak caused 66 SNA, f. Vavro Srobar, fold . 4. J. Rudinsky to V. Srobar, July 5, 1923. 67 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 337-33 8. Obrana, July 17, 1923, 4. Letz, " Biskup ... ," 45 . 68 69 �SLOVAKIA 23 outrage among American Slovak Catholics. The Slovak Catholic Federation decided to call a meeting to discuss the affair and to take appropriate action. At this meeting, which was held in Pittsburgh on August 8, 1923, representatives of all Slovak American Catholic organizations, most of the clergy and Slovak American leaders resolved to send a complaint to the Congress of the Slovak Catholic Federation held in Lansford, PA, on October 9-11, 1923. At the Congress, the delegates unanimously decided to acquaint the world with the offensive step of Minister Malypeter and to launch an indictment against the President and government of the Czechoslovak Republic. 70 In response to the refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, the Slovak Catholic Federation issued a strong open letter addressed to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic T. G. Masaryk. In this letter, Slovak Catholics in America expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the President and government of Czechoslovakia, and even the sense of a threat to their national existence. Besides other matters, they pointed to the cause of bishop Jan Vojtassak. They directly charged the Czechoslovak government with trying to assimilate the Slovaks and to promote the spiritual genocide of the Slovak nation. 71 The open letter was sent to all representatives of the Allies, as well as to Bohemia and Slovakia. 72 In Czechoslovakia, however, it 10 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. TomM Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5-6. 71 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5, 8 - 9. The open letter was printed in Slovak (600 copies) and English (500 copies). For a copy of its English version see AMZV CR, f. Ill. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11 , 1924. For its Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi Tomasovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis Institutu hist6rie FF PU v Pre.save, 5 (No. 2, 2011 ), 79-82. 72 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. Milan Getting of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague that an English version of the open letter was sent particularly to the representatives of the Catholic Church in the USA, to editorial staffs of several American newspapers, to all leading Polish and Ruthenian newspapers and pastors, to university professors, as well as to the members of the foreign committee of the �24 SLOVAKIA was confiscated by the Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava prohibited the distribution of the letter through the mails and it was confiscated by the public prosecutor's office in Prague as well. 73 On behalf of all Slovak American Catholics, the Slovak Catholic Federation protested against this confiscation to the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC. They referred to the confiscation as vandalism and a new insult to Slovak Catholics in America.74 In their protest through the open letter, however, Slovak-American Catholics were not united. Jednota criticized the open letter. The editor considered it to be a tactical mistake. He declared the letter to be too radical and also criticized its timing.75 In an effort to weaken the impact of the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation and to prove that views expressed in it belonged to a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York agreed with the Rev. Klement Ihrisky, a representative of American Slovaks in New York, to issue an "anti-letter" addressed to the President of Czechoslovakia. 76 This "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department. It was also issued in the form of brochure and sent to the same addresses as the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation.77 Senate and Congress in Washington. In its Slovak version, the open letter was mosttr sent to Prague to the members of Parliament. 7 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Attachment of the letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 12, 1924; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 27, 1924. 74 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation to Frantisek Chvalkovsky, Ambassador of the CSR in Washington, DC, February 25 , 1924. 75 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. 76 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 rtAMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 7, 1924; Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda , 383. �SLOVAKIA 25 It should be apparent, therefore, that the main reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. Moreover, the rude refusal may be explained by the timing of his journey. After World War I, Slovaks in America, represented by their cover organization the Slovak League, underwent several changes of opinion regarding political developments in the newly-established Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the one hand, they struggled to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic as expressed in the Pittsburgh Agreement. On the other hand, American Slovaks tried to remain neutral and not to get involved in the political infighting in Slovakia. With the personal metamorphosis of the president of the Slovak League of America, and with the Slovak League being hesitant concerning the matter of the autonomy promised by T. G. Masaryk in the Pittsburgh Agreement, Slovak Catholic organizations took the lead in the promotion of Slovak national demands after 1919. Due to the growing autonomist movement in Slovakia, as well as the activities of Anton Kompanek, the vice-president of the Slovak National Party, in the USA the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America concentrated the autonomist forces and it eventually provoked the Czechoslovak government to try to deliver a decisive blow to the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks in 1923. In response to the refusal of the Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, however, Slovak Catholics in America were not united. The scathing open letter (in stilted English) issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation was justifiably criticized by Jednota. To weaken the impact of this open letter and to try to prove that it represented only a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter (in perfect English) addressed to the president of Czechoslovakia. It was typical of the machinations of the then Czechoslovak government that the "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department and not by American Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 26 APPENDIX I Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk President of the Czechoslovak Republic. 78 Mr. Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Prague Mr. President: In a critical time when fate was about to decide the turn of the world war, you and those loyal to you exerted all that was in your power that the result of the struggle might turn out in our mutual favor. Your appearance among the American Slovaks ignited unprecedented enthusiasm--your knocking at the hearts of our people found animated response - and your appeal for our assistance was crowned with success. Brother embraced brother and on the brightened horizon of acquired freedom and brotherhood smiled the sun towards our happy future ... Permit us, Mr. President, to remind you of the enthusiasm and the jubilation with which our Slovak people welcomed you wherever you appeared among them, unfolded your plans before them and assured them of your most sincere intentions. Permit us to remind you of the sacrifices in money and in blood which later were the seal of our loyalty to a work so noble and so sacred. The American Slovaks have kept their promise; we loyally stood, and to the present day, stand by your promise. Notwithstanding this, we note with some acerbity, for the past four years that your constituents who had sent you to us, and who cared so much for our alliance and our assistance never intended to fulfill that promise which they had placed into your mouth, and which you supported by this background in their name had promised. You came to us as an 78 This English version is a copy of the open letter available in AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650 . Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11, 1924. For the Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi TomMovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis lnstitutu hist6rie FF PU v Presove, 5 (No . 2, 2011 ), 79-82 . �SLOVAKIA 27 equal to equals; that was the way we associated with you and that was the way we drafted plans for the future with you. Not without our assistance, not without the efforts of the American Slovaks did you accomplish the fulfillment of your life's dreams - the liberation of the Czech Nation. Would we were not compelled to admit to you before the world that only (the liberation) of the Czech Nation; for the Slovak Nation, as a contrahent (contracting party) primarily recognized by you in the building of that republic at the head of which you now stand, does not feel under your aegis free in the sense of freedom as an independent nation has the right to vindicate for itself, particularly in the present epoch of self determination of nations. We have patiently waited for four years, whether the conscience of those cliques will move which had forced themselves upon us as brother, but today they treat us in stepmother fashion, nay, even like slaves. We see ourselves step by step betrayed, sold not only by compatriots of your strain and feelings, by your Government, but also by our own weaker compatriots, who for economic considerations lured into an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and even to us "ignorant" Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred. They are Slovak "Sviha's" pure and simple. While dwelling among us you spoke to us in the voice of a brother, plain and without bombast which is bountifully at the disposal of people of your profession. Today we desire to tell you in the same simple and plain manner that the Slovaks not only feel disappointed in you and in the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but directly endangered in their national existence. We do not desire to remind you of the recent acts by means of which the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic beyond any doubt manifested its desire of absorption respectively extermination of the Slovaks as a nation. These facts are sufficiently well known to you. We will show you the last incident which hardly has its parallel in the history of states which are only in the transitory stage of an experiment in democracy--an incident which startles any one who has sense for culture and democracy. Following the noble representatives of the World Powers there also came to America during the last few years representatives of the various religious denominations, in order to strengthen their adherents in their ways in which they de- �28 SLOVAKIA sire to reach eternal well-being in the post-terrestrial realm. What was more natural, but that also the Catholic Slovaks in America desired to welcome in their midst some one of these dignitaries with whom Rome has honored us after the revolution not without efforts on the part of your Government. The incident of Bishop Vojtassak is known to you (and how could it not be) whom we had invited here as our guest; from whom we expected good not only for ourselves, and for our church, but also for the welfare of your Republic. And here the system of government of the Czecho-Slovak republic showed up in its ugly and horrible nudity! Mr. President, the American Slovak Catholics identify themselves with the incident of Bishop Vojtassak. Your government has culminated by it the climax of its repressions, wrongfully committed for fully four years on Slovakia and the Slovaks. The refusal of a passport by your Minister caused such bitterness among us that we would be unworthy of our name and of our Credo, were we not to protest against it most emphatically. The Federation of Slovak Catholics called a council meeting to Pittsburgh which was held on August 8th, and at which the representatives of all Catholic organizations, a large number of Clergy and prominent exponents resolved to submit this grievance to the Congress of this Federation which was held on the days from the 9th to the 11th of October 1923, in Lansford, Pa., where we unanimously resolved to acquaint the educated world particularly with this outrage of your Minister and also submit to the world Powers and the leading representatives the following COMPLAINT against you and your Government. If you, as president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic according to law, are not responsible for your acts to the state authorities--and if your government does not honor your promise and your signature as President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, then we are taking you to task as a gentleman for that piece of cultural piracy which your Government and your ministers are committing on our Slovak nation from the first hour of the revolution-at the same time demanding from you as a gentleman to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised to us, the American Slovaks. This right we abrogate to ourselves as one of the parties contracting with you in the building of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. �SLOVAKIA 29 We are lodging this complaint against you and against your former factors in Paris before the conclusion of peace and after it, of having misled the peace delegates and the whole world in general, by claiming that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation. To such a statement we Slovaks object most emphatically. This erroneous opinion of your Government was upset even by the Czech Academy, and prominent historians are convinced of its fallacy. For this reason do we, the American Slovak Catholics request that the respective provisions at Paris-Versailles and Trianon, be revised. We are lodging against you a complaint, for breach of contract entered into between us and you as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and contained in the so-called Pittsburgh Pact, the value of which you now disavow, bagatellize-on the fulfillment of which, however, we insist ascribing to it the significance of a National Bill of Rights. We complain against you and your Government for the undemocratic, unrepublican persecutions of newspapers of our party alignment and that of the opposition parties, which are not pulling the cart of Czecho-imperialistic aspirations, and which stand firmly by the principle that the Slovaks are an autochthone nation. We accuse you and your Government of the confiscation of Catholic institution[ s]-of the forcing of textbooks offensive to Catholics into the primary and higher schools, of the open favorizing of individuals and societies whose aims are the undermining of the Catholic spirit in our people. We complain against you and your Government before the civilized world for that barbarian monstrosity which you have sanctioned and which under the name "A law for the protection of the Republic" destroys the idea of democracy; which in reality exists [to silence us, the Slovaks, forever], and is, in our opinion, a cancerous growth upon the body of the Republic. We complain against you and your Government for the so-called "County Reform" so much lauded by you, which is equivalent to shackles for Slovakia as a national unit, which is white in Bohemia and black in Slovakia, and which impoverishes us economically and culturally, exposing us to the chicaneries of your centralist officials. For these and similar undeniable facts , we, American Slovak Catholics are accusing you and your Government before the world for the reason that the censorship (o, democracy, o republic, �30 SLOVAKIA o enlightened twentieth century of progress and free thought), the censorship of your Government does not permit in Slovakia a single manifestation of opposition against this madly raving autocracy by means of which your conscienceless compatriots and political adventurers keep Slovakia shackled. If the saying is correct that history repeats itself, let us be permitted to remind you that the entire Czech nation on one occasion resisted the Habsburgs for the reason that Francis Joseph did not keep the promise once made to the Czechs. You gave him the epithet of a perjurer-and that rightly so, and that regardless of the fact whether his promises were only "of historic value" or not. And we do not blame you or your adherents, that you built the foundations of the Republic on these unfulfilled promises of your former "sovereign". But now, out of consideration for this repetition in history, please do not forget, together with your Government, that "quod uni justum, alteri aequum"--what you had disliked in your oligarchs, that we are not obliged to like either and that the "Camarilla of Prague" directly compels the Slovaks to repay you and your regime in equal coin, if you should not desist in your anti-Slovak and anti-Catholic intentions, and should refuse to give the Slovaks that to which they are entitled. And the consequences? Let Prague be responsible for them--you Mr. President, and your Government. Mr. President, you know well, just as we do that powerful enemies of our young state are carrying on a propaganda in foreign countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic is neither a natural state, nor a logical national, geographical, or resting upon a historical foundation; that it inherited all the weak points of the defunct monarchy, without having acquired one single good quality. Would there not be a necessity for internal unity, an internal understanding in accordance with your own motto "democracy is a discussion"? In opposition to this you with your Government, or that Government under your protection hamper and destroy even the slightest manifestation where the emphasizing of our national individuality is concerned. We, the Slovak Catholics in America, identify ourselves with the fate of our brethren across the ocean and the wrongs committed on them are also our wrongs, as Slovaks as well as Catholics; therefore, the disregard shown to Bishop Vojtassak affected us in a twofold manner. Your Government kicked him both for being a bishop (of �SLOVAKIA 31 course, a Catholic) and for being a patriotic Slovak who looks Prague straight in the eyes. And this double insult had for its consequence that also a preponderating majority of patriotic American Slovaks of other denominations joined our ranks, as brothers who are feeling with us our national wrong and our national disregard. What Prague has dared to do against us during the past four years, and what it recently dared to do with Bishop Vojtassak, would have ignited a scandal even among other nations; in our opinion it is so much greater, because you, Mr. President, instead of realizing the unprovoked insult and without regard to the abuse of jurisdiction of your minister, whose trammeling of the personal liberty of a free citizen exceeds all conceptions of democracy and humanity, whom you, as if trying to mock us, still tolerate in office. Of course, we admit that under the stress of circumstances, we Slovak Catholics cannot demand satisfaction from people whose life motto it had been "to square accounts with Rome", whose "programme is Tabor", who are provoking us that we should struggle for what we desire to preserve by right of heritage as Catholics, and as a deceived party of honest contrahents we cannot even demand it, but closing the list of our incriminations we solemnly declare to you, to your Government, and we shall not cease declaring to the whole world in spite of the opposing views of your regime that just as we are praying with our Catholic-Slovak brethren beneath the Tatra Mountains for the welfare of the young republic which had been won by our common sacrifices of blood, we wish you would take notice with your Government, and all its competent officials, that we are Slovaks, a self existing nation, homogenous and autochthone in origin and culture, as well as in history and language; that we desire to remain such without any artificial intermixture. Should the Czecho-Slovak Government hinder us in this either directly or indirectly, and not stop the wrongs cited in the above complaints--even if we were not able at once to put up against every "Metternich," "Bach," or "Schmerling" from Prague a Slovak "Palacky," "Rieger," or "Brauner," we shall yet find means and ways for the revelation of our wrongs; but we hope at the same time that God who will not let perish a nation trusting in Him, will awaken new "Viators" who will inform the world of our subjugated condition and that He will enthuse more "Bjornson[s]" who will tell you and your Czecho-Slovak �SLOVAKIA 32 Government such truths as you would least like to hear in this highly delicate situation. By authorization of the Slovak Catholic Federation in America, JOHN B. PASTORAK, Secretary, Schenectady, N. Y. ANDREW PA VLIS, President, Sheppton, Pa. APPENDIX II An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia79 MR. PRESIDENT: SOME time ago the Slovak Catholic Federation in America issued an Open Letter, addressed to you and signed by Father John B. Pastorak and Father Andrew Pavlis, in which complaints are being raised against you and your Government. A spirit of narrow sectarianism lurks behind every line of the Open Letter. You, Mr. President, and your Government are accused of desiring to "exterminate the Slovaks as a nation," of "cultural piracy," of having "misled the peace delegates," of "breach of faith," etc. In order that you may not have an erroneous idea as to the feelings and views of the American Slovaks, we, the undersigned, representatives of Slovak organizations in America, desire to point out that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America represents a very small part of our compatriots, and that the great majority of the American Slovaks are heart and soul with you. 79 Originally published in English, this open letter is available in MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 pp. �SLOVAKIA 33 Under your able leadership the Czechoslovak Republic has been most successful in piloting itself through the dangerous postwar period and it has been consolidated to such an extent that today it may be classed among the most ordered and prosperous States of Europe. In Slovakia, especially, great progress has been made as regards both cultural and economic development. We, therefore, are at a loss to understand the unjustified complaints made by the above-mentioned Slovak Catholic Federation against you and your Government. Permit us, Mr. President, to draw your attention to some of these complaints. The writers maintain that the Slovaks are "directly endangered in their national existence." How can this statement be reconciled with the progress which Slovakia has made in educational matters? As you are no doubt aware, under the Magyar regime all schools, whether elementary, secondary, or high schools, were in the hands of the Magyars. Properly speaking, there were no Slovak schools at all, with the exception of a few schools where the work was carried on by a handful of teachers who were evangelical for the greater part, the instruction was Magyar both in letter and spirit. Today, there are over four thousand elementary schools, over fifty secondary schools, besides commercial and technical institutes, and a university at Bratislava. The educational progress made since the liberation of Slovakia certainly does not prove the statement that the Slovaks are "endangered in their national existence." On the contrary, it proves, that the national existence and the cultural development of the Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic is fully assured. The Slovaks have three ministers in the Government and many officials in all branches of civil service. In certain cases, owing to lack of competent officials among the Slovaks, it was necessary to send Czechs to Slovakia but these are being withdrawn as soon as the Slovaks are able to fill these places with their own officials. There are, however, no proofs that Slovakia has been treated in "step-mother fashion ," nor do the writers offer any proofs of their vague generalization. The writers "object most emphatically" to the statement alleged to have been made by the Czechoslovak delegates at the Paris Peace Conference to the effect that the "Czechs and Slovaks are one nation". Assuming that this statement has really been made we should like to point out that we, too, are of the same opinion. Moreover, we �SLOVAKIA 34 may add that Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Autonomists, himself held, and probably still holds, the same view. On May 4th, 1908, he made the following declaration before the Magyar court at Bratislava: " It will remain an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one stock, one culture, one nation with the Czechs, and up to quite recent times we had a language in common with the Czechs, and up to this day our evangelical ministers make use of the Czech language in their church service." And it was the same Father Hlinka who, on October 30, 1918, cordially associated himself with the manifesto of the Slovak nation which contains the following words : "In language, culture and historical traditions the Slovak nation forms a part of the single Czechoslovak nation." It may be disputed whether - from a strictly historical and ethnographical point of view - the Slovaks and Czechs are one nation or not. Their feeling and consciousness, however, is the deciding factor. If the Slovaks and Czechs feel themselves as one nation, no historian or ethnographist can alter that feeling or consciousness. The writers accuse you, Mr. President, of "breach of contract" known as the "Pittsburgh Agreement." As regards this agreement which was arrived at between the American Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918, we should like to point out in how far the provisions of this agreement have been carried out. For this purpose we are giving on one side the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement and on the other what has been done: 1. We accept the political program providing for a union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State composed of the Czech territories and Slovakia. 1. Carried out 2. Slovakia will have its own administration, its diet and its courts. 2. In accordance with the Constitution the whole Republic is divided into 20 autonomous regions, 6 of which comprise Slovakia. These regions are administered by the Slovaks themselves by means of autonomous bodies containing about 40 members who are elected by the vote of all citizens, �SLOVAKIA 35 irrespective of sex, on a system of proportional representation. These zones thus have all the attributes of democratic local autonomy. From the representative bodies is elected an administrative council for the whole of Slovakia, also by proportional representation. This council is composed of 24 members, 8 of whom, under the presidency of Slovak administration, attend to the executive authority for Slovakia. 3. Slovak will be official language in schools, administration and in public life. 3. Both Czech and Slovak are official languages throughout the territory of the Republic. 4. The Czechoslovak State will be a Republic and its constitution will be democratic. 4. Carried out. 5. The organization of the co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will, according to the needs and to the changed situation, be broadened and regulated. 5. Left to be carried out by the American Slovaks and Czechs. 6. Concrete details concerning the administration of the CzechoSlovak State are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their duly elected representatives . 6. In accordance with this provision the present status of Slovakia (see article 2 of the agreement) has been elaborated. You will observe, Mr. President, that as a matter of fact the Pittsburgh Agreement has been substantially carried out. The aim of this agreement was to assure the future status and cultural development of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak State, and this aim has been achieved. The Czechoslovak Republic is the result of the work of both the Slovaks and Czechs. During the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they deman- �36 SLOVAKIA ded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks. Hence the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the Czechoslovak Nation. We, in America, are watching the development of events in Czechoslovakia very closely and we are not unmindful of the great progress the Republic has made. We are especially aware of the fact that your untiring efforts have in no small measure contributed to this progress . The good name of the Czechoslovak Republic abroad has been established, above all, by your indefatigable work and by the work of your able collaborator, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Benes. On behalf of the American Slovaks we thank you most heartily for your labor which has given to Slovakia her due place among the free nations of the world. We beg you to continue in your endeavors to make of Slovakia a happy land such as we have dreamt of while fighting in common for Czechoslovakia' s freedom and national independence. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our highest esteem and respect. JOHN KRAFCIK, President National Slovak Society. JOHN DVORSCAK, Secretary National Slovak Society. JOHN ZEMAN, President Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK OSLISLO, Secretary Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK ST AS , Treasurer Slovak League of America. JOHN MATLOCHA, President Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. JOHN L. ZAROVY, Secretary Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. NICHOLAS KOVAC, President District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. STEPHEN ERHARDT, Secretary District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. CLEMENT IHRISKY, President New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JANCEK, Secretary New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JOSCAK, Editor New Yorksky Dennik FRANK CELKO, Editor Slovensky Sokol STEPHEN HUSKA, Editor Nove Casy � SLOVAKIA 7 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS: BISHOP JAN VOJTASSAK'S ABORTED JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1923 r V V r Stefan Kucik In 1923 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak, bishop of the diocese of Spis in Slovakia, decided to undertake a pastoral journey to Slovak Catholics in the United States of America. However, Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue him a passport. They considered his trip to be political. It turns out that Vojtassak's planned journey conflicted with Czechoslovak government plans to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Upon hearing of this refusal, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America published an open letter to Tomas G. Masaryk, president of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which they expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the president and his government. To counteract the impact of this letter, the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter to the president, ostensibly by a group of American Slovaks who supported him and his government. Interestingly, this "anti-letter" was written by an official of Czechoslovak intelligence. While many scholars have dealt with the biography of bishop Jan Vojtassak, only Robert Letz has provided us with a thorough explanation of the reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant him passport in 1923 .1 In this context, however, no one has pointed to the open letters addressed to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation and the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York. The present article will try to fill this gap, as well as to put the matter into a broader context. I Robert Letz, "Bi skup Jan Vojtassak a slovenska politika V medzi vojnovom obdobi," in Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, Ivan Chalupecky, ed. (Spisska KapitulaSpisske Podhradie: Ki\azsky seminar biskupa Jana Vojtassaka, 2003 ), 25 -52. �8 SLOVAKIA After Jan Vojtassak had been appointed bishop of Spis towards the end of 1920,2 along with Marian Blaha for the diocese of Banska Bystrica and Karol Kmet'ko for the diocese of Nitra, American Slovaks rejoiced. As early as December 22, 1920, editor Jozef Husek wrote in the Catholic weekly Jednota : "Only those who look at the deep religious sentiment of our people, and their simple faith and devotion to the Holy Church, can understand what it means for Catholic Slovaks to have apostles of their own flesh and blood, of their national sentiment and outlook. " 3 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak was ordained a bishop in Nitra on February 13, 1921. In a fortnight he assumed his office in Spisska Kapitula. In his first pastoral letter, Vojtassak outlined a program of his future activities. He was aware of the negative consequences of the Great War. He realized that the war had caused many to lose their faith in God, and felt that the war's ravages threatened the very basis of love for one 's neighbours. It not only produced a lot of cripples, but largely devastated people' s spiritual values . At war's end materialism and the class struggle began to appear and hatred toward the Catholic Church grew. In Czechoslovakia, the strong anti-Catholic character of the new political system was evident right after the war. The Czechs did not show much consideration for the religiosity of Slovakia. They also tended to undervalue the contribution of the Slovak Catholic clergy in the creation of the common independent state,4 whether in Slovakia or in the USA, and tended to forget that Roman Catholics constituted the vast majority of both populations. The Czechoslovak government, however, was not satisfied with just the secularization of the new country. It also decided to transfer its anti-Catholicism to Czech and Slovak communities in America. In order to promote the newly established Czechoslovak Church among American compatriots, it sent a mission led by its first bishop Gorazd Pavlik to the USA. In connection with this mission, which 2 For the appointment, ordination and enthronement of bishop Jan Vojta~~ak see Ivan Chalupecky, "Obsadenie spi~skeho biskupskeho stolca po roku 19 18," in Chalupecky, Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, 7-24. 3 Jozef Paufo, 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, I 965), 165 . 4 Ivan Chalupecky, Biskup Jan Vojtassak: K jeho verejnej a politickej cinnosti (Rufo mberok: Katolicka univerzita v Rufo mberku, Filozofi cka fakulta, 2009), 2 1-25. �SLOVAKIA 9 was carried out between June 1922 and January 1923,5 an incident which became infamous in the history of the Slovak Catholic Church occurred. It filled both Slovak Catholics in Czechoslovakia and in America with much indignation. The incident lay behind the refusal of Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to the bishop of Spis. Jan Vojtassak had decided to travel to America as early as December of 1922. He had reached his decision on the basis of a circular letter issued by Antonin Cyril Stojan, Archbishop of Olomouc. Addressed to all ordinaries in Slovakia, the letter was based upon an earlier one sent by Czech Catholic priests in America on the basis of instructions received from the Czech episcopate. They had been asked to try to paralyze Gorazd Pavlik's activities, because some Slovak priests in America had begun to affiliate with the new Czechoslovak Church. The Czech priests emphasized that they had not succeeded in their work among American Slovaks because they were Czechs and not Slovaks. Had the episcopate sent Slovak priests among American Slovaks, these would have been more successful. 6 This circular letter, as well as reports published in Slovak-American newspapers and republished in Slovakia, plus a number of private letters received from individuals across the United States, led bishop Vojtassak to decide to lead a mission to the USA. 7 He was also aware that many Slovak Catholics in America came from his diocese. Vojtassak's mission was fully supported by the Czech mission of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the USA, as well as by Archbishop A. C. Stojan and other Slovak and Czech bishops, along with the former apostolic nuncio Clemente Micara. The Holy See also agreed with Vojtassak' s planned journey to America. 8 Bishop Vojtassak began to prepare for his trip in April of 1923. Slovak organizations in the USA were informed of his coming.9 In May of the same year, Vojtassak applied for a passport. Although at that time passports were usually granted by district authorities, Vojtassak's application was forwarded to the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava. Thence it was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, whence it was 5 Letz, " Bi skup ... ," 47 . Slovak (Bratislava), July 5, 1923, 1; Jednota (Middletown, PA), July 25 , 1923, 4. 7 Slovak, July 5, 1923, 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Letz, "Biskup ... ," 44. 6 �SLOVAKIA returned back to Bratislava. This kind of procrastination continued for a month. To try to expedite matters, Vojtassak travelled to Bratislava and even to Prague, but his efforts proved fruitless . The parliamentary deputy of the Czechoslovak People's Party Vaclav Myslivec, as well as some parliamentary deputies of the Slovak People's Party, intervened with the Minister of the Interior Jan Malypetr. The latter, however, refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport with the comment that "he knows Catholic bishops who lie. " 10 In order to comprehend such a rude refusal, one needs to understand the situation in the Slovak-American community in the first years after the creation of Czechoslovakia. After Tomas G. Masaryk had left America in the fall 1918, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Cleveland to decide on sending a delegation to Slovakia. 11 According to Albert P. Mamatey, president of the League, 12 the delegates were to make contact with political leaders in the old country and to let them know about the Pittsburgh Agreement concluded with T. G. Masaryk in May of 1918. 13 Upon their arrival in Slovakia, the delegates acted impartially. In their Privet delegacie Slovenskej ligy v Amerike [Address of the Delegation of the Slovak League of America] dated April 9, 1919, they expressed their surprise at the growing political struggles in Slovakia. Therefore, they initially hesitated to give the Pittsburgh Agreement to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Responsible for Slovakia, or to Ferdis Juriga or Andrej Hlinka, the most popular priests and politicians in the Slovak People ' s Party. 14 They considered the political squabbles among the many new political parties a waste of energy for a small nation. 15 Upon their return to the USA, two of the delegates, Jozef Rusek, the editor of Jednota and Milan Getting, the editor of New Yorksky dennik, reported on the situation in Slovakia at the 12th Congress of the Slovak League held in Scranton, PA, on May 29, 1919. Jozef 10 Slowik, July 5, 1923, 1. Nave Slo vensko (Pittsburgh, PA), December 2, 19 18, 2-3. 12 Albert Pavo! Mamatey was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1911 to 1920. 13 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slav. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., dna 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, PA: Slovak League of America), 9. 14 Karol Sidor, Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava, 1929), 226-227. 15 Slovak, May 3, 1919, I. 11 �SLOVAKIA 11 Husek advised American Slovaks to be careful in pressing for the autonomy of Slovakia as promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, because at that time it might help Magyar efforts to re-annex Slovakia to Hungary. However, he did not abandon his claim to the autonomy of Slovakia. He postponed it to a time when the situation in Slovakia would improve. 16 Milan Getting, on the other hand, did not even mention the autonomy of Slovakia. He reported on his plan of agitation against Magyarization in Slovakia. He worked out this plan on the basis of a suggestion made by Minister V. Srobar. Since Srobar was short of funds, Getting returned to the USA to ask American Slovaks to purchase a printing press for Minister Srobar's agitation. 17 Despite Jozef Husek's advice not to immediately press for the autonomy of Slovakia and Milan Getting's ignoring of the issue, American Slovaks began to very heatedly discuss this matter. 18 On July 31, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Pittsburgh and accepted the brochure Politicka nauka vzh/'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat [Political Perspective Regarding the Czecho-Slovak State] 19 as the basis of its future activities. The brochure stated that the Slovak League of America decided to support its program of autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. The final arrangement of the Czecho-Slovak state, however, it left to the Slovaks in the old country. 20 Another representative of the Slovak League of America, who reported on the situation in Slovakia right after the World War I, was Ignac Gessay. However, he did not belong to the above mentioned delegation. This renowned Slovak-American editor was sent to Slovakia somewhat later. The reason for his mission was a lack of reliable information from Europe at the beginning of 1919. 21 American 16 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slov. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., diia 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, 19 19), 24. 17 Ibid. , 30-31. 18 Sidor, Slovaci... , 231. 19 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Trnave, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 299K3. Zapisnica zo sch6dze Ustrednej spravy Slovenskej Ligy vydrziavanej di\a 31. jula 191 9 v Henry Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. The brochure was written by editor Jan A. Feriencik and published by the Slovak League of America in 19 19. Informally, it was called .. Politicky Katechismus " [Political Catechism]. 20 Jan A. Feriencik, Politicka nauka vzhl'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat (Pittsburgh: Slovenska liga v Amerike, 19 19), 7. 21 Dobry Pastier, April 19 19, 7. �12 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, therefore, decided to establish an information office, at first in Paris, and once regular postal service had been established between Czecho-Slovakia and the USA, in Slovakia too.22 This task was entrusted to lgnac Gessay, at that time an editor of Nave Slovensko, 23 official organ of the Slovak League of America.24 In his report to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League held in Pittsburgh on October 24, 1919, Gessay recommended that American Slovaks take a neutral stand on the issue of Slovak autonomy. He suggested a gradual implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement and warned radical Slovak-American autonomists that immediate autonomy would have been fatal for the new republic. 25 Both Gessay's and Husek's initial reports had a huge impact on the official stand of the Slovak League towards autonomy. Jozef Rusek, however, would gradually change his mind and then would support the autonomist movement in Slovakia. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League on October 24, 1919, two delegates of the Slovak People's Party, the Rev. Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala, also appeared. Jozef Rudinsky had been sent to the USA by several leaders of the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka in August of 1919. He had been chosen as a trustworthy person whose task it was to defend the idea of Slovak autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Republic among American Slovaks, and to inform them of the Party's activities. In addition, Rudinsky was supposed to raise funds for the autonomist movement. On the suggestion of the Rev. Frantisek Jehlicska, Jozef Kubala, a merchant from Vrbove, joined Rudinsky before his departure to the USA. In Poland, however, they both joined the Rev. Hlinka's delegation to Paris, in an attempt to have autonomy for Slovakia included in the Paris Peace Treaties. After a week's stay in the capital of France and the delegation's expulsion from that country, Ru- 22 Slovensky narodny archiv, Brati slava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter SNA), fund (hereinafter f.) Slovenska liga v Amerike [Slovak League of America], folder (hereinafter fold .) 2. Albert Mamatey to Frantisek Stas, April 17, 191 9. 23 Nave Slovensko, official organ of the Slovak League of America in 1918-1922. 24 Jgnac Gessay, S/ovensko po oslobodeni (Cleveland: Slovenska liga v Amerike), 4; ASSV, fasc . 236CI0. Authorization for Ignac Gessay, April 26, 1919. 25 Gessay, S/ovensko ... , 26-28, 37-38. �SLOVAKIA 13 dinsky and Kubala continued on their original journey to the United States, where they arrived on October 13, 1919. 26 At the time of the delegates' trip to the USA the majority of American Slovaks felt distaste for the policy of the Slovak People's Party.27 This aversion arose mainly from the reports of Jozef Husek and Ignac Gessay, as well as Andrej Hlinka' s faux pas in connection with his rash journey to the Paris Peace Conference. Another reason was the fact that the delegates arrived in America with Polish passports and Polish visas, and not Czecho-Slovak. 28 Having presented their credentials to the League, Jozef Rudinsky was asked to explain his mission to America. He clarified the position of the Slovak People's Party at length. Like the Slovak League of America, the People's Party demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. It also wanted autonomy for Slovakia to be included in the Paris Peace Treaties. Therefore, he had come to the USA, along with Jozef Kubala, to agitate for autonomy and to raise funds towards this end. 29 Although the Executive Committee of the Slovak League did not find anything contrary to its program in the Rudinsky mission, it nevertheless took a negative stand towards it. Rudinsky and Kubala did not have any credentials from the Czecho-Slovak government and the League did not agree with Hlinka's journey to the Paris Peace Conference. The League accused the delegates of driving a wedge between the Slovaks and Czechs in America, which might have had a negative impact on their coexistence in the USA, as well as in Czecho-Slovakia. 30 On the other hand, the Executive Commit26 Robert Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky - vyznamna osobnost' Turzovky," in Turzovka kriiom-kraiom, Ivan Gajdiciar ed. (Turzovka: Spolok priatel'ov Turzovky, 2010), 328329. 27 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Rufomberok: Lev, 1921 ), 11 . 28 Karol Sidor, "Zasahy Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike do politickeho vyvinu slovenskeho (1914 - 1939)," in Slovenska liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna, Mikulas Sprinc, ed. (Scranton, PA : Slovenska liga v Amerike, 1947), 54. 29 ASSV, fasc . 299A6. Zapisnica zo schodze Ustredneho vyboru Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydrziavanej di\a 24. okt6bra I 919 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli v Pittsburgh, Penna. JO Masarykuv ustav a Archiv Akademie ved Ceske republiky, V. V. i., Archiv UTGM, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter MUA AV CR, AUTGM), f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 459. Rezolucia Slovenskej Ligy prijata na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednyrn vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., di\a 24. a 25. okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919. (For the letter without attachments see Slovenske �14 SLOVAKIA tee issued a memorandum, in which American Slovaks demanded the gradual implementation of the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement in the newly-created Czecho-Slovakia. 31The resolution against Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala and the League's subsequent memorandum expressed American Slovaks' efforts to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the other hand, it also reflected their efforts to maintain their neutral stand and not to be drawn into political affairs in Slovakia. In such a situation, the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party could not rely on the authority of the Slovak League of America. They, therefore, approached two Slovak-American organizations which disagreed with the League 's stand: the Slovak Catholic Federation and the First Catholic Slovak Union. Jozef Rudinsky expressed his ideas mainly in the weekly Jednota , where he was assisted by Jozef Husek, and in the newspaper Obrana, which was edited by the Rev. Jan Metod Liscinsky.32 While Rudinsky and Kubala, assisted by Slovak-American Catholic organizations, were agitating in the USA for Slovak autonomy, Albert Mamatey left on a three-month journey (December 10, 1919 March 14, 1920) to Czecho-Slovakia. His intentions were very much the same as that of the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party in the USA, i.e. that the Pittsburgh Agreement should be incorporated into the future Czecho-Slovak Constitution. Upon his return to the United States, Mamatey reported to a meeting of the Executive Committee in Pittsburgh on April 8, 1920. 33 He had traveled to Czecho-Slovakia via France and Switzerland. In Paris, he had met with Stefan Osusky, the general secretary of the Czecho-Slovak delegation to the Peace Conference and a vyst'ahovalectvo: Dokumenty 3, Frantisek Bielik, Elo Rakos, eds. (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1976), 165-172, document no. 325); ASSV, fasc . 299A9. Prehlas a verejne osvedcenie Slov. Ligy. 31 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R- republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 45 9. Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy Prijate na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednym vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., dna 24. a 25 . okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919; Jednota, October 29, 1919, I. 32 Sidor, Slovaci... , 235; Letz, "JozefRudinsky ...," 329-330. 33 ASSV, fasc . 299A4. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia ustr. a vyko. vyboru Slov. ligy 8. apr. 1920 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli, Pittsburgh, Pa. �SLOVAKIA 15 delegate of the Slovak League of America to Masaryk in 1916. 34 When Mamatey suggested that the Slovaks should have been contractually guaranteed their home rule at the Paris Peace Conference in the same way as had the Ruthenians, Osusky offered the following explanation: "During the whole war, we cooperated and worked with our brothers the Czechs for our independence as a UNIT, as two branches of one nation that belong together. Thanks to this UNIFIED stand with our brothers the Czechs, the Allies recognized our independence, our separation from the Magyars and our joining with the Czechs. "35 Osusky, however, was not worried about the future of the Slovaks. He promised that they would get everything that they asked for and that they wished, except for things that might be detrimental to them: "Because what we do not want, what would be detrimental or destructive for Slovakia, as for instance, a separate Diet at this time, nobody from the outside wi 11 force upon us nor put into our minds." 36 After this meeting, the intervention of Albert Mamatey on behalf of the autonomy of Slovakia sounded unconvincing. He had met with T. G. Masaryk, the President of Czecho-Slovakia, with Edvard Benes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Vavro Srobar, the Minister with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia, and others. In February of 1920, Mamatey had also taken part in the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies. Almost all with whom he had negotiated, had agreed with the view that at that time the autonomy of Slovakia with a separate Diet would have been fatal for Slovakia. Mamatey, however, had negotiated only with the members of 34 For more on Osusky, his earlier life in America and his mission to Europe, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia," Slovak Studies, 8 (1968), 27-30 and 57-66. 35 Zprava Predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana Ustrednemu Vyboru Slov. ligy v Pittsburghu, Pa. dna 8. aprila 1920 o Jeho ceste a missi v Cesko-slovenskej republike (Pittsburgh, 1920), 8. 36 Ibid. �16 SLOVAKIA the centralist Czechoslovak political parties and opponents of the legislative autonomy of Slovakia. In connection with the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies a regrettable incident occurred. The Club had passed a resolution which was supposed to confirm that in the draft Constitution there be included everything that had been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, except for a separate Diet. However, the signatures of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party (Alois Kalisek, Jan Kovalik, Stefan Onderco, Jozef Sivak and Florian Tomanek) on the resolution had been forged. This affair came to light only after the resolution had been cited in full in the Memorandum of the Slovak League of America addressed to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1922.37 Even if the resolution significantly influenced the future attitudes of American Slovaks to the issue of the autonomy of Slovakia, it seems that it did not have a great impact on the views of Albert Mamatey. On February 28, 1920, one day before he left Czecho-Slovakia, Albert Mamatey received a letter from Milan Hodza, the Minister for the Unification of Laws and one of the main Slovak political leaders. In this letter, Hodza had also rejected a separate Slovak Diet. Despite the unwillingness of the main political representatives to accept the claim to a Slovak Diet, Albert Mamatey did not hesitate to conclude his report with the words: "Slovakia may look forward to a great future," although he added that "it would take some time." 38 However, it is well-known how important a separate Diet was for American Slovaks. Jozef Rusek expressed their outlook very clearly: "Autonomy without a Diet, without legislation, is no autonomy. Indeed, autonomy is a Diet and a Diet is autonomy! Without a Diet there is no autonomy!" 39 Albert Mamatey must have been aware of the importance of a separate Slovak Diet to fulfill the promise of autonomy. He must have also known that if the requirement of a separate Slovak Diet had been deleted from the Pittsburgh Agreement, the latter would have been worthless. His attitude on the issue of the autonomy of 37 Memorandum Slovenskej ligy v Amerike upravene na vladu a Narodne Shromaidenie Cesko-Slovenskej Republiky v zaujime vtelenia Pittsburghskej Dohody do iistavy C-S Republiky (Pittsburgh : Slovak League of America, 1922). 38 Ibid. , 26. 39 Jednota, February 18, 1920, 4. �SLOVAKIA 17 Slovakia began to change by the beginning of 1919. In one of his letters addressed to Dr. Miloslav Francisci of Cleveland, son of a famous Slovak revolutionary hero of 1848, Mamatey wrote: "I have been fighting for the national individuality of the Slovak nation for over four years. I have insisted that the Slovaks are not just an "appendix" of the Czech nation, but the Slovaks are as independent a nation as the Czechs. However, I have gotten tired of the constant fighting. Anyways, the fate of the Slovak nation will not be determined by us from America, but by those back home. - You, I and hundreds of others here in America have done our duty. " 40 In accordance with his changed attitude towards autonomy for Slovakia and his hardly concealable inclination towards government policy, which was fuelled by the promise of the office of Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, Albert Mamatey decided to paralyze the agitation of Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala among American Slovaks. To this end he arranged that two delegates of the Czechoslovak government were sent to America. The mission of the Roman Catholic priest Ladislav Moys and the social democrat Jan Pocisk, did not bear fruit. They failed to persuade American Slovaks to approve of the Czechoslovak Constitution and their activities in the USA were deplored by the "Response" [Ohlas] of the Slovak Catholic Federation. 41 In response to the steps taken by Albert Mamatey and by the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek announced his resignation from the League. He accused the leading League officials of having knowingly and intentionally missed the opportunity to have Slovakia constitutionally guaranteed the right to 40 Aibert Mamatey to M . Francisci, January 22, 1919. It was published in Konstantin Culen, "Zo zaviatych listov (Z korespondencie A. Mamateya s Dr. M. Franciscim)," in Literarny almanach Slovaka v Amerike na rok 1962 (Middletown, Pa.: Hrobak Publications), 147. 41 Dobry Pastier (Middletown, PA), April 1920, 14-15; Jan Pankuch, Dejiny clevelandskych a lakewoodskych Slovakov (Cleveland, 1930), 188; Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Andreja, 1937), 274; Paufo, 162163; Natalia Krajfovicova, "Americki Slovaci a slovenski autonomisti v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR," in Miroslav Peknik et al. , Ferdinand Juriga: /'udovy smer slovenskej politiky (Bratislava: VEDA, 2009), 260. �18 SLOVAKIA home rule and individual national, cultural and economic life within the Czechoslovak Republic. Moreover, he accused the League's officials of morally and financially supporting agitation against the Pittsburgh Agreement. 42 As a result, no Slovak-American Catholic organization attended the 13th Congress of the Slovak League held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 24-25, 1920. 43 After the Congress, the Slovak League of America was subjected to a lot of criticism by Jozef Husek. The latter concluded that the League "ceases to be the moral and official representative of the Slovak-American colony."44 As a result, the role that had been played in the promotion of Slovak national demands by the Slovak League of America began to be played by representatives of Slovak American Catholics led by the Slovak Catholic Federation and those organizations with which the Federation closely co-operated.45 However, after the Slovak National Party had split from the Slovak National and Agrarian Party in March of 192 I in order to be able more vigorously to demand the legislative autonomy of Slovakia, the Slovak League of America, led by its new president Ivan Bielek,46 began to change its stand. One of the first consequences of the creation of the Slovak National Party was the adoption of a compromise declaration requesting the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement at the conference of the representatives of American Slovaks in Washington, DC, on May 21 , 1921 . In this declaration, American Slovaks demanded that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also requested the gradual autonomy of Slovakia. 47 Another event that influenced the Slovak League of America was the secession of the Slovak People's 42 Jednota, June 19, 1920, 4. Pauco, 160. 44 Jednota , Jul y 7, 1920, 4. 45 Pauco, 160. 46 Ivan Bielek, a fo rmer newspaper editor, was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1920 to 1934. As the first vice-president of the League, Bielek became its president after Albert Mamatey resigned in September of 1920 due to his appointment as a consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Pittsburgh. Jednota, September 22, 1920, 2; Slovak Institute and Reference Library in Cleveland (hereinafter SIRL), fasc. Mamatey, Albert 1870 - 1923. "Pan Mamatey sa vzdava predsednictva Slov. Ligy," newspaper clipping, September 17, 1920. 47 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 317, 320. 43 �SLOVAKIA 19 Party from the common parliamentary club of the Czechoslovak People 's Party in November of 1921. 48 On June 28-30 1922, the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Pittsburgh. The Congress was attended by the vice-president of the Slovak National Party and the Rev. Anton Kompanek. The latter called uJ'on American Slovaks not to give up on the Pittsburgh Agreement. 4 His mission in the USA was to rally autonomist forces , both in America and in Slovakia. 50 The congress then split into two camps - autonomists and centralists. Nevertheless, the delegates supported the Pittsburgh Agreement almost unanimously and they ordered the Executive Board "to write to Prague."51 The Executive Board then sent a Memorandum to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic requesting that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Czechoslovak Constitution. They also demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia. 52 The 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was very important for the future orientation of this organization. In spite of expectations that the crisis within the League would deepen, the Congress became a new concentration of autonomist forces . However, the concentration was only reached with great effort. The June 29, 1922 debate about the Pittsburgh Agreement was long and lasted until 11 :00 p.m.53 The discussion on the Pittsburgh Agreement at the Congress was significantly influenced by Anton Kompanek. Once in America, he began to create a united front for the recognition of the Pittsburgh 48 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnfch vecf Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), f. rn. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, inventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report "Hlinkovci v Amerike" by M. Getting, director ofCSTK in Washington, DC, January 24, 1922. 49 Zapisnica XIV. Kongressu Slovenskej Lfgy vydi iavaneho v dnoch 28., 29. a 30. juna /922 v Moose Temple, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Pittsburgh, 1922), 83. 50 Krajcovicova, 262. 51 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report " Slovenske veci v Amerike", July 1, 1922 by M . Getting, director of CSTK in Washington, DC, July 7, 1922; Archfv Krajanskeho muzea Matice slovenskej, Bratislava (hereinafter AKM MS), f. Ignac Gessay, fold. I. Telegram to I. Gessay (torso, without sender, undated). 52 See footnote 3 7. 53 Robert Letz, "Slovenska liga v Amerike a Slovenska liga na Slovensku," in Historicky zbornfk, 19 (No. 1, 2009), 65 ; Obrana, June 27, 1922, 3 and Jul y 4, 1922, 1. �20 SLOVAKIA Agreement through his articles, which were published in the Slovak American press. In a series of articles in Obrana, Kompanek recommended that Slovak autonomy be achieved gradually, and only within the Czechoslovak Republic. As for American Slovaks, he was convinced that there was not as much disunity over the issue of autonomy as in the old country. He admitted, on the other hand, that there were also some personal antipathies (Bielek versus Husek, with the former favoring the Slovak National Party over the Slovak People's Party) .54 Anton Kompanek tried to eliminate these disagreements and he invited supporters of Slovak autonomy to a conference in Pittsburgh on October 12, 1922. At this conference, he stressed that the fate of the Pittsburgh Agreement was in the hands of American Slovaks. He stated that it was not enough to issue resolutions, but it was necessary to work systematically and support materially the movement for the autonomy of Slovakia directly in Slovakia. At the conference, a five-member committee was elected to coordinate the work on behalf of the Pittsburgh Agreement. It was named the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom and its members were Stefan Kocis, Jan Pankuch, Ivan Bielek, Jan Bibza and Jozef Husek. The latter was elected its president. The aim of the Committee was to unite all Slovak American organizations, their newspapers and public officials in the struggle for the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Another goal of the new organization was to try to create a coalition of all autonomist parties in Slovakia. 55 Even though Ivan Bielek had attended the conference in Pittsburgh as a private person, 56 once the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom was established, the "centralists" were expelled from the Slovak League of America. 57 This happened at the meeting of the Executive Committee with the Executive Board held on June 27-28 in Cleveland, 58 and was completed and approved at the 15th Con54 Krajcovicova, 262-263. Jednota, October 18, 1922, 4; Krajcovicova, 263 . 56 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0., 13. 57 Jednota, July 4, 1923, 4; Krajcovicova, 264. 58 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0 ., 73 . 55 �SLOVAKIA 21 gress of the League held on May 27-29, 1924 in Binghamton, New York. 59 In terms of the resolution of its 14th congress, the Slovak League of America reacted negatively to the new activities of Jozef Rudinsky in the USA in 1923. This time, contrary to his first mission among American Slovaks, Rudinsky, who had switched sides, and had become a major supporter of Milan Hodza, came to the USA in the service of the Czechoslovak government. The League also rejected a similar mission by Vavro Srobar and Vaclav Maule, a Czech professor and head of the branch of the Ministry of Education in Bratislava. They came in the same year to lecture on behalf of Czechoslovak national unity and against the autonomy of Slovakia.60 Their mission, however, failed among Slovak American autonomists. 61 Upon his return to Czechoslovakia in November of 1920, Jozef Rudinsky's relationship with Andrej Hlinka deteriorated and they eventually parted company.62 As early as the beginning of 1923, Rudinsky and Vavro Srobar began to talk. These conversations were probably initiated by Srobar, who was preparing for his own journey to the USA 63 in order to counteract the results of the 14th congress of the Slovak League of America. 64 Rudinsky and Srobar discussed Rudinsky' s planned new journey to America and concluded that the latter should use the contacts that he had made in his previous mission. They particularly counted upon Rudinsky's past friendship with Jozef Husek. To make his mission more successful, Rudinsky decided to depart alone, without Srobar. The latter would come after him and would finish what Rudinsky had started. 65 Rudinsky ' s and Srobar' s trips were intended to appear as two completely unrelated and independent initiatives. However, that same year bishop Vojtassak was also preparing for his journey to the USA. Vojtassak was not aware of Srobar' s and Rudinsky' s plans. If 59 Zapisnica XV. kongressu S/o venskej ligy vydri iavaneho v diioch 27., 28. a 29. maja / 924, v Bennett Hoteli, Binghamton, N. Y. (Pittsburgh), 16-17, 20. 60 Zap isnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v diioch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.M C.A ., Cleveland, 0 ., 14. 61 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864 - 1926), 504-505. 62 For a detailed analysis of their breakup see Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 334-337. 63 Ibid. , 33 7. 64 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 383. 65 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ...," 337. �22 SLOVAKIA he had gone, Vojtassak would have certainly strengthened the position of Slovak Catholics in the USA, as well as that of his friend Andrej Hlinka and the whole autonomist movement. Therefore, Rudinsky in his letters referring to Vojtassak' s planned journey to the USA, found it extremely undesirable. Upon his arrival in the USA, Rudinsky wrote to Srobar: "I was almost dejected by the news that Vojtassak was already aboard ship and was about to arrive any day. If it is true, there is nothing left but to pack my bags and return home. I will be not able to counteract his influence."66 Of course, bishop Vojtassak was not aboard the ship Majestic, which was to arrive in the USA on July 6, 1923. 67 However, the information that came to Rudinsky must have been based upon Vojtassak's planned arrival in America. In New York City, a reception had been prepared on that day to which representatives of the city council were invited. A welcome committee consisting of Catholic priests must have blushed with shame when Vojtassak did not arrive on the Majestic, . 68 nor on any ot h er sh 1ps. Thus, the main reason why the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. The refusal had to do with the timing of his journey. It was planned at exactly the time when the Czechoslovak government was preparing to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Vojtassak' s trip could have thwarted these plans. In addition, the Czechoslovak government harbored suspicions about Vojtassak as a supporter of the Slovak People's Party. It feared that he would make use of his journey to raise funds for the Party just before municipal and county elections (September, 1923) were to take place. They also speculated that Vojtassak' s trip might have helped the Eudova banka [People's Bank], since it was in financial difficulty.69 Slovak Catholics in the USA, on the other hand, looked upon Vojtassak's trip as a pastoral journey, and not a political one. They pointed this out in their press . Bishop Vojtassak had been invited by the Slovak Catholic Federation in America. The news of such a rude and offensive refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak caused 66 SNA, f. Vavro Srobar, fold . 4. J. Rudinsky to V. Srobar, July 5, 1923. 67 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 337-33 8. Obrana, July 17, 1923, 4. Letz, " Biskup ... ," 45 . 68 69 �SLOVAKIA 23 outrage among American Slovak Catholics. The Slovak Catholic Federation decided to call a meeting to discuss the affair and to take appropriate action. At this meeting, which was held in Pittsburgh on August 8, 1923, representatives of all Slovak American Catholic organizations, most of the clergy and Slovak American leaders resolved to send a complaint to the Congress of the Slovak Catholic Federation held in Lansford, PA, on October 9-11, 1923. At the Congress, the delegates unanimously decided to acquaint the world with the offensive step of Minister Malypeter and to launch an indictment against the President and government of the Czechoslovak Republic. 70 In response to the refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, the Slovak Catholic Federation issued a strong open letter addressed to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic T. G. Masaryk. In this letter, Slovak Catholics in America expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the President and government of Czechoslovakia, and even the sense of a threat to their national existence. Besides other matters, they pointed to the cause of bishop Jan Vojtassak. They directly charged the Czechoslovak government with trying to assimilate the Slovaks and to promote the spiritual genocide of the Slovak nation. 71 The open letter was sent to all representatives of the Allies, as well as to Bohemia and Slovakia. 72 In Czechoslovakia, however, it 10 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. TomM Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5-6. 71 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5, 8 - 9. The open letter was printed in Slovak (600 copies) and English (500 copies). For a copy of its English version see AMZV CR, f. Ill. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11 , 1924. For its Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi Tomasovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis Institutu hist6rie FF PU v Pre.save, 5 (No. 2, 2011 ), 79-82. 72 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. Milan Getting of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague that an English version of the open letter was sent particularly to the representatives of the Catholic Church in the USA, to editorial staffs of several American newspapers, to all leading Polish and Ruthenian newspapers and pastors, to university professors, as well as to the members of the foreign committee of the �24 SLOVAKIA was confiscated by the Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava prohibited the distribution of the letter through the mails and it was confiscated by the public prosecutor's office in Prague as well. 73 On behalf of all Slovak American Catholics, the Slovak Catholic Federation protested against this confiscation to the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC. They referred to the confiscation as vandalism and a new insult to Slovak Catholics in America.74 In their protest through the open letter, however, Slovak-American Catholics were not united. Jednota criticized the open letter. The editor considered it to be a tactical mistake. He declared the letter to be too radical and also criticized its timing.75 In an effort to weaken the impact of the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation and to prove that views expressed in it belonged to a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York agreed with the Rev. Klement Ihrisky, a representative of American Slovaks in New York, to issue an "anti-letter" addressed to the President of Czechoslovakia. 76 This "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department. It was also issued in the form of brochure and sent to the same addresses as the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation.77 Senate and Congress in Washington. In its Slovak version, the open letter was mosttr sent to Prague to the members of Parliament. 7 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Attachment of the letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 12, 1924; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 27, 1924. 74 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation to Frantisek Chvalkovsky, Ambassador of the CSR in Washington, DC, February 25 , 1924. 75 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. 76 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 rtAMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 7, 1924; Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda , 383. �SLOVAKIA 25 It should be apparent, therefore, that the main reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. Moreover, the rude refusal may be explained by the timing of his journey. After World War I, Slovaks in America, represented by their cover organization the Slovak League, underwent several changes of opinion regarding political developments in the newly-established Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the one hand, they struggled to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic as expressed in the Pittsburgh Agreement. On the other hand, American Slovaks tried to remain neutral and not to get involved in the political infighting in Slovakia. With the personal metamorphosis of the president of the Slovak League of America, and with the Slovak League being hesitant concerning the matter of the autonomy promised by T. G. Masaryk in the Pittsburgh Agreement, Slovak Catholic organizations took the lead in the promotion of Slovak national demands after 1919. Due to the growing autonomist movement in Slovakia, as well as the activities of Anton Kompanek, the vice-president of the Slovak National Party, in the USA the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America concentrated the autonomist forces and it eventually provoked the Czechoslovak government to try to deliver a decisive blow to the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks in 1923. In response to the refusal of the Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, however, Slovak Catholics in America were not united. The scathing open letter (in stilted English) issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation was justifiably criticized by Jednota. To weaken the impact of this open letter and to try to prove that it represented only a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter (in perfect English) addressed to the president of Czechoslovakia. It was typical of the machinations of the then Czechoslovak government that the "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department and not by American Slovaks. �SLOVAKIA 26 APPENDIX I Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk President of the Czechoslovak Republic. 78 Mr. Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Prague Mr. President: In a critical time when fate was about to decide the turn of the world war, you and those loyal to you exerted all that was in your power that the result of the struggle might turn out in our mutual favor. Your appearance among the American Slovaks ignited unprecedented enthusiasm--your knocking at the hearts of our people found animated response - and your appeal for our assistance was crowned with success. Brother embraced brother and on the brightened horizon of acquired freedom and brotherhood smiled the sun towards our happy future ... Permit us, Mr. President, to remind you of the enthusiasm and the jubilation with which our Slovak people welcomed you wherever you appeared among them, unfolded your plans before them and assured them of your most sincere intentions. Permit us to remind you of the sacrifices in money and in blood which later were the seal of our loyalty to a work so noble and so sacred. The American Slovaks have kept their promise; we loyally stood, and to the present day, stand by your promise. Notwithstanding this, we note with some acerbity, for the past four years that your constituents who had sent you to us, and who cared so much for our alliance and our assistance never intended to fulfill that promise which they had placed into your mouth, and which you supported by this background in their name had promised. You came to us as an 78 This English version is a copy of the open letter available in AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650 . Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11, 1924. For the Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi TomMovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis lnstitutu hist6rie FF PU v Presove, 5 (No . 2, 2011 ), 79-82 . �SLOVAKIA 27 equal to equals; that was the way we associated with you and that was the way we drafted plans for the future with you. Not without our assistance, not without the efforts of the American Slovaks did you accomplish the fulfillment of your life's dreams - the liberation of the Czech Nation. Would we were not compelled to admit to you before the world that only (the liberation) of the Czech Nation; for the Slovak Nation, as a contrahent (contracting party) primarily recognized by you in the building of that republic at the head of which you now stand, does not feel under your aegis free in the sense of freedom as an independent nation has the right to vindicate for itself, particularly in the present epoch of self determination of nations. We have patiently waited for four years, whether the conscience of those cliques will move which had forced themselves upon us as brother, but today they treat us in stepmother fashion, nay, even like slaves. We see ourselves step by step betrayed, sold not only by compatriots of your strain and feelings, by your Government, but also by our own weaker compatriots, who for economic considerations lured into an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and even to us "ignorant" Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred. They are Slovak "Sviha's" pure and simple. While dwelling among us you spoke to us in the voice of a brother, plain and without bombast which is bountifully at the disposal of people of your profession. Today we desire to tell you in the same simple and plain manner that the Slovaks not only feel disappointed in you and in the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but directly endangered in their national existence. We do not desire to remind you of the recent acts by means of which the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic beyond any doubt manifested its desire of absorption respectively extermination of the Slovaks as a nation. These facts are sufficiently well known to you. We will show you the last incident which hardly has its parallel in the history of states which are only in the transitory stage of an experiment in democracy--an incident which startles any one who has sense for culture and democracy. Following the noble representatives of the World Powers there also came to America during the last few years representatives of the various religious denominations, in order to strengthen their adherents in their ways in which they de- �28 SLOVAKIA sire to reach eternal well-being in the post-terrestrial realm. What was more natural, but that also the Catholic Slovaks in America desired to welcome in their midst some one of these dignitaries with whom Rome has honored us after the revolution not without efforts on the part of your Government. The incident of Bishop Vojtassak is known to you (and how could it not be) whom we had invited here as our guest; from whom we expected good not only for ourselves, and for our church, but also for the welfare of your Republic. And here the system of government of the Czecho-Slovak republic showed up in its ugly and horrible nudity! Mr. President, the American Slovak Catholics identify themselves with the incident of Bishop Vojtassak. Your government has culminated by it the climax of its repressions, wrongfully committed for fully four years on Slovakia and the Slovaks. The refusal of a passport by your Minister caused such bitterness among us that we would be unworthy of our name and of our Credo, were we not to protest against it most emphatically. The Federation of Slovak Catholics called a council meeting to Pittsburgh which was held on August 8th, and at which the representatives of all Catholic organizations, a large number of Clergy and prominent exponents resolved to submit this grievance to the Congress of this Federation which was held on the days from the 9th to the 11th of October 1923, in Lansford, Pa., where we unanimously resolved to acquaint the educated world particularly with this outrage of your Minister and also submit to the world Powers and the leading representatives the following COMPLAINT against you and your Government. If you, as president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic according to law, are not responsible for your acts to the state authorities--and if your government does not honor your promise and your signature as President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, then we are taking you to task as a gentleman for that piece of cultural piracy which your Government and your ministers are committing on our Slovak nation from the first hour of the revolution-at the same time demanding from you as a gentleman to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised to us, the American Slovaks. This right we abrogate to ourselves as one of the parties contracting with you in the building of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. �SLOVAKIA 29 We are lodging this complaint against you and against your former factors in Paris before the conclusion of peace and after it, of having misled the peace delegates and the whole world in general, by claiming that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation. To such a statement we Slovaks object most emphatically. This erroneous opinion of your Government was upset even by the Czech Academy, and prominent historians are convinced of its fallacy. For this reason do we, the American Slovak Catholics request that the respective provisions at Paris-Versailles and Trianon, be revised. We are lodging against you a complaint, for breach of contract entered into between us and you as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and contained in the so-called Pittsburgh Pact, the value of which you now disavow, bagatellize-on the fulfillment of which, however, we insist ascribing to it the significance of a National Bill of Rights. We complain against you and your Government for the undemocratic, unrepublican persecutions of newspapers of our party alignment and that of the opposition parties, which are not pulling the cart of Czecho-imperialistic aspirations, and which stand firmly by the principle that the Slovaks are an autochthone nation. We accuse you and your Government of the confiscation of Catholic institution[ s]-of the forcing of textbooks offensive to Catholics into the primary and higher schools, of the open favorizing of individuals and societies whose aims are the undermining of the Catholic spirit in our people. We complain against you and your Government before the civilized world for that barbarian monstrosity which you have sanctioned and which under the name "A law for the protection of the Republic" destroys the idea of democracy; which in reality exists [to silence us, the Slovaks, forever], and is, in our opinion, a cancerous growth upon the body of the Republic. We complain against you and your Government for the so-called "County Reform" so much lauded by you, which is equivalent to shackles for Slovakia as a national unit, which is white in Bohemia and black in Slovakia, and which impoverishes us economically and culturally, exposing us to the chicaneries of your centralist officials. For these and similar undeniable facts , we, American Slovak Catholics are accusing you and your Government before the world for the reason that the censorship (o, democracy, o republic, �30 SLOVAKIA o enlightened twentieth century of progress and free thought), the censorship of your Government does not permit in Slovakia a single manifestation of opposition against this madly raving autocracy by means of which your conscienceless compatriots and political adventurers keep Slovakia shackled. If the saying is correct that history repeats itself, let us be permitted to remind you that the entire Czech nation on one occasion resisted the Habsburgs for the reason that Francis Joseph did not keep the promise once made to the Czechs. You gave him the epithet of a perjurer-and that rightly so, and that regardless of the fact whether his promises were only "of historic value" or not. And we do not blame you or your adherents, that you built the foundations of the Republic on these unfulfilled promises of your former "sovereign". But now, out of consideration for this repetition in history, please do not forget, together with your Government, that "quod uni justum, alteri aequum"--what you had disliked in your oligarchs, that we are not obliged to like either and that the "Camarilla of Prague" directly compels the Slovaks to repay you and your regime in equal coin, if you should not desist in your anti-Slovak and anti-Catholic intentions, and should refuse to give the Slovaks that to which they are entitled. And the consequences? Let Prague be responsible for them--you Mr. President, and your Government. Mr. President, you know well, just as we do that powerful enemies of our young state are carrying on a propaganda in foreign countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic is neither a natural state, nor a logical national, geographical, or resting upon a historical foundation; that it inherited all the weak points of the defunct monarchy, without having acquired one single good quality. Would there not be a necessity for internal unity, an internal understanding in accordance with your own motto "democracy is a discussion"? In opposition to this you with your Government, or that Government under your protection hamper and destroy even the slightest manifestation where the emphasizing of our national individuality is concerned. We, the Slovak Catholics in America, identify ourselves with the fate of our brethren across the ocean and the wrongs committed on them are also our wrongs, as Slovaks as well as Catholics; therefore, the disregard shown to Bishop Vojtassak affected us in a twofold manner. Your Government kicked him both for being a bishop (of �SLOVAKIA 31 course, a Catholic) and for being a patriotic Slovak who looks Prague straight in the eyes. And this double insult had for its consequence that also a preponderating majority of patriotic American Slovaks of other denominations joined our ranks, as brothers who are feeling with us our national wrong and our national disregard. What Prague has dared to do against us during the past four years, and what it recently dared to do with Bishop Vojtassak, would have ignited a scandal even among other nations; in our opinion it is so much greater, because you, Mr. President, instead of realizing the unprovoked insult and without regard to the abuse of jurisdiction of your minister, whose trammeling of the personal liberty of a free citizen exceeds all conceptions of democracy and humanity, whom you, as if trying to mock us, still tolerate in office. Of course, we admit that under the stress of circumstances, we Slovak Catholics cannot demand satisfaction from people whose life motto it had been "to square accounts with Rome", whose "programme is Tabor", who are provoking us that we should struggle for what we desire to preserve by right of heritage as Catholics, and as a deceived party of honest contrahents we cannot even demand it, but closing the list of our incriminations we solemnly declare to you, to your Government, and we shall not cease declaring to the whole world in spite of the opposing views of your regime that just as we are praying with our Catholic-Slovak brethren beneath the Tatra Mountains for the welfare of the young republic which had been won by our common sacrifices of blood, we wish you would take notice with your Government, and all its competent officials, that we are Slovaks, a self existing nation, homogenous and autochthone in origin and culture, as well as in history and language; that we desire to remain such without any artificial intermixture. Should the Czecho-Slovak Government hinder us in this either directly or indirectly, and not stop the wrongs cited in the above complaints--even if we were not able at once to put up against every "Metternich," "Bach," or "Schmerling" from Prague a Slovak "Palacky," "Rieger," or "Brauner," we shall yet find means and ways for the revelation of our wrongs; but we hope at the same time that God who will not let perish a nation trusting in Him, will awaken new "Viators" who will inform the world of our subjugated condition and that He will enthuse more "Bjornson[s]" who will tell you and your Czecho-Slovak �SLOVAKIA 32 Government such truths as you would least like to hear in this highly delicate situation. By authorization of the Slovak Catholic Federation in America, JOHN B. PASTORAK, Secretary, Schenectady, N. Y. ANDREW PA VLIS, President, Sheppton, Pa. APPENDIX II An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia79 MR. PRESIDENT: SOME time ago the Slovak Catholic Federation in America issued an Open Letter, addressed to you and signed by Father John B. Pastorak and Father Andrew Pavlis, in which complaints are being raised against you and your Government. A spirit of narrow sectarianism lurks behind every line of the Open Letter. You, Mr. President, and your Government are accused of desiring to "exterminate the Slovaks as a nation," of "cultural piracy," of having "misled the peace delegates," of "breach of faith," etc. In order that you may not have an erroneous idea as to the feelings and views of the American Slovaks, we, the undersigned, representatives of Slovak organizations in America, desire to point out that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America represents a very small part of our compatriots, and that the great majority of the American Slovaks are heart and soul with you. 79 Originally published in English, this open letter is available in MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 pp. �SLOVAKIA 33 Under your able leadership the Czechoslovak Republic has been most successful in piloting itself through the dangerous postwar period and it has been consolidated to such an extent that today it may be classed among the most ordered and prosperous States of Europe. In Slovakia, especially, great progress has been made as regards both cultural and economic development. We, therefore, are at a loss to understand the unjustified complaints made by the above-mentioned Slovak Catholic Federation against you and your Government. Permit us, Mr. President, to draw your attention to some of these complaints. The writers maintain that the Slovaks are "directly endangered in their national existence." How can this statement be reconciled with the progress which Slovakia has made in educational matters? As you are no doubt aware, under the Magyar regime all schools, whether elementary, secondary, or high schools, were in the hands of the Magyars. Properly speaking, there were no Slovak schools at all, with the exception of a few schools where the work was carried on by a handful of teachers who were evangelical for the greater part, the instruction was Magyar both in letter and spirit. Today, there are over four thousand elementary schools, over fifty secondary schools, besides commercial and technical institutes, and a university at Bratislava. The educational progress made since the liberation of Slovakia certainly does not prove the statement that the Slovaks are "endangered in their national existence." On the contrary, it proves, that the national existence and the cultural development of the Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic is fully assured. The Slovaks have three ministers in the Government and many officials in all branches of civil service. In certain cases, owing to lack of competent officials among the Slovaks, it was necessary to send Czechs to Slovakia but these are being withdrawn as soon as the Slovaks are able to fill these places with their own officials. There are, however, no proofs that Slovakia has been treated in "step-mother fashion ," nor do the writers offer any proofs of their vague generalization. The writers "object most emphatically" to the statement alleged to have been made by the Czechoslovak delegates at the Paris Peace Conference to the effect that the "Czechs and Slovaks are one nation". Assuming that this statement has really been made we should like to point out that we, too, are of the same opinion. Moreover, we �SLOVAKIA 34 may add that Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Autonomists, himself held, and probably still holds, the same view. On May 4th, 1908, he made the following declaration before the Magyar court at Bratislava: " It will remain an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one stock, one culture, one nation with the Czechs, and up to quite recent times we had a language in common with the Czechs, and up to this day our evangelical ministers make use of the Czech language in their church service." And it was the same Father Hlinka who, on October 30, 1918, cordially associated himself with the manifesto of the Slovak nation which contains the following words : "In language, culture and historical traditions the Slovak nation forms a part of the single Czechoslovak nation." It may be disputed whether - from a strictly historical and ethnographical point of view - the Slovaks and Czechs are one nation or not. Their feeling and consciousness, however, is the deciding factor. If the Slovaks and Czechs feel themselves as one nation, no historian or ethnographist can alter that feeling or consciousness. The writers accuse you, Mr. President, of "breach of contract" known as the "Pittsburgh Agreement." As regards this agreement which was arrived at between the American Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918, we should like to point out in how far the provisions of this agreement have been carried out. For this purpose we are giving on one side the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement and on the other what has been done: 1. We accept the political program providing for a union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State composed of the Czech territories and Slovakia. 1. Carried out 2. Slovakia will have its own administration, its diet and its courts. 2. In accordance with the Constitution the whole Republic is divided into 20 autonomous regions, 6 of which comprise Slovakia. These regions are administered by the Slovaks themselves by means of autonomous bodies containing about 40 members who are elected by the vote of all citizens, �SLOVAKIA 35 irrespective of sex, on a system of proportional representation. These zones thus have all the attributes of democratic local autonomy. From the representative bodies is elected an administrative council for the whole of Slovakia, also by proportional representation. This council is composed of 24 members, 8 of whom, under the presidency of Slovak administration, attend to the executive authority for Slovakia. 3. Slovak will be official language in schools, administration and in public life. 3. Both Czech and Slovak are official languages throughout the territory of the Republic. 4. The Czechoslovak State will be a Republic and its constitution will be democratic. 4. Carried out. 5. The organization of the co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will, according to the needs and to the changed situation, be broadened and regulated. 5. Left to be carried out by the American Slovaks and Czechs. 6. Concrete details concerning the administration of the CzechoSlovak State are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their duly elected representatives . 6. In accordance with this provision the present status of Slovakia (see article 2 of the agreement) has been elaborated. You will observe, Mr. President, that as a matter of fact the Pittsburgh Agreement has been substantially carried out. The aim of this agreement was to assure the future status and cultural development of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak State, and this aim has been achieved. The Czechoslovak Republic is the result of the work of both the Slovaks and Czechs. During the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they deman- �36 SLOVAKIA ded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks. Hence the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the Czechoslovak Nation. We, in America, are watching the development of events in Czechoslovakia very closely and we are not unmindful of the great progress the Republic has made. We are especially aware of the fact that your untiring efforts have in no small measure contributed to this progress . The good name of the Czechoslovak Republic abroad has been established, above all, by your indefatigable work and by the work of your able collaborator, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Benes. On behalf of the American Slovaks we thank you most heartily for your labor which has given to Slovakia her due place among the free nations of the world. We beg you to continue in your endeavors to make of Slovakia a happy land such as we have dreamt of while fighting in common for Czechoslovakia' s freedom and national independence. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our highest esteem and respect. JOHN KRAFCIK, President National Slovak Society. JOHN DVORSCAK, Secretary National Slovak Society. JOHN ZEMAN, President Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK OSLISLO, Secretary Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK ST AS , Treasurer Slovak League of America. JOHN MATLOCHA, President Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. JOHN L. ZAROVY, Secretary Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. NICHOLAS KOVAC, President District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. STEPHEN ERHARDT, Secretary District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. CLEMENT IHRISKY, President New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JANCEK, Secretary New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JOSCAK, Editor New Yorksky Dennik FRANK CELKO, Editor Slovensky Sokol STEPHEN HUSKA, Editor Nove Casy � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF AMERICAN SLOVAKS: BISHOP JAN VOJTASSAK'S ABORTED JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1923 r V V r Stefan Kucik In 1923 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak, bishop of the diocese of Spis in Slovakia, decided to undertake a pastoral journey to Slovak Catholics in the United States of America. However, Czechoslovak authorities refused to issue him a passport. They considered his trip to be political. It turns out that Vojtassak's planned journey conflicted with Czechoslovak government plans to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Upon hearing of this refusal, the Slovak Catholic Federation in America published an open letter to Tomas G. Masaryk, president of the Czechoslovak Republic, in which they expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the president and his government. To counteract the impact of this letter, the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter to the president, ostensibly by a group of American Slovaks who supported him and his government. Interestingly, this "anti-letter" was written by an official of Czechoslovak intelligence. While many scholars have dealt with the biography of bishop Jan Vojtassak, only Robert Letz has provided us with a thorough explanation of the reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant him passport in 1923 .1 In this context, however, no one has pointed to the open letters addressed to Tomas Garrigue Masaryk issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation and the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York. The present article will try to fill this gap, as well as to put the matter into a broader context. I Robert Letz, "Bi skup Jan Vojtassak a slovenska politika V medzi vojnovom obdobi," in Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, Ivan Chalupecky, ed. (Spisska KapitulaSpisske Podhradie: Ki\azsky seminar biskupa Jana Vojtassaka, 2003 ), 25 -52. 8 SLOVAKIA After Jan Vojtassak had been appointed bishop of Spis towards the end of 1920,2 along with Marian Blaha for the diocese of Banska Bystrica and Karol Kmet'ko for the diocese of Nitra, American Slovaks rejoiced. As early as December 22, 1920, editor Jozef Husek wrote in the Catholic weekly Jednota : "Only those who look at the deep religious sentiment of our people, and their simple faith and devotion to the Holy Church, can understand what it means for Catholic Slovaks to have apostles of their own flesh and blood, of their national sentiment and outlook. " 3 Msgr. Jan Vojtassak was ordained a bishop in Nitra on February 13, 1921. In a fortnight he assumed his office in Spisska Kapitula. In his first pastoral letter, Vojtassak outlined a program of his future activities. He was aware of the negative consequences of the Great War. He realized that the war had caused many to lose their faith in God, and felt that the war's ravages threatened the very basis of love for one 's neighbours. It not only produced a lot of cripples, but largely devastated people' s spiritual values . At war's end materialism and the class struggle began to appear and hatred toward the Catholic Church grew. In Czechoslovakia, the strong anti-Catholic character of the new political system was evident right after the war. The Czechs did not show much consideration for the religiosity of Slovakia. They also tended to undervalue the contribution of the Slovak Catholic clergy in the creation of the common independent state,4 whether in Slovakia or in the USA, and tended to forget that Roman Catholics constituted the vast majority of both populations. The Czechoslovak government, however, was not satisfied with just the secularization of the new country. It also decided to transfer its anti-Catholicism to Czech and Slovak communities in America. In order to promote the newly established Czechoslovak Church among American compatriots, it sent a mission led by its first bishop Gorazd Pavlik to the USA. In connection with this mission, which 2 For the appointment, ordination and enthronement of bishop Jan Vojta~~ak see Ivan Chalupecky, "Obsadenie spi~skeho biskupskeho stolca po roku 19 18," in Chalupecky, Spissky biskup Jan Vojtassak, 7-24. 3 Jozef Paufo, 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, I 965), 165 . 4 Ivan Chalupecky, Biskup Jan Vojtassak: K jeho verejnej a politickej cinnosti (Rufo mberok: Katolicka univerzita v Rufo mberku, Filozofi cka fakulta, 2009), 2 1-25. SLOVAKIA 9 was carried out between June 1922 and January 1923,5 an incident which became infamous in the history of the Slovak Catholic Church occurred. It filled both Slovak Catholics in Czechoslovakia and in America with much indignation. The incident lay behind the refusal of Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to the bishop of Spis. Jan Vojtassak had decided to travel to America as early as December of 1922. He had reached his decision on the basis of a circular letter issued by Antonin Cyril Stojan, Archbishop of Olomouc. Addressed to all ordinaries in Slovakia, the letter was based upon an earlier one sent by Czech Catholic priests in America on the basis of instructions received from the Czech episcopate. They had been asked to try to paralyze Gorazd Pavlik's activities, because some Slovak priests in America had begun to affiliate with the new Czechoslovak Church. The Czech priests emphasized that they had not succeeded in their work among American Slovaks because they were Czechs and not Slovaks. Had the episcopate sent Slovak priests among American Slovaks, these would have been more successful. 6 This circular letter, as well as reports published in Slovak-American newspapers and republished in Slovakia, plus a number of private letters received from individuals across the United States, led bishop Vojtassak to decide to lead a mission to the USA. 7 He was also aware that many Slovak Catholics in America came from his diocese. Vojtassak's mission was fully supported by the Czech mission of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the USA, as well as by Archbishop A. C. Stojan and other Slovak and Czech bishops, along with the former apostolic nuncio Clemente Micara. The Holy See also agreed with Vojtassak' s planned journey to America. 8 Bishop Vojtassak began to prepare for his trip in April of 1923. Slovak organizations in the USA were informed of his coming.9 In May of the same year, Vojtassak applied for a passport. Although at that time passports were usually granted by district authorities, Vojtassak's application was forwarded to the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava. Thence it was forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague, whence it was 5 Letz, " Bi skup ... ," 47 . Slovak (Bratislava), July 5, 1923, 1; Jednota (Middletown, PA), July 25 , 1923, 4. 7 Slovak, July 5, 1923, 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Letz, "Biskup ... ," 44. 6 SLOVAKIA returned back to Bratislava. This kind of procrastination continued for a month. To try to expedite matters, Vojtassak travelled to Bratislava and even to Prague, but his efforts proved fruitless . The parliamentary deputy of the Czechoslovak People's Party Vaclav Myslivec, as well as some parliamentary deputies of the Slovak People's Party, intervened with the Minister of the Interior Jan Malypetr. The latter, however, refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport with the comment that "he knows Catholic bishops who lie. " 10 In order to comprehend such a rude refusal, one needs to understand the situation in the Slovak-American community in the first years after the creation of Czechoslovakia. After Tomas G. Masaryk had left America in the fall 1918, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Cleveland to decide on sending a delegation to Slovakia. 11 According to Albert P. Mamatey, president of the League, 12 the delegates were to make contact with political leaders in the old country and to let them know about the Pittsburgh Agreement concluded with T. G. Masaryk in May of 1918. 13 Upon their arrival in Slovakia, the delegates acted impartially. In their Privet delegacie Slovenskej ligy v Amerike [Address of the Delegation of the Slovak League of America] dated April 9, 1919, they expressed their surprise at the growing political struggles in Slovakia. Therefore, they initially hesitated to give the Pittsburgh Agreement to Vavro Srobar, the Minister Responsible for Slovakia, or to Ferdis Juriga or Andrej Hlinka, the most popular priests and politicians in the Slovak People ' s Party. 14 They considered the political squabbles among the many new political parties a waste of energy for a small nation. 15 Upon their return to the USA, two of the delegates, Jozef Rusek, the editor of Jednota and Milan Getting, the editor of New Yorksky dennik, reported on the situation in Slovakia at the 12th Congress of the Slovak League held in Scranton, PA, on May 29, 1919. Jozef 10 Slowik, July 5, 1923, 1. Nave Slo vensko (Pittsburgh, PA), December 2, 19 18, 2-3. 12 Albert Pavo! Mamatey was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1911 to 1920. 13 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slav. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., dna 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, PA: Slovak League of America), 9. 14 Karol Sidor, Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji (Bratislava, 1929), 226-227. 15 Slovak, May 3, 1919, I. 11 SLOVAKIA 11 Husek advised American Slovaks to be careful in pressing for the autonomy of Slovakia as promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, because at that time it might help Magyar efforts to re-annex Slovakia to Hungary. However, he did not abandon his claim to the autonomy of Slovakia. He postponed it to a time when the situation in Slovakia would improve. 16 Milan Getting, on the other hand, did not even mention the autonomy of Slovakia. He reported on his plan of agitation against Magyarization in Slovakia. He worked out this plan on the basis of a suggestion made by Minister V. Srobar. Since Srobar was short of funds, Getting returned to the USA to ask American Slovaks to purchase a printing press for Minister Srobar's agitation. 17 Despite Jozef Husek's advice not to immediately press for the autonomy of Slovakia and Milan Getting's ignoring of the issue, American Slovaks began to very heatedly discuss this matter. 18 On July 31, 1919, the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America met in Pittsburgh and accepted the brochure Politicka nauka vzh/'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat [Political Perspective Regarding the Czecho-Slovak State] 19 as the basis of its future activities. The brochure stated that the Slovak League of America decided to support its program of autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. The final arrangement of the Czecho-Slovak state, however, it left to the Slovaks in the old country. 20 Another representative of the Slovak League of America, who reported on the situation in Slovakia right after the World War I, was Ignac Gessay. However, he did not belong to the above mentioned delegation. This renowned Slovak-American editor was sent to Slovakia somewhat later. The reason for his mission was a lack of reliable information from Europe at the beginning of 1919. 21 American 16 Zprava predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana na XII. Kongresse Slov. Ligy v Scranton, Pa., diia 29. maja 1919 (Pittsburgh, 19 19), 24. 17 Ibid. , 30-31. 18 Sidor, Slovaci... , 231. 19 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Trnave, Tmava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter ASSV), fascicle (hereinafter fasc .) 299K3. Zapisnica zo sch6dze Ustrednej spravy Slovenskej Ligy vydrziavanej di\a 31. jula 191 9 v Henry Hotel, Pittsburgh, Pa. The brochure was written by editor Jan A. Feriencik and published by the Slovak League of America in 19 19. Informally, it was called .. Politicky Katechismus " [Political Catechism]. 20 Jan A. Feriencik, Politicka nauka vzhl'adom na Cesko-Slovensky stat (Pittsburgh: Slovenska liga v Amerike, 19 19), 7. 21 Dobry Pastier, April 19 19, 7. 12 SLOVAKIA Slovaks, therefore, decided to establish an information office, at first in Paris, and once regular postal service had been established between Czecho-Slovakia and the USA, in Slovakia too.22 This task was entrusted to lgnac Gessay, at that time an editor of Nave Slovensko, 23 official organ of the Slovak League of America.24 In his report to the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League held in Pittsburgh on October 24, 1919, Gessay recommended that American Slovaks take a neutral stand on the issue of Slovak autonomy. He suggested a gradual implementation of the Pittsburgh Agreement and warned radical Slovak-American autonomists that immediate autonomy would have been fatal for the new republic. 25 Both Gessay's and Husek's initial reports had a huge impact on the official stand of the Slovak League towards autonomy. Jozef Rusek, however, would gradually change his mind and then would support the autonomist movement in Slovakia. At the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Slovak League on October 24, 1919, two delegates of the Slovak People's Party, the Rev. Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala, also appeared. Jozef Rudinsky had been sent to the USA by several leaders of the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka in August of 1919. He had been chosen as a trustworthy person whose task it was to defend the idea of Slovak autonomy within the Czecho-Slovak Republic among American Slovaks, and to inform them of the Party's activities. In addition, Rudinsky was supposed to raise funds for the autonomist movement. On the suggestion of the Rev. Frantisek Jehlicska, Jozef Kubala, a merchant from Vrbove, joined Rudinsky before his departure to the USA. In Poland, however, they both joined the Rev. Hlinka's delegation to Paris, in an attempt to have autonomy for Slovakia included in the Paris Peace Treaties. After a week's stay in the capital of France and the delegation's expulsion from that country, Ru- 22 Slovensky narodny archiv, Brati slava, Slovak Republic (hereinafter SNA), fund (hereinafter f.) Slovenska liga v Amerike [Slovak League of America], folder (hereinafter fold .) 2. Albert Mamatey to Frantisek Stas, April 17, 191 9. 23 Nave Slovensko, official organ of the Slovak League of America in 1918-1922. 24 Jgnac Gessay, S/ovensko po oslobodeni (Cleveland: Slovenska liga v Amerike), 4; ASSV, fasc . 236CI0. Authorization for Ignac Gessay, April 26, 1919. 25 Gessay, S/ovensko ... , 26-28, 37-38. SLOVAKIA 13 dinsky and Kubala continued on their original journey to the United States, where they arrived on October 13, 1919. 26 At the time of the delegates' trip to the USA the majority of American Slovaks felt distaste for the policy of the Slovak People's Party.27 This aversion arose mainly from the reports of Jozef Husek and Ignac Gessay, as well as Andrej Hlinka' s faux pas in connection with his rash journey to the Paris Peace Conference. Another reason was the fact that the delegates arrived in America with Polish passports and Polish visas, and not Czecho-Slovak. 28 Having presented their credentials to the League, Jozef Rudinsky was asked to explain his mission to America. He clarified the position of the Slovak People's Party at length. Like the Slovak League of America, the People's Party demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia based upon the Pittsburgh Agreement. It also wanted autonomy for Slovakia to be included in the Paris Peace Treaties. Therefore, he had come to the USA, along with Jozef Kubala, to agitate for autonomy and to raise funds towards this end. 29 Although the Executive Committee of the Slovak League did not find anything contrary to its program in the Rudinsky mission, it nevertheless took a negative stand towards it. Rudinsky and Kubala did not have any credentials from the Czecho-Slovak government and the League did not agree with Hlinka's journey to the Paris Peace Conference. The League accused the delegates of driving a wedge between the Slovaks and Czechs in America, which might have had a negative impact on their coexistence in the USA, as well as in Czecho-Slovakia. 30 On the other hand, the Executive Commit26 Robert Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky - vyznamna osobnost' Turzovky," in Turzovka kriiom-kraiom, Ivan Gajdiciar ed. (Turzovka: Spolok priatel'ov Turzovky, 2010), 328329. 27 Jozef Rudinsky, V Amerike a doma (Rufomberok: Lev, 1921 ), 11 . 28 Karol Sidor, "Zasahy Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike do politickeho vyvinu slovenskeho (1914 - 1939)," in Slovenska liga v Amerike styridsat'rocna, Mikulas Sprinc, ed. (Scranton, PA : Slovenska liga v Amerike, 1947), 54. 29 ASSV, fasc . 299A6. Zapisnica zo schodze Ustredneho vyboru Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydrziavanej di\a 24. okt6bra I 919 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli v Pittsburgh, Penna. JO Masarykuv ustav a Archiv Akademie ved Ceske republiky, V. V. i., Archiv UTGM, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter MUA AV CR, AUTGM), f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 459. Rezolucia Slovenskej Ligy prijata na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednyrn vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., di\a 24. a 25. okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919. (For the letter without attachments see Slovenske 14 SLOVAKIA tee issued a memorandum, in which American Slovaks demanded the gradual implementation of the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement in the newly-created Czecho-Slovakia. 31The resolution against Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala and the League's subsequent memorandum expressed American Slovaks' efforts to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the other hand, it also reflected their efforts to maintain their neutral stand and not to be drawn into political affairs in Slovakia. In such a situation, the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party could not rely on the authority of the Slovak League of America. They, therefore, approached two Slovak-American organizations which disagreed with the League 's stand: the Slovak Catholic Federation and the First Catholic Slovak Union. Jozef Rudinsky expressed his ideas mainly in the weekly Jednota , where he was assisted by Jozef Husek, and in the newspaper Obrana, which was edited by the Rev. Jan Metod Liscinsky.32 While Rudinsky and Kubala, assisted by Slovak-American Catholic organizations, were agitating in the USA for Slovak autonomy, Albert Mamatey left on a three-month journey (December 10, 1919 March 14, 1920) to Czecho-Slovakia. His intentions were very much the same as that of the delegates of the Slovak People' s Party in the USA, i.e. that the Pittsburgh Agreement should be incorporated into the future Czecho-Slovak Constitution. Upon his return to the United States, Mamatey reported to a meeting of the Executive Committee in Pittsburgh on April 8, 1920. 33 He had traveled to Czecho-Slovakia via France and Switzerland. In Paris, he had met with Stefan Osusky, the general secretary of the Czecho-Slovak delegation to the Peace Conference and a vyst'ahovalectvo: Dokumenty 3, Frantisek Bielik, Elo Rakos, eds. (Martin: Matica slovenska, 1976), 165-172, document no. 325); ASSV, fasc . 299A9. Prehlas a verejne osvedcenie Slov. Ligy. 31 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R- republika 191 8 - 1937, fold. 45 9. Memorandum Slovenskej Ligy Prijate na schodzi ustrednej spravy s ustrednym vyborom Slov. Ligy, vydrziavanej v Pittsburghu, Pa., dna 24. a 25 . okt6bra t. r. Attachment of letter of Albert Mamatey to V. Srobar, November 22, 1919; Jednota, October 29, 1919, I. 32 Sidor, Slovaci... , 235; Letz, "JozefRudinsky ...," 329-330. 33 ASSV, fasc . 299A4. Zapisnica zo zasadnutia ustr. a vyko. vyboru Slov. ligy 8. apr. 1920 vo Fort Pitt Hoteli, Pittsburgh, Pa. SLOVAKIA 15 delegate of the Slovak League of America to Masaryk in 1916. 34 When Mamatey suggested that the Slovaks should have been contractually guaranteed their home rule at the Paris Peace Conference in the same way as had the Ruthenians, Osusky offered the following explanation: "During the whole war, we cooperated and worked with our brothers the Czechs for our independence as a UNIT, as two branches of one nation that belong together. Thanks to this UNIFIED stand with our brothers the Czechs, the Allies recognized our independence, our separation from the Magyars and our joining with the Czechs. "35 Osusky, however, was not worried about the future of the Slovaks. He promised that they would get everything that they asked for and that they wished, except for things that might be detrimental to them: "Because what we do not want, what would be detrimental or destructive for Slovakia, as for instance, a separate Diet at this time, nobody from the outside wi 11 force upon us nor put into our minds." 36 After this meeting, the intervention of Albert Mamatey on behalf of the autonomy of Slovakia sounded unconvincing. He had met with T. G. Masaryk, the President of Czecho-Slovakia, with Edvard Benes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Vavro Srobar, the Minister with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia, and others. In February of 1920, Mamatey had also taken part in the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies. Almost all with whom he had negotiated, had agreed with the view that at that time the autonomy of Slovakia with a separate Diet would have been fatal for Slovakia. Mamatey, however, had negotiated only with the members of 34 For more on Osusky, his earlier life in America and his mission to Europe, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Role of American Slovaks in the Creation of Czecho-Slovakia," Slovak Studies, 8 (1968), 27-30 and 57-66. 35 Zprava Predsedu Slovenskej Ligy v Amerike, podana Ustrednemu Vyboru Slov. ligy v Pittsburghu, Pa. dna 8. aprila 1920 o Jeho ceste a missi v Cesko-slovenskej republike (Pittsburgh, 1920), 8. 36 Ibid. 16 SLOVAKIA the centralist Czechoslovak political parties and opponents of the legislative autonomy of Slovakia. In connection with the meeting of the Club of Slovak Parliamentary Deputies a regrettable incident occurred. The Club had passed a resolution which was supposed to confirm that in the draft Constitution there be included everything that had been promised in the Pittsburgh Agreement, except for a separate Diet. However, the signatures of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party (Alois Kalisek, Jan Kovalik, Stefan Onderco, Jozef Sivak and Florian Tomanek) on the resolution had been forged. This affair came to light only after the resolution had been cited in full in the Memorandum of the Slovak League of America addressed to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1922.37 Even if the resolution significantly influenced the future attitudes of American Slovaks to the issue of the autonomy of Slovakia, it seems that it did not have a great impact on the views of Albert Mamatey. On February 28, 1920, one day before he left Czecho-Slovakia, Albert Mamatey received a letter from Milan Hodza, the Minister for the Unification of Laws and one of the main Slovak political leaders. In this letter, Hodza had also rejected a separate Slovak Diet. Despite the unwillingness of the main political representatives to accept the claim to a Slovak Diet, Albert Mamatey did not hesitate to conclude his report with the words: "Slovakia may look forward to a great future," although he added that "it would take some time." 38 However, it is well-known how important a separate Diet was for American Slovaks. Jozef Rusek expressed their outlook very clearly: "Autonomy without a Diet, without legislation, is no autonomy. Indeed, autonomy is a Diet and a Diet is autonomy! Without a Diet there is no autonomy!" 39 Albert Mamatey must have been aware of the importance of a separate Slovak Diet to fulfill the promise of autonomy. He must have also known that if the requirement of a separate Slovak Diet had been deleted from the Pittsburgh Agreement, the latter would have been worthless. His attitude on the issue of the autonomy of 37 Memorandum Slovenskej ligy v Amerike upravene na vladu a Narodne Shromaidenie Cesko-Slovenskej Republiky v zaujime vtelenia Pittsburghskej Dohody do iistavy C-S Republiky (Pittsburgh : Slovak League of America, 1922). 38 Ibid. , 26. 39 Jednota, February 18, 1920, 4. SLOVAKIA 17 Slovakia began to change by the beginning of 1919. In one of his letters addressed to Dr. Miloslav Francisci of Cleveland, son of a famous Slovak revolutionary hero of 1848, Mamatey wrote: "I have been fighting for the national individuality of the Slovak nation for over four years. I have insisted that the Slovaks are not just an "appendix" of the Czech nation, but the Slovaks are as independent a nation as the Czechs. However, I have gotten tired of the constant fighting. Anyways, the fate of the Slovak nation will not be determined by us from America, but by those back home. - You, I and hundreds of others here in America have done our duty. " 40 In accordance with his changed attitude towards autonomy for Slovakia and his hardly concealable inclination towards government policy, which was fuelled by the promise of the office of Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, Albert Mamatey decided to paralyze the agitation of Jozef Rudinsky and Jozef Kubala among American Slovaks. To this end he arranged that two delegates of the Czechoslovak government were sent to America. The mission of the Roman Catholic priest Ladislav Moys and the social democrat Jan Pocisk, did not bear fruit. They failed to persuade American Slovaks to approve of the Czechoslovak Constitution and their activities in the USA were deplored by the "Response" [Ohlas] of the Slovak Catholic Federation. 41 In response to the steps taken by Albert Mamatey and by the Executive Committee of the Slovak League of America, Jozef Husek announced his resignation from the League. He accused the leading League officials of having knowingly and intentionally missed the opportunity to have Slovakia constitutionally guaranteed the right to 40 Aibert Mamatey to M . Francisci, January 22, 1919. It was published in Konstantin Culen, "Zo zaviatych listov (Z korespondencie A. Mamateya s Dr. M. Franciscim)," in Literarny almanach Slovaka v Amerike na rok 1962 (Middletown, Pa.: Hrobak Publications), 147. 41 Dobry Pastier (Middletown, PA), April 1920, 14-15; Jan Pankuch, Dejiny clevelandskych a lakewoodskych Slovakov (Cleveland, 1930), 188; Konstantin Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda (Bratislava: Knihtlaciaren Andreja, 1937), 274; Paufo, 162163; Natalia Krajfovicova, "Americki Slovaci a slovenski autonomisti v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR," in Miroslav Peknik et al. , Ferdinand Juriga: /'udovy smer slovenskej politiky (Bratislava: VEDA, 2009), 260. 18 SLOVAKIA home rule and individual national, cultural and economic life within the Czechoslovak Republic. Moreover, he accused the League's officials of morally and financially supporting agitation against the Pittsburgh Agreement. 42 As a result, no Slovak-American Catholic organization attended the 13th Congress of the Slovak League held in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on June 24-25, 1920. 43 After the Congress, the Slovak League of America was subjected to a lot of criticism by Jozef Husek. The latter concluded that the League "ceases to be the moral and official representative of the Slovak-American colony."44 As a result, the role that had been played in the promotion of Slovak national demands by the Slovak League of America began to be played by representatives of Slovak American Catholics led by the Slovak Catholic Federation and those organizations with which the Federation closely co-operated.45 However, after the Slovak National Party had split from the Slovak National and Agrarian Party in March of 192 I in order to be able more vigorously to demand the legislative autonomy of Slovakia, the Slovak League of America, led by its new president Ivan Bielek,46 began to change its stand. One of the first consequences of the creation of the Slovak National Party was the adoption of a compromise declaration requesting the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement at the conference of the representatives of American Slovaks in Washington, DC, on May 21 , 1921 . In this declaration, American Slovaks demanded that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic. They also requested the gradual autonomy of Slovakia. 47 Another event that influenced the Slovak League of America was the secession of the Slovak People's 42 Jednota, June 19, 1920, 4. Pauco, 160. 44 Jednota , Jul y 7, 1920, 4. 45 Pauco, 160. 46 Ivan Bielek, a fo rmer newspaper editor, was the president of the Slovak League of America from 1920 to 1934. As the first vice-president of the League, Bielek became its president after Albert Mamatey resigned in September of 1920 due to his appointment as a consul of the Czechoslovak Republic in Pittsburgh. Jednota, September 22, 1920, 2; Slovak Institute and Reference Library in Cleveland (hereinafter SIRL), fasc. Mamatey, Albert 1870 - 1923. "Pan Mamatey sa vzdava predsednictva Slov. Ligy," newspaper clipping, September 17, 1920. 47 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 317, 320. 43 SLOVAKIA 19 Party from the common parliamentary club of the Czechoslovak People 's Party in November of 1921. 48 On June 28-30 1922, the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Pittsburgh. The Congress was attended by the vice-president of the Slovak National Party and the Rev. Anton Kompanek. The latter called uJ'on American Slovaks not to give up on the Pittsburgh Agreement. 4 His mission in the USA was to rally autonomist forces , both in America and in Slovakia. 50 The congress then split into two camps - autonomists and centralists. Nevertheless, the delegates supported the Pittsburgh Agreement almost unanimously and they ordered the Executive Board "to write to Prague."51 The Executive Board then sent a Memorandum to the Government and National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic requesting that the Pittsburgh Agreement be incorporated into the Czechoslovak Constitution. They also demanded gradual autonomy for Slovakia. 52 The 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America was very important for the future orientation of this organization. In spite of expectations that the crisis within the League would deepen, the Congress became a new concentration of autonomist forces . However, the concentration was only reached with great effort. The June 29, 1922 debate about the Pittsburgh Agreement was long and lasted until 11 :00 p.m.53 The discussion on the Pittsburgh Agreement at the Congress was significantly influenced by Anton Kompanek. Once in America, he began to create a united front for the recognition of the Pittsburgh 48 Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnfch vecf Ceske republiky, Prague, Czech Republic (hereinafter AMZV CR), f. rn. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, inventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report "Hlinkovci v Amerike" by M. Getting, director ofCSTK in Washington, DC, January 24, 1922. 49 Zapisnica XIV. Kongressu Slovenskej Lfgy vydi iavaneho v dnoch 28., 29. a 30. juna /922 v Moose Temple, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Pittsburgh, 1922), 83. 50 Krajcovicova, 262. 51 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 617. Complementary report to the report " Slovenske veci v Amerike", July 1, 1922 by M . Getting, director of CSTK in Washington, DC, July 7, 1922; Archfv Krajanskeho muzea Matice slovenskej, Bratislava (hereinafter AKM MS), f. Ignac Gessay, fold. I. Telegram to I. Gessay (torso, without sender, undated). 52 See footnote 3 7. 53 Robert Letz, "Slovenska liga v Amerike a Slovenska liga na Slovensku," in Historicky zbornfk, 19 (No. 1, 2009), 65 ; Obrana, June 27, 1922, 3 and Jul y 4, 1922, 1. 20 SLOVAKIA Agreement through his articles, which were published in the Slovak American press. In a series of articles in Obrana, Kompanek recommended that Slovak autonomy be achieved gradually, and only within the Czechoslovak Republic. As for American Slovaks, he was convinced that there was not as much disunity over the issue of autonomy as in the old country. He admitted, on the other hand, that there were also some personal antipathies (Bielek versus Husek, with the former favoring the Slovak National Party over the Slovak People's Party) .54 Anton Kompanek tried to eliminate these disagreements and he invited supporters of Slovak autonomy to a conference in Pittsburgh on October 12, 1922. At this conference, he stressed that the fate of the Pittsburgh Agreement was in the hands of American Slovaks. He stated that it was not enough to issue resolutions, but it was necessary to work systematically and support materially the movement for the autonomy of Slovakia directly in Slovakia. At the conference, a five-member committee was elected to coordinate the work on behalf of the Pittsburgh Agreement. It was named the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom and its members were Stefan Kocis, Jan Pankuch, Ivan Bielek, Jan Bibza and Jozef Husek. The latter was elected its president. The aim of the Committee was to unite all Slovak American organizations, their newspapers and public officials in the struggle for the enactment of the Pittsburgh Agreement. Another goal of the new organization was to try to create a coalition of all autonomist parties in Slovakia. 55 Even though Ivan Bielek had attended the conference in Pittsburgh as a private person, 56 once the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom was established, the "centralists" were expelled from the Slovak League of America. 57 This happened at the meeting of the Executive Committee with the Executive Board held on June 27-28 in Cleveland, 58 and was completed and approved at the 15th Con54 Krajcovicova, 262-263. Jednota, October 18, 1922, 4; Krajcovicova, 263 . 56 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0., 13. 57 Jednota, July 4, 1923, 4; Krajcovicova, 264. 58 Zapisnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v dnoch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.MC.A. , Cleveland, 0 ., 73 . 55 SLOVAKIA 21 gress of the League held on May 27-29, 1924 in Binghamton, New York. 59 In terms of the resolution of its 14th congress, the Slovak League of America reacted negatively to the new activities of Jozef Rudinsky in the USA in 1923. This time, contrary to his first mission among American Slovaks, Rudinsky, who had switched sides, and had become a major supporter of Milan Hodza, came to the USA in the service of the Czechoslovak government. The League also rejected a similar mission by Vavro Srobar and Vaclav Maule, a Czech professor and head of the branch of the Ministry of Education in Bratislava. They came in the same year to lecture on behalf of Czechoslovak national unity and against the autonomy of Slovakia.60 Their mission, however, failed among Slovak American autonomists. 61 Upon his return to Czechoslovakia in November of 1920, Jozef Rudinsky's relationship with Andrej Hlinka deteriorated and they eventually parted company.62 As early as the beginning of 1923, Rudinsky and Vavro Srobar began to talk. These conversations were probably initiated by Srobar, who was preparing for his own journey to the USA 63 in order to counteract the results of the 14th congress of the Slovak League of America. 64 Rudinsky and Srobar discussed Rudinsky' s planned new journey to America and concluded that the latter should use the contacts that he had made in his previous mission. They particularly counted upon Rudinsky's past friendship with Jozef Husek. To make his mission more successful, Rudinsky decided to depart alone, without Srobar. The latter would come after him and would finish what Rudinsky had started. 65 Rudinsky ' s and Srobar' s trips were intended to appear as two completely unrelated and independent initiatives. However, that same year bishop Vojtassak was also preparing for his journey to the USA. Vojtassak was not aware of Srobar' s and Rudinsky' s plans. If 59 Zapisnica XV. kongressu S/o venskej ligy vydri iavaneho v diioch 27., 28. a 29. maja / 924, v Bennett Hoteli, Binghamton, N. Y. (Pittsburgh), 16-17, 20. 60 Zap isnica schodze Ustredneho vyboru s Ustrednou spravou Slovenskej ligy v Amerike vydriiavanej v diioch 27. a 28. juna 1923 v budove Y.M C.A ., Cleveland, 0 ., 14. 61 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hlinka (1864 - 1926), 504-505. 62 For a detailed analysis of their breakup see Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 334-337. 63 Ibid. , 33 7. 64 Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda, 383. 65 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ...," 337. 22 SLOVAKIA he had gone, Vojtassak would have certainly strengthened the position of Slovak Catholics in the USA, as well as that of his friend Andrej Hlinka and the whole autonomist movement. Therefore, Rudinsky in his letters referring to Vojtassak' s planned journey to the USA, found it extremely undesirable. Upon his arrival in the USA, Rudinsky wrote to Srobar: "I was almost dejected by the news that Vojtassak was already aboard ship and was about to arrive any day. If it is true, there is nothing left but to pack my bags and return home. I will be not able to counteract his influence."66 Of course, bishop Vojtassak was not aboard the ship Majestic, which was to arrive in the USA on July 6, 1923. 67 However, the information that came to Rudinsky must have been based upon Vojtassak's planned arrival in America. In New York City, a reception had been prepared on that day to which representatives of the city council were invited. A welcome committee consisting of Catholic priests must have blushed with shame when Vojtassak did not arrive on the Majestic, . 68 nor on any ot h er sh 1ps. Thus, the main reason why the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. The refusal had to do with the timing of his journey. It was planned at exactly the time when the Czechoslovak government was preparing to strike a decisive blow against the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks. Vojtassak' s trip could have thwarted these plans. In addition, the Czechoslovak government harbored suspicions about Vojtassak as a supporter of the Slovak People's Party. It feared that he would make use of his journey to raise funds for the Party just before municipal and county elections (September, 1923) were to take place. They also speculated that Vojtassak' s trip might have helped the Eudova banka [People's Bank], since it was in financial difficulty.69 Slovak Catholics in the USA, on the other hand, looked upon Vojtassak's trip as a pastoral journey, and not a political one. They pointed this out in their press . Bishop Vojtassak had been invited by the Slovak Catholic Federation in America. The news of such a rude and offensive refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak caused 66 SNA, f. Vavro Srobar, fold . 4. J. Rudinsky to V. Srobar, July 5, 1923. 67 Letz, "Jozef Rudinsky ... ," 337-33 8. Obrana, July 17, 1923, 4. Letz, " Biskup ... ," 45 . 68 69 SLOVAKIA 23 outrage among American Slovak Catholics. The Slovak Catholic Federation decided to call a meeting to discuss the affair and to take appropriate action. At this meeting, which was held in Pittsburgh on August 8, 1923, representatives of all Slovak American Catholic organizations, most of the clergy and Slovak American leaders resolved to send a complaint to the Congress of the Slovak Catholic Federation held in Lansford, PA, on October 9-11, 1923. At the Congress, the delegates unanimously decided to acquaint the world with the offensive step of Minister Malypeter and to launch an indictment against the President and government of the Czechoslovak Republic. 70 In response to the refusal to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, the Slovak Catholic Federation issued a strong open letter addressed to the President of the Czechoslovak Republic T. G. Masaryk. In this letter, Slovak Catholics in America expressed their disappointment over the policies of both the President and government of Czechoslovakia, and even the sense of a threat to their national existence. Besides other matters, they pointed to the cause of bishop Jan Vojtassak. They directly charged the Czechoslovak government with trying to assimilate the Slovaks and to promote the spiritual genocide of the Slovak nation. 71 The open letter was sent to all representatives of the Allies, as well as to Bohemia and Slovakia. 72 In Czechoslovakia, however, it 10 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. TomM Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5-6. 71 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 459. Otvoreny List P. Tomasovi G. Masarykovi Prezidentovi Republiky Cesko-Slovenskej (Sdruzenie Slovenskych Katolikov v Amerike, 1923), 5, 8 - 9. The open letter was printed in Slovak (600 copies) and English (500 copies). For a copy of its English version see AMZV CR, f. Ill. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11 , 1924. For its Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi Tomasovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis Institutu hist6rie FF PU v Pre.save, 5 (No. 2, 2011 ), 79-82. 72 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. Milan Getting of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague that an English version of the open letter was sent particularly to the representatives of the Catholic Church in the USA, to editorial staffs of several American newspapers, to all leading Polish and Ruthenian newspapers and pastors, to university professors, as well as to the members of the foreign committee of the 24 SLOVAKIA was confiscated by the Czechoslovak authorities. First, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava prohibited the distribution of the letter through the mails and it was confiscated by the public prosecutor's office in Prague as well. 73 On behalf of all Slovak American Catholics, the Slovak Catholic Federation protested against this confiscation to the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC. They referred to the confiscation as vandalism and a new insult to Slovak Catholics in America.74 In their protest through the open letter, however, Slovak-American Catholics were not united. Jednota criticized the open letter. The editor considered it to be a tactical mistake. He declared the letter to be too radical and also criticized its timing.75 In an effort to weaken the impact of the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation and to prove that views expressed in it belonged to a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York agreed with the Rev. Klement Ihrisky, a representative of American Slovaks in New York, to issue an "anti-letter" addressed to the President of Czechoslovakia. 76 This "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department. It was also issued in the form of brochure and sent to the same addresses as the open letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation.77 Senate and Congress in Washington. In its Slovak version, the open letter was mosttr sent to Prague to the members of Parliament. 7 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Attachment of the letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 12, 1924; AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold . 650. Letter of the Ministry of the CSR with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, February 27, 1924. 74 AMZV CR, f. III . sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Slovak Catholic Federation to Frantisek Chvalkovsky, Ambassador of the CSR in Washington, DC, February 25 , 1924. 75 AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. ,,Otvoreny list na Masaryka". A clipping of the weekly Jednota, March 19, 1924. 76 MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 rtAMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 191 8 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650. Letter of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 7, 1924; Culen, Pittsburghska dohoda , 383. SLOVAKIA 25 It should be apparent, therefore, that the main reason for which the Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant bishop Vojtassak a passport was political. Moreover, the rude refusal may be explained by the timing of his journey. After World War I, Slovaks in America, represented by their cover organization the Slovak League, underwent several changes of opinion regarding political developments in the newly-established Czecho-Slovak Republic. On the one hand, they struggled to remain devoted to their program of the autonomy of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak Republic as expressed in the Pittsburgh Agreement. On the other hand, American Slovaks tried to remain neutral and not to get involved in the political infighting in Slovakia. With the personal metamorphosis of the president of the Slovak League of America, and with the Slovak League being hesitant concerning the matter of the autonomy promised by T. G. Masaryk in the Pittsburgh Agreement, Slovak Catholic organizations took the lead in the promotion of Slovak national demands after 1919. Due to the growing autonomist movement in Slovakia, as well as the activities of Anton Kompanek, the vice-president of the Slovak National Party, in the USA the 14th Congress of the Slovak League of America concentrated the autonomist forces and it eventually provoked the Czechoslovak government to try to deliver a decisive blow to the growing autonomist movement among American Slovaks in 1923. In response to the refusal of the Czechoslovak authorities to grant a passport to bishop Vojtassak, however, Slovak Catholics in America were not united. The scathing open letter (in stilted English) issued by the Slovak Catholic Federation was justifiably criticized by Jednota. To weaken the impact of this open letter and to try to prove that it represented only a small number of American Slovaks, the intelligence department of the Czechoslovak Consulate General in New York issued another open letter (in perfect English) addressed to the president of Czechoslovakia. It was typical of the machinations of the then Czechoslovak government that the "anti-letter" was written by an official of the intelligence department and not by American Slovaks. SLOVAKIA 26 APPENDIX I Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk President of the Czechoslovak Republic. 78 Mr. Thomas G. Masaryk, President of the Czechoslovak Republic, Prague Mr. President: In a critical time when fate was about to decide the turn of the world war, you and those loyal to you exerted all that was in your power that the result of the struggle might turn out in our mutual favor. Your appearance among the American Slovaks ignited unprecedented enthusiasm--your knocking at the hearts of our people found animated response - and your appeal for our assistance was crowned with success. Brother embraced brother and on the brightened horizon of acquired freedom and brotherhood smiled the sun towards our happy future ... Permit us, Mr. President, to remind you of the enthusiasm and the jubilation with which our Slovak people welcomed you wherever you appeared among them, unfolded your plans before them and assured them of your most sincere intentions. Permit us to remind you of the sacrifices in money and in blood which later were the seal of our loyalty to a work so noble and so sacred. The American Slovaks have kept their promise; we loyally stood, and to the present day, stand by your promise. Notwithstanding this, we note with some acerbity, for the past four years that your constituents who had sent you to us, and who cared so much for our alliance and our assistance never intended to fulfill that promise which they had placed into your mouth, and which you supported by this background in their name had promised. You came to us as an 78 This English version is a copy of the open letter available in AMZV CR, f. III. sekce MZV 1918 - 1939, i. no. 22, fold. 650 . Letter of the Czechoslovak Legation in Washington, DC, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CSR in Prague, April 11, 1924. For the Slovak version see my "Dva otvorene listy prezidentovi TomMovi G. Masarykovi," in Dejiny: internetovy casopis lnstitutu hist6rie FF PU v Presove, 5 (No . 2, 2011 ), 79-82 . SLOVAKIA 27 equal to equals; that was the way we associated with you and that was the way we drafted plans for the future with you. Not without our assistance, not without the efforts of the American Slovaks did you accomplish the fulfillment of your life's dreams - the liberation of the Czech Nation. Would we were not compelled to admit to you before the world that only (the liberation) of the Czech Nation; for the Slovak Nation, as a contrahent (contracting party) primarily recognized by you in the building of that republic at the head of which you now stand, does not feel under your aegis free in the sense of freedom as an independent nation has the right to vindicate for itself, particularly in the present epoch of self determination of nations. We have patiently waited for four years, whether the conscience of those cliques will move which had forced themselves upon us as brother, but today they treat us in stepmother fashion, nay, even like slaves. We see ourselves step by step betrayed, sold not only by compatriots of your strain and feelings, by your Government, but also by our own weaker compatriots, who for economic considerations lured into an invisible net of imperialistic aspirations, renounced openly that which is to every nation and even to us "ignorant" Slovaks inviolable, priceless, sacred. They are Slovak "Sviha's" pure and simple. While dwelling among us you spoke to us in the voice of a brother, plain and without bombast which is bountifully at the disposal of people of your profession. Today we desire to tell you in the same simple and plain manner that the Slovaks not only feel disappointed in you and in the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but directly endangered in their national existence. We do not desire to remind you of the recent acts by means of which the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic beyond any doubt manifested its desire of absorption respectively extermination of the Slovaks as a nation. These facts are sufficiently well known to you. We will show you the last incident which hardly has its parallel in the history of states which are only in the transitory stage of an experiment in democracy--an incident which startles any one who has sense for culture and democracy. Following the noble representatives of the World Powers there also came to America during the last few years representatives of the various religious denominations, in order to strengthen their adherents in their ways in which they de- 28 SLOVAKIA sire to reach eternal well-being in the post-terrestrial realm. What was more natural, but that also the Catholic Slovaks in America desired to welcome in their midst some one of these dignitaries with whom Rome has honored us after the revolution not without efforts on the part of your Government. The incident of Bishop Vojtassak is known to you (and how could it not be) whom we had invited here as our guest; from whom we expected good not only for ourselves, and for our church, but also for the welfare of your Republic. And here the system of government of the Czecho-Slovak republic showed up in its ugly and horrible nudity! Mr. President, the American Slovak Catholics identify themselves with the incident of Bishop Vojtassak. Your government has culminated by it the climax of its repressions, wrongfully committed for fully four years on Slovakia and the Slovaks. The refusal of a passport by your Minister caused such bitterness among us that we would be unworthy of our name and of our Credo, were we not to protest against it most emphatically. The Federation of Slovak Catholics called a council meeting to Pittsburgh which was held on August 8th, and at which the representatives of all Catholic organizations, a large number of Clergy and prominent exponents resolved to submit this grievance to the Congress of this Federation which was held on the days from the 9th to the 11th of October 1923, in Lansford, Pa., where we unanimously resolved to acquaint the educated world particularly with this outrage of your Minister and also submit to the world Powers and the leading representatives the following COMPLAINT against you and your Government. If you, as president of the Czecho-Slovak Republic according to law, are not responsible for your acts to the state authorities--and if your government does not honor your promise and your signature as President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, then we are taking you to task as a gentleman for that piece of cultural piracy which your Government and your ministers are committing on our Slovak nation from the first hour of the revolution-at the same time demanding from you as a gentleman to acknowledge and fulfill that which you had promised to us, the American Slovaks. This right we abrogate to ourselves as one of the parties contracting with you in the building of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. SLOVAKIA 29 We are lodging this complaint against you and against your former factors in Paris before the conclusion of peace and after it, of having misled the peace delegates and the whole world in general, by claiming that the Czechs and Slovaks are one nation. To such a statement we Slovaks object most emphatically. This erroneous opinion of your Government was upset even by the Czech Academy, and prominent historians are convinced of its fallacy. For this reason do we, the American Slovak Catholics request that the respective provisions at Paris-Versailles and Trianon, be revised. We are lodging against you a complaint, for breach of contract entered into between us and you as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and contained in the so-called Pittsburgh Pact, the value of which you now disavow, bagatellize-on the fulfillment of which, however, we insist ascribing to it the significance of a National Bill of Rights. We complain against you and your Government for the undemocratic, unrepublican persecutions of newspapers of our party alignment and that of the opposition parties, which are not pulling the cart of Czecho-imperialistic aspirations, and which stand firmly by the principle that the Slovaks are an autochthone nation. We accuse you and your Government of the confiscation of Catholic institution[ s]-of the forcing of textbooks offensive to Catholics into the primary and higher schools, of the open favorizing of individuals and societies whose aims are the undermining of the Catholic spirit in our people. We complain against you and your Government before the civilized world for that barbarian monstrosity which you have sanctioned and which under the name "A law for the protection of the Republic" destroys the idea of democracy; which in reality exists [to silence us, the Slovaks, forever], and is, in our opinion, a cancerous growth upon the body of the Republic. We complain against you and your Government for the so-called "County Reform" so much lauded by you, which is equivalent to shackles for Slovakia as a national unit, which is white in Bohemia and black in Slovakia, and which impoverishes us economically and culturally, exposing us to the chicaneries of your centralist officials. For these and similar undeniable facts , we, American Slovak Catholics are accusing you and your Government before the world for the reason that the censorship (o, democracy, o republic, 30 SLOVAKIA o enlightened twentieth century of progress and free thought), the censorship of your Government does not permit in Slovakia a single manifestation of opposition against this madly raving autocracy by means of which your conscienceless compatriots and political adventurers keep Slovakia shackled. If the saying is correct that history repeats itself, let us be permitted to remind you that the entire Czech nation on one occasion resisted the Habsburgs for the reason that Francis Joseph did not keep the promise once made to the Czechs. You gave him the epithet of a perjurer-and that rightly so, and that regardless of the fact whether his promises were only "of historic value" or not. And we do not blame you or your adherents, that you built the foundations of the Republic on these unfulfilled promises of your former "sovereign". But now, out of consideration for this repetition in history, please do not forget, together with your Government, that "quod uni justum, alteri aequum"--what you had disliked in your oligarchs, that we are not obliged to like either and that the "Camarilla of Prague" directly compels the Slovaks to repay you and your regime in equal coin, if you should not desist in your anti-Slovak and anti-Catholic intentions, and should refuse to give the Slovaks that to which they are entitled. And the consequences? Let Prague be responsible for them--you Mr. President, and your Government. Mr. President, you know well, just as we do that powerful enemies of our young state are carrying on a propaganda in foreign countries that the Czecho-Slovak Republic is neither a natural state, nor a logical national, geographical, or resting upon a historical foundation; that it inherited all the weak points of the defunct monarchy, without having acquired one single good quality. Would there not be a necessity for internal unity, an internal understanding in accordance with your own motto "democracy is a discussion"? In opposition to this you with your Government, or that Government under your protection hamper and destroy even the slightest manifestation where the emphasizing of our national individuality is concerned. We, the Slovak Catholics in America, identify ourselves with the fate of our brethren across the ocean and the wrongs committed on them are also our wrongs, as Slovaks as well as Catholics; therefore, the disregard shown to Bishop Vojtassak affected us in a twofold manner. Your Government kicked him both for being a bishop (of SLOVAKIA 31 course, a Catholic) and for being a patriotic Slovak who looks Prague straight in the eyes. And this double insult had for its consequence that also a preponderating majority of patriotic American Slovaks of other denominations joined our ranks, as brothers who are feeling with us our national wrong and our national disregard. What Prague has dared to do against us during the past four years, and what it recently dared to do with Bishop Vojtassak, would have ignited a scandal even among other nations; in our opinion it is so much greater, because you, Mr. President, instead of realizing the unprovoked insult and without regard to the abuse of jurisdiction of your minister, whose trammeling of the personal liberty of a free citizen exceeds all conceptions of democracy and humanity, whom you, as if trying to mock us, still tolerate in office. Of course, we admit that under the stress of circumstances, we Slovak Catholics cannot demand satisfaction from people whose life motto it had been "to square accounts with Rome", whose "programme is Tabor", who are provoking us that we should struggle for what we desire to preserve by right of heritage as Catholics, and as a deceived party of honest contrahents we cannot even demand it, but closing the list of our incriminations we solemnly declare to you, to your Government, and we shall not cease declaring to the whole world in spite of the opposing views of your regime that just as we are praying with our Catholic-Slovak brethren beneath the Tatra Mountains for the welfare of the young republic which had been won by our common sacrifices of blood, we wish you would take notice with your Government, and all its competent officials, that we are Slovaks, a self existing nation, homogenous and autochthone in origin and culture, as well as in history and language; that we desire to remain such without any artificial intermixture. Should the Czecho-Slovak Government hinder us in this either directly or indirectly, and not stop the wrongs cited in the above complaints--even if we were not able at once to put up against every "Metternich," "Bach," or "Schmerling" from Prague a Slovak "Palacky," "Rieger," or "Brauner," we shall yet find means and ways for the revelation of our wrongs; but we hope at the same time that God who will not let perish a nation trusting in Him, will awaken new "Viators" who will inform the world of our subjugated condition and that He will enthuse more "Bjornson[s]" who will tell you and your Czecho-Slovak SLOVAKIA 32 Government such truths as you would least like to hear in this highly delicate situation. By authorization of the Slovak Catholic Federation in America, JOHN B. PASTORAK, Secretary, Schenectady, N. Y. ANDREW PA VLIS, President, Sheppton, Pa. APPENDIX II An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia79 MR. PRESIDENT: SOME time ago the Slovak Catholic Federation in America issued an Open Letter, addressed to you and signed by Father John B. Pastorak and Father Andrew Pavlis, in which complaints are being raised against you and your Government. A spirit of narrow sectarianism lurks behind every line of the Open Letter. You, Mr. President, and your Government are accused of desiring to "exterminate the Slovaks as a nation," of "cultural piracy," of having "misled the peace delegates," of "breach of faith," etc. In order that you may not have an erroneous idea as to the feelings and views of the American Slovaks, we, the undersigned, representatives of Slovak organizations in America, desire to point out that the Slovak Catholic Federation in America represents a very small part of our compatriots, and that the great majority of the American Slovaks are heart and soul with you. 79 Originally published in English, this open letter is available in MUA AV CR, AUTGM, f. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, R - republika 1918 - 1937, fold. 460. An Open Letter to Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, 6 pp. SLOVAKIA 33 Under your able leadership the Czechoslovak Republic has been most successful in piloting itself through the dangerous postwar period and it has been consolidated to such an extent that today it may be classed among the most ordered and prosperous States of Europe. In Slovakia, especially, great progress has been made as regards both cultural and economic development. We, therefore, are at a loss to understand the unjustified complaints made by the above-mentioned Slovak Catholic Federation against you and your Government. Permit us, Mr. President, to draw your attention to some of these complaints. The writers maintain that the Slovaks are "directly endangered in their national existence." How can this statement be reconciled with the progress which Slovakia has made in educational matters? As you are no doubt aware, under the Magyar regime all schools, whether elementary, secondary, or high schools, were in the hands of the Magyars. Properly speaking, there were no Slovak schools at all, with the exception of a few schools where the work was carried on by a handful of teachers who were evangelical for the greater part, the instruction was Magyar both in letter and spirit. Today, there are over four thousand elementary schools, over fifty secondary schools, besides commercial and technical institutes, and a university at Bratislava. The educational progress made since the liberation of Slovakia certainly does not prove the statement that the Slovaks are "endangered in their national existence." On the contrary, it proves, that the national existence and the cultural development of the Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic is fully assured. The Slovaks have three ministers in the Government and many officials in all branches of civil service. In certain cases, owing to lack of competent officials among the Slovaks, it was necessary to send Czechs to Slovakia but these are being withdrawn as soon as the Slovaks are able to fill these places with their own officials. There are, however, no proofs that Slovakia has been treated in "step-mother fashion ," nor do the writers offer any proofs of their vague generalization. The writers "object most emphatically" to the statement alleged to have been made by the Czechoslovak delegates at the Paris Peace Conference to the effect that the "Czechs and Slovaks are one nation". Assuming that this statement has really been made we should like to point out that we, too, are of the same opinion. Moreover, we SLOVAKIA 34 may add that Father Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Autonomists, himself held, and probably still holds, the same view. On May 4th, 1908, he made the following declaration before the Magyar court at Bratislava: " It will remain an eternal truth that we Slovaks are one stock, one culture, one nation with the Czechs, and up to quite recent times we had a language in common with the Czechs, and up to this day our evangelical ministers make use of the Czech language in their church service." And it was the same Father Hlinka who, on October 30, 1918, cordially associated himself with the manifesto of the Slovak nation which contains the following words : "In language, culture and historical traditions the Slovak nation forms a part of the single Czechoslovak nation." It may be disputed whether - from a strictly historical and ethnographical point of view - the Slovaks and Czechs are one nation or not. Their feeling and consciousness, however, is the deciding factor. If the Slovaks and Czechs feel themselves as one nation, no historian or ethnographist can alter that feeling or consciousness. The writers accuse you, Mr. President, of "breach of contract" known as the "Pittsburgh Agreement." As regards this agreement which was arrived at between the American Czechs and Slovaks on May 30, 1918, we should like to point out in how far the provisions of this agreement have been carried out. For this purpose we are giving on one side the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement and on the other what has been done: 1. We accept the political program providing for a union of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State composed of the Czech territories and Slovakia. 1. Carried out 2. Slovakia will have its own administration, its diet and its courts. 2. In accordance with the Constitution the whole Republic is divided into 20 autonomous regions, 6 of which comprise Slovakia. These regions are administered by the Slovaks themselves by means of autonomous bodies containing about 40 members who are elected by the vote of all citizens, SLOVAKIA 35 irrespective of sex, on a system of proportional representation. These zones thus have all the attributes of democratic local autonomy. From the representative bodies is elected an administrative council for the whole of Slovakia, also by proportional representation. This council is composed of 24 members, 8 of whom, under the presidency of Slovak administration, attend to the executive authority for Slovakia. 3. Slovak will be official language in schools, administration and in public life. 3. Both Czech and Slovak are official languages throughout the territory of the Republic. 4. The Czechoslovak State will be a Republic and its constitution will be democratic. 4. Carried out. 5. The organization of the co-operation between the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States will, according to the needs and to the changed situation, be broadened and regulated. 5. Left to be carried out by the American Slovaks and Czechs. 6. Concrete details concerning the administration of the CzechoSlovak State are left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their duly elected representatives . 6. In accordance with this provision the present status of Slovakia (see article 2 of the agreement) has been elaborated. You will observe, Mr. President, that as a matter of fact the Pittsburgh Agreement has been substantially carried out. The aim of this agreement was to assure the future status and cultural development of Slovakia within the Czechoslovak State, and this aim has been achieved. The Czechoslovak Republic is the result of the work of both the Slovaks and Czechs. During the war neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks demanded self-determination for each separately; they deman- 36 SLOVAKIA ded self-determination for the Czechoslovaks. Hence the unity of the Czechoslovak Republic and of the Czechoslovak Nation. We, in America, are watching the development of events in Czechoslovakia very closely and we are not unmindful of the great progress the Republic has made. We are especially aware of the fact that your untiring efforts have in no small measure contributed to this progress . The good name of the Czechoslovak Republic abroad has been established, above all, by your indefatigable work and by the work of your able collaborator, the Foreign Minister, Dr. Benes. On behalf of the American Slovaks we thank you most heartily for your labor which has given to Slovakia her due place among the free nations of the world. We beg you to continue in your endeavors to make of Slovakia a happy land such as we have dreamt of while fighting in common for Czechoslovakia' s freedom and national independence. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of our highest esteem and respect. JOHN KRAFCIK, President National Slovak Society. JOHN DVORSCAK, Secretary National Slovak Society. JOHN ZEMAN, President Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK OSLISLO, Secretary Slovak Gymnastic Union Sokol. FRANK ST AS , Treasurer Slovak League of America. JOHN MATLOCHA, President Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. JOHN L. ZAROVY, Secretary Western Assembly District of the Slovak League. NICHOLAS KOVAC, President District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. STEPHEN ERHARDT, Secretary District Assembly New England States of the Slovak League. CLEMENT IHRISKY, President New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JANCEK, Secretary New York District Assembly of the Slovak League. JOSEPH JOSCAK, Editor New Yorksky Dennik FRANK CELKO, Editor Slovensky Sokol STEPHEN HUSKA, Editor Nove Casy  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Struggle for the Hearts and Minds of American Slovaks: Bishop Ján Vojtaššák's Aborted Journey to the USA in 1923 Description An account of the resource Štefan Kucík Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 7-36 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kucík, Štefan, 1979- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d023ccaeedb74cebe19168dfd1930829.pdf eb5a622a7a925213cb2adf3b3c0ef1cb PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 37 AN UNWELCOME GUEST: MILAN HODZA IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTS BETWEEN 1941 AND 1944 V Roman Licko In December of 1938 Milan Hodza, a Slovak politician and the last prime minister of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic, went into exile in France. There, along with Stefan Osusky, another Slovak statesman and diplomat, he became the leading figure of Slovak democratic exiles before 1 the outbreak of WW II. Towards the end of 1939 Rodia established the Slovak National Council, which, under his auspices, was reorganized in early 1940 into the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Both political bodies subscribed to the democratic ideals of pre-war Czechoslovakia, as well as to the belief in a continuation of Czechoslovak statehood.2 However, in stark 1 Before Hodfa' s arrival in Paris in November of 1939, Ambassador Stefan Osusky had been the leading figure of the Czechoslovak resistance movement operating from France. His greatest achievement was the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement concerning the creation of a new Czechoslovak army in France by which the French government recognised de fa cto the continued existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. During this period Osusky and Hodza shared similar ideas about Slovakia' s future . They both unequivocally supported the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia. However, they strongly opposed the centralism of the inter-war Prague governments. Osusky favoured a federal constitutional arrangement between Czechs and Slovaks. Hodza spoke of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored ' CzechoSlovakia'. Osusky maintained close contact with Hodza, who was, at that time, in London. The two men even cooperated in the preparation of a memorandum of Slovak demands in the lead-up to the establishment of the Benes-led Czechoslovak National Committee in France. Interestingly enough, Osusky did not become a member of any of the resistance organizations established by Hodza after his arrival in Paris. For more on the Hodfa-Osusky co-operation during this period see Slavomir Michalek, "Hodza a Osusky, nazory a pozicie v rokoch 1939- 1941 ," in Milan Hodia-statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 301- 18. 2 This paper uses the more widely accepted spellings ' Czechoslovakia' and 'Czechoslovak'. In reference to Hodza' s ideas, however, the spellings 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovak' have been retained as these were the forms preferred by Hodfa himself. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 adopted the unhyphenated spelling of the name. In November of 1938 the country officially returned to the hyphenated spelling 'Czecho-Slovakia' in recognition of the fact that Slovakia had been declared an autonomous region. The use of the one name or the other, by both Czechs and Slovaks throughout the war, had political connotations. Generally speaking, the Slovaks who favoured the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after WW II but op- �38 SLOVAKIA opposetion to Edward Benes, the leading figure of the Czech democratic exiles, Hodza advocated a thoroughly decentralized model of a new Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement, with self-governing status for Slovakia. After the failure to find common ground on this issue with Benes, who consistently refused to allow any political representation of Slovak federalists in his exile government-to-be, Hodza moved to London. The German occupation of France in the summer of 1940 and the ensuing Battle of Britain in September of 1940 speeded up Britain' s recognition ofBenes's government-in-exile. Feeling powerless and marginalised, Hodza saw no purpose in participating in any government headed by Benes. By the autumn of 1941 he decided to leave Britain and in October of that year he arrived in the United States. There he pursued two political objectives: he intended to convince politically-minded Slovak Americans to support his programme of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, he attempted to lobby the Roosevelt administration to throw its weight behind the creation of a federation of Central European states. This paper, which draws primarily on research in United States government archives, attempts to trace Hodza ' s political campaign among Slovak Americans from the point of view of the Roosevelt administration. At the same time, it follows Hodza ' s efforts to engage the American government in a dialogue concerning a comprehensive post-war peace settlement in Central Europe. With the help of secondary literature on the subject, the study assesses the success of these attempts, and how they were viewed by the chief foreign policy makers in the Roosevelt administration. 3 posed the pre-war unitary constitutional arrangement between the two nations preferred the hyphenated designation. 3 The first attempt to document the activities of Milan Hodfa in the USA was made by his close associate, Michal Mudry Sebik, in his book Milan Hodia v Amerike. (Chicago :Geringer Press, Inc., 1949). The author published a number of articles in the periodicals of Slovak democratic exiles in the USA after WW II, e.g. Michal Mudry, "Svedectvo historickej doby. Bullitovo a Hodzovo memorandum," Nase snahy, 6, no. 9 (May - June 1970). In 1965 Susan Mikula, an American of Slovak descent, wrote a dissertation on Hodza's activities in the USA. However, it was not until 1992, at a conference in Bratislava, that she presented her work in Slovakia: Susan Mikula, " Dr. Milan Hodfa vo svelte archivnych dokumentov z archivov v USA," in : Milan Hodia - statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 345- 50. Czech historians have also dealt with Hodfa 's stay in the USA . For instance J. Kuklik and J. Nemecek, Hodia versus Benes. Milan Hodia a slovenska otazka v zahranicnim odboji za druhe svetove valky (Praha: Karolinum, 1999). The most comprehensive account yet of Hodfa's political activities in the USA. , including some views of the Roosevelt administration, was written by the late Slovak historian Pavol Luklic, "Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii v USA a reakcie na jeho federalisticke plany, Historicky casopis 51 , no. 4 (2003), pp. 497- 515 . As Lukac himself observed, however, Kuklik' s and Nemecek's book only traced �SLOVAKIA 39 Apart from the Slovak League of America (hereafter SLA), which favoured independence for Slovakia, there was no other Slovak organization in the USA in 1941 that had a clear idea about Slovakia' s political future after the war. 4 The leaders of the opposition organization - the Slovak National Alliance (hereafter SNA) - stuck to the policy of a reinstated Czechoslovakia, but were unwelling to commit themselves to negotiating a more specific settlement on this issue. In line with the official policy of President Edvard Benes, they maintained that Slovakia's future should be resolved after the war by a democratic vote. Despite their uncommitted attitude, Slovakia's political future was as sensitive an issue among the individual leaders of the SNA as it was for the leadership of the SLA. As long as there was no political leader in the United States who was able to offer a political alternative to the League-promulgated Slovak independence, the issue was bound to remain unresolved. This situation changed after the arrival of Milan Hodfa in the United States in October of 1941. During the three years of his American stay, Hodfa devoted his energies to political campaigning and lobbying. Like Slovak-American leaders, he too wanted to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards Slovakia. As a former Czechoslovak statesman, Hodfa had access to the United States Department of State. He was allowed to discuss the Slovak question with high-ranking government officials. Hodfa ' s political campaign in the USA aroused the interest of the American media, as well as that of federal authorities. Right up to his death in 1944, his activities were closely followed by the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS) and its subordinate department, the Foreign Nationalities Branch (hereafter FNB). Hodfa's arrival in the United States generated interest, not only among Slovak Americans, but also in the American media. Almost immediately, a number of speculative pieces about Hodfa's political objectives appeared in Hodfa's political campaign in the USA on the basis of secondary archival materials left by Hodfa 's contemporaries, and not from the documents of the U.S. Department of State. The present study draws upon the following primary sources: 1. an independent investigation of the documents of the Department of State; 2. the hitherto unpublished documents of the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate department - the Foreign Nationalities Branch (both housed in the National Archives in Washington), the archival documentation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (released to the author under the Freedom oflnformation - Privacy Acts); and 3. the documents issued by the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy collected and published by Polish historians JozefLaptos and Marius Misztal in 2002 . 4 For the activities of the Slovak League of America on behalf of Slovak independence during and after the war, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia 39, nos. 72-73 (2007), 19-34. �40 SLOVAKIA the press. One OSS report from 1942 read that the former Czechoslovak prime minister had come as a private citizen. 5 Hodza himself said that the main reason for his arrival was for reasons of health. In the USA he planned to undergo a series of medical treatments.6 This is well attested in the Hodfa family correspondence of the period. 7 On the other hand, the former Czechoslovak prime minister did hope to achieve in the United States some well-defined political goals. 8 In his first interview with The New York Tim es, Hodfa stated that he intended to "test out American opinion regarding Central Europe" and, at the same time, he wanted to "inform it of the trend of opinion there."9 Not all American media reported on Hodza's intentions impartially. On November 7, the Overseas News Agency issued a press release which assessed Hodfa 's pre-war political career in an unflattering light. According to this source, Hodfa's Agrarian Party was only a little less reactionary than the pro-fascist Hlinka Guard in Slovakia. The release went on to claim that Hodfa's arrival also shed a negative light on Slovak Americans. The authors of the release dubbed their political mindset as "isolationist and pro-fascist," referring to some of the Slovak fraternal press in America as evidence. 10 It is clear that the primary motivation of the author must have been to damage Hodfa's political reputation . According to 5 National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 6 1. This information was acquired by the OSS from the New York Times interview with Hodza conducted by Frederick T. Birchall. 6 M. Mudry, Hodza's assoc iate in America, later wrote: "An American journalist who visited and interviewed Hodza claimed that in response to the question about his plans Hodfa took out a bottle of medication and said that what he wanted, first and foremost, was a recovery." Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike .. ., 20. 7 John Palka, Milan Hodfa's grandson, mentions two bouts of pneumonia that his grandfather suffered from shortly after his arrival. See John Palka, Maje S/ovensko, moja rodina (Bratislava: Kalli gram, 2010), 57. 8 Kuklik and Nemecek argue: " It cannot be ruled out that the former Prime Minister could have been driven by his effort to shore up support among his expatriates especially Slovak Americans, with whom he could attempt, with new energy, to stage a comeback in the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad. So far his departure was seen, perhaps with some oversimplification, as his resignation to the attempts to advance his Slovak national programme in emigration, " Hodia versus Benes..., 142.The view that Hodfa sought the leading position in the resistance is also supported by Lukac, " Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii ... ", 605 . 9 The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 1 °Kuklik and Nemecek quote from Overseas News Agency release No. 400, July 11, 1941: " Hodfa's presence sheds light on the political tendencies of Slovak Americans. Apparently, the majority of Slovaks living in the United States are isolationist and pro-fascist and this has been reflected in the Slovak press here as well." The Czech authors say that Hodfa sued the ONA for libel, claiming $600,000 in damages, Hodia versus Benes.. ., 144. �SLOVAKIA 41 Hodza's close associate in the USA, Michal Mudry, unfounded attacks like these were frequent and their authors were mainly Slovak-American Communists, supported by Czechoslovak authorities in the USA. 11 The sources of the anti-Hodfa campaign remain obscure. We contend, however, that for President Benes and his government-in-exile, Hodfa's presence in the country posed a serious political problem. The main reason was that Hodfa was determined to call on Slovak Americans to actively participate in the discussions about the future of Slovakia. The Roosevelt administration's attitudes towards Hodfa's political activities were shaped gradually and drew upon several sources. One of them was Hodfa himself. Almost immediately after his arrival, the former Czechoslovak prime minister made contact with the Department of State, and during his stay visited it several times. It can be argued that Hodfa was the only Slovak who discussed the Slovak question with United States government officials during WW II. From its inception in the summer of 1942, the OSS kept an eye on Hodfa 's activities, and from December of that year his political campaign was scrutinized by the officers of the FNB. The OSS analysed Hodfa 's activities by scanning his articles in the Slovak-American media, as well as in the American press in general. In addition to that, Hodza attracted the close attention of the FBI, which since I 940 had been investigating the activities of the Slovak League and the Slovak National Alliance. All the sources at the U.S . government' s disposal indicated that Hodfa pursued very specific political objectives in the United States. Sometime around mid-1942, an OSS report noted that: "Dr. Hodza' s visits to the State Department, his public speeches, interviews granted by him, and his article in The Nation (May 16, 1942) have demonstrated his willingness to express his ideas, whatever may be the extent of his actual political activity. ,, 12 Hodfa' s approach to the Slovak question differed from all other political plans which had been discussed among Slovak Americans to date. The crucial difference was that in Hod:fa' s view, the Slovak question was not to be solved in isolation, but as part of the security, economic and strategic 11 "Various groups, more or less under the influence of leftist elements and the Czechoslovak Information Service, take pot shots at Hodfa and where possible, in connection with his person, they attack Slovak Americans as well. These groups are often made up of the active Czech and Slovak communists such as Hoffmeister, Weisskopf Benau [a social democrat - author's note) and others, at that time undoubtedly under the influence and in favour with Czechoslovak authorities in America." According to Mudry, the most malicious attack upon Hodfa was the pamphlet entitled " Persona non grata". It contained a scathing criticism of Hodfa 's efforts to create a federation , which, among other things, was to constitute a buffer against the Russian Bolsheviks. See Mudry, Milan Hodia v Ameriike .. . , 37. 12 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS , RG 226 E 100, Box 3, p. 47 . �42 SLOVAKIA issues concerning the whole of Central Europe. At that time, Hodza's ideas and political thought may have been known to the public as well as the OSS from his book Federation in Central Europe. 13 Hodza was convinced that federation was the only political arrangement capable of harnessing nationnal forces while preserving the freedom of nations and of individuals. Federation would enable Central Europe to become a viable system of production and consumption on the basis of which a New Europe could be built. The liberated and reinstated countries of Central Europe would conclude a treaty that would become the basic framework for a federal constitution. The treaty was supposed to be the result of spontaneous decisions made by Central European countries, which, bearing in mind their common goals, would identify common interests and mutual commitments. Powers concerning mutual affairs were to be delegated to federal bodies, and their exercise entrusted to a federal govemment. 14 It would be headed by a federal Chancellor, who would be nominated by the President of the federation . The legislative body would be made up of a federal Congress, which was to oversee the legislative process as well as the federal budget. The Federal Court was to be the highest judicial body, which would decide on matters raised by the federal government or by the governments of the constituent countries. The federalization of Central Europe was envisaged as the key to solving the Slovak question and Slovak-Czech relations. Hodza believed that the freedom and security of small nations could be guaranteed only through a supranational federation . If small states were to merge their sovereignties, thereby creating a stronger unit, it would clearly mean more to them than to be in permanent danger of losing their sovereignties. Slovakia, however, was not to enter the Central European federation as a separate state. According to Hodza, the political coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks was not only feasible, but also inevitable. For Czechs, Slovakia represented an important connection with Central Europe. Self-government would satisfy Slovakia to the extent that it would never be a source of weakness for the new republic, but the reverse - it would become the source of its stability and strength. However, Hodza warned, certain mistakes from the past should be avoided. "Stubborn centralism as well as mischievous separatism have to disappear," he argued. Hodza did not support Slovak independence and never sympathized with the representatives of the Slovak regime at home. In his book, he unequivocally dissociated himself from the "Slovakian Quisling regime" 13 Federation in Central Europe (London and New York: Jarrolds Publishers, 1942). Hodza proposed the creation of the following federal ministries: I . finance, 2. International trade, 3. foreign affairs, 4. defence, 5. postal services and communications, 6. and 7. air and naval transport, 8. federal legislation, 9. federal cooperation. Federation in Central Europe ... , 172 - 7. 14 �SLOVAKIA 43 and made it clear that its political representatives did not represent the will of the people. As far as the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London was concerned, Hodza claimed he respected it and was willing to cooperate with it. In his opinion, though, the real leaders of the Slovaks existed not only in London, but also in the USA. He was convinced that in the settling of the Slovak question, Slovak Americans should take an active part. By emphasising the importance of Slovak Americans, Hodza underlined how much hope he pinned on them in deciding the political future of Slovakia after the war. 15 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Hodza presented his vision to the American press. On December 7, 1941 The New York Times published an interview with him entitled "Hope Put in Union of Central Europe," which the former Czechoslovak statesman had granted to American journalist Frederick T. Birchall. The subheading of the article informed the American reader that federation was the goal of 110 million Central Europeans. 16 In the introduction, the author informed the reader that Hodza arrived in the USA unofficially, but with the approval of the Czechoslovak government in London. In fact, the second part of this statement was not true. President Benes could not prevent Hodza from leaving for the United States, but he was far from pleased with the prospect of his greatest political rival in exile campaigning among Slovak Americans. In the Birchall interview Hodza outlined some of the constitutional mechanisms of the proposed federation, and expressed his conviction that the prevailing political tendency in exile was "wholly in the direction of such a federation." As proof, Hodza pointed to the recent rapprochement of two old foes - Czechoslovakia and Poland. 17 These two countries, he believed, should form the nucleus of the future federation . It should then be joined by Romania, and subsequently also by a democratized Hungary, provided that the latter gave up its "imperialistic policy of coercing non-Magyar regions." According to 15 "Most of the Slovak leaders now stay in this country [United Kingdom] and in the USA ." Hodza, Federation in Central Europe . .. , 94. 16 The other two subheadings read: "For Common Government" and "He Explains Plan Will Not Deal in Half Measures, Such as the Old Little Entente," The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 17 Hodza alluded here to the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations of a possible confederation between the exiled governments of both countries in London. The outcome of these negotiations, which took place between 1940 and 1942, were two joint declarations - one in November 11 , 1940 and the other on January 23, 1942. The negotiations did not, however, lead to any specific action. In 1943 they ended for good as a result of the new pro-Soviet orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, as well as Moscow 's negative attitude towards such a confederation. For details see, Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). �44 SLOVAKIA Hodza, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had already been working out their own idea of a federation . Hodza touched on the issue of the relations of Central Europe with Germany and Russia. He considered Russian Bolshevism as great a threat to Europe as German fascism. That was also the reason why the proposed federation should act as "a barrier between Nazi ideologists and Russian Bolsheviki." 18 Peasants, representing the conservative values of Central Europe, would, according to Hodza, be a stabilising force in the proposed federation . Their conservative influence would be of significant importance, since it would be necessary to "maintain a conservative democratic entity between the two subversive influences of Nazism and Bolshevism". Having talked to some lower-level officials of the U.S. Department of State, Hodfa met Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle on December 9, 1941. 19 On the same day Hodfa dined informally with DeWitt C. Poole, a high-ranking OSS officer and future head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch.20 During his meeting with the Assistant Secretary, Hodza presented Berle with a memorandum in which he outlined the development of Slovak affairs in Czechoslovakia and in subsequent exile between 1918 and 1939.21 In the memorandum, Hodfa pointed out that the Czechoslovak Cabinet in 1938, under his premiership, approved proposed legislation on decentralization - which, among other things, granted Slovakia its regional parliament. That was the last valid legal arrangement made before the Munich Pact, and it was recognized even by Jan Lichner, a minister of the exiled government. This view, Hodfa claimed, was subscribed to by the absolute majority of public opinion in Slovakia in late 1939. He admits that later on, in Paris, Czechoslovak leaders agreed that such constitutional issues as Slovakia's 18 Quoting Hodfa, the author goes on to say: "With a solid bloc of I 00, 000, 000 people separating them, a successful democracy operating next door would be a continuing object lesson of a better and more profitable way of life." The New York Times, December 9, 1941. 19 Prior to the meeting with Berle, Hodfa held talks with C. W. Cannon and H. Hoskins, as well as the head of the Coordination of Information, William J. Donovan. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle (author H. Hoskins), December 9, 1941. 20 According to Kuklik and Nemecek, Hodza maintained that his first visit to the Department of State was a response to an invitation by C. W. Cannon, R. Atherton and A. Berle. The aim was to discuss the memorandum of Slovak-American separatist Gustav Kosik presented to the Department at an earlier date. 21 P. Lukac also suggested that Hodfa's visit to the State Department and his memorandum was a reaction to the memorandum of Gustav Kosik (Memorandum for His Excellency the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America). NARA signature 860f.01 /429- l/2, Roll 30. Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 612. �SLOVAKIA 45 future should be decided by democratic majorities of Czechs and Slovaks after the war. Hodfa was willing to adhere to this agreement, provided that the exiled Czechoslovak National Council included representatives of Slovak federalists. In the posited post-war settlement, Hodfa emphasized the importance of a Czecho-Slovak restoration, but with a provision for Slovak self-government. He argued that Slovakia would not be able to maintain its sovereignty even as a separate member of the Central European federation. In the conclusion to the memorandum, Hodza condemned the Slovak puppet regime and hazarded a guess that its support among Slovaks did not exceed I 0%. As for Slovak Americans, he believed that the majority of them had never stopped supporting Czecho-Slovakia. The rest of them, in Hodza 's opinion, would soon change their political views. The official reaction to Hodfa' s memorandum of December 9, 1941 is not known, but it appears that he made a good impression during his first visit to the State Department. The report written for the Secretary of State Cordell Hull observed that, "Dr. Hodza gave the impression of an able patriot with qualities of sincerity and vision that might be with advantage put to constructive work in the post-war period in Central Europe." 22 In his later conversation with Poole, Hodfa himself assessed his meeting with Berle in a similar vein.23 It was intimated to Hodfa that, in the future, he might be received by Secretary Hull himself. Moreover, the State Department did not seem to have any objections to Hodfa's intention of lecturing at American universities and colleges. It was even suggested that Poole might be able to help by making the necessary arrangements.24 Hodfa expected that he would once again be in communication with the Department of State as early as January, 1942. His deteriorating health, however, forced him to stay in American sanatoria for several months, where he recuperated until April of 1942. 25 22 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle, H. Hoskins, December 9, 1941 , p. 3. 23 In his report Poole wrote: "He [Hodza] said that he had explained to Mr. Berle his views on the future political organization of Central Europe, and Mr. Berle seemed to be favourably impressed." D. C. Poole later checked Hodfa's impressions against those of H. Hoskins: "Following my talk with Dr. Hodza, I spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hoskins, and gathered from him that Dr .Hodza had given a substantially accurate account of his reception at the Department of State and Mr. Berle' s attitude. " NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 24 During the conversation at the Department of State, C. Cannon suggested that D. C. Poole "might be in the best position to bring this about." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 25 Lukac writes that Hodza recuperated from chronic bronchitis in a sanatorium at Lake Placid, New York and Hot Springs, Arkansas. Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. ., 612 . �46 SLOVAKIA In Hodfa 's plans, 1942 should have marked a turning-point in his political campaign. After a modest recovery of his health, Hodfa launched his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and began publishing in American scholarly journals. On May 16 he outlined his federalization plans to the politically-minded American public in The Nation. The reactions of Czech and Slovak Americans to his article, A Central European Federation, were collected in two OSS reports from June. Both reports assessed the attitudes of American "Czechoslovaks" towards Hodza as predominantly negative. 26 The first one, dated June 1, 1942, pointed out that Czechoslovak Americans had missed the article because they did not regularly read The Nation. Still, the OSS observer admitted that Hodza's ideas were, in general, favourably received by many Central Europeans because they were in line with their own post-war plans.27 The other report from June 11 portrays Hodza's arrival in America, his political past and goals in the USA in a very negative light. In the introduction, the author alleged that Czechoslovak Americans received the article with considerable mistrust. Claiming that he had researched the Czechoslovak American press and talked to "a number of leading Czechoslovak Americans as well as Czechoslovak exiles," the OSS observer contended that the article was "not a bona fide piece of political thinking, but that it rather serves as a cloak for its author' s ambition to become the exclusive or most important spokesman for the Slovaks (American and otherwise), regardless of cost in terms of Czechoslovak unity here and abroad." 28 It may be argued that the negative tone of the report was influenced by its author's very selective approach to sources. For example, he claimed that he had read reactions in the "Czechoslovak press," but he did not give any specific titles. The only sources he acknowledged were J. Papanek, professor J. B. Kozak and D. Benau. 29Jan Papanek, head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA and Benes's right-hand man, referred to Hodfa as an " unfortunate incident."30 He maintained that Hod26 Neither of the reports makes any distinction between American Slovaks and American Czechs. They refer to both groups collectively as "Czechoslovak Americans." 27 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-47, June I, 1942, p. I. 28 Ibid. The author of the report signed himself"Ivan Ivanovitch ." 29 At the time, Professor Kozak was lecturing at Oberlin College in Ohio. Prior to his arrival in the USA he was a member of the Czechoslovak State Council, a legislative-executive body ofBenes's government-in-exile in London. 30 J. Papanek' s negative attitude towards Hodza 's political views was widely known. Papanek disagreed with decentralisation to the extent advocated by Hodza. The head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA expressed his attitude towards Hodza in one of his letters to Benes in January of 1942: "I do not agree with the policy of decentralization or self-government on the scale suggested by Lichner and Hodfa. I am convinced that this would lead to a new Zilina [agreement on Slova- �SLOVAKIA 47 fa's goal was to split the ranks of Slovak Americans, who had been, until his arrival, predominantly in full support of the Czechoslovak government headed by Bene~. Professor Kozak, a former member of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, called Hodfa 's Central European Agrarian Bloc a reactionary body which collaborated with non-democrats. Benau, editor of the "Czechoslovak" New Yorksky dennik, added that Hodfa had a dubious financial past. Hodfa's entree into Slovak-American politics was facilitated by his long-time friend and associate Michal Mudry Sebik. With his assistance, Hodfa first approached the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance. On May 22, 1942, during the meeting of the SNA's Central Committee in Detroit, which discussed Hodfa 's lecture tour, the majority of the Committee expressed their support for Hodfa's political programme.31 At that time, Hodza formulated his position on the Slovak question as follows : 1. A Slovak Parliament and Slovak judiciary; 2. Slovak self-government, 3. Slovak as the only official language in Slovakia. With this political aim he launched a series of lectures at local branches of the SNA. However, the decision of the Central Committee was strongly challenged by the conservative wing of the SNA leadership. At the June meeting of the Executive Board, the president, secretary and treasurer of the organization announced their opposition to the decision taken by the Central Committee on May 22. According to these leaders, Hodfa's demands were a mere repetition of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which concerned the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. The leaders proclaimed that, as American citizens, they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic, because that was against the SNA programme as well as American law. In addition to that, the proclamation of the Executive Board pointed out that, it was thanks to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that Slovaks were not considered enemies of the Allies. Discussions about Slovakia's political future were destroying the unity of the SNA and threatened the future of the Slovak people. In the final part of the proclamation, the three members of the Executive Board issued a warning: "Disputes over things which do not concern us as American citizens - among these disputes is the question of selfgovernment of the Slovak nation - harm our country, harm all of us, and kia's autonomy, signed Oct. 6, 1938) and all that followed." Slavomir Michalek, Jan Papanek za vojny Bene.fovi. Vyber z dokumentov 1939 - 1945 (Bratislava: VEDA, 1997), 97. 31 Fifteen members of the Central Committee were in favour of Hodza' s lectures, twelve were against. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT9CZ-82. Later M. Mudry observed: "The meeting of the SNA ' s Central Committee in Detroit was especially important in the history of Slovaks. It showed that the great majority of Slovak Americans, in favour of the Czechoslovak Republic, preferred the Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement as it was outlined by Dr. M. Hodza." Mudry, Milan Hodi a v Amerike ..., 32. �48 SLOVAKIA only help the enemy!" 32 The position proclaimed by the Executive Board on June 29 confused other SNA leaders, as well as its rank-and-file. At the same time, it spurred a new wave of discussion about the position of the organization on the Slovak question, which continued throughout 1942. Several days before his second visit to the Department of State, Hodza had an appointment with Poole and J. C. Wiley of the OSS. After the SNA meeting in Detroit, Hodfa expressed his views openly, and his criticism of his opponents was sharper, on occasion turning into personal attacks. He told the OSS officers that his goals were to mobilize Slovak Americans and win their support for a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovak Republic. He reiterated that the Czechoslovak constitutional arrangement, agreed upon by the Czechoslovak cabinet in July of 1938, was legally valid and politically binding. During one conversation, the OSS officers noted, Hodfa "disclosed a determined opposition to what he called the centralism in the Czechoslovakian constitutional practice of Benes and his entourage." 33 He criticized Benes, who, during their London talks in 1939, had been deliberately evasive and noncommittal regarding discussion of Slovakia's constitutional status. In talks with American government officials, Hodfa maintained that the campaign against himself in the USA had been masterminded by Papanek. The head of the CIS was not, in Hodfa' s words, to any degree a political figure, but merely an agent and intriguer for Benes.34 Apart from the members of the SNA, Hodfa was also planning to address the Slovak American Catholics associated within the Slovak League of America. As Hodfa put it bluntly in his conversation with Poole, he intended to "destroy this organisation" by winning over its popular support, leaving its leaders without any following, which he believed was very weak. 35 Meeting the OSS officers provided Hodfa with an opportunity to get some feedback on how his political activities were viewed by the administration. On this, the position of the OSS and the government was clear and unequivocal. American authorities were anxious not to see American 32 The Proclamation of the SNA Executive Board was signed by its President, Jaroslav Pelikan, Secretary Jan W. Golosinec and Treasurer Vaclav Hovorka. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-82. 33 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. I. 34 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. On this occasion Hodfa also expressed his firm belief in winning the forthcoming trial against the Overseas News Agency. He was convinced that the ONA had obtained its libellous information against him from Pap{mek, who was to be identified as the true culprit. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. 35 Hodfa told the OSS that the local branch of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, NJ, came out in open support of his programme, as did the First Catholic Slovak Union in Wilkes-Barre, PA. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1/2 Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. �SLOVAKIA 49 citizens and alien residents fighting over European political issues on American soil. 36 The concerns of the American government about the unity of Slovak Americans were aired once again during Hodza's second visit to the Department of State on June 18, 1942.37 Hodza met H. Hoskins and C. Cannon. On the same day he spoke on the telephone to Assistant Secretary Berle. Hoskins and Cannon were interested in Hodfa's ongoing lecture tour among Slovak Americans. The former Czechoslovak premier did not hide his optimism and spoke extremely positively about his campaign.38 He was keen to ascertain how his activities were viewed by the Department of State. In response to his query, Assistant Secretary Berle told Hodfa that he thought that his "efforts had been in the right direction. "39 He made it clear, though, that the American government did not wish American unity to be disturbed by conflicts among Americans of foreign descent. Apparently, what the Assistant Secretary had in mind under "efforts in the right direction" were activities that would strengthen Czechoslovak unity in the USA. It was obvious that Slovakia's political future per se played a secondary role, if any, in the Department of State's post-war strategic planning. We can only wonder whether the Department of State had been informed about the results of the SNA' s Detroit meeting at the time of Hodza 's telephone conversation with Berle. It can be argued that, if it had been the case, the Assistant Secretary would not have so favorably assessed Hodza's activities. At any rate, Hodfa took Berle's statement as an expression of approval of his American campaign. He told this to Poole two days later while travelling with him on the train to New York. 40 During this conversation, Hodza reiterated that he was determined to get on with his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and to work on the project of the Central European Federa36 Hodza reacted to this open allusion to his political activities in the USA by assuring the OSS officers that in this respect there could be no objections to his campaign, since his primary aim was to unite, not to divide all Slovak Americans. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. 37 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910- 1944. 38 Lukac quotes from the Memorandum of conversation of June 18 : "Since then he has been in touch with various Slovak groups in this country and felt he had made progress in his efforts to convince them that Slovakia should work out its problem within the framework of the present republic, not as a small independent state". Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 613. 39 Lukac points out that the original memorandum contains the following handwritten note beside the word "efforts": "This related only to his effort to reduce the controversies between Czechs and Slovaks and similar peacemaking attempts." Ibid., 614. 40 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0 1/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Author of report D. C. Poole, June 20, 1942. Poole observed Hodfa's satisfaction with his visit to the Department of State. �50 SLOVAKIA tion.41 He suggested to Poole that American authorities could get in touch with some of his Hungarian and Yugoslav friends who were in favour of such a federation. 42 In return, the OSS officer promised to put him in touch with another academic institution, which would enable him to lecture at universities in his capacity as a former history professor. 43 While lecturing to Slovak Americans during the summer of 1942, Hodza found himself yet again the target of unwanted publicity. This time, Hodza ' s political opponents broadcast their views on New York-based radio station WMCA. Though the statements made by the radio commentator are not known, we do know that they drew an indignant response from Hodza. Following the broadcast by WMCA on July 28th, 1942, Hodza contacted Dr. Morris D. Forkosch, his New York-based lawyer, with a view to bringing legal action against the radio commentator. Hodza was adamant that Johannes Steele, the radio presenter in question, as well as his "sponsors," by which Hodza meant the people who supplied him with the slanderous information, should be sued for libel. This, however, was not to be. Four months later, Hodza abruptly asked his lawyer to drop the suit. In one of his telegrams to Forkosch in mid-October, Hodza wrote: "It is imperative that you immediately and explicitly advise the new sponsors of the radio commentator and others you approached that you acted upon mistaken instructions and to withdraw steps [sic.]."44 From Hodza's correspondence with Forkosch we learn that the defendants (Steele, the WMCA, the Terminal Shops) accepted some sort of "settlement," though it is not at all clear what this arrangement was. What remains baffling is what made Hodza change his mind. Money may have been part of it. Hodza had been dogged by financial problems since his arrival in the United States. On the other hand, Hodza 41 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /446-l /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 2. Hodfa referred specifically to a Hungarian, John Polonyi, and a Yugoslav, Bof olyub Jeftich. 3 During this conversation Hodfa expressed his interest in giving informal talks and participating in conferences as a historian of the 19th century. Poole had facilitated academic contacts for Hodza before. In the autumn of 1941 he introduced him to Dr. Duggan, Director of the International Institute of Education and later to Malcolm Davis, who was to assist in Hodfa 's cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 44 In his letter to Hodfa from October 28, 1942, Forkosch recounted all the telegraphic communications between him and Hodfa related to the libel suit. He did this, presumably, to clarify all possible misunderstandings as to what Hodfa really wanted and what his instructions to Forkosch were. Forkosch, however, did not provide any reasons for his client 's decision to drop the case. NARS, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129. Copy of M. D. Forkosch 's letter to Hodfa, October 28, 1942, p. I. 42 �SLOVAKIA 51 would hardly have initiated a costly new lawsuit if he had not been convinced that he stood a fair chance of having his name cleared and his political detractors exposed. 45 The FNB files remain silent as to who supplied the WMCA with the information or what motivation drove its commentator to attack Hodza over the airwaves. Michal Mudry Sebik had little doubt that public attacks against Hodza were masterminded by Jan Papanek, and condoned by Benes's Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Hurban. This view has not been contested by any Hodza historians. So far, however, there has been no reliable evidence to prove that this was indeed the case. As far as the American government was concerned, it knew all about the perpetrators of the anti-Hodza smear campaign since June of 1943. The ideological split in the Slovak-American community, partially caused by Hodfa' s political campaign, was a source of growing concern to the American government. Amidst fears for the unity of Slovak Americans, the Department of State, in co-operation with several other government agencies, decided to take action. On September 14, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) organized in Pittsburgh a conference of Slovak newspaper editors and presidents of Slovak organizations.46 The intention of the OWI organizers was to unify Slovak-American organizations and persuade their leaders to sign a joint declaration expressing Slovak support for the U.S. government and, at the same time, condemning its enemies, including the Slovak Republic. At the actual conference two resolutions were passed. According to the OSS, on the previous day the members of the Resolution Committee had consulted the wording of both resolutions with Hodza, who had arrived earlier in Pittsburgh.47 The first resolution pledged allegiance to the government of the United States and its president. The second one outlined the principles concerning Slovakia's political future, in line with the Atlantic Charter. It stated, among other things, that Czechoslovakia should be "recreated on a basis of equal rights, equal privileges, equal opportunities and equal obligations."48 This passage, however, elicited strong objections 45 Hodza's libel suit against the Overseas News Agency had been dragging on and off since November of 1941. The case was finally closed in June of 1943. 46 The conference was held at the William Penn Hotel. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. OSS, V. P. Backora to Dr. Kelso, September 16, 1942. 47 NARS, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. In the lead-up to the conference, Hodza met with Vendelin Platek, president of the National Slovak Society (NSS), Emil Stankoviansky, editor of Slovensky h/asnik [Slovak Herald] , the organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and J. Willo (NSS), chairman of the Resolution Committee. 48 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-143 . A photocopy of the September 14 resolution was published in Slovensky hlasnik on Octo- �52 SLOVAKIA from the "Czechoslovak" hardliners and followers of Benes under the leadership of Jaroslav Pelikan. The text of the second resolution had to be rephrased, and the controversial part concerning the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was eventually omitted. In this form, the resolutions did not please any of the participants. The outcome of the conference left both sides unhappy. The OWI had received a token expression of Slovak allegiance, but the disgruntled Slovak leaders, seeking more definite commitments regarding Slovakia' s future, remained dissatisfied.49 The efforts of the Department of State and the OSS to direct Hodza's activities in favour of Slovak-American unity continued after the unsuccessful conference in Pittsburgh. On September 17, 1942 Assistant Secretary Berle wrote a letter to the OSS in which he asked Poole to settle the ongoing arguments between Papanek and Hodza. In this letter he reiterated the stance of the U.S. government as it was set out in June of 1942. The priorities of the Department did not lie in the various merits and demerits of the argument about the Slovak question, but in the need for unity and peace among Slovak Americans, which would contribute to victory in the war. 50 The concerns of the U.S . government were further exacerbated about two months later when the leaders of Slovak organizations and Hodza 's followers called a new conference with the intention of rallying the Slovak Americans behind Hodza's political programme. A new umbrella organization was established - the Council of Slovak American Organizations and Newspapers (hereafter CASON). This organization later succeeded in encouraging cooperation with some of the Catholic fraternal organizations. Politically, it subscribed to the restoration of Czechoslovakia, but in contrast to Benes's government-in-exile, it demanded a more definite commitment on Slovakia's status after the war. 51 This development was highly undesirable from the standpoint of the U.S . administration, which had only recently confirmed its definitive recognition of Benes's government in Lon- her I, 1942. The resolution was signed by twenty-four Slovak leaders and newspa£er editors. 9 As the OSS observer put it: "The compromise resolution satisfies no one but it is at least a step forward . Hodza is still causing disunity among the American Slovaks." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. 50 "The State Department is not at present interested in the merits of the controversy, but it has, of course, a very distinct interest in preserving that harmony and unity which best contributes towards winning the war." Quoted from the letter of A. Berle to D. C. Poole (NARA 860f. 00/993). See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodi u .. ., 617,note44. 51 The main figures behind the establishment of CASON were the President of the NSS, V. Platek, the President of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Michal Vargovich, and Jan Bradac, at that time the Honorary President of the SNA. �SLOVAKIA 53 don.52 Hodfa 's campaign among Slovak Americans was becoming an ever more pressing political problem for the U.S. administration. In its March report, the OSS recommended that the State Department step in: "It would be of great value and benefit all around, if our State Department would speak nicely to Mr .Hodja [sic.] and advise him to apply his talents towards unity and not disruption among the Slovak Americans." 53 Throughout 1943, apart from campaigning among Slovak Americans, Hodfa was occupied with, and increasingly alarmed by, the developments in Czechoslovak foreign policy under Benes's leadership. In May - June, the president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile came on an official visit of the United States, where he was met by the highest officials in the country, including the Secretary of State. One of the primary objectives of the president's visit was to gain American approval for his planned journey to Moscow towards the end of the year. There, Benes was planning to sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. This diplomatic initiative was the pinnacle of Benes's efforts to change the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy during WW II. From then on, the international security of the country was no longer to be guaranteed by military alliances with the Western Powers. Instead, it was to be safeguarded through close cooperation and coordination of its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. It remains unclear whether, in the summer of 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt voiced their approval of the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. According to Benes's personal secretary, Edvard Taborsky, Berle said that the United States followed no specific plans in relation to Central Europe, nor did they have any intention of negotiating with Hodfa on this issue.54 It appears that the ill-defined position of the Roosevelt administration in 1943 confirmed Benes's conviction that the United States did not hold any objections to Czechoslovakia's new Soviet-oriented foreign policy. Hodza, by contrast, regarded the conclusion of the treaty in December 1943 as a very dangerous step on the road to creating a new Soviet sphere of influence. He also feared that, after the war, the Soviet Union would try to impose on Czechoslovakia a political system similar to its own. Moreover, Hodfa was deeply convinced that Slovaks had not a scintilla of sympa- 52 The definiti ve American recognition of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile was granted on October 28, 1942. 53 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E 142, Box 3. Re: Recent Slovak Affairs, Milan Hodia, Jozef Hu~ek, Fedor Salva, etc., April 3, 1942. 54 According to Taborsky, Berle felt the need to defend himself against allegations that he sympathized with Hodia. "Hodfa was your prime minister and now he is a refugee. We respect him as such, but we will make no political deals with him, I can say this categorically." See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 620. Document quoted: NARA, 860F. 00/1009. �54 SLOVAKIA thy for Russian Bolshevism. He objected vigorously to the treaty, and made his criticism heard. Benes's visit to the United States presented the head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch with a perfect opportunity to cut troublesome Hodza down to size. Hodza ' s long-standing legal feud with the Overseas News Agency (ONA) carried potential risks not only for the news agency itself, but for the whole of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Back in December of I 941 , Hodza had complained to the Office of the Coordination of Information that the ONA had been spreading word that he was a fascist collaborating with Otto von Habsburg and Tibor Eckhardt in a plot hatched by German generals to eliminate Hitler with a view to negotiating a separate peace.55 The same source branded the majority of Slovak Americans as isolationist and pro-fascist. Hodza was convinced that if the ONA was made to disclose its source, some of the top Czechoslovak authorities in the USA would be implicated. In June of 1943, the American court which was investigating the libel suit, required the ONA to answer a set of questions contained in a bill of particulars. One of them inquired about the source the ONA drew upon in its news release of November 7, 1941 . Shortly before the deadline by which the ONA was to comply, the case took an unexpected turn. On June 1st, Jacob Landau, the agency's managing director, paid a visit to Poole in his Washington office. He briefed the FNB boss about the case and discussed the questions in the bill of particulars. Later on, in his report of the meeting, Poole noted: "If ONA had to answer, Mr. Landau asserted, one of the sources to be named would be the Czechoslovak Ambassador [in the United States] ." Such a development was, from the perspective of the U.S. government, highly undesirable. Not only would it expose its wartime ally - the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - as the source of the anti-Hodza smear campaign, it would also fan the flames of the Benes-Hodza controversy among Slovak Americans. Although the head of the FNB felt he was not in a position to "interfere in an official way," he promised Landau that he would talk to Hodfa in order to make him "freely desi st" from the libel suit. Three days later in New York, Poole broached the subject of anti-Hodza propaganda in his conversation with Jan Papanek, the head of the Czechoslovak Information Service (hereafter CIS) in the United States. Without telling him what he knew from Landau, Poole received from the CIS head a resolute denial of any involvement on the part of the Czechoslovak government. Nevertheless, Papanek was very pleased with Poole 's intention to convince Hodza to desist from the case. On his part, the Czechoslovak propaganda boss promised he would do his utmost 55 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-9CZ-22, p. I. Memorandum of conversation between John. C. Wiley and Milan Hodia, December 4, I 94 I. �SLOVAKIA 55 to prevent further escalation of the Hodza-Benes controversy. He also mentioned to Poole that during his visit in the States, Benes held a long private conversation with Jan Palka, Hodfa's son-in-law. This information, whether imparted casually or by design, presented the head of the FNB with the bargaining leverage he so much needed in his dealings with Hodfa. Although Papanek did not tell Poole what Palka had discussed with Benes, it was not difficult to surmise. Hodfa's dire financial situation was an open secret in Czechoslovak circles, and the OSS knew about it. Until his death in 1944, Hodfa struggled to keep his political campaign in America financially afloat. In October of 1942, for example, he asked the Polish government-in-exile for $650. 56 In May of the following year, Hodfa asked Slovak-American leader Vendelin Platek to help him out financially. The only regular income Hod.fa had was a monthly salary of $250 received from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile for his absentee membership in the London-based State Council. The money was payable to the account of Hodfa 's wife, who, at that time, resided in Chicago. Being well-informed of Hodfa's financial woes, Poole decided to use this information in the name of national interest. On June 5th, he telephoned Hodza, who was convalescing in Clearwater, Florida. The subject of the conversation was the ONA libel suit. According to Poole's account, Hodfa was tired of the longstanding legal battle and "had really lost interest in the matter." 57 This was borne out by David Karr, who had been following the case at the Office of War Information He informed Poole in November of 1942 that Hodza had indeed tried to drop his lawsuit, but this had not happened because of some misunderstanding between him and his lawyers. 58 As the secret memorandum of the telephone conversation between the two men suggests, Poole pressured Hodza to discontinue his campaign among Slovak Americans. During the conversation he hinted that both he and President Benes had been well aware of his financial difficulties. Poole then played his trump 56 Dusan Seges, "Ohlas sudobej krajanskej tlace na politicke posobenie Milana Hodzu v USA v rokoch 1941 - 1944," in Milan Hodia politik a i urnalista, ed. M. Peknik (Bratislava: Veda, 2008), 185 . In his article, Seges writes that Hodza wanted to use the money to gain a dominant influence on the Slovak-American newspaper Slovensky Hlasnik. Seges maintains that in the end Hodza succeeded in getting some of the money. 57 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943. 58 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129, November 18, 1942. In his report, D. C. Poole clarified: "He [David Karr] thought that there had been some misunderstanding, in consequence probably of Dr. Hodza's imperfect command of English. Specifically, Mr. Karr gained the impression that Dr. Hodza had instructed his attorneys 'to settle,' meaning come to a final friendly adjustment; but the attorneys interpreted this to refer to obtaining a 'settlement' ." �56 SLOVAKIA card. He reassured his interlocutor that he had "obtained satisfactory assurances from Dr. Benes that Dr. Hodza's personal situation would not be disturbed."59 To make himself absolutely clear, the head of the FNB pointed out to Hodfa that "It would seem unfortunate if by pressing the suit against the Overseas News Agency at this time he should bring on a change."60 Though elegantly phrased, to Hodfa 's ears Poole's talk must have sounded like nothing more than political blackmail. There is little doubt that Hodfa took his words at face value. In the following days he contacted his lawyer. In order to find out whether he had really done so, Poole telephoned Hodza again on June 10th. Hodfa confirmed that he had instructed his lawyer via telegraph to terminate the suit. Fear for the post-war scenario in Central Europe prompted Hodza to draw up a document - Europe at the Crossroads - which he sent to the State Department in March of 1944.6 1 This memorandum analyzed the political situation in Central Europe within the context of its states' relations with the Soviet Union. Hodfa pointed to the undemocratic character of the Soviet political system, and warned against its application in any form . He challenged Benes's arguments, according to which the new foreign policy realignment with the Soviet Union was unavoidable. Hodza argued that by signing the treaty, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile willingly entered into the Soviet sphere of influence and thus became an instrument of the Russian Drang nach dem Westen. He rejected the policy of creating a "special sphere," the necessity of which Benes justified by the failure of the Western Powers and the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia" in 1938. He contended that no sphere of influence was able to guarantee the sovereignty of small countries. The only guarantee of security, Hodza maintained, was a system of collective security similar to the one promulgated by the Ameri59 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943 . 60 Tbid. 61 Some historians doubt whether or not the Department of State actually received the memorandum. Lukac, who did not have a copy of the document at his disposal, claimed that "Despite the fact that several authors claim the memorandum was sent to the Department, including the author of this article, there is no copy of Europe at the Crossroads in the State Department archives. We can only speculate what fate it met, whether it was sent at all or "got lost" in American archives. " Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. . , 622. The author of this study (R. Licko) can confirm that a copy of this 22-page-long memorandum is kept in the National Archives in Washington, in the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch section with signature INT-32A-75. Moreover, there is also firm evidence that the memorandum was read at the State Department. D. C. Poole, chief of the FNB, summarised its contents in his report of March 8, 1944. �SLOVAKIA 57 cans and the British in the form of the United Nations. The final victory was achievable only as a "collective victory," with collective war aims. He went on to write, with bitter regret, that the "official Czecho-Slovak policy obviously relinquished this imperative requirement of all alliances." 62 Hod.fa expressed his belief that "Czecho-Slovakia surely deserves a better fate than to become the victim of any personal rule or of any kind of soviet system."63 The memorandum also touches upon the position of the U.S. government, which chose not to reject the treaty. Hod.fa respected this view. However, the American position did not, in his opinion, change the simple fact that the treaty had contributed significantly to the creation of spheres of influence, whose catastrophic consequences would have to be dealt with after the war through a system of collective security. Part V of the memorandum was devoted to the Slovak question. According to Hodfa, the majority of Slovaks, with only a handful of opponents, demanded fair self-government for Slovakia. This demand was in stark contrast to the stubborn centralism of Benes and his political supporters in exile. Hodza's disapproval of the Soviet Union ' s influence, in relation to Slovakia's future, was based upon his conviction that the Soviet political system was incompatible with the political and cultural traditions of Slovaks. Hodza vehemently denied that Slovaks had ever sympathized with Communism. He also reminded the State Department that Slovaks had been fighting against Nazism on the Eastern as well as the Western fronts. Moreover, the majority of the Slovak soldiers who had defected from the Slovak army were, in Hod.fa ' s opinion, anti-Communists, with whom he had maintained radio contact. They desired, on the whole, a "Slovakia administered by Slovaks." Hodfa vigorously denied the allegations, current at the time, that Slovaks had not fought against Fascism. According to his information, as many as 75% of the Czecho-Slovak Army personnel in France between 1939 and 1940 were Slovaks.64 Europe at the Crossroads was Hod.fa' s last attempt to influence the U.S. administration. His memorandum was thoroughly analyzed by the OSS. The political analyst who studied it related its content to his superior DeWitt Poole.65 In the introduction of the report, its author noted: "It confirms my impression of him as a man of a high degree of peasant shrewdness." The OSS shared Hod.fa's concerns about the future of small Central European nations after the war: "The European peoples, more particularly, the East European nationnalities, will be potter's clay in the coming interplay of forces." The author fully sanctioned Hodza' s proposal to hold plebi62 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, I 942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75 , p. 15. lbid., p. 19. 64 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75. 65 Julian Towster to D. C. Poole, March 8, 1944. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, fNT-3 2A-75 . 63 �58 SLOVAKIA scites in Central Europe, ideally under the auspices of the United Nations. 66 Russia's willingness, or lack thereof, to respect the free will of Central Europeans was to be a clear indication of how far this country intended to go in improving its relations with the Western Allies in the post-war period. The OSS report did not pay any particular attention to the issue of Slovakia's future after the war. At the time when the State Department received the OSS report, Hodza had been undergoing medical treatment in a holiday resort in Florida. Despite several periods of improvement during his stay in the United States, Hodza never recovered from his illness. On June 27, 1944, after an operation in Clearwater, Hodza succumbed to his illness. 67 His death was an immense loss, primarily to the advocates of Slovak self-government. Moreover, there was a general opinion among Slovak-American leaders that, apart from Stefan Osusky, there was no other political leader at that time who would have been able to unite the politically fragmented Slovak Americans.68 Having been a prominent Central European politician and statesman throughout his life, Hodza's death elicited obituaries in a number of leading dailies around the world. 69 His life-long political contribution to politics was acknowledged by the Czechoslovak government, and even by his political enemies, including Edvard Benes. Belatedly, the U.S. government paid 66 "Hodza is perfectly right in emphasizing the plebiscite angle. Plebiscites may not always have been the best yardstick of true national sentiment, but the principle of unhindered expression of such sentiment and of consultation between the leading United Nations members in regard to securing such expression goes to the heart of the problem." 67 Hodfa suffered from cancer of the large intestine. According to the autopsy report, the immediate cause of death was a complication - internal obturation during the operation . Hodza never regained consciousness. See Lukac, "Posledne chvile Milana Hodzu," in Obcianska spolocnost', no. 8 (August, 2000), I 0. 68 The Slovak leaders, especially those associated in the CASON, suggested Stefan Osusky as Hodfa's possible successor, because they did not regard Hodfa' s aide, Mudry Sebik, as a "strong and effective" leader. FBI, Chicago File No. 100-15744, January 25 , 1945 . Report: Slovak National Alliance, p. 7. Another FBI report written by its director on July 1, 1944, advised the Department of State of Osusky' s intention to ask for permission to enter the United States. In addition to giving a brief account ofOsusky's political career, the report states that V. Platek, the leader of the National Slovak Society, wrote a letter to Osusky as early as in June of 1943 . In it, Platek asked Osusky to come to the United States and to assume the leadership of Slovak Americans together with Hodfa. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.202 l l/71844 PSNL, Roll 31, 1940 - 1944. Memorandum of J. E. Hoover to A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State. Subject: Milan Hodza and Stefan (Stephen) Osusky, July I, 1944. 69 The New York Times published Hodfa 's obituary on June 29, 1944. On July 4, 1944 the newspaper reported on Hodfa's funeral in Chicago. �SLOVAKIA 59 tribute to this outstanding Czechoslovak statesman. In 1951 , U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles praised Hodfa's understanding of the mutual interdependence of sovereign and equal peoples, and acknowledged Hodfa's contribution to the cause of European unity.70 Given the scope of Hodfa's plans and activities in the United States during WW II, one has to ask oneself: what did the Roosevelt administration's foreign policymakers make of Hodfa's federalization plans, and what solution, if any, did they think desirable in the dispute about Slovakia's post-war future? What significance did Hodfa's plans play in American strategic planning in Central Europe? Were these in line with the existing American blueprint for the overall European peace settlement, or did they contradict it? To what extent were Hodfa's plans for a Central European federation examined, and what political will was there to intervene in the debate on the post-war status of Slovakia? American and European historians more or less share the same view that Central Europe, throughout WW II, was not an area of priority in the United States' strategic planning. United States foreign policy in Central Europe was the outcome of a variety of factors, domestic and international, and on the whole it could be characterized as unsystematic.71 Another characteristic of this policy was the fact that the United States' attitudes towards Eastern Europe went through several changes during WW IL To a large extent, these changes were the result of the personal influence of key political figures in the White House, as well as in the Department of State. It is commonly known that, at the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt was an advocate of the doctrine of the Four Policemen, according to which the four greatest powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - were expected to take over the responsibility for the post-war political organization of the territories subjected to their influence. In Central Europe, this would mean an unprecedented increase in Soviet influence, given that Germany was to be disarmed after the war and its influence eliminated for good. From the standpoint ofHodfa's political plans, this represented an undesirable return to spheres of influence against which he so persistently warned. 70 Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 625 . The Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad summarizes the non-systematic nature of this policy as follows: "So tenuous was the coherence of the many diverse elements in these policies, fluctuating in response to political and economic forces within the US itself, to local events in Eastern Europe, and to the challenges inherent in Great Power rivalry, that I have chosen the term the American non-policy to describe the end result of the various influencing factors . American policy-makers were never quite able to make up their minds about the importance of Eastern Europe to the United States." Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (Oslo : Universitets forlaget, 1978), 34. 71 �60 SLOVAKIA Quite a different view of the post-war world order was held by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He advocated a vision of a globalized world, in which economic and political conflicts among sovereign countries were to be solved through a world organization.72 However, the idea of resurrecting a world organization on the principle of the interwar League of Nations was extremely unpopular in the United States. Warming up to such an idea took some time and was a gradual process.73 After the resignation of Sumner Welles from the position of Under Secretary of State in 1943, Cordell Hull finally succeeded in convincing the conservative-minded Department of State to accept the idea of a new United Nations. In relation to Central Europe, the new line in foreign policy resulted in the conviction that the reformed system of collective security would prevent the recreation of old spheres of influence. This was also the reason why the State Department was very reluctant to give its views on the various integration schemes of the Central European governments in exile. The growing influence of the Soviet Union in this area was a worrying development for the Roosevelt administration, but did not lead to a significant shift in the established policy of non-intervention.74 Surprisingly enough, despite the negative attitude towards European integration in general, the archival documents of the Department of State suggest that the U.S. foreign policy makers devoted con72 This track of American foreign policy in the 20th century is frequently referred to as "globalism," or, "universalism." See Michael Lind, "The Twilight of the U.N.," The New Republic, October 30, 1995, p. 28 . 73 The League of Nations, created in 1920, was part of the peace initiative of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, generally known as the "Fourteen Points." In terms of conflict resolution and international security, the organization's philosophy was based upon the principle of collective security, which stood in opposition to the notion of the balance of power and advancement of national interests. The U.S. Congress, however, refused to ratify the League' s Covenant. Wilson ' s peace initiative is often criticized and branded as an example of American political idealism. From the point of view of international relations, Wilson's plan stemmed from "idealistic and liberal dissatisfaction with the international anarchy, balance of power and the concept of self-help which had hitherto characterized the state-system." Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin books, 1998), p. 300. 74 In the introduction to his book The Myth of Liberation; East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 , Bennett Kovrig described American idealism in relation to Central Europe in the words of A. J. P. Taylor: "democratic foreign policy must be idealistic, or at the very least it has to be justified in terms of great general principles ". Kovrig added, "Yet the reader will find few villains and even fewer heroes, for seldom in the history of America 's foreign relations have good intentions reaped such a bitter harvest". Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation; EastCentral Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 194! (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), x. �SLOVAKIA 61 siderable time to various integration schemes such as those proposed by Hodza. 75 The duties of investigating and assessing these plans, as well as drawing up recommendations which were to serve as guidelines in American post-war foreign policy, were entrusted to the Department of State Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.76 Browsing through the minutes of the Advisory Committee between May 1942 and March 1944 gives one some idea of how much time and space the Department of State devoted to federalization plans for Central Europe and what attitudes towards them various committee members maintained. On May 9, the Committee's agenda included the so-called Danubian Federation 77 The discussions focused on two plans drawn up by politicians in exile. One of these plans was the proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish union, put forward in the United States by the exiled Polish Prime Minister 75 Documentary sources from the American archives relating to the U.S. attitudes towards Central European integration were collected and annotated by the Polish authors J. Laptos and M. Misztal Marius, American Debates on Central European Unio n, 1942 - 1944. Documents of the American State Department (Brussels & New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2002). 76 F. D. Roosevelt approved of the establishment of the Advisory Committee three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 28, 1941 . It included academics as well as leading officers of the Department of State. The Committee reported directly to the State Secretary. At that time, the position of vice-chairman was held by Under Secretary Sumner Welles. Everyday activities were overseen by Leo Pasvolsky. The Advisory Committee had six subcommittees, the most important of which were those dedicated to political, economic and territorial issues. Other key figures on the Committee who specialised in Central Europe were Hamilton Fish Armstrong ( 1893 - 1973) and Adolf A. Berle. It was the latter who was often believed by Czech and Slovak emigres to have harboured sympathies for Hodza's plans. The Committee 's job was to draw up general guidelines for the United States in peace negotiations. The official activity of this Committee was ended in the summer of 1943, but many of its members continued their work on other committees until the end of the war. The Committee 's research team drew up hundreds of reports, situational analyses and recommendations, which became a blueprint for the discussions and proceedings of the Committee and its subcommittees. Regular minutes of the subcommittees' discussions were kept. The documentation produced by the Advisory Committee is deposited in the National Archives in the Notter File. See Ignac Romcis, "Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Documents from the U.S. Department of State, 1942 - 1944" Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, [online] , 1992, 30, no. 77 . [Quoted: 2008-06-05] . Available at: <http ://www.hungarianhistory.hu> 77 The term "Danubian Federation" was chosen by the Advisory Committee to refer to the integration efforts of the Central European countries in the Danubian region. The discussions of the Advisory Committee on the "Danubian Federation" included possible membership for Poland and Austria. �62 SLOVAKIA Wladyslaw Sikorski. 78 The other was the Danubian Federation, championed by exiled Hungarian politicians Tibor Eckhardt and Janos Pelenyi.79 Hodfa's federation plan was not included. It was referred to only marginally by a member of the Committee, Anne McCormick. 80 She mentioned Hodfa as an agrarian politician who had been involved in solving agrarian problems.81 The foreign policy analyst went on to inform the Committee, quite misleadingly, that Hod:fa 's plan limited itself to the Danubian region.82 This ignorance of the details of Hodza's plan is interesting, because by that time Hodfa had already spoken about his plans to The New York Times and, more importantly, must have made his views known at the State Department during his first visit. 83 Hodfa 's plan was almost completely 78 Laptos and Mizstal pointed out that Sikorski 's plan for federation was dealt with only briefly. According to the information available to the Committee, Sikorski's federation was to comprise Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The plan envisaged the complete economic federation and eventual political federation of its constituent countries. According to the Advisory Committee, Polish influence in the thus-constituted federation was obvious, though the sheer scale of the supranational state ruled out complete Polish domination. Laptos and Mizstal, .American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 74. 79 Tibor Eckhardt was a Hungarian politician of the interwar period. In 1938 he represented Hungary at the League of Nations Assembly. In 1941 he was sent on a mission to the USA by Miklos Horthy in order to approach the Allies and the Hungarian democratic opposition. Eckhardt's federation was brought to the attention of the Committee by Under Secretary of State Welles. According to this plan, Central Europe was to be divided into three parts: a Polish-Baltic bloc, a Balkan bloc and a "Danubian" union,comprising Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Slovakia and Transylvania, with the possibility of the later admission of Croatia. The unifying element of the federation was to be their common history as part of the Habsburg monarchy. NARCS Notter File, Department of State. Minutes P - I 0, Danubian Federation, May 9, 1942. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 74. 80 Anne O ' Hare McCormick (1882 - 1954), a member of the Advisory Committee, was a foreign policy analyst for The New York Times. 81 The minutes of the meeting captured McCormick's information on Hodza and his plan as follows: " Mrs. McCormick said that mention might also be made of the Hodfa plan, which confines itself to the Danubian area. Mr. Hodfa, she pointed out, being a peasant, is chiefly concerned with the agricultural problem. His plan expresses the aspirations of the Green International." Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 75. 82 In Hodza's plan the core of the proposed federation was to be formed by CzechoSlovakia and Poland, who were to be joined by other countries in the south of Central Europe. 83 See Hope Put in Union of Central Europe, the OSS report on the interview with M. Hodza. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-1 , December 7, 1941 . �SLOVAKIA 63 ignored. It was mentioned in passing in connection with the association of agrarian parties known as the Green International. American foreign policy advisors again failed to include Hodza's plan when they discussed the so-called East European Union as one of the issues related to the Department of State's plans to create a world organization. 84 The members of the Division of Special Research discussed, among other things, the results of the negotiations between the exiled governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland on the creation of a joint union .85 In mid-June of 1942, the Department of State presented to the Advisory Committee the first draft of American recommendations which any supranational organization in Central Europe should comply with. One of the main differences, in comparison with Hodza's plan, was that the United States preferred a union to a federation. This preference reflected the Roosevelt administration's unwillingness to sanction political integration. What the Department of State recommended was a loose organization of free sovereign states, which would be able to advance their interests through joint, non-legislative institutions. Such an economic union was to comprise all states of Central and Eastern Europe, including countries as far apart as Estonia, Austria and Greece.86 The establishment of this union would have to take place under the auspices of the United Nations. The main rationale was that the establishment of such a union would solve the existing security problems and bring with it economic advantages as a result of regional cooperation. The territorial integrity of the union was to be safeguarded by the United Nations, and the security forces of the union were to act in concordance with the security system of the United Nations. After the war, the world organization was to facilitate the creation of the union by adjusting all outstanding border claims. What is most striking to the European reader about the attitudes of the American government are its views on the armed forces of member 84 The meeting of the Division of Special Research, which prepared reports for the Advisory Committee, took place on June 6, I 942. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P 14, June 6, I 942 . NARA, Notter File, Box 65 ., Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 96 - 103. 85 For the history of the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations on uniting, including the attitudes of the United States and the other great powers, see Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943. 86 " The regional organization should have the form not of a federation but of a union of independent and sovereign states, cooperating for limited objectives through common non-legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized. Provisionally the union is considered as including all states of Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany from and including Estonia in the North to Austria in the West and Greece in the South." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P Document 24, June 19, 1942. NARA, Notter File, box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 110. �64 SLOVAKIA countries, as well as on the military of the union as a whole. Every constituent country would have to contribute a designated contingent of troops for the international armed forces (under the command of the UN), but no member state was to have its own armed forces . This recommendation testified to the distrust with which the American foreign policymakers looked upon the nations of Central Europe. The Advisory Committee's analysis of the factors which were thought to be conducive to, or had disintegrating effects upon, the creation of a Central European Union offers an interesting insight into the mindset of the American foreign policy advisors of that time. In the beginning the majority of the Committee members seemed to be in favour of one large Central European union from the Baltic to the Balkans.87 It was argued that a larger union was more advantageous to the United States, because it would be better able to eliminate the destructive forces of nationalism, mutual antagonisms and the land disputes of the Central European nations. 88 An analysis of the economic benefits failed to persuade American foreign policy advisors that economic prosperity was in itself motivationally adequate for unification . In the American view, the history of integration efforts in the interwar period showed that political interests in the area had often been given priority over economic ones. The unification of Czechs and Slovaks was pointed out as an example. According to L. Pasvolsky, Masaryk and Bene~ were willing to accept any economic disadvantages in order to achieve political and cultural unity after WW I. 89 It was nationalism, however, that elicited the greatest fears in the members of the Committee. The issue was frequently raised during the discussions, and the Department of State believed that nationalism was one of the five main obstacles to Central European integration.90 As the feasibility study for the Department of State from 87 This notion was supported most enthusiastically by S. Welles and H. F. Armstrong. 88 From the economic point of view, a larger union appeared to offer better prospects of strengthening the commercial position of member states in trade with the rest of Europe. As for the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the gravest concerns at the Department of State were aroused by Hungarian nationalism, with some criticism also levelled at the former Czechoslovakia. 89 "Mr. Bowman observed that in the case of the unification of the Czechs and the Slovaks the main emphasis had been on the achievement of political and cultural unity from the beginning. Economic considerations had played a decidedly minor £iart." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943 . Apart from nationalism, the list of five disintegrative forces comprised the absence of common roots, cultural di versity, external political influences and diversity in regional economic development. Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943. NARA , NARA, Notter File, �SLOVAKIA 65 February, 1943 observed, "Since the present war began, the animosity between several of the states, e.g., between Bulgaria and Greece, and between Hungary and Romania, has been greatly increased and the conflicts between ethnic groups within one state e.g., between Czechs and Slovaks, between Serbs and Croats, have become bitter."9 1 Where the State Department seemed to be in agreement with Hodfa was the belief that the peasantry could play a positive role in the process of Central European integration. In the inter-war period, peasant parties in Central Europe had engaged in mutual cooperation and shared a similar political agenda. 92 A member of the Committee, J. T. Shotwell, also sympathised with this opinion, but expressed reservations about the role of agrarian leaders, who, in his view, had nationalistic tendencies which might prove distractive. 93 The discussion about the cohesive and destructive forces of unification eventually prompted the members of the Committee to break the proposed union into two parts. With regard to the attitudes of the exiled governments, Berle pointed out that, surprisingly, none of these su£ported a large union, with the exception of the Czechoslovak government. 4 Strictly speaking, however, this was no longer the case. By that time, the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations had reached a stalemate and the Czechoslovak Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 187 - 88. 91 Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943 . NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 92 State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part III: Movements Tending Toward Unity, February 19, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 93 According to Shotwell, the majority of Central European leaders were nationalists of the 19th century type. As an example he pointed to Count Apponyi, who owned land in Slovakia, a fact which had a great deal of influence on his political outlook. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P I 7, June 27, 1942. Milan Hodza himself often mentioned the agrarian problems in Hungary. That was also why he laid down conditions on the membership of Hungary in a Central European Federation, stressing first the necessity of agrarian reform in that country. 94 Laptos and Mistal put Berle 's incorrect information down to the skilfulness of the Czechoslovak propaganda. "The question was asked whether Mr. Welles and Mr. Berle had talked with representatives of these countries on this matter. Mr. Berle said that no one of that group had the concept of a single union. Mr. Welles said he had never found one who had the conception of one union, most favoring three unions; some, two. Mr. Berle said that the Czechs were the only ones who had offered any support for a single union." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union . .., 129 - 30. �66 SLOVAKIA government was getting increasingly cold feet about any union with its northern neighbour. At the end of June, the members of the Committee agreed that for the sake of further discussions about Central European integration they would consider two options- the so-called Northern East European Group and a Balkan Group. 95 Another key issue to which the Advisory Committee devoted its attention was the problem of how viable the proposed union would be and what attitudes the great powers would adopt in dealing with this supranational state. According to the above-mentioned feasibility study, the political will of the member states alone was insufficient for the union's long-term survival. American foreign policymakers understood perfectly well that in order for the union to survive, it had to secure the support of the victorious powers, including that of the United States. 96 The advantages from the American point of view seemed palpable enough: a solution to questions of security in relation to Germany and Russia, pacification of the space between the Baltic and the Aegean seas in an area inaccessible to the naval powers, and the protection of Eastern European countries against possible German expansion. The most important question, of course, was how such a union would be viewed by the geographically closest of the powers - the Soviet Union. In the October Memorandum on Russia and the East European Federation, drawn up by the Council on Foreign Relations, an expert on Soviet affairs informed the Committee that the reasons for Soviet opposition were far stronger than those which might induce the Soviet Union to support such a scheme. 97 The first and the most decisive reason for Soviet 95 The proposal to break up the union was put forward by Under Secretary of State Welles at the meeting of the Division of Special Research on June 27, 1942 . The main reason was the diverse character of the member states of the union, which might lead to its disintegration. On the issue of breaking up the union, the members of the Committee were by no means united. Welles was in principle in favour of a single union, but practical considerations compelled him to opt for two smaller ones. The key problem of the two-union solution was Austria and Hungary. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA , Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 119 - 20. 96 See Part IV: Steps Necessary to make Union Effective: "In view of the fact that Eastern Europe has felt the impact of virtually none of those dynamic forces that would aid in creating a unity out of this di versity of peoples, the creation of a union and its maintenance for an indefinite period would have to be in large measure the work of the great victorious powers or of the international organization. " State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part IV: NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 19 1. 97 The author of the memorandum was Isaiah Bowman. The Counci l on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, �SLOVAKIA 67 opposition was the assumption that the establishment of a union would prevent the Soviet Union from exercising its policy of divide et impera. Moscow was also worried that the political orientation of the Central European countries within the proposed union would lead to the weakening of the existing pro-Russian orientation in some of them. 98 There is little doubt that Czechoslovakia was one of those countries. Its president-in-exile Edward Benes had indicated that Czechoslovak foreign policy after the war would be oriented towards the east. The Soviet attitude towards integration in Central Europe was yet again referred to by American foreign policy advisors as "apparently hostile" in February of 1943. 99 The report made it clear that Moscow was in no mood to support federalization plans of a lesser scope, such as the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish or Greek-Yugoslav unions. The Department of State reached this conclusion on the basis of the information obtained directly from representatives of the Czechoslovak government-inexile. The negative attitude of Moscow was also identified as the main rea- October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 176. 98 The author continues: "The possibilities of supporting Czechoslovakia against Poland, Hungary against Rumania, Yugoslavia against Hungary and so forth, present an almost limitless field for maneuver by Russia to make its influence strong and even preponderant among the disunited states of East Central Europe." Other Soviet objections could be summarized as follows: 2. the united states of Central Europe would find it easier to advance their territorial claims against Russia, 3. the political system of the member countries would unify, but become very likely hostile to that of the Soviet Union, 4. the union 's armed forces would be stronger in defence, which would weaken Soviet military position, 5. the exports of such a federation would compete in world markets with Soviet exports; Soviet exports into the union would be disadvantaged, since Russia would have to deal with the union as a whole rather than trading with countries separately, 6. the union would curb the revived pan-Slav sentiment, because it would include non-Slav countries and the pro-Russian orientation of the Slav countries would thus be weakened. The Council on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 177. 99 "On the basis of information at present available in the Political Section, the Soviet Government is apparently hostile to the idea of the creation of an all-embracing East European Union, unless, perhaps, such a Union were established under the preponderant influence of the Soviet Union. An examination of the Soviet press and periodicals has disclosed no discussions of such projects for an Eastern European Union as have been put forward from time to time in Britain and the United States." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Document P 206, February 18, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. LAPTOS, Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 196. �68 SLOVAKIA son why the Czechoslovak §ovemment broke off its negotiations with the Polish govemment-in-exile. 1 0 The work of the Advisory Committee for Postwar Foreign Policy officially ended in July of 1943, though some of its subcommittees continued their work on Central European integration plans until the spring of 1944. 101 The issue of Slovakia's post-war political status never came up. Neither was it discussed by any of the Committee's numerous subcommittees. The abandonment of American discussions of the Central European integration plans raises two questions: what were the reasons for this decision and what political future did the Roosevelt administration envisage for the Central European nations? The answer to the first question should be looked for in the analyses of U.S. foreign policy for this period. Drawing on the latest historical research, one finds, more or less, consensus on this issue. The dominant factor in American strategic planning was the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe, which went hand in hand with its increasing political influence. It became clear, towards the end of 1943, that the Red Army would liberate a substantial part of Central Europe, a fact which would inevitably increase the role of the Soviet Union in the post-war political organization of the area. Regardless of their original plans, President Roosevelt and the Department of State had to constantly adjust to these developments. In 1943, under pressure of the events on the Eastern Front, Roosevelt was forced to review his erstwhi le concept of an "Anglo-American world police force" and extend it into the well-known "Four Policemen" theory. This had to take the Soviet Union into account as an equal partner in the political organization of territories within its own sphere of influence. From this point of view it 100 "Mr. Berle remarked that when the Polish-Czech confederation was agreed upon, both parties had believed that the Russians were not opposed to the idea. The worsening of relations between Russia and the Polish government-in-exile, however, has since resulted in a change in the Russian position. The Czechs have withdrawn from their discussions with the Poles, ostensibly because the Poles were unwilling to abandon their claim to the Teschen area, but in reality because of Russian opposition to the combination." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 217. 101 Secretary of State Cordell Hull ended the work of the Committee in a letter of July 12, 1943 . Mary E. Bradshaw, "Congress and Foreign Policy Since 1900," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 289 (September, 1953), 45 . The last minutes of the Political Subcommittee dealing with the Central European union were those of March 15- 17, 1944, NARA, Notter File, Box 84. The last meeting of the Economic Subcommittee took place on March 31 , 1944. Advisory Committee, Economic Subcommittee, R Minutes 16, March 31, 1944 NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Unio n ... , 243 . �SLOVAKIA 69 can be understood why any American position on a Central European federation or union had to be approved by Moscow. The absence of a Soviet stance on the issue throughout 1942 kept the idea of integration alive among the exiled politicians of Central Europe, and occupied the minds of American foreign policy advisors on the Advisory Committee. Doubts about Moscow's priorities were finally ended in October of 1943, when the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, officially confirmed the negative position of the USSR. 102 The answer to the second question, namely what the Americans desired as the political future for Central Europe, is more complicated. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the views of the Roosevelt administration on this issue were not unanimous. Significant differences of opinion existed in Washington, which divided even the chief foreign policy makers, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. American historians' interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy objectives in Central Europe during this period have gone through several developments since WW II. 103 The more recent research emphasizes the importance of Roosevelt's role in the process of foreign policymaking, and interprets his apparent lack of determination and unsystematic approach as misleading. According to this interpretation, Roosevelt, from the beginning of the war, pursued a clear goal in relation to Continental Europe: to reduce its international standing and marginalize it as the most effective way of preventing future conflicts in the area. Roosevelt intended to achieve this marginalization through fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively powerless, and wherever possible, ethnically homogenous states. These states should in no case possess any armed forces, and after disarmament they should be placed within the sphere of influ102 This information was imparted to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who asked V. Molotov about the Soviet view on Central European integration efforts at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 19 - 29, 1943. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 63 . 103 The oldest interpretation of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe maintains that the Roosevelt administration favoured active involvement in the rebuilding of European democracies and in strengthening the position of European states. Roosevelt is criticised, however, because he was unable to see through Stalin's empty promises at Yalta. The second, "revisionist" theory contends that the post-war division of Europe was afait accompli long before Yalta, because the Red Anny would occupy the whole of Eastern Europe and the United States had to respect this fact. ." Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos. A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought 26 (no. 2, 1996), 73 . Lundestad, who reviewed both of the above theories, characterized U.S. foreign policy towards Central Europe as a policy of "modified universalism in the area of non-essential interest for the USA." For the lack of internal coherence in this policy he chose to refer to it as a "non-policy." G. Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe .. . , 34. �70 SLOVAKIA ence of either Britain or the Soviet Union. 104 Such a vision of the future of Central European nations was incompatible with Hodza 's federalization. He feared the political influence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, called for concerted efforts to strengthen the position of Central Europe. As far as Slovakia's future was concerned, Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention, whether intentional or inadvertent, played more into the hands of Slovak separatists than those of the proponents of federative integration.' 05 Roosevelt's concept of new spheres of influence, however, stood in contrast to the universalistic vision of Secretary of State Hull, who was advocating global cooperation among nations on the basis of a renewed world organization. The key moment, which resulted in the adoption of the universalistic approach as the main guideline in U.S. foreign policy, is usually thought to be the resignation of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 106 After Welles's resignation, Secretary of State Hull and his department advanced the concept of collective security within the framework of a restored world organization under a new name. ' 07 The new line in American foreign policy, however, did not make the Roosevelt administration take a more active role in suppressing the emerging Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Roosevelt continued to count on Soviet assistance as a decisive political force in the post-war reorganization of Central Europe. What he and his foreign policy advisors got wrong was the belief that Stalin's Russia would sooner or later discard its system of central planning, return to the market economy and join the rest of the democratic world. 104 "As he [Roosevelt] told the British Foreign Minister in March 1943, 'armaments after the war in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of the policing powers Britain, the United States and Russia. The smaller powers might have rifles but nothing more dangerous than this' .. .These two great powers had to maintain order over other disarmed European countries, if necessary by force." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War", 72 . 105 "He [Roosevelt] also envisioned splitting up multiethnic countries such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," 70. On another occasion, when meeting representtatives of the Slovak League in 1940, Roosevelt remarked: "I believe that every nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its nationhood." Ever since then, the Slovak League interpreted the president's statement as approval of the establishment of an independent Slovak state. NARA, Washington D. C., 860F.0l /446. Reverend C. Mlynarovich to C. Manion of the Office for Government Refcort, Indiana, May 11, 1942. 06 Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's closest ally in the Department of State, was a strong supporter of the president's concept of the "Four Policemen." Roosevelt did not trust Hull. In 1943 the president accepted Welles 's resignation in connection with his alleged homosexual activities. 107 In the field of international relations, Hull 's approach to foreign affairs is often associated with the principles of universalism, globalism and political idealism . �SLOVAKIA 71 Thus we have seen that, between 1941 and 1944, the American authorities closely followed the political activities of exiled Slovak politician Milan Hodfa. His political goal in the United States was twofold. First, he intended to influence Roosevelt's foreign policy makers in favour of the creation of a supranational federation of Central European states, which he saw as a political panacea for the area' s many unresolved problems. According to this plan, a restored Czechoslovakia was to be one of the founding members of such a federation . Slovakia was to be part of Czechoslovakia again, but with a new constitutional arrangement stipulating its equal political status with the Czech lands. Secondly, Hodza planned to lead a political campaign among Slovak Americans. In particular, he hoped to win the endorsement of the leaders of their organizations for his programme of a self-governing Slovakia. Various federal agencies' keen interest in Hodza, however, was not motivated by the desire of the U.S. government to support the creation of a central European federation . It rather stemmed from the fact that U.S. governmental agencies had deep misgivings about the effects of Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans. Thus, for the American government, Hodfa soon emerged as an unwelcome guest as the OSS began in mid-1942 supplying various U.S. departments with reports about the ideological split within the Slovak-American community. The fears frequently expressed in the OSS reports were motivated by the perceived possible consequences of Hodza ' s campaign on the home front as well as the on the American war effort in general. Foremost among these fears was that the Hodfa-inspired opposition to the Benes-led government-in-exile would not only undermine the standing of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - one of the war-time allies of the United States - but would also have a deleterious effect on the morale of the hundreds of thousands of Slovak Americans employed in key American heavy industries. Hodza's political campaign among Slovak Americans targeted two deeply antagonistic camps. He attempted to win the support of the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance, who had originally supported Benes's government-in-exile. At the same time, he tried to negotiate with the leaders of the Slovak League of America, several of whom offered their organizations' support for his programme. However, Hodfa failed to eliminate the powerful influence of the hard-liners in these umbrella organizations. The Czechoslovak Information Service in the United States, a propaganda tool of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile, severely criticized Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans, constantly challenging his right to discuss Slovakia' s future on American soil and running a smear campaign against him. The U.S. administration viewed Hodfa 's activities with growing alarm. The most worrying development from the American point of view was the ideological split in the Slovak National Alliance which devel- �72 SLOVAKIA oped as a result of Hodza ' s lecture tour. The OSS repeatedly called on the Department of State to intervene in order to mend the rift among the proCzechoslovak fraternal leaders. Hodza ' s attempts to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards the future organization of Central Europe had little impact on American foreign policy. lndeed, his plan for a Central European federation was never discussed by the American foreign policy advisors. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State and its agencies devoted considerable time to weighing the pros and cons of Central European integration from the point of view of American interests. The Department of State tended to favour an economic union rather than a political federation. Moreover, it feared the destructive forces of Central European nationalisms, not excluding the Slovak and Czech ones. However, the major American objection to any form of Central European integration stemmed from the strong opposition to it from the United States' chief war ally in Eastern Europe - the Soviet Union. Stalin had no intention of supporting any integration plans in the area. He preferred a fragmented Central Europe made up of weak states, which would strengthen the negotiating position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis these countries. Roosevelt ' s policy of deliberate non-intervention in Central Europe, coupled with the American belief in a new world organization, resulted after the war in a gradual Sovietization of Central Europe and the creation of a new sphere of influence. Given the pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile from December of 1943 onwards, the Roosevelt administration refrained from publicly expressing any of its views on Slovakia's post-war future. � SLOVAKIA 37 AN UNWELCOME GUEST: MILAN HODZA IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTS BETWEEN 1941 AND 1944 V Roman Licko In December of 1938 Milan Hodza, a Slovak politician and the last prime minister of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic, went into exile in France. There, along with Stefan Osusky, another Slovak statesman and diplomat, he became the leading figure of Slovak democratic exiles before 1 the outbreak of WW II. Towards the end of 1939 Rodia established the Slovak National Council, which, under his auspices, was reorganized in early 1940 into the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Both political bodies subscribed to the democratic ideals of pre-war Czechoslovakia, as well as to the belief in a continuation of Czechoslovak statehood.2 However, in stark 1 Before Hodfa' s arrival in Paris in November of 1939, Ambassador Stefan Osusky had been the leading figure of the Czechoslovak resistance movement operating from France. His greatest achievement was the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement concerning the creation of a new Czechoslovak army in France by which the French government recognised de fa cto the continued existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. During this period Osusky and Hodza shared similar ideas about Slovakia' s future . They both unequivocally supported the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia. However, they strongly opposed the centralism of the inter-war Prague governments. Osusky favoured a federal constitutional arrangement between Czechs and Slovaks. Hodza spoke of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored ' CzechoSlovakia'. Osusky maintained close contact with Hodza, who was, at that time, in London. The two men even cooperated in the preparation of a memorandum of Slovak demands in the lead-up to the establishment of the Benes-led Czechoslovak National Committee in France. Interestingly enough, Osusky did not become a member of any of the resistance organizations established by Hodza after his arrival in Paris. For more on the Hodfa-Osusky co-operation during this period see Slavomir Michalek, "Hodza a Osusky, nazory a pozicie v rokoch 1939- 1941 ," in Milan Hodia-statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 301- 18. 2 This paper uses the more widely accepted spellings ' Czechoslovakia' and 'Czechoslovak'. In reference to Hodza' s ideas, however, the spellings 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovak' have been retained as these were the forms preferred by Hodfa himself. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 adopted the unhyphenated spelling of the name. In November of 1938 the country officially returned to the hyphenated spelling 'Czecho-Slovakia' in recognition of the fact that Slovakia had been declared an autonomous region. The use of the one name or the other, by both Czechs and Slovaks throughout the war, had political connotations. Generally speaking, the Slovaks who favoured the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after WW II but op- �38 SLOVAKIA opposetion to Edward Benes, the leading figure of the Czech democratic exiles, Hodza advocated a thoroughly decentralized model of a new Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement, with self-governing status for Slovakia. After the failure to find common ground on this issue with Benes, who consistently refused to allow any political representation of Slovak federalists in his exile government-to-be, Hodza moved to London. The German occupation of France in the summer of 1940 and the ensuing Battle of Britain in September of 1940 speeded up Britain' s recognition ofBenes's government-in-exile. Feeling powerless and marginalised, Hodza saw no purpose in participating in any government headed by Benes. By the autumn of 1941 he decided to leave Britain and in October of that year he arrived in the United States. There he pursued two political objectives: he intended to convince politically-minded Slovak Americans to support his programme of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, he attempted to lobby the Roosevelt administration to throw its weight behind the creation of a federation of Central European states. This paper, which draws primarily on research in United States government archives, attempts to trace Hodza ' s political campaign among Slovak Americans from the point of view of the Roosevelt administration. At the same time, it follows Hodza ' s efforts to engage the American government in a dialogue concerning a comprehensive post-war peace settlement in Central Europe. With the help of secondary literature on the subject, the study assesses the success of these attempts, and how they were viewed by the chief foreign policy makers in the Roosevelt administration. 3 posed the pre-war unitary constitutional arrangement between the two nations preferred the hyphenated designation. 3 The first attempt to document the activities of Milan Hodfa in the USA was made by his close associate, Michal Mudry Sebik, in his book Milan Hodia v Amerike. (Chicago :Geringer Press, Inc., 1949). The author published a number of articles in the periodicals of Slovak democratic exiles in the USA after WW II, e.g. Michal Mudry, "Svedectvo historickej doby. Bullitovo a Hodzovo memorandum," Nase snahy, 6, no. 9 (May - June 1970). In 1965 Susan Mikula, an American of Slovak descent, wrote a dissertation on Hodza's activities in the USA. However, it was not until 1992, at a conference in Bratislava, that she presented her work in Slovakia: Susan Mikula, " Dr. Milan Hodfa vo svelte archivnych dokumentov z archivov v USA," in : Milan Hodia - statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 345- 50. Czech historians have also dealt with Hodfa 's stay in the USA . For instance J. Kuklik and J. Nemecek, Hodia versus Benes. Milan Hodia a slovenska otazka v zahranicnim odboji za druhe svetove valky (Praha: Karolinum, 1999). The most comprehensive account yet of Hodfa's political activities in the USA. , including some views of the Roosevelt administration, was written by the late Slovak historian Pavol Luklic, "Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii v USA a reakcie na jeho federalisticke plany, Historicky casopis 51 , no. 4 (2003), pp. 497- 515 . As Lukac himself observed, however, Kuklik' s and Nemecek's book only traced �SLOVAKIA 39 Apart from the Slovak League of America (hereafter SLA), which favoured independence for Slovakia, there was no other Slovak organization in the USA in 1941 that had a clear idea about Slovakia' s political future after the war. 4 The leaders of the opposition organization - the Slovak National Alliance (hereafter SNA) - stuck to the policy of a reinstated Czechoslovakia, but were unwelling to commit themselves to negotiating a more specific settlement on this issue. In line with the official policy of President Edvard Benes, they maintained that Slovakia's future should be resolved after the war by a democratic vote. Despite their uncommitted attitude, Slovakia's political future was as sensitive an issue among the individual leaders of the SNA as it was for the leadership of the SLA. As long as there was no political leader in the United States who was able to offer a political alternative to the League-promulgated Slovak independence, the issue was bound to remain unresolved. This situation changed after the arrival of Milan Hodfa in the United States in October of 1941. During the three years of his American stay, Hodfa devoted his energies to political campaigning and lobbying. Like Slovak-American leaders, he too wanted to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards Slovakia. As a former Czechoslovak statesman, Hodfa had access to the United States Department of State. He was allowed to discuss the Slovak question with high-ranking government officials. Hodfa ' s political campaign in the USA aroused the interest of the American media, as well as that of federal authorities. Right up to his death in 1944, his activities were closely followed by the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS) and its subordinate department, the Foreign Nationalities Branch (hereafter FNB). Hodfa's arrival in the United States generated interest, not only among Slovak Americans, but also in the American media. Almost immediately, a number of speculative pieces about Hodfa's political objectives appeared in Hodfa's political campaign in the USA on the basis of secondary archival materials left by Hodfa 's contemporaries, and not from the documents of the U.S. Department of State. The present study draws upon the following primary sources: 1. an independent investigation of the documents of the Department of State; 2. the hitherto unpublished documents of the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate department - the Foreign Nationalities Branch (both housed in the National Archives in Washington), the archival documentation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (released to the author under the Freedom oflnformation - Privacy Acts); and 3. the documents issued by the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy collected and published by Polish historians JozefLaptos and Marius Misztal in 2002 . 4 For the activities of the Slovak League of America on behalf of Slovak independence during and after the war, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia 39, nos. 72-73 (2007), 19-34. �40 SLOVAKIA the press. One OSS report from 1942 read that the former Czechoslovak prime minister had come as a private citizen. 5 Hodza himself said that the main reason for his arrival was for reasons of health. In the USA he planned to undergo a series of medical treatments.6 This is well attested in the Hodfa family correspondence of the period. 7 On the other hand, the former Czechoslovak prime minister did hope to achieve in the United States some well-defined political goals. 8 In his first interview with The New York Tim es, Hodfa stated that he intended to "test out American opinion regarding Central Europe" and, at the same time, he wanted to "inform it of the trend of opinion there."9 Not all American media reported on Hodza's intentions impartially. On November 7, the Overseas News Agency issued a press release which assessed Hodfa 's pre-war political career in an unflattering light. According to this source, Hodfa's Agrarian Party was only a little less reactionary than the pro-fascist Hlinka Guard in Slovakia. The release went on to claim that Hodfa's arrival also shed a negative light on Slovak Americans. The authors of the release dubbed their political mindset as "isolationist and pro-fascist," referring to some of the Slovak fraternal press in America as evidence. 10 It is clear that the primary motivation of the author must have been to damage Hodfa's political reputation . According to 5 National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 6 1. This information was acquired by the OSS from the New York Times interview with Hodza conducted by Frederick T. Birchall. 6 M. Mudry, Hodza's assoc iate in America, later wrote: "An American journalist who visited and interviewed Hodza claimed that in response to the question about his plans Hodfa took out a bottle of medication and said that what he wanted, first and foremost, was a recovery." Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike .. ., 20. 7 John Palka, Milan Hodfa's grandson, mentions two bouts of pneumonia that his grandfather suffered from shortly after his arrival. See John Palka, Maje S/ovensko, moja rodina (Bratislava: Kalli gram, 2010), 57. 8 Kuklik and Nemecek argue: " It cannot be ruled out that the former Prime Minister could have been driven by his effort to shore up support among his expatriates especially Slovak Americans, with whom he could attempt, with new energy, to stage a comeback in the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad. So far his departure was seen, perhaps with some oversimplification, as his resignation to the attempts to advance his Slovak national programme in emigration, " Hodia versus Benes..., 142.The view that Hodfa sought the leading position in the resistance is also supported by Lukac, " Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii ... ", 605 . 9 The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 1 °Kuklik and Nemecek quote from Overseas News Agency release No. 400, July 11, 1941: " Hodfa's presence sheds light on the political tendencies of Slovak Americans. Apparently, the majority of Slovaks living in the United States are isolationist and pro-fascist and this has been reflected in the Slovak press here as well." The Czech authors say that Hodfa sued the ONA for libel, claiming $600,000 in damages, Hodia versus Benes.. ., 144. �SLOVAKIA 41 Hodza's close associate in the USA, Michal Mudry, unfounded attacks like these were frequent and their authors were mainly Slovak-American Communists, supported by Czechoslovak authorities in the USA. 11 The sources of the anti-Hodfa campaign remain obscure. We contend, however, that for President Benes and his government-in-exile, Hodfa's presence in the country posed a serious political problem. The main reason was that Hodfa was determined to call on Slovak Americans to actively participate in the discussions about the future of Slovakia. The Roosevelt administration's attitudes towards Hodfa's political activities were shaped gradually and drew upon several sources. One of them was Hodfa himself. Almost immediately after his arrival, the former Czechoslovak prime minister made contact with the Department of State, and during his stay visited it several times. It can be argued that Hodfa was the only Slovak who discussed the Slovak question with United States government officials during WW II. From its inception in the summer of 1942, the OSS kept an eye on Hodfa 's activities, and from December of that year his political campaign was scrutinized by the officers of the FNB. The OSS analysed Hodfa 's activities by scanning his articles in the Slovak-American media, as well as in the American press in general. In addition to that, Hodza attracted the close attention of the FBI, which since I 940 had been investigating the activities of the Slovak League and the Slovak National Alliance. All the sources at the U.S . government' s disposal indicated that Hodfa pursued very specific political objectives in the United States. Sometime around mid-1942, an OSS report noted that: "Dr. Hodza' s visits to the State Department, his public speeches, interviews granted by him, and his article in The Nation (May 16, 1942) have demonstrated his willingness to express his ideas, whatever may be the extent of his actual political activity. ,, 12 Hodfa' s approach to the Slovak question differed from all other political plans which had been discussed among Slovak Americans to date. The crucial difference was that in Hod:fa' s view, the Slovak question was not to be solved in isolation, but as part of the security, economic and strategic 11 "Various groups, more or less under the influence of leftist elements and the Czechoslovak Information Service, take pot shots at Hodfa and where possible, in connection with his person, they attack Slovak Americans as well. These groups are often made up of the active Czech and Slovak communists such as Hoffmeister, Weisskopf Benau [a social democrat - author's note) and others, at that time undoubtedly under the influence and in favour with Czechoslovak authorities in America." According to Mudry, the most malicious attack upon Hodfa was the pamphlet entitled " Persona non grata". It contained a scathing criticism of Hodfa 's efforts to create a federation , which, among other things, was to constitute a buffer against the Russian Bolsheviks. See Mudry, Milan Hodia v Ameriike .. . , 37. 12 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS , RG 226 E 100, Box 3, p. 47 . �42 SLOVAKIA issues concerning the whole of Central Europe. At that time, Hodza's ideas and political thought may have been known to the public as well as the OSS from his book Federation in Central Europe. 13 Hodza was convinced that federation was the only political arrangement capable of harnessing nationnal forces while preserving the freedom of nations and of individuals. Federation would enable Central Europe to become a viable system of production and consumption on the basis of which a New Europe could be built. The liberated and reinstated countries of Central Europe would conclude a treaty that would become the basic framework for a federal constitution. The treaty was supposed to be the result of spontaneous decisions made by Central European countries, which, bearing in mind their common goals, would identify common interests and mutual commitments. Powers concerning mutual affairs were to be delegated to federal bodies, and their exercise entrusted to a federal govemment. 14 It would be headed by a federal Chancellor, who would be nominated by the President of the federation . The legislative body would be made up of a federal Congress, which was to oversee the legislative process as well as the federal budget. The Federal Court was to be the highest judicial body, which would decide on matters raised by the federal government or by the governments of the constituent countries. The federalization of Central Europe was envisaged as the key to solving the Slovak question and Slovak-Czech relations. Hodza believed that the freedom and security of small nations could be guaranteed only through a supranational federation . If small states were to merge their sovereignties, thereby creating a stronger unit, it would clearly mean more to them than to be in permanent danger of losing their sovereignties. Slovakia, however, was not to enter the Central European federation as a separate state. According to Hodza, the political coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks was not only feasible, but also inevitable. For Czechs, Slovakia represented an important connection with Central Europe. Self-government would satisfy Slovakia to the extent that it would never be a source of weakness for the new republic, but the reverse - it would become the source of its stability and strength. However, Hodza warned, certain mistakes from the past should be avoided. "Stubborn centralism as well as mischievous separatism have to disappear," he argued. Hodza did not support Slovak independence and never sympathized with the representatives of the Slovak regime at home. In his book, he unequivocally dissociated himself from the "Slovakian Quisling regime" 13 Federation in Central Europe (London and New York: Jarrolds Publishers, 1942). Hodza proposed the creation of the following federal ministries: I . finance, 2. International trade, 3. foreign affairs, 4. defence, 5. postal services and communications, 6. and 7. air and naval transport, 8. federal legislation, 9. federal cooperation. Federation in Central Europe ... , 172 - 7. 14 �SLOVAKIA 43 and made it clear that its political representatives did not represent the will of the people. As far as the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London was concerned, Hodza claimed he respected it and was willing to cooperate with it. In his opinion, though, the real leaders of the Slovaks existed not only in London, but also in the USA. He was convinced that in the settling of the Slovak question, Slovak Americans should take an active part. By emphasising the importance of Slovak Americans, Hodza underlined how much hope he pinned on them in deciding the political future of Slovakia after the war. 15 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Hodza presented his vision to the American press. On December 7, 1941 The New York Times published an interview with him entitled "Hope Put in Union of Central Europe," which the former Czechoslovak statesman had granted to American journalist Frederick T. Birchall. The subheading of the article informed the American reader that federation was the goal of 110 million Central Europeans. 16 In the introduction, the author informed the reader that Hodza arrived in the USA unofficially, but with the approval of the Czechoslovak government in London. In fact, the second part of this statement was not true. President Benes could not prevent Hodza from leaving for the United States, but he was far from pleased with the prospect of his greatest political rival in exile campaigning among Slovak Americans. In the Birchall interview Hodza outlined some of the constitutional mechanisms of the proposed federation, and expressed his conviction that the prevailing political tendency in exile was "wholly in the direction of such a federation." As proof, Hodza pointed to the recent rapprochement of two old foes - Czechoslovakia and Poland. 17 These two countries, he believed, should form the nucleus of the future federation . It should then be joined by Romania, and subsequently also by a democratized Hungary, provided that the latter gave up its "imperialistic policy of coercing non-Magyar regions." According to 15 "Most of the Slovak leaders now stay in this country [United Kingdom] and in the USA ." Hodza, Federation in Central Europe . .. , 94. 16 The other two subheadings read: "For Common Government" and "He Explains Plan Will Not Deal in Half Measures, Such as the Old Little Entente," The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 17 Hodza alluded here to the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations of a possible confederation between the exiled governments of both countries in London. The outcome of these negotiations, which took place between 1940 and 1942, were two joint declarations - one in November 11 , 1940 and the other on January 23, 1942. The negotiations did not, however, lead to any specific action. In 1943 they ended for good as a result of the new pro-Soviet orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, as well as Moscow 's negative attitude towards such a confederation. For details see, Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). �44 SLOVAKIA Hodza, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had already been working out their own idea of a federation . Hodza touched on the issue of the relations of Central Europe with Germany and Russia. He considered Russian Bolshevism as great a threat to Europe as German fascism. That was also the reason why the proposed federation should act as "a barrier between Nazi ideologists and Russian Bolsheviki." 18 Peasants, representing the conservative values of Central Europe, would, according to Hodza, be a stabilising force in the proposed federation . Their conservative influence would be of significant importance, since it would be necessary to "maintain a conservative democratic entity between the two subversive influences of Nazism and Bolshevism". Having talked to some lower-level officials of the U.S. Department of State, Hodfa met Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle on December 9, 1941. 19 On the same day Hodfa dined informally with DeWitt C. Poole, a high-ranking OSS officer and future head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch.20 During his meeting with the Assistant Secretary, Hodza presented Berle with a memorandum in which he outlined the development of Slovak affairs in Czechoslovakia and in subsequent exile between 1918 and 1939.21 In the memorandum, Hodfa pointed out that the Czechoslovak Cabinet in 1938, under his premiership, approved proposed legislation on decentralization - which, among other things, granted Slovakia its regional parliament. That was the last valid legal arrangement made before the Munich Pact, and it was recognized even by Jan Lichner, a minister of the exiled government. This view, Hodfa claimed, was subscribed to by the absolute majority of public opinion in Slovakia in late 1939. He admits that later on, in Paris, Czechoslovak leaders agreed that such constitutional issues as Slovakia's 18 Quoting Hodfa, the author goes on to say: "With a solid bloc of I 00, 000, 000 people separating them, a successful democracy operating next door would be a continuing object lesson of a better and more profitable way of life." The New York Times, December 9, 1941. 19 Prior to the meeting with Berle, Hodfa held talks with C. W. Cannon and H. Hoskins, as well as the head of the Coordination of Information, William J. Donovan. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle (author H. Hoskins), December 9, 1941. 20 According to Kuklik and Nemecek, Hodza maintained that his first visit to the Department of State was a response to an invitation by C. W. Cannon, R. Atherton and A. Berle. The aim was to discuss the memorandum of Slovak-American separatist Gustav Kosik presented to the Department at an earlier date. 21 P. Lukac also suggested that Hodfa's visit to the State Department and his memorandum was a reaction to the memorandum of Gustav Kosik (Memorandum for His Excellency the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America). NARA signature 860f.01 /429- l/2, Roll 30. Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 612. �SLOVAKIA 45 future should be decided by democratic majorities of Czechs and Slovaks after the war. Hodfa was willing to adhere to this agreement, provided that the exiled Czechoslovak National Council included representatives of Slovak federalists. In the posited post-war settlement, Hodfa emphasized the importance of a Czecho-Slovak restoration, but with a provision for Slovak self-government. He argued that Slovakia would not be able to maintain its sovereignty even as a separate member of the Central European federation. In the conclusion to the memorandum, Hodza condemned the Slovak puppet regime and hazarded a guess that its support among Slovaks did not exceed I 0%. As for Slovak Americans, he believed that the majority of them had never stopped supporting Czecho-Slovakia. The rest of them, in Hodza 's opinion, would soon change their political views. The official reaction to Hodfa' s memorandum of December 9, 1941 is not known, but it appears that he made a good impression during his first visit to the State Department. The report written for the Secretary of State Cordell Hull observed that, "Dr. Hodza gave the impression of an able patriot with qualities of sincerity and vision that might be with advantage put to constructive work in the post-war period in Central Europe." 22 In his later conversation with Poole, Hodfa himself assessed his meeting with Berle in a similar vein.23 It was intimated to Hodfa that, in the future, he might be received by Secretary Hull himself. Moreover, the State Department did not seem to have any objections to Hodfa's intention of lecturing at American universities and colleges. It was even suggested that Poole might be able to help by making the necessary arrangements.24 Hodfa expected that he would once again be in communication with the Department of State as early as January, 1942. His deteriorating health, however, forced him to stay in American sanatoria for several months, where he recuperated until April of 1942. 25 22 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle, H. Hoskins, December 9, 1941 , p. 3. 23 In his report Poole wrote: "He [Hodza] said that he had explained to Mr. Berle his views on the future political organization of Central Europe, and Mr. Berle seemed to be favourably impressed." D. C. Poole later checked Hodfa's impressions against those of H. Hoskins: "Following my talk with Dr. Hodza, I spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hoskins, and gathered from him that Dr .Hodza had given a substantially accurate account of his reception at the Department of State and Mr. Berle' s attitude. " NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 24 During the conversation at the Department of State, C. Cannon suggested that D. C. Poole "might be in the best position to bring this about." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 25 Lukac writes that Hodza recuperated from chronic bronchitis in a sanatorium at Lake Placid, New York and Hot Springs, Arkansas. Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. ., 612 . �46 SLOVAKIA In Hodfa 's plans, 1942 should have marked a turning-point in his political campaign. After a modest recovery of his health, Hodfa launched his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and began publishing in American scholarly journals. On May 16 he outlined his federalization plans to the politically-minded American public in The Nation. The reactions of Czech and Slovak Americans to his article, A Central European Federation, were collected in two OSS reports from June. Both reports assessed the attitudes of American "Czechoslovaks" towards Hodza as predominantly negative. 26 The first one, dated June 1, 1942, pointed out that Czechoslovak Americans had missed the article because they did not regularly read The Nation. Still, the OSS observer admitted that Hodza's ideas were, in general, favourably received by many Central Europeans because they were in line with their own post-war plans.27 The other report from June 11 portrays Hodza's arrival in America, his political past and goals in the USA in a very negative light. In the introduction, the author alleged that Czechoslovak Americans received the article with considerable mistrust. Claiming that he had researched the Czechoslovak American press and talked to "a number of leading Czechoslovak Americans as well as Czechoslovak exiles," the OSS observer contended that the article was "not a bona fide piece of political thinking, but that it rather serves as a cloak for its author' s ambition to become the exclusive or most important spokesman for the Slovaks (American and otherwise), regardless of cost in terms of Czechoslovak unity here and abroad." 28 It may be argued that the negative tone of the report was influenced by its author's very selective approach to sources. For example, he claimed that he had read reactions in the "Czechoslovak press," but he did not give any specific titles. The only sources he acknowledged were J. Papanek, professor J. B. Kozak and D. Benau. 29Jan Papanek, head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA and Benes's right-hand man, referred to Hodfa as an " unfortunate incident."30 He maintained that Hod26 Neither of the reports makes any distinction between American Slovaks and American Czechs. They refer to both groups collectively as "Czechoslovak Americans." 27 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-47, June I, 1942, p. I. 28 Ibid. The author of the report signed himself"Ivan Ivanovitch ." 29 At the time, Professor Kozak was lecturing at Oberlin College in Ohio. Prior to his arrival in the USA he was a member of the Czechoslovak State Council, a legislative-executive body ofBenes's government-in-exile in London. 30 J. Papanek' s negative attitude towards Hodza 's political views was widely known. Papanek disagreed with decentralisation to the extent advocated by Hodza. The head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA expressed his attitude towards Hodza in one of his letters to Benes in January of 1942: "I do not agree with the policy of decentralization or self-government on the scale suggested by Lichner and Hodfa. I am convinced that this would lead to a new Zilina [agreement on Slova- �SLOVAKIA 47 fa's goal was to split the ranks of Slovak Americans, who had been, until his arrival, predominantly in full support of the Czechoslovak government headed by Bene~. Professor Kozak, a former member of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, called Hodfa 's Central European Agrarian Bloc a reactionary body which collaborated with non-democrats. Benau, editor of the "Czechoslovak" New Yorksky dennik, added that Hodfa had a dubious financial past. Hodfa's entree into Slovak-American politics was facilitated by his long-time friend and associate Michal Mudry Sebik. With his assistance, Hodfa first approached the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance. On May 22, 1942, during the meeting of the SNA's Central Committee in Detroit, which discussed Hodfa 's lecture tour, the majority of the Committee expressed their support for Hodfa's political programme.31 At that time, Hodza formulated his position on the Slovak question as follows : 1. A Slovak Parliament and Slovak judiciary; 2. Slovak self-government, 3. Slovak as the only official language in Slovakia. With this political aim he launched a series of lectures at local branches of the SNA. However, the decision of the Central Committee was strongly challenged by the conservative wing of the SNA leadership. At the June meeting of the Executive Board, the president, secretary and treasurer of the organization announced their opposition to the decision taken by the Central Committee on May 22. According to these leaders, Hodfa's demands were a mere repetition of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which concerned the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. The leaders proclaimed that, as American citizens, they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic, because that was against the SNA programme as well as American law. In addition to that, the proclamation of the Executive Board pointed out that, it was thanks to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that Slovaks were not considered enemies of the Allies. Discussions about Slovakia's political future were destroying the unity of the SNA and threatened the future of the Slovak people. In the final part of the proclamation, the three members of the Executive Board issued a warning: "Disputes over things which do not concern us as American citizens - among these disputes is the question of selfgovernment of the Slovak nation - harm our country, harm all of us, and kia's autonomy, signed Oct. 6, 1938) and all that followed." Slavomir Michalek, Jan Papanek za vojny Bene.fovi. Vyber z dokumentov 1939 - 1945 (Bratislava: VEDA, 1997), 97. 31 Fifteen members of the Central Committee were in favour of Hodza' s lectures, twelve were against. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT9CZ-82. Later M. Mudry observed: "The meeting of the SNA ' s Central Committee in Detroit was especially important in the history of Slovaks. It showed that the great majority of Slovak Americans, in favour of the Czechoslovak Republic, preferred the Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement as it was outlined by Dr. M. Hodza." Mudry, Milan Hodi a v Amerike ..., 32. �48 SLOVAKIA only help the enemy!" 32 The position proclaimed by the Executive Board on June 29 confused other SNA leaders, as well as its rank-and-file. At the same time, it spurred a new wave of discussion about the position of the organization on the Slovak question, which continued throughout 1942. Several days before his second visit to the Department of State, Hodza had an appointment with Poole and J. C. Wiley of the OSS. After the SNA meeting in Detroit, Hodfa expressed his views openly, and his criticism of his opponents was sharper, on occasion turning into personal attacks. He told the OSS officers that his goals were to mobilize Slovak Americans and win their support for a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovak Republic. He reiterated that the Czechoslovak constitutional arrangement, agreed upon by the Czechoslovak cabinet in July of 1938, was legally valid and politically binding. During one conversation, the OSS officers noted, Hodfa "disclosed a determined opposition to what he called the centralism in the Czechoslovakian constitutional practice of Benes and his entourage." 33 He criticized Benes, who, during their London talks in 1939, had been deliberately evasive and noncommittal regarding discussion of Slovakia's constitutional status. In talks with American government officials, Hodfa maintained that the campaign against himself in the USA had been masterminded by Papanek. The head of the CIS was not, in Hodfa' s words, to any degree a political figure, but merely an agent and intriguer for Benes.34 Apart from the members of the SNA, Hodfa was also planning to address the Slovak American Catholics associated within the Slovak League of America. As Hodfa put it bluntly in his conversation with Poole, he intended to "destroy this organisation" by winning over its popular support, leaving its leaders without any following, which he believed was very weak. 35 Meeting the OSS officers provided Hodfa with an opportunity to get some feedback on how his political activities were viewed by the administration. On this, the position of the OSS and the government was clear and unequivocal. American authorities were anxious not to see American 32 The Proclamation of the SNA Executive Board was signed by its President, Jaroslav Pelikan, Secretary Jan W. Golosinec and Treasurer Vaclav Hovorka. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-82. 33 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. I. 34 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. On this occasion Hodfa also expressed his firm belief in winning the forthcoming trial against the Overseas News Agency. He was convinced that the ONA had obtained its libellous information against him from Pap{mek, who was to be identified as the true culprit. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. 35 Hodfa told the OSS that the local branch of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, NJ, came out in open support of his programme, as did the First Catholic Slovak Union in Wilkes-Barre, PA. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1/2 Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. �SLOVAKIA 49 citizens and alien residents fighting over European political issues on American soil. 36 The concerns of the American government about the unity of Slovak Americans were aired once again during Hodza's second visit to the Department of State on June 18, 1942.37 Hodza met H. Hoskins and C. Cannon. On the same day he spoke on the telephone to Assistant Secretary Berle. Hoskins and Cannon were interested in Hodfa's ongoing lecture tour among Slovak Americans. The former Czechoslovak premier did not hide his optimism and spoke extremely positively about his campaign.38 He was keen to ascertain how his activities were viewed by the Department of State. In response to his query, Assistant Secretary Berle told Hodfa that he thought that his "efforts had been in the right direction. "39 He made it clear, though, that the American government did not wish American unity to be disturbed by conflicts among Americans of foreign descent. Apparently, what the Assistant Secretary had in mind under "efforts in the right direction" were activities that would strengthen Czechoslovak unity in the USA. It was obvious that Slovakia's political future per se played a secondary role, if any, in the Department of State's post-war strategic planning. We can only wonder whether the Department of State had been informed about the results of the SNA' s Detroit meeting at the time of Hodza 's telephone conversation with Berle. It can be argued that, if it had been the case, the Assistant Secretary would not have so favorably assessed Hodza's activities. At any rate, Hodfa took Berle's statement as an expression of approval of his American campaign. He told this to Poole two days later while travelling with him on the train to New York. 40 During this conversation, Hodza reiterated that he was determined to get on with his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and to work on the project of the Central European Federa36 Hodza reacted to this open allusion to his political activities in the USA by assuring the OSS officers that in this respect there could be no objections to his campaign, since his primary aim was to unite, not to divide all Slovak Americans. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. 37 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910- 1944. 38 Lukac quotes from the Memorandum of conversation of June 18 : "Since then he has been in touch with various Slovak groups in this country and felt he had made progress in his efforts to convince them that Slovakia should work out its problem within the framework of the present republic, not as a small independent state". Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 613. 39 Lukac points out that the original memorandum contains the following handwritten note beside the word "efforts": "This related only to his effort to reduce the controversies between Czechs and Slovaks and similar peacemaking attempts." Ibid., 614. 40 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0 1/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Author of report D. C. Poole, June 20, 1942. Poole observed Hodfa's satisfaction with his visit to the Department of State. �50 SLOVAKIA tion.41 He suggested to Poole that American authorities could get in touch with some of his Hungarian and Yugoslav friends who were in favour of such a federation. 42 In return, the OSS officer promised to put him in touch with another academic institution, which would enable him to lecture at universities in his capacity as a former history professor. 43 While lecturing to Slovak Americans during the summer of 1942, Hodza found himself yet again the target of unwanted publicity. This time, Hodza ' s political opponents broadcast their views on New York-based radio station WMCA. Though the statements made by the radio commentator are not known, we do know that they drew an indignant response from Hodza. Following the broadcast by WMCA on July 28th, 1942, Hodza contacted Dr. Morris D. Forkosch, his New York-based lawyer, with a view to bringing legal action against the radio commentator. Hodza was adamant that Johannes Steele, the radio presenter in question, as well as his "sponsors," by which Hodza meant the people who supplied him with the slanderous information, should be sued for libel. This, however, was not to be. Four months later, Hodza abruptly asked his lawyer to drop the suit. In one of his telegrams to Forkosch in mid-October, Hodza wrote: "It is imperative that you immediately and explicitly advise the new sponsors of the radio commentator and others you approached that you acted upon mistaken instructions and to withdraw steps [sic.]."44 From Hodza's correspondence with Forkosch we learn that the defendants (Steele, the WMCA, the Terminal Shops) accepted some sort of "settlement," though it is not at all clear what this arrangement was. What remains baffling is what made Hodza change his mind. Money may have been part of it. Hodza had been dogged by financial problems since his arrival in the United States. On the other hand, Hodza 41 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /446-l /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 2. Hodfa referred specifically to a Hungarian, John Polonyi, and a Yugoslav, Bof olyub Jeftich. 3 During this conversation Hodfa expressed his interest in giving informal talks and participating in conferences as a historian of the 19th century. Poole had facilitated academic contacts for Hodza before. In the autumn of 1941 he introduced him to Dr. Duggan, Director of the International Institute of Education and later to Malcolm Davis, who was to assist in Hodfa 's cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 44 In his letter to Hodfa from October 28, 1942, Forkosch recounted all the telegraphic communications between him and Hodfa related to the libel suit. He did this, presumably, to clarify all possible misunderstandings as to what Hodfa really wanted and what his instructions to Forkosch were. Forkosch, however, did not provide any reasons for his client 's decision to drop the case. NARS, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129. Copy of M. D. Forkosch 's letter to Hodfa, October 28, 1942, p. I. 42 �SLOVAKIA 51 would hardly have initiated a costly new lawsuit if he had not been convinced that he stood a fair chance of having his name cleared and his political detractors exposed. 45 The FNB files remain silent as to who supplied the WMCA with the information or what motivation drove its commentator to attack Hodza over the airwaves. Michal Mudry Sebik had little doubt that public attacks against Hodza were masterminded by Jan Papanek, and condoned by Benes's Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Hurban. This view has not been contested by any Hodza historians. So far, however, there has been no reliable evidence to prove that this was indeed the case. As far as the American government was concerned, it knew all about the perpetrators of the anti-Hodza smear campaign since June of 1943. The ideological split in the Slovak-American community, partially caused by Hodfa' s political campaign, was a source of growing concern to the American government. Amidst fears for the unity of Slovak Americans, the Department of State, in co-operation with several other government agencies, decided to take action. On September 14, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) organized in Pittsburgh a conference of Slovak newspaper editors and presidents of Slovak organizations.46 The intention of the OWI organizers was to unify Slovak-American organizations and persuade their leaders to sign a joint declaration expressing Slovak support for the U.S. government and, at the same time, condemning its enemies, including the Slovak Republic. At the actual conference two resolutions were passed. According to the OSS, on the previous day the members of the Resolution Committee had consulted the wording of both resolutions with Hodza, who had arrived earlier in Pittsburgh.47 The first resolution pledged allegiance to the government of the United States and its president. The second one outlined the principles concerning Slovakia's political future, in line with the Atlantic Charter. It stated, among other things, that Czechoslovakia should be "recreated on a basis of equal rights, equal privileges, equal opportunities and equal obligations."48 This passage, however, elicited strong objections 45 Hodza's libel suit against the Overseas News Agency had been dragging on and off since November of 1941. The case was finally closed in June of 1943. 46 The conference was held at the William Penn Hotel. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. OSS, V. P. Backora to Dr. Kelso, September 16, 1942. 47 NARS, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. In the lead-up to the conference, Hodza met with Vendelin Platek, president of the National Slovak Society (NSS), Emil Stankoviansky, editor of Slovensky h/asnik [Slovak Herald] , the organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and J. Willo (NSS), chairman of the Resolution Committee. 48 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-143 . A photocopy of the September 14 resolution was published in Slovensky hlasnik on Octo- �52 SLOVAKIA from the "Czechoslovak" hardliners and followers of Benes under the leadership of Jaroslav Pelikan. The text of the second resolution had to be rephrased, and the controversial part concerning the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was eventually omitted. In this form, the resolutions did not please any of the participants. The outcome of the conference left both sides unhappy. The OWI had received a token expression of Slovak allegiance, but the disgruntled Slovak leaders, seeking more definite commitments regarding Slovakia' s future, remained dissatisfied.49 The efforts of the Department of State and the OSS to direct Hodza's activities in favour of Slovak-American unity continued after the unsuccessful conference in Pittsburgh. On September 17, 1942 Assistant Secretary Berle wrote a letter to the OSS in which he asked Poole to settle the ongoing arguments between Papanek and Hodza. In this letter he reiterated the stance of the U.S. government as it was set out in June of 1942. The priorities of the Department did not lie in the various merits and demerits of the argument about the Slovak question, but in the need for unity and peace among Slovak Americans, which would contribute to victory in the war. 50 The concerns of the U.S . government were further exacerbated about two months later when the leaders of Slovak organizations and Hodza 's followers called a new conference with the intention of rallying the Slovak Americans behind Hodza's political programme. A new umbrella organization was established - the Council of Slovak American Organizations and Newspapers (hereafter CASON). This organization later succeeded in encouraging cooperation with some of the Catholic fraternal organizations. Politically, it subscribed to the restoration of Czechoslovakia, but in contrast to Benes's government-in-exile, it demanded a more definite commitment on Slovakia's status after the war. 51 This development was highly undesirable from the standpoint of the U.S . administration, which had only recently confirmed its definitive recognition of Benes's government in Lon- her I, 1942. The resolution was signed by twenty-four Slovak leaders and newspa£er editors. 9 As the OSS observer put it: "The compromise resolution satisfies no one but it is at least a step forward . Hodza is still causing disunity among the American Slovaks." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. 50 "The State Department is not at present interested in the merits of the controversy, but it has, of course, a very distinct interest in preserving that harmony and unity which best contributes towards winning the war." Quoted from the letter of A. Berle to D. C. Poole (NARA 860f. 00/993). See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodi u .. ., 617,note44. 51 The main figures behind the establishment of CASON were the President of the NSS, V. Platek, the President of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Michal Vargovich, and Jan Bradac, at that time the Honorary President of the SNA. �SLOVAKIA 53 don.52 Hodfa 's campaign among Slovak Americans was becoming an ever more pressing political problem for the U.S. administration. In its March report, the OSS recommended that the State Department step in: "It would be of great value and benefit all around, if our State Department would speak nicely to Mr .Hodja [sic.] and advise him to apply his talents towards unity and not disruption among the Slovak Americans." 53 Throughout 1943, apart from campaigning among Slovak Americans, Hodfa was occupied with, and increasingly alarmed by, the developments in Czechoslovak foreign policy under Benes's leadership. In May - June, the president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile came on an official visit of the United States, where he was met by the highest officials in the country, including the Secretary of State. One of the primary objectives of the president's visit was to gain American approval for his planned journey to Moscow towards the end of the year. There, Benes was planning to sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. This diplomatic initiative was the pinnacle of Benes's efforts to change the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy during WW II. From then on, the international security of the country was no longer to be guaranteed by military alliances with the Western Powers. Instead, it was to be safeguarded through close cooperation and coordination of its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. It remains unclear whether, in the summer of 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt voiced their approval of the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. According to Benes's personal secretary, Edvard Taborsky, Berle said that the United States followed no specific plans in relation to Central Europe, nor did they have any intention of negotiating with Hodfa on this issue.54 It appears that the ill-defined position of the Roosevelt administration in 1943 confirmed Benes's conviction that the United States did not hold any objections to Czechoslovakia's new Soviet-oriented foreign policy. Hodza, by contrast, regarded the conclusion of the treaty in December 1943 as a very dangerous step on the road to creating a new Soviet sphere of influence. He also feared that, after the war, the Soviet Union would try to impose on Czechoslovakia a political system similar to its own. Moreover, Hodfa was deeply convinced that Slovaks had not a scintilla of sympa- 52 The definiti ve American recognition of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile was granted on October 28, 1942. 53 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E 142, Box 3. Re: Recent Slovak Affairs, Milan Hodia, Jozef Hu~ek, Fedor Salva, etc., April 3, 1942. 54 According to Taborsky, Berle felt the need to defend himself against allegations that he sympathized with Hodia. "Hodfa was your prime minister and now he is a refugee. We respect him as such, but we will make no political deals with him, I can say this categorically." See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 620. Document quoted: NARA, 860F. 00/1009. �54 SLOVAKIA thy for Russian Bolshevism. He objected vigorously to the treaty, and made his criticism heard. Benes's visit to the United States presented the head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch with a perfect opportunity to cut troublesome Hodza down to size. Hodza ' s long-standing legal feud with the Overseas News Agency (ONA) carried potential risks not only for the news agency itself, but for the whole of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Back in December of I 941 , Hodza had complained to the Office of the Coordination of Information that the ONA had been spreading word that he was a fascist collaborating with Otto von Habsburg and Tibor Eckhardt in a plot hatched by German generals to eliminate Hitler with a view to negotiating a separate peace.55 The same source branded the majority of Slovak Americans as isolationist and pro-fascist. Hodza was convinced that if the ONA was made to disclose its source, some of the top Czechoslovak authorities in the USA would be implicated. In June of 1943, the American court which was investigating the libel suit, required the ONA to answer a set of questions contained in a bill of particulars. One of them inquired about the source the ONA drew upon in its news release of November 7, 1941 . Shortly before the deadline by which the ONA was to comply, the case took an unexpected turn. On June 1st, Jacob Landau, the agency's managing director, paid a visit to Poole in his Washington office. He briefed the FNB boss about the case and discussed the questions in the bill of particulars. Later on, in his report of the meeting, Poole noted: "If ONA had to answer, Mr. Landau asserted, one of the sources to be named would be the Czechoslovak Ambassador [in the United States] ." Such a development was, from the perspective of the U.S. government, highly undesirable. Not only would it expose its wartime ally - the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - as the source of the anti-Hodza smear campaign, it would also fan the flames of the Benes-Hodza controversy among Slovak Americans. Although the head of the FNB felt he was not in a position to "interfere in an official way," he promised Landau that he would talk to Hodfa in order to make him "freely desi st" from the libel suit. Three days later in New York, Poole broached the subject of anti-Hodza propaganda in his conversation with Jan Papanek, the head of the Czechoslovak Information Service (hereafter CIS) in the United States. Without telling him what he knew from Landau, Poole received from the CIS head a resolute denial of any involvement on the part of the Czechoslovak government. Nevertheless, Papanek was very pleased with Poole 's intention to convince Hodza to desist from the case. On his part, the Czechoslovak propaganda boss promised he would do his utmost 55 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-9CZ-22, p. I. Memorandum of conversation between John. C. Wiley and Milan Hodia, December 4, I 94 I. �SLOVAKIA 55 to prevent further escalation of the Hodza-Benes controversy. He also mentioned to Poole that during his visit in the States, Benes held a long private conversation with Jan Palka, Hodfa's son-in-law. This information, whether imparted casually or by design, presented the head of the FNB with the bargaining leverage he so much needed in his dealings with Hodfa. Although Papanek did not tell Poole what Palka had discussed with Benes, it was not difficult to surmise. Hodfa's dire financial situation was an open secret in Czechoslovak circles, and the OSS knew about it. Until his death in 1944, Hodfa struggled to keep his political campaign in America financially afloat. In October of 1942, for example, he asked the Polish government-in-exile for $650. 56 In May of the following year, Hodfa asked Slovak-American leader Vendelin Platek to help him out financially. The only regular income Hod.fa had was a monthly salary of $250 received from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile for his absentee membership in the London-based State Council. The money was payable to the account of Hodfa 's wife, who, at that time, resided in Chicago. Being well-informed of Hodfa's financial woes, Poole decided to use this information in the name of national interest. On June 5th, he telephoned Hodza, who was convalescing in Clearwater, Florida. The subject of the conversation was the ONA libel suit. According to Poole's account, Hodfa was tired of the longstanding legal battle and "had really lost interest in the matter." 57 This was borne out by David Karr, who had been following the case at the Office of War Information He informed Poole in November of 1942 that Hodza had indeed tried to drop his lawsuit, but this had not happened because of some misunderstanding between him and his lawyers. 58 As the secret memorandum of the telephone conversation between the two men suggests, Poole pressured Hodza to discontinue his campaign among Slovak Americans. During the conversation he hinted that both he and President Benes had been well aware of his financial difficulties. Poole then played his trump 56 Dusan Seges, "Ohlas sudobej krajanskej tlace na politicke posobenie Milana Hodzu v USA v rokoch 1941 - 1944," in Milan Hodia politik a i urnalista, ed. M. Peknik (Bratislava: Veda, 2008), 185 . In his article, Seges writes that Hodza wanted to use the money to gain a dominant influence on the Slovak-American newspaper Slovensky Hlasnik. Seges maintains that in the end Hodza succeeded in getting some of the money. 57 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943. 58 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129, November 18, 1942. In his report, D. C. Poole clarified: "He [David Karr] thought that there had been some misunderstanding, in consequence probably of Dr. Hodza's imperfect command of English. Specifically, Mr. Karr gained the impression that Dr. Hodza had instructed his attorneys 'to settle,' meaning come to a final friendly adjustment; but the attorneys interpreted this to refer to obtaining a 'settlement' ." �56 SLOVAKIA card. He reassured his interlocutor that he had "obtained satisfactory assurances from Dr. Benes that Dr. Hodza's personal situation would not be disturbed."59 To make himself absolutely clear, the head of the FNB pointed out to Hodfa that "It would seem unfortunate if by pressing the suit against the Overseas News Agency at this time he should bring on a change."60 Though elegantly phrased, to Hodfa 's ears Poole's talk must have sounded like nothing more than political blackmail. There is little doubt that Hodfa took his words at face value. In the following days he contacted his lawyer. In order to find out whether he had really done so, Poole telephoned Hodza again on June 10th. Hodfa confirmed that he had instructed his lawyer via telegraph to terminate the suit. Fear for the post-war scenario in Central Europe prompted Hodza to draw up a document - Europe at the Crossroads - which he sent to the State Department in March of 1944.6 1 This memorandum analyzed the political situation in Central Europe within the context of its states' relations with the Soviet Union. Hodfa pointed to the undemocratic character of the Soviet political system, and warned against its application in any form . He challenged Benes's arguments, according to which the new foreign policy realignment with the Soviet Union was unavoidable. Hodza argued that by signing the treaty, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile willingly entered into the Soviet sphere of influence and thus became an instrument of the Russian Drang nach dem Westen. He rejected the policy of creating a "special sphere," the necessity of which Benes justified by the failure of the Western Powers and the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia" in 1938. He contended that no sphere of influence was able to guarantee the sovereignty of small countries. The only guarantee of security, Hodza maintained, was a system of collective security similar to the one promulgated by the Ameri59 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943 . 60 Tbid. 61 Some historians doubt whether or not the Department of State actually received the memorandum. Lukac, who did not have a copy of the document at his disposal, claimed that "Despite the fact that several authors claim the memorandum was sent to the Department, including the author of this article, there is no copy of Europe at the Crossroads in the State Department archives. We can only speculate what fate it met, whether it was sent at all or "got lost" in American archives. " Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. . , 622. The author of this study (R. Licko) can confirm that a copy of this 22-page-long memorandum is kept in the National Archives in Washington, in the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch section with signature INT-32A-75. Moreover, there is also firm evidence that the memorandum was read at the State Department. D. C. Poole, chief of the FNB, summarised its contents in his report of March 8, 1944. �SLOVAKIA 57 cans and the British in the form of the United Nations. The final victory was achievable only as a "collective victory," with collective war aims. He went on to write, with bitter regret, that the "official Czecho-Slovak policy obviously relinquished this imperative requirement of all alliances." 62 Hod.fa expressed his belief that "Czecho-Slovakia surely deserves a better fate than to become the victim of any personal rule or of any kind of soviet system."63 The memorandum also touches upon the position of the U.S. government, which chose not to reject the treaty. Hod.fa respected this view. However, the American position did not, in his opinion, change the simple fact that the treaty had contributed significantly to the creation of spheres of influence, whose catastrophic consequences would have to be dealt with after the war through a system of collective security. Part V of the memorandum was devoted to the Slovak question. According to Hodfa, the majority of Slovaks, with only a handful of opponents, demanded fair self-government for Slovakia. This demand was in stark contrast to the stubborn centralism of Benes and his political supporters in exile. Hodza's disapproval of the Soviet Union ' s influence, in relation to Slovakia's future, was based upon his conviction that the Soviet political system was incompatible with the political and cultural traditions of Slovaks. Hodza vehemently denied that Slovaks had ever sympathized with Communism. He also reminded the State Department that Slovaks had been fighting against Nazism on the Eastern as well as the Western fronts. Moreover, the majority of the Slovak soldiers who had defected from the Slovak army were, in Hod.fa ' s opinion, anti-Communists, with whom he had maintained radio contact. They desired, on the whole, a "Slovakia administered by Slovaks." Hodfa vigorously denied the allegations, current at the time, that Slovaks had not fought against Fascism. According to his information, as many as 75% of the Czecho-Slovak Army personnel in France between 1939 and 1940 were Slovaks.64 Europe at the Crossroads was Hod.fa' s last attempt to influence the U.S. administration. His memorandum was thoroughly analyzed by the OSS. The political analyst who studied it related its content to his superior DeWitt Poole.65 In the introduction of the report, its author noted: "It confirms my impression of him as a man of a high degree of peasant shrewdness." The OSS shared Hod.fa's concerns about the future of small Central European nations after the war: "The European peoples, more particularly, the East European nationnalities, will be potter's clay in the coming interplay of forces." The author fully sanctioned Hodza' s proposal to hold plebi62 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, I 942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75 , p. 15. lbid., p. 19. 64 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75. 65 Julian Towster to D. C. Poole, March 8, 1944. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, fNT-3 2A-75 . 63 �58 SLOVAKIA scites in Central Europe, ideally under the auspices of the United Nations. 66 Russia's willingness, or lack thereof, to respect the free will of Central Europeans was to be a clear indication of how far this country intended to go in improving its relations with the Western Allies in the post-war period. The OSS report did not pay any particular attention to the issue of Slovakia's future after the war. At the time when the State Department received the OSS report, Hodza had been undergoing medical treatment in a holiday resort in Florida. Despite several periods of improvement during his stay in the United States, Hodza never recovered from his illness. On June 27, 1944, after an operation in Clearwater, Hodza succumbed to his illness. 67 His death was an immense loss, primarily to the advocates of Slovak self-government. Moreover, there was a general opinion among Slovak-American leaders that, apart from Stefan Osusky, there was no other political leader at that time who would have been able to unite the politically fragmented Slovak Americans.68 Having been a prominent Central European politician and statesman throughout his life, Hodza's death elicited obituaries in a number of leading dailies around the world. 69 His life-long political contribution to politics was acknowledged by the Czechoslovak government, and even by his political enemies, including Edvard Benes. Belatedly, the U.S. government paid 66 "Hodza is perfectly right in emphasizing the plebiscite angle. Plebiscites may not always have been the best yardstick of true national sentiment, but the principle of unhindered expression of such sentiment and of consultation between the leading United Nations members in regard to securing such expression goes to the heart of the problem." 67 Hodfa suffered from cancer of the large intestine. According to the autopsy report, the immediate cause of death was a complication - internal obturation during the operation . Hodza never regained consciousness. See Lukac, "Posledne chvile Milana Hodzu," in Obcianska spolocnost', no. 8 (August, 2000), I 0. 68 The Slovak leaders, especially those associated in the CASON, suggested Stefan Osusky as Hodfa's possible successor, because they did not regard Hodfa' s aide, Mudry Sebik, as a "strong and effective" leader. FBI, Chicago File No. 100-15744, January 25 , 1945 . Report: Slovak National Alliance, p. 7. Another FBI report written by its director on July 1, 1944, advised the Department of State of Osusky' s intention to ask for permission to enter the United States. In addition to giving a brief account ofOsusky's political career, the report states that V. Platek, the leader of the National Slovak Society, wrote a letter to Osusky as early as in June of 1943 . In it, Platek asked Osusky to come to the United States and to assume the leadership of Slovak Americans together with Hodfa. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.202 l l/71844 PSNL, Roll 31, 1940 - 1944. Memorandum of J. E. Hoover to A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State. Subject: Milan Hodza and Stefan (Stephen) Osusky, July I, 1944. 69 The New York Times published Hodfa 's obituary on June 29, 1944. On July 4, 1944 the newspaper reported on Hodfa's funeral in Chicago. �SLOVAKIA 59 tribute to this outstanding Czechoslovak statesman. In 1951 , U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles praised Hodfa's understanding of the mutual interdependence of sovereign and equal peoples, and acknowledged Hodfa's contribution to the cause of European unity.70 Given the scope of Hodfa's plans and activities in the United States during WW II, one has to ask oneself: what did the Roosevelt administration's foreign policymakers make of Hodfa's federalization plans, and what solution, if any, did they think desirable in the dispute about Slovakia's post-war future? What significance did Hodfa's plans play in American strategic planning in Central Europe? Were these in line with the existing American blueprint for the overall European peace settlement, or did they contradict it? To what extent were Hodfa's plans for a Central European federation examined, and what political will was there to intervene in the debate on the post-war status of Slovakia? American and European historians more or less share the same view that Central Europe, throughout WW II, was not an area of priority in the United States' strategic planning. United States foreign policy in Central Europe was the outcome of a variety of factors, domestic and international, and on the whole it could be characterized as unsystematic.71 Another characteristic of this policy was the fact that the United States' attitudes towards Eastern Europe went through several changes during WW IL To a large extent, these changes were the result of the personal influence of key political figures in the White House, as well as in the Department of State. It is commonly known that, at the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt was an advocate of the doctrine of the Four Policemen, according to which the four greatest powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - were expected to take over the responsibility for the post-war political organization of the territories subjected to their influence. In Central Europe, this would mean an unprecedented increase in Soviet influence, given that Germany was to be disarmed after the war and its influence eliminated for good. From the standpoint ofHodfa's political plans, this represented an undesirable return to spheres of influence against which he so persistently warned. 70 Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 625 . The Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad summarizes the non-systematic nature of this policy as follows: "So tenuous was the coherence of the many diverse elements in these policies, fluctuating in response to political and economic forces within the US itself, to local events in Eastern Europe, and to the challenges inherent in Great Power rivalry, that I have chosen the term the American non-policy to describe the end result of the various influencing factors . American policy-makers were never quite able to make up their minds about the importance of Eastern Europe to the United States." Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (Oslo : Universitets forlaget, 1978), 34. 71 �60 SLOVAKIA Quite a different view of the post-war world order was held by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He advocated a vision of a globalized world, in which economic and political conflicts among sovereign countries were to be solved through a world organization.72 However, the idea of resurrecting a world organization on the principle of the interwar League of Nations was extremely unpopular in the United States. Warming up to such an idea took some time and was a gradual process.73 After the resignation of Sumner Welles from the position of Under Secretary of State in 1943, Cordell Hull finally succeeded in convincing the conservative-minded Department of State to accept the idea of a new United Nations. In relation to Central Europe, the new line in foreign policy resulted in the conviction that the reformed system of collective security would prevent the recreation of old spheres of influence. This was also the reason why the State Department was very reluctant to give its views on the various integration schemes of the Central European governments in exile. The growing influence of the Soviet Union in this area was a worrying development for the Roosevelt administration, but did not lead to a significant shift in the established policy of non-intervention.74 Surprisingly enough, despite the negative attitude towards European integration in general, the archival documents of the Department of State suggest that the U.S. foreign policy makers devoted con72 This track of American foreign policy in the 20th century is frequently referred to as "globalism," or, "universalism." See Michael Lind, "The Twilight of the U.N.," The New Republic, October 30, 1995, p. 28 . 73 The League of Nations, created in 1920, was part of the peace initiative of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, generally known as the "Fourteen Points." In terms of conflict resolution and international security, the organization's philosophy was based upon the principle of collective security, which stood in opposition to the notion of the balance of power and advancement of national interests. The U.S. Congress, however, refused to ratify the League' s Covenant. Wilson ' s peace initiative is often criticized and branded as an example of American political idealism. From the point of view of international relations, Wilson's plan stemmed from "idealistic and liberal dissatisfaction with the international anarchy, balance of power and the concept of self-help which had hitherto characterized the state-system." Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin books, 1998), p. 300. 74 In the introduction to his book The Myth of Liberation; East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 , Bennett Kovrig described American idealism in relation to Central Europe in the words of A. J. P. Taylor: "democratic foreign policy must be idealistic, or at the very least it has to be justified in terms of great general principles ". Kovrig added, "Yet the reader will find few villains and even fewer heroes, for seldom in the history of America 's foreign relations have good intentions reaped such a bitter harvest". Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation; EastCentral Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 194! (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), x. �SLOVAKIA 61 siderable time to various integration schemes such as those proposed by Hodza. 75 The duties of investigating and assessing these plans, as well as drawing up recommendations which were to serve as guidelines in American post-war foreign policy, were entrusted to the Department of State Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.76 Browsing through the minutes of the Advisory Committee between May 1942 and March 1944 gives one some idea of how much time and space the Department of State devoted to federalization plans for Central Europe and what attitudes towards them various committee members maintained. On May 9, the Committee's agenda included the so-called Danubian Federation 77 The discussions focused on two plans drawn up by politicians in exile. One of these plans was the proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish union, put forward in the United States by the exiled Polish Prime Minister 75 Documentary sources from the American archives relating to the U.S. attitudes towards Central European integration were collected and annotated by the Polish authors J. Laptos and M. Misztal Marius, American Debates on Central European Unio n, 1942 - 1944. Documents of the American State Department (Brussels & New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2002). 76 F. D. Roosevelt approved of the establishment of the Advisory Committee three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 28, 1941 . It included academics as well as leading officers of the Department of State. The Committee reported directly to the State Secretary. At that time, the position of vice-chairman was held by Under Secretary Sumner Welles. Everyday activities were overseen by Leo Pasvolsky. The Advisory Committee had six subcommittees, the most important of which were those dedicated to political, economic and territorial issues. Other key figures on the Committee who specialised in Central Europe were Hamilton Fish Armstrong ( 1893 - 1973) and Adolf A. Berle. It was the latter who was often believed by Czech and Slovak emigres to have harboured sympathies for Hodza's plans. The Committee 's job was to draw up general guidelines for the United States in peace negotiations. The official activity of this Committee was ended in the summer of 1943, but many of its members continued their work on other committees until the end of the war. The Committee 's research team drew up hundreds of reports, situational analyses and recommendations, which became a blueprint for the discussions and proceedings of the Committee and its subcommittees. Regular minutes of the subcommittees' discussions were kept. The documentation produced by the Advisory Committee is deposited in the National Archives in the Notter File. See Ignac Romcis, "Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Documents from the U.S. Department of State, 1942 - 1944" Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, [online] , 1992, 30, no. 77 . [Quoted: 2008-06-05] . Available at: <http ://www.hungarianhistory.hu> 77 The term "Danubian Federation" was chosen by the Advisory Committee to refer to the integration efforts of the Central European countries in the Danubian region. The discussions of the Advisory Committee on the "Danubian Federation" included possible membership for Poland and Austria. �62 SLOVAKIA Wladyslaw Sikorski. 78 The other was the Danubian Federation, championed by exiled Hungarian politicians Tibor Eckhardt and Janos Pelenyi.79 Hodfa's federation plan was not included. It was referred to only marginally by a member of the Committee, Anne McCormick. 80 She mentioned Hodfa as an agrarian politician who had been involved in solving agrarian problems.81 The foreign policy analyst went on to inform the Committee, quite misleadingly, that Hod:fa 's plan limited itself to the Danubian region.82 This ignorance of the details of Hodza's plan is interesting, because by that time Hodfa had already spoken about his plans to The New York Times and, more importantly, must have made his views known at the State Department during his first visit. 83 Hodfa 's plan was almost completely 78 Laptos and Mizstal pointed out that Sikorski 's plan for federation was dealt with only briefly. According to the information available to the Committee, Sikorski's federation was to comprise Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The plan envisaged the complete economic federation and eventual political federation of its constituent countries. According to the Advisory Committee, Polish influence in the thus-constituted federation was obvious, though the sheer scale of the supranational state ruled out complete Polish domination. Laptos and Mizstal, .American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 74. 79 Tibor Eckhardt was a Hungarian politician of the interwar period. In 1938 he represented Hungary at the League of Nations Assembly. In 1941 he was sent on a mission to the USA by Miklos Horthy in order to approach the Allies and the Hungarian democratic opposition. Eckhardt's federation was brought to the attention of the Committee by Under Secretary of State Welles. According to this plan, Central Europe was to be divided into three parts: a Polish-Baltic bloc, a Balkan bloc and a "Danubian" union,comprising Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Slovakia and Transylvania, with the possibility of the later admission of Croatia. The unifying element of the federation was to be their common history as part of the Habsburg monarchy. NARCS Notter File, Department of State. Minutes P - I 0, Danubian Federation, May 9, 1942. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 74. 80 Anne O ' Hare McCormick (1882 - 1954), a member of the Advisory Committee, was a foreign policy analyst for The New York Times. 81 The minutes of the meeting captured McCormick's information on Hodza and his plan as follows: " Mrs. McCormick said that mention might also be made of the Hodfa plan, which confines itself to the Danubian area. Mr. Hodfa, she pointed out, being a peasant, is chiefly concerned with the agricultural problem. His plan expresses the aspirations of the Green International." Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 75. 82 In Hodza's plan the core of the proposed federation was to be formed by CzechoSlovakia and Poland, who were to be joined by other countries in the south of Central Europe. 83 See Hope Put in Union of Central Europe, the OSS report on the interview with M. Hodza. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-1 , December 7, 1941 . �SLOVAKIA 63 ignored. It was mentioned in passing in connection with the association of agrarian parties known as the Green International. American foreign policy advisors again failed to include Hodza's plan when they discussed the so-called East European Union as one of the issues related to the Department of State's plans to create a world organization. 84 The members of the Division of Special Research discussed, among other things, the results of the negotiations between the exiled governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland on the creation of a joint union .85 In mid-June of 1942, the Department of State presented to the Advisory Committee the first draft of American recommendations which any supranational organization in Central Europe should comply with. One of the main differences, in comparison with Hodza's plan, was that the United States preferred a union to a federation. This preference reflected the Roosevelt administration's unwillingness to sanction political integration. What the Department of State recommended was a loose organization of free sovereign states, which would be able to advance their interests through joint, non-legislative institutions. Such an economic union was to comprise all states of Central and Eastern Europe, including countries as far apart as Estonia, Austria and Greece.86 The establishment of this union would have to take place under the auspices of the United Nations. The main rationale was that the establishment of such a union would solve the existing security problems and bring with it economic advantages as a result of regional cooperation. The territorial integrity of the union was to be safeguarded by the United Nations, and the security forces of the union were to act in concordance with the security system of the United Nations. After the war, the world organization was to facilitate the creation of the union by adjusting all outstanding border claims. What is most striking to the European reader about the attitudes of the American government are its views on the armed forces of member 84 The meeting of the Division of Special Research, which prepared reports for the Advisory Committee, took place on June 6, I 942. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P 14, June 6, I 942 . NARA, Notter File, Box 65 ., Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 96 - 103. 85 For the history of the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations on uniting, including the attitudes of the United States and the other great powers, see Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943. 86 " The regional organization should have the form not of a federation but of a union of independent and sovereign states, cooperating for limited objectives through common non-legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized. Provisionally the union is considered as including all states of Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany from and including Estonia in the North to Austria in the West and Greece in the South." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P Document 24, June 19, 1942. NARA, Notter File, box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 110. �64 SLOVAKIA countries, as well as on the military of the union as a whole. Every constituent country would have to contribute a designated contingent of troops for the international armed forces (under the command of the UN), but no member state was to have its own armed forces . This recommendation testified to the distrust with which the American foreign policymakers looked upon the nations of Central Europe. The Advisory Committee's analysis of the factors which were thought to be conducive to, or had disintegrating effects upon, the creation of a Central European Union offers an interesting insight into the mindset of the American foreign policy advisors of that time. In the beginning the majority of the Committee members seemed to be in favour of one large Central European union from the Baltic to the Balkans.87 It was argued that a larger union was more advantageous to the United States, because it would be better able to eliminate the destructive forces of nationalism, mutual antagonisms and the land disputes of the Central European nations. 88 An analysis of the economic benefits failed to persuade American foreign policy advisors that economic prosperity was in itself motivationally adequate for unification . In the American view, the history of integration efforts in the interwar period showed that political interests in the area had often been given priority over economic ones. The unification of Czechs and Slovaks was pointed out as an example. According to L. Pasvolsky, Masaryk and Bene~ were willing to accept any economic disadvantages in order to achieve political and cultural unity after WW I. 89 It was nationalism, however, that elicited the greatest fears in the members of the Committee. The issue was frequently raised during the discussions, and the Department of State believed that nationalism was one of the five main obstacles to Central European integration.90 As the feasibility study for the Department of State from 87 This notion was supported most enthusiastically by S. Welles and H. F. Armstrong. 88 From the economic point of view, a larger union appeared to offer better prospects of strengthening the commercial position of member states in trade with the rest of Europe. As for the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the gravest concerns at the Department of State were aroused by Hungarian nationalism, with some criticism also levelled at the former Czechoslovakia. 89 "Mr. Bowman observed that in the case of the unification of the Czechs and the Slovaks the main emphasis had been on the achievement of political and cultural unity from the beginning. Economic considerations had played a decidedly minor £iart." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943 . Apart from nationalism, the list of five disintegrative forces comprised the absence of common roots, cultural di versity, external political influences and diversity in regional economic development. Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943. NARA , NARA, Notter File, �SLOVAKIA 65 February, 1943 observed, "Since the present war began, the animosity between several of the states, e.g., between Bulgaria and Greece, and between Hungary and Romania, has been greatly increased and the conflicts between ethnic groups within one state e.g., between Czechs and Slovaks, between Serbs and Croats, have become bitter."9 1 Where the State Department seemed to be in agreement with Hodfa was the belief that the peasantry could play a positive role in the process of Central European integration. In the inter-war period, peasant parties in Central Europe had engaged in mutual cooperation and shared a similar political agenda. 92 A member of the Committee, J. T. Shotwell, also sympathised with this opinion, but expressed reservations about the role of agrarian leaders, who, in his view, had nationalistic tendencies which might prove distractive. 93 The discussion about the cohesive and destructive forces of unification eventually prompted the members of the Committee to break the proposed union into two parts. With regard to the attitudes of the exiled governments, Berle pointed out that, surprisingly, none of these su£ported a large union, with the exception of the Czechoslovak government. 4 Strictly speaking, however, this was no longer the case. By that time, the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations had reached a stalemate and the Czechoslovak Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 187 - 88. 91 Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943 . NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 92 State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part III: Movements Tending Toward Unity, February 19, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 93 According to Shotwell, the majority of Central European leaders were nationalists of the 19th century type. As an example he pointed to Count Apponyi, who owned land in Slovakia, a fact which had a great deal of influence on his political outlook. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P I 7, June 27, 1942. Milan Hodza himself often mentioned the agrarian problems in Hungary. That was also why he laid down conditions on the membership of Hungary in a Central European Federation, stressing first the necessity of agrarian reform in that country. 94 Laptos and Mistal put Berle 's incorrect information down to the skilfulness of the Czechoslovak propaganda. "The question was asked whether Mr. Welles and Mr. Berle had talked with representatives of these countries on this matter. Mr. Berle said that no one of that group had the concept of a single union. Mr. Welles said he had never found one who had the conception of one union, most favoring three unions; some, two. Mr. Berle said that the Czechs were the only ones who had offered any support for a single union." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union . .., 129 - 30. �66 SLOVAKIA government was getting increasingly cold feet about any union with its northern neighbour. At the end of June, the members of the Committee agreed that for the sake of further discussions about Central European integration they would consider two options- the so-called Northern East European Group and a Balkan Group. 95 Another key issue to which the Advisory Committee devoted its attention was the problem of how viable the proposed union would be and what attitudes the great powers would adopt in dealing with this supranational state. According to the above-mentioned feasibility study, the political will of the member states alone was insufficient for the union's long-term survival. American foreign policymakers understood perfectly well that in order for the union to survive, it had to secure the support of the victorious powers, including that of the United States. 96 The advantages from the American point of view seemed palpable enough: a solution to questions of security in relation to Germany and Russia, pacification of the space between the Baltic and the Aegean seas in an area inaccessible to the naval powers, and the protection of Eastern European countries against possible German expansion. The most important question, of course, was how such a union would be viewed by the geographically closest of the powers - the Soviet Union. In the October Memorandum on Russia and the East European Federation, drawn up by the Council on Foreign Relations, an expert on Soviet affairs informed the Committee that the reasons for Soviet opposition were far stronger than those which might induce the Soviet Union to support such a scheme. 97 The first and the most decisive reason for Soviet 95 The proposal to break up the union was put forward by Under Secretary of State Welles at the meeting of the Division of Special Research on June 27, 1942 . The main reason was the diverse character of the member states of the union, which might lead to its disintegration. On the issue of breaking up the union, the members of the Committee were by no means united. Welles was in principle in favour of a single union, but practical considerations compelled him to opt for two smaller ones. The key problem of the two-union solution was Austria and Hungary. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA , Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 119 - 20. 96 See Part IV: Steps Necessary to make Union Effective: "In view of the fact that Eastern Europe has felt the impact of virtually none of those dynamic forces that would aid in creating a unity out of this di versity of peoples, the creation of a union and its maintenance for an indefinite period would have to be in large measure the work of the great victorious powers or of the international organization. " State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part IV: NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 19 1. 97 The author of the memorandum was Isaiah Bowman. The Counci l on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, �SLOVAKIA 67 opposition was the assumption that the establishment of a union would prevent the Soviet Union from exercising its policy of divide et impera. Moscow was also worried that the political orientation of the Central European countries within the proposed union would lead to the weakening of the existing pro-Russian orientation in some of them. 98 There is little doubt that Czechoslovakia was one of those countries. Its president-in-exile Edward Benes had indicated that Czechoslovak foreign policy after the war would be oriented towards the east. The Soviet attitude towards integration in Central Europe was yet again referred to by American foreign policy advisors as "apparently hostile" in February of 1943. 99 The report made it clear that Moscow was in no mood to support federalization plans of a lesser scope, such as the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish or Greek-Yugoslav unions. The Department of State reached this conclusion on the basis of the information obtained directly from representatives of the Czechoslovak government-inexile. The negative attitude of Moscow was also identified as the main rea- October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 176. 98 The author continues: "The possibilities of supporting Czechoslovakia against Poland, Hungary against Rumania, Yugoslavia against Hungary and so forth, present an almost limitless field for maneuver by Russia to make its influence strong and even preponderant among the disunited states of East Central Europe." Other Soviet objections could be summarized as follows: 2. the united states of Central Europe would find it easier to advance their territorial claims against Russia, 3. the political system of the member countries would unify, but become very likely hostile to that of the Soviet Union, 4. the union 's armed forces would be stronger in defence, which would weaken Soviet military position, 5. the exports of such a federation would compete in world markets with Soviet exports; Soviet exports into the union would be disadvantaged, since Russia would have to deal with the union as a whole rather than trading with countries separately, 6. the union would curb the revived pan-Slav sentiment, because it would include non-Slav countries and the pro-Russian orientation of the Slav countries would thus be weakened. The Council on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 177. 99 "On the basis of information at present available in the Political Section, the Soviet Government is apparently hostile to the idea of the creation of an all-embracing East European Union, unless, perhaps, such a Union were established under the preponderant influence of the Soviet Union. An examination of the Soviet press and periodicals has disclosed no discussions of such projects for an Eastern European Union as have been put forward from time to time in Britain and the United States." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Document P 206, February 18, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. LAPTOS, Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 196. �68 SLOVAKIA son why the Czechoslovak §ovemment broke off its negotiations with the Polish govemment-in-exile. 1 0 The work of the Advisory Committee for Postwar Foreign Policy officially ended in July of 1943, though some of its subcommittees continued their work on Central European integration plans until the spring of 1944. 101 The issue of Slovakia's post-war political status never came up. Neither was it discussed by any of the Committee's numerous subcommittees. The abandonment of American discussions of the Central European integration plans raises two questions: what were the reasons for this decision and what political future did the Roosevelt administration envisage for the Central European nations? The answer to the first question should be looked for in the analyses of U.S. foreign policy for this period. Drawing on the latest historical research, one finds, more or less, consensus on this issue. The dominant factor in American strategic planning was the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe, which went hand in hand with its increasing political influence. It became clear, towards the end of 1943, that the Red Army would liberate a substantial part of Central Europe, a fact which would inevitably increase the role of the Soviet Union in the post-war political organization of the area. Regardless of their original plans, President Roosevelt and the Department of State had to constantly adjust to these developments. In 1943, under pressure of the events on the Eastern Front, Roosevelt was forced to review his erstwhi le concept of an "Anglo-American world police force" and extend it into the well-known "Four Policemen" theory. This had to take the Soviet Union into account as an equal partner in the political organization of territories within its own sphere of influence. From this point of view it 100 "Mr. Berle remarked that when the Polish-Czech confederation was agreed upon, both parties had believed that the Russians were not opposed to the idea. The worsening of relations between Russia and the Polish government-in-exile, however, has since resulted in a change in the Russian position. The Czechs have withdrawn from their discussions with the Poles, ostensibly because the Poles were unwilling to abandon their claim to the Teschen area, but in reality because of Russian opposition to the combination." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 217. 101 Secretary of State Cordell Hull ended the work of the Committee in a letter of July 12, 1943 . Mary E. Bradshaw, "Congress and Foreign Policy Since 1900," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 289 (September, 1953), 45 . The last minutes of the Political Subcommittee dealing with the Central European union were those of March 15- 17, 1944, NARA, Notter File, Box 84. The last meeting of the Economic Subcommittee took place on March 31 , 1944. Advisory Committee, Economic Subcommittee, R Minutes 16, March 31, 1944 NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Unio n ... , 243 . �SLOVAKIA 69 can be understood why any American position on a Central European federation or union had to be approved by Moscow. The absence of a Soviet stance on the issue throughout 1942 kept the idea of integration alive among the exiled politicians of Central Europe, and occupied the minds of American foreign policy advisors on the Advisory Committee. Doubts about Moscow's priorities were finally ended in October of 1943, when the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, officially confirmed the negative position of the USSR. 102 The answer to the second question, namely what the Americans desired as the political future for Central Europe, is more complicated. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the views of the Roosevelt administration on this issue were not unanimous. Significant differences of opinion existed in Washington, which divided even the chief foreign policy makers, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. American historians' interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy objectives in Central Europe during this period have gone through several developments since WW II. 103 The more recent research emphasizes the importance of Roosevelt's role in the process of foreign policymaking, and interprets his apparent lack of determination and unsystematic approach as misleading. According to this interpretation, Roosevelt, from the beginning of the war, pursued a clear goal in relation to Continental Europe: to reduce its international standing and marginalize it as the most effective way of preventing future conflicts in the area. Roosevelt intended to achieve this marginalization through fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively powerless, and wherever possible, ethnically homogenous states. These states should in no case possess any armed forces, and after disarmament they should be placed within the sphere of influ102 This information was imparted to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who asked V. Molotov about the Soviet view on Central European integration efforts at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 19 - 29, 1943. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 63 . 103 The oldest interpretation of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe maintains that the Roosevelt administration favoured active involvement in the rebuilding of European democracies and in strengthening the position of European states. Roosevelt is criticised, however, because he was unable to see through Stalin's empty promises at Yalta. The second, "revisionist" theory contends that the post-war division of Europe was afait accompli long before Yalta, because the Red Anny would occupy the whole of Eastern Europe and the United States had to respect this fact. ." Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos. A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought 26 (no. 2, 1996), 73 . Lundestad, who reviewed both of the above theories, characterized U.S. foreign policy towards Central Europe as a policy of "modified universalism in the area of non-essential interest for the USA." For the lack of internal coherence in this policy he chose to refer to it as a "non-policy." G. Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe .. . , 34. �70 SLOVAKIA ence of either Britain or the Soviet Union. 104 Such a vision of the future of Central European nations was incompatible with Hodza 's federalization. He feared the political influence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, called for concerted efforts to strengthen the position of Central Europe. As far as Slovakia's future was concerned, Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention, whether intentional or inadvertent, played more into the hands of Slovak separatists than those of the proponents of federative integration.' 05 Roosevelt's concept of new spheres of influence, however, stood in contrast to the universalistic vision of Secretary of State Hull, who was advocating global cooperation among nations on the basis of a renewed world organization. The key moment, which resulted in the adoption of the universalistic approach as the main guideline in U.S. foreign policy, is usually thought to be the resignation of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 106 After Welles's resignation, Secretary of State Hull and his department advanced the concept of collective security within the framework of a restored world organization under a new name. ' 07 The new line in American foreign policy, however, did not make the Roosevelt administration take a more active role in suppressing the emerging Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Roosevelt continued to count on Soviet assistance as a decisive political force in the post-war reorganization of Central Europe. What he and his foreign policy advisors got wrong was the belief that Stalin's Russia would sooner or later discard its system of central planning, return to the market economy and join the rest of the democratic world. 104 "As he [Roosevelt] told the British Foreign Minister in March 1943, 'armaments after the war in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of the policing powers Britain, the United States and Russia. The smaller powers might have rifles but nothing more dangerous than this' .. .These two great powers had to maintain order over other disarmed European countries, if necessary by force." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War", 72 . 105 "He [Roosevelt] also envisioned splitting up multiethnic countries such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," 70. On another occasion, when meeting representtatives of the Slovak League in 1940, Roosevelt remarked: "I believe that every nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its nationhood." Ever since then, the Slovak League interpreted the president's statement as approval of the establishment of an independent Slovak state. NARA, Washington D. C., 860F.0l /446. Reverend C. Mlynarovich to C. Manion of the Office for Government Refcort, Indiana, May 11, 1942. 06 Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's closest ally in the Department of State, was a strong supporter of the president's concept of the "Four Policemen." Roosevelt did not trust Hull. In 1943 the president accepted Welles 's resignation in connection with his alleged homosexual activities. 107 In the field of international relations, Hull 's approach to foreign affairs is often associated with the principles of universalism, globalism and political idealism . �SLOVAKIA 71 Thus we have seen that, between 1941 and 1944, the American authorities closely followed the political activities of exiled Slovak politician Milan Hodfa. His political goal in the United States was twofold. First, he intended to influence Roosevelt's foreign policy makers in favour of the creation of a supranational federation of Central European states, which he saw as a political panacea for the area' s many unresolved problems. According to this plan, a restored Czechoslovakia was to be one of the founding members of such a federation . Slovakia was to be part of Czechoslovakia again, but with a new constitutional arrangement stipulating its equal political status with the Czech lands. Secondly, Hodza planned to lead a political campaign among Slovak Americans. In particular, he hoped to win the endorsement of the leaders of their organizations for his programme of a self-governing Slovakia. Various federal agencies' keen interest in Hodza, however, was not motivated by the desire of the U.S. government to support the creation of a central European federation . It rather stemmed from the fact that U.S. governmental agencies had deep misgivings about the effects of Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans. Thus, for the American government, Hodfa soon emerged as an unwelcome guest as the OSS began in mid-1942 supplying various U.S. departments with reports about the ideological split within the Slovak-American community. The fears frequently expressed in the OSS reports were motivated by the perceived possible consequences of Hodza ' s campaign on the home front as well as the on the American war effort in general. Foremost among these fears was that the Hodfa-inspired opposition to the Benes-led government-in-exile would not only undermine the standing of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - one of the war-time allies of the United States - but would also have a deleterious effect on the morale of the hundreds of thousands of Slovak Americans employed in key American heavy industries. Hodza's political campaign among Slovak Americans targeted two deeply antagonistic camps. He attempted to win the support of the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance, who had originally supported Benes's government-in-exile. At the same time, he tried to negotiate with the leaders of the Slovak League of America, several of whom offered their organizations' support for his programme. However, Hodfa failed to eliminate the powerful influence of the hard-liners in these umbrella organizations. The Czechoslovak Information Service in the United States, a propaganda tool of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile, severely criticized Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans, constantly challenging his right to discuss Slovakia' s future on American soil and running a smear campaign against him. The U.S. administration viewed Hodfa 's activities with growing alarm. The most worrying development from the American point of view was the ideological split in the Slovak National Alliance which devel- �72 SLOVAKIA oped as a result of Hodza ' s lecture tour. The OSS repeatedly called on the Department of State to intervene in order to mend the rift among the proCzechoslovak fraternal leaders. Hodza ' s attempts to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards the future organization of Central Europe had little impact on American foreign policy. lndeed, his plan for a Central European federation was never discussed by the American foreign policy advisors. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State and its agencies devoted considerable time to weighing the pros and cons of Central European integration from the point of view of American interests. The Department of State tended to favour an economic union rather than a political federation. Moreover, it feared the destructive forces of Central European nationalisms, not excluding the Slovak and Czech ones. However, the major American objection to any form of Central European integration stemmed from the strong opposition to it from the United States' chief war ally in Eastern Europe - the Soviet Union. Stalin had no intention of supporting any integration plans in the area. He preferred a fragmented Central Europe made up of weak states, which would strengthen the negotiating position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis these countries. Roosevelt ' s policy of deliberate non-intervention in Central Europe, coupled with the American belief in a new world organization, resulted after the war in a gradual Sovietization of Central Europe and the creation of a new sphere of influence. Given the pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile from December of 1943 onwards, the Roosevelt administration refrained from publicly expressing any of its views on Slovakia's post-war future. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 37 AN UNWELCOME GUEST: MILAN HODZA IN AMERICAN DOCUMENTS BETWEEN 1941 AND 1944 V Roman Licko In December of 1938 Milan Hodza, a Slovak politician and the last prime minister of the pre-Munich Czechoslovak Republic, went into exile in France. There, along with Stefan Osusky, another Slovak statesman and diplomat, he became the leading figure of Slovak democratic exiles before 1 the outbreak of WW II. Towards the end of 1939 Rodia established the Slovak National Council, which, under his auspices, was reorganized in early 1940 into the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Both political bodies subscribed to the democratic ideals of pre-war Czechoslovakia, as well as to the belief in a continuation of Czechoslovak statehood.2 However, in stark 1 Before Hodfa' s arrival in Paris in November of 1939, Ambassador Stefan Osusky had been the leading figure of the Czechoslovak resistance movement operating from France. His greatest achievement was the signing of the Franco-Czechoslovak Agreement concerning the creation of a new Czechoslovak army in France by which the French government recognised de fa cto the continued existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. During this period Osusky and Hodza shared similar ideas about Slovakia' s future . They both unequivocally supported the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia. However, they strongly opposed the centralism of the inter-war Prague governments. Osusky favoured a federal constitutional arrangement between Czechs and Slovaks. Hodza spoke of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored ' CzechoSlovakia'. Osusky maintained close contact with Hodza, who was, at that time, in London. The two men even cooperated in the preparation of a memorandum of Slovak demands in the lead-up to the establishment of the Benes-led Czechoslovak National Committee in France. Interestingly enough, Osusky did not become a member of any of the resistance organizations established by Hodza after his arrival in Paris. For more on the Hodfa-Osusky co-operation during this period see Slavomir Michalek, "Hodza a Osusky, nazory a pozicie v rokoch 1939- 1941 ," in Milan Hodia-statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 301- 18. 2 This paper uses the more widely accepted spellings ' Czechoslovakia' and 'Czechoslovak'. In reference to Hodza' s ideas, however, the spellings 'Czecho-Slovakia' and 'Czecho-Slovak' have been retained as these were the forms preferred by Hodfa himself. The Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920 adopted the unhyphenated spelling of the name. In November of 1938 the country officially returned to the hyphenated spelling 'Czecho-Slovakia' in recognition of the fact that Slovakia had been declared an autonomous region. The use of the one name or the other, by both Czechs and Slovaks throughout the war, had political connotations. Generally speaking, the Slovaks who favoured the re-establishment of Czechoslovakia after WW II but op- 38 SLOVAKIA opposetion to Edward Benes, the leading figure of the Czech democratic exiles, Hodza advocated a thoroughly decentralized model of a new Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement, with self-governing status for Slovakia. After the failure to find common ground on this issue with Benes, who consistently refused to allow any political representation of Slovak federalists in his exile government-to-be, Hodza moved to London. The German occupation of France in the summer of 1940 and the ensuing Battle of Britain in September of 1940 speeded up Britain' s recognition ofBenes's government-in-exile. Feeling powerless and marginalised, Hodza saw no purpose in participating in any government headed by Benes. By the autumn of 1941 he decided to leave Britain and in October of that year he arrived in the United States. There he pursued two political objectives: he intended to convince politically-minded Slovak Americans to support his programme of a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovakia. Concurrently, he attempted to lobby the Roosevelt administration to throw its weight behind the creation of a federation of Central European states. This paper, which draws primarily on research in United States government archives, attempts to trace Hodza ' s political campaign among Slovak Americans from the point of view of the Roosevelt administration. At the same time, it follows Hodza ' s efforts to engage the American government in a dialogue concerning a comprehensive post-war peace settlement in Central Europe. With the help of secondary literature on the subject, the study assesses the success of these attempts, and how they were viewed by the chief foreign policy makers in the Roosevelt administration. 3 posed the pre-war unitary constitutional arrangement between the two nations preferred the hyphenated designation. 3 The first attempt to document the activities of Milan Hodfa in the USA was made by his close associate, Michal Mudry Sebik, in his book Milan Hodia v Amerike. (Chicago :Geringer Press, Inc., 1949). The author published a number of articles in the periodicals of Slovak democratic exiles in the USA after WW II, e.g. Michal Mudry, "Svedectvo historickej doby. Bullitovo a Hodzovo memorandum," Nase snahy, 6, no. 9 (May - June 1970). In 1965 Susan Mikula, an American of Slovak descent, wrote a dissertation on Hodza's activities in the USA. However, it was not until 1992, at a conference in Bratislava, that she presented her work in Slovakia: Susan Mikula, " Dr. Milan Hodfa vo svelte archivnych dokumentov z archivov v USA," in : Milan Hodia - statnik a politik, ed. M. Peknik et. al. (Bratislava: Veda, 2002), 345- 50. Czech historians have also dealt with Hodfa 's stay in the USA . For instance J. Kuklik and J. Nemecek, Hodia versus Benes. Milan Hodia a slovenska otazka v zahranicnim odboji za druhe svetove valky (Praha: Karolinum, 1999). The most comprehensive account yet of Hodfa's political activities in the USA. , including some views of the Roosevelt administration, was written by the late Slovak historian Pavol Luklic, "Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii v USA a reakcie na jeho federalisticke plany, Historicky casopis 51 , no. 4 (2003), pp. 497- 515 . As Lukac himself observed, however, Kuklik' s and Nemecek's book only traced SLOVAKIA 39 Apart from the Slovak League of America (hereafter SLA), which favoured independence for Slovakia, there was no other Slovak organization in the USA in 1941 that had a clear idea about Slovakia' s political future after the war. 4 The leaders of the opposition organization - the Slovak National Alliance (hereafter SNA) - stuck to the policy of a reinstated Czechoslovakia, but were unwelling to commit themselves to negotiating a more specific settlement on this issue. In line with the official policy of President Edvard Benes, they maintained that Slovakia's future should be resolved after the war by a democratic vote. Despite their uncommitted attitude, Slovakia's political future was as sensitive an issue among the individual leaders of the SNA as it was for the leadership of the SLA. As long as there was no political leader in the United States who was able to offer a political alternative to the League-promulgated Slovak independence, the issue was bound to remain unresolved. This situation changed after the arrival of Milan Hodfa in the United States in October of 1941. During the three years of his American stay, Hodfa devoted his energies to political campaigning and lobbying. Like Slovak-American leaders, he too wanted to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards Slovakia. As a former Czechoslovak statesman, Hodfa had access to the United States Department of State. He was allowed to discuss the Slovak question with high-ranking government officials. Hodfa ' s political campaign in the USA aroused the interest of the American media, as well as that of federal authorities. Right up to his death in 1944, his activities were closely followed by the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter OSS) and its subordinate department, the Foreign Nationalities Branch (hereafter FNB). Hodfa's arrival in the United States generated interest, not only among Slovak Americans, but also in the American media. Almost immediately, a number of speculative pieces about Hodfa's political objectives appeared in Hodfa's political campaign in the USA on the basis of secondary archival materials left by Hodfa 's contemporaries, and not from the documents of the U.S. Department of State. The present study draws upon the following primary sources: 1. an independent investigation of the documents of the Department of State; 2. the hitherto unpublished documents of the Office of Strategic Services and its subordinate department - the Foreign Nationalities Branch (both housed in the National Archives in Washington), the archival documentation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (released to the author under the Freedom oflnformation - Privacy Acts); and 3. the documents issued by the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy collected and published by Polish historians JozefLaptos and Marius Misztal in 2002 . 4 For the activities of the Slovak League of America on behalf of Slovak independence during and after the war, see M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League in the Struggle for the Self-Determination of the Nation, 1907-1992," Slovakia 39, nos. 72-73 (2007), 19-34. 40 SLOVAKIA the press. One OSS report from 1942 read that the former Czechoslovak prime minister had come as a private citizen. 5 Hodza himself said that the main reason for his arrival was for reasons of health. In the USA he planned to undergo a series of medical treatments.6 This is well attested in the Hodfa family correspondence of the period. 7 On the other hand, the former Czechoslovak prime minister did hope to achieve in the United States some well-defined political goals. 8 In his first interview with The New York Tim es, Hodfa stated that he intended to "test out American opinion regarding Central Europe" and, at the same time, he wanted to "inform it of the trend of opinion there."9 Not all American media reported on Hodza's intentions impartially. On November 7, the Overseas News Agency issued a press release which assessed Hodfa 's pre-war political career in an unflattering light. According to this source, Hodfa's Agrarian Party was only a little less reactionary than the pro-fascist Hlinka Guard in Slovakia. The release went on to claim that Hodfa's arrival also shed a negative light on Slovak Americans. The authors of the release dubbed their political mindset as "isolationist and pro-fascist," referring to some of the Slovak fraternal press in America as evidence. 10 It is clear that the primary motivation of the author must have been to damage Hodfa's political reputation . According to 5 National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E I 00, Box 3, p. 6 1. This information was acquired by the OSS from the New York Times interview with Hodza conducted by Frederick T. Birchall. 6 M. Mudry, Hodza's assoc iate in America, later wrote: "An American journalist who visited and interviewed Hodza claimed that in response to the question about his plans Hodfa took out a bottle of medication and said that what he wanted, first and foremost, was a recovery." Mudry, Milan Hodia v Amerike .. ., 20. 7 John Palka, Milan Hodfa's grandson, mentions two bouts of pneumonia that his grandfather suffered from shortly after his arrival. See John Palka, Maje S/ovensko, moja rodina (Bratislava: Kalli gram, 2010), 57. 8 Kuklik and Nemecek argue: " It cannot be ruled out that the former Prime Minister could have been driven by his effort to shore up support among his expatriates especially Slovak Americans, with whom he could attempt, with new energy, to stage a comeback in the Czechoslovak resistance movement abroad. So far his departure was seen, perhaps with some oversimplification, as his resignation to the attempts to advance his Slovak national programme in emigration, " Hodia versus Benes..., 142.The view that Hodfa sought the leading position in the resistance is also supported by Lukac, " Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu v emigracii ... ", 605 . 9 The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 1 °Kuklik and Nemecek quote from Overseas News Agency release No. 400, July 11, 1941: " Hodfa's presence sheds light on the political tendencies of Slovak Americans. Apparently, the majority of Slovaks living in the United States are isolationist and pro-fascist and this has been reflected in the Slovak press here as well." The Czech authors say that Hodfa sued the ONA for libel, claiming $600,000 in damages, Hodia versus Benes.. ., 144. SLOVAKIA 41 Hodza's close associate in the USA, Michal Mudry, unfounded attacks like these were frequent and their authors were mainly Slovak-American Communists, supported by Czechoslovak authorities in the USA. 11 The sources of the anti-Hodfa campaign remain obscure. We contend, however, that for President Benes and his government-in-exile, Hodfa's presence in the country posed a serious political problem. The main reason was that Hodfa was determined to call on Slovak Americans to actively participate in the discussions about the future of Slovakia. The Roosevelt administration's attitudes towards Hodfa's political activities were shaped gradually and drew upon several sources. One of them was Hodfa himself. Almost immediately after his arrival, the former Czechoslovak prime minister made contact with the Department of State, and during his stay visited it several times. It can be argued that Hodfa was the only Slovak who discussed the Slovak question with United States government officials during WW II. From its inception in the summer of 1942, the OSS kept an eye on Hodfa 's activities, and from December of that year his political campaign was scrutinized by the officers of the FNB. The OSS analysed Hodfa 's activities by scanning his articles in the Slovak-American media, as well as in the American press in general. In addition to that, Hodza attracted the close attention of the FBI, which since I 940 had been investigating the activities of the Slovak League and the Slovak National Alliance. All the sources at the U.S . government' s disposal indicated that Hodfa pursued very specific political objectives in the United States. Sometime around mid-1942, an OSS report noted that: "Dr. Hodza' s visits to the State Department, his public speeches, interviews granted by him, and his article in The Nation (May 16, 1942) have demonstrated his willingness to express his ideas, whatever may be the extent of his actual political activity. ,, 12 Hodfa' s approach to the Slovak question differed from all other political plans which had been discussed among Slovak Americans to date. The crucial difference was that in Hod:fa' s view, the Slovak question was not to be solved in isolation, but as part of the security, economic and strategic 11 "Various groups, more or less under the influence of leftist elements and the Czechoslovak Information Service, take pot shots at Hodfa and where possible, in connection with his person, they attack Slovak Americans as well. These groups are often made up of the active Czech and Slovak communists such as Hoffmeister, Weisskopf Benau [a social democrat - author's note) and others, at that time undoubtedly under the influence and in favour with Czechoslovak authorities in America." According to Mudry, the most malicious attack upon Hodfa was the pamphlet entitled " Persona non grata". It contained a scathing criticism of Hodfa 's efforts to create a federation , which, among other things, was to constitute a buffer against the Russian Bolsheviks. See Mudry, Milan Hodia v Ameriike .. . , 37. 12 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS , RG 226 E 100, Box 3, p. 47 . 42 SLOVAKIA issues concerning the whole of Central Europe. At that time, Hodza's ideas and political thought may have been known to the public as well as the OSS from his book Federation in Central Europe. 13 Hodza was convinced that federation was the only political arrangement capable of harnessing nationnal forces while preserving the freedom of nations and of individuals. Federation would enable Central Europe to become a viable system of production and consumption on the basis of which a New Europe could be built. The liberated and reinstated countries of Central Europe would conclude a treaty that would become the basic framework for a federal constitution. The treaty was supposed to be the result of spontaneous decisions made by Central European countries, which, bearing in mind their common goals, would identify common interests and mutual commitments. Powers concerning mutual affairs were to be delegated to federal bodies, and their exercise entrusted to a federal govemment. 14 It would be headed by a federal Chancellor, who would be nominated by the President of the federation . The legislative body would be made up of a federal Congress, which was to oversee the legislative process as well as the federal budget. The Federal Court was to be the highest judicial body, which would decide on matters raised by the federal government or by the governments of the constituent countries. The federalization of Central Europe was envisaged as the key to solving the Slovak question and Slovak-Czech relations. Hodza believed that the freedom and security of small nations could be guaranteed only through a supranational federation . If small states were to merge their sovereignties, thereby creating a stronger unit, it would clearly mean more to them than to be in permanent danger of losing their sovereignties. Slovakia, however, was not to enter the Central European federation as a separate state. According to Hodza, the political coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks was not only feasible, but also inevitable. For Czechs, Slovakia represented an important connection with Central Europe. Self-government would satisfy Slovakia to the extent that it would never be a source of weakness for the new republic, but the reverse - it would become the source of its stability and strength. However, Hodza warned, certain mistakes from the past should be avoided. "Stubborn centralism as well as mischievous separatism have to disappear," he argued. Hodza did not support Slovak independence and never sympathized with the representatives of the Slovak regime at home. In his book, he unequivocally dissociated himself from the "Slovakian Quisling regime" 13 Federation in Central Europe (London and New York: Jarrolds Publishers, 1942). Hodza proposed the creation of the following federal ministries: I . finance, 2. International trade, 3. foreign affairs, 4. defence, 5. postal services and communications, 6. and 7. air and naval transport, 8. federal legislation, 9. federal cooperation. Federation in Central Europe ... , 172 - 7. 14 SLOVAKIA 43 and made it clear that its political representatives did not represent the will of the people. As far as the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London was concerned, Hodza claimed he respected it and was willing to cooperate with it. In his opinion, though, the real leaders of the Slovaks existed not only in London, but also in the USA. He was convinced that in the settling of the Slovak question, Slovak Americans should take an active part. By emphasising the importance of Slovak Americans, Hodza underlined how much hope he pinned on them in deciding the political future of Slovakia after the war. 15 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Hodza presented his vision to the American press. On December 7, 1941 The New York Times published an interview with him entitled "Hope Put in Union of Central Europe," which the former Czechoslovak statesman had granted to American journalist Frederick T. Birchall. The subheading of the article informed the American reader that federation was the goal of 110 million Central Europeans. 16 In the introduction, the author informed the reader that Hodza arrived in the USA unofficially, but with the approval of the Czechoslovak government in London. In fact, the second part of this statement was not true. President Benes could not prevent Hodza from leaving for the United States, but he was far from pleased with the prospect of his greatest political rival in exile campaigning among Slovak Americans. In the Birchall interview Hodza outlined some of the constitutional mechanisms of the proposed federation, and expressed his conviction that the prevailing political tendency in exile was "wholly in the direction of such a federation." As proof, Hodza pointed to the recent rapprochement of two old foes - Czechoslovakia and Poland. 17 These two countries, he believed, should form the nucleus of the future federation . It should then be joined by Romania, and subsequently also by a democratized Hungary, provided that the latter gave up its "imperialistic policy of coercing non-Magyar regions." According to 15 "Most of the Slovak leaders now stay in this country [United Kingdom] and in the USA ." Hodza, Federation in Central Europe . .. , 94. 16 The other two subheadings read: "For Common Government" and "He Explains Plan Will Not Deal in Half Measures, Such as the Old Little Entente," The New York Times, December 7, 1941 . 17 Hodza alluded here to the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations of a possible confederation between the exiled governments of both countries in London. The outcome of these negotiations, which took place between 1940 and 1942, were two joint declarations - one in November 11 , 1940 and the other on January 23, 1942. The negotiations did not, however, lead to any specific action. In 1943 they ended for good as a result of the new pro-Soviet orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, as well as Moscow 's negative attitude towards such a confederation. For details see, Piotr S. Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956). 44 SLOVAKIA Hodza, Yugoslavs and Bulgarians had already been working out their own idea of a federation . Hodza touched on the issue of the relations of Central Europe with Germany and Russia. He considered Russian Bolshevism as great a threat to Europe as German fascism. That was also the reason why the proposed federation should act as "a barrier between Nazi ideologists and Russian Bolsheviki." 18 Peasants, representing the conservative values of Central Europe, would, according to Hodza, be a stabilising force in the proposed federation . Their conservative influence would be of significant importance, since it would be necessary to "maintain a conservative democratic entity between the two subversive influences of Nazism and Bolshevism". Having talked to some lower-level officials of the U.S. Department of State, Hodfa met Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle on December 9, 1941. 19 On the same day Hodfa dined informally with DeWitt C. Poole, a high-ranking OSS officer and future head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch.20 During his meeting with the Assistant Secretary, Hodza presented Berle with a memorandum in which he outlined the development of Slovak affairs in Czechoslovakia and in subsequent exile between 1918 and 1939.21 In the memorandum, Hodfa pointed out that the Czechoslovak Cabinet in 1938, under his premiership, approved proposed legislation on decentralization - which, among other things, granted Slovakia its regional parliament. That was the last valid legal arrangement made before the Munich Pact, and it was recognized even by Jan Lichner, a minister of the exiled government. This view, Hodfa claimed, was subscribed to by the absolute majority of public opinion in Slovakia in late 1939. He admits that later on, in Paris, Czechoslovak leaders agreed that such constitutional issues as Slovakia's 18 Quoting Hodfa, the author goes on to say: "With a solid bloc of I 00, 000, 000 people separating them, a successful democracy operating next door would be a continuing object lesson of a better and more profitable way of life." The New York Times, December 9, 1941. 19 Prior to the meeting with Berle, Hodfa held talks with C. W. Cannon and H. Hoskins, as well as the head of the Coordination of Information, William J. Donovan. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle (author H. Hoskins), December 9, 1941. 20 According to Kuklik and Nemecek, Hodza maintained that his first visit to the Department of State was a response to an invitation by C. W. Cannon, R. Atherton and A. Berle. The aim was to discuss the memorandum of Slovak-American separatist Gustav Kosik presented to the Department at an earlier date. 21 P. Lukac also suggested that Hodfa's visit to the State Department and his memorandum was a reaction to the memorandum of Gustav Kosik (Memorandum for His Excellency the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States of America). NARA signature 860f.01 /429- l/2, Roll 30. Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 612. SLOVAKIA 45 future should be decided by democratic majorities of Czechs and Slovaks after the war. Hodfa was willing to adhere to this agreement, provided that the exiled Czechoslovak National Council included representatives of Slovak federalists. In the posited post-war settlement, Hodfa emphasized the importance of a Czecho-Slovak restoration, but with a provision for Slovak self-government. He argued that Slovakia would not be able to maintain its sovereignty even as a separate member of the Central European federation. In the conclusion to the memorandum, Hodza condemned the Slovak puppet regime and hazarded a guess that its support among Slovaks did not exceed I 0%. As for Slovak Americans, he believed that the majority of them had never stopped supporting Czecho-Slovakia. The rest of them, in Hodza 's opinion, would soon change their political views. The official reaction to Hodfa' s memorandum of December 9, 1941 is not known, but it appears that he made a good impression during his first visit to the State Department. The report written for the Secretary of State Cordell Hull observed that, "Dr. Hodza gave the impression of an able patriot with qualities of sincerity and vision that might be with advantage put to constructive work in the post-war period in Central Europe." 22 In his later conversation with Poole, Hodfa himself assessed his meeting with Berle in a similar vein.23 It was intimated to Hodfa that, in the future, he might be received by Secretary Hull himself. Moreover, the State Department did not seem to have any objections to Hodfa's intention of lecturing at American universities and colleges. It was even suggested that Poole might be able to help by making the necessary arrangements.24 Hodfa expected that he would once again be in communication with the Department of State as early as January, 1942. His deteriorating health, however, forced him to stay in American sanatoria for several months, where he recuperated until April of 1942. 25 22 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /429-3/4, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Memorandum of conversation between M. Hodfa and A. Berle, H. Hoskins, December 9, 1941 , p. 3. 23 In his report Poole wrote: "He [Hodza] said that he had explained to Mr. Berle his views on the future political organization of Central Europe, and Mr. Berle seemed to be favourably impressed." D. C. Poole later checked Hodfa's impressions against those of H. Hoskins: "Following my talk with Dr. Hodza, I spoke on the telephone with Mr. Hoskins, and gathered from him that Dr .Hodza had given a substantially accurate account of his reception at the Department of State and Mr. Berle' s attitude. " NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 24 During the conversation at the Department of State, C. Cannon suggested that D. C. Poole "might be in the best position to bring this about." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-4. 25 Lukac writes that Hodza recuperated from chronic bronchitis in a sanatorium at Lake Placid, New York and Hot Springs, Arkansas. Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. ., 612 . 46 SLOVAKIA In Hodfa 's plans, 1942 should have marked a turning-point in his political campaign. After a modest recovery of his health, Hodfa launched his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and began publishing in American scholarly journals. On May 16 he outlined his federalization plans to the politically-minded American public in The Nation. The reactions of Czech and Slovak Americans to his article, A Central European Federation, were collected in two OSS reports from June. Both reports assessed the attitudes of American "Czechoslovaks" towards Hodza as predominantly negative. 26 The first one, dated June 1, 1942, pointed out that Czechoslovak Americans had missed the article because they did not regularly read The Nation. Still, the OSS observer admitted that Hodza's ideas were, in general, favourably received by many Central Europeans because they were in line with their own post-war plans.27 The other report from June 11 portrays Hodza's arrival in America, his political past and goals in the USA in a very negative light. In the introduction, the author alleged that Czechoslovak Americans received the article with considerable mistrust. Claiming that he had researched the Czechoslovak American press and talked to "a number of leading Czechoslovak Americans as well as Czechoslovak exiles," the OSS observer contended that the article was "not a bona fide piece of political thinking, but that it rather serves as a cloak for its author' s ambition to become the exclusive or most important spokesman for the Slovaks (American and otherwise), regardless of cost in terms of Czechoslovak unity here and abroad." 28 It may be argued that the negative tone of the report was influenced by its author's very selective approach to sources. For example, he claimed that he had read reactions in the "Czechoslovak press," but he did not give any specific titles. The only sources he acknowledged were J. Papanek, professor J. B. Kozak and D. Benau. 29Jan Papanek, head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA and Benes's right-hand man, referred to Hodfa as an " unfortunate incident."30 He maintained that Hod26 Neither of the reports makes any distinction between American Slovaks and American Czechs. They refer to both groups collectively as "Czechoslovak Americans." 27 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-47, June I, 1942, p. I. 28 Ibid. The author of the report signed himself"Ivan Ivanovitch ." 29 At the time, Professor Kozak was lecturing at Oberlin College in Ohio. Prior to his arrival in the USA he was a member of the Czechoslovak State Council, a legislative-executive body ofBenes's government-in-exile in London. 30 J. Papanek' s negative attitude towards Hodza 's political views was widely known. Papanek disagreed with decentralisation to the extent advocated by Hodza. The head of the Czechoslovak Information Service in the USA expressed his attitude towards Hodza in one of his letters to Benes in January of 1942: "I do not agree with the policy of decentralization or self-government on the scale suggested by Lichner and Hodfa. I am convinced that this would lead to a new Zilina [agreement on Slova- SLOVAKIA 47 fa's goal was to split the ranks of Slovak Americans, who had been, until his arrival, predominantly in full support of the Czechoslovak government headed by Bene~. Professor Kozak, a former member of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, called Hodfa 's Central European Agrarian Bloc a reactionary body which collaborated with non-democrats. Benau, editor of the "Czechoslovak" New Yorksky dennik, added that Hodfa had a dubious financial past. Hodfa's entree into Slovak-American politics was facilitated by his long-time friend and associate Michal Mudry Sebik. With his assistance, Hodfa first approached the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance. On May 22, 1942, during the meeting of the SNA's Central Committee in Detroit, which discussed Hodfa 's lecture tour, the majority of the Committee expressed their support for Hodfa's political programme.31 At that time, Hodza formulated his position on the Slovak question as follows : 1. A Slovak Parliament and Slovak judiciary; 2. Slovak self-government, 3. Slovak as the only official language in Slovakia. With this political aim he launched a series of lectures at local branches of the SNA. However, the decision of the Central Committee was strongly challenged by the conservative wing of the SNA leadership. At the June meeting of the Executive Board, the president, secretary and treasurer of the organization announced their opposition to the decision taken by the Central Committee on May 22. According to these leaders, Hodfa's demands were a mere repetition of the Pittsburgh Agreement, which concerned the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic. The leaders proclaimed that, as American citizens, they had no intention of meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic, because that was against the SNA programme as well as American law. In addition to that, the proclamation of the Executive Board pointed out that, it was thanks to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that Slovaks were not considered enemies of the Allies. Discussions about Slovakia's political future were destroying the unity of the SNA and threatened the future of the Slovak people. In the final part of the proclamation, the three members of the Executive Board issued a warning: "Disputes over things which do not concern us as American citizens - among these disputes is the question of selfgovernment of the Slovak nation - harm our country, harm all of us, and kia's autonomy, signed Oct. 6, 1938) and all that followed." Slavomir Michalek, Jan Papanek za vojny Bene.fovi. Vyber z dokumentov 1939 - 1945 (Bratislava: VEDA, 1997), 97. 31 Fifteen members of the Central Committee were in favour of Hodza' s lectures, twelve were against. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT9CZ-82. Later M. Mudry observed: "The meeting of the SNA ' s Central Committee in Detroit was especially important in the history of Slovaks. It showed that the great majority of Slovak Americans, in favour of the Czechoslovak Republic, preferred the Czecho-Slovak constitutional arrangement as it was outlined by Dr. M. Hodza." Mudry, Milan Hodi a v Amerike ..., 32. 48 SLOVAKIA only help the enemy!" 32 The position proclaimed by the Executive Board on June 29 confused other SNA leaders, as well as its rank-and-file. At the same time, it spurred a new wave of discussion about the position of the organization on the Slovak question, which continued throughout 1942. Several days before his second visit to the Department of State, Hodza had an appointment with Poole and J. C. Wiley of the OSS. After the SNA meeting in Detroit, Hodfa expressed his views openly, and his criticism of his opponents was sharper, on occasion turning into personal attacks. He told the OSS officers that his goals were to mobilize Slovak Americans and win their support for a self-governing Slovakia within a restored Czechoslovak Republic. He reiterated that the Czechoslovak constitutional arrangement, agreed upon by the Czechoslovak cabinet in July of 1938, was legally valid and politically binding. During one conversation, the OSS officers noted, Hodfa "disclosed a determined opposition to what he called the centralism in the Czechoslovakian constitutional practice of Benes and his entourage." 33 He criticized Benes, who, during their London talks in 1939, had been deliberately evasive and noncommittal regarding discussion of Slovakia's constitutional status. In talks with American government officials, Hodfa maintained that the campaign against himself in the USA had been masterminded by Papanek. The head of the CIS was not, in Hodfa' s words, to any degree a political figure, but merely an agent and intriguer for Benes.34 Apart from the members of the SNA, Hodfa was also planning to address the Slovak American Catholics associated within the Slovak League of America. As Hodfa put it bluntly in his conversation with Poole, he intended to "destroy this organisation" by winning over its popular support, leaving its leaders without any following, which he believed was very weak. 35 Meeting the OSS officers provided Hodfa with an opportunity to get some feedback on how his political activities were viewed by the administration. On this, the position of the OSS and the government was clear and unequivocal. American authorities were anxious not to see American 32 The Proclamation of the SNA Executive Board was signed by its President, Jaroslav Pelikan, Secretary Jan W. Golosinec and Treasurer Vaclav Hovorka. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-82. 33 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. I. 34 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. On this occasion Hodfa also expressed his firm belief in winning the forthcoming trial against the Overseas News Agency. He was convinced that the ONA had obtained its libellous information against him from Pap{mek, who was to be identified as the true culprit. NARA, Washington D. C. , 860f.0I 444-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 3. 35 Hodfa told the OSS that the local branch of the Slovak Catholic Sokol in Passaic, NJ, came out in open support of his programme, as did the First Catholic Slovak Union in Wilkes-Barre, PA. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0I 444-1/2 Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. SLOVAKIA 49 citizens and alien residents fighting over European political issues on American soil. 36 The concerns of the American government about the unity of Slovak Americans were aired once again during Hodza's second visit to the Department of State on June 18, 1942.37 Hodza met H. Hoskins and C. Cannon. On the same day he spoke on the telephone to Assistant Secretary Berle. Hoskins and Cannon were interested in Hodfa's ongoing lecture tour among Slovak Americans. The former Czechoslovak premier did not hide his optimism and spoke extremely positively about his campaign.38 He was keen to ascertain how his activities were viewed by the Department of State. In response to his query, Assistant Secretary Berle told Hodfa that he thought that his "efforts had been in the right direction. "39 He made it clear, though, that the American government did not wish American unity to be disturbed by conflicts among Americans of foreign descent. Apparently, what the Assistant Secretary had in mind under "efforts in the right direction" were activities that would strengthen Czechoslovak unity in the USA. It was obvious that Slovakia's political future per se played a secondary role, if any, in the Department of State's post-war strategic planning. We can only wonder whether the Department of State had been informed about the results of the SNA' s Detroit meeting at the time of Hodza 's telephone conversation with Berle. It can be argued that, if it had been the case, the Assistant Secretary would not have so favorably assessed Hodza's activities. At any rate, Hodfa took Berle's statement as an expression of approval of his American campaign. He told this to Poole two days later while travelling with him on the train to New York. 40 During this conversation, Hodza reiterated that he was determined to get on with his lecture tour among Slovak Americans and to work on the project of the Central European Federa36 Hodza reacted to this open allusion to his political activities in the USA by assuring the OSS officers that in this respect there could be no objections to his campaign, since his primary aim was to unite, not to divide all Slovak Americans. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 444-1/2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 6. 37 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910- 1944. 38 Lukac quotes from the Memorandum of conversation of June 18 : "Since then he has been in touch with various Slovak groups in this country and felt he had made progress in his efforts to convince them that Slovakia should work out its problem within the framework of the present republic, not as a small independent state". Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 613. 39 Lukac points out that the original memorandum contains the following handwritten note beside the word "efforts": "This related only to his effort to reduce the controversies between Czechs and Slovaks and similar peacemaking attempts." Ibid., 614. 40 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.0 1/446-1 /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944. Author of report D. C. Poole, June 20, 1942. Poole observed Hodfa's satisfaction with his visit to the Department of State. 50 SLOVAKIA tion.41 He suggested to Poole that American authorities could get in touch with some of his Hungarian and Yugoslav friends who were in favour of such a federation. 42 In return, the OSS officer promised to put him in touch with another academic institution, which would enable him to lecture at universities in his capacity as a former history professor. 43 While lecturing to Slovak Americans during the summer of 1942, Hodza found himself yet again the target of unwanted publicity. This time, Hodza ' s political opponents broadcast their views on New York-based radio station WMCA. Though the statements made by the radio commentator are not known, we do know that they drew an indignant response from Hodza. Following the broadcast by WMCA on July 28th, 1942, Hodza contacted Dr. Morris D. Forkosch, his New York-based lawyer, with a view to bringing legal action against the radio commentator. Hodza was adamant that Johannes Steele, the radio presenter in question, as well as his "sponsors," by which Hodza meant the people who supplied him with the slanderous information, should be sued for libel. This, however, was not to be. Four months later, Hodza abruptly asked his lawyer to drop the suit. In one of his telegrams to Forkosch in mid-October, Hodza wrote: "It is imperative that you immediately and explicitly advise the new sponsors of the radio commentator and others you approached that you acted upon mistaken instructions and to withdraw steps [sic.]."44 From Hodza's correspondence with Forkosch we learn that the defendants (Steele, the WMCA, the Terminal Shops) accepted some sort of "settlement," though it is not at all clear what this arrangement was. What remains baffling is what made Hodza change his mind. Money may have been part of it. Hodza had been dogged by financial problems since his arrival in the United States. On the other hand, Hodza 41 NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.01 /446-l /2, Roll 30, 1910 - 1944, p. 2. Hodfa referred specifically to a Hungarian, John Polonyi, and a Yugoslav, Bof olyub Jeftich. 3 During this conversation Hodfa expressed his interest in giving informal talks and participating in conferences as a historian of the 19th century. Poole had facilitated academic contacts for Hodza before. In the autumn of 1941 he introduced him to Dr. Duggan, Director of the International Institute of Education and later to Malcolm Davis, who was to assist in Hodfa 's cooperation with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 44 In his letter to Hodfa from October 28, 1942, Forkosch recounted all the telegraphic communications between him and Hodfa related to the libel suit. He did this, presumably, to clarify all possible misunderstandings as to what Hodfa really wanted and what his instructions to Forkosch were. Forkosch, however, did not provide any reasons for his client 's decision to drop the case. NARS, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129. Copy of M. D. Forkosch 's letter to Hodfa, October 28, 1942, p. I. 42 SLOVAKIA 51 would hardly have initiated a costly new lawsuit if he had not been convinced that he stood a fair chance of having his name cleared and his political detractors exposed. 45 The FNB files remain silent as to who supplied the WMCA with the information or what motivation drove its commentator to attack Hodza over the airwaves. Michal Mudry Sebik had little doubt that public attacks against Hodza were masterminded by Jan Papanek, and condoned by Benes's Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir Hurban. This view has not been contested by any Hodza historians. So far, however, there has been no reliable evidence to prove that this was indeed the case. As far as the American government was concerned, it knew all about the perpetrators of the anti-Hodza smear campaign since June of 1943. The ideological split in the Slovak-American community, partially caused by Hodfa' s political campaign, was a source of growing concern to the American government. Amidst fears for the unity of Slovak Americans, the Department of State, in co-operation with several other government agencies, decided to take action. On September 14, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) organized in Pittsburgh a conference of Slovak newspaper editors and presidents of Slovak organizations.46 The intention of the OWI organizers was to unify Slovak-American organizations and persuade their leaders to sign a joint declaration expressing Slovak support for the U.S. government and, at the same time, condemning its enemies, including the Slovak Republic. At the actual conference two resolutions were passed. According to the OSS, on the previous day the members of the Resolution Committee had consulted the wording of both resolutions with Hodza, who had arrived earlier in Pittsburgh.47 The first resolution pledged allegiance to the government of the United States and its president. The second one outlined the principles concerning Slovakia's political future, in line with the Atlantic Charter. It stated, among other things, that Czechoslovakia should be "recreated on a basis of equal rights, equal privileges, equal opportunities and equal obligations."48 This passage, however, elicited strong objections 45 Hodza's libel suit against the Overseas News Agency had been dragging on and off since November of 1941. The case was finally closed in June of 1943. 46 The conference was held at the William Penn Hotel. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. OSS, V. P. Backora to Dr. Kelso, September 16, 1942. 47 NARS, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. In the lead-up to the conference, Hodza met with Vendelin Platek, president of the National Slovak Society (NSS), Emil Stankoviansky, editor of Slovensky h/asnik [Slovak Herald] , the organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and J. Willo (NSS), chairman of the Resolution Committee. 48 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-143 . A photocopy of the September 14 resolution was published in Slovensky hlasnik on Octo- 52 SLOVAKIA from the "Czechoslovak" hardliners and followers of Benes under the leadership of Jaroslav Pelikan. The text of the second resolution had to be rephrased, and the controversial part concerning the relationship between the Czechs and Slovaks was eventually omitted. In this form, the resolutions did not please any of the participants. The outcome of the conference left both sides unhappy. The OWI had received a token expression of Slovak allegiance, but the disgruntled Slovak leaders, seeking more definite commitments regarding Slovakia' s future, remained dissatisfied.49 The efforts of the Department of State and the OSS to direct Hodza's activities in favour of Slovak-American unity continued after the unsuccessful conference in Pittsburgh. On September 17, 1942 Assistant Secretary Berle wrote a letter to the OSS in which he asked Poole to settle the ongoing arguments between Papanek and Hodza. In this letter he reiterated the stance of the U.S. government as it was set out in June of 1942. The priorities of the Department did not lie in the various merits and demerits of the argument about the Slovak question, but in the need for unity and peace among Slovak Americans, which would contribute to victory in the war. 50 The concerns of the U.S . government were further exacerbated about two months later when the leaders of Slovak organizations and Hodza 's followers called a new conference with the intention of rallying the Slovak Americans behind Hodza's political programme. A new umbrella organization was established - the Council of Slovak American Organizations and Newspapers (hereafter CASON). This organization later succeeded in encouraging cooperation with some of the Catholic fraternal organizations. Politically, it subscribed to the restoration of Czechoslovakia, but in contrast to Benes's government-in-exile, it demanded a more definite commitment on Slovakia's status after the war. 51 This development was highly undesirable from the standpoint of the U.S . administration, which had only recently confirmed its definitive recognition of Benes's government in Lon- her I, 1942. The resolution was signed by twenty-four Slovak leaders and newspa£er editors. 9 As the OSS observer put it: "The compromise resolution satisfies no one but it is at least a step forward . Hodza is still causing disunity among the American Slovaks." NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-139. 50 "The State Department is not at present interested in the merits of the controversy, but it has, of course, a very distinct interest in preserving that harmony and unity which best contributes towards winning the war." Quoted from the letter of A. Berle to D. C. Poole (NARA 860f. 00/993). See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodi u .. ., 617,note44. 51 The main figures behind the establishment of CASON were the President of the NSS, V. Platek, the President of the First Catholic Slovak Union, Michal Vargovich, and Jan Bradac, at that time the Honorary President of the SNA. SLOVAKIA 53 don.52 Hodfa 's campaign among Slovak Americans was becoming an ever more pressing political problem for the U.S. administration. In its March report, the OSS recommended that the State Department step in: "It would be of great value and benefit all around, if our State Department would speak nicely to Mr .Hodja [sic.] and advise him to apply his talents towards unity and not disruption among the Slovak Americans." 53 Throughout 1943, apart from campaigning among Slovak Americans, Hodfa was occupied with, and increasingly alarmed by, the developments in Czechoslovak foreign policy under Benes's leadership. In May - June, the president of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile came on an official visit of the United States, where he was met by the highest officials in the country, including the Secretary of State. One of the primary objectives of the president's visit was to gain American approval for his planned journey to Moscow towards the end of the year. There, Benes was planning to sign a new Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. This diplomatic initiative was the pinnacle of Benes's efforts to change the orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy during WW II. From then on, the international security of the country was no longer to be guaranteed by military alliances with the Western Powers. Instead, it was to be safeguarded through close cooperation and coordination of its foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. It remains unclear whether, in the summer of 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Roosevelt voiced their approval of the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty. According to Benes's personal secretary, Edvard Taborsky, Berle said that the United States followed no specific plans in relation to Central Europe, nor did they have any intention of negotiating with Hodfa on this issue.54 It appears that the ill-defined position of the Roosevelt administration in 1943 confirmed Benes's conviction that the United States did not hold any objections to Czechoslovakia's new Soviet-oriented foreign policy. Hodza, by contrast, regarded the conclusion of the treaty in December 1943 as a very dangerous step on the road to creating a new Soviet sphere of influence. He also feared that, after the war, the Soviet Union would try to impose on Czechoslovakia a political system similar to its own. Moreover, Hodfa was deeply convinced that Slovaks had not a scintilla of sympa- 52 The definiti ve American recognition of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile was granted on October 28, 1942. 53 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, RG 226 E 142, Box 3. Re: Recent Slovak Affairs, Milan Hodia, Jozef Hu~ek, Fedor Salva, etc., April 3, 1942. 54 According to Taborsky, Berle felt the need to defend himself against allegations that he sympathized with Hodia. "Hodfa was your prime minister and now he is a refugee. We respect him as such, but we will make no political deals with him, I can say this categorically." See Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodiu ... , 620. Document quoted: NARA, 860F. 00/1009. 54 SLOVAKIA thy for Russian Bolshevism. He objected vigorously to the treaty, and made his criticism heard. Benes's visit to the United States presented the head of the Foreign Nationalities Branch with a perfect opportunity to cut troublesome Hodza down to size. Hodza ' s long-standing legal feud with the Overseas News Agency (ONA) carried potential risks not only for the news agency itself, but for the whole of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Back in December of I 941 , Hodza had complained to the Office of the Coordination of Information that the ONA had been spreading word that he was a fascist collaborating with Otto von Habsburg and Tibor Eckhardt in a plot hatched by German generals to eliminate Hitler with a view to negotiating a separate peace.55 The same source branded the majority of Slovak Americans as isolationist and pro-fascist. Hodza was convinced that if the ONA was made to disclose its source, some of the top Czechoslovak authorities in the USA would be implicated. In June of 1943, the American court which was investigating the libel suit, required the ONA to answer a set of questions contained in a bill of particulars. One of them inquired about the source the ONA drew upon in its news release of November 7, 1941 . Shortly before the deadline by which the ONA was to comply, the case took an unexpected turn. On June 1st, Jacob Landau, the agency's managing director, paid a visit to Poole in his Washington office. He briefed the FNB boss about the case and discussed the questions in the bill of particulars. Later on, in his report of the meeting, Poole noted: "If ONA had to answer, Mr. Landau asserted, one of the sources to be named would be the Czechoslovak Ambassador [in the United States] ." Such a development was, from the perspective of the U.S. government, highly undesirable. Not only would it expose its wartime ally - the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - as the source of the anti-Hodza smear campaign, it would also fan the flames of the Benes-Hodza controversy among Slovak Americans. Although the head of the FNB felt he was not in a position to "interfere in an official way," he promised Landau that he would talk to Hodfa in order to make him "freely desi st" from the libel suit. Three days later in New York, Poole broached the subject of anti-Hodza propaganda in his conversation with Jan Papanek, the head of the Czechoslovak Information Service (hereafter CIS) in the United States. Without telling him what he knew from Landau, Poole received from the CIS head a resolute denial of any involvement on the part of the Czechoslovak government. Nevertheless, Papanek was very pleased with Poole 's intention to convince Hodza to desist from the case. On his part, the Czechoslovak propaganda boss promised he would do his utmost 55 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-9CZ-22, p. I. Memorandum of conversation between John. C. Wiley and Milan Hodia, December 4, I 94 I. SLOVAKIA 55 to prevent further escalation of the Hodza-Benes controversy. He also mentioned to Poole that during his visit in the States, Benes held a long private conversation with Jan Palka, Hodfa's son-in-law. This information, whether imparted casually or by design, presented the head of the FNB with the bargaining leverage he so much needed in his dealings with Hodfa. Although Papanek did not tell Poole what Palka had discussed with Benes, it was not difficult to surmise. Hodfa's dire financial situation was an open secret in Czechoslovak circles, and the OSS knew about it. Until his death in 1944, Hodfa struggled to keep his political campaign in America financially afloat. In October of 1942, for example, he asked the Polish government-in-exile for $650. 56 In May of the following year, Hodfa asked Slovak-American leader Vendelin Platek to help him out financially. The only regular income Hod.fa had was a monthly salary of $250 received from the Czechoslovak government-in-exile for his absentee membership in the London-based State Council. The money was payable to the account of Hodfa 's wife, who, at that time, resided in Chicago. Being well-informed of Hodfa's financial woes, Poole decided to use this information in the name of national interest. On June 5th, he telephoned Hodza, who was convalescing in Clearwater, Florida. The subject of the conversation was the ONA libel suit. According to Poole's account, Hodfa was tired of the longstanding legal battle and "had really lost interest in the matter." 57 This was borne out by David Karr, who had been following the case at the Office of War Information He informed Poole in November of 1942 that Hodza had indeed tried to drop his lawsuit, but this had not happened because of some misunderstanding between him and his lawyers. 58 As the secret memorandum of the telephone conversation between the two men suggests, Poole pressured Hodza to discontinue his campaign among Slovak Americans. During the conversation he hinted that both he and President Benes had been well aware of his financial difficulties. Poole then played his trump 56 Dusan Seges, "Ohlas sudobej krajanskej tlace na politicke posobenie Milana Hodzu v USA v rokoch 1941 - 1944," in Milan Hodia politik a i urnalista, ed. M. Peknik (Bratislava: Veda, 2008), 185 . In his article, Seges writes that Hodza wanted to use the money to gain a dominant influence on the Slovak-American newspaper Slovensky Hlasnik. Seges maintains that in the end Hodza succeeded in getting some of the money. 57 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943. 58 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-129, November 18, 1942. In his report, D. C. Poole clarified: "He [David Karr] thought that there had been some misunderstanding, in consequence probably of Dr. Hodza's imperfect command of English. Specifically, Mr. Karr gained the impression that Dr. Hodza had instructed his attorneys 'to settle,' meaning come to a final friendly adjustment; but the attorneys interpreted this to refer to obtaining a 'settlement' ." 56 SLOVAKIA card. He reassured his interlocutor that he had "obtained satisfactory assurances from Dr. Benes that Dr. Hodza's personal situation would not be disturbed."59 To make himself absolutely clear, the head of the FNB pointed out to Hodfa that "It would seem unfortunate if by pressing the suit against the Overseas News Agency at this time he should bring on a change."60 Though elegantly phrased, to Hodfa 's ears Poole's talk must have sounded like nothing more than political blackmail. There is little doubt that Hodfa took his words at face value. In the following days he contacted his lawyer. In order to find out whether he had really done so, Poole telephoned Hodza again on June 10th. Hodfa confirmed that he had instructed his lawyer via telegraph to terminate the suit. Fear for the post-war scenario in Central Europe prompted Hodza to draw up a document - Europe at the Crossroads - which he sent to the State Department in March of 1944.6 1 This memorandum analyzed the political situation in Central Europe within the context of its states' relations with the Soviet Union. Hodfa pointed to the undemocratic character of the Soviet political system, and warned against its application in any form . He challenged Benes's arguments, according to which the new foreign policy realignment with the Soviet Union was unavoidable. Hodza argued that by signing the treaty, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile willingly entered into the Soviet sphere of influence and thus became an instrument of the Russian Drang nach dem Westen. He rejected the policy of creating a "special sphere," the necessity of which Benes justified by the failure of the Western Powers and the "betrayal of Czechoslovakia" in 1938. He contended that no sphere of influence was able to guarantee the sovereignty of small countries. The only guarantee of security, Hodza maintained, was a system of collective security similar to the one promulgated by the Ameri59 NARA , Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-33CZ-20, p. 4. Memorandum of telephone conversation between D. C. Poole and Milan Hodza, June 10, 1943 . 60 Tbid. 61 Some historians doubt whether or not the Department of State actually received the memorandum. Lukac, who did not have a copy of the document at his disposal, claimed that "Despite the fact that several authors claim the memorandum was sent to the Department, including the author of this article, there is no copy of Europe at the Crossroads in the State Department archives. We can only speculate what fate it met, whether it was sent at all or "got lost" in American archives. " Lukac, Politic/ca cinnost' Milana Hodiu .. . , 622. The author of this study (R. Licko) can confirm that a copy of this 22-page-long memorandum is kept in the National Archives in Washington, in the OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch section with signature INT-32A-75. Moreover, there is also firm evidence that the memorandum was read at the State Department. D. C. Poole, chief of the FNB, summarised its contents in his report of March 8, 1944. SLOVAKIA 57 cans and the British in the form of the United Nations. The final victory was achievable only as a "collective victory," with collective war aims. He went on to write, with bitter regret, that the "official Czecho-Slovak policy obviously relinquished this imperative requirement of all alliances." 62 Hod.fa expressed his belief that "Czecho-Slovakia surely deserves a better fate than to become the victim of any personal rule or of any kind of soviet system."63 The memorandum also touches upon the position of the U.S. government, which chose not to reject the treaty. Hod.fa respected this view. However, the American position did not, in his opinion, change the simple fact that the treaty had contributed significantly to the creation of spheres of influence, whose catastrophic consequences would have to be dealt with after the war through a system of collective security. Part V of the memorandum was devoted to the Slovak question. According to Hodfa, the majority of Slovaks, with only a handful of opponents, demanded fair self-government for Slovakia. This demand was in stark contrast to the stubborn centralism of Benes and his political supporters in exile. Hodza's disapproval of the Soviet Union ' s influence, in relation to Slovakia's future, was based upon his conviction that the Soviet political system was incompatible with the political and cultural traditions of Slovaks. Hodza vehemently denied that Slovaks had ever sympathized with Communism. He also reminded the State Department that Slovaks had been fighting against Nazism on the Eastern as well as the Western fronts. Moreover, the majority of the Slovak soldiers who had defected from the Slovak army were, in Hod.fa ' s opinion, anti-Communists, with whom he had maintained radio contact. They desired, on the whole, a "Slovakia administered by Slovaks." Hodfa vigorously denied the allegations, current at the time, that Slovaks had not fought against Fascism. According to his information, as many as 75% of the Czecho-Slovak Army personnel in France between 1939 and 1940 were Slovaks.64 Europe at the Crossroads was Hod.fa' s last attempt to influence the U.S. administration. His memorandum was thoroughly analyzed by the OSS. The political analyst who studied it related its content to his superior DeWitt Poole.65 In the introduction of the report, its author noted: "It confirms my impression of him as a man of a high degree of peasant shrewdness." The OSS shared Hod.fa's concerns about the future of small Central European nations after the war: "The European peoples, more particularly, the East European nationnalities, will be potter's clay in the coming interplay of forces." The author fully sanctioned Hodza' s proposal to hold plebi62 NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, I 942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75 , p. 15. lbid., p. 19. 64 NARA, Washington D. C. , OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, TNT-32A-75. 65 Julian Towster to D. C. Poole, March 8, 1944. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, fNT-3 2A-75 . 63 58 SLOVAKIA scites in Central Europe, ideally under the auspices of the United Nations. 66 Russia's willingness, or lack thereof, to respect the free will of Central Europeans was to be a clear indication of how far this country intended to go in improving its relations with the Western Allies in the post-war period. The OSS report did not pay any particular attention to the issue of Slovakia's future after the war. At the time when the State Department received the OSS report, Hodza had been undergoing medical treatment in a holiday resort in Florida. Despite several periods of improvement during his stay in the United States, Hodza never recovered from his illness. On June 27, 1944, after an operation in Clearwater, Hodza succumbed to his illness. 67 His death was an immense loss, primarily to the advocates of Slovak self-government. Moreover, there was a general opinion among Slovak-American leaders that, apart from Stefan Osusky, there was no other political leader at that time who would have been able to unite the politically fragmented Slovak Americans.68 Having been a prominent Central European politician and statesman throughout his life, Hodza's death elicited obituaries in a number of leading dailies around the world. 69 His life-long political contribution to politics was acknowledged by the Czechoslovak government, and even by his political enemies, including Edvard Benes. Belatedly, the U.S. government paid 66 "Hodza is perfectly right in emphasizing the plebiscite angle. Plebiscites may not always have been the best yardstick of true national sentiment, but the principle of unhindered expression of such sentiment and of consultation between the leading United Nations members in regard to securing such expression goes to the heart of the problem." 67 Hodfa suffered from cancer of the large intestine. According to the autopsy report, the immediate cause of death was a complication - internal obturation during the operation . Hodza never regained consciousness. See Lukac, "Posledne chvile Milana Hodzu," in Obcianska spolocnost', no. 8 (August, 2000), I 0. 68 The Slovak leaders, especially those associated in the CASON, suggested Stefan Osusky as Hodfa's possible successor, because they did not regard Hodfa' s aide, Mudry Sebik, as a "strong and effective" leader. FBI, Chicago File No. 100-15744, January 25 , 1945 . Report: Slovak National Alliance, p. 7. Another FBI report written by its director on July 1, 1944, advised the Department of State of Osusky' s intention to ask for permission to enter the United States. In addition to giving a brief account ofOsusky's political career, the report states that V. Platek, the leader of the National Slovak Society, wrote a letter to Osusky as early as in June of 1943 . In it, Platek asked Osusky to come to the United States and to assume the leadership of Slovak Americans together with Hodfa. NARA, Washington D. C., 860f.202 l l/71844 PSNL, Roll 31, 1940 - 1944. Memorandum of J. E. Hoover to A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State. Subject: Milan Hodza and Stefan (Stephen) Osusky, July I, 1944. 69 The New York Times published Hodfa 's obituary on June 29, 1944. On July 4, 1944 the newspaper reported on Hodfa's funeral in Chicago. SLOVAKIA 59 tribute to this outstanding Czechoslovak statesman. In 1951 , U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles praised Hodfa's understanding of the mutual interdependence of sovereign and equal peoples, and acknowledged Hodfa's contribution to the cause of European unity.70 Given the scope of Hodfa's plans and activities in the United States during WW II, one has to ask oneself: what did the Roosevelt administration's foreign policymakers make of Hodfa's federalization plans, and what solution, if any, did they think desirable in the dispute about Slovakia's post-war future? What significance did Hodfa's plans play in American strategic planning in Central Europe? Were these in line with the existing American blueprint for the overall European peace settlement, or did they contradict it? To what extent were Hodfa's plans for a Central European federation examined, and what political will was there to intervene in the debate on the post-war status of Slovakia? American and European historians more or less share the same view that Central Europe, throughout WW II, was not an area of priority in the United States' strategic planning. United States foreign policy in Central Europe was the outcome of a variety of factors, domestic and international, and on the whole it could be characterized as unsystematic.71 Another characteristic of this policy was the fact that the United States' attitudes towards Eastern Europe went through several changes during WW IL To a large extent, these changes were the result of the personal influence of key political figures in the White House, as well as in the Department of State. It is commonly known that, at the beginning of the war, President Roosevelt was an advocate of the doctrine of the Four Policemen, according to which the four greatest powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China - were expected to take over the responsibility for the post-war political organization of the territories subjected to their influence. In Central Europe, this would mean an unprecedented increase in Soviet influence, given that Germany was to be disarmed after the war and its influence eliminated for good. From the standpoint ofHodfa's political plans, this represented an undesirable return to spheres of influence against which he so persistently warned. 70 Lukac, Politicka cinnost' Milana Hodzu ... , 625 . The Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad summarizes the non-systematic nature of this policy as follows: "So tenuous was the coherence of the many diverse elements in these policies, fluctuating in response to political and economic forces within the US itself, to local events in Eastern Europe, and to the challenges inherent in Great Power rivalry, that I have chosen the term the American non-policy to describe the end result of the various influencing factors . American policy-makers were never quite able to make up their minds about the importance of Eastern Europe to the United States." Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe (Oslo : Universitets forlaget, 1978), 34. 71 60 SLOVAKIA Quite a different view of the post-war world order was held by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. He advocated a vision of a globalized world, in which economic and political conflicts among sovereign countries were to be solved through a world organization.72 However, the idea of resurrecting a world organization on the principle of the interwar League of Nations was extremely unpopular in the United States. Warming up to such an idea took some time and was a gradual process.73 After the resignation of Sumner Welles from the position of Under Secretary of State in 1943, Cordell Hull finally succeeded in convincing the conservative-minded Department of State to accept the idea of a new United Nations. In relation to Central Europe, the new line in foreign policy resulted in the conviction that the reformed system of collective security would prevent the recreation of old spheres of influence. This was also the reason why the State Department was very reluctant to give its views on the various integration schemes of the Central European governments in exile. The growing influence of the Soviet Union in this area was a worrying development for the Roosevelt administration, but did not lead to a significant shift in the established policy of non-intervention.74 Surprisingly enough, despite the negative attitude towards European integration in general, the archival documents of the Department of State suggest that the U.S. foreign policy makers devoted con72 This track of American foreign policy in the 20th century is frequently referred to as "globalism," or, "universalism." See Michael Lind, "The Twilight of the U.N.," The New Republic, October 30, 1995, p. 28 . 73 The League of Nations, created in 1920, was part of the peace initiative of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, generally known as the "Fourteen Points." In terms of conflict resolution and international security, the organization's philosophy was based upon the principle of collective security, which stood in opposition to the notion of the balance of power and advancement of national interests. The U.S. Congress, however, refused to ratify the League' s Covenant. Wilson ' s peace initiative is often criticized and branded as an example of American political idealism. From the point of view of international relations, Wilson's plan stemmed from "idealistic and liberal dissatisfaction with the international anarchy, balance of power and the concept of self-help which had hitherto characterized the state-system." Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newham, Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin books, 1998), p. 300. 74 In the introduction to his book The Myth of Liberation; East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941 , Bennett Kovrig described American idealism in relation to Central Europe in the words of A. J. P. Taylor: "democratic foreign policy must be idealistic, or at the very least it has to be justified in terms of great general principles ". Kovrig added, "Yet the reader will find few villains and even fewer heroes, for seldom in the history of America 's foreign relations have good intentions reaped such a bitter harvest". Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation; EastCentral Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 194! (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), x. SLOVAKIA 61 siderable time to various integration schemes such as those proposed by Hodza. 75 The duties of investigating and assessing these plans, as well as drawing up recommendations which were to serve as guidelines in American post-war foreign policy, were entrusted to the Department of State Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.76 Browsing through the minutes of the Advisory Committee between May 1942 and March 1944 gives one some idea of how much time and space the Department of State devoted to federalization plans for Central Europe and what attitudes towards them various committee members maintained. On May 9, the Committee's agenda included the so-called Danubian Federation 77 The discussions focused on two plans drawn up by politicians in exile. One of these plans was the proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish union, put forward in the United States by the exiled Polish Prime Minister 75 Documentary sources from the American archives relating to the U.S. attitudes towards Central European integration were collected and annotated by the Polish authors J. Laptos and M. Misztal Marius, American Debates on Central European Unio n, 1942 - 1944. Documents of the American State Department (Brussels & New York: P.I.E.-P. Lang, 2002). 76 F. D. Roosevelt approved of the establishment of the Advisory Committee three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 28, 1941 . It included academics as well as leading officers of the Department of State. The Committee reported directly to the State Secretary. At that time, the position of vice-chairman was held by Under Secretary Sumner Welles. Everyday activities were overseen by Leo Pasvolsky. The Advisory Committee had six subcommittees, the most important of which were those dedicated to political, economic and territorial issues. Other key figures on the Committee who specialised in Central Europe were Hamilton Fish Armstrong ( 1893 - 1973) and Adolf A. Berle. It was the latter who was often believed by Czech and Slovak emigres to have harboured sympathies for Hodza's plans. The Committee 's job was to draw up general guidelines for the United States in peace negotiations. The official activity of this Committee was ended in the summer of 1943, but many of its members continued their work on other committees until the end of the war. The Committee 's research team drew up hundreds of reports, situational analyses and recommendations, which became a blueprint for the discussions and proceedings of the Committee and its subcommittees. Regular minutes of the subcommittees' discussions were kept. The documentation produced by the Advisory Committee is deposited in the National Archives in the Notter File. See Ignac Romcis, "Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Documents from the U.S. Department of State, 1942 - 1944" Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, [online] , 1992, 30, no. 77 . [Quoted: 2008-06-05] . Available at: <http ://www.hungarianhistory.hu> 77 The term "Danubian Federation" was chosen by the Advisory Committee to refer to the integration efforts of the Central European countries in the Danubian region. The discussions of the Advisory Committee on the "Danubian Federation" included possible membership for Poland and Austria. 62 SLOVAKIA Wladyslaw Sikorski. 78 The other was the Danubian Federation, championed by exiled Hungarian politicians Tibor Eckhardt and Janos Pelenyi.79 Hodfa's federation plan was not included. It was referred to only marginally by a member of the Committee, Anne McCormick. 80 She mentioned Hodfa as an agrarian politician who had been involved in solving agrarian problems.81 The foreign policy analyst went on to inform the Committee, quite misleadingly, that Hod:fa 's plan limited itself to the Danubian region.82 This ignorance of the details of Hodza's plan is interesting, because by that time Hodfa had already spoken about his plans to The New York Times and, more importantly, must have made his views known at the State Department during his first visit. 83 Hodfa 's plan was almost completely 78 Laptos and Mizstal pointed out that Sikorski 's plan for federation was dealt with only briefly. According to the information available to the Committee, Sikorski's federation was to comprise Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The plan envisaged the complete economic federation and eventual political federation of its constituent countries. According to the Advisory Committee, Polish influence in the thus-constituted federation was obvious, though the sheer scale of the supranational state ruled out complete Polish domination. Laptos and Mizstal, .American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 74. 79 Tibor Eckhardt was a Hungarian politician of the interwar period. In 1938 he represented Hungary at the League of Nations Assembly. In 1941 he was sent on a mission to the USA by Miklos Horthy in order to approach the Allies and the Hungarian democratic opposition. Eckhardt's federation was brought to the attention of the Committee by Under Secretary of State Welles. According to this plan, Central Europe was to be divided into three parts: a Polish-Baltic bloc, a Balkan bloc and a "Danubian" union,comprising Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Slovakia and Transylvania, with the possibility of the later admission of Croatia. The unifying element of the federation was to be their common history as part of the Habsburg monarchy. NARCS Notter File, Department of State. Minutes P - I 0, Danubian Federation, May 9, 1942. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 74. 80 Anne O ' Hare McCormick (1882 - 1954), a member of the Advisory Committee, was a foreign policy analyst for The New York Times. 81 The minutes of the meeting captured McCormick's information on Hodza and his plan as follows: " Mrs. McCormick said that mention might also be made of the Hodfa plan, which confines itself to the Danubian area. Mr. Hodfa, she pointed out, being a peasant, is chiefly concerned with the agricultural problem. His plan expresses the aspirations of the Green International." Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 75. 82 In Hodza's plan the core of the proposed federation was to be formed by CzechoSlovakia and Poland, who were to be joined by other countries in the south of Central Europe. 83 See Hope Put in Union of Central Europe, the OSS report on the interview with M. Hodza. NARA, Washington D. C., OSS, FNB Files, 1942 - 1945, INT-9CZ-1 , December 7, 1941 . SLOVAKIA 63 ignored. It was mentioned in passing in connection with the association of agrarian parties known as the Green International. American foreign policy advisors again failed to include Hodza's plan when they discussed the so-called East European Union as one of the issues related to the Department of State's plans to create a world organization. 84 The members of the Division of Special Research discussed, among other things, the results of the negotiations between the exiled governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland on the creation of a joint union .85 In mid-June of 1942, the Department of State presented to the Advisory Committee the first draft of American recommendations which any supranational organization in Central Europe should comply with. One of the main differences, in comparison with Hodza's plan, was that the United States preferred a union to a federation. This preference reflected the Roosevelt administration's unwillingness to sanction political integration. What the Department of State recommended was a loose organization of free sovereign states, which would be able to advance their interests through joint, non-legislative institutions. Such an economic union was to comprise all states of Central and Eastern Europe, including countries as far apart as Estonia, Austria and Greece.86 The establishment of this union would have to take place under the auspices of the United Nations. The main rationale was that the establishment of such a union would solve the existing security problems and bring with it economic advantages as a result of regional cooperation. The territorial integrity of the union was to be safeguarded by the United Nations, and the security forces of the union were to act in concordance with the security system of the United Nations. After the war, the world organization was to facilitate the creation of the union by adjusting all outstanding border claims. What is most striking to the European reader about the attitudes of the American government are its views on the armed forces of member 84 The meeting of the Division of Special Research, which prepared reports for the Advisory Committee, took place on June 6, I 942. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P 14, June 6, I 942 . NARA, Notter File, Box 65 ., Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 96 - 103. 85 For the history of the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations on uniting, including the attitudes of the United States and the other great powers, see Wandycz, Czechoslovak-Polish Confederation and the Great Powers, 1940 - 1943. 86 " The regional organization should have the form not of a federation but of a union of independent and sovereign states, cooperating for limited objectives through common non-legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized. Provisionally the union is considered as including all states of Central and Eastern Europe between Russia and Germany from and including Estonia in the North to Austria in the West and Greece in the South." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Minutes P Document 24, June 19, 1942. NARA, Notter File, box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 110. 64 SLOVAKIA countries, as well as on the military of the union as a whole. Every constituent country would have to contribute a designated contingent of troops for the international armed forces (under the command of the UN), but no member state was to have its own armed forces . This recommendation testified to the distrust with which the American foreign policymakers looked upon the nations of Central Europe. The Advisory Committee's analysis of the factors which were thought to be conducive to, or had disintegrating effects upon, the creation of a Central European Union offers an interesting insight into the mindset of the American foreign policy advisors of that time. In the beginning the majority of the Committee members seemed to be in favour of one large Central European union from the Baltic to the Balkans.87 It was argued that a larger union was more advantageous to the United States, because it would be better able to eliminate the destructive forces of nationalism, mutual antagonisms and the land disputes of the Central European nations. 88 An analysis of the economic benefits failed to persuade American foreign policy advisors that economic prosperity was in itself motivationally adequate for unification . In the American view, the history of integration efforts in the interwar period showed that political interests in the area had often been given priority over economic ones. The unification of Czechs and Slovaks was pointed out as an example. According to L. Pasvolsky, Masaryk and Bene~ were willing to accept any economic disadvantages in order to achieve political and cultural unity after WW I. 89 It was nationalism, however, that elicited the greatest fears in the members of the Committee. The issue was frequently raised during the discussions, and the Department of State believed that nationalism was one of the five main obstacles to Central European integration.90 As the feasibility study for the Department of State from 87 This notion was supported most enthusiastically by S. Welles and H. F. Armstrong. 88 From the economic point of view, a larger union appeared to offer better prospects of strengthening the commercial position of member states in trade with the rest of Europe. As for the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the gravest concerns at the Department of State were aroused by Hungarian nationalism, with some criticism also levelled at the former Czechoslovakia. 89 "Mr. Bowman observed that in the case of the unification of the Czechs and the Slovaks the main emphasis had been on the achievement of political and cultural unity from the beginning. Economic considerations had played a decidedly minor £iart." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943 . Apart from nationalism, the list of five disintegrative forces comprised the absence of common roots, cultural di versity, external political influences and diversity in regional economic development. Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943. NARA , NARA, Notter File, SLOVAKIA 65 February, 1943 observed, "Since the present war began, the animosity between several of the states, e.g., between Bulgaria and Greece, and between Hungary and Romania, has been greatly increased and the conflicts between ethnic groups within one state e.g., between Czechs and Slovaks, between Serbs and Croats, have become bitter."9 1 Where the State Department seemed to be in agreement with Hodfa was the belief that the peasantry could play a positive role in the process of Central European integration. In the inter-war period, peasant parties in Central Europe had engaged in mutual cooperation and shared a similar political agenda. 92 A member of the Committee, J. T. Shotwell, also sympathised with this opinion, but expressed reservations about the role of agrarian leaders, who, in his view, had nationalistic tendencies which might prove distractive. 93 The discussion about the cohesive and destructive forces of unification eventually prompted the members of the Committee to break the proposed union into two parts. With regard to the attitudes of the exiled governments, Berle pointed out that, surprisingly, none of these su£ported a large union, with the exception of the Czechoslovak government. 4 Strictly speaking, however, this was no longer the case. By that time, the Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations had reached a stalemate and the Czechoslovak Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 187 - 88. 91 Department of State, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, February 19, 1943 . NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 92 State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part III: Movements Tending Toward Unity, February 19, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 188. 93 According to Shotwell, the majority of Central European leaders were nationalists of the 19th century type. As an example he pointed to Count Apponyi, who owned land in Slovakia, a fact which had a great deal of influence on his political outlook. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P I 7, June 27, 1942. Milan Hodza himself often mentioned the agrarian problems in Hungary. That was also why he laid down conditions on the membership of Hungary in a Central European Federation, stressing first the necessity of agrarian reform in that country. 94 Laptos and Mistal put Berle 's incorrect information down to the skilfulness of the Czechoslovak propaganda. "The question was asked whether Mr. Welles and Mr. Berle had talked with representatives of these countries on this matter. Mr. Berle said that no one of that group had the concept of a single union. Mr. Welles said he had never found one who had the conception of one union, most favoring three unions; some, two. Mr. Berle said that the Czechs were the only ones who had offered any support for a single union." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union . .., 129 - 30. 66 SLOVAKIA government was getting increasingly cold feet about any union with its northern neighbour. At the end of June, the members of the Committee agreed that for the sake of further discussions about Central European integration they would consider two options- the so-called Northern East European Group and a Balkan Group. 95 Another key issue to which the Advisory Committee devoted its attention was the problem of how viable the proposed union would be and what attitudes the great powers would adopt in dealing with this supranational state. According to the above-mentioned feasibility study, the political will of the member states alone was insufficient for the union's long-term survival. American foreign policymakers understood perfectly well that in order for the union to survive, it had to secure the support of the victorious powers, including that of the United States. 96 The advantages from the American point of view seemed palpable enough: a solution to questions of security in relation to Germany and Russia, pacification of the space between the Baltic and the Aegean seas in an area inaccessible to the naval powers, and the protection of Eastern European countries against possible German expansion. The most important question, of course, was how such a union would be viewed by the geographically closest of the powers - the Soviet Union. In the October Memorandum on Russia and the East European Federation, drawn up by the Council on Foreign Relations, an expert on Soviet affairs informed the Committee that the reasons for Soviet opposition were far stronger than those which might induce the Soviet Union to support such a scheme. 97 The first and the most decisive reason for Soviet 95 The proposal to break up the union was put forward by Under Secretary of State Welles at the meeting of the Division of Special Research on June 27, 1942 . The main reason was the diverse character of the member states of the union, which might lead to its disintegration. On the issue of breaking up the union, the members of the Committee were by no means united. Welles was in principle in favour of a single union, but practical considerations compelled him to opt for two smaller ones. The key problem of the two-union solution was Austria and Hungary. Department of State, Division of Special Research, Political Subcommittee, Minutes P 17, June 27, 1942. NARA , Notter File, Box 55. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 119 - 20. 96 See Part IV: Steps Necessary to make Union Effective: "In view of the fact that Eastern Europe has felt the impact of virtually none of those dynamic forces that would aid in creating a unity out of this di versity of peoples, the creation of a union and its maintenance for an indefinite period would have to be in large measure the work of the great victorious powers or of the international organization. " State Department, P Document 204, The Feasibility of an East European Union, Part IV: NARA, Notter File, Box 57. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 19 1. 97 The author of the memorandum was Isaiah Bowman. The Counci l on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, SLOVAKIA 67 opposition was the assumption that the establishment of a union would prevent the Soviet Union from exercising its policy of divide et impera. Moscow was also worried that the political orientation of the Central European countries within the proposed union would lead to the weakening of the existing pro-Russian orientation in some of them. 98 There is little doubt that Czechoslovakia was one of those countries. Its president-in-exile Edward Benes had indicated that Czechoslovak foreign policy after the war would be oriented towards the east. The Soviet attitude towards integration in Central Europe was yet again referred to by American foreign policy advisors as "apparently hostile" in February of 1943. 99 The report made it clear that Moscow was in no mood to support federalization plans of a lesser scope, such as the proposed Czechoslovak-Polish or Greek-Yugoslav unions. The Department of State reached this conclusion on the basis of the information obtained directly from representatives of the Czechoslovak government-inexile. The negative attitude of Moscow was also identified as the main rea- October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 176. 98 The author continues: "The possibilities of supporting Czechoslovakia against Poland, Hungary against Rumania, Yugoslavia against Hungary and so forth, present an almost limitless field for maneuver by Russia to make its influence strong and even preponderant among the disunited states of East Central Europe." Other Soviet objections could be summarized as follows: 2. the united states of Central Europe would find it easier to advance their territorial claims against Russia, 3. the political system of the member countries would unify, but become very likely hostile to that of the Soviet Union, 4. the union 's armed forces would be stronger in defence, which would weaken Soviet military position, 5. the exports of such a federation would compete in world markets with Soviet exports; Soviet exports into the union would be disadvantaged, since Russia would have to deal with the union as a whole rather than trading with countries separately, 6. the union would curb the revived pan-Slav sentiment, because it would include non-Slav countries and the pro-Russian orientation of the Slav countries would thus be weakened. The Council on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Territorial series, October 26, 1942. NARA, Notter File, Box 61. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. . , 177. 99 "On the basis of information at present available in the Political Section, the Soviet Government is apparently hostile to the idea of the creation of an all-embracing East European Union, unless, perhaps, such a Union were established under the preponderant influence of the Soviet Union. An examination of the Soviet press and periodicals has disclosed no discussions of such projects for an Eastern European Union as have been put forward from time to time in Britain and the United States." Department of State, Division of Special Research, Document P 206, February 18, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 57. LAPTOS, Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 196. 68 SLOVAKIA son why the Czechoslovak §ovemment broke off its negotiations with the Polish govemment-in-exile. 1 0 The work of the Advisory Committee for Postwar Foreign Policy officially ended in July of 1943, though some of its subcommittees continued their work on Central European integration plans until the spring of 1944. 101 The issue of Slovakia's post-war political status never came up. Neither was it discussed by any of the Committee's numerous subcommittees. The abandonment of American discussions of the Central European integration plans raises two questions: what were the reasons for this decision and what political future did the Roosevelt administration envisage for the Central European nations? The answer to the first question should be looked for in the analyses of U.S. foreign policy for this period. Drawing on the latest historical research, one finds, more or less, consensus on this issue. The dominant factor in American strategic planning was the growing military presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe, which went hand in hand with its increasing political influence. It became clear, towards the end of 1943, that the Red Army would liberate a substantial part of Central Europe, a fact which would inevitably increase the role of the Soviet Union in the post-war political organization of the area. Regardless of their original plans, President Roosevelt and the Department of State had to constantly adjust to these developments. In 1943, under pressure of the events on the Eastern Front, Roosevelt was forced to review his erstwhi le concept of an "Anglo-American world police force" and extend it into the well-known "Four Policemen" theory. This had to take the Soviet Union into account as an equal partner in the political organization of territories within its own sphere of influence. From this point of view it 100 "Mr. Berle remarked that when the Polish-Czech confederation was agreed upon, both parties had believed that the Russians were not opposed to the idea. The worsening of relations between Russia and the Polish government-in-exile, however, has since resulted in a change in the Russian position. The Czechs have withdrawn from their discussions with the Poles, ostensibly because the Poles were unwilling to abandon their claim to the Teschen area, but in reality because of Russian opposition to the combination." Department of State, Advisory Committee, R Minutes 7, November 12, 1943. NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union ... , 217. 101 Secretary of State Cordell Hull ended the work of the Committee in a letter of July 12, 1943 . Mary E. Bradshaw, "Congress and Foreign Policy Since 1900," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 289 (September, 1953), 45 . The last minutes of the Political Subcommittee dealing with the Central European union were those of March 15- 17, 1944, NARA, Notter File, Box 84. The last meeting of the Economic Subcommittee took place on March 31 , 1944. Advisory Committee, Economic Subcommittee, R Minutes 16, March 31, 1944 NARA, Notter File, Box 84. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Unio n ... , 243 . SLOVAKIA 69 can be understood why any American position on a Central European federation or union had to be approved by Moscow. The absence of a Soviet stance on the issue throughout 1942 kept the idea of integration alive among the exiled politicians of Central Europe, and occupied the minds of American foreign policy advisors on the Advisory Committee. Doubts about Moscow's priorities were finally ended in October of 1943, when the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, officially confirmed the negative position of the USSR. 102 The answer to the second question, namely what the Americans desired as the political future for Central Europe, is more complicated. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that the views of the Roosevelt administration on this issue were not unanimous. Significant differences of opinion existed in Washington, which divided even the chief foreign policy makers, President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. American historians' interpretation of the U.S. foreign policy objectives in Central Europe during this period have gone through several developments since WW II. 103 The more recent research emphasizes the importance of Roosevelt's role in the process of foreign policymaking, and interprets his apparent lack of determination and unsystematic approach as misleading. According to this interpretation, Roosevelt, from the beginning of the war, pursued a clear goal in relation to Continental Europe: to reduce its international standing and marginalize it as the most effective way of preventing future conflicts in the area. Roosevelt intended to achieve this marginalization through fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively powerless, and wherever possible, ethnically homogenous states. These states should in no case possess any armed forces, and after disarmament they should be placed within the sphere of influ102 This information was imparted to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who asked V. Molotov about the Soviet view on Central European integration efforts at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 19 - 29, 1943. Laptos and Mizstal, American Debates on Central European Union .. ., 63 . 103 The oldest interpretation of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe maintains that the Roosevelt administration favoured active involvement in the rebuilding of European democracies and in strengthening the position of European states. Roosevelt is criticised, however, because he was unable to see through Stalin's empty promises at Yalta. The second, "revisionist" theory contends that the post-war division of Europe was afait accompli long before Yalta, because the Red Anny would occupy the whole of Eastern Europe and the United States had to respect this fact. ." Elena Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War: A Reevaluation," Telos. A Quarterly Journal of Critical Thought 26 (no. 2, 1996), 73 . Lundestad, who reviewed both of the above theories, characterized U.S. foreign policy towards Central Europe as a policy of "modified universalism in the area of non-essential interest for the USA." For the lack of internal coherence in this policy he chose to refer to it as a "non-policy." G. Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe .. . , 34. 70 SLOVAKIA ence of either Britain or the Soviet Union. 104 Such a vision of the future of Central European nations was incompatible with Hodza 's federalization. He feared the political influence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, called for concerted efforts to strengthen the position of Central Europe. As far as Slovakia's future was concerned, Roosevelt's policy of non-intervention, whether intentional or inadvertent, played more into the hands of Slovak separatists than those of the proponents of federative integration.' 05 Roosevelt's concept of new spheres of influence, however, stood in contrast to the universalistic vision of Secretary of State Hull, who was advocating global cooperation among nations on the basis of a renewed world organization. The key moment, which resulted in the adoption of the universalistic approach as the main guideline in U.S. foreign policy, is usually thought to be the resignation of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 106 After Welles's resignation, Secretary of State Hull and his department advanced the concept of collective security within the framework of a restored world organization under a new name. ' 07 The new line in American foreign policy, however, did not make the Roosevelt administration take a more active role in suppressing the emerging Soviet sphere of influence. On the contrary, Roosevelt continued to count on Soviet assistance as a decisive political force in the post-war reorganization of Central Europe. What he and his foreign policy advisors got wrong was the belief that Stalin's Russia would sooner or later discard its system of central planning, return to the market economy and join the rest of the democratic world. 104 "As he [Roosevelt] told the British Foreign Minister in March 1943, 'armaments after the war in Europe should be concentrated in the hands of the policing powers Britain, the United States and Russia. The smaller powers might have rifles but nothing more dangerous than this' .. .These two great powers had to maintain order over other disarmed European countries, if necessary by force." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War", 72 . 105 "He [Roosevelt] also envisioned splitting up multiethnic countries such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." Aga-Rossi, "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," 70. On another occasion, when meeting representtatives of the Slovak League in 1940, Roosevelt remarked: "I believe that every nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its nationhood." Ever since then, the Slovak League interpreted the president's statement as approval of the establishment of an independent Slovak state. NARA, Washington D. C., 860F.0l /446. Reverend C. Mlynarovich to C. Manion of the Office for Government Refcort, Indiana, May 11, 1942. 06 Sumner Welles, Roosevelt's closest ally in the Department of State, was a strong supporter of the president's concept of the "Four Policemen." Roosevelt did not trust Hull. In 1943 the president accepted Welles 's resignation in connection with his alleged homosexual activities. 107 In the field of international relations, Hull 's approach to foreign affairs is often associated with the principles of universalism, globalism and political idealism . SLOVAKIA 71 Thus we have seen that, between 1941 and 1944, the American authorities closely followed the political activities of exiled Slovak politician Milan Hodfa. His political goal in the United States was twofold. First, he intended to influence Roosevelt's foreign policy makers in favour of the creation of a supranational federation of Central European states, which he saw as a political panacea for the area' s many unresolved problems. According to this plan, a restored Czechoslovakia was to be one of the founding members of such a federation . Slovakia was to be part of Czechoslovakia again, but with a new constitutional arrangement stipulating its equal political status with the Czech lands. Secondly, Hodza planned to lead a political campaign among Slovak Americans. In particular, he hoped to win the endorsement of the leaders of their organizations for his programme of a self-governing Slovakia. Various federal agencies' keen interest in Hodza, however, was not motivated by the desire of the U.S. government to support the creation of a central European federation . It rather stemmed from the fact that U.S. governmental agencies had deep misgivings about the effects of Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans. Thus, for the American government, Hodfa soon emerged as an unwelcome guest as the OSS began in mid-1942 supplying various U.S. departments with reports about the ideological split within the Slovak-American community. The fears frequently expressed in the OSS reports were motivated by the perceived possible consequences of Hodza ' s campaign on the home front as well as the on the American war effort in general. Foremost among these fears was that the Hodfa-inspired opposition to the Benes-led government-in-exile would not only undermine the standing of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile - one of the war-time allies of the United States - but would also have a deleterious effect on the morale of the hundreds of thousands of Slovak Americans employed in key American heavy industries. Hodza's political campaign among Slovak Americans targeted two deeply antagonistic camps. He attempted to win the support of the leaders of the Slovak National Alliance, who had originally supported Benes's government-in-exile. At the same time, he tried to negotiate with the leaders of the Slovak League of America, several of whom offered their organizations' support for his programme. However, Hodfa failed to eliminate the powerful influence of the hard-liners in these umbrella organizations. The Czechoslovak Information Service in the United States, a propaganda tool of the London-based Czechoslovak government-in-exile, severely criticized Hodfa's campaign among Slovak Americans, constantly challenging his right to discuss Slovakia' s future on American soil and running a smear campaign against him. The U.S. administration viewed Hodfa 's activities with growing alarm. The most worrying development from the American point of view was the ideological split in the Slovak National Alliance which devel- 72 SLOVAKIA oped as a result of Hodza ' s lecture tour. The OSS repeatedly called on the Department of State to intervene in order to mend the rift among the proCzechoslovak fraternal leaders. Hodza ' s attempts to influence the attitudes of the Roosevelt administration towards the future organization of Central Europe had little impact on American foreign policy. lndeed, his plan for a Central European federation was never discussed by the American foreign policy advisors. Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State and its agencies devoted considerable time to weighing the pros and cons of Central European integration from the point of view of American interests. The Department of State tended to favour an economic union rather than a political federation. Moreover, it feared the destructive forces of Central European nationalisms, not excluding the Slovak and Czech ones. However, the major American objection to any form of Central European integration stemmed from the strong opposition to it from the United States' chief war ally in Eastern Europe - the Soviet Union. Stalin had no intention of supporting any integration plans in the area. He preferred a fragmented Central Europe made up of weak states, which would strengthen the negotiating position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis these countries. Roosevelt ' s policy of deliberate non-intervention in Central Europe, coupled with the American belief in a new world organization, resulted after the war in a gradual Sovietization of Central Europe and the creation of a new sphere of influence. Given the pro-Soviet foreign policy orientation of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile from December of 1943 onwards, the Roosevelt administration refrained from publicly expressing any of its views on Slovakia's post-war future.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource An Unwelcome Guest: Milan Hodža in American Documents Between 1941 and 1944 Description An account of the resource Roman Ličko Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 37-72 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ličko, Roman Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b49f58106e26d9b609f40427f2a0c22d.pdf 5013aa35164ccd986cee7bb9e2e6c268 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 73 SEEMING AND BEING: CONTEXTUALIZING THE HISTORY OF POST - COMMUNIST SLOVAKIA Juraj Hocman The year 1989 marked the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia and the beginning of Slovakia's road to independence. For the Slovaks this year also revealed the gap between their perception of national history and how it was viewed from the outside. In the 1990s, a new generation of western scholars contrasted the post-communist change of Czechoslovakia' s two nations. In their studies of modem Slovak society they rarely went beyond 1918. They relied very much on general accounts and traditional dichotomies between the Czechs and Slovaks, such as 'industrial' versus 'rural,' 'secular' versus 'religious,' ' progressive' versus 'backward.' 1 This was why in the 1990s the Slovaks continued to be seen as a "non-historic" nation hastily modernized during the communist era. Since it was mostly invisible in Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Slovak history automatically appeared as ruptured and fragmented. Following the downfall of the communist regime and the creation of the independent Slovak Republic in January of 1993, the country's image was primarily associated with radical nationalism, intolerance towards its minorities and an unstable domestic political scene. All of these seemed to have been sufficient to explain Slovakia' s failure to achieve a functioning democracy in the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s, a secondwave of scholarly interest in Slovakia began. Attracted by the country' s economic progress and an overall social and political stability, western scholars turned their attention to what had seemed in the 1990s as a satisfactory explanation for the peculiarities of Slovakia's evolution as a post-communist state. Some of them came to the conclusion that the existing stereotypes stemmed from preconceived methodological approaches, even unfamiliarity with the facts .2 The1 Abby Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001 ), ix-xi. 2 Karen Henderson, "Evaluating the Slovak Transition : What Creates the Image of Slovakia?" In Slovakia after Communism and Meciarism, ed. Kieran Williams (London: School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, 2000), 26. �74 SLOVAKIA refore, a better understanding of what was happening in the country since its creation requires a broader historical approach. 1. Seeming and Being in the History of East and West. The self-challenging motto of the Andrassy family of Hungarian nobles, Non videri, sed esse (Not Seeming but Being), which inspired medieval and early modern societies, stands in direct opposition to modem approaches to social reality that tend to place image over substance.3 In this regard small nations are at greater risk of being overlooked, even misjudged by bigger nations. 4 While it is hardly imaginable that the views of a Slovak or a Czech scholar on the history of Great Britain, the United States or Canada would have the same resonance and impact on the international image of those countries, western scholars have scrutinized the history of Czechoslovakia and its two nations with significant consequences.5 This could happen since the capacity of Slovak historians to conduct independent research and publish the results during the communist era was subject to ideological indoctrination and political constraints. Moreover, Slovak historians, in contrast to their Czech colleagues, until recently did not work systematically on a conceptualization of Slovak history and the minimalization of its invisibility. Such a course would have helped to "sell" their cause abroad - the legitimacy and viability of the existence of Slovakia as a sovereign state - long after its creation. In the 1990s this gap was filled by foreign scholars and the media in a way that simplified and, in some cases, distorted the mostly unknown Slovak history waiting for its reinterpretation at home and rediscovery abroad. The Slovaks were depicted, in terms of their 3 Eva Smelkova and Julius Barczi, "Andrassyovci a Rozi\ava," Forum Historiae 2/2008, p.5. Accessed at www.forumhistoriae.sk/FH 2/smelkova. df 4 See the interview with the Norwegian publicist and writer Egil Lejon "Slovensko prikladom" on the parallels between the historical evolution of the Slovaks and the small Scandinavian nations in the 19th century. Literarny tyidennik, August 12, 1994, pp. I and 11. 5 Even large states are vulnerable to intrusions into their national histories that contradict domestic interpretations. See the internet article "Russia Will Never Let Anyone Falsify [the] History of [the] Second World War" which refers to the image of the soldiers of the Red Army in WW II as looters and rapists . Russia has created a special committee to counteract the "attempts at distorting history to the detriment of Russi a's interest. " Pravda (Moscow). Accessed at www.pravda.ru, May 20, 2009 . �SLOVAKIA 75 missing statehood, as a non-historic nation, which, after the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1993, cured its historical complexes and democratic deficiencies at the expense of their advanced neighbors with whom they shared a common history - the Czechs and the Magyars. 6 To that, some Slovak scholars and politicians reacted with fervor instead of providing a systemic and efficient alternative.7 Consequently, they created solitary and isolated interprettations of Slovak history that clashed with stereotypes and automatically brought about the risk of being viewed either as hard-core nationalists or revisionists.8 In the early 2000s, western scholars such as Karen Henderson, Abby Innes, Cas Mudde and others expressed their doubts concerning cliches linked to Slovak history. The progress in the rediscovery of Slovak history in the West since the beginning of the 2000s cannot be overlooked as the new generation of scholars did their fieldwork in the Slovak Republic and critically examined the earlier interpretations of Slovak history emerging in the 1990s. 9 Although the trend of foreign and Slovak historians coming closer in their interpretations is growing, a lot of work remains to be done by both sides.10 6 George Schopflin, Nations, Identity, Power (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 280-297 ("The Slovak case study"). 7 Looking for internationally-known personalities with Slovak origins at any cost to improve the image of Slovakia could result in quite opposite effects. See Greg Steinmetz's article, "Slovaks desperately searching for famous countrymen," The Globe and Mail, April 27, 1996. Similarly, the publishing of another variant of the multi-volume "History of Slovakia" in the Slovak language with short resumes in German, English, French and Russian, and picture books with descriptive texts designed for common readers are hardly ways to provide a conceptual and critical synthesis of Slovak history known and accepted internationally. 8 Franti~ek Vnuk, Milan Durica and other historians grouped around the Matica slovens/ca. 9 Next to Karen Henderson and Abby Innes, the best examples are the recent works by Tim Haughton and John A. Scherpereel cited in this article. The British scholar George Schopflin sees a great challenge for historians of East Central Europe to become familiar with the Anglo-Saxon, German, French, Russian, and Italian scholarly literature. For consequences regarding Slovak history see George Schopflin, "Vytvaranie eur6pskej kulturnej identity? Stredna Europa v rozfaenej Eur6pskej unii," Listy SFPA, March-April 2003 , pp.2-3. 10 " .. . it is hardly surprising that any effort to straighten the Slovak spine is seen as nationalism, the equivalent of n[N]azism, fascism and the oppression of minorities. It may be hard to believe but the greatest enemies of Slovakia are Slovaks themselves. On several occasions, I have had an opportunity to witness the way in which Slovak historians have given lectures on Slovakia to foreign audiences. Nearly all of �76 SLOVAKIA Furthermore, in the modem era the role of the media in building popular perceptions on the basis of simplified interpretations of historical developments has been increasing. A reasonable objection can be made as to why a scholarly study should be bothered by what the media say. In short, the media can popularize history more effectively than scholars who create their interpretations only after years of studying a particular problem. Thus, in creating a public image, it is the media which paints the larger picture, not scholars. 11 Paraphrasing Clausewitz, the media may be seen as the continuation of historiography and social science by other means. 12 This was evident in the case of Slovakia's image as hyper-nationalist in the early 1990s and during the country's quasi-miraculous instant awakening in 1998. Views by the media helped to reduce this phase in modem Slovak history to the Manichean conflict between 'evil' and 'good' politicians, and, implicitly, between the 'progressive' and 'backward' electorates and segments of Slovak society. 13 them have had one thing in common: they present the Slovaks as a nation without a history, without culture and traditions - and surprise - as the oppressor of minorities. Nor do they neglect to mention Slovakia's facist and Nazi past. Their spiritual kin in the West have gone so far in their blind, ignorant hatred as to blame the Slovaks for the hanging of Communists and Jews in Kosice in January of 1945. According to one German commentator, the massacres in Kosice were ' one of the last abominations of the fascist Slovak state and ally of Adolf Hitler. ' The fact that Kosice belonged to Hungary at that time and that this sad, vile act was committed by the Hungarian fascists "Wild Rose Crosses," is apparently of interest to no one, the least to our own historians." Darina Vergesova, "Dajte Duricovi pokoj," Kritika & Kon text, nos. 2-3 ( 1997), pp.59-60. 11 "A separate chapter in our [Slovak] media is that of the methodical loss of national memory," Pavo! Dinka, S/ovenske media: Met6dy manipulacie (Bratislava: PPA, 2008), 21. Due to its image inherited from the 1990s, Slovakia was depicted in three films - "Hostel" (2004), "Eurotrip" (2004) and "Hostel 2" (2007) - as a nest of danf:erous and perverted criminals and mafia. For details see www.imdb.com 2 On the shift of the media in the time of globalization from being the Fourth Power (provider of information) to the Fifth Power (manipulator of information) see the article by Ignacio Ramonet, "Le cinquieme pouvoir," Le Monde Diplomatique, Apri l-Mai (2005), pp.74-78 "Dans la nouvelle guerre ideologique qu 'impose la mondialisation, !es medias sont utilisees comme une arme de combat. L' information, en raison de son explosion, de sa multiplication, de sa surabondance, de ses partis pris, se trouve litteralement contaminee, empoisonnee par toute sorte des mensonges, pollue par !es rumeurs, !es distorsions, !es manipulations." Ibid., p.77. 13 Lubomir Kopecek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke stranictvi na Slovensku (Brno: CDK, 2006), p.308. A survey conducted in Slovakia in the mid- l 990s focused on the degree of tolerance towards minorities, disrespect for the law by politi- �SLOVAKIA 77 Next to the risk of perspectives based on simplified portrayals of reality stands the problem of divergent approaches towards the same phenomena in the history of the East and West. The classic saying goes "if disease is beautiful, it is generally someone else's disease." 14 Apart from its complimentary aspect, Chesterton's aphorism can be applied to nationalism and its negative characteristics associated primarily with the East. In the 1990s, the resurrected nationalism of East Central Europe gained a negative image linked to the ethnocentric nationalism of the 19th century. This resulted in the categorization of post-communist states into progressive ones and those which lagged behind. It is true that the downfall of Communism and the subsequent disintegration of the Communist Bloc resulted in an explosion of ethnic tensions. When examining the roots of nationalism and its capacity for political and social mobilezation, it should become clear that the same primordial instincts attributed to the East had existed among western literati in the 19th century. In multiethnic Britain the same elements of linguistic and ethnic tensions shaped by romantic nationalism can be found in historical novels designed with the same purpose as those by writers in East Central Europe. 15 The similarities between the nation-building processes in W estem and East Central Europe can particularly be observed in the creation of multi-ethnic Great Britain as a political nation during the period 1707-1837, where the impact of external threats helped her to overcome the historical centripetal tendencies based on ethnic diversity. 16 What worked in Great Britain did not work in Austria- cians, positive opinions on the communist regime before its fall and engagement in civic association activities. 14 Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: The Bodley Head, 1949), p.12. 15 On the Norman-Saxon ethno-linguistic division and societal hierarchy in medieval England see Sir Walter Scott's historical novel Ivanhoe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 16 Linda Colley, Britons: Forg ing the Nation 1707-/837 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992). For the major argument of the book see the introduction, pp.1-9. See also the comparison of the Magyars with the English "who have violently Anglicized ten millions of Irishmen and Scottsmen" made by a Magyar Deputy in the Hungarian Diet in 1879 in justification of the forced Magyarization . R.W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London: Archibald Constable, 1908; reprinted in New York by Howard Fertig, 1972), 217 . There is a significant difference. Whereas Great Britain made, at least formally, its Compromise in 1707, the radical part of Magyar political elites failed to do it until it was too late. �78 SLOVAKIA Hungary from 1848 to 1918 and in Czechoslovakia, where centripetal tendencies eventually prevailed. Recalling the indication by Cas Mudde of double standards in explaining ' bad' and 'good' nationalism in Slovakia during the period 1989-1992, 17 nationalism, in general, appeared as progressive when it had helped to create nation-states in the West from the 16th to the 19th centuries, whereas it became perverted in state-building processes in post-communist Eastern Europe in the 1990s. 18 Though the concerns of multi-ethnic states about the possible consequences of various forms of nationalism, past and future, to which modem historiography and political science have legitimately pointed, are understandable, the common roots of nationalism should not be forgotten. This will help us to avoid the traps of nationalism's general recrimination in post-communist East Central Europe, including Slovakia, regardless of the context within which it emerged and had been shaped. 19 In addition to the perception of the Slovaks as intolerant nationalists, the image of the country has been that of a non-historic nation due to the viewing of unexplored parts of Slovak history as myths. Robert Pynsent suggests that a myth can appear either as a "normal neutral narrative of concem," 20 or it can be a "bridge too far" in re17 Cas Mudde, "Civil society in post-communist Europe: Lessons from the ' dark side,"' In Uncivil society? Contentious politics in post-communist Europe, eds. Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 161. 18 For the opposite view see Egil Lejon who sees the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1993 as a result of Slovak historical traditions and an emancipation movement which accelerated in 1848 and later. Interview with Egil Lejon "Slovensko prikladom," Literarny tyzdennik, August 12, 1994, p.11. Lejon suggests that the Slovaks are not nationalistic enough in terms of what modem nationalism requires: cultural self-confidence, national pride, and loyalty. 19 See Kedourie on the selective use of the antonyms 'progressive ' - ' regressive ' in regard to nationalism in the Marxist interpretation of history ('progressive' during the advent of capitalism replacing fe udalism, ' progressive' in the fight of colonial and post-colonial nations against imperialism, and ' regressive' within capitalism resisting socialism). Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1966), 90-91. Applying Mudde 's observation, the 'bad ' case of nationalism in the early 1990s was the split of Czechoslovakia, whereas the 'good' cases were the dismemberments of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In contrast to the two latter, Slovak nationalism did not involve violence. 20 Robert Pynsent, Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality (Budapest-London-New York: Central European University Press, 1994), 87. �SLOVAKIA 79 gard to its practical implications in nation and state-building processes in Slovak history as implicated by G. Eyal, S.J. Cohen and T. Haughton. 2 1 While applying the first flexible definition, it may be postulated that myths are constantly emerging. An effective way to understand the essence of a myth in terms of its value as a possible source of historical facts is to compare both of its forms. The official mythology of the European Union is that it was born out of a sudden inspiration that had fallen upon Jean Monnet - a Romulus to the European Community - during his trip to the Alps. The idea was apparently instrumental in reconciling France and Germany during the meeting of Robert Schumann and Konrad Adenauer in May of 1950, which gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community. 22 Others see this process in an all-European myth-deconstructing perspective as the outcome of the decisive involvement of the United States, tired of the French-German reluctance to reach an agreement. 23 Concurrently, some scholars have viewed the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s as the culmination of the tireless work of lobbyists, who had effectively executed the wishes of great corporations to create a common market which was about to grant the architects of the EU even greater eco- 21 See Gil Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites: from the Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 131 , and Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Post-Communist Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 4-5. This is also the leitmotif of Shari J. Cohen's book Politics Without A Past: The Absence Of History In Postcommunist Nationalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999). 22 "Chaque annee, si je le peux, je vais faire de grandes courses dans les Alpes .. .J'y retrouve l'expression de l'inquietude qui opressait l'Europe cinq ans apres la guerre: une autre guerre est proche devant nous si nous ne faisons rien. L' Allemagne n' en sera pas la cause, mais elle en sera l'enjeu. II faut qu'elle cesse d'etre un enjeu, qu 'elle devienne au contraire un lien. Seule la France peut actuellement prendre une initiative." Jean Monnet, Memoires (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 342. 23 John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge University Press, 1991 ). Particularly explicative is the role of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy in bringing the French and Germans together to the signing of the Treaty of Paris (April 18, 1951 ), which instituted the European Coal and Steel Community. Gillingham stressed the fact that McCloy "summoned" the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to his office for a "dressing down" for his unwillingness to sign the document. Ibid, 280. �80 SLOVAKIA nomic profits. 24 A different group of authors opposed such ignoble motives with their hagiographic vision of the institutional emergence of the European Community and the later European Union as the outcome of exceptional negotiating and diplomatic skills of supranational executives who were serving the citizens of Europe.25 It is clear that each perspective has its merits and this adds to the perplexing complexity of the issue and resulting interpretations. This variety of opinions points to the core of the problem linked to the non-historicity of Slovaks and their questionable ability to cope with more recent problems in the transformation of their society. The skeptically insinuated ' mythical' legacy of 9th century Great Moravia and the invisible link from it to modem Slovak politics, apart from its distance from the present, which partially legitimizes its appearance as a myth, disregards the simple fact that to the Slovaks it was a lighthouse, not a matrix blindly to follow in the creation of a sovereign modem Slovakia. There is no difference in this regard between small and big nations who honor their historical traditions that often blend with myths. Most importantly, it is not Great Moravia itself, but the connection between it and the 19th and 20th centuries that matters in the discourse on the historicity of Slovaks. This link was hardly reflected, let alone examined, by western scholars in the 1990s in contrast to their predecessors - the historians R.W. Seton-Watson, Robert A. Kann, Oscar Halecki, and C.A. Macartney.26 After the extinction of the Arpad dynasty (1301 ), which had represented the ethnic Magyars, the foreign rulers of the Kingdom of 24 Belen Balanya, Ann Doherty, Olivier Hoedeman, Adam Ma' anit and Erik Wesselius, Europe Inc.: Regional and Global Restructuring and the Rise of Corporate Power (London-Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000). The authors stress their perception of the creation of the European Union as the result of a plan made by the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) composed of 45 captains of the largest European transnational corporations. See Preface of the book, xi-xv. 25 Ken Endo, The Presidency of the Europ ean Commission under Jacques De/ors. The Politics of Shared Leadership (London : Macmillan, 1999). Helen Drake, Jacques De/ors. Perspectives on a European Leader (London-New York: Routledge, 2000). 26 For an attempt to see Slovak history in historical continuity by a foreign scholar see the chapter by the Austrian historian Arnold Suppan, "Die Slowakei zwischen Grossmahrischen Reich und Europaischer Union: Kontinuitaten und Diskontinui taten," in Plus Ultra. Die Welt Der Neuzeit. Festschrift far Alfred Kohler zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. F. Edelmayer, M. Fuchs, G. Heilingsetler, P. Rauscher (Munster: Aschendorf, 2008), 331-68. �SLOVAKIA 81 Hungary - the Anjous, the Luxembourgs, the Jagiellons, the Hahsburgs - were wisely and clairvoyantly tolerant towards the ethnic groups of Hungary as the state otherwise would have not survived for the next seven centuries.27 Once the glory of the Kingdom of Hungary and the privileges of a political nation were attributed to one nationality (the Magyars) in the 18th and 19th centuries, there was no choice for others, who felt degraded to second-class citizens, than to nourish and strengthen their own identities - linguistic, cultural, social, and political. Paradoxically, a tendency to be suspicious of the interpretations of Slovak history as an indivisible part of the history of the Kingdom of Hungary still prevails. Until a shift in this perception happens, Slovaks may be further viewed as a non-historic entity despite empirical and heuristic evidence that testifies to their genuine participation in the societal and institutional life of the kingdom they shared with others in times when language and ethnicity meant less than social status and class affiliation. 28 The myth versus 'myth' ambiguity in the interpretations of the history of East and West testifies to the existence of a wide range of applicable perspectives and alternative interpretations. A better awareness of this ambiguity, which exists in both East and West, may help us to also understand the reasons for the ruptures in Slovak history, fractured into its being and seeming. The most visible anoma- 27 Disregarding the multi-ethnic aspects and dynastic ruptures in the medieval and modern history of Hungary would be the same as excluding the early Plantagenets from the history of England due to their appearance as non-Anglo-Saxon, FrancoNorman, elements. The history of England would have to begin anew with the Tudors . The rupture progressive versus regressive (see Kedourie) in the history of the United States is observable in the interpretations of the reasons for the Civil War and its aftermath. A similar rupture (totalitarian+-+democratic) exists in the history of Germany before it became a democratic state. 28 "The Slovaks on their side lost their national existence [after the defeat of Great Moravia] in that of their Asiatic conquerors, entered into their ranks as soldiers, and participated thence-forward in all their fortunes .. .Their language however is the only remnant of their national existence which the Slovaks have preserved; in every other respect they belong to the Hungarian nation, of which they form an ingredient part, as the Magyars form another; and on the glory of whose valiant deeds they have an equal claim." Therese Albertine Louise von Jacob Robinson, Historical View of the Language and Literature of the Slavic Nation (New York: BiblioBazaar, LLC, 2006) (Reprint of the original version published by George P. Putnam in New York in 1851), 186-7. �82 SLOVAKIA lies of this split consequently appeared either as 'betrayals' or 'awakenings.' 2. Seeming and Being in Slovak History as a Part of the History of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In 1991 Slovak historian Anton Hmko pointed out that the book by Slovak politician Ivan Derer on the rulings of the National Court in the First Czechoslovak Republic,29 written from the perspective of an ardent unitarist and "Czechoslovak," was conveniently accepted by Marxist historiography. The reason was obvious as the adversary was the same - the Slovak autonomist movement and the legacy of the wartime Slovak Republic (1939-1945). Having provided statistical data on the topics of the studies published by Slovak historians, Hrnko argued that the history of interwar Czechoslovakia ( 19181938) belonged to one of its most ideologically distorted segments. 30 This vacuum was filled by the works of court historians who helped to create myths as the politically and ideologically "subjective projection of desirable horizons." 31 If a 'myth' could emerge relatively recently with plenty of primary documents, one can ask the question - are there more of them? To respond to it at least in part, it is necessary to return to the early 1990s, when ideological constraints were removed from scholarship and academia and the attention of scholars and media turned towards nationalism. Miroslav Hroch's classification of nationalities in East Central Europe on their advancement in the national reawakening, which was published in the year when Czechoslovakia broke up, put the Slovaks a step behind the Czechs and the Magyars, without providing details, except for a very general reference. 32 This article suggests that, until the revolution of 1848, Slovaks did not lag behind 29 Ivan Derer, Slovensky vyvin a l'udacka zrada (Praha: Kvasnicka a Hamp!, I 946). Anton Hmko, "Zatemnene dejiny: Obraz medzivojnovej slovenskej spolocnosti v fracach slovenskych historikov," Literarny tyidennik, June 28, 1991 , p.10. 1 Marianna Oravcova, "The Ethnic and Cultural Dimension of National Emancipation: The Evocation of the Slovak Nation," in Language, Values and the Slovak Nation, eds. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gasparikova (Washington: Paideia Press, 1994), 11 . In the last sentence Oravcova refers to the article by Pavo! Horvath, "K niektorym otazkam historickych tradicii na Slovensku," Slovensky narodopis 1-2 (1986), 60-65 . 32 Miloslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe," New Left Review, 1/198 (March-April 1993), 64. 30 �SLOVAKIA 83 the Czechs in terms of the press, programs, the creation of a literary language and the petition movements. Hroch was more accurate when pointing to the forced Magyarization that started after 1867 as a major hindrance to Slovak national progress, including its social and economic aspects. Yet even that historical period has to be reexamined as it had not been a time of complete silence, although it would be convenient to see it in that way. Communist historiography in the 1950s gladly embraced the earlier idea that Slovaks had been saved by the Czechs from extinction as a nation, a concept which slipped into western scholarship. This hypothesis was based on censuses which showed the decreasing number of Slovak intelligentsia and schools as the 19th century progressed. These scholars concluded that the Slovaks would have been assimilated by the Magyars in one or two generations. 33 There had previously been two generations of Slovaks living under Magyarization from 1875 to 1914, yet the Slovak press, though under censorship and constant pressure, was full of political articles and calls for national, social and cultural progress. 34 Magyar elites knew very well that Slovak identity did not depend solely on schooling in their native language, but also on the family environment. Therefore, they forcibly took Slovak children from poor families and transported them to regions where Magyar was spoken. 35 The unrest in Turiec and Zvolen County in Central Slovakia that led to attacks on local Magyar authorities was a mixture of social and national elements. They testified to the continuing, even increasing Slovak resilience against Magyarization as observed by R. W. Seton-Watson. 36 Final33 For an argument against the traditional view that the Slovaks could not create their intelligentsia because of harsh Magyarization see Dusan Kovac, Roman Holec, Elena Jakesova, Elena Mannova, Milan Podrimavsky, Na zaciatku storocia, 19011914 (Bratislava: Veda, 2004), 44. 34 Milan Krajcovic, "Slovaci v emancipacnom pohybe nemad'arskych narodov," in Slovensko na zaciatku storocia: Spolocnost'. stat a narod v suradniciach doby, eds. Milan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (Bratislava: Hu SA V, 1999), 48-65 . 35 "By the Law of 1891 , the State has deliberately assumed the attitude of the Sultans in earlier centuries. Just as the Christian rayah was regarded as a breedingmachine to supply janissaries, so to-day non-Magyars of Hungary are breedingmachines whose children must be taught Magyar from the earliest age in the hope that they may become renegades to the traditions of their ancestors." R.W. SetonWatson, Racial Problems in Hungary , 222. 36 Ibid., 394. Seton-Watson stressed that 92 .5% of the Liptov county inhabitants were Slovaks and 90.6% understood no Magyar. Ibid. , 332. �84 SLOVAKIA ly, in 1918, it was the masses of peasants and lower strata of Slovak society that had preserved, as lsmo Nurmi suggested, a high degree of self-consciousness. 37 They were instrumental in embracing the idea of their future coexistence with the Czechs under the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement, but under no circumstances with the Magyars. Without this support the few intellectuals at home and abroad could hardly have reached their political goals in October and November of 1918 when the Czechoslovak Republic was born. It is equally true that significant numbers of Slovak Magyarones gave up their ethnicity for the sake of their careers while following the example of the Slovak nobility and gentry which were "easily and gladly" Magyarized in the 19th century. 38 Still, it is hard to believe that three million Slovaks at home and abroad, with the most resistant of them in North America, would have been completely Magyarzsed even if Hungary had been preserved in its prewar boundaries . A possible analogy with the Irish resistance, underscored by the role played in national emancipation by leaders such as Milan R. Stefanik and Stefan Osusky, who left Hungary and vehemently fought for the Slovak cause abroad, comes to mind. Their work, done at the highest political and diplomatic levels, was supplemented by dozens of zealous Slovak national activists in the United States. 39 37 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia - A Playground for Nationalism and National Identity, 1918-1920: Manifestations of the National identity of Slovaks (Helsinki : Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1999), 45. 38 C.A . Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919-1937 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937), 91. 39 The Slovak press in North America - 30 newspapers with a circulation of 150,000 in 1914 - was such a force that the Hungarian government as early as in 1890 had banned the imports of some of them and began subsidi zing pro-Hungarian publications in the United States. M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press," in Sally M. Miller ed. , The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 365. Count Albert Apponyi, one of the main protagonists of Magyarization and a representative of the Hungarian government on his visit to the United States attempted to present Hungary as a ftee and democratic country. He was denounced as a tyrant and pressed by a huge mob comprising members of "Slavic nationalities and Hungarian socialists" during his lectures. In Chicago, Apponyi escaped the fury of the mob and fled to his car only with the protection provided by the police. See The New York Times, February 25, 1911 , p. 3. For the Slovak resistence against the territorial aspirations of fascist Hungary see the boastful statement by Gustav Husak on February 28, 1945: "I openly declare that Slovakia' s frontiers [with Hungary] as they had existed in the [prewar] Czechoslovak Republic are stable. Slovakia is united and non-divisible. Any �SLOVAKIA 85 After World War II, Konstantin Culen, a Slovak publicist in exile, suggested that living with the Czechs was for the Slovaks a rather negative experience. 4°Culen's arguments were based on the constant rejection of Slovak autonomy in Czechoslovakia by President Edvard Benes, who had never shown any particular affection for the Slovaks, and the post-war execution of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, President of the wartime Slovak Republic. With the situation of the Slovaks in southern Slovakia ceded to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938 in mind, it is legitimate to assume that cohabitation with the Czechs, though far from being idyllic, included fewer risks for the completion of Slovak national emancipation than their hypothetical existence in Hungary after WW I. Furthermore, the Czechs in 1918 were already significantly ahead of the Slovaks as far as societal cohesion and socio-economic progress of their societies were concerned. The animosity started with the Czech disrespect toward the Catholic Church and with their disregard for the continuing socio-economic underdevelopment of Slovakia. The problem became acute in the 1930s, when the Slovak intelligentsia, which had remarkably increased by that time, as well as ordinary citizens, could not find work in Slovakia because the best jobs were filled by the Czechs. In contrast to the situation that had existed in the 1920s, Slovaks were ready to become executives, administrators, teachers, lawyers and doctors. This happened in 1939 and after. Unfortunately, after WW II Czech political leaders, both civic and communist, were not willing to admit that the Slovaks had grown up and were able to govern themselves.41 The Czech historical experience was strongly influenced by the Protestant Reformation, secularism and greater industrial advancement due to their proximity to and cohabitation with the Germans. With the creation of Czechoslovakia after WW I, the Czechs proved themselves worthy followers of their predecessors and for a moment irredentism by Magyar fascists will end in vain. Our nation, which has been able to resist the military power of Germany, will find enough strength to firmly defend its borders." See the document "Z referatu Gustava Husaka na konferencii Komunistickej strany Slovenska," February 28, 1945. Dokumenty slovenskej narodnej identi2; a statnosti II (Bratislava: Narodne literarne centrum, 1998), 400. Konstantin Culen, Po Sviitoplukovi druha nasa hlava: Politicky i ivotopis Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: The First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947). 41 Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 89. �86 SLOVAKIA also a barrier erected by the victorious Allies against German domination over Central and Eastern Europe. After the incorporation of Slovakia into Czechoslovakia, the national self-confidence of the Czechs was on the rise. After WW II, the Czechs led by the Communist Party, and with the mighty Soviet Union backing them, returned to the concept of a unitary Czechoslovakia. To them, the push for reforms in the 1960's, which was interpreted as the "Prague" rather than the "Czecho-Slovak Spring," was also a return to their national history. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in August of 1968, led by the Soviet Union, their former liberator, and the only Slavic Superpower, was especially traumatic for the Czechs. This trauma, imposed from outside, was complemented by a domestic one: the effects of 'normalization' and federalization, both seen as a part of the chain of Slovak "betrayals." The Slovaks rebelled from 1920 onward. First, they asked for autonomy, then they allegedly "conspired" with the Magyars and the Poles against the prewar Republic, and eventually got a taste of the forbidden fruit of political emancipation in the form of their nominally independent state.42 Meanwhile, in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (1939-1945), the Czechs were ruled over and persecuted by the Germans. 43 With this perception of national history in Czech minds, the disappearance of the communist regime in 1989, which was allegedly harsher in the Czech Lands than in Slovakia, and which treated the Slovaks in the same way as did the First Czechoslovak Republic, was a golden opportunity to rebuild the state to Czech expectations. After recognizing that Slovaks were not willing to accept what they considered to be the continuation of the imbalance in the distribution of competences in a joint state in 1990-1992, the Czechs opted for the territorially-reduced variant of Czechoslovakia while inheriting its trademark. Since then, they have fared very well. 44 It 42 Leff, National Conflict, 26 and 164. For a Slovak perspective on the history of the Slovak-Czech and Czecho-Slovak relations since 1918 as the "history of broken pacts and unfulfilled promises," see Anton Hmko, "Politicke zapasy na Slovensku v lete a na jesen 1990," Historicky zbornik 10, no. I (2000), 77. 43 Though the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia had its own administration, it was an indivisible part of the Third Reich, which saw itself as a historic successor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. 44 See the article "Slovakia's Economy ls Doing Well, Too" by Peter Burian, The New York Times, June I, 1996. The author, charge d 'ajfaires of the Embassy of the �SLOVAKIA 87 may seem that this chapter of their history was closed and sealed. The aftermath of the "Velvet Divorce" and the relationship between the two former federal nations was not always rosy. Throughout the 1990s, it was not difficult to contrast the progress made by the Czech Republic with Slovakia's problems. In the early 2000s, with the Meciar era gone and economic advancement that surprised many, the previous negative image of Slovaks as nationalists turned to the delay in democratic transformation of their society. 45 In recent books on Czech history since the early medieval era the Slovaks are hardly mentioned. With Slovakia's progress in the integration processes, substitutes for Slovak nationalism appeared instantly.46 Despite mutual sympathies as documented by surveys of public opinion and praise by Slovak and Czech politicians of their good relations, from 1993 onward free of economic quarrels,47 the clash of bitter memories continued. They have ranged from topics such as investment opportunities by renowned international compa- Slovak Republic in Washington, responded to a similar article in the NYT on the Czech Republic doing well "with luck and without Slovakia," while providing data on GDP (7.4% growth), unemployment (7.4%), doubled foreign currency reserves, a £ositive trade balance and low foreign debt per capita ($800.00). 5 According to Professor Filip Palda from E Ecole nationale d 'administration publique in Montreal, "Separation in 1992 allowed the Czechs to halt the payola on which Slovaks had come to depend. Since separation in 1992, the Slovaks have gone the way of Argentina, whereas the Czechs are now preparing to enter the European Union." See "Argentina north" by Filip Palda. The Ottawa Citizen, January 21 , 2002. Anton Hykisch, former Slovak ambassador to Canada, opined that, for Hungary and the Czech Republic, Slovakia's economic success in the early 2000s was a big surprise which was hard for them to accept. Author interview with Anton Hykisch, Bratislava, June 5, 2007. 46 For a contrasting view on the political systems and parliamentarism in the Czech and Slovak Republics as advanced and less developed see Petr Kopecky, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party competition and parliamentary institutionalization (London : Ashgate, 2001). The Czech political scientist Lubomir Kopecek opines that in comparison with the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, the evolution of the Slovak political system is unfinished and the system itself is unstable. As a result, Slovakia is a "semi-consolidated democracy." Lubomir Kopecek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke stranictvi stranictvi na Slovensku (Brno: CDK, 2006), 307 and 3 10. 47 See the article "Klaus: Vzt'ahy Slovenska a Ceska m6zu byt' pri.kladom pre celu Eur6pu," Pravda, June 29, 2009. It became a tradition that the first official visits of the newly-elected presidents and prime ministers of the Czech and Slovak Republics have been with their closest neighbor. �88 SLOVAKIA nies, 48 to the often derogatory comments on domestic politics and rivalry in sports, with frequent references to the "sins" in national histories of the two nations .49 Until the revolutionary years 1848-1849, Slovaks and Magyars had cohabitated peacefully. Four decades of forced Magyarization after 1867 were hard for the Slovaks, yet there was still some moral and socio-political capital left for the improvement of mutual relationships. If this failed in 1918, Slovaks could hardly have been blamed for it as their political weight and influence in Hungary was marginal. In the fall of 193 8, after two decades of the existence of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia was stripped of its southern territories by the Vienna Award.50 Almost seven years of living in Hungary (19381945) returned the Slovaks in the south to a life which resembled what had existed before 1918. After the Second World War and until 1989, the relationship between the Slovaks and Magyars might have appeared as normal, but it was not. Once the Soviet Union was gone and the fate of Czechoslovakia disputed, the old animosities resurfaced . For all Slovak governments since 1989, the status of the Magyar minority became a litmus test in measuring the state of democracy in Slovakia by western governments and scholars. During the Meciar years, Magyars in Slovakia voiced their dissatisfaction with 48 According to a poll by the Czech Private Equity and Venture Capital Association based in Prague, four out of five of its economists and financial analysts said that foreign investment would flow to the Czech rather than to the Slovak Republic. See "Investori uprednostnia Cesko pred Slovenskom," Sme, May 29, 2009. Slovak readers rejected the idea as wishful thinking on the Czech side and suggested that a poll conducted by a Slovak-based company would have shown the opposite. 49 They frequently appear on the Czech web sites www.seznam.cz., www.idnes.cz and their Slovak counterparts www.sme.sk and www.pravda.sk. On April 1 of2009 when the Slovak national football team defeated its opponent in Prague in the qualifier for the Word Cup in South Africa (2010), debates among the fans of both teams turned to their common past with references to the "betrayal" in 1938-1939 and to the Slovak inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Czechs. Slovaks pointed to Czech compliance with German rule in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and affirmed that they did not measure themselves against the Czechs - a fixed idea on the Czech side. 50 Julius Mesaros, "Some Deformations in the Interpretation of Censuses in Recent Slovak-Magyar Controversies," In Slovak & Magyars, ed. Pavol Stevcek (Bratislava: Ministerstvo kultury, 1995), 63-84. The census of 1910 showed the presence of 885,397 Magyars on the territory which became part of Slovakia in 1918 (30.3% of the population). Mesaros argues that even "this number was not the result of natural development, or Slovak-Magyar and Magyar-Slovak bilingualism, but a result of the purposeful Magyarization and oppression of Slovaks." Ibid. , 78 . �SLOVAKIA 89 the approaches of Slovak governments in administrative, linguistic, financial and cultural matters. Claims made by their leaders for more tolerance and understanding by the Slovaks have been in stark contrast with the ambiguous language of the representatives of the Magyar minority regarding their possible autonomy. 5 1 While the Slovaks and the Czechs after 1992 were able to reach the highest level of mutual respect and understanding, Slovaks and Magyars remained mentally anchored in the period between 1918 and 1945. The trauma of Trianon in 1920 and their expulsion from South Slovakia in 1945-194 7 is deeply engraved in the minds of Magyars, as is the forced Magyarization and the effects of the Vienna Arbitration in the minds of the Slovaks. Each side continues to interpret the causes and outcomes of those events according to its own perception and sentiments. A partial solution to the problem - history textbooks written by Slovak and Magyar historians together - is to this date still "in progress" and it is hard to predict when and if they will ever be finished and distributed to schools in both countries. 52 History is firmly tied into daily politics in East Central Europe. Its revival outside of scholarly conferences and seminars and its use as a model for the present or future by politicians may lead to the release of a genie from his bottle. 53 This refers particularly to Slovakia as being possibly identified as the weakest link within an informal Little Entente. 54 If both nations do not want to waste what has 51 The representatives of the Magyar political parties in Slovakia (before 1998), with the exception of Miklos Duray and Pal Csaky from the SMK. (the Party of the Magyar Coalition), were careful about publicly speaking of autonomy for Magyars in Slovakia, though the idea of their political and administrative autonomy has frequently appeared - sotto voce - as their ultimate goal. Most recently, Duray admitted that territorial autonomy is unrealistic, but the chance for a vaguely defined "personal'' autonomy for the Magyar minority in Slovakia still exists. See the article "Ouray o vel'kom Mad'arsku nesniva, auton6mia je vsak podl'a neho realna," Pravda, August 4, 2009. 52 Vilaro Kratochvil, "K moznostiam oslabovania predsudkov a stereotypov v tvorbe ucebnic dejepisu," in Myty a predsudky v dejincich. Historickci konferencia 7. decembra 2004, ed. Attila Simon (Samorin-Dunajska Streda: Forum Institut pre vyskum mensin, 2005). 53 See the interview with Slovak historian Ivan Kamenec. "Kamenec: Politici su najhorsi ziaci hist6rie," Sme, May 9, 2009. Kamenec refers to the diverging interpretations of the period 1944-1948. 54 Serbia, Slovakia, Romania, in which Magyar minorities live. Jan Camogursky said that the highest challenge to Slovakia's foreign policy after accession into NATO and the EU remains the country's ability to face continuing interference by �90 SLOVAKIA remained positive from the legacy of their peaceful cohabitation, and if they wish to get rid of the shadows of the past, they have to reach a mutually respectful Slovak - Magyar and Magyar - Slovak Compromise. Not by political gestures, but by the inner force of their societies. Neither of the two nations, closely bound together for centuries, can separately pass this test of national and civic maturity.55 3. The Myth of a Sudden Awakening of Slovak Society in the 1998 Parliamentary Elections. The major problem in Slovak history from an outsider's perspective - its invisibility linked to a fragmented appearance as a part of the history of Hungary and Czechoslovakia - influenced also its recent domestic interpretations. In reference to the Slovak national anthem, sociologists Martin Butora and Zora Butorova compared Slovak society in 1989 to "Sleeping Beauty." 56 They went so far as to say that" .. . in November 1989, an overwhelming majority of people in Slovakia accepted political change passively." This view is similar to those that refer to "socialism with a human face" in the second half of the 1960s as a purely Czech affair, 57 and those that see Charright-wing Magyar politicians into Slovakia's domestic affairs through issues regardi ng the status of the Magyar minority in Slovakia. Author interview with Jan Camogursky, Bratislava, May 24, 2007. In a poll conducted in January of 2004, 21 .3% of participants identified Hungary as a major threat to Slovak national security. See Boris Benkovic, "Vyskumna sprava," in Verejnti mienka a politika. Medzintirodne vzt'ahy a zahranicnti politika Slovenskej republiky, ed. Miroslav Peknik (Brati slava: Veda, 2005), 38 (see Graph 9). 55 For the necessity for mutual respect between the Slovak majority and minorities that would lead to their loyalty to the state based on civic principles see Milan Zemko, "Modemy politicky narod," in Slovenskti ottizka dnes, ed. Laszlo Szigeti (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2007), 192 . Zemko refers to Renan ' s idea of a "nation as a daily plebiscite" in a continuous building of a Slovak political nation : "L'existence d' une nation est. .. plebiscite de tous lesj ours, comme !'existence de l'individu est affirmation perpetuelle de vie." Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu ' une nation?" Conference faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882. Oeuvres completes d 'Ernest Renan (Paris: Calmann Levy, editor, 1882), 27. 56 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "S lovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy 10, no. I (1999), 80. 5 Ibid, 83. See Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulbricht K. Preuss, Institutional design in post-communist societies: rebuilding the ship at sea (Cambridge - New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The authors came to the conclusion that "The 1968 vision of socialism with a human face was entirely a Czech, not Slovak phenomenon." Ibid. , 264. �SLOVAKIA 91 ter 77 as the only agent of civic resistance against the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Earlier observations by Karen Henderson point to preconceived approaches to Slovak history suffering from "dangerous analytical misconceptions that have to work backward."58 Theories on the institution-building processes in communist and post-communist Czechoslovakia view the institutions emerging during the transitory period as a result of bricolage - the innovative building of new institutions by politicians who function as bricoleurs. 59 A similar approach can be taken when examining the most important moments in the modern history of Slovakia and their contrasting interpretations seen in "bricks." Works by political scientists are often based on deductive reasoning (see the scheme's Bricolage I, at the end of the article). Thus, if Slovakia deviated from its course towards western democracies in the mid-1990s (originally Brick A), the explanation was obvious: it happened because of the country's past, bound by the immaturity of its society following the breakup of Czechoslovakia, which stemmed from pervasive Slovak nationalism. This led to ungratefulness towards the Czechs and revenge towards the Magyars (Brick B). Likewise, it has been argued that a high degree of compliance with the communist regime and its detrimental impact on Slovak society kept societal life frozen (Brick C). Moreover, the weak economic base of Slovakia inherited from Hungary, along with the controversial character and legacy of wartime Slovakia (Brick D), did not help to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness, political inexperience of Slovaks and thus their negative international image (Brick E) . Deductive reasoning has its merits. It is even more convincing when supported by direct experience and contact with the subject of the study, buttressed by familiarity with primary sources. Foreign scholars who did their research in Slovakia in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s, helped to broaden a variety of perspectives on Slovak history, which Slovak historians themselves have been unaware of. It is interesting to observe that western, not Slovak scholars, argue in favor of the capacity of Slovak society to build new institu58 Karen Henderson, "Evaluating the Slovak Transition: What Creates the Image of Slovaki a?" 26. 59 John A. Scherpereel, Governing the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Between State Socialism and the European Union (Boulder - London : First Forum Press, 2009), 68 . �92 SLOVAKIA tions during the communist and post-communist era (Scherpereel, Haughton) . Foreign scholars have referred to the importance of a "critical mass of educated citizens" and political stability in Slovakia prior to, during and after the "change" in 1998 (Henderson), and stressed the presence of a "profound and sizeable Slovak opposition to the culture of Communism" (A. Innes), whilst sociologists and political scientists at home (S. Szomolanyi, 0 . Gyarfasova, Z. Butorova, J. Marusiak) have been more skeptical. From a long-term historical perspective based on inductive reasoning, the context and nuances of Slovakia's post-communist transformation appear significantly different from a micro perspective as applied by the social sciences. This perspective suggests that, to understand the evolution of Slovak society with all its accomplishments and failures, the key is to start from the beginning, not from the end or the middle, and not by theories and generalizations, but with facts, particularly in contested perspectives. Interpretations based on deductive reasoning may result, and they often did, in theories on and explanations of the reasons for the still continuing building of the Slovak political nation and democracy in the country as an "unfinished business," turning it into "the hare versus turtle" race. Such perspectives attribute nationalism in the 1990s exclusively to the Slovaks, while ignoring the fears of Slovak society stemming from its historical experience, linked to the years 1867-1918, 19181919, 1938-1939, 1945-1948 and after. Moreover, such perspectives suffer from inner contradictions. Despite the partly beneficial impact of Czechoslovakia on Slovakia, the latter was in 1993, similar to the years 1918, 1938-1939 as well as during communist Czechoslovakia, socio-economically a less developed part of the common state. 60 Likewise, the Slovak political experience in prewar Czechoslovakia has been seen as weak due to the detrimental impact of a different and underdeveloped political culture inherited by the Slovaks from Hungary, for which two decades of the existence of democratic Czechoslovakia ( 1918-193 8) was too a short period to improve. 61 Consequently, due to the traditional "historic deficits" in the evolution of Slovak society, its civic attitu60 Miroslav Londak, "K niektorym problemom ekonomickeho vyvoja na Slovensku na prahu roka 1968," Historicke studie 44 (2006), p.188. 61 Kopecek, 27-34 and 311. �SLOVAKIA 93 des linked to pluralism during Communism did not develop properly.62 This perspective does seem not to apply to Slovakia's neighbors, the Magyars and the Poles, with their limited experience with parliamentary democracy before and after WW II, which were similar to Spain and Italy in the West. Hungary and Poland apparently redeemed themselves in the eyes of the West by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the activities of the Solidarity Movement in Poland from 1980 onward. The question, however, is how could those events of undisputed civic bravery substitute for democracy as a system of governance that needs time to develop? By contrast, the longlasting non-compliance of Slovak society with the communist regime, as demonstrated by repeated large-scale participation in religious pilgrimages and demonstrations, has either been downplayed or referred to as having had no impact on politics in communist Czechoslovakia.63 After the 1998 parliamentary elections, Slovak sociologists and leaders of the non-governmental sector helped to create and spread a positive image of Slovak society by contrasting the Meciar era with the progress made in integration with western organizations during the two Dzurinda governments. 64 They suggested that the electoral behavior of voters in rural and economically underdeveloped regions, who voted in favor of the Movement for a Democratic Slo62 Based on a survey conducted in May of 1968, in which 69.5% of the respondents in the Czech Lands as compared with 54.6% in Slovakia supported the existence of more political parties. At the same time, 53 % of Czech participants saw positively the role of civic associations in political life, while in Slovakia it was only 32%. Kopecek, 143. 63 Kopecek stresses the continuity in Czech dissent linked to the reform movement in the I 960s and the role of Charter 77, which was signed by 1800 Czechs in comparison with two dozen Slovaks as the flag bearer of civic resistance against Communism in Czechoslovakia. Kopecek, p.145. Jan Camogursky vigorously opposes the assumption that religious dissent in Slovakia had a limited impact on the regime. According to him, the massive pilgrimages to Velehrad and Levoca helped to soften the harassment of dissenters and citizens by communist authorities. Author interview with Jan Camogursky, Bratislava, May 24, 2007. On a similar stance taken by Abby Innes see her book Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 36-37. 64 Such delineation is, technically, an anachronism, as the third Meciar government did not oppose integration, particularly into the EU, though it eventually brought Slovakia into international isolation. �94 SLOVAKIA vakia (HZDS) led by Vladimir Meciar and the Slovak National Party (SNS),65 resembled support for the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (the tudaks) during the wartime Slovak Republic. In contrast to their earlier suggestions, these observers view positively the ability of Magyar communities in Slovakia, which live in rural areas and cast their votes exclusively for the Magyar political parties in each election 66 while referring to it as a "higher form of civic participation and social engagement." 67 Inductive reasoning provides the reader with the opportunity to view Slovakia's post-communist transformation in a complex, evolutionary perspective (see the scheme's Bricolage II): It consists of the following "bricks:" Brick A - "Antecedents" (1848-1918). The traditional view is that during and after the Revolutions of 1848-1849, Slovaks were aware that Magyars were not willing to allow them to exist autonomously and, hence, they started to design their political programs, build institutions, schools, and political parties . Fearing Panslavism, Magyar radicals attempted to Magyarize the nationalities in Hungary, including the Slovaks, with some success (Magyarones). As a consequence, some Slovak, mostly Pro65 The SNS, which, next to the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH) in the early 1990s and the HZDS in the mid-1 990s was also compared with the HSCS, has always been supportive of the legacy of the Slovak National Uprising in stark contrast to the perspective of the l'udaks and the neo-l'udaks. The same holds for the HZDS. 66 Next to the SMK, a new party to represent both Magyars and Slovaks named the Most-Hid (The Bridge; Slovak and Magyar), was established in July of 2009. Its chairman became Bela Bugar, the former chairman of the SMK, who lost to Pal Csaky in the party elections in April of 2007 . See "Ministerstvo vnutra zaregistrovalo Bugarovu stranu," Pravda, July 3, 2009. ln the 2010 parliamentary elections another new political party, Freedom and Solidarity [SaS] appeared, and supplied ministers to the Radicova government but also caused it to collapse in October of 20 11. Only recently established parties are: Obycajni l'udia - nezavisle osobnosti (Ordinary People - Independent Personalities), Strana slobodne slovo (The Free Word Party), and 99% - Obciansky hlas (99% - A Citizen's Voice). 67 See the article "Mad'ari su aktivnejsi nez Slovaci, tvrdi prieskum," Sme, March 28 2009. The article refers to a survey conducted by the Slovak Academy of Sciences and its interpretation by Zora Butorova from the Institute for Public Affairs (TVO), a non-governmental think-tank. Slovak Magyars defending their rights, while keeping their traditions and the cohesiveness of their society intact, is praised as a positive quality. The same was not applied to the Slovaks in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia when they tried to do the same. �SLOVAKIA 95 testant, intellectuals, opted for cultural, and possibly political, cooperation with the Czechs. A majority of Slovaks, mostly Catholics, still believed that a solution for Slovakia within Hungary could be found. The period from 1890 to 1914, which was traditionally seen as the "dark ages" of Slovak national emancipation, brought about even more resilience against Magyarization. In October of 1918, the Slovaks joined the Czechs in a common state. They rejectted the offer by the Karolyi government for autonomy within Hungary. From November of 1918 onward, a series of military clashes occurred between Magyar and Czechoslovak troops. In June of 1919 the Hungarian Red Army invaded and occupied eastern and southern Slovakia for a short time. Difference (traditional views+-+the article): Slovaks were socially and politically active, not passive in Hungary, even during the time of the harshest Magyarization in 1890-1914, which coincided with the process of the formation of the Slovaks as a political nation. During and after WW I, Slovak leaders abroad and at home decided to join the Czechs in the new state of Czechoslovakia on the assumption they would receive autonomy as promised by the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. At the same time, the Slovak population demonstrated its strong dissatisfaction with the Magyar government and supported secession from Hungary by protests in which social and national aspects blended. Brick B - "Betrayals" (1918-1948). In prewar Czechoslovakia, the Slovaks were divided between the autonomists and the "Czechoslovaks." In this clash the CatholicProtestant controversy played an important role. Though the autonomists were seen in the Czech Lands as the destroyers of Czechoslovakia, they did not want to secede because they were afraid of territorial revisionism by the Poles and the Magyars. After Munich, Slovak political parties congregated in Zilina and expressed their support for Slovak autonomy within the rump second Czecho-Slovak Republic. The government of the nominally independent wartime Slovak Republic discriminated against and failed to protect its Jewish and Roma citizens from deportation to death camps. In the administrative and economic spheres, however, the Slovaks demonstrated their capacity to form a state and administer it themselves. Based on this experience, Slovak Communists, who had helped to �96 SLOVAKIA organize the Slovak National Uprising in 1944, expected Slovakia to receive autonomous status within the reconstituted Czechoslovakia. This was rejected by Czech presidents Edvard Benes, Klement Gottwald and Antonin Novotny. Difference: Slovaks were stereotyped in the Czech Lands as traitors since the 1920s. The fact that they did not want to secede from Czechoslovakia and remained in the second Czecho-Slovak Republic for half a year has been frequently overlooked. The socio-economic progress made by the wartime Slovak Republic, in contrast with the disinterest in Slovak affairs by previous centralist Czechoslovak governments, was significant. In May of 1946, the Communists were defeated in parliamentary elections in Slovakia, but not in the Czech Lands. By November of 1947, the Communists gained political control over Slovakia. The three Prague Agreements were viewed by the Slovaks as a betrayal, just as the Czechs viewed the aftermath of the Munich Agreement. Brick C - "Communism" (1948-1989). The idea of Slovak autonomy and economic equalization with the Czechs was adopted by Slovak Communists. The demand for reforming Communism in Slovakia grew with the accession to power in 1963 of the Slovak Alexander Dubcek. The return to national history and the drive for economic reform resulted in the idea of the federalization of Czechoslovakia. This was interpreted by the Czech side as a continuation of Slovak nationalism, because the debate in the Czech Lands was oriented towards political pluralism and economic reform. In 1969 came the removal of Dubcek, who was caught between the need for reform at home and the mistrust in him by political leaders of other communist countries. He was replaced by Gustav Husak, another Slovak, who embodied 'normalization.' Whereas Czechs intellectuals voiced their dissatisfaction with the Husak regime, Slovaks, allegedly, were compliant with it. Difference: Slovaks were no less active than the Czechs in initiating the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s; in fact, they had helped to start it. Economic reform as a continuation of equalization stood in the forefront of the efforts of Slovak communist political leaders as well as economists. Federalization was important in regard to both political and economic competencies, whilst it was viewed by Czech society as another from of archetypal natio- �SLOVAKIA 97 nal reassertion of the Slovaks resembling the 19th century. Slovak society lived in a paradoxical situation: next to the material benefits received during 'normalization,' the traditionally religious Slovaks reacted to ideological indoctrination by massive participation in religious pilgrimages. In addition to the religious dissenters, who were active already in the 1970s, environmentalists began to play an important role in the early 1980s in making also the secular part of Slovak society aware of the risks stemming from insensitive industrialization. In 1989, Slovak society as a whole, and on its own initiative, rejected the communist regime by massive demonstrations against it. Brick D - "Division" (1993-1997). The "Velvet Revolution," similar to the "Prague Spring," indicated, how the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia was perceived internationally. From the beginning, there was mistrust between the newly-emerging Slovak and Czech political elites. Each had its own symbol: they were Alexander Dubcek in Slovakia and Vaclav Havel in the Czech Lands . Since the former accepted the rather symbolic post of Speaker of the Federal Assembly in Prague, new political leaders emerged instantly in Slovakia, first and foremost Vladimir Meciar. In contrast to its federal partner, Slovakia had two more tasks: 1) to gain international recognition and 2) to deal with the status of the Magyar minority. Fighting on three fronts (the third were federal competences) simultaneously, Slovak politicians were divided. Eventually, it was the HZDS, led by Meciar, which prevailed. Contrary to its portrayal as anti-federalist and nationalist, the HZDS and its leader still aspired for a looser federation with the Czechs. This was unacceptable to the "technocrats," represented by Vaclav Klaus and Czech nationalists such as Miroslav Macek (both Civic Democratic Party; ODS) and Jan Kalvoda (Civic Democratic alliance; ODA). As a result, Slovak and Czech political leaders opted for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as of December 31, 1992. Difference: In contrast to the traditional perspectives that interpret renewed Slovak efforts for building an "authentic federation" in the early 1990s at the expense of the Czechs, it is suggested that Slovaks wanted more powers in order to avoid the continuation of debates of constitutional discrepancies and socio-economic disparities that had started in the 1930s, continued in 1960s, and resurfaced at �98 SLOVAKIA the end of the communist regime in the late 1980s. Since the Czechs had controlled Czechoslovakia for decades, regardless of its constitutional form , they interpreted their own nationalism as "civicness," in contrast to the allegedly old-fashioned ethnic Slovak nationalism. Brick E - "Europe" ("The Awakening" and the "Change," 19982004). Since Slovaks were seen as passive in communist Czechoslovakia and their religious dissent was allegedly insignificant in terms of challenging the communist regime, new institutions and political parties had to emerge in the early 1990s. During the period 19901992, Slovaks allegedly once again focused on federal and national competencies, instead of building democracy and a market economy, which were Czech priorities. According to some sociologists, Slovakia missed the chance to experience its own Velvet Revolution. After the creation of independent Slovakia, the state had to re-build its structures and to strive for international recognition. It inherited a sensitive problem with the Magyar minority, which resulted in tensions regarding the use of the official and Magyar languages on territories with a mixed population. In the spring of 1994, pro-democratic and pro-western forces ousted Vladimir Meciar from office, yet the six following months was too a short a time for catching up with the rest of reforming post-communist countries, particularly Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1994, Vladimir Meciar returned to power. Allied with the nationalists and the radical left, he imposed a harsh rule over the National Council, the opposition and the media. As a result of the mysterious abduction of the son of President Michal Kovac, who dared to defy the government and Meciar himself, Slovakia began to lag behind in the European integration processes. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the opposition political parties supported, though indirectly, by non-governmental organizations and awakened Slovak society, defeated the government that torpedoed its own formally proclaimed integrationist goals. The two subsequent governments, led by Mikulas Dzurinda, succeeded in transforming the country's negative international image and attracting foreign investments. Being politically stable, the country became a member of both NATO and the EU in 2004. �SLOVAKIA 99 Difference: When attempts to reach an agreement with the Czechs on an authentic federation failed, Slovaks received, somehow unexpectedly, their own state in a way resembling March of 1939. The accusations against Meciar as an authoritarian leader collided with divergent views on how national property should be privatized. After Meciar' s return to power in the fall of 1994, Slovakia continued in its efforts to join the European Union and NATO. It failed to become a member of the OECD due to the government's unwillingness to privatize strategic branches of the Slovak economy. Despite diplomatic and political warnings regarding the infamous causes of Michal Kovac, the denial of his parliamentary seat to Frantisek Gaulieder and the assassination of Robert Remias, who had information regarding the Kovac kidnapping, negotiations with the EU and NA TO continued. The "change" in 1998 brought about an influx of former representatives of the non-governmental sector into the various ministries, while many of those who remained loyal to their original mission of being the watchdogs over a young democracy were disillusioned. The fragmentation of old political parties and the emergence of new ones in the late l 990s and the early 2000s were complemented by scandals stemming from corruption. In contrast with the third Meciar government, where there were two camps clearly separated one from another, the situation in the first and second Dzurinda governments resembled wars of all against all. The only factor that kept the coalition together was fear of Meciar. Slovak society, which was tired of the endless chain of political conflicts and scandals, with what was left of its enthusiasm and energy, helped to complete the country's integration into the EU. As a part of the community of European nations, Slovaks have not only the right, but also the duty to expect that their ability to comply with the criteria for membership should be equaled by the ability of the Union to provide fair and indiscriminate treatment, free from paternalistic approaches. This will help the Slovaks to grow and appear as a modem and self-confident nation, visible and judged according to their efforts and accomplishments. Speculations on Slovakia's cultural and civilizational proximity with either the East or the West, which bothered so many domestic and foreign politicians and intellectuals in the mid-1990s, are secondary. Of primary importance is the ability of Slovak society to maintain and strengthen its internal integration and to continue to proceed in its mental trans- �100 SLOVAKIA formation . This requires the capacity and willingness of Slovak society to reproduce itself on the basis of its historical traditions, while embracing democratic values, as well as a pluralist and consensual system of governance and politics. At the same time, the membership of Slovakia and other Central Eastern European post-communist states in the European Union provides it with an opportunity to learn from the collapse of the former Communist Bloc by evolving into a community of truly equal members. Slovakia's Postcommunist Transformation from an Historical Perspective Scheme Seeming +- As ---+ Being t Method : Deductive Begins in the present Method: Inductive Begins in the past t t Perspective: Political Science Perspective: History and PSCI t t Objective: Explaining the present by interpreting the Objective: Understanding the present by interpreting the past by reconstructing the past t Depth of historical background: Medium t Retrograde horizon: Medium t Depth of historical background: High t Retrograde horizon : Distant yet connectable With the present t t Connectivity present---+past: Retrospective Connectivity past---+present: Chronological �SLOVAKIA t t Causality: Fragmented Bricolage I 101 Causality: Complex Divergence Brick A: Result Delayed Slovak postCommunist transfor- - low mation and integration with EU and NA TO Bricolage II Brick "Europe" Slovakia's integration delayed but completed on institutional level, continues on societal level t i Brick B: Sub-condition Breakup of Czechoslovakia Reason: prevalence of - high archetypical Slovak nationalism over the solution of practical problems Brick "Division" Split with the Czechs over disparities and competences, not national identity t i Brick C: Prerequisite 1 High degree of Slovak compliance with - high communist regime. Societal life completely Hibernated Brick "Communism" Slovaks partly compliant with communist regime; Refuse interference in religious matters, form environmental movement t i Brick D : Prerequisite 2 Brick "Betrayals" Week economic base -medium- Wartime Slovak Republic Inherited from Hungary; created out of necessity, Legacy of wartime Slovak economically viable. SloRepublic as a totalitarian vak autonomy rejected in State postwar Czechoslovakia t Brick E: Historical residua Slovaks politically passive; Their extinction as a nation Imminent, if not saved By Czechs -medium/high- i Brick"Antecedents" Slovaks resilient and socially active in A-H; opt for Czechoslovakia instead of Hungary � SLOVAKIA 73 SEEMING AND BEING: CONTEXTUALIZING THE HISTORY OF POST - COMMUNIST SLOVAKIA Juraj Hocman The year 1989 marked the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia and the beginning of Slovakia's road to independence. For the Slovaks this year also revealed the gap between their perception of national history and how it was viewed from the outside. In the 1990s, a new generation of western scholars contrasted the post-communist change of Czechoslovakia' s two nations. In their studies of modem Slovak society they rarely went beyond 1918. They relied very much on general accounts and traditional dichotomies between the Czechs and Slovaks, such as 'industrial' versus 'rural,' 'secular' versus 'religious,' ' progressive' versus 'backward.' 1 This was why in the 1990s the Slovaks continued to be seen as a "non-historic" nation hastily modernized during the communist era. Since it was mostly invisible in Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Slovak history automatically appeared as ruptured and fragmented. Following the downfall of the communist regime and the creation of the independent Slovak Republic in January of 1993, the country's image was primarily associated with radical nationalism, intolerance towards its minorities and an unstable domestic political scene. All of these seemed to have been sufficient to explain Slovakia' s failure to achieve a functioning democracy in the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s, a secondwave of scholarly interest in Slovakia began. Attracted by the country' s economic progress and an overall social and political stability, western scholars turned their attention to what had seemed in the 1990s as a satisfactory explanation for the peculiarities of Slovakia's evolution as a post-communist state. Some of them came to the conclusion that the existing stereotypes stemmed from preconceived methodological approaches, even unfamiliarity with the facts .2 The1 Abby Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001 ), ix-xi. 2 Karen Henderson, "Evaluating the Slovak Transition : What Creates the Image of Slovakia?" In Slovakia after Communism and Meciarism, ed. Kieran Williams (London: School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, 2000), 26. �74 SLOVAKIA refore, a better understanding of what was happening in the country since its creation requires a broader historical approach. 1. Seeming and Being in the History of East and West. The self-challenging motto of the Andrassy family of Hungarian nobles, Non videri, sed esse (Not Seeming but Being), which inspired medieval and early modern societies, stands in direct opposition to modem approaches to social reality that tend to place image over substance.3 In this regard small nations are at greater risk of being overlooked, even misjudged by bigger nations. 4 While it is hardly imaginable that the views of a Slovak or a Czech scholar on the history of Great Britain, the United States or Canada would have the same resonance and impact on the international image of those countries, western scholars have scrutinized the history of Czechoslovakia and its two nations with significant consequences.5 This could happen since the capacity of Slovak historians to conduct independent research and publish the results during the communist era was subject to ideological indoctrination and political constraints. Moreover, Slovak historians, in contrast to their Czech colleagues, until recently did not work systematically on a conceptualization of Slovak history and the minimalization of its invisibility. Such a course would have helped to "sell" their cause abroad - the legitimacy and viability of the existence of Slovakia as a sovereign state - long after its creation. In the 1990s this gap was filled by foreign scholars and the media in a way that simplified and, in some cases, distorted the mostly unknown Slovak history waiting for its reinterpretation at home and rediscovery abroad. The Slovaks were depicted, in terms of their 3 Eva Smelkova and Julius Barczi, "Andrassyovci a Rozi\ava," Forum Historiae 2/2008, p.5. Accessed at www.forumhistoriae.sk/FH 2/smelkova. df 4 See the interview with the Norwegian publicist and writer Egil Lejon "Slovensko prikladom" on the parallels between the historical evolution of the Slovaks and the small Scandinavian nations in the 19th century. Literarny tyidennik, August 12, 1994, pp. I and 11. 5 Even large states are vulnerable to intrusions into their national histories that contradict domestic interpretations. See the internet article "Russia Will Never Let Anyone Falsify [the] History of [the] Second World War" which refers to the image of the soldiers of the Red Army in WW II as looters and rapists . Russia has created a special committee to counteract the "attempts at distorting history to the detriment of Russi a's interest. " Pravda (Moscow). Accessed at www.pravda.ru, May 20, 2009 . �SLOVAKIA 75 missing statehood, as a non-historic nation, which, after the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1993, cured its historical complexes and democratic deficiencies at the expense of their advanced neighbors with whom they shared a common history - the Czechs and the Magyars. 6 To that, some Slovak scholars and politicians reacted with fervor instead of providing a systemic and efficient alternative.7 Consequently, they created solitary and isolated interprettations of Slovak history that clashed with stereotypes and automatically brought about the risk of being viewed either as hard-core nationalists or revisionists.8 In the early 2000s, western scholars such as Karen Henderson, Abby Innes, Cas Mudde and others expressed their doubts concerning cliches linked to Slovak history. The progress in the rediscovery of Slovak history in the West since the beginning of the 2000s cannot be overlooked as the new generation of scholars did their fieldwork in the Slovak Republic and critically examined the earlier interpretations of Slovak history emerging in the 1990s. 9 Although the trend of foreign and Slovak historians coming closer in their interpretations is growing, a lot of work remains to be done by both sides.10 6 George Schopflin, Nations, Identity, Power (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 280-297 ("The Slovak case study"). 7 Looking for internationally-known personalities with Slovak origins at any cost to improve the image of Slovakia could result in quite opposite effects. See Greg Steinmetz's article, "Slovaks desperately searching for famous countrymen," The Globe and Mail, April 27, 1996. Similarly, the publishing of another variant of the multi-volume "History of Slovakia" in the Slovak language with short resumes in German, English, French and Russian, and picture books with descriptive texts designed for common readers are hardly ways to provide a conceptual and critical synthesis of Slovak history known and accepted internationally. 8 Franti~ek Vnuk, Milan Durica and other historians grouped around the Matica slovens/ca. 9 Next to Karen Henderson and Abby Innes, the best examples are the recent works by Tim Haughton and John A. Scherpereel cited in this article. The British scholar George Schopflin sees a great challenge for historians of East Central Europe to become familiar with the Anglo-Saxon, German, French, Russian, and Italian scholarly literature. For consequences regarding Slovak history see George Schopflin, "Vytvaranie eur6pskej kulturnej identity? Stredna Europa v rozfaenej Eur6pskej unii," Listy SFPA, March-April 2003 , pp.2-3. 10 " .. . it is hardly surprising that any effort to straighten the Slovak spine is seen as nationalism, the equivalent of n[N]azism, fascism and the oppression of minorities. It may be hard to believe but the greatest enemies of Slovakia are Slovaks themselves. On several occasions, I have had an opportunity to witness the way in which Slovak historians have given lectures on Slovakia to foreign audiences. Nearly all of �76 SLOVAKIA Furthermore, in the modem era the role of the media in building popular perceptions on the basis of simplified interpretations of historical developments has been increasing. A reasonable objection can be made as to why a scholarly study should be bothered by what the media say. In short, the media can popularize history more effectively than scholars who create their interpretations only after years of studying a particular problem. Thus, in creating a public image, it is the media which paints the larger picture, not scholars. 11 Paraphrasing Clausewitz, the media may be seen as the continuation of historiography and social science by other means. 12 This was evident in the case of Slovakia's image as hyper-nationalist in the early 1990s and during the country's quasi-miraculous instant awakening in 1998. Views by the media helped to reduce this phase in modem Slovak history to the Manichean conflict between 'evil' and 'good' politicians, and, implicitly, between the 'progressive' and 'backward' electorates and segments of Slovak society. 13 them have had one thing in common: they present the Slovaks as a nation without a history, without culture and traditions - and surprise - as the oppressor of minorities. Nor do they neglect to mention Slovakia's facist and Nazi past. Their spiritual kin in the West have gone so far in their blind, ignorant hatred as to blame the Slovaks for the hanging of Communists and Jews in Kosice in January of 1945. According to one German commentator, the massacres in Kosice were ' one of the last abominations of the fascist Slovak state and ally of Adolf Hitler. ' The fact that Kosice belonged to Hungary at that time and that this sad, vile act was committed by the Hungarian fascists "Wild Rose Crosses," is apparently of interest to no one, the least to our own historians." Darina Vergesova, "Dajte Duricovi pokoj," Kritika & Kon text, nos. 2-3 ( 1997), pp.59-60. 11 "A separate chapter in our [Slovak] media is that of the methodical loss of national memory," Pavo! Dinka, S/ovenske media: Met6dy manipulacie (Bratislava: PPA, 2008), 21. Due to its image inherited from the 1990s, Slovakia was depicted in three films - "Hostel" (2004), "Eurotrip" (2004) and "Hostel 2" (2007) - as a nest of danf:erous and perverted criminals and mafia. For details see www.imdb.com 2 On the shift of the media in the time of globalization from being the Fourth Power (provider of information) to the Fifth Power (manipulator of information) see the article by Ignacio Ramonet, "Le cinquieme pouvoir," Le Monde Diplomatique, Apri l-Mai (2005), pp.74-78 "Dans la nouvelle guerre ideologique qu 'impose la mondialisation, !es medias sont utilisees comme une arme de combat. L' information, en raison de son explosion, de sa multiplication, de sa surabondance, de ses partis pris, se trouve litteralement contaminee, empoisonnee par toute sorte des mensonges, pollue par !es rumeurs, !es distorsions, !es manipulations." Ibid., p.77. 13 Lubomir Kopecek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke stranictvi na Slovensku (Brno: CDK, 2006), p.308. A survey conducted in Slovakia in the mid- l 990s focused on the degree of tolerance towards minorities, disrespect for the law by politi- �SLOVAKIA 77 Next to the risk of perspectives based on simplified portrayals of reality stands the problem of divergent approaches towards the same phenomena in the history of the East and West. The classic saying goes "if disease is beautiful, it is generally someone else's disease." 14 Apart from its complimentary aspect, Chesterton's aphorism can be applied to nationalism and its negative characteristics associated primarily with the East. In the 1990s, the resurrected nationalism of East Central Europe gained a negative image linked to the ethnocentric nationalism of the 19th century. This resulted in the categorization of post-communist states into progressive ones and those which lagged behind. It is true that the downfall of Communism and the subsequent disintegration of the Communist Bloc resulted in an explosion of ethnic tensions. When examining the roots of nationalism and its capacity for political and social mobilezation, it should become clear that the same primordial instincts attributed to the East had existed among western literati in the 19th century. In multiethnic Britain the same elements of linguistic and ethnic tensions shaped by romantic nationalism can be found in historical novels designed with the same purpose as those by writers in East Central Europe. 15 The similarities between the nation-building processes in W estem and East Central Europe can particularly be observed in the creation of multi-ethnic Great Britain as a political nation during the period 1707-1837, where the impact of external threats helped her to overcome the historical centripetal tendencies based on ethnic diversity. 16 What worked in Great Britain did not work in Austria- cians, positive opinions on the communist regime before its fall and engagement in civic association activities. 14 Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: The Bodley Head, 1949), p.12. 15 On the Norman-Saxon ethno-linguistic division and societal hierarchy in medieval England see Sir Walter Scott's historical novel Ivanhoe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 16 Linda Colley, Britons: Forg ing the Nation 1707-/837 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992). For the major argument of the book see the introduction, pp.1-9. See also the comparison of the Magyars with the English "who have violently Anglicized ten millions of Irishmen and Scottsmen" made by a Magyar Deputy in the Hungarian Diet in 1879 in justification of the forced Magyarization . R.W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London: Archibald Constable, 1908; reprinted in New York by Howard Fertig, 1972), 217 . There is a significant difference. Whereas Great Britain made, at least formally, its Compromise in 1707, the radical part of Magyar political elites failed to do it until it was too late. �78 SLOVAKIA Hungary from 1848 to 1918 and in Czechoslovakia, where centripetal tendencies eventually prevailed. Recalling the indication by Cas Mudde of double standards in explaining ' bad' and 'good' nationalism in Slovakia during the period 1989-1992, 17 nationalism, in general, appeared as progressive when it had helped to create nation-states in the West from the 16th to the 19th centuries, whereas it became perverted in state-building processes in post-communist Eastern Europe in the 1990s. 18 Though the concerns of multi-ethnic states about the possible consequences of various forms of nationalism, past and future, to which modem historiography and political science have legitimately pointed, are understandable, the common roots of nationalism should not be forgotten. This will help us to avoid the traps of nationalism's general recrimination in post-communist East Central Europe, including Slovakia, regardless of the context within which it emerged and had been shaped. 19 In addition to the perception of the Slovaks as intolerant nationalists, the image of the country has been that of a non-historic nation due to the viewing of unexplored parts of Slovak history as myths. Robert Pynsent suggests that a myth can appear either as a "normal neutral narrative of concem," 20 or it can be a "bridge too far" in re17 Cas Mudde, "Civil society in post-communist Europe: Lessons from the ' dark side,"' In Uncivil society? Contentious politics in post-communist Europe, eds. Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 161. 18 For the opposite view see Egil Lejon who sees the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1993 as a result of Slovak historical traditions and an emancipation movement which accelerated in 1848 and later. Interview with Egil Lejon "Slovensko prikladom," Literarny tyzdennik, August 12, 1994, p.11. Lejon suggests that the Slovaks are not nationalistic enough in terms of what modem nationalism requires: cultural self-confidence, national pride, and loyalty. 19 See Kedourie on the selective use of the antonyms 'progressive ' - ' regressive ' in regard to nationalism in the Marxist interpretation of history ('progressive' during the advent of capitalism replacing fe udalism, ' progressive' in the fight of colonial and post-colonial nations against imperialism, and ' regressive' within capitalism resisting socialism). Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1966), 90-91. Applying Mudde 's observation, the 'bad ' case of nationalism in the early 1990s was the split of Czechoslovakia, whereas the 'good' cases were the dismemberments of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In contrast to the two latter, Slovak nationalism did not involve violence. 20 Robert Pynsent, Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality (Budapest-London-New York: Central European University Press, 1994), 87. �SLOVAKIA 79 gard to its practical implications in nation and state-building processes in Slovak history as implicated by G. Eyal, S.J. Cohen and T. Haughton. 2 1 While applying the first flexible definition, it may be postulated that myths are constantly emerging. An effective way to understand the essence of a myth in terms of its value as a possible source of historical facts is to compare both of its forms. The official mythology of the European Union is that it was born out of a sudden inspiration that had fallen upon Jean Monnet - a Romulus to the European Community - during his trip to the Alps. The idea was apparently instrumental in reconciling France and Germany during the meeting of Robert Schumann and Konrad Adenauer in May of 1950, which gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community. 22 Others see this process in an all-European myth-deconstructing perspective as the outcome of the decisive involvement of the United States, tired of the French-German reluctance to reach an agreement. 23 Concurrently, some scholars have viewed the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s as the culmination of the tireless work of lobbyists, who had effectively executed the wishes of great corporations to create a common market which was about to grant the architects of the EU even greater eco- 21 See Gil Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites: from the Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 131 , and Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Post-Communist Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 4-5. This is also the leitmotif of Shari J. Cohen's book Politics Without A Past: The Absence Of History In Postcommunist Nationalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999). 22 "Chaque annee, si je le peux, je vais faire de grandes courses dans les Alpes .. .J'y retrouve l'expression de l'inquietude qui opressait l'Europe cinq ans apres la guerre: une autre guerre est proche devant nous si nous ne faisons rien. L' Allemagne n' en sera pas la cause, mais elle en sera l'enjeu. II faut qu'elle cesse d'etre un enjeu, qu 'elle devienne au contraire un lien. Seule la France peut actuellement prendre une initiative." Jean Monnet, Memoires (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 342. 23 John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge University Press, 1991 ). Particularly explicative is the role of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy in bringing the French and Germans together to the signing of the Treaty of Paris (April 18, 1951 ), which instituted the European Coal and Steel Community. Gillingham stressed the fact that McCloy "summoned" the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to his office for a "dressing down" for his unwillingness to sign the document. Ibid, 280. �80 SLOVAKIA nomic profits. 24 A different group of authors opposed such ignoble motives with their hagiographic vision of the institutional emergence of the European Community and the later European Union as the outcome of exceptional negotiating and diplomatic skills of supranational executives who were serving the citizens of Europe.25 It is clear that each perspective has its merits and this adds to the perplexing complexity of the issue and resulting interpretations. This variety of opinions points to the core of the problem linked to the non-historicity of Slovaks and their questionable ability to cope with more recent problems in the transformation of their society. The skeptically insinuated ' mythical' legacy of 9th century Great Moravia and the invisible link from it to modem Slovak politics, apart from its distance from the present, which partially legitimizes its appearance as a myth, disregards the simple fact that to the Slovaks it was a lighthouse, not a matrix blindly to follow in the creation of a sovereign modem Slovakia. There is no difference in this regard between small and big nations who honor their historical traditions that often blend with myths. Most importantly, it is not Great Moravia itself, but the connection between it and the 19th and 20th centuries that matters in the discourse on the historicity of Slovaks. This link was hardly reflected, let alone examined, by western scholars in the 1990s in contrast to their predecessors - the historians R.W. Seton-Watson, Robert A. Kann, Oscar Halecki, and C.A. Macartney.26 After the extinction of the Arpad dynasty (1301 ), which had represented the ethnic Magyars, the foreign rulers of the Kingdom of 24 Belen Balanya, Ann Doherty, Olivier Hoedeman, Adam Ma' anit and Erik Wesselius, Europe Inc.: Regional and Global Restructuring and the Rise of Corporate Power (London-Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000). The authors stress their perception of the creation of the European Union as the result of a plan made by the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) composed of 45 captains of the largest European transnational corporations. See Preface of the book, xi-xv. 25 Ken Endo, The Presidency of the Europ ean Commission under Jacques De/ors. The Politics of Shared Leadership (London : Macmillan, 1999). Helen Drake, Jacques De/ors. Perspectives on a European Leader (London-New York: Routledge, 2000). 26 For an attempt to see Slovak history in historical continuity by a foreign scholar see the chapter by the Austrian historian Arnold Suppan, "Die Slowakei zwischen Grossmahrischen Reich und Europaischer Union: Kontinuitaten und Diskontinui taten," in Plus Ultra. Die Welt Der Neuzeit. Festschrift far Alfred Kohler zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. F. Edelmayer, M. Fuchs, G. Heilingsetler, P. Rauscher (Munster: Aschendorf, 2008), 331-68. �SLOVAKIA 81 Hungary - the Anjous, the Luxembourgs, the Jagiellons, the Hahsburgs - were wisely and clairvoyantly tolerant towards the ethnic groups of Hungary as the state otherwise would have not survived for the next seven centuries.27 Once the glory of the Kingdom of Hungary and the privileges of a political nation were attributed to one nationality (the Magyars) in the 18th and 19th centuries, there was no choice for others, who felt degraded to second-class citizens, than to nourish and strengthen their own identities - linguistic, cultural, social, and political. Paradoxically, a tendency to be suspicious of the interpretations of Slovak history as an indivisible part of the history of the Kingdom of Hungary still prevails. Until a shift in this perception happens, Slovaks may be further viewed as a non-historic entity despite empirical and heuristic evidence that testifies to their genuine participation in the societal and institutional life of the kingdom they shared with others in times when language and ethnicity meant less than social status and class affiliation. 28 The myth versus 'myth' ambiguity in the interpretations of the history of East and West testifies to the existence of a wide range of applicable perspectives and alternative interpretations. A better awareness of this ambiguity, which exists in both East and West, may help us to also understand the reasons for the ruptures in Slovak history, fractured into its being and seeming. The most visible anoma- 27 Disregarding the multi-ethnic aspects and dynastic ruptures in the medieval and modern history of Hungary would be the same as excluding the early Plantagenets from the history of England due to their appearance as non-Anglo-Saxon, FrancoNorman, elements. The history of England would have to begin anew with the Tudors . The rupture progressive versus regressive (see Kedourie) in the history of the United States is observable in the interpretations of the reasons for the Civil War and its aftermath. A similar rupture (totalitarian+-+democratic) exists in the history of Germany before it became a democratic state. 28 "The Slovaks on their side lost their national existence [after the defeat of Great Moravia] in that of their Asiatic conquerors, entered into their ranks as soldiers, and participated thence-forward in all their fortunes .. .Their language however is the only remnant of their national existence which the Slovaks have preserved; in every other respect they belong to the Hungarian nation, of which they form an ingredient part, as the Magyars form another; and on the glory of whose valiant deeds they have an equal claim." Therese Albertine Louise von Jacob Robinson, Historical View of the Language and Literature of the Slavic Nation (New York: BiblioBazaar, LLC, 2006) (Reprint of the original version published by George P. Putnam in New York in 1851), 186-7. �82 SLOVAKIA lies of this split consequently appeared either as 'betrayals' or 'awakenings.' 2. Seeming and Being in Slovak History as a Part of the History of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In 1991 Slovak historian Anton Hmko pointed out that the book by Slovak politician Ivan Derer on the rulings of the National Court in the First Czechoslovak Republic,29 written from the perspective of an ardent unitarist and "Czechoslovak," was conveniently accepted by Marxist historiography. The reason was obvious as the adversary was the same - the Slovak autonomist movement and the legacy of the wartime Slovak Republic (1939-1945). Having provided statistical data on the topics of the studies published by Slovak historians, Hrnko argued that the history of interwar Czechoslovakia ( 19181938) belonged to one of its most ideologically distorted segments. 30 This vacuum was filled by the works of court historians who helped to create myths as the politically and ideologically "subjective projection of desirable horizons." 31 If a 'myth' could emerge relatively recently with plenty of primary documents, one can ask the question - are there more of them? To respond to it at least in part, it is necessary to return to the early 1990s, when ideological constraints were removed from scholarship and academia and the attention of scholars and media turned towards nationalism. Miroslav Hroch's classification of nationalities in East Central Europe on their advancement in the national reawakening, which was published in the year when Czechoslovakia broke up, put the Slovaks a step behind the Czechs and the Magyars, without providing details, except for a very general reference. 32 This article suggests that, until the revolution of 1848, Slovaks did not lag behind 29 Ivan Derer, Slovensky vyvin a l'udacka zrada (Praha: Kvasnicka a Hamp!, I 946). Anton Hmko, "Zatemnene dejiny: Obraz medzivojnovej slovenskej spolocnosti v fracach slovenskych historikov," Literarny tyidennik, June 28, 1991 , p.10. 1 Marianna Oravcova, "The Ethnic and Cultural Dimension of National Emancipation: The Evocation of the Slovak Nation," in Language, Values and the Slovak Nation, eds. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gasparikova (Washington: Paideia Press, 1994), 11 . In the last sentence Oravcova refers to the article by Pavo! Horvath, "K niektorym otazkam historickych tradicii na Slovensku," Slovensky narodopis 1-2 (1986), 60-65 . 32 Miloslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe," New Left Review, 1/198 (March-April 1993), 64. 30 �SLOVAKIA 83 the Czechs in terms of the press, programs, the creation of a literary language and the petition movements. Hroch was more accurate when pointing to the forced Magyarization that started after 1867 as a major hindrance to Slovak national progress, including its social and economic aspects. Yet even that historical period has to be reexamined as it had not been a time of complete silence, although it would be convenient to see it in that way. Communist historiography in the 1950s gladly embraced the earlier idea that Slovaks had been saved by the Czechs from extinction as a nation, a concept which slipped into western scholarship. This hypothesis was based on censuses which showed the decreasing number of Slovak intelligentsia and schools as the 19th century progressed. These scholars concluded that the Slovaks would have been assimilated by the Magyars in one or two generations. 33 There had previously been two generations of Slovaks living under Magyarization from 1875 to 1914, yet the Slovak press, though under censorship and constant pressure, was full of political articles and calls for national, social and cultural progress. 34 Magyar elites knew very well that Slovak identity did not depend solely on schooling in their native language, but also on the family environment. Therefore, they forcibly took Slovak children from poor families and transported them to regions where Magyar was spoken. 35 The unrest in Turiec and Zvolen County in Central Slovakia that led to attacks on local Magyar authorities was a mixture of social and national elements. They testified to the continuing, even increasing Slovak resilience against Magyarization as observed by R. W. Seton-Watson. 36 Final33 For an argument against the traditional view that the Slovaks could not create their intelligentsia because of harsh Magyarization see Dusan Kovac, Roman Holec, Elena Jakesova, Elena Mannova, Milan Podrimavsky, Na zaciatku storocia, 19011914 (Bratislava: Veda, 2004), 44. 34 Milan Krajcovic, "Slovaci v emancipacnom pohybe nemad'arskych narodov," in Slovensko na zaciatku storocia: Spolocnost'. stat a narod v suradniciach doby, eds. Milan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (Bratislava: Hu SA V, 1999), 48-65 . 35 "By the Law of 1891 , the State has deliberately assumed the attitude of the Sultans in earlier centuries. Just as the Christian rayah was regarded as a breedingmachine to supply janissaries, so to-day non-Magyars of Hungary are breedingmachines whose children must be taught Magyar from the earliest age in the hope that they may become renegades to the traditions of their ancestors." R.W. SetonWatson, Racial Problems in Hungary , 222. 36 Ibid., 394. Seton-Watson stressed that 92 .5% of the Liptov county inhabitants were Slovaks and 90.6% understood no Magyar. Ibid. , 332. �84 SLOVAKIA ly, in 1918, it was the masses of peasants and lower strata of Slovak society that had preserved, as lsmo Nurmi suggested, a high degree of self-consciousness. 37 They were instrumental in embracing the idea of their future coexistence with the Czechs under the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement, but under no circumstances with the Magyars. Without this support the few intellectuals at home and abroad could hardly have reached their political goals in October and November of 1918 when the Czechoslovak Republic was born. It is equally true that significant numbers of Slovak Magyarones gave up their ethnicity for the sake of their careers while following the example of the Slovak nobility and gentry which were "easily and gladly" Magyarized in the 19th century. 38 Still, it is hard to believe that three million Slovaks at home and abroad, with the most resistant of them in North America, would have been completely Magyarzsed even if Hungary had been preserved in its prewar boundaries . A possible analogy with the Irish resistance, underscored by the role played in national emancipation by leaders such as Milan R. Stefanik and Stefan Osusky, who left Hungary and vehemently fought for the Slovak cause abroad, comes to mind. Their work, done at the highest political and diplomatic levels, was supplemented by dozens of zealous Slovak national activists in the United States. 39 37 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia - A Playground for Nationalism and National Identity, 1918-1920: Manifestations of the National identity of Slovaks (Helsinki : Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1999), 45. 38 C.A . Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919-1937 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937), 91. 39 The Slovak press in North America - 30 newspapers with a circulation of 150,000 in 1914 - was such a force that the Hungarian government as early as in 1890 had banned the imports of some of them and began subsidi zing pro-Hungarian publications in the United States. M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press," in Sally M. Miller ed. , The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 365. Count Albert Apponyi, one of the main protagonists of Magyarization and a representative of the Hungarian government on his visit to the United States attempted to present Hungary as a ftee and democratic country. He was denounced as a tyrant and pressed by a huge mob comprising members of "Slavic nationalities and Hungarian socialists" during his lectures. In Chicago, Apponyi escaped the fury of the mob and fled to his car only with the protection provided by the police. See The New York Times, February 25, 1911 , p. 3. For the Slovak resistence against the territorial aspirations of fascist Hungary see the boastful statement by Gustav Husak on February 28, 1945: "I openly declare that Slovakia' s frontiers [with Hungary] as they had existed in the [prewar] Czechoslovak Republic are stable. Slovakia is united and non-divisible. Any �SLOVAKIA 85 After World War II, Konstantin Culen, a Slovak publicist in exile, suggested that living with the Czechs was for the Slovaks a rather negative experience. 4°Culen's arguments were based on the constant rejection of Slovak autonomy in Czechoslovakia by President Edvard Benes, who had never shown any particular affection for the Slovaks, and the post-war execution of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, President of the wartime Slovak Republic. With the situation of the Slovaks in southern Slovakia ceded to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938 in mind, it is legitimate to assume that cohabitation with the Czechs, though far from being idyllic, included fewer risks for the completion of Slovak national emancipation than their hypothetical existence in Hungary after WW I. Furthermore, the Czechs in 1918 were already significantly ahead of the Slovaks as far as societal cohesion and socio-economic progress of their societies were concerned. The animosity started with the Czech disrespect toward the Catholic Church and with their disregard for the continuing socio-economic underdevelopment of Slovakia. The problem became acute in the 1930s, when the Slovak intelligentsia, which had remarkably increased by that time, as well as ordinary citizens, could not find work in Slovakia because the best jobs were filled by the Czechs. In contrast to the situation that had existed in the 1920s, Slovaks were ready to become executives, administrators, teachers, lawyers and doctors. This happened in 1939 and after. Unfortunately, after WW II Czech political leaders, both civic and communist, were not willing to admit that the Slovaks had grown up and were able to govern themselves.41 The Czech historical experience was strongly influenced by the Protestant Reformation, secularism and greater industrial advancement due to their proximity to and cohabitation with the Germans. With the creation of Czechoslovakia after WW I, the Czechs proved themselves worthy followers of their predecessors and for a moment irredentism by Magyar fascists will end in vain. Our nation, which has been able to resist the military power of Germany, will find enough strength to firmly defend its borders." See the document "Z referatu Gustava Husaka na konferencii Komunistickej strany Slovenska," February 28, 1945. Dokumenty slovenskej narodnej identi2; a statnosti II (Bratislava: Narodne literarne centrum, 1998), 400. Konstantin Culen, Po Sviitoplukovi druha nasa hlava: Politicky i ivotopis Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: The First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947). 41 Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 89. �86 SLOVAKIA also a barrier erected by the victorious Allies against German domination over Central and Eastern Europe. After the incorporation of Slovakia into Czechoslovakia, the national self-confidence of the Czechs was on the rise. After WW II, the Czechs led by the Communist Party, and with the mighty Soviet Union backing them, returned to the concept of a unitary Czechoslovakia. To them, the push for reforms in the 1960's, which was interpreted as the "Prague" rather than the "Czecho-Slovak Spring," was also a return to their national history. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in August of 1968, led by the Soviet Union, their former liberator, and the only Slavic Superpower, was especially traumatic for the Czechs. This trauma, imposed from outside, was complemented by a domestic one: the effects of 'normalization' and federalization, both seen as a part of the chain of Slovak "betrayals." The Slovaks rebelled from 1920 onward. First, they asked for autonomy, then they allegedly "conspired" with the Magyars and the Poles against the prewar Republic, and eventually got a taste of the forbidden fruit of political emancipation in the form of their nominally independent state.42 Meanwhile, in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (1939-1945), the Czechs were ruled over and persecuted by the Germans. 43 With this perception of national history in Czech minds, the disappearance of the communist regime in 1989, which was allegedly harsher in the Czech Lands than in Slovakia, and which treated the Slovaks in the same way as did the First Czechoslovak Republic, was a golden opportunity to rebuild the state to Czech expectations. After recognizing that Slovaks were not willing to accept what they considered to be the continuation of the imbalance in the distribution of competences in a joint state in 1990-1992, the Czechs opted for the territorially-reduced variant of Czechoslovakia while inheriting its trademark. Since then, they have fared very well. 44 It 42 Leff, National Conflict, 26 and 164. For a Slovak perspective on the history of the Slovak-Czech and Czecho-Slovak relations since 1918 as the "history of broken pacts and unfulfilled promises," see Anton Hmko, "Politicke zapasy na Slovensku v lete a na jesen 1990," Historicky zbornik 10, no. I (2000), 77. 43 Though the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia had its own administration, it was an indivisible part of the Third Reich, which saw itself as a historic successor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. 44 See the article "Slovakia's Economy ls Doing Well, Too" by Peter Burian, The New York Times, June I, 1996. The author, charge d 'ajfaires of the Embassy of the �SLOVAKIA 87 may seem that this chapter of their history was closed and sealed. The aftermath of the "Velvet Divorce" and the relationship between the two former federal nations was not always rosy. Throughout the 1990s, it was not difficult to contrast the progress made by the Czech Republic with Slovakia's problems. In the early 2000s, with the Meciar era gone and economic advancement that surprised many, the previous negative image of Slovaks as nationalists turned to the delay in democratic transformation of their society. 45 In recent books on Czech history since the early medieval era the Slovaks are hardly mentioned. With Slovakia's progress in the integration processes, substitutes for Slovak nationalism appeared instantly.46 Despite mutual sympathies as documented by surveys of public opinion and praise by Slovak and Czech politicians of their good relations, from 1993 onward free of economic quarrels,47 the clash of bitter memories continued. They have ranged from topics such as investment opportunities by renowned international compa- Slovak Republic in Washington, responded to a similar article in the NYT on the Czech Republic doing well "with luck and without Slovakia," while providing data on GDP (7.4% growth), unemployment (7.4%), doubled foreign currency reserves, a £ositive trade balance and low foreign debt per capita ($800.00). 5 According to Professor Filip Palda from E Ecole nationale d 'administration publique in Montreal, "Separation in 1992 allowed the Czechs to halt the payola on which Slovaks had come to depend. Since separation in 1992, the Slovaks have gone the way of Argentina, whereas the Czechs are now preparing to enter the European Union." See "Argentina north" by Filip Palda. The Ottawa Citizen, January 21 , 2002. Anton Hykisch, former Slovak ambassador to Canada, opined that, for Hungary and the Czech Republic, Slovakia's economic success in the early 2000s was a big surprise which was hard for them to accept. Author interview with Anton Hykisch, Bratislava, June 5, 2007. 46 For a contrasting view on the political systems and parliamentarism in the Czech and Slovak Republics as advanced and less developed see Petr Kopecky, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party competition and parliamentary institutionalization (London : Ashgate, 2001). The Czech political scientist Lubomir Kopecek opines that in comparison with the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, the evolution of the Slovak political system is unfinished and the system itself is unstable. As a result, Slovakia is a "semi-consolidated democracy." Lubomir Kopecek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke stranictvi stranictvi na Slovensku (Brno: CDK, 2006), 307 and 3 10. 47 See the article "Klaus: Vzt'ahy Slovenska a Ceska m6zu byt' pri.kladom pre celu Eur6pu," Pravda, June 29, 2009. It became a tradition that the first official visits of the newly-elected presidents and prime ministers of the Czech and Slovak Republics have been with their closest neighbor. �88 SLOVAKIA nies, 48 to the often derogatory comments on domestic politics and rivalry in sports, with frequent references to the "sins" in national histories of the two nations .49 Until the revolutionary years 1848-1849, Slovaks and Magyars had cohabitated peacefully. Four decades of forced Magyarization after 1867 were hard for the Slovaks, yet there was still some moral and socio-political capital left for the improvement of mutual relationships. If this failed in 1918, Slovaks could hardly have been blamed for it as their political weight and influence in Hungary was marginal. In the fall of 193 8, after two decades of the existence of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia was stripped of its southern territories by the Vienna Award.50 Almost seven years of living in Hungary (19381945) returned the Slovaks in the south to a life which resembled what had existed before 1918. After the Second World War and until 1989, the relationship between the Slovaks and Magyars might have appeared as normal, but it was not. Once the Soviet Union was gone and the fate of Czechoslovakia disputed, the old animosities resurfaced . For all Slovak governments since 1989, the status of the Magyar minority became a litmus test in measuring the state of democracy in Slovakia by western governments and scholars. During the Meciar years, Magyars in Slovakia voiced their dissatisfaction with 48 According to a poll by the Czech Private Equity and Venture Capital Association based in Prague, four out of five of its economists and financial analysts said that foreign investment would flow to the Czech rather than to the Slovak Republic. See "Investori uprednostnia Cesko pred Slovenskom," Sme, May 29, 2009. Slovak readers rejected the idea as wishful thinking on the Czech side and suggested that a poll conducted by a Slovak-based company would have shown the opposite. 49 They frequently appear on the Czech web sites www.seznam.cz., www.idnes.cz and their Slovak counterparts www.sme.sk and www.pravda.sk. On April 1 of2009 when the Slovak national football team defeated its opponent in Prague in the qualifier for the Word Cup in South Africa (2010), debates among the fans of both teams turned to their common past with references to the "betrayal" in 1938-1939 and to the Slovak inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Czechs. Slovaks pointed to Czech compliance with German rule in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and affirmed that they did not measure themselves against the Czechs - a fixed idea on the Czech side. 50 Julius Mesaros, "Some Deformations in the Interpretation of Censuses in Recent Slovak-Magyar Controversies," In Slovak & Magyars, ed. Pavol Stevcek (Bratislava: Ministerstvo kultury, 1995), 63-84. The census of 1910 showed the presence of 885,397 Magyars on the territory which became part of Slovakia in 1918 (30.3% of the population). Mesaros argues that even "this number was not the result of natural development, or Slovak-Magyar and Magyar-Slovak bilingualism, but a result of the purposeful Magyarization and oppression of Slovaks." Ibid. , 78 . �SLOVAKIA 89 the approaches of Slovak governments in administrative, linguistic, financial and cultural matters. Claims made by their leaders for more tolerance and understanding by the Slovaks have been in stark contrast with the ambiguous language of the representatives of the Magyar minority regarding their possible autonomy. 5 1 While the Slovaks and the Czechs after 1992 were able to reach the highest level of mutual respect and understanding, Slovaks and Magyars remained mentally anchored in the period between 1918 and 1945. The trauma of Trianon in 1920 and their expulsion from South Slovakia in 1945-194 7 is deeply engraved in the minds of Magyars, as is the forced Magyarization and the effects of the Vienna Arbitration in the minds of the Slovaks. Each side continues to interpret the causes and outcomes of those events according to its own perception and sentiments. A partial solution to the problem - history textbooks written by Slovak and Magyar historians together - is to this date still "in progress" and it is hard to predict when and if they will ever be finished and distributed to schools in both countries. 52 History is firmly tied into daily politics in East Central Europe. Its revival outside of scholarly conferences and seminars and its use as a model for the present or future by politicians may lead to the release of a genie from his bottle. 53 This refers particularly to Slovakia as being possibly identified as the weakest link within an informal Little Entente. 54 If both nations do not want to waste what has 51 The representatives of the Magyar political parties in Slovakia (before 1998), with the exception of Miklos Duray and Pal Csaky from the SMK. (the Party of the Magyar Coalition), were careful about publicly speaking of autonomy for Magyars in Slovakia, though the idea of their political and administrative autonomy has frequently appeared - sotto voce - as their ultimate goal. Most recently, Duray admitted that territorial autonomy is unrealistic, but the chance for a vaguely defined "personal'' autonomy for the Magyar minority in Slovakia still exists. See the article "Ouray o vel'kom Mad'arsku nesniva, auton6mia je vsak podl'a neho realna," Pravda, August 4, 2009. 52 Vilaro Kratochvil, "K moznostiam oslabovania predsudkov a stereotypov v tvorbe ucebnic dejepisu," in Myty a predsudky v dejincich. Historickci konferencia 7. decembra 2004, ed. Attila Simon (Samorin-Dunajska Streda: Forum Institut pre vyskum mensin, 2005). 53 See the interview with Slovak historian Ivan Kamenec. "Kamenec: Politici su najhorsi ziaci hist6rie," Sme, May 9, 2009. Kamenec refers to the diverging interpretations of the period 1944-1948. 54 Serbia, Slovakia, Romania, in which Magyar minorities live. Jan Camogursky said that the highest challenge to Slovakia's foreign policy after accession into NATO and the EU remains the country's ability to face continuing interference by �90 SLOVAKIA remained positive from the legacy of their peaceful cohabitation, and if they wish to get rid of the shadows of the past, they have to reach a mutually respectful Slovak - Magyar and Magyar - Slovak Compromise. Not by political gestures, but by the inner force of their societies. Neither of the two nations, closely bound together for centuries, can separately pass this test of national and civic maturity.55 3. The Myth of a Sudden Awakening of Slovak Society in the 1998 Parliamentary Elections. The major problem in Slovak history from an outsider's perspective - its invisibility linked to a fragmented appearance as a part of the history of Hungary and Czechoslovakia - influenced also its recent domestic interpretations. In reference to the Slovak national anthem, sociologists Martin Butora and Zora Butorova compared Slovak society in 1989 to "Sleeping Beauty." 56 They went so far as to say that" .. . in November 1989, an overwhelming majority of people in Slovakia accepted political change passively." This view is similar to those that refer to "socialism with a human face" in the second half of the 1960s as a purely Czech affair, 57 and those that see Charright-wing Magyar politicians into Slovakia's domestic affairs through issues regardi ng the status of the Magyar minority in Slovakia. Author interview with Jan Camogursky, Bratislava, May 24, 2007. In a poll conducted in January of 2004, 21 .3% of participants identified Hungary as a major threat to Slovak national security. See Boris Benkovic, "Vyskumna sprava," in Verejnti mienka a politika. Medzintirodne vzt'ahy a zahranicnti politika Slovenskej republiky, ed. Miroslav Peknik (Brati slava: Veda, 2005), 38 (see Graph 9). 55 For the necessity for mutual respect between the Slovak majority and minorities that would lead to their loyalty to the state based on civic principles see Milan Zemko, "Modemy politicky narod," in Slovenskti ottizka dnes, ed. Laszlo Szigeti (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2007), 192 . Zemko refers to Renan ' s idea of a "nation as a daily plebiscite" in a continuous building of a Slovak political nation : "L'existence d' une nation est. .. plebiscite de tous lesj ours, comme !'existence de l'individu est affirmation perpetuelle de vie." Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu ' une nation?" Conference faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882. Oeuvres completes d 'Ernest Renan (Paris: Calmann Levy, editor, 1882), 27. 56 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "S lovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy 10, no. I (1999), 80. 5 Ibid, 83. See Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulbricht K. Preuss, Institutional design in post-communist societies: rebuilding the ship at sea (Cambridge - New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The authors came to the conclusion that "The 1968 vision of socialism with a human face was entirely a Czech, not Slovak phenomenon." Ibid. , 264. �SLOVAKIA 91 ter 77 as the only agent of civic resistance against the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Earlier observations by Karen Henderson point to preconceived approaches to Slovak history suffering from "dangerous analytical misconceptions that have to work backward."58 Theories on the institution-building processes in communist and post-communist Czechoslovakia view the institutions emerging during the transitory period as a result of bricolage - the innovative building of new institutions by politicians who function as bricoleurs. 59 A similar approach can be taken when examining the most important moments in the modern history of Slovakia and their contrasting interpretations seen in "bricks." Works by political scientists are often based on deductive reasoning (see the scheme's Bricolage I, at the end of the article). Thus, if Slovakia deviated from its course towards western democracies in the mid-1990s (originally Brick A), the explanation was obvious: it happened because of the country's past, bound by the immaturity of its society following the breakup of Czechoslovakia, which stemmed from pervasive Slovak nationalism. This led to ungratefulness towards the Czechs and revenge towards the Magyars (Brick B). Likewise, it has been argued that a high degree of compliance with the communist regime and its detrimental impact on Slovak society kept societal life frozen (Brick C). Moreover, the weak economic base of Slovakia inherited from Hungary, along with the controversial character and legacy of wartime Slovakia (Brick D), did not help to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness, political inexperience of Slovaks and thus their negative international image (Brick E) . Deductive reasoning has its merits. It is even more convincing when supported by direct experience and contact with the subject of the study, buttressed by familiarity with primary sources. Foreign scholars who did their research in Slovakia in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s, helped to broaden a variety of perspectives on Slovak history, which Slovak historians themselves have been unaware of. It is interesting to observe that western, not Slovak scholars, argue in favor of the capacity of Slovak society to build new institu58 Karen Henderson, "Evaluating the Slovak Transition: What Creates the Image of Slovaki a?" 26. 59 John A. Scherpereel, Governing the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Between State Socialism and the European Union (Boulder - London : First Forum Press, 2009), 68 . �92 SLOVAKIA tions during the communist and post-communist era (Scherpereel, Haughton) . Foreign scholars have referred to the importance of a "critical mass of educated citizens" and political stability in Slovakia prior to, during and after the "change" in 1998 (Henderson), and stressed the presence of a "profound and sizeable Slovak opposition to the culture of Communism" (A. Innes), whilst sociologists and political scientists at home (S. Szomolanyi, 0 . Gyarfasova, Z. Butorova, J. Marusiak) have been more skeptical. From a long-term historical perspective based on inductive reasoning, the context and nuances of Slovakia's post-communist transformation appear significantly different from a micro perspective as applied by the social sciences. This perspective suggests that, to understand the evolution of Slovak society with all its accomplishments and failures, the key is to start from the beginning, not from the end or the middle, and not by theories and generalizations, but with facts, particularly in contested perspectives. Interpretations based on deductive reasoning may result, and they often did, in theories on and explanations of the reasons for the still continuing building of the Slovak political nation and democracy in the country as an "unfinished business," turning it into "the hare versus turtle" race. Such perspectives attribute nationalism in the 1990s exclusively to the Slovaks, while ignoring the fears of Slovak society stemming from its historical experience, linked to the years 1867-1918, 19181919, 1938-1939, 1945-1948 and after. Moreover, such perspectives suffer from inner contradictions. Despite the partly beneficial impact of Czechoslovakia on Slovakia, the latter was in 1993, similar to the years 1918, 1938-1939 as well as during communist Czechoslovakia, socio-economically a less developed part of the common state. 60 Likewise, the Slovak political experience in prewar Czechoslovakia has been seen as weak due to the detrimental impact of a different and underdeveloped political culture inherited by the Slovaks from Hungary, for which two decades of the existence of democratic Czechoslovakia ( 1918-193 8) was too a short period to improve. 61 Consequently, due to the traditional "historic deficits" in the evolution of Slovak society, its civic attitu60 Miroslav Londak, "K niektorym problemom ekonomickeho vyvoja na Slovensku na prahu roka 1968," Historicke studie 44 (2006), p.188. 61 Kopecek, 27-34 and 311. �SLOVAKIA 93 des linked to pluralism during Communism did not develop properly.62 This perspective does seem not to apply to Slovakia's neighbors, the Magyars and the Poles, with their limited experience with parliamentary democracy before and after WW II, which were similar to Spain and Italy in the West. Hungary and Poland apparently redeemed themselves in the eyes of the West by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the activities of the Solidarity Movement in Poland from 1980 onward. The question, however, is how could those events of undisputed civic bravery substitute for democracy as a system of governance that needs time to develop? By contrast, the longlasting non-compliance of Slovak society with the communist regime, as demonstrated by repeated large-scale participation in religious pilgrimages and demonstrations, has either been downplayed or referred to as having had no impact on politics in communist Czechoslovakia.63 After the 1998 parliamentary elections, Slovak sociologists and leaders of the non-governmental sector helped to create and spread a positive image of Slovak society by contrasting the Meciar era with the progress made in integration with western organizations during the two Dzurinda governments. 64 They suggested that the electoral behavior of voters in rural and economically underdeveloped regions, who voted in favor of the Movement for a Democratic Slo62 Based on a survey conducted in May of 1968, in which 69.5% of the respondents in the Czech Lands as compared with 54.6% in Slovakia supported the existence of more political parties. At the same time, 53 % of Czech participants saw positively the role of civic associations in political life, while in Slovakia it was only 32%. Kopecek, 143. 63 Kopecek stresses the continuity in Czech dissent linked to the reform movement in the I 960s and the role of Charter 77, which was signed by 1800 Czechs in comparison with two dozen Slovaks as the flag bearer of civic resistance against Communism in Czechoslovakia. Kopecek, p.145. Jan Camogursky vigorously opposes the assumption that religious dissent in Slovakia had a limited impact on the regime. According to him, the massive pilgrimages to Velehrad and Levoca helped to soften the harassment of dissenters and citizens by communist authorities. Author interview with Jan Camogursky, Bratislava, May 24, 2007. On a similar stance taken by Abby Innes see her book Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 36-37. 64 Such delineation is, technically, an anachronism, as the third Meciar government did not oppose integration, particularly into the EU, though it eventually brought Slovakia into international isolation. �94 SLOVAKIA vakia (HZDS) led by Vladimir Meciar and the Slovak National Party (SNS),65 resembled support for the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (the tudaks) during the wartime Slovak Republic. In contrast to their earlier suggestions, these observers view positively the ability of Magyar communities in Slovakia, which live in rural areas and cast their votes exclusively for the Magyar political parties in each election 66 while referring to it as a "higher form of civic participation and social engagement." 67 Inductive reasoning provides the reader with the opportunity to view Slovakia's post-communist transformation in a complex, evolutionary perspective (see the scheme's Bricolage II): It consists of the following "bricks:" Brick A - "Antecedents" (1848-1918). The traditional view is that during and after the Revolutions of 1848-1849, Slovaks were aware that Magyars were not willing to allow them to exist autonomously and, hence, they started to design their political programs, build institutions, schools, and political parties . Fearing Panslavism, Magyar radicals attempted to Magyarize the nationalities in Hungary, including the Slovaks, with some success (Magyarones). As a consequence, some Slovak, mostly Pro65 The SNS, which, next to the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH) in the early 1990s and the HZDS in the mid-1 990s was also compared with the HSCS, has always been supportive of the legacy of the Slovak National Uprising in stark contrast to the perspective of the l'udaks and the neo-l'udaks. The same holds for the HZDS. 66 Next to the SMK, a new party to represent both Magyars and Slovaks named the Most-Hid (The Bridge; Slovak and Magyar), was established in July of 2009. Its chairman became Bela Bugar, the former chairman of the SMK, who lost to Pal Csaky in the party elections in April of 2007 . See "Ministerstvo vnutra zaregistrovalo Bugarovu stranu," Pravda, July 3, 2009. ln the 2010 parliamentary elections another new political party, Freedom and Solidarity [SaS] appeared, and supplied ministers to the Radicova government but also caused it to collapse in October of 20 11. Only recently established parties are: Obycajni l'udia - nezavisle osobnosti (Ordinary People - Independent Personalities), Strana slobodne slovo (The Free Word Party), and 99% - Obciansky hlas (99% - A Citizen's Voice). 67 See the article "Mad'ari su aktivnejsi nez Slovaci, tvrdi prieskum," Sme, March 28 2009. The article refers to a survey conducted by the Slovak Academy of Sciences and its interpretation by Zora Butorova from the Institute for Public Affairs (TVO), a non-governmental think-tank. Slovak Magyars defending their rights, while keeping their traditions and the cohesiveness of their society intact, is praised as a positive quality. The same was not applied to the Slovaks in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia when they tried to do the same. �SLOVAKIA 95 testant, intellectuals, opted for cultural, and possibly political, cooperation with the Czechs. A majority of Slovaks, mostly Catholics, still believed that a solution for Slovakia within Hungary could be found. The period from 1890 to 1914, which was traditionally seen as the "dark ages" of Slovak national emancipation, brought about even more resilience against Magyarization. In October of 1918, the Slovaks joined the Czechs in a common state. They rejectted the offer by the Karolyi government for autonomy within Hungary. From November of 1918 onward, a series of military clashes occurred between Magyar and Czechoslovak troops. In June of 1919 the Hungarian Red Army invaded and occupied eastern and southern Slovakia for a short time. Difference (traditional views+-+the article): Slovaks were socially and politically active, not passive in Hungary, even during the time of the harshest Magyarization in 1890-1914, which coincided with the process of the formation of the Slovaks as a political nation. During and after WW I, Slovak leaders abroad and at home decided to join the Czechs in the new state of Czechoslovakia on the assumption they would receive autonomy as promised by the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. At the same time, the Slovak population demonstrated its strong dissatisfaction with the Magyar government and supported secession from Hungary by protests in which social and national aspects blended. Brick B - "Betrayals" (1918-1948). In prewar Czechoslovakia, the Slovaks were divided between the autonomists and the "Czechoslovaks." In this clash the CatholicProtestant controversy played an important role. Though the autonomists were seen in the Czech Lands as the destroyers of Czechoslovakia, they did not want to secede because they were afraid of territorial revisionism by the Poles and the Magyars. After Munich, Slovak political parties congregated in Zilina and expressed their support for Slovak autonomy within the rump second Czecho-Slovak Republic. The government of the nominally independent wartime Slovak Republic discriminated against and failed to protect its Jewish and Roma citizens from deportation to death camps. In the administrative and economic spheres, however, the Slovaks demonstrated their capacity to form a state and administer it themselves. Based on this experience, Slovak Communists, who had helped to �96 SLOVAKIA organize the Slovak National Uprising in 1944, expected Slovakia to receive autonomous status within the reconstituted Czechoslovakia. This was rejected by Czech presidents Edvard Benes, Klement Gottwald and Antonin Novotny. Difference: Slovaks were stereotyped in the Czech Lands as traitors since the 1920s. The fact that they did not want to secede from Czechoslovakia and remained in the second Czecho-Slovak Republic for half a year has been frequently overlooked. The socio-economic progress made by the wartime Slovak Republic, in contrast with the disinterest in Slovak affairs by previous centralist Czechoslovak governments, was significant. In May of 1946, the Communists were defeated in parliamentary elections in Slovakia, but not in the Czech Lands. By November of 1947, the Communists gained political control over Slovakia. The three Prague Agreements were viewed by the Slovaks as a betrayal, just as the Czechs viewed the aftermath of the Munich Agreement. Brick C - "Communism" (1948-1989). The idea of Slovak autonomy and economic equalization with the Czechs was adopted by Slovak Communists. The demand for reforming Communism in Slovakia grew with the accession to power in 1963 of the Slovak Alexander Dubcek. The return to national history and the drive for economic reform resulted in the idea of the federalization of Czechoslovakia. This was interpreted by the Czech side as a continuation of Slovak nationalism, because the debate in the Czech Lands was oriented towards political pluralism and economic reform. In 1969 came the removal of Dubcek, who was caught between the need for reform at home and the mistrust in him by political leaders of other communist countries. He was replaced by Gustav Husak, another Slovak, who embodied 'normalization.' Whereas Czechs intellectuals voiced their dissatisfaction with the Husak regime, Slovaks, allegedly, were compliant with it. Difference: Slovaks were no less active than the Czechs in initiating the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s; in fact, they had helped to start it. Economic reform as a continuation of equalization stood in the forefront of the efforts of Slovak communist political leaders as well as economists. Federalization was important in regard to both political and economic competencies, whilst it was viewed by Czech society as another from of archetypal natio- �SLOVAKIA 97 nal reassertion of the Slovaks resembling the 19th century. Slovak society lived in a paradoxical situation: next to the material benefits received during 'normalization,' the traditionally religious Slovaks reacted to ideological indoctrination by massive participation in religious pilgrimages. In addition to the religious dissenters, who were active already in the 1970s, environmentalists began to play an important role in the early 1980s in making also the secular part of Slovak society aware of the risks stemming from insensitive industrialization. In 1989, Slovak society as a whole, and on its own initiative, rejected the communist regime by massive demonstrations against it. Brick D - "Division" (1993-1997). The "Velvet Revolution," similar to the "Prague Spring," indicated, how the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia was perceived internationally. From the beginning, there was mistrust between the newly-emerging Slovak and Czech political elites. Each had its own symbol: they were Alexander Dubcek in Slovakia and Vaclav Havel in the Czech Lands . Since the former accepted the rather symbolic post of Speaker of the Federal Assembly in Prague, new political leaders emerged instantly in Slovakia, first and foremost Vladimir Meciar. In contrast to its federal partner, Slovakia had two more tasks: 1) to gain international recognition and 2) to deal with the status of the Magyar minority. Fighting on three fronts (the third were federal competences) simultaneously, Slovak politicians were divided. Eventually, it was the HZDS, led by Meciar, which prevailed. Contrary to its portrayal as anti-federalist and nationalist, the HZDS and its leader still aspired for a looser federation with the Czechs. This was unacceptable to the "technocrats," represented by Vaclav Klaus and Czech nationalists such as Miroslav Macek (both Civic Democratic Party; ODS) and Jan Kalvoda (Civic Democratic alliance; ODA). As a result, Slovak and Czech political leaders opted for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as of December 31, 1992. Difference: In contrast to the traditional perspectives that interpret renewed Slovak efforts for building an "authentic federation" in the early 1990s at the expense of the Czechs, it is suggested that Slovaks wanted more powers in order to avoid the continuation of debates of constitutional discrepancies and socio-economic disparities that had started in the 1930s, continued in 1960s, and resurfaced at �98 SLOVAKIA the end of the communist regime in the late 1980s. Since the Czechs had controlled Czechoslovakia for decades, regardless of its constitutional form , they interpreted their own nationalism as "civicness," in contrast to the allegedly old-fashioned ethnic Slovak nationalism. Brick E - "Europe" ("The Awakening" and the "Change," 19982004). Since Slovaks were seen as passive in communist Czechoslovakia and their religious dissent was allegedly insignificant in terms of challenging the communist regime, new institutions and political parties had to emerge in the early 1990s. During the period 19901992, Slovaks allegedly once again focused on federal and national competencies, instead of building democracy and a market economy, which were Czech priorities. According to some sociologists, Slovakia missed the chance to experience its own Velvet Revolution. After the creation of independent Slovakia, the state had to re-build its structures and to strive for international recognition. It inherited a sensitive problem with the Magyar minority, which resulted in tensions regarding the use of the official and Magyar languages on territories with a mixed population. In the spring of 1994, pro-democratic and pro-western forces ousted Vladimir Meciar from office, yet the six following months was too a short a time for catching up with the rest of reforming post-communist countries, particularly Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1994, Vladimir Meciar returned to power. Allied with the nationalists and the radical left, he imposed a harsh rule over the National Council, the opposition and the media. As a result of the mysterious abduction of the son of President Michal Kovac, who dared to defy the government and Meciar himself, Slovakia began to lag behind in the European integration processes. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the opposition political parties supported, though indirectly, by non-governmental organizations and awakened Slovak society, defeated the government that torpedoed its own formally proclaimed integrationist goals. The two subsequent governments, led by Mikulas Dzurinda, succeeded in transforming the country's negative international image and attracting foreign investments. Being politically stable, the country became a member of both NATO and the EU in 2004. �SLOVAKIA 99 Difference: When attempts to reach an agreement with the Czechs on an authentic federation failed, Slovaks received, somehow unexpectedly, their own state in a way resembling March of 1939. The accusations against Meciar as an authoritarian leader collided with divergent views on how national property should be privatized. After Meciar' s return to power in the fall of 1994, Slovakia continued in its efforts to join the European Union and NATO. It failed to become a member of the OECD due to the government's unwillingness to privatize strategic branches of the Slovak economy. Despite diplomatic and political warnings regarding the infamous causes of Michal Kovac, the denial of his parliamentary seat to Frantisek Gaulieder and the assassination of Robert Remias, who had information regarding the Kovac kidnapping, negotiations with the EU and NA TO continued. The "change" in 1998 brought about an influx of former representatives of the non-governmental sector into the various ministries, while many of those who remained loyal to their original mission of being the watchdogs over a young democracy were disillusioned. The fragmentation of old political parties and the emergence of new ones in the late l 990s and the early 2000s were complemented by scandals stemming from corruption. In contrast with the third Meciar government, where there were two camps clearly separated one from another, the situation in the first and second Dzurinda governments resembled wars of all against all. The only factor that kept the coalition together was fear of Meciar. Slovak society, which was tired of the endless chain of political conflicts and scandals, with what was left of its enthusiasm and energy, helped to complete the country's integration into the EU. As a part of the community of European nations, Slovaks have not only the right, but also the duty to expect that their ability to comply with the criteria for membership should be equaled by the ability of the Union to provide fair and indiscriminate treatment, free from paternalistic approaches. This will help the Slovaks to grow and appear as a modem and self-confident nation, visible and judged according to their efforts and accomplishments. Speculations on Slovakia's cultural and civilizational proximity with either the East or the West, which bothered so many domestic and foreign politicians and intellectuals in the mid-1990s, are secondary. Of primary importance is the ability of Slovak society to maintain and strengthen its internal integration and to continue to proceed in its mental trans- �100 SLOVAKIA formation . This requires the capacity and willingness of Slovak society to reproduce itself on the basis of its historical traditions, while embracing democratic values, as well as a pluralist and consensual system of governance and politics. At the same time, the membership of Slovakia and other Central Eastern European post-communist states in the European Union provides it with an opportunity to learn from the collapse of the former Communist Bloc by evolving into a community of truly equal members. Slovakia's Postcommunist Transformation from an Historical Perspective Scheme Seeming +- As ---+ Being t Method : Deductive Begins in the present Method: Inductive Begins in the past t t Perspective: Political Science Perspective: History and PSCI t t Objective: Explaining the present by interpreting the Objective: Understanding the present by interpreting the past by reconstructing the past t Depth of historical background: Medium t Retrograde horizon: Medium t Depth of historical background: High t Retrograde horizon : Distant yet connectable With the present t t Connectivity present---+past: Retrospective Connectivity past---+present: Chronological �SLOVAKIA t t Causality: Fragmented Bricolage I 101 Causality: Complex Divergence Brick A: Result Delayed Slovak postCommunist transfor- - low mation and integration with EU and NA TO Bricolage II Brick "Europe" Slovakia's integration delayed but completed on institutional level, continues on societal level t i Brick B: Sub-condition Breakup of Czechoslovakia Reason: prevalence of - high archetypical Slovak nationalism over the solution of practical problems Brick "Division" Split with the Czechs over disparities and competences, not national identity t i Brick C: Prerequisite 1 High degree of Slovak compliance with - high communist regime. Societal life completely Hibernated Brick "Communism" Slovaks partly compliant with communist regime; Refuse interference in religious matters, form environmental movement t i Brick D : Prerequisite 2 Brick "Betrayals" Week economic base -medium- Wartime Slovak Republic Inherited from Hungary; created out of necessity, Legacy of wartime Slovak economically viable. SloRepublic as a totalitarian vak autonomy rejected in State postwar Czechoslovakia t Brick E: Historical residua Slovaks politically passive; Their extinction as a nation Imminent, if not saved By Czechs -medium/high- i Brick"Antecedents" Slovaks resilient and socially active in A-H; opt for Czechoslovakia instead of Hungary � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 73 SEEMING AND BEING: CONTEXTUALIZING THE HISTORY OF POST - COMMUNIST SLOVAKIA Juraj Hocman The year 1989 marked the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia and the beginning of Slovakia's road to independence. For the Slovaks this year also revealed the gap between their perception of national history and how it was viewed from the outside. In the 1990s, a new generation of western scholars contrasted the post-communist change of Czechoslovakia' s two nations. In their studies of modem Slovak society they rarely went beyond 1918. They relied very much on general accounts and traditional dichotomies between the Czechs and Slovaks, such as 'industrial' versus 'rural,' 'secular' versus 'religious,' ' progressive' versus 'backward.' 1 This was why in the 1990s the Slovaks continued to be seen as a "non-historic" nation hastily modernized during the communist era. Since it was mostly invisible in Austria-Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Slovak history automatically appeared as ruptured and fragmented. Following the downfall of the communist regime and the creation of the independent Slovak Republic in January of 1993, the country's image was primarily associated with radical nationalism, intolerance towards its minorities and an unstable domestic political scene. All of these seemed to have been sufficient to explain Slovakia' s failure to achieve a functioning democracy in the mid-1990s. In the early 2000s, a secondwave of scholarly interest in Slovakia began. Attracted by the country' s economic progress and an overall social and political stability, western scholars turned their attention to what had seemed in the 1990s as a satisfactory explanation for the peculiarities of Slovakia's evolution as a post-communist state. Some of them came to the conclusion that the existing stereotypes stemmed from preconceived methodological approaches, even unfamiliarity with the facts .2 The1 Abby Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001 ), ix-xi. 2 Karen Henderson, "Evaluating the Slovak Transition : What Creates the Image of Slovakia?" In Slovakia after Communism and Meciarism, ed. Kieran Williams (London: School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, 2000), 26. 74 SLOVAKIA refore, a better understanding of what was happening in the country since its creation requires a broader historical approach. 1. Seeming and Being in the History of East and West. The self-challenging motto of the Andrassy family of Hungarian nobles, Non videri, sed esse (Not Seeming but Being), which inspired medieval and early modern societies, stands in direct opposition to modem approaches to social reality that tend to place image over substance.3 In this regard small nations are at greater risk of being overlooked, even misjudged by bigger nations. 4 While it is hardly imaginable that the views of a Slovak or a Czech scholar on the history of Great Britain, the United States or Canada would have the same resonance and impact on the international image of those countries, western scholars have scrutinized the history of Czechoslovakia and its two nations with significant consequences.5 This could happen since the capacity of Slovak historians to conduct independent research and publish the results during the communist era was subject to ideological indoctrination and political constraints. Moreover, Slovak historians, in contrast to their Czech colleagues, until recently did not work systematically on a conceptualization of Slovak history and the minimalization of its invisibility. Such a course would have helped to "sell" their cause abroad - the legitimacy and viability of the existence of Slovakia as a sovereign state - long after its creation. In the 1990s this gap was filled by foreign scholars and the media in a way that simplified and, in some cases, distorted the mostly unknown Slovak history waiting for its reinterpretation at home and rediscovery abroad. The Slovaks were depicted, in terms of their 3 Eva Smelkova and Julius Barczi, "Andrassyovci a Rozi\ava," Forum Historiae 2/2008, p.5. Accessed at www.forumhistoriae.sk/FH 2/smelkova. df 4 See the interview with the Norwegian publicist and writer Egil Lejon "Slovensko prikladom" on the parallels between the historical evolution of the Slovaks and the small Scandinavian nations in the 19th century. Literarny tyidennik, August 12, 1994, pp. I and 11. 5 Even large states are vulnerable to intrusions into their national histories that contradict domestic interpretations. See the internet article "Russia Will Never Let Anyone Falsify [the] History of [the] Second World War" which refers to the image of the soldiers of the Red Army in WW II as looters and rapists . Russia has created a special committee to counteract the "attempts at distorting history to the detriment of Russi a's interest. " Pravda (Moscow). Accessed at www.pravda.ru, May 20, 2009 . SLOVAKIA 75 missing statehood, as a non-historic nation, which, after the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1993, cured its historical complexes and democratic deficiencies at the expense of their advanced neighbors with whom they shared a common history - the Czechs and the Magyars. 6 To that, some Slovak scholars and politicians reacted with fervor instead of providing a systemic and efficient alternative.7 Consequently, they created solitary and isolated interprettations of Slovak history that clashed with stereotypes and automatically brought about the risk of being viewed either as hard-core nationalists or revisionists.8 In the early 2000s, western scholars such as Karen Henderson, Abby Innes, Cas Mudde and others expressed their doubts concerning cliches linked to Slovak history. The progress in the rediscovery of Slovak history in the West since the beginning of the 2000s cannot be overlooked as the new generation of scholars did their fieldwork in the Slovak Republic and critically examined the earlier interpretations of Slovak history emerging in the 1990s. 9 Although the trend of foreign and Slovak historians coming closer in their interpretations is growing, a lot of work remains to be done by both sides.10 6 George Schopflin, Nations, Identity, Power (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 280-297 ("The Slovak case study"). 7 Looking for internationally-known personalities with Slovak origins at any cost to improve the image of Slovakia could result in quite opposite effects. See Greg Steinmetz's article, "Slovaks desperately searching for famous countrymen," The Globe and Mail, April 27, 1996. Similarly, the publishing of another variant of the multi-volume "History of Slovakia" in the Slovak language with short resumes in German, English, French and Russian, and picture books with descriptive texts designed for common readers are hardly ways to provide a conceptual and critical synthesis of Slovak history known and accepted internationally. 8 Franti~ek Vnuk, Milan Durica and other historians grouped around the Matica slovens/ca. 9 Next to Karen Henderson and Abby Innes, the best examples are the recent works by Tim Haughton and John A. Scherpereel cited in this article. The British scholar George Schopflin sees a great challenge for historians of East Central Europe to become familiar with the Anglo-Saxon, German, French, Russian, and Italian scholarly literature. For consequences regarding Slovak history see George Schopflin, "Vytvaranie eur6pskej kulturnej identity? Stredna Europa v rozfaenej Eur6pskej unii," Listy SFPA, March-April 2003 , pp.2-3. 10 " .. . it is hardly surprising that any effort to straighten the Slovak spine is seen as nationalism, the equivalent of n[N]azism, fascism and the oppression of minorities. It may be hard to believe but the greatest enemies of Slovakia are Slovaks themselves. On several occasions, I have had an opportunity to witness the way in which Slovak historians have given lectures on Slovakia to foreign audiences. Nearly all of 76 SLOVAKIA Furthermore, in the modem era the role of the media in building popular perceptions on the basis of simplified interpretations of historical developments has been increasing. A reasonable objection can be made as to why a scholarly study should be bothered by what the media say. In short, the media can popularize history more effectively than scholars who create their interpretations only after years of studying a particular problem. Thus, in creating a public image, it is the media which paints the larger picture, not scholars. 11 Paraphrasing Clausewitz, the media may be seen as the continuation of historiography and social science by other means. 12 This was evident in the case of Slovakia's image as hyper-nationalist in the early 1990s and during the country's quasi-miraculous instant awakening in 1998. Views by the media helped to reduce this phase in modem Slovak history to the Manichean conflict between 'evil' and 'good' politicians, and, implicitly, between the 'progressive' and 'backward' electorates and segments of Slovak society. 13 them have had one thing in common: they present the Slovaks as a nation without a history, without culture and traditions - and surprise - as the oppressor of minorities. Nor do they neglect to mention Slovakia's facist and Nazi past. Their spiritual kin in the West have gone so far in their blind, ignorant hatred as to blame the Slovaks for the hanging of Communists and Jews in Kosice in January of 1945. According to one German commentator, the massacres in Kosice were ' one of the last abominations of the fascist Slovak state and ally of Adolf Hitler. ' The fact that Kosice belonged to Hungary at that time and that this sad, vile act was committed by the Hungarian fascists "Wild Rose Crosses," is apparently of interest to no one, the least to our own historians." Darina Vergesova, "Dajte Duricovi pokoj," Kritika & Kon text, nos. 2-3 ( 1997), pp.59-60. 11 "A separate chapter in our [Slovak] media is that of the methodical loss of national memory," Pavo! Dinka, S/ovenske media: Met6dy manipulacie (Bratislava: PPA, 2008), 21. Due to its image inherited from the 1990s, Slovakia was depicted in three films - "Hostel" (2004), "Eurotrip" (2004) and "Hostel 2" (2007) - as a nest of danf:erous and perverted criminals and mafia. For details see www.imdb.com 2 On the shift of the media in the time of globalization from being the Fourth Power (provider of information) to the Fifth Power (manipulator of information) see the article by Ignacio Ramonet, "Le cinquieme pouvoir," Le Monde Diplomatique, Apri l-Mai (2005), pp.74-78 "Dans la nouvelle guerre ideologique qu 'impose la mondialisation, !es medias sont utilisees comme une arme de combat. L' information, en raison de son explosion, de sa multiplication, de sa surabondance, de ses partis pris, se trouve litteralement contaminee, empoisonnee par toute sorte des mensonges, pollue par !es rumeurs, !es distorsions, !es manipulations." Ibid., p.77. 13 Lubomir Kopecek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke stranictvi na Slovensku (Brno: CDK, 2006), p.308. A survey conducted in Slovakia in the mid- l 990s focused on the degree of tolerance towards minorities, disrespect for the law by politi- SLOVAKIA 77 Next to the risk of perspectives based on simplified portrayals of reality stands the problem of divergent approaches towards the same phenomena in the history of the East and West. The classic saying goes "if disease is beautiful, it is generally someone else's disease." 14 Apart from its complimentary aspect, Chesterton's aphorism can be applied to nationalism and its negative characteristics associated primarily with the East. In the 1990s, the resurrected nationalism of East Central Europe gained a negative image linked to the ethnocentric nationalism of the 19th century. This resulted in the categorization of post-communist states into progressive ones and those which lagged behind. It is true that the downfall of Communism and the subsequent disintegration of the Communist Bloc resulted in an explosion of ethnic tensions. When examining the roots of nationalism and its capacity for political and social mobilezation, it should become clear that the same primordial instincts attributed to the East had existed among western literati in the 19th century. In multiethnic Britain the same elements of linguistic and ethnic tensions shaped by romantic nationalism can be found in historical novels designed with the same purpose as those by writers in East Central Europe. 15 The similarities between the nation-building processes in W estem and East Central Europe can particularly be observed in the creation of multi-ethnic Great Britain as a political nation during the period 1707-1837, where the impact of external threats helped her to overcome the historical centripetal tendencies based on ethnic diversity. 16 What worked in Great Britain did not work in Austria- cians, positive opinions on the communist regime before its fall and engagement in civic association activities. 14 Gilbert Keith Chesterton, Orthodoxy (London: The Bodley Head, 1949), p.12. 15 On the Norman-Saxon ethno-linguistic division and societal hierarchy in medieval England see Sir Walter Scott's historical novel Ivanhoe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 16 Linda Colley, Britons: Forg ing the Nation 1707-/837 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992). For the major argument of the book see the introduction, pp.1-9. See also the comparison of the Magyars with the English "who have violently Anglicized ten millions of Irishmen and Scottsmen" made by a Magyar Deputy in the Hungarian Diet in 1879 in justification of the forced Magyarization . R.W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London: Archibald Constable, 1908; reprinted in New York by Howard Fertig, 1972), 217 . There is a significant difference. Whereas Great Britain made, at least formally, its Compromise in 1707, the radical part of Magyar political elites failed to do it until it was too late. 78 SLOVAKIA Hungary from 1848 to 1918 and in Czechoslovakia, where centripetal tendencies eventually prevailed. Recalling the indication by Cas Mudde of double standards in explaining ' bad' and 'good' nationalism in Slovakia during the period 1989-1992, 17 nationalism, in general, appeared as progressive when it had helped to create nation-states in the West from the 16th to the 19th centuries, whereas it became perverted in state-building processes in post-communist Eastern Europe in the 1990s. 18 Though the concerns of multi-ethnic states about the possible consequences of various forms of nationalism, past and future, to which modem historiography and political science have legitimately pointed, are understandable, the common roots of nationalism should not be forgotten. This will help us to avoid the traps of nationalism's general recrimination in post-communist East Central Europe, including Slovakia, regardless of the context within which it emerged and had been shaped. 19 In addition to the perception of the Slovaks as intolerant nationalists, the image of the country has been that of a non-historic nation due to the viewing of unexplored parts of Slovak history as myths. Robert Pynsent suggests that a myth can appear either as a "normal neutral narrative of concem," 20 or it can be a "bridge too far" in re17 Cas Mudde, "Civil society in post-communist Europe: Lessons from the ' dark side,"' In Uncivil society? Contentious politics in post-communist Europe, eds. Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 161. 18 For the opposite view see Egil Lejon who sees the creation of the Slovak Republic in 1993 as a result of Slovak historical traditions and an emancipation movement which accelerated in 1848 and later. Interview with Egil Lejon "Slovensko prikladom," Literarny tyzdennik, August 12, 1994, p.11. Lejon suggests that the Slovaks are not nationalistic enough in terms of what modem nationalism requires: cultural self-confidence, national pride, and loyalty. 19 See Kedourie on the selective use of the antonyms 'progressive ' - ' regressive ' in regard to nationalism in the Marxist interpretation of history ('progressive' during the advent of capitalism replacing fe udalism, ' progressive' in the fight of colonial and post-colonial nations against imperialism, and ' regressive' within capitalism resisting socialism). Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1966), 90-91. Applying Mudde 's observation, the 'bad ' case of nationalism in the early 1990s was the split of Czechoslovakia, whereas the 'good' cases were the dismemberments of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In contrast to the two latter, Slovak nationalism did not involve violence. 20 Robert Pynsent, Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality (Budapest-London-New York: Central European University Press, 1994), 87. SLOVAKIA 79 gard to its practical implications in nation and state-building processes in Slovak history as implicated by G. Eyal, S.J. Cohen and T. Haughton. 2 1 While applying the first flexible definition, it may be postulated that myths are constantly emerging. An effective way to understand the essence of a myth in terms of its value as a possible source of historical facts is to compare both of its forms. The official mythology of the European Union is that it was born out of a sudden inspiration that had fallen upon Jean Monnet - a Romulus to the European Community - during his trip to the Alps. The idea was apparently instrumental in reconciling France and Germany during the meeting of Robert Schumann and Konrad Adenauer in May of 1950, which gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community. 22 Others see this process in an all-European myth-deconstructing perspective as the outcome of the decisive involvement of the United States, tired of the French-German reluctance to reach an agreement. 23 Concurrently, some scholars have viewed the creation of the European Union in the early 1990s as the culmination of the tireless work of lobbyists, who had effectively executed the wishes of great corporations to create a common market which was about to grant the architects of the EU even greater eco- 21 See Gil Eyal, The Origins of Post-Communist Elites: from the Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 131 , and Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Post-Communist Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 4-5. This is also the leitmotif of Shari J. Cohen's book Politics Without A Past: The Absence Of History In Postcommunist Nationalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999). 22 "Chaque annee, si je le peux, je vais faire de grandes courses dans les Alpes .. .J'y retrouve l'expression de l'inquietude qui opressait l'Europe cinq ans apres la guerre: une autre guerre est proche devant nous si nous ne faisons rien. L' Allemagne n' en sera pas la cause, mais elle en sera l'enjeu. II faut qu'elle cesse d'etre un enjeu, qu 'elle devienne au contraire un lien. Seule la France peut actuellement prendre une initiative." Jean Monnet, Memoires (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 342. 23 John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge University Press, 1991 ). Particularly explicative is the role of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy in bringing the French and Germans together to the signing of the Treaty of Paris (April 18, 1951 ), which instituted the European Coal and Steel Community. Gillingham stressed the fact that McCloy "summoned" the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to his office for a "dressing down" for his unwillingness to sign the document. Ibid, 280. 80 SLOVAKIA nomic profits. 24 A different group of authors opposed such ignoble motives with their hagiographic vision of the institutional emergence of the European Community and the later European Union as the outcome of exceptional negotiating and diplomatic skills of supranational executives who were serving the citizens of Europe.25 It is clear that each perspective has its merits and this adds to the perplexing complexity of the issue and resulting interpretations. This variety of opinions points to the core of the problem linked to the non-historicity of Slovaks and their questionable ability to cope with more recent problems in the transformation of their society. The skeptically insinuated ' mythical' legacy of 9th century Great Moravia and the invisible link from it to modem Slovak politics, apart from its distance from the present, which partially legitimizes its appearance as a myth, disregards the simple fact that to the Slovaks it was a lighthouse, not a matrix blindly to follow in the creation of a sovereign modem Slovakia. There is no difference in this regard between small and big nations who honor their historical traditions that often blend with myths. Most importantly, it is not Great Moravia itself, but the connection between it and the 19th and 20th centuries that matters in the discourse on the historicity of Slovaks. This link was hardly reflected, let alone examined, by western scholars in the 1990s in contrast to their predecessors - the historians R.W. Seton-Watson, Robert A. Kann, Oscar Halecki, and C.A. Macartney.26 After the extinction of the Arpad dynasty (1301 ), which had represented the ethnic Magyars, the foreign rulers of the Kingdom of 24 Belen Balanya, Ann Doherty, Olivier Hoedeman, Adam Ma' anit and Erik Wesselius, Europe Inc.: Regional and Global Restructuring and the Rise of Corporate Power (London-Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000). The authors stress their perception of the creation of the European Union as the result of a plan made by the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) composed of 45 captains of the largest European transnational corporations. See Preface of the book, xi-xv. 25 Ken Endo, The Presidency of the Europ ean Commission under Jacques De/ors. The Politics of Shared Leadership (London : Macmillan, 1999). Helen Drake, Jacques De/ors. Perspectives on a European Leader (London-New York: Routledge, 2000). 26 For an attempt to see Slovak history in historical continuity by a foreign scholar see the chapter by the Austrian historian Arnold Suppan, "Die Slowakei zwischen Grossmahrischen Reich und Europaischer Union: Kontinuitaten und Diskontinui taten," in Plus Ultra. Die Welt Der Neuzeit. Festschrift far Alfred Kohler zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. F. Edelmayer, M. Fuchs, G. Heilingsetler, P. Rauscher (Munster: Aschendorf, 2008), 331-68. SLOVAKIA 81 Hungary - the Anjous, the Luxembourgs, the Jagiellons, the Hahsburgs - were wisely and clairvoyantly tolerant towards the ethnic groups of Hungary as the state otherwise would have not survived for the next seven centuries.27 Once the glory of the Kingdom of Hungary and the privileges of a political nation were attributed to one nationality (the Magyars) in the 18th and 19th centuries, there was no choice for others, who felt degraded to second-class citizens, than to nourish and strengthen their own identities - linguistic, cultural, social, and political. Paradoxically, a tendency to be suspicious of the interpretations of Slovak history as an indivisible part of the history of the Kingdom of Hungary still prevails. Until a shift in this perception happens, Slovaks may be further viewed as a non-historic entity despite empirical and heuristic evidence that testifies to their genuine participation in the societal and institutional life of the kingdom they shared with others in times when language and ethnicity meant less than social status and class affiliation. 28 The myth versus 'myth' ambiguity in the interpretations of the history of East and West testifies to the existence of a wide range of applicable perspectives and alternative interpretations. A better awareness of this ambiguity, which exists in both East and West, may help us to also understand the reasons for the ruptures in Slovak history, fractured into its being and seeming. The most visible anoma- 27 Disregarding the multi-ethnic aspects and dynastic ruptures in the medieval and modern history of Hungary would be the same as excluding the early Plantagenets from the history of England due to their appearance as non-Anglo-Saxon, FrancoNorman, elements. The history of England would have to begin anew with the Tudors . The rupture progressive versus regressive (see Kedourie) in the history of the United States is observable in the interpretations of the reasons for the Civil War and its aftermath. A similar rupture (totalitarian+-+democratic) exists in the history of Germany before it became a democratic state. 28 "The Slovaks on their side lost their national existence [after the defeat of Great Moravia] in that of their Asiatic conquerors, entered into their ranks as soldiers, and participated thence-forward in all their fortunes .. .Their language however is the only remnant of their national existence which the Slovaks have preserved; in every other respect they belong to the Hungarian nation, of which they form an ingredient part, as the Magyars form another; and on the glory of whose valiant deeds they have an equal claim." Therese Albertine Louise von Jacob Robinson, Historical View of the Language and Literature of the Slavic Nation (New York: BiblioBazaar, LLC, 2006) (Reprint of the original version published by George P. Putnam in New York in 1851), 186-7. 82 SLOVAKIA lies of this split consequently appeared either as 'betrayals' or 'awakenings.' 2. Seeming and Being in Slovak History as a Part of the History of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In 1991 Slovak historian Anton Hmko pointed out that the book by Slovak politician Ivan Derer on the rulings of the National Court in the First Czechoslovak Republic,29 written from the perspective of an ardent unitarist and "Czechoslovak," was conveniently accepted by Marxist historiography. The reason was obvious as the adversary was the same - the Slovak autonomist movement and the legacy of the wartime Slovak Republic (1939-1945). Having provided statistical data on the topics of the studies published by Slovak historians, Hrnko argued that the history of interwar Czechoslovakia ( 19181938) belonged to one of its most ideologically distorted segments. 30 This vacuum was filled by the works of court historians who helped to create myths as the politically and ideologically "subjective projection of desirable horizons." 31 If a 'myth' could emerge relatively recently with plenty of primary documents, one can ask the question - are there more of them? To respond to it at least in part, it is necessary to return to the early 1990s, when ideological constraints were removed from scholarship and academia and the attention of scholars and media turned towards nationalism. Miroslav Hroch's classification of nationalities in East Central Europe on their advancement in the national reawakening, which was published in the year when Czechoslovakia broke up, put the Slovaks a step behind the Czechs and the Magyars, without providing details, except for a very general reference. 32 This article suggests that, until the revolution of 1848, Slovaks did not lag behind 29 Ivan Derer, Slovensky vyvin a l'udacka zrada (Praha: Kvasnicka a Hamp!, I 946). Anton Hmko, "Zatemnene dejiny: Obraz medzivojnovej slovenskej spolocnosti v fracach slovenskych historikov," Literarny tyidennik, June 28, 1991 , p.10. 1 Marianna Oravcova, "The Ethnic and Cultural Dimension of National Emancipation: The Evocation of the Slovak Nation," in Language, Values and the Slovak Nation, eds. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gasparikova (Washington: Paideia Press, 1994), 11 . In the last sentence Oravcova refers to the article by Pavo! Horvath, "K niektorym otazkam historickych tradicii na Slovensku," Slovensky narodopis 1-2 (1986), 60-65 . 32 Miloslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe," New Left Review, 1/198 (March-April 1993), 64. 30 SLOVAKIA 83 the Czechs in terms of the press, programs, the creation of a literary language and the petition movements. Hroch was more accurate when pointing to the forced Magyarization that started after 1867 as a major hindrance to Slovak national progress, including its social and economic aspects. Yet even that historical period has to be reexamined as it had not been a time of complete silence, although it would be convenient to see it in that way. Communist historiography in the 1950s gladly embraced the earlier idea that Slovaks had been saved by the Czechs from extinction as a nation, a concept which slipped into western scholarship. This hypothesis was based on censuses which showed the decreasing number of Slovak intelligentsia and schools as the 19th century progressed. These scholars concluded that the Slovaks would have been assimilated by the Magyars in one or two generations. 33 There had previously been two generations of Slovaks living under Magyarization from 1875 to 1914, yet the Slovak press, though under censorship and constant pressure, was full of political articles and calls for national, social and cultural progress. 34 Magyar elites knew very well that Slovak identity did not depend solely on schooling in their native language, but also on the family environment. Therefore, they forcibly took Slovak children from poor families and transported them to regions where Magyar was spoken. 35 The unrest in Turiec and Zvolen County in Central Slovakia that led to attacks on local Magyar authorities was a mixture of social and national elements. They testified to the continuing, even increasing Slovak resilience against Magyarization as observed by R. W. Seton-Watson. 36 Final33 For an argument against the traditional view that the Slovaks could not create their intelligentsia because of harsh Magyarization see Dusan Kovac, Roman Holec, Elena Jakesova, Elena Mannova, Milan Podrimavsky, Na zaciatku storocia, 19011914 (Bratislava: Veda, 2004), 44. 34 Milan Krajcovic, "Slovaci v emancipacnom pohybe nemad'arskych narodov," in Slovensko na zaciatku storocia: Spolocnost'. stat a narod v suradniciach doby, eds. Milan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (Bratislava: Hu SA V, 1999), 48-65 . 35 "By the Law of 1891 , the State has deliberately assumed the attitude of the Sultans in earlier centuries. Just as the Christian rayah was regarded as a breedingmachine to supply janissaries, so to-day non-Magyars of Hungary are breedingmachines whose children must be taught Magyar from the earliest age in the hope that they may become renegades to the traditions of their ancestors." R.W. SetonWatson, Racial Problems in Hungary , 222. 36 Ibid., 394. Seton-Watson stressed that 92 .5% of the Liptov county inhabitants were Slovaks and 90.6% understood no Magyar. Ibid. , 332. 84 SLOVAKIA ly, in 1918, it was the masses of peasants and lower strata of Slovak society that had preserved, as lsmo Nurmi suggested, a high degree of self-consciousness. 37 They were instrumental in embracing the idea of their future coexistence with the Czechs under the provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement, but under no circumstances with the Magyars. Without this support the few intellectuals at home and abroad could hardly have reached their political goals in October and November of 1918 when the Czechoslovak Republic was born. It is equally true that significant numbers of Slovak Magyarones gave up their ethnicity for the sake of their careers while following the example of the Slovak nobility and gentry which were "easily and gladly" Magyarized in the 19th century. 38 Still, it is hard to believe that three million Slovaks at home and abroad, with the most resistant of them in North America, would have been completely Magyarzsed even if Hungary had been preserved in its prewar boundaries . A possible analogy with the Irish resistance, underscored by the role played in national emancipation by leaders such as Milan R. Stefanik and Stefan Osusky, who left Hungary and vehemently fought for the Slovak cause abroad, comes to mind. Their work, done at the highest political and diplomatic levels, was supplemented by dozens of zealous Slovak national activists in the United States. 39 37 Ismo Nurmi, Slovakia - A Playground for Nationalism and National Identity, 1918-1920: Manifestations of the National identity of Slovaks (Helsinki : Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1999), 45. 38 C.A . Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919-1937 (London : Oxford University Press, 1937), 91. 39 The Slovak press in North America - 30 newspapers with a circulation of 150,000 in 1914 - was such a force that the Hungarian government as early as in 1890 had banned the imports of some of them and began subsidi zing pro-Hungarian publications in the United States. M. Mark Stolarik, "The Slovak-American Press," in Sally M. Miller ed. , The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 365. Count Albert Apponyi, one of the main protagonists of Magyarization and a representative of the Hungarian government on his visit to the United States attempted to present Hungary as a ftee and democratic country. He was denounced as a tyrant and pressed by a huge mob comprising members of "Slavic nationalities and Hungarian socialists" during his lectures. In Chicago, Apponyi escaped the fury of the mob and fled to his car only with the protection provided by the police. See The New York Times, February 25, 1911 , p. 3. For the Slovak resistence against the territorial aspirations of fascist Hungary see the boastful statement by Gustav Husak on February 28, 1945: "I openly declare that Slovakia' s frontiers [with Hungary] as they had existed in the [prewar] Czechoslovak Republic are stable. Slovakia is united and non-divisible. Any SLOVAKIA 85 After World War II, Konstantin Culen, a Slovak publicist in exile, suggested that living with the Czechs was for the Slovaks a rather negative experience. 4°Culen's arguments were based on the constant rejection of Slovak autonomy in Czechoslovakia by President Edvard Benes, who had never shown any particular affection for the Slovaks, and the post-war execution of Msgr. Jozef Tiso, President of the wartime Slovak Republic. With the situation of the Slovaks in southern Slovakia ceded to Hungary by the Vienna Award of November 1938 in mind, it is legitimate to assume that cohabitation with the Czechs, though far from being idyllic, included fewer risks for the completion of Slovak national emancipation than their hypothetical existence in Hungary after WW I. Furthermore, the Czechs in 1918 were already significantly ahead of the Slovaks as far as societal cohesion and socio-economic progress of their societies were concerned. The animosity started with the Czech disrespect toward the Catholic Church and with their disregard for the continuing socio-economic underdevelopment of Slovakia. The problem became acute in the 1930s, when the Slovak intelligentsia, which had remarkably increased by that time, as well as ordinary citizens, could not find work in Slovakia because the best jobs were filled by the Czechs. In contrast to the situation that had existed in the 1920s, Slovaks were ready to become executives, administrators, teachers, lawyers and doctors. This happened in 1939 and after. Unfortunately, after WW II Czech political leaders, both civic and communist, were not willing to admit that the Slovaks had grown up and were able to govern themselves.41 The Czech historical experience was strongly influenced by the Protestant Reformation, secularism and greater industrial advancement due to their proximity to and cohabitation with the Germans. With the creation of Czechoslovakia after WW I, the Czechs proved themselves worthy followers of their predecessors and for a moment irredentism by Magyar fascists will end in vain. Our nation, which has been able to resist the military power of Germany, will find enough strength to firmly defend its borders." See the document "Z referatu Gustava Husaka na konferencii Komunistickej strany Slovenska," February 28, 1945. Dokumenty slovenskej narodnej identi2; a statnosti II (Bratislava: Narodne literarne centrum, 1998), 400. Konstantin Culen, Po Sviitoplukovi druha nasa hlava: Politicky i ivotopis Dr. Jozefa Tisu (Cleveland: The First Catholic Slovak Union, 1947). 41 Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 89. 86 SLOVAKIA also a barrier erected by the victorious Allies against German domination over Central and Eastern Europe. After the incorporation of Slovakia into Czechoslovakia, the national self-confidence of the Czechs was on the rise. After WW II, the Czechs led by the Communist Party, and with the mighty Soviet Union backing them, returned to the concept of a unitary Czechoslovakia. To them, the push for reforms in the 1960's, which was interpreted as the "Prague" rather than the "Czecho-Slovak Spring," was also a return to their national history. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armies of the Warsaw Pact in August of 1968, led by the Soviet Union, their former liberator, and the only Slavic Superpower, was especially traumatic for the Czechs. This trauma, imposed from outside, was complemented by a domestic one: the effects of 'normalization' and federalization, both seen as a part of the chain of Slovak "betrayals." The Slovaks rebelled from 1920 onward. First, they asked for autonomy, then they allegedly "conspired" with the Magyars and the Poles against the prewar Republic, and eventually got a taste of the forbidden fruit of political emancipation in the form of their nominally independent state.42 Meanwhile, in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (1939-1945), the Czechs were ruled over and persecuted by the Germans. 43 With this perception of national history in Czech minds, the disappearance of the communist regime in 1989, which was allegedly harsher in the Czech Lands than in Slovakia, and which treated the Slovaks in the same way as did the First Czechoslovak Republic, was a golden opportunity to rebuild the state to Czech expectations. After recognizing that Slovaks were not willing to accept what they considered to be the continuation of the imbalance in the distribution of competences in a joint state in 1990-1992, the Czechs opted for the territorially-reduced variant of Czechoslovakia while inheriting its trademark. Since then, they have fared very well. 44 It 42 Leff, National Conflict, 26 and 164. For a Slovak perspective on the history of the Slovak-Czech and Czecho-Slovak relations since 1918 as the "history of broken pacts and unfulfilled promises," see Anton Hmko, "Politicke zapasy na Slovensku v lete a na jesen 1990," Historicky zbornik 10, no. I (2000), 77. 43 Though the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia had its own administration, it was an indivisible part of the Third Reich, which saw itself as a historic successor of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. 44 See the article "Slovakia's Economy ls Doing Well, Too" by Peter Burian, The New York Times, June I, 1996. The author, charge d 'ajfaires of the Embassy of the SLOVAKIA 87 may seem that this chapter of their history was closed and sealed. The aftermath of the "Velvet Divorce" and the relationship between the two former federal nations was not always rosy. Throughout the 1990s, it was not difficult to contrast the progress made by the Czech Republic with Slovakia's problems. In the early 2000s, with the Meciar era gone and economic advancement that surprised many, the previous negative image of Slovaks as nationalists turned to the delay in democratic transformation of their society. 45 In recent books on Czech history since the early medieval era the Slovaks are hardly mentioned. With Slovakia's progress in the integration processes, substitutes for Slovak nationalism appeared instantly.46 Despite mutual sympathies as documented by surveys of public opinion and praise by Slovak and Czech politicians of their good relations, from 1993 onward free of economic quarrels,47 the clash of bitter memories continued. They have ranged from topics such as investment opportunities by renowned international compa- Slovak Republic in Washington, responded to a similar article in the NYT on the Czech Republic doing well "with luck and without Slovakia," while providing data on GDP (7.4% growth), unemployment (7.4%), doubled foreign currency reserves, a £ositive trade balance and low foreign debt per capita ($800.00). 5 According to Professor Filip Palda from E Ecole nationale d 'administration publique in Montreal, "Separation in 1992 allowed the Czechs to halt the payola on which Slovaks had come to depend. Since separation in 1992, the Slovaks have gone the way of Argentina, whereas the Czechs are now preparing to enter the European Union." See "Argentina north" by Filip Palda. The Ottawa Citizen, January 21 , 2002. Anton Hykisch, former Slovak ambassador to Canada, opined that, for Hungary and the Czech Republic, Slovakia's economic success in the early 2000s was a big surprise which was hard for them to accept. Author interview with Anton Hykisch, Bratislava, June 5, 2007. 46 For a contrasting view on the political systems and parliamentarism in the Czech and Slovak Republics as advanced and less developed see Petr Kopecky, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party competition and parliamentary institutionalization (London : Ashgate, 2001). The Czech political scientist Lubomir Kopecek opines that in comparison with the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, the evolution of the Slovak political system is unfinished and the system itself is unstable. As a result, Slovakia is a "semi-consolidated democracy." Lubomir Kopecek, Demokracie, diktatury a politicke stranictvi stranictvi na Slovensku (Brno: CDK, 2006), 307 and 3 10. 47 See the article "Klaus: Vzt'ahy Slovenska a Ceska m6zu byt' pri.kladom pre celu Eur6pu," Pravda, June 29, 2009. It became a tradition that the first official visits of the newly-elected presidents and prime ministers of the Czech and Slovak Republics have been with their closest neighbor. 88 SLOVAKIA nies, 48 to the often derogatory comments on domestic politics and rivalry in sports, with frequent references to the "sins" in national histories of the two nations .49 Until the revolutionary years 1848-1849, Slovaks and Magyars had cohabitated peacefully. Four decades of forced Magyarization after 1867 were hard for the Slovaks, yet there was still some moral and socio-political capital left for the improvement of mutual relationships. If this failed in 1918, Slovaks could hardly have been blamed for it as their political weight and influence in Hungary was marginal. In the fall of 193 8, after two decades of the existence of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia was stripped of its southern territories by the Vienna Award.50 Almost seven years of living in Hungary (19381945) returned the Slovaks in the south to a life which resembled what had existed before 1918. After the Second World War and until 1989, the relationship between the Slovaks and Magyars might have appeared as normal, but it was not. Once the Soviet Union was gone and the fate of Czechoslovakia disputed, the old animosities resurfaced . For all Slovak governments since 1989, the status of the Magyar minority became a litmus test in measuring the state of democracy in Slovakia by western governments and scholars. During the Meciar years, Magyars in Slovakia voiced their dissatisfaction with 48 According to a poll by the Czech Private Equity and Venture Capital Association based in Prague, four out of five of its economists and financial analysts said that foreign investment would flow to the Czech rather than to the Slovak Republic. See "Investori uprednostnia Cesko pred Slovenskom," Sme, May 29, 2009. Slovak readers rejected the idea as wishful thinking on the Czech side and suggested that a poll conducted by a Slovak-based company would have shown the opposite. 49 They frequently appear on the Czech web sites www.seznam.cz., www.idnes.cz and their Slovak counterparts www.sme.sk and www.pravda.sk. On April 1 of2009 when the Slovak national football team defeated its opponent in Prague in the qualifier for the Word Cup in South Africa (2010), debates among the fans of both teams turned to their common past with references to the "betrayal" in 1938-1939 and to the Slovak inferiority complex vis-a-vis the Czechs. Slovaks pointed to Czech compliance with German rule in the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and affirmed that they did not measure themselves against the Czechs - a fixed idea on the Czech side. 50 Julius Mesaros, "Some Deformations in the Interpretation of Censuses in Recent Slovak-Magyar Controversies," In Slovak & Magyars, ed. Pavol Stevcek (Bratislava: Ministerstvo kultury, 1995), 63-84. The census of 1910 showed the presence of 885,397 Magyars on the territory which became part of Slovakia in 1918 (30.3% of the population). Mesaros argues that even "this number was not the result of natural development, or Slovak-Magyar and Magyar-Slovak bilingualism, but a result of the purposeful Magyarization and oppression of Slovaks." Ibid. , 78 . SLOVAKIA 89 the approaches of Slovak governments in administrative, linguistic, financial and cultural matters. Claims made by their leaders for more tolerance and understanding by the Slovaks have been in stark contrast with the ambiguous language of the representatives of the Magyar minority regarding their possible autonomy. 5 1 While the Slovaks and the Czechs after 1992 were able to reach the highest level of mutual respect and understanding, Slovaks and Magyars remained mentally anchored in the period between 1918 and 1945. The trauma of Trianon in 1920 and their expulsion from South Slovakia in 1945-194 7 is deeply engraved in the minds of Magyars, as is the forced Magyarization and the effects of the Vienna Arbitration in the minds of the Slovaks. Each side continues to interpret the causes and outcomes of those events according to its own perception and sentiments. A partial solution to the problem - history textbooks written by Slovak and Magyar historians together - is to this date still "in progress" and it is hard to predict when and if they will ever be finished and distributed to schools in both countries. 52 History is firmly tied into daily politics in East Central Europe. Its revival outside of scholarly conferences and seminars and its use as a model for the present or future by politicians may lead to the release of a genie from his bottle. 53 This refers particularly to Slovakia as being possibly identified as the weakest link within an informal Little Entente. 54 If both nations do not want to waste what has 51 The representatives of the Magyar political parties in Slovakia (before 1998), with the exception of Miklos Duray and Pal Csaky from the SMK. (the Party of the Magyar Coalition), were careful about publicly speaking of autonomy for Magyars in Slovakia, though the idea of their political and administrative autonomy has frequently appeared - sotto voce - as their ultimate goal. Most recently, Duray admitted that territorial autonomy is unrealistic, but the chance for a vaguely defined "personal'' autonomy for the Magyar minority in Slovakia still exists. See the article "Ouray o vel'kom Mad'arsku nesniva, auton6mia je vsak podl'a neho realna," Pravda, August 4, 2009. 52 Vilaro Kratochvil, "K moznostiam oslabovania predsudkov a stereotypov v tvorbe ucebnic dejepisu," in Myty a predsudky v dejincich. Historickci konferencia 7. decembra 2004, ed. Attila Simon (Samorin-Dunajska Streda: Forum Institut pre vyskum mensin, 2005). 53 See the interview with Slovak historian Ivan Kamenec. "Kamenec: Politici su najhorsi ziaci hist6rie," Sme, May 9, 2009. Kamenec refers to the diverging interpretations of the period 1944-1948. 54 Serbia, Slovakia, Romania, in which Magyar minorities live. Jan Camogursky said that the highest challenge to Slovakia's foreign policy after accession into NATO and the EU remains the country's ability to face continuing interference by 90 SLOVAKIA remained positive from the legacy of their peaceful cohabitation, and if they wish to get rid of the shadows of the past, they have to reach a mutually respectful Slovak - Magyar and Magyar - Slovak Compromise. Not by political gestures, but by the inner force of their societies. Neither of the two nations, closely bound together for centuries, can separately pass this test of national and civic maturity.55 3. The Myth of a Sudden Awakening of Slovak Society in the 1998 Parliamentary Elections. The major problem in Slovak history from an outsider's perspective - its invisibility linked to a fragmented appearance as a part of the history of Hungary and Czechoslovakia - influenced also its recent domestic interpretations. In reference to the Slovak national anthem, sociologists Martin Butora and Zora Butorova compared Slovak society in 1989 to "Sleeping Beauty." 56 They went so far as to say that" .. . in November 1989, an overwhelming majority of people in Slovakia accepted political change passively." This view is similar to those that refer to "socialism with a human face" in the second half of the 1960s as a purely Czech affair, 57 and those that see Charright-wing Magyar politicians into Slovakia's domestic affairs through issues regardi ng the status of the Magyar minority in Slovakia. Author interview with Jan Camogursky, Bratislava, May 24, 2007. In a poll conducted in January of 2004, 21 .3% of participants identified Hungary as a major threat to Slovak national security. See Boris Benkovic, "Vyskumna sprava," in Verejnti mienka a politika. Medzintirodne vzt'ahy a zahranicnti politika Slovenskej republiky, ed. Miroslav Peknik (Brati slava: Veda, 2005), 38 (see Graph 9). 55 For the necessity for mutual respect between the Slovak majority and minorities that would lead to their loyalty to the state based on civic principles see Milan Zemko, "Modemy politicky narod," in Slovenskti ottizka dnes, ed. Laszlo Szigeti (Bratislava: Kalligram, 2007), 192 . Zemko refers to Renan ' s idea of a "nation as a daily plebiscite" in a continuous building of a Slovak political nation : "L'existence d' une nation est. .. plebiscite de tous lesj ours, comme !'existence de l'individu est affirmation perpetuelle de vie." Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu ' une nation?" Conference faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882. Oeuvres completes d 'Ernest Renan (Paris: Calmann Levy, editor, 1882), 27. 56 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "S lovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy 10, no. I (1999), 80. 5 Ibid, 83. See Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulbricht K. Preuss, Institutional design in post-communist societies: rebuilding the ship at sea (Cambridge - New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The authors came to the conclusion that "The 1968 vision of socialism with a human face was entirely a Czech, not Slovak phenomenon." Ibid. , 264. SLOVAKIA 91 ter 77 as the only agent of civic resistance against the communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Earlier observations by Karen Henderson point to preconceived approaches to Slovak history suffering from "dangerous analytical misconceptions that have to work backward."58 Theories on the institution-building processes in communist and post-communist Czechoslovakia view the institutions emerging during the transitory period as a result of bricolage - the innovative building of new institutions by politicians who function as bricoleurs. 59 A similar approach can be taken when examining the most important moments in the modern history of Slovakia and their contrasting interpretations seen in "bricks." Works by political scientists are often based on deductive reasoning (see the scheme's Bricolage I, at the end of the article). Thus, if Slovakia deviated from its course towards western democracies in the mid-1990s (originally Brick A), the explanation was obvious: it happened because of the country's past, bound by the immaturity of its society following the breakup of Czechoslovakia, which stemmed from pervasive Slovak nationalism. This led to ungratefulness towards the Czechs and revenge towards the Magyars (Brick B). Likewise, it has been argued that a high degree of compliance with the communist regime and its detrimental impact on Slovak society kept societal life frozen (Brick C). Moreover, the weak economic base of Slovakia inherited from Hungary, along with the controversial character and legacy of wartime Slovakia (Brick D), did not help to eliminate the socio-economic backwardness, political inexperience of Slovaks and thus their negative international image (Brick E) . Deductive reasoning has its merits. It is even more convincing when supported by direct experience and contact with the subject of the study, buttressed by familiarity with primary sources. Foreign scholars who did their research in Slovakia in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s, helped to broaden a variety of perspectives on Slovak history, which Slovak historians themselves have been unaware of. It is interesting to observe that western, not Slovak scholars, argue in favor of the capacity of Slovak society to build new institu58 Karen Henderson, "Evaluating the Slovak Transition: What Creates the Image of Slovaki a?" 26. 59 John A. Scherpereel, Governing the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Between State Socialism and the European Union (Boulder - London : First Forum Press, 2009), 68 . 92 SLOVAKIA tions during the communist and post-communist era (Scherpereel, Haughton) . Foreign scholars have referred to the importance of a "critical mass of educated citizens" and political stability in Slovakia prior to, during and after the "change" in 1998 (Henderson), and stressed the presence of a "profound and sizeable Slovak opposition to the culture of Communism" (A. Innes), whilst sociologists and political scientists at home (S. Szomolanyi, 0 . Gyarfasova, Z. Butorova, J. Marusiak) have been more skeptical. From a long-term historical perspective based on inductive reasoning, the context and nuances of Slovakia's post-communist transformation appear significantly different from a micro perspective as applied by the social sciences. This perspective suggests that, to understand the evolution of Slovak society with all its accomplishments and failures, the key is to start from the beginning, not from the end or the middle, and not by theories and generalizations, but with facts, particularly in contested perspectives. Interpretations based on deductive reasoning may result, and they often did, in theories on and explanations of the reasons for the still continuing building of the Slovak political nation and democracy in the country as an "unfinished business," turning it into "the hare versus turtle" race. Such perspectives attribute nationalism in the 1990s exclusively to the Slovaks, while ignoring the fears of Slovak society stemming from its historical experience, linked to the years 1867-1918, 19181919, 1938-1939, 1945-1948 and after. Moreover, such perspectives suffer from inner contradictions. Despite the partly beneficial impact of Czechoslovakia on Slovakia, the latter was in 1993, similar to the years 1918, 1938-1939 as well as during communist Czechoslovakia, socio-economically a less developed part of the common state. 60 Likewise, the Slovak political experience in prewar Czechoslovakia has been seen as weak due to the detrimental impact of a different and underdeveloped political culture inherited by the Slovaks from Hungary, for which two decades of the existence of democratic Czechoslovakia ( 1918-193 8) was too a short period to improve. 61 Consequently, due to the traditional "historic deficits" in the evolution of Slovak society, its civic attitu60 Miroslav Londak, "K niektorym problemom ekonomickeho vyvoja na Slovensku na prahu roka 1968," Historicke studie 44 (2006), p.188. 61 Kopecek, 27-34 and 311. SLOVAKIA 93 des linked to pluralism during Communism did not develop properly.62 This perspective does seem not to apply to Slovakia's neighbors, the Magyars and the Poles, with their limited experience with parliamentary democracy before and after WW II, which were similar to Spain and Italy in the West. Hungary and Poland apparently redeemed themselves in the eyes of the West by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the activities of the Solidarity Movement in Poland from 1980 onward. The question, however, is how could those events of undisputed civic bravery substitute for democracy as a system of governance that needs time to develop? By contrast, the longlasting non-compliance of Slovak society with the communist regime, as demonstrated by repeated large-scale participation in religious pilgrimages and demonstrations, has either been downplayed or referred to as having had no impact on politics in communist Czechoslovakia.63 After the 1998 parliamentary elections, Slovak sociologists and leaders of the non-governmental sector helped to create and spread a positive image of Slovak society by contrasting the Meciar era with the progress made in integration with western organizations during the two Dzurinda governments. 64 They suggested that the electoral behavior of voters in rural and economically underdeveloped regions, who voted in favor of the Movement for a Democratic Slo62 Based on a survey conducted in May of 1968, in which 69.5% of the respondents in the Czech Lands as compared with 54.6% in Slovakia supported the existence of more political parties. At the same time, 53 % of Czech participants saw positively the role of civic associations in political life, while in Slovakia it was only 32%. Kopecek, 143. 63 Kopecek stresses the continuity in Czech dissent linked to the reform movement in the I 960s and the role of Charter 77, which was signed by 1800 Czechs in comparison with two dozen Slovaks as the flag bearer of civic resistance against Communism in Czechoslovakia. Kopecek, p.145. Jan Camogursky vigorously opposes the assumption that religious dissent in Slovakia had a limited impact on the regime. According to him, the massive pilgrimages to Velehrad and Levoca helped to soften the harassment of dissenters and citizens by communist authorities. Author interview with Jan Camogursky, Bratislava, May 24, 2007. On a similar stance taken by Abby Innes see her book Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 36-37. 64 Such delineation is, technically, an anachronism, as the third Meciar government did not oppose integration, particularly into the EU, though it eventually brought Slovakia into international isolation. 94 SLOVAKIA vakia (HZDS) led by Vladimir Meciar and the Slovak National Party (SNS),65 resembled support for the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (the tudaks) during the wartime Slovak Republic. In contrast to their earlier suggestions, these observers view positively the ability of Magyar communities in Slovakia, which live in rural areas and cast their votes exclusively for the Magyar political parties in each election 66 while referring to it as a "higher form of civic participation and social engagement." 67 Inductive reasoning provides the reader with the opportunity to view Slovakia's post-communist transformation in a complex, evolutionary perspective (see the scheme's Bricolage II): It consists of the following "bricks:" Brick A - "Antecedents" (1848-1918). The traditional view is that during and after the Revolutions of 1848-1849, Slovaks were aware that Magyars were not willing to allow them to exist autonomously and, hence, they started to design their political programs, build institutions, schools, and political parties . Fearing Panslavism, Magyar radicals attempted to Magyarize the nationalities in Hungary, including the Slovaks, with some success (Magyarones). As a consequence, some Slovak, mostly Pro65 The SNS, which, next to the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH) in the early 1990s and the HZDS in the mid-1 990s was also compared with the HSCS, has always been supportive of the legacy of the Slovak National Uprising in stark contrast to the perspective of the l'udaks and the neo-l'udaks. The same holds for the HZDS. 66 Next to the SMK, a new party to represent both Magyars and Slovaks named the Most-Hid (The Bridge; Slovak and Magyar), was established in July of 2009. Its chairman became Bela Bugar, the former chairman of the SMK, who lost to Pal Csaky in the party elections in April of 2007 . See "Ministerstvo vnutra zaregistrovalo Bugarovu stranu," Pravda, July 3, 2009. ln the 2010 parliamentary elections another new political party, Freedom and Solidarity [SaS] appeared, and supplied ministers to the Radicova government but also caused it to collapse in October of 20 11. Only recently established parties are: Obycajni l'udia - nezavisle osobnosti (Ordinary People - Independent Personalities), Strana slobodne slovo (The Free Word Party), and 99% - Obciansky hlas (99% - A Citizen's Voice). 67 See the article "Mad'ari su aktivnejsi nez Slovaci, tvrdi prieskum," Sme, March 28 2009. The article refers to a survey conducted by the Slovak Academy of Sciences and its interpretation by Zora Butorova from the Institute for Public Affairs (TVO), a non-governmental think-tank. Slovak Magyars defending their rights, while keeping their traditions and the cohesiveness of their society intact, is praised as a positive quality. The same was not applied to the Slovaks in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia when they tried to do the same. SLOVAKIA 95 testant, intellectuals, opted for cultural, and possibly political, cooperation with the Czechs. A majority of Slovaks, mostly Catholics, still believed that a solution for Slovakia within Hungary could be found. The period from 1890 to 1914, which was traditionally seen as the "dark ages" of Slovak national emancipation, brought about even more resilience against Magyarization. In October of 1918, the Slovaks joined the Czechs in a common state. They rejectted the offer by the Karolyi government for autonomy within Hungary. From November of 1918 onward, a series of military clashes occurred between Magyar and Czechoslovak troops. In June of 1919 the Hungarian Red Army invaded and occupied eastern and southern Slovakia for a short time. Difference (traditional views+-+the article): Slovaks were socially and politically active, not passive in Hungary, even during the time of the harshest Magyarization in 1890-1914, which coincided with the process of the formation of the Slovaks as a political nation. During and after WW I, Slovak leaders abroad and at home decided to join the Czechs in the new state of Czechoslovakia on the assumption they would receive autonomy as promised by the Pittsburgh Agreement of 1918. At the same time, the Slovak population demonstrated its strong dissatisfaction with the Magyar government and supported secession from Hungary by protests in which social and national aspects blended. Brick B - "Betrayals" (1918-1948). In prewar Czechoslovakia, the Slovaks were divided between the autonomists and the "Czechoslovaks." In this clash the CatholicProtestant controversy played an important role. Though the autonomists were seen in the Czech Lands as the destroyers of Czechoslovakia, they did not want to secede because they were afraid of territorial revisionism by the Poles and the Magyars. After Munich, Slovak political parties congregated in Zilina and expressed their support for Slovak autonomy within the rump second Czecho-Slovak Republic. The government of the nominally independent wartime Slovak Republic discriminated against and failed to protect its Jewish and Roma citizens from deportation to death camps. In the administrative and economic spheres, however, the Slovaks demonstrated their capacity to form a state and administer it themselves. Based on this experience, Slovak Communists, who had helped to 96 SLOVAKIA organize the Slovak National Uprising in 1944, expected Slovakia to receive autonomous status within the reconstituted Czechoslovakia. This was rejected by Czech presidents Edvard Benes, Klement Gottwald and Antonin Novotny. Difference: Slovaks were stereotyped in the Czech Lands as traitors since the 1920s. The fact that they did not want to secede from Czechoslovakia and remained in the second Czecho-Slovak Republic for half a year has been frequently overlooked. The socio-economic progress made by the wartime Slovak Republic, in contrast with the disinterest in Slovak affairs by previous centralist Czechoslovak governments, was significant. In May of 1946, the Communists were defeated in parliamentary elections in Slovakia, but not in the Czech Lands. By November of 1947, the Communists gained political control over Slovakia. The three Prague Agreements were viewed by the Slovaks as a betrayal, just as the Czechs viewed the aftermath of the Munich Agreement. Brick C - "Communism" (1948-1989). The idea of Slovak autonomy and economic equalization with the Czechs was adopted by Slovak Communists. The demand for reforming Communism in Slovakia grew with the accession to power in 1963 of the Slovak Alexander Dubcek. The return to national history and the drive for economic reform resulted in the idea of the federalization of Czechoslovakia. This was interpreted by the Czech side as a continuation of Slovak nationalism, because the debate in the Czech Lands was oriented towards political pluralism and economic reform. In 1969 came the removal of Dubcek, who was caught between the need for reform at home and the mistrust in him by political leaders of other communist countries. He was replaced by Gustav Husak, another Slovak, who embodied 'normalization.' Whereas Czechs intellectuals voiced their dissatisfaction with the Husak regime, Slovaks, allegedly, were compliant with it. Difference: Slovaks were no less active than the Czechs in initiating the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s; in fact, they had helped to start it. Economic reform as a continuation of equalization stood in the forefront of the efforts of Slovak communist political leaders as well as economists. Federalization was important in regard to both political and economic competencies, whilst it was viewed by Czech society as another from of archetypal natio- SLOVAKIA 97 nal reassertion of the Slovaks resembling the 19th century. Slovak society lived in a paradoxical situation: next to the material benefits received during 'normalization,' the traditionally religious Slovaks reacted to ideological indoctrination by massive participation in religious pilgrimages. In addition to the religious dissenters, who were active already in the 1970s, environmentalists began to play an important role in the early 1980s in making also the secular part of Slovak society aware of the risks stemming from insensitive industrialization. In 1989, Slovak society as a whole, and on its own initiative, rejected the communist regime by massive demonstrations against it. Brick D - "Division" (1993-1997). The "Velvet Revolution," similar to the "Prague Spring," indicated, how the fall of Communism in Czechoslovakia was perceived internationally. From the beginning, there was mistrust between the newly-emerging Slovak and Czech political elites. Each had its own symbol: they were Alexander Dubcek in Slovakia and Vaclav Havel in the Czech Lands . Since the former accepted the rather symbolic post of Speaker of the Federal Assembly in Prague, new political leaders emerged instantly in Slovakia, first and foremost Vladimir Meciar. In contrast to its federal partner, Slovakia had two more tasks: 1) to gain international recognition and 2) to deal with the status of the Magyar minority. Fighting on three fronts (the third were federal competences) simultaneously, Slovak politicians were divided. Eventually, it was the HZDS, led by Meciar, which prevailed. Contrary to its portrayal as anti-federalist and nationalist, the HZDS and its leader still aspired for a looser federation with the Czechs. This was unacceptable to the "technocrats," represented by Vaclav Klaus and Czech nationalists such as Miroslav Macek (both Civic Democratic Party; ODS) and Jan Kalvoda (Civic Democratic alliance; ODA). As a result, Slovak and Czech political leaders opted for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as of December 31, 1992. Difference: In contrast to the traditional perspectives that interpret renewed Slovak efforts for building an "authentic federation" in the early 1990s at the expense of the Czechs, it is suggested that Slovaks wanted more powers in order to avoid the continuation of debates of constitutional discrepancies and socio-economic disparities that had started in the 1930s, continued in 1960s, and resurfaced at 98 SLOVAKIA the end of the communist regime in the late 1980s. Since the Czechs had controlled Czechoslovakia for decades, regardless of its constitutional form , they interpreted their own nationalism as "civicness," in contrast to the allegedly old-fashioned ethnic Slovak nationalism. Brick E - "Europe" ("The Awakening" and the "Change," 19982004). Since Slovaks were seen as passive in communist Czechoslovakia and their religious dissent was allegedly insignificant in terms of challenging the communist regime, new institutions and political parties had to emerge in the early 1990s. During the period 19901992, Slovaks allegedly once again focused on federal and national competencies, instead of building democracy and a market economy, which were Czech priorities. According to some sociologists, Slovakia missed the chance to experience its own Velvet Revolution. After the creation of independent Slovakia, the state had to re-build its structures and to strive for international recognition. It inherited a sensitive problem with the Magyar minority, which resulted in tensions regarding the use of the official and Magyar languages on territories with a mixed population. In the spring of 1994, pro-democratic and pro-western forces ousted Vladimir Meciar from office, yet the six following months was too a short a time for catching up with the rest of reforming post-communist countries, particularly Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the parliamentary elections in the fall of 1994, Vladimir Meciar returned to power. Allied with the nationalists and the radical left, he imposed a harsh rule over the National Council, the opposition and the media. As a result of the mysterious abduction of the son of President Michal Kovac, who dared to defy the government and Meciar himself, Slovakia began to lag behind in the European integration processes. In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the opposition political parties supported, though indirectly, by non-governmental organizations and awakened Slovak society, defeated the government that torpedoed its own formally proclaimed integrationist goals. The two subsequent governments, led by Mikulas Dzurinda, succeeded in transforming the country's negative international image and attracting foreign investments. Being politically stable, the country became a member of both NATO and the EU in 2004. SLOVAKIA 99 Difference: When attempts to reach an agreement with the Czechs on an authentic federation failed, Slovaks received, somehow unexpectedly, their own state in a way resembling March of 1939. The accusations against Meciar as an authoritarian leader collided with divergent views on how national property should be privatized. After Meciar' s return to power in the fall of 1994, Slovakia continued in its efforts to join the European Union and NATO. It failed to become a member of the OECD due to the government's unwillingness to privatize strategic branches of the Slovak economy. Despite diplomatic and political warnings regarding the infamous causes of Michal Kovac, the denial of his parliamentary seat to Frantisek Gaulieder and the assassination of Robert Remias, who had information regarding the Kovac kidnapping, negotiations with the EU and NA TO continued. The "change" in 1998 brought about an influx of former representatives of the non-governmental sector into the various ministries, while many of those who remained loyal to their original mission of being the watchdogs over a young democracy were disillusioned. The fragmentation of old political parties and the emergence of new ones in the late l 990s and the early 2000s were complemented by scandals stemming from corruption. In contrast with the third Meciar government, where there were two camps clearly separated one from another, the situation in the first and second Dzurinda governments resembled wars of all against all. The only factor that kept the coalition together was fear of Meciar. Slovak society, which was tired of the endless chain of political conflicts and scandals, with what was left of its enthusiasm and energy, helped to complete the country's integration into the EU. As a part of the community of European nations, Slovaks have not only the right, but also the duty to expect that their ability to comply with the criteria for membership should be equaled by the ability of the Union to provide fair and indiscriminate treatment, free from paternalistic approaches. This will help the Slovaks to grow and appear as a modem and self-confident nation, visible and judged according to their efforts and accomplishments. Speculations on Slovakia's cultural and civilizational proximity with either the East or the West, which bothered so many domestic and foreign politicians and intellectuals in the mid-1990s, are secondary. Of primary importance is the ability of Slovak society to maintain and strengthen its internal integration and to continue to proceed in its mental trans- 100 SLOVAKIA formation . This requires the capacity and willingness of Slovak society to reproduce itself on the basis of its historical traditions, while embracing democratic values, as well as a pluralist and consensual system of governance and politics. At the same time, the membership of Slovakia and other Central Eastern European post-communist states in the European Union provides it with an opportunity to learn from the collapse of the former Communist Bloc by evolving into a community of truly equal members. Slovakia's Postcommunist Transformation from an Historical Perspective Scheme Seeming +- As ---+ Being t Method : Deductive Begins in the present Method: Inductive Begins in the past t t Perspective: Political Science Perspective: History and PSCI t t Objective: Explaining the present by interpreting the Objective: Understanding the present by interpreting the past by reconstructing the past t Depth of historical background: Medium t Retrograde horizon: Medium t Depth of historical background: High t Retrograde horizon : Distant yet connectable With the present t t Connectivity present---+past: Retrospective Connectivity past---+present: Chronological SLOVAKIA t t Causality: Fragmented Bricolage I 101 Causality: Complex Divergence Brick A: Result Delayed Slovak postCommunist transfor- - low mation and integration with EU and NA TO Bricolage II Brick "Europe" Slovakia's integration delayed but completed on institutional level, continues on societal level t i Brick B: Sub-condition Breakup of Czechoslovakia Reason: prevalence of - high archetypical Slovak nationalism over the solution of practical problems Brick "Division" Split with the Czechs over disparities and competences, not national identity t i Brick C: Prerequisite 1 High degree of Slovak compliance with - high communist regime. Societal life completely Hibernated Brick "Communism" Slovaks partly compliant with communist regime; Refuse interference in religious matters, form environmental movement t i Brick D : Prerequisite 2 Brick "Betrayals" Week economic base -medium- Wartime Slovak Republic Inherited from Hungary; created out of necessity, Legacy of wartime Slovak economically viable. SloRepublic as a totalitarian vak autonomy rejected in State postwar Czechoslovakia t Brick E: Historical residua Slovaks politically passive; Their extinction as a nation Imminent, if not saved By Czechs -medium/high- i Brick"Antecedents" Slovaks resilient and socially active in A-H; opt for Czechoslovakia instead of Hungary  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Seeming and Being: Contextualizing the History of Post-Communist Slovakia Description An account of the resource Juraj Hocman Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 73-101 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hocman, Juraj Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/29df0575d66e8d9f4062768833e5c57d.pdf 81d244299cc14ebf8304bb9bf66fadb6 PDF Text Text 102 SLOVAKIA , ..., VLADIMIR MECIAR AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION IN SLOVAKIA, 1992-1998 1 John A. Gould "A just privatization does not exist; we all know that the only criterion was loyalty. " - Vit'azoslav Morie, SNS honorary chair2 Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution put former Communist Party bureaucrats and industrial managers on the defensive. Associated with the communist past, many top managers were removed from their jobs while the middle managers that replaced them carried little political clout in broader debates over the design of economic reforms like privatization. As a result, Czechoslovak privatization architects had the freedom to offer average citizens a potential stake in state-owned companies. In return for a small administrative fee, citizens received coupons that would allow them to bid on company shares . Most participating citizens, however, chose to invest through new financial intermediaries, called investment privatization funds, which would concentrate citizens' small shares into larger stakes in privatized companies. By 1993, these intermediaries began to rival remaining communist-era managers for control of Czech and Slovak firms .3 1 This paper is adopted from John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 103-32. A full list of acknowledgments can be found on pp. vii-viii of that work, but the author would like to thank the following for their comments, assistance and support: Hilary Appel, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Sharon Fisher, Zsolt Gal, Simona Gould, Timothy Haughton, Cubomira Hromkova, Darina Malova, Mikael Olsson, Marek Ryhal', Sona Szomolanyi, James Thompson and Milada Anna Vachudova. The author is responsible for any errors in logic or fact. 2 Abigail Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 200 I), 263. 3 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby,"The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Republic," Europe-Asia Studies 48 :2 (1996), 285-303; Mitchell Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: �SLOVAKIA 103 While the mass privatization program continued in the Czech Republic through 1995, Slovakia's industrial managers were able to derail it after independence on January 1, 1993 . They had initially suffered from the same liabilities as their Czech counterparts. 4 Yet, as debate over the sovereign status of Slovakia developed in 199192, Slovak managers found a resource in identity politics that their Czech counterparts largely lacked. 5 By fusing their interests to rising popular-nationalism, a select group gained influence with a number of Slovakia's nascent political parties, and most notably, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The following paper examines the politics of privatization in Slovakia after independence. Slovakia's battle over privatization and its aftermath was a nasty, occasionally dangerous affair with very high stakes. At the center of this battle, initially, were the efforts of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and various industrialists to stop the highly popular citizens' "voucher" privatization program that Slovakia had inherited from the federal republic. This had little to do with the voucher program 's evident flaws . Rather, Meciar's policies sought to reorient privatization away from the new financial intermediaries which largely supported his opponents. In its place, his government operated a direct sales program that would benefit those who would support him. Yet, by attempting to replace a program that rewarded a majority of Slovak citizens with a program that only rewarded a narrow group of industrial managers and political allies, Meciar embarked on a democratically difficult project. His early efforts to gain close personal control over the privatization process contributed to the alienation of many of the key players in the HZDS, including President of Slovakia Michal Kovac. The president briefly orchestrated Meciar's Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Central Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Peter Rutland, "Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic," Telos 94 ( I 992), I 03-130; Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 56-68. 4 Interview wi th Jozef Uhrik, Commercial Director, Volkswagen Slovakia, Devinska Nova Yes, Slovakia, January 14, 1997 ; Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povai.ske strojarne, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, Slovakia, July, 22 I 998 . 5 Hilary Appel and John Gould, " Identi ty Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics," Europe-A sia Studies 52: I (2000), 111-31. �104 SLOVAKIA removal from power in March of 1994 after he made a speech criticizing a series of legally questionable privatization decisions. When Meciar regained power in November, he acted on the knowledge that his political and economic ambitions were incompatible with the democratic institutions he had inherited. The ensuing assault on democratic norms, rules and procedures, while not entirely directed at privatization, nevertheless gave his ruling coalition the freedom to privatize as it pleased. However, by the end of Meciar' s third term, Slovakia could no longer demonstrate its democratic credentials to the European Union or NATO . Both threatened to exclude Slovakia from their next rounds of expansion. Privileged access to government was not simply important to acquiring property. Under Meciar it also became increasingly useful for securing favorable economic policies such as the allocation of credit, the regulation of capital markets, government procurement, and taxation policies. Between 1996 and 1998, such largess undermined Slovakia' s economic recovery and threw the country into an economic crisis. By 1998, both Slovakia's long term economic recovery and its European future were in danger. Slovak voters responded with an 84.4 percent electoral turnout that left the ruling coalition no choice but to accept the vote and surrender power. Privatization should produce independent economic actors who seek a profit rather than a government handout. Yet, as the Slovak experience under Meciar reminds us, privatization is first and foremost a means of acquiring wealth and power. Where easy profits can easily be had through political connections, creating private property does not necessarily go hand in hand with market democracy. For privatization to be most effective, societies must first be willing and able to police the intersection of state policy and economic activity. Voucher Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1993. Privatization in Czechoslovakia was designed at the federal level, but it was largely carried out by the Czech and Slovak republiclevel governments. In Slovakia privatization began under the government of Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky (Christiaq Democratic Movement-KDH) and his 30 year-old neo-liberal Minister of Privatiza- �SLOVAKIA 105 tion,6 Ivan Miklos. While there was room for administrative innovation to account for local differences, in practice, Miklos administered the voucher program in an almost identical fashion to his Czech counterparts. This was no small accomplishment. Following the collapse of support for Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's first government in the spring 1991 , the new ruling coalition was deeply divided over privatization. The Carnogursky government included Jan Holcfk, and Jozef Belzak as Ministers of Industry and Economy, respectively. While both men favored a transition towards markets, both had industrial ties and favored a strong sectoral industrial policy in which firms would be restructured before privatization. In addition to Carnogursky 's ministers, industry had a strong friend in KDH member Viliam Oberhauser, a founding member of what Miklos claimed was industry's nomenklatura-controlled peak organization, the Federation of Employers Unions and Associations (AZZZ). 7 Oberhauser was a key member of the nationalist wing of the KDH and had helped author a "gradualist" economic reform scenario, challenging the market-oriented federal economic reforms that had been in place since January of 1991. 8 This created difficulties for Miklos. In the final years of the 1980s, Miklos had studied market economics at the Austrian school of Friedrich Hayek. At the time of the Revolution, he had been an economics student and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics in Bratislava. Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak brought him into the government in 1990. 9 After, the launch of strong market-oriented 6 There were three privatization ministries- one in each republic, and one at the federal level to deal with federal state property. Their formal name at the republic level was the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Assets. For an explanation see, Petr Husak, Budovani kapitalismu v Cechach: Rozhovory s Tomasem Jeikem (Prague: Volvox Globatour, 1997), 111 ; John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 61. 7 lvan Miklos "Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientalist Structures in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Slovak Political Science Association, 1997), 65. 8 Jvan Miklos recalls that the Ministries of Forest and Water, Agriculture and even the Environment - all run by KDH appointees - had strong gradualist leanings. Interview with Ivan Miklos, Consultant, M.E.S.A. I 0, Bratislava, April 2, 1997. 9 Miklos's first post was as Deputy Prime Minister, Jozef Kucerak's advisor, and Director of the Government's Section for Economic and Social Policy. Interview �106 SLOVAKIA reforms in January of 1991, however, Slovakia ' s economy suffered disproportionately more than the Czech Republic ' s economy. 10 Economic liberals like Kucerak increasingly became the target of colleagues seeking to distance themselves publicly from the growing pain of economic transformation. Market reforms would be managed better, they argued, if Slovak politicians were to have greater control over their own economic and political affairs where they could use state controls to moderate the pace of transition. 11 As the lead proponent of a federally brokered, rapid transformation towards a market economy, Kucerak was forced to step down after a vote of no-confidence in the spring of 1991 . Miklos was elevated to Minister of Privatization soon after and quickly replaced Kucerak as the most outspoken market liberal in the government and the strongest public supporter of federal reforms. He faced the brunt of attacks from both the opposition and the national wing of the ruling KDH. This included surviving several parliamentary votes of no-confidence. By the winter of 1991-92, it was increasingly clear that the KDH-led coalition would fare poorly in the upcoming June elections. Miklos feared that the next government would most likely slow privatization and delay the creation of private owners. He therefore sought to start the voucher program as quickly as possible- to create a fait accompli of new owners with a stake in continuing the rapid property transformation program. Miklos was responsible for convincing state-owned firms to put up shares for the voucher privatization program in Slovakia. He recalled that the threat of dismissal helped him to encourage most managers to include significant voucher components in their base privatization plans, but the pressure was bitterly resented. 12 Miklos with Ivan Miklos, Bratislava, October 1, 1996; Interview with Jozef Kucenik, Bratislava, January 13, 1997. 10 Slovakia was particularly handicapped by its reliance on heavy defense industries, among other things. See Gould, Politics of Privatization. 11 For details see Gould, Politics of Privatization , 73-79 . 12 In about sixty cases, managers called for direct sales exclusively to themselves. Assuming that the managers had failed to meet their obligations under the privatization act to make important data available to competitors, Miklos reopened the proposed submission process for an additional two months and pushed the firms to provide the necessary data to allow competitors to propose rival privatization plans for each firm, Miklos interview, October I, 1996; Ivan Miklos, "Corruption Risks in the Privatization Process: A Study of Privatization Developments in the Slovak Re- �SLOVAKIA 107 further alienated industrial elites by converting what they hoped would be a program of cheap, direct sales of enterprise shares to incumbent managers, into a transparent, competitive program in which price was the leading criterion. Prior to the June elections, the ministry sold shares in 189 firms for prices approximating and often exceeding their book value. 13 It would be another six years before the state would do as well financially in its direct sales of public property. Meanwhile, the first wave of voucher privatization began in October of 1991 with the registration of 2.59 million Slovak citizens, almost two-thirds of the adult population, through the federal Ministry of Finance. As in the Czech Republic, 14 registration for the program in Slovakia initially lagged until financial intermediaries (also referred to as investment privatization companies) began to offer a ten-fold or greater return on the voucher holder's initial registration fee within a year. Seventy-two percent of Slovak citizen-participants subsequently invested their voucher coupons with investment privatization funds in the first wave of privatization. Bidding on firms began in May of 1992 and closed in December. Shares were finally distributed to new owners in April of 1993 .15 Despite the efforts of industrial elites, the federal voucher privatization program had succeeded in providing the investment privatization funds stakes of up to forty percent in privatized firms. 16 Another wave of voucher privatization could allow fund owners to consolidate ownership of Slovakia's industrial assets. Over the next two years industrial managers, therefore, worked diligently through AZZZ to ensure a second wave of voucher privatization would not take place. 17 public," Bratislava, Klub Windsor, I 995; Interview with I.'.udovit Cemak, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 2, I 997. 13 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997; Mikael Olsson, Ownership, Reform and Corporate Governance: The Slovak Privatization Process in 1990-1996 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1999), 119. 14 For details, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, Chapter 5. 15 For more on the technical details of voucher privatization, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 63-8. 16 0Jsson, Ownership, Reform, 115-6, 219. 17 AZZZ (Federation of Employers Unions and Associations), "5. vyrocie AZZZ SR, 1991-1996," Spravodaj AZZZ Extra. Bratislava, March, 1996; Rudolf Lachovic, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie a kolektivneho investovania," Global Brokers, Bratislava, I 997, manuscript. �108 SLOVAKIA Meciar's Second Government, 1992-1994. Meciar's HZDS dominated the June 1992 elections. With the tacit support of the Slovak National Party (SNS), he became Slovak Prime Minister for the second time. In July negotiations with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, Meciar failed in his bid to form a weak confederation with the Czech Republic. Unable to reconcile Meciar's concept of a weak confederation with Klaus' concept of a strong federation, the two agreed to replace the federal state with two sovereign, independent republics. After parliamentary approval in both republican assemblies, the countries split peacefully on January 1, 1993. 18 As in the Czech Republic, voucher privatization in Slovakia became one of the more popular aspects of the federal reform program. 19 This may help to explain why the Meciar government, elected in June of 1992, completed the first wave as its predecessor had planned. Nevertheless, Meciar's Minister of Privatization, I:ubomir Dolgos, promised a shakeup in the next round. One of the new govemment' s first decisions was to indefinitely postpone the demand that firms submit second round privatization plans to the Ministry of Privatization. This necessitated at least a delay in the second round of voucher privatization. In September of 1992, the government program declaration and an associated Ministry of Privatization document spelled out a new privatization philosophy based on a more gradual state-guided economic transformation. Rather than emphasize the rapid creation of new owners, the state would now single out "strategic fields" where it would intervene to protect the national interest through the state restructuring of enterprises before, or in place of, privatization. Industrial ministries would design and coordinate restructuring plans with the assistance of the state-controlled financial sector. 18 Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Innes, Czechoslo vakia. 19 Miklo~ interview, April 2, 1997; Dusan Triska recalled being surprised at the strong support for the voucher scheme in Slovakia. Dusan Triska, "Privatization: Czechoslovakia" Eastern European Economics 26 (Fall, 1991 ); DusanTl'iska, "Political , Organizational, and Legislative Aspects of Mass Privatization-Czechoslovakia," in Marko Simonetti and Andreja Bohm, eds., Privatization in Central & Eastern Europe, 1991 . (Ljubljana: Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1991 ). Oldfich Dedek, The Break-up of Czechoslovakia (Aldershoot: Ave bury 1996), 201 . �SLOVAKIA 109 This concept also favored direct sales to incumbent managers over voucher privatization. Price was no longer the dominant criterion in evaluating bids on the company shares that were to sold. First installments were lowered from thirty percent of the price to ten to fifteen percent, and payment could be extended over fifteen years. Another round of voucher privatization would take place, but would only be used as a residual method.20 Similarly, the threat that a manager would be dismissed diminished under the new government. Miklos asserted that Meciar and his Minister of Economy, I:udovit Cernak, reappointed many of the communist-era managers that had been pushed out by Carnogursky's government. 21 Many of these had been forced out for having collaborated with the communist secret service before the Revolution-in a process called "lustration."22 Cemak himself related that Meciar frequently paid little attention to his appointees' lustration certificates in . personne l dec1s1ons. . . 23 h1s Little privatization occurred under Dolgos in the first six months of 1993. Rather, Meciar focused his energies on consolidating control over his cabinet- pushing out co-HZDS founder Milan Kiiazko (who was a marginal threat to Meciar for party control) and Minister of Economy, Cemak. As a Kiiazko protege, Dolgos soon found himself in constant conflict with Meciar-most notably over whether vouchers should have any role in the second round when it started. Meciar felt they should not, while Dolgos asserted that he sought to put aside about a third of corporate shares for voucher privatization. 20 Dolgos stressed that any efforts to set voucher privatization timelines or the volume of assets to be voucher privatized in advance, "would ... fail to serve a purpose." Dolgos's reformulated concept even "warned" industrial managers that if their second wave base privatization plans relied too heavily on the voucher method, they would be "subjected to particularly critical and thorough evaluation." There would also be a critical "assessment of the risks derived from concentration of ownership through privatization investment funds ." Instead, Dolgos emphasized "combined methods" in which management buyouts would play an "exceedingly important role." Ministry of Administration and Privatization, SR. , "Concept of the Continuing Process of Privatization in the Slovak Republic. " Ministry of Administration and Privatization of National Property of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1992; Interview with Cubomir Dolgos, Faculty of Management, Economics University, Bratislava, March 20, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 119-20. 21 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997. 22 Marsina interview, July, 22 1998; Uhrik interview, January 14, 1997. 2 3<'.:emak interview, April 2, 1997. �110 SLOVAKIA On June 12, 1993, Dolgos lost an HZDS-engineered vote of no confidence and stepped down.24 The departures of independent personalities like Cernak, Kiiazko and Dolgos left Meciar in more solid control over the HZDS and the government, but it also made his parliamentary majority vulnerable to future defections. Nevertheless, Meciar stepped up his efforts to replace his former colleagues with his personal loyalists-particularly in the Ministry of Privatization and the Fund for National Property (FNM). 25 At that time, the privatization ministry coordinated the privatization decision-making process while the FNM was a fully state-owned joint stock company charged with distributing shares to their new private owners. FNM appointees also represented the state's interests as a shareholder at general assemblies of corporate shareholders. In 100% state-owned companies, the FNM was on paper, at least, in complete control of the firm. Control over the FNM would give the Prime Minister control over most unprivatized and many partially privatized firms. Attempts to gain direct governmental control over the privatezation ministry and the FNM brought Meciar into sharp conflict with President Michael Kovac, another co-founder of the HZDS .26 To replace Dolgos at the privatization ministry, Meciar chose a close associate, Ivan Lexa. Having backed Meciar in the dismissal of Kiiazko, Kovac now balked. Citing Lexa's inexperience and potential conflicts of interest with his father (a communist-era central planning agency bureaucrat, recently-turned entrepreneur), the president refused to approve the appointment. Meciar responded by giving Lexa the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Privatization (the highest ministerial position not requiring presidential approval) and assumed the responsibilities of Minister himself. One of Lexa's first privatization decisions as State Secretary in July of 1992 was to ap24 Dolgos interview, March 20, 1997; Cemak interview, April 2, 1997. Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 25 . 26 Slovakia 's President was constitutionally weak, making the need for a strong party system to check the Prime Minister's power all the more necessary. Executive power flowed from the Parliament, with limited presidential powers to check it. Kovac could and did veto legislation and appointees, but Parliament could override this with a simple majority. Later, when Parliament deadlocked over a new presidential candidate, presidenti al powers - including the power of a presidential amnesty transferred to the Prime Minister. 25 �SLOVAKIA 111 prove his father ' s participation in the privatization of Povazske mlyny a cestoviname, a.s., with a personal stake estimated at up to 1 billion Sk (then about US $30 million).27 While Meciar consolidated power over Slovakia' s privatization and property control mechanisms, financial intermediaries whose funds had done so well in the first round of privatization began to assert some clout in shareholder meetings. Enterprise managers had also established a few funds. 28 Slovakia' s largest company, Vychodoslovenske zeleziame, a.s (Eastern Slovak Steelworks- VSZ) had established Cassiovia Invest, which had the marketing clout to acquire more than ten percent of the vouchers. But most funds- and hence a large portion of corporate power- were in the hands of enterprise outsiders, a fact that was increasingly resented by the incumbent industrial managers.29 In the first wave of privatization, the funds had amassed a forty percent stake in privatized firms and from the perspective of incumbent managers, carried unwelcome clout. Battles soon emerged over which would be dominant in determining the overall strategy of the company, the shareholder-dominated Supervisory Boards or the management-controlled Boards of Directors.30 Meciar' s allies came to feel that the most influential funds were, as subsequent Fund for National Property President Stefan Gavomik put it, "owned by the opposition."31While not technically true, by the end of the year, industrial managers and fund-appointed board members began to run into sharp conflict over the day-to-day management and long-term strategy of "privatized" companies. Hoping to avoid a further erosion of corporate insider influence, AZZZ halted a 27 Anton Marcincin, Daniela Zemanovifova, and Lubos Vagac, "Privatization Methods and Development of Slovakia," Bratislava, Center for Economic Development, 1996, 17. 28 Another fi fty percent was spread across a wide range of funds and individual shareholders, leaving the FNM , with its residual 37.6 percent, effectively in charge. Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 223 . 29 AZZZ, "S.Vyrocie AZZZ SR, 199 1- 1996"; Miklos, "Corruption Risks," 64; Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 279, 283. 30 Slovak and Czech companies had a dual board structure consisting of a supervisory board that gave general strategic direction to the company and managerial oversight, and a management board- largely consisting of top corporate mana~ers- that oversaw the day-to-day operations of the firm. 1 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 11 8. �112 SLOVAKIA second round of voucher privatization. Meciar obligingly pushed back the start date for the next round of voucher privatization. In the fall of 1993, Meciar complimented his firm grasp of the Ministry of Privatization by putting personal loyalists on the board of the National Property Fund. Between December of 1993 and March of 1994, his indirect control over state shares of major firms allowed him to replace enterprise board members and managers of twentyone Slovak companies which, allegedly, failed to show sufficient loyalty to the HZDS. Meciar claimed that he was simply replacing opposition-linked managers from the VPN-KDH era with more independent managers . Indeed, he accused parliamentary opposition leaders "straight into the eye, in front of everyone, that each one of them is linked with one of the twenty-one major Slovak corporations in which we intervened. And this is the problem." 32 Meciar was possibly correct in his assessment. While in power, KDH ministers appointed people to the boards of leading Slovak state firms and other opposition leaders clearly had close industrial connections. However, it was unclear whether they were now being removed because they were acting as KDH clients or due to their reluctance to serve HZDS interests. Indeed, the KDH-era manager of the large oil refinery, Slovnaft, was allegedly replaced after he refused Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky's demands that he subcontract services to HZDS-linked firms. 33 By the winter of 1994, Meciar' s increasingly personal consoledation of party and governmental power had alienated many of his own party members. By February of 1994, a last remaining block of HZDS deputies, led by HZDS co-founder Jozef Moravcik, appeared ready to follow other former HZDS members and allies into opposition. The threat of losing power may have led to a subsequent wave of direct sales. Starting with the "midnight privatizations" of February 1, 2004, Lexa sold forty-four companies with a book value of $96 million for a final sale price of just $22 million. The decisions were notable for their lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and advantageous terms to the purchasers-many of whom had close ties to leading government officials. Thirteen were subsequently annulled 32 Specifically, Meciar was accusing Vojtech Sugar, Jan Carnogursky, Cudovit Cernak and Peter Wiess. "Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," T ASR-Slovakia (February 6, 1994). 33 Confidential interview, Slovnaft insider, Bratislava, February, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 113 by the successor government for contravening the Large Scale Privatization Act of February 1991 , but virtually all of the privatizations were suspect. The beneficiaries included a range of politically connected individuals-from the wife of the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) to Meciar's own Minister of Finance, Julius T6th.34 A March 11 , 1994 report of a commission investigating the privatizations triggered the departure of the dissident-HZDS faction led by Jozef Moravcik and a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the government. In his speech before parliament, HZDS co-founder and Slovak President Michael Kovac openly accused Meciar of a lack of transparency and clientalism in the privatization process, among oth. 35 er th mgs. Meciar's and Lexa's hurried attempts to reorient Slovakia's privatization framework to favor political and economic insiders had run afoul of the opposition's effective use of liberal democratic institutions and norms. When next he gained power, Meciar' s new parliamentary majority would attack these opposition resources directly. VSZ and the Slovak Way of Privatization. One of Meciar's last acts in the1992-1994 government helps illustrate both the zero-sum nature of privatization, as well as its growing politicization. In December of 1993, the state exercised its shareholder rights to remove President Zoltan Berghauer and other top managers from the executive management of the state-owned firm VSZ, Slovakia's largest commercial entity. Berghauer had cofounded the AZZZ and was the lead author of an industry antireform petition in early 1991. 36 Meciar claimed that the top management change was a technocratic decision-made through consulta- 34 Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 121. Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 25. 36 In February of 1991 , only a month after the start of market reforms, the Slovak and Czech industrial federations delivered a joint petition to the Federal Assembly demanding "help in solving the difficult economic and financial situation of industrial companies ... [resulting from] the ill-considered restrictive fiscal , credit and monetary policy of the Federal Government. " Reforms, the industrialists continued, threatened, "the collapse of the entire national economy" and a "declining living standard for all citizens of the state." Zoltan Bergauer et al. , "Petice svaz u pnlmyslu CR a SR Federilnimu shromizdeni CSFR," Hospodafske noviny, February 29, 1991 , p. 3. 35 �114 SLOVAKIA tions with high-ranking bank and industrial managers.37 Yet he did not hide the fact that the change was to reduce the "unwarranted influence" of "opposition parties" in Slovakia's largest enterprise. 38 Berghauer and other purged VSZ managers protested the move, citing a history of political manipulation and threats by the HZDS towards VSZ management. The source of the claim directly attacked Meciar's Minister of Finance, JuliusToth. Toth had been VSZ's Vice President of Finance until he had resigned to join Meciar's government. According to Berghauer, Toth allegedly become enraged when Berghauer and VSZ's management refused to accept an HZDS member on the VSZ Board of Directors. Toth allegedly responded by demanding that the two top VSZ officials resign due to their political support for the KDH and other political opponents of the HZDS. 39 Toth later asserted that the Berghauer team had been stripping assets from the company. Through control of both the VSZ and collaboration with an independent trading company, they allegedly could siphon cash from the VSZ to the trade company by overcharging for supplies and underpaying for products.40 Perhaps to cut these alleged sales out of the revenue loop, or maybe to cut his allies in, Toth's new management team set up a new VSZ-owned sales company to oversee sales responsible for eighty percent of VSZ revenues. 4 1 As Minister of Finance, Toth and Lexa orchestrated the purchase of a 9.52 percent share of VSZ stock through a new private company, Manager a.s., established by five VSZ board members, including prominent HZDS member Alexander Rezes. The purchase was ques37 "Strong in the Saddle," T ASR-Slovakia, February 11, 1994. "Meciar Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," TASRSlovakia, February 6, 1994. 39 "Former Members of VSZ Board Lodge Complaint," CTK Business News, March 21 , 1994. 40 Despite Toth's allegations against Berghauer, no charges were ever filed . 41 Anthony Robinson, "Survey of Slovakia," The Financial Times, December 16, 1994, p. iv. It is unlikely that Toth was genuinely outraged at the allegations of corruption at VSZ. In 1993 he had allegedly used his influence as Minister of Finance to give a trading company, VSZ Selecta, a state contract to sell sugar that the Indian government provided to the Slovak government in place of its cash debt. VSZ Selecta won the contract without the required tender and then sold the sugar on the world market in violation of its contract. Toth was a member of the company's board. "Report on "Sugar Affair" to be out in January," CTK News, December 5, 1993. 38 �SLOVAKIA 115 tionable for its unsightly conflicts of interest, advantageous terms and most of all, its timing. Again, in accordance with the government program, the shares were sold to domestic entrepreneurs at a substantial discount with a generous payment schedule. The discount on the current share value of the package was $36 million.42 After a ten percent down payment, Manager would pay the rest in yearly installments over five years. Manager's members each made their down payment with an interest-free $62,000 loan from the Kosice-based Priemyselna banka (Industrial Bank) whose controlling shareholder was, in turn, the VSZ-controlled fund, Cassiovia Invest. 43 Priemyselna banka, moreover, received these funds from Banka Slovakia (Bank Slovakia), which then served as the repository and investment arm of the FNM. In short, Manager borrowed FNM funds to buy shares from the FNM that in tum benefited close associates of its directors and the man responsible for their appointment, Vladimir Meciar.44 The timing was also controversial. The Meciar government received the proposal to privatize the VSZ shares to Manager on March 7 and the government approved the request on March 11- the day on which parliament finally passed a vote no-confidence in the Meciar cabinet. The FNM and Manager signed the agreement on March 14, the day the government fell. On March 17, VSZ held a general assembly at which the now former Minister of Finance and FNM Board member, JuliusT6th, was elected Chair of VSZ's Board of Directors. Rezes would become Minister of Transportation in 42 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 22 . 0lsson, Ownership, Reform , 223 , note 39. 44 "Approach to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Meciar attempted to establish Banka Slovakia as early as 1993 in his home region of Banska Bystrica as part of his effort to develop a regional banking center. The goal was to use the bank to recycle FNM funds and provide cheap credit for small to medium sized enterprises. After the VSZ deal, however, the opposition charged that it would be used as a means of providing the politically connected with cheap capital to make down payments for privatization deals. In April of 1994, the next government suspended the bank's license to operate. With Meciar's re-election in the fall, the government pushed the National Bank of Slovakia to grant the license. But, after building a costly and elaborate headquarters in Banska Bystrica and suffering from notoriously poor lending practices, the bank had significant difficulties with capitalization. The NBS finally approved a license to begin operating on June I, 1996, but the bank- like most Slovak banks-quickly developed a problem with non-performing loans. 43 �116 SLOVAKIA Meciar's next cabinet. Supporting the vote were VSZ's investment privatization fund, Cassiovia Invest and VUE Invest, the investment company of Vseobecna uverova banka (General Credit Bank-VUB) and Slovakia's largest state owned bank. Ironically, oversight responsibility for VUB had, until four days earlier, lain primarily with T6th's Ministry of Finance.45 Meciar's Opposition Takes Power, March-November, 1993. A five-party caretaker government under the leadership of HZDS defector Jozef Moravcik was formed in mid-March. It promised to restore transparency and accountability to the privatization process and to re-launch the voucher privatization process as soon as possible. This was to be done before the scheduled new elections at the end of September. The coalition fought, however, over how to restore confidence, transparency and speed to the privatization process. Nevertheless, Kevin Deegan-Krause demonstrated how the new coalition allowed itself to be held accountable to competitive political forces. 46 The recent experience with Meciar may have taught the government coalition partners a good lesson in the dangers of overconcentration of power-particularly in the areas of property management and privatization. Yet, the new five-party coalition was fractious and ideologically incoherent. This influenced privatization. On the one hand, the formerly communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDI:) sought to maintain direct sales as the primary method of privatization. On the other hand, the coalition partners accused it of intending to use direct sales to reward its own allies amongst Slovakia's ex-communist industrialists and bureaucrats. The Ministry of Privatization, however, was now led by Milan Janicina, a lawyer from the center-right Democratic Union (DU). He sought to ensure that any direct sales would be a rule-governed, multi-party competitive process, not something to be run exclusively by SDI: dictates. 47 The SDI: did, however, secure an agreement to sub- 45 "Approac h to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Toth also became deputy chairman of Priemyselna banka, Olsson Ownership, Reform, 223, note 39. 46 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 26. 47 Interviews with Milan Janicina, Commercial Lawyer, Bratislava, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 117 ordinate the importance of price in the sales to employment and future investment commitments. 48 Corruption may have been possible in the final sales, but the number of competing interests in the decision making process ensured that the foxes guarding the hen house would keep each other in line. 49 Still , the program was not unimpeachable. Most of the direct privatization sales of fifty-four Slovak enterprises occurred after the elections had delivered a strong plurality to the HZDS but before Meciar had formed a government. 50 The government also conducted a public tender for the government's 24.9 percent share in VSi, attracting interest from nine companies, including the Austrian bank Creditanstalt. The coalition lost power before it could resolve internal bickering over the final buyer. 51 Throughout the summer of 1994, citizens, center-right coalition parties, brokerage firms and investment privatization funds clamored for a second wave of voucher privatization. Janicina fought with SD~'s Minister of the Economy Peter Magvasi (also an AZZZ member) to ensure that there would be enough property offered to make the project worthwhile. In preparation, the Ministry of Finance issued voucher booklets to seventy-two percent of Slovak citizens (ninety percent of those eligible). This was a significantly higher participation rate than the first wave. Janicina secured assets valued at $1.96 billion for the voucher program- making each voucher booklet potentially worth $593.00. After another aggressive campaign from financial intermediaries, fifty-eight percent of voucher holders traded their points for shares in investment privatization funds. 52 If the second wave of voucher privatization was completed, managerial insiders would cede significant additional economic power to the funds. 53 48 OIsson, Ownership, Reform , 124. Anna Grzymala-Busse, " Beyond Clientelism : Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," Comparative Political Studies 41 :4/5 (2008), 638-73 . 50 Jnterview with Rudolf Filkus, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 15, 1997; Janicina interviews, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. 51 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 222 . 52 Tbid. , 124-5. 53 Janici na interview, April I, 1997. 49 �SLOVAKIA Privatization under Meciar's Third Government, 1994-1998. The Moravcik government was short-lived. The SD:C had secured early elections and in the ensuing campaign the center-right fragmented amongst a range of competing personalities. A number of opposition parties failed to cross the five percent threshold in the September-October 1994 vote. Moravcik's Democratic Union (DU) received 8.6 percent, the KDH won 10.l percent, SD:C got 10.4 percent and the ethnic Hungarian Coalition took 10.2 percent of the votes. The HZDS, meanwhile, won a thirty-five percent plurality. This was less than in 1992. However, since thirteen percent of the electorate voted for parties that did not pass the five percent threshold, the ideological weight of the next parliament shifted sharply back towards Meciar and his national-populism. After a month of negotiations, the HZDS formed an ideologically awkward coalition with the two smallest delegations in parliament-the extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS-5.4 percent) led by the garrulous Jan Slota,54 and the extreme left Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS-7.34 percent). 55 To discipline his junior coalition partners, Meciar could use the threat of an alternative coalition with the reformed communist party, the SD:C.56 Critics speculated that the "brown-red" wings of the new ruling coalition were held together only by the promise of privatization benefits. 57 The National-Populist Privatization Concept and its Implementation. Meciar's privatization policies formally settled the long-standing ideological battle between market reformers and gradualists over privatization policy, but in reality, this conflict had stood proxy for an underlying clash of interests between enterprise outsiders and incumbent firm management. Gradualist concepts were hijacked, to an extent, and combined with clientalism and xenophobic nationa54 1n the spring of 1993, Meciar had helped Jan Slota oust Cernak from control over the SNS. Cernak left (with Janicina) to form the Democratic Union. Cernak interview, April 2, 1997. 55 Grigorij Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Party System," in Soi\a Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation , 50. 56 Innes, Czechoslo vakia, 262. 57 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 64. �SLOVAKIA 119 !ism to benefit the governing coalition and its allies at, as we shall see, a growing cost to the public. The formal theory underlying the Meciar government's privatezation program echoed the Dolgos strategy of the fall of 1992. The government would work closely with incumbent industrial managers to achieve ownership patterns that would be most appropriate to a coordinated industrial policy. The state would integrate equity transfer, credit and other policies in ways that would boost the strength of Slovak national firms on world markets and minimize transformational pain at the enterprise level. The variety of capitalism officially envisioned was thus much closer to a continental-style state-coordinated market economy than a more hands-off liberal market economy. However, Slovak industrial leaders at AZZZ also invoked Asian development models to explain what they were trying to accomplish.58 Insiders Ascendant. In practice, Meciar's coalition privatized the privatization process. It also subordinated capital markets regulation to the needs of incumbent managers at the expense of enterprise outsiders. The main target was the funds that emerged through voucher privatization. 59 Meciar's new parliamentary majority began to work even before he formed a government. In an overnight session of parliament on November 3-4, 1994, his new coalition passed legislation that secured exclusive control and oversight of privatization, the state media and the secret service. 60 An amendment to the 1991 Large Scale Privati58 Interview with Frantisek Bruckrneyer, General Director, Federation of Employers' Unions and Associations (AZZZ), Bratislava, February 6, 1997. Prior to becoming Director of AZZZ, Bruckrneyer worked for the Czechoslovak federal government after the Warsaw Pact invasion (1970-1974) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow (1974-1980). In the 1980s, he directed the state-owned firm, Zdroj , before co-founding AZZZ in 1991 . Compiled from "Leaders.sk" database. Trend Holding Co. and The Slovak Spectator, Bratislava. http://www.leaders.sk/index.php?id=674 [accessed August 30, 2010). 59 Marcincin et al., "Privatization Methods"; Miklos, "Economic Transition,"; Ivan Miklos, "Privatizacia," in Martin Butora and Michal lvantysin, eds. Slovensko, 1997: Suhrn a sprava o stave spolocnosti a trendoch na rok 1998. (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky, 1998). 60 Soi\a Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 10. �120 SLOVAKIA zation Act transferred the right to propose and decide direct sales from the privatization ministry to the relatively less transparent FNM (Act #369/1994). The majority then stacked the FNM's Presidium and Supervisory Board with coalition officials and cancelled Janicina's 54 direct post-election sales (Act #370/1994). In five cases, new property owners had already taken legal possession of their assets from the state. 61 This violated both international human rights law and the Slovak Constitution. 62 The transfer of power to the FNM had important implications. The Constitutional Court later ruled that, as a joint stock company, the FNM did not have to submit to government review or regulatory oversight. Hence, it was exempt from oversight by the supreme government control body that could oversee and audit state agencies. Even had it not been exempt from oversight, however, the November 3-4 "night of the long knives" removed opposition parliamentarians from the oversight committee. The ruling majority was now fully responsible for monitoring itself. 63 While extolling the virtues of a state-directed transformation, Meciar provided the new measures with a market reform cover story. He claimed that insulating the privatization process from opposition would allow the FNM to make decisions according to technocratic criteria, free from political influence. In 1998, when the damage had been done, this allowed him to claim that although he still agreed with his "concept" of privatization, he had not been responsible for its administration. 64 Meciar's "concept" ultimately excluded outsiders from privatization. He initially promised that the second wave of voucher privatization would go ahead as planned-although with less property than Janicina envisioned. In July of 1995, however, Parliament cancelled voucher privatization altogether (Act #190/1995). Voucher booklets 61 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 126. Both Article 17b of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly 217 /1948) and Protocol 1, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1952) secure the right to possessions. 63 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. In the fall of 1997, Parliament finally gave into EU and opposition pressure and appointed Ivan Miklos to the supervisory board of the FNM. 64 CTK News, May 8, 1998. Meciar was never directly implicated in a privatization scandal while in power, Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist, (New York: Pal grave, 2006), 91. 62 �SLOVAKIA 121 could now be exchanged for a bond with a face value of l 0,000 Sk to be redeemable in 2001 or on the bearer's 65 th birthday and with an interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). Proceeds to meet the bond obligations were to come from sales of state property- a promise that the FNM's new privatization policy of selling to domestic industrial managers at a deep discount made impossible to keep . In its public statements, AZZZ took full credit for the cancellation of vouchers.65 A Constitutional Court decision overturned parts of Act #190 in late 1996.66 By that time, however, the FNM had already privatized most of Slovakia's remaining "non-strategic" industrial enterprises. Even had the government wanted to re-launch the voucher program, it would now have had to renationalize private properties to find adequate assets to make the program work. An additional measure passed in July of 1995 enhanced the government's capabilities to coordinate a state-directed industrial policy through the Strategic Enterprises Act (# 175/ 1995). The purpose of the act was to preserve the "public interest" in crucial Slovak industries. First, twenty-nine firms would be exempt from privatization altogether. This included the fundamental sectors of the economy including telecommunications, energy and the defense-related engineering sector. The list of strategic companies, made public in the summer of 1996, also included some at least questionably "strategic" firms such as health spas. 67 All told, the Strategic Enterprises Act reduced the book value of assets remaining to be privatized by half. 68 A second, legally controversial provision of the act, forced an additional forty-five firms to transfer a "golden share" to the firm's founding ministry-in most cases, to Jan Ducky's Ministry of the Economy. The Constitutional Court overturned this prescription in April of 1996 as a clear violation of property rights, but tellingly, the owners of major pro-HZDS firms , like Slovnaft, had failed to give 65 Lachovit, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie". Katarina Zavacka, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 164. 67 The administration may have legitimately feared that privatization would mean the services of the spas would no longer be readily available or affordable to average Slovaks through the health care system. 68 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 130. 66 �122 SLOVAKIA the state ownership rights over the golden share. Their reaction gave credence to the market reformers' expectations that privatizationeven via a highly politicized process-would produce independent agents with the potential, at least, to resist government policies that hurt their material interests. 69 In November of 1996, the Constitutional Court also annulled Parliament's transfer of privatization powers to the FNM (Act #370/1994). The court argued that the act had illegally abrogated the state's responsibility for the transformation of state property. The Court stopped short of retroactively annulling the FNM ' s actions, however. Stripped of its exclusive prerogative over direct sales, the HZDS-controlled FNM continued to serve its clients through public auctions of shares from the FNM portfolio. While share auctions are a relatively uncontroversial privatization mode, critics allege that the FNM often limited access about the time and location of the auction to all but the intended buyer. 70 Coalition Control over Direct Sales. Between January of 1994 and November of 1996, the FNM privatized at a furious pace. While Act #3 70/1994 removed privatezation from the government's portfolio of responsibilities, coalition officials and industrial insiders from AZZZ retained close control over the process. Two FNM officials, HZDS member and FNM Chairman Milan Rehak, and Co-Chair and Director of the Direct Sales Section, Jan Povraznik, were responsible for executing Presidium decisions . These were closely controlled by the ruling coalition. Junior coalition partner ZRS had formal responsibility for the privatization process . ZRS member Peter Bisak ran the Ministry of Privatization while ZRS vice-chairman Stefan Gavornik chaired the Presidium. Gavornik attested, however, that his influence was minimal: while the HZDS had no seats on the nine member Presidium, AZZZ members held six seats and hence a majority of the votesand they supported the HZDS .7 1 Understandably, now that AZZZ 69 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi , "Bridging Slovakia's Elite Chasm," Transitions, November, 1997. 70 Jnterview with Gabriel Palacka, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 18, 1997 ; Miklos, "Economic Transition," 67-8 . 71 Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Postcommunist Europe (London: Ashgate, 2005), 64. �SLOVAKIA 123 influence was secured, incumbent managers who had previously been skeptical about privatization became its strong advocates. 72 According to Sharon Fisher, regional committees of five coalition representatives determined properties to be sold and top coalition officials made final decisions at coalition meetings every Wednesday at 6:00pm. 73 Allegedly, the meetings rarely considered the business merits of the proposal-or even how the sale would further the official goal of coordinated industrial restructuring. As Gavomik recalled, "We were .... lobbying for those who were coming to us." Yet, Gavomik added, "not even a nail was sold without Meciar."74 Milan Cagala, a HZDS-appointed FNM presidium member, confirmed these allegations. 75 More broadly, members of the ruling coalition were open about clientalism. 76 As Minister of the Economy, Jan Ducky (HZDS) explained, "every government gives advantages to those groups that cooperate with them. This is not controversial." 77 Yet sales went beyond clientalism to open self-dealing-included sales to leading ruling coalition politicians and their family members. As Gavomik admitted, "Of course there are [politicians in the privatization process], and I know about them, but I won't tell. After all .. . every citizen has a right to take part in privatization." 78 Participants in the FNM's direct sales program typically received terms similar to the midnight privatizations of February 1994. Buyers-usually incumbent managers- would receive the company for 72 Ibid. , 35. Fisher, Political Change, 88-9. The regional meetings were an institutional mechanism for regionally based privatization groups to make their claims to property. In the eyes of observers, the groups became associated with leading HZDS officials and clients. For example, it was rumored that meetings in Kosice tended to be dominated by Rezes, those in Banska Bystrica by Meciar, and those in Tmava by Vladimir Poor. Interview with Valer Ostrovsky, CEO, Schultz and Ostrovsky, Bratislava, May 14, 1997. 74 Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic," Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 75 Ibid. 76 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 66-7. 77 Author's notes from "Slovak Spectator Live, Debates for Democracy Series: Brigita Schmognerova & Jan Ducky," Bratislava, 1996. An FNM spokesman shared this sentiment with the author. Interview with Oto Balogh, Press Spokesman, Fund for National Property, Bratislava, April 22, 1998. 78 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 277-8, note 26. 73 �124 SLOVAKIA as little as one third, one-fifth, or even less of its book value. In practice, the typical firm required a ten to fifteen percent down payment, often using money borrowed from a state-owned financial institution. Moreover, installments on the purchaser' s debt to the FNM were usually spread over ten years and deductible from the company' s tax bill. These terms and often the buyers themselves were also frequently kept secret. In the case of the illegal sale of the strategically listed and highly profitable oil extraction and storage company, Nafta Gbely a.s., the new owners of the company remained a matter of intense speculation among opposition politicians and the press. The official address of the purchasing company, Druha obchodna, a.s. was initially an abandoned building. Vladimir Poor, Trnava's HZDS chief and a member of the regional coalition privatization committee later admitted to being a primary beneficiary of the deal, along with a close Meciar aide.79 FNM President Gavornik later alleged that Poor was able to meet the company's 575 million Sk purchase price simply by raiding the company's 1,075 million Sk capital account. If Gavornik is right, Poor used the firm's bank account to buy the firm for himself. Prosecutors later unsuccessfully charged Poor with "tunneling" 300 million Sk out of the company, but dropped the charges. In the end, the circumstances of the company ' s privatization were never fully investigated, perhaps because Poor voluntarily returned the company to the state. 80 In another controversial case, the FNM sold a controlling stake of Slovnaft, Slovakia's oil refinery, to Slovintegra-a company owned by Slovnaft' s director, Slavomir Hatina and nineteen other managers. Hatina was a financial backer of the HZDS and bought thirty-nine percent of the company at an eighty percent discount over the currently traded price. The initial down payment, moreover, was only 1.56 percent of the sale value. The FNM soon reduced the sale price by an additional eighty-four percent to reward management for meeting its promised investment and employment targets.81 The privatization of Slovakia' s largest company, VSZ, also continued apace under Meciar's direct sales framework. In 1995, junior 79 Fisher, Political Change, 93-4; Marcincin et al. , "Privatization Methods. " Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic, Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 81 Marcincin et. al. , "Privatization Methods," 18. 80 �SLOVAKIA 125 coalition member ZRS engineered a sale of ten percent of VSZ shares to Hutnik, a company formally owned by VSZ's union members but strongly under the influence of Minister of Transport (until 1996), Alexander Rezes. Again the price was a fraction of the real value of the shares and payments were made on a generous installment plan. Hutnik then collaborated with Rezes to form Ferrimex, a company that purchased another 15.4 percent on extraordinarily generous terms.82 The deal cemented Rezes ' s control over VSZ. Rezes responded by essentially barring minority shareholder VUB kup6n (an investment company set up by Slovakia' s state-run savings bank) from receiving any information about the health and activities of the firm _sJ Nationalism in Privatization. The Meciar government employed popular economic nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric to justify its choice of a privatization program. Junior coalition partner SNS campaigned in 1994 on a promise to protect Slovakia from "impoverishment" at the hands of foreign investors.84 The subsequent 1995 government program declaration promised to privilege "domestic business subjects" over foreigners in the privatization process. National entrepreneurs would then deal with their assets as they saw fit in what Meciar correctly predicted would be a "third wave" of privatization to foreigners. 85 In practice, Slovak government officials remained deeply suspicious of foreign direct investment and often sought to block foreign partnerships. "We just want to avoid them coming in and closing [the company]," remarked one FNM official in an interview with the author. "Investors only come to misuse companies and disappear." 86 One example is notable for its senselessness: a foreign advisor to the government related that he worked with an entrepreneur to acquire a strategic foreign partner to modernize and expand production of his product line for export abroad. While the entrepreneur was not explicitly prohibited from signing the deal, he received several telephone calls from top officials in one ministry warning that he would 82 01sson, Ownership, Reform, 223 -5. lbid., 182. 84 Fisher, Political Change, 89. 85 Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 65 . 86 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997. 83 �126 SLOVAKIA be held fully accountable if even one Slovak lost his job as a result of the investment. He lost his nerve and cancelled the contract. The enterprise thus remained in debt and was unable to raise the money on its own for modernization; nor was it able to make its own marketing contacts abroad. The advisor noted that this was typical of the Meciar government's attitude towards foreign joint-ventures. 87 The combination of national capitalism and knee-jerk nationalism cost Slovakia dearly. Joint ventures with multinational corporations were at that time leading the deep industrial restrucuring of Central Europe. They had the capital, marketing networks and technology to outperform domestically privatized companies and they were far outperforming firms that remained in state hands, measured in both production increases and productivity growth. 88 Despite this growing record of success, the ruling coalition sold a mere five companies to foreigners out of a total 347. 89 On a per capita basis, by 1998, Slovakia had received half the FDI of Poland, one-third the FDI of the Czech Republic and only a tenth of the FDI of Hungary.90 This was a lost opportunity. Over the next few years, new owners would effortlessly enrich themselves by "flipping" their cheaply acquired companies to international capital-realizing for themselves gains that should have gone into the FNM accounts to meet its new privatization bond obligations. 91 Insider-Controlled Capital Markets Regulation. Having gained control over the privatization process, incumbent managers pressured the government for a favorable capital markets policy. Throughout 1994 and into 1995, investment privatization companies had clashed with incumbent managers in company board rooms. As Michael Olsson relates, the managers wanted the new ow87 Confidential interview with a foreign financial service executive, Bratislava, October 20, 1996. Most of the foreign financial service executives and consultants I sroke with had similar stories. 8 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Elite Fragmentation, Industry and the Prospects for Democracy in Slovakia: Insights from New Elite Theory" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 1997), http: //www.ciaonet.org/book/gould/ [accessed February 23, 2012]. 89 Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 133. 90 Gould and Szomolinyi, "Elite Fragmentation," 58. 91 Fisher, Political Change, 94. �SLOVAKIA 127 ners to contribute capital while they continued to control the direction of the company. The new owners of the funds, by contrast, sought to pressure the incumbent managers into improving cost efficiency, technological and organizational restructuring, and developing new- often international- marketing arrangements. It did not help that the funds with diverse portfolios did not have sufficient expertise to cover all the firms in their portfolio. Fund representtatives were often barely out of university and entirely lacking in experience. A cultural clash thus developed between the older generation of industrial managers-most of whom had their start in Slovak industry in the 1960s and 70s-and the "young men from Bratislava_ ,,92 Government actions in 1995 wrested industrial control from the funds back to the industrial managers. Incumbent managers began to use the direct sales process to tum the tables at meetings of general shareholders. Olsson writes, "[M]anagers who acquired a large chunk of shares on soft terms from the FNM all of a sudden lost all respect for other minority shareholders .... funds could only sit by [as] ... managers or other domestic industrial groups took over." 93 The government also intervened in capital markets to further tilt the balance of power towards management. Legislation in 1995 reduced the maximum stake investment privatization companies could hold in a company from twenty to ten percent. It also prohibited investment privatization companies from placing officials on a company ' s Board of Directors. This weakened the ability of fund-dominated Supervisory Boards to monitor the day-to-day actions of company managers. Parliament also passed capital markets regulation in 1996 that reduced the transparency of capital markets transacttions and all but eliminated minority shareholder rights. President Kovac returned the legislation, demanding better protection for minority shareholders. Ironically, the funds were not necessarily in favor of a better regulated market. The Slovak capital market had few of the institutional safeguards to protect minority shareholder rights and prevent insider trading that we find in more developed equity markets. Controlling owners were often able to expropriate value from minority 92 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 182. 93 fbid. �128 SLOVAKIA shareholders without penalty. This meant, ironically, that the emergence of a dominant shareholder in a firm often would lead to a decline in the value of the firms' shares. 94 The result was a loss in equity market liquidity: when one lost control over a company, one would often be unable to sell one's shares at any price. Wise investors knew that the majority shareholders could tunnel the real value of the company elsewhere. Under such conditions, a passive portfolio stake in all but a few "blue chip" companies made little sense. Funds found they could best make money by secretly acquiring a controlling share of companies in unregistered, off market trades of physical paper shares and then selling them at a profit to a strategic investor. Given that a more transparent market would actually undermine this strategy, a number of funds were somewhat ambivalent about reforms that might make passive portfolio investment safer and profitable. 95 The ruling coalition made things even worse. It sought to limit the funds to a portfolio role even as it actively undermined their minority shareholder rights. Ministry of Finance capital markets regulator Jozef Magula testified on behalf of minority shareholder rights in front of Parliament--much to the disappointment of top AZZZ managers . A better law was passed in 1997 .96 Still, the new law continued to allow controlling shares to be bought anonymously in secret off-market trades. 97 Remarked one broker philosophically, "at least we have rules."98 94 Economist Joseph Stiglitz observed this phenomenon in the Czech equity market, but the problems were quite similar in Slovakia. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Comments on 'Czech Republic: Capital Market Review Report,"' Delivered at the Ministry of Finance, Prague, Czech Republic, May 9, I 997 ; For details, see Gould, The Politics o[ Privatization, 81- 10 I. 9 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 184-5 . 96 Magula claims that, as a result of his parliamentary testimony, he came under AZZZ pressure to step down. He relented and moved to the central bank. Interview with Jozef Magula, Member of the Bank Board, General Relations Department, National Bank of Slovakia, Bratislava, July 28, 1998. 97 Magula interview, July 28, 1998 ; Interview with Rudolf Lachovic, President, Association of Investment Managers and Investment Funds of the Slovak Republic, Brati slava, June I 6, 1997; for the early market regulatory climate, see Juris, I 994. 98 Ostrovsky interview, May 14, I 997. �SLOVAKIA 129 Meaningful portfolio investment disappeared under Meciar. In addition, led by Magula, the government destroyed a rapidly growing mutual fund industry in 1996. Unlike the privatization funds, the new mutual funds gathered people's savings and invested them in the market and other assets. The pioneer was Prva slovenska investicna skupina, a.s (First Slovak Investment Company-PSIS) an open-ended fund into which citizens could deposit and withdraw like a checking account. By early 1995, the PSIS's Sporofund had over $50 million in savings. 99 It was allegedly well-run and had done a reasonable job at building shareholder value within its portfolio. But in the fall of 1994, the PSIS used its savings to invest in citizen voucher booklets issued under the Moravcik government. Vouchers, the PSIS controversially argued, were a form of state security and hence a legal investment for the mutual fund. Over 750,000 Slovaks signed up for the PSIS voucher privatization funds . Had the second wave of voucher privatization gone forward as planned, PSIS would have become the second wave's largest owner of shares in Slovak enterpnses. However, PSIS owners were also strong contributors to the Democratic Union-the party of Janicina and Moravcik. Moreover, the PSIS had a stake in the independent daily newspaper SME. Both PSIS' s political orientation and its potential economic power were a threat to the ruling coalition and its industrial allies. In the spring of 1995, the Ministry of Finance revoked PSIS 's operating license. Courts found the measure illegal and ordered that the Ministry restore the license, but the Ministry simply revoked it again and transferred control of the company's Sporofund portfolio to Harvard Investment Company. In the face of a rapid withdrawal from the Sporofund, Harvard liquidated the fund and paid off savers about half of what they had put in. 100 The Coalition Assault on Democracy, 1995-1998. Meciar's coalition could not have achieved such close control over the privatization framework without a significant attack on democratic political and civic institutions. Hence, while Slovakia's 99 Interview with Vladimir Hoffman, Broker, Delta Securities, Prague, Czech Republic, July 25 , 1997. I0°Magula interview, July 28, 1998; Ostrovsky interview, May 14, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 187-90. �130 SLOVAKIA democratic decline from 1994 to 1998 was not exclusively caused by privatization, it was certainly linked to it. Indeed, it is unlikely that the ruling coalition and its allies would have fought so hard had the nation's most lucrative assets not been available for appropriation. After ad hoc encroachments on democratic norms in 1993-94, between late 1994 and 1998, Meciar' s parliamentary majority reduced Slovakia's formal democracy to an illiberal shell verging on soft authoritarianism. One permissive cause was the majoritarian nature of the Slovak Constitution. Led by a strong executive and unhindered by a weak presidency already on the defensive, the Meciar majority sought to override the remaining checks posed by the Constitutional Court, the political opposition, civil society and regional and municipal governments. This enabled a reorientation of the privatization framework towards political and economic insiders, but it also endangered "horizontal accountability"-the country' s internal balance of institutional power. 101 Meciar' s squabble with the president was the most visible aspect of this encroachment. Kovac ' s 1993 veto over Meciar's choice of Ivan Lexa to run the privatization ministry marked the beginning of a running battle between the government and the president. The conflict took on added intensity during Meciar's third government. Kovac did not have much institutional power to start with. His repeated vetoes of parliamentary acts were quickly overridden by a simple majority- entirely in line with the Constitution. Yet, Meciar sought to further weaken and discredit the president. An important player in this campaign was the Slovak Information Service (SIS), Slovakia ' s secret service. First, Meciar had to gain control over it. In the November 3-4, 1994 session of parliament, Meciar's majority excluded opposition parties from participating on the SIS oversight committee. In the spring of 1995, parliament transferred power to appoint the head of Slovakia's intelligence agency from President Kovac to Prime Minister Meciar. Meciar then appointed his trusted protege, Ivan Lexa, to head the service. 102 Over the next two and a half years, Lexa waged a war of "dirty tricks" against the president and harassed civil society and indepen10 1 Guillenno O' Donnell, "Delegati ve Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5: I ( 1994), 55-69; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities. 102 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. �SLOVAKIA 131 dent entrepreneurs. The war reached its climax in August of 1995 when someone- possibly Meciar, but more probably Lexa-ordered that the president' s son be kidnapped, drugged, and dumped in neighboring Austria. When Robert Remias, the confidant of an exSIS agent, implicated Lexa's SIS in discussions with the editor of the leading independent daily SME, Remias was assassinated. Meciar's government squashed the investigation into the assassinationreplacing three investigators before finding one who suspended the inquiry into the SIS link. The new investigator concealed evidence that 150-200 grams of Semtex had ignited the car's propane tank. Now on the defensive, the SIS launched a campaign to show that Kovac Jr. had arranged for his own kidnapping.103 The battle between Meciar and Kovac ended only after the president's term of office expired in 1997. As the government and opposition could not achieve the super majority needed to select a replacement under a clearly flawed constitutional provision, presidential powers fell to the Prime Minister. Meciar subsequently used his presidential powers to pardon anyone linked to the kidnapping and Remias's murder-despite the lack of any official finding that a crime had taken place. 104 The government also encroached on the rights and prerogatives of the opposition, the courts, civil society and the media. In addition to oversight of the secret service, the November 3-4, 1994 parliamentary session blocked opposition MPs from participation on all substantive committees except the environment committee. The coalition further revealed its hegemonic intentions by trying to have former Prime Minister Moravcik' s party, the Democratic Union (DU), banned from parliament and by charging President Kovac with treason. Both efforts failed. To safeguard against a repeat of the 1993-4 defections of Kovac, Moravcik, Filkus, Knazko and others, defectors from the HZDS were now treated with open disrespect for the constitution. After HZDS co-founder Frantisek Gaulider left the HZDS parliamentary club in 1996, the HZDS leadership produced a pre-signed letter of resignation that they had obtained in 1994 to ensure party discipline. The 103 Kieran Wiliams, "Slovakia Since 1993," in Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001 ), 130-140. 104 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 48-50. �132 SLOVAKIA parliamentary majority then stripped him of his parliamentary mandate, barred him from the building and replaced him in parliament with a HZDS loyalist. The Constitutional Court ruled these acts to be unconstitutional, but parliament did not reinstate him- another violation of Slovakia' s fragile system of checks and balances. Gaulider also received numerous threats to his life. 105 Media and civil society also came under intense legal and extralegal pressure from the government and allegedly the SIS. The HZDS attempted to monopolize channels for societal interest group representation by creating bureaucratic barriers to their legal operation and by establishing party-controlled interest groups that competed with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. 106 Similarly in the media, parliament' s November 1994 legislation excluded the opposition from any role in oversight over public broadcasting. The state-controlled mass media and sympathetic newspapers then justified the government's actions with a torrent of unbalanced coverage, nationalism, xenophobia, personal slurs and misdirection. 107 Things were also tough for the independent media. Following his reporting on the Kovac, Jr. case, the editor of SME found a dead cat nailed to his door and his car burned. An anonymous leafleting campaign accused two other critical journalists of pornography and pedophilia. A third journalist who looked too closely at the links between Alexander Rezes and the HZDS was beaten up in a Kosice restaurant. 108 Meanwhile, privatization beneficiaries frequently bought and attempted to control the editorial content of the independent media. When VSZ took over the business daily 105 Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation," 43 ; Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, "Preface," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 5. 06 ' Darina Malova, "The Development of Interest Representation in Slovakia after 1989: From 'Transmission Belts' to ' Party-State Corporatism?"' in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 93113 . 07 ' The Helsinki Civic Assembly and the Association for the Support for Local Democracy survey concluded that state-run Slovak Television violated the principles of fa irness more often than any other public or private media outlet during the 1998 electoral campaign. It devoted seventy-five percent of its news programs to Met iar and the HZDS, RFEIRL News line, 2: 192 (October 5, 1998), Part II . 108 Innes, Czechoslovakia, 313 , note 139. �SLOVAKIA 133 Narodna obroda, for example, the new owners fired the newspaper's independent-minded editor. Overall, while the independent media functioned effectively, it faced numerous forms of petty harassment from various government agencies. 109 Independent news sources, however, did not reach the entire population. In much of the country, the state broadcast media was the primary source of information. After the November 3-4 session of parliament, government loyalists controlled the state media and state broadcasting reflected their views, even to the point of collaborating with the SIS to fabricate "investigative reports" slandering the president. Nor did the most important independent media source-the television station Markiza-initially have the coverage capacity or willingness to acquaint Slovaks with the details of privatization or other rule of law issues. Toward the end of the 1996-1998 period, however, TV Markiza did become a crucial source of alternative information in Slovakia. 11 0 As the Meciar government came into conflict with basic liberal institutions and freedoms , the EU, NA TO, European governments and the United States all registered their displeasure. The EU, in particular, issued a series of diplomatic demarches as part of its dialogue with applicant countries. 111 In 1996, Freedom House reduced Slovakia's political rights ranking from "free" to "partially free." 112 However, the nastiest rap to the government's knuckles came in July of 1997, after the government illegally cancelled a national referendum on NATO membership. The European Commission recommended that Slovakia be excluded from the first wave of EU membership negotiations. While Slovakia was a liberal democracy in 109 Andrej Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media in the Post-Communist Transition of Slovakia" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 187-208. 110 Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media," 196. 111 Alexander Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation and the Conflict over Slovakia's International Alignment," in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 209-30; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, l everage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 11 2 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World, 2007," Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2007 . �134 SLOVAKIA form, the Commission opined, it operated differently in practice. 113 NATO Followed suit and excluded Slovakia from its first round of • 114 expansion. The Meciar government dismissed these external critics by questioning the objectivity of their processes and critiquing the patriotism of domestic opponents who agreed with them . Yet, the blows hurt. Slovakia's young, urban and educated citizens were deeply concerned with proving the country's western credentials and desperately wished to join Europe 's most exclusive clubs. Thus, the EU and to a lesser extent NA TO, increasingly put the government in a bind: Meciar could not comply with their "conditions" and still retain his increasingly politicized and often illegal control over political and economic life. As Milada Vachudova pointed out, "political power depended on strategies that were incompatible with the EU's re~uirements of liberal democracy and comprehensive market reform." 15 With the September/October 1998 parliamentary elections approaching, the HZDS even appeared ready to jettison free and fair elections. Parliament amended the electoral law in ways that gave the Ministry of the Interior greater influence in counting the vote; and it put ambiguous and potentially expandable limitations on the ability of the private media to cover the election. New electoral rules also shackled the ability of small parties or coalitions to participate in the election. Finally, the HZDS had the courts review the leading opposition coalition 's eligibility to participate. Many worried that should the government apply a literal interpretation of its new laws, it could eliminate a number of important institutions of liberal democracy, including the right to contestation and participation as well as the right to alternative sources of information. Opponents feared a fullfledged authoritarian turn . 116 Privatization's Half-way Reform. Meciar's privatization program produced stakeholders in dysfun113 European Commission, Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application for Membership of the European Union , (Brussels: European Union, 1997), section I. 3. 114 Duleba, " Democratic Consolidation." 115 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 38. 11 6 1.M. Viersma, "Sprava docasnej pozorovatelskej misie na Slovensku," Euro Report, no. I 5, 1998, pp. 22-23. �SLOVAKIA 135 ctional economic policies. This was not necessarily pre-ordained. The first two Slovak governments retained the basic elements of the market reform program inherited from the federal government. An independent National Bank of Slovakia kept the Slovak currency strong, while the first two post-independence governments restricted their fiscal expenditures and preserved a liberalized trade environment. By 1995-6, Slovakia's firms were beginning to find new markets in Western Europe. Unemployment, still high at thirteen percent, was beginning to inch down. With so much slack in the labor market, inflationary pressures remained acceptable-reflecting a sustainable increase in demand as tradable products integrated into world markets. The major problem was the deliberate coalition policy of politicized reform. 1997-8 turned out to be challenging years in the global economy. Yet, the network of industry-state-party ties shaped by an insider privatization process and illiberal politics made Slovakia even more vulnerable to a downturn. 117 Missed tax payments, uncompetitive government procurement programs, significant new government financial obligations, delayed enterprise restructuring, low foreign direct investment and a troubled banking sector all contributed to an economic crisis that would cost Slovakia the next three years of growth. Manipulation of Debt. The Slovak Republic shows that a government's capacity to protect investor property rights and enforce debt contracts is crucial to the efficiency of privatization. 118 The Meciar government's policy of direct sales led to a rapid concentration of ownership, but it did not always produce more efficient behavior. According to interviews with Western financial services experts and equity market actors, Slovak owners often rejected enterprise restructuring and instead used their insider access to cash flows and assets from privatized 117 OECD, (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Slovakia, (Paris: OECD, 1999), 29-30. 11 8 Olsson, Ownership, Reform; Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, "Privatization and Corporate Governance," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0. Krueger, eds, Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region. NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics, 12 (2001), 13-34. http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0l82 .pdf [accessed February 23, 2012]. �136 SLOVAKIA enterprises to get rich quickly-a process known as "rent seeking." Much of the reason relates to debt and the firms' low purchase prices. Slovak firms carried a large outstanding burden of debt which they were not necessarily pressured to honor. First, Slovakia's bankruptcy law privileged debtors over creditors, reinforcing a persistent problem with overdue liabiities. 11 9 Second, the administration of the first wave of voucher privatization in Slovakia led to an initial concentration of privatized property in the state-bank owned funds . These state-owned banks often transgressed the official firewall between their lending and equity management operations and forced firms to take on more loans than they needed. 120 The percentage of nonperforming loans in the portfolios of Slovakia's three state banks skyrocketed between 1996 and 1998 from twenty-five to thirty-seven percent. 121 Third, privatization in highly discounted client or management buyouts failed to bring in new cash or debt relief to Slovak companies. Despite the often-symbolic purchase prices and favorable repayment terms, politically connected buyers would often increase debt by borrowing from state banks to make their down payment to the FNM. Privatized firms also frequently stopped paying their taxes. Between 1995 and 1998, tax arrears of private firms in Slovakia tripled to about sixteen percent of total state expenditures. Fully paid, this would have been enough to eliminate the budget deficit. 122 The scarcity of cash in the economy did not bode well for restructuring. Many managers privatized their firms only to find themselves apparently condemned to eke out a living at the margins of solvency for years on end. Facing such choices, and given lucrative 11 9 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, p. 97 . Debt loading is the practice of pushing unnecessary loans on cash rich firms at high rates as a means of extracting their funds. According to Andrew Schwartz, it was a common practice among bank-owned privatization funds in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Since debt loading siphoned off cash that should have been shared with the enterprise ownership's minority shareholders, it was a form of tunneling. Andrew Schwartz, The Politics of Greed: How Privatization Structured Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 236-7; Appel, A New Capitalist Order, 64; Jarko Fidrmuc and Andreas Worgotter, "Czech Banking Sector: Reasons of Banking Crises and Prospects," Discussion Parer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1998. 21 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 79. 122 Ibid., 54-55 . 120 �SLOVAKIA 137 opportunities for cash assets elsewhere, 123 it actually made sense for new owners to strip their companies and return the shells to the FNM before making the first installment payment. Another option was to consume the company slowly-meeting its minimal obligations to the FNM and tax office, defaulting on inter-enterprise debt and siphoning off the extra cash. 124 Officially, the FNM was allowed to control major asset transfers in firms with FNM debt, but in practice, it was too over-stretched to monitor all transactions. 125 Meciar's HZDS- through the government- held the ends of the long strings of debt that permeated the economy. Ideally, given its commitment to state-led industrial restructuring, these debt obligetions should have been used by the government and the Ministries of Finance and Economy to coordinate restructuring efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of the Economy's official statement on industrial policy made it clear that control over liability networks was a crucial component of its effort to engage in industrial restructuring. The Ministry also aspired to promote the development of asset networks, "by supporting groupings of enterprises into holdings," to "pool investment resources." 126 The reality was that, due to coalition permeation by privileged 123 In one example of crowding out, the author interviewed an industrial manager who had recently signed a contract to produce copper pipes for a firm in Germany. When it came time to buy scrap metal to begin production, however, the cash he had reserved for the purpose had disappeared and he had to default on the contract. He soon learned that the owners had moved the funds to a short-term security with a return far greater than that offered by the copper pipe contract. Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povazske strojame, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, July, 22 1998. 124 Indeed, one EU sponsored consultant that I spoke with actually advised his clients to engage in a similar "triage" strategy of debt management. He advised managers facing illiquidity to delay paying those creditors who were no longer essential to the firm while using scarce cash to meet obligations to those creditors who were. The understanding was that the legal framework would favor the debtor. Confidential interview, foreign financial consultant, Bratislava, April, 1997. 125 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997 . Ironically, the politicization of credit and debt may have meant that the incentives to "rip off' stakeholders and minority shareholders were greater for owners who did not enjoy close contacts with the government. Unlike their well-connected competitors, they were less likely to win any dispensations from government creditors at the state-owned banks, the FNM or the tax officials. 126 Ministry of the Economy, SR, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update." Ministry of the Economy, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1997. �138 SLOVAKIA industrial interests, it was the governing coalition's industrial clients (as well as those firms that could "arrange" for ad hoc dispensations) that often pulled the strings of Slovak industrial and privatization policy. The result was that state-business networks were used to channel present and future tax revenues into the pockets of politically important industries and individuals. Ironically, after the Meciar government fell in 1998, the successor government picked up these long strings and used them to regain control of many enterprises. Revitalization and Industrial Policy. Even inter-enterprise debt and tax arrears provided opportunities for government manipulation. As noted, the bankruptcy framework privileged debtors over creditors. As most AZZZ members were debtors, there was little incentive for the industrial lobby to support a change in policy. Yet the government also passed a controversial Revitalization Act that granted chosen firms the right to enter into a state-sponsored debt relief program. 127 The Revitalization Act was designed in conjunction with Ducky's Ministry of the Economy on behalf of Slovakia's hard-hit engineering and machinery sectors. Based largely on tax relief, in practice its use was limited to the "restructured" companies owned by the quasi-private holding company, DMD Holdings a.s., as well as a number of agricultural firms. 128 DMD, run by Meciar's former Minister of Finance JuliusT6th, was an umbrella holding company for a network of former state-run defense manufacturing firms that were most severely hit by defense cutbacks at the end of the Cold War. In addition to restructuring, DMD profited from direct Ministry of Economy support- mostly in the form of encouragement and coordination-for the development of an indigenous automobile supply network. 129 While the effects of these direct attempts at industrial policy appeared to be generally well intentioned, they had little positive effect on restructuring the 127 Ministry of the Economy, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update," 18. The government also set up a state-run arms trading company, Armex. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, l 04-5 . 129 AZZZ 1996; Intervi ew with Ministry of Economy Plenipotentiary for the Automotive Industry in Slovakia, Alfred Richter in Samuel Bibza, "Yel'ke Plany," MOT, August, 1998, 4-8 . Interview with Jan Lesinsky, President, Slovak Society of Automoti ve Engineers, Bratis lava, August I 0, 1998 . 128 �SLOVAKIA 139 companies involved. 130 Indeed, the program virtually halted marginally successful earlier attempts at defense conversion. 131 Slovakia eventually got its automotive sector, but it took the defeat of Meciar, clear political compliance with the prerequisites of EU membership, macroeconomic stabilization and significant initial investment incentives to entice foreign automobile producers and supply companies to come to Slovakia. 132 Politicization of Bank Privatization. The FNM's insider privatization framework raised levels of conflict surrounding bank privatization. In early 1996, Meciar promised to privatize Slovakia's largest state banks to Slovakia' s leading enterprises, most notably VSZ and Slovnaft. 133 Observers quickly pointed out that the likely result of the privatizations would be to decapitalize the banks as owner-firms, like VSZ, wrote themselves checks. Hence, while opposition parties KDH, DS and DU, were officially in favor of privatizing the banks, they formed a one-time coalition with HZDS's far left wing governing partner, ZRS , to get the banks placed on the list of strategic enterprises that prevented their privatization. The ZRS had nothing against bank privatization per se, but it allegedly was upset that the HZDS had excluded ZRS clients from buying one of the banks. 134 While partially preventing the banks ' capture and potential mismanagement by industrial managers, the banks nevertheless remained undercapitalized. Deeply in need of capital, the VSZ nevertheless did secure control over Slovakia's third largest state bank, Investicna a rozvojova banka (Investment and Development Bank-IRB) through the support of the FNM at shareholder meetings. 135 IRB had a troubled portfolio 130 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 104-5 . Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 75 . 132 Sharon Fisher, John Gould and Tim Haughton, "Slovakia's Neoliberal Tum," Europe-Asia Studies 59:6 (2007), 977-98. 133 If we include the third state owned financial institution, Slovenska sporitel'na, these three banks accounted for as much as 90% of all Slovak deposits and 60% of all loans. OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, (Paris: OECD, 1998), 29; EilJ (Economist Intelligence Unit), Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, (London: Economist, 1998), 17. 134 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 258 . 135 OECD, Slo vak Country Report, 1997-8, p. 29; EilJ, Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, p. 17; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 158. 131 �140 SLOVAKIA which VSZ control did little to correct. The state had been using it to keep a nuclear power plant solvent and to provide subsidies to the construction industry to build apartments for young couples. In 1997, IRB liquidity problems worsened and the bank was forced to borrow internationally at rates driven up by the emerging global financial crisis . The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) directed the VSZ, as the primary owner, to provide a much-needed capital injection. The VSZ refused. The NBS later "suggested" that the bank's deterioration resulted from "serious illegal transgressions which negatively influenced the bank's activities ." To add to the crisis, junior coalition partner SNS refused to support a renewal of state support for the construction industry's subsidized apartment loan program. After more government infighting, the IRB failed to meet its depositors' demands, forcing the NBS to seize it in December of 1997. 136 The VSZ raid on Slovakia's financial sector was the logical culmination of insider privatization under illiberal political conditions. Tightly bound together by political necessity, Meciar's administration provided Rezes and his network of enterprises insider access to special deals in privatization, taxation, credit allocation (from state financial institutions) and almost every other area where the state intersects with economic activity. Moreover, Meciar did this despite open indications of nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. The final cost to other corporations, the taxpayers and VSZ's more than 25,000 employees was enormous. By the winter of 1998, VSZ Holdings had defaulted on its foreign obligations and was facing layoffs and bankruptcy. Meciar's successor government then used this crisis to regain control of the company and limit its growing debt. 137 In 2000, the successor government sold the VSZ to United States Steel Corporation. 136 OECD, Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, 77-8; EfU, Slovak Country Report, 1st Quarter I 998, 17. In the spring of 1998, the VSZ used its influence with the FNM and its direct and indirect shareholdings in the two other state financial institutions to provide the !RB with a costly capital injection. The VSZ again refused to contribute any cash of its own beyond the initial amount required by the NBS . Nor was there any real attempt by VSZ to find an adequate foreign buyer. Peter Laca, "Troubled !RB bank approves capital injection," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-21 , 1998. 137 "Vlada mimo hry," Pravda, November 17, I 998; See also Miklo§, 1997 . �SLOVAKIA 141 Abuse of State Property. Coalition misuse of property included firms that were not yet privatized. Perhaps the most notable case is former Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky' s abuse of the country's natural gas company, Slovensky plynarensky priemysel (Slovak Gas Industry-SPP). A key member of AZZZ and a former communist-era official, Ducky resigned his position with the government to oversee a systematic tunneling of SPP assets for personal and political use. This included financing FC Slovan- Slovakia' s most famous football team (and, ironically, the former Czechoslovak rival to Sparta Praha, a team purchased by VSZ's Alexander Rezes). Ducky would even hand out cash bonuses to reward players for stellar play. 138 The full extent of Ducky's tunneling only became clear after the government fell from power. Ducky died in a still unexplained assassination in 1999 three days after a probe was launched into his handling of the company.139 Slowing Macroeconomic Performance. It is ironic that, except for privatization, Meciar's second government largely left the federal reform package intact until 1996. 140 The resulting favorable entrepreneurial conditions and international demand produced a relatively strong recovery in 1994-1996, matching a regional trend. The tight monetary policy of the largely independent NBS was a crucial element in the strong macroeconomic performance of Slovakia. Yet, since NBS monetary discipline also signifycantly raised the cost of credit, maintained the real value of liabilities, and put constraints on fiscal policy, the NBS came under pressure from the Ministry of Finance to be "more cooperative" with Slovak industrial policy. According to Ivan Miklos, VSZ President Jan Smerek complained that the NBS's tight money policy was a form of "disliking VSZ and, apparently, disliking Slovakia's development." 14 1 Under intense industrial pressure, the NBS narrowly escaped an attempt by parliament to place it more directly under government control. 142 Heavy borrowing, low foreign investment and this attack on the NBS led major investment rating agencies to 138 Confidential interview with FC Slovan football player, Bratislava, July 1998. Fisher, Political Change, 94. 140 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 63. 141 Ibid., 71-2. 142 EIU, Slovak Country Report, r" Quarter 1998, 16-7. 139 �142 SLOVAKIA downgrade Slovak bonds to below investment-grade level in the spring of 1998. This further raised the cost of borrowing. 143 By the end of Meciar's third government, enterprise restructuring in Slovakia had also slowed. Firms that sought an injection of capital had to face among other things : poorly functioning equity markets rendering an initial public offering nearly impossible; a government that was suspicious and even hostile to foreign strategic investors; government decision-making and procurement processes that frequently violated the equal application of the rule of law; and finally , an increasingly profligate fiscal policy, capped by a costly infrastructure development program that crowded out private investment. By the spring of 1998, the Meciar government had to finance its cash-starved economy on European markets at the relatively costly rate of 3.5 percent above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. It also borrowed short term domestically at a nominal rate of twenty-eight percent. The high level of domestic borrowing aggravated the credit squeeze on Slovakia's already strapped enterprises. 144 Short term borrowing to meet long term debt obligations was the final nail in the Meciar government's economic coffin. By the summer of 1998 it was clear that the Slovak performance of the previous years had been financed by unsustainable fiscal spending and borrowing. Meciar's Electoral Defeat, October 1998. Parliamentary elections in late September of 1998 proved a satisfactory denouement to the regime's VSZ-led orgy of self-dealing. The government had put in place rules that looked as if it was equipping itself with the necessary tools for a full-fledged authoritarian seizure of power. No seizure occurred. It is possible that the HZDS did not even consider the possibility. Even if it had, concerted efforts from independent NGOs, regional governmental associations, and a united center-right coalition of parties and the SDI.; helped to mobilize 84.25 percent of the voting population. Many correctly interpreted the election as a test of Slovakia's Western European credentials. The HZDS won a marginal plurality, but the ZRS was in shambles 143 "Another Agency Downgrades Slovaki a's Risk Indicator," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-2 1, 1998, p. 5. 144 M. E.S.A I 0, Slovak Mo nthly Report, May 1998, p. 1-2; M. E. S.A I 0, Slovak Monthly Report, July 1998, p. 2. �SLOVAKIA 143 after its lamentable performance as a far left party in formal charge of creating capitalists from state assets. The HZDS tried, but was unable to lure the SDI: away from the opposition to form a coalition. The SDC then joined a coalition of parties (the Slovak Democratic Coalition-SOK), SMK and the new Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) to form a government united by little more than opposition to Meciar and a desire to get into the EU and NAT0. 145 Slovakia's privatization winners split deeply during the election. Most of the direct beneficiaries of Meciar's politicized economic policies remained close to the Prime Minister. Most notably, VSZ owner Alexander Rezes provided the HZDS with significant frnancial support and other perks, including flying the Prime Minister to campaign events in his private jet and even forcing his football team, Sparta Praha, to wear HZDS jerseys in a campaign-related friendly match. Rezes ' s empire was already hemorrhaging money despite having raided two of Slovakia' s leading frnancial institutions. The IRB had already been bailed out by the NBS at taxpayer expense. This was an indirect subsidy that allowed money to filter into the HZDS campaign. It must have been clear to Rezes that only continued "industrial collaboration" with his political patron would save his fortune. Yet, faced with the gathering strength of the opposition, other Meciar clients were more circumspect- even Tmava's Vladimir Poor hinted at his willingness to work with a new govemment. 146 The SOP, the new "Party of Civic Understanding" promoted itself as the voice of the independent entrepreneurial community. In interviews, its spokesman strongly critiqued the disastrous economic management of the government and promised to uphold the rule of law in economic and political dealings. It sought initially to establish a safe, pro-business middle ground between the polarized camps in Slovakia' s "Cold War. " Despite this, its founder, Rudolf Schuster, refused any prospect of cooperation with the HZDS. 147 Other entre145 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy, I0: I (I 999), 80-95 . 146 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence," in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites after State Socialism (Lanham: Rowm an and Littlefield, 2000), 47-70. 147 Interview with Ferdinand Petrak, Vice Chairman, Party for Civic Understanding (SOP), Bratislava, July 28, 1998; Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities, 71. �144 SLOVAKIA preneurs continued to support the SDI:, and the newly united Slovak Christian and Democratic Union (SKDU). 148 Conclusion. Having privatized their enterprises through political connections, Meciar's clients went on to privatize state policy. Rather than demand the rule of law, they corrupted politicians; rather than invest resources to restructure, they stripped and tunneled them; rather than act as national champions, they preyed on the country's financial stability. By 1998, the coalition government's economic model was no longer sustainable. As the economic price of clientalism grew, the politicization of economic policy became an important additional grievance in the opposition's political arsenal. Never completely unied, many of the coalition's economic allies sat on the fence or sought accommodation with the opposition. Others proved firm HZDS supporters-particularly Rezes's VSZ, who must have seen that VSZ's financial future was closely linked to government policy. On the whole, privatization in Slovakia did not produce "market democrats," but it did succeed in providing economic agents who responded to their own logic of action. These proved to be both a boon and a curse to Meciar during his moment of greatest political crisis. Privatization' s impact on Slovakia's political liberalization, in short, was at best neutral and at worst negative. Ultimately, it was a united opposition, strategically smart NGO's and a mass mobilezation of Slovakia's voters that established market democracy in Slovakia. 148 Gould and Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence." � 102 SLOVAKIA , ..., VLADIMIR MECIAR AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION IN SLOVAKIA, 1992-1998 1 John A. Gould "A just privatization does not exist; we all know that the only criterion was loyalty. " - Vit'azoslav Morie, SNS honorary chair2 Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution put former Communist Party bureaucrats and industrial managers on the defensive. Associated with the communist past, many top managers were removed from their jobs while the middle managers that replaced them carried little political clout in broader debates over the design of economic reforms like privatization. As a result, Czechoslovak privatization architects had the freedom to offer average citizens a potential stake in state-owned companies. In return for a small administrative fee, citizens received coupons that would allow them to bid on company shares . Most participating citizens, however, chose to invest through new financial intermediaries, called investment privatization funds, which would concentrate citizens' small shares into larger stakes in privatized companies. By 1993, these intermediaries began to rival remaining communist-era managers for control of Czech and Slovak firms .3 1 This paper is adopted from John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 103-32. A full list of acknowledgments can be found on pp. vii-viii of that work, but the author would like to thank the following for their comments, assistance and support: Hilary Appel, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Sharon Fisher, Zsolt Gal, Simona Gould, Timothy Haughton, Cubomira Hromkova, Darina Malova, Mikael Olsson, Marek Ryhal', Sona Szomolanyi, James Thompson and Milada Anna Vachudova. The author is responsible for any errors in logic or fact. 2 Abigail Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 200 I), 263. 3 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby,"The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Republic," Europe-Asia Studies 48 :2 (1996), 285-303; Mitchell Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: �SLOVAKIA 103 While the mass privatization program continued in the Czech Republic through 1995, Slovakia's industrial managers were able to derail it after independence on January 1, 1993 . They had initially suffered from the same liabilities as their Czech counterparts. 4 Yet, as debate over the sovereign status of Slovakia developed in 199192, Slovak managers found a resource in identity politics that their Czech counterparts largely lacked. 5 By fusing their interests to rising popular-nationalism, a select group gained influence with a number of Slovakia's nascent political parties, and most notably, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The following paper examines the politics of privatization in Slovakia after independence. Slovakia's battle over privatization and its aftermath was a nasty, occasionally dangerous affair with very high stakes. At the center of this battle, initially, were the efforts of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and various industrialists to stop the highly popular citizens' "voucher" privatization program that Slovakia had inherited from the federal republic. This had little to do with the voucher program 's evident flaws . Rather, Meciar's policies sought to reorient privatization away from the new financial intermediaries which largely supported his opponents. In its place, his government operated a direct sales program that would benefit those who would support him. Yet, by attempting to replace a program that rewarded a majority of Slovak citizens with a program that only rewarded a narrow group of industrial managers and political allies, Meciar embarked on a democratically difficult project. His early efforts to gain close personal control over the privatization process contributed to the alienation of many of the key players in the HZDS, including President of Slovakia Michal Kovac. The president briefly orchestrated Meciar's Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Central Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Peter Rutland, "Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic," Telos 94 ( I 992), I 03-130; Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 56-68. 4 Interview wi th Jozef Uhrik, Commercial Director, Volkswagen Slovakia, Devinska Nova Yes, Slovakia, January 14, 1997 ; Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povai.ske strojarne, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, Slovakia, July, 22 I 998 . 5 Hilary Appel and John Gould, " Identi ty Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics," Europe-A sia Studies 52: I (2000), 111-31. �104 SLOVAKIA removal from power in March of 1994 after he made a speech criticizing a series of legally questionable privatization decisions. When Meciar regained power in November, he acted on the knowledge that his political and economic ambitions were incompatible with the democratic institutions he had inherited. The ensuing assault on democratic norms, rules and procedures, while not entirely directed at privatization, nevertheless gave his ruling coalition the freedom to privatize as it pleased. However, by the end of Meciar' s third term, Slovakia could no longer demonstrate its democratic credentials to the European Union or NATO . Both threatened to exclude Slovakia from their next rounds of expansion. Privileged access to government was not simply important to acquiring property. Under Meciar it also became increasingly useful for securing favorable economic policies such as the allocation of credit, the regulation of capital markets, government procurement, and taxation policies. Between 1996 and 1998, such largess undermined Slovakia' s economic recovery and threw the country into an economic crisis. By 1998, both Slovakia's long term economic recovery and its European future were in danger. Slovak voters responded with an 84.4 percent electoral turnout that left the ruling coalition no choice but to accept the vote and surrender power. Privatization should produce independent economic actors who seek a profit rather than a government handout. Yet, as the Slovak experience under Meciar reminds us, privatization is first and foremost a means of acquiring wealth and power. Where easy profits can easily be had through political connections, creating private property does not necessarily go hand in hand with market democracy. For privatization to be most effective, societies must first be willing and able to police the intersection of state policy and economic activity. Voucher Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1993. Privatization in Czechoslovakia was designed at the federal level, but it was largely carried out by the Czech and Slovak republiclevel governments. In Slovakia privatization began under the government of Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky (Christiaq Democratic Movement-KDH) and his 30 year-old neo-liberal Minister of Privatiza- �SLOVAKIA 105 tion,6 Ivan Miklos. While there was room for administrative innovation to account for local differences, in practice, Miklos administered the voucher program in an almost identical fashion to his Czech counterparts. This was no small accomplishment. Following the collapse of support for Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's first government in the spring 1991 , the new ruling coalition was deeply divided over privatization. The Carnogursky government included Jan Holcfk, and Jozef Belzak as Ministers of Industry and Economy, respectively. While both men favored a transition towards markets, both had industrial ties and favored a strong sectoral industrial policy in which firms would be restructured before privatization. In addition to Carnogursky 's ministers, industry had a strong friend in KDH member Viliam Oberhauser, a founding member of what Miklos claimed was industry's nomenklatura-controlled peak organization, the Federation of Employers Unions and Associations (AZZZ). 7 Oberhauser was a key member of the nationalist wing of the KDH and had helped author a "gradualist" economic reform scenario, challenging the market-oriented federal economic reforms that had been in place since January of 1991. 8 This created difficulties for Miklos. In the final years of the 1980s, Miklos had studied market economics at the Austrian school of Friedrich Hayek. At the time of the Revolution, he had been an economics student and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics in Bratislava. Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak brought him into the government in 1990. 9 After, the launch of strong market-oriented 6 There were three privatization ministries- one in each republic, and one at the federal level to deal with federal state property. Their formal name at the republic level was the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Assets. For an explanation see, Petr Husak, Budovani kapitalismu v Cechach: Rozhovory s Tomasem Jeikem (Prague: Volvox Globatour, 1997), 111 ; John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 61. 7 lvan Miklos "Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientalist Structures in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Slovak Political Science Association, 1997), 65. 8 Jvan Miklos recalls that the Ministries of Forest and Water, Agriculture and even the Environment - all run by KDH appointees - had strong gradualist leanings. Interview with Ivan Miklos, Consultant, M.E.S.A. I 0, Bratislava, April 2, 1997. 9 Miklos's first post was as Deputy Prime Minister, Jozef Kucerak's advisor, and Director of the Government's Section for Economic and Social Policy. Interview �106 SLOVAKIA reforms in January of 1991, however, Slovakia ' s economy suffered disproportionately more than the Czech Republic ' s economy. 10 Economic liberals like Kucerak increasingly became the target of colleagues seeking to distance themselves publicly from the growing pain of economic transformation. Market reforms would be managed better, they argued, if Slovak politicians were to have greater control over their own economic and political affairs where they could use state controls to moderate the pace of transition. 11 As the lead proponent of a federally brokered, rapid transformation towards a market economy, Kucerak was forced to step down after a vote of no-confidence in the spring of 1991 . Miklos was elevated to Minister of Privatization soon after and quickly replaced Kucerak as the most outspoken market liberal in the government and the strongest public supporter of federal reforms. He faced the brunt of attacks from both the opposition and the national wing of the ruling KDH. This included surviving several parliamentary votes of no-confidence. By the winter of 1991-92, it was increasingly clear that the KDH-led coalition would fare poorly in the upcoming June elections. Miklos feared that the next government would most likely slow privatization and delay the creation of private owners. He therefore sought to start the voucher program as quickly as possible- to create a fait accompli of new owners with a stake in continuing the rapid property transformation program. Miklos was responsible for convincing state-owned firms to put up shares for the voucher privatization program in Slovakia. He recalled that the threat of dismissal helped him to encourage most managers to include significant voucher components in their base privatization plans, but the pressure was bitterly resented. 12 Miklos with Ivan Miklos, Bratislava, October 1, 1996; Interview with Jozef Kucenik, Bratislava, January 13, 1997. 10 Slovakia was particularly handicapped by its reliance on heavy defense industries, among other things. See Gould, Politics of Privatization. 11 For details see Gould, Politics of Privatization , 73-79 . 12 In about sixty cases, managers called for direct sales exclusively to themselves. Assuming that the managers had failed to meet their obligations under the privatization act to make important data available to competitors, Miklos reopened the proposed submission process for an additional two months and pushed the firms to provide the necessary data to allow competitors to propose rival privatization plans for each firm, Miklos interview, October I, 1996; Ivan Miklos, "Corruption Risks in the Privatization Process: A Study of Privatization Developments in the Slovak Re- �SLOVAKIA 107 further alienated industrial elites by converting what they hoped would be a program of cheap, direct sales of enterprise shares to incumbent managers, into a transparent, competitive program in which price was the leading criterion. Prior to the June elections, the ministry sold shares in 189 firms for prices approximating and often exceeding their book value. 13 It would be another six years before the state would do as well financially in its direct sales of public property. Meanwhile, the first wave of voucher privatization began in October of 1991 with the registration of 2.59 million Slovak citizens, almost two-thirds of the adult population, through the federal Ministry of Finance. As in the Czech Republic, 14 registration for the program in Slovakia initially lagged until financial intermediaries (also referred to as investment privatization companies) began to offer a ten-fold or greater return on the voucher holder's initial registration fee within a year. Seventy-two percent of Slovak citizen-participants subsequently invested their voucher coupons with investment privatization funds in the first wave of privatization. Bidding on firms began in May of 1992 and closed in December. Shares were finally distributed to new owners in April of 1993 .15 Despite the efforts of industrial elites, the federal voucher privatization program had succeeded in providing the investment privatization funds stakes of up to forty percent in privatized firms. 16 Another wave of voucher privatization could allow fund owners to consolidate ownership of Slovakia's industrial assets. Over the next two years industrial managers, therefore, worked diligently through AZZZ to ensure a second wave of voucher privatization would not take place. 17 public," Bratislava, Klub Windsor, I 995; Interview with I.'.udovit Cemak, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 2, I 997. 13 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997; Mikael Olsson, Ownership, Reform and Corporate Governance: The Slovak Privatization Process in 1990-1996 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1999), 119. 14 For details, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, Chapter 5. 15 For more on the technical details of voucher privatization, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 63-8. 16 0Jsson, Ownership, Reform, 115-6, 219. 17 AZZZ (Federation of Employers Unions and Associations), "5. vyrocie AZZZ SR, 1991-1996," Spravodaj AZZZ Extra. Bratislava, March, 1996; Rudolf Lachovic, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie a kolektivneho investovania," Global Brokers, Bratislava, I 997, manuscript. �108 SLOVAKIA Meciar's Second Government, 1992-1994. Meciar's HZDS dominated the June 1992 elections. With the tacit support of the Slovak National Party (SNS), he became Slovak Prime Minister for the second time. In July negotiations with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, Meciar failed in his bid to form a weak confederation with the Czech Republic. Unable to reconcile Meciar's concept of a weak confederation with Klaus' concept of a strong federation, the two agreed to replace the federal state with two sovereign, independent republics. After parliamentary approval in both republican assemblies, the countries split peacefully on January 1, 1993. 18 As in the Czech Republic, voucher privatization in Slovakia became one of the more popular aspects of the federal reform program. 19 This may help to explain why the Meciar government, elected in June of 1992, completed the first wave as its predecessor had planned. Nevertheless, Meciar's Minister of Privatization, I:ubomir Dolgos, promised a shakeup in the next round. One of the new govemment' s first decisions was to indefinitely postpone the demand that firms submit second round privatization plans to the Ministry of Privatization. This necessitated at least a delay in the second round of voucher privatization. In September of 1992, the government program declaration and an associated Ministry of Privatization document spelled out a new privatization philosophy based on a more gradual state-guided economic transformation. Rather than emphasize the rapid creation of new owners, the state would now single out "strategic fields" where it would intervene to protect the national interest through the state restructuring of enterprises before, or in place of, privatization. Industrial ministries would design and coordinate restructuring plans with the assistance of the state-controlled financial sector. 18 Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Innes, Czechoslo vakia. 19 Miklo~ interview, April 2, 1997; Dusan Triska recalled being surprised at the strong support for the voucher scheme in Slovakia. Dusan Triska, "Privatization: Czechoslovakia" Eastern European Economics 26 (Fall, 1991 ); DusanTl'iska, "Political , Organizational, and Legislative Aspects of Mass Privatization-Czechoslovakia," in Marko Simonetti and Andreja Bohm, eds., Privatization in Central & Eastern Europe, 1991 . (Ljubljana: Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1991 ). Oldfich Dedek, The Break-up of Czechoslovakia (Aldershoot: Ave bury 1996), 201 . �SLOVAKIA 109 This concept also favored direct sales to incumbent managers over voucher privatization. Price was no longer the dominant criterion in evaluating bids on the company shares that were to sold. First installments were lowered from thirty percent of the price to ten to fifteen percent, and payment could be extended over fifteen years. Another round of voucher privatization would take place, but would only be used as a residual method.20 Similarly, the threat that a manager would be dismissed diminished under the new government. Miklos asserted that Meciar and his Minister of Economy, I:udovit Cernak, reappointed many of the communist-era managers that had been pushed out by Carnogursky's government. 21 Many of these had been forced out for having collaborated with the communist secret service before the Revolution-in a process called "lustration."22 Cemak himself related that Meciar frequently paid little attention to his appointees' lustration certificates in . personne l dec1s1ons. . . 23 h1s Little privatization occurred under Dolgos in the first six months of 1993. Rather, Meciar focused his energies on consolidating control over his cabinet- pushing out co-HZDS founder Milan Kiiazko (who was a marginal threat to Meciar for party control) and Minister of Economy, Cemak. As a Kiiazko protege, Dolgos soon found himself in constant conflict with Meciar-most notably over whether vouchers should have any role in the second round when it started. Meciar felt they should not, while Dolgos asserted that he sought to put aside about a third of corporate shares for voucher privatization. 20 Dolgos stressed that any efforts to set voucher privatization timelines or the volume of assets to be voucher privatized in advance, "would ... fail to serve a purpose." Dolgos's reformulated concept even "warned" industrial managers that if their second wave base privatization plans relied too heavily on the voucher method, they would be "subjected to particularly critical and thorough evaluation." There would also be a critical "assessment of the risks derived from concentration of ownership through privatization investment funds ." Instead, Dolgos emphasized "combined methods" in which management buyouts would play an "exceedingly important role." Ministry of Administration and Privatization, SR. , "Concept of the Continuing Process of Privatization in the Slovak Republic. " Ministry of Administration and Privatization of National Property of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1992; Interview with Cubomir Dolgos, Faculty of Management, Economics University, Bratislava, March 20, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 119-20. 21 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997. 22 Marsina interview, July, 22 1998; Uhrik interview, January 14, 1997. 2 3<'.:emak interview, April 2, 1997. �110 SLOVAKIA On June 12, 1993, Dolgos lost an HZDS-engineered vote of no confidence and stepped down.24 The departures of independent personalities like Cernak, Kiiazko and Dolgos left Meciar in more solid control over the HZDS and the government, but it also made his parliamentary majority vulnerable to future defections. Nevertheless, Meciar stepped up his efforts to replace his former colleagues with his personal loyalists-particularly in the Ministry of Privatization and the Fund for National Property (FNM). 25 At that time, the privatization ministry coordinated the privatization decision-making process while the FNM was a fully state-owned joint stock company charged with distributing shares to their new private owners. FNM appointees also represented the state's interests as a shareholder at general assemblies of corporate shareholders. In 100% state-owned companies, the FNM was on paper, at least, in complete control of the firm. Control over the FNM would give the Prime Minister control over most unprivatized and many partially privatized firms. Attempts to gain direct governmental control over the privatezation ministry and the FNM brought Meciar into sharp conflict with President Michael Kovac, another co-founder of the HZDS .26 To replace Dolgos at the privatization ministry, Meciar chose a close associate, Ivan Lexa. Having backed Meciar in the dismissal of Kiiazko, Kovac now balked. Citing Lexa's inexperience and potential conflicts of interest with his father (a communist-era central planning agency bureaucrat, recently-turned entrepreneur), the president refused to approve the appointment. Meciar responded by giving Lexa the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Privatization (the highest ministerial position not requiring presidential approval) and assumed the responsibilities of Minister himself. One of Lexa's first privatization decisions as State Secretary in July of 1992 was to ap24 Dolgos interview, March 20, 1997; Cemak interview, April 2, 1997. Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 25 . 26 Slovakia 's President was constitutionally weak, making the need for a strong party system to check the Prime Minister's power all the more necessary. Executive power flowed from the Parliament, with limited presidential powers to check it. Kovac could and did veto legislation and appointees, but Parliament could override this with a simple majority. Later, when Parliament deadlocked over a new presidential candidate, presidenti al powers - including the power of a presidential amnesty transferred to the Prime Minister. 25 �SLOVAKIA 111 prove his father ' s participation in the privatization of Povazske mlyny a cestoviname, a.s., with a personal stake estimated at up to 1 billion Sk (then about US $30 million).27 While Meciar consolidated power over Slovakia' s privatization and property control mechanisms, financial intermediaries whose funds had done so well in the first round of privatization began to assert some clout in shareholder meetings. Enterprise managers had also established a few funds. 28 Slovakia' s largest company, Vychodoslovenske zeleziame, a.s (Eastern Slovak Steelworks- VSZ) had established Cassiovia Invest, which had the marketing clout to acquire more than ten percent of the vouchers. But most funds- and hence a large portion of corporate power- were in the hands of enterprise outsiders, a fact that was increasingly resented by the incumbent industrial managers.29 In the first wave of privatization, the funds had amassed a forty percent stake in privatized firms and from the perspective of incumbent managers, carried unwelcome clout. Battles soon emerged over which would be dominant in determining the overall strategy of the company, the shareholder-dominated Supervisory Boards or the management-controlled Boards of Directors.30 Meciar' s allies came to feel that the most influential funds were, as subsequent Fund for National Property President Stefan Gavomik put it, "owned by the opposition."31While not technically true, by the end of the year, industrial managers and fund-appointed board members began to run into sharp conflict over the day-to-day management and long-term strategy of "privatized" companies. Hoping to avoid a further erosion of corporate insider influence, AZZZ halted a 27 Anton Marcincin, Daniela Zemanovifova, and Lubos Vagac, "Privatization Methods and Development of Slovakia," Bratislava, Center for Economic Development, 1996, 17. 28 Another fi fty percent was spread across a wide range of funds and individual shareholders, leaving the FNM , with its residual 37.6 percent, effectively in charge. Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 223 . 29 AZZZ, "S.Vyrocie AZZZ SR, 199 1- 1996"; Miklos, "Corruption Risks," 64; Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 279, 283. 30 Slovak and Czech companies had a dual board structure consisting of a supervisory board that gave general strategic direction to the company and managerial oversight, and a management board- largely consisting of top corporate mana~ers- that oversaw the day-to-day operations of the firm. 1 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 11 8. �112 SLOVAKIA second round of voucher privatization. Meciar obligingly pushed back the start date for the next round of voucher privatization. In the fall of 1993, Meciar complimented his firm grasp of the Ministry of Privatization by putting personal loyalists on the board of the National Property Fund. Between December of 1993 and March of 1994, his indirect control over state shares of major firms allowed him to replace enterprise board members and managers of twentyone Slovak companies which, allegedly, failed to show sufficient loyalty to the HZDS. Meciar claimed that he was simply replacing opposition-linked managers from the VPN-KDH era with more independent managers . Indeed, he accused parliamentary opposition leaders "straight into the eye, in front of everyone, that each one of them is linked with one of the twenty-one major Slovak corporations in which we intervened. And this is the problem." 32 Meciar was possibly correct in his assessment. While in power, KDH ministers appointed people to the boards of leading Slovak state firms and other opposition leaders clearly had close industrial connections. However, it was unclear whether they were now being removed because they were acting as KDH clients or due to their reluctance to serve HZDS interests. Indeed, the KDH-era manager of the large oil refinery, Slovnaft, was allegedly replaced after he refused Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky's demands that he subcontract services to HZDS-linked firms. 33 By the winter of 1994, Meciar' s increasingly personal consoledation of party and governmental power had alienated many of his own party members. By February of 1994, a last remaining block of HZDS deputies, led by HZDS co-founder Jozef Moravcik, appeared ready to follow other former HZDS members and allies into opposition. The threat of losing power may have led to a subsequent wave of direct sales. Starting with the "midnight privatizations" of February 1, 2004, Lexa sold forty-four companies with a book value of $96 million for a final sale price of just $22 million. The decisions were notable for their lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and advantageous terms to the purchasers-many of whom had close ties to leading government officials. Thirteen were subsequently annulled 32 Specifically, Meciar was accusing Vojtech Sugar, Jan Carnogursky, Cudovit Cernak and Peter Wiess. "Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," T ASR-Slovakia (February 6, 1994). 33 Confidential interview, Slovnaft insider, Bratislava, February, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 113 by the successor government for contravening the Large Scale Privatization Act of February 1991 , but virtually all of the privatizations were suspect. The beneficiaries included a range of politically connected individuals-from the wife of the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) to Meciar's own Minister of Finance, Julius T6th.34 A March 11 , 1994 report of a commission investigating the privatizations triggered the departure of the dissident-HZDS faction led by Jozef Moravcik and a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the government. In his speech before parliament, HZDS co-founder and Slovak President Michael Kovac openly accused Meciar of a lack of transparency and clientalism in the privatization process, among oth. 35 er th mgs. Meciar's and Lexa's hurried attempts to reorient Slovakia's privatization framework to favor political and economic insiders had run afoul of the opposition's effective use of liberal democratic institutions and norms. When next he gained power, Meciar' s new parliamentary majority would attack these opposition resources directly. VSZ and the Slovak Way of Privatization. One of Meciar's last acts in the1992-1994 government helps illustrate both the zero-sum nature of privatization, as well as its growing politicization. In December of 1993, the state exercised its shareholder rights to remove President Zoltan Berghauer and other top managers from the executive management of the state-owned firm VSZ, Slovakia's largest commercial entity. Berghauer had cofounded the AZZZ and was the lead author of an industry antireform petition in early 1991. 36 Meciar claimed that the top management change was a technocratic decision-made through consulta- 34 Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 121. Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 25. 36 In February of 1991 , only a month after the start of market reforms, the Slovak and Czech industrial federations delivered a joint petition to the Federal Assembly demanding "help in solving the difficult economic and financial situation of industrial companies ... [resulting from] the ill-considered restrictive fiscal , credit and monetary policy of the Federal Government. " Reforms, the industrialists continued, threatened, "the collapse of the entire national economy" and a "declining living standard for all citizens of the state." Zoltan Bergauer et al. , "Petice svaz u pnlmyslu CR a SR Federilnimu shromizdeni CSFR," Hospodafske noviny, February 29, 1991 , p. 3. 35 �114 SLOVAKIA tions with high-ranking bank and industrial managers.37 Yet he did not hide the fact that the change was to reduce the "unwarranted influence" of "opposition parties" in Slovakia's largest enterprise. 38 Berghauer and other purged VSZ managers protested the move, citing a history of political manipulation and threats by the HZDS towards VSZ management. The source of the claim directly attacked Meciar's Minister of Finance, JuliusToth. Toth had been VSZ's Vice President of Finance until he had resigned to join Meciar's government. According to Berghauer, Toth allegedly become enraged when Berghauer and VSZ's management refused to accept an HZDS member on the VSZ Board of Directors. Toth allegedly responded by demanding that the two top VSZ officials resign due to their political support for the KDH and other political opponents of the HZDS. 39 Toth later asserted that the Berghauer team had been stripping assets from the company. Through control of both the VSZ and collaboration with an independent trading company, they allegedly could siphon cash from the VSZ to the trade company by overcharging for supplies and underpaying for products.40 Perhaps to cut these alleged sales out of the revenue loop, or maybe to cut his allies in, Toth's new management team set up a new VSZ-owned sales company to oversee sales responsible for eighty percent of VSZ revenues. 4 1 As Minister of Finance, Toth and Lexa orchestrated the purchase of a 9.52 percent share of VSZ stock through a new private company, Manager a.s., established by five VSZ board members, including prominent HZDS member Alexander Rezes. The purchase was ques37 "Strong in the Saddle," T ASR-Slovakia, February 11, 1994. "Meciar Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," TASRSlovakia, February 6, 1994. 39 "Former Members of VSZ Board Lodge Complaint," CTK Business News, March 21 , 1994. 40 Despite Toth's allegations against Berghauer, no charges were ever filed . 41 Anthony Robinson, "Survey of Slovakia," The Financial Times, December 16, 1994, p. iv. It is unlikely that Toth was genuinely outraged at the allegations of corruption at VSZ. In 1993 he had allegedly used his influence as Minister of Finance to give a trading company, VSZ Selecta, a state contract to sell sugar that the Indian government provided to the Slovak government in place of its cash debt. VSZ Selecta won the contract without the required tender and then sold the sugar on the world market in violation of its contract. Toth was a member of the company's board. "Report on "Sugar Affair" to be out in January," CTK News, December 5, 1993. 38 �SLOVAKIA 115 tionable for its unsightly conflicts of interest, advantageous terms and most of all, its timing. Again, in accordance with the government program, the shares were sold to domestic entrepreneurs at a substantial discount with a generous payment schedule. The discount on the current share value of the package was $36 million.42 After a ten percent down payment, Manager would pay the rest in yearly installments over five years. Manager's members each made their down payment with an interest-free $62,000 loan from the Kosice-based Priemyselna banka (Industrial Bank) whose controlling shareholder was, in turn, the VSZ-controlled fund, Cassiovia Invest. 43 Priemyselna banka, moreover, received these funds from Banka Slovakia (Bank Slovakia), which then served as the repository and investment arm of the FNM. In short, Manager borrowed FNM funds to buy shares from the FNM that in tum benefited close associates of its directors and the man responsible for their appointment, Vladimir Meciar.44 The timing was also controversial. The Meciar government received the proposal to privatize the VSZ shares to Manager on March 7 and the government approved the request on March 11- the day on which parliament finally passed a vote no-confidence in the Meciar cabinet. The FNM and Manager signed the agreement on March 14, the day the government fell. On March 17, VSZ held a general assembly at which the now former Minister of Finance and FNM Board member, JuliusT6th, was elected Chair of VSZ's Board of Directors. Rezes would become Minister of Transportation in 42 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 22 . 0lsson, Ownership, Reform , 223 , note 39. 44 "Approach to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Meciar attempted to establish Banka Slovakia as early as 1993 in his home region of Banska Bystrica as part of his effort to develop a regional banking center. The goal was to use the bank to recycle FNM funds and provide cheap credit for small to medium sized enterprises. After the VSZ deal, however, the opposition charged that it would be used as a means of providing the politically connected with cheap capital to make down payments for privatization deals. In April of 1994, the next government suspended the bank's license to operate. With Meciar's re-election in the fall, the government pushed the National Bank of Slovakia to grant the license. But, after building a costly and elaborate headquarters in Banska Bystrica and suffering from notoriously poor lending practices, the bank had significant difficulties with capitalization. The NBS finally approved a license to begin operating on June I, 1996, but the bank- like most Slovak banks-quickly developed a problem with non-performing loans. 43 �116 SLOVAKIA Meciar's next cabinet. Supporting the vote were VSZ's investment privatization fund, Cassiovia Invest and VUE Invest, the investment company of Vseobecna uverova banka (General Credit Bank-VUB) and Slovakia's largest state owned bank. Ironically, oversight responsibility for VUB had, until four days earlier, lain primarily with T6th's Ministry of Finance.45 Meciar's Opposition Takes Power, March-November, 1993. A five-party caretaker government under the leadership of HZDS defector Jozef Moravcik was formed in mid-March. It promised to restore transparency and accountability to the privatization process and to re-launch the voucher privatization process as soon as possible. This was to be done before the scheduled new elections at the end of September. The coalition fought, however, over how to restore confidence, transparency and speed to the privatization process. Nevertheless, Kevin Deegan-Krause demonstrated how the new coalition allowed itself to be held accountable to competitive political forces. 46 The recent experience with Meciar may have taught the government coalition partners a good lesson in the dangers of overconcentration of power-particularly in the areas of property management and privatization. Yet, the new five-party coalition was fractious and ideologically incoherent. This influenced privatization. On the one hand, the formerly communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDI:) sought to maintain direct sales as the primary method of privatization. On the other hand, the coalition partners accused it of intending to use direct sales to reward its own allies amongst Slovakia's ex-communist industrialists and bureaucrats. The Ministry of Privatization, however, was now led by Milan Janicina, a lawyer from the center-right Democratic Union (DU). He sought to ensure that any direct sales would be a rule-governed, multi-party competitive process, not something to be run exclusively by SDI: dictates. 47 The SDI: did, however, secure an agreement to sub- 45 "Approac h to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Toth also became deputy chairman of Priemyselna banka, Olsson Ownership, Reform, 223, note 39. 46 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 26. 47 Interviews with Milan Janicina, Commercial Lawyer, Bratislava, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 117 ordinate the importance of price in the sales to employment and future investment commitments. 48 Corruption may have been possible in the final sales, but the number of competing interests in the decision making process ensured that the foxes guarding the hen house would keep each other in line. 49 Still , the program was not unimpeachable. Most of the direct privatization sales of fifty-four Slovak enterprises occurred after the elections had delivered a strong plurality to the HZDS but before Meciar had formed a government. 50 The government also conducted a public tender for the government's 24.9 percent share in VSi, attracting interest from nine companies, including the Austrian bank Creditanstalt. The coalition lost power before it could resolve internal bickering over the final buyer. 51 Throughout the summer of 1994, citizens, center-right coalition parties, brokerage firms and investment privatization funds clamored for a second wave of voucher privatization. Janicina fought with SD~'s Minister of the Economy Peter Magvasi (also an AZZZ member) to ensure that there would be enough property offered to make the project worthwhile. In preparation, the Ministry of Finance issued voucher booklets to seventy-two percent of Slovak citizens (ninety percent of those eligible). This was a significantly higher participation rate than the first wave. Janicina secured assets valued at $1.96 billion for the voucher program- making each voucher booklet potentially worth $593.00. After another aggressive campaign from financial intermediaries, fifty-eight percent of voucher holders traded their points for shares in investment privatization funds. 52 If the second wave of voucher privatization was completed, managerial insiders would cede significant additional economic power to the funds. 53 48 OIsson, Ownership, Reform , 124. Anna Grzymala-Busse, " Beyond Clientelism : Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," Comparative Political Studies 41 :4/5 (2008), 638-73 . 50 Jnterview with Rudolf Filkus, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 15, 1997; Janicina interviews, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. 51 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 222 . 52 Tbid. , 124-5. 53 Janici na interview, April I, 1997. 49 �SLOVAKIA Privatization under Meciar's Third Government, 1994-1998. The Moravcik government was short-lived. The SD:C had secured early elections and in the ensuing campaign the center-right fragmented amongst a range of competing personalities. A number of opposition parties failed to cross the five percent threshold in the September-October 1994 vote. Moravcik's Democratic Union (DU) received 8.6 percent, the KDH won 10.l percent, SD:C got 10.4 percent and the ethnic Hungarian Coalition took 10.2 percent of the votes. The HZDS, meanwhile, won a thirty-five percent plurality. This was less than in 1992. However, since thirteen percent of the electorate voted for parties that did not pass the five percent threshold, the ideological weight of the next parliament shifted sharply back towards Meciar and his national-populism. After a month of negotiations, the HZDS formed an ideologically awkward coalition with the two smallest delegations in parliament-the extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS-5.4 percent) led by the garrulous Jan Slota,54 and the extreme left Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS-7.34 percent). 55 To discipline his junior coalition partners, Meciar could use the threat of an alternative coalition with the reformed communist party, the SD:C.56 Critics speculated that the "brown-red" wings of the new ruling coalition were held together only by the promise of privatization benefits. 57 The National-Populist Privatization Concept and its Implementation. Meciar's privatization policies formally settled the long-standing ideological battle between market reformers and gradualists over privatization policy, but in reality, this conflict had stood proxy for an underlying clash of interests between enterprise outsiders and incumbent firm management. Gradualist concepts were hijacked, to an extent, and combined with clientalism and xenophobic nationa54 1n the spring of 1993, Meciar had helped Jan Slota oust Cernak from control over the SNS. Cernak left (with Janicina) to form the Democratic Union. Cernak interview, April 2, 1997. 55 Grigorij Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Party System," in Soi\a Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation , 50. 56 Innes, Czechoslo vakia, 262. 57 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 64. �SLOVAKIA 119 !ism to benefit the governing coalition and its allies at, as we shall see, a growing cost to the public. The formal theory underlying the Meciar government's privatezation program echoed the Dolgos strategy of the fall of 1992. The government would work closely with incumbent industrial managers to achieve ownership patterns that would be most appropriate to a coordinated industrial policy. The state would integrate equity transfer, credit and other policies in ways that would boost the strength of Slovak national firms on world markets and minimize transformational pain at the enterprise level. The variety of capitalism officially envisioned was thus much closer to a continental-style state-coordinated market economy than a more hands-off liberal market economy. However, Slovak industrial leaders at AZZZ also invoked Asian development models to explain what they were trying to accomplish.58 Insiders Ascendant. In practice, Meciar's coalition privatized the privatization process. It also subordinated capital markets regulation to the needs of incumbent managers at the expense of enterprise outsiders. The main target was the funds that emerged through voucher privatization. 59 Meciar's new parliamentary majority began to work even before he formed a government. In an overnight session of parliament on November 3-4, 1994, his new coalition passed legislation that secured exclusive control and oversight of privatization, the state media and the secret service. 60 An amendment to the 1991 Large Scale Privati58 Interview with Frantisek Bruckrneyer, General Director, Federation of Employers' Unions and Associations (AZZZ), Bratislava, February 6, 1997. Prior to becoming Director of AZZZ, Bruckrneyer worked for the Czechoslovak federal government after the Warsaw Pact invasion (1970-1974) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow (1974-1980). In the 1980s, he directed the state-owned firm, Zdroj , before co-founding AZZZ in 1991 . Compiled from "Leaders.sk" database. Trend Holding Co. and The Slovak Spectator, Bratislava. http://www.leaders.sk/index.php?id=674 [accessed August 30, 2010). 59 Marcincin et al., "Privatization Methods"; Miklos, "Economic Transition,"; Ivan Miklos, "Privatizacia," in Martin Butora and Michal lvantysin, eds. Slovensko, 1997: Suhrn a sprava o stave spolocnosti a trendoch na rok 1998. (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky, 1998). 60 Soi\a Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 10. �120 SLOVAKIA zation Act transferred the right to propose and decide direct sales from the privatization ministry to the relatively less transparent FNM (Act #369/1994). The majority then stacked the FNM's Presidium and Supervisory Board with coalition officials and cancelled Janicina's 54 direct post-election sales (Act #370/1994). In five cases, new property owners had already taken legal possession of their assets from the state. 61 This violated both international human rights law and the Slovak Constitution. 62 The transfer of power to the FNM had important implications. The Constitutional Court later ruled that, as a joint stock company, the FNM did not have to submit to government review or regulatory oversight. Hence, it was exempt from oversight by the supreme government control body that could oversee and audit state agencies. Even had it not been exempt from oversight, however, the November 3-4 "night of the long knives" removed opposition parliamentarians from the oversight committee. The ruling majority was now fully responsible for monitoring itself. 63 While extolling the virtues of a state-directed transformation, Meciar provided the new measures with a market reform cover story. He claimed that insulating the privatization process from opposition would allow the FNM to make decisions according to technocratic criteria, free from political influence. In 1998, when the damage had been done, this allowed him to claim that although he still agreed with his "concept" of privatization, he had not been responsible for its administration. 64 Meciar's "concept" ultimately excluded outsiders from privatization. He initially promised that the second wave of voucher privatization would go ahead as planned-although with less property than Janicina envisioned. In July of 1995, however, Parliament cancelled voucher privatization altogether (Act #190/1995). Voucher booklets 61 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 126. Both Article 17b of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly 217 /1948) and Protocol 1, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1952) secure the right to possessions. 63 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. In the fall of 1997, Parliament finally gave into EU and opposition pressure and appointed Ivan Miklos to the supervisory board of the FNM. 64 CTK News, May 8, 1998. Meciar was never directly implicated in a privatization scandal while in power, Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist, (New York: Pal grave, 2006), 91. 62 �SLOVAKIA 121 could now be exchanged for a bond with a face value of l 0,000 Sk to be redeemable in 2001 or on the bearer's 65 th birthday and with an interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). Proceeds to meet the bond obligations were to come from sales of state property- a promise that the FNM's new privatization policy of selling to domestic industrial managers at a deep discount made impossible to keep . In its public statements, AZZZ took full credit for the cancellation of vouchers.65 A Constitutional Court decision overturned parts of Act #190 in late 1996.66 By that time, however, the FNM had already privatized most of Slovakia's remaining "non-strategic" industrial enterprises. Even had the government wanted to re-launch the voucher program, it would now have had to renationalize private properties to find adequate assets to make the program work. An additional measure passed in July of 1995 enhanced the government's capabilities to coordinate a state-directed industrial policy through the Strategic Enterprises Act (# 175/ 1995). The purpose of the act was to preserve the "public interest" in crucial Slovak industries. First, twenty-nine firms would be exempt from privatization altogether. This included the fundamental sectors of the economy including telecommunications, energy and the defense-related engineering sector. The list of strategic companies, made public in the summer of 1996, also included some at least questionably "strategic" firms such as health spas. 67 All told, the Strategic Enterprises Act reduced the book value of assets remaining to be privatized by half. 68 A second, legally controversial provision of the act, forced an additional forty-five firms to transfer a "golden share" to the firm's founding ministry-in most cases, to Jan Ducky's Ministry of the Economy. The Constitutional Court overturned this prescription in April of 1996 as a clear violation of property rights, but tellingly, the owners of major pro-HZDS firms , like Slovnaft, had failed to give 65 Lachovit, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie". Katarina Zavacka, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 164. 67 The administration may have legitimately feared that privatization would mean the services of the spas would no longer be readily available or affordable to average Slovaks through the health care system. 68 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 130. 66 �122 SLOVAKIA the state ownership rights over the golden share. Their reaction gave credence to the market reformers' expectations that privatizationeven via a highly politicized process-would produce independent agents with the potential, at least, to resist government policies that hurt their material interests. 69 In November of 1996, the Constitutional Court also annulled Parliament's transfer of privatization powers to the FNM (Act #370/1994). The court argued that the act had illegally abrogated the state's responsibility for the transformation of state property. The Court stopped short of retroactively annulling the FNM ' s actions, however. Stripped of its exclusive prerogative over direct sales, the HZDS-controlled FNM continued to serve its clients through public auctions of shares from the FNM portfolio. While share auctions are a relatively uncontroversial privatization mode, critics allege that the FNM often limited access about the time and location of the auction to all but the intended buyer. 70 Coalition Control over Direct Sales. Between January of 1994 and November of 1996, the FNM privatized at a furious pace. While Act #3 70/1994 removed privatezation from the government's portfolio of responsibilities, coalition officials and industrial insiders from AZZZ retained close control over the process. Two FNM officials, HZDS member and FNM Chairman Milan Rehak, and Co-Chair and Director of the Direct Sales Section, Jan Povraznik, were responsible for executing Presidium decisions . These were closely controlled by the ruling coalition. Junior coalition partner ZRS had formal responsibility for the privatization process . ZRS member Peter Bisak ran the Ministry of Privatization while ZRS vice-chairman Stefan Gavornik chaired the Presidium. Gavornik attested, however, that his influence was minimal: while the HZDS had no seats on the nine member Presidium, AZZZ members held six seats and hence a majority of the votesand they supported the HZDS .7 1 Understandably, now that AZZZ 69 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi , "Bridging Slovakia's Elite Chasm," Transitions, November, 1997. 70 Jnterview with Gabriel Palacka, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 18, 1997 ; Miklos, "Economic Transition," 67-8 . 71 Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Postcommunist Europe (London: Ashgate, 2005), 64. �SLOVAKIA 123 influence was secured, incumbent managers who had previously been skeptical about privatization became its strong advocates. 72 According to Sharon Fisher, regional committees of five coalition representatives determined properties to be sold and top coalition officials made final decisions at coalition meetings every Wednesday at 6:00pm. 73 Allegedly, the meetings rarely considered the business merits of the proposal-or even how the sale would further the official goal of coordinated industrial restructuring. As Gavomik recalled, "We were .... lobbying for those who were coming to us." Yet, Gavomik added, "not even a nail was sold without Meciar."74 Milan Cagala, a HZDS-appointed FNM presidium member, confirmed these allegations. 75 More broadly, members of the ruling coalition were open about clientalism. 76 As Minister of the Economy, Jan Ducky (HZDS) explained, "every government gives advantages to those groups that cooperate with them. This is not controversial." 77 Yet sales went beyond clientalism to open self-dealing-included sales to leading ruling coalition politicians and their family members. As Gavomik admitted, "Of course there are [politicians in the privatization process], and I know about them, but I won't tell. After all .. . every citizen has a right to take part in privatization." 78 Participants in the FNM's direct sales program typically received terms similar to the midnight privatizations of February 1994. Buyers-usually incumbent managers- would receive the company for 72 Ibid. , 35. Fisher, Political Change, 88-9. The regional meetings were an institutional mechanism for regionally based privatization groups to make their claims to property. In the eyes of observers, the groups became associated with leading HZDS officials and clients. For example, it was rumored that meetings in Kosice tended to be dominated by Rezes, those in Banska Bystrica by Meciar, and those in Tmava by Vladimir Poor. Interview with Valer Ostrovsky, CEO, Schultz and Ostrovsky, Bratislava, May 14, 1997. 74 Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic," Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 75 Ibid. 76 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 66-7. 77 Author's notes from "Slovak Spectator Live, Debates for Democracy Series: Brigita Schmognerova & Jan Ducky," Bratislava, 1996. An FNM spokesman shared this sentiment with the author. Interview with Oto Balogh, Press Spokesman, Fund for National Property, Bratislava, April 22, 1998. 78 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 277-8, note 26. 73 �124 SLOVAKIA as little as one third, one-fifth, or even less of its book value. In practice, the typical firm required a ten to fifteen percent down payment, often using money borrowed from a state-owned financial institution. Moreover, installments on the purchaser' s debt to the FNM were usually spread over ten years and deductible from the company' s tax bill. These terms and often the buyers themselves were also frequently kept secret. In the case of the illegal sale of the strategically listed and highly profitable oil extraction and storage company, Nafta Gbely a.s., the new owners of the company remained a matter of intense speculation among opposition politicians and the press. The official address of the purchasing company, Druha obchodna, a.s. was initially an abandoned building. Vladimir Poor, Trnava's HZDS chief and a member of the regional coalition privatization committee later admitted to being a primary beneficiary of the deal, along with a close Meciar aide.79 FNM President Gavornik later alleged that Poor was able to meet the company's 575 million Sk purchase price simply by raiding the company's 1,075 million Sk capital account. If Gavornik is right, Poor used the firm's bank account to buy the firm for himself. Prosecutors later unsuccessfully charged Poor with "tunneling" 300 million Sk out of the company, but dropped the charges. In the end, the circumstances of the company ' s privatization were never fully investigated, perhaps because Poor voluntarily returned the company to the state. 80 In another controversial case, the FNM sold a controlling stake of Slovnaft, Slovakia's oil refinery, to Slovintegra-a company owned by Slovnaft' s director, Slavomir Hatina and nineteen other managers. Hatina was a financial backer of the HZDS and bought thirty-nine percent of the company at an eighty percent discount over the currently traded price. The initial down payment, moreover, was only 1.56 percent of the sale value. The FNM soon reduced the sale price by an additional eighty-four percent to reward management for meeting its promised investment and employment targets.81 The privatization of Slovakia' s largest company, VSZ, also continued apace under Meciar's direct sales framework. In 1995, junior 79 Fisher, Political Change, 93-4; Marcincin et al. , "Privatization Methods. " Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic, Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 81 Marcincin et. al. , "Privatization Methods," 18. 80 �SLOVAKIA 125 coalition member ZRS engineered a sale of ten percent of VSZ shares to Hutnik, a company formally owned by VSZ's union members but strongly under the influence of Minister of Transport (until 1996), Alexander Rezes. Again the price was a fraction of the real value of the shares and payments were made on a generous installment plan. Hutnik then collaborated with Rezes to form Ferrimex, a company that purchased another 15.4 percent on extraordinarily generous terms.82 The deal cemented Rezes ' s control over VSZ. Rezes responded by essentially barring minority shareholder VUB kup6n (an investment company set up by Slovakia' s state-run savings bank) from receiving any information about the health and activities of the firm _sJ Nationalism in Privatization. The Meciar government employed popular economic nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric to justify its choice of a privatization program. Junior coalition partner SNS campaigned in 1994 on a promise to protect Slovakia from "impoverishment" at the hands of foreign investors.84 The subsequent 1995 government program declaration promised to privilege "domestic business subjects" over foreigners in the privatization process. National entrepreneurs would then deal with their assets as they saw fit in what Meciar correctly predicted would be a "third wave" of privatization to foreigners. 85 In practice, Slovak government officials remained deeply suspicious of foreign direct investment and often sought to block foreign partnerships. "We just want to avoid them coming in and closing [the company]," remarked one FNM official in an interview with the author. "Investors only come to misuse companies and disappear." 86 One example is notable for its senselessness: a foreign advisor to the government related that he worked with an entrepreneur to acquire a strategic foreign partner to modernize and expand production of his product line for export abroad. While the entrepreneur was not explicitly prohibited from signing the deal, he received several telephone calls from top officials in one ministry warning that he would 82 01sson, Ownership, Reform, 223 -5. lbid., 182. 84 Fisher, Political Change, 89. 85 Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 65 . 86 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997. 83 �126 SLOVAKIA be held fully accountable if even one Slovak lost his job as a result of the investment. He lost his nerve and cancelled the contract. The enterprise thus remained in debt and was unable to raise the money on its own for modernization; nor was it able to make its own marketing contacts abroad. The advisor noted that this was typical of the Meciar government's attitude towards foreign joint-ventures. 87 The combination of national capitalism and knee-jerk nationalism cost Slovakia dearly. Joint ventures with multinational corporations were at that time leading the deep industrial restrucuring of Central Europe. They had the capital, marketing networks and technology to outperform domestically privatized companies and they were far outperforming firms that remained in state hands, measured in both production increases and productivity growth. 88 Despite this growing record of success, the ruling coalition sold a mere five companies to foreigners out of a total 347. 89 On a per capita basis, by 1998, Slovakia had received half the FDI of Poland, one-third the FDI of the Czech Republic and only a tenth of the FDI of Hungary.90 This was a lost opportunity. Over the next few years, new owners would effortlessly enrich themselves by "flipping" their cheaply acquired companies to international capital-realizing for themselves gains that should have gone into the FNM accounts to meet its new privatization bond obligations. 91 Insider-Controlled Capital Markets Regulation. Having gained control over the privatization process, incumbent managers pressured the government for a favorable capital markets policy. Throughout 1994 and into 1995, investment privatization companies had clashed with incumbent managers in company board rooms. As Michael Olsson relates, the managers wanted the new ow87 Confidential interview with a foreign financial service executive, Bratislava, October 20, 1996. Most of the foreign financial service executives and consultants I sroke with had similar stories. 8 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Elite Fragmentation, Industry and the Prospects for Democracy in Slovakia: Insights from New Elite Theory" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 1997), http: //www.ciaonet.org/book/gould/ [accessed February 23, 2012]. 89 Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 133. 90 Gould and Szomolinyi, "Elite Fragmentation," 58. 91 Fisher, Political Change, 94. �SLOVAKIA 127 ners to contribute capital while they continued to control the direction of the company. The new owners of the funds, by contrast, sought to pressure the incumbent managers into improving cost efficiency, technological and organizational restructuring, and developing new- often international- marketing arrangements. It did not help that the funds with diverse portfolios did not have sufficient expertise to cover all the firms in their portfolio. Fund representtatives were often barely out of university and entirely lacking in experience. A cultural clash thus developed between the older generation of industrial managers-most of whom had their start in Slovak industry in the 1960s and 70s-and the "young men from Bratislava_ ,,92 Government actions in 1995 wrested industrial control from the funds back to the industrial managers. Incumbent managers began to use the direct sales process to tum the tables at meetings of general shareholders. Olsson writes, "[M]anagers who acquired a large chunk of shares on soft terms from the FNM all of a sudden lost all respect for other minority shareholders .... funds could only sit by [as] ... managers or other domestic industrial groups took over." 93 The government also intervened in capital markets to further tilt the balance of power towards management. Legislation in 1995 reduced the maximum stake investment privatization companies could hold in a company from twenty to ten percent. It also prohibited investment privatization companies from placing officials on a company ' s Board of Directors. This weakened the ability of fund-dominated Supervisory Boards to monitor the day-to-day actions of company managers. Parliament also passed capital markets regulation in 1996 that reduced the transparency of capital markets transacttions and all but eliminated minority shareholder rights. President Kovac returned the legislation, demanding better protection for minority shareholders. Ironically, the funds were not necessarily in favor of a better regulated market. The Slovak capital market had few of the institutional safeguards to protect minority shareholder rights and prevent insider trading that we find in more developed equity markets. Controlling owners were often able to expropriate value from minority 92 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 182. 93 fbid. �128 SLOVAKIA shareholders without penalty. This meant, ironically, that the emergence of a dominant shareholder in a firm often would lead to a decline in the value of the firms' shares. 94 The result was a loss in equity market liquidity: when one lost control over a company, one would often be unable to sell one's shares at any price. Wise investors knew that the majority shareholders could tunnel the real value of the company elsewhere. Under such conditions, a passive portfolio stake in all but a few "blue chip" companies made little sense. Funds found they could best make money by secretly acquiring a controlling share of companies in unregistered, off market trades of physical paper shares and then selling them at a profit to a strategic investor. Given that a more transparent market would actually undermine this strategy, a number of funds were somewhat ambivalent about reforms that might make passive portfolio investment safer and profitable. 95 The ruling coalition made things even worse. It sought to limit the funds to a portfolio role even as it actively undermined their minority shareholder rights. Ministry of Finance capital markets regulator Jozef Magula testified on behalf of minority shareholder rights in front of Parliament--much to the disappointment of top AZZZ managers . A better law was passed in 1997 .96 Still, the new law continued to allow controlling shares to be bought anonymously in secret off-market trades. 97 Remarked one broker philosophically, "at least we have rules."98 94 Economist Joseph Stiglitz observed this phenomenon in the Czech equity market, but the problems were quite similar in Slovakia. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Comments on 'Czech Republic: Capital Market Review Report,"' Delivered at the Ministry of Finance, Prague, Czech Republic, May 9, I 997 ; For details, see Gould, The Politics o[ Privatization, 81- 10 I. 9 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 184-5 . 96 Magula claims that, as a result of his parliamentary testimony, he came under AZZZ pressure to step down. He relented and moved to the central bank. Interview with Jozef Magula, Member of the Bank Board, General Relations Department, National Bank of Slovakia, Bratislava, July 28, 1998. 97 Magula interview, July 28, 1998 ; Interview with Rudolf Lachovic, President, Association of Investment Managers and Investment Funds of the Slovak Republic, Brati slava, June I 6, 1997; for the early market regulatory climate, see Juris, I 994. 98 Ostrovsky interview, May 14, I 997. �SLOVAKIA 129 Meaningful portfolio investment disappeared under Meciar. In addition, led by Magula, the government destroyed a rapidly growing mutual fund industry in 1996. Unlike the privatization funds, the new mutual funds gathered people's savings and invested them in the market and other assets. The pioneer was Prva slovenska investicna skupina, a.s (First Slovak Investment Company-PSIS) an open-ended fund into which citizens could deposit and withdraw like a checking account. By early 1995, the PSIS's Sporofund had over $50 million in savings. 99 It was allegedly well-run and had done a reasonable job at building shareholder value within its portfolio. But in the fall of 1994, the PSIS used its savings to invest in citizen voucher booklets issued under the Moravcik government. Vouchers, the PSIS controversially argued, were a form of state security and hence a legal investment for the mutual fund. Over 750,000 Slovaks signed up for the PSIS voucher privatization funds . Had the second wave of voucher privatization gone forward as planned, PSIS would have become the second wave's largest owner of shares in Slovak enterpnses. However, PSIS owners were also strong contributors to the Democratic Union-the party of Janicina and Moravcik. Moreover, the PSIS had a stake in the independent daily newspaper SME. Both PSIS' s political orientation and its potential economic power were a threat to the ruling coalition and its industrial allies. In the spring of 1995, the Ministry of Finance revoked PSIS 's operating license. Courts found the measure illegal and ordered that the Ministry restore the license, but the Ministry simply revoked it again and transferred control of the company's Sporofund portfolio to Harvard Investment Company. In the face of a rapid withdrawal from the Sporofund, Harvard liquidated the fund and paid off savers about half of what they had put in. 100 The Coalition Assault on Democracy, 1995-1998. Meciar's coalition could not have achieved such close control over the privatization framework without a significant attack on democratic political and civic institutions. Hence, while Slovakia's 99 Interview with Vladimir Hoffman, Broker, Delta Securities, Prague, Czech Republic, July 25 , 1997. I0°Magula interview, July 28, 1998; Ostrovsky interview, May 14, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 187-90. �130 SLOVAKIA democratic decline from 1994 to 1998 was not exclusively caused by privatization, it was certainly linked to it. Indeed, it is unlikely that the ruling coalition and its allies would have fought so hard had the nation's most lucrative assets not been available for appropriation. After ad hoc encroachments on democratic norms in 1993-94, between late 1994 and 1998, Meciar' s parliamentary majority reduced Slovakia's formal democracy to an illiberal shell verging on soft authoritarianism. One permissive cause was the majoritarian nature of the Slovak Constitution. Led by a strong executive and unhindered by a weak presidency already on the defensive, the Meciar majority sought to override the remaining checks posed by the Constitutional Court, the political opposition, civil society and regional and municipal governments. This enabled a reorientation of the privatization framework towards political and economic insiders, but it also endangered "horizontal accountability"-the country' s internal balance of institutional power. 101 Meciar' s squabble with the president was the most visible aspect of this encroachment. Kovac ' s 1993 veto over Meciar's choice of Ivan Lexa to run the privatization ministry marked the beginning of a running battle between the government and the president. The conflict took on added intensity during Meciar's third government. Kovac did not have much institutional power to start with. His repeated vetoes of parliamentary acts were quickly overridden by a simple majority- entirely in line with the Constitution. Yet, Meciar sought to further weaken and discredit the president. An important player in this campaign was the Slovak Information Service (SIS), Slovakia ' s secret service. First, Meciar had to gain control over it. In the November 3-4, 1994 session of parliament, Meciar's majority excluded opposition parties from participating on the SIS oversight committee. In the spring of 1995, parliament transferred power to appoint the head of Slovakia's intelligence agency from President Kovac to Prime Minister Meciar. Meciar then appointed his trusted protege, Ivan Lexa, to head the service. 102 Over the next two and a half years, Lexa waged a war of "dirty tricks" against the president and harassed civil society and indepen10 1 Guillenno O' Donnell, "Delegati ve Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5: I ( 1994), 55-69; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities. 102 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. �SLOVAKIA 131 dent entrepreneurs. The war reached its climax in August of 1995 when someone- possibly Meciar, but more probably Lexa-ordered that the president' s son be kidnapped, drugged, and dumped in neighboring Austria. When Robert Remias, the confidant of an exSIS agent, implicated Lexa's SIS in discussions with the editor of the leading independent daily SME, Remias was assassinated. Meciar's government squashed the investigation into the assassinationreplacing three investigators before finding one who suspended the inquiry into the SIS link. The new investigator concealed evidence that 150-200 grams of Semtex had ignited the car's propane tank. Now on the defensive, the SIS launched a campaign to show that Kovac Jr. had arranged for his own kidnapping.103 The battle between Meciar and Kovac ended only after the president's term of office expired in 1997. As the government and opposition could not achieve the super majority needed to select a replacement under a clearly flawed constitutional provision, presidential powers fell to the Prime Minister. Meciar subsequently used his presidential powers to pardon anyone linked to the kidnapping and Remias's murder-despite the lack of any official finding that a crime had taken place. 104 The government also encroached on the rights and prerogatives of the opposition, the courts, civil society and the media. In addition to oversight of the secret service, the November 3-4, 1994 parliamentary session blocked opposition MPs from participation on all substantive committees except the environment committee. The coalition further revealed its hegemonic intentions by trying to have former Prime Minister Moravcik' s party, the Democratic Union (DU), banned from parliament and by charging President Kovac with treason. Both efforts failed. To safeguard against a repeat of the 1993-4 defections of Kovac, Moravcik, Filkus, Knazko and others, defectors from the HZDS were now treated with open disrespect for the constitution. After HZDS co-founder Frantisek Gaulider left the HZDS parliamentary club in 1996, the HZDS leadership produced a pre-signed letter of resignation that they had obtained in 1994 to ensure party discipline. The 103 Kieran Wiliams, "Slovakia Since 1993," in Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001 ), 130-140. 104 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 48-50. �132 SLOVAKIA parliamentary majority then stripped him of his parliamentary mandate, barred him from the building and replaced him in parliament with a HZDS loyalist. The Constitutional Court ruled these acts to be unconstitutional, but parliament did not reinstate him- another violation of Slovakia' s fragile system of checks and balances. Gaulider also received numerous threats to his life. 105 Media and civil society also came under intense legal and extralegal pressure from the government and allegedly the SIS. The HZDS attempted to monopolize channels for societal interest group representation by creating bureaucratic barriers to their legal operation and by establishing party-controlled interest groups that competed with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. 106 Similarly in the media, parliament' s November 1994 legislation excluded the opposition from any role in oversight over public broadcasting. The state-controlled mass media and sympathetic newspapers then justified the government's actions with a torrent of unbalanced coverage, nationalism, xenophobia, personal slurs and misdirection. 107 Things were also tough for the independent media. Following his reporting on the Kovac, Jr. case, the editor of SME found a dead cat nailed to his door and his car burned. An anonymous leafleting campaign accused two other critical journalists of pornography and pedophilia. A third journalist who looked too closely at the links between Alexander Rezes and the HZDS was beaten up in a Kosice restaurant. 108 Meanwhile, privatization beneficiaries frequently bought and attempted to control the editorial content of the independent media. When VSZ took over the business daily 105 Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation," 43 ; Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, "Preface," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 5. 06 ' Darina Malova, "The Development of Interest Representation in Slovakia after 1989: From 'Transmission Belts' to ' Party-State Corporatism?"' in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 93113 . 07 ' The Helsinki Civic Assembly and the Association for the Support for Local Democracy survey concluded that state-run Slovak Television violated the principles of fa irness more often than any other public or private media outlet during the 1998 electoral campaign. It devoted seventy-five percent of its news programs to Met iar and the HZDS, RFEIRL News line, 2: 192 (October 5, 1998), Part II . 108 Innes, Czechoslovakia, 313 , note 139. �SLOVAKIA 133 Narodna obroda, for example, the new owners fired the newspaper's independent-minded editor. Overall, while the independent media functioned effectively, it faced numerous forms of petty harassment from various government agencies. 109 Independent news sources, however, did not reach the entire population. In much of the country, the state broadcast media was the primary source of information. After the November 3-4 session of parliament, government loyalists controlled the state media and state broadcasting reflected their views, even to the point of collaborating with the SIS to fabricate "investigative reports" slandering the president. Nor did the most important independent media source-the television station Markiza-initially have the coverage capacity or willingness to acquaint Slovaks with the details of privatization or other rule of law issues. Toward the end of the 1996-1998 period, however, TV Markiza did become a crucial source of alternative information in Slovakia. 11 0 As the Meciar government came into conflict with basic liberal institutions and freedoms , the EU, NA TO, European governments and the United States all registered their displeasure. The EU, in particular, issued a series of diplomatic demarches as part of its dialogue with applicant countries. 111 In 1996, Freedom House reduced Slovakia's political rights ranking from "free" to "partially free." 112 However, the nastiest rap to the government's knuckles came in July of 1997, after the government illegally cancelled a national referendum on NATO membership. The European Commission recommended that Slovakia be excluded from the first wave of EU membership negotiations. While Slovakia was a liberal democracy in 109 Andrej Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media in the Post-Communist Transition of Slovakia" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 187-208. 110 Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media," 196. 111 Alexander Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation and the Conflict over Slovakia's International Alignment," in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 209-30; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, l everage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 11 2 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World, 2007," Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2007 . �134 SLOVAKIA form, the Commission opined, it operated differently in practice. 113 NATO Followed suit and excluded Slovakia from its first round of • 114 expansion. The Meciar government dismissed these external critics by questioning the objectivity of their processes and critiquing the patriotism of domestic opponents who agreed with them . Yet, the blows hurt. Slovakia's young, urban and educated citizens were deeply concerned with proving the country's western credentials and desperately wished to join Europe 's most exclusive clubs. Thus, the EU and to a lesser extent NA TO, increasingly put the government in a bind: Meciar could not comply with their "conditions" and still retain his increasingly politicized and often illegal control over political and economic life. As Milada Vachudova pointed out, "political power depended on strategies that were incompatible with the EU's re~uirements of liberal democracy and comprehensive market reform." 15 With the September/October 1998 parliamentary elections approaching, the HZDS even appeared ready to jettison free and fair elections. Parliament amended the electoral law in ways that gave the Ministry of the Interior greater influence in counting the vote; and it put ambiguous and potentially expandable limitations on the ability of the private media to cover the election. New electoral rules also shackled the ability of small parties or coalitions to participate in the election. Finally, the HZDS had the courts review the leading opposition coalition 's eligibility to participate. Many worried that should the government apply a literal interpretation of its new laws, it could eliminate a number of important institutions of liberal democracy, including the right to contestation and participation as well as the right to alternative sources of information. Opponents feared a fullfledged authoritarian turn . 116 Privatization's Half-way Reform. Meciar's privatization program produced stakeholders in dysfun113 European Commission, Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application for Membership of the European Union , (Brussels: European Union, 1997), section I. 3. 114 Duleba, " Democratic Consolidation." 115 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 38. 11 6 1.M. Viersma, "Sprava docasnej pozorovatelskej misie na Slovensku," Euro Report, no. I 5, 1998, pp. 22-23. �SLOVAKIA 135 ctional economic policies. This was not necessarily pre-ordained. The first two Slovak governments retained the basic elements of the market reform program inherited from the federal government. An independent National Bank of Slovakia kept the Slovak currency strong, while the first two post-independence governments restricted their fiscal expenditures and preserved a liberalized trade environment. By 1995-6, Slovakia's firms were beginning to find new markets in Western Europe. Unemployment, still high at thirteen percent, was beginning to inch down. With so much slack in the labor market, inflationary pressures remained acceptable-reflecting a sustainable increase in demand as tradable products integrated into world markets. The major problem was the deliberate coalition policy of politicized reform. 1997-8 turned out to be challenging years in the global economy. Yet, the network of industry-state-party ties shaped by an insider privatization process and illiberal politics made Slovakia even more vulnerable to a downturn. 117 Missed tax payments, uncompetitive government procurement programs, significant new government financial obligations, delayed enterprise restructuring, low foreign direct investment and a troubled banking sector all contributed to an economic crisis that would cost Slovakia the next three years of growth. Manipulation of Debt. The Slovak Republic shows that a government's capacity to protect investor property rights and enforce debt contracts is crucial to the efficiency of privatization. 118 The Meciar government's policy of direct sales led to a rapid concentration of ownership, but it did not always produce more efficient behavior. According to interviews with Western financial services experts and equity market actors, Slovak owners often rejected enterprise restructuring and instead used their insider access to cash flows and assets from privatized 117 OECD, (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Slovakia, (Paris: OECD, 1999), 29-30. 11 8 Olsson, Ownership, Reform; Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, "Privatization and Corporate Governance," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0. Krueger, eds, Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region. NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics, 12 (2001), 13-34. http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0l82 .pdf [accessed February 23, 2012]. �136 SLOVAKIA enterprises to get rich quickly-a process known as "rent seeking." Much of the reason relates to debt and the firms' low purchase prices. Slovak firms carried a large outstanding burden of debt which they were not necessarily pressured to honor. First, Slovakia's bankruptcy law privileged debtors over creditors, reinforcing a persistent problem with overdue liabiities. 11 9 Second, the administration of the first wave of voucher privatization in Slovakia led to an initial concentration of privatized property in the state-bank owned funds . These state-owned banks often transgressed the official firewall between their lending and equity management operations and forced firms to take on more loans than they needed. 120 The percentage of nonperforming loans in the portfolios of Slovakia's three state banks skyrocketed between 1996 and 1998 from twenty-five to thirty-seven percent. 121 Third, privatization in highly discounted client or management buyouts failed to bring in new cash or debt relief to Slovak companies. Despite the often-symbolic purchase prices and favorable repayment terms, politically connected buyers would often increase debt by borrowing from state banks to make their down payment to the FNM. Privatized firms also frequently stopped paying their taxes. Between 1995 and 1998, tax arrears of private firms in Slovakia tripled to about sixteen percent of total state expenditures. Fully paid, this would have been enough to eliminate the budget deficit. 122 The scarcity of cash in the economy did not bode well for restructuring. Many managers privatized their firms only to find themselves apparently condemned to eke out a living at the margins of solvency for years on end. Facing such choices, and given lucrative 11 9 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, p. 97 . Debt loading is the practice of pushing unnecessary loans on cash rich firms at high rates as a means of extracting their funds. According to Andrew Schwartz, it was a common practice among bank-owned privatization funds in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Since debt loading siphoned off cash that should have been shared with the enterprise ownership's minority shareholders, it was a form of tunneling. Andrew Schwartz, The Politics of Greed: How Privatization Structured Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 236-7; Appel, A New Capitalist Order, 64; Jarko Fidrmuc and Andreas Worgotter, "Czech Banking Sector: Reasons of Banking Crises and Prospects," Discussion Parer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1998. 21 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 79. 122 Ibid., 54-55 . 120 �SLOVAKIA 137 opportunities for cash assets elsewhere, 123 it actually made sense for new owners to strip their companies and return the shells to the FNM before making the first installment payment. Another option was to consume the company slowly-meeting its minimal obligations to the FNM and tax office, defaulting on inter-enterprise debt and siphoning off the extra cash. 124 Officially, the FNM was allowed to control major asset transfers in firms with FNM debt, but in practice, it was too over-stretched to monitor all transactions. 125 Meciar's HZDS- through the government- held the ends of the long strings of debt that permeated the economy. Ideally, given its commitment to state-led industrial restructuring, these debt obligetions should have been used by the government and the Ministries of Finance and Economy to coordinate restructuring efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of the Economy's official statement on industrial policy made it clear that control over liability networks was a crucial component of its effort to engage in industrial restructuring. The Ministry also aspired to promote the development of asset networks, "by supporting groupings of enterprises into holdings," to "pool investment resources." 126 The reality was that, due to coalition permeation by privileged 123 In one example of crowding out, the author interviewed an industrial manager who had recently signed a contract to produce copper pipes for a firm in Germany. When it came time to buy scrap metal to begin production, however, the cash he had reserved for the purpose had disappeared and he had to default on the contract. He soon learned that the owners had moved the funds to a short-term security with a return far greater than that offered by the copper pipe contract. Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povazske strojame, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, July, 22 1998. 124 Indeed, one EU sponsored consultant that I spoke with actually advised his clients to engage in a similar "triage" strategy of debt management. He advised managers facing illiquidity to delay paying those creditors who were no longer essential to the firm while using scarce cash to meet obligations to those creditors who were. The understanding was that the legal framework would favor the debtor. Confidential interview, foreign financial consultant, Bratislava, April, 1997. 125 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997 . Ironically, the politicization of credit and debt may have meant that the incentives to "rip off' stakeholders and minority shareholders were greater for owners who did not enjoy close contacts with the government. Unlike their well-connected competitors, they were less likely to win any dispensations from government creditors at the state-owned banks, the FNM or the tax officials. 126 Ministry of the Economy, SR, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update." Ministry of the Economy, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1997. �138 SLOVAKIA industrial interests, it was the governing coalition's industrial clients (as well as those firms that could "arrange" for ad hoc dispensations) that often pulled the strings of Slovak industrial and privatization policy. The result was that state-business networks were used to channel present and future tax revenues into the pockets of politically important industries and individuals. Ironically, after the Meciar government fell in 1998, the successor government picked up these long strings and used them to regain control of many enterprises. Revitalization and Industrial Policy. Even inter-enterprise debt and tax arrears provided opportunities for government manipulation. As noted, the bankruptcy framework privileged debtors over creditors. As most AZZZ members were debtors, there was little incentive for the industrial lobby to support a change in policy. Yet the government also passed a controversial Revitalization Act that granted chosen firms the right to enter into a state-sponsored debt relief program. 127 The Revitalization Act was designed in conjunction with Ducky's Ministry of the Economy on behalf of Slovakia's hard-hit engineering and machinery sectors. Based largely on tax relief, in practice its use was limited to the "restructured" companies owned by the quasi-private holding company, DMD Holdings a.s., as well as a number of agricultural firms. 128 DMD, run by Meciar's former Minister of Finance JuliusT6th, was an umbrella holding company for a network of former state-run defense manufacturing firms that were most severely hit by defense cutbacks at the end of the Cold War. In addition to restructuring, DMD profited from direct Ministry of Economy support- mostly in the form of encouragement and coordination-for the development of an indigenous automobile supply network. 129 While the effects of these direct attempts at industrial policy appeared to be generally well intentioned, they had little positive effect on restructuring the 127 Ministry of the Economy, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update," 18. The government also set up a state-run arms trading company, Armex. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, l 04-5 . 129 AZZZ 1996; Intervi ew with Ministry of Economy Plenipotentiary for the Automotive Industry in Slovakia, Alfred Richter in Samuel Bibza, "Yel'ke Plany," MOT, August, 1998, 4-8 . Interview with Jan Lesinsky, President, Slovak Society of Automoti ve Engineers, Bratis lava, August I 0, 1998 . 128 �SLOVAKIA 139 companies involved. 130 Indeed, the program virtually halted marginally successful earlier attempts at defense conversion. 131 Slovakia eventually got its automotive sector, but it took the defeat of Meciar, clear political compliance with the prerequisites of EU membership, macroeconomic stabilization and significant initial investment incentives to entice foreign automobile producers and supply companies to come to Slovakia. 132 Politicization of Bank Privatization. The FNM's insider privatization framework raised levels of conflict surrounding bank privatization. In early 1996, Meciar promised to privatize Slovakia's largest state banks to Slovakia' s leading enterprises, most notably VSZ and Slovnaft. 133 Observers quickly pointed out that the likely result of the privatizations would be to decapitalize the banks as owner-firms, like VSZ, wrote themselves checks. Hence, while opposition parties KDH, DS and DU, were officially in favor of privatizing the banks, they formed a one-time coalition with HZDS's far left wing governing partner, ZRS , to get the banks placed on the list of strategic enterprises that prevented their privatization. The ZRS had nothing against bank privatization per se, but it allegedly was upset that the HZDS had excluded ZRS clients from buying one of the banks. 134 While partially preventing the banks ' capture and potential mismanagement by industrial managers, the banks nevertheless remained undercapitalized. Deeply in need of capital, the VSZ nevertheless did secure control over Slovakia's third largest state bank, Investicna a rozvojova banka (Investment and Development Bank-IRB) through the support of the FNM at shareholder meetings. 135 IRB had a troubled portfolio 130 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 104-5 . Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 75 . 132 Sharon Fisher, John Gould and Tim Haughton, "Slovakia's Neoliberal Tum," Europe-Asia Studies 59:6 (2007), 977-98. 133 If we include the third state owned financial institution, Slovenska sporitel'na, these three banks accounted for as much as 90% of all Slovak deposits and 60% of all loans. OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, (Paris: OECD, 1998), 29; EilJ (Economist Intelligence Unit), Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, (London: Economist, 1998), 17. 134 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 258 . 135 OECD, Slo vak Country Report, 1997-8, p. 29; EilJ, Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, p. 17; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 158. 131 �140 SLOVAKIA which VSZ control did little to correct. The state had been using it to keep a nuclear power plant solvent and to provide subsidies to the construction industry to build apartments for young couples. In 1997, IRB liquidity problems worsened and the bank was forced to borrow internationally at rates driven up by the emerging global financial crisis . The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) directed the VSZ, as the primary owner, to provide a much-needed capital injection. The VSZ refused. The NBS later "suggested" that the bank's deterioration resulted from "serious illegal transgressions which negatively influenced the bank's activities ." To add to the crisis, junior coalition partner SNS refused to support a renewal of state support for the construction industry's subsidized apartment loan program. After more government infighting, the IRB failed to meet its depositors' demands, forcing the NBS to seize it in December of 1997. 136 The VSZ raid on Slovakia's financial sector was the logical culmination of insider privatization under illiberal political conditions. Tightly bound together by political necessity, Meciar's administration provided Rezes and his network of enterprises insider access to special deals in privatization, taxation, credit allocation (from state financial institutions) and almost every other area where the state intersects with economic activity. Moreover, Meciar did this despite open indications of nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. The final cost to other corporations, the taxpayers and VSZ's more than 25,000 employees was enormous. By the winter of 1998, VSZ Holdings had defaulted on its foreign obligations and was facing layoffs and bankruptcy. Meciar's successor government then used this crisis to regain control of the company and limit its growing debt. 137 In 2000, the successor government sold the VSZ to United States Steel Corporation. 136 OECD, Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, 77-8; EfU, Slovak Country Report, 1st Quarter I 998, 17. In the spring of 1998, the VSZ used its influence with the FNM and its direct and indirect shareholdings in the two other state financial institutions to provide the !RB with a costly capital injection. The VSZ again refused to contribute any cash of its own beyond the initial amount required by the NBS . Nor was there any real attempt by VSZ to find an adequate foreign buyer. Peter Laca, "Troubled !RB bank approves capital injection," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-21 , 1998. 137 "Vlada mimo hry," Pravda, November 17, I 998; See also Miklo§, 1997 . �SLOVAKIA 141 Abuse of State Property. Coalition misuse of property included firms that were not yet privatized. Perhaps the most notable case is former Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky' s abuse of the country's natural gas company, Slovensky plynarensky priemysel (Slovak Gas Industry-SPP). A key member of AZZZ and a former communist-era official, Ducky resigned his position with the government to oversee a systematic tunneling of SPP assets for personal and political use. This included financing FC Slovan- Slovakia' s most famous football team (and, ironically, the former Czechoslovak rival to Sparta Praha, a team purchased by VSZ's Alexander Rezes). Ducky would even hand out cash bonuses to reward players for stellar play. 138 The full extent of Ducky's tunneling only became clear after the government fell from power. Ducky died in a still unexplained assassination in 1999 three days after a probe was launched into his handling of the company.139 Slowing Macroeconomic Performance. It is ironic that, except for privatization, Meciar's second government largely left the federal reform package intact until 1996. 140 The resulting favorable entrepreneurial conditions and international demand produced a relatively strong recovery in 1994-1996, matching a regional trend. The tight monetary policy of the largely independent NBS was a crucial element in the strong macroeconomic performance of Slovakia. Yet, since NBS monetary discipline also signifycantly raised the cost of credit, maintained the real value of liabilities, and put constraints on fiscal policy, the NBS came under pressure from the Ministry of Finance to be "more cooperative" with Slovak industrial policy. According to Ivan Miklos, VSZ President Jan Smerek complained that the NBS's tight money policy was a form of "disliking VSZ and, apparently, disliking Slovakia's development." 14 1 Under intense industrial pressure, the NBS narrowly escaped an attempt by parliament to place it more directly under government control. 142 Heavy borrowing, low foreign investment and this attack on the NBS led major investment rating agencies to 138 Confidential interview with FC Slovan football player, Bratislava, July 1998. Fisher, Political Change, 94. 140 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 63. 141 Ibid., 71-2. 142 EIU, Slovak Country Report, r" Quarter 1998, 16-7. 139 �142 SLOVAKIA downgrade Slovak bonds to below investment-grade level in the spring of 1998. This further raised the cost of borrowing. 143 By the end of Meciar's third government, enterprise restructuring in Slovakia had also slowed. Firms that sought an injection of capital had to face among other things : poorly functioning equity markets rendering an initial public offering nearly impossible; a government that was suspicious and even hostile to foreign strategic investors; government decision-making and procurement processes that frequently violated the equal application of the rule of law; and finally , an increasingly profligate fiscal policy, capped by a costly infrastructure development program that crowded out private investment. By the spring of 1998, the Meciar government had to finance its cash-starved economy on European markets at the relatively costly rate of 3.5 percent above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. It also borrowed short term domestically at a nominal rate of twenty-eight percent. The high level of domestic borrowing aggravated the credit squeeze on Slovakia's already strapped enterprises. 144 Short term borrowing to meet long term debt obligations was the final nail in the Meciar government's economic coffin. By the summer of 1998 it was clear that the Slovak performance of the previous years had been financed by unsustainable fiscal spending and borrowing. Meciar's Electoral Defeat, October 1998. Parliamentary elections in late September of 1998 proved a satisfactory denouement to the regime's VSZ-led orgy of self-dealing. The government had put in place rules that looked as if it was equipping itself with the necessary tools for a full-fledged authoritarian seizure of power. No seizure occurred. It is possible that the HZDS did not even consider the possibility. Even if it had, concerted efforts from independent NGOs, regional governmental associations, and a united center-right coalition of parties and the SDI.; helped to mobilize 84.25 percent of the voting population. Many correctly interpreted the election as a test of Slovakia's Western European credentials. The HZDS won a marginal plurality, but the ZRS was in shambles 143 "Another Agency Downgrades Slovaki a's Risk Indicator," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-2 1, 1998, p. 5. 144 M. E.S.A I 0, Slovak Mo nthly Report, May 1998, p. 1-2; M. E. S.A I 0, Slovak Monthly Report, July 1998, p. 2. �SLOVAKIA 143 after its lamentable performance as a far left party in formal charge of creating capitalists from state assets. The HZDS tried, but was unable to lure the SDI: away from the opposition to form a coalition. The SDC then joined a coalition of parties (the Slovak Democratic Coalition-SOK), SMK and the new Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) to form a government united by little more than opposition to Meciar and a desire to get into the EU and NAT0. 145 Slovakia's privatization winners split deeply during the election. Most of the direct beneficiaries of Meciar's politicized economic policies remained close to the Prime Minister. Most notably, VSZ owner Alexander Rezes provided the HZDS with significant frnancial support and other perks, including flying the Prime Minister to campaign events in his private jet and even forcing his football team, Sparta Praha, to wear HZDS jerseys in a campaign-related friendly match. Rezes ' s empire was already hemorrhaging money despite having raided two of Slovakia' s leading frnancial institutions. The IRB had already been bailed out by the NBS at taxpayer expense. This was an indirect subsidy that allowed money to filter into the HZDS campaign. It must have been clear to Rezes that only continued "industrial collaboration" with his political patron would save his fortune. Yet, faced with the gathering strength of the opposition, other Meciar clients were more circumspect- even Tmava's Vladimir Poor hinted at his willingness to work with a new govemment. 146 The SOP, the new "Party of Civic Understanding" promoted itself as the voice of the independent entrepreneurial community. In interviews, its spokesman strongly critiqued the disastrous economic management of the government and promised to uphold the rule of law in economic and political dealings. It sought initially to establish a safe, pro-business middle ground between the polarized camps in Slovakia' s "Cold War. " Despite this, its founder, Rudolf Schuster, refused any prospect of cooperation with the HZDS. 147 Other entre145 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy, I0: I (I 999), 80-95 . 146 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence," in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites after State Socialism (Lanham: Rowm an and Littlefield, 2000), 47-70. 147 Interview with Ferdinand Petrak, Vice Chairman, Party for Civic Understanding (SOP), Bratislava, July 28, 1998; Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities, 71. �144 SLOVAKIA preneurs continued to support the SDI:, and the newly united Slovak Christian and Democratic Union (SKDU). 148 Conclusion. Having privatized their enterprises through political connections, Meciar's clients went on to privatize state policy. Rather than demand the rule of law, they corrupted politicians; rather than invest resources to restructure, they stripped and tunneled them; rather than act as national champions, they preyed on the country's financial stability. By 1998, the coalition government's economic model was no longer sustainable. As the economic price of clientalism grew, the politicization of economic policy became an important additional grievance in the opposition's political arsenal. Never completely unied, many of the coalition's economic allies sat on the fence or sought accommodation with the opposition. Others proved firm HZDS supporters-particularly Rezes's VSZ, who must have seen that VSZ's financial future was closely linked to government policy. On the whole, privatization in Slovakia did not produce "market democrats," but it did succeed in providing economic agents who responded to their own logic of action. These proved to be both a boon and a curse to Meciar during his moment of greatest political crisis. Privatization' s impact on Slovakia's political liberalization, in short, was at best neutral and at worst negative. Ultimately, it was a united opposition, strategically smart NGO's and a mass mobilezation of Slovakia's voters that established market democracy in Slovakia. 148 Gould and Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 102 SLOVAKIA , ..., VLADIMIR MECIAR AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION IN SLOVAKIA, 1992-1998 1 John A. Gould "A just privatization does not exist; we all know that the only criterion was loyalty. " - Vit'azoslav Morie, SNS honorary chair2 Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution put former Communist Party bureaucrats and industrial managers on the defensive. Associated with the communist past, many top managers were removed from their jobs while the middle managers that replaced them carried little political clout in broader debates over the design of economic reforms like privatization. As a result, Czechoslovak privatization architects had the freedom to offer average citizens a potential stake in state-owned companies. In return for a small administrative fee, citizens received coupons that would allow them to bid on company shares . Most participating citizens, however, chose to invest through new financial intermediaries, called investment privatization funds, which would concentrate citizens' small shares into larger stakes in privatized companies. By 1993, these intermediaries began to rival remaining communist-era managers for control of Czech and Slovak firms .3 1 This paper is adopted from John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 103-32. A full list of acknowledgments can be found on pp. vii-viii of that work, but the author would like to thank the following for their comments, assistance and support: Hilary Appel, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Sharon Fisher, Zsolt Gal, Simona Gould, Timothy Haughton, Cubomira Hromkova, Darina Malova, Mikael Olsson, Marek Ryhal', Sona Szomolanyi, James Thompson and Milada Anna Vachudova. The author is responsible for any errors in logic or fact. 2 Abigail Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 200 I), 263. 3 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby,"The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Republic," Europe-Asia Studies 48 :2 (1996), 285-303; Mitchell Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: SLOVAKIA 103 While the mass privatization program continued in the Czech Republic through 1995, Slovakia's industrial managers were able to derail it after independence on January 1, 1993 . They had initially suffered from the same liabilities as their Czech counterparts. 4 Yet, as debate over the sovereign status of Slovakia developed in 199192, Slovak managers found a resource in identity politics that their Czech counterparts largely lacked. 5 By fusing their interests to rising popular-nationalism, a select group gained influence with a number of Slovakia's nascent political parties, and most notably, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The following paper examines the politics of privatization in Slovakia after independence. Slovakia's battle over privatization and its aftermath was a nasty, occasionally dangerous affair with very high stakes. At the center of this battle, initially, were the efforts of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and various industrialists to stop the highly popular citizens' "voucher" privatization program that Slovakia had inherited from the federal republic. This had little to do with the voucher program 's evident flaws . Rather, Meciar's policies sought to reorient privatization away from the new financial intermediaries which largely supported his opponents. In its place, his government operated a direct sales program that would benefit those who would support him. Yet, by attempting to replace a program that rewarded a majority of Slovak citizens with a program that only rewarded a narrow group of industrial managers and political allies, Meciar embarked on a democratically difficult project. His early efforts to gain close personal control over the privatization process contributed to the alienation of many of the key players in the HZDS, including President of Slovakia Michal Kovac. The president briefly orchestrated Meciar's Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Central Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Peter Rutland, "Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic," Telos 94 ( I 992), I 03-130; Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 56-68. 4 Interview wi th Jozef Uhrik, Commercial Director, Volkswagen Slovakia, Devinska Nova Yes, Slovakia, January 14, 1997 ; Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povai.ske strojarne, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, Slovakia, July, 22 I 998 . 5 Hilary Appel and John Gould, " Identi ty Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics," Europe-A sia Studies 52: I (2000), 111-31. 104 SLOVAKIA removal from power in March of 1994 after he made a speech criticizing a series of legally questionable privatization decisions. When Meciar regained power in November, he acted on the knowledge that his political and economic ambitions were incompatible with the democratic institutions he had inherited. The ensuing assault on democratic norms, rules and procedures, while not entirely directed at privatization, nevertheless gave his ruling coalition the freedom to privatize as it pleased. However, by the end of Meciar' s third term, Slovakia could no longer demonstrate its democratic credentials to the European Union or NATO . Both threatened to exclude Slovakia from their next rounds of expansion. Privileged access to government was not simply important to acquiring property. Under Meciar it also became increasingly useful for securing favorable economic policies such as the allocation of credit, the regulation of capital markets, government procurement, and taxation policies. Between 1996 and 1998, such largess undermined Slovakia' s economic recovery and threw the country into an economic crisis. By 1998, both Slovakia's long term economic recovery and its European future were in danger. Slovak voters responded with an 84.4 percent electoral turnout that left the ruling coalition no choice but to accept the vote and surrender power. Privatization should produce independent economic actors who seek a profit rather than a government handout. Yet, as the Slovak experience under Meciar reminds us, privatization is first and foremost a means of acquiring wealth and power. Where easy profits can easily be had through political connections, creating private property does not necessarily go hand in hand with market democracy. For privatization to be most effective, societies must first be willing and able to police the intersection of state policy and economic activity. Voucher Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1993. Privatization in Czechoslovakia was designed at the federal level, but it was largely carried out by the Czech and Slovak republiclevel governments. In Slovakia privatization began under the government of Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky (Christiaq Democratic Movement-KDH) and his 30 year-old neo-liberal Minister of Privatiza- SLOVAKIA 105 tion,6 Ivan Miklos. While there was room for administrative innovation to account for local differences, in practice, Miklos administered the voucher program in an almost identical fashion to his Czech counterparts. This was no small accomplishment. Following the collapse of support for Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's first government in the spring 1991 , the new ruling coalition was deeply divided over privatization. The Carnogursky government included Jan Holcfk, and Jozef Belzak as Ministers of Industry and Economy, respectively. While both men favored a transition towards markets, both had industrial ties and favored a strong sectoral industrial policy in which firms would be restructured before privatization. In addition to Carnogursky 's ministers, industry had a strong friend in KDH member Viliam Oberhauser, a founding member of what Miklos claimed was industry's nomenklatura-controlled peak organization, the Federation of Employers Unions and Associations (AZZZ). 7 Oberhauser was a key member of the nationalist wing of the KDH and had helped author a "gradualist" economic reform scenario, challenging the market-oriented federal economic reforms that had been in place since January of 1991. 8 This created difficulties for Miklos. In the final years of the 1980s, Miklos had studied market economics at the Austrian school of Friedrich Hayek. At the time of the Revolution, he had been an economics student and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics in Bratislava. Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak brought him into the government in 1990. 9 After, the launch of strong market-oriented 6 There were three privatization ministries- one in each republic, and one at the federal level to deal with federal state property. Their formal name at the republic level was the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Assets. For an explanation see, Petr Husak, Budovani kapitalismu v Cechach: Rozhovory s Tomasem Jeikem (Prague: Volvox Globatour, 1997), 111 ; John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 61. 7 lvan Miklos "Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientalist Structures in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Slovak Political Science Association, 1997), 65. 8 Jvan Miklos recalls that the Ministries of Forest and Water, Agriculture and even the Environment - all run by KDH appointees - had strong gradualist leanings. Interview with Ivan Miklos, Consultant, M.E.S.A. I 0, Bratislava, April 2, 1997. 9 Miklos's first post was as Deputy Prime Minister, Jozef Kucerak's advisor, and Director of the Government's Section for Economic and Social Policy. Interview 106 SLOVAKIA reforms in January of 1991, however, Slovakia ' s economy suffered disproportionately more than the Czech Republic ' s economy. 10 Economic liberals like Kucerak increasingly became the target of colleagues seeking to distance themselves publicly from the growing pain of economic transformation. Market reforms would be managed better, they argued, if Slovak politicians were to have greater control over their own economic and political affairs where they could use state controls to moderate the pace of transition. 11 As the lead proponent of a federally brokered, rapid transformation towards a market economy, Kucerak was forced to step down after a vote of no-confidence in the spring of 1991 . Miklos was elevated to Minister of Privatization soon after and quickly replaced Kucerak as the most outspoken market liberal in the government and the strongest public supporter of federal reforms. He faced the brunt of attacks from both the opposition and the national wing of the ruling KDH. This included surviving several parliamentary votes of no-confidence. By the winter of 1991-92, it was increasingly clear that the KDH-led coalition would fare poorly in the upcoming June elections. Miklos feared that the next government would most likely slow privatization and delay the creation of private owners. He therefore sought to start the voucher program as quickly as possible- to create a fait accompli of new owners with a stake in continuing the rapid property transformation program. Miklos was responsible for convincing state-owned firms to put up shares for the voucher privatization program in Slovakia. He recalled that the threat of dismissal helped him to encourage most managers to include significant voucher components in their base privatization plans, but the pressure was bitterly resented. 12 Miklos with Ivan Miklos, Bratislava, October 1, 1996; Interview with Jozef Kucenik, Bratislava, January 13, 1997. 10 Slovakia was particularly handicapped by its reliance on heavy defense industries, among other things. See Gould, Politics of Privatization. 11 For details see Gould, Politics of Privatization , 73-79 . 12 In about sixty cases, managers called for direct sales exclusively to themselves. Assuming that the managers had failed to meet their obligations under the privatization act to make important data available to competitors, Miklos reopened the proposed submission process for an additional two months and pushed the firms to provide the necessary data to allow competitors to propose rival privatization plans for each firm, Miklos interview, October I, 1996; Ivan Miklos, "Corruption Risks in the Privatization Process: A Study of Privatization Developments in the Slovak Re- SLOVAKIA 107 further alienated industrial elites by converting what they hoped would be a program of cheap, direct sales of enterprise shares to incumbent managers, into a transparent, competitive program in which price was the leading criterion. Prior to the June elections, the ministry sold shares in 189 firms for prices approximating and often exceeding their book value. 13 It would be another six years before the state would do as well financially in its direct sales of public property. Meanwhile, the first wave of voucher privatization began in October of 1991 with the registration of 2.59 million Slovak citizens, almost two-thirds of the adult population, through the federal Ministry of Finance. As in the Czech Republic, 14 registration for the program in Slovakia initially lagged until financial intermediaries (also referred to as investment privatization companies) began to offer a ten-fold or greater return on the voucher holder's initial registration fee within a year. Seventy-two percent of Slovak citizen-participants subsequently invested their voucher coupons with investment privatization funds in the first wave of privatization. Bidding on firms began in May of 1992 and closed in December. Shares were finally distributed to new owners in April of 1993 .15 Despite the efforts of industrial elites, the federal voucher privatization program had succeeded in providing the investment privatization funds stakes of up to forty percent in privatized firms. 16 Another wave of voucher privatization could allow fund owners to consolidate ownership of Slovakia's industrial assets. Over the next two years industrial managers, therefore, worked diligently through AZZZ to ensure a second wave of voucher privatization would not take place. 17 public," Bratislava, Klub Windsor, I 995; Interview with I.'.udovit Cemak, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 2, I 997. 13 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997; Mikael Olsson, Ownership, Reform and Corporate Governance: The Slovak Privatization Process in 1990-1996 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1999), 119. 14 For details, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, Chapter 5. 15 For more on the technical details of voucher privatization, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 63-8. 16 0Jsson, Ownership, Reform, 115-6, 219. 17 AZZZ (Federation of Employers Unions and Associations), "5. vyrocie AZZZ SR, 1991-1996," Spravodaj AZZZ Extra. Bratislava, March, 1996; Rudolf Lachovic, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie a kolektivneho investovania," Global Brokers, Bratislava, I 997, manuscript. 108 SLOVAKIA Meciar's Second Government, 1992-1994. Meciar's HZDS dominated the June 1992 elections. With the tacit support of the Slovak National Party (SNS), he became Slovak Prime Minister for the second time. In July negotiations with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, Meciar failed in his bid to form a weak confederation with the Czech Republic. Unable to reconcile Meciar's concept of a weak confederation with Klaus' concept of a strong federation, the two agreed to replace the federal state with two sovereign, independent republics. After parliamentary approval in both republican assemblies, the countries split peacefully on January 1, 1993. 18 As in the Czech Republic, voucher privatization in Slovakia became one of the more popular aspects of the federal reform program. 19 This may help to explain why the Meciar government, elected in June of 1992, completed the first wave as its predecessor had planned. Nevertheless, Meciar's Minister of Privatization, I:ubomir Dolgos, promised a shakeup in the next round. One of the new govemment' s first decisions was to indefinitely postpone the demand that firms submit second round privatization plans to the Ministry of Privatization. This necessitated at least a delay in the second round of voucher privatization. In September of 1992, the government program declaration and an associated Ministry of Privatization document spelled out a new privatization philosophy based on a more gradual state-guided economic transformation. Rather than emphasize the rapid creation of new owners, the state would now single out "strategic fields" where it would intervene to protect the national interest through the state restructuring of enterprises before, or in place of, privatization. Industrial ministries would design and coordinate restructuring plans with the assistance of the state-controlled financial sector. 18 Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Innes, Czechoslo vakia. 19 Miklo~ interview, April 2, 1997; Dusan Triska recalled being surprised at the strong support for the voucher scheme in Slovakia. Dusan Triska, "Privatization: Czechoslovakia" Eastern European Economics 26 (Fall, 1991 ); DusanTl'iska, "Political , Organizational, and Legislative Aspects of Mass Privatization-Czechoslovakia," in Marko Simonetti and Andreja Bohm, eds., Privatization in Central & Eastern Europe, 1991 . (Ljubljana: Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1991 ). Oldfich Dedek, The Break-up of Czechoslovakia (Aldershoot: Ave bury 1996), 201 . SLOVAKIA 109 This concept also favored direct sales to incumbent managers over voucher privatization. Price was no longer the dominant criterion in evaluating bids on the company shares that were to sold. First installments were lowered from thirty percent of the price to ten to fifteen percent, and payment could be extended over fifteen years. Another round of voucher privatization would take place, but would only be used as a residual method.20 Similarly, the threat that a manager would be dismissed diminished under the new government. Miklos asserted that Meciar and his Minister of Economy, I:udovit Cernak, reappointed many of the communist-era managers that had been pushed out by Carnogursky's government. 21 Many of these had been forced out for having collaborated with the communist secret service before the Revolution-in a process called "lustration."22 Cemak himself related that Meciar frequently paid little attention to his appointees' lustration certificates in . personne l dec1s1ons. . . 23 h1s Little privatization occurred under Dolgos in the first six months of 1993. Rather, Meciar focused his energies on consolidating control over his cabinet- pushing out co-HZDS founder Milan Kiiazko (who was a marginal threat to Meciar for party control) and Minister of Economy, Cemak. As a Kiiazko protege, Dolgos soon found himself in constant conflict with Meciar-most notably over whether vouchers should have any role in the second round when it started. Meciar felt they should not, while Dolgos asserted that he sought to put aside about a third of corporate shares for voucher privatization. 20 Dolgos stressed that any efforts to set voucher privatization timelines or the volume of assets to be voucher privatized in advance, "would ... fail to serve a purpose." Dolgos's reformulated concept even "warned" industrial managers that if their second wave base privatization plans relied too heavily on the voucher method, they would be "subjected to particularly critical and thorough evaluation." There would also be a critical "assessment of the risks derived from concentration of ownership through privatization investment funds ." Instead, Dolgos emphasized "combined methods" in which management buyouts would play an "exceedingly important role." Ministry of Administration and Privatization, SR. , "Concept of the Continuing Process of Privatization in the Slovak Republic. " Ministry of Administration and Privatization of National Property of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1992; Interview with Cubomir Dolgos, Faculty of Management, Economics University, Bratislava, March 20, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 119-20. 21 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997. 22 Marsina interview, July, 22 1998; Uhrik interview, January 14, 1997. 2 3<'.:emak interview, April 2, 1997. 110 SLOVAKIA On June 12, 1993, Dolgos lost an HZDS-engineered vote of no confidence and stepped down.24 The departures of independent personalities like Cernak, Kiiazko and Dolgos left Meciar in more solid control over the HZDS and the government, but it also made his parliamentary majority vulnerable to future defections. Nevertheless, Meciar stepped up his efforts to replace his former colleagues with his personal loyalists-particularly in the Ministry of Privatization and the Fund for National Property (FNM). 25 At that time, the privatization ministry coordinated the privatization decision-making process while the FNM was a fully state-owned joint stock company charged with distributing shares to their new private owners. FNM appointees also represented the state's interests as a shareholder at general assemblies of corporate shareholders. In 100% state-owned companies, the FNM was on paper, at least, in complete control of the firm. Control over the FNM would give the Prime Minister control over most unprivatized and many partially privatized firms. Attempts to gain direct governmental control over the privatezation ministry and the FNM brought Meciar into sharp conflict with President Michael Kovac, another co-founder of the HZDS .26 To replace Dolgos at the privatization ministry, Meciar chose a close associate, Ivan Lexa. Having backed Meciar in the dismissal of Kiiazko, Kovac now balked. Citing Lexa's inexperience and potential conflicts of interest with his father (a communist-era central planning agency bureaucrat, recently-turned entrepreneur), the president refused to approve the appointment. Meciar responded by giving Lexa the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Privatization (the highest ministerial position not requiring presidential approval) and assumed the responsibilities of Minister himself. One of Lexa's first privatization decisions as State Secretary in July of 1992 was to ap24 Dolgos interview, March 20, 1997; Cemak interview, April 2, 1997. Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 25 . 26 Slovakia 's President was constitutionally weak, making the need for a strong party system to check the Prime Minister's power all the more necessary. Executive power flowed from the Parliament, with limited presidential powers to check it. Kovac could and did veto legislation and appointees, but Parliament could override this with a simple majority. Later, when Parliament deadlocked over a new presidential candidate, presidenti al powers - including the power of a presidential amnesty transferred to the Prime Minister. 25 SLOVAKIA 111 prove his father ' s participation in the privatization of Povazske mlyny a cestoviname, a.s., with a personal stake estimated at up to 1 billion Sk (then about US $30 million).27 While Meciar consolidated power over Slovakia' s privatization and property control mechanisms, financial intermediaries whose funds had done so well in the first round of privatization began to assert some clout in shareholder meetings. Enterprise managers had also established a few funds. 28 Slovakia' s largest company, Vychodoslovenske zeleziame, a.s (Eastern Slovak Steelworks- VSZ) had established Cassiovia Invest, which had the marketing clout to acquire more than ten percent of the vouchers. But most funds- and hence a large portion of corporate power- were in the hands of enterprise outsiders, a fact that was increasingly resented by the incumbent industrial managers.29 In the first wave of privatization, the funds had amassed a forty percent stake in privatized firms and from the perspective of incumbent managers, carried unwelcome clout. Battles soon emerged over which would be dominant in determining the overall strategy of the company, the shareholder-dominated Supervisory Boards or the management-controlled Boards of Directors.30 Meciar' s allies came to feel that the most influential funds were, as subsequent Fund for National Property President Stefan Gavomik put it, "owned by the opposition."31While not technically true, by the end of the year, industrial managers and fund-appointed board members began to run into sharp conflict over the day-to-day management and long-term strategy of "privatized" companies. Hoping to avoid a further erosion of corporate insider influence, AZZZ halted a 27 Anton Marcincin, Daniela Zemanovifova, and Lubos Vagac, "Privatization Methods and Development of Slovakia," Bratislava, Center for Economic Development, 1996, 17. 28 Another fi fty percent was spread across a wide range of funds and individual shareholders, leaving the FNM , with its residual 37.6 percent, effectively in charge. Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 223 . 29 AZZZ, "S.Vyrocie AZZZ SR, 199 1- 1996"; Miklos, "Corruption Risks," 64; Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 279, 283. 30 Slovak and Czech companies had a dual board structure consisting of a supervisory board that gave general strategic direction to the company and managerial oversight, and a management board- largely consisting of top corporate mana~ers- that oversaw the day-to-day operations of the firm. 1 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 11 8. 112 SLOVAKIA second round of voucher privatization. Meciar obligingly pushed back the start date for the next round of voucher privatization. In the fall of 1993, Meciar complimented his firm grasp of the Ministry of Privatization by putting personal loyalists on the board of the National Property Fund. Between December of 1993 and March of 1994, his indirect control over state shares of major firms allowed him to replace enterprise board members and managers of twentyone Slovak companies which, allegedly, failed to show sufficient loyalty to the HZDS. Meciar claimed that he was simply replacing opposition-linked managers from the VPN-KDH era with more independent managers . Indeed, he accused parliamentary opposition leaders "straight into the eye, in front of everyone, that each one of them is linked with one of the twenty-one major Slovak corporations in which we intervened. And this is the problem." 32 Meciar was possibly correct in his assessment. While in power, KDH ministers appointed people to the boards of leading Slovak state firms and other opposition leaders clearly had close industrial connections. However, it was unclear whether they were now being removed because they were acting as KDH clients or due to their reluctance to serve HZDS interests. Indeed, the KDH-era manager of the large oil refinery, Slovnaft, was allegedly replaced after he refused Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky's demands that he subcontract services to HZDS-linked firms. 33 By the winter of 1994, Meciar' s increasingly personal consoledation of party and governmental power had alienated many of his own party members. By February of 1994, a last remaining block of HZDS deputies, led by HZDS co-founder Jozef Moravcik, appeared ready to follow other former HZDS members and allies into opposition. The threat of losing power may have led to a subsequent wave of direct sales. Starting with the "midnight privatizations" of February 1, 2004, Lexa sold forty-four companies with a book value of $96 million for a final sale price of just $22 million. The decisions were notable for their lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and advantageous terms to the purchasers-many of whom had close ties to leading government officials. Thirteen were subsequently annulled 32 Specifically, Meciar was accusing Vojtech Sugar, Jan Carnogursky, Cudovit Cernak and Peter Wiess. "Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," T ASR-Slovakia (February 6, 1994). 33 Confidential interview, Slovnaft insider, Bratislava, February, 1997. SLOVAKIA 113 by the successor government for contravening the Large Scale Privatization Act of February 1991 , but virtually all of the privatizations were suspect. The beneficiaries included a range of politically connected individuals-from the wife of the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) to Meciar's own Minister of Finance, Julius T6th.34 A March 11 , 1994 report of a commission investigating the privatizations triggered the departure of the dissident-HZDS faction led by Jozef Moravcik and a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the government. In his speech before parliament, HZDS co-founder and Slovak President Michael Kovac openly accused Meciar of a lack of transparency and clientalism in the privatization process, among oth. 35 er th mgs. Meciar's and Lexa's hurried attempts to reorient Slovakia's privatization framework to favor political and economic insiders had run afoul of the opposition's effective use of liberal democratic institutions and norms. When next he gained power, Meciar' s new parliamentary majority would attack these opposition resources directly. VSZ and the Slovak Way of Privatization. One of Meciar's last acts in the1992-1994 government helps illustrate both the zero-sum nature of privatization, as well as its growing politicization. In December of 1993, the state exercised its shareholder rights to remove President Zoltan Berghauer and other top managers from the executive management of the state-owned firm VSZ, Slovakia's largest commercial entity. Berghauer had cofounded the AZZZ and was the lead author of an industry antireform petition in early 1991. 36 Meciar claimed that the top management change was a technocratic decision-made through consulta- 34 Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 121. Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 25. 36 In February of 1991 , only a month after the start of market reforms, the Slovak and Czech industrial federations delivered a joint petition to the Federal Assembly demanding "help in solving the difficult economic and financial situation of industrial companies ... [resulting from] the ill-considered restrictive fiscal , credit and monetary policy of the Federal Government. " Reforms, the industrialists continued, threatened, "the collapse of the entire national economy" and a "declining living standard for all citizens of the state." Zoltan Bergauer et al. , "Petice svaz u pnlmyslu CR a SR Federilnimu shromizdeni CSFR," Hospodafske noviny, February 29, 1991 , p. 3. 35 114 SLOVAKIA tions with high-ranking bank and industrial managers.37 Yet he did not hide the fact that the change was to reduce the "unwarranted influence" of "opposition parties" in Slovakia's largest enterprise. 38 Berghauer and other purged VSZ managers protested the move, citing a history of political manipulation and threats by the HZDS towards VSZ management. The source of the claim directly attacked Meciar's Minister of Finance, JuliusToth. Toth had been VSZ's Vice President of Finance until he had resigned to join Meciar's government. According to Berghauer, Toth allegedly become enraged when Berghauer and VSZ's management refused to accept an HZDS member on the VSZ Board of Directors. Toth allegedly responded by demanding that the two top VSZ officials resign due to their political support for the KDH and other political opponents of the HZDS. 39 Toth later asserted that the Berghauer team had been stripping assets from the company. Through control of both the VSZ and collaboration with an independent trading company, they allegedly could siphon cash from the VSZ to the trade company by overcharging for supplies and underpaying for products.40 Perhaps to cut these alleged sales out of the revenue loop, or maybe to cut his allies in, Toth's new management team set up a new VSZ-owned sales company to oversee sales responsible for eighty percent of VSZ revenues. 4 1 As Minister of Finance, Toth and Lexa orchestrated the purchase of a 9.52 percent share of VSZ stock through a new private company, Manager a.s., established by five VSZ board members, including prominent HZDS member Alexander Rezes. The purchase was ques37 "Strong in the Saddle," T ASR-Slovakia, February 11, 1994. "Meciar Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," TASRSlovakia, February 6, 1994. 39 "Former Members of VSZ Board Lodge Complaint," CTK Business News, March 21 , 1994. 40 Despite Toth's allegations against Berghauer, no charges were ever filed . 41 Anthony Robinson, "Survey of Slovakia," The Financial Times, December 16, 1994, p. iv. It is unlikely that Toth was genuinely outraged at the allegations of corruption at VSZ. In 1993 he had allegedly used his influence as Minister of Finance to give a trading company, VSZ Selecta, a state contract to sell sugar that the Indian government provided to the Slovak government in place of its cash debt. VSZ Selecta won the contract without the required tender and then sold the sugar on the world market in violation of its contract. Toth was a member of the company's board. "Report on "Sugar Affair" to be out in January," CTK News, December 5, 1993. 38 SLOVAKIA 115 tionable for its unsightly conflicts of interest, advantageous terms and most of all, its timing. Again, in accordance with the government program, the shares were sold to domestic entrepreneurs at a substantial discount with a generous payment schedule. The discount on the current share value of the package was $36 million.42 After a ten percent down payment, Manager would pay the rest in yearly installments over five years. Manager's members each made their down payment with an interest-free $62,000 loan from the Kosice-based Priemyselna banka (Industrial Bank) whose controlling shareholder was, in turn, the VSZ-controlled fund, Cassiovia Invest. 43 Priemyselna banka, moreover, received these funds from Banka Slovakia (Bank Slovakia), which then served as the repository and investment arm of the FNM. In short, Manager borrowed FNM funds to buy shares from the FNM that in tum benefited close associates of its directors and the man responsible for their appointment, Vladimir Meciar.44 The timing was also controversial. The Meciar government received the proposal to privatize the VSZ shares to Manager on March 7 and the government approved the request on March 11- the day on which parliament finally passed a vote no-confidence in the Meciar cabinet. The FNM and Manager signed the agreement on March 14, the day the government fell. On March 17, VSZ held a general assembly at which the now former Minister of Finance and FNM Board member, JuliusT6th, was elected Chair of VSZ's Board of Directors. Rezes would become Minister of Transportation in 42 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 22 . 0lsson, Ownership, Reform , 223 , note 39. 44 "Approach to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Meciar attempted to establish Banka Slovakia as early as 1993 in his home region of Banska Bystrica as part of his effort to develop a regional banking center. The goal was to use the bank to recycle FNM funds and provide cheap credit for small to medium sized enterprises. After the VSZ deal, however, the opposition charged that it would be used as a means of providing the politically connected with cheap capital to make down payments for privatization deals. In April of 1994, the next government suspended the bank's license to operate. With Meciar's re-election in the fall, the government pushed the National Bank of Slovakia to grant the license. But, after building a costly and elaborate headquarters in Banska Bystrica and suffering from notoriously poor lending practices, the bank had significant difficulties with capitalization. The NBS finally approved a license to begin operating on June I, 1996, but the bank- like most Slovak banks-quickly developed a problem with non-performing loans. 43 116 SLOVAKIA Meciar's next cabinet. Supporting the vote were VSZ's investment privatization fund, Cassiovia Invest and VUE Invest, the investment company of Vseobecna uverova banka (General Credit Bank-VUB) and Slovakia's largest state owned bank. Ironically, oversight responsibility for VUB had, until four days earlier, lain primarily with T6th's Ministry of Finance.45 Meciar's Opposition Takes Power, March-November, 1993. A five-party caretaker government under the leadership of HZDS defector Jozef Moravcik was formed in mid-March. It promised to restore transparency and accountability to the privatization process and to re-launch the voucher privatization process as soon as possible. This was to be done before the scheduled new elections at the end of September. The coalition fought, however, over how to restore confidence, transparency and speed to the privatization process. Nevertheless, Kevin Deegan-Krause demonstrated how the new coalition allowed itself to be held accountable to competitive political forces. 46 The recent experience with Meciar may have taught the government coalition partners a good lesson in the dangers of overconcentration of power-particularly in the areas of property management and privatization. Yet, the new five-party coalition was fractious and ideologically incoherent. This influenced privatization. On the one hand, the formerly communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDI:) sought to maintain direct sales as the primary method of privatization. On the other hand, the coalition partners accused it of intending to use direct sales to reward its own allies amongst Slovakia's ex-communist industrialists and bureaucrats. The Ministry of Privatization, however, was now led by Milan Janicina, a lawyer from the center-right Democratic Union (DU). He sought to ensure that any direct sales would be a rule-governed, multi-party competitive process, not something to be run exclusively by SDI: dictates. 47 The SDI: did, however, secure an agreement to sub- 45 "Approac h to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Toth also became deputy chairman of Priemyselna banka, Olsson Ownership, Reform, 223, note 39. 46 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 26. 47 Interviews with Milan Janicina, Commercial Lawyer, Bratislava, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. SLOVAKIA 117 ordinate the importance of price in the sales to employment and future investment commitments. 48 Corruption may have been possible in the final sales, but the number of competing interests in the decision making process ensured that the foxes guarding the hen house would keep each other in line. 49 Still , the program was not unimpeachable. Most of the direct privatization sales of fifty-four Slovak enterprises occurred after the elections had delivered a strong plurality to the HZDS but before Meciar had formed a government. 50 The government also conducted a public tender for the government's 24.9 percent share in VSi, attracting interest from nine companies, including the Austrian bank Creditanstalt. The coalition lost power before it could resolve internal bickering over the final buyer. 51 Throughout the summer of 1994, citizens, center-right coalition parties, brokerage firms and investment privatization funds clamored for a second wave of voucher privatization. Janicina fought with SD~'s Minister of the Economy Peter Magvasi (also an AZZZ member) to ensure that there would be enough property offered to make the project worthwhile. In preparation, the Ministry of Finance issued voucher booklets to seventy-two percent of Slovak citizens (ninety percent of those eligible). This was a significantly higher participation rate than the first wave. Janicina secured assets valued at $1.96 billion for the voucher program- making each voucher booklet potentially worth $593.00. After another aggressive campaign from financial intermediaries, fifty-eight percent of voucher holders traded their points for shares in investment privatization funds. 52 If the second wave of voucher privatization was completed, managerial insiders would cede significant additional economic power to the funds. 53 48 OIsson, Ownership, Reform , 124. Anna Grzymala-Busse, " Beyond Clientelism : Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," Comparative Political Studies 41 :4/5 (2008), 638-73 . 50 Jnterview with Rudolf Filkus, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 15, 1997; Janicina interviews, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. 51 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 222 . 52 Tbid. , 124-5. 53 Janici na interview, April I, 1997. 49 SLOVAKIA Privatization under Meciar's Third Government, 1994-1998. The Moravcik government was short-lived. The SD:C had secured early elections and in the ensuing campaign the center-right fragmented amongst a range of competing personalities. A number of opposition parties failed to cross the five percent threshold in the September-October 1994 vote. Moravcik's Democratic Union (DU) received 8.6 percent, the KDH won 10.l percent, SD:C got 10.4 percent and the ethnic Hungarian Coalition took 10.2 percent of the votes. The HZDS, meanwhile, won a thirty-five percent plurality. This was less than in 1992. However, since thirteen percent of the electorate voted for parties that did not pass the five percent threshold, the ideological weight of the next parliament shifted sharply back towards Meciar and his national-populism. After a month of negotiations, the HZDS formed an ideologically awkward coalition with the two smallest delegations in parliament-the extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS-5.4 percent) led by the garrulous Jan Slota,54 and the extreme left Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS-7.34 percent). 55 To discipline his junior coalition partners, Meciar could use the threat of an alternative coalition with the reformed communist party, the SD:C.56 Critics speculated that the "brown-red" wings of the new ruling coalition were held together only by the promise of privatization benefits. 57 The National-Populist Privatization Concept and its Implementation. Meciar's privatization policies formally settled the long-standing ideological battle between market reformers and gradualists over privatization policy, but in reality, this conflict had stood proxy for an underlying clash of interests between enterprise outsiders and incumbent firm management. Gradualist concepts were hijacked, to an extent, and combined with clientalism and xenophobic nationa54 1n the spring of 1993, Meciar had helped Jan Slota oust Cernak from control over the SNS. Cernak left (with Janicina) to form the Democratic Union. Cernak interview, April 2, 1997. 55 Grigorij Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Party System," in Soi\a Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation , 50. 56 Innes, Czechoslo vakia, 262. 57 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 64. SLOVAKIA 119 !ism to benefit the governing coalition and its allies at, as we shall see, a growing cost to the public. The formal theory underlying the Meciar government's privatezation program echoed the Dolgos strategy of the fall of 1992. The government would work closely with incumbent industrial managers to achieve ownership patterns that would be most appropriate to a coordinated industrial policy. The state would integrate equity transfer, credit and other policies in ways that would boost the strength of Slovak national firms on world markets and minimize transformational pain at the enterprise level. The variety of capitalism officially envisioned was thus much closer to a continental-style state-coordinated market economy than a more hands-off liberal market economy. However, Slovak industrial leaders at AZZZ also invoked Asian development models to explain what they were trying to accomplish.58 Insiders Ascendant. In practice, Meciar's coalition privatized the privatization process. It also subordinated capital markets regulation to the needs of incumbent managers at the expense of enterprise outsiders. The main target was the funds that emerged through voucher privatization. 59 Meciar's new parliamentary majority began to work even before he formed a government. In an overnight session of parliament on November 3-4, 1994, his new coalition passed legislation that secured exclusive control and oversight of privatization, the state media and the secret service. 60 An amendment to the 1991 Large Scale Privati58 Interview with Frantisek Bruckrneyer, General Director, Federation of Employers' Unions and Associations (AZZZ), Bratislava, February 6, 1997. Prior to becoming Director of AZZZ, Bruckrneyer worked for the Czechoslovak federal government after the Warsaw Pact invasion (1970-1974) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow (1974-1980). In the 1980s, he directed the state-owned firm, Zdroj , before co-founding AZZZ in 1991 . Compiled from "Leaders.sk" database. Trend Holding Co. and The Slovak Spectator, Bratislava. http://www.leaders.sk/index.php?id=674 [accessed August 30, 2010). 59 Marcincin et al., "Privatization Methods"; Miklos, "Economic Transition,"; Ivan Miklos, "Privatizacia," in Martin Butora and Michal lvantysin, eds. Slovensko, 1997: Suhrn a sprava o stave spolocnosti a trendoch na rok 1998. (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky, 1998). 60 Soi\a Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 10. 120 SLOVAKIA zation Act transferred the right to propose and decide direct sales from the privatization ministry to the relatively less transparent FNM (Act #369/1994). The majority then stacked the FNM's Presidium and Supervisory Board with coalition officials and cancelled Janicina's 54 direct post-election sales (Act #370/1994). In five cases, new property owners had already taken legal possession of their assets from the state. 61 This violated both international human rights law and the Slovak Constitution. 62 The transfer of power to the FNM had important implications. The Constitutional Court later ruled that, as a joint stock company, the FNM did not have to submit to government review or regulatory oversight. Hence, it was exempt from oversight by the supreme government control body that could oversee and audit state agencies. Even had it not been exempt from oversight, however, the November 3-4 "night of the long knives" removed opposition parliamentarians from the oversight committee. The ruling majority was now fully responsible for monitoring itself. 63 While extolling the virtues of a state-directed transformation, Meciar provided the new measures with a market reform cover story. He claimed that insulating the privatization process from opposition would allow the FNM to make decisions according to technocratic criteria, free from political influence. In 1998, when the damage had been done, this allowed him to claim that although he still agreed with his "concept" of privatization, he had not been responsible for its administration. 64 Meciar's "concept" ultimately excluded outsiders from privatization. He initially promised that the second wave of voucher privatization would go ahead as planned-although with less property than Janicina envisioned. In July of 1995, however, Parliament cancelled voucher privatization altogether (Act #190/1995). Voucher booklets 61 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 126. Both Article 17b of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly 217 /1948) and Protocol 1, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1952) secure the right to possessions. 63 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. In the fall of 1997, Parliament finally gave into EU and opposition pressure and appointed Ivan Miklos to the supervisory board of the FNM. 64 CTK News, May 8, 1998. Meciar was never directly implicated in a privatization scandal while in power, Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist, (New York: Pal grave, 2006), 91. 62 SLOVAKIA 121 could now be exchanged for a bond with a face value of l 0,000 Sk to be redeemable in 2001 or on the bearer's 65 th birthday and with an interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). Proceeds to meet the bond obligations were to come from sales of state property- a promise that the FNM's new privatization policy of selling to domestic industrial managers at a deep discount made impossible to keep . In its public statements, AZZZ took full credit for the cancellation of vouchers.65 A Constitutional Court decision overturned parts of Act #190 in late 1996.66 By that time, however, the FNM had already privatized most of Slovakia's remaining "non-strategic" industrial enterprises. Even had the government wanted to re-launch the voucher program, it would now have had to renationalize private properties to find adequate assets to make the program work. An additional measure passed in July of 1995 enhanced the government's capabilities to coordinate a state-directed industrial policy through the Strategic Enterprises Act (# 175/ 1995). The purpose of the act was to preserve the "public interest" in crucial Slovak industries. First, twenty-nine firms would be exempt from privatization altogether. This included the fundamental sectors of the economy including telecommunications, energy and the defense-related engineering sector. The list of strategic companies, made public in the summer of 1996, also included some at least questionably "strategic" firms such as health spas. 67 All told, the Strategic Enterprises Act reduced the book value of assets remaining to be privatized by half. 68 A second, legally controversial provision of the act, forced an additional forty-five firms to transfer a "golden share" to the firm's founding ministry-in most cases, to Jan Ducky's Ministry of the Economy. The Constitutional Court overturned this prescription in April of 1996 as a clear violation of property rights, but tellingly, the owners of major pro-HZDS firms , like Slovnaft, had failed to give 65 Lachovit, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie". Katarina Zavacka, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 164. 67 The administration may have legitimately feared that privatization would mean the services of the spas would no longer be readily available or affordable to average Slovaks through the health care system. 68 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 130. 66 122 SLOVAKIA the state ownership rights over the golden share. Their reaction gave credence to the market reformers' expectations that privatizationeven via a highly politicized process-would produce independent agents with the potential, at least, to resist government policies that hurt their material interests. 69 In November of 1996, the Constitutional Court also annulled Parliament's transfer of privatization powers to the FNM (Act #370/1994). The court argued that the act had illegally abrogated the state's responsibility for the transformation of state property. The Court stopped short of retroactively annulling the FNM ' s actions, however. Stripped of its exclusive prerogative over direct sales, the HZDS-controlled FNM continued to serve its clients through public auctions of shares from the FNM portfolio. While share auctions are a relatively uncontroversial privatization mode, critics allege that the FNM often limited access about the time and location of the auction to all but the intended buyer. 70 Coalition Control over Direct Sales. Between January of 1994 and November of 1996, the FNM privatized at a furious pace. While Act #3 70/1994 removed privatezation from the government's portfolio of responsibilities, coalition officials and industrial insiders from AZZZ retained close control over the process. Two FNM officials, HZDS member and FNM Chairman Milan Rehak, and Co-Chair and Director of the Direct Sales Section, Jan Povraznik, were responsible for executing Presidium decisions . These were closely controlled by the ruling coalition. Junior coalition partner ZRS had formal responsibility for the privatization process . ZRS member Peter Bisak ran the Ministry of Privatization while ZRS vice-chairman Stefan Gavornik chaired the Presidium. Gavornik attested, however, that his influence was minimal: while the HZDS had no seats on the nine member Presidium, AZZZ members held six seats and hence a majority of the votesand they supported the HZDS .7 1 Understandably, now that AZZZ 69 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi , "Bridging Slovakia's Elite Chasm," Transitions, November, 1997. 70 Jnterview with Gabriel Palacka, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 18, 1997 ; Miklos, "Economic Transition," 67-8 . 71 Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Postcommunist Europe (London: Ashgate, 2005), 64. SLOVAKIA 123 influence was secured, incumbent managers who had previously been skeptical about privatization became its strong advocates. 72 According to Sharon Fisher, regional committees of five coalition representatives determined properties to be sold and top coalition officials made final decisions at coalition meetings every Wednesday at 6:00pm. 73 Allegedly, the meetings rarely considered the business merits of the proposal-or even how the sale would further the official goal of coordinated industrial restructuring. As Gavomik recalled, "We were .... lobbying for those who were coming to us." Yet, Gavomik added, "not even a nail was sold without Meciar."74 Milan Cagala, a HZDS-appointed FNM presidium member, confirmed these allegations. 75 More broadly, members of the ruling coalition were open about clientalism. 76 As Minister of the Economy, Jan Ducky (HZDS) explained, "every government gives advantages to those groups that cooperate with them. This is not controversial." 77 Yet sales went beyond clientalism to open self-dealing-included sales to leading ruling coalition politicians and their family members. As Gavomik admitted, "Of course there are [politicians in the privatization process], and I know about them, but I won't tell. After all .. . every citizen has a right to take part in privatization." 78 Participants in the FNM's direct sales program typically received terms similar to the midnight privatizations of February 1994. Buyers-usually incumbent managers- would receive the company for 72 Ibid. , 35. Fisher, Political Change, 88-9. The regional meetings were an institutional mechanism for regionally based privatization groups to make their claims to property. In the eyes of observers, the groups became associated with leading HZDS officials and clients. For example, it was rumored that meetings in Kosice tended to be dominated by Rezes, those in Banska Bystrica by Meciar, and those in Tmava by Vladimir Poor. Interview with Valer Ostrovsky, CEO, Schultz and Ostrovsky, Bratislava, May 14, 1997. 74 Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic," Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 75 Ibid. 76 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 66-7. 77 Author's notes from "Slovak Spectator Live, Debates for Democracy Series: Brigita Schmognerova & Jan Ducky," Bratislava, 1996. An FNM spokesman shared this sentiment with the author. Interview with Oto Balogh, Press Spokesman, Fund for National Property, Bratislava, April 22, 1998. 78 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 277-8, note 26. 73 124 SLOVAKIA as little as one third, one-fifth, or even less of its book value. In practice, the typical firm required a ten to fifteen percent down payment, often using money borrowed from a state-owned financial institution. Moreover, installments on the purchaser' s debt to the FNM were usually spread over ten years and deductible from the company' s tax bill. These terms and often the buyers themselves were also frequently kept secret. In the case of the illegal sale of the strategically listed and highly profitable oil extraction and storage company, Nafta Gbely a.s., the new owners of the company remained a matter of intense speculation among opposition politicians and the press. The official address of the purchasing company, Druha obchodna, a.s. was initially an abandoned building. Vladimir Poor, Trnava's HZDS chief and a member of the regional coalition privatization committee later admitted to being a primary beneficiary of the deal, along with a close Meciar aide.79 FNM President Gavornik later alleged that Poor was able to meet the company's 575 million Sk purchase price simply by raiding the company's 1,075 million Sk capital account. If Gavornik is right, Poor used the firm's bank account to buy the firm for himself. Prosecutors later unsuccessfully charged Poor with "tunneling" 300 million Sk out of the company, but dropped the charges. In the end, the circumstances of the company ' s privatization were never fully investigated, perhaps because Poor voluntarily returned the company to the state. 80 In another controversial case, the FNM sold a controlling stake of Slovnaft, Slovakia's oil refinery, to Slovintegra-a company owned by Slovnaft' s director, Slavomir Hatina and nineteen other managers. Hatina was a financial backer of the HZDS and bought thirty-nine percent of the company at an eighty percent discount over the currently traded price. The initial down payment, moreover, was only 1.56 percent of the sale value. The FNM soon reduced the sale price by an additional eighty-four percent to reward management for meeting its promised investment and employment targets.81 The privatization of Slovakia' s largest company, VSZ, also continued apace under Meciar's direct sales framework. In 1995, junior 79 Fisher, Political Change, 93-4; Marcincin et al. , "Privatization Methods. " Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic, Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 81 Marcincin et. al. , "Privatization Methods," 18. 80 SLOVAKIA 125 coalition member ZRS engineered a sale of ten percent of VSZ shares to Hutnik, a company formally owned by VSZ's union members but strongly under the influence of Minister of Transport (until 1996), Alexander Rezes. Again the price was a fraction of the real value of the shares and payments were made on a generous installment plan. Hutnik then collaborated with Rezes to form Ferrimex, a company that purchased another 15.4 percent on extraordinarily generous terms.82 The deal cemented Rezes ' s control over VSZ. Rezes responded by essentially barring minority shareholder VUB kup6n (an investment company set up by Slovakia' s state-run savings bank) from receiving any information about the health and activities of the firm _sJ Nationalism in Privatization. The Meciar government employed popular economic nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric to justify its choice of a privatization program. Junior coalition partner SNS campaigned in 1994 on a promise to protect Slovakia from "impoverishment" at the hands of foreign investors.84 The subsequent 1995 government program declaration promised to privilege "domestic business subjects" over foreigners in the privatization process. National entrepreneurs would then deal with their assets as they saw fit in what Meciar correctly predicted would be a "third wave" of privatization to foreigners. 85 In practice, Slovak government officials remained deeply suspicious of foreign direct investment and often sought to block foreign partnerships. "We just want to avoid them coming in and closing [the company]," remarked one FNM official in an interview with the author. "Investors only come to misuse companies and disappear." 86 One example is notable for its senselessness: a foreign advisor to the government related that he worked with an entrepreneur to acquire a strategic foreign partner to modernize and expand production of his product line for export abroad. While the entrepreneur was not explicitly prohibited from signing the deal, he received several telephone calls from top officials in one ministry warning that he would 82 01sson, Ownership, Reform, 223 -5. lbid., 182. 84 Fisher, Political Change, 89. 85 Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 65 . 86 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997. 83 126 SLOVAKIA be held fully accountable if even one Slovak lost his job as a result of the investment. He lost his nerve and cancelled the contract. The enterprise thus remained in debt and was unable to raise the money on its own for modernization; nor was it able to make its own marketing contacts abroad. The advisor noted that this was typical of the Meciar government's attitude towards foreign joint-ventures. 87 The combination of national capitalism and knee-jerk nationalism cost Slovakia dearly. Joint ventures with multinational corporations were at that time leading the deep industrial restrucuring of Central Europe. They had the capital, marketing networks and technology to outperform domestically privatized companies and they were far outperforming firms that remained in state hands, measured in both production increases and productivity growth. 88 Despite this growing record of success, the ruling coalition sold a mere five companies to foreigners out of a total 347. 89 On a per capita basis, by 1998, Slovakia had received half the FDI of Poland, one-third the FDI of the Czech Republic and only a tenth of the FDI of Hungary.90 This was a lost opportunity. Over the next few years, new owners would effortlessly enrich themselves by "flipping" their cheaply acquired companies to international capital-realizing for themselves gains that should have gone into the FNM accounts to meet its new privatization bond obligations. 91 Insider-Controlled Capital Markets Regulation. Having gained control over the privatization process, incumbent managers pressured the government for a favorable capital markets policy. Throughout 1994 and into 1995, investment privatization companies had clashed with incumbent managers in company board rooms. As Michael Olsson relates, the managers wanted the new ow87 Confidential interview with a foreign financial service executive, Bratislava, October 20, 1996. Most of the foreign financial service executives and consultants I sroke with had similar stories. 8 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Elite Fragmentation, Industry and the Prospects for Democracy in Slovakia: Insights from New Elite Theory" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 1997), http: //www.ciaonet.org/book/gould/ [accessed February 23, 2012]. 89 Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 133. 90 Gould and Szomolinyi, "Elite Fragmentation," 58. 91 Fisher, Political Change, 94. SLOVAKIA 127 ners to contribute capital while they continued to control the direction of the company. The new owners of the funds, by contrast, sought to pressure the incumbent managers into improving cost efficiency, technological and organizational restructuring, and developing new- often international- marketing arrangements. It did not help that the funds with diverse portfolios did not have sufficient expertise to cover all the firms in their portfolio. Fund representtatives were often barely out of university and entirely lacking in experience. A cultural clash thus developed between the older generation of industrial managers-most of whom had their start in Slovak industry in the 1960s and 70s-and the "young men from Bratislava_ ,,92 Government actions in 1995 wrested industrial control from the funds back to the industrial managers. Incumbent managers began to use the direct sales process to tum the tables at meetings of general shareholders. Olsson writes, "[M]anagers who acquired a large chunk of shares on soft terms from the FNM all of a sudden lost all respect for other minority shareholders .... funds could only sit by [as] ... managers or other domestic industrial groups took over." 93 The government also intervened in capital markets to further tilt the balance of power towards management. Legislation in 1995 reduced the maximum stake investment privatization companies could hold in a company from twenty to ten percent. It also prohibited investment privatization companies from placing officials on a company ' s Board of Directors. This weakened the ability of fund-dominated Supervisory Boards to monitor the day-to-day actions of company managers. Parliament also passed capital markets regulation in 1996 that reduced the transparency of capital markets transacttions and all but eliminated minority shareholder rights. President Kovac returned the legislation, demanding better protection for minority shareholders. Ironically, the funds were not necessarily in favor of a better regulated market. The Slovak capital market had few of the institutional safeguards to protect minority shareholder rights and prevent insider trading that we find in more developed equity markets. Controlling owners were often able to expropriate value from minority 92 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 182. 93 fbid. 128 SLOVAKIA shareholders without penalty. This meant, ironically, that the emergence of a dominant shareholder in a firm often would lead to a decline in the value of the firms' shares. 94 The result was a loss in equity market liquidity: when one lost control over a company, one would often be unable to sell one's shares at any price. Wise investors knew that the majority shareholders could tunnel the real value of the company elsewhere. Under such conditions, a passive portfolio stake in all but a few "blue chip" companies made little sense. Funds found they could best make money by secretly acquiring a controlling share of companies in unregistered, off market trades of physical paper shares and then selling them at a profit to a strategic investor. Given that a more transparent market would actually undermine this strategy, a number of funds were somewhat ambivalent about reforms that might make passive portfolio investment safer and profitable. 95 The ruling coalition made things even worse. It sought to limit the funds to a portfolio role even as it actively undermined their minority shareholder rights. Ministry of Finance capital markets regulator Jozef Magula testified on behalf of minority shareholder rights in front of Parliament--much to the disappointment of top AZZZ managers . A better law was passed in 1997 .96 Still, the new law continued to allow controlling shares to be bought anonymously in secret off-market trades. 97 Remarked one broker philosophically, "at least we have rules."98 94 Economist Joseph Stiglitz observed this phenomenon in the Czech equity market, but the problems were quite similar in Slovakia. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Comments on 'Czech Republic: Capital Market Review Report,"' Delivered at the Ministry of Finance, Prague, Czech Republic, May 9, I 997 ; For details, see Gould, The Politics o[ Privatization, 81- 10 I. 9 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 184-5 . 96 Magula claims that, as a result of his parliamentary testimony, he came under AZZZ pressure to step down. He relented and moved to the central bank. Interview with Jozef Magula, Member of the Bank Board, General Relations Department, National Bank of Slovakia, Bratislava, July 28, 1998. 97 Magula interview, July 28, 1998 ; Interview with Rudolf Lachovic, President, Association of Investment Managers and Investment Funds of the Slovak Republic, Brati slava, June I 6, 1997; for the early market regulatory climate, see Juris, I 994. 98 Ostrovsky interview, May 14, I 997. SLOVAKIA 129 Meaningful portfolio investment disappeared under Meciar. In addition, led by Magula, the government destroyed a rapidly growing mutual fund industry in 1996. Unlike the privatization funds, the new mutual funds gathered people's savings and invested them in the market and other assets. The pioneer was Prva slovenska investicna skupina, a.s (First Slovak Investment Company-PSIS) an open-ended fund into which citizens could deposit and withdraw like a checking account. By early 1995, the PSIS's Sporofund had over $50 million in savings. 99 It was allegedly well-run and had done a reasonable job at building shareholder value within its portfolio. But in the fall of 1994, the PSIS used its savings to invest in citizen voucher booklets issued under the Moravcik government. Vouchers, the PSIS controversially argued, were a form of state security and hence a legal investment for the mutual fund. Over 750,000 Slovaks signed up for the PSIS voucher privatization funds . Had the second wave of voucher privatization gone forward as planned, PSIS would have become the second wave's largest owner of shares in Slovak enterpnses. However, PSIS owners were also strong contributors to the Democratic Union-the party of Janicina and Moravcik. Moreover, the PSIS had a stake in the independent daily newspaper SME. Both PSIS' s political orientation and its potential economic power were a threat to the ruling coalition and its industrial allies. In the spring of 1995, the Ministry of Finance revoked PSIS 's operating license. Courts found the measure illegal and ordered that the Ministry restore the license, but the Ministry simply revoked it again and transferred control of the company's Sporofund portfolio to Harvard Investment Company. In the face of a rapid withdrawal from the Sporofund, Harvard liquidated the fund and paid off savers about half of what they had put in. 100 The Coalition Assault on Democracy, 1995-1998. Meciar's coalition could not have achieved such close control over the privatization framework without a significant attack on democratic political and civic institutions. Hence, while Slovakia's 99 Interview with Vladimir Hoffman, Broker, Delta Securities, Prague, Czech Republic, July 25 , 1997. I0°Magula interview, July 28, 1998; Ostrovsky interview, May 14, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 187-90. 130 SLOVAKIA democratic decline from 1994 to 1998 was not exclusively caused by privatization, it was certainly linked to it. Indeed, it is unlikely that the ruling coalition and its allies would have fought so hard had the nation's most lucrative assets not been available for appropriation. After ad hoc encroachments on democratic norms in 1993-94, between late 1994 and 1998, Meciar' s parliamentary majority reduced Slovakia's formal democracy to an illiberal shell verging on soft authoritarianism. One permissive cause was the majoritarian nature of the Slovak Constitution. Led by a strong executive and unhindered by a weak presidency already on the defensive, the Meciar majority sought to override the remaining checks posed by the Constitutional Court, the political opposition, civil society and regional and municipal governments. This enabled a reorientation of the privatization framework towards political and economic insiders, but it also endangered "horizontal accountability"-the country' s internal balance of institutional power. 101 Meciar' s squabble with the president was the most visible aspect of this encroachment. Kovac ' s 1993 veto over Meciar's choice of Ivan Lexa to run the privatization ministry marked the beginning of a running battle between the government and the president. The conflict took on added intensity during Meciar's third government. Kovac did not have much institutional power to start with. His repeated vetoes of parliamentary acts were quickly overridden by a simple majority- entirely in line with the Constitution. Yet, Meciar sought to further weaken and discredit the president. An important player in this campaign was the Slovak Information Service (SIS), Slovakia ' s secret service. First, Meciar had to gain control over it. In the November 3-4, 1994 session of parliament, Meciar's majority excluded opposition parties from participating on the SIS oversight committee. In the spring of 1995, parliament transferred power to appoint the head of Slovakia's intelligence agency from President Kovac to Prime Minister Meciar. Meciar then appointed his trusted protege, Ivan Lexa, to head the service. 102 Over the next two and a half years, Lexa waged a war of "dirty tricks" against the president and harassed civil society and indepen10 1 Guillenno O' Donnell, "Delegati ve Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5: I ( 1994), 55-69; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities. 102 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. SLOVAKIA 131 dent entrepreneurs. The war reached its climax in August of 1995 when someone- possibly Meciar, but more probably Lexa-ordered that the president' s son be kidnapped, drugged, and dumped in neighboring Austria. When Robert Remias, the confidant of an exSIS agent, implicated Lexa's SIS in discussions with the editor of the leading independent daily SME, Remias was assassinated. Meciar's government squashed the investigation into the assassinationreplacing three investigators before finding one who suspended the inquiry into the SIS link. The new investigator concealed evidence that 150-200 grams of Semtex had ignited the car's propane tank. Now on the defensive, the SIS launched a campaign to show that Kovac Jr. had arranged for his own kidnapping.103 The battle between Meciar and Kovac ended only after the president's term of office expired in 1997. As the government and opposition could not achieve the super majority needed to select a replacement under a clearly flawed constitutional provision, presidential powers fell to the Prime Minister. Meciar subsequently used his presidential powers to pardon anyone linked to the kidnapping and Remias's murder-despite the lack of any official finding that a crime had taken place. 104 The government also encroached on the rights and prerogatives of the opposition, the courts, civil society and the media. In addition to oversight of the secret service, the November 3-4, 1994 parliamentary session blocked opposition MPs from participation on all substantive committees except the environment committee. The coalition further revealed its hegemonic intentions by trying to have former Prime Minister Moravcik' s party, the Democratic Union (DU), banned from parliament and by charging President Kovac with treason. Both efforts failed. To safeguard against a repeat of the 1993-4 defections of Kovac, Moravcik, Filkus, Knazko and others, defectors from the HZDS were now treated with open disrespect for the constitution. After HZDS co-founder Frantisek Gaulider left the HZDS parliamentary club in 1996, the HZDS leadership produced a pre-signed letter of resignation that they had obtained in 1994 to ensure party discipline. The 103 Kieran Wiliams, "Slovakia Since 1993," in Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001 ), 130-140. 104 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 48-50. 132 SLOVAKIA parliamentary majority then stripped him of his parliamentary mandate, barred him from the building and replaced him in parliament with a HZDS loyalist. The Constitutional Court ruled these acts to be unconstitutional, but parliament did not reinstate him- another violation of Slovakia' s fragile system of checks and balances. Gaulider also received numerous threats to his life. 105 Media and civil society also came under intense legal and extralegal pressure from the government and allegedly the SIS. The HZDS attempted to monopolize channels for societal interest group representation by creating bureaucratic barriers to their legal operation and by establishing party-controlled interest groups that competed with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. 106 Similarly in the media, parliament' s November 1994 legislation excluded the opposition from any role in oversight over public broadcasting. The state-controlled mass media and sympathetic newspapers then justified the government's actions with a torrent of unbalanced coverage, nationalism, xenophobia, personal slurs and misdirection. 107 Things were also tough for the independent media. Following his reporting on the Kovac, Jr. case, the editor of SME found a dead cat nailed to his door and his car burned. An anonymous leafleting campaign accused two other critical journalists of pornography and pedophilia. A third journalist who looked too closely at the links between Alexander Rezes and the HZDS was beaten up in a Kosice restaurant. 108 Meanwhile, privatization beneficiaries frequently bought and attempted to control the editorial content of the independent media. When VSZ took over the business daily 105 Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation," 43 ; Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, "Preface," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 5. 06 ' Darina Malova, "The Development of Interest Representation in Slovakia after 1989: From 'Transmission Belts' to ' Party-State Corporatism?"' in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 93113 . 07 ' The Helsinki Civic Assembly and the Association for the Support for Local Democracy survey concluded that state-run Slovak Television violated the principles of fa irness more often than any other public or private media outlet during the 1998 electoral campaign. It devoted seventy-five percent of its news programs to Met iar and the HZDS, RFEIRL News line, 2: 192 (October 5, 1998), Part II . 108 Innes, Czechoslovakia, 313 , note 139. SLOVAKIA 133 Narodna obroda, for example, the new owners fired the newspaper's independent-minded editor. Overall, while the independent media functioned effectively, it faced numerous forms of petty harassment from various government agencies. 109 Independent news sources, however, did not reach the entire population. In much of the country, the state broadcast media was the primary source of information. After the November 3-4 session of parliament, government loyalists controlled the state media and state broadcasting reflected their views, even to the point of collaborating with the SIS to fabricate "investigative reports" slandering the president. Nor did the most important independent media source-the television station Markiza-initially have the coverage capacity or willingness to acquaint Slovaks with the details of privatization or other rule of law issues. Toward the end of the 1996-1998 period, however, TV Markiza did become a crucial source of alternative information in Slovakia. 11 0 As the Meciar government came into conflict with basic liberal institutions and freedoms , the EU, NA TO, European governments and the United States all registered their displeasure. The EU, in particular, issued a series of diplomatic demarches as part of its dialogue with applicant countries. 111 In 1996, Freedom House reduced Slovakia's political rights ranking from "free" to "partially free." 112 However, the nastiest rap to the government's knuckles came in July of 1997, after the government illegally cancelled a national referendum on NATO membership. The European Commission recommended that Slovakia be excluded from the first wave of EU membership negotiations. While Slovakia was a liberal democracy in 109 Andrej Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media in the Post-Communist Transition of Slovakia" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 187-208. 110 Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media," 196. 111 Alexander Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation and the Conflict over Slovakia's International Alignment," in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 209-30; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, l everage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 11 2 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World, 2007," Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2007 . 134 SLOVAKIA form, the Commission opined, it operated differently in practice. 113 NATO Followed suit and excluded Slovakia from its first round of • 114 expansion. The Meciar government dismissed these external critics by questioning the objectivity of their processes and critiquing the patriotism of domestic opponents who agreed with them . Yet, the blows hurt. Slovakia's young, urban and educated citizens were deeply concerned with proving the country's western credentials and desperately wished to join Europe 's most exclusive clubs. Thus, the EU and to a lesser extent NA TO, increasingly put the government in a bind: Meciar could not comply with their "conditions" and still retain his increasingly politicized and often illegal control over political and economic life. As Milada Vachudova pointed out, "political power depended on strategies that were incompatible with the EU's re~uirements of liberal democracy and comprehensive market reform." 15 With the September/October 1998 parliamentary elections approaching, the HZDS even appeared ready to jettison free and fair elections. Parliament amended the electoral law in ways that gave the Ministry of the Interior greater influence in counting the vote; and it put ambiguous and potentially expandable limitations on the ability of the private media to cover the election. New electoral rules also shackled the ability of small parties or coalitions to participate in the election. Finally, the HZDS had the courts review the leading opposition coalition 's eligibility to participate. Many worried that should the government apply a literal interpretation of its new laws, it could eliminate a number of important institutions of liberal democracy, including the right to contestation and participation as well as the right to alternative sources of information. Opponents feared a fullfledged authoritarian turn . 116 Privatization's Half-way Reform. Meciar's privatization program produced stakeholders in dysfun113 European Commission, Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application for Membership of the European Union , (Brussels: European Union, 1997), section I. 3. 114 Duleba, " Democratic Consolidation." 115 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 38. 11 6 1.M. Viersma, "Sprava docasnej pozorovatelskej misie na Slovensku," Euro Report, no. I 5, 1998, pp. 22-23. SLOVAKIA 135 ctional economic policies. This was not necessarily pre-ordained. The first two Slovak governments retained the basic elements of the market reform program inherited from the federal government. An independent National Bank of Slovakia kept the Slovak currency strong, while the first two post-independence governments restricted their fiscal expenditures and preserved a liberalized trade environment. By 1995-6, Slovakia's firms were beginning to find new markets in Western Europe. Unemployment, still high at thirteen percent, was beginning to inch down. With so much slack in the labor market, inflationary pressures remained acceptable-reflecting a sustainable increase in demand as tradable products integrated into world markets. The major problem was the deliberate coalition policy of politicized reform. 1997-8 turned out to be challenging years in the global economy. Yet, the network of industry-state-party ties shaped by an insider privatization process and illiberal politics made Slovakia even more vulnerable to a downturn. 117 Missed tax payments, uncompetitive government procurement programs, significant new government financial obligations, delayed enterprise restructuring, low foreign direct investment and a troubled banking sector all contributed to an economic crisis that would cost Slovakia the next three years of growth. Manipulation of Debt. The Slovak Republic shows that a government's capacity to protect investor property rights and enforce debt contracts is crucial to the efficiency of privatization. 118 The Meciar government's policy of direct sales led to a rapid concentration of ownership, but it did not always produce more efficient behavior. According to interviews with Western financial services experts and equity market actors, Slovak owners often rejected enterprise restructuring and instead used their insider access to cash flows and assets from privatized 117 OECD, (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Slovakia, (Paris: OECD, 1999), 29-30. 11 8 Olsson, Ownership, Reform; Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, "Privatization and Corporate Governance," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0. Krueger, eds, Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region. NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics, 12 (2001), 13-34. http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0l82 .pdf [accessed February 23, 2012]. 136 SLOVAKIA enterprises to get rich quickly-a process known as "rent seeking." Much of the reason relates to debt and the firms' low purchase prices. Slovak firms carried a large outstanding burden of debt which they were not necessarily pressured to honor. First, Slovakia's bankruptcy law privileged debtors over creditors, reinforcing a persistent problem with overdue liabiities. 11 9 Second, the administration of the first wave of voucher privatization in Slovakia led to an initial concentration of privatized property in the state-bank owned funds . These state-owned banks often transgressed the official firewall between their lending and equity management operations and forced firms to take on more loans than they needed. 120 The percentage of nonperforming loans in the portfolios of Slovakia's three state banks skyrocketed between 1996 and 1998 from twenty-five to thirty-seven percent. 121 Third, privatization in highly discounted client or management buyouts failed to bring in new cash or debt relief to Slovak companies. Despite the often-symbolic purchase prices and favorable repayment terms, politically connected buyers would often increase debt by borrowing from state banks to make their down payment to the FNM. Privatized firms also frequently stopped paying their taxes. Between 1995 and 1998, tax arrears of private firms in Slovakia tripled to about sixteen percent of total state expenditures. Fully paid, this would have been enough to eliminate the budget deficit. 122 The scarcity of cash in the economy did not bode well for restructuring. Many managers privatized their firms only to find themselves apparently condemned to eke out a living at the margins of solvency for years on end. Facing such choices, and given lucrative 11 9 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, p. 97 . Debt loading is the practice of pushing unnecessary loans on cash rich firms at high rates as a means of extracting their funds. According to Andrew Schwartz, it was a common practice among bank-owned privatization funds in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Since debt loading siphoned off cash that should have been shared with the enterprise ownership's minority shareholders, it was a form of tunneling. Andrew Schwartz, The Politics of Greed: How Privatization Structured Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 236-7; Appel, A New Capitalist Order, 64; Jarko Fidrmuc and Andreas Worgotter, "Czech Banking Sector: Reasons of Banking Crises and Prospects," Discussion Parer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1998. 21 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 79. 122 Ibid., 54-55 . 120 SLOVAKIA 137 opportunities for cash assets elsewhere, 123 it actually made sense for new owners to strip their companies and return the shells to the FNM before making the first installment payment. Another option was to consume the company slowly-meeting its minimal obligations to the FNM and tax office, defaulting on inter-enterprise debt and siphoning off the extra cash. 124 Officially, the FNM was allowed to control major asset transfers in firms with FNM debt, but in practice, it was too over-stretched to monitor all transactions. 125 Meciar's HZDS- through the government- held the ends of the long strings of debt that permeated the economy. Ideally, given its commitment to state-led industrial restructuring, these debt obligetions should have been used by the government and the Ministries of Finance and Economy to coordinate restructuring efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of the Economy's official statement on industrial policy made it clear that control over liability networks was a crucial component of its effort to engage in industrial restructuring. The Ministry also aspired to promote the development of asset networks, "by supporting groupings of enterprises into holdings," to "pool investment resources." 126 The reality was that, due to coalition permeation by privileged 123 In one example of crowding out, the author interviewed an industrial manager who had recently signed a contract to produce copper pipes for a firm in Germany. When it came time to buy scrap metal to begin production, however, the cash he had reserved for the purpose had disappeared and he had to default on the contract. He soon learned that the owners had moved the funds to a short-term security with a return far greater than that offered by the copper pipe contract. Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povazske strojame, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, July, 22 1998. 124 Indeed, one EU sponsored consultant that I spoke with actually advised his clients to engage in a similar "triage" strategy of debt management. He advised managers facing illiquidity to delay paying those creditors who were no longer essential to the firm while using scarce cash to meet obligations to those creditors who were. The understanding was that the legal framework would favor the debtor. Confidential interview, foreign financial consultant, Bratislava, April, 1997. 125 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997 . Ironically, the politicization of credit and debt may have meant that the incentives to "rip off' stakeholders and minority shareholders were greater for owners who did not enjoy close contacts with the government. Unlike their well-connected competitors, they were less likely to win any dispensations from government creditors at the state-owned banks, the FNM or the tax officials. 126 Ministry of the Economy, SR, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update." Ministry of the Economy, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1997. 138 SLOVAKIA industrial interests, it was the governing coalition's industrial clients (as well as those firms that could "arrange" for ad hoc dispensations) that often pulled the strings of Slovak industrial and privatization policy. The result was that state-business networks were used to channel present and future tax revenues into the pockets of politically important industries and individuals. Ironically, after the Meciar government fell in 1998, the successor government picked up these long strings and used them to regain control of many enterprises. Revitalization and Industrial Policy. Even inter-enterprise debt and tax arrears provided opportunities for government manipulation. As noted, the bankruptcy framework privileged debtors over creditors. As most AZZZ members were debtors, there was little incentive for the industrial lobby to support a change in policy. Yet the government also passed a controversial Revitalization Act that granted chosen firms the right to enter into a state-sponsored debt relief program. 127 The Revitalization Act was designed in conjunction with Ducky's Ministry of the Economy on behalf of Slovakia's hard-hit engineering and machinery sectors. Based largely on tax relief, in practice its use was limited to the "restructured" companies owned by the quasi-private holding company, DMD Holdings a.s., as well as a number of agricultural firms. 128 DMD, run by Meciar's former Minister of Finance JuliusT6th, was an umbrella holding company for a network of former state-run defense manufacturing firms that were most severely hit by defense cutbacks at the end of the Cold War. In addition to restructuring, DMD profited from direct Ministry of Economy support- mostly in the form of encouragement and coordination-for the development of an indigenous automobile supply network. 129 While the effects of these direct attempts at industrial policy appeared to be generally well intentioned, they had little positive effect on restructuring the 127 Ministry of the Economy, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update," 18. The government also set up a state-run arms trading company, Armex. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, l 04-5 . 129 AZZZ 1996; Intervi ew with Ministry of Economy Plenipotentiary for the Automotive Industry in Slovakia, Alfred Richter in Samuel Bibza, "Yel'ke Plany," MOT, August, 1998, 4-8 . Interview with Jan Lesinsky, President, Slovak Society of Automoti ve Engineers, Bratis lava, August I 0, 1998 . 128 SLOVAKIA 139 companies involved. 130 Indeed, the program virtually halted marginally successful earlier attempts at defense conversion. 131 Slovakia eventually got its automotive sector, but it took the defeat of Meciar, clear political compliance with the prerequisites of EU membership, macroeconomic stabilization and significant initial investment incentives to entice foreign automobile producers and supply companies to come to Slovakia. 132 Politicization of Bank Privatization. The FNM's insider privatization framework raised levels of conflict surrounding bank privatization. In early 1996, Meciar promised to privatize Slovakia's largest state banks to Slovakia' s leading enterprises, most notably VSZ and Slovnaft. 133 Observers quickly pointed out that the likely result of the privatizations would be to decapitalize the banks as owner-firms, like VSZ, wrote themselves checks. Hence, while opposition parties KDH, DS and DU, were officially in favor of privatizing the banks, they formed a one-time coalition with HZDS's far left wing governing partner, ZRS , to get the banks placed on the list of strategic enterprises that prevented their privatization. The ZRS had nothing against bank privatization per se, but it allegedly was upset that the HZDS had excluded ZRS clients from buying one of the banks. 134 While partially preventing the banks ' capture and potential mismanagement by industrial managers, the banks nevertheless remained undercapitalized. Deeply in need of capital, the VSZ nevertheless did secure control over Slovakia's third largest state bank, Investicna a rozvojova banka (Investment and Development Bank-IRB) through the support of the FNM at shareholder meetings. 135 IRB had a troubled portfolio 130 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 104-5 . Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 75 . 132 Sharon Fisher, John Gould and Tim Haughton, "Slovakia's Neoliberal Tum," Europe-Asia Studies 59:6 (2007), 977-98. 133 If we include the third state owned financial institution, Slovenska sporitel'na, these three banks accounted for as much as 90% of all Slovak deposits and 60% of all loans. OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, (Paris: OECD, 1998), 29; EilJ (Economist Intelligence Unit), Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, (London: Economist, 1998), 17. 134 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 258 . 135 OECD, Slo vak Country Report, 1997-8, p. 29; EilJ, Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, p. 17; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 158. 131 140 SLOVAKIA which VSZ control did little to correct. The state had been using it to keep a nuclear power plant solvent and to provide subsidies to the construction industry to build apartments for young couples. In 1997, IRB liquidity problems worsened and the bank was forced to borrow internationally at rates driven up by the emerging global financial crisis . The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) directed the VSZ, as the primary owner, to provide a much-needed capital injection. The VSZ refused. The NBS later "suggested" that the bank's deterioration resulted from "serious illegal transgressions which negatively influenced the bank's activities ." To add to the crisis, junior coalition partner SNS refused to support a renewal of state support for the construction industry's subsidized apartment loan program. After more government infighting, the IRB failed to meet its depositors' demands, forcing the NBS to seize it in December of 1997. 136 The VSZ raid on Slovakia's financial sector was the logical culmination of insider privatization under illiberal political conditions. Tightly bound together by political necessity, Meciar's administration provided Rezes and his network of enterprises insider access to special deals in privatization, taxation, credit allocation (from state financial institutions) and almost every other area where the state intersects with economic activity. Moreover, Meciar did this despite open indications of nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. The final cost to other corporations, the taxpayers and VSZ's more than 25,000 employees was enormous. By the winter of 1998, VSZ Holdings had defaulted on its foreign obligations and was facing layoffs and bankruptcy. Meciar's successor government then used this crisis to regain control of the company and limit its growing debt. 137 In 2000, the successor government sold the VSZ to United States Steel Corporation. 136 OECD, Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, 77-8; EfU, Slovak Country Report, 1st Quarter I 998, 17. In the spring of 1998, the VSZ used its influence with the FNM and its direct and indirect shareholdings in the two other state financial institutions to provide the !RB with a costly capital injection. The VSZ again refused to contribute any cash of its own beyond the initial amount required by the NBS . Nor was there any real attempt by VSZ to find an adequate foreign buyer. Peter Laca, "Troubled !RB bank approves capital injection," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-21 , 1998. 137 "Vlada mimo hry," Pravda, November 17, I 998; See also Miklo§, 1997 . SLOVAKIA 141 Abuse of State Property. Coalition misuse of property included firms that were not yet privatized. Perhaps the most notable case is former Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky' s abuse of the country's natural gas company, Slovensky plynarensky priemysel (Slovak Gas Industry-SPP). A key member of AZZZ and a former communist-era official, Ducky resigned his position with the government to oversee a systematic tunneling of SPP assets for personal and political use. This included financing FC Slovan- Slovakia' s most famous football team (and, ironically, the former Czechoslovak rival to Sparta Praha, a team purchased by VSZ's Alexander Rezes). Ducky would even hand out cash bonuses to reward players for stellar play. 138 The full extent of Ducky's tunneling only became clear after the government fell from power. Ducky died in a still unexplained assassination in 1999 three days after a probe was launched into his handling of the company.139 Slowing Macroeconomic Performance. It is ironic that, except for privatization, Meciar's second government largely left the federal reform package intact until 1996. 140 The resulting favorable entrepreneurial conditions and international demand produced a relatively strong recovery in 1994-1996, matching a regional trend. The tight monetary policy of the largely independent NBS was a crucial element in the strong macroeconomic performance of Slovakia. Yet, since NBS monetary discipline also signifycantly raised the cost of credit, maintained the real value of liabilities, and put constraints on fiscal policy, the NBS came under pressure from the Ministry of Finance to be "more cooperative" with Slovak industrial policy. According to Ivan Miklos, VSZ President Jan Smerek complained that the NBS's tight money policy was a form of "disliking VSZ and, apparently, disliking Slovakia's development." 14 1 Under intense industrial pressure, the NBS narrowly escaped an attempt by parliament to place it more directly under government control. 142 Heavy borrowing, low foreign investment and this attack on the NBS led major investment rating agencies to 138 Confidential interview with FC Slovan football player, Bratislava, July 1998. Fisher, Political Change, 94. 140 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 63. 141 Ibid., 71-2. 142 EIU, Slovak Country Report, r" Quarter 1998, 16-7. 139 142 SLOVAKIA downgrade Slovak bonds to below investment-grade level in the spring of 1998. This further raised the cost of borrowing. 143 By the end of Meciar's third government, enterprise restructuring in Slovakia had also slowed. Firms that sought an injection of capital had to face among other things : poorly functioning equity markets rendering an initial public offering nearly impossible; a government that was suspicious and even hostile to foreign strategic investors; government decision-making and procurement processes that frequently violated the equal application of the rule of law; and finally , an increasingly profligate fiscal policy, capped by a costly infrastructure development program that crowded out private investment. By the spring of 1998, the Meciar government had to finance its cash-starved economy on European markets at the relatively costly rate of 3.5 percent above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. It also borrowed short term domestically at a nominal rate of twenty-eight percent. The high level of domestic borrowing aggravated the credit squeeze on Slovakia's already strapped enterprises. 144 Short term borrowing to meet long term debt obligations was the final nail in the Meciar government's economic coffin. By the summer of 1998 it was clear that the Slovak performance of the previous years had been financed by unsustainable fiscal spending and borrowing. Meciar's Electoral Defeat, October 1998. Parliamentary elections in late September of 1998 proved a satisfactory denouement to the regime's VSZ-led orgy of self-dealing. The government had put in place rules that looked as if it was equipping itself with the necessary tools for a full-fledged authoritarian seizure of power. No seizure occurred. It is possible that the HZDS did not even consider the possibility. Even if it had, concerted efforts from independent NGOs, regional governmental associations, and a united center-right coalition of parties and the SDI.; helped to mobilize 84.25 percent of the voting population. Many correctly interpreted the election as a test of Slovakia's Western European credentials. The HZDS won a marginal plurality, but the ZRS was in shambles 143 "Another Agency Downgrades Slovaki a's Risk Indicator," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-2 1, 1998, p. 5. 144 M. E.S.A I 0, Slovak Mo nthly Report, May 1998, p. 1-2; M. E. S.A I 0, Slovak Monthly Report, July 1998, p. 2. SLOVAKIA 143 after its lamentable performance as a far left party in formal charge of creating capitalists from state assets. The HZDS tried, but was unable to lure the SDI: away from the opposition to form a coalition. The SDC then joined a coalition of parties (the Slovak Democratic Coalition-SOK), SMK and the new Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) to form a government united by little more than opposition to Meciar and a desire to get into the EU and NAT0. 145 Slovakia's privatization winners split deeply during the election. Most of the direct beneficiaries of Meciar's politicized economic policies remained close to the Prime Minister. Most notably, VSZ owner Alexander Rezes provided the HZDS with significant frnancial support and other perks, including flying the Prime Minister to campaign events in his private jet and even forcing his football team, Sparta Praha, to wear HZDS jerseys in a campaign-related friendly match. Rezes ' s empire was already hemorrhaging money despite having raided two of Slovakia' s leading frnancial institutions. The IRB had already been bailed out by the NBS at taxpayer expense. This was an indirect subsidy that allowed money to filter into the HZDS campaign. It must have been clear to Rezes that only continued "industrial collaboration" with his political patron would save his fortune. Yet, faced with the gathering strength of the opposition, other Meciar clients were more circumspect- even Tmava's Vladimir Poor hinted at his willingness to work with a new govemment. 146 The SOP, the new "Party of Civic Understanding" promoted itself as the voice of the independent entrepreneurial community. In interviews, its spokesman strongly critiqued the disastrous economic management of the government and promised to uphold the rule of law in economic and political dealings. It sought initially to establish a safe, pro-business middle ground between the polarized camps in Slovakia' s "Cold War. " Despite this, its founder, Rudolf Schuster, refused any prospect of cooperation with the HZDS. 147 Other entre145 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy, I0: I (I 999), 80-95 . 146 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence," in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites after State Socialism (Lanham: Rowm an and Littlefield, 2000), 47-70. 147 Interview with Ferdinand Petrak, Vice Chairman, Party for Civic Understanding (SOP), Bratislava, July 28, 1998; Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities, 71. 144 SLOVAKIA preneurs continued to support the SDI:, and the newly united Slovak Christian and Democratic Union (SKDU). 148 Conclusion. Having privatized their enterprises through political connections, Meciar's clients went on to privatize state policy. Rather than demand the rule of law, they corrupted politicians; rather than invest resources to restructure, they stripped and tunneled them; rather than act as national champions, they preyed on the country's financial stability. By 1998, the coalition government's economic model was no longer sustainable. As the economic price of clientalism grew, the politicization of economic policy became an important additional grievance in the opposition's political arsenal. Never completely unied, many of the coalition's economic allies sat on the fence or sought accommodation with the opposition. Others proved firm HZDS supporters-particularly Rezes's VSZ, who must have seen that VSZ's financial future was closely linked to government policy. On the whole, privatization in Slovakia did not produce "market democrats," but it did succeed in providing economic agents who responded to their own logic of action. These proved to be both a boon and a curse to Meciar during his moment of greatest political crisis. Privatization' s impact on Slovakia's political liberalization, in short, was at best neutral and at worst negative. Ultimately, it was a united opposition, strategically smart NGO's and a mass mobilezation of Slovakia's voters that established market democracy in Slovakia. 148 Gould and Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vladimír Mečiar and the Politics of Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1998 Description An account of the resource John A. Gould Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 102-144 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gould, John A., 1962- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9b964b756148f0d55292194851d3aff0.pdf 63a27c69236b127e82f6d929b6bdf47f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 145 HUNGARIAN MINORITY POLITICS IN SLOVAKIA: UNDER FICO, AFTER EU ACCESSION Carol Skalnik Leff Many scholars of European integration have shown keen interest in the behavior of new members after the pressures of "conditionality" have been lifted, and the political and policy constraints of qualifying for membership have abated. The 2006 election in Slovakia, won by Robert Fico's SMER, was the first contested after Slovakia's EU accession, and offers a useful case study of one of the EU's desiderata- the treatment of ethnic minorities. In this article, I analyze the Fico era's impact on the minority rights agenda by focusing on two points. The first is the Fico government's record in the sphere of minority politics and policy. The second, and in some respects potentially more consequential, is the way the Slovak party system' s identity politics dimension was reconfigured during his term of office. I contextualize this analysis by noting the Fico government's positioning in the evolution of the "two-level game" on minority rights issues played out under successive Slovak governments with the European Union. During the pre-accession period, external pressures to conform to European concerns seemed less important for Slovak responsiveness than the composition of the government in power. The postaccession period analyzed here seems to follow the same pattern, with the Fico government relatively resistant to external initiatives and the successor Radicova government more aligned with EU norms and expectations. The Context: 2006 witnessed the first Slovak elections following the country's accession to the European Union. Slovakia's two previous national elections had been fought in the shadow of EU membership prospects. Both the 1998 and 2002 elections immediately preceded critical moments in the accession process- the choice of candidate states in 1998 and the final decisions on membership invitations in 2002. Karen Henderson made the point most strongly: "While it has been argued that referendums sometimes fulfill the function of second �146 SLOVAKIA order national elections ... Slovakia had twice experienced something approaching the reverse: national elections, in 1998 and 2002 , that were in part referendums about whether Slovakia should join the EU ." 1 Given the strength of pro-integration sentiment, which was rising toward the eightieth percentiles by the late 1990s, I would rephrase this formulation to suggest that the referendum quality of these elections consisted of the question of whether Slovakia would be able to join the EU, or which party could best deliver on membership. As Henderson noted, "the vital question was not whether [Slovaks] wanted the EU, but whether the EU wanted them." 2 In 1998 Vladimir Meciar lost the election and hence the key impediment to EU acceptance of Slovakia was removed. The 2002 results secured the conditions for a final push.3 The two right-of-center coalition governments under SDKU leader Mikulas Dzurinda that served from 1998 to 2006 strove, successfully, to cement Slovakia's case for inclusion in the 2004 EU enlargement. Tactically, one of the centerpiece components of that effort was the inclusion of the Hungarian Minority Coalition (SMK) in both governments. The alignment strategy to please Europe in the case is quite evident, and noticeable in Romania and Bulgaria as well; for the EU, ethnic minority parties were the preferred coalition partners, and radical nationalist participation a source of EU concern . Lacking its own minority rights acquis at the collapse of Com4 munism, the European Union's expectations about respect for minority rights protection was often ad hoc, and rested on the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 rather than on developed community law. 1 Karen Henderson, " EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus," West European Politics 27:4 (September, 2004), 653 . 2 Henderson, 656. 3 By 2002, the incumbent government urged voters to let it "fini sh what we started" and take that last "one more step (one last step is needed to the EU and NA TO... with us you' ll make it). The SDKU, in its famous peaceable kingdom billboard (a cat and dog entwined together) reminded voters that the party had managed to maintain a fract ious coalition : "Thanks to that, we are on the threshold of NATO and the EU." 4 The European Union was still the European Economic Communities in 1989, but for simplicity 's sake, I will refer to the "European Union" throughout. For a critique of the EU's minority rights conditionality, see Kyriaki Topidi, "The Limits of EU Conditionali ty: Minority Ri ghts in Slovakia," Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe I (2003), 20-29. �SLOVAKIA 147 However, all states with substantial minorities were well aware that minority treatment by the government was under scrutiny; hence, the elevation of the SMK to a coalition partner was accompanied by policy adjustments in the eroded minority rights regime of the Meciar period. The 2006 elections that brought Fico to power, however, occurred in a very different international strategic context, one in which Slovakia's European fate no longer depended on electoral outcomes and government composition. "We got you into Europe" lacked the resonance of SDKU's (Slovak Christian Democratic Party) 2002 appeal "You need us to get into Europe." 5 However, the economy that had earned Slovakia the epithet "Tatra Tiger" had not benefited all; Slovakia's unemployment rate of 15% in 2006 was one of the highest in Europe (and that was an improvement over the peak of 19% in 2000-2002). Small wonder, then, that Robert Fico 's populist critique of the reform era found powerful electoral resonance in 2006. His new government, however constituted, would face different international and domestic constraints than had been true for the previous decade. For the purpose of this analysis, the most salient point is that the externally-induced incentives for minority inclusion, and for adherence to minority-tolerant policies, were less pronounced than in the past. One thing, however, remained constant. It was generally impossible to form a majority coalition without including one of the two key parties aligned on the identity dimension of the party system: either the SMK or the Slovak National Party (SNS). 6 The choice between them had been definitive for the tenor of the government's minority relations policy after past elections. The question wasn't simply, therefore, whether the SMK was in or out, but rather that its exclusion likely meant the inclusion of the SNS. SMER's leadership chose the latter option (a choice that will be discussed below), with 5 In 2002, the incumbent anti- Meciar parties urged voters to let them "finish what we started" and take that last "one more step." (the billboard message: one last step is needed to the EU and NATO ... with us you'll make it). 6 In 1998, the inclusion of the SMK produced an over-sized coalition . SMK was not necessary for a parliamentary majority. It was, however, necessary, for agenda control and constitutional change, including the transition to a directly elected presidency that was virtually the first order of business of the Dzurinda government that formed the coalition. �148 SLOVAKIA consequences that shaped the minority rights agenda for the Fico government. Minority Policy Dimensions of the Fico Government: Policy relevant to minorities in Slovakia has followed the trajectory of government change. Meciar's second and third governments in the l 990 's had ruled with the support of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and pursued minority-relevant policies that evoked European criticism, either because of overt actions (language and education laws) or omissions (the failure to pass a minority-language law to clarify and codify the language rights of non-Slovaks). By contrast, the three right-of-center governments, led by Jozef Moravcik and twice by Dzurinda, ruled with the support of the Hungarian minority coalition and proved responsive to the European push for stronger minority protections. The coalition pattern continued under Fico and his successor lveta Radicova, with Fico's left-of-center government incorporating the SNS and Radicova's right-of-center coalition including the new Hungarian-Slovak Most-Hid formation (Note that Slovakia's predictable pattern of coalition alliances is by no means characteristic: in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia-the three other East and Central European countries with established and governmentally salient minority parties- both right-and left-of-center governments have ruled with minority party support. In Slovakia, the SMK has not changed sides). Policy initiatives cannot fully capture the almost immediate change of tone in Hungarian-Slovak relations, marked by patriotic football hooliganism and the virulent controversy over the Malina/ Malinova affair.7 The core of Fico' s minority policy-making, however, was a re-balancing toward Slovak language rights in uradny (official) communication, and correspondingly greater ambiguity about the security of minority language rights. The first controversy emerged over the potentially restrictive impact of the 2008 amendments 7 Hedvig Malina was a Hungarian student in Nitra who in 2006 reported to the police that she had been assaulted for speaking Hungarian in public. The complaint generated a mini-Dreyfus affa ir, with one' s political orientation determining whether or not to give credence to her claims. The government ultimately sided against her, and lodged perjury charges. The Fico government charged Hungary with unacceptable interference in the case. See also "Slovakia and Hungary: Trouble in Felvidek," Transitions Online, September 5, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 149 to the education law regarding Hungarian language education. In the spring of 2009, the focus was on Hungarian language textbooks, with the government seeking to supplant minority-produced course materials with translations of Slovak texts. This was accompanied by a protracted disagreement about the rendering of Slovak place names. For example, the government wanted the Danube river in Slovak (Dunaj) rather than Hungarian (Duna), even in Hungarian texts. The compromise, reached in February of 2009, appears to allow the previous practice of using "deep-rooted" geographical place names in Hungarian with the Slovak names in parentheses. Additional concern was generated by the restriction of Hungarian minority Radio Patria broadcasts to short wave transmitters that did not reach Bratislava or eastern Slovakia.8 The Language Law But the most internationally visible and resonant initiative was a revisiting of the language laws of the 1990s, as amended in 1999 under the Dzurinda government. As Martin Votruba has pointed out, a major thrust of the 1999 amendment (Act on the Use of Minority Language) had been to remove the penalties (fines) that Meciar's government had enacted for violations of the 1995 law establishing the primacy of the Slovak language. 9 Hastily drafted to meet EU expectations and, therefore, imprecise in some passages, the 1999 amendment did establish rights to the use of minority language in official communications.10 In response to the status quo, the coalition program of the Fico government in 2006 included commitments to safeguard the state language and in particular the "promotion of Slovak culture in the mixed regions ." Legislation fulfilling this pledge by privileging the use of the Slovak language in official communications passed in 8 See Kata Eplenyi, "The Language Rights of Hungarian Communities in Slovakia and Romania: The Impacts and Perspectives of EU-Membership," Masters Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, Nationalism Studies Program, 2009. 9 Votruba 's analysis of the provisions of the law is the most comprehensive I have found. Martin Votruba, "The Uncommon Language: Bratislava, Budapest, and Brussels," Slovak Studies Association Newsletter, volume 33 (2009). See also Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gal, "The New Slovak Language Law: Internal or External Politics?" ECMI Working paper #8, September 2000. http ://www.ecmi.de/download/working paper 8.pdf. 10 Eplenyi, "Language Rights. " �150 SLOVAKIA 2009, and provoked an immediate storm of international protest, largely centered on the hefty penalties (up to 5,000 euros) that could be imposed for violations. Media commentary tended to paint the legislation with a broad brush, whether in praise or blame, and thus to obfuscate the actual provisions. It would appear for example, that vivid scenarios of fines for an ethnically Hungarian patient speaking the native tongue to his ethnically Hungarian doctor in Hungarian are inapt, since the government maintained that only legal entities and not individuals were slated to be fined for violations . 11 Nor were the frequently invoked foreign-language church services under threat. However, in protecting Slovak language use, the law clearly appeared to have a chilling effect on minority language rights, and aroused vehement criticism from both the Hungarian minority and from neighboring Hungary, as well as from critics in the European Parliament. For its part, the government tended to make somewhat misleading claims about international approval (a familiar pattern in the Meciar years as well) . Emblematic of suspicion about those claims was the opposition demand that the OSCE advisory opinion on the law be published in full , without abridgement. A slightly exasperated Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, visited Slovakia by invitation during the controversy, and chastised both sides for exaggerating the OSCE position. He reiterated the OSCE conclusion that the law met international standards, but added "that doesn't mean that I necessarily think it's a good law;" he said that the High Commission would like to see the fines omitted from the legislation, and warned that the normative validity of some provisions would depend on their implementation. 12 The ongoing engagement of external arbiters was evident in this contra11 Nonetheless, the successor Radicova government introduced legislation in September of 2010 to lower fines and to explicitly lift their imposition on individuals except where citizen safety and property ri ghts were in question, to permit nonSlovak records in minority schools, and to exempt transport, communications and postal employees. Catherine McNally, "Are Relations between Hungary and Slovakia beginning to thaw?" CS!S, October 5, 2010, http ://csis.org. 12 OSCE Envoy Proffers 'Advice' On Language Law, European Dialogue, September 30, 2009, http://eurodialogue.org/osce/OSCE-Envoy-Proffers-Advice-On-Language-Law; Zuzana Vaskova, "Slovakia's Controversial Language Law," EU Reporter, September 28, 2009, http://www.eureporter.co.uk/story/slovakias-controversial-language-law. �SLOVAKIA 151 versy, although Slovakia was no longer constrained by mandatory monitoring. A second feature of policy during the Fico administration was an exchange of symbolic and substantive rebuffs between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, implicitly or usually explicitly targeting the issue of loyalties to state or nation. An official state visit between Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, the first such in eight years, was cancelled after the language law controversy . 13 Another unfortunate incident surrounded the unveiling of a statue of St. Stephen in the city of Komarno in August of 2009. Hungary's president Laszlo S6lyom planned to attend this event as a private citizen, but was stopped from crossing the bridge between Hungary and Slovakia after a diplomatic exchange confirmed that he would not be permitted to enter Slovakia for this purpose. The Slovak government considered this event a provocation, noting that no high Slovak official had been invited to the unveiling. In July of 2010, the newly-installed nationalist FIDESZ government in Hungary further roiled the waters by taking the incident to the European Court of Justice. (Ex-president S6lyom returned to lay a wreath at the statue without incident in August of 2010). 14 The most sensitive development in Slovak-Hungarian relations occurred in the interval between the April Hungarian elections of 2010 and the June Slovak elections. A few days after its installation, the FIDESZ government, led by Viktor Orban, lobbed a political grenade into the Slovak election campaign by approving a new law on dual citizenship. By a crushing vote of 344-3 with five abstentions, the Hungarian parliament sanctioned measures that would allow ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship as of January, 2011 even without the intention of residing in Hungary (they would not have voting rights in Hungary itself) . The Fico government recalled its ambassador from Budapest, called a session of the security council, and retaliated with legislation forfeiting Slovak citizenship 13 Lubos Palata "Slovak Language Law: Slap in the Face," Transitions Online, July 13, 2009. http :ijwww.ceeo1 .com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=f3bblacd-4a304701-9d6f-6889e003d4bc&articleld=3fa741b5-2f9f-4663-9824-a43e09e 7fe4b. 14 "Mad'arsky exprezident S6lyom presiel do Komama bez problemov," SME, August 22, 2010. �152 SLOVAKIA to those taking additional Hungarian citizenship. 15 Orban 's somewhat baffling timing would appear likely to damage the electoral prospects of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and to bolster Slovak nationalist voting. The European community could only watch ineffectively, urge a negotiated settlement to the question, and ponder what citizenship norms might be appropriate to cross-border minorities. 16 Overall, the Fico government's minority rights initiatives bear a pronounced resemblance to those of the Meciar era, the last time the SNS was in government and the governmental orientation stressed the risks to Slovak identity of a multi-ethnic state. As in the case of the Meciar governments, external concerns seemed largely ineffectual in modifying the course of policy-making or ameliorating relations with Hungary. The policy-making dynamics, however, are less complex than the partisan political dynamics, to which I now tum. The Fico Government and Its Impact on the Identity Dimension of the Party System. Although minority relations may appear to be only a delimited segment of the larger political picture, in two important respects they were arguably central to Fico's governance because of the impact they have had on coalition formation in 2006 and 2010 and on coalition politics in between. Indeed, Fico 's government notably shaped the party system itself, but not only in terms of its national identity dimension. In both respects the impact had international ramifications. I now want to focus on this larger picture. 15 Previous Slovak law allowed for dual citizenship, but with certain provisions that could be adapted to bar dual citizenship in this particular instance. See Dagmar Kusa, "The Slovak Question and the Slovak Answer: Citizenship during the Quest for National Self-Determination and after," in Rainer Baubock, Bernhard Perching and Wiebke Sievers, eds ., Citizenship Policies in the New Europe (Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), 275-303. Note that Romania remained silent over Orban 's move, although it equally affected Romania' s large Hungarian minority. The Romanian government had previously used Orban 's ploy in extending citizenship rights to ethnically Romanian Moldovans in 2009, and so could hardly complain about a similar law in Hungary. See Slovak Sfectator, August 10, 2010. 1 See for example, Rainer Baubock, ed., "Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to Respond to the Hungarian-Slovak Tit-for-Tat," EU Working Papers, RSCAS 2010/75 (2010, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy). �SLOVAKIA 153 Government formation in post-communist states has consistently proved challenging, although the challenges have varied systematically from state to state. A common thread through most of the postcommunist era to date, however, has been the Euro-relevance of coalition choices. In the 2002 election campaign, SMER's inaugural effort, Fico refused to name preferred coalition partners or to rule out the HZDS (although he emphatically rejected a cabinet shared with either Meciar or Dzurinda, leaders he styled as representative of an 17 old, corrupt generation). Some analysts have plausibly suggested that his failure to exclude the HZDS raised voter doubts about a Fico-led government's capacity to complete the EU integration project and helped to account for his last minute sag in the polls. 18 The coalition formation process after the 2006 elections was undoubtedly critical to the subsequent pattern of party system dynamics in ways I will investigate below. Frontrunner Fico had promised a coalition that Europe could approve. In the late stages of the campaign, some analysts dismissed the possibility of a SMER-HZDSSNS coalition (including two political formations most unpopular in Europe because of their perceived demagogic, authoritarian and nationalist leadership) as a product of incumbent Dzurinda's fear-mongering. SMER derided this as a bogey-man. Fico characterized the coalition as a "specter" created by Dzurinda. 19 SMER's Vice President Robert Kalinak told reporters , "Smer will not be part of any government that is not internationally accepted, and I think that's a pretty clear statement that you can deduce all kinds of things from." 20 .... But apparently not the coalition that actually emerged in 2006. In the event, the "worst case scenario" was not merely a scare tactic. The victorious Smer did indeed invite the HZDS and the SNS into a coalition, albeit explicitly without either of their leaders, in cabinet positions. And Fico assured the public, at home and abroad, that the presence of the SNS in government did not dilute existing commitments to minority and human rights, again signaling that minority parties were not pariahs . The Bratislava daily Novy cas dub17 Fico was born in 1964, Dzurinda in 1955 and Meciar in 1942. Tim Haughton, "We Will finish What We've Started: The 2002 Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19:4 (December, 2003), 65-90. 19 Transitions Online, June 19, 2006; TASR, June 12, 2006. 20 Interview with Robert Kalinak, Slovak Spectator, June 12, 2006. 18 �154 SLOVAKIA bed this the "you can't be serious" coalition-and it prompted an immediate external response. The European Union cannot dictate who is eligible to govern a member state. This issue was clarified with the case of Austria, a neutral state that joined the EU in 1995, once membership ceased to be associated with the divisions of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter, the use of conditionality after accession to membership received a major setback. In 2000, Austria breached a long-standing but informal West European consensus against the inclusion of the radical right in democratic governments- a so-called "cordon sanitaire" against extremist parties--when Austria's Christian Democrats accepted Jorg Haider and his Freedom Party as junior coalition partners. Appalled that a party led by a man who attended SS reunions was included in a member government, the EU created an impromptu and awkward state of "diplomatic isolation" that proved largely counterproductive, and embarrassing in its implication that the European Union, riddled with its own democratic deficits, had the right to judge the democratically elected governments of its members. The EU backed down after seven months.21 If the EU wouldn't act, the European party formation in which SMER was an observing member- the Party of European Socialists (PES)--was not similarly constrained, although ultimately equally ineffectual. PES publicly expressed "concern and deep misgivings" over Fico's coalition choices, as well as "shock" and "deep disgust," for good measure. Club deputy chair Johannes Swoboda expressed doubt that such a government could uphold European values; 22 and the Belgian socialist MEP asked "Don't you feel ashamed as a social 21 EU concern persists. The long-term legacy of the abortive effort to assert European values in the Austrian case, and to provide for response to future democratic deviations is Article 7 of both the Nice Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a so-called "emergency brake," a decision-making mechanism to impose sanctions on member states that manifest a "serious breach" of European values specified in the treaty under Article 2. Approving the Lisbon Treaty thus does provide a new conditionality mechanism; it remains to be seen how badly it is needed and whether it will have any practical utility. See http ://register.consilium.europa.eu/gdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf 2 "Evropsti socialiste znepokojeni vznikajici koalici na Slovensku," CTK, June 29, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 155 democrat of forming a coalition with a party known for its xenophobia?"23 In October 2006, PES President Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced: The PES resolution refers specifically to the Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe" adopted by PES Congress in 2001 in Berlin which states "all PES parties adhere to the following principles .. . to refrain from any form ofpolitical alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred. " 24 Only in 2008 was SMER 'S membership application conditionally reinstated after both SMER and SNS submitted letters confirming their commitment to minority rights, a largely declarative gesture. But this so-called "nightmare coalition" with the HZDS and SNS was not inevitable. The contrasting case of Bulgaria is instructive. The victorious Borisov party in 2009 ruled out a coalition with the Turkish minority MRF during the election campaign as part of the incumbent government he attacked. Like Fico, candidate Borisov employed a populist discourse-what Pop-Eleches would call the new centrist populism 25- and an appeal that, while taking pot shots at minorities, was not radically nationalist. His "outsider" strategy, however, dictated a rejection of all the status quo parties, and particularly the incumbents. Fico, on the other hand, although not loath to criticize minorities, had moderated his populist appeals and reoriented to social democracy by the 2006 election. 26 Fico gave serious consideration to a KDH/MKP coalition, but could not get agreement on it-Miroslav Kusy notes that the KDH leadership was badly and bitterly split on the possibility, with some insisting on a set of moral issues (such as ban23 24 25 Slovak Spectator, September 11 , 2006. http ://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family. Pop-Eleches, "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism," World Politics 62 (2010), 221-60. 26 See Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton, "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia," Politics and Policy 37:4 (2009), 82 1-41 . �156 SLOVAKIA ning same-sex marriage and contraception); KDH deliberations were so protracted that Fico ultimately gave up. 27 KDH's hesitation was the mostly widely cited reason for the sinking of the alternative SMER-SMK-KDH coalition, both by media and coalition partners. 28 Despite the programmatic dissonances with SMER, such an alignment had the attraction for KDH and SMK of averting the coalition that did in fact emerge. In any case, Fico is a clever politician, and he realized that the SNS and HZDS would be easier to undercut. Fico could and did steal some of the SNS political clothes and a bit of its electorate by annexing the nationalist issue-a kind of electoral poaching that would have been impossible against the KDH and SMK--and in Meciar's HZDS he had an aging and politically dying junior partner. Fico is also something of a control freak- he immediately sidelined Monika Flasikova-Benova, a public critic of his coalition choice, at the next party congress by stripping her and others of leadership roles-(he was also canny in avoiding the appointment of too many MPs as ministers, who if discarded, might return to parliament and defect from the party). His final coalition choices therefore, would be more malleable, provided he could manage the public response, in particular, to SNS outbursts. In the new government, Meciar's party alarmingly claimed the Justice portfolio. SNS portfolios included Agriculture, Regional Development and Education, all highly salient policy domains for minorities. Agriculture and Regional Development, previously held by SMK, are germane to economic conditions in the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia, which are generally more rural and less developed than the north or west. And putting education policy in the hands of SNS raised concerns that minority issues would get short shrift. 27 Miroslav Kusy, "Catastrophic Scenario in Bratislava," The Analyst: Central and Eastern European Review 2 (2006), 37. The KDH division was so pronounced as to cause a leadership crisis and resignations from the party leadership in its aftermath. 28 See for example the comments by Ivan Miklos in Hospodtirske noviny, June 29, 2006: "The European Peoples Party won't understand very well, how it is possible that these three EPP member parties weren't able to reach agreement. In this sense, I think that the responsibility for this situation lies especially on the KDH. " In this case, Miklos blamed the KDH for balking at bringing the HZDS into a SDKUKDH-SMK coalition. �SLOVAKIA 157 Two related effects of this government's tenure on party system dynamics are worth noting. At the majority nationalist end of the identity continuum, one can visualize Fico as a political vampire, draining his coalition partners of standing and voters. Fico preempted the national issue from his more volatile and extremist coalition colleague, Jan Slota of the SNS, by challenging the national sentiment of historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, as well as of the media, both of whom he accused of exhibiting "un-Slovak" tendencies. Fico proclaimed 2008 as the "Year of the Slovak Nation." He re-constructed pre-national history with a claim on the Great Moravian Empire having consisted of "ancient Slovaks"29 and commissioned a statue of warrior King (Prince) Svatopluk for the Bratislava Castle courtyard-an equestrian monument installed just before the elections in 2010 amid great controversy about the historicity of the claims made about his ethnicity, the Byzantine cross on his shield, and even whether he was actually a king.30 From the outset, Fico tended to overlook rather than to chastise the SNS and its incendiary leader. He was content to let Slota's outrageous statements pillory his own credibility. A case in point: Slota apparently sought to launch his party's electoral campaign in early 2010 with the pronouncement that Hungary was planning a military 31 invasion of Slovakia to revise the Treaty of Trianon. Fico did chastise the spectacular SNS corruption in office. Both in the 1990s and in the Fico government, the SNS has been noted for ministerial corruption. The SNS held two portfolios-Construction and Regional development and Environment--in the Fico government, in addition to a deputy prime-ministership. Both incumbents at Construction and Regional Development were dismissed in quick succession over the so-called "Bulletin-Board" tender, in which public procurement procedures were violated in favor of an in-house 29 "Fico's Revisionist History," Transitions Online, February 29, 2008. ° Fico expressed the hope that the statue would become a national pilgrimage site, 3 but the statue immediately became politicized as the extremist group "Our Slovakia" came to its rescue (a commission on its dissolution has been formed) without an assembly permit. As of November 2010, the party's website has youtube video of riot police blocking the pilgrimage. Meanwhile, anti-racist groups mobilized to challenge the party. Fico also appropriated the 18 th century social bandit Jano~ik as a Social Democrat. 31 The Slovak Spectator, March 24, 2010. �158 SLOVAKIA process that awarded contracts to two firms with close ties to the SNS leader Jan Slota. SNS Environment Minister Jaroslav Izak, who was asked to resign for his ministry's mishandling of EU environmental funds , was followed by Jan Chrbet, whose forced resignation was triggered by a scandal surrounding the awarding of carbon emissions contracts on terms unfavorable to the government. When his successor from the SNS, Viliam Tursky, was also removed for murky contract awards, Prime Minister Fico announced that it was time to take the environmental portfolio away from the SNS.32 (Startlingly, Slota demanded the human and minority rights portfolio in exchange for the lost environmental slot.) Hence, by the end of his term in office, Fico had succeeded not only in pre-empting Slota with a more respectable nationalism, but also in discrediting him and his party on the politically winning issue of anti-corruption (a useful diversion from SMER 's own corruption problems).33 By 2010, the debilitated SNS squeaked into the subsequent parliament by only a tenth of a percentage point over the electoral threshold and lost more than half of its previous seats (down from twenty to nine )- a voting hemorrhage that pre-election opinion polls suggest went to Fico. 34 Tibor Kis concludes that Fico "offered voters a European alternative to Vladimir Meciar's nationalist L'S-HZDS and a social and ' Slovak' alternative relative to centre-right organiza- 32 See The Slovak Spectator, August 31, 2009. http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36352/11 /people often get what they want n ot what they need.html. 33 SNS corruption problems might have been predicted from its previous term in office, and by the general trends in ministerial corruption region-wide. In the overall universe of cabinet ministers in 13 post-communist EU members and candidate members serving between 1990 and 2009, minority politicians were just about exactly average in their involvement in corruption scandals (13%). The majority nationalist party ministers, by contrast, were close to twice as likely to be scandal prone (23%) as the norm, and thereby more embarrassing as coalition partners. Involvement in corruption scandals as used here does not imply eventually proven guilt in a court of law. (Corruption Involvement is coded if the minister is formally investigated by law enforcement agencies or parliament, arrested and tried, or documented as engaging in suspect behavior by a corruption agency). 34 See Kevin Deegan-Krause 's Pozorblog, 2010 Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Post-Election Report, July 14, 2010, http://www.pozorb1og. com/ . �SLOVAKIA 159 tions."35 Fico appears, indeed, to have been too successful in this regard: As Mesik notes, "By attracting SNS as well as HZDS voters, Fico successfully cannibalized his partners in the government and only woke up to the day when his by far strongest party did not have partners to form a government with." Hungarian Minority Politics If Fico proved effective (and somewhat self-defeating) in absorbing votes from his coalition partners in the 2010 elections, the exclusion of the SMK from government also had ramifications for minority party politics. At first, the SMK' s position on the opposition benches had some echoes of the 1990s. Amidst a general disarray after losing power, it was striking that the Fico era started with the failure of the ethnic Slovak opposition parties to back the SMK on issues like the Hedviga Malinova /Malina Hedvig case. The three opposition parties did not meet for four months until the controversy regarding Deputy Agriculture Minister Marian Zahumensky. Second, the transition to opposition acerbated longstanding tensions within the SMK. As long as the SMK was in government, tensions within the party could be curbed. Going into opposition meant not only a loss of policy influence, but also a time of reckoning. In March of 2007, the popular and moderate Bela Bugar moved on his less moderate vice-chair- the venerable communist-era dissident Miklos Duray--by seeking to abolish the vice-chair position; the effort rebounded, leading to an upset victory for the party leadership by Pal Csaky. The new SMK was ever more closely identified with Hungary and particularly with FIDESZ, a stance that proved an excellent foil for Slota and the SNS . The SMK was "increasingly perceived and portrayed by Slovak politicians as an extraterritorial branch of FIDESZ." 36 35 Tibor Kis, "Smer: Success Story or Scandal?" The Analyst-Central and Eastern European Review I (2008), 67 . 36 Mesik, Juraj , Slovakia 2010: An Election with Only Limited Choice (Prague: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2010), p. I. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache :NXmv IM538AJ :www.boell.cz/downloads/slovakia-20 I 0( I ).pdf+Slovakia+20 I 0:+An+Election+with+Only+Limited+Choice&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEE SjAbC2uqap66j5MK3mL54uKxbdb6uwiyAnKG8PdcOnGr7TN3cTV4UToaJbphV Dhh Wjlam VNsCTq DriBh Yin WQ4wn6V9PW9qn WFarJSCkyf Jho VJx2g9JpgEj7MPq-DXaaQb&sig=AHIEtbQZam6lz-BjubssUvDtT73Na95dzA �160 SLOVAKIA Csaky 's orientation to the protection of Hungarian interests was to look outward. An example was his meeting with Laszlo Tokes, a central figure of the hard-line wing of Romania' s minority party UDMR, and Csaky's attendance as an observer at the Carpathian Autonomy Council that Tokes had founded. The two leaders apparently discussed the idea of a cross-national mini-minority parliament. Nothing could have been better calculated to play to ethnic Slovak fears about Slovak Hungarian loyalties.37 In 2008, Bugar left the SMK and founded his own party- one that signaled its moderation on national issues with the name MostHid (bridge in Slovak and Hungarian). Csaky professed to believe, along with Slota, that Most-Hid was a stalking horse (actually a Trojan horse) created and funded by SMER. Beyond that, he refused to discuss future cooperation with Most-Hid on the grounds that it wouldn't make it into parliament. 38 Csaky was quite wrong. Defying the pre-election polls, Most-Hid polled over eight percent, nearly doubling the vote of Csaky's SMK, and replacing it in parliament. What did the 2010 vote mean? Were Hungarian voters seeking moderation, as some media analysts said? Or was it a coordination failure , with Hungarians in Slovakia voting strategically in hopes of getting both SMK and Most-Hid into parliament? (This view would explain why Most-Hid did so much better than the last pre-election polls suggested-ethnic Hungarian voters, seeing that SMK was comfortably over the threshold, may have diverted votes to MostHid/ 9 As in the case of many party schisms, then, the upshot was a crippling of Hungarian minority representation in parliament. 40 37 "Csaky naru~il tabu," SME, September 29, 2008. "Csaky: Nep6jdeme do vlady za kazdu cenu," SME, May 7, 20 10, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanok_ tlac.asp?cl=5363302 39 The Slovak Spectator June 21, 20 IO ; some SMK leaders embraced this theory. "Csaky konti, SMK hl'ada ~efa" SME, June 14, 20 I 0, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanoktlac.asp?cl=5421864. 40 A pre-election poll in 20 IO indicated that Most-Hid was drawing almost 60% of its supporters from SMK, 18% from first time voters, 5% from former non-voters and the rest from other parties. The Slovak Spectator, June 3, 20 I 0. The number of Hungarians in the Most-Hid delegation itself was also lowered by the preferential voting of supporters of OKS (Civic Conservative Party), with whom Most-Hid fo rmed a joint candidate slate. See Viera Zuborova, Viera (2011 ), Marketizacia vonkaj~ej reklamy v parlamentnych vol'bach 20 IO v Slovenskej republike," Acta Politologica 3: I (2011 ):7; statistics at "Vysledky preferenfoeo hlasovania: Vys38 �SLOVAKIA 161 Conclusion: Is there reason to expect a durable effect of the Fico era for identity politics in Slovakia? The policy footprint was not especially deep, and the succeeding Radicova government mitigated some of its impact on Hungarian minority relations. The Fico language law was partially modified in December of 2010, restricting its use, but disappointing minorities-who deemed the amendment "less bad"-by its retention of the penalties for improper language use.41 2011 saw an initiative to resolve the dual citizenship issue by joint agreement with the Hungarian government, although to date without a favorable response from the Orban government. 42 The long-term party system effects are less predictable. For example, while Meciar's slide into oblivion even deepened in the 2012 election, sliding to a mere percentage point of the electorate, it is less obvious that Slota's SNS is on the brink of extinction despite the narrow escape in 2010 and the failure to return to parliament in 2012. Earlier, the SNS had survived a schism (in some respects the mirror image of what happened to SMK after 2006) that actually knocked it out of parliament in 2002; it reconsolidated and returned. In 2012, as well, the party was fractured by the expulsion of deputy leader Anna Belousova, who contested the 2012 election with her own party Nation and Justice. Despite the SNS record of corruption and outrageousness, yet another reunion of the party leadership might resuscitate it, although service in Fico 's government was definitely a poisoned chalice. In the 2010 election, the shrinkage of the SNS deprived Fico of a coalition partner and the prime ministership. As a result of the March, 2012 elections, Fico no longer needed that assistance, since his SMER became the first Slovak party since indeledky volieb do NR SR: 12.06.2010," Most-Hid website, http://www.most-hidke.sk/sk/vo1by-nrsr20 I 0-preferencne-hlasy. 41 "Language Act takes a "less bad" form," Minority Report, Monthly Bulletin on the Hungarian Community in Slovakia, Issue 12-2010, http://www.freeweb.hu/mkdsz l/pdf/MR-Ol-2011.pdf. 42 "Hungary: "Nern! " to Slovak Dual Citizenship Proposal," The Daily.sk, posted 12 July 20 11 , http://www.thedaily.sk/2011 /07 /12/top-news/hungary-nem-to-slovak-dualcitizensh ip-proposal/. The Fico government, elected in March of 2012, signaled that it would slightly modify its earlier draconian response by allowing dual citizenship to Slovaks actually residing in the other country. �162 SLOVAKIA pendence to win an outright majority of the parliamentary seats (83 out of 150).43 As for the emergence of two major partisan competitors for the Hungarian electorate, the ambiguities in interpreting Most-Hid's victory over the SMK stand in the way of a clear prediction. Past electoral outcomes show that being in power has not previously eroded the support of the minority electorate, either in Slovakia or in the parallel cases of Bulgaria and Romania. On that basis, it might be possible to argue for Most-Hid to further consolidate its position. However, what Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia also had in common until this election was the dominance of a single minority party or electoral coalition. 44 The story may be quite different with an alternative and established minority-based party challenging each decision, even from outside parliament. The municipal elections of November 2010 and the parliamentary elections of 2012, which showed the two Hungarian parties splitting their vote, did not clarify the picture. Although an extraparliamentary party like the SMK could not promise influence at the center to woo voters, the SMK retained its established organizational base and its government subsidy and thus retains a presence in politics (it also retains its representation in the European parliament). Local party organizations generally hold the decision-making power to run joint candidates with other parties or to cooperate in local coalitions after elections, and there was indeed some limited cooperation, but also cases, as in the Komarno mayor's race, where dividing the Hungarian vote opened the way to victory for an independent Slovak candidate. The basis for cooperation, however, is shaky. The SMK has grown ever closer to the nationalist Fidesz party in Hungary, and proudly announced in March 2011 that Hungary had incorporated three SMK proposals into its new constitution. Moreover, the SMK party chair, Joszef Berenyi, actually announced in January of 2011 that he was applying for Hungarian citizenship under the controversial new law. These maneuvers only underline the SMK' s distance from the more moderate Most-Hid. During the winter of 2011, de43 Sme, March 11 , 2012. It is true that before 1998, the SMK was not a single entity; rather, it was a group of Hungarian parties which ran on a single slate, not as competitors. 44 �SLOVAKIA 163 spite the clear electoral incentives to do so, the two parties failed to reach any agreement on electoral cooperation in 2012, and contested the parliamentary elections completely separately. Once again, SMK barely missed parliamentary representation, while Most-Hid survived, although it lost more than a percentage point and one MP in the 2012 elections. In closing, it would appear that electoral outcomes and coalition choices matter more than external pressures for normative conformity on minority rights issues, just as they did in the pre-accession period before 2004. Government policies on minorities in Slovakia respond primarily to partisan domestic constituencies, and vary according to the government in power. Even though minority inclusion in government was known to be desirable to Brussels, once Slovakia was safely in the European Union, minority inclusion was not jettisoned, but rather subject to the same kinds of political logic and choices that determined which identity-based party would be included in government before 2004. � SLOVAKIA 145 HUNGARIAN MINORITY POLITICS IN SLOVAKIA: UNDER FICO, AFTER EU ACCESSION Carol Skalnik Leff Many scholars of European integration have shown keen interest in the behavior of new members after the pressures of "conditionality" have been lifted, and the political and policy constraints of qualifying for membership have abated. The 2006 election in Slovakia, won by Robert Fico's SMER, was the first contested after Slovakia's EU accession, and offers a useful case study of one of the EU's desiderata- the treatment of ethnic minorities. In this article, I analyze the Fico era's impact on the minority rights agenda by focusing on two points. The first is the Fico government's record in the sphere of minority politics and policy. The second, and in some respects potentially more consequential, is the way the Slovak party system' s identity politics dimension was reconfigured during his term of office. I contextualize this analysis by noting the Fico government's positioning in the evolution of the "two-level game" on minority rights issues played out under successive Slovak governments with the European Union. During the pre-accession period, external pressures to conform to European concerns seemed less important for Slovak responsiveness than the composition of the government in power. The postaccession period analyzed here seems to follow the same pattern, with the Fico government relatively resistant to external initiatives and the successor Radicova government more aligned with EU norms and expectations. The Context: 2006 witnessed the first Slovak elections following the country's accession to the European Union. Slovakia's two previous national elections had been fought in the shadow of EU membership prospects. Both the 1998 and 2002 elections immediately preceded critical moments in the accession process- the choice of candidate states in 1998 and the final decisions on membership invitations in 2002. Karen Henderson made the point most strongly: "While it has been argued that referendums sometimes fulfill the function of second �146 SLOVAKIA order national elections ... Slovakia had twice experienced something approaching the reverse: national elections, in 1998 and 2002 , that were in part referendums about whether Slovakia should join the EU ." 1 Given the strength of pro-integration sentiment, which was rising toward the eightieth percentiles by the late 1990s, I would rephrase this formulation to suggest that the referendum quality of these elections consisted of the question of whether Slovakia would be able to join the EU, or which party could best deliver on membership. As Henderson noted, "the vital question was not whether [Slovaks] wanted the EU, but whether the EU wanted them." 2 In 1998 Vladimir Meciar lost the election and hence the key impediment to EU acceptance of Slovakia was removed. The 2002 results secured the conditions for a final push.3 The two right-of-center coalition governments under SDKU leader Mikulas Dzurinda that served from 1998 to 2006 strove, successfully, to cement Slovakia's case for inclusion in the 2004 EU enlargement. Tactically, one of the centerpiece components of that effort was the inclusion of the Hungarian Minority Coalition (SMK) in both governments. The alignment strategy to please Europe in the case is quite evident, and noticeable in Romania and Bulgaria as well; for the EU, ethnic minority parties were the preferred coalition partners, and radical nationalist participation a source of EU concern . Lacking its own minority rights acquis at the collapse of Com4 munism, the European Union's expectations about respect for minority rights protection was often ad hoc, and rested on the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 rather than on developed community law. 1 Karen Henderson, " EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus," West European Politics 27:4 (September, 2004), 653 . 2 Henderson, 656. 3 By 2002, the incumbent government urged voters to let it "fini sh what we started" and take that last "one more step (one last step is needed to the EU and NA TO... with us you' ll make it). The SDKU, in its famous peaceable kingdom billboard (a cat and dog entwined together) reminded voters that the party had managed to maintain a fract ious coalition : "Thanks to that, we are on the threshold of NATO and the EU." 4 The European Union was still the European Economic Communities in 1989, but for simplicity 's sake, I will refer to the "European Union" throughout. For a critique of the EU's minority rights conditionality, see Kyriaki Topidi, "The Limits of EU Conditionali ty: Minority Ri ghts in Slovakia," Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe I (2003), 20-29. �SLOVAKIA 147 However, all states with substantial minorities were well aware that minority treatment by the government was under scrutiny; hence, the elevation of the SMK to a coalition partner was accompanied by policy adjustments in the eroded minority rights regime of the Meciar period. The 2006 elections that brought Fico to power, however, occurred in a very different international strategic context, one in which Slovakia's European fate no longer depended on electoral outcomes and government composition. "We got you into Europe" lacked the resonance of SDKU's (Slovak Christian Democratic Party) 2002 appeal "You need us to get into Europe." 5 However, the economy that had earned Slovakia the epithet "Tatra Tiger" had not benefited all; Slovakia's unemployment rate of 15% in 2006 was one of the highest in Europe (and that was an improvement over the peak of 19% in 2000-2002). Small wonder, then, that Robert Fico 's populist critique of the reform era found powerful electoral resonance in 2006. His new government, however constituted, would face different international and domestic constraints than had been true for the previous decade. For the purpose of this analysis, the most salient point is that the externally-induced incentives for minority inclusion, and for adherence to minority-tolerant policies, were less pronounced than in the past. One thing, however, remained constant. It was generally impossible to form a majority coalition without including one of the two key parties aligned on the identity dimension of the party system: either the SMK or the Slovak National Party (SNS). 6 The choice between them had been definitive for the tenor of the government's minority relations policy after past elections. The question wasn't simply, therefore, whether the SMK was in or out, but rather that its exclusion likely meant the inclusion of the SNS. SMER's leadership chose the latter option (a choice that will be discussed below), with 5 In 2002, the incumbent anti- Meciar parties urged voters to let them "finish what we started" and take that last "one more step." (the billboard message: one last step is needed to the EU and NATO ... with us you'll make it). 6 In 1998, the inclusion of the SMK produced an over-sized coalition . SMK was not necessary for a parliamentary majority. It was, however, necessary, for agenda control and constitutional change, including the transition to a directly elected presidency that was virtually the first order of business of the Dzurinda government that formed the coalition. �148 SLOVAKIA consequences that shaped the minority rights agenda for the Fico government. Minority Policy Dimensions of the Fico Government: Policy relevant to minorities in Slovakia has followed the trajectory of government change. Meciar's second and third governments in the l 990 's had ruled with the support of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and pursued minority-relevant policies that evoked European criticism, either because of overt actions (language and education laws) or omissions (the failure to pass a minority-language law to clarify and codify the language rights of non-Slovaks). By contrast, the three right-of-center governments, led by Jozef Moravcik and twice by Dzurinda, ruled with the support of the Hungarian minority coalition and proved responsive to the European push for stronger minority protections. The coalition pattern continued under Fico and his successor lveta Radicova, with Fico's left-of-center government incorporating the SNS and Radicova's right-of-center coalition including the new Hungarian-Slovak Most-Hid formation (Note that Slovakia's predictable pattern of coalition alliances is by no means characteristic: in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia-the three other East and Central European countries with established and governmentally salient minority parties- both right-and left-of-center governments have ruled with minority party support. In Slovakia, the SMK has not changed sides). Policy initiatives cannot fully capture the almost immediate change of tone in Hungarian-Slovak relations, marked by patriotic football hooliganism and the virulent controversy over the Malina/ Malinova affair.7 The core of Fico' s minority policy-making, however, was a re-balancing toward Slovak language rights in uradny (official) communication, and correspondingly greater ambiguity about the security of minority language rights. The first controversy emerged over the potentially restrictive impact of the 2008 amendments 7 Hedvig Malina was a Hungarian student in Nitra who in 2006 reported to the police that she had been assaulted for speaking Hungarian in public. The complaint generated a mini-Dreyfus affa ir, with one' s political orientation determining whether or not to give credence to her claims. The government ultimately sided against her, and lodged perjury charges. The Fico government charged Hungary with unacceptable interference in the case. See also "Slovakia and Hungary: Trouble in Felvidek," Transitions Online, September 5, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 149 to the education law regarding Hungarian language education. In the spring of 2009, the focus was on Hungarian language textbooks, with the government seeking to supplant minority-produced course materials with translations of Slovak texts. This was accompanied by a protracted disagreement about the rendering of Slovak place names. For example, the government wanted the Danube river in Slovak (Dunaj) rather than Hungarian (Duna), even in Hungarian texts. The compromise, reached in February of 2009, appears to allow the previous practice of using "deep-rooted" geographical place names in Hungarian with the Slovak names in parentheses. Additional concern was generated by the restriction of Hungarian minority Radio Patria broadcasts to short wave transmitters that did not reach Bratislava or eastern Slovakia.8 The Language Law But the most internationally visible and resonant initiative was a revisiting of the language laws of the 1990s, as amended in 1999 under the Dzurinda government. As Martin Votruba has pointed out, a major thrust of the 1999 amendment (Act on the Use of Minority Language) had been to remove the penalties (fines) that Meciar's government had enacted for violations of the 1995 law establishing the primacy of the Slovak language. 9 Hastily drafted to meet EU expectations and, therefore, imprecise in some passages, the 1999 amendment did establish rights to the use of minority language in official communications.10 In response to the status quo, the coalition program of the Fico government in 2006 included commitments to safeguard the state language and in particular the "promotion of Slovak culture in the mixed regions ." Legislation fulfilling this pledge by privileging the use of the Slovak language in official communications passed in 8 See Kata Eplenyi, "The Language Rights of Hungarian Communities in Slovakia and Romania: The Impacts and Perspectives of EU-Membership," Masters Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, Nationalism Studies Program, 2009. 9 Votruba 's analysis of the provisions of the law is the most comprehensive I have found. Martin Votruba, "The Uncommon Language: Bratislava, Budapest, and Brussels," Slovak Studies Association Newsletter, volume 33 (2009). See also Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gal, "The New Slovak Language Law: Internal or External Politics?" ECMI Working paper #8, September 2000. http ://www.ecmi.de/download/working paper 8.pdf. 10 Eplenyi, "Language Rights. " �150 SLOVAKIA 2009, and provoked an immediate storm of international protest, largely centered on the hefty penalties (up to 5,000 euros) that could be imposed for violations. Media commentary tended to paint the legislation with a broad brush, whether in praise or blame, and thus to obfuscate the actual provisions. It would appear for example, that vivid scenarios of fines for an ethnically Hungarian patient speaking the native tongue to his ethnically Hungarian doctor in Hungarian are inapt, since the government maintained that only legal entities and not individuals were slated to be fined for violations . 11 Nor were the frequently invoked foreign-language church services under threat. However, in protecting Slovak language use, the law clearly appeared to have a chilling effect on minority language rights, and aroused vehement criticism from both the Hungarian minority and from neighboring Hungary, as well as from critics in the European Parliament. For its part, the government tended to make somewhat misleading claims about international approval (a familiar pattern in the Meciar years as well) . Emblematic of suspicion about those claims was the opposition demand that the OSCE advisory opinion on the law be published in full , without abridgement. A slightly exasperated Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, visited Slovakia by invitation during the controversy, and chastised both sides for exaggerating the OSCE position. He reiterated the OSCE conclusion that the law met international standards, but added "that doesn't mean that I necessarily think it's a good law;" he said that the High Commission would like to see the fines omitted from the legislation, and warned that the normative validity of some provisions would depend on their implementation. 12 The ongoing engagement of external arbiters was evident in this contra11 Nonetheless, the successor Radicova government introduced legislation in September of 2010 to lower fines and to explicitly lift their imposition on individuals except where citizen safety and property ri ghts were in question, to permit nonSlovak records in minority schools, and to exempt transport, communications and postal employees. Catherine McNally, "Are Relations between Hungary and Slovakia beginning to thaw?" CS!S, October 5, 2010, http ://csis.org. 12 OSCE Envoy Proffers 'Advice' On Language Law, European Dialogue, September 30, 2009, http://eurodialogue.org/osce/OSCE-Envoy-Proffers-Advice-On-Language-Law; Zuzana Vaskova, "Slovakia's Controversial Language Law," EU Reporter, September 28, 2009, http://www.eureporter.co.uk/story/slovakias-controversial-language-law. �SLOVAKIA 151 versy, although Slovakia was no longer constrained by mandatory monitoring. A second feature of policy during the Fico administration was an exchange of symbolic and substantive rebuffs between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, implicitly or usually explicitly targeting the issue of loyalties to state or nation. An official state visit between Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, the first such in eight years, was cancelled after the language law controversy . 13 Another unfortunate incident surrounded the unveiling of a statue of St. Stephen in the city of Komarno in August of 2009. Hungary's president Laszlo S6lyom planned to attend this event as a private citizen, but was stopped from crossing the bridge between Hungary and Slovakia after a diplomatic exchange confirmed that he would not be permitted to enter Slovakia for this purpose. The Slovak government considered this event a provocation, noting that no high Slovak official had been invited to the unveiling. In July of 2010, the newly-installed nationalist FIDESZ government in Hungary further roiled the waters by taking the incident to the European Court of Justice. (Ex-president S6lyom returned to lay a wreath at the statue without incident in August of 2010). 14 The most sensitive development in Slovak-Hungarian relations occurred in the interval between the April Hungarian elections of 2010 and the June Slovak elections. A few days after its installation, the FIDESZ government, led by Viktor Orban, lobbed a political grenade into the Slovak election campaign by approving a new law on dual citizenship. By a crushing vote of 344-3 with five abstentions, the Hungarian parliament sanctioned measures that would allow ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship as of January, 2011 even without the intention of residing in Hungary (they would not have voting rights in Hungary itself) . The Fico government recalled its ambassador from Budapest, called a session of the security council, and retaliated with legislation forfeiting Slovak citizenship 13 Lubos Palata "Slovak Language Law: Slap in the Face," Transitions Online, July 13, 2009. http :ijwww.ceeo1 .com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=f3bblacd-4a304701-9d6f-6889e003d4bc&articleld=3fa741b5-2f9f-4663-9824-a43e09e 7fe4b. 14 "Mad'arsky exprezident S6lyom presiel do Komama bez problemov," SME, August 22, 2010. �152 SLOVAKIA to those taking additional Hungarian citizenship. 15 Orban 's somewhat baffling timing would appear likely to damage the electoral prospects of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and to bolster Slovak nationalist voting. The European community could only watch ineffectively, urge a negotiated settlement to the question, and ponder what citizenship norms might be appropriate to cross-border minorities. 16 Overall, the Fico government's minority rights initiatives bear a pronounced resemblance to those of the Meciar era, the last time the SNS was in government and the governmental orientation stressed the risks to Slovak identity of a multi-ethnic state. As in the case of the Meciar governments, external concerns seemed largely ineffectual in modifying the course of policy-making or ameliorating relations with Hungary. The policy-making dynamics, however, are less complex than the partisan political dynamics, to which I now tum. The Fico Government and Its Impact on the Identity Dimension of the Party System. Although minority relations may appear to be only a delimited segment of the larger political picture, in two important respects they were arguably central to Fico's governance because of the impact they have had on coalition formation in 2006 and 2010 and on coalition politics in between. Indeed, Fico 's government notably shaped the party system itself, but not only in terms of its national identity dimension. In both respects the impact had international ramifications. I now want to focus on this larger picture. 15 Previous Slovak law allowed for dual citizenship, but with certain provisions that could be adapted to bar dual citizenship in this particular instance. See Dagmar Kusa, "The Slovak Question and the Slovak Answer: Citizenship during the Quest for National Self-Determination and after," in Rainer Baubock, Bernhard Perching and Wiebke Sievers, eds ., Citizenship Policies in the New Europe (Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), 275-303. Note that Romania remained silent over Orban 's move, although it equally affected Romania' s large Hungarian minority. The Romanian government had previously used Orban 's ploy in extending citizenship rights to ethnically Romanian Moldovans in 2009, and so could hardly complain about a similar law in Hungary. See Slovak Sfectator, August 10, 2010. 1 See for example, Rainer Baubock, ed., "Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to Respond to the Hungarian-Slovak Tit-for-Tat," EU Working Papers, RSCAS 2010/75 (2010, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy). �SLOVAKIA 153 Government formation in post-communist states has consistently proved challenging, although the challenges have varied systematically from state to state. A common thread through most of the postcommunist era to date, however, has been the Euro-relevance of coalition choices. In the 2002 election campaign, SMER's inaugural effort, Fico refused to name preferred coalition partners or to rule out the HZDS (although he emphatically rejected a cabinet shared with either Meciar or Dzurinda, leaders he styled as representative of an 17 old, corrupt generation). Some analysts have plausibly suggested that his failure to exclude the HZDS raised voter doubts about a Fico-led government's capacity to complete the EU integration project and helped to account for his last minute sag in the polls. 18 The coalition formation process after the 2006 elections was undoubtedly critical to the subsequent pattern of party system dynamics in ways I will investigate below. Frontrunner Fico had promised a coalition that Europe could approve. In the late stages of the campaign, some analysts dismissed the possibility of a SMER-HZDSSNS coalition (including two political formations most unpopular in Europe because of their perceived demagogic, authoritarian and nationalist leadership) as a product of incumbent Dzurinda's fear-mongering. SMER derided this as a bogey-man. Fico characterized the coalition as a "specter" created by Dzurinda. 19 SMER's Vice President Robert Kalinak told reporters , "Smer will not be part of any government that is not internationally accepted, and I think that's a pretty clear statement that you can deduce all kinds of things from." 20 .... But apparently not the coalition that actually emerged in 2006. In the event, the "worst case scenario" was not merely a scare tactic. The victorious Smer did indeed invite the HZDS and the SNS into a coalition, albeit explicitly without either of their leaders, in cabinet positions. And Fico assured the public, at home and abroad, that the presence of the SNS in government did not dilute existing commitments to minority and human rights, again signaling that minority parties were not pariahs . The Bratislava daily Novy cas dub17 Fico was born in 1964, Dzurinda in 1955 and Meciar in 1942. Tim Haughton, "We Will finish What We've Started: The 2002 Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19:4 (December, 2003), 65-90. 19 Transitions Online, June 19, 2006; TASR, June 12, 2006. 20 Interview with Robert Kalinak, Slovak Spectator, June 12, 2006. 18 �154 SLOVAKIA bed this the "you can't be serious" coalition-and it prompted an immediate external response. The European Union cannot dictate who is eligible to govern a member state. This issue was clarified with the case of Austria, a neutral state that joined the EU in 1995, once membership ceased to be associated with the divisions of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter, the use of conditionality after accession to membership received a major setback. In 2000, Austria breached a long-standing but informal West European consensus against the inclusion of the radical right in democratic governments- a so-called "cordon sanitaire" against extremist parties--when Austria's Christian Democrats accepted Jorg Haider and his Freedom Party as junior coalition partners. Appalled that a party led by a man who attended SS reunions was included in a member government, the EU created an impromptu and awkward state of "diplomatic isolation" that proved largely counterproductive, and embarrassing in its implication that the European Union, riddled with its own democratic deficits, had the right to judge the democratically elected governments of its members. The EU backed down after seven months.21 If the EU wouldn't act, the European party formation in which SMER was an observing member- the Party of European Socialists (PES)--was not similarly constrained, although ultimately equally ineffectual. PES publicly expressed "concern and deep misgivings" over Fico's coalition choices, as well as "shock" and "deep disgust," for good measure. Club deputy chair Johannes Swoboda expressed doubt that such a government could uphold European values; 22 and the Belgian socialist MEP asked "Don't you feel ashamed as a social 21 EU concern persists. The long-term legacy of the abortive effort to assert European values in the Austrian case, and to provide for response to future democratic deviations is Article 7 of both the Nice Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a so-called "emergency brake," a decision-making mechanism to impose sanctions on member states that manifest a "serious breach" of European values specified in the treaty under Article 2. Approving the Lisbon Treaty thus does provide a new conditionality mechanism; it remains to be seen how badly it is needed and whether it will have any practical utility. See http ://register.consilium.europa.eu/gdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf 2 "Evropsti socialiste znepokojeni vznikajici koalici na Slovensku," CTK, June 29, 2006. �SLOVAKIA 155 democrat of forming a coalition with a party known for its xenophobia?"23 In October 2006, PES President Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced: The PES resolution refers specifically to the Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe" adopted by PES Congress in 2001 in Berlin which states "all PES parties adhere to the following principles .. . to refrain from any form ofpolitical alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred. " 24 Only in 2008 was SMER 'S membership application conditionally reinstated after both SMER and SNS submitted letters confirming their commitment to minority rights, a largely declarative gesture. But this so-called "nightmare coalition" with the HZDS and SNS was not inevitable. The contrasting case of Bulgaria is instructive. The victorious Borisov party in 2009 ruled out a coalition with the Turkish minority MRF during the election campaign as part of the incumbent government he attacked. Like Fico, candidate Borisov employed a populist discourse-what Pop-Eleches would call the new centrist populism 25- and an appeal that, while taking pot shots at minorities, was not radically nationalist. His "outsider" strategy, however, dictated a rejection of all the status quo parties, and particularly the incumbents. Fico, on the other hand, although not loath to criticize minorities, had moderated his populist appeals and reoriented to social democracy by the 2006 election. 26 Fico gave serious consideration to a KDH/MKP coalition, but could not get agreement on it-Miroslav Kusy notes that the KDH leadership was badly and bitterly split on the possibility, with some insisting on a set of moral issues (such as ban23 24 25 Slovak Spectator, September 11 , 2006. http ://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family. Pop-Eleches, "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism," World Politics 62 (2010), 221-60. 26 See Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton, "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia," Politics and Policy 37:4 (2009), 82 1-41 . �156 SLOVAKIA ning same-sex marriage and contraception); KDH deliberations were so protracted that Fico ultimately gave up. 27 KDH's hesitation was the mostly widely cited reason for the sinking of the alternative SMER-SMK-KDH coalition, both by media and coalition partners. 28 Despite the programmatic dissonances with SMER, such an alignment had the attraction for KDH and SMK of averting the coalition that did in fact emerge. In any case, Fico is a clever politician, and he realized that the SNS and HZDS would be easier to undercut. Fico could and did steal some of the SNS political clothes and a bit of its electorate by annexing the nationalist issue-a kind of electoral poaching that would have been impossible against the KDH and SMK--and in Meciar's HZDS he had an aging and politically dying junior partner. Fico is also something of a control freak- he immediately sidelined Monika Flasikova-Benova, a public critic of his coalition choice, at the next party congress by stripping her and others of leadership roles-(he was also canny in avoiding the appointment of too many MPs as ministers, who if discarded, might return to parliament and defect from the party). His final coalition choices therefore, would be more malleable, provided he could manage the public response, in particular, to SNS outbursts. In the new government, Meciar's party alarmingly claimed the Justice portfolio. SNS portfolios included Agriculture, Regional Development and Education, all highly salient policy domains for minorities. Agriculture and Regional Development, previously held by SMK, are germane to economic conditions in the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia, which are generally more rural and less developed than the north or west. And putting education policy in the hands of SNS raised concerns that minority issues would get short shrift. 27 Miroslav Kusy, "Catastrophic Scenario in Bratislava," The Analyst: Central and Eastern European Review 2 (2006), 37. The KDH division was so pronounced as to cause a leadership crisis and resignations from the party leadership in its aftermath. 28 See for example the comments by Ivan Miklos in Hospodtirske noviny, June 29, 2006: "The European Peoples Party won't understand very well, how it is possible that these three EPP member parties weren't able to reach agreement. In this sense, I think that the responsibility for this situation lies especially on the KDH. " In this case, Miklos blamed the KDH for balking at bringing the HZDS into a SDKUKDH-SMK coalition. �SLOVAKIA 157 Two related effects of this government's tenure on party system dynamics are worth noting. At the majority nationalist end of the identity continuum, one can visualize Fico as a political vampire, draining his coalition partners of standing and voters. Fico preempted the national issue from his more volatile and extremist coalition colleague, Jan Slota of the SNS, by challenging the national sentiment of historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, as well as of the media, both of whom he accused of exhibiting "un-Slovak" tendencies. Fico proclaimed 2008 as the "Year of the Slovak Nation." He re-constructed pre-national history with a claim on the Great Moravian Empire having consisted of "ancient Slovaks"29 and commissioned a statue of warrior King (Prince) Svatopluk for the Bratislava Castle courtyard-an equestrian monument installed just before the elections in 2010 amid great controversy about the historicity of the claims made about his ethnicity, the Byzantine cross on his shield, and even whether he was actually a king.30 From the outset, Fico tended to overlook rather than to chastise the SNS and its incendiary leader. He was content to let Slota's outrageous statements pillory his own credibility. A case in point: Slota apparently sought to launch his party's electoral campaign in early 2010 with the pronouncement that Hungary was planning a military 31 invasion of Slovakia to revise the Treaty of Trianon. Fico did chastise the spectacular SNS corruption in office. Both in the 1990s and in the Fico government, the SNS has been noted for ministerial corruption. The SNS held two portfolios-Construction and Regional development and Environment--in the Fico government, in addition to a deputy prime-ministership. Both incumbents at Construction and Regional Development were dismissed in quick succession over the so-called "Bulletin-Board" tender, in which public procurement procedures were violated in favor of an in-house 29 "Fico's Revisionist History," Transitions Online, February 29, 2008. ° Fico expressed the hope that the statue would become a national pilgrimage site, 3 but the statue immediately became politicized as the extremist group "Our Slovakia" came to its rescue (a commission on its dissolution has been formed) without an assembly permit. As of November 2010, the party's website has youtube video of riot police blocking the pilgrimage. Meanwhile, anti-racist groups mobilized to challenge the party. Fico also appropriated the 18 th century social bandit Jano~ik as a Social Democrat. 31 The Slovak Spectator, March 24, 2010. �158 SLOVAKIA process that awarded contracts to two firms with close ties to the SNS leader Jan Slota. SNS Environment Minister Jaroslav Izak, who was asked to resign for his ministry's mishandling of EU environmental funds , was followed by Jan Chrbet, whose forced resignation was triggered by a scandal surrounding the awarding of carbon emissions contracts on terms unfavorable to the government. When his successor from the SNS, Viliam Tursky, was also removed for murky contract awards, Prime Minister Fico announced that it was time to take the environmental portfolio away from the SNS.32 (Startlingly, Slota demanded the human and minority rights portfolio in exchange for the lost environmental slot.) Hence, by the end of his term in office, Fico had succeeded not only in pre-empting Slota with a more respectable nationalism, but also in discrediting him and his party on the politically winning issue of anti-corruption (a useful diversion from SMER 's own corruption problems).33 By 2010, the debilitated SNS squeaked into the subsequent parliament by only a tenth of a percentage point over the electoral threshold and lost more than half of its previous seats (down from twenty to nine )- a voting hemorrhage that pre-election opinion polls suggest went to Fico. 34 Tibor Kis concludes that Fico "offered voters a European alternative to Vladimir Meciar's nationalist L'S-HZDS and a social and ' Slovak' alternative relative to centre-right organiza- 32 See The Slovak Spectator, August 31, 2009. http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36352/11 /people often get what they want n ot what they need.html. 33 SNS corruption problems might have been predicted from its previous term in office, and by the general trends in ministerial corruption region-wide. In the overall universe of cabinet ministers in 13 post-communist EU members and candidate members serving between 1990 and 2009, minority politicians were just about exactly average in their involvement in corruption scandals (13%). The majority nationalist party ministers, by contrast, were close to twice as likely to be scandal prone (23%) as the norm, and thereby more embarrassing as coalition partners. Involvement in corruption scandals as used here does not imply eventually proven guilt in a court of law. (Corruption Involvement is coded if the minister is formally investigated by law enforcement agencies or parliament, arrested and tried, or documented as engaging in suspect behavior by a corruption agency). 34 See Kevin Deegan-Krause 's Pozorblog, 2010 Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Post-Election Report, July 14, 2010, http://www.pozorb1og. com/ . �SLOVAKIA 159 tions."35 Fico appears, indeed, to have been too successful in this regard: As Mesik notes, "By attracting SNS as well as HZDS voters, Fico successfully cannibalized his partners in the government and only woke up to the day when his by far strongest party did not have partners to form a government with." Hungarian Minority Politics If Fico proved effective (and somewhat self-defeating) in absorbing votes from his coalition partners in the 2010 elections, the exclusion of the SMK from government also had ramifications for minority party politics. At first, the SMK' s position on the opposition benches had some echoes of the 1990s. Amidst a general disarray after losing power, it was striking that the Fico era started with the failure of the ethnic Slovak opposition parties to back the SMK on issues like the Hedviga Malinova /Malina Hedvig case. The three opposition parties did not meet for four months until the controversy regarding Deputy Agriculture Minister Marian Zahumensky. Second, the transition to opposition acerbated longstanding tensions within the SMK. As long as the SMK was in government, tensions within the party could be curbed. Going into opposition meant not only a loss of policy influence, but also a time of reckoning. In March of 2007, the popular and moderate Bela Bugar moved on his less moderate vice-chair- the venerable communist-era dissident Miklos Duray--by seeking to abolish the vice-chair position; the effort rebounded, leading to an upset victory for the party leadership by Pal Csaky. The new SMK was ever more closely identified with Hungary and particularly with FIDESZ, a stance that proved an excellent foil for Slota and the SNS . The SMK was "increasingly perceived and portrayed by Slovak politicians as an extraterritorial branch of FIDESZ." 36 35 Tibor Kis, "Smer: Success Story or Scandal?" The Analyst-Central and Eastern European Review I (2008), 67 . 36 Mesik, Juraj , Slovakia 2010: An Election with Only Limited Choice (Prague: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2010), p. I. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache :NXmv IM538AJ :www.boell.cz/downloads/slovakia-20 I 0( I ).pdf+Slovakia+20 I 0:+An+Election+with+Only+Limited+Choice&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEE SjAbC2uqap66j5MK3mL54uKxbdb6uwiyAnKG8PdcOnGr7TN3cTV4UToaJbphV Dhh Wjlam VNsCTq DriBh Yin WQ4wn6V9PW9qn WFarJSCkyf Jho VJx2g9JpgEj7MPq-DXaaQb&sig=AHIEtbQZam6lz-BjubssUvDtT73Na95dzA �160 SLOVAKIA Csaky 's orientation to the protection of Hungarian interests was to look outward. An example was his meeting with Laszlo Tokes, a central figure of the hard-line wing of Romania' s minority party UDMR, and Csaky's attendance as an observer at the Carpathian Autonomy Council that Tokes had founded. The two leaders apparently discussed the idea of a cross-national mini-minority parliament. Nothing could have been better calculated to play to ethnic Slovak fears about Slovak Hungarian loyalties.37 In 2008, Bugar left the SMK and founded his own party- one that signaled its moderation on national issues with the name MostHid (bridge in Slovak and Hungarian). Csaky professed to believe, along with Slota, that Most-Hid was a stalking horse (actually a Trojan horse) created and funded by SMER. Beyond that, he refused to discuss future cooperation with Most-Hid on the grounds that it wouldn't make it into parliament. 38 Csaky was quite wrong. Defying the pre-election polls, Most-Hid polled over eight percent, nearly doubling the vote of Csaky's SMK, and replacing it in parliament. What did the 2010 vote mean? Were Hungarian voters seeking moderation, as some media analysts said? Or was it a coordination failure , with Hungarians in Slovakia voting strategically in hopes of getting both SMK and Most-Hid into parliament? (This view would explain why Most-Hid did so much better than the last pre-election polls suggested-ethnic Hungarian voters, seeing that SMK was comfortably over the threshold, may have diverted votes to MostHid/ 9 As in the case of many party schisms, then, the upshot was a crippling of Hungarian minority representation in parliament. 40 37 "Csaky naru~il tabu," SME, September 29, 2008. "Csaky: Nep6jdeme do vlady za kazdu cenu," SME, May 7, 20 10, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanok_ tlac.asp?cl=5363302 39 The Slovak Spectator June 21, 20 IO ; some SMK leaders embraced this theory. "Csaky konti, SMK hl'ada ~efa" SME, June 14, 20 I 0, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanoktlac.asp?cl=5421864. 40 A pre-election poll in 20 IO indicated that Most-Hid was drawing almost 60% of its supporters from SMK, 18% from first time voters, 5% from former non-voters and the rest from other parties. The Slovak Spectator, June 3, 20 I 0. The number of Hungarians in the Most-Hid delegation itself was also lowered by the preferential voting of supporters of OKS (Civic Conservative Party), with whom Most-Hid fo rmed a joint candidate slate. See Viera Zuborova, Viera (2011 ), Marketizacia vonkaj~ej reklamy v parlamentnych vol'bach 20 IO v Slovenskej republike," Acta Politologica 3: I (2011 ):7; statistics at "Vysledky preferenfoeo hlasovania: Vys38 �SLOVAKIA 161 Conclusion: Is there reason to expect a durable effect of the Fico era for identity politics in Slovakia? The policy footprint was not especially deep, and the succeeding Radicova government mitigated some of its impact on Hungarian minority relations. The Fico language law was partially modified in December of 2010, restricting its use, but disappointing minorities-who deemed the amendment "less bad"-by its retention of the penalties for improper language use.41 2011 saw an initiative to resolve the dual citizenship issue by joint agreement with the Hungarian government, although to date without a favorable response from the Orban government. 42 The long-term party system effects are less predictable. For example, while Meciar's slide into oblivion even deepened in the 2012 election, sliding to a mere percentage point of the electorate, it is less obvious that Slota's SNS is on the brink of extinction despite the narrow escape in 2010 and the failure to return to parliament in 2012. Earlier, the SNS had survived a schism (in some respects the mirror image of what happened to SMK after 2006) that actually knocked it out of parliament in 2002; it reconsolidated and returned. In 2012, as well, the party was fractured by the expulsion of deputy leader Anna Belousova, who contested the 2012 election with her own party Nation and Justice. Despite the SNS record of corruption and outrageousness, yet another reunion of the party leadership might resuscitate it, although service in Fico 's government was definitely a poisoned chalice. In the 2010 election, the shrinkage of the SNS deprived Fico of a coalition partner and the prime ministership. As a result of the March, 2012 elections, Fico no longer needed that assistance, since his SMER became the first Slovak party since indeledky volieb do NR SR: 12.06.2010," Most-Hid website, http://www.most-hidke.sk/sk/vo1by-nrsr20 I 0-preferencne-hlasy. 41 "Language Act takes a "less bad" form," Minority Report, Monthly Bulletin on the Hungarian Community in Slovakia, Issue 12-2010, http://www.freeweb.hu/mkdsz l/pdf/MR-Ol-2011.pdf. 42 "Hungary: "Nern! " to Slovak Dual Citizenship Proposal," The Daily.sk, posted 12 July 20 11 , http://www.thedaily.sk/2011 /07 /12/top-news/hungary-nem-to-slovak-dualcitizensh ip-proposal/. The Fico government, elected in March of 2012, signaled that it would slightly modify its earlier draconian response by allowing dual citizenship to Slovaks actually residing in the other country. �162 SLOVAKIA pendence to win an outright majority of the parliamentary seats (83 out of 150).43 As for the emergence of two major partisan competitors for the Hungarian electorate, the ambiguities in interpreting Most-Hid's victory over the SMK stand in the way of a clear prediction. Past electoral outcomes show that being in power has not previously eroded the support of the minority electorate, either in Slovakia or in the parallel cases of Bulgaria and Romania. On that basis, it might be possible to argue for Most-Hid to further consolidate its position. However, what Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia also had in common until this election was the dominance of a single minority party or electoral coalition. 44 The story may be quite different with an alternative and established minority-based party challenging each decision, even from outside parliament. The municipal elections of November 2010 and the parliamentary elections of 2012, which showed the two Hungarian parties splitting their vote, did not clarify the picture. Although an extraparliamentary party like the SMK could not promise influence at the center to woo voters, the SMK retained its established organizational base and its government subsidy and thus retains a presence in politics (it also retains its representation in the European parliament). Local party organizations generally hold the decision-making power to run joint candidates with other parties or to cooperate in local coalitions after elections, and there was indeed some limited cooperation, but also cases, as in the Komarno mayor's race, where dividing the Hungarian vote opened the way to victory for an independent Slovak candidate. The basis for cooperation, however, is shaky. The SMK has grown ever closer to the nationalist Fidesz party in Hungary, and proudly announced in March 2011 that Hungary had incorporated three SMK proposals into its new constitution. Moreover, the SMK party chair, Joszef Berenyi, actually announced in January of 2011 that he was applying for Hungarian citizenship under the controversial new law. These maneuvers only underline the SMK' s distance from the more moderate Most-Hid. During the winter of 2011, de43 Sme, March 11 , 2012. It is true that before 1998, the SMK was not a single entity; rather, it was a group of Hungarian parties which ran on a single slate, not as competitors. 44 �SLOVAKIA 163 spite the clear electoral incentives to do so, the two parties failed to reach any agreement on electoral cooperation in 2012, and contested the parliamentary elections completely separately. Once again, SMK barely missed parliamentary representation, while Most-Hid survived, although it lost more than a percentage point and one MP in the 2012 elections. In closing, it would appear that electoral outcomes and coalition choices matter more than external pressures for normative conformity on minority rights issues, just as they did in the pre-accession period before 2004. Government policies on minorities in Slovakia respond primarily to partisan domestic constituencies, and vary according to the government in power. Even though minority inclusion in government was known to be desirable to Brussels, once Slovakia was safely in the European Union, minority inclusion was not jettisoned, but rather subject to the same kinds of political logic and choices that determined which identity-based party would be included in government before 2004. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 145 HUNGARIAN MINORITY POLITICS IN SLOVAKIA: UNDER FICO, AFTER EU ACCESSION Carol Skalnik Leff Many scholars of European integration have shown keen interest in the behavior of new members after the pressures of "conditionality" have been lifted, and the political and policy constraints of qualifying for membership have abated. The 2006 election in Slovakia, won by Robert Fico's SMER, was the first contested after Slovakia's EU accession, and offers a useful case study of one of the EU's desiderata- the treatment of ethnic minorities. In this article, I analyze the Fico era's impact on the minority rights agenda by focusing on two points. The first is the Fico government's record in the sphere of minority politics and policy. The second, and in some respects potentially more consequential, is the way the Slovak party system' s identity politics dimension was reconfigured during his term of office. I contextualize this analysis by noting the Fico government's positioning in the evolution of the "two-level game" on minority rights issues played out under successive Slovak governments with the European Union. During the pre-accession period, external pressures to conform to European concerns seemed less important for Slovak responsiveness than the composition of the government in power. The postaccession period analyzed here seems to follow the same pattern, with the Fico government relatively resistant to external initiatives and the successor Radicova government more aligned with EU norms and expectations. The Context: 2006 witnessed the first Slovak elections following the country's accession to the European Union. Slovakia's two previous national elections had been fought in the shadow of EU membership prospects. Both the 1998 and 2002 elections immediately preceded critical moments in the accession process- the choice of candidate states in 1998 and the final decisions on membership invitations in 2002. Karen Henderson made the point most strongly: "While it has been argued that referendums sometimes fulfill the function of second 146 SLOVAKIA order national elections ... Slovakia had twice experienced something approaching the reverse: national elections, in 1998 and 2002 , that were in part referendums about whether Slovakia should join the EU ." 1 Given the strength of pro-integration sentiment, which was rising toward the eightieth percentiles by the late 1990s, I would rephrase this formulation to suggest that the referendum quality of these elections consisted of the question of whether Slovakia would be able to join the EU, or which party could best deliver on membership. As Henderson noted, "the vital question was not whether [Slovaks] wanted the EU, but whether the EU wanted them." 2 In 1998 Vladimir Meciar lost the election and hence the key impediment to EU acceptance of Slovakia was removed. The 2002 results secured the conditions for a final push.3 The two right-of-center coalition governments under SDKU leader Mikulas Dzurinda that served from 1998 to 2006 strove, successfully, to cement Slovakia's case for inclusion in the 2004 EU enlargement. Tactically, one of the centerpiece components of that effort was the inclusion of the Hungarian Minority Coalition (SMK) in both governments. The alignment strategy to please Europe in the case is quite evident, and noticeable in Romania and Bulgaria as well; for the EU, ethnic minority parties were the preferred coalition partners, and radical nationalist participation a source of EU concern . Lacking its own minority rights acquis at the collapse of Com4 munism, the European Union's expectations about respect for minority rights protection was often ad hoc, and rested on the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 rather than on developed community law. 1 Karen Henderson, " EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus," West European Politics 27:4 (September, 2004), 653 . 2 Henderson, 656. 3 By 2002, the incumbent government urged voters to let it "fini sh what we started" and take that last "one more step (one last step is needed to the EU and NA TO... with us you' ll make it). The SDKU, in its famous peaceable kingdom billboard (a cat and dog entwined together) reminded voters that the party had managed to maintain a fract ious coalition : "Thanks to that, we are on the threshold of NATO and the EU." 4 The European Union was still the European Economic Communities in 1989, but for simplicity 's sake, I will refer to the "European Union" throughout. For a critique of the EU's minority rights conditionality, see Kyriaki Topidi, "The Limits of EU Conditionali ty: Minority Ri ghts in Slovakia," Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe I (2003), 20-29. SLOVAKIA 147 However, all states with substantial minorities were well aware that minority treatment by the government was under scrutiny; hence, the elevation of the SMK to a coalition partner was accompanied by policy adjustments in the eroded minority rights regime of the Meciar period. The 2006 elections that brought Fico to power, however, occurred in a very different international strategic context, one in which Slovakia's European fate no longer depended on electoral outcomes and government composition. "We got you into Europe" lacked the resonance of SDKU's (Slovak Christian Democratic Party) 2002 appeal "You need us to get into Europe." 5 However, the economy that had earned Slovakia the epithet "Tatra Tiger" had not benefited all; Slovakia's unemployment rate of 15% in 2006 was one of the highest in Europe (and that was an improvement over the peak of 19% in 2000-2002). Small wonder, then, that Robert Fico 's populist critique of the reform era found powerful electoral resonance in 2006. His new government, however constituted, would face different international and domestic constraints than had been true for the previous decade. For the purpose of this analysis, the most salient point is that the externally-induced incentives for minority inclusion, and for adherence to minority-tolerant policies, were less pronounced than in the past. One thing, however, remained constant. It was generally impossible to form a majority coalition without including one of the two key parties aligned on the identity dimension of the party system: either the SMK or the Slovak National Party (SNS). 6 The choice between them had been definitive for the tenor of the government's minority relations policy after past elections. The question wasn't simply, therefore, whether the SMK was in or out, but rather that its exclusion likely meant the inclusion of the SNS. SMER's leadership chose the latter option (a choice that will be discussed below), with 5 In 2002, the incumbent anti- Meciar parties urged voters to let them "finish what we started" and take that last "one more step." (the billboard message: one last step is needed to the EU and NATO ... with us you'll make it). 6 In 1998, the inclusion of the SMK produced an over-sized coalition . SMK was not necessary for a parliamentary majority. It was, however, necessary, for agenda control and constitutional change, including the transition to a directly elected presidency that was virtually the first order of business of the Dzurinda government that formed the coalition. 148 SLOVAKIA consequences that shaped the minority rights agenda for the Fico government. Minority Policy Dimensions of the Fico Government: Policy relevant to minorities in Slovakia has followed the trajectory of government change. Meciar's second and third governments in the l 990 's had ruled with the support of the Slovak National Party (SNS) and pursued minority-relevant policies that evoked European criticism, either because of overt actions (language and education laws) or omissions (the failure to pass a minority-language law to clarify and codify the language rights of non-Slovaks). By contrast, the three right-of-center governments, led by Jozef Moravcik and twice by Dzurinda, ruled with the support of the Hungarian minority coalition and proved responsive to the European push for stronger minority protections. The coalition pattern continued under Fico and his successor lveta Radicova, with Fico's left-of-center government incorporating the SNS and Radicova's right-of-center coalition including the new Hungarian-Slovak Most-Hid formation (Note that Slovakia's predictable pattern of coalition alliances is by no means characteristic: in Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia-the three other East and Central European countries with established and governmentally salient minority parties- both right-and left-of-center governments have ruled with minority party support. In Slovakia, the SMK has not changed sides). Policy initiatives cannot fully capture the almost immediate change of tone in Hungarian-Slovak relations, marked by patriotic football hooliganism and the virulent controversy over the Malina/ Malinova affair.7 The core of Fico' s minority policy-making, however, was a re-balancing toward Slovak language rights in uradny (official) communication, and correspondingly greater ambiguity about the security of minority language rights. The first controversy emerged over the potentially restrictive impact of the 2008 amendments 7 Hedvig Malina was a Hungarian student in Nitra who in 2006 reported to the police that she had been assaulted for speaking Hungarian in public. The complaint generated a mini-Dreyfus affa ir, with one' s political orientation determining whether or not to give credence to her claims. The government ultimately sided against her, and lodged perjury charges. The Fico government charged Hungary with unacceptable interference in the case. See also "Slovakia and Hungary: Trouble in Felvidek," Transitions Online, September 5, 2006. SLOVAKIA 149 to the education law regarding Hungarian language education. In the spring of 2009, the focus was on Hungarian language textbooks, with the government seeking to supplant minority-produced course materials with translations of Slovak texts. This was accompanied by a protracted disagreement about the rendering of Slovak place names. For example, the government wanted the Danube river in Slovak (Dunaj) rather than Hungarian (Duna), even in Hungarian texts. The compromise, reached in February of 2009, appears to allow the previous practice of using "deep-rooted" geographical place names in Hungarian with the Slovak names in parentheses. Additional concern was generated by the restriction of Hungarian minority Radio Patria broadcasts to short wave transmitters that did not reach Bratislava or eastern Slovakia.8 The Language Law But the most internationally visible and resonant initiative was a revisiting of the language laws of the 1990s, as amended in 1999 under the Dzurinda government. As Martin Votruba has pointed out, a major thrust of the 1999 amendment (Act on the Use of Minority Language) had been to remove the penalties (fines) that Meciar's government had enacted for violations of the 1995 law establishing the primacy of the Slovak language. 9 Hastily drafted to meet EU expectations and, therefore, imprecise in some passages, the 1999 amendment did establish rights to the use of minority language in official communications.10 In response to the status quo, the coalition program of the Fico government in 2006 included commitments to safeguard the state language and in particular the "promotion of Slovak culture in the mixed regions ." Legislation fulfilling this pledge by privileging the use of the Slovak language in official communications passed in 8 See Kata Eplenyi, "The Language Rights of Hungarian Communities in Slovakia and Romania: The Impacts and Perspectives of EU-Membership," Masters Thesis, Central European University, Budapest, Nationalism Studies Program, 2009. 9 Votruba 's analysis of the provisions of the law is the most comprehensive I have found. Martin Votruba, "The Uncommon Language: Bratislava, Budapest, and Brussels," Slovak Studies Association Newsletter, volume 33 (2009). See also Farimah Daftary and Kinga Gal, "The New Slovak Language Law: Internal or External Politics?" ECMI Working paper #8, September 2000. http ://www.ecmi.de/download/working paper 8.pdf. 10 Eplenyi, "Language Rights. " 150 SLOVAKIA 2009, and provoked an immediate storm of international protest, largely centered on the hefty penalties (up to 5,000 euros) that could be imposed for violations. Media commentary tended to paint the legislation with a broad brush, whether in praise or blame, and thus to obfuscate the actual provisions. It would appear for example, that vivid scenarios of fines for an ethnically Hungarian patient speaking the native tongue to his ethnically Hungarian doctor in Hungarian are inapt, since the government maintained that only legal entities and not individuals were slated to be fined for violations . 11 Nor were the frequently invoked foreign-language church services under threat. However, in protecting Slovak language use, the law clearly appeared to have a chilling effect on minority language rights, and aroused vehement criticism from both the Hungarian minority and from neighboring Hungary, as well as from critics in the European Parliament. For its part, the government tended to make somewhat misleading claims about international approval (a familiar pattern in the Meciar years as well) . Emblematic of suspicion about those claims was the opposition demand that the OSCE advisory opinion on the law be published in full , without abridgement. A slightly exasperated Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, visited Slovakia by invitation during the controversy, and chastised both sides for exaggerating the OSCE position. He reiterated the OSCE conclusion that the law met international standards, but added "that doesn't mean that I necessarily think it's a good law;" he said that the High Commission would like to see the fines omitted from the legislation, and warned that the normative validity of some provisions would depend on their implementation. 12 The ongoing engagement of external arbiters was evident in this contra11 Nonetheless, the successor Radicova government introduced legislation in September of 2010 to lower fines and to explicitly lift their imposition on individuals except where citizen safety and property ri ghts were in question, to permit nonSlovak records in minority schools, and to exempt transport, communications and postal employees. Catherine McNally, "Are Relations between Hungary and Slovakia beginning to thaw?" CS!S, October 5, 2010, http ://csis.org. 12 OSCE Envoy Proffers 'Advice' On Language Law, European Dialogue, September 30, 2009, http://eurodialogue.org/osce/OSCE-Envoy-Proffers-Advice-On-Language-Law; Zuzana Vaskova, "Slovakia's Controversial Language Law," EU Reporter, September 28, 2009, http://www.eureporter.co.uk/story/slovakias-controversial-language-law. SLOVAKIA 151 versy, although Slovakia was no longer constrained by mandatory monitoring. A second feature of policy during the Fico administration was an exchange of symbolic and substantive rebuffs between the Hungarian and Slovak governments, implicitly or usually explicitly targeting the issue of loyalties to state or nation. An official state visit between Fico and Hungarian Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai, the first such in eight years, was cancelled after the language law controversy . 13 Another unfortunate incident surrounded the unveiling of a statue of St. Stephen in the city of Komarno in August of 2009. Hungary's president Laszlo S6lyom planned to attend this event as a private citizen, but was stopped from crossing the bridge between Hungary and Slovakia after a diplomatic exchange confirmed that he would not be permitted to enter Slovakia for this purpose. The Slovak government considered this event a provocation, noting that no high Slovak official had been invited to the unveiling. In July of 2010, the newly-installed nationalist FIDESZ government in Hungary further roiled the waters by taking the incident to the European Court of Justice. (Ex-president S6lyom returned to lay a wreath at the statue without incident in August of 2010). 14 The most sensitive development in Slovak-Hungarian relations occurred in the interval between the April Hungarian elections of 2010 and the June Slovak elections. A few days after its installation, the FIDESZ government, led by Viktor Orban, lobbed a political grenade into the Slovak election campaign by approving a new law on dual citizenship. By a crushing vote of 344-3 with five abstentions, the Hungarian parliament sanctioned measures that would allow ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship as of January, 2011 even without the intention of residing in Hungary (they would not have voting rights in Hungary itself) . The Fico government recalled its ambassador from Budapest, called a session of the security council, and retaliated with legislation forfeiting Slovak citizenship 13 Lubos Palata "Slovak Language Law: Slap in the Face," Transitions Online, July 13, 2009. http :ijwww.ceeo1 .com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=f3bblacd-4a304701-9d6f-6889e003d4bc&articleld=3fa741b5-2f9f-4663-9824-a43e09e 7fe4b. 14 "Mad'arsky exprezident S6lyom presiel do Komama bez problemov," SME, August 22, 2010. 152 SLOVAKIA to those taking additional Hungarian citizenship. 15 Orban 's somewhat baffling timing would appear likely to damage the electoral prospects of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and to bolster Slovak nationalist voting. The European community could only watch ineffectively, urge a negotiated settlement to the question, and ponder what citizenship norms might be appropriate to cross-border minorities. 16 Overall, the Fico government's minority rights initiatives bear a pronounced resemblance to those of the Meciar era, the last time the SNS was in government and the governmental orientation stressed the risks to Slovak identity of a multi-ethnic state. As in the case of the Meciar governments, external concerns seemed largely ineffectual in modifying the course of policy-making or ameliorating relations with Hungary. The policy-making dynamics, however, are less complex than the partisan political dynamics, to which I now tum. The Fico Government and Its Impact on the Identity Dimension of the Party System. Although minority relations may appear to be only a delimited segment of the larger political picture, in two important respects they were arguably central to Fico's governance because of the impact they have had on coalition formation in 2006 and 2010 and on coalition politics in between. Indeed, Fico 's government notably shaped the party system itself, but not only in terms of its national identity dimension. In both respects the impact had international ramifications. I now want to focus on this larger picture. 15 Previous Slovak law allowed for dual citizenship, but with certain provisions that could be adapted to bar dual citizenship in this particular instance. See Dagmar Kusa, "The Slovak Question and the Slovak Answer: Citizenship during the Quest for National Self-Determination and after," in Rainer Baubock, Bernhard Perching and Wiebke Sievers, eds ., Citizenship Policies in the New Europe (Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, University of Amsterdam Press, 2009), 275-303. Note that Romania remained silent over Orban 's move, although it equally affected Romania' s large Hungarian minority. The Romanian government had previously used Orban 's ploy in extending citizenship rights to ethnically Romanian Moldovans in 2009, and so could hardly complain about a similar law in Hungary. See Slovak Sfectator, August 10, 2010. 1 See for example, Rainer Baubock, ed., "Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to Respond to the Hungarian-Slovak Tit-for-Tat," EU Working Papers, RSCAS 2010/75 (2010, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy). SLOVAKIA 153 Government formation in post-communist states has consistently proved challenging, although the challenges have varied systematically from state to state. A common thread through most of the postcommunist era to date, however, has been the Euro-relevance of coalition choices. In the 2002 election campaign, SMER's inaugural effort, Fico refused to name preferred coalition partners or to rule out the HZDS (although he emphatically rejected a cabinet shared with either Meciar or Dzurinda, leaders he styled as representative of an 17 old, corrupt generation). Some analysts have plausibly suggested that his failure to exclude the HZDS raised voter doubts about a Fico-led government's capacity to complete the EU integration project and helped to account for his last minute sag in the polls. 18 The coalition formation process after the 2006 elections was undoubtedly critical to the subsequent pattern of party system dynamics in ways I will investigate below. Frontrunner Fico had promised a coalition that Europe could approve. In the late stages of the campaign, some analysts dismissed the possibility of a SMER-HZDSSNS coalition (including two political formations most unpopular in Europe because of their perceived demagogic, authoritarian and nationalist leadership) as a product of incumbent Dzurinda's fear-mongering. SMER derided this as a bogey-man. Fico characterized the coalition as a "specter" created by Dzurinda. 19 SMER's Vice President Robert Kalinak told reporters , "Smer will not be part of any government that is not internationally accepted, and I think that's a pretty clear statement that you can deduce all kinds of things from." 20 .... But apparently not the coalition that actually emerged in 2006. In the event, the "worst case scenario" was not merely a scare tactic. The victorious Smer did indeed invite the HZDS and the SNS into a coalition, albeit explicitly without either of their leaders, in cabinet positions. And Fico assured the public, at home and abroad, that the presence of the SNS in government did not dilute existing commitments to minority and human rights, again signaling that minority parties were not pariahs . The Bratislava daily Novy cas dub17 Fico was born in 1964, Dzurinda in 1955 and Meciar in 1942. Tim Haughton, "We Will finish What We've Started: The 2002 Parliamentary Elections," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 19:4 (December, 2003), 65-90. 19 Transitions Online, June 19, 2006; TASR, June 12, 2006. 20 Interview with Robert Kalinak, Slovak Spectator, June 12, 2006. 18 154 SLOVAKIA bed this the "you can't be serious" coalition-and it prompted an immediate external response. The European Union cannot dictate who is eligible to govern a member state. This issue was clarified with the case of Austria, a neutral state that joined the EU in 1995, once membership ceased to be associated with the divisions of the Cold War. Shortly thereafter, the use of conditionality after accession to membership received a major setback. In 2000, Austria breached a long-standing but informal West European consensus against the inclusion of the radical right in democratic governments- a so-called "cordon sanitaire" against extremist parties--when Austria's Christian Democrats accepted Jorg Haider and his Freedom Party as junior coalition partners. Appalled that a party led by a man who attended SS reunions was included in a member government, the EU created an impromptu and awkward state of "diplomatic isolation" that proved largely counterproductive, and embarrassing in its implication that the European Union, riddled with its own democratic deficits, had the right to judge the democratically elected governments of its members. The EU backed down after seven months.21 If the EU wouldn't act, the European party formation in which SMER was an observing member- the Party of European Socialists (PES)--was not similarly constrained, although ultimately equally ineffectual. PES publicly expressed "concern and deep misgivings" over Fico's coalition choices, as well as "shock" and "deep disgust," for good measure. Club deputy chair Johannes Swoboda expressed doubt that such a government could uphold European values; 22 and the Belgian socialist MEP asked "Don't you feel ashamed as a social 21 EU concern persists. The long-term legacy of the abortive effort to assert European values in the Austrian case, and to provide for response to future democratic deviations is Article 7 of both the Nice Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a so-called "emergency brake," a decision-making mechanism to impose sanctions on member states that manifest a "serious breach" of European values specified in the treaty under Article 2. Approving the Lisbon Treaty thus does provide a new conditionality mechanism; it remains to be seen how badly it is needed and whether it will have any practical utility. See http ://register.consilium.europa.eu/gdf/en/08/st06/st06655.en08.pdf 2 "Evropsti socialiste znepokojeni vznikajici koalici na Slovensku," CTK, June 29, 2006. SLOVAKIA 155 democrat of forming a coalition with a party known for its xenophobia?"23 In October 2006, PES President Poul Nyrup Rasmussen announced: The PES resolution refers specifically to the Declaration "For a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe" adopted by PES Congress in 2001 in Berlin which states "all PES parties adhere to the following principles .. . to refrain from any form ofpolitical alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred. " 24 Only in 2008 was SMER 'S membership application conditionally reinstated after both SMER and SNS submitted letters confirming their commitment to minority rights, a largely declarative gesture. But this so-called "nightmare coalition" with the HZDS and SNS was not inevitable. The contrasting case of Bulgaria is instructive. The victorious Borisov party in 2009 ruled out a coalition with the Turkish minority MRF during the election campaign as part of the incumbent government he attacked. Like Fico, candidate Borisov employed a populist discourse-what Pop-Eleches would call the new centrist populism 25- and an appeal that, while taking pot shots at minorities, was not radically nationalist. His "outsider" strategy, however, dictated a rejection of all the status quo parties, and particularly the incumbents. Fico, on the other hand, although not loath to criticize minorities, had moderated his populist appeals and reoriented to social democracy by the 2006 election. 26 Fico gave serious consideration to a KDH/MKP coalition, but could not get agreement on it-Miroslav Kusy notes that the KDH leadership was badly and bitterly split on the possibility, with some insisting on a set of moral issues (such as ban23 24 25 Slovak Spectator, September 11 , 2006. http ://www.pes.org/en/news/smer-suspended-pes-political-family. Pop-Eleches, "Throwing out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties after Communism," World Politics 62 (2010), 221-60. 26 See Kevin Deegan-Krause and Tim Haughton, "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appeals in the Case of Slovakia," Politics and Policy 37:4 (2009), 82 1-41 . 156 SLOVAKIA ning same-sex marriage and contraception); KDH deliberations were so protracted that Fico ultimately gave up. 27 KDH's hesitation was the mostly widely cited reason for the sinking of the alternative SMER-SMK-KDH coalition, both by media and coalition partners. 28 Despite the programmatic dissonances with SMER, such an alignment had the attraction for KDH and SMK of averting the coalition that did in fact emerge. In any case, Fico is a clever politician, and he realized that the SNS and HZDS would be easier to undercut. Fico could and did steal some of the SNS political clothes and a bit of its electorate by annexing the nationalist issue-a kind of electoral poaching that would have been impossible against the KDH and SMK--and in Meciar's HZDS he had an aging and politically dying junior partner. Fico is also something of a control freak- he immediately sidelined Monika Flasikova-Benova, a public critic of his coalition choice, at the next party congress by stripping her and others of leadership roles-(he was also canny in avoiding the appointment of too many MPs as ministers, who if discarded, might return to parliament and defect from the party). His final coalition choices therefore, would be more malleable, provided he could manage the public response, in particular, to SNS outbursts. In the new government, Meciar's party alarmingly claimed the Justice portfolio. SNS portfolios included Agriculture, Regional Development and Education, all highly salient policy domains for minorities. Agriculture and Regional Development, previously held by SMK, are germane to economic conditions in the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia, which are generally more rural and less developed than the north or west. And putting education policy in the hands of SNS raised concerns that minority issues would get short shrift. 27 Miroslav Kusy, "Catastrophic Scenario in Bratislava," The Analyst: Central and Eastern European Review 2 (2006), 37. The KDH division was so pronounced as to cause a leadership crisis and resignations from the party leadership in its aftermath. 28 See for example the comments by Ivan Miklos in Hospodtirske noviny, June 29, 2006: "The European Peoples Party won't understand very well, how it is possible that these three EPP member parties weren't able to reach agreement. In this sense, I think that the responsibility for this situation lies especially on the KDH. " In this case, Miklos blamed the KDH for balking at bringing the HZDS into a SDKUKDH-SMK coalition. SLOVAKIA 157 Two related effects of this government's tenure on party system dynamics are worth noting. At the majority nationalist end of the identity continuum, one can visualize Fico as a political vampire, draining his coalition partners of standing and voters. Fico preempted the national issue from his more volatile and extremist coalition colleague, Jan Slota of the SNS, by challenging the national sentiment of historians at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, as well as of the media, both of whom he accused of exhibiting "un-Slovak" tendencies. Fico proclaimed 2008 as the "Year of the Slovak Nation." He re-constructed pre-national history with a claim on the Great Moravian Empire having consisted of "ancient Slovaks"29 and commissioned a statue of warrior King (Prince) Svatopluk for the Bratislava Castle courtyard-an equestrian monument installed just before the elections in 2010 amid great controversy about the historicity of the claims made about his ethnicity, the Byzantine cross on his shield, and even whether he was actually a king.30 From the outset, Fico tended to overlook rather than to chastise the SNS and its incendiary leader. He was content to let Slota's outrageous statements pillory his own credibility. A case in point: Slota apparently sought to launch his party's electoral campaign in early 2010 with the pronouncement that Hungary was planning a military 31 invasion of Slovakia to revise the Treaty of Trianon. Fico did chastise the spectacular SNS corruption in office. Both in the 1990s and in the Fico government, the SNS has been noted for ministerial corruption. The SNS held two portfolios-Construction and Regional development and Environment--in the Fico government, in addition to a deputy prime-ministership. Both incumbents at Construction and Regional Development were dismissed in quick succession over the so-called "Bulletin-Board" tender, in which public procurement procedures were violated in favor of an in-house 29 "Fico's Revisionist History," Transitions Online, February 29, 2008. ° Fico expressed the hope that the statue would become a national pilgrimage site, 3 but the statue immediately became politicized as the extremist group "Our Slovakia" came to its rescue (a commission on its dissolution has been formed) without an assembly permit. As of November 2010, the party's website has youtube video of riot police blocking the pilgrimage. Meanwhile, anti-racist groups mobilized to challenge the party. Fico also appropriated the 18 th century social bandit Jano~ik as a Social Democrat. 31 The Slovak Spectator, March 24, 2010. 158 SLOVAKIA process that awarded contracts to two firms with close ties to the SNS leader Jan Slota. SNS Environment Minister Jaroslav Izak, who was asked to resign for his ministry's mishandling of EU environmental funds , was followed by Jan Chrbet, whose forced resignation was triggered by a scandal surrounding the awarding of carbon emissions contracts on terms unfavorable to the government. When his successor from the SNS, Viliam Tursky, was also removed for murky contract awards, Prime Minister Fico announced that it was time to take the environmental portfolio away from the SNS.32 (Startlingly, Slota demanded the human and minority rights portfolio in exchange for the lost environmental slot.) Hence, by the end of his term in office, Fico had succeeded not only in pre-empting Slota with a more respectable nationalism, but also in discrediting him and his party on the politically winning issue of anti-corruption (a useful diversion from SMER 's own corruption problems).33 By 2010, the debilitated SNS squeaked into the subsequent parliament by only a tenth of a percentage point over the electoral threshold and lost more than half of its previous seats (down from twenty to nine )- a voting hemorrhage that pre-election opinion polls suggest went to Fico. 34 Tibor Kis concludes that Fico "offered voters a European alternative to Vladimir Meciar's nationalist L'S-HZDS and a social and ' Slovak' alternative relative to centre-right organiza- 32 See The Slovak Spectator, August 31, 2009. http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36352/11 /people often get what they want n ot what they need.html. 33 SNS corruption problems might have been predicted from its previous term in office, and by the general trends in ministerial corruption region-wide. In the overall universe of cabinet ministers in 13 post-communist EU members and candidate members serving between 1990 and 2009, minority politicians were just about exactly average in their involvement in corruption scandals (13%). The majority nationalist party ministers, by contrast, were close to twice as likely to be scandal prone (23%) as the norm, and thereby more embarrassing as coalition partners. Involvement in corruption scandals as used here does not imply eventually proven guilt in a court of law. (Corruption Involvement is coded if the minister is formally investigated by law enforcement agencies or parliament, arrested and tried, or documented as engaging in suspect behavior by a corruption agency). 34 See Kevin Deegan-Krause 's Pozorblog, 2010 Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Post-Election Report, July 14, 2010, http://www.pozorb1og. com/ . SLOVAKIA 159 tions."35 Fico appears, indeed, to have been too successful in this regard: As Mesik notes, "By attracting SNS as well as HZDS voters, Fico successfully cannibalized his partners in the government and only woke up to the day when his by far strongest party did not have partners to form a government with." Hungarian Minority Politics If Fico proved effective (and somewhat self-defeating) in absorbing votes from his coalition partners in the 2010 elections, the exclusion of the SMK from government also had ramifications for minority party politics. At first, the SMK' s position on the opposition benches had some echoes of the 1990s. Amidst a general disarray after losing power, it was striking that the Fico era started with the failure of the ethnic Slovak opposition parties to back the SMK on issues like the Hedviga Malinova /Malina Hedvig case. The three opposition parties did not meet for four months until the controversy regarding Deputy Agriculture Minister Marian Zahumensky. Second, the transition to opposition acerbated longstanding tensions within the SMK. As long as the SMK was in government, tensions within the party could be curbed. Going into opposition meant not only a loss of policy influence, but also a time of reckoning. In March of 2007, the popular and moderate Bela Bugar moved on his less moderate vice-chair- the venerable communist-era dissident Miklos Duray--by seeking to abolish the vice-chair position; the effort rebounded, leading to an upset victory for the party leadership by Pal Csaky. The new SMK was ever more closely identified with Hungary and particularly with FIDESZ, a stance that proved an excellent foil for Slota and the SNS . The SMK was "increasingly perceived and portrayed by Slovak politicians as an extraterritorial branch of FIDESZ." 36 35 Tibor Kis, "Smer: Success Story or Scandal?" The Analyst-Central and Eastern European Review I (2008), 67 . 36 Mesik, Juraj , Slovakia 2010: An Election with Only Limited Choice (Prague: Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 2010), p. I. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache :NXmv IM538AJ :www.boell.cz/downloads/slovakia-20 I 0( I ).pdf+Slovakia+20 I 0:+An+Election+with+Only+Limited+Choice&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEE SjAbC2uqap66j5MK3mL54uKxbdb6uwiyAnKG8PdcOnGr7TN3cTV4UToaJbphV Dhh Wjlam VNsCTq DriBh Yin WQ4wn6V9PW9qn WFarJSCkyf Jho VJx2g9JpgEj7MPq-DXaaQb&sig=AHIEtbQZam6lz-BjubssUvDtT73Na95dzA 160 SLOVAKIA Csaky 's orientation to the protection of Hungarian interests was to look outward. An example was his meeting with Laszlo Tokes, a central figure of the hard-line wing of Romania' s minority party UDMR, and Csaky's attendance as an observer at the Carpathian Autonomy Council that Tokes had founded. The two leaders apparently discussed the idea of a cross-national mini-minority parliament. Nothing could have been better calculated to play to ethnic Slovak fears about Slovak Hungarian loyalties.37 In 2008, Bugar left the SMK and founded his own party- one that signaled its moderation on national issues with the name MostHid (bridge in Slovak and Hungarian). Csaky professed to believe, along with Slota, that Most-Hid was a stalking horse (actually a Trojan horse) created and funded by SMER. Beyond that, he refused to discuss future cooperation with Most-Hid on the grounds that it wouldn't make it into parliament. 38 Csaky was quite wrong. Defying the pre-election polls, Most-Hid polled over eight percent, nearly doubling the vote of Csaky's SMK, and replacing it in parliament. What did the 2010 vote mean? Were Hungarian voters seeking moderation, as some media analysts said? Or was it a coordination failure , with Hungarians in Slovakia voting strategically in hopes of getting both SMK and Most-Hid into parliament? (This view would explain why Most-Hid did so much better than the last pre-election polls suggested-ethnic Hungarian voters, seeing that SMK was comfortably over the threshold, may have diverted votes to MostHid/ 9 As in the case of many party schisms, then, the upshot was a crippling of Hungarian minority representation in parliament. 40 37 "Csaky naru~il tabu," SME, September 29, 2008. "Csaky: Nep6jdeme do vlady za kazdu cenu," SME, May 7, 20 10, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanok_ tlac.asp?cl=5363302 39 The Slovak Spectator June 21, 20 IO ; some SMK leaders embraced this theory. "Csaky konti, SMK hl'ada ~efa" SME, June 14, 20 I 0, http ://volby.sme.sk/clanoktlac.asp?cl=5421864. 40 A pre-election poll in 20 IO indicated that Most-Hid was drawing almost 60% of its supporters from SMK, 18% from first time voters, 5% from former non-voters and the rest from other parties. The Slovak Spectator, June 3, 20 I 0. The number of Hungarians in the Most-Hid delegation itself was also lowered by the preferential voting of supporters of OKS (Civic Conservative Party), with whom Most-Hid fo rmed a joint candidate slate. See Viera Zuborova, Viera (2011 ), Marketizacia vonkaj~ej reklamy v parlamentnych vol'bach 20 IO v Slovenskej republike," Acta Politologica 3: I (2011 ):7; statistics at "Vysledky preferenfoeo hlasovania: Vys38 SLOVAKIA 161 Conclusion: Is there reason to expect a durable effect of the Fico era for identity politics in Slovakia? The policy footprint was not especially deep, and the succeeding Radicova government mitigated some of its impact on Hungarian minority relations. The Fico language law was partially modified in December of 2010, restricting its use, but disappointing minorities-who deemed the amendment "less bad"-by its retention of the penalties for improper language use.41 2011 saw an initiative to resolve the dual citizenship issue by joint agreement with the Hungarian government, although to date without a favorable response from the Orban government. 42 The long-term party system effects are less predictable. For example, while Meciar's slide into oblivion even deepened in the 2012 election, sliding to a mere percentage point of the electorate, it is less obvious that Slota's SNS is on the brink of extinction despite the narrow escape in 2010 and the failure to return to parliament in 2012. Earlier, the SNS had survived a schism (in some respects the mirror image of what happened to SMK after 2006) that actually knocked it out of parliament in 2002; it reconsolidated and returned. In 2012, as well, the party was fractured by the expulsion of deputy leader Anna Belousova, who contested the 2012 election with her own party Nation and Justice. Despite the SNS record of corruption and outrageousness, yet another reunion of the party leadership might resuscitate it, although service in Fico 's government was definitely a poisoned chalice. In the 2010 election, the shrinkage of the SNS deprived Fico of a coalition partner and the prime ministership. As a result of the March, 2012 elections, Fico no longer needed that assistance, since his SMER became the first Slovak party since indeledky volieb do NR SR: 12.06.2010," Most-Hid website, http://www.most-hidke.sk/sk/vo1by-nrsr20 I 0-preferencne-hlasy. 41 "Language Act takes a "less bad" form," Minority Report, Monthly Bulletin on the Hungarian Community in Slovakia, Issue 12-2010, http://www.freeweb.hu/mkdsz l/pdf/MR-Ol-2011.pdf. 42 "Hungary: "Nern! " to Slovak Dual Citizenship Proposal," The Daily.sk, posted 12 July 20 11 , http://www.thedaily.sk/2011 /07 /12/top-news/hungary-nem-to-slovak-dualcitizensh ip-proposal/. The Fico government, elected in March of 2012, signaled that it would slightly modify its earlier draconian response by allowing dual citizenship to Slovaks actually residing in the other country. 162 SLOVAKIA pendence to win an outright majority of the parliamentary seats (83 out of 150).43 As for the emergence of two major partisan competitors for the Hungarian electorate, the ambiguities in interpreting Most-Hid's victory over the SMK stand in the way of a clear prediction. Past electoral outcomes show that being in power has not previously eroded the support of the minority electorate, either in Slovakia or in the parallel cases of Bulgaria and Romania. On that basis, it might be possible to argue for Most-Hid to further consolidate its position. However, what Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia also had in common until this election was the dominance of a single minority party or electoral coalition. 44 The story may be quite different with an alternative and established minority-based party challenging each decision, even from outside parliament. The municipal elections of November 2010 and the parliamentary elections of 2012, which showed the two Hungarian parties splitting their vote, did not clarify the picture. Although an extraparliamentary party like the SMK could not promise influence at the center to woo voters, the SMK retained its established organizational base and its government subsidy and thus retains a presence in politics (it also retains its representation in the European parliament). Local party organizations generally hold the decision-making power to run joint candidates with other parties or to cooperate in local coalitions after elections, and there was indeed some limited cooperation, but also cases, as in the Komarno mayor's race, where dividing the Hungarian vote opened the way to victory for an independent Slovak candidate. The basis for cooperation, however, is shaky. The SMK has grown ever closer to the nationalist Fidesz party in Hungary, and proudly announced in March 2011 that Hungary had incorporated three SMK proposals into its new constitution. Moreover, the SMK party chair, Joszef Berenyi, actually announced in January of 2011 that he was applying for Hungarian citizenship under the controversial new law. These maneuvers only underline the SMK' s distance from the more moderate Most-Hid. During the winter of 2011, de43 Sme, March 11 , 2012. It is true that before 1998, the SMK was not a single entity; rather, it was a group of Hungarian parties which ran on a single slate, not as competitors. 44 SLOVAKIA 163 spite the clear electoral incentives to do so, the two parties failed to reach any agreement on electoral cooperation in 2012, and contested the parliamentary elections completely separately. Once again, SMK barely missed parliamentary representation, while Most-Hid survived, although it lost more than a percentage point and one MP in the 2012 elections. In closing, it would appear that electoral outcomes and coalition choices matter more than external pressures for normative conformity on minority rights issues, just as they did in the pre-accession period before 2004. Government policies on minorities in Slovakia respond primarily to partisan domestic constituencies, and vary according to the government in power. Even though minority inclusion in government was known to be desirable to Brussels, once Slovakia was safely in the European Union, minority inclusion was not jettisoned, but rather subject to the same kinds of political logic and choices that determined which identity-based party would be included in government before 2004.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Hungarian Minority Politics in Slovakia: Under Fico, After EU Accession Description An account of the resource Carol Skalnik Leff Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 145-163 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Leff, Carol Skalnik, 1947- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/68d96fd94c6a537f50454a0614b21e4a.pdf 7efb4f09b09f2369ded33cb58e1658f0 PDF Text Text 164 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S 2010 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 Kevin Deegan-Krause2 The academic publishing cycle is not known for being particularly quick, but it is usually fast enough to beat the electoral cycle in most countries and thereby allow articles considering the consequences of one election without immediately requiring consideration of the next one. Not so for Slovakia. The country's political change in the early 2010 's left no time for leisurely consideration and this article, which began its life as a review of Slovakia's 2010 election, must deal not only with the birth of Slovakia's 2010 government but also its early death in 2012. On 12 June 2010 citizens of Slovakia went to the polls for parliamentary elections for the seventh time since Communist Party rule ended in 1989. A plurality-more than one third-voted for the party of incumbent prime minister Robert Fico. However, Slovakia's system of proportional representation does not give any particular advantage to the largest party, and Fico again found it necessary to seek coalition partners to muster the 50%+ 1 of parliamentary votes necessary to form a government. Unfortunately for Fico, a decline in support for his past government partners and antagonistic relationships with all other parties made it impossible for him to muster the necessary 76 votes. Fico's opponents quickly arranged a majority coalition and on 8 July 2010, Iveta Radifova of the Slovak Democratic and 1 Large segments of this article were first published online at: http://themonkeycage.org/blog/20 I 0/07 / 13/20 IO slovak parliamentary elec/, http ://www.pozorblog.com/20 I 0/07 /20 I 0-slovak-parliamentary-elections-postelection-report/, http://www.pozorblog.com/2012/03/2012-parliamentary-electionsin-slovakia-the-building-blocs-of-success/ and as part of an interview in SME, http:/lwww.pozorblog.com/2012/03/slovakias-electoral-pol itics-an-i nterview-with-sme/. 2 1 am grateful to Sharon Fisher, Tim Haughton, Adrian Harmata, Carol Leff, Vladimir Krivy, Darina Malova, Marek Ryba!', Sharon Wolchik, the entire staff at the Institute for Public Affairs in Bratislava and many others who have helped me to understand Slovakia's politics over the past two decades. I am indebted to the Department of Political Science of Comenius University in Bratislava for logistical support and the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board for the financial support that contributed to this article. �SLOVAKIA 165 Christian Union (SDKU) became the prime minister of a coalition government consisting of four parties with pro-market orientations and relatively moderate views on intra-ethnic cooperation between Slovaks and Hungarians. Radicova was not only a new face in the premiership but a new kind of face in a country with relatively weak representation of women in positions of power. Slovakia differs little from its neighbors in this regard: the Visegrad Four-a regional grouping consisting of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary-has had only one other female prime minister in the last twenty years (Poland's Hanna Suchocka in the early 1990 ' s) and although several of the other countries in the region have had female presidents (Latvia) or prime ministers (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia ) women still remain the exception in post-communist European politics and the incoming 2010 government of the neighboring Czech Republic was criticized for having no women at all. 3 Even Radicova's success did not extend to others: her own government had only one other female cabinet minister, and Slovakia's new parliament actually had fewer female deputies than it did in its previous term. And like every other female prime minister in the region, Radicova did not serve a full term. After just fifteen months in power, intra-coalition conflict produced a vote of no confidence that forced early elections and led to Radicova' s departure from politics, at least for the moment. The emergence and collapse of Radicova's government point to patterns more fundamental than the career path of any particular political leader. Slovakia' s political competition functions in three distinct dimensions-one related to economic questions, another to national questions and a third to the functioning of political systems. Analysis tends to settle at one of three levels, all of which have some claim to the truth, provided that we understand the context, and how we understand Slovakia's recent political shifts depends heavily on what we are looking for. This article works outward from the simplest of these to the most complex, looking at how the underlying dynamics shaped election results in 20 l 0 and the post-election trajectory of Radicova' s govemmet. 3 Appeltova, Michaela, 2010, "Ve vlade neni ani jedna zena, proc?", 30 June, available online: http://padesatprocent.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/ve-vlade-neni-ani-jedna-zenaproc, last accessed 24 May 2012 . �SLOVAKIA 166 The Three Dimensions of Slovakia's Party Competition. Dimension One: Right Coalition Wins, Left Coalition Loses. The most superficial (but not unimportant) level of analysis looks at coalitions and oppositions and involves a one-dimensional space. "Left" and "right" have not always been useful in understanding Slovakia' s political space, but they have become more relevant in recent years, especially since the "right" neo-liberal reforms of the Dzurinda government between 2002 and 2006 and Fico's "left" response in the four years that followed. Using the left-right dimensions as shorthand reveals the 2010 election as a handover of power from one side to the other with a swing of seven seats in Slovakia's 150 seat parliament from Fico ' s coalition to Radicova' s. (Fico ' s coalition dropped from 85 seats in 2006 to 71 in 2010, though Fico's party itself grew by twelve seats). For the purposes of governing, this made all the difference, shifting the parliamentary majority from Fico to Radicova. Figure 1. Changes in relative bloc size in Slovakia, one-dimension, 2006-2012. Dark grey includes left and Slovak-national ( Fico 2006-2010, 2012-present). Light grey includes right and Hungarian- national ( Radicova, 2010-2012) . Left ( 'Mth Slovak National) Right ('Mth Hungarian National) Government: 85 seats Cpposition : 65 seats Cpposition : 71 seats Government: 79 seats Government: 83 seats Cpposi ti on : 67 seats 2006 2010 2012 That majority did not last, however, and early elections in 2012 moved the respective positions of the two blocs almost precisely back to where they had been in 2006. Although observers viewed these election results as a disaster for the right, the latter actually emerged with a stronger position in parliament than it had held during the first Fico government. The difference, of course, was that in 2006 the Fico government' s 85 voters were split between Fico and two not-so-docile coalition partners, whereas in 2012 all 83 seats of �SLOVAKIA 167 the governing majority lay in the hands of Fico's own well-disciplined political party. 4 Dimension Two: Left and Right Parties Gain, Slovak and Hungarian National Parties Lose. Of course "left" and "right" are not usually sufficient for understanding political competition, and in addition to the left-right axis of competition that has recently dominated governments, Slovakia has a clear competitive axis related to national questions. The current dominant dimension includes and overshadows another one related to national issues. According to this two-dimensional framework, Fico's first government represented a coalition between "anti-market left" and "Slovak national" whereas the Radicova government (like the Dzurinda government that preceded Fico before 2006) is a coalition between "pro-market right" and "Hungarian national." Analysis of election results according to the four blocs defined by these two dimensions produces a rather different set of judgments. Although the total vote share of "right" parties of the incoming government increased by five percentage points from 2006 to 2010, the vote share of the "left" party in the outgoing govemrnent- Fico's "Direction-Social Democracy"(Smer-SD)-increased by even more. Corresponding to the gains by both left and right were major losses in the "Slovak national" bloc: the Slovak National Party under Jan Slota fell catastrophically from 12% to 5%, squeaking over the barrier for parliamentary representation by just two thousand votes out of two-and-a-half million cast; and Vladimir Meciar, once the sun and the moon of Slovakia' s politics, continued a remarkably long and gradual slide into obscurity, falling below the barrier and out of parliament altogether. (In the 2012 election Meciar completed the slide with a drop to less than 1%; he resigned from the leadership of his party in April 2012). 5 Like Jaroslav Kaczynski in Poland in 2007, Fico could justifiably claim that it was not he, but rather his partners who had lost the election (though Meciar publicly suggested that, 4 Marek Rybar and Kevin Deegan-Krause, 2009, "Party Democracy and Party Competitiveness in Slovakia: Is There A Trade-Off?," Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of workshops, Lisbon. 5SME, 2012, "Vladimir Meciar odchadza bez nastupcu", 27 April, available online: http://www.sme.sk/c/6356308/vladimir-meciar-odchadza-bez-nastupcu.htrnl, last accessed, 24 May 2012. �168 SLOVAKIA having undermined his partners to maximize his own party' s gain, Fico deserved his fate) . Figure 2: Olanges in relative bloc size in Slovakia, two-dimensions, 2006-2012 . Figure indicates lost seats in light grey and gained seats in dark grey. 2006 2010 Hungarian National 2012 Hu ngarian National 67 I ■·-~- ,>It ! i :,; ,83 ..,, Slovak National Slovak National l " Slovak National Fico did not significantly alter his strategy for the 2012 election but he avoided the same fate because of his party' s own increased support. By mid-2011 Smer 's poll numbers were strong enough to suggest that it could potentially win a majority of seats by itself. In that circumstance, Smer had no further need for coalition partners and had an additional incentive to push its former partners fall below the threshold and take a share of seats that would originally have gone to them. The encouraging numbers also permitted Smer to run a careful and measured campaign designed to avoid losing voters rather than gaining new ones. The party's success in this regard can be measured in its addition of twenty-one new parliamentary seats, though this must be understood in the broader context that, although Smer alone achieved 83 seats, this was several seats fewer than Smer had achieved in its coalition with Slovak national parties in 2006. Although Fico clearly won the election of 2012, the parties of the right together obtained more seats than they had in 2006, in large part thanks to the decline of the national parties. Dimension Three: Slovak National Voters Move Left, Anti-Corruption Voters Move Right (for now). One of the most striking aspects of these shifts in electoral support is the finding of two opinion polls conducted before the election that the exodus of voters from Slovak national parties was not distributed evenly to left and right. In fact, nearly all of it went to the left, �SLOVAKIA 169 mainly to Fico's Smer.6 This is not surprising since Fico played on national themes for some time before the election. For the electoral math to work out, however, this must mean that some of Fico's voters also went elsewhere, and the polls suggest that at least some of them went to the new party of the right, SaS (Freedom and Solidarity). These shifts among blocs are hard to explain even using the twodimensional array of economic and national competition. The answer requires a third dimension, one that arrays voters according to their willingness to tolerate corruption and search for established leaders to resolve these problems. This dimension is hard to identify because its players change sides: the anti-corruption party of one election may become the corrupt but experienced party of the next election. 7 Adding this dimension can help make sense of a voter's jump from Smer, which in 2002 and 2006 attracted a significant share of the anti-corruption electorate, to the Freedom and Solidarity which shared few programmatic positions with Smer, but did promote itself as the answer to the country's corruption problems and, as a new party was itself not (or at least not yet) corrupt. Corruption sensitivity may also explain much of the shift from the two Slovak national parties to the by-no-means-clean but still less corrupt Smer, a shift which is less surprising because Fico had already gone quite far in adopting Slovak national themes. It also conforms to polls showing that younger voters and new voters within the Hungarian electorate shifted from the more established of two Hungarian parties to its newcomer alternative, Most-Hid (Bridge). Slovakia's political shift in 2010 thus reflects not a fundamental shift from left and right but only a left-to-right shift in the votes of those most highly sensitive to corruption. Such a shift endures for only one election until the emergence of another new anti-corruption party in the next election cycle. Smer 's return to relatively clean status during a period out of government ended with the "Gorilla" scandal that linked his political opponents with improper party funding 6 Institute for Public Affairs. 2010. "SaS berie hlasy Smeru a SDKU, Most ziskava volicov SMK." Available online: http ://www.ivo.sk/6082/sk/aktuality/sas-berie-hlasy-smeru-a-sdku-most-ziskava-volicov-smk, last accessed 7 May 2012 . 7 Haughton, Tim , Novotna, Tereza and Deegan-Krause, Kevin (2011) "The 2010 Czech and Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Red Cards to the 'Winners," West European Politics, 34: 2, 394-402 �170 SLOVAKIA from large economic interests.8 Nor do shifts in the nationally-oriented Slovak voters reflect a fundamental decline in the strength of the Slovak national position p er se, but rather a shift of Slovak national voters from the smaller parties with stronger emphasis on national questions to Fico's larger and more diffuse but sufficiently national and less corrupt alternative. Figure 3a below graphically illustrates the conjectured shift of the most "corruption intolerant" voters of SNS and HZDS to Smer (the arrow pointing up and left) and the corruption-intolerant Smer to SaS (the arrow pointing straight right) . (Shifts also occurred within the "right" (from SDKU to SaS) and within the Hungarian national (from MKP-SMK to Most-Hid) but for simplicity's sake those are not shown here.) Figure 3. Hypothesized shifts in party bloc support during Slovakia's most recent two election cycles a. 2006-2010 Hungarian Nation,:; Pro State Left Pro Mlrket Right 8 SME, 20 12, "Cast' spisu Gorila potvrdil policajt, ktory infonnova l Pentu", 3 January, avai lable online at http ://www.sme.sk/c/6203225/cast-spisu-gorila-potvrdil-policajt-ktory-infonnovalpentu.html#ixzz I w9o jAJgG, last accessed 24 May 20 12. �SLOVAKIA b. 171 2010-2012 Hun garian National Pro-Sta t e Left Pro- Mlrket Right The shifts between 2010 and 2012 were smaller but also important. Surveys suggest that a few additional voters shifted from Slovak-national parties such as SNS and HZDS to Smer and that some supporters of the SDKU and its coalition partners shifted back to Smer, while within the coalition voters also shifted to the new Ordinary People and Independents (O1'.aNO). Figure 3b depicts these shifts in the form of twin arrows pointing to the left, with new and returning party voters . SaS avoided the "government death" that has affected every new party entering government since 1994-the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP), and the Party of the New Citizen (ANO)-but it came very close to failing. Even though SaS did not have to serve a full term in government and dropped out of visible participation in government in order to run as anti-political outsiders in late 2011 , it returned to parliament in 2012 with half of its 20 l O strength, less than one percentage point above the 5% threshold This third dimension of politics in Slovakia is not the main one or even the secondary one. It is likely that fewer voters care about corruption than the major national and economic issues, but because the economic and national blocs are narrowly balanced, corruption has a major impact on the creation of parliamentary majorities and the formation of governments. �172 SLOVAKIA 2010: Three Dimensions, One Government, Four (and a half) Parties. The conditions under which the 2010 government gained its majority had a clear impact on its form and, ultimately, its inability to endure. The dynamics that ultimately sank the coalition mixed questions of economic left and right with questions of national consciousness and the legacy of new party formation. Those who had little contact with Slovakia during the late 2000's might be excused for experiencing the 2010 Radicova government with a bit of deja vu. The names of some of the parties changed slightly from the 2002 Dzurinda government, but the general array was almost identical. Most-Hid replaced the Party of the Hungarian Coalition in the Hungarian national slot, and one new pro-market anti-corruption party "Freedom and Solidarity" (SaS) replaced another (the now defunct Alliance of the ew Citizen). Ten of the fifteen cabinet posts remained in the hands of the same party that controlled them in 2002 (or its analog) and seven of the fifteen ministers who took office in 2010 had served in the 2002-2006 cabinet (in several cases heading the same respective ministries that they had managed earlier in the decade). The actual performance of the government is difficult to assess because it lasted such a short time. Hardly a year passed between the government's appointment and the beginning of the Euro bailout crisis that absorbed its entire attention and brought about its demise. During its brief tenure, the government's ability to make change was further limited not only by a narrow political margin, but by constant threats of fragmentation. Particularly notable in this regard were the frequent shifts of four deputies associated with the aforementioned obscure civic movement called "Ordinary People" (OC). 9 These four 9 In a piquant sign of the tactics played during election campaigns in Slovakia, the leader of a defunct but still-formall y-registered party successfully changed its appellation to Ordinary People (01..'.) just hours before the parliamentary caucus came to register the same name. The leaders of the caucus were thus turned away at the party registration desk and forced to find an alternative, registering several weeks later as Ordinary People and Independents (OEaNO). See Pravda, 20 11 , "Morie, ktory si zaregistroval stranu Obyfajni l'udia, navrat nechysta", I November, available online: h ://s ra . ravda.sk/moric-kto -si-zare istroval-stranu-ob ca·ni-ludia-navratnech sta-1 n-/sk do mace.as ?c=A 11110 I 200428 sk do mace 29#ixzz 1wCSKUTuJ, last accessed 24 May 2012. �SLOVAKIA 173 deputies managed unexpectedly to leap into parliament from positions at the very bottom of the SaS list (thanks to preference votes gained from prominent spots in the local commercial inserts that were the main business enterprise of O~'s leader, Igor Matovic). Therefore, they owed little loyalty to SaS and were able to stall key government initiatives through repeated threats of departure. In economic affairs, Radicova ' s government was relatively unified but had limited space for policy innovation. Its efforts were forestalled in part by past successes: the Dzurinda government managed to demonstrate significant coalition discipline during its 20022006 term and, though possessed of a slight parliamentary majority, it managed to pass major economic reforms in taxation, health care, education, the labor market and other aspects of the foreign investment climate. Furthermore, although the Fico government between 2006 and 2010 engaged in high-profile increases in pensions and family benefits and made changes to the labor law, the party actually did little to alter the fundamental framework of the Dzurinda government and presented few opportunities for Radicova's government to reclaim lost ground. On the axis of cultural and religious questions the coalition had little hope of agreement, as it included the parties at both extremes of the axis: SaS supported gay marriage and drug legalization while the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) supported traditional Christian values and a stronger relationship with the Vatican. Fortunately for the coalition, however, this axis did not constitute one of the more salient lines of conflict in Slovakia's politics, and the coalition simply stayed clear of most cultural issues in order not to create a deeper intra-coalition rift. On national identity and foreign policy Radicova's government was not so lucky. On taking office in 2010, the parties that formed the new government shared a common pro-Western outlook and (relatively) accommodating views on ethnic co-existence and national identity, but they found it difficult to translate these positions into policy. On minority-rights issues the coalition ' s Hungarian and Slovak parties differed over what should constitute "appropriate" support for minority culture. Most-Hid sought to reverse the more restrictive language and citizenship policies of the 2006-2010 Fico government, but the Slovak parties of the coalition sought to avoid appearing weak in their dealings with the assertively nationalist gov- �174 SLOVAKIA ernment in neighboring Hungary or, by extension, the Hungarian population with Slovakia. On international integration issues, the coalition also failed to find consensus. In this case the dissenting coalition party was SaS, whose generally pro-Western approach conflicted with its neoliberalism on the question of Slovakia's obligation as part of the Eurozone. After numerous "negotiated solutions" and apparent agreements between SaS and the other coalition parties, the leaders of Radifova' s SDKU raised the stakes and hoped to force SaS into compliance by linking the Eurozone bailout to a vote of confidence in the government, but the SaS refused to budge. Smer, which nominally supported the bailout, refused to prolong Radifova's government by voting in its favor. Once Radifova' s government collapsed and new elections were underway, Smer joined with Radifova's party and several others in ensuring passage of the bailout. 2012: Three Dimensions, One Government, One Party. The Eurozone-related vote of no confidence led to early elections on 10 March 2012. As the sections above suggest, the relatively small shifts in public opinion produced a significant difference in government orientation and an even more significant difference in government composition. Slovakia has its first one-party majority government since 1989 and the outcomes bear close attention. On economic questions, Smer retains a moderately pro-redistribution position, but the 2012 Fico government has acknowledged that it faces budgetary constraints that will limit its potential largesse, and some top party officials have interests in international finance that may (as with Slovakia's adoption of the Euro in 2009) encourage a relatively conservative fiscal policy. Indeed the party's budget for 2013 included a combination of austerity measures and tax increases that won praise from Western investors. 10 On national questions Smer has previously expressed wariness toward Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, but the 2012 Fico government has appointed a moderate, professional diplomat as foreign minister, and as with financial questions, some of Fico's closest supporters have 10 Cienski, Jan, 2012, "Fico: Austerity rules," Financial Times, 23 May, available online: http://blogs. ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/05/23/fico-austerity-rules/#axzz I w9zH5aGM, last accessed 24 May 201 2. �SLOVAKIA 175 more moderate positions than others. On corruption questions, Fico's party has a less-than pristine record, but the revelations of the recent "Gorilla" scandal about connections between large firms and party finance on Slovakia's right allowed Smer to appear relatively clean by comparison. Complete control of government may in this regard prove somewhat disadvantageous as Smer will become the main focus of corruption allegations. In each case, Fico ' s own party faces internal divisions along the same lines as the party system as a whole. It is obviously not as deeply riven as Radicova' s coalition, but the exact same lines of stress sometimes (in obscure and ambiguous ways) produce cracks in the party's veneer of unity. While intra-party competition within Smer is highly imperfect as a mechanism of accountability, it will play a critical role during the coming Fico government. Like Vladimir Meciar in 1992 and 1994, Fico is returning to Slovakia's top position after a brief interlude of government by a coalition of strange bedfellows. Each time Meciar returned in the early 1990' s he engaged in bolder use (and frequently misuse) of government authority in an attempt to regain and maintain control. Fico, by contrast, began his return to government not with radical change but with calls for cooperation, and his personnel appointments in many areas seemed to reflect a turn toward moderation. As tempting as it is to compare Fico with Meciar, the two are not alike. And even if their personalities did incline them toward the same efforts, their experiences and constraints are different. On the one hand, Fico's political position is currently so strong that he has no need to hurry into any thing. At the same time, Fico may also be more aware of the need for caution: unlike Meciar in 1994, Fico was removed from the prime ministership in 2010 by the voters, and he may be more aware than Meciar of voters' ability to express displeasure. Regardless of the reason, the inauspicious example of political development in neighboring Hungary make it particularly reassuring that (as of this writing) Fico has not used his political strength to alter Slovakia's democratic institutions to his own advantage. As the very nature of this article suggests, however, change can come quickly. ��DOCUMENTATION �� 164 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S 2010 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 Kevin Deegan-Krause2 The academic publishing cycle is not known for being particularly quick, but it is usually fast enough to beat the electoral cycle in most countries and thereby allow articles considering the consequences of one election without immediately requiring consideration of the next one. Not so for Slovakia. The country's political change in the early 2010 's left no time for leisurely consideration and this article, which began its life as a review of Slovakia's 2010 election, must deal not only with the birth of Slovakia's 2010 government but also its early death in 2012. On 12 June 2010 citizens of Slovakia went to the polls for parliamentary elections for the seventh time since Communist Party rule ended in 1989. A plurality-more than one third-voted for the party of incumbent prime minister Robert Fico. However, Slovakia's system of proportional representation does not give any particular advantage to the largest party, and Fico again found it necessary to seek coalition partners to muster the 50%+ 1 of parliamentary votes necessary to form a government. Unfortunately for Fico, a decline in support for his past government partners and antagonistic relationships with all other parties made it impossible for him to muster the necessary 76 votes. Fico's opponents quickly arranged a majority coalition and on 8 July 2010, Iveta Radifova of the Slovak Democratic and 1 Large segments of this article were first published online at: http://themonkeycage.org/blog/20 I 0/07 / 13/20 IO slovak parliamentary elec/, http ://www.pozorblog.com/20 I 0/07 /20 I 0-slovak-parliamentary-elections-postelection-report/, http://www.pozorblog.com/2012/03/2012-parliamentary-electionsin-slovakia-the-building-blocs-of-success/ and as part of an interview in SME, http:/lwww.pozorblog.com/2012/03/slovakias-electoral-pol itics-an-i nterview-with-sme/. 2 1 am grateful to Sharon Fisher, Tim Haughton, Adrian Harmata, Carol Leff, Vladimir Krivy, Darina Malova, Marek Ryba!', Sharon Wolchik, the entire staff at the Institute for Public Affairs in Bratislava and many others who have helped me to understand Slovakia's politics over the past two decades. I am indebted to the Department of Political Science of Comenius University in Bratislava for logistical support and the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board for the financial support that contributed to this article. �SLOVAKIA 165 Christian Union (SDKU) became the prime minister of a coalition government consisting of four parties with pro-market orientations and relatively moderate views on intra-ethnic cooperation between Slovaks and Hungarians. Radicova was not only a new face in the premiership but a new kind of face in a country with relatively weak representation of women in positions of power. Slovakia differs little from its neighbors in this regard: the Visegrad Four-a regional grouping consisting of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary-has had only one other female prime minister in the last twenty years (Poland's Hanna Suchocka in the early 1990 ' s) and although several of the other countries in the region have had female presidents (Latvia) or prime ministers (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia ) women still remain the exception in post-communist European politics and the incoming 2010 government of the neighboring Czech Republic was criticized for having no women at all. 3 Even Radicova's success did not extend to others: her own government had only one other female cabinet minister, and Slovakia's new parliament actually had fewer female deputies than it did in its previous term. And like every other female prime minister in the region, Radicova did not serve a full term. After just fifteen months in power, intra-coalition conflict produced a vote of no confidence that forced early elections and led to Radicova' s departure from politics, at least for the moment. The emergence and collapse of Radicova's government point to patterns more fundamental than the career path of any particular political leader. Slovakia' s political competition functions in three distinct dimensions-one related to economic questions, another to national questions and a third to the functioning of political systems. Analysis tends to settle at one of three levels, all of which have some claim to the truth, provided that we understand the context, and how we understand Slovakia's recent political shifts depends heavily on what we are looking for. This article works outward from the simplest of these to the most complex, looking at how the underlying dynamics shaped election results in 20 l 0 and the post-election trajectory of Radicova' s govemmet. 3 Appeltova, Michaela, 2010, "Ve vlade neni ani jedna zena, proc?", 30 June, available online: http://padesatprocent.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/ve-vlade-neni-ani-jedna-zenaproc, last accessed 24 May 2012 . �SLOVAKIA 166 The Three Dimensions of Slovakia's Party Competition. Dimension One: Right Coalition Wins, Left Coalition Loses. The most superficial (but not unimportant) level of analysis looks at coalitions and oppositions and involves a one-dimensional space. "Left" and "right" have not always been useful in understanding Slovakia' s political space, but they have become more relevant in recent years, especially since the "right" neo-liberal reforms of the Dzurinda government between 2002 and 2006 and Fico's "left" response in the four years that followed. Using the left-right dimensions as shorthand reveals the 2010 election as a handover of power from one side to the other with a swing of seven seats in Slovakia's 150 seat parliament from Fico ' s coalition to Radicova' s. (Fico ' s coalition dropped from 85 seats in 2006 to 71 in 2010, though Fico's party itself grew by twelve seats). For the purposes of governing, this made all the difference, shifting the parliamentary majority from Fico to Radicova. Figure 1. Changes in relative bloc size in Slovakia, one-dimension, 2006-2012. Dark grey includes left and Slovak-national ( Fico 2006-2010, 2012-present). Light grey includes right and Hungarian- national ( Radicova, 2010-2012) . Left ( 'Mth Slovak National) Right ('Mth Hungarian National) Government: 85 seats Cpposition : 65 seats Cpposition : 71 seats Government: 79 seats Government: 83 seats Cpposi ti on : 67 seats 2006 2010 2012 That majority did not last, however, and early elections in 2012 moved the respective positions of the two blocs almost precisely back to where they had been in 2006. Although observers viewed these election results as a disaster for the right, the latter actually emerged with a stronger position in parliament than it had held during the first Fico government. The difference, of course, was that in 2006 the Fico government' s 85 voters were split between Fico and two not-so-docile coalition partners, whereas in 2012 all 83 seats of �SLOVAKIA 167 the governing majority lay in the hands of Fico's own well-disciplined political party. 4 Dimension Two: Left and Right Parties Gain, Slovak and Hungarian National Parties Lose. Of course "left" and "right" are not usually sufficient for understanding political competition, and in addition to the left-right axis of competition that has recently dominated governments, Slovakia has a clear competitive axis related to national questions. The current dominant dimension includes and overshadows another one related to national issues. According to this two-dimensional framework, Fico's first government represented a coalition between "anti-market left" and "Slovak national" whereas the Radicova government (like the Dzurinda government that preceded Fico before 2006) is a coalition between "pro-market right" and "Hungarian national." Analysis of election results according to the four blocs defined by these two dimensions produces a rather different set of judgments. Although the total vote share of "right" parties of the incoming government increased by five percentage points from 2006 to 2010, the vote share of the "left" party in the outgoing govemrnent- Fico's "Direction-Social Democracy"(Smer-SD)-increased by even more. Corresponding to the gains by both left and right were major losses in the "Slovak national" bloc: the Slovak National Party under Jan Slota fell catastrophically from 12% to 5%, squeaking over the barrier for parliamentary representation by just two thousand votes out of two-and-a-half million cast; and Vladimir Meciar, once the sun and the moon of Slovakia' s politics, continued a remarkably long and gradual slide into obscurity, falling below the barrier and out of parliament altogether. (In the 2012 election Meciar completed the slide with a drop to less than 1%; he resigned from the leadership of his party in April 2012). 5 Like Jaroslav Kaczynski in Poland in 2007, Fico could justifiably claim that it was not he, but rather his partners who had lost the election (though Meciar publicly suggested that, 4 Marek Rybar and Kevin Deegan-Krause, 2009, "Party Democracy and Party Competitiveness in Slovakia: Is There A Trade-Off?," Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of workshops, Lisbon. 5SME, 2012, "Vladimir Meciar odchadza bez nastupcu", 27 April, available online: http://www.sme.sk/c/6356308/vladimir-meciar-odchadza-bez-nastupcu.htrnl, last accessed, 24 May 2012. �168 SLOVAKIA having undermined his partners to maximize his own party' s gain, Fico deserved his fate) . Figure 2: Olanges in relative bloc size in Slovakia, two-dimensions, 2006-2012 . Figure indicates lost seats in light grey and gained seats in dark grey. 2006 2010 Hungarian National 2012 Hu ngarian National 67 I ■·-~- ,>It ! i :,; ,83 ..,, Slovak National Slovak National l " Slovak National Fico did not significantly alter his strategy for the 2012 election but he avoided the same fate because of his party' s own increased support. By mid-2011 Smer 's poll numbers were strong enough to suggest that it could potentially win a majority of seats by itself. In that circumstance, Smer had no further need for coalition partners and had an additional incentive to push its former partners fall below the threshold and take a share of seats that would originally have gone to them. The encouraging numbers also permitted Smer to run a careful and measured campaign designed to avoid losing voters rather than gaining new ones. The party's success in this regard can be measured in its addition of twenty-one new parliamentary seats, though this must be understood in the broader context that, although Smer alone achieved 83 seats, this was several seats fewer than Smer had achieved in its coalition with Slovak national parties in 2006. Although Fico clearly won the election of 2012, the parties of the right together obtained more seats than they had in 2006, in large part thanks to the decline of the national parties. Dimension Three: Slovak National Voters Move Left, Anti-Corruption Voters Move Right (for now). One of the most striking aspects of these shifts in electoral support is the finding of two opinion polls conducted before the election that the exodus of voters from Slovak national parties was not distributed evenly to left and right. In fact, nearly all of it went to the left, �SLOVAKIA 169 mainly to Fico's Smer.6 This is not surprising since Fico played on national themes for some time before the election. For the electoral math to work out, however, this must mean that some of Fico's voters also went elsewhere, and the polls suggest that at least some of them went to the new party of the right, SaS (Freedom and Solidarity). These shifts among blocs are hard to explain even using the twodimensional array of economic and national competition. The answer requires a third dimension, one that arrays voters according to their willingness to tolerate corruption and search for established leaders to resolve these problems. This dimension is hard to identify because its players change sides: the anti-corruption party of one election may become the corrupt but experienced party of the next election. 7 Adding this dimension can help make sense of a voter's jump from Smer, which in 2002 and 2006 attracted a significant share of the anti-corruption electorate, to the Freedom and Solidarity which shared few programmatic positions with Smer, but did promote itself as the answer to the country's corruption problems and, as a new party was itself not (or at least not yet) corrupt. Corruption sensitivity may also explain much of the shift from the two Slovak national parties to the by-no-means-clean but still less corrupt Smer, a shift which is less surprising because Fico had already gone quite far in adopting Slovak national themes. It also conforms to polls showing that younger voters and new voters within the Hungarian electorate shifted from the more established of two Hungarian parties to its newcomer alternative, Most-Hid (Bridge). Slovakia's political shift in 2010 thus reflects not a fundamental shift from left and right but only a left-to-right shift in the votes of those most highly sensitive to corruption. Such a shift endures for only one election until the emergence of another new anti-corruption party in the next election cycle. Smer 's return to relatively clean status during a period out of government ended with the "Gorilla" scandal that linked his political opponents with improper party funding 6 Institute for Public Affairs. 2010. "SaS berie hlasy Smeru a SDKU, Most ziskava volicov SMK." Available online: http ://www.ivo.sk/6082/sk/aktuality/sas-berie-hlasy-smeru-a-sdku-most-ziskava-volicov-smk, last accessed 7 May 2012 . 7 Haughton, Tim , Novotna, Tereza and Deegan-Krause, Kevin (2011) "The 2010 Czech and Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Red Cards to the 'Winners," West European Politics, 34: 2, 394-402 �170 SLOVAKIA from large economic interests.8 Nor do shifts in the nationally-oriented Slovak voters reflect a fundamental decline in the strength of the Slovak national position p er se, but rather a shift of Slovak national voters from the smaller parties with stronger emphasis on national questions to Fico's larger and more diffuse but sufficiently national and less corrupt alternative. Figure 3a below graphically illustrates the conjectured shift of the most "corruption intolerant" voters of SNS and HZDS to Smer (the arrow pointing up and left) and the corruption-intolerant Smer to SaS (the arrow pointing straight right) . (Shifts also occurred within the "right" (from SDKU to SaS) and within the Hungarian national (from MKP-SMK to Most-Hid) but for simplicity's sake those are not shown here.) Figure 3. Hypothesized shifts in party bloc support during Slovakia's most recent two election cycles a. 2006-2010 Hungarian Nation,:; Pro State Left Pro Mlrket Right 8 SME, 20 12, "Cast' spisu Gorila potvrdil policajt, ktory infonnova l Pentu", 3 January, avai lable online at http ://www.sme.sk/c/6203225/cast-spisu-gorila-potvrdil-policajt-ktory-infonnovalpentu.html#ixzz I w9o jAJgG, last accessed 24 May 20 12. �SLOVAKIA b. 171 2010-2012 Hun garian National Pro-Sta t e Left Pro- Mlrket Right The shifts between 2010 and 2012 were smaller but also important. Surveys suggest that a few additional voters shifted from Slovak-national parties such as SNS and HZDS to Smer and that some supporters of the SDKU and its coalition partners shifted back to Smer, while within the coalition voters also shifted to the new Ordinary People and Independents (O1'.aNO). Figure 3b depicts these shifts in the form of twin arrows pointing to the left, with new and returning party voters . SaS avoided the "government death" that has affected every new party entering government since 1994-the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP), and the Party of the New Citizen (ANO)-but it came very close to failing. Even though SaS did not have to serve a full term in government and dropped out of visible participation in government in order to run as anti-political outsiders in late 2011 , it returned to parliament in 2012 with half of its 20 l O strength, less than one percentage point above the 5% threshold This third dimension of politics in Slovakia is not the main one or even the secondary one. It is likely that fewer voters care about corruption than the major national and economic issues, but because the economic and national blocs are narrowly balanced, corruption has a major impact on the creation of parliamentary majorities and the formation of governments. �172 SLOVAKIA 2010: Three Dimensions, One Government, Four (and a half) Parties. The conditions under which the 2010 government gained its majority had a clear impact on its form and, ultimately, its inability to endure. The dynamics that ultimately sank the coalition mixed questions of economic left and right with questions of national consciousness and the legacy of new party formation. Those who had little contact with Slovakia during the late 2000's might be excused for experiencing the 2010 Radicova government with a bit of deja vu. The names of some of the parties changed slightly from the 2002 Dzurinda government, but the general array was almost identical. Most-Hid replaced the Party of the Hungarian Coalition in the Hungarian national slot, and one new pro-market anti-corruption party "Freedom and Solidarity" (SaS) replaced another (the now defunct Alliance of the ew Citizen). Ten of the fifteen cabinet posts remained in the hands of the same party that controlled them in 2002 (or its analog) and seven of the fifteen ministers who took office in 2010 had served in the 2002-2006 cabinet (in several cases heading the same respective ministries that they had managed earlier in the decade). The actual performance of the government is difficult to assess because it lasted such a short time. Hardly a year passed between the government's appointment and the beginning of the Euro bailout crisis that absorbed its entire attention and brought about its demise. During its brief tenure, the government's ability to make change was further limited not only by a narrow political margin, but by constant threats of fragmentation. Particularly notable in this regard were the frequent shifts of four deputies associated with the aforementioned obscure civic movement called "Ordinary People" (OC). 9 These four 9 In a piquant sign of the tactics played during election campaigns in Slovakia, the leader of a defunct but still-formall y-registered party successfully changed its appellation to Ordinary People (01..'.) just hours before the parliamentary caucus came to register the same name. The leaders of the caucus were thus turned away at the party registration desk and forced to find an alternative, registering several weeks later as Ordinary People and Independents (OEaNO). See Pravda, 20 11 , "Morie, ktory si zaregistroval stranu Obyfajni l'udia, navrat nechysta", I November, available online: h ://s ra . ravda.sk/moric-kto -si-zare istroval-stranu-ob ca·ni-ludia-navratnech sta-1 n-/sk do mace.as ?c=A 11110 I 200428 sk do mace 29#ixzz 1wCSKUTuJ, last accessed 24 May 2012. �SLOVAKIA 173 deputies managed unexpectedly to leap into parliament from positions at the very bottom of the SaS list (thanks to preference votes gained from prominent spots in the local commercial inserts that were the main business enterprise of O~'s leader, Igor Matovic). Therefore, they owed little loyalty to SaS and were able to stall key government initiatives through repeated threats of departure. In economic affairs, Radicova ' s government was relatively unified but had limited space for policy innovation. Its efforts were forestalled in part by past successes: the Dzurinda government managed to demonstrate significant coalition discipline during its 20022006 term and, though possessed of a slight parliamentary majority, it managed to pass major economic reforms in taxation, health care, education, the labor market and other aspects of the foreign investment climate. Furthermore, although the Fico government between 2006 and 2010 engaged in high-profile increases in pensions and family benefits and made changes to the labor law, the party actually did little to alter the fundamental framework of the Dzurinda government and presented few opportunities for Radicova's government to reclaim lost ground. On the axis of cultural and religious questions the coalition had little hope of agreement, as it included the parties at both extremes of the axis: SaS supported gay marriage and drug legalization while the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) supported traditional Christian values and a stronger relationship with the Vatican. Fortunately for the coalition, however, this axis did not constitute one of the more salient lines of conflict in Slovakia's politics, and the coalition simply stayed clear of most cultural issues in order not to create a deeper intra-coalition rift. On national identity and foreign policy Radicova's government was not so lucky. On taking office in 2010, the parties that formed the new government shared a common pro-Western outlook and (relatively) accommodating views on ethnic co-existence and national identity, but they found it difficult to translate these positions into policy. On minority-rights issues the coalition ' s Hungarian and Slovak parties differed over what should constitute "appropriate" support for minority culture. Most-Hid sought to reverse the more restrictive language and citizenship policies of the 2006-2010 Fico government, but the Slovak parties of the coalition sought to avoid appearing weak in their dealings with the assertively nationalist gov- �174 SLOVAKIA ernment in neighboring Hungary or, by extension, the Hungarian population with Slovakia. On international integration issues, the coalition also failed to find consensus. In this case the dissenting coalition party was SaS, whose generally pro-Western approach conflicted with its neoliberalism on the question of Slovakia's obligation as part of the Eurozone. After numerous "negotiated solutions" and apparent agreements between SaS and the other coalition parties, the leaders of Radifova' s SDKU raised the stakes and hoped to force SaS into compliance by linking the Eurozone bailout to a vote of confidence in the government, but the SaS refused to budge. Smer, which nominally supported the bailout, refused to prolong Radifova's government by voting in its favor. Once Radifova' s government collapsed and new elections were underway, Smer joined with Radifova's party and several others in ensuring passage of the bailout. 2012: Three Dimensions, One Government, One Party. The Eurozone-related vote of no confidence led to early elections on 10 March 2012. As the sections above suggest, the relatively small shifts in public opinion produced a significant difference in government orientation and an even more significant difference in government composition. Slovakia has its first one-party majority government since 1989 and the outcomes bear close attention. On economic questions, Smer retains a moderately pro-redistribution position, but the 2012 Fico government has acknowledged that it faces budgetary constraints that will limit its potential largesse, and some top party officials have interests in international finance that may (as with Slovakia's adoption of the Euro in 2009) encourage a relatively conservative fiscal policy. Indeed the party's budget for 2013 included a combination of austerity measures and tax increases that won praise from Western investors. 10 On national questions Smer has previously expressed wariness toward Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, but the 2012 Fico government has appointed a moderate, professional diplomat as foreign minister, and as with financial questions, some of Fico's closest supporters have 10 Cienski, Jan, 2012, "Fico: Austerity rules," Financial Times, 23 May, available online: http://blogs. ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/05/23/fico-austerity-rules/#axzz I w9zH5aGM, last accessed 24 May 201 2. �SLOVAKIA 175 more moderate positions than others. On corruption questions, Fico's party has a less-than pristine record, but the revelations of the recent "Gorilla" scandal about connections between large firms and party finance on Slovakia's right allowed Smer to appear relatively clean by comparison. Complete control of government may in this regard prove somewhat disadvantageous as Smer will become the main focus of corruption allegations. In each case, Fico ' s own party faces internal divisions along the same lines as the party system as a whole. It is obviously not as deeply riven as Radicova' s coalition, but the exact same lines of stress sometimes (in obscure and ambiguous ways) produce cracks in the party's veneer of unity. While intra-party competition within Smer is highly imperfect as a mechanism of accountability, it will play a critical role during the coming Fico government. Like Vladimir Meciar in 1992 and 1994, Fico is returning to Slovakia's top position after a brief interlude of government by a coalition of strange bedfellows. Each time Meciar returned in the early 1990' s he engaged in bolder use (and frequently misuse) of government authority in an attempt to regain and maintain control. Fico, by contrast, began his return to government not with radical change but with calls for cooperation, and his personnel appointments in many areas seemed to reflect a turn toward moderation. As tempting as it is to compare Fico with Meciar, the two are not alike. And even if their personalities did incline them toward the same efforts, their experiences and constraints are different. On the one hand, Fico's political position is currently so strong that he has no need to hurry into any thing. At the same time, Fico may also be more aware of the need for caution: unlike Meciar in 1994, Fico was removed from the prime ministership in 2010 by the voters, and he may be more aware than Meciar of voters' ability to express displeasure. Regardless of the reason, the inauspicious example of political development in neighboring Hungary make it particularly reassuring that (as of this writing) Fico has not used his political strength to alter Slovakia's democratic institutions to his own advantage. As the very nature of this article suggests, however, change can come quickly. ��DOCUMENTATION �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 164 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S 2010 ELECTION AND ITS AFTERMATH 1 Kevin Deegan-Krause2 The academic publishing cycle is not known for being particularly quick, but it is usually fast enough to beat the electoral cycle in most countries and thereby allow articles considering the consequences of one election without immediately requiring consideration of the next one. Not so for Slovakia. The country's political change in the early 2010 's left no time for leisurely consideration and this article, which began its life as a review of Slovakia's 2010 election, must deal not only with the birth of Slovakia's 2010 government but also its early death in 2012. On 12 June 2010 citizens of Slovakia went to the polls for parliamentary elections for the seventh time since Communist Party rule ended in 1989. A plurality-more than one third-voted for the party of incumbent prime minister Robert Fico. However, Slovakia's system of proportional representation does not give any particular advantage to the largest party, and Fico again found it necessary to seek coalition partners to muster the 50%+ 1 of parliamentary votes necessary to form a government. Unfortunately for Fico, a decline in support for his past government partners and antagonistic relationships with all other parties made it impossible for him to muster the necessary 76 votes. Fico's opponents quickly arranged a majority coalition and on 8 July 2010, Iveta Radifova of the Slovak Democratic and 1 Large segments of this article were first published online at: http://themonkeycage.org/blog/20 I 0/07 / 13/20 IO slovak parliamentary elec/, http ://www.pozorblog.com/20 I 0/07 /20 I 0-slovak-parliamentary-elections-postelection-report/, http://www.pozorblog.com/2012/03/2012-parliamentary-electionsin-slovakia-the-building-blocs-of-success/ and as part of an interview in SME, http:/lwww.pozorblog.com/2012/03/slovakias-electoral-pol itics-an-i nterview-with-sme/. 2 1 am grateful to Sharon Fisher, Tim Haughton, Adrian Harmata, Carol Leff, Vladimir Krivy, Darina Malova, Marek Ryba!', Sharon Wolchik, the entire staff at the Institute for Public Affairs in Bratislava and many others who have helped me to understand Slovakia's politics over the past two decades. I am indebted to the Department of Political Science of Comenius University in Bratislava for logistical support and the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board for the financial support that contributed to this article. SLOVAKIA 165 Christian Union (SDKU) became the prime minister of a coalition government consisting of four parties with pro-market orientations and relatively moderate views on intra-ethnic cooperation between Slovaks and Hungarians. Radicova was not only a new face in the premiership but a new kind of face in a country with relatively weak representation of women in positions of power. Slovakia differs little from its neighbors in this regard: the Visegrad Four-a regional grouping consisting of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary-has had only one other female prime minister in the last twenty years (Poland's Hanna Suchocka in the early 1990 ' s) and although several of the other countries in the region have had female presidents (Latvia) or prime ministers (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia ) women still remain the exception in post-communist European politics and the incoming 2010 government of the neighboring Czech Republic was criticized for having no women at all. 3 Even Radicova's success did not extend to others: her own government had only one other female cabinet minister, and Slovakia's new parliament actually had fewer female deputies than it did in its previous term. And like every other female prime minister in the region, Radicova did not serve a full term. After just fifteen months in power, intra-coalition conflict produced a vote of no confidence that forced early elections and led to Radicova' s departure from politics, at least for the moment. The emergence and collapse of Radicova's government point to patterns more fundamental than the career path of any particular political leader. Slovakia' s political competition functions in three distinct dimensions-one related to economic questions, another to national questions and a third to the functioning of political systems. Analysis tends to settle at one of three levels, all of which have some claim to the truth, provided that we understand the context, and how we understand Slovakia's recent political shifts depends heavily on what we are looking for. This article works outward from the simplest of these to the most complex, looking at how the underlying dynamics shaped election results in 20 l 0 and the post-election trajectory of Radicova' s govemmet. 3 Appeltova, Michaela, 2010, "Ve vlade neni ani jedna zena, proc?", 30 June, available online: http://padesatprocent.cz/cz/zpravodajstvi/ve-vlade-neni-ani-jedna-zenaproc, last accessed 24 May 2012 . SLOVAKIA 166 The Three Dimensions of Slovakia's Party Competition. Dimension One: Right Coalition Wins, Left Coalition Loses. The most superficial (but not unimportant) level of analysis looks at coalitions and oppositions and involves a one-dimensional space. "Left" and "right" have not always been useful in understanding Slovakia' s political space, but they have become more relevant in recent years, especially since the "right" neo-liberal reforms of the Dzurinda government between 2002 and 2006 and Fico's "left" response in the four years that followed. Using the left-right dimensions as shorthand reveals the 2010 election as a handover of power from one side to the other with a swing of seven seats in Slovakia's 150 seat parliament from Fico ' s coalition to Radicova' s. (Fico ' s coalition dropped from 85 seats in 2006 to 71 in 2010, though Fico's party itself grew by twelve seats). For the purposes of governing, this made all the difference, shifting the parliamentary majority from Fico to Radicova. Figure 1. Changes in relative bloc size in Slovakia, one-dimension, 2006-2012. Dark grey includes left and Slovak-national ( Fico 2006-2010, 2012-present). Light grey includes right and Hungarian- national ( Radicova, 2010-2012) . Left ( 'Mth Slovak National) Right ('Mth Hungarian National) Government: 85 seats Cpposition : 65 seats Cpposition : 71 seats Government: 79 seats Government: 83 seats Cpposi ti on : 67 seats 2006 2010 2012 That majority did not last, however, and early elections in 2012 moved the respective positions of the two blocs almost precisely back to where they had been in 2006. Although observers viewed these election results as a disaster for the right, the latter actually emerged with a stronger position in parliament than it had held during the first Fico government. The difference, of course, was that in 2006 the Fico government' s 85 voters were split between Fico and two not-so-docile coalition partners, whereas in 2012 all 83 seats of SLOVAKIA 167 the governing majority lay in the hands of Fico's own well-disciplined political party. 4 Dimension Two: Left and Right Parties Gain, Slovak and Hungarian National Parties Lose. Of course "left" and "right" are not usually sufficient for understanding political competition, and in addition to the left-right axis of competition that has recently dominated governments, Slovakia has a clear competitive axis related to national questions. The current dominant dimension includes and overshadows another one related to national issues. According to this two-dimensional framework, Fico's first government represented a coalition between "anti-market left" and "Slovak national" whereas the Radicova government (like the Dzurinda government that preceded Fico before 2006) is a coalition between "pro-market right" and "Hungarian national." Analysis of election results according to the four blocs defined by these two dimensions produces a rather different set of judgments. Although the total vote share of "right" parties of the incoming government increased by five percentage points from 2006 to 2010, the vote share of the "left" party in the outgoing govemrnent- Fico's "Direction-Social Democracy"(Smer-SD)-increased by even more. Corresponding to the gains by both left and right were major losses in the "Slovak national" bloc: the Slovak National Party under Jan Slota fell catastrophically from 12% to 5%, squeaking over the barrier for parliamentary representation by just two thousand votes out of two-and-a-half million cast; and Vladimir Meciar, once the sun and the moon of Slovakia' s politics, continued a remarkably long and gradual slide into obscurity, falling below the barrier and out of parliament altogether. (In the 2012 election Meciar completed the slide with a drop to less than 1%; he resigned from the leadership of his party in April 2012). 5 Like Jaroslav Kaczynski in Poland in 2007, Fico could justifiably claim that it was not he, but rather his partners who had lost the election (though Meciar publicly suggested that, 4 Marek Rybar and Kevin Deegan-Krause, 2009, "Party Democracy and Party Competitiveness in Slovakia: Is There A Trade-Off?," Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Session of workshops, Lisbon. 5SME, 2012, "Vladimir Meciar odchadza bez nastupcu", 27 April, available online: http://www.sme.sk/c/6356308/vladimir-meciar-odchadza-bez-nastupcu.htrnl, last accessed, 24 May 2012. 168 SLOVAKIA having undermined his partners to maximize his own party' s gain, Fico deserved his fate) . Figure 2: Olanges in relative bloc size in Slovakia, two-dimensions, 2006-2012 . Figure indicates lost seats in light grey and gained seats in dark grey. 2006 2010 Hungarian National 2012 Hu ngarian National 67 I ■·-~- ,>It ! i :,; ,83 ..,, Slovak National Slovak National l " Slovak National Fico did not significantly alter his strategy for the 2012 election but he avoided the same fate because of his party' s own increased support. By mid-2011 Smer 's poll numbers were strong enough to suggest that it could potentially win a majority of seats by itself. In that circumstance, Smer had no further need for coalition partners and had an additional incentive to push its former partners fall below the threshold and take a share of seats that would originally have gone to them. The encouraging numbers also permitted Smer to run a careful and measured campaign designed to avoid losing voters rather than gaining new ones. The party's success in this regard can be measured in its addition of twenty-one new parliamentary seats, though this must be understood in the broader context that, although Smer alone achieved 83 seats, this was several seats fewer than Smer had achieved in its coalition with Slovak national parties in 2006. Although Fico clearly won the election of 2012, the parties of the right together obtained more seats than they had in 2006, in large part thanks to the decline of the national parties. Dimension Three: Slovak National Voters Move Left, Anti-Corruption Voters Move Right (for now). One of the most striking aspects of these shifts in electoral support is the finding of two opinion polls conducted before the election that the exodus of voters from Slovak national parties was not distributed evenly to left and right. In fact, nearly all of it went to the left, SLOVAKIA 169 mainly to Fico's Smer.6 This is not surprising since Fico played on national themes for some time before the election. For the electoral math to work out, however, this must mean that some of Fico's voters also went elsewhere, and the polls suggest that at least some of them went to the new party of the right, SaS (Freedom and Solidarity). These shifts among blocs are hard to explain even using the twodimensional array of economic and national competition. The answer requires a third dimension, one that arrays voters according to their willingness to tolerate corruption and search for established leaders to resolve these problems. This dimension is hard to identify because its players change sides: the anti-corruption party of one election may become the corrupt but experienced party of the next election. 7 Adding this dimension can help make sense of a voter's jump from Smer, which in 2002 and 2006 attracted a significant share of the anti-corruption electorate, to the Freedom and Solidarity which shared few programmatic positions with Smer, but did promote itself as the answer to the country's corruption problems and, as a new party was itself not (or at least not yet) corrupt. Corruption sensitivity may also explain much of the shift from the two Slovak national parties to the by-no-means-clean but still less corrupt Smer, a shift which is less surprising because Fico had already gone quite far in adopting Slovak national themes. It also conforms to polls showing that younger voters and new voters within the Hungarian electorate shifted from the more established of two Hungarian parties to its newcomer alternative, Most-Hid (Bridge). Slovakia's political shift in 2010 thus reflects not a fundamental shift from left and right but only a left-to-right shift in the votes of those most highly sensitive to corruption. Such a shift endures for only one election until the emergence of another new anti-corruption party in the next election cycle. Smer 's return to relatively clean status during a period out of government ended with the "Gorilla" scandal that linked his political opponents with improper party funding 6 Institute for Public Affairs. 2010. "SaS berie hlasy Smeru a SDKU, Most ziskava volicov SMK." Available online: http ://www.ivo.sk/6082/sk/aktuality/sas-berie-hlasy-smeru-a-sdku-most-ziskava-volicov-smk, last accessed 7 May 2012 . 7 Haughton, Tim , Novotna, Tereza and Deegan-Krause, Kevin (2011) "The 2010 Czech and Slovak Parliamentary Elections: Red Cards to the 'Winners," West European Politics, 34: 2, 394-402 170 SLOVAKIA from large economic interests.8 Nor do shifts in the nationally-oriented Slovak voters reflect a fundamental decline in the strength of the Slovak national position p er se, but rather a shift of Slovak national voters from the smaller parties with stronger emphasis on national questions to Fico's larger and more diffuse but sufficiently national and less corrupt alternative. Figure 3a below graphically illustrates the conjectured shift of the most "corruption intolerant" voters of SNS and HZDS to Smer (the arrow pointing up and left) and the corruption-intolerant Smer to SaS (the arrow pointing straight right) . (Shifts also occurred within the "right" (from SDKU to SaS) and within the Hungarian national (from MKP-SMK to Most-Hid) but for simplicity's sake those are not shown here.) Figure 3. Hypothesized shifts in party bloc support during Slovakia's most recent two election cycles a. 2006-2010 Hungarian Nation,:; Pro State Left Pro Mlrket Right 8 SME, 20 12, "Cast' spisu Gorila potvrdil policajt, ktory infonnova l Pentu", 3 January, avai lable online at http ://www.sme.sk/c/6203225/cast-spisu-gorila-potvrdil-policajt-ktory-infonnovalpentu.html#ixzz I w9o jAJgG, last accessed 24 May 20 12. SLOVAKIA b. 171 2010-2012 Hun garian National Pro-Sta t e Left Pro- Mlrket Right The shifts between 2010 and 2012 were smaller but also important. Surveys suggest that a few additional voters shifted from Slovak-national parties such as SNS and HZDS to Smer and that some supporters of the SDKU and its coalition partners shifted back to Smer, while within the coalition voters also shifted to the new Ordinary People and Independents (O1'.aNO). Figure 3b depicts these shifts in the form of twin arrows pointing to the left, with new and returning party voters . SaS avoided the "government death" that has affected every new party entering government since 1994-the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS), the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP), and the Party of the New Citizen (ANO)-but it came very close to failing. Even though SaS did not have to serve a full term in government and dropped out of visible participation in government in order to run as anti-political outsiders in late 2011 , it returned to parliament in 2012 with half of its 20 l O strength, less than one percentage point above the 5% threshold This third dimension of politics in Slovakia is not the main one or even the secondary one. It is likely that fewer voters care about corruption than the major national and economic issues, but because the economic and national blocs are narrowly balanced, corruption has a major impact on the creation of parliamentary majorities and the formation of governments. 172 SLOVAKIA 2010: Three Dimensions, One Government, Four (and a half) Parties. The conditions under which the 2010 government gained its majority had a clear impact on its form and, ultimately, its inability to endure. The dynamics that ultimately sank the coalition mixed questions of economic left and right with questions of national consciousness and the legacy of new party formation. Those who had little contact with Slovakia during the late 2000's might be excused for experiencing the 2010 Radicova government with a bit of deja vu. The names of some of the parties changed slightly from the 2002 Dzurinda government, but the general array was almost identical. Most-Hid replaced the Party of the Hungarian Coalition in the Hungarian national slot, and one new pro-market anti-corruption party "Freedom and Solidarity" (SaS) replaced another (the now defunct Alliance of the ew Citizen). Ten of the fifteen cabinet posts remained in the hands of the same party that controlled them in 2002 (or its analog) and seven of the fifteen ministers who took office in 2010 had served in the 2002-2006 cabinet (in several cases heading the same respective ministries that they had managed earlier in the decade). The actual performance of the government is difficult to assess because it lasted such a short time. Hardly a year passed between the government's appointment and the beginning of the Euro bailout crisis that absorbed its entire attention and brought about its demise. During its brief tenure, the government's ability to make change was further limited not only by a narrow political margin, but by constant threats of fragmentation. Particularly notable in this regard were the frequent shifts of four deputies associated with the aforementioned obscure civic movement called "Ordinary People" (OC). 9 These four 9 In a piquant sign of the tactics played during election campaigns in Slovakia, the leader of a defunct but still-formall y-registered party successfully changed its appellation to Ordinary People (01..'.) just hours before the parliamentary caucus came to register the same name. The leaders of the caucus were thus turned away at the party registration desk and forced to find an alternative, registering several weeks later as Ordinary People and Independents (OEaNO). See Pravda, 20 11 , "Morie, ktory si zaregistroval stranu Obyfajni l'udia, navrat nechysta", I November, available online: h ://s ra . ravda.sk/moric-kto -si-zare istroval-stranu-ob ca·ni-ludia-navratnech sta-1 n-/sk do mace.as ?c=A 11110 I 200428 sk do mace 29#ixzz 1wCSKUTuJ, last accessed 24 May 2012. SLOVAKIA 173 deputies managed unexpectedly to leap into parliament from positions at the very bottom of the SaS list (thanks to preference votes gained from prominent spots in the local commercial inserts that were the main business enterprise of O~'s leader, Igor Matovic). Therefore, they owed little loyalty to SaS and were able to stall key government initiatives through repeated threats of departure. In economic affairs, Radicova ' s government was relatively unified but had limited space for policy innovation. Its efforts were forestalled in part by past successes: the Dzurinda government managed to demonstrate significant coalition discipline during its 20022006 term and, though possessed of a slight parliamentary majority, it managed to pass major economic reforms in taxation, health care, education, the labor market and other aspects of the foreign investment climate. Furthermore, although the Fico government between 2006 and 2010 engaged in high-profile increases in pensions and family benefits and made changes to the labor law, the party actually did little to alter the fundamental framework of the Dzurinda government and presented few opportunities for Radicova's government to reclaim lost ground. On the axis of cultural and religious questions the coalition had little hope of agreement, as it included the parties at both extremes of the axis: SaS supported gay marriage and drug legalization while the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) supported traditional Christian values and a stronger relationship with the Vatican. Fortunately for the coalition, however, this axis did not constitute one of the more salient lines of conflict in Slovakia's politics, and the coalition simply stayed clear of most cultural issues in order not to create a deeper intra-coalition rift. On national identity and foreign policy Radicova's government was not so lucky. On taking office in 2010, the parties that formed the new government shared a common pro-Western outlook and (relatively) accommodating views on ethnic co-existence and national identity, but they found it difficult to translate these positions into policy. On minority-rights issues the coalition ' s Hungarian and Slovak parties differed over what should constitute "appropriate" support for minority culture. Most-Hid sought to reverse the more restrictive language and citizenship policies of the 2006-2010 Fico government, but the Slovak parties of the coalition sought to avoid appearing weak in their dealings with the assertively nationalist gov- 174 SLOVAKIA ernment in neighboring Hungary or, by extension, the Hungarian population with Slovakia. On international integration issues, the coalition also failed to find consensus. In this case the dissenting coalition party was SaS, whose generally pro-Western approach conflicted with its neoliberalism on the question of Slovakia's obligation as part of the Eurozone. After numerous "negotiated solutions" and apparent agreements between SaS and the other coalition parties, the leaders of Radifova' s SDKU raised the stakes and hoped to force SaS into compliance by linking the Eurozone bailout to a vote of confidence in the government, but the SaS refused to budge. Smer, which nominally supported the bailout, refused to prolong Radifova's government by voting in its favor. Once Radifova' s government collapsed and new elections were underway, Smer joined with Radifova's party and several others in ensuring passage of the bailout. 2012: Three Dimensions, One Government, One Party. The Eurozone-related vote of no confidence led to early elections on 10 March 2012. As the sections above suggest, the relatively small shifts in public opinion produced a significant difference in government orientation and an even more significant difference in government composition. Slovakia has its first one-party majority government since 1989 and the outcomes bear close attention. On economic questions, Smer retains a moderately pro-redistribution position, but the 2012 Fico government has acknowledged that it faces budgetary constraints that will limit its potential largesse, and some top party officials have interests in international finance that may (as with Slovakia's adoption of the Euro in 2009) encourage a relatively conservative fiscal policy. Indeed the party's budget for 2013 included a combination of austerity measures and tax increases that won praise from Western investors. 10 On national questions Smer has previously expressed wariness toward Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, but the 2012 Fico government has appointed a moderate, professional diplomat as foreign minister, and as with financial questions, some of Fico's closest supporters have 10 Cienski, Jan, 2012, "Fico: Austerity rules," Financial Times, 23 May, available online: http://blogs. ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/05/23/fico-austerity-rules/#axzz I w9zH5aGM, last accessed 24 May 201 2. SLOVAKIA 175 more moderate positions than others. On corruption questions, Fico's party has a less-than pristine record, but the revelations of the recent "Gorilla" scandal about connections between large firms and party finance on Slovakia's right allowed Smer to appear relatively clean by comparison. Complete control of government may in this regard prove somewhat disadvantageous as Smer will become the main focus of corruption allegations. In each case, Fico ' s own party faces internal divisions along the same lines as the party system as a whole. It is obviously not as deeply riven as Radicova' s coalition, but the exact same lines of stress sometimes (in obscure and ambiguous ways) produce cracks in the party's veneer of unity. While intra-party competition within Smer is highly imperfect as a mechanism of accountability, it will play a critical role during the coming Fico government. Like Vladimir Meciar in 1992 and 1994, Fico is returning to Slovakia's top position after a brief interlude of government by a coalition of strange bedfellows. Each time Meciar returned in the early 1990' s he engaged in bolder use (and frequently misuse) of government authority in an attempt to regain and maintain control. Fico, by contrast, began his return to government not with radical change but with calls for cooperation, and his personnel appointments in many areas seemed to reflect a turn toward moderation. As tempting as it is to compare Fico with Meciar, the two are not alike. And even if their personalities did incline them toward the same efforts, their experiences and constraints are different. On the one hand, Fico's political position is currently so strong that he has no need to hurry into any thing. At the same time, Fico may also be more aware of the need for caution: unlike Meciar in 1994, Fico was removed from the prime ministership in 2010 by the voters, and he may be more aware than Meciar of voters' ability to express displeasure. Regardless of the reason, the inauspicious example of political development in neighboring Hungary make it particularly reassuring that (as of this writing) Fico has not used his political strength to alter Slovakia's democratic institutions to his own advantage. As the very nature of this article suggests, however, change can come quickly. DOCUMENTATION  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia's 2010 Election and Its Aftermath Description An account of the resource Kevin Deegan-Krause Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 164-175 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Deegan-Krause, Kevin Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6eddbebeec47d1c911b38343d3742daa.pdf 7ecf6c97b2c4f90f0758cc11e32c687b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 179 THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF MILAN R. STEFANIK IN RUSSIA ON BEHALF OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CAUSE (BASED UPON DOCUMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES) Evgeny F. Firsov This paper focuses on Milan R. Stefanik's recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers for the Czechoslovak 1 national movement in Russia during the First World War. It is based upon original materials identified in the Russian archives in the Russian, Czech, Slovak and French languages, including from the Department of written sources of the State Historical Museum (then - OPI GIM). Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), Slovak by origin, naturalized in France, was undoubtedly one of the most visible and popular figures among Czechs and Slovaks abroad during the First World War. In one reference to the Czechoslovak diaspora and to prisoners of war in Russia, it was underlined that the success of the national movement was guaranteed by the activity of M. R. Stefanik. This document made the flattering assessment: You know who Stefanik is. He is from the Slovak Nitra region on the border with Moravia, once the center of the former Great Moravian Empire of Sviitopluk, which was the natural center of the Czechoslovak nation. He is a member and plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak National Council, the authorized representative of Prof Masaryk. A renowned scholar, a hero, who distinguished himself on the French, Italian and Serbian fronts, he is a first-class and influential diplomat.2 1 ln the Russian documents of that time Czecho-Slovak was written, as a rule, as one word. And Stefanik adhered to the Czechoslovak orientation. 2 OPT GIM, f. 151. N.F. Melnikova-Kedrova-Rivnac. Materialy J. Papouseka. Hektograf na cesskom jazyke. February, 14, I 917. See also Evgeni Firsov, ,, Hektograficke materialy a korespondence v propagande patriotickeho hnuti ceskych a slovenskych zajatcu v Rusku," Historie a vojenstvi 1 (Praha, 2003), 23-36. �180 SLOVAKIA In Soviet historiography before 1990, Stefanik was considered one of the initiators of foreign intervention in Russia and a supporter of Admiral Kolchak. Despite this, his name can be found in the Soviet Encyclop edia. Furthermore, in Soviet and other historiography, Stefanik appeared as an anti-hero, in spite of all his achievements in the national liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks. 3 Only in 2001 , on the initiative of Igor Furdik, Ambassador Extraordinary of Slovakia to Russia, and due to the efforts of a number of Russian historians (including the author of this article) and Slovak historian Joseph Husar, there appeared a really objective work: Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Novy) vzg/'ad [Milan Rastislav Stefanik. A New Approach] (Martin, 2001 ). It is remarkable that the book was published in Slovakia. As expressed by Ambassador Furdik, the new situation in Central Europe finally allowed a fair and balanced assessment of Milan R. Stefanik. 4 Stefanik's personality characteristics in Russian sources are generally very positive and sympathetic. They repeatedly illustrated his courage and sacrifice. Stefanik initially arrived in Russia in 1916 as an emissary of the French military and only later as a representative of the Czechoslovak National Council. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak sociologist Anton Stefanek pointed out that to Stefanik ... we owe the fact that no one can rule over the Slovaks and the Slovak language, and Slovak national traditions regained their freedom, something which everybody was dreaming of, and that our ancestors had been waiting for. Th e history of the Slovak p eople would apparently have developed quite differently had it not been for Stefanik. 5 Stefanik appeared as a stoic person, but he was in poor health. He was ready to go to the end of the world for T. G. Masaryk and to 3 Sovetskij enciklopedicheskij slovar' (Moskva, 1982), 15-17, "Stefanik"; L. Holotik, Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Bratislava, 1958). 4 Milan Rastislav Stefa nik. Novy) vzg/'ad (Martin, 2001 ), 9; Evgenij F. Firsov, ,. Bojovnik za narodnu slobodu. M.R.Stefanik vo svetle ruskych pramenov," in M R. Stefanik v zrkadle prameiiov a najnovsich poznatkov historiograjie (Bratislava, 20 I 0). For a bibliography of the proceedings of the author about the national movement of Czechs and Slovaks of this period, see Evgenij Firsov, Scholars of Bohemian, Czech and Czechoslovak History Studies I (A- I) (Prague, 2005), 262-68 . 5 Slovensky dennik, 7, 1924, p.102. �SLOVAKIA 181 carry out any mission in distant Russia. The correspondence between Masaryk and Edvard Benes (from the Prague archives) shows that neither one was initially in any hurry to go to Russia. Benes justified his unwillingness to go by teaching a course on Czech history and literature from the sociological aspect at the Paris Higher Institute of Oriental Languages 6 . Masaryk was engaged in similar activities in London. So it was necessary for Stefanik to go to Russia. On July 26, 1916, The French General Staff issued an order, signed by the deputy Chief of Staff General Pelle, authorizing a "special mission" to Russia. By this order, Lieutenant Stefanik (led by General Maurice Janin) would be to allowed by Russia to organize a group of Austrian prisoners of war of Czech nationality to serve in France in Russian units or in special units. These would be formed on the basis of an agreement between France and Russia.7 The Czech troops were supposed to serve on the French front, but not on the Russian, to ensure their future independence from Russia. The French Command believed that Stefanik's mission should be limited to the recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers in order to strengthen the military forces of France. 8 Long and difficult negotiations (and even "nervousness," as noted by contemporaries) during the summer of 1916 and the spring of 191 7, and again between November 1918 and January 1919, ensued. Stefanik had to deal with former Czech member of the Austrian Parliament Josef Durich and his followers and with the board of the Union of Czech and Slovak Societies in Russia. He was assisted by Bohdan Pavlu and a group of Petrograd Czechs. Stefanik finally has managed to incline Slovak national groups in Russia to the proCzechoslovak and pro-French orientation of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. 9 Upon his arrival in Russia, Stefanik was able to make a most favorable impression upon the leaders of the diplomatic office of Stav6 TGM - EB. Korespondence (Praha, 2004), 192. Milan Rastislav Stefanik v archivnych dokumentoch Historickej slui by fran cuzskeho ministerstva obrany. Ed. Frederic Guelton a i. (Bratislava: Ministerstvo obrany SR, 2009), 55 . 8 Ibid., 58. 9 See more details see E. Firsov, ,,Boj za orientaciu ceskeho a slovenskeho narodnooslobodzovacieho hnutia v Rusku v rokoch 1915-1917," Historicky casopis 43 , no. I ( 1995), 47-68. 7 �182 SLOVAKIA ka (General Headquarters - E.F.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further - MF A). As the August 2, 1916 letter of Basili (the Chief of the Diplomatic office of Stavka) to A. Neratoff in MF A of stated: "In the middle of August Stefanik arrived, a Lieutenant in the French service, originally a Czech (! - E.F. ). General Alekseev (Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander - E.F.), as well as I, were impressed by Stefanik as a sensible and intelligent man" 10 . Basili then continued: In my conversations, I repeated to him (Stefanik - E.F.) what I had to tell his countrymen, that the success of the Czech cause depended upon ending, as soon as possible, the disagreement among the Czechs working with us .... and that we did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechs, but of course expect them to keep in mind their natural duty primarily to Russia. Stefanik went from Stavka to Kiev, where he attended a meeting of Czech leaders. At his suggestion, they created the Association of Czechs in Russia. At the head of the new organization will be Durich, with a staff, elected in agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council. 11 Stefanik showed much more useful activities with the organization of Czech troops, according to Basili. 12 Furthermore, Basili went on, The role played by Stefanik in concluding an agreement with Durich, and the latter's f ear of Stefanik, makes us want to turn him from the Czech cause in Russia, since he could be useful to us in military terms. From this point of view the commissioning of persons proposed to you by Stefanik is also undesirable because of their deliberate Masaryk coloring. JJ After this message of August 30, 1916, A. Neratoff informed Basili that: ... all negotiations on the Czech political system are concentrated in the hands of Masaryk. Durich 's activity is re10 11 12 13 AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 96. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 9606.-98. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93 . L. I 05 . AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 607. D. 93 . L. I 07. �SLOVAKIA 183 stricted to propaganda among the Czech prisoners of war in Russia, under the close supervision of Masaryk ' agents, the most important of which is Stefanik. 14 The main result of this exchange was the September, 1916 conclusion that it was necessary to make efforts to retain the main center of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia. World War I would decide on the structure of Central Europe based upon new principles. Thus, we can conclude that the results of the first Stefanik mission to Russia almost did not depend on him (in spite of the fact that in historical literature it was judged a failure ). 15 This was especially true because at the beginning of August 1916, i.e. before Stefanik's arrival in Russia, the Council of Ministers had rejected a request by the French government to allow a significant number of prisoners of war to be transferred to France. Stefanik's mission led to the neutralization of Masaryk's competitor in Russia, Josef Diirich, and paved the way for T.G. Masaryk' s coming to Russia as the leader of the Czechoslovak national movement a few months after the February, 1917 revolution. The archival materials of Jaroslav Papousek, discovered by us, included letters to Bohdan Pavhl, a close colleague and authorized representative of M. R. Stefanik. They complete the history of the struggle for the recognition of the Masaryk program for the independent Czechoslovak State from the "Russian" colony of Czechs and Slovaks. They also cover the creation of the Council headed by Diirich, as well as the history of its collapse. With the strong support of Milan R. Stefanik, a decisive role in this was played by representatives of the so-called Petrograd opposition (B. Pavhl, J. Papousek, J. Klecanda, etc.). Supported by M. R. Stefanik, they carried out the decisions of Masaryk and his Council in Paris. In this regard, the literature on the Legionnaires, which alluded to the spontaneous connection of "Russian" Czechs and Slovaks to Masaryk's program, is unconvincing. 16 14 For more about this see E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam zarskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 41. 15 See for example, K. Pichlik , B. Klipa., J. Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti /egionafi (1914-1920) (Praha, 1996). 6 See, for example, JosefKudela, S nasim voj skem na Rusi (Praha, 1923). �184 SLOVAKIA Now we will present at least part of a letter, written by M. R. Stefanik in Petrograd in February of 1917, and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It reads in part: Your Excellency, I have the honor hereby to inform Your Excellency that the Czechoslovak National Council unanimously agreed to exclude the deputy J. Durich from membership in the National Council. I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency of the sad act which was forced upon the Czechoslovak National Council by Mr. Durich 's actions. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and deep devotion. Milan Stefanik, a member of the Czechoslovak National Council, in Petrograd, February 9, 1917. His Excellency Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs N. N. Pokrovsky 17 . Then followed a detailed explanation by Stefanik. The text consists of more than fourteen pages. On Stefanik' s letter there appears a hand-written notation : it was read by the Minister at a meeting on February 10, 1917. From these documents it is clear that Stefanik' s efforts as the representative of the Paris Czechoslovak National Council were ultimately aimed at weakening Russia's geopolitical influence in Central Europe. We now proceed to the next arrival of M. R. Stefanik in Russia, this time in Siberia. This information is taken mainly from the Admiral Kolchak government reports (mostly from the collections of GARF) . It is not my intention to reproduce the history of Kolchak's government in the Siberian expanses of Russia, nor to give a detailed explanation of the relations between the Siberian Provisional Government at Omsk and the Czechoslovak Legions. For us it was more important to look at the general condition and spirit of the Czechoslovak troops on the eve of Stefanik' s arrival in Siberia through Vladivostok, and to reproduce for the first time important materials about Stefanik' s activities. 17 A VPRI, F. Osobyj politotdel. D., 224. �SLOVAKIA 185 The relationship between the Czechoslovak military units and the Provisional Siberian Government, according to the operative information of Stefanik, evolved quite favorably. In reports from the summer of 1918 it was noted that almost brotherly relations had been established with the Czechs and Slovaks, based on a community of mutual interests and goals. On behalf of the Allies, the French side gave official thanks to the Czechs and Slovaks for their actions and their willingness to contribute to the opening of a second front. 18 The first mention of Stefanik (who at this time was identified as a Czech) was found in a telegram of November 5, 1918, from the Siberian command headquarters in Omsk, that is, a few days before the Kolchak coup. It said that the Allies knew about the expansion of the Czechoslovak military units, and their rebelliousness was seen as a desire to leave Russia. It further stated: "General Janin, with Czech General Stefanik, arrived in Russia to command the Czechs and to arrange for help. The latter condemns the policy of the Czech National Council." 19 The documents further stated that the Omsk events (Kolchak's coup) were favorably received by the Allies. Stefanik arrived in Siberia in an emergency situation, especially with the intention of inspecting the situation. He was powerless to affect the general course of events. No less important, and quite a delicate task, was to quell a strong revolutionary and even proBolshevik unrest in the ranks of the Czech and Slovak troops. He also had to overcome the anti-Kolchak' spirit of the troops (spread immediately after the coup), and to persuade their leaders to cooperate with the new Siberian power, as the other Allies had already done. Those believed that the Czechoslovaks should not leave Russia until their presence was no longer necessary for intervention. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak army in Russia was also essential to Prague, as it was one of the guarantors of the projected boundaries of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. The binding of Czech and Slovak troops to the new government did not happen immediately. The operative information at the end of November, 1918 was that the Czechoslovak army had no sympathy 18 See E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti) ," in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 3556. 19 GARF. F. 162. �186 SLOVAKIA for the violent upheaval at Omsk and considered the crisis unfinished and looked forward to its resolution by legal means. Among the Czechoslovak Army Corps demands arose to send these military units home. The critical attitude of the Czechoslovak army during 1919 did not change. The Kolchak government failed to recruit it for the front. Its Council of Ministers even promised to reward the Czechoslovak army in the struggle for the revival of Russia by giving it the right to acquire real estate. The general condition of Czechoslovak forces was compared in the reports with the situation in the Russian army. It was noted that Czech and Slovak officers quickly became right-wing and the rankand-file left-wing, with a gap growing between them. After General Stefanik's arrival, Admiral Kolchak, in a telegram of December 20, 1918 to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, informed him that: "General Janin has arrived, whom we expected with impatience, hoping to resolve urgent problems of command together with him and Stefanik. .. 11 20 . In our view, many complications stemmed not only from the fact that the Czech and Slovak commanders often acted (according to Kolchak) quite independently, but also that the mass of the Czech and Slovak Legionaries saw in Kolchak's government the danger of the restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order. It was no secret that the Legionnaires' political orientations were formed by the party of social revolutionaries. By tremendous persuasion General Stefanik managed to turn the Czech and Slovak troops into allies of Kolchak. In conversations with the Czech and Slovak troops, Stefanik set out to fulfill promises which were made to the Allies - to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, which the Legionnaires had captured, as well as the city of Omsk. He even had to struggle with cases of insubordination. His most radical step was to publish order Number 588 on January 16, 1919, which was announced after his departure. According to this order, the army and democracy were incompatible. Therefore, all elected committees of the Russian Army type were to be dissolved. A few days later Stefanik left Siberia, apparently due to ill health. 20 E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl 'ad (Martin, 200 I), 45-46. �SLOVAKIA 187 The most detailed archival materials on Stefanik's activities in Siberia are contained in the July 3, 1919 Department of State Protection report to Kolchak's government. It covers the long period from the fall of 1918 to the summer of 1919. This report, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Russiyanov (some reports were signed by an agent nicknamed "Summer"), noted: While the Czechoslovaks had plenty of everything, and everyone was interested in them, when they felt that they were in charge, [they] did not feel homesick and forgot the drought at home. But when their position had deteriorated, and they receded into the background, discontent arose among them .. . Their commanders, wishing to suppress a rising discontent, and at the same time to constrain the demoralizing propagation of "Committees" among them, have welcomed to Russia General Stefanik, who is clothed with the authority of the Republic ... Stefanik informed them that, as of his arrival, the Czechoslovak army became a regular army of the Czechoslovak Republic. Stefanik promised that he would do everything in his power to alleviate the Czechoslovaks' situation in Siberia and to ensure their return home as soon as possible... "21 One of the representatives of Kolchak' Department of State Protection even declared that "almost without exception, all social classes have turned against the Czechoslovaks. Always it heard that the Czechoslovaks have undertaken not to work for them."22 What were the results of this Siberian tour? Almost a century later, contrary to the negative opinions regarding Stefanik's stay in Russia, 23 positive results are also evident. Stefanik helped to unite the Czechoslovak army, to increase its combat capability, and to make it a part of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. He persuaded the Legionaries to endure for a bit longer, even though they were so far from their native land. Russian sources also speak of Stefanik's merits and to his expulsion of the most Russophobe-minded members of the Czechoslovak National Council, who opposed Kolchak. 24 21 GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. L. 5806. 23 See for example, L. Holotik, "Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR" (Bratislava, 1958). 24 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 22 �188 SLOVAKIA Thanks to Stefanik, many Russian troops, earlier divided over the Czechoslovak army, went over to Kolchak. Stefanik helped to smooth the friction between French General Janin and Admiral Kolchak. With Stefanik' s sudden departure from Siberia, the relationship between the Allies and Kolchak deteriorated and latent plans were nurtured about the secret withdrawal of Czechoslovak troops from the zone of Kolchak' power. Thus the fate of the Siberian governor was sealed by the Allies. Nevertheless, the Allies still continued to watch over Kolchak, for they were attracted by the Russian gold reserves 25 and an incredible desire to profit by them. They were not able to provide to the Russian government of Kolchak substantial military aid and the mission of Janin and the Allies turned from a military to a diplomatic one. In the words of G. K. Gins (whose work "Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak" has been published several times in Russia) "the consciousness of common Slavonic problems, the adherence to culture which was broken by Bolshevism - could it be understood by an ordinary Czech soldier?" 26 Stefanik was one of the few who perceived these problems and planted this understanding with another compatriot. The book of G.K. Gins, a former manager of the Kolchak government, contains the highest praise for Stefanik and his stay in Omsk. Gins concludes that the Czech Legionnaires' saga in Russia was not heroic in itself. It contributed nothing to the Slavic peoples, to Siberia or to Russia. The Czechs and Slovaks just wanted to go home. 27 In 2007 a book entitled "With Kolchak against Kolchak" appeared. This work leaves much to be desired. The section about Stefanik, for example, contains many mistakes. The name "Stefanik" on page 13 7 is distorted and the years of his life are not specified. Furthermore, it asserted that Stefanik was "ill in Siberia and moved to Czechoslovakia," and further in this book, " ... he came for the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps, and on September 2, 1920 25 RGV A, f. 1198. Dokumental 'nyje materialy po istorii sozdanija cecho-slovackogo gosudarstva. Kollekcij a. CCXIII. General Janin E. Benesu. Omsk, 29.X.1919. The document in fiarticular says: «Je provoque mesures pour transferer reserve d' orn . 6 G.K Gins., Sibir ', sojuzniki i Kolcak (Moskva, 2008), 578. 27 Ibid., 574-75 . �SLOVAKIA 189 departed from Vladivostok to Czechoslovakia" 28 (but we know that Stefanik died on May 4, 1919). Most recently, valuable sources of the Russian State Military Archives (further - RGV A) relating to the national liberation struggle of Czechs and Slovaks in the First World War have become available. Of special interest are materials containing confidential correspondence (most often marked "urgent") by the Chief of Allied forces in Siberia, General Maurice Janin, with various authorities. They include numerous dispatches (intercepted by Kolchak's counterespionage) sent by Janin to the French command, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edvard Benes. An exchange of telegrams was also conducted with the commander of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. More steadfast analysis of this considerable block of archival materials still needs to be carried out. The materials reveal a lot about the role of the Allies in Siberia, and especially characterize the relationship of the Allies, General Janin and the Czechoslovak army with Kolchak's government. The RGVA block also contains some interesting materials relating to Stefanik's stay in the camp of the Czechoslovak army and Kolchak's, and Stefanik's reports to Benes. And here one can draw a general conclusion that as a military commander and as a representative of the new Czechoslovak Republic, Stefanik enjoyed unprecedented respect and trust. Estimations of Stefanik contained in Janin's dispatches are positive and respectful. In summary, we will now underline the importance of Stefanik's military missions in Russia. During his first mission, Stefanik made the break which led to Diirich's downfall and this made things easier for T. G. Masaryk, who arrived after the February revolution in 1917. The second mission in Siberia and to the Far East, appears unfinished because Stefanik's health deteriorated. However, there was also a disagreement with Maurice Janin, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Entente. As a result, Stefanik abruptly left Siberia in order to take part in the Paris Peace Conference, even though he was not officially included in the Czechoslovak delegation. He intended to use his abilities, his influence at the highest levels and his diplomatic skills to uphold Czechoslovak (and especially Slovak) affairs. The important question of the frontiers of the new state was 28 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. �190 SLOVAKIA solved. And the merits of Stefanik, judging by the memoirs of representatives of Great Britain, were recognized as considerable. 29 The arrival of Stefanik strengthened the Slovak component in the argument for an independent Czecho-Slovak state. At the Paris Conference Stefanik was named "the Czech Military Minister;" he left the impression of a mobile, and in contrast to the corpulent Karel Kramai', a "vigorous and imperious figure." Those who remembered Stefanik at the Conference considered his death an "essential loss, as by temperament Stefanik was sparkling champagne compared to the Czech spirit of heavy beer." 30 oan OIOflk 27 /x 1919 Qeneralu 'lffrcr,y Irtutak Situace na f rmU lpatna. LeT' lcl'idlo T plnea 11atup11. Stl'ed a pra,e lcl'idlo 118tupuje ponolna, ~llkytujice dosU tmoUjn;f odpor, Tiak nhledea k w,tupu lwfho kfidla msi tab ustuponti. Oeobd pro tentokraty neohoTa■ perne nada j i T UBj>lohu d jaU protiofendT:y. llyslli le T bnku ae 1aane e na- kusei o.Ji:a. Poehybuji le se Tlada T pl'1paU nakuaoe O..ka udrli. ProeiA pfilalllU sacboTat1 T Anla:la pa'h.dak.Zlollllram 0.Sl. ~dy naehuejioill ae jelti T o.ku daU patr16DII roskuy k e1'8ntuelni 91'llkuao1 Genenll JANI N. Illustration I . Instructions of General Janin to General Syrovy in connection with the planned evacuation of Czechoslovak troops from Omsk (The source is from RGVA , Russia) 29 30 G. Nikolson, Kak delalsja mir v /919 g. (Moskva, 1945), 251 . Ibid. �191 SLOVAKIA OOIIII ExplldU d 'Omsk le 29 OctobN 1919. ioie franqaiae Co.wrlquer Docteur BEIIES. Retrai te continue la ga110he eat aur 1 • ICJ!Dl oo peo en annt Pl!'?ROPAil.OSKI le reete a pe11 pres de mi-chnin entre le11 2 rhieraa. Tro11pea sont tree ua4es, d4moralidee, lea r4eerres douteuses. J' 4proun Tina craintea au 11uj11t d • <IISK, qua partage je croia eal'oir l.e Comaand8J!llllt an Ohef. Je prol'oq'tll aesurea pour t r&Daf6rer r411erre d • or. Situation r6sllltant de 1· 11ffoudr81118nt du front, de 1 • 4Yacuati <11 dee ~nee et du d4sordra g4n4rali ■ d est bien diftlcile. General JANIN. Illustration 2. General Janin informs Edvard Benes about the measures taken on displacement of the Russian gold reserves (The source is from RGVA. Russia) �� SLOVAKIA 179 THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF MILAN R. STEFANIK IN RUSSIA ON BEHALF OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CAUSE (BASED UPON DOCUMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES) Evgeny F. Firsov This paper focuses on Milan R. Stefanik's recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers for the Czechoslovak 1 national movement in Russia during the First World War. It is based upon original materials identified in the Russian archives in the Russian, Czech, Slovak and French languages, including from the Department of written sources of the State Historical Museum (then - OPI GIM). Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), Slovak by origin, naturalized in France, was undoubtedly one of the most visible and popular figures among Czechs and Slovaks abroad during the First World War. In one reference to the Czechoslovak diaspora and to prisoners of war in Russia, it was underlined that the success of the national movement was guaranteed by the activity of M. R. Stefanik. This document made the flattering assessment: You know who Stefanik is. He is from the Slovak Nitra region on the border with Moravia, once the center of the former Great Moravian Empire of Sviitopluk, which was the natural center of the Czechoslovak nation. He is a member and plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak National Council, the authorized representative of Prof Masaryk. A renowned scholar, a hero, who distinguished himself on the French, Italian and Serbian fronts, he is a first-class and influential diplomat.2 1 ln the Russian documents of that time Czecho-Slovak was written, as a rule, as one word. And Stefanik adhered to the Czechoslovak orientation. 2 OPT GIM, f. 151. N.F. Melnikova-Kedrova-Rivnac. Materialy J. Papouseka. Hektograf na cesskom jazyke. February, 14, I 917. See also Evgeni Firsov, ,, Hektograficke materialy a korespondence v propagande patriotickeho hnuti ceskych a slovenskych zajatcu v Rusku," Historie a vojenstvi 1 (Praha, 2003), 23-36. �180 SLOVAKIA In Soviet historiography before 1990, Stefanik was considered one of the initiators of foreign intervention in Russia and a supporter of Admiral Kolchak. Despite this, his name can be found in the Soviet Encyclop edia. Furthermore, in Soviet and other historiography, Stefanik appeared as an anti-hero, in spite of all his achievements in the national liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks. 3 Only in 2001 , on the initiative of Igor Furdik, Ambassador Extraordinary of Slovakia to Russia, and due to the efforts of a number of Russian historians (including the author of this article) and Slovak historian Joseph Husar, there appeared a really objective work: Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Novy) vzg/'ad [Milan Rastislav Stefanik. A New Approach] (Martin, 2001 ). It is remarkable that the book was published in Slovakia. As expressed by Ambassador Furdik, the new situation in Central Europe finally allowed a fair and balanced assessment of Milan R. Stefanik. 4 Stefanik's personality characteristics in Russian sources are generally very positive and sympathetic. They repeatedly illustrated his courage and sacrifice. Stefanik initially arrived in Russia in 1916 as an emissary of the French military and only later as a representative of the Czechoslovak National Council. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak sociologist Anton Stefanek pointed out that to Stefanik ... we owe the fact that no one can rule over the Slovaks and the Slovak language, and Slovak national traditions regained their freedom, something which everybody was dreaming of, and that our ancestors had been waiting for. Th e history of the Slovak p eople would apparently have developed quite differently had it not been for Stefanik. 5 Stefanik appeared as a stoic person, but he was in poor health. He was ready to go to the end of the world for T. G. Masaryk and to 3 Sovetskij enciklopedicheskij slovar' (Moskva, 1982), 15-17, "Stefanik"; L. Holotik, Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Bratislava, 1958). 4 Milan Rastislav Stefa nik. Novy) vzg/'ad (Martin, 2001 ), 9; Evgenij F. Firsov, ,. Bojovnik za narodnu slobodu. M.R.Stefanik vo svetle ruskych pramenov," in M R. Stefanik v zrkadle prameiiov a najnovsich poznatkov historiograjie (Bratislava, 20 I 0). For a bibliography of the proceedings of the author about the national movement of Czechs and Slovaks of this period, see Evgenij Firsov, Scholars of Bohemian, Czech and Czechoslovak History Studies I (A- I) (Prague, 2005), 262-68 . 5 Slovensky dennik, 7, 1924, p.102. �SLOVAKIA 181 carry out any mission in distant Russia. The correspondence between Masaryk and Edvard Benes (from the Prague archives) shows that neither one was initially in any hurry to go to Russia. Benes justified his unwillingness to go by teaching a course on Czech history and literature from the sociological aspect at the Paris Higher Institute of Oriental Languages 6 . Masaryk was engaged in similar activities in London. So it was necessary for Stefanik to go to Russia. On July 26, 1916, The French General Staff issued an order, signed by the deputy Chief of Staff General Pelle, authorizing a "special mission" to Russia. By this order, Lieutenant Stefanik (led by General Maurice Janin) would be to allowed by Russia to organize a group of Austrian prisoners of war of Czech nationality to serve in France in Russian units or in special units. These would be formed on the basis of an agreement between France and Russia.7 The Czech troops were supposed to serve on the French front, but not on the Russian, to ensure their future independence from Russia. The French Command believed that Stefanik's mission should be limited to the recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers in order to strengthen the military forces of France. 8 Long and difficult negotiations (and even "nervousness," as noted by contemporaries) during the summer of 1916 and the spring of 191 7, and again between November 1918 and January 1919, ensued. Stefanik had to deal with former Czech member of the Austrian Parliament Josef Durich and his followers and with the board of the Union of Czech and Slovak Societies in Russia. He was assisted by Bohdan Pavlu and a group of Petrograd Czechs. Stefanik finally has managed to incline Slovak national groups in Russia to the proCzechoslovak and pro-French orientation of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. 9 Upon his arrival in Russia, Stefanik was able to make a most favorable impression upon the leaders of the diplomatic office of Stav6 TGM - EB. Korespondence (Praha, 2004), 192. Milan Rastislav Stefanik v archivnych dokumentoch Historickej slui by fran cuzskeho ministerstva obrany. Ed. Frederic Guelton a i. (Bratislava: Ministerstvo obrany SR, 2009), 55 . 8 Ibid., 58. 9 See more details see E. Firsov, ,,Boj za orientaciu ceskeho a slovenskeho narodnooslobodzovacieho hnutia v Rusku v rokoch 1915-1917," Historicky casopis 43 , no. I ( 1995), 47-68. 7 �182 SLOVAKIA ka (General Headquarters - E.F.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further - MF A). As the August 2, 1916 letter of Basili (the Chief of the Diplomatic office of Stavka) to A. Neratoff in MF A of stated: "In the middle of August Stefanik arrived, a Lieutenant in the French service, originally a Czech (! - E.F. ). General Alekseev (Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander - E.F.), as well as I, were impressed by Stefanik as a sensible and intelligent man" 10 . Basili then continued: In my conversations, I repeated to him (Stefanik - E.F.) what I had to tell his countrymen, that the success of the Czech cause depended upon ending, as soon as possible, the disagreement among the Czechs working with us .... and that we did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechs, but of course expect them to keep in mind their natural duty primarily to Russia. Stefanik went from Stavka to Kiev, where he attended a meeting of Czech leaders. At his suggestion, they created the Association of Czechs in Russia. At the head of the new organization will be Durich, with a staff, elected in agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council. 11 Stefanik showed much more useful activities with the organization of Czech troops, according to Basili. 12 Furthermore, Basili went on, The role played by Stefanik in concluding an agreement with Durich, and the latter's f ear of Stefanik, makes us want to turn him from the Czech cause in Russia, since he could be useful to us in military terms. From this point of view the commissioning of persons proposed to you by Stefanik is also undesirable because of their deliberate Masaryk coloring. JJ After this message of August 30, 1916, A. Neratoff informed Basili that: ... all negotiations on the Czech political system are concentrated in the hands of Masaryk. Durich 's activity is re10 11 12 13 AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 96. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 9606.-98. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93 . L. I 05 . AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 607. D. 93 . L. I 07. �SLOVAKIA 183 stricted to propaganda among the Czech prisoners of war in Russia, under the close supervision of Masaryk ' agents, the most important of which is Stefanik. 14 The main result of this exchange was the September, 1916 conclusion that it was necessary to make efforts to retain the main center of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia. World War I would decide on the structure of Central Europe based upon new principles. Thus, we can conclude that the results of the first Stefanik mission to Russia almost did not depend on him (in spite of the fact that in historical literature it was judged a failure ). 15 This was especially true because at the beginning of August 1916, i.e. before Stefanik's arrival in Russia, the Council of Ministers had rejected a request by the French government to allow a significant number of prisoners of war to be transferred to France. Stefanik's mission led to the neutralization of Masaryk's competitor in Russia, Josef Diirich, and paved the way for T.G. Masaryk' s coming to Russia as the leader of the Czechoslovak national movement a few months after the February, 1917 revolution. The archival materials of Jaroslav Papousek, discovered by us, included letters to Bohdan Pavhl, a close colleague and authorized representative of M. R. Stefanik. They complete the history of the struggle for the recognition of the Masaryk program for the independent Czechoslovak State from the "Russian" colony of Czechs and Slovaks. They also cover the creation of the Council headed by Diirich, as well as the history of its collapse. With the strong support of Milan R. Stefanik, a decisive role in this was played by representatives of the so-called Petrograd opposition (B. Pavhl, J. Papousek, J. Klecanda, etc.). Supported by M. R. Stefanik, they carried out the decisions of Masaryk and his Council in Paris. In this regard, the literature on the Legionnaires, which alluded to the spontaneous connection of "Russian" Czechs and Slovaks to Masaryk's program, is unconvincing. 16 14 For more about this see E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam zarskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 41. 15 See for example, K. Pichlik , B. Klipa., J. Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti /egionafi (1914-1920) (Praha, 1996). 6 See, for example, JosefKudela, S nasim voj skem na Rusi (Praha, 1923). �184 SLOVAKIA Now we will present at least part of a letter, written by M. R. Stefanik in Petrograd in February of 1917, and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It reads in part: Your Excellency, I have the honor hereby to inform Your Excellency that the Czechoslovak National Council unanimously agreed to exclude the deputy J. Durich from membership in the National Council. I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency of the sad act which was forced upon the Czechoslovak National Council by Mr. Durich 's actions. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and deep devotion. Milan Stefanik, a member of the Czechoslovak National Council, in Petrograd, February 9, 1917. His Excellency Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs N. N. Pokrovsky 17 . Then followed a detailed explanation by Stefanik. The text consists of more than fourteen pages. On Stefanik' s letter there appears a hand-written notation : it was read by the Minister at a meeting on February 10, 1917. From these documents it is clear that Stefanik' s efforts as the representative of the Paris Czechoslovak National Council were ultimately aimed at weakening Russia's geopolitical influence in Central Europe. We now proceed to the next arrival of M. R. Stefanik in Russia, this time in Siberia. This information is taken mainly from the Admiral Kolchak government reports (mostly from the collections of GARF) . It is not my intention to reproduce the history of Kolchak's government in the Siberian expanses of Russia, nor to give a detailed explanation of the relations between the Siberian Provisional Government at Omsk and the Czechoslovak Legions. For us it was more important to look at the general condition and spirit of the Czechoslovak troops on the eve of Stefanik' s arrival in Siberia through Vladivostok, and to reproduce for the first time important materials about Stefanik' s activities. 17 A VPRI, F. Osobyj politotdel. D., 224. �SLOVAKIA 185 The relationship between the Czechoslovak military units and the Provisional Siberian Government, according to the operative information of Stefanik, evolved quite favorably. In reports from the summer of 1918 it was noted that almost brotherly relations had been established with the Czechs and Slovaks, based on a community of mutual interests and goals. On behalf of the Allies, the French side gave official thanks to the Czechs and Slovaks for their actions and their willingness to contribute to the opening of a second front. 18 The first mention of Stefanik (who at this time was identified as a Czech) was found in a telegram of November 5, 1918, from the Siberian command headquarters in Omsk, that is, a few days before the Kolchak coup. It said that the Allies knew about the expansion of the Czechoslovak military units, and their rebelliousness was seen as a desire to leave Russia. It further stated: "General Janin, with Czech General Stefanik, arrived in Russia to command the Czechs and to arrange for help. The latter condemns the policy of the Czech National Council." 19 The documents further stated that the Omsk events (Kolchak's coup) were favorably received by the Allies. Stefanik arrived in Siberia in an emergency situation, especially with the intention of inspecting the situation. He was powerless to affect the general course of events. No less important, and quite a delicate task, was to quell a strong revolutionary and even proBolshevik unrest in the ranks of the Czech and Slovak troops. He also had to overcome the anti-Kolchak' spirit of the troops (spread immediately after the coup), and to persuade their leaders to cooperate with the new Siberian power, as the other Allies had already done. Those believed that the Czechoslovaks should not leave Russia until their presence was no longer necessary for intervention. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak army in Russia was also essential to Prague, as it was one of the guarantors of the projected boundaries of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. The binding of Czech and Slovak troops to the new government did not happen immediately. The operative information at the end of November, 1918 was that the Czechoslovak army had no sympathy 18 See E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti) ," in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 3556. 19 GARF. F. 162. �186 SLOVAKIA for the violent upheaval at Omsk and considered the crisis unfinished and looked forward to its resolution by legal means. Among the Czechoslovak Army Corps demands arose to send these military units home. The critical attitude of the Czechoslovak army during 1919 did not change. The Kolchak government failed to recruit it for the front. Its Council of Ministers even promised to reward the Czechoslovak army in the struggle for the revival of Russia by giving it the right to acquire real estate. The general condition of Czechoslovak forces was compared in the reports with the situation in the Russian army. It was noted that Czech and Slovak officers quickly became right-wing and the rankand-file left-wing, with a gap growing between them. After General Stefanik's arrival, Admiral Kolchak, in a telegram of December 20, 1918 to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, informed him that: "General Janin has arrived, whom we expected with impatience, hoping to resolve urgent problems of command together with him and Stefanik. .. 11 20 . In our view, many complications stemmed not only from the fact that the Czech and Slovak commanders often acted (according to Kolchak) quite independently, but also that the mass of the Czech and Slovak Legionaries saw in Kolchak's government the danger of the restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order. It was no secret that the Legionnaires' political orientations were formed by the party of social revolutionaries. By tremendous persuasion General Stefanik managed to turn the Czech and Slovak troops into allies of Kolchak. In conversations with the Czech and Slovak troops, Stefanik set out to fulfill promises which were made to the Allies - to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, which the Legionnaires had captured, as well as the city of Omsk. He even had to struggle with cases of insubordination. His most radical step was to publish order Number 588 on January 16, 1919, which was announced after his departure. According to this order, the army and democracy were incompatible. Therefore, all elected committees of the Russian Army type were to be dissolved. A few days later Stefanik left Siberia, apparently due to ill health. 20 E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl 'ad (Martin, 200 I), 45-46. �SLOVAKIA 187 The most detailed archival materials on Stefanik's activities in Siberia are contained in the July 3, 1919 Department of State Protection report to Kolchak's government. It covers the long period from the fall of 1918 to the summer of 1919. This report, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Russiyanov (some reports were signed by an agent nicknamed "Summer"), noted: While the Czechoslovaks had plenty of everything, and everyone was interested in them, when they felt that they were in charge, [they] did not feel homesick and forgot the drought at home. But when their position had deteriorated, and they receded into the background, discontent arose among them .. . Their commanders, wishing to suppress a rising discontent, and at the same time to constrain the demoralizing propagation of "Committees" among them, have welcomed to Russia General Stefanik, who is clothed with the authority of the Republic ... Stefanik informed them that, as of his arrival, the Czechoslovak army became a regular army of the Czechoslovak Republic. Stefanik promised that he would do everything in his power to alleviate the Czechoslovaks' situation in Siberia and to ensure their return home as soon as possible... "21 One of the representatives of Kolchak' Department of State Protection even declared that "almost without exception, all social classes have turned against the Czechoslovaks. Always it heard that the Czechoslovaks have undertaken not to work for them."22 What were the results of this Siberian tour? Almost a century later, contrary to the negative opinions regarding Stefanik's stay in Russia, 23 positive results are also evident. Stefanik helped to unite the Czechoslovak army, to increase its combat capability, and to make it a part of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. He persuaded the Legionaries to endure for a bit longer, even though they were so far from their native land. Russian sources also speak of Stefanik's merits and to his expulsion of the most Russophobe-minded members of the Czechoslovak National Council, who opposed Kolchak. 24 21 GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. L. 5806. 23 See for example, L. Holotik, "Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR" (Bratislava, 1958). 24 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 22 �188 SLOVAKIA Thanks to Stefanik, many Russian troops, earlier divided over the Czechoslovak army, went over to Kolchak. Stefanik helped to smooth the friction between French General Janin and Admiral Kolchak. With Stefanik' s sudden departure from Siberia, the relationship between the Allies and Kolchak deteriorated and latent plans were nurtured about the secret withdrawal of Czechoslovak troops from the zone of Kolchak' power. Thus the fate of the Siberian governor was sealed by the Allies. Nevertheless, the Allies still continued to watch over Kolchak, for they were attracted by the Russian gold reserves 25 and an incredible desire to profit by them. They were not able to provide to the Russian government of Kolchak substantial military aid and the mission of Janin and the Allies turned from a military to a diplomatic one. In the words of G. K. Gins (whose work "Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak" has been published several times in Russia) "the consciousness of common Slavonic problems, the adherence to culture which was broken by Bolshevism - could it be understood by an ordinary Czech soldier?" 26 Stefanik was one of the few who perceived these problems and planted this understanding with another compatriot. The book of G.K. Gins, a former manager of the Kolchak government, contains the highest praise for Stefanik and his stay in Omsk. Gins concludes that the Czech Legionnaires' saga in Russia was not heroic in itself. It contributed nothing to the Slavic peoples, to Siberia or to Russia. The Czechs and Slovaks just wanted to go home. 27 In 2007 a book entitled "With Kolchak against Kolchak" appeared. This work leaves much to be desired. The section about Stefanik, for example, contains many mistakes. The name "Stefanik" on page 13 7 is distorted and the years of his life are not specified. Furthermore, it asserted that Stefanik was "ill in Siberia and moved to Czechoslovakia," and further in this book, " ... he came for the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps, and on September 2, 1920 25 RGV A, f. 1198. Dokumental 'nyje materialy po istorii sozdanija cecho-slovackogo gosudarstva. Kollekcij a. CCXIII. General Janin E. Benesu. Omsk, 29.X.1919. The document in fiarticular says: «Je provoque mesures pour transferer reserve d' orn . 6 G.K Gins., Sibir ', sojuzniki i Kolcak (Moskva, 2008), 578. 27 Ibid., 574-75 . �SLOVAKIA 189 departed from Vladivostok to Czechoslovakia" 28 (but we know that Stefanik died on May 4, 1919). Most recently, valuable sources of the Russian State Military Archives (further - RGV A) relating to the national liberation struggle of Czechs and Slovaks in the First World War have become available. Of special interest are materials containing confidential correspondence (most often marked "urgent") by the Chief of Allied forces in Siberia, General Maurice Janin, with various authorities. They include numerous dispatches (intercepted by Kolchak's counterespionage) sent by Janin to the French command, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edvard Benes. An exchange of telegrams was also conducted with the commander of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. More steadfast analysis of this considerable block of archival materials still needs to be carried out. The materials reveal a lot about the role of the Allies in Siberia, and especially characterize the relationship of the Allies, General Janin and the Czechoslovak army with Kolchak's government. The RGVA block also contains some interesting materials relating to Stefanik's stay in the camp of the Czechoslovak army and Kolchak's, and Stefanik's reports to Benes. And here one can draw a general conclusion that as a military commander and as a representative of the new Czechoslovak Republic, Stefanik enjoyed unprecedented respect and trust. Estimations of Stefanik contained in Janin's dispatches are positive and respectful. In summary, we will now underline the importance of Stefanik's military missions in Russia. During his first mission, Stefanik made the break which led to Diirich's downfall and this made things easier for T. G. Masaryk, who arrived after the February revolution in 1917. The second mission in Siberia and to the Far East, appears unfinished because Stefanik's health deteriorated. However, there was also a disagreement with Maurice Janin, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Entente. As a result, Stefanik abruptly left Siberia in order to take part in the Paris Peace Conference, even though he was not officially included in the Czechoslovak delegation. He intended to use his abilities, his influence at the highest levels and his diplomatic skills to uphold Czechoslovak (and especially Slovak) affairs. The important question of the frontiers of the new state was 28 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. �190 SLOVAKIA solved. And the merits of Stefanik, judging by the memoirs of representatives of Great Britain, were recognized as considerable. 29 The arrival of Stefanik strengthened the Slovak component in the argument for an independent Czecho-Slovak state. At the Paris Conference Stefanik was named "the Czech Military Minister;" he left the impression of a mobile, and in contrast to the corpulent Karel Kramai', a "vigorous and imperious figure." Those who remembered Stefanik at the Conference considered his death an "essential loss, as by temperament Stefanik was sparkling champagne compared to the Czech spirit of heavy beer." 30 oan OIOflk 27 /x 1919 Qeneralu 'lffrcr,y Irtutak Situace na f rmU lpatna. LeT' lcl'idlo T plnea 11atup11. Stl'ed a pra,e lcl'idlo 118tupuje ponolna, ~llkytujice dosU tmoUjn;f odpor, Tiak nhledea k w,tupu lwfho kfidla msi tab ustuponti. Oeobd pro tentokraty neohoTa■ perne nada j i T UBj>lohu d jaU protiofendT:y. llyslli le T bnku ae 1aane e na- kusei o.Ji:a. Poehybuji le se Tlada T pl'1paU nakuaoe O..ka udrli. ProeiA pfilalllU sacboTat1 T Anla:la pa'h.dak.Zlollllram 0.Sl. ~dy naehuejioill ae jelti T o.ku daU patr16DII roskuy k e1'8ntuelni 91'llkuao1 Genenll JANI N. Illustration I . Instructions of General Janin to General Syrovy in connection with the planned evacuation of Czechoslovak troops from Omsk (The source is from RGVA , Russia) 29 30 G. Nikolson, Kak delalsja mir v /919 g. (Moskva, 1945), 251 . Ibid. �191 SLOVAKIA OOIIII ExplldU d 'Omsk le 29 OctobN 1919. ioie franqaiae Co.wrlquer Docteur BEIIES. Retrai te continue la ga110he eat aur 1 • ICJ!Dl oo peo en annt Pl!'?ROPAil.OSKI le reete a pe11 pres de mi-chnin entre le11 2 rhieraa. Tro11pea sont tree ua4es, d4moralidee, lea r4eerres douteuses. J' 4proun Tina craintea au 11uj11t d • <IISK, qua partage je croia eal'oir l.e Comaand8J!llllt an Ohef. Je prol'oq'tll aesurea pour t r&Daf6rer r411erre d • or. Situation r6sllltant de 1· 11ffoudr81118nt du front, de 1 • 4Yacuati <11 dee ~nee et du d4sordra g4n4rali ■ d est bien diftlcile. General JANIN. Illustration 2. General Janin informs Edvard Benes about the measures taken on displacement of the Russian gold reserves (The source is from RGVA. Russia) �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 179 THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF MILAN R. STEFANIK IN RUSSIA ON BEHALF OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CAUSE (BASED UPON DOCUMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES) Evgeny F. Firsov This paper focuses on Milan R. Stefanik's recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers for the Czechoslovak 1 national movement in Russia during the First World War. It is based upon original materials identified in the Russian archives in the Russian, Czech, Slovak and French languages, including from the Department of written sources of the State Historical Museum (then - OPI GIM). Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), Slovak by origin, naturalized in France, was undoubtedly one of the most visible and popular figures among Czechs and Slovaks abroad during the First World War. In one reference to the Czechoslovak diaspora and to prisoners of war in Russia, it was underlined that the success of the national movement was guaranteed by the activity of M. R. Stefanik. This document made the flattering assessment: You know who Stefanik is. He is from the Slovak Nitra region on the border with Moravia, once the center of the former Great Moravian Empire of Sviitopluk, which was the natural center of the Czechoslovak nation. He is a member and plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak National Council, the authorized representative of Prof Masaryk. A renowned scholar, a hero, who distinguished himself on the French, Italian and Serbian fronts, he is a first-class and influential diplomat.2 1 ln the Russian documents of that time Czecho-Slovak was written, as a rule, as one word. And Stefanik adhered to the Czechoslovak orientation. 2 OPT GIM, f. 151. N.F. Melnikova-Kedrova-Rivnac. Materialy J. Papouseka. Hektograf na cesskom jazyke. February, 14, I 917. See also Evgeni Firsov, ,, Hektograficke materialy a korespondence v propagande patriotickeho hnuti ceskych a slovenskych zajatcu v Rusku," Historie a vojenstvi 1 (Praha, 2003), 23-36. 180 SLOVAKIA In Soviet historiography before 1990, Stefanik was considered one of the initiators of foreign intervention in Russia and a supporter of Admiral Kolchak. Despite this, his name can be found in the Soviet Encyclop edia. Furthermore, in Soviet and other historiography, Stefanik appeared as an anti-hero, in spite of all his achievements in the national liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks. 3 Only in 2001 , on the initiative of Igor Furdik, Ambassador Extraordinary of Slovakia to Russia, and due to the efforts of a number of Russian historians (including the author of this article) and Slovak historian Joseph Husar, there appeared a really objective work: Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Novy) vzg/'ad [Milan Rastislav Stefanik. A New Approach] (Martin, 2001 ). It is remarkable that the book was published in Slovakia. As expressed by Ambassador Furdik, the new situation in Central Europe finally allowed a fair and balanced assessment of Milan R. Stefanik. 4 Stefanik's personality characteristics in Russian sources are generally very positive and sympathetic. They repeatedly illustrated his courage and sacrifice. Stefanik initially arrived in Russia in 1916 as an emissary of the French military and only later as a representative of the Czechoslovak National Council. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak sociologist Anton Stefanek pointed out that to Stefanik ... we owe the fact that no one can rule over the Slovaks and the Slovak language, and Slovak national traditions regained their freedom, something which everybody was dreaming of, and that our ancestors had been waiting for. Th e history of the Slovak p eople would apparently have developed quite differently had it not been for Stefanik. 5 Stefanik appeared as a stoic person, but he was in poor health. He was ready to go to the end of the world for T. G. Masaryk and to 3 Sovetskij enciklopedicheskij slovar' (Moskva, 1982), 15-17, "Stefanik"; L. Holotik, Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Bratislava, 1958). 4 Milan Rastislav Stefa nik. Novy) vzg/'ad (Martin, 2001 ), 9; Evgenij F. Firsov, ,. Bojovnik za narodnu slobodu. M.R.Stefanik vo svetle ruskych pramenov," in M R. Stefanik v zrkadle prameiiov a najnovsich poznatkov historiograjie (Bratislava, 20 I 0). For a bibliography of the proceedings of the author about the national movement of Czechs and Slovaks of this period, see Evgenij Firsov, Scholars of Bohemian, Czech and Czechoslovak History Studies I (A- I) (Prague, 2005), 262-68 . 5 Slovensky dennik, 7, 1924, p.102. SLOVAKIA 181 carry out any mission in distant Russia. The correspondence between Masaryk and Edvard Benes (from the Prague archives) shows that neither one was initially in any hurry to go to Russia. Benes justified his unwillingness to go by teaching a course on Czech history and literature from the sociological aspect at the Paris Higher Institute of Oriental Languages 6 . Masaryk was engaged in similar activities in London. So it was necessary for Stefanik to go to Russia. On July 26, 1916, The French General Staff issued an order, signed by the deputy Chief of Staff General Pelle, authorizing a "special mission" to Russia. By this order, Lieutenant Stefanik (led by General Maurice Janin) would be to allowed by Russia to organize a group of Austrian prisoners of war of Czech nationality to serve in France in Russian units or in special units. These would be formed on the basis of an agreement between France and Russia.7 The Czech troops were supposed to serve on the French front, but not on the Russian, to ensure their future independence from Russia. The French Command believed that Stefanik's mission should be limited to the recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers in order to strengthen the military forces of France. 8 Long and difficult negotiations (and even "nervousness," as noted by contemporaries) during the summer of 1916 and the spring of 191 7, and again between November 1918 and January 1919, ensued. Stefanik had to deal with former Czech member of the Austrian Parliament Josef Durich and his followers and with the board of the Union of Czech and Slovak Societies in Russia. He was assisted by Bohdan Pavlu and a group of Petrograd Czechs. Stefanik finally has managed to incline Slovak national groups in Russia to the proCzechoslovak and pro-French orientation of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. 9 Upon his arrival in Russia, Stefanik was able to make a most favorable impression upon the leaders of the diplomatic office of Stav6 TGM - EB. Korespondence (Praha, 2004), 192. Milan Rastislav Stefanik v archivnych dokumentoch Historickej slui by fran cuzskeho ministerstva obrany. Ed. Frederic Guelton a i. (Bratislava: Ministerstvo obrany SR, 2009), 55 . 8 Ibid., 58. 9 See more details see E. Firsov, ,,Boj za orientaciu ceskeho a slovenskeho narodnooslobodzovacieho hnutia v Rusku v rokoch 1915-1917," Historicky casopis 43 , no. I ( 1995), 47-68. 7 182 SLOVAKIA ka (General Headquarters - E.F.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further - MF A). As the August 2, 1916 letter of Basili (the Chief of the Diplomatic office of Stavka) to A. Neratoff in MF A of stated: "In the middle of August Stefanik arrived, a Lieutenant in the French service, originally a Czech (! - E.F. ). General Alekseev (Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander - E.F.), as well as I, were impressed by Stefanik as a sensible and intelligent man" 10 . Basili then continued: In my conversations, I repeated to him (Stefanik - E.F.) what I had to tell his countrymen, that the success of the Czech cause depended upon ending, as soon as possible, the disagreement among the Czechs working with us .... and that we did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechs, but of course expect them to keep in mind their natural duty primarily to Russia. Stefanik went from Stavka to Kiev, where he attended a meeting of Czech leaders. At his suggestion, they created the Association of Czechs in Russia. At the head of the new organization will be Durich, with a staff, elected in agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council. 11 Stefanik showed much more useful activities with the organization of Czech troops, according to Basili. 12 Furthermore, Basili went on, The role played by Stefanik in concluding an agreement with Durich, and the latter's f ear of Stefanik, makes us want to turn him from the Czech cause in Russia, since he could be useful to us in military terms. From this point of view the commissioning of persons proposed to you by Stefanik is also undesirable because of their deliberate Masaryk coloring. JJ After this message of August 30, 1916, A. Neratoff informed Basili that: ... all negotiations on the Czech political system are concentrated in the hands of Masaryk. Durich 's activity is re10 11 12 13 AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 96. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 9606.-98. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93 . L. I 05 . AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 607. D. 93 . L. I 07. SLOVAKIA 183 stricted to propaganda among the Czech prisoners of war in Russia, under the close supervision of Masaryk ' agents, the most important of which is Stefanik. 14 The main result of this exchange was the September, 1916 conclusion that it was necessary to make efforts to retain the main center of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia. World War I would decide on the structure of Central Europe based upon new principles. Thus, we can conclude that the results of the first Stefanik mission to Russia almost did not depend on him (in spite of the fact that in historical literature it was judged a failure ). 15 This was especially true because at the beginning of August 1916, i.e. before Stefanik's arrival in Russia, the Council of Ministers had rejected a request by the French government to allow a significant number of prisoners of war to be transferred to France. Stefanik's mission led to the neutralization of Masaryk's competitor in Russia, Josef Diirich, and paved the way for T.G. Masaryk' s coming to Russia as the leader of the Czechoslovak national movement a few months after the February, 1917 revolution. The archival materials of Jaroslav Papousek, discovered by us, included letters to Bohdan Pavhl, a close colleague and authorized representative of M. R. Stefanik. They complete the history of the struggle for the recognition of the Masaryk program for the independent Czechoslovak State from the "Russian" colony of Czechs and Slovaks. They also cover the creation of the Council headed by Diirich, as well as the history of its collapse. With the strong support of Milan R. Stefanik, a decisive role in this was played by representatives of the so-called Petrograd opposition (B. Pavhl, J. Papousek, J. Klecanda, etc.). Supported by M. R. Stefanik, they carried out the decisions of Masaryk and his Council in Paris. In this regard, the literature on the Legionnaires, which alluded to the spontaneous connection of "Russian" Czechs and Slovaks to Masaryk's program, is unconvincing. 16 14 For more about this see E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam zarskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 41. 15 See for example, K. Pichlik , B. Klipa., J. Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti /egionafi (1914-1920) (Praha, 1996). 6 See, for example, JosefKudela, S nasim voj skem na Rusi (Praha, 1923). 184 SLOVAKIA Now we will present at least part of a letter, written by M. R. Stefanik in Petrograd in February of 1917, and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It reads in part: Your Excellency, I have the honor hereby to inform Your Excellency that the Czechoslovak National Council unanimously agreed to exclude the deputy J. Durich from membership in the National Council. I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency of the sad act which was forced upon the Czechoslovak National Council by Mr. Durich 's actions. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and deep devotion. Milan Stefanik, a member of the Czechoslovak National Council, in Petrograd, February 9, 1917. His Excellency Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs N. N. Pokrovsky 17 . Then followed a detailed explanation by Stefanik. The text consists of more than fourteen pages. On Stefanik' s letter there appears a hand-written notation : it was read by the Minister at a meeting on February 10, 1917. From these documents it is clear that Stefanik' s efforts as the representative of the Paris Czechoslovak National Council were ultimately aimed at weakening Russia's geopolitical influence in Central Europe. We now proceed to the next arrival of M. R. Stefanik in Russia, this time in Siberia. This information is taken mainly from the Admiral Kolchak government reports (mostly from the collections of GARF) . It is not my intention to reproduce the history of Kolchak's government in the Siberian expanses of Russia, nor to give a detailed explanation of the relations between the Siberian Provisional Government at Omsk and the Czechoslovak Legions. For us it was more important to look at the general condition and spirit of the Czechoslovak troops on the eve of Stefanik' s arrival in Siberia through Vladivostok, and to reproduce for the first time important materials about Stefanik' s activities. 17 A VPRI, F. Osobyj politotdel. D., 224. SLOVAKIA 185 The relationship between the Czechoslovak military units and the Provisional Siberian Government, according to the operative information of Stefanik, evolved quite favorably. In reports from the summer of 1918 it was noted that almost brotherly relations had been established with the Czechs and Slovaks, based on a community of mutual interests and goals. On behalf of the Allies, the French side gave official thanks to the Czechs and Slovaks for their actions and their willingness to contribute to the opening of a second front. 18 The first mention of Stefanik (who at this time was identified as a Czech) was found in a telegram of November 5, 1918, from the Siberian command headquarters in Omsk, that is, a few days before the Kolchak coup. It said that the Allies knew about the expansion of the Czechoslovak military units, and their rebelliousness was seen as a desire to leave Russia. It further stated: "General Janin, with Czech General Stefanik, arrived in Russia to command the Czechs and to arrange for help. The latter condemns the policy of the Czech National Council." 19 The documents further stated that the Omsk events (Kolchak's coup) were favorably received by the Allies. Stefanik arrived in Siberia in an emergency situation, especially with the intention of inspecting the situation. He was powerless to affect the general course of events. No less important, and quite a delicate task, was to quell a strong revolutionary and even proBolshevik unrest in the ranks of the Czech and Slovak troops. He also had to overcome the anti-Kolchak' spirit of the troops (spread immediately after the coup), and to persuade their leaders to cooperate with the new Siberian power, as the other Allies had already done. Those believed that the Czechoslovaks should not leave Russia until their presence was no longer necessary for intervention. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak army in Russia was also essential to Prague, as it was one of the guarantors of the projected boundaries of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. The binding of Czech and Slovak troops to the new government did not happen immediately. The operative information at the end of November, 1918 was that the Czechoslovak army had no sympathy 18 See E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti) ," in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 3556. 19 GARF. F. 162. 186 SLOVAKIA for the violent upheaval at Omsk and considered the crisis unfinished and looked forward to its resolution by legal means. Among the Czechoslovak Army Corps demands arose to send these military units home. The critical attitude of the Czechoslovak army during 1919 did not change. The Kolchak government failed to recruit it for the front. Its Council of Ministers even promised to reward the Czechoslovak army in the struggle for the revival of Russia by giving it the right to acquire real estate. The general condition of Czechoslovak forces was compared in the reports with the situation in the Russian army. It was noted that Czech and Slovak officers quickly became right-wing and the rankand-file left-wing, with a gap growing between them. After General Stefanik's arrival, Admiral Kolchak, in a telegram of December 20, 1918 to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, informed him that: "General Janin has arrived, whom we expected with impatience, hoping to resolve urgent problems of command together with him and Stefanik. .. 11 20 . In our view, many complications stemmed not only from the fact that the Czech and Slovak commanders often acted (according to Kolchak) quite independently, but also that the mass of the Czech and Slovak Legionaries saw in Kolchak's government the danger of the restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order. It was no secret that the Legionnaires' political orientations were formed by the party of social revolutionaries. By tremendous persuasion General Stefanik managed to turn the Czech and Slovak troops into allies of Kolchak. In conversations with the Czech and Slovak troops, Stefanik set out to fulfill promises which were made to the Allies - to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, which the Legionnaires had captured, as well as the city of Omsk. He even had to struggle with cases of insubordination. His most radical step was to publish order Number 588 on January 16, 1919, which was announced after his departure. According to this order, the army and democracy were incompatible. Therefore, all elected committees of the Russian Army type were to be dissolved. A few days later Stefanik left Siberia, apparently due to ill health. 20 E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl 'ad (Martin, 200 I), 45-46. SLOVAKIA 187 The most detailed archival materials on Stefanik's activities in Siberia are contained in the July 3, 1919 Department of State Protection report to Kolchak's government. It covers the long period from the fall of 1918 to the summer of 1919. This report, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Russiyanov (some reports were signed by an agent nicknamed "Summer"), noted: While the Czechoslovaks had plenty of everything, and everyone was interested in them, when they felt that they were in charge, [they] did not feel homesick and forgot the drought at home. But when their position had deteriorated, and they receded into the background, discontent arose among them .. . Their commanders, wishing to suppress a rising discontent, and at the same time to constrain the demoralizing propagation of "Committees" among them, have welcomed to Russia General Stefanik, who is clothed with the authority of the Republic ... Stefanik informed them that, as of his arrival, the Czechoslovak army became a regular army of the Czechoslovak Republic. Stefanik promised that he would do everything in his power to alleviate the Czechoslovaks' situation in Siberia and to ensure their return home as soon as possible... "21 One of the representatives of Kolchak' Department of State Protection even declared that "almost without exception, all social classes have turned against the Czechoslovaks. Always it heard that the Czechoslovaks have undertaken not to work for them."22 What were the results of this Siberian tour? Almost a century later, contrary to the negative opinions regarding Stefanik's stay in Russia, 23 positive results are also evident. Stefanik helped to unite the Czechoslovak army, to increase its combat capability, and to make it a part of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. He persuaded the Legionaries to endure for a bit longer, even though they were so far from their native land. Russian sources also speak of Stefanik's merits and to his expulsion of the most Russophobe-minded members of the Czechoslovak National Council, who opposed Kolchak. 24 21 GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. L. 5806. 23 See for example, L. Holotik, "Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR" (Bratislava, 1958). 24 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 22 188 SLOVAKIA Thanks to Stefanik, many Russian troops, earlier divided over the Czechoslovak army, went over to Kolchak. Stefanik helped to smooth the friction between French General Janin and Admiral Kolchak. With Stefanik' s sudden departure from Siberia, the relationship between the Allies and Kolchak deteriorated and latent plans were nurtured about the secret withdrawal of Czechoslovak troops from the zone of Kolchak' power. Thus the fate of the Siberian governor was sealed by the Allies. Nevertheless, the Allies still continued to watch over Kolchak, for they were attracted by the Russian gold reserves 25 and an incredible desire to profit by them. They were not able to provide to the Russian government of Kolchak substantial military aid and the mission of Janin and the Allies turned from a military to a diplomatic one. In the words of G. K. Gins (whose work "Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak" has been published several times in Russia) "the consciousness of common Slavonic problems, the adherence to culture which was broken by Bolshevism - could it be understood by an ordinary Czech soldier?" 26 Stefanik was one of the few who perceived these problems and planted this understanding with another compatriot. The book of G.K. Gins, a former manager of the Kolchak government, contains the highest praise for Stefanik and his stay in Omsk. Gins concludes that the Czech Legionnaires' saga in Russia was not heroic in itself. It contributed nothing to the Slavic peoples, to Siberia or to Russia. The Czechs and Slovaks just wanted to go home. 27 In 2007 a book entitled "With Kolchak against Kolchak" appeared. This work leaves much to be desired. The section about Stefanik, for example, contains many mistakes. The name "Stefanik" on page 13 7 is distorted and the years of his life are not specified. Furthermore, it asserted that Stefanik was "ill in Siberia and moved to Czechoslovakia," and further in this book, " ... he came for the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps, and on September 2, 1920 25 RGV A, f. 1198. Dokumental 'nyje materialy po istorii sozdanija cecho-slovackogo gosudarstva. Kollekcij a. CCXIII. General Janin E. Benesu. Omsk, 29.X.1919. The document in fiarticular says: «Je provoque mesures pour transferer reserve d' orn . 6 G.K Gins., Sibir ', sojuzniki i Kolcak (Moskva, 2008), 578. 27 Ibid., 574-75 . SLOVAKIA 189 departed from Vladivostok to Czechoslovakia" 28 (but we know that Stefanik died on May 4, 1919). Most recently, valuable sources of the Russian State Military Archives (further - RGV A) relating to the national liberation struggle of Czechs and Slovaks in the First World War have become available. Of special interest are materials containing confidential correspondence (most often marked "urgent") by the Chief of Allied forces in Siberia, General Maurice Janin, with various authorities. They include numerous dispatches (intercepted by Kolchak's counterespionage) sent by Janin to the French command, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edvard Benes. An exchange of telegrams was also conducted with the commander of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. More steadfast analysis of this considerable block of archival materials still needs to be carried out. The materials reveal a lot about the role of the Allies in Siberia, and especially characterize the relationship of the Allies, General Janin and the Czechoslovak army with Kolchak's government. The RGVA block also contains some interesting materials relating to Stefanik's stay in the camp of the Czechoslovak army and Kolchak's, and Stefanik's reports to Benes. And here one can draw a general conclusion that as a military commander and as a representative of the new Czechoslovak Republic, Stefanik enjoyed unprecedented respect and trust. Estimations of Stefanik contained in Janin's dispatches are positive and respectful. In summary, we will now underline the importance of Stefanik's military missions in Russia. During his first mission, Stefanik made the break which led to Diirich's downfall and this made things easier for T. G. Masaryk, who arrived after the February revolution in 1917. The second mission in Siberia and to the Far East, appears unfinished because Stefanik's health deteriorated. However, there was also a disagreement with Maurice Janin, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Entente. As a result, Stefanik abruptly left Siberia in order to take part in the Paris Peace Conference, even though he was not officially included in the Czechoslovak delegation. He intended to use his abilities, his influence at the highest levels and his diplomatic skills to uphold Czechoslovak (and especially Slovak) affairs. The important question of the frontiers of the new state was 28 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 190 SLOVAKIA solved. And the merits of Stefanik, judging by the memoirs of representatives of Great Britain, were recognized as considerable. 29 The arrival of Stefanik strengthened the Slovak component in the argument for an independent Czecho-Slovak state. At the Paris Conference Stefanik was named "the Czech Military Minister;" he left the impression of a mobile, and in contrast to the corpulent Karel Kramai', a "vigorous and imperious figure." Those who remembered Stefanik at the Conference considered his death an "essential loss, as by temperament Stefanik was sparkling champagne compared to the Czech spirit of heavy beer." 30 oan OIOflk 27 /x 1919 Qeneralu 'lffrcr,y Irtutak Situace na f rmU lpatna. LeT' lcl'idlo T plnea 11atup11. Stl'ed a pra,e lcl'idlo 118tupuje ponolna, ~llkytujice dosU tmoUjn;f odpor, Tiak nhledea k w,tupu lwfho kfidla msi tab ustuponti. Oeobd pro tentokraty neohoTa■ perne nada j i T UBj>lohu d jaU protiofendT:y. llyslli le T bnku ae 1aane e na- kusei o.Ji:a. Poehybuji le se Tlada T pl'1paU nakuaoe O..ka udrli. ProeiA pfilalllU sacboTat1 T Anla:la pa'h.dak.Zlollllram 0.Sl. ~dy naehuejioill ae jelti T o.ku daU patr16DII roskuy k e1'8ntuelni 91'llkuao1 Genenll JANI N. Illustration I . Instructions of General Janin to General Syrovy in connection with the planned evacuation of Czechoslovak troops from Omsk (The source is from RGVA , Russia) 29 30 G. Nikolson, Kak delalsja mir v /919 g. (Moskva, 1945), 251 . Ibid. 191 SLOVAKIA OOIIII ExplldU d 'Omsk le 29 OctobN 1919. ioie franqaiae Co.wrlquer Docteur BEIIES. Retrai te continue la ga110he eat aur 1 • ICJ!Dl oo peo en annt Pl!'?ROPAil.OSKI le reete a pe11 pres de mi-chnin entre le11 2 rhieraa. Tro11pea sont tree ua4es, d4moralidee, lea r4eerres douteuses. J' 4proun Tina craintea au 11uj11t d • <IISK, qua partage je croia eal'oir l.e Comaand8J!llllt an Ohef. Je prol'oq'tll aesurea pour t r&Daf6rer r411erre d • or. Situation r6sllltant de 1· 11ffoudr81118nt du front, de 1 • 4Yacuati <11 dee ~nee et du d4sordra g4n4rali ■ d est bien diftlcile. General JANIN. Illustration 2. General Janin informs Edvard Benes about the measures taken on displacement of the Russian gold reserves (The source is from RGVA. Russia)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Military Missions of Milan R. Štefánik in Russia on Behalf of the Czech and Slovak Cause Description An account of the resource Evgeny F. Firsov Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 179-191 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Firsov, E. F. (Evgeniĭ Fedorovich) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0f7ea0d68adb60108eeba5034ecba754.pdf d6ed17f3c3fa38eeff13fd95e7a89069 PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 195 Robert M Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, I 890-1945. Selingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2010 . 329pp. Notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa In this revised Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1998), Robert M. Zecker set out to prove that Slovaks who lived in six widely dispersed neighborhoods of Philadelphia in the 20 th century formed "translocal" (p. 19) communities based upon four parish churches and about a dozen fraternal-benefit societies. The author dug deeply into census records, city directories, parish and fraternal records, supplemented by oral history interviews and published histories of Philadelphia and other ethnic groups across the United States. He showed that, even though Slovaks in Philadelphia were widely dispersed and lived among other ethnic groups, in the first two generations they socialized mostly among themselves. Indeed, they travelled great distances to attend church services on Sundays as well as fraternal meetings, dances, plays, gymnastic events and other amusements. Not only did they form translocal "imagined communities" (p.160) but they were also transconfessional because Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutherans and Marxists attended each other's events and financially supported them. Zecker also pointed out that Slovaks in Philadelphia, and elsewhere, bought into American race ideology. Thus, they stressed their "whiteness," as did other ethnic groups, by staging minstrel shows in the 1930's and 1940's and resisted the building of public housing in their neighborhoods. When they lost this fight, they followed other Americans into the suburbs. Zecker concluded that Slovaks in Philadelphia, like other ethnic groups in America, did not form compact neighborhoods of residence, but were widely dispersed. Nevertheless, they stuck together in the first two generations by attending distant church services, fraternal meetings and a wide variety of social activities. With the arrival of the 1930's New Deal, the post-war automobile boom, and the advent of television in the 1940's, Slovaks, like other Americans, began to move into the suburbs. Although the second generation remained loyal to their parents' institutions, the third generation lost �196 SLOVAKIA interest and their community institutions began to decline and disappear. This is a phenomenon facing all "older" ethnic groups in America. Since Zecker is admittedly an "outsider" to the Slovak community (p . 214), this book, like others written by American-born and educated scholars, suffers from both linguistic and factual errors. Zecker had to learn Slovak from scratch and never mastered its nuances. Thus, he mistakenly identified "Hutoraks" (it should be hutoraci) as Slovaks who originated in the vicinity of the village of "Hutka" (p.27). Instead, "hutoraci" is a pjorative term used by Central and Western Slovaks for Eastern Slovaks who do not speak (hovoria), but, rather, "hutoria" in their own dialect. He mis-translates Slovak "zupy" as "provinces," when they were counties (p.31). He misspells "okres" (district) as "okra" (p.35) and "krnotor" (godfather) as "Kumoda" (p .102). Furthermore, he misspelled and mis-translated the phrase "tu baz [mas!] vzduch" as "There's too much air in here," when it should have been "Here 's some air" (p.183), and many more such mistakes, too numerous to be listed. In addition to the above, Zecker also made some factual errors. He mis-identified the social commentator Nicholas von Hoffman as Alexander von Hoffman (pages 16 and 219); he had Lutheran pastors celebrating "Mass" and dispensing "sacraments" (p.155)! He had "Hapsburg troops" firing upon a Slovak crowd in 1907 when Hungarian gendarmes did so (p.278); he identified the Rev. Andrej Hlinka as a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament in 1907 when the latter would not become a member of the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament until 1919 (p.201 ); and he promoted brigadier-general Milan R. Stefanik into an air marshal (p.204)! The latter errors testified to Zecker' s weak knowledge of European history, which is typical of many scholars of American history. Indeed, when one searches for references to the works of scholars in Slovakia on the subject of immigration, one is disappointed. Even though Zecker went out of his way to detail the history of the tiny group of Slovak Marxists in Philadelphia, he never cited the many articles on this subject by the late Milos Gosiorovsky. Nor did he seem to be aware of the three-volume work on Slovak immigration compiled by Frantisek Bielik and others. Finally, even though Zecker presented an impressive bibliography at the end of the book, it was unorganized. Thus, he mixed up �SLOVAKIA 197 his primary sources (archives, censuses, minutes of fraternal-benefit societies, church records, etc), with secondary sources, largely on American ethnic groups and American history in general. Fortunately, he did list his oral history interviews separately but failed to identify his interviewees. While the author may have agreed with his informants not to list their full names, he never did identify the leaders of the various Slovak communities (except their priests). We are left wondering who some of the "movers and shakers" were who founded the churches and fraternal-benefit societies, the various businesses, community halls, savings and loan associations, bands, radio programs and so on. This is a weakness found in most American social histories, which stress the "common man" (and woman) but ignore the leaders. Thus, Zecker's story of the various Slovak communities in Philadelphis remains incomplete. In spite of these deficiencies, Zecker's history of Slovaks in Philadelphia is a welcome addition to the field. We now have professional histories of three Slovak communities in the United States Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, by the author of this review ( 1985); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by June Granatir Alexander (1987); and Philadelphia by Robert M. Zecker. May we soon have even more! Valerian Bystricky, Miroslav Michela, Michal Schvarc a kol., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historicke rejlexie zaniku Cesko-Slovenska. Bratislava: VEDA, 2010. 575 pp., notes, bibliography, English resume, index. STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM Department of International Studies York University, Glendon College This is an unusual volume. A title with a question mark implies an answer. However, to demand that thirty-three scholars from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland provide one is problematic, especially when each contributes a specialized examination of an issue, which may, or may not be related directly to the question. Secondly, the chapter breakdown is determined by the contributions rather than a thematic organization arising out of the title. �198 SLOVAKIA Thirdly, the book is bilingual (Slovak and Czech). Finally, all contributors share something in common, namely extensive and thorough research in archives, many hitherto inaccessible, and references to authoritative secondary sources, although, with one exception, the list is limited to Central European scholars. This review will highlight those contributions that are deemed worthy of comment either because of their interpretation, their contribution to scholarship, or their pertinence to the question in the title. In an effort to answer whether post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia (C-SR) was broken up or collapsed in 1939, the editors divided the book into five thematic chapters and an epilogue of two essays on Slovak historiography. In each chapter, different authors looked at particular issues apparently linked to the theme. The first deals with the C-SR, from October 1938 to March 1939. The focus is on foreign policy and its consequences on domestic politics, especially Slovak politics. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution by Emilia Hrabovec on the perceptions of the Holy See concerning the future of that state. In the Vatican archives she discovered how the Holy See followed with great interest and interpreted with prudence the domestic and foreign developments that led to the Slovak proclamation of independence in March of 1939 and why it gave diplomatic recognition to the first Slovak Republic. Equally interesting are the contributions by l:udovit Hallon on economic changes in Slovakia and the preponderant role played by Germany; and by Miloslav Caplovic on what happened to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces after Munich, especially the transfer of many divisions to Slovakia to protect the state against possible Hungarian and Polish military incursions. Caplovic also mentions the reorganisation that later resulted in the creation of the Armed Forces of the first Slovak Republic. Jozef Bystricky, in chapter four, offeres a detailed analysis of how this happened and also the state of the military forces that responded to Hungarian incursions after independence. The contribution by Valerian Bystricky on the foreign policy activities of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party stands out because of the absence of a contextual perspective. Bystricky bases his article on constitutional legalism to criticize the efforts of members of this party to establish foreign contacts in order to ensure the future of Slovakia when the international situation in Central Europe was deteriorating and the fate of the C-SR was uncertain. �SLOVAKIA 199 The second chapter, "Disliked by its neighbours," is on Germany and the C-SR; Slovakia and Ruthenia in the policies of Hungary and Poland; and the nationality question as a political instrument. The nine contributors provide an interesting analysis of Slovakia's relations with its neighbours at a time when its leaders sought to figure out its future and these neighbours were using the nationality question to achieve their objectives. Slovakia was not "disliked;" rather it was the object of revisionist (Hungary) or strategic policies (Germany and Poland). Most contributions, especially the one by Angela Hermann on German policy toward Slovakia, do indicate that Slovakia' s neighbours sought the break up of the C-SR. What is missing is an assessment on how the C-SR and Slovak politicians reacted to the political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvring that took place after October 1938. Hermann ' s contribution makes clear that Slovak leaders understood the realities of power in Central Europe, but also their own responsibility to their nation. The third chapter has eight contributions on "The March events of 1939." Half offer a study of external reactions to these events; the other half look at specific domestic events or attitudes around the 14 March proclamation. One can learn what the German press, British scholarship, or Americans of Czech and Slovak background thought of these events. The latter contribution by Frantisek Hanzlik is, however, very superficial , especially with regards to Slovak Americans. Regarding domestic events, Zlatica Zudova-Leskova ' s examination of the emergency measures of l O March is most atypical. Both in tone and content, it is a strident attack on those who do not see these measures as a legitimate response by C-SR authorities to protect the integrity of that state. In marked contrast, Robert Letz ' s study of the attitude of the Catholic Church and its episcopate in Slovakia toward the March events offers a sophisticated glimpse of the interplay of religion, politics, hierarchy, and the need for public order at a time of constitutional change and foreign political and ideological pressure. A limited sociological examination of the general Slovak reaction is found in the presentation by Martin Hetenyi on the Nitra region. "The beginnings of the Slovak State" constitutes the theme of the fourth chapter. It brings together contributions that deal with the formation of the political system; the independence of the judiciary as seen by the leading political party in Slovakia in 1938-1939; the formation of the Slovak Armed Forces; and the departure of Czech sol- �200 SLOVAKIA diers from Slovakia after independence. The first two contributions, especially the one by Igor Baka, focus on those elements in the political system emanating from the policies of the regime that, according to the two authors, show the creation of a totalitarian state in Slovakia after March 1939. That the first Slovak Republic became a one-party state is beyond dispute; to conclude, however, that it became totalitarian is to ignore the international and comparative context (with other states at that time or the later Communist one) and the essence of political life in Slovakia, whatever the constitutional or administrative system. Scholarship is not served by approaching this subject with a conceptual bias (i .e. if it was not democratic, then it had to be totalitarian), as these two contributions do. Finally, the two bibliographical contributions in the epilogue make a major contribution to Slovak historiography. Both outline the problems Slovak historiography has had and continues to have, which the essays in this volume reflect. The variety of views and the disparity of approaches in this book would have been better served with the title: Break-up and Collapse, a title, which the contributions underlie and with which every serious scholar specializing in the topic would concur. This volume contributes to a broader understanding of that period but does not help resolve the debates around it. Slovak scholarship still has a long way to go. Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, Zandar troch rei imov alebo Slovenske dejiny 20. storocia z ineho pohl'adu. Gustav Polcik a jeho slui ba v Prievidzi v rokoch 1942-1972. Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2011. xliv-334 pp. , notes, illustrations, bibliography, abbreviations, index. YESHA YAHU JELINEK Beer-Sheva, Israel Prievidza, the home-town of the hero of this monograph (and also of the author of this review), lies in the upper Nitra river valley. At the beginning of World War II, it had about 5,000 inhabitants. Industrialization and more intensive coal mining during the communist era boosted the population to about thirty thousand today. Since the �SLOVAKIA 201 days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prievidza boasted a Gendarme (police) station, which served about twenty villages and townships. Between five and ten Gendarmes served there, but came from elsewhere. A bachelor Gendarme was forbidden to marry for the first four years of his service, and especially not to a local woman. The Gendarme was expected to become closely acquainted with the locality, its people, and culture. However, he was also supposed to be neutral in political matters, and not to join any political parties. The latter regulation was changed during the communist era, when all Gendarmes were expected to join the Communist Party and to enforce its rule. As he related to the compilers of this book, Gustav Polcik arrived in Prievidza as a Gendarme in the summer of 1942. Four years later he married his village sweetheart and had two daughters with her. The family was apparently very proud of its Gendarme son, as the many photographs of him in his uniform attest. The job guaranteed him a good salary and respect. It was a major move up the social ladder for a village boy. When Polcik retired in 1972, he had reached the rank of major, which was testimony to a successful career in the service of his people in the city of Prievidza. It is not easy to review a perspective "from the other side," as the authors/editors of this book titled it. After all, Polcik served three ruling regimes. During the years of the Holocaust, Polcik carried out the official policies of the Slovak Republic, which was allied with Nazi Germany. One of them was to deport Slovak Jews to Poland, where they were exterminated by the Germans. Although Polcik claimed that, because he had arrived in Prievidza in the summer of 1942, the Jews had already been expelled (p.94), this is not credible. The last transport of Jews from that locality left in October of 1942. Nora Kellerman, a Prievidza friend and neighbour of the author of this review described the deportation of her father thus : "Suddenly, two men arrived, a Gendarme and a Hlinka Guard (the Hlinka Guard was a paramilitary force of the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party), they gave father ten minutes to pack his belongings, he kissed us and they escorted him out. I was six years old and never saw my father again." Clearly, the Gendarmes executed the orders of the government in Bratislava. Polcik admitted throughout the book that he faithfully executed orders from above. All Gendarmes were trained to do this, even dur- �202 SLOVAKIA ing the first Czechoslovak Republic. During the communist period, even though he joined the Party, he sometimes sought to avoid enforcing unpleasant orders with various ruses. Often he convinced himself that the orders were wrong. He did admit that many times the orders gnawed at his conscience. In these instances he sought to avoid carrying them out, but without harm to himself. A good example of Polcik's reasoning and actions was when he was assigned to serve on the Italian front in 1944. He did not want to go and sought out the commander of the Gendarmerie in Slovakia, Colonel Timotheus lstok, who happened to come from his native village, and who was friendly with his parents. In spite of being received by lstok, the orders were not changed. Therefore, Polcik decided to desert to the local partisans (guerrillas), whom he knew, and had assisted in various ways. Ironically, the government bureaucracy continued to pay his wages while he was in active opposition to the regime! Once the war had ended, Polcik emerged as a resistance fighter and his career continued to blossom. When the Communists seized power in 1948, Polcik joined the Party and continued his climb upward. He even became head of the local Hunter's Association and assisted the Prievidza Communists, who were poorly-educated, to write their reports in his beautiful handwriting. He could also type and, thus, was privy to all the secret reports sent by the government in Bratislava. He always sought to help those whom he could, and to not make any enemies. He was also a non-drinker, which kept him out of trouble. When all is said and done, what we have here is the life history of an opportunistic public servant, interested above all in his advancement. Therefore, by being very careful, he was able to survive the frequently changing regimes and governments in his homeland. Polcik survived and advanced because he understood how to manage himself in every situation. This book gives us a good insight into the political life of Slovakia over thirty years and how some of the people, like the Gendarme Gustav Polcik, successfully adjusted to three very different political regimes. �SLOVAKIA 203 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov do ZSSR 1945-194 7. Bratislava: Goralinga, 2011. 340pp. appendices, charts, bibliography, resumes. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto At the close of World War II, world leaders seemed determined to try to create a new political order that, hopefully, would preclude catastrophic conflicts of the kind they had just experienced. Many statesmen felt that national minorities and the ideology of integral nationalism were among the main causes leading to World War II . Therefore, in an attempt to correct this situation, many governments set out to adjust ethnographic boundaries to state boundaries. There were several ways in which this might be achieved: a change in international borders; national assimilation of minority groups; physical extermination; or resettlement. Population resettlement became an acceptable and favored political solution at the time. The most monumental example of this approach was the displacement of millions of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia to create the new states of India and Pakistan. Postwar Europe also engaged in population resettlement, the best known case being the expulsion in 1946-1947 of over six million Germans (3 .2 million from Poland and three million from Czechoslovakia) and their resettlement in the various occupation zones of postwar Germany. Smaller in scale and much less known were the population exchanges between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. These took place in two phases. When, in June 1945 , Czechoslovakia formally ceded its pre-Munich eastern province of Subcarpathian Rus' to the Soviet Union, a protocol to the treaty provided for the right of persons of Slovak and Czech nationality resident in Subcarpathian Rus '/Transcarpathian Ukraine to resettle in postwar Czechoslovakia, and for the right of persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality in Czechoslovakia- specifically from "districts (okresy) in Slovakia"to resettle in the Soviet Union. Technically, these populations were being given "the right to opt" (prava opcie) for either Czechoslovak �204 SLOVAKIA or Soviet citizenship, a status which would allow them to resettle permanently in one or the other country. The second phase came as a result of an accord signed in October of 1946, according to which persons of Czech and Slovak nationality living in the Soviet Union (specifically the Volhynia region of Soviet Ukraine) were to be resettled to Czechoslovakia in exchange for persons of Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusan nationality in Czechoslovakia who were to be resettled in the Soviet Union. Despite the various nationalities listed in the treaty, in practice the populations in question were only two : Czechs, who in the nineteenth century had emigrated to what was then the province of Volhynia in the Russian Empire; and Carpatho-Rusyns (Rusnaks), who since their first appearance in the early Middle Ages inhabited relatively compact areas in northeastern Slovakia. The numbers in both phases were relatively small-about 25 ,000 persons to Czechoslovakia as a result of the 1945 treaty; followed by 40,000 persons to Czechoslovakia and 12,000 to Soviet Ukraine as a result of the 1946 treaty. The latter exchange was known as the Volhynian Operation/Volynska akcia and was carried out in 1947. The story of the two Czechoslovak-Soviet population exchanges is the subject of this book by Michal Smigel, an associate professor of history at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, and Stefan Krusko, a writer and civic activist whose family had opted to go to Soviet Ukraine in 1947 and who later "re-opted" back to Czechoslovakia. Aside from the details of the actual resettlement process between 1945 and 1947, the authors devote the third and last chapter of their book to the fate of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyns from northeastern Slovakia who voluntarily opted for the Soviet Union. No sooner had the transports arrived in the Soviet Union in the spring of 194 7, than did the newcomers from Czechoslovakia realize they had made a mistake. Many wanted immediately to go back home, but there was no leaving the "Soviet paradise." The very thought of doing so could- and did- result in arrests and imprisonment during the height of Stalinist repressive rule. Thus began what turned out to be decades of struggle on the part of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyn "exiles" in Soviet Volhynia to return to their Carpathian homeland. In the interim, the children born "in exile" were educated in Ukrainian, while their parents proceeded to claim that they were "Slovaks" (and were generally described as such by local Ukraini- �SLOVAKIA 205 ans) in an effort to justify their legal right to return to Czechoslovakia. Beginning in the 1960s, a small but gradually increasing number of families managed to leave Volhynia, settling first in Soviet Transcarpathia, from where some managed to return to Czechoslovakia. The process of return was long and complicated, however, and it did not end until the 1990s, when ironically it was connected with the world's first prominently publicized nuclear disaster. Looking for an excuse to justify the entry for "immigrants" from the east, Slovakia passed a law which allowed for the return of its former citizens from what was described as "the zone [including Volhynia] affected by the Chornobyl nuclear disaster." The homecoming for the reoptanty (those who opted to return) was often far from ideal. Most did not return to their native villages, since local residents-and even family members- were suspicious of people who in 1947 had left for the Soviet east as "Rusnaks," who came back as "Slovaks," often speaking Ukrainian, and who consequently were viewed by their former neighbors as "Russians" (rusky), an epithet that in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was, to say the least, not a positive one. Nevertheless, the reoptanty, in particular children who left with their parents or who were born in Ukraine, eventually did well after their return to Czechoslovakia. Some found employment in the various Ukrainian minority cultural institutions in Presov that were liberally funded in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. Most, however, assimilated into Slovak society in a conscious effort to distance themselves from the East. Among the best known of the reoptanty was Peter Bondra. He was born in Soviet Ukraine to Carpatho-Rusyn parents, who in 1947 were settled in the Soviet Union, but who returned in the 1970s to Slovakia, where Peter was raised and where he learned a new skill- hockey. This allowed him later in life to "re-emigrate," this time to the United States, where he became a star in the National Hockey League. Smigel and Krusko have done an excellent job in describing the fascinating tale of one aspect of post-World War II demographic engineering in central and eastern Europe. The narrative is interspersed with statistical charts and historic photographs . Included as well are several appendices: the full texts of the 1945 and 1946 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties, accompanying protocols, and instructions for implementation; detailed charts with data on the 194 7 population �206 SLOVAKIA exchanges; an extensive bibliography of archival and secondary sources; and resumes in English and Russian. M. Mark Stolarik, compiler and editor, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. Mundelein, Ill. : Bolchazy-Carducci, 2010 . xxxiv-305 pp ., notes, photos, index, hard and soft cover. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University Salisbury, Maryland This book is based on the proceedings of a conference held at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2008 . M. Mark Stolarik, who holds the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at that institution, organized the meeting, compiled and edited the papers, as well as contributed most of the photographs. He also wrote the Introduction in which he offered his personal reminiscences of those August days as he witnessed the invasion, the largest military action in Europe since the Second World War. His Introduction gives a brief overview of the subsequent papers and commentaries, and includes excellent footnotes providing first-rate bibliographic material covering the subject. He concludes the Introduction with an almost two-year chronology of the "Prague Spring," from October of 1967 to September of 1969, to better orient the reader. The authors of the papers and commentaries are a Who's Who of specialists on East Central Europe. Participants from countries of the former Warsaw Pact wrote the papers based largely on archival investigations: Mikhail V. Latysh (USSR), Jan Rychlik (Czech Republic), Slavomir Michalek and Stanislav Sikora (Slovakia), Lukasz Kaminski (Poland), Rudiger Wenzke (East Germany), Ivana Skalova (Bulgaria), Csaba Bekes (Hungary), and Drago~ Petrescu (Romania). Americans and Canadians who presented commentaries include: Matthew J. Ouimet (USSR), Michael Kraus (Czech Republic ), Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (Slovakia), Piotr Wrobel (Poland), Gary Bruce (East Germany), Mark Kramer (Bulgaria), Peter Pastor (Hungary), and Monica Ciobranu (Romania). At the end of the text, before the �SLOVAKIA 207 index, Stolarik included "Notes on Contributors," which gives basic biographical information on the participants. The reader will find many interesting and largely hitherto unknown facts available in the standard works on the subject. For example, at the last minute, the Soviet Union would not allow East Germany to participate in the invasion for fear that it would bring back horrifying memories of the Nazi dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Yet, until its dying days, the East German government, which wholeheartedly supported the invasion, and early on argued for its implementation, perpetuated the myth that it was an active participant. Another, perhaps more striking example, would be the claim by Soviet General G. Yashkin that Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces , ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in early May of 1968, only to reverse his decision several minutes later. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhikov, uneasy over events in Czechoslovakia by early spring of 1968, insisted that he be present at the negotiations with Czechoslovakia and pressed for an early solution, despite the fact that Bulgaria had no common border with Czechoslovakia. Yet, after his fall from power, Zhivkov denied any wrongdoing, but instead insisted that he supported the reforms and reluctantly agreed to support the invasion. Whereas Bekes presents Hungarian leader Janos Kadar in a sympathetic light as a grand compromiser, Pastor sees him instead using double speak for domestic consumption. On a more humorous note, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, an early proponent for intervention, intensely disliked Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and consistently changed the "b" in his name to a "p", thereby rendering his surname in Polish to be an unmentionable part of the human anatomy in polite society. Constraints of space will not allow a discussion of the individual papers and commentaries. However, of particular note is the attention paid to Romania. This member of the Warsaw Pact neither participated in the discussions leading to nor took part in the invasion itself. Nonetheless, as most are aware, the Romanian regime outwardly supported the reforms and then vehemently attacked the invasion. Although Petrescu's piece is more of a political science approach than the other contributions, he makes a persuasive argument that the invasion provided legitimacy and popular support for Ceau~escu' s rise to power after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu- �208 SLOVAKIA Dej. Ceau~escu would never be as popular as he was in August of 1968, when he unified and rallied the country. However, once firmly in control, he ended economic liberalization and ideological relaxation and became more autocratic, relying on his famil y members for support, which eventually led to his demise in 1989. The Soviets ultimately misjudged popular reaction to the 1968 invasion. Petrescu has included an excellent quote from the Romanian dictator that prophetically summed up the results of the invasion, "In my opinion, a big and tragic mistake, with heavy consequences upon the fate of the unity of the socialist system and the international communist and workers movement occurred (252-53)." In short, the invasion mortally wounded the Eastern Bloc 's experiment with Communism. It showed that it could not be a viable alternative to liberal democracy and market economics. This volume is a fine addition to our knowledge of the events of the Prague Spring. Some of the information may be a bit too scholarly for the general reader, but, it is an up-to-date work based on research in archives and other sources opened after 1989. It is a must read for anyone interested in the topic. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 195 Robert M Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, I 890-1945. Selingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2010 . 329pp. Notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa In this revised Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1998), Robert M. Zecker set out to prove that Slovaks who lived in six widely dispersed neighborhoods of Philadelphia in the 20 th century formed "translocal" (p. 19) communities based upon four parish churches and about a dozen fraternal-benefit societies. The author dug deeply into census records, city directories, parish and fraternal records, supplemented by oral history interviews and published histories of Philadelphia and other ethnic groups across the United States. He showed that, even though Slovaks in Philadelphia were widely dispersed and lived among other ethnic groups, in the first two generations they socialized mostly among themselves. Indeed, they travelled great distances to attend church services on Sundays as well as fraternal meetings, dances, plays, gymnastic events and other amusements. Not only did they form translocal "imagined communities" (p.160) but they were also transconfessional because Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutherans and Marxists attended each other's events and financially supported them. Zecker also pointed out that Slovaks in Philadelphia, and elsewhere, bought into American race ideology. Thus, they stressed their "whiteness," as did other ethnic groups, by staging minstrel shows in the 1930's and 1940's and resisted the building of public housing in their neighborhoods. When they lost this fight, they followed other Americans into the suburbs. Zecker concluded that Slovaks in Philadelphia, like other ethnic groups in America, did not form compact neighborhoods of residence, but were widely dispersed. Nevertheless, they stuck together in the first two generations by attending distant church services, fraternal meetings and a wide variety of social activities. With the arrival of the 1930's New Deal, the post-war automobile boom, and the advent of television in the 1940's, Slovaks, like other Americans, began to move into the suburbs. Although the second generation remained loyal to their parents' institutions, the third generation lost �196 SLOVAKIA interest and their community institutions began to decline and disappear. This is a phenomenon facing all "older" ethnic groups in America. Since Zecker is admittedly an "outsider" to the Slovak community (p . 214), this book, like others written by American-born and educated scholars, suffers from both linguistic and factual errors. Zecker had to learn Slovak from scratch and never mastered its nuances. Thus, he mistakenly identified "Hutoraks" (it should be hutoraci) as Slovaks who originated in the vicinity of the village of "Hutka" (p.27). Instead, "hutoraci" is a pjorative term used by Central and Western Slovaks for Eastern Slovaks who do not speak (hovoria), but, rather, "hutoria" in their own dialect. He mis-translates Slovak "zupy" as "provinces," when they were counties (p.31). He misspells "okres" (district) as "okra" (p.35) and "krnotor" (godfather) as "Kumoda" (p .102). Furthermore, he misspelled and mis-translated the phrase "tu baz [mas!] vzduch" as "There's too much air in here," when it should have been "Here 's some air" (p.183), and many more such mistakes, too numerous to be listed. In addition to the above, Zecker also made some factual errors. He mis-identified the social commentator Nicholas von Hoffman as Alexander von Hoffman (pages 16 and 219); he had Lutheran pastors celebrating "Mass" and dispensing "sacraments" (p.155)! He had "Hapsburg troops" firing upon a Slovak crowd in 1907 when Hungarian gendarmes did so (p.278); he identified the Rev. Andrej Hlinka as a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament in 1907 when the latter would not become a member of the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament until 1919 (p.201 ); and he promoted brigadier-general Milan R. Stefanik into an air marshal (p.204)! The latter errors testified to Zecker' s weak knowledge of European history, which is typical of many scholars of American history. Indeed, when one searches for references to the works of scholars in Slovakia on the subject of immigration, one is disappointed. Even though Zecker went out of his way to detail the history of the tiny group of Slovak Marxists in Philadelphia, he never cited the many articles on this subject by the late Milos Gosiorovsky. Nor did he seem to be aware of the three-volume work on Slovak immigration compiled by Frantisek Bielik and others. Finally, even though Zecker presented an impressive bibliography at the end of the book, it was unorganized. Thus, he mixed up �SLOVAKIA 197 his primary sources (archives, censuses, minutes of fraternal-benefit societies, church records, etc), with secondary sources, largely on American ethnic groups and American history in general. Fortunately, he did list his oral history interviews separately but failed to identify his interviewees. While the author may have agreed with his informants not to list their full names, he never did identify the leaders of the various Slovak communities (except their priests). We are left wondering who some of the "movers and shakers" were who founded the churches and fraternal-benefit societies, the various businesses, community halls, savings and loan associations, bands, radio programs and so on. This is a weakness found in most American social histories, which stress the "common man" (and woman) but ignore the leaders. Thus, Zecker's story of the various Slovak communities in Philadelphis remains incomplete. In spite of these deficiencies, Zecker's history of Slovaks in Philadelphia is a welcome addition to the field. We now have professional histories of three Slovak communities in the United States Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, by the author of this review ( 1985); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by June Granatir Alexander (1987); and Philadelphia by Robert M. Zecker. May we soon have even more! Valerian Bystricky, Miroslav Michela, Michal Schvarc a kol., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historicke rejlexie zaniku Cesko-Slovenska. Bratislava: VEDA, 2010. 575 pp., notes, bibliography, English resume, index. STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM Department of International Studies York University, Glendon College This is an unusual volume. A title with a question mark implies an answer. However, to demand that thirty-three scholars from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland provide one is problematic, especially when each contributes a specialized examination of an issue, which may, or may not be related directly to the question. Secondly, the chapter breakdown is determined by the contributions rather than a thematic organization arising out of the title. �198 SLOVAKIA Thirdly, the book is bilingual (Slovak and Czech). Finally, all contributors share something in common, namely extensive and thorough research in archives, many hitherto inaccessible, and references to authoritative secondary sources, although, with one exception, the list is limited to Central European scholars. This review will highlight those contributions that are deemed worthy of comment either because of their interpretation, their contribution to scholarship, or their pertinence to the question in the title. In an effort to answer whether post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia (C-SR) was broken up or collapsed in 1939, the editors divided the book into five thematic chapters and an epilogue of two essays on Slovak historiography. In each chapter, different authors looked at particular issues apparently linked to the theme. The first deals with the C-SR, from October 1938 to March 1939. The focus is on foreign policy and its consequences on domestic politics, especially Slovak politics. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution by Emilia Hrabovec on the perceptions of the Holy See concerning the future of that state. In the Vatican archives she discovered how the Holy See followed with great interest and interpreted with prudence the domestic and foreign developments that led to the Slovak proclamation of independence in March of 1939 and why it gave diplomatic recognition to the first Slovak Republic. Equally interesting are the contributions by l:udovit Hallon on economic changes in Slovakia and the preponderant role played by Germany; and by Miloslav Caplovic on what happened to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces after Munich, especially the transfer of many divisions to Slovakia to protect the state against possible Hungarian and Polish military incursions. Caplovic also mentions the reorganisation that later resulted in the creation of the Armed Forces of the first Slovak Republic. Jozef Bystricky, in chapter four, offeres a detailed analysis of how this happened and also the state of the military forces that responded to Hungarian incursions after independence. The contribution by Valerian Bystricky on the foreign policy activities of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party stands out because of the absence of a contextual perspective. Bystricky bases his article on constitutional legalism to criticize the efforts of members of this party to establish foreign contacts in order to ensure the future of Slovakia when the international situation in Central Europe was deteriorating and the fate of the C-SR was uncertain. �SLOVAKIA 199 The second chapter, "Disliked by its neighbours," is on Germany and the C-SR; Slovakia and Ruthenia in the policies of Hungary and Poland; and the nationality question as a political instrument. The nine contributors provide an interesting analysis of Slovakia's relations with its neighbours at a time when its leaders sought to figure out its future and these neighbours were using the nationality question to achieve their objectives. Slovakia was not "disliked;" rather it was the object of revisionist (Hungary) or strategic policies (Germany and Poland). Most contributions, especially the one by Angela Hermann on German policy toward Slovakia, do indicate that Slovakia' s neighbours sought the break up of the C-SR. What is missing is an assessment on how the C-SR and Slovak politicians reacted to the political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvring that took place after October 1938. Hermann ' s contribution makes clear that Slovak leaders understood the realities of power in Central Europe, but also their own responsibility to their nation. The third chapter has eight contributions on "The March events of 1939." Half offer a study of external reactions to these events; the other half look at specific domestic events or attitudes around the 14 March proclamation. One can learn what the German press, British scholarship, or Americans of Czech and Slovak background thought of these events. The latter contribution by Frantisek Hanzlik is, however, very superficial , especially with regards to Slovak Americans. Regarding domestic events, Zlatica Zudova-Leskova ' s examination of the emergency measures of l O March is most atypical. Both in tone and content, it is a strident attack on those who do not see these measures as a legitimate response by C-SR authorities to protect the integrity of that state. In marked contrast, Robert Letz ' s study of the attitude of the Catholic Church and its episcopate in Slovakia toward the March events offers a sophisticated glimpse of the interplay of religion, politics, hierarchy, and the need for public order at a time of constitutional change and foreign political and ideological pressure. A limited sociological examination of the general Slovak reaction is found in the presentation by Martin Hetenyi on the Nitra region. "The beginnings of the Slovak State" constitutes the theme of the fourth chapter. It brings together contributions that deal with the formation of the political system; the independence of the judiciary as seen by the leading political party in Slovakia in 1938-1939; the formation of the Slovak Armed Forces; and the departure of Czech sol- �200 SLOVAKIA diers from Slovakia after independence. The first two contributions, especially the one by Igor Baka, focus on those elements in the political system emanating from the policies of the regime that, according to the two authors, show the creation of a totalitarian state in Slovakia after March 1939. That the first Slovak Republic became a one-party state is beyond dispute; to conclude, however, that it became totalitarian is to ignore the international and comparative context (with other states at that time or the later Communist one) and the essence of political life in Slovakia, whatever the constitutional or administrative system. Scholarship is not served by approaching this subject with a conceptual bias (i .e. if it was not democratic, then it had to be totalitarian), as these two contributions do. Finally, the two bibliographical contributions in the epilogue make a major contribution to Slovak historiography. Both outline the problems Slovak historiography has had and continues to have, which the essays in this volume reflect. The variety of views and the disparity of approaches in this book would have been better served with the title: Break-up and Collapse, a title, which the contributions underlie and with which every serious scholar specializing in the topic would concur. This volume contributes to a broader understanding of that period but does not help resolve the debates around it. Slovak scholarship still has a long way to go. Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, Zandar troch rei imov alebo Slovenske dejiny 20. storocia z ineho pohl'adu. Gustav Polcik a jeho slui ba v Prievidzi v rokoch 1942-1972. Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2011. xliv-334 pp. , notes, illustrations, bibliography, abbreviations, index. YESHA YAHU JELINEK Beer-Sheva, Israel Prievidza, the home-town of the hero of this monograph (and also of the author of this review), lies in the upper Nitra river valley. At the beginning of World War II, it had about 5,000 inhabitants. Industrialization and more intensive coal mining during the communist era boosted the population to about thirty thousand today. Since the �SLOVAKIA 201 days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prievidza boasted a Gendarme (police) station, which served about twenty villages and townships. Between five and ten Gendarmes served there, but came from elsewhere. A bachelor Gendarme was forbidden to marry for the first four years of his service, and especially not to a local woman. The Gendarme was expected to become closely acquainted with the locality, its people, and culture. However, he was also supposed to be neutral in political matters, and not to join any political parties. The latter regulation was changed during the communist era, when all Gendarmes were expected to join the Communist Party and to enforce its rule. As he related to the compilers of this book, Gustav Polcik arrived in Prievidza as a Gendarme in the summer of 1942. Four years later he married his village sweetheart and had two daughters with her. The family was apparently very proud of its Gendarme son, as the many photographs of him in his uniform attest. The job guaranteed him a good salary and respect. It was a major move up the social ladder for a village boy. When Polcik retired in 1972, he had reached the rank of major, which was testimony to a successful career in the service of his people in the city of Prievidza. It is not easy to review a perspective "from the other side," as the authors/editors of this book titled it. After all, Polcik served three ruling regimes. During the years of the Holocaust, Polcik carried out the official policies of the Slovak Republic, which was allied with Nazi Germany. One of them was to deport Slovak Jews to Poland, where they were exterminated by the Germans. Although Polcik claimed that, because he had arrived in Prievidza in the summer of 1942, the Jews had already been expelled (p.94), this is not credible. The last transport of Jews from that locality left in October of 1942. Nora Kellerman, a Prievidza friend and neighbour of the author of this review described the deportation of her father thus : "Suddenly, two men arrived, a Gendarme and a Hlinka Guard (the Hlinka Guard was a paramilitary force of the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party), they gave father ten minutes to pack his belongings, he kissed us and they escorted him out. I was six years old and never saw my father again." Clearly, the Gendarmes executed the orders of the government in Bratislava. Polcik admitted throughout the book that he faithfully executed orders from above. All Gendarmes were trained to do this, even dur- �202 SLOVAKIA ing the first Czechoslovak Republic. During the communist period, even though he joined the Party, he sometimes sought to avoid enforcing unpleasant orders with various ruses. Often he convinced himself that the orders were wrong. He did admit that many times the orders gnawed at his conscience. In these instances he sought to avoid carrying them out, but without harm to himself. A good example of Polcik's reasoning and actions was when he was assigned to serve on the Italian front in 1944. He did not want to go and sought out the commander of the Gendarmerie in Slovakia, Colonel Timotheus lstok, who happened to come from his native village, and who was friendly with his parents. In spite of being received by lstok, the orders were not changed. Therefore, Polcik decided to desert to the local partisans (guerrillas), whom he knew, and had assisted in various ways. Ironically, the government bureaucracy continued to pay his wages while he was in active opposition to the regime! Once the war had ended, Polcik emerged as a resistance fighter and his career continued to blossom. When the Communists seized power in 1948, Polcik joined the Party and continued his climb upward. He even became head of the local Hunter's Association and assisted the Prievidza Communists, who were poorly-educated, to write their reports in his beautiful handwriting. He could also type and, thus, was privy to all the secret reports sent by the government in Bratislava. He always sought to help those whom he could, and to not make any enemies. He was also a non-drinker, which kept him out of trouble. When all is said and done, what we have here is the life history of an opportunistic public servant, interested above all in his advancement. Therefore, by being very careful, he was able to survive the frequently changing regimes and governments in his homeland. Polcik survived and advanced because he understood how to manage himself in every situation. This book gives us a good insight into the political life of Slovakia over thirty years and how some of the people, like the Gendarme Gustav Polcik, successfully adjusted to three very different political regimes. �SLOVAKIA 203 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov do ZSSR 1945-194 7. Bratislava: Goralinga, 2011. 340pp. appendices, charts, bibliography, resumes. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto At the close of World War II, world leaders seemed determined to try to create a new political order that, hopefully, would preclude catastrophic conflicts of the kind they had just experienced. Many statesmen felt that national minorities and the ideology of integral nationalism were among the main causes leading to World War II . Therefore, in an attempt to correct this situation, many governments set out to adjust ethnographic boundaries to state boundaries. There were several ways in which this might be achieved: a change in international borders; national assimilation of minority groups; physical extermination; or resettlement. Population resettlement became an acceptable and favored political solution at the time. The most monumental example of this approach was the displacement of millions of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia to create the new states of India and Pakistan. Postwar Europe also engaged in population resettlement, the best known case being the expulsion in 1946-1947 of over six million Germans (3 .2 million from Poland and three million from Czechoslovakia) and their resettlement in the various occupation zones of postwar Germany. Smaller in scale and much less known were the population exchanges between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. These took place in two phases. When, in June 1945 , Czechoslovakia formally ceded its pre-Munich eastern province of Subcarpathian Rus' to the Soviet Union, a protocol to the treaty provided for the right of persons of Slovak and Czech nationality resident in Subcarpathian Rus '/Transcarpathian Ukraine to resettle in postwar Czechoslovakia, and for the right of persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality in Czechoslovakia- specifically from "districts (okresy) in Slovakia"to resettle in the Soviet Union. Technically, these populations were being given "the right to opt" (prava opcie) for either Czechoslovak �204 SLOVAKIA or Soviet citizenship, a status which would allow them to resettle permanently in one or the other country. The second phase came as a result of an accord signed in October of 1946, according to which persons of Czech and Slovak nationality living in the Soviet Union (specifically the Volhynia region of Soviet Ukraine) were to be resettled to Czechoslovakia in exchange for persons of Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusan nationality in Czechoslovakia who were to be resettled in the Soviet Union. Despite the various nationalities listed in the treaty, in practice the populations in question were only two : Czechs, who in the nineteenth century had emigrated to what was then the province of Volhynia in the Russian Empire; and Carpatho-Rusyns (Rusnaks), who since their first appearance in the early Middle Ages inhabited relatively compact areas in northeastern Slovakia. The numbers in both phases were relatively small-about 25 ,000 persons to Czechoslovakia as a result of the 1945 treaty; followed by 40,000 persons to Czechoslovakia and 12,000 to Soviet Ukraine as a result of the 1946 treaty. The latter exchange was known as the Volhynian Operation/Volynska akcia and was carried out in 1947. The story of the two Czechoslovak-Soviet population exchanges is the subject of this book by Michal Smigel, an associate professor of history at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, and Stefan Krusko, a writer and civic activist whose family had opted to go to Soviet Ukraine in 1947 and who later "re-opted" back to Czechoslovakia. Aside from the details of the actual resettlement process between 1945 and 1947, the authors devote the third and last chapter of their book to the fate of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyns from northeastern Slovakia who voluntarily opted for the Soviet Union. No sooner had the transports arrived in the Soviet Union in the spring of 194 7, than did the newcomers from Czechoslovakia realize they had made a mistake. Many wanted immediately to go back home, but there was no leaving the "Soviet paradise." The very thought of doing so could- and did- result in arrests and imprisonment during the height of Stalinist repressive rule. Thus began what turned out to be decades of struggle on the part of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyn "exiles" in Soviet Volhynia to return to their Carpathian homeland. In the interim, the children born "in exile" were educated in Ukrainian, while their parents proceeded to claim that they were "Slovaks" (and were generally described as such by local Ukraini- �SLOVAKIA 205 ans) in an effort to justify their legal right to return to Czechoslovakia. Beginning in the 1960s, a small but gradually increasing number of families managed to leave Volhynia, settling first in Soviet Transcarpathia, from where some managed to return to Czechoslovakia. The process of return was long and complicated, however, and it did not end until the 1990s, when ironically it was connected with the world's first prominently publicized nuclear disaster. Looking for an excuse to justify the entry for "immigrants" from the east, Slovakia passed a law which allowed for the return of its former citizens from what was described as "the zone [including Volhynia] affected by the Chornobyl nuclear disaster." The homecoming for the reoptanty (those who opted to return) was often far from ideal. Most did not return to their native villages, since local residents-and even family members- were suspicious of people who in 1947 had left for the Soviet east as "Rusnaks," who came back as "Slovaks," often speaking Ukrainian, and who consequently were viewed by their former neighbors as "Russians" (rusky), an epithet that in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was, to say the least, not a positive one. Nevertheless, the reoptanty, in particular children who left with their parents or who were born in Ukraine, eventually did well after their return to Czechoslovakia. Some found employment in the various Ukrainian minority cultural institutions in Presov that were liberally funded in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. Most, however, assimilated into Slovak society in a conscious effort to distance themselves from the East. Among the best known of the reoptanty was Peter Bondra. He was born in Soviet Ukraine to Carpatho-Rusyn parents, who in 1947 were settled in the Soviet Union, but who returned in the 1970s to Slovakia, where Peter was raised and where he learned a new skill- hockey. This allowed him later in life to "re-emigrate," this time to the United States, where he became a star in the National Hockey League. Smigel and Krusko have done an excellent job in describing the fascinating tale of one aspect of post-World War II demographic engineering in central and eastern Europe. The narrative is interspersed with statistical charts and historic photographs . Included as well are several appendices: the full texts of the 1945 and 1946 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties, accompanying protocols, and instructions for implementation; detailed charts with data on the 194 7 population �206 SLOVAKIA exchanges; an extensive bibliography of archival and secondary sources; and resumes in English and Russian. M. Mark Stolarik, compiler and editor, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. Mundelein, Ill. : Bolchazy-Carducci, 2010 . xxxiv-305 pp ., notes, photos, index, hard and soft cover. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University Salisbury, Maryland This book is based on the proceedings of a conference held at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2008 . M. Mark Stolarik, who holds the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at that institution, organized the meeting, compiled and edited the papers, as well as contributed most of the photographs. He also wrote the Introduction in which he offered his personal reminiscences of those August days as he witnessed the invasion, the largest military action in Europe since the Second World War. His Introduction gives a brief overview of the subsequent papers and commentaries, and includes excellent footnotes providing first-rate bibliographic material covering the subject. He concludes the Introduction with an almost two-year chronology of the "Prague Spring," from October of 1967 to September of 1969, to better orient the reader. The authors of the papers and commentaries are a Who's Who of specialists on East Central Europe. Participants from countries of the former Warsaw Pact wrote the papers based largely on archival investigations: Mikhail V. Latysh (USSR), Jan Rychlik (Czech Republic), Slavomir Michalek and Stanislav Sikora (Slovakia), Lukasz Kaminski (Poland), Rudiger Wenzke (East Germany), Ivana Skalova (Bulgaria), Csaba Bekes (Hungary), and Drago~ Petrescu (Romania). Americans and Canadians who presented commentaries include: Matthew J. Ouimet (USSR), Michael Kraus (Czech Republic ), Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (Slovakia), Piotr Wrobel (Poland), Gary Bruce (East Germany), Mark Kramer (Bulgaria), Peter Pastor (Hungary), and Monica Ciobranu (Romania). At the end of the text, before the �SLOVAKIA 207 index, Stolarik included "Notes on Contributors," which gives basic biographical information on the participants. The reader will find many interesting and largely hitherto unknown facts available in the standard works on the subject. For example, at the last minute, the Soviet Union would not allow East Germany to participate in the invasion for fear that it would bring back horrifying memories of the Nazi dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Yet, until its dying days, the East German government, which wholeheartedly supported the invasion, and early on argued for its implementation, perpetuated the myth that it was an active participant. Another, perhaps more striking example, would be the claim by Soviet General G. Yashkin that Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces , ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in early May of 1968, only to reverse his decision several minutes later. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhikov, uneasy over events in Czechoslovakia by early spring of 1968, insisted that he be present at the negotiations with Czechoslovakia and pressed for an early solution, despite the fact that Bulgaria had no common border with Czechoslovakia. Yet, after his fall from power, Zhivkov denied any wrongdoing, but instead insisted that he supported the reforms and reluctantly agreed to support the invasion. Whereas Bekes presents Hungarian leader Janos Kadar in a sympathetic light as a grand compromiser, Pastor sees him instead using double speak for domestic consumption. On a more humorous note, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, an early proponent for intervention, intensely disliked Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and consistently changed the "b" in his name to a "p", thereby rendering his surname in Polish to be an unmentionable part of the human anatomy in polite society. Constraints of space will not allow a discussion of the individual papers and commentaries. However, of particular note is the attention paid to Romania. This member of the Warsaw Pact neither participated in the discussions leading to nor took part in the invasion itself. Nonetheless, as most are aware, the Romanian regime outwardly supported the reforms and then vehemently attacked the invasion. Although Petrescu's piece is more of a political science approach than the other contributions, he makes a persuasive argument that the invasion provided legitimacy and popular support for Ceau~escu' s rise to power after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu- �208 SLOVAKIA Dej. Ceau~escu would never be as popular as he was in August of 1968, when he unified and rallied the country. However, once firmly in control, he ended economic liberalization and ideological relaxation and became more autocratic, relying on his famil y members for support, which eventually led to his demise in 1989. The Soviets ultimately misjudged popular reaction to the 1968 invasion. Petrescu has included an excellent quote from the Romanian dictator that prophetically summed up the results of the invasion, "In my opinion, a big and tragic mistake, with heavy consequences upon the fate of the unity of the socialist system and the international communist and workers movement occurred (252-53)." In short, the invasion mortally wounded the Eastern Bloc 's experiment with Communism. It showed that it could not be a viable alternative to liberal democracy and market economics. This volume is a fine addition to our knowledge of the events of the Prague Spring. Some of the information may be a bit too scholarly for the general reader, but, it is an up-to-date work based on research in archives and other sources opened after 1989. It is a must read for anyone interested in the topic. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA 195 Robert M Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, I 890-1945. Selingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2010 . 329pp. Notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa In this revised Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1998), Robert M. Zecker set out to prove that Slovaks who lived in six widely dispersed neighborhoods of Philadelphia in the 20 th century formed "translocal" (p. 19) communities based upon four parish churches and about a dozen fraternal-benefit societies. The author dug deeply into census records, city directories, parish and fraternal records, supplemented by oral history interviews and published histories of Philadelphia and other ethnic groups across the United States. He showed that, even though Slovaks in Philadelphia were widely dispersed and lived among other ethnic groups, in the first two generations they socialized mostly among themselves. Indeed, they travelled great distances to attend church services on Sundays as well as fraternal meetings, dances, plays, gymnastic events and other amusements. Not only did they form translocal "imagined communities" (p.160) but they were also transconfessional because Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutherans and Marxists attended each other's events and financially supported them. Zecker also pointed out that Slovaks in Philadelphia, and elsewhere, bought into American race ideology. Thus, they stressed their "whiteness," as did other ethnic groups, by staging minstrel shows in the 1930's and 1940's and resisted the building of public housing in their neighborhoods. When they lost this fight, they followed other Americans into the suburbs. Zecker concluded that Slovaks in Philadelphia, like other ethnic groups in America, did not form compact neighborhoods of residence, but were widely dispersed. Nevertheless, they stuck together in the first two generations by attending distant church services, fraternal meetings and a wide variety of social activities. With the arrival of the 1930's New Deal, the post-war automobile boom, and the advent of television in the 1940's, Slovaks, like other Americans, began to move into the suburbs. Although the second generation remained loyal to their parents' institutions, the third generation lost 196 SLOVAKIA interest and their community institutions began to decline and disappear. This is a phenomenon facing all "older" ethnic groups in America. Since Zecker is admittedly an "outsider" to the Slovak community (p . 214), this book, like others written by American-born and educated scholars, suffers from both linguistic and factual errors. Zecker had to learn Slovak from scratch and never mastered its nuances. Thus, he mistakenly identified "Hutoraks" (it should be hutoraci) as Slovaks who originated in the vicinity of the village of "Hutka" (p.27). Instead, "hutoraci" is a pjorative term used by Central and Western Slovaks for Eastern Slovaks who do not speak (hovoria), but, rather, "hutoria" in their own dialect. He mis-translates Slovak "zupy" as "provinces," when they were counties (p.31). He misspells "okres" (district) as "okra" (p.35) and "krnotor" (godfather) as "Kumoda" (p .102). Furthermore, he misspelled and mis-translated the phrase "tu baz [mas!] vzduch" as "There's too much air in here," when it should have been "Here 's some air" (p.183), and many more such mistakes, too numerous to be listed. In addition to the above, Zecker also made some factual errors. He mis-identified the social commentator Nicholas von Hoffman as Alexander von Hoffman (pages 16 and 219); he had Lutheran pastors celebrating "Mass" and dispensing "sacraments" (p.155)! He had "Hapsburg troops" firing upon a Slovak crowd in 1907 when Hungarian gendarmes did so (p.278); he identified the Rev. Andrej Hlinka as a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament in 1907 when the latter would not become a member of the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament until 1919 (p.201 ); and he promoted brigadier-general Milan R. Stefanik into an air marshal (p.204)! The latter errors testified to Zecker' s weak knowledge of European history, which is typical of many scholars of American history. Indeed, when one searches for references to the works of scholars in Slovakia on the subject of immigration, one is disappointed. Even though Zecker went out of his way to detail the history of the tiny group of Slovak Marxists in Philadelphia, he never cited the many articles on this subject by the late Milos Gosiorovsky. Nor did he seem to be aware of the three-volume work on Slovak immigration compiled by Frantisek Bielik and others. Finally, even though Zecker presented an impressive bibliography at the end of the book, it was unorganized. Thus, he mixed up SLOVAKIA 197 his primary sources (archives, censuses, minutes of fraternal-benefit societies, church records, etc), with secondary sources, largely on American ethnic groups and American history in general. Fortunately, he did list his oral history interviews separately but failed to identify his interviewees. While the author may have agreed with his informants not to list their full names, he never did identify the leaders of the various Slovak communities (except their priests). We are left wondering who some of the "movers and shakers" were who founded the churches and fraternal-benefit societies, the various businesses, community halls, savings and loan associations, bands, radio programs and so on. This is a weakness found in most American social histories, which stress the "common man" (and woman) but ignore the leaders. Thus, Zecker's story of the various Slovak communities in Philadelphis remains incomplete. In spite of these deficiencies, Zecker's history of Slovaks in Philadelphia is a welcome addition to the field. We now have professional histories of three Slovak communities in the United States Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, by the author of this review ( 1985); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by June Granatir Alexander (1987); and Philadelphia by Robert M. Zecker. May we soon have even more! Valerian Bystricky, Miroslav Michela, Michal Schvarc a kol., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historicke rejlexie zaniku Cesko-Slovenska. Bratislava: VEDA, 2010. 575 pp., notes, bibliography, English resume, index. STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM Department of International Studies York University, Glendon College This is an unusual volume. A title with a question mark implies an answer. However, to demand that thirty-three scholars from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland provide one is problematic, especially when each contributes a specialized examination of an issue, which may, or may not be related directly to the question. Secondly, the chapter breakdown is determined by the contributions rather than a thematic organization arising out of the title. 198 SLOVAKIA Thirdly, the book is bilingual (Slovak and Czech). Finally, all contributors share something in common, namely extensive and thorough research in archives, many hitherto inaccessible, and references to authoritative secondary sources, although, with one exception, the list is limited to Central European scholars. This review will highlight those contributions that are deemed worthy of comment either because of their interpretation, their contribution to scholarship, or their pertinence to the question in the title. In an effort to answer whether post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia (C-SR) was broken up or collapsed in 1939, the editors divided the book into five thematic chapters and an epilogue of two essays on Slovak historiography. In each chapter, different authors looked at particular issues apparently linked to the theme. The first deals with the C-SR, from October 1938 to March 1939. The focus is on foreign policy and its consequences on domestic politics, especially Slovak politics. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution by Emilia Hrabovec on the perceptions of the Holy See concerning the future of that state. In the Vatican archives she discovered how the Holy See followed with great interest and interpreted with prudence the domestic and foreign developments that led to the Slovak proclamation of independence in March of 1939 and why it gave diplomatic recognition to the first Slovak Republic. Equally interesting are the contributions by l:udovit Hallon on economic changes in Slovakia and the preponderant role played by Germany; and by Miloslav Caplovic on what happened to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces after Munich, especially the transfer of many divisions to Slovakia to protect the state against possible Hungarian and Polish military incursions. Caplovic also mentions the reorganisation that later resulted in the creation of the Armed Forces of the first Slovak Republic. Jozef Bystricky, in chapter four, offeres a detailed analysis of how this happened and also the state of the military forces that responded to Hungarian incursions after independence. The contribution by Valerian Bystricky on the foreign policy activities of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party stands out because of the absence of a contextual perspective. Bystricky bases his article on constitutional legalism to criticize the efforts of members of this party to establish foreign contacts in order to ensure the future of Slovakia when the international situation in Central Europe was deteriorating and the fate of the C-SR was uncertain. SLOVAKIA 199 The second chapter, "Disliked by its neighbours," is on Germany and the C-SR; Slovakia and Ruthenia in the policies of Hungary and Poland; and the nationality question as a political instrument. The nine contributors provide an interesting analysis of Slovakia's relations with its neighbours at a time when its leaders sought to figure out its future and these neighbours were using the nationality question to achieve their objectives. Slovakia was not "disliked;" rather it was the object of revisionist (Hungary) or strategic policies (Germany and Poland). Most contributions, especially the one by Angela Hermann on German policy toward Slovakia, do indicate that Slovakia' s neighbours sought the break up of the C-SR. What is missing is an assessment on how the C-SR and Slovak politicians reacted to the political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvring that took place after October 1938. Hermann ' s contribution makes clear that Slovak leaders understood the realities of power in Central Europe, but also their own responsibility to their nation. The third chapter has eight contributions on "The March events of 1939." Half offer a study of external reactions to these events; the other half look at specific domestic events or attitudes around the 14 March proclamation. One can learn what the German press, British scholarship, or Americans of Czech and Slovak background thought of these events. The latter contribution by Frantisek Hanzlik is, however, very superficial , especially with regards to Slovak Americans. Regarding domestic events, Zlatica Zudova-Leskova ' s examination of the emergency measures of l O March is most atypical. Both in tone and content, it is a strident attack on those who do not see these measures as a legitimate response by C-SR authorities to protect the integrity of that state. In marked contrast, Robert Letz ' s study of the attitude of the Catholic Church and its episcopate in Slovakia toward the March events offers a sophisticated glimpse of the interplay of religion, politics, hierarchy, and the need for public order at a time of constitutional change and foreign political and ideological pressure. A limited sociological examination of the general Slovak reaction is found in the presentation by Martin Hetenyi on the Nitra region. "The beginnings of the Slovak State" constitutes the theme of the fourth chapter. It brings together contributions that deal with the formation of the political system; the independence of the judiciary as seen by the leading political party in Slovakia in 1938-1939; the formation of the Slovak Armed Forces; and the departure of Czech sol- 200 SLOVAKIA diers from Slovakia after independence. The first two contributions, especially the one by Igor Baka, focus on those elements in the political system emanating from the policies of the regime that, according to the two authors, show the creation of a totalitarian state in Slovakia after March 1939. That the first Slovak Republic became a one-party state is beyond dispute; to conclude, however, that it became totalitarian is to ignore the international and comparative context (with other states at that time or the later Communist one) and the essence of political life in Slovakia, whatever the constitutional or administrative system. Scholarship is not served by approaching this subject with a conceptual bias (i .e. if it was not democratic, then it had to be totalitarian), as these two contributions do. Finally, the two bibliographical contributions in the epilogue make a major contribution to Slovak historiography. Both outline the problems Slovak historiography has had and continues to have, which the essays in this volume reflect. The variety of views and the disparity of approaches in this book would have been better served with the title: Break-up and Collapse, a title, which the contributions underlie and with which every serious scholar specializing in the topic would concur. This volume contributes to a broader understanding of that period but does not help resolve the debates around it. Slovak scholarship still has a long way to go. Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, Zandar troch rei imov alebo Slovenske dejiny 20. storocia z ineho pohl'adu. Gustav Polcik a jeho slui ba v Prievidzi v rokoch 1942-1972. Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2011. xliv-334 pp. , notes, illustrations, bibliography, abbreviations, index. YESHA YAHU JELINEK Beer-Sheva, Israel Prievidza, the home-town of the hero of this monograph (and also of the author of this review), lies in the upper Nitra river valley. At the beginning of World War II, it had about 5,000 inhabitants. Industrialization and more intensive coal mining during the communist era boosted the population to about thirty thousand today. Since the SLOVAKIA 201 days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prievidza boasted a Gendarme (police) station, which served about twenty villages and townships. Between five and ten Gendarmes served there, but came from elsewhere. A bachelor Gendarme was forbidden to marry for the first four years of his service, and especially not to a local woman. The Gendarme was expected to become closely acquainted with the locality, its people, and culture. However, he was also supposed to be neutral in political matters, and not to join any political parties. The latter regulation was changed during the communist era, when all Gendarmes were expected to join the Communist Party and to enforce its rule. As he related to the compilers of this book, Gustav Polcik arrived in Prievidza as a Gendarme in the summer of 1942. Four years later he married his village sweetheart and had two daughters with her. The family was apparently very proud of its Gendarme son, as the many photographs of him in his uniform attest. The job guaranteed him a good salary and respect. It was a major move up the social ladder for a village boy. When Polcik retired in 1972, he had reached the rank of major, which was testimony to a successful career in the service of his people in the city of Prievidza. It is not easy to review a perspective "from the other side," as the authors/editors of this book titled it. After all, Polcik served three ruling regimes. During the years of the Holocaust, Polcik carried out the official policies of the Slovak Republic, which was allied with Nazi Germany. One of them was to deport Slovak Jews to Poland, where they were exterminated by the Germans. Although Polcik claimed that, because he had arrived in Prievidza in the summer of 1942, the Jews had already been expelled (p.94), this is not credible. The last transport of Jews from that locality left in October of 1942. Nora Kellerman, a Prievidza friend and neighbour of the author of this review described the deportation of her father thus : "Suddenly, two men arrived, a Gendarme and a Hlinka Guard (the Hlinka Guard was a paramilitary force of the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party), they gave father ten minutes to pack his belongings, he kissed us and they escorted him out. I was six years old and never saw my father again." Clearly, the Gendarmes executed the orders of the government in Bratislava. Polcik admitted throughout the book that he faithfully executed orders from above. All Gendarmes were trained to do this, even dur- 202 SLOVAKIA ing the first Czechoslovak Republic. During the communist period, even though he joined the Party, he sometimes sought to avoid enforcing unpleasant orders with various ruses. Often he convinced himself that the orders were wrong. He did admit that many times the orders gnawed at his conscience. In these instances he sought to avoid carrying them out, but without harm to himself. A good example of Polcik's reasoning and actions was when he was assigned to serve on the Italian front in 1944. He did not want to go and sought out the commander of the Gendarmerie in Slovakia, Colonel Timotheus lstok, who happened to come from his native village, and who was friendly with his parents. In spite of being received by lstok, the orders were not changed. Therefore, Polcik decided to desert to the local partisans (guerrillas), whom he knew, and had assisted in various ways. Ironically, the government bureaucracy continued to pay his wages while he was in active opposition to the regime! Once the war had ended, Polcik emerged as a resistance fighter and his career continued to blossom. When the Communists seized power in 1948, Polcik joined the Party and continued his climb upward. He even became head of the local Hunter's Association and assisted the Prievidza Communists, who were poorly-educated, to write their reports in his beautiful handwriting. He could also type and, thus, was privy to all the secret reports sent by the government in Bratislava. He always sought to help those whom he could, and to not make any enemies. He was also a non-drinker, which kept him out of trouble. When all is said and done, what we have here is the life history of an opportunistic public servant, interested above all in his advancement. Therefore, by being very careful, he was able to survive the frequently changing regimes and governments in his homeland. Polcik survived and advanced because he understood how to manage himself in every situation. This book gives us a good insight into the political life of Slovakia over thirty years and how some of the people, like the Gendarme Gustav Polcik, successfully adjusted to three very different political regimes. SLOVAKIA 203 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov do ZSSR 1945-194 7. Bratislava: Goralinga, 2011. 340pp. appendices, charts, bibliography, resumes. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto At the close of World War II, world leaders seemed determined to try to create a new political order that, hopefully, would preclude catastrophic conflicts of the kind they had just experienced. Many statesmen felt that national minorities and the ideology of integral nationalism were among the main causes leading to World War II . Therefore, in an attempt to correct this situation, many governments set out to adjust ethnographic boundaries to state boundaries. There were several ways in which this might be achieved: a change in international borders; national assimilation of minority groups; physical extermination; or resettlement. Population resettlement became an acceptable and favored political solution at the time. The most monumental example of this approach was the displacement of millions of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia to create the new states of India and Pakistan. Postwar Europe also engaged in population resettlement, the best known case being the expulsion in 1946-1947 of over six million Germans (3 .2 million from Poland and three million from Czechoslovakia) and their resettlement in the various occupation zones of postwar Germany. Smaller in scale and much less known were the population exchanges between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. These took place in two phases. When, in June 1945 , Czechoslovakia formally ceded its pre-Munich eastern province of Subcarpathian Rus' to the Soviet Union, a protocol to the treaty provided for the right of persons of Slovak and Czech nationality resident in Subcarpathian Rus '/Transcarpathian Ukraine to resettle in postwar Czechoslovakia, and for the right of persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality in Czechoslovakia- specifically from "districts (okresy) in Slovakia"to resettle in the Soviet Union. Technically, these populations were being given "the right to opt" (prava opcie) for either Czechoslovak 204 SLOVAKIA or Soviet citizenship, a status which would allow them to resettle permanently in one or the other country. The second phase came as a result of an accord signed in October of 1946, according to which persons of Czech and Slovak nationality living in the Soviet Union (specifically the Volhynia region of Soviet Ukraine) were to be resettled to Czechoslovakia in exchange for persons of Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusan nationality in Czechoslovakia who were to be resettled in the Soviet Union. Despite the various nationalities listed in the treaty, in practice the populations in question were only two : Czechs, who in the nineteenth century had emigrated to what was then the province of Volhynia in the Russian Empire; and Carpatho-Rusyns (Rusnaks), who since their first appearance in the early Middle Ages inhabited relatively compact areas in northeastern Slovakia. The numbers in both phases were relatively small-about 25 ,000 persons to Czechoslovakia as a result of the 1945 treaty; followed by 40,000 persons to Czechoslovakia and 12,000 to Soviet Ukraine as a result of the 1946 treaty. The latter exchange was known as the Volhynian Operation/Volynska akcia and was carried out in 1947. The story of the two Czechoslovak-Soviet population exchanges is the subject of this book by Michal Smigel, an associate professor of history at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, and Stefan Krusko, a writer and civic activist whose family had opted to go to Soviet Ukraine in 1947 and who later "re-opted" back to Czechoslovakia. Aside from the details of the actual resettlement process between 1945 and 1947, the authors devote the third and last chapter of their book to the fate of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyns from northeastern Slovakia who voluntarily opted for the Soviet Union. No sooner had the transports arrived in the Soviet Union in the spring of 194 7, than did the newcomers from Czechoslovakia realize they had made a mistake. Many wanted immediately to go back home, but there was no leaving the "Soviet paradise." The very thought of doing so could- and did- result in arrests and imprisonment during the height of Stalinist repressive rule. Thus began what turned out to be decades of struggle on the part of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyn "exiles" in Soviet Volhynia to return to their Carpathian homeland. In the interim, the children born "in exile" were educated in Ukrainian, while their parents proceeded to claim that they were "Slovaks" (and were generally described as such by local Ukraini- SLOVAKIA 205 ans) in an effort to justify their legal right to return to Czechoslovakia. Beginning in the 1960s, a small but gradually increasing number of families managed to leave Volhynia, settling first in Soviet Transcarpathia, from where some managed to return to Czechoslovakia. The process of return was long and complicated, however, and it did not end until the 1990s, when ironically it was connected with the world's first prominently publicized nuclear disaster. Looking for an excuse to justify the entry for "immigrants" from the east, Slovakia passed a law which allowed for the return of its former citizens from what was described as "the zone [including Volhynia] affected by the Chornobyl nuclear disaster." The homecoming for the reoptanty (those who opted to return) was often far from ideal. Most did not return to their native villages, since local residents-and even family members- were suspicious of people who in 1947 had left for the Soviet east as "Rusnaks," who came back as "Slovaks," often speaking Ukrainian, and who consequently were viewed by their former neighbors as "Russians" (rusky), an epithet that in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was, to say the least, not a positive one. Nevertheless, the reoptanty, in particular children who left with their parents or who were born in Ukraine, eventually did well after their return to Czechoslovakia. Some found employment in the various Ukrainian minority cultural institutions in Presov that were liberally funded in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. Most, however, assimilated into Slovak society in a conscious effort to distance themselves from the East. Among the best known of the reoptanty was Peter Bondra. He was born in Soviet Ukraine to Carpatho-Rusyn parents, who in 1947 were settled in the Soviet Union, but who returned in the 1970s to Slovakia, where Peter was raised and where he learned a new skill- hockey. This allowed him later in life to "re-emigrate," this time to the United States, where he became a star in the National Hockey League. Smigel and Krusko have done an excellent job in describing the fascinating tale of one aspect of post-World War II demographic engineering in central and eastern Europe. The narrative is interspersed with statistical charts and historic photographs . Included as well are several appendices: the full texts of the 1945 and 1946 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties, accompanying protocols, and instructions for implementation; detailed charts with data on the 194 7 population 206 SLOVAKIA exchanges; an extensive bibliography of archival and secondary sources; and resumes in English and Russian. M. Mark Stolarik, compiler and editor, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. Mundelein, Ill. : Bolchazy-Carducci, 2010 . xxxiv-305 pp ., notes, photos, index, hard and soft cover. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University Salisbury, Maryland This book is based on the proceedings of a conference held at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2008 . M. Mark Stolarik, who holds the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at that institution, organized the meeting, compiled and edited the papers, as well as contributed most of the photographs. He also wrote the Introduction in which he offered his personal reminiscences of those August days as he witnessed the invasion, the largest military action in Europe since the Second World War. His Introduction gives a brief overview of the subsequent papers and commentaries, and includes excellent footnotes providing first-rate bibliographic material covering the subject. He concludes the Introduction with an almost two-year chronology of the "Prague Spring," from October of 1967 to September of 1969, to better orient the reader. The authors of the papers and commentaries are a Who's Who of specialists on East Central Europe. Participants from countries of the former Warsaw Pact wrote the papers based largely on archival investigations: Mikhail V. Latysh (USSR), Jan Rychlik (Czech Republic), Slavomir Michalek and Stanislav Sikora (Slovakia), Lukasz Kaminski (Poland), Rudiger Wenzke (East Germany), Ivana Skalova (Bulgaria), Csaba Bekes (Hungary), and Drago~ Petrescu (Romania). Americans and Canadians who presented commentaries include: Matthew J. Ouimet (USSR), Michael Kraus (Czech Republic ), Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (Slovakia), Piotr Wrobel (Poland), Gary Bruce (East Germany), Mark Kramer (Bulgaria), Peter Pastor (Hungary), and Monica Ciobranu (Romania). At the end of the text, before the SLOVAKIA 207 index, Stolarik included "Notes on Contributors," which gives basic biographical information on the participants. The reader will find many interesting and largely hitherto unknown facts available in the standard works on the subject. For example, at the last minute, the Soviet Union would not allow East Germany to participate in the invasion for fear that it would bring back horrifying memories of the Nazi dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Yet, until its dying days, the East German government, which wholeheartedly supported the invasion, and early on argued for its implementation, perpetuated the myth that it was an active participant. Another, perhaps more striking example, would be the claim by Soviet General G. Yashkin that Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces , ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in early May of 1968, only to reverse his decision several minutes later. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhikov, uneasy over events in Czechoslovakia by early spring of 1968, insisted that he be present at the negotiations with Czechoslovakia and pressed for an early solution, despite the fact that Bulgaria had no common border with Czechoslovakia. Yet, after his fall from power, Zhivkov denied any wrongdoing, but instead insisted that he supported the reforms and reluctantly agreed to support the invasion. Whereas Bekes presents Hungarian leader Janos Kadar in a sympathetic light as a grand compromiser, Pastor sees him instead using double speak for domestic consumption. On a more humorous note, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, an early proponent for intervention, intensely disliked Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and consistently changed the "b" in his name to a "p", thereby rendering his surname in Polish to be an unmentionable part of the human anatomy in polite society. Constraints of space will not allow a discussion of the individual papers and commentaries. However, of particular note is the attention paid to Romania. This member of the Warsaw Pact neither participated in the discussions leading to nor took part in the invasion itself. Nonetheless, as most are aware, the Romanian regime outwardly supported the reforms and then vehemently attacked the invasion. Although Petrescu's piece is more of a political science approach than the other contributions, he makes a persuasive argument that the invasion provided legitimacy and popular support for Ceau~escu' s rise to power after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu- 208 SLOVAKIA Dej. Ceau~escu would never be as popular as he was in August of 1968, when he unified and rallied the country. However, once firmly in control, he ended economic liberalization and ideological relaxation and became more autocratic, relying on his famil y members for support, which eventually led to his demise in 1989. The Soviets ultimately misjudged popular reaction to the 1968 invasion. Petrescu has included an excellent quote from the Romanian dictator that prophetically summed up the results of the invasion, "In my opinion, a big and tragic mistake, with heavy consequences upon the fate of the unity of the socialist system and the international communist and workers movement occurred (252-53)." In short, the invasion mortally wounded the Eastern Bloc 's experiment with Communism. It showed that it could not be a viable alternative to liberal democracy and market economics. This volume is a fine addition to our knowledge of the events of the Prague Spring. Some of the information may be a bit too scholarly for the general reader, but, it is an up-to-date work based on research in archives and other sources opened after 1989. It is a must read for anyone interested in the topic.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Robert M. Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, 1890-1945 (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 195</li> <li>Valerián Bystrický et al., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historické reflexie zániku Česko-Slovenska (Stanislav J. Kirschbaum), p. 197</li> <li>Martin Lacko a Ján Sabo, Žandár troch režimov alebo Slovenské dejiny 20. storočia z iného pohľadu (Yeshayahu Jelinek), p. 200</li> <li>Michal Šmigel a Štefan Kruško, Opcia a presídlenie Rusínov do ZSSR 1945-1947 (Paul Robert Magocsi), p. 203</li> <li>M. Mark Stolarik, comp. and ed., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later (Gregory C. Ference), p. 206</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ference, Gregory Curtis, 1957- Jelinek, Yeshayahu A. Kirschbaum, Stanislav J., 1942- Magocsi, Paul Robert, 1945- Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9d5223666f35faa038e0e3f587566135.pdf e56bc10a6691bf808b66e2627d2cc241 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 209 CONTRIBUTORS KEVIN DEEGAN-KRAUSE has a Ph.D. in Government from the University of Notre Dame and is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University. He is the author of Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, (Stanford University Press, 2006), co-editor of The Structure of Political Competition in Western Europe (Routledge, 2010) and co-editor of the European Journal of Political Research 's Political Data Yearbook, with responsibility for its development as an interactive data-driven website. EVGENY F. FIRSOV graduated in history from the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 1975 and in 1979 was awarded the Candidate in Science degree. He is currently Professor of History at the same university. His research interests include T.G. Masaryk and M.R. Stefanik in Russia, the Czech and Slovak cause in Russia during the First World War, parliamentary democracy in the first Czechoslovak Republic and so on. He is the author of more than 140 articles and book chapters on Czech and Slovak history and some monographs, including Opy t demokratii v CSR pri Tomase Masaryke: koalicionnyj pluralism (1997); and T. G. Masaryk i rossijskaja intellektual'naja sreda. 1-11 (2005 , 2012). JOHN A. GOULD is Associate Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at Colorado College. He is author of The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Lynne Rienner, 2011 ). He has published articles in Business and Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, Comparative European Politics, Review of International Political Economy and Global Governance. Gould is an associate editor at the Journal of International Relations and Development and a member of the academic advisory board of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. JURAJ HOCMAN, J.D. international law, Safarik University (Kosice), and M.A. , Comenius University (Bratislava), history and archival science; postgraduate diploma in international relations. �210 SLOVAKIA Posted as a diplomat in Rome. M.A., Carleton University (Ottawa), Ph.D. University of Ottawa. He recently published Slovakia from the Downfall of Communism to its Accession into the European Union, 1989-2004: The Re-Emergence of Political Parties and Democratic Institutions (Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang, 2011). He teaches at the Pan-European University in Bratislava. STEFAN KUCiK, is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education, Catholic University of Rufomberok. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Presov. He is the author of Podiel americkych Slow:ikov na autonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku (1918 - 1938) (Martin, 201 I), as well as several articles in scholarly journals. Currently he is working on the international project Slovak and Czech Compatriot Movements in the USA in collaboration with Czech historians. ROMAN LICKO , Ph.D., Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. In 1997 he joined the Department of English and American Studies at the same university. A visiting Fulbright scholar at the University of Illinois (2002-2003), he researched the U.S. government's attitudes towards Slovakia and American Slovaks during WWII. In 2008 he published his dissertation- Pod dohl'adom spravodajskych slui ieb: Americka vlada a slovenska otazka v USA v rokoch 1939 - 1945. His second book, Nevitany host': Milan Hodia v dokumentoch americkej vlady 1941 - 1944 was published in 2010. CAROL SKALNIK LEFF is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana. She received her Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 1979. Among her many publications are National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) and The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). �SLOVAKIA 211 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. ���THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, John A. Holy, Eileen S. Wilson, John G. Duch, Esq., Stephanie Seigel, Dr. Ludovit J. Pavlo, Cynthia M. Maleski, Esq., Andrew M. Rajec, Larry M. Glugosh, Theresa M. Kluchinski, Sue Ann. M. Seich, David M. Blazek, Kenneth A. Arendt, Steven M. Pogorelec, F.I.C., Linda M. Strom, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � SLOVAKIA 209 CONTRIBUTORS KEVIN DEEGAN-KRAUSE has a Ph.D. in Government from the University of Notre Dame and is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University. He is the author of Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, (Stanford University Press, 2006), co-editor of The Structure of Political Competition in Western Europe (Routledge, 2010) and co-editor of the European Journal of Political Research 's Political Data Yearbook, with responsibility for its development as an interactive data-driven website. EVGENY F. FIRSOV graduated in history from the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 1975 and in 1979 was awarded the Candidate in Science degree. He is currently Professor of History at the same university. His research interests include T.G. Masaryk and M.R. Stefanik in Russia, the Czech and Slovak cause in Russia during the First World War, parliamentary democracy in the first Czechoslovak Republic and so on. He is the author of more than 140 articles and book chapters on Czech and Slovak history and some monographs, including Opy t demokratii v CSR pri Tomase Masaryke: koalicionnyj pluralism (1997); and T. G. Masaryk i rossijskaja intellektual'naja sreda. 1-11 (2005 , 2012). JOHN A. GOULD is Associate Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at Colorado College. He is author of The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Lynne Rienner, 2011 ). He has published articles in Business and Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, Comparative European Politics, Review of International Political Economy and Global Governance. Gould is an associate editor at the Journal of International Relations and Development and a member of the academic advisory board of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. JURAJ HOCMAN, J.D. international law, Safarik University (Kosice), and M.A. , Comenius University (Bratislava), history and archival science; postgraduate diploma in international relations. �210 SLOVAKIA Posted as a diplomat in Rome. M.A., Carleton University (Ottawa), Ph.D. University of Ottawa. He recently published Slovakia from the Downfall of Communism to its Accession into the European Union, 1989-2004: The Re-Emergence of Political Parties and Democratic Institutions (Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang, 2011). He teaches at the Pan-European University in Bratislava. STEFAN KUCiK, is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education, Catholic University of Rufomberok. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Presov. He is the author of Podiel americkych Slow:ikov na autonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku (1918 - 1938) (Martin, 201 I), as well as several articles in scholarly journals. Currently he is working on the international project Slovak and Czech Compatriot Movements in the USA in collaboration with Czech historians. ROMAN LICKO , Ph.D., Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. In 1997 he joined the Department of English and American Studies at the same university. A visiting Fulbright scholar at the University of Illinois (2002-2003), he researched the U.S. government's attitudes towards Slovakia and American Slovaks during WWII. In 2008 he published his dissertation- Pod dohl'adom spravodajskych slui ieb: Americka vlada a slovenska otazka v USA v rokoch 1939 - 1945. His second book, Nevitany host': Milan Hodia v dokumentoch americkej vlady 1941 - 1944 was published in 2010. CAROL SKALNIK LEFF is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana. She received her Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 1979. Among her many publications are National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) and The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). �SLOVAKIA 211 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. ���THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, John A. Holy, Eileen S. Wilson, John G. Duch, Esq., Stephanie Seigel, Dr. Ludovit J. Pavlo, Cynthia M. Maleski, Esq., Andrew M. Rajec, Larry M. Glugosh, Theresa M. Kluchinski, Sue Ann. M. Seich, David M. Blazek, Kenneth A. Arendt, Steven M. Pogorelec, F.I.C., Linda M. Strom, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 209 CONTRIBUTORS KEVIN DEEGAN-KRAUSE has a Ph.D. in Government from the University of Notre Dame and is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne State University. He is the author of Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, (Stanford University Press, 2006), co-editor of The Structure of Political Competition in Western Europe (Routledge, 2010) and co-editor of the European Journal of Political Research 's Political Data Yearbook, with responsibility for its development as an interactive data-driven website. EVGENY F. FIRSOV graduated in history from the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 1975 and in 1979 was awarded the Candidate in Science degree. He is currently Professor of History at the same university. His research interests include T.G. Masaryk and M.R. Stefanik in Russia, the Czech and Slovak cause in Russia during the First World War, parliamentary democracy in the first Czechoslovak Republic and so on. He is the author of more than 140 articles and book chapters on Czech and Slovak history and some monographs, including Opy t demokratii v CSR pri Tomase Masaryke: koalicionnyj pluralism (1997); and T. G. Masaryk i rossijskaja intellektual'naja sreda. 1-11 (2005 , 2012). JOHN A. GOULD is Associate Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at Colorado College. He is author of The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Lynne Rienner, 2011 ). He has published articles in Business and Politics, Europe-Asia Studies, Comparative European Politics, Review of International Political Economy and Global Governance. Gould is an associate editor at the Journal of International Relations and Development and a member of the academic advisory board of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. JURAJ HOCMAN, J.D. international law, Safarik University (Kosice), and M.A. , Comenius University (Bratislava), history and archival science; postgraduate diploma in international relations. 210 SLOVAKIA Posted as a diplomat in Rome. M.A., Carleton University (Ottawa), Ph.D. University of Ottawa. He recently published Slovakia from the Downfall of Communism to its Accession into the European Union, 1989-2004: The Re-Emergence of Political Parties and Democratic Institutions (Frankfurt am Main & New York: Peter Lang, 2011). He teaches at the Pan-European University in Bratislava. STEFAN KUCiK, is an Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Education, Catholic University of Rufomberok. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Presov. He is the author of Podiel americkych Slow:ikov na autonomistickom hnuti na Slovensku (1918 - 1938) (Martin, 201 I), as well as several articles in scholarly journals. Currently he is working on the international project Slovak and Czech Compatriot Movements in the USA in collaboration with Czech historians. ROMAN LICKO , Ph.D., Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, Slovakia. In 1997 he joined the Department of English and American Studies at the same university. A visiting Fulbright scholar at the University of Illinois (2002-2003), he researched the U.S. government's attitudes towards Slovakia and American Slovaks during WWII. In 2008 he published his dissertation- Pod dohl'adom spravodajskych slui ieb: Americka vlada a slovenska otazka v USA v rokoch 1939 - 1945. His second book, Nevitany host': Milan Hodia v dokumentoch americkej vlady 1941 - 1944 was published in 2010. CAROL SKALNIK LEFF is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana. She received her Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 1979. Among her many publications are National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) and The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation versus State (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). SLOVAKIA 211 GUIDELINES FOR MANUSCRIPTS Manuscripts for possible publication should be sent to the editor. Articles should normally not exceed twenty-five pages in length, should be typed double-spaced, should include footnotes at the bottom of the page, and should be submitted in electronic format (stolarik@uottawa.ca), using either MicrosoftWord or WordPerfect. Text and format should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style. Proper orthography and diacritical marks must be supplied for all foreign words. Books for review are to be sent to the editor. Unsolicited book reviews are not encouraged. THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA A civic and cultural federation of Americans of Slovak Ancestry Organized in 1907 DANIEL F. TANZONE President Dr. Mikulas A. Halko 1st Vice President W. NINA HOLY Secretary - Treasurer Vice Presidents Justine Wesnak 2nd Vice President Gabriel Kovac 3rd Vice President Executive Board Daniel F. Tanzone, W. Nina Holy, John A. Holy, Eileen S. Wilson, John G. Duch, Esq., Stephanie Seigel, Dr. Ludovit J. Pavlo, Cynthia M. Maleski, Esq., Andrew M. Rajec, Larry M. Glugosh, Theresa M. Kluchinski, Sue Ann. M. Seich, David M. Blazek, Kenneth A. Arendt, Steven M. Pogorelec, F.I.C., Linda M. Strom, Mary Jo Savidge Milan Cuba, Youth Director Martha Catalano, Dr. Ladislav Korcek, Joseph Goda, Auditors SLOVAK FRATERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK LADIES ASSOCIATION Beachwood, Ohio FIRST CATHOLIC SLOVAK UNION OF THE U.S.A. AND CANADA Independence, Ohio SLOVAK CATHOLIC SOKOL Passaic, New Jersey NATIONAL SLOVAK SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. McMurray, Pennsylvania LADIES PENNSYLVANIA SLOVAK CATHOLIC UNION Wilkes - Barre, Pennsylvania THE SLOVAK NEWSPAPERMEN'S ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA $ 10.00 per issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77) Description An account of the resource includes Contributors; Guidelines for Manuscripts Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cc7123542f80466fc86cc2b01b73390c.pdf f3ff830665ae007adbc865cdb11ab61e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XL NUMBERS 74-75 2010 A scholarl y annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itoria l Board MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PA TRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak Leag ue of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions shou ld be sent to the above address . The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Ed itor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road , Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa .ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The Cemova Massacre: Magyar Miscalculation, Slovak Gain Edita Bosak .............. ... .. ... ... .. .... ..... ..... ....... .. ..................... .......... . 7 Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky ( 1862-1916) Jan Petrovsky .. ..... ..... ............. ...... ....... .......... ........ .......... ........... 24 Andrej Hlinka's Journey to the USA in 1926 Stefan Kucik .. .... ....... ... .... ...... ... .. ........................ .. ......... ...... ....... 32 Jozef Stasko ( 1917-1999): His Life and Achievements Miroslav Chromek ... .................................... ........ ....................... 47 Rising Against Stalinism: De-Stalinization and the Reinterpretation of the Slovak National Uprising in Slovak Historiography of the 1960's Scott Brown ..... ........ ................ ....... ..... ........ ..... .. ....... .. .. ... .......... 60 Myths Regarding the Anti-Communist Resistance in Slovakia Jan Carnogursky ....................................... .. .. .. .... .......... .. .... .. .. ... 81 REVIEW ESSAY Slovak-Polish Relations Marcel Jesensky .................. ........... .... .... .......... ...... .. ..... ....... .. .... 95 REVIEWS Ludevit Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej Gerald J. Sabo ..... .... ....... ........ ................ .................................. 103 Andras Gero, The Jewish Criterion in Hungary Yeshayahu Jelinek ..................................................... ..... .. ....... . 106 �4 SLOVAKIA Miroslav Fabricius, Ladislav Susko and Katarina Hradska, eds., Tiso, Jozef Prejavy a clcinky Daniel E. Miller ........... ...... .............. ... ............ ......... ...... .... ....... l 08 Max Domarus, The Complete Hitler Vasil/is Vourkoutiotis .. ..................... ........ ....... ...... ....... ............ 113 James R. Pelak, After Hitler, Before Stalin M Mark Stolarik .. ............ ... ..... .... ....... ........ ......... ...... ... .. .......... 114 Edward Snajdr, Nature Protests Jura) Hocman .......... .. ..................... .. ........... .. .. ......................... 117 Contributors .... ... .. .............. ................... ............... ............ .. .............. 120 Guidelines for Manuscripts ........ ......... ... ......... ......... .... .. .. ........... .... 122 �ARTICLES �� SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA ��SLOVAKIA VOLUME XL NUMBERS 74-75 2010 A scholarl y annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itoria l Board MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PA TRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak Leag ue of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions shou ld be sent to the above address . The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Ed itor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road , Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa .ca ��Table of Contents ARTICLES The Cemova Massacre: Magyar Miscalculation, Slovak Gain Edita Bosak .............. ... .. ... ... .. .... ..... ..... ....... .. ..................... .......... . 7 Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky ( 1862-1916) Jan Petrovsky .. ..... ..... ............. ...... ....... .......... ........ .......... ........... 24 Andrej Hlinka's Journey to the USA in 1926 Stefan Kucik .. .... ....... ... .... ...... ... .. ........................ .. ......... ...... ....... 32 Jozef Stasko ( 1917-1999): His Life and Achievements Miroslav Chromek ... .................................... ........ ....................... 47 Rising Against Stalinism: De-Stalinization and the Reinterpretation of the Slovak National Uprising in Slovak Historiography of the 1960's Scott Brown ..... ........ ................ ....... ..... ........ ..... .. ....... .. .. ... .......... 60 Myths Regarding the Anti-Communist Resistance in Slovakia Jan Carnogursky ....................................... .. .. .. .... .......... .. .... .. .. ... 81 REVIEW ESSAY Slovak-Polish Relations Marcel Jesensky .................. ........... .... .... .......... ...... .. ..... ....... .. .... 95 REVIEWS Ludevit Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej Gerald J. Sabo ..... .... ....... ........ ................ .................................. 103 Andras Gero, The Jewish Criterion in Hungary Yeshayahu Jelinek ..................................................... ..... .. ....... . 106 �4 SLOVAKIA Miroslav Fabricius, Ladislav Susko and Katarina Hradska, eds., Tiso, Jozef Prejavy a clcinky Daniel E. Miller ........... ...... .............. ... ............ ......... ...... .... ....... l 08 Max Domarus, The Complete Hitler Vasil/is Vourkoutiotis .. ..................... ........ ....... ...... ....... ............ 113 James R. Pelak, After Hitler, Before Stalin M Mark Stolarik .. ............ ... ..... .... ....... ........ ......... ...... ... .. .......... 114 Edward Snajdr, Nature Protests Jura) Hocman .......... .. ..................... .. ........... .. .. ......................... 117 Contributors .... ... .. .............. ................... ............... ............ .. .............. 120 Guidelines for Manuscripts ........ ......... ... ......... ......... .... .. .. ........... .... 122 �ARTICLES �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2010, Vol. 40 Description An account of the resource Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published By THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA SLOVAKIA VOLUME XL NUMBERS 74-75 2010 A scholarl y annual devoted to the history, literature and culture of the Slovaks the world over Editor M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa Ed itoria l Board MICHAEL NOV AK American Enterprise Institute ROBERT K. EVANSON University of Missouri JAMES R. FELAK University of Washington PETER PETRO University of British Columbia CAROL S. LEFF University of Illinois PA TRICIA KRAFCIK The Evergreen State College Publisher Slovak Leag ue of America 205 Madison Street Passaic, NJ 07055 , USA Inquiries regarding subscriptions shou ld be sent to the above address . The cost of a single issue is U.S. $10.00 Manuscripts for possible publication and books for review should be sent to M. Mark Stolarik, Ed itor, Slovakia 22 Bren-Maur Road , Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2J 3Z7 stolarik@uottawa .ca Table of Contents ARTICLES The Cemova Massacre: Magyar Miscalculation, Slovak Gain Edita Bosak .............. ... .. ... ... .. .... ..... ..... ....... .. ..................... .......... . 7 Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky ( 1862-1916) Jan Petrovsky .. ..... ..... ............. ...... ....... .......... ........ .......... ........... 24 Andrej Hlinka's Journey to the USA in 1926 Stefan Kucik .. .... ....... ... .... ...... ... .. ........................ .. ......... ...... ....... 32 Jozef Stasko ( 1917-1999): His Life and Achievements Miroslav Chromek ... .................................... ........ ....................... 47 Rising Against Stalinism: De-Stalinization and the Reinterpretation of the Slovak National Uprising in Slovak Historiography of the 1960's Scott Brown ..... ........ ................ ....... ..... ........ ..... .. ....... .. .. ... .......... 60 Myths Regarding the Anti-Communist Resistance in Slovakia Jan Carnogursky ....................................... .. .. .. .... .......... .. .... .. .. ... 81 REVIEW ESSAY Slovak-Polish Relations Marcel Jesensky .................. ........... .... .... .......... ...... .. ..... ....... .. .... 95 REVIEWS Ludevit Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej Gerald J. Sabo ..... .... ....... ........ ................ .................................. 103 Andras Gero, The Jewish Criterion in Hungary Yeshayahu Jelinek ..................................................... ..... .. ....... . 106 4 SLOVAKIA Miroslav Fabricius, Ladislav Susko and Katarina Hradska, eds., Tiso, Jozef Prejavy a clcinky Daniel E. Miller ........... ...... .............. ... ............ ......... ...... .... ....... l 08 Max Domarus, The Complete Hitler Vasil/is Vourkoutiotis .. ..................... ........ ....... ...... ....... ............ 113 James R. Pelak, After Hitler, Before Stalin M Mark Stolarik .. ............ ... ..... .... ....... ........ ......... ...... ... .. .......... 114 Edward Snajdr, Nature Protests Jura) Hocman .......... .. ..................... .. ........... .. .. ......................... 117 Contributors .... ... .. .............. ................... ............... ............ .. .............. 120 Guidelines for Manuscripts ........ ......... ... ......... ......... .... .. .. ........... .... 122 ARTICLES  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 40 (No. 74-75) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5537aaa0888771e68d80eaae7e103dbe.pdf 755e88aca23327760f4d22f566a11ece PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 THE CERNOVA MASSACRE: MAGYAR MISCALCULATION, SLOVAK GAIN Edita Bosak Cernova, formerly an independent municipality of Liptov county, today a suburb of Ruzomberok, played a key role in the Slovak national movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. With the signing of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the hegemony of the Austrian Empire ended. The agreement opened the way for the ruling Magyar political forces in the Kingdom of Hungary to enforce their national interests without regard for the interests of the non-Magyar nationalities. Since this meant that no legal rights would be granted to the non-Magyar nations in Hungary, the Slovaks in Northern Hungary found their political situation deteriorating over the next fifty years. Between 1905 and 1907, the Dual Monarchy found itself in a serious political and social crisis and also faced deeply divisive nationality problems as a result of the Compromise. This study will explore the role of the Cernova massacre in changing the direction of the Slovak national movement, in exposing the Magyar government's nationalities' policies both internally and abroad, and thus forcing the Magyars into a defensive position. With the passing of the Compromise in 1867, Magyar statesmen Ferenc Deak and J6szef Eotvos, crafted the Legislative Act 44/1868 on the Equality of the Nationalities, 1 commonly known as the Nationalities Law. Although this law was intended to satisfy the nationalities' yearning for equality, in actual fact it denied the equality of all the nationalities in Hungary except for the Croats, who were recognized as a separate nation. The preamble of the law clearly stated: " .... all citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, in conformity with the 1 Torveny-czikk a nemzetisek egyenj ogus:ig t:irgy:iban. Magyar torvenyt:ir 10001895 . 1838-1 868 evi torvenyczikkek. (Budapest, I 896) 490-4, as cited in Milan Podrim avsky, " Slovaks in the Conditions of the Hungarian State at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." Human Affairs, 9, I (1999), 45 . �8 SLOVAKIA Constitution and from the political point of view, create an indivisible unitary Hungarian (Magyar) nation, of which each citizen of the country, belonging to any nationality, is an equal member." 2 In effect, the equality of the citizens of the state as individuals, independent of their nationality, was proclaimed; but the equality of the nationalities of the old Kingdom of Hungary was not. The discriminatory character of the Nationality Law had serious ramifications for the Slovaks. As a result, in 1878 the Slovaks sent another deputation led by one of the heroes of the 1848 Revolution, Jozef M. Hurban, to Vienna requesting an independent Slovak territory.3 The emperor refused to meet with Hurban, and returned his Memorandum to him. This led to an escalation in Magyarization (assimilation into the Magyar language and culture) and legislation by Magyar political forces which sought to erode any remaining rights of the nationalities. Prior to 1867, the Slovak national movement had made considerable headway. In the early 1860's intellectuals accepted the language reforms which I.:udovit Stur had made in 1846, and which led 4 to the final codification of the Slovak language in 1851. The Slovak nationalists sought to win legal guarantees that would safeguard the Slovak national existence and sovereignty. Although they were unsuccessful in obtaining recognition for the Memorandum of 1861 and the Okolie (a Slovak territory), they did manage to create the cultural and literary organization Matica slovenska in 1863 in the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin and three Slovak gymnazia in the 1860s. The number of Slovak newspapers also expanded at this time. These achievements gave the Slovaks hope for bettering their political, social and economic situation in Hungary. It was short lived. With the signing of the A usgleich in 1867, these national developments came to a rapid end. The gymnazia were closed in 1874 and the Matica slovenska in 1875, with the state confiscating all of Matica 's property. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Kalman Tisza, announced at the sitting of the Diet that he did not know of "any Slovak nation" . Hungary.s m 2 Podrimavsky, " Slovaks ... ," 45. Anton Spiesz and Dusan Caplovic, Illustrated Slovak History (Wauconda, Ill inois: Bolchazy- Carducci Publi shers, 2006), 149. 4 Ludevi t Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej (Presporok, 1846; reprinted in Bratislava, 2006). 5 Milan Durica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov (Bratislava: Luc, 2003), 235. 3 �SLOVAKIA 9 The arrival of the government of Kalman Tisza in 1875 inaugurated a new period of oppression. The ruling Magyar circles were determined to strengthen the supremacy of national politics within the old Kingdom of Hungary vis-a-vis Vienna and also outside of the Monarchy, especially towards the Balkans. The virulent Magyarization policies of fifteen years of Tisza rule seriously hampered the ability of Slovaks to keep pace with their counterparts in other regions of Europe. The Slovak intelligentsia was continuously attacked and began to lose hope. The Hungarian government believed that the only solution to the nationality problem was assimilating the nonMagyar nations. Its Magyarization policies employed a variety of devices. The Magyar language was implemented at all levels of society, including from the pulpit. Various associations to help assimilate the nationalities 6 were established and also the local press was harnessed to ensure the Magyarization program would be effecttive and ensure the elimination of the Slovak language from public life. In terms of organized religion, both the authorities of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches practiced Magyarization in private, as well as in public. Slovak children attending Catholic schools were required to use the Magyar language. Slovak priests and teachers were persecuted for their national consciousness and participation in the Slovak national movement. 7 Slovak ministers and priests, who were known to be nationalists, were transferred from wealthier parishes to ones where the minister or priest, along with his flock, had . 8 to strugg Ie to survive. In 1878, the Slovenska narodna strana (Slovak National Party) announced it would boycott the elections to protest the discrimination suffered by the Slovaks. Not a single Slovak deputy was elected 6 Tisza' s gove rnment establi shed th e Magyar Educa tio nal League for Upper Hungary (FEMKE) in 1882 w ith its seat in the anci ent Slova k city of Nitra and the Educati onal League fo r Upper Hun ga ry (MT KE) in 1885 w ith its headquarters in Budapest, as we ll several j ourn als and news papers to aid in fi ghting th e g rowth of Slovak nati onal co nsc io usness. Podrimavsky, "S lova ks in the Co nditions of th e Hun gari an State . . . ," 4 7. 7 Ibid., 47-8. 8 Karel Kalal, Mad'arizacia. Obraz slovenske utrpenie. (Originall y publi shed in 1900, reprinted in Brati slava : Eko- ko nzult, 2006), 27. "The Sl ovak priest Moyses los t hi s parish in Lucky and th e Magyarone Smizar repl aced him ; the people sto pped go in g to church, th ey are bu ry in g their dead themselves, children are not be ing bapti zed, but no ne of th at moves either Smi za r, or " Fath er" Parvy. " �SLOVAKIA to the Diet in the elections of 1875 or 1878 . From this date until the early twentieth century, the Slovenska narodna strana followed a policy of political passivity and withdrew to the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin in Central Slovakia. They also brought with them their newspaper Slovenske narodne noviny (Slovak National News) from its previous home in Budapest. Two factors , one internal and the other external , were instrumental in activating the Martin nationalists at the turn of the century. First of all, the economic situation was depressed and created a climate of both social and political unrest. The gravity of this situation was described as late as 1914 in an article entitled "The Decline of Industry" 9 by the pro-Magyar, government-sponsored, newspaper Slovenske noviny , published in Budapest. Alongside this industrial problem was the failure of the agrarian sector to thrive as a result of several bad harvests. The result was a growth in anti-Semitism, as the Jews were blamed for the drop in agricultural prices. This was followed by the rise of a new Catholic, anti-Semitic, Hungarian political party: the Hungarian People's Party (Neppart) established by Ferdinand Zichy and its weekly Krest'an. ' 0 It should be pointed out that most Jews in Hungary tied their economic well-being to support for the Magyar ruling class. Another catalyst for Slovak patriots was the trial of Romanian nationalists in 1894 which helped bring together a coalition of nonMagyar nationalists. Recognizing their common goals and the advantage of solidarity, the nationalities came together for the first time in the Congress of Non-Hungarian Nations in Budapest in 1895 . The Congress sought national equality in conjunction with democratic demands for universal and secret manhood suffrage, and freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association for all the nationalities. An external factor which played a major role in ending political passivity was a new generation of university students who were 9 Dr. Adolf Phany, "Upado k priemys lu," Slovenske noviny, 14 January 1914, p. l . Robert W. Seton-Watso n, A Hislory of 1he Czechs and Slovaks (Londo n, 1943:, reprint ed., Hamden, CT, 1965) 27 1-2. See also Julius Popely, " Boj o liberalne cirkevnopoliticke reform y v Uhorsku a zaloze nie katolickej l' udovej strany," Hisloricky casopis 29, 6 ( 198 1), 85 7-70, and Julius Popely, "Yzt' ah medzi statom a cirkvou v posledn ej tretine 19. storocia a korene politi ckeho kl erikali zmu v Uhorsku," Historickestudie 24 ( 1980): 77 -96, and Owen V. Johnson, " Losing Faith : The Slova k Hungari an Constitutional Struggle, 1906-1914," Harvard Ukrainian S1udies, 22, I, ( 1998), 293-3 12. 10 �SLOVAKIA 11 either educated by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a Czech professor at Charles University in Prague, or who read his works while studying in Vienna and Budapest. As graduates and young professionals, they returned to Slovakia and spread Masaryk's ideas and teachings, his "Realist" program, and especially the concept of "drobna praca" (intensive work) . 11 On the advice of Masaryk, some of his students in 1898 established the journal Hlas (Voice). It preached the advantages of closer Czech and Slovak cooperation. This was enough to prompt the leadership of the old guard--the poet, writer, and editor of Ncirodne noviny, Svetozar Hurban Vajansky; Pavel Mudroii, party chair for the Slovenskci ncirodnci strana; Matus Dula, Ambro Pietor, and several others into protesting that the charges of political passivity levelled by Hlas editors Vavro Srobar and Pavel Blaho were unjust. A rift emerged between the older and younger generation. The elders felt the younger generation was neither respectful nor grateful for the sacrifices made by their elders in furthering the Slovak national movement. When Hlas ceased publication in 1904, there was a short respite. However, the demands of the young nationalists for a platform led to the publiccation of another journal, Prudy (Currents) in 1909. Milan Hodza, a young Budapest lawyer and publicist recognized that the Slovaks needed to become politically engaged and he put his energies into the building of a mass movement. In his newspaper Slovensky tyi dennik (Slovak Weekly) begun in 1903, Hodza tried to capture the Slovak peoples' interests and educate them in political activity. The young people rejected their elders' policy of political passivity. 11 Edita Bosak, "Czech-Slovak Relati ons and the Student Organisati on Detvan, 1882- I 91 4" in Slovak Polirics, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirsc hbaum (C leveland : Slovak Institute, 1983), 6-41. See also Ed ita Bosa k, "The Slovak National Movement, 184819 18" in Rejlecrions on Slovak Hisrory, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirschbaum and Anne C. Roman (Toronto: Sl ovak World Congress, 1987), 59-72 , and Edita Bosak, "T. G. Masaryk and th e Emerge nce of th e Hl as ist Move ment, 1898-1904", in J. M. Rydlo , ed, Milan S. Durica. Fesrschrift (Brati slava, 1995) 29-42. Edita Bosa k, " Slowakische Studentenorganisati onen in W ien, Prag und Budapes t und ihre Zusa mm enarbeit," in Wegenetz europiiischen Ceistes fl - Universitiiten und Studenten: Die Bedeutung studentischer Migrationen in Mittel - und Siidosteuropa vom 18. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Eds. Ri chard G. Plasc hka and Karlheinz Mac k (Muni ch: 1987), 162-1 82. �SLOVAKIA 12 Slovak politicians finally dropped their pass1v1ty before the Hungarian constitutional crisis in 1905-1906. Hungarian political circles noted this and their Magyarisation politics were stepped up and the persecution of Slovak nationalists reached their peak. On the eve of the 1905 elections, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza bluntly stated his position on the nationalities as follows : A cardinal condition for the enjoyment of rights by other nationalities is that the citizens of other nationalities should recognize unreservedly that this State is the Magyar State .... The Magyar nation has never given a binding promise to maintain the Law of Nationalities for all time, or not to alter it... when conditions change, and when we perceive that through this law we grant to our opponents rights against ourselves. 12 The policy of Magyarization continued to escalate at all government and religious levels, and to touch the social, economic, and political fabric of the state. The Apponyi Education Acts of 1907 reiterated that teachers in religious schools were state employees, and, as such, had to be able to read, write, and teach in Magyar. Leading Magyar nationalists held firm to these views . There were even fears among government leaders that negotiations with the nationalities would derail the Magyar goal of a single national state. Tisza, in response to the fears expressed by Count Albert Apponyi, that he was negotiating with the Romanians, stated very clearly that he stood " ... on the basis of a single undivided Hungarian national state ... No Hungarian can hold any other position other than the position of a single Hungarian nation, creating a single united Hungarian national state. 13 As far as Tisza was concerned, this position was unassailable. These views were held by most of the Hungarian ruling circle and permeated throughout the administrative echelons and bureaucracy. Surprisingly, in the 1906 elections, six Slovaks from the Slovenska l'udova strana (Slovak People's Party) 14 and one from the Slovenska 12 R. W. Seton-Watson, German, Slav, and Magyar (New York : Howard Fertig, 1968), 45-6. 13 Kalman Tisza Slovenske noviny, 16 January 19 14, p. l. 14 The Slovenska /'udova strana had separated from Zichy's People' s Party, Neppart, in 1905 because the latter did not represent the Slovak peoples ' interests. 1 �SLOVAKIA 13 narodna strana (Slovak National Party) were elected. They demonstrated that a well-organized campaign, with emphasis on the needs of the peasants, was the way to attract votes. 15 However, the campaigners also pointed out that parties such as Neppart were not working in the interests of the Slovak peasants. Although this was a small win for the Slovak national movement (given their proportion of the population, the Slovaks should have had 40 seats in Parliament), its impact was significant enough that the Hungarian government expanded and increased the tempo of its Magyarization process. With hindsight it is clear that this political achievement was very much a milestone in the Slovak national movement. Slovak leaders, laymen as well as clergy, were now targeted in a stepped up campaign of persecution. 16 The Catholic Church's hierarchy, educated in the "great Magyar spirit," 17 was also actively involved in these persecutions . Even sermons had to be given in Magyar in completely Slovak parishes. Slovak priests who expressed national sentiments and used their own language in church were persecuted. Yet it was this Slovak clergy to which the people looked for guidance. The Slovak intelligentsia was very small, and as a result, both Roman Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers filled this gap. This form of Magyarization also attracted the attention of William Ritter, 18 a Swiss writer and artist. He published the details of the trial of Andrej Hlinka in Ruzomberok, October 26-November 6, 15 Ameri can Slovaks, in a sign of support and solidarity, had co llected $ I 0,000 and se nt it to the Slovak leadership back home to help defray electi on ex penses. The electi on of seven Slovaks to th e Hun ga ri an Parli ament, a first in history , was enthusiasti call y received as one Slovak Am erican decl ared "Our mon ey has been well spent. " In M. Mark Stolarik , Immig ration and Urban ization: The Slovak Experience, 1870- / 9 18 (New York: AM S Press, 1989), 194. 16 Several Slova k nati onali st leaders were now tri ed and convicted of " inciting aga inst the Magya r nati on" and sentenced to term s in prison: the Rev. Ferdi s Juriga, Dr. Vavro Srobar, the Rev. Andrej Hlinka, Milan Iva nka, etc. 17 Kuruc, Stefa n, " Katolicka cirkev na Slovenskom uze mi Uhorska na zaciatku 20. storocia," in My tus a realita, Stefan Kuci k, ed. (Rufo mberok : Katolicka uni versita v Rufo mberku, 2008), 6 1. 18 William Ritter ( I 867- I 955) was one of th e earli est and most creati ve of the foreign Sl ovakophiles who wrote about th e situati on faced by the Slovak s in the Hungari an part of the Dual Monarc hy of Austri a-H ungary. He pro tested aga inst Magyari zati on w ith others like th e Ru ssian Alexander Alexa ndrovic Papkov ( I 866-1920), the Scot Robert William Seton-Watson ( I 879- I 95 I), the Frenchm an Ernest Deni s ( 1849-1 92 1) and the No rweg ian Bj ornstjern e Bjorn son ( 1832- 19 10). �14 SLOVAKIA 1906 in the French Catholic magazine Demain. His article was read by officials in the Vatican and, as result, Hlinka was able to defend himself successfully from the Hungarian hierarchy' s accusations. 19 Ritter also published the letters of Hungarian bishops and Slovak priests in 1906 in Demain. He was a regular visitor to Slovakia from 1888 until 1947, and maintained a faithful and steadfast interest in the Slovaks until his death.20 Ritter had a vibrant correspondence with Slovakia's nationalists and greatest writers and poets, and through his publications pointed out to the western world the inhumane political, religious, social and cultural Magyarization of the Slovaks in the Kingdom Hungary. 21 Ritter was the first Slovakophile to expose the brutal sentiments expressed by the Magyar Prime Minister Istvan Tisza in 1905. In his article "Eveques hongrois et pretres slovaques" in the Lyons journal Demain politique, social, religieux,22 Ritter quoted Tisza as having stated "The law is dead for you Slovaks."23 Ritter had also published the harsh words of Tisza's father, Kalman Tisza, when he had been the head of government years earlier: "Slovaks should be crushed under the heel." 24 This Swiss humanitarian also expounded on Magyarization carried out in poor Slovak parish schools, in the theological seminaries and amongst Slovak priests . In fact, the fateful Cernova massacre simply confirmed the truth of Ritter's writings. Villagers in the small settlement of Cemova, in the diocese of Spis, had constructed a church mainly through the initiative and support of a local son, the Reverend Andrej Hlinka. Out of pride and gratitude, the citizens of Cemova, asked their bishop, Alexander Parvy, to allow Hlinka to consecrate the new church. 25 These people knew the importance of having one of their own sons fulfill this ceremony. Since Hlinka had been suspended from his priestly duties by Parvy because of his nationalist behavior, the people of Cemova requested a delay in consecration until such time as Hlinka could 19 Jozef M. Rydl o, " Sudny proces proti Andrejovi Hlinkovi v Rufo mberku 26. 106.11.1906 a obrana Slovakov proti mad 'arizacii perom William Rittera na strankach francu zskeho Demain", in Kucik, My tus a realita, 24. 20 Ibid. , 22 . 21 Ibid ., 23 . 22 Ibid ., 24. 23 Ibid., 24. 24 Ibid., 24. 25 Alexander Parvy was bishop of the Spis diocese from 1904 to 19 19. �SLOVAKIA 15 preside over it. The bishop refused. The political background leading up to this is important for, as F. S. Clarke, in a dispatch from the British Consul-General in Budapest reported to the Foreign Office, The parish priest at Rozsahegy (Ruiomberok) ... , named Hlinka ... , by his nationalist tendencies, has incurred the displeasure--not only of the civil, but also of the ecclesiastical authorities, and had, in December last, been sentenced to a fine and to two years for the incitement against the Magyar State idea '-- ... 26 Hlinka had been actively backing his friend Dr. Vavro Srobar during the election campaign, something which Parvy considered tantamount to political agitation against the Magyar state. Thus, in Hlinka's place, Parvy chose the Reverend Anton Klurimsky, a Magyarone, to consecrate the newly-built church, despite the objections of the people of Cemova. These sentiments had even been personally relayed to the bishop by deacon M. Pazurik. The bishop decided that the dedication ceremony would take place regardless of the objections voiced by the parishioners. A group of gendarmes and a magistrate from Ruzomberok were assigned to escort the priests to nearby Cemova, and to maintain law and order. Upon their arrival on 27 October 1907, the priests and the squad of gendarmes were greeted by the people of Cemova, who although passive, verbally berated them. According to eye-witness reports, the gendarmes, without any provocation, shot into the crowd gathered on the roadside, which was impeding their progress. The result was "nine dead immediately, three died the following day, one on the third day" 27 and by the 25 th of December all told there were fifteen dead. 28 Because it was feared that a revolt would follow , a contingent of Honveds (National Guards) was dispatched from Ruzomberok.29 The following day a series of arrests of so-called "agi26 F. S. Clarke to Sir Edward Goschen, Budapest, October 31 , 1907. Foreign Office Papers #371 , Pol. A-H , 1907 - # 196 fil e 36724, No. 58, (United Kingdom: Public Record Office) . 27 "Vrazdenie slovenseho l' udu v Cemovej", S/o vensky tyidennik, 1 November 1907, p. I. 28 Karol Sidor, Cerno va (/80 7- /937) (Bratislava: " Slovak", 1937), 35. 29 Ibid. , 32. �16 SLOVAKIA tators" 30 among the survivors began, one of whom was Hlinka's sister, fifty-five year old Anna Fullova. In all, there were 13 arrests. 3 1 The tragedy of Cernova did more than any other event to bring the Slovak problem before a national and international forum . Two Czech deputies, Silinger and Dr. Hruban, brought before the Reichsrat in Vienna an interpellation which requested the government "to ask for an official report on how this sad affair came about and if the guilty parties had been investigated and punished and to put it before them?" 32 The second part of the document " ... asked the Hungarian government, as the second component of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, to finally end similar persecution of the Slovak people and the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary." 33 Dr. Hruban stated most emphatically "that the Czech nation will think over very carefully if it can make an agreement with a state which so persecutes the Slovak nation and the other non-Magyar nationalities."34 During the debate on the Austro-Hungarian economic agreement before the Austrian Parliament, T.G. Masaryk took the opportunity to present his views: I turn to the nationality question. For us, who are here from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, for us Czechs the Compromise had politico-national importance. You heard today in the interpellation about the events in Ruiomberok which the Agrarian speaker also spoke about. The matter is quite simple. We have two million Slovaks in Hungary who belong to our nation: a nation of eight million will not abandon two million of its brethren to Magyar national chauvinism. It is our duty here and at every opportunity in 30 Ibid., 35. Ibid. , 35. 32 Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Ha uses der Abgeordneten des oesterreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1907. Haus der Abgeordneten - 30. Sitzung der XVIII. Sess ion am 30. October 1907, p. 3 I 79. "Dotaz". (London , UK: Briti sh Museum). (Hereafter, Protocol). 33 Protocol, p. 3179 34 "Cemovska vrazda na sneme," Slovensky tyi dennik, I November 190 7, p. 3. The agreement mentioned here refers to the new ten-year agreement between Austria and Hungary wh ich was about to be voted on by the Viennese Parliament. 31 �SLOVAKIA 17 this house to declare to Austria and the whole public that what the Magyars are doing to our Slovaks is inhumane. 35 The German Moravian representative Dr. Redlich also expressed his concern with the Magyarizing fervor in Hungary: I need not remind any of your Czech gentlemen of what is happening to the Slovaks in Hungary. Think not of Cernova alone; think of the whole process which led to it, the Hlinka trial, the Juriga trial /36 Later, the Czech deputy Dr. Zahradnik requested to know if the president of the Parliament intended to add the following to the protocol: " ... the expression of our deep regret and our deep sympathy not only for the unfortunate victims of Cernova but for all the nonMagyar nations who suffer under such great oppression. " 37 Deputy Gunther raised the hope that " ... the whole of civilized Europe, all who still have some feeling for human suffering will finally put themselves on the side of the great Norwegian poet. .. the whole world will find out what is hidden behind this Magyar liberalism ." 38 Gunther was referring to the poet and Nobel-prize winner Bjornstjerne Bjornson, who, the previous month, had delivered a speech criticizing the "Magyar humbug and ... oppression in the service of nationalistic thinking," 39 thus drawing the attention of Europe to its deeds. Bjornson had taken up the cudgel on Hungarian policy towards its nationalists with special reference to the Slovaks. Cernova gave him the opportunity to follow up with a long article in the Neue Freie Presse, describing at length the Magyarizing process. Needless to say, the above annoyed the Hungarian government but even greater was the upheaval caused by the writings of such wellknown foreign journalists as Henry Wickham Steed of The Times 40 (London), and the conversion of Scotus Viator to the Slovak cause. 35 Protocol, p. 2346. Protocol, p. 2365. 37 Protocol, p. 23 18. 38 Protocol, p. 2376. 39 Bjomstjerne Bjornson , Narodni listy, 23 October I 907, p. 2. 40 Scotus Viator was the pseudonym of R. W. Seton-Watson, the renowned Scots historian. Seton-Watson became acquai nted with the sociologist Anton Stefanek in 1906 in Vienna, and it was through Stefanek that he had the opportunity to learn the 36 �18 SLOVAKIA 41 In 1908, Scotus Viator published Racial Problems in Hungary, which dealt with the corruption of electoral practices and Magyarization in that country. It earned him his doctorate. Shortly after the first publication, the book was translated into several other European languages, including Czech . This book helped publicize the oppresssed condition of the Slovaks in Upper Hungary throughout the western world. The French press also adopted an inimical stance towards the Magyars . The Poles wrote in Swiat slowianski that: It is not necessary to have concern about our sympathy. We sympathize with all the p ersecuted. We are wholeheartedly on their side. No mistake is as outrageous as that which the Magyars are making when they p ersecute the Slovaks. The Magyar advance against the Slovaks will end badly for the Magyars, but the Slovaks will live on. 42 William Ritter, who was already writing and exposing the Slovaks' plight, added his voice to that of the others. The Slovak politician Milan Hodza made an interpellation in the Hungarian Parliament on the subject of Cernova only an hour after the proceedings of the Austrian Reichstag had become known to the Hungarian Parliament. Feeling amongst the Magyar deputies ran high . Hodza had barely begun to speak before he was rudely interrupted by a very rowdy assembly. His interpellation consisted of a request that the Minister of the Interior, Julius Andrassy, extend the investigation of the Cernova massacre to include an examination of the actions of the administrative official present at Cernova; then, secondly, to suspend the said official from his office on the basis of already known facts until such time as the investigation will have 43 been concluded; and finally, to withdraw the army from the village. facts about Magyari zati on and the oppresssion of the Slovaks and th e other nonMagyar peoples in Hungary. Ce rnova served to re info rce Seton-Watson' s views and he became a vigorous defender of the non-M agya r nationalities in the European ~ress, much to the ire and indignati on of the Hungari an government. 1 London: Archiba ld Constabl e, 1908; reprinted by Howa rd Ferti g, New York, 1972. 42 Swiat slowianski (Cracow, 1907), 12 and 375 , cited in Karo l Sidor, Cernova, 51 . 43 "Cernovska vrazda na sneme" Slo venskj tyi dennik, I November 1907 , p. 4. �SLOVAKIA 19 Julius Andrassy defended the priests as having gone to Cemova only to reassure the people that the consecration would not take place at that time, that the gendarmes had fired in self-defence, and finally, that Zoltan Pereszleny would not be suspended but that a fair investigation would be made.44 Andrassy, along with his colleagues, accused such newspapers as Slovensky tyidennik of "stirring the people to bloodshed." 45 Meanwhile, Hlinka continued his lecture tour of Moravia and Bohemia, acquainting the Czechs with Magyar policy and the events of Cemova. The massacre at Cemova served as a unifying force among the Czechs for the Slovak cause. Hlinka was greeted enthusiastically wherever he went. He was seen as a martyr, a representative of the whole Slovak nation. His speeches activated a far more systematic interest in the Slovaks than ever before exhibited by the Czechs. Slovensky obzor put it quite frankly: What Kalal, Masaryk, Heyduk after long years did not know how to achieve, that is what Cernova events did - in one night! In fact, Cernova even captured the interest of the heir presumptive Francis Ferdinand, who had deputy Milan Hodza inform him personally of the whole sequence of 46 events at the Cernova massacre. V In November of 1907 the Cardinal Primate of Hungary issued a circular in which he put the Eudove noviny on the Index of forbidden reading. Hlinka responded with a plea in the Brno Hlas (6 December 1907) to the Bohemian and Moravian clergy for support: ... the Magyar hierarchy has come down hard on us. They wish to suffocate Eudove noviny, the most Catholic of newspapers, with a clerical curse. I turn to the Moravian and Bohemian clergy today so that they may defend us. Do not let the strongest bastion of the faith and the Slovak language fall. The newspaper Eudove noviny is a substitute today for school. It is equally a catechism and a syllabus. Without it the Slovaks will die or will become a senseless 44 45 46 Ibid ., p.4. "Prijezd Andreje HI inky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. Slovensky obzor, 1907, 564 cited in Sidor, Cernova, 51. �SLOVAKIA 20 mass of slaves and helots .. . Me, they failed, my paper Eudove noviny they prosecute with clerical punishments! Protect our press! 47 His call did not go unheeded - the strength of the religious tie and the events of Cemova caused Czech and Moravian papers to write, urging Slovaks to continue to read Eudove noviny as a good Catholic newspaper. Arriving in Prague on 1 November 1907 in the company of A. Kolisek and J. Uprka, Hlinka was greeted by Czech leaders F. Taborsky, J. Rotnagl , Dr. Lang, and Dr. E. Krajicek, and a large number of students.48 On the 2 November 1907, he gave a speech on Slovansky ostrov which created such a stir that Ceskoslovanska jednota established a Ceskoslovensky komitet (Czechoslovak Committee) on the following day. Its function was to collect money to aid the orphans of Cemova49 and to organize the rest of Hlinka's lecture tours in the Czech Lands. Altogether, there were over 700 rallies on behalf of the Slovaks and Cemova. 50 Josef Anyz, editor-in-chief of Narodni listy, was elected chairman of the Committee with J. Rotnagl as secretary. Such a good working relationship between Anyz and Rotnagl grew out of the Committee that, according to Rotnagl , "whatever I went to N. listy 51 with some request from Cs/. Jednota, l was never turned down." Right after Cemova the number of Slovak evenings organized to acquaint the Czech public with the Slovaks and their culture increased dramatically, as did informative lectures on the same theme. Great speakers such as Pavel Blaho, Matus Dula, Andrej Hlinka, Milan Hodza, Jozef I:udovit Hol'uby, I:udovit Medvecky, Anton Stefanek, Vavro Srobar, and Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, were invited by Jednota to speak to the people of Moravia and Bohemia. Czech newspapers touched the hearts of their reading public, calling for Czech financial support for the victims of Cemova: V 47 Hlas, 6 December 1907, cited in K. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka , p. 205. "Prijezd Andreje Hlinky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. 49 " Pomozte sirotkum po zavrazdenych v Cemove," Cas, XXI , o. 303 ( 1907), 5. 50 "Nasi bratia Ces i," Slovenky tyidennik, 27 March 1908, p. I. 51 "Narodni listy a slovenska vec," Rotn ag l Papers, Literarni archiv pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi, Prague. (He reafter, LA PNP). 48 �SLOVAKIA 21 At this difficult tim e it is our duty to help those .. . orphans, whose fath ers have fallen in def ense of the rights of the Slovak people against brutal violence. Let a collection be taken throughout the whole nation, the y ield of which will be dedicated to the unfortunate victims of Cernova as proof that Czechs and Slovaks f eel together both joy and grief 52 The success of the fund-raising was evident in the letter of 8 August 1908 from Anton Stefanek to Seton-Watson: "We have the whole Czech people behind us. During the last year the Czech people have raised a fund of 80,000 Crowns for us under the influence of Cemova." 53 Seton-Watson received a full report on Cemova and the imprisonment of Hlinka for "incitement against the Magyar nation" 54 from Stefanek. This caused him to write a letter to the London Spectator, describing all the events and he referred to them "as a typical example of the oppression of the Slovaks." 55 The result was a response from Count Esterhazy defending the Magyar position, followed by a scathing rebuttal from Seton-Watson in the Spectator and Manchester Guardian. The Times editor, Wickham Steed, was particularly gleeful when he read them and wrote to Seton-Watson: "The reply to Esterhazy is the best bit of pulverization I have seen anywhere. It made me green with envy for the whole day. Talk about sledgehammers! You are a steamroller when you get going." 56 Czech-Slovak relations drew closer in 1907 when Antonin Reis, a member of Ceskoslovanska j ednota suggested to Pavel Blaho, that now would be a good time to establish an informative journal on Slovakia, especially for the Czech readership. 57 Thus was born Nase Slovensko , short-lived from 1907 to 1910, but important because it 52 " Hunove vrazdi ," Cas, No. 300 ( 1907), p. I . Hugh Seton-Watson, "Anton Stefanek and R. W. Seton-Watson," Bohemia Jahrbuch des Co /legium Carolin um, 18 ( 1977), 236. 54 Jan Ryc hlfk, Thomas D. Marzik, Mi ros lav Bie lik, eds. R. W. Seton-Watson and his Relations with the Czechs and the Slovaks, I, (Prague: Ostav T. G. Masaryka and Martin : Matica slovenska, 1995), 22 55 Rychlfk, et a l. , 22. 56 Ryc hlfk, et al. , p. 139. 57 Antonin Reis, Letter to P. Blaho, 8 March 1907, Blaho Papers (Slovak State Archi ves, Bratislava, hereafter SSUA), Carton 12, Signature Bll-98. The same letter was sent to other prominent Slovaks introduc ing the plan to fo und this journal and seeking support. 53 �22 SLOVAKIA gave the young Slovak generation the motivation to seek other ways of saving themselves from the oppression of the Magyars. They became more engaged in the Slovak national movement and were able to test their skills through such vehicles as Nase Slovensko and later Prudy. It also distanced them from the old generation in Martin who continued to believe that only the Russians could save them from the Magyars. American Slovaks also became very outspoken about the situation in Slovakia. From the late 1860s to the late l 880's, American Slovaks had been more concerned with survival in their new homeland and saving their money to send home to their families . By the late 1890s and early 1900s, they had acclimatized to their new democracy and created self-help associations and newspapers indicative of a maturing Slovak national consciousness. The persecution of Hlinka in connection with the pre-election agitation in 1906 was brought to the attention of the American Slovak public by the Roman Catholic priest Stefan Furdek. 58 The result was an open letter in the newspaper Eudove noviny written by Slovak priests working in America. Collections were organized as a result of the persecution during the elections of 1906, and once this precedent was set a similar procedure was followed to aid Cernova victims. A direct result of the persecution of Hlinka and the other Slovak representatives resulted in the emergence of the Union of Slovak Journalists and the Slovak League of America.59 A very impassioned message "For the Cernova Widows and Orphans," to all Slovaks was written by Furdek in his weekly Jednota, on 7 November 1907: They won't frighten us; our truth will not go begging crumbs from the tyrant. If it 's a fight they want, then a fight they will get; we are not afraid of it .. . Now, when we have the attention of the world, we must prove to the world that we stand together like a strong chain ... A bloody battle has begun in Cernova! Our sacred duty is to financially and morally support the struggle, which will determine whether 58 Stefan Furdek was the founder of The First Cath olic Slovak Union ( 1890) and th e Slovak League of America ( I 907). 59 Stefan Kucik, "Ohlas prenasledovania Andreja Hlinku a Cemovskej tragedie medzi Americkymi Slovakmi", in Kucik, Mytus a Realita, 115. �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slovak nation will exist or not exist in its ancient homeland. 60 With the passing of time, the furor created around Cernova abated. However, the actions of the Magyar authorities in bringing to trial those persons arrested on that tragic day, served to re-awaken interest in various camps. Both Czech and Slovak newspapers reported on the proceedings of the trial, but the Slovak newspaper Narodnie noviny gave its readers a daily account which lasted from the 2 nd to the 10 th of March in 1908. Altogether forty men and women were sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. 61 Cernova was in some ways a catalyst, not just on home ground but in Bohemia and Moravia and internationally. Slovaks in America also rallied and sought to acquaint their government of the situation in the homeland. What the Magyars had probably thought was an insignificant consecration and sign of Slovak thick-headedness turned into a cause celebre. The Magyars never expected this event to attract such attention and greatly miscalculated the damage this would cause them in the eyes of Europe. Men like Count Esterhazy never expected to find themselves having to defend Magyar racial policies, all because of an insignificant village like Cernova and a "people who did not exist," 62 according to Magyar politicians! In many ways, Cernova helped the Slovaks both in Slovakia and in America to unite and to begin thinking of alternatives to the rule of the Hungarian government and its Magyarizing policies. 60 Stefan Furdek, "Pre vdovy a siroty ce m ovske" quoted in Kucik, I 16-1 7. V. H., Cernovsky process (Turciansky Sv. Martin : Knihtl ac iarskeho ucas tinarskeho spolku, I 908), 72 . 62 Bela Grun wa ld, A felv idek, in Duri ca, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, 238. Grunwa ld wrote in 1887 that there were Slovak speak ing-inhabi tants in Hungary but there was no Slovak nation. 61 � SLOVAKIA 7 THE CERNOVA MASSACRE: MAGYAR MISCALCULATION, SLOVAK GAIN Edita Bosak Cernova, formerly an independent municipality of Liptov county, today a suburb of Ruzomberok, played a key role in the Slovak national movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. With the signing of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the hegemony of the Austrian Empire ended. The agreement opened the way for the ruling Magyar political forces in the Kingdom of Hungary to enforce their national interests without regard for the interests of the non-Magyar nationalities. Since this meant that no legal rights would be granted to the non-Magyar nations in Hungary, the Slovaks in Northern Hungary found their political situation deteriorating over the next fifty years. Between 1905 and 1907, the Dual Monarchy found itself in a serious political and social crisis and also faced deeply divisive nationality problems as a result of the Compromise. This study will explore the role of the Cernova massacre in changing the direction of the Slovak national movement, in exposing the Magyar government's nationalities' policies both internally and abroad, and thus forcing the Magyars into a defensive position. With the passing of the Compromise in 1867, Magyar statesmen Ferenc Deak and J6szef Eotvos, crafted the Legislative Act 44/1868 on the Equality of the Nationalities, 1 commonly known as the Nationalities Law. Although this law was intended to satisfy the nationalities' yearning for equality, in actual fact it denied the equality of all the nationalities in Hungary except for the Croats, who were recognized as a separate nation. The preamble of the law clearly stated: " .... all citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, in conformity with the 1 Torveny-czikk a nemzetisek egyenj ogus:ig t:irgy:iban. Magyar torvenyt:ir 10001895 . 1838-1 868 evi torvenyczikkek. (Budapest, I 896) 490-4, as cited in Milan Podrim avsky, " Slovaks in the Conditions of the Hungarian State at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." Human Affairs, 9, I (1999), 45 . �8 SLOVAKIA Constitution and from the political point of view, create an indivisible unitary Hungarian (Magyar) nation, of which each citizen of the country, belonging to any nationality, is an equal member." 2 In effect, the equality of the citizens of the state as individuals, independent of their nationality, was proclaimed; but the equality of the nationalities of the old Kingdom of Hungary was not. The discriminatory character of the Nationality Law had serious ramifications for the Slovaks. As a result, in 1878 the Slovaks sent another deputation led by one of the heroes of the 1848 Revolution, Jozef M. Hurban, to Vienna requesting an independent Slovak territory.3 The emperor refused to meet with Hurban, and returned his Memorandum to him. This led to an escalation in Magyarization (assimilation into the Magyar language and culture) and legislation by Magyar political forces which sought to erode any remaining rights of the nationalities. Prior to 1867, the Slovak national movement had made considerable headway. In the early 1860's intellectuals accepted the language reforms which I.:udovit Stur had made in 1846, and which led 4 to the final codification of the Slovak language in 1851. The Slovak nationalists sought to win legal guarantees that would safeguard the Slovak national existence and sovereignty. Although they were unsuccessful in obtaining recognition for the Memorandum of 1861 and the Okolie (a Slovak territory), they did manage to create the cultural and literary organization Matica slovenska in 1863 in the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin and three Slovak gymnazia in the 1860s. The number of Slovak newspapers also expanded at this time. These achievements gave the Slovaks hope for bettering their political, social and economic situation in Hungary. It was short lived. With the signing of the A usgleich in 1867, these national developments came to a rapid end. The gymnazia were closed in 1874 and the Matica slovenska in 1875, with the state confiscating all of Matica 's property. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Kalman Tisza, announced at the sitting of the Diet that he did not know of "any Slovak nation" . Hungary.s m 2 Podrimavsky, " Slovaks ... ," 45. Anton Spiesz and Dusan Caplovic, Illustrated Slovak History (Wauconda, Ill inois: Bolchazy- Carducci Publi shers, 2006), 149. 4 Ludevi t Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej (Presporok, 1846; reprinted in Bratislava, 2006). 5 Milan Durica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov (Bratislava: Luc, 2003), 235. 3 �SLOVAKIA 9 The arrival of the government of Kalman Tisza in 1875 inaugurated a new period of oppression. The ruling Magyar circles were determined to strengthen the supremacy of national politics within the old Kingdom of Hungary vis-a-vis Vienna and also outside of the Monarchy, especially towards the Balkans. The virulent Magyarization policies of fifteen years of Tisza rule seriously hampered the ability of Slovaks to keep pace with their counterparts in other regions of Europe. The Slovak intelligentsia was continuously attacked and began to lose hope. The Hungarian government believed that the only solution to the nationality problem was assimilating the nonMagyar nations. Its Magyarization policies employed a variety of devices. The Magyar language was implemented at all levels of society, including from the pulpit. Various associations to help assimilate the nationalities 6 were established and also the local press was harnessed to ensure the Magyarization program would be effecttive and ensure the elimination of the Slovak language from public life. In terms of organized religion, both the authorities of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches practiced Magyarization in private, as well as in public. Slovak children attending Catholic schools were required to use the Magyar language. Slovak priests and teachers were persecuted for their national consciousness and participation in the Slovak national movement. 7 Slovak ministers and priests, who were known to be nationalists, were transferred from wealthier parishes to ones where the minister or priest, along with his flock, had . 8 to strugg Ie to survive. In 1878, the Slovenska narodna strana (Slovak National Party) announced it would boycott the elections to protest the discrimination suffered by the Slovaks. Not a single Slovak deputy was elected 6 Tisza' s gove rnment establi shed th e Magyar Educa tio nal League for Upper Hungary (FEMKE) in 1882 w ith its seat in the anci ent Slova k city of Nitra and the Educati onal League fo r Upper Hun ga ry (MT KE) in 1885 w ith its headquarters in Budapest, as we ll several j ourn als and news papers to aid in fi ghting th e g rowth of Slovak nati onal co nsc io usness. Podrimavsky, "S lova ks in the Co nditions of th e Hun gari an State . . . ," 4 7. 7 Ibid., 47-8. 8 Karel Kalal, Mad'arizacia. Obraz slovenske utrpenie. (Originall y publi shed in 1900, reprinted in Brati slava : Eko- ko nzult, 2006), 27. "The Sl ovak priest Moyses los t hi s parish in Lucky and th e Magyarone Smizar repl aced him ; the people sto pped go in g to church, th ey are bu ry in g their dead themselves, children are not be ing bapti zed, but no ne of th at moves either Smi za r, or " Fath er" Parvy. " �SLOVAKIA to the Diet in the elections of 1875 or 1878 . From this date until the early twentieth century, the Slovenska narodna strana followed a policy of political passivity and withdrew to the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin in Central Slovakia. They also brought with them their newspaper Slovenske narodne noviny (Slovak National News) from its previous home in Budapest. Two factors , one internal and the other external , were instrumental in activating the Martin nationalists at the turn of the century. First of all, the economic situation was depressed and created a climate of both social and political unrest. The gravity of this situation was described as late as 1914 in an article entitled "The Decline of Industry" 9 by the pro-Magyar, government-sponsored, newspaper Slovenske noviny , published in Budapest. Alongside this industrial problem was the failure of the agrarian sector to thrive as a result of several bad harvests. The result was a growth in anti-Semitism, as the Jews were blamed for the drop in agricultural prices. This was followed by the rise of a new Catholic, anti-Semitic, Hungarian political party: the Hungarian People's Party (Neppart) established by Ferdinand Zichy and its weekly Krest'an. ' 0 It should be pointed out that most Jews in Hungary tied their economic well-being to support for the Magyar ruling class. Another catalyst for Slovak patriots was the trial of Romanian nationalists in 1894 which helped bring together a coalition of nonMagyar nationalists. Recognizing their common goals and the advantage of solidarity, the nationalities came together for the first time in the Congress of Non-Hungarian Nations in Budapest in 1895 . The Congress sought national equality in conjunction with democratic demands for universal and secret manhood suffrage, and freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association for all the nationalities. An external factor which played a major role in ending political passivity was a new generation of university students who were 9 Dr. Adolf Phany, "Upado k priemys lu," Slovenske noviny, 14 January 1914, p. l . Robert W. Seton-Watso n, A Hislory of 1he Czechs and Slovaks (Londo n, 1943:, reprint ed., Hamden, CT, 1965) 27 1-2. See also Julius Popely, " Boj o liberalne cirkevnopoliticke reform y v Uhorsku a zaloze nie katolickej l' udovej strany," Hisloricky casopis 29, 6 ( 198 1), 85 7-70, and Julius Popely, "Yzt' ah medzi statom a cirkvou v posledn ej tretine 19. storocia a korene politi ckeho kl erikali zmu v Uhorsku," Historickestudie 24 ( 1980): 77 -96, and Owen V. Johnson, " Losing Faith : The Slova k Hungari an Constitutional Struggle, 1906-1914," Harvard Ukrainian S1udies, 22, I, ( 1998), 293-3 12. 10 �SLOVAKIA 11 either educated by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a Czech professor at Charles University in Prague, or who read his works while studying in Vienna and Budapest. As graduates and young professionals, they returned to Slovakia and spread Masaryk's ideas and teachings, his "Realist" program, and especially the concept of "drobna praca" (intensive work) . 11 On the advice of Masaryk, some of his students in 1898 established the journal Hlas (Voice). It preached the advantages of closer Czech and Slovak cooperation. This was enough to prompt the leadership of the old guard--the poet, writer, and editor of Ncirodne noviny, Svetozar Hurban Vajansky; Pavel Mudroii, party chair for the Slovenskci ncirodnci strana; Matus Dula, Ambro Pietor, and several others into protesting that the charges of political passivity levelled by Hlas editors Vavro Srobar and Pavel Blaho were unjust. A rift emerged between the older and younger generation. The elders felt the younger generation was neither respectful nor grateful for the sacrifices made by their elders in furthering the Slovak national movement. When Hlas ceased publication in 1904, there was a short respite. However, the demands of the young nationalists for a platform led to the publiccation of another journal, Prudy (Currents) in 1909. Milan Hodza, a young Budapest lawyer and publicist recognized that the Slovaks needed to become politically engaged and he put his energies into the building of a mass movement. In his newspaper Slovensky tyi dennik (Slovak Weekly) begun in 1903, Hodza tried to capture the Slovak peoples' interests and educate them in political activity. The young people rejected their elders' policy of political passivity. 11 Edita Bosak, "Czech-Slovak Relati ons and the Student Organisati on Detvan, 1882- I 91 4" in Slovak Polirics, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirsc hbaum (C leveland : Slovak Institute, 1983), 6-41. See also Ed ita Bosa k, "The Slovak National Movement, 184819 18" in Rejlecrions on Slovak Hisrory, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirschbaum and Anne C. Roman (Toronto: Sl ovak World Congress, 1987), 59-72 , and Edita Bosak, "T. G. Masaryk and th e Emerge nce of th e Hl as ist Move ment, 1898-1904", in J. M. Rydlo , ed, Milan S. Durica. Fesrschrift (Brati slava, 1995) 29-42. Edita Bosa k, " Slowakische Studentenorganisati onen in W ien, Prag und Budapes t und ihre Zusa mm enarbeit," in Wegenetz europiiischen Ceistes fl - Universitiiten und Studenten: Die Bedeutung studentischer Migrationen in Mittel - und Siidosteuropa vom 18. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Eds. Ri chard G. Plasc hka and Karlheinz Mac k (Muni ch: 1987), 162-1 82. �SLOVAKIA 12 Slovak politicians finally dropped their pass1v1ty before the Hungarian constitutional crisis in 1905-1906. Hungarian political circles noted this and their Magyarisation politics were stepped up and the persecution of Slovak nationalists reached their peak. On the eve of the 1905 elections, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza bluntly stated his position on the nationalities as follows : A cardinal condition for the enjoyment of rights by other nationalities is that the citizens of other nationalities should recognize unreservedly that this State is the Magyar State .... The Magyar nation has never given a binding promise to maintain the Law of Nationalities for all time, or not to alter it... when conditions change, and when we perceive that through this law we grant to our opponents rights against ourselves. 12 The policy of Magyarization continued to escalate at all government and religious levels, and to touch the social, economic, and political fabric of the state. The Apponyi Education Acts of 1907 reiterated that teachers in religious schools were state employees, and, as such, had to be able to read, write, and teach in Magyar. Leading Magyar nationalists held firm to these views . There were even fears among government leaders that negotiations with the nationalities would derail the Magyar goal of a single national state. Tisza, in response to the fears expressed by Count Albert Apponyi, that he was negotiating with the Romanians, stated very clearly that he stood " ... on the basis of a single undivided Hungarian national state ... No Hungarian can hold any other position other than the position of a single Hungarian nation, creating a single united Hungarian national state. 13 As far as Tisza was concerned, this position was unassailable. These views were held by most of the Hungarian ruling circle and permeated throughout the administrative echelons and bureaucracy. Surprisingly, in the 1906 elections, six Slovaks from the Slovenska l'udova strana (Slovak People's Party) 14 and one from the Slovenska 12 R. W. Seton-Watson, German, Slav, and Magyar (New York : Howard Fertig, 1968), 45-6. 13 Kalman Tisza Slovenske noviny, 16 January 19 14, p. l. 14 The Slovenska /'udova strana had separated from Zichy's People' s Party, Neppart, in 1905 because the latter did not represent the Slovak peoples ' interests. 1 �SLOVAKIA 13 narodna strana (Slovak National Party) were elected. They demonstrated that a well-organized campaign, with emphasis on the needs of the peasants, was the way to attract votes. 15 However, the campaigners also pointed out that parties such as Neppart were not working in the interests of the Slovak peasants. Although this was a small win for the Slovak national movement (given their proportion of the population, the Slovaks should have had 40 seats in Parliament), its impact was significant enough that the Hungarian government expanded and increased the tempo of its Magyarization process. With hindsight it is clear that this political achievement was very much a milestone in the Slovak national movement. Slovak leaders, laymen as well as clergy, were now targeted in a stepped up campaign of persecution. 16 The Catholic Church's hierarchy, educated in the "great Magyar spirit," 17 was also actively involved in these persecutions . Even sermons had to be given in Magyar in completely Slovak parishes. Slovak priests who expressed national sentiments and used their own language in church were persecuted. Yet it was this Slovak clergy to which the people looked for guidance. The Slovak intelligentsia was very small, and as a result, both Roman Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers filled this gap. This form of Magyarization also attracted the attention of William Ritter, 18 a Swiss writer and artist. He published the details of the trial of Andrej Hlinka in Ruzomberok, October 26-November 6, 15 Ameri can Slovaks, in a sign of support and solidarity, had co llected $ I 0,000 and se nt it to the Slovak leadership back home to help defray electi on ex penses. The electi on of seven Slovaks to th e Hun ga ri an Parli ament, a first in history , was enthusiasti call y received as one Slovak Am erican decl ared "Our mon ey has been well spent. " In M. Mark Stolarik , Immig ration and Urban ization: The Slovak Experience, 1870- / 9 18 (New York: AM S Press, 1989), 194. 16 Several Slova k nati onali st leaders were now tri ed and convicted of " inciting aga inst the Magya r nati on" and sentenced to term s in prison: the Rev. Ferdi s Juriga, Dr. Vavro Srobar, the Rev. Andrej Hlinka, Milan Iva nka, etc. 17 Kuruc, Stefa n, " Katolicka cirkev na Slovenskom uze mi Uhorska na zaciatku 20. storocia," in My tus a realita, Stefan Kuci k, ed. (Rufo mberok : Katolicka uni versita v Rufo mberku, 2008), 6 1. 18 William Ritter ( I 867- I 955) was one of th e earli est and most creati ve of the foreign Sl ovakophiles who wrote about th e situati on faced by the Slovak s in the Hungari an part of the Dual Monarc hy of Austri a-H ungary. He pro tested aga inst Magyari zati on w ith others like th e Ru ssian Alexander Alexa ndrovic Papkov ( I 866-1920), the Scot Robert William Seton-Watson ( I 879- I 95 I), the Frenchm an Ernest Deni s ( 1849-1 92 1) and the No rweg ian Bj ornstjern e Bjorn son ( 1832- 19 10). �14 SLOVAKIA 1906 in the French Catholic magazine Demain. His article was read by officials in the Vatican and, as result, Hlinka was able to defend himself successfully from the Hungarian hierarchy' s accusations. 19 Ritter also published the letters of Hungarian bishops and Slovak priests in 1906 in Demain. He was a regular visitor to Slovakia from 1888 until 1947, and maintained a faithful and steadfast interest in the Slovaks until his death.20 Ritter had a vibrant correspondence with Slovakia's nationalists and greatest writers and poets, and through his publications pointed out to the western world the inhumane political, religious, social and cultural Magyarization of the Slovaks in the Kingdom Hungary. 21 Ritter was the first Slovakophile to expose the brutal sentiments expressed by the Magyar Prime Minister Istvan Tisza in 1905. In his article "Eveques hongrois et pretres slovaques" in the Lyons journal Demain politique, social, religieux,22 Ritter quoted Tisza as having stated "The law is dead for you Slovaks."23 Ritter had also published the harsh words of Tisza's father, Kalman Tisza, when he had been the head of government years earlier: "Slovaks should be crushed under the heel." 24 This Swiss humanitarian also expounded on Magyarization carried out in poor Slovak parish schools, in the theological seminaries and amongst Slovak priests . In fact, the fateful Cernova massacre simply confirmed the truth of Ritter's writings. Villagers in the small settlement of Cemova, in the diocese of Spis, had constructed a church mainly through the initiative and support of a local son, the Reverend Andrej Hlinka. Out of pride and gratitude, the citizens of Cemova, asked their bishop, Alexander Parvy, to allow Hlinka to consecrate the new church. 25 These people knew the importance of having one of their own sons fulfill this ceremony. Since Hlinka had been suspended from his priestly duties by Parvy because of his nationalist behavior, the people of Cemova requested a delay in consecration until such time as Hlinka could 19 Jozef M. Rydl o, " Sudny proces proti Andrejovi Hlinkovi v Rufo mberku 26. 106.11.1906 a obrana Slovakov proti mad 'arizacii perom William Rittera na strankach francu zskeho Demain", in Kucik, My tus a realita, 24. 20 Ibid. , 22 . 21 Ibid ., 23 . 22 Ibid ., 24. 23 Ibid., 24. 24 Ibid., 24. 25 Alexander Parvy was bishop of the Spis diocese from 1904 to 19 19. �SLOVAKIA 15 preside over it. The bishop refused. The political background leading up to this is important for, as F. S. Clarke, in a dispatch from the British Consul-General in Budapest reported to the Foreign Office, The parish priest at Rozsahegy (Ruiomberok) ... , named Hlinka ... , by his nationalist tendencies, has incurred the displeasure--not only of the civil, but also of the ecclesiastical authorities, and had, in December last, been sentenced to a fine and to two years for the incitement against the Magyar State idea '-- ... 26 Hlinka had been actively backing his friend Dr. Vavro Srobar during the election campaign, something which Parvy considered tantamount to political agitation against the Magyar state. Thus, in Hlinka's place, Parvy chose the Reverend Anton Klurimsky, a Magyarone, to consecrate the newly-built church, despite the objections of the people of Cemova. These sentiments had even been personally relayed to the bishop by deacon M. Pazurik. The bishop decided that the dedication ceremony would take place regardless of the objections voiced by the parishioners. A group of gendarmes and a magistrate from Ruzomberok were assigned to escort the priests to nearby Cemova, and to maintain law and order. Upon their arrival on 27 October 1907, the priests and the squad of gendarmes were greeted by the people of Cemova, who although passive, verbally berated them. According to eye-witness reports, the gendarmes, without any provocation, shot into the crowd gathered on the roadside, which was impeding their progress. The result was "nine dead immediately, three died the following day, one on the third day" 27 and by the 25 th of December all told there were fifteen dead. 28 Because it was feared that a revolt would follow , a contingent of Honveds (National Guards) was dispatched from Ruzomberok.29 The following day a series of arrests of so-called "agi26 F. S. Clarke to Sir Edward Goschen, Budapest, October 31 , 1907. Foreign Office Papers #371 , Pol. A-H , 1907 - # 196 fil e 36724, No. 58, (United Kingdom: Public Record Office) . 27 "Vrazdenie slovenseho l' udu v Cemovej", S/o vensky tyidennik, 1 November 1907, p. I. 28 Karol Sidor, Cerno va (/80 7- /937) (Bratislava: " Slovak", 1937), 35. 29 Ibid. , 32. �16 SLOVAKIA tators" 30 among the survivors began, one of whom was Hlinka's sister, fifty-five year old Anna Fullova. In all, there were 13 arrests. 3 1 The tragedy of Cernova did more than any other event to bring the Slovak problem before a national and international forum . Two Czech deputies, Silinger and Dr. Hruban, brought before the Reichsrat in Vienna an interpellation which requested the government "to ask for an official report on how this sad affair came about and if the guilty parties had been investigated and punished and to put it before them?" 32 The second part of the document " ... asked the Hungarian government, as the second component of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, to finally end similar persecution of the Slovak people and the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary." 33 Dr. Hruban stated most emphatically "that the Czech nation will think over very carefully if it can make an agreement with a state which so persecutes the Slovak nation and the other non-Magyar nationalities."34 During the debate on the Austro-Hungarian economic agreement before the Austrian Parliament, T.G. Masaryk took the opportunity to present his views: I turn to the nationality question. For us, who are here from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, for us Czechs the Compromise had politico-national importance. You heard today in the interpellation about the events in Ruiomberok which the Agrarian speaker also spoke about. The matter is quite simple. We have two million Slovaks in Hungary who belong to our nation: a nation of eight million will not abandon two million of its brethren to Magyar national chauvinism. It is our duty here and at every opportunity in 30 Ibid., 35. Ibid. , 35. 32 Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Ha uses der Abgeordneten des oesterreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1907. Haus der Abgeordneten - 30. Sitzung der XVIII. Sess ion am 30. October 1907, p. 3 I 79. "Dotaz". (London , UK: Briti sh Museum). (Hereafter, Protocol). 33 Protocol, p. 3179 34 "Cemovska vrazda na sneme," Slovensky tyi dennik, I November 190 7, p. 3. The agreement mentioned here refers to the new ten-year agreement between Austria and Hungary wh ich was about to be voted on by the Viennese Parliament. 31 �SLOVAKIA 17 this house to declare to Austria and the whole public that what the Magyars are doing to our Slovaks is inhumane. 35 The German Moravian representative Dr. Redlich also expressed his concern with the Magyarizing fervor in Hungary: I need not remind any of your Czech gentlemen of what is happening to the Slovaks in Hungary. Think not of Cernova alone; think of the whole process which led to it, the Hlinka trial, the Juriga trial /36 Later, the Czech deputy Dr. Zahradnik requested to know if the president of the Parliament intended to add the following to the protocol: " ... the expression of our deep regret and our deep sympathy not only for the unfortunate victims of Cernova but for all the nonMagyar nations who suffer under such great oppression. " 37 Deputy Gunther raised the hope that " ... the whole of civilized Europe, all who still have some feeling for human suffering will finally put themselves on the side of the great Norwegian poet. .. the whole world will find out what is hidden behind this Magyar liberalism ." 38 Gunther was referring to the poet and Nobel-prize winner Bjornstjerne Bjornson, who, the previous month, had delivered a speech criticizing the "Magyar humbug and ... oppression in the service of nationalistic thinking," 39 thus drawing the attention of Europe to its deeds. Bjornson had taken up the cudgel on Hungarian policy towards its nationalists with special reference to the Slovaks. Cernova gave him the opportunity to follow up with a long article in the Neue Freie Presse, describing at length the Magyarizing process. Needless to say, the above annoyed the Hungarian government but even greater was the upheaval caused by the writings of such wellknown foreign journalists as Henry Wickham Steed of The Times 40 (London), and the conversion of Scotus Viator to the Slovak cause. 35 Protocol, p. 2346. Protocol, p. 2365. 37 Protocol, p. 23 18. 38 Protocol, p. 2376. 39 Bjomstjerne Bjornson , Narodni listy, 23 October I 907, p. 2. 40 Scotus Viator was the pseudonym of R. W. Seton-Watson, the renowned Scots historian. Seton-Watson became acquai nted with the sociologist Anton Stefanek in 1906 in Vienna, and it was through Stefanek that he had the opportunity to learn the 36 �18 SLOVAKIA 41 In 1908, Scotus Viator published Racial Problems in Hungary, which dealt with the corruption of electoral practices and Magyarization in that country. It earned him his doctorate. Shortly after the first publication, the book was translated into several other European languages, including Czech . This book helped publicize the oppresssed condition of the Slovaks in Upper Hungary throughout the western world. The French press also adopted an inimical stance towards the Magyars . The Poles wrote in Swiat slowianski that: It is not necessary to have concern about our sympathy. We sympathize with all the p ersecuted. We are wholeheartedly on their side. No mistake is as outrageous as that which the Magyars are making when they p ersecute the Slovaks. The Magyar advance against the Slovaks will end badly for the Magyars, but the Slovaks will live on. 42 William Ritter, who was already writing and exposing the Slovaks' plight, added his voice to that of the others. The Slovak politician Milan Hodza made an interpellation in the Hungarian Parliament on the subject of Cernova only an hour after the proceedings of the Austrian Reichstag had become known to the Hungarian Parliament. Feeling amongst the Magyar deputies ran high . Hodza had barely begun to speak before he was rudely interrupted by a very rowdy assembly. His interpellation consisted of a request that the Minister of the Interior, Julius Andrassy, extend the investigation of the Cernova massacre to include an examination of the actions of the administrative official present at Cernova; then, secondly, to suspend the said official from his office on the basis of already known facts until such time as the investigation will have 43 been concluded; and finally, to withdraw the army from the village. facts about Magyari zati on and the oppresssion of the Slovaks and th e other nonMagyar peoples in Hungary. Ce rnova served to re info rce Seton-Watson' s views and he became a vigorous defender of the non-M agya r nationalities in the European ~ress, much to the ire and indignati on of the Hungari an government. 1 London: Archiba ld Constabl e, 1908; reprinted by Howa rd Ferti g, New York, 1972. 42 Swiat slowianski (Cracow, 1907), 12 and 375 , cited in Karo l Sidor, Cernova, 51 . 43 "Cernovska vrazda na sneme" Slo venskj tyi dennik, I November 1907 , p. 4. �SLOVAKIA 19 Julius Andrassy defended the priests as having gone to Cemova only to reassure the people that the consecration would not take place at that time, that the gendarmes had fired in self-defence, and finally, that Zoltan Pereszleny would not be suspended but that a fair investigation would be made.44 Andrassy, along with his colleagues, accused such newspapers as Slovensky tyidennik of "stirring the people to bloodshed." 45 Meanwhile, Hlinka continued his lecture tour of Moravia and Bohemia, acquainting the Czechs with Magyar policy and the events of Cemova. The massacre at Cemova served as a unifying force among the Czechs for the Slovak cause. Hlinka was greeted enthusiastically wherever he went. He was seen as a martyr, a representative of the whole Slovak nation. His speeches activated a far more systematic interest in the Slovaks than ever before exhibited by the Czechs. Slovensky obzor put it quite frankly: What Kalal, Masaryk, Heyduk after long years did not know how to achieve, that is what Cernova events did - in one night! In fact, Cernova even captured the interest of the heir presumptive Francis Ferdinand, who had deputy Milan Hodza inform him personally of the whole sequence of 46 events at the Cernova massacre. V In November of 1907 the Cardinal Primate of Hungary issued a circular in which he put the Eudove noviny on the Index of forbidden reading. Hlinka responded with a plea in the Brno Hlas (6 December 1907) to the Bohemian and Moravian clergy for support: ... the Magyar hierarchy has come down hard on us. They wish to suffocate Eudove noviny, the most Catholic of newspapers, with a clerical curse. I turn to the Moravian and Bohemian clergy today so that they may defend us. Do not let the strongest bastion of the faith and the Slovak language fall. The newspaper Eudove noviny is a substitute today for school. It is equally a catechism and a syllabus. Without it the Slovaks will die or will become a senseless 44 45 46 Ibid ., p.4. "Prijezd Andreje HI inky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. Slovensky obzor, 1907, 564 cited in Sidor, Cernova, 51. �SLOVAKIA 20 mass of slaves and helots .. . Me, they failed, my paper Eudove noviny they prosecute with clerical punishments! Protect our press! 47 His call did not go unheeded - the strength of the religious tie and the events of Cemova caused Czech and Moravian papers to write, urging Slovaks to continue to read Eudove noviny as a good Catholic newspaper. Arriving in Prague on 1 November 1907 in the company of A. Kolisek and J. Uprka, Hlinka was greeted by Czech leaders F. Taborsky, J. Rotnagl , Dr. Lang, and Dr. E. Krajicek, and a large number of students.48 On the 2 November 1907, he gave a speech on Slovansky ostrov which created such a stir that Ceskoslovanska jednota established a Ceskoslovensky komitet (Czechoslovak Committee) on the following day. Its function was to collect money to aid the orphans of Cemova49 and to organize the rest of Hlinka's lecture tours in the Czech Lands. Altogether, there were over 700 rallies on behalf of the Slovaks and Cemova. 50 Josef Anyz, editor-in-chief of Narodni listy, was elected chairman of the Committee with J. Rotnagl as secretary. Such a good working relationship between Anyz and Rotnagl grew out of the Committee that, according to Rotnagl , "whatever I went to N. listy 51 with some request from Cs/. Jednota, l was never turned down." Right after Cemova the number of Slovak evenings organized to acquaint the Czech public with the Slovaks and their culture increased dramatically, as did informative lectures on the same theme. Great speakers such as Pavel Blaho, Matus Dula, Andrej Hlinka, Milan Hodza, Jozef I:udovit Hol'uby, I:udovit Medvecky, Anton Stefanek, Vavro Srobar, and Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, were invited by Jednota to speak to the people of Moravia and Bohemia. Czech newspapers touched the hearts of their reading public, calling for Czech financial support for the victims of Cemova: V 47 Hlas, 6 December 1907, cited in K. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka , p. 205. "Prijezd Andreje Hlinky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. 49 " Pomozte sirotkum po zavrazdenych v Cemove," Cas, XXI , o. 303 ( 1907), 5. 50 "Nasi bratia Ces i," Slovenky tyidennik, 27 March 1908, p. I. 51 "Narodni listy a slovenska vec," Rotn ag l Papers, Literarni archiv pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi, Prague. (He reafter, LA PNP). 48 �SLOVAKIA 21 At this difficult tim e it is our duty to help those .. . orphans, whose fath ers have fallen in def ense of the rights of the Slovak people against brutal violence. Let a collection be taken throughout the whole nation, the y ield of which will be dedicated to the unfortunate victims of Cernova as proof that Czechs and Slovaks f eel together both joy and grief 52 The success of the fund-raising was evident in the letter of 8 August 1908 from Anton Stefanek to Seton-Watson: "We have the whole Czech people behind us. During the last year the Czech people have raised a fund of 80,000 Crowns for us under the influence of Cemova." 53 Seton-Watson received a full report on Cemova and the imprisonment of Hlinka for "incitement against the Magyar nation" 54 from Stefanek. This caused him to write a letter to the London Spectator, describing all the events and he referred to them "as a typical example of the oppression of the Slovaks." 55 The result was a response from Count Esterhazy defending the Magyar position, followed by a scathing rebuttal from Seton-Watson in the Spectator and Manchester Guardian. The Times editor, Wickham Steed, was particularly gleeful when he read them and wrote to Seton-Watson: "The reply to Esterhazy is the best bit of pulverization I have seen anywhere. It made me green with envy for the whole day. Talk about sledgehammers! You are a steamroller when you get going." 56 Czech-Slovak relations drew closer in 1907 when Antonin Reis, a member of Ceskoslovanska j ednota suggested to Pavel Blaho, that now would be a good time to establish an informative journal on Slovakia, especially for the Czech readership. 57 Thus was born Nase Slovensko , short-lived from 1907 to 1910, but important because it 52 " Hunove vrazdi ," Cas, No. 300 ( 1907), p. I . Hugh Seton-Watson, "Anton Stefanek and R. W. Seton-Watson," Bohemia Jahrbuch des Co /legium Carolin um, 18 ( 1977), 236. 54 Jan Ryc hlfk, Thomas D. Marzik, Mi ros lav Bie lik, eds. R. W. Seton-Watson and his Relations with the Czechs and the Slovaks, I, (Prague: Ostav T. G. Masaryka and Martin : Matica slovenska, 1995), 22 55 Rychlfk, et a l. , 22. 56 Ryc hlfk, et al. , p. 139. 57 Antonin Reis, Letter to P. Blaho, 8 March 1907, Blaho Papers (Slovak State Archi ves, Bratislava, hereafter SSUA), Carton 12, Signature Bll-98. The same letter was sent to other prominent Slovaks introduc ing the plan to fo und this journal and seeking support. 53 �22 SLOVAKIA gave the young Slovak generation the motivation to seek other ways of saving themselves from the oppression of the Magyars. They became more engaged in the Slovak national movement and were able to test their skills through such vehicles as Nase Slovensko and later Prudy. It also distanced them from the old generation in Martin who continued to believe that only the Russians could save them from the Magyars. American Slovaks also became very outspoken about the situation in Slovakia. From the late 1860s to the late l 880's, American Slovaks had been more concerned with survival in their new homeland and saving their money to send home to their families . By the late 1890s and early 1900s, they had acclimatized to their new democracy and created self-help associations and newspapers indicative of a maturing Slovak national consciousness. The persecution of Hlinka in connection with the pre-election agitation in 1906 was brought to the attention of the American Slovak public by the Roman Catholic priest Stefan Furdek. 58 The result was an open letter in the newspaper Eudove noviny written by Slovak priests working in America. Collections were organized as a result of the persecution during the elections of 1906, and once this precedent was set a similar procedure was followed to aid Cernova victims. A direct result of the persecution of Hlinka and the other Slovak representatives resulted in the emergence of the Union of Slovak Journalists and the Slovak League of America.59 A very impassioned message "For the Cernova Widows and Orphans," to all Slovaks was written by Furdek in his weekly Jednota, on 7 November 1907: They won't frighten us; our truth will not go begging crumbs from the tyrant. If it 's a fight they want, then a fight they will get; we are not afraid of it .. . Now, when we have the attention of the world, we must prove to the world that we stand together like a strong chain ... A bloody battle has begun in Cernova! Our sacred duty is to financially and morally support the struggle, which will determine whether 58 Stefan Furdek was the founder of The First Cath olic Slovak Union ( 1890) and th e Slovak League of America ( I 907). 59 Stefan Kucik, "Ohlas prenasledovania Andreja Hlinku a Cemovskej tragedie medzi Americkymi Slovakmi", in Kucik, Mytus a Realita, 115. �SLOVAKIA 23 the Slovak nation will exist or not exist in its ancient homeland. 60 With the passing of time, the furor created around Cernova abated. However, the actions of the Magyar authorities in bringing to trial those persons arrested on that tragic day, served to re-awaken interest in various camps. Both Czech and Slovak newspapers reported on the proceedings of the trial, but the Slovak newspaper Narodnie noviny gave its readers a daily account which lasted from the 2 nd to the 10 th of March in 1908. Altogether forty men and women were sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. 61 Cernova was in some ways a catalyst, not just on home ground but in Bohemia and Moravia and internationally. Slovaks in America also rallied and sought to acquaint their government of the situation in the homeland. What the Magyars had probably thought was an insignificant consecration and sign of Slovak thick-headedness turned into a cause celebre. The Magyars never expected this event to attract such attention and greatly miscalculated the damage this would cause them in the eyes of Europe. Men like Count Esterhazy never expected to find themselves having to defend Magyar racial policies, all because of an insignificant village like Cernova and a "people who did not exist," 62 according to Magyar politicians! In many ways, Cernova helped the Slovaks both in Slovakia and in America to unite and to begin thinking of alternatives to the rule of the Hungarian government and its Magyarizing policies. 60 Stefan Furdek, "Pre vdovy a siroty ce m ovske" quoted in Kucik, I 16-1 7. V. H., Cernovsky process (Turciansky Sv. Martin : Knihtl ac iarskeho ucas tinarskeho spolku, I 908), 72 . 62 Bela Grun wa ld, A felv idek, in Duri ca, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, 238. Grunwa ld wrote in 1887 that there were Slovak speak ing-inhabi tants in Hungary but there was no Slovak nation. 61 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2010, Vol. 40 Description An account of the resource Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 THE CERNOVA MASSACRE: MAGYAR MISCALCULATION, SLOVAK GAIN Edita Bosak Cernova, formerly an independent municipality of Liptov county, today a suburb of Ruzomberok, played a key role in the Slovak national movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. With the signing of the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise, which created the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the hegemony of the Austrian Empire ended. The agreement opened the way for the ruling Magyar political forces in the Kingdom of Hungary to enforce their national interests without regard for the interests of the non-Magyar nationalities. Since this meant that no legal rights would be granted to the non-Magyar nations in Hungary, the Slovaks in Northern Hungary found their political situation deteriorating over the next fifty years. Between 1905 and 1907, the Dual Monarchy found itself in a serious political and social crisis and also faced deeply divisive nationality problems as a result of the Compromise. This study will explore the role of the Cernova massacre in changing the direction of the Slovak national movement, in exposing the Magyar government's nationalities' policies both internally and abroad, and thus forcing the Magyars into a defensive position. With the passing of the Compromise in 1867, Magyar statesmen Ferenc Deak and J6szef Eotvos, crafted the Legislative Act 44/1868 on the Equality of the Nationalities, 1 commonly known as the Nationalities Law. Although this law was intended to satisfy the nationalities' yearning for equality, in actual fact it denied the equality of all the nationalities in Hungary except for the Croats, who were recognized as a separate nation. The preamble of the law clearly stated: " .... all citizens of the Kingdom of Hungary, in conformity with the 1 Torveny-czikk a nemzetisek egyenj ogus:ig t:irgy:iban. Magyar torvenyt:ir 10001895 . 1838-1 868 evi torvenyczikkek. (Budapest, I 896) 490-4, as cited in Milan Podrim avsky, " Slovaks in the Conditions of the Hungarian State at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." Human Affairs, 9, I (1999), 45 . 8 SLOVAKIA Constitution and from the political point of view, create an indivisible unitary Hungarian (Magyar) nation, of which each citizen of the country, belonging to any nationality, is an equal member." 2 In effect, the equality of the citizens of the state as individuals, independent of their nationality, was proclaimed; but the equality of the nationalities of the old Kingdom of Hungary was not. The discriminatory character of the Nationality Law had serious ramifications for the Slovaks. As a result, in 1878 the Slovaks sent another deputation led by one of the heroes of the 1848 Revolution, Jozef M. Hurban, to Vienna requesting an independent Slovak territory.3 The emperor refused to meet with Hurban, and returned his Memorandum to him. This led to an escalation in Magyarization (assimilation into the Magyar language and culture) and legislation by Magyar political forces which sought to erode any remaining rights of the nationalities. Prior to 1867, the Slovak national movement had made considerable headway. In the early 1860's intellectuals accepted the language reforms which I.:udovit Stur had made in 1846, and which led 4 to the final codification of the Slovak language in 1851. The Slovak nationalists sought to win legal guarantees that would safeguard the Slovak national existence and sovereignty. Although they were unsuccessful in obtaining recognition for the Memorandum of 1861 and the Okolie (a Slovak territory), they did manage to create the cultural and literary organization Matica slovenska in 1863 in the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin and three Slovak gymnazia in the 1860s. The number of Slovak newspapers also expanded at this time. These achievements gave the Slovaks hope for bettering their political, social and economic situation in Hungary. It was short lived. With the signing of the A usgleich in 1867, these national developments came to a rapid end. The gymnazia were closed in 1874 and the Matica slovenska in 1875, with the state confiscating all of Matica 's property. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Kalman Tisza, announced at the sitting of the Diet that he did not know of "any Slovak nation" . Hungary.s m 2 Podrimavsky, " Slovaks ... ," 45. Anton Spiesz and Dusan Caplovic, Illustrated Slovak History (Wauconda, Ill inois: Bolchazy- Carducci Publi shers, 2006), 149. 4 Ludevi t Stur, Nauka reci slovenskej (Presporok, 1846; reprinted in Bratislava, 2006). 5 Milan Durica, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov (Bratislava: Luc, 2003), 235. 3 SLOVAKIA 9 The arrival of the government of Kalman Tisza in 1875 inaugurated a new period of oppression. The ruling Magyar circles were determined to strengthen the supremacy of national politics within the old Kingdom of Hungary vis-a-vis Vienna and also outside of the Monarchy, especially towards the Balkans. The virulent Magyarization policies of fifteen years of Tisza rule seriously hampered the ability of Slovaks to keep pace with their counterparts in other regions of Europe. The Slovak intelligentsia was continuously attacked and began to lose hope. The Hungarian government believed that the only solution to the nationality problem was assimilating the nonMagyar nations. Its Magyarization policies employed a variety of devices. The Magyar language was implemented at all levels of society, including from the pulpit. Various associations to help assimilate the nationalities 6 were established and also the local press was harnessed to ensure the Magyarization program would be effecttive and ensure the elimination of the Slovak language from public life. In terms of organized religion, both the authorities of the Catholic and Lutheran Churches practiced Magyarization in private, as well as in public. Slovak children attending Catholic schools were required to use the Magyar language. Slovak priests and teachers were persecuted for their national consciousness and participation in the Slovak national movement. 7 Slovak ministers and priests, who were known to be nationalists, were transferred from wealthier parishes to ones where the minister or priest, along with his flock, had . 8 to strugg Ie to survive. In 1878, the Slovenska narodna strana (Slovak National Party) announced it would boycott the elections to protest the discrimination suffered by the Slovaks. Not a single Slovak deputy was elected 6 Tisza' s gove rnment establi shed th e Magyar Educa tio nal League for Upper Hungary (FEMKE) in 1882 w ith its seat in the anci ent Slova k city of Nitra and the Educati onal League fo r Upper Hun ga ry (MT KE) in 1885 w ith its headquarters in Budapest, as we ll several j ourn als and news papers to aid in fi ghting th e g rowth of Slovak nati onal co nsc io usness. Podrimavsky, "S lova ks in the Co nditions of th e Hun gari an State . . . ," 4 7. 7 Ibid., 47-8. 8 Karel Kalal, Mad'arizacia. Obraz slovenske utrpenie. (Originall y publi shed in 1900, reprinted in Brati slava : Eko- ko nzult, 2006), 27. "The Sl ovak priest Moyses los t hi s parish in Lucky and th e Magyarone Smizar repl aced him ; the people sto pped go in g to church, th ey are bu ry in g their dead themselves, children are not be ing bapti zed, but no ne of th at moves either Smi za r, or " Fath er" Parvy. " SLOVAKIA to the Diet in the elections of 1875 or 1878 . From this date until the early twentieth century, the Slovenska narodna strana followed a policy of political passivity and withdrew to the small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin in Central Slovakia. They also brought with them their newspaper Slovenske narodne noviny (Slovak National News) from its previous home in Budapest. Two factors , one internal and the other external , were instrumental in activating the Martin nationalists at the turn of the century. First of all, the economic situation was depressed and created a climate of both social and political unrest. The gravity of this situation was described as late as 1914 in an article entitled "The Decline of Industry" 9 by the pro-Magyar, government-sponsored, newspaper Slovenske noviny , published in Budapest. Alongside this industrial problem was the failure of the agrarian sector to thrive as a result of several bad harvests. The result was a growth in anti-Semitism, as the Jews were blamed for the drop in agricultural prices. This was followed by the rise of a new Catholic, anti-Semitic, Hungarian political party: the Hungarian People's Party (Neppart) established by Ferdinand Zichy and its weekly Krest'an. ' 0 It should be pointed out that most Jews in Hungary tied their economic well-being to support for the Magyar ruling class. Another catalyst for Slovak patriots was the trial of Romanian nationalists in 1894 which helped bring together a coalition of nonMagyar nationalists. Recognizing their common goals and the advantage of solidarity, the nationalities came together for the first time in the Congress of Non-Hungarian Nations in Budapest in 1895 . The Congress sought national equality in conjunction with democratic demands for universal and secret manhood suffrage, and freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association for all the nationalities. An external factor which played a major role in ending political passivity was a new generation of university students who were 9 Dr. Adolf Phany, "Upado k priemys lu," Slovenske noviny, 14 January 1914, p. l . Robert W. Seton-Watso n, A Hislory of 1he Czechs and Slovaks (Londo n, 1943:, reprint ed., Hamden, CT, 1965) 27 1-2. See also Julius Popely, " Boj o liberalne cirkevnopoliticke reform y v Uhorsku a zaloze nie katolickej l' udovej strany," Hisloricky casopis 29, 6 ( 198 1), 85 7-70, and Julius Popely, "Yzt' ah medzi statom a cirkvou v posledn ej tretine 19. storocia a korene politi ckeho kl erikali zmu v Uhorsku," Historickestudie 24 ( 1980): 77 -96, and Owen V. Johnson, " Losing Faith : The Slova k Hungari an Constitutional Struggle, 1906-1914," Harvard Ukrainian S1udies, 22, I, ( 1998), 293-3 12. 10 SLOVAKIA 11 either educated by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, a Czech professor at Charles University in Prague, or who read his works while studying in Vienna and Budapest. As graduates and young professionals, they returned to Slovakia and spread Masaryk's ideas and teachings, his "Realist" program, and especially the concept of "drobna praca" (intensive work) . 11 On the advice of Masaryk, some of his students in 1898 established the journal Hlas (Voice). It preached the advantages of closer Czech and Slovak cooperation. This was enough to prompt the leadership of the old guard--the poet, writer, and editor of Ncirodne noviny, Svetozar Hurban Vajansky; Pavel Mudroii, party chair for the Slovenskci ncirodnci strana; Matus Dula, Ambro Pietor, and several others into protesting that the charges of political passivity levelled by Hlas editors Vavro Srobar and Pavel Blaho were unjust. A rift emerged between the older and younger generation. The elders felt the younger generation was neither respectful nor grateful for the sacrifices made by their elders in furthering the Slovak national movement. When Hlas ceased publication in 1904, there was a short respite. However, the demands of the young nationalists for a platform led to the publiccation of another journal, Prudy (Currents) in 1909. Milan Hodza, a young Budapest lawyer and publicist recognized that the Slovaks needed to become politically engaged and he put his energies into the building of a mass movement. In his newspaper Slovensky tyi dennik (Slovak Weekly) begun in 1903, Hodza tried to capture the Slovak peoples' interests and educate them in political activity. The young people rejected their elders' policy of political passivity. 11 Edita Bosak, "Czech-Slovak Relati ons and the Student Organisati on Detvan, 1882- I 91 4" in Slovak Polirics, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirsc hbaum (C leveland : Slovak Institute, 1983), 6-41. See also Ed ita Bosa k, "The Slovak National Movement, 184819 18" in Rejlecrions on Slovak Hisrory, Ed. Stani slav J. Kirschbaum and Anne C. Roman (Toronto: Sl ovak World Congress, 1987), 59-72 , and Edita Bosak, "T. G. Masaryk and th e Emerge nce of th e Hl as ist Move ment, 1898-1904", in J. M. Rydlo , ed, Milan S. Durica. Fesrschrift (Brati slava, 1995) 29-42. Edita Bosa k, " Slowakische Studentenorganisati onen in W ien, Prag und Budapes t und ihre Zusa mm enarbeit," in Wegenetz europiiischen Ceistes fl - Universitiiten und Studenten: Die Bedeutung studentischer Migrationen in Mittel - und Siidosteuropa vom 18. Bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Eds. Ri chard G. Plasc hka and Karlheinz Mac k (Muni ch: 1987), 162-1 82. SLOVAKIA 12 Slovak politicians finally dropped their pass1v1ty before the Hungarian constitutional crisis in 1905-1906. Hungarian political circles noted this and their Magyarisation politics were stepped up and the persecution of Slovak nationalists reached their peak. On the eve of the 1905 elections, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza bluntly stated his position on the nationalities as follows : A cardinal condition for the enjoyment of rights by other nationalities is that the citizens of other nationalities should recognize unreservedly that this State is the Magyar State .... The Magyar nation has never given a binding promise to maintain the Law of Nationalities for all time, or not to alter it... when conditions change, and when we perceive that through this law we grant to our opponents rights against ourselves. 12 The policy of Magyarization continued to escalate at all government and religious levels, and to touch the social, economic, and political fabric of the state. The Apponyi Education Acts of 1907 reiterated that teachers in religious schools were state employees, and, as such, had to be able to read, write, and teach in Magyar. Leading Magyar nationalists held firm to these views . There were even fears among government leaders that negotiations with the nationalities would derail the Magyar goal of a single national state. Tisza, in response to the fears expressed by Count Albert Apponyi, that he was negotiating with the Romanians, stated very clearly that he stood " ... on the basis of a single undivided Hungarian national state ... No Hungarian can hold any other position other than the position of a single Hungarian nation, creating a single united Hungarian national state. 13 As far as Tisza was concerned, this position was unassailable. These views were held by most of the Hungarian ruling circle and permeated throughout the administrative echelons and bureaucracy. Surprisingly, in the 1906 elections, six Slovaks from the Slovenska l'udova strana (Slovak People's Party) 14 and one from the Slovenska 12 R. W. Seton-Watson, German, Slav, and Magyar (New York : Howard Fertig, 1968), 45-6. 13 Kalman Tisza Slovenske noviny, 16 January 19 14, p. l. 14 The Slovenska /'udova strana had separated from Zichy's People' s Party, Neppart, in 1905 because the latter did not represent the Slovak peoples ' interests. 1 SLOVAKIA 13 narodna strana (Slovak National Party) were elected. They demonstrated that a well-organized campaign, with emphasis on the needs of the peasants, was the way to attract votes. 15 However, the campaigners also pointed out that parties such as Neppart were not working in the interests of the Slovak peasants. Although this was a small win for the Slovak national movement (given their proportion of the population, the Slovaks should have had 40 seats in Parliament), its impact was significant enough that the Hungarian government expanded and increased the tempo of its Magyarization process. With hindsight it is clear that this political achievement was very much a milestone in the Slovak national movement. Slovak leaders, laymen as well as clergy, were now targeted in a stepped up campaign of persecution. 16 The Catholic Church's hierarchy, educated in the "great Magyar spirit," 17 was also actively involved in these persecutions . Even sermons had to be given in Magyar in completely Slovak parishes. Slovak priests who expressed national sentiments and used their own language in church were persecuted. Yet it was this Slovak clergy to which the people looked for guidance. The Slovak intelligentsia was very small, and as a result, both Roman Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers filled this gap. This form of Magyarization also attracted the attention of William Ritter, 18 a Swiss writer and artist. He published the details of the trial of Andrej Hlinka in Ruzomberok, October 26-November 6, 15 Ameri can Slovaks, in a sign of support and solidarity, had co llected $ I 0,000 and se nt it to the Slovak leadership back home to help defray electi on ex penses. The electi on of seven Slovaks to th e Hun ga ri an Parli ament, a first in history , was enthusiasti call y received as one Slovak Am erican decl ared "Our mon ey has been well spent. " In M. Mark Stolarik , Immig ration and Urban ization: The Slovak Experience, 1870- / 9 18 (New York: AM S Press, 1989), 194. 16 Several Slova k nati onali st leaders were now tri ed and convicted of " inciting aga inst the Magya r nati on" and sentenced to term s in prison: the Rev. Ferdi s Juriga, Dr. Vavro Srobar, the Rev. Andrej Hlinka, Milan Iva nka, etc. 17 Kuruc, Stefa n, " Katolicka cirkev na Slovenskom uze mi Uhorska na zaciatku 20. storocia," in My tus a realita, Stefan Kuci k, ed. (Rufo mberok : Katolicka uni versita v Rufo mberku, 2008), 6 1. 18 William Ritter ( I 867- I 955) was one of th e earli est and most creati ve of the foreign Sl ovakophiles who wrote about th e situati on faced by the Slovak s in the Hungari an part of the Dual Monarc hy of Austri a-H ungary. He pro tested aga inst Magyari zati on w ith others like th e Ru ssian Alexander Alexa ndrovic Papkov ( I 866-1920), the Scot Robert William Seton-Watson ( I 879- I 95 I), the Frenchm an Ernest Deni s ( 1849-1 92 1) and the No rweg ian Bj ornstjern e Bjorn son ( 1832- 19 10). 14 SLOVAKIA 1906 in the French Catholic magazine Demain. His article was read by officials in the Vatican and, as result, Hlinka was able to defend himself successfully from the Hungarian hierarchy' s accusations. 19 Ritter also published the letters of Hungarian bishops and Slovak priests in 1906 in Demain. He was a regular visitor to Slovakia from 1888 until 1947, and maintained a faithful and steadfast interest in the Slovaks until his death.20 Ritter had a vibrant correspondence with Slovakia's nationalists and greatest writers and poets, and through his publications pointed out to the western world the inhumane political, religious, social and cultural Magyarization of the Slovaks in the Kingdom Hungary. 21 Ritter was the first Slovakophile to expose the brutal sentiments expressed by the Magyar Prime Minister Istvan Tisza in 1905. In his article "Eveques hongrois et pretres slovaques" in the Lyons journal Demain politique, social, religieux,22 Ritter quoted Tisza as having stated "The law is dead for you Slovaks."23 Ritter had also published the harsh words of Tisza's father, Kalman Tisza, when he had been the head of government years earlier: "Slovaks should be crushed under the heel." 24 This Swiss humanitarian also expounded on Magyarization carried out in poor Slovak parish schools, in the theological seminaries and amongst Slovak priests . In fact, the fateful Cernova massacre simply confirmed the truth of Ritter's writings. Villagers in the small settlement of Cemova, in the diocese of Spis, had constructed a church mainly through the initiative and support of a local son, the Reverend Andrej Hlinka. Out of pride and gratitude, the citizens of Cemova, asked their bishop, Alexander Parvy, to allow Hlinka to consecrate the new church. 25 These people knew the importance of having one of their own sons fulfill this ceremony. Since Hlinka had been suspended from his priestly duties by Parvy because of his nationalist behavior, the people of Cemova requested a delay in consecration until such time as Hlinka could 19 Jozef M. Rydl o, " Sudny proces proti Andrejovi Hlinkovi v Rufo mberku 26. 106.11.1906 a obrana Slovakov proti mad 'arizacii perom William Rittera na strankach francu zskeho Demain", in Kucik, My tus a realita, 24. 20 Ibid. , 22 . 21 Ibid ., 23 . 22 Ibid ., 24. 23 Ibid., 24. 24 Ibid., 24. 25 Alexander Parvy was bishop of the Spis diocese from 1904 to 19 19. SLOVAKIA 15 preside over it. The bishop refused. The political background leading up to this is important for, as F. S. Clarke, in a dispatch from the British Consul-General in Budapest reported to the Foreign Office, The parish priest at Rozsahegy (Ruiomberok) ... , named Hlinka ... , by his nationalist tendencies, has incurred the displeasure--not only of the civil, but also of the ecclesiastical authorities, and had, in December last, been sentenced to a fine and to two years for the incitement against the Magyar State idea '-- ... 26 Hlinka had been actively backing his friend Dr. Vavro Srobar during the election campaign, something which Parvy considered tantamount to political agitation against the Magyar state. Thus, in Hlinka's place, Parvy chose the Reverend Anton Klurimsky, a Magyarone, to consecrate the newly-built church, despite the objections of the people of Cemova. These sentiments had even been personally relayed to the bishop by deacon M. Pazurik. The bishop decided that the dedication ceremony would take place regardless of the objections voiced by the parishioners. A group of gendarmes and a magistrate from Ruzomberok were assigned to escort the priests to nearby Cemova, and to maintain law and order. Upon their arrival on 27 October 1907, the priests and the squad of gendarmes were greeted by the people of Cemova, who although passive, verbally berated them. According to eye-witness reports, the gendarmes, without any provocation, shot into the crowd gathered on the roadside, which was impeding their progress. The result was "nine dead immediately, three died the following day, one on the third day" 27 and by the 25 th of December all told there were fifteen dead. 28 Because it was feared that a revolt would follow , a contingent of Honveds (National Guards) was dispatched from Ruzomberok.29 The following day a series of arrests of so-called "agi26 F. S. Clarke to Sir Edward Goschen, Budapest, October 31 , 1907. Foreign Office Papers #371 , Pol. A-H , 1907 - # 196 fil e 36724, No. 58, (United Kingdom: Public Record Office) . 27 "Vrazdenie slovenseho l' udu v Cemovej", S/o vensky tyidennik, 1 November 1907, p. I. 28 Karol Sidor, Cerno va (/80 7- /937) (Bratislava: " Slovak", 1937), 35. 29 Ibid. , 32. 16 SLOVAKIA tators" 30 among the survivors began, one of whom was Hlinka's sister, fifty-five year old Anna Fullova. In all, there were 13 arrests. 3 1 The tragedy of Cernova did more than any other event to bring the Slovak problem before a national and international forum . Two Czech deputies, Silinger and Dr. Hruban, brought before the Reichsrat in Vienna an interpellation which requested the government "to ask for an official report on how this sad affair came about and if the guilty parties had been investigated and punished and to put it before them?" 32 The second part of the document " ... asked the Hungarian government, as the second component of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, to finally end similar persecution of the Slovak people and the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary." 33 Dr. Hruban stated most emphatically "that the Czech nation will think over very carefully if it can make an agreement with a state which so persecutes the Slovak nation and the other non-Magyar nationalities."34 During the debate on the Austro-Hungarian economic agreement before the Austrian Parliament, T.G. Masaryk took the opportunity to present his views: I turn to the nationality question. For us, who are here from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, for us Czechs the Compromise had politico-national importance. You heard today in the interpellation about the events in Ruiomberok which the Agrarian speaker also spoke about. The matter is quite simple. We have two million Slovaks in Hungary who belong to our nation: a nation of eight million will not abandon two million of its brethren to Magyar national chauvinism. It is our duty here and at every opportunity in 30 Ibid., 35. Ibid. , 35. 32 Anhang zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Ha uses der Abgeordneten des oesterreichischen Reichsrates im Jahre 1907. Haus der Abgeordneten - 30. Sitzung der XVIII. Sess ion am 30. October 1907, p. 3 I 79. "Dotaz". (London , UK: Briti sh Museum). (Hereafter, Protocol). 33 Protocol, p. 3179 34 "Cemovska vrazda na sneme," Slovensky tyi dennik, I November 190 7, p. 3. The agreement mentioned here refers to the new ten-year agreement between Austria and Hungary wh ich was about to be voted on by the Viennese Parliament. 31 SLOVAKIA 17 this house to declare to Austria and the whole public that what the Magyars are doing to our Slovaks is inhumane. 35 The German Moravian representative Dr. Redlich also expressed his concern with the Magyarizing fervor in Hungary: I need not remind any of your Czech gentlemen of what is happening to the Slovaks in Hungary. Think not of Cernova alone; think of the whole process which led to it, the Hlinka trial, the Juriga trial /36 Later, the Czech deputy Dr. Zahradnik requested to know if the president of the Parliament intended to add the following to the protocol: " ... the expression of our deep regret and our deep sympathy not only for the unfortunate victims of Cernova but for all the nonMagyar nations who suffer under such great oppression. " 37 Deputy Gunther raised the hope that " ... the whole of civilized Europe, all who still have some feeling for human suffering will finally put themselves on the side of the great Norwegian poet. .. the whole world will find out what is hidden behind this Magyar liberalism ." 38 Gunther was referring to the poet and Nobel-prize winner Bjornstjerne Bjornson, who, the previous month, had delivered a speech criticizing the "Magyar humbug and ... oppression in the service of nationalistic thinking," 39 thus drawing the attention of Europe to its deeds. Bjornson had taken up the cudgel on Hungarian policy towards its nationalists with special reference to the Slovaks. Cernova gave him the opportunity to follow up with a long article in the Neue Freie Presse, describing at length the Magyarizing process. Needless to say, the above annoyed the Hungarian government but even greater was the upheaval caused by the writings of such wellknown foreign journalists as Henry Wickham Steed of The Times 40 (London), and the conversion of Scotus Viator to the Slovak cause. 35 Protocol, p. 2346. Protocol, p. 2365. 37 Protocol, p. 23 18. 38 Protocol, p. 2376. 39 Bjomstjerne Bjornson , Narodni listy, 23 October I 907, p. 2. 40 Scotus Viator was the pseudonym of R. W. Seton-Watson, the renowned Scots historian. Seton-Watson became acquai nted with the sociologist Anton Stefanek in 1906 in Vienna, and it was through Stefanek that he had the opportunity to learn the 36 18 SLOVAKIA 41 In 1908, Scotus Viator published Racial Problems in Hungary, which dealt with the corruption of electoral practices and Magyarization in that country. It earned him his doctorate. Shortly after the first publication, the book was translated into several other European languages, including Czech . This book helped publicize the oppresssed condition of the Slovaks in Upper Hungary throughout the western world. The French press also adopted an inimical stance towards the Magyars . The Poles wrote in Swiat slowianski that: It is not necessary to have concern about our sympathy. We sympathize with all the p ersecuted. We are wholeheartedly on their side. No mistake is as outrageous as that which the Magyars are making when they p ersecute the Slovaks. The Magyar advance against the Slovaks will end badly for the Magyars, but the Slovaks will live on. 42 William Ritter, who was already writing and exposing the Slovaks' plight, added his voice to that of the others. The Slovak politician Milan Hodza made an interpellation in the Hungarian Parliament on the subject of Cernova only an hour after the proceedings of the Austrian Reichstag had become known to the Hungarian Parliament. Feeling amongst the Magyar deputies ran high . Hodza had barely begun to speak before he was rudely interrupted by a very rowdy assembly. His interpellation consisted of a request that the Minister of the Interior, Julius Andrassy, extend the investigation of the Cernova massacre to include an examination of the actions of the administrative official present at Cernova; then, secondly, to suspend the said official from his office on the basis of already known facts until such time as the investigation will have 43 been concluded; and finally, to withdraw the army from the village. facts about Magyari zati on and the oppresssion of the Slovaks and th e other nonMagyar peoples in Hungary. Ce rnova served to re info rce Seton-Watson' s views and he became a vigorous defender of the non-M agya r nationalities in the European ~ress, much to the ire and indignati on of the Hungari an government. 1 London: Archiba ld Constabl e, 1908; reprinted by Howa rd Ferti g, New York, 1972. 42 Swiat slowianski (Cracow, 1907), 12 and 375 , cited in Karo l Sidor, Cernova, 51 . 43 "Cernovska vrazda na sneme" Slo venskj tyi dennik, I November 1907 , p. 4. SLOVAKIA 19 Julius Andrassy defended the priests as having gone to Cemova only to reassure the people that the consecration would not take place at that time, that the gendarmes had fired in self-defence, and finally, that Zoltan Pereszleny would not be suspended but that a fair investigation would be made.44 Andrassy, along with his colleagues, accused such newspapers as Slovensky tyidennik of "stirring the people to bloodshed." 45 Meanwhile, Hlinka continued his lecture tour of Moravia and Bohemia, acquainting the Czechs with Magyar policy and the events of Cemova. The massacre at Cemova served as a unifying force among the Czechs for the Slovak cause. Hlinka was greeted enthusiastically wherever he went. He was seen as a martyr, a representative of the whole Slovak nation. His speeches activated a far more systematic interest in the Slovaks than ever before exhibited by the Czechs. Slovensky obzor put it quite frankly: What Kalal, Masaryk, Heyduk after long years did not know how to achieve, that is what Cernova events did - in one night! In fact, Cernova even captured the interest of the heir presumptive Francis Ferdinand, who had deputy Milan Hodza inform him personally of the whole sequence of 46 events at the Cernova massacre. V In November of 1907 the Cardinal Primate of Hungary issued a circular in which he put the Eudove noviny on the Index of forbidden reading. Hlinka responded with a plea in the Brno Hlas (6 December 1907) to the Bohemian and Moravian clergy for support: ... the Magyar hierarchy has come down hard on us. They wish to suffocate Eudove noviny, the most Catholic of newspapers, with a clerical curse. I turn to the Moravian and Bohemian clergy today so that they may defend us. Do not let the strongest bastion of the faith and the Slovak language fall. The newspaper Eudove noviny is a substitute today for school. It is equally a catechism and a syllabus. Without it the Slovaks will die or will become a senseless 44 45 46 Ibid ., p.4. "Prijezd Andreje HI inky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. Slovensky obzor, 1907, 564 cited in Sidor, Cernova, 51. SLOVAKIA 20 mass of slaves and helots .. . Me, they failed, my paper Eudove noviny they prosecute with clerical punishments! Protect our press! 47 His call did not go unheeded - the strength of the religious tie and the events of Cemova caused Czech and Moravian papers to write, urging Slovaks to continue to read Eudove noviny as a good Catholic newspaper. Arriving in Prague on 1 November 1907 in the company of A. Kolisek and J. Uprka, Hlinka was greeted by Czech leaders F. Taborsky, J. Rotnagl , Dr. Lang, and Dr. E. Krajicek, and a large number of students.48 On the 2 November 1907, he gave a speech on Slovansky ostrov which created such a stir that Ceskoslovanska jednota established a Ceskoslovensky komitet (Czechoslovak Committee) on the following day. Its function was to collect money to aid the orphans of Cemova49 and to organize the rest of Hlinka's lecture tours in the Czech Lands. Altogether, there were over 700 rallies on behalf of the Slovaks and Cemova. 50 Josef Anyz, editor-in-chief of Narodni listy, was elected chairman of the Committee with J. Rotnagl as secretary. Such a good working relationship between Anyz and Rotnagl grew out of the Committee that, according to Rotnagl , "whatever I went to N. listy 51 with some request from Cs/. Jednota, l was never turned down." Right after Cemova the number of Slovak evenings organized to acquaint the Czech public with the Slovaks and their culture increased dramatically, as did informative lectures on the same theme. Great speakers such as Pavel Blaho, Matus Dula, Andrej Hlinka, Milan Hodza, Jozef I:udovit Hol'uby, I:udovit Medvecky, Anton Stefanek, Vavro Srobar, and Svetozar Hurban Vajansky, were invited by Jednota to speak to the people of Moravia and Bohemia. Czech newspapers touched the hearts of their reading public, calling for Czech financial support for the victims of Cemova: V 47 Hlas, 6 December 1907, cited in K. Sidor, Andrej Hlinka , p. 205. "Prijezd Andreje Hlinky," Cas, XXI, No. 303 ( 1907), 5. 49 " Pomozte sirotkum po zavrazdenych v Cemove," Cas, XXI , o. 303 ( 1907), 5. 50 "Nasi bratia Ces i," Slovenky tyidennik, 27 March 1908, p. I. 51 "Narodni listy a slovenska vec," Rotn ag l Papers, Literarni archiv pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi, Prague. (He reafter, LA PNP). 48 SLOVAKIA 21 At this difficult tim e it is our duty to help those .. . orphans, whose fath ers have fallen in def ense of the rights of the Slovak people against brutal violence. Let a collection be taken throughout the whole nation, the y ield of which will be dedicated to the unfortunate victims of Cernova as proof that Czechs and Slovaks f eel together both joy and grief 52 The success of the fund-raising was evident in the letter of 8 August 1908 from Anton Stefanek to Seton-Watson: "We have the whole Czech people behind us. During the last year the Czech people have raised a fund of 80,000 Crowns for us under the influence of Cemova." 53 Seton-Watson received a full report on Cemova and the imprisonment of Hlinka for "incitement against the Magyar nation" 54 from Stefanek. This caused him to write a letter to the London Spectator, describing all the events and he referred to them "as a typical example of the oppression of the Slovaks." 55 The result was a response from Count Esterhazy defending the Magyar position, followed by a scathing rebuttal from Seton-Watson in the Spectator and Manchester Guardian. The Times editor, Wickham Steed, was particularly gleeful when he read them and wrote to Seton-Watson: "The reply to Esterhazy is the best bit of pulverization I have seen anywhere. It made me green with envy for the whole day. Talk about sledgehammers! You are a steamroller when you get going." 56 Czech-Slovak relations drew closer in 1907 when Antonin Reis, a member of Ceskoslovanska j ednota suggested to Pavel Blaho, that now would be a good time to establish an informative journal on Slovakia, especially for the Czech readership. 57 Thus was born Nase Slovensko , short-lived from 1907 to 1910, but important because it 52 " Hunove vrazdi ," Cas, No. 300 ( 1907), p. I . Hugh Seton-Watson, "Anton Stefanek and R. W. Seton-Watson," Bohemia Jahrbuch des Co /legium Carolin um, 18 ( 1977), 236. 54 Jan Ryc hlfk, Thomas D. Marzik, Mi ros lav Bie lik, eds. R. W. Seton-Watson and his Relations with the Czechs and the Slovaks, I, (Prague: Ostav T. G. Masaryka and Martin : Matica slovenska, 1995), 22 55 Rychlfk, et a l. , 22. 56 Ryc hlfk, et al. , p. 139. 57 Antonin Reis, Letter to P. Blaho, 8 March 1907, Blaho Papers (Slovak State Archi ves, Bratislava, hereafter SSUA), Carton 12, Signature Bll-98. The same letter was sent to other prominent Slovaks introduc ing the plan to fo und this journal and seeking support. 53 22 SLOVAKIA gave the young Slovak generation the motivation to seek other ways of saving themselves from the oppression of the Magyars. They became more engaged in the Slovak national movement and were able to test their skills through such vehicles as Nase Slovensko and later Prudy. It also distanced them from the old generation in Martin who continued to believe that only the Russians could save them from the Magyars. American Slovaks also became very outspoken about the situation in Slovakia. From the late 1860s to the late l 880's, American Slovaks had been more concerned with survival in their new homeland and saving their money to send home to their families . By the late 1890s and early 1900s, they had acclimatized to their new democracy and created self-help associations and newspapers indicative of a maturing Slovak national consciousness. The persecution of Hlinka in connection with the pre-election agitation in 1906 was brought to the attention of the American Slovak public by the Roman Catholic priest Stefan Furdek. 58 The result was an open letter in the newspaper Eudove noviny written by Slovak priests working in America. Collections were organized as a result of the persecution during the elections of 1906, and once this precedent was set a similar procedure was followed to aid Cernova victims. A direct result of the persecution of Hlinka and the other Slovak representatives resulted in the emergence of the Union of Slovak Journalists and the Slovak League of America.59 A very impassioned message "For the Cernova Widows and Orphans," to all Slovaks was written by Furdek in his weekly Jednota, on 7 November 1907: They won't frighten us; our truth will not go begging crumbs from the tyrant. If it 's a fight they want, then a fight they will get; we are not afraid of it .. . Now, when we have the attention of the world, we must prove to the world that we stand together like a strong chain ... A bloody battle has begun in Cernova! Our sacred duty is to financially and morally support the struggle, which will determine whether 58 Stefan Furdek was the founder of The First Cath olic Slovak Union ( 1890) and th e Slovak League of America ( I 907). 59 Stefan Kucik, "Ohlas prenasledovania Andreja Hlinku a Cemovskej tragedie medzi Americkymi Slovakmi", in Kucik, Mytus a Realita, 115. SLOVAKIA 23 the Slovak nation will exist or not exist in its ancient homeland. 60 With the passing of time, the furor created around Cernova abated. However, the actions of the Magyar authorities in bringing to trial those persons arrested on that tragic day, served to re-awaken interest in various camps. Both Czech and Slovak newspapers reported on the proceedings of the trial, but the Slovak newspaper Narodnie noviny gave its readers a daily account which lasted from the 2 nd to the 10 th of March in 1908. Altogether forty men and women were sentenced to a total of 37 years of imprisonment. 61 Cernova was in some ways a catalyst, not just on home ground but in Bohemia and Moravia and internationally. Slovaks in America also rallied and sought to acquaint their government of the situation in the homeland. What the Magyars had probably thought was an insignificant consecration and sign of Slovak thick-headedness turned into a cause celebre. The Magyars never expected this event to attract such attention and greatly miscalculated the damage this would cause them in the eyes of Europe. Men like Count Esterhazy never expected to find themselves having to defend Magyar racial policies, all because of an insignificant village like Cernova and a "people who did not exist," 62 according to Magyar politicians! In many ways, Cernova helped the Slovaks both in Slovakia and in America to unite and to begin thinking of alternatives to the rule of the Hungarian government and its Magyarizing policies. 60 Stefan Furdek, "Pre vdovy a siroty ce m ovske" quoted in Kucik, I 16-1 7. V. H., Cernovsky process (Turciansky Sv. Martin : Knihtl ac iarskeho ucas tinarskeho spolku, I 908), 72 . 62 Bela Grun wa ld, A felv idek, in Duri ca, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov, 238. Grunwa ld wrote in 1887 that there were Slovak speak ing-inhabi tants in Hungary but there was no Slovak nation. 61  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Černová Massacre: Magyar Miscalculation, Slovak Gain Description An account of the resource Edita Bosak Slovakia, Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010 pp. 7-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bosák, Edita, 1950-2022 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2c556388b5ae469772d396e611e7b6a3.pdf 22be1dfe9b4f01ed3cda7b57635994ef PDF Text Text 24 SLOVAKIA GUSTAV MARSHALL-PETROVSKY (1862-1916) Jan Petrovsky In the capitalist United States of America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conditions were such that American Slovaks were able to achieve a higher level of national consciousness than their cousins in the Kingdom of Hungary. This was shown by their well-developed societies, associations and organizations, by the quality and range of numerous American-Slovak publications and by their cultural activities with their own literary, theatrical and scientific achievements. 1 One of the preeminent cultural leaders of American Slovaks at that time was Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky and, since Jozef Pauco failed to include him in his book on Slovak pioneers in America, I will attempt to fill this gap. 2 The idea of national self-realization among American Slovaks originated in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when Slovak fraternal benefit societies were established. 3 The writer, journalist and patriot Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky was one of the pre-eminent leaders of American Slovaks. He was the best-known and most published of Slovak prose writers living in the USA. As such, he was an important symbol of Slovak national development. 4 He defined a nation as a people related by blood, speaking the same language and practicing the same culture and ideals. 5 Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky played a leading role in promoting Slovak culture and ideals.6 11 Bielik, Frantisek, "Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo a jeho mi es to v nas ich narodnyc h dejinach" [Slova k Emigration and Its Place in Our Nati onal History], in "Vyst'ahovalectvo a i ivot kraj anov vo svete [E mi grati on and the Life of Our Co untrymen Abroad] (Martin: Matica slove nska, 1982), 32. 2 Pauco, Jozef, Slovenski priekopnici v Amerike (Cleveland, 1972). 3 Bielik, op.cit. 4 Alner, Juraj , " Literatura o slove nskom vyst'ahovalectve do Spojenych statov americkych" [Literature about Slovak Emi grati on to the United States of Ameri ca], in : Slovaci v zahranici 4 - 5 ( I 979), I 3 7. 5 Balch, Emily G., Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), I 0. 6 Alner, " Literature about Slova k Emi gra ti on .. ... , 137. �SLOVAKIA 25 This patriot was born on June 8, 1862 in the Lutheran village of Bacsky Petrovec, in southern Hungary (now in Serbia) to the family of an affluent Slovak tanner. He attended elementary school in his home town and went on to grammar school in nearby Novy Sad and Sarvas. After studying law for a year at the Lutheran Lyceum in Presov (Slovakia), he was expelled by Education Minister Agoston Trefort for his national activity among fellow-students when he tried to form a Slovak student organization. Indeed, he was forbidden to study in any school in Hungary. Therefore, between 1882 and 1890 he studied medicine in Vienna and joined the Slovak academic society "Tatran," of which he was elected president three times. 7 Gustav's father and grandfather had also made a deep impresssion upon him, especially in his perception of his nation, language and culture. Both gave him a strong appreciation of his homeland. But the strongest influence on Gustav was his father. 8 That led to his umbrage against national oppression and Magyarization 9 in Hungary, which made his further studies in that Kingdom impossible. 10 Petrovsky was a conscious Slovak patriot who, even in the most difficult and crucial moments of harassment in Presov, never turned away from his primary goal: the social, economic, cultural and literary elevation of his nation. In that effort there was no obstacle in his temperament, boisterous and ambitious character, but on the contrary, these attributes enabled him to penetrate the cause of the problems, to recruit young Slovak students and inflame them for work 7 Kocak, Michal , "Gustav Marsall- Petrovsky : Spomienka pri 135. vyroc i narodeni a" [Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky: On the Anniversary of his 135 th Birthday], in: Slovenske narodne noviny. 8, No. 11 , 1997, p. 8. 8 Various authors, "Zivot a die/a Gustava Marfola- Petrovskeho: Zborn ik prac z medzinarodneho sy mp6zia v Novom Sade, Petro vci a Hloianoch 23. a 24. okt6bra 1987" [The Life and Work of Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," Almanac of Works from the International Symposium in No vy Sad, Petrovec and Hloiany on October 23rd and 24th, 198 7] (Novy Sad: OBZOR, 1989), p. 19. 9 It was an attem pt by the Magyar ruling classes to create a united Hungarian state of 30 mill ion people speaki ng one language (Magyar), practicing one culture, and having one fee ling and thought. Butvin , Jozef, "V boj i za narodnu a socialnu slobodu" [The Struggle fo r Nat iona l and Social Freedom], in Dejiny Slovenska slovom i obrazom II. [Slovak Histo,y in Words and Pictures II.] (Martin: Osveta, I 98 I), 58. Various authors, Life and Work of Gustav ... , p. I 9. 10 Petrovsky, Gustav, M, Janosik, kapitan horskych chlapcov - j eho biirlivy i ivot a desna smrt' [Janosik, Captain of the Mountain Boys- His Notorious Life and Frightful Death] (Bacsky Petrovec: OBZOR, I 967), 267. �26 SLOVAKIA among his people. His unshakeable activity in the 1880s helped in the revival of Slovak national life, especially the Slovak student movement, in times of the strongest Magyarization. 11 In addition to his works that appeared in the Almanach slovenskej mladeie in 1885 (Slovak Youth Almanac) and Pamatnica Tatrana in 1890 (Memory of Tatran), Petrovsky made his literary debut in Tatran with "Novely" - Z parku, Kaplan, Pod hrubou korou (Short Stories- of the Park, the Chaplain, Under the Thick Crust) in 1887. Before leaving Vienna in 1890 he published a Slovak grammar in German. 12 In the United States he published a second edition of a Practical Guidebook of Slovak in the German Language in 1907. 13 In 1890 the persecuted Marshall-Petrovsky moved to the United States. He immediately joined various Slovak fraternal-benefit societies and worked as an editor of Slovak newspapers and periodicals. From the beginning he became one of the pioneers of Slovak national and cultural life. In 1893, together with the Reverend Stefan Furdek of Cleveland, he founded the Matica slovenska in America and Petrovsky became its second president (the Hungarian government had closed the original Matica in 1875). Petrovsky was one of the founders of the Slovak Evangelical Union (1892), initially editor of P.V. Rovnianek's weekly Amerikansko-slovenske noviny (American-Slovak News, founded in 1886) in Pittsburgh, and later editor and co-owner of the weekly Slovak v Amerike (The Slovak in America, founded in 1889) 14 in New York City. Still later he edited the weekly Luteran (Lutheran) 15 in Cleveland, he helped to found the weekly Slovenske slovo (The Slovak Word) in Chicago in 19131914, and became managing editor of Chicagsky dennik (Chicago Daily). After he had a falling out with the publisher of the latter newspaper, he decided to become a banker, but failed in this attempt. He died destitute in Chicago on June 15th, 1916 after 24 years of work in the USA and was buried in the Bohemian National Cemetery. Petrovsky's work in so many newspapers may have drained him of lot of creative energy. The continual uncertainty in that profess11 Various authors, "Life and Work of Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," Almanac of .. , p. 28 . 12 Praktisches Lehrbuch der slowakische Sprache (Vienna, 1890). 13 Bartalska, I.:ubica, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in : Slovaks abroad. .., p. 299. 14 The first newspaper in which he started to wri te as an American immigrant. 15 Later Slovens/..y hlasnik (Slovak Herald). �SLOVAKIA 27 sion brought him many troubles . But the same destiny overtook many of his fellow workers. He advertised his works in the newspapers at which he was employed. These works included sketches, novels and fairy tales. The lives and characters of his literary works reflected the hardships and experiences of Slovak immigrants after they moved to the United States. 16 Petrovskys American short stories appeared at a very specific time in his life--from August of 1905 to March of 1906. From his correspondence we know that Petrovsky was at that time editor of Slovensky hlasnik (Slovak Herald) in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. This newspaper was the official organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and had a strong national orientation. In 1906 it paid a lot of attention to the trial of the Rev. Andrej Hlinka of Ruzomberok. On July 13, 1905 Petrovsky started the valuable rubric Zabava a poucenie (Fun and Advice), given to fiction . In July and August of 1905, drawing upon a Greek fairy tale and a Russian sketch, Petrovsky elaborated upon and translated four didactic pictures of life and published his sketch Kto mecom bojuje, mecom zahynie! (He Who Fights with the Sword, Will Die by the Sword!). The same literary invention follows in two short stories--The Samaritan and The Parakeet. Petrovsky's resolution to fill this rubric with reality was activated by his literary experience and so his pictures of real life as didactic stories attained wider artistic merit and gradually merged into clear fictional works: Tak sa easy menia ... (The Times, They Are a Changing . .. ), September, 1905, Pan Tlchuba v nesnadzach (Mr. Babbler in Trouble), October, 1905, which appeared under "Amusing Narratives in the Life of American Slovaks;" Spat' (Back) November-December, 1905 ; Mi n6 spik englis (Me no Speak English), January, 1906; Ochranca komarov (Protector of Mosquitoes), February, 1906; Pozde (Late), February 1906, with the subtitle "A Short Story from the Life of American Slovaks;" and Presta/ pr6by (He stopped Trying), March, 1906, with the subtitle "A Story From the life of Hungarian Serbians." 17 Meanwhile, Petrovsky also published books of advice and novels . In his much earlier Radca slovenskych prist'ahovalcov v Ame16 Bartalska, Cubica, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in Slovaci v zahranici, 4-5 (Slovaks abroad) ( 1979), p. 299, 30 I. 17 Marsall-Petrovs ky, Gustav : Spod zavejov americkych. Bacsky Petrovec: Obzor, 1966, s. 260, 26 1. �28 SLOVAKIA rike (Advisor to Slovak Immigrants in America), which he published in 1895, Petrovsky warned his countrymen against exploitation and abuse as cheap labor and criticized contemporary conditions, the system of capitalism and the huge social differences that existed in the United States. In his 1894 novel Janosik, kapitan horskych chlapcov - j eho bur/ivy i ivot a desna smrt' (Janosik, Captain of the Mountain Boys: His Riotous Life and Frightful Death), which is his most extensive work, Petrovsky focused upon traditional, never-beforetold and fabulous acts in Janosik's life. He did not depart from the main, traditional, stories which are divided into particular themesJanosik who steals from the rich and gives to the poor, who has his great love and enemies among his own people, who is admired and hated. Nevertheless, Petrovsky ' s Janosik is different in some places. Through his hero the author wanted to awaken a love for all Slovaks, emphasizing the spirit of patriotism and love for the everlasting values of his ancestors. 18 In 1906 Petrovsky published a collection of short stories entitled Spod zavejov americkych (From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America), in which he detailed the tragedy of many inexperienced countrymen, cruelly exploited and abused by capitalists. 19 Here he utilized the most common anglicized words such as majna (mine) in America, ollerajt (all right) or st6r (store). 20 As he declared: "I named my little book Spod zavejov americkych because the fairy tales contained in it originated in snowdrifts, both there and here. " 21 While in America, Petrovsky did not forget his homeland and tried to rouse his countrymen against Magyarization in Hungary. He criticized those who were indifferent to national societies. In his story Spat' (Back), he discussed the problem of the gradual denationalizing of Slovaks in America, blaming not only the American educational system, but also the indifference of many countrymen to their assimilation. 22 The literary message of this patriot, journalist, rebel, editor and social activist can be illustrated in two ways. In several novels and 18 Petrovsky, Gustav M., Janosik, Captain of .. , p. 267 . Kutlik, F. , "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in : Eud, 35, No. 69 ( I982), p. 5. 20 Petrovsky, Gustav M., Spod zavejo v americkych [From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America] (Bacsky Petrovec : OBZOR and Bratislava: TATRAN0, p. 276 . 21 Petrovsky, Gustav M. : Dielo llJ (Bae sky Petrovec: Obzor, 1966), 196 . 22 Kutlik, F., "Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky," in: People, p. 5. 19 �SLOVAKIA 29 romances he tried to educate the reader in a popular way, at the expense of literary quality. Many of his stories, especially of the love genre, are artistically of high quality and the story Back and the collection of tales From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America are touching and masterfully written.23 In his novel about Slovak coal miners in the United States, Obete ciernych diamantov (Victims of Black Diamonds, 1906), tragedy is substituted for sentimental love, and it leads to a fatal climax. Here he described the coal mining environment in the USA.24 Amongst the best of Marshall's works are the stories which he published in Spod zavejov americkych and Obete ciernych diamantov. The focus of the first group are love affairs, amusing stories of everyday life and sad, even tragic, events. In these stories Petrovsky penetrated inside of a Slovak man who lived separated from his family and his place of birth. He fixed his eyes, not only on his face, but even on his privacy. It is a sad face, covered by tragedy, often by despair, a face yearning for home, a face which is disturbed by those who forgot their homeland. In Obete ciernych diamantov, he presented the story of a mining disaster in one of America's many coalfields . He brought to the surface the tragic story of Slovaks who were looking for work overseas at a time of national oppression and poverty. The author wrote it in a remarkably suggestive style, with a sense for drama and intensity of action.25 The trials and tribulations of Slovak emigrants to America were described by Marshall- Petrovsky himself: "A frost awaits them. What a cry, what hopes they must bury in their scramble for bread. And what will happen to those living at home? Not even millions of dollars sent to Slovakia can compensate for each sender's soul and spirit. " He then added, I greet you all with my sincere fraternal heart and I wish you and I could be back in the place from whence misery and tragedy banished us, to this cold and unforgiving place. 23 1bid. Cabadaj , Peter, "Album za budanych osobnosti: Marsall- Petrovsky, Gustav [Album of Forgotten Persona liti es: Marshall- Petrovsky, Gustav], in Literarny tyi dennfk, 13 , No. 18 (2000), p. 8. 25 Petrovs ky , Gustav M., Spod zavejov americkych [From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America], p. 276. 24 �30 SLOVAKIA The branch ripped from the tree will never become rooted and the stem will dry up, even breaking its limbs ... therefore come back! Back from beneath the snowdrifts of America, here to your place of birth and poverty! Better to cry with a f ellow countryman than to smile with strangers. Here, by ourselves, we will become aliens !26 Until his death, Marshall- Petrovsky was on the front lines of the struggle for Slovak national liberation. At the beginning of the Great War in 1914 he was a co-signer in the name of the Chicagsky dennik (Chicago Daily) of the Memorandum of the Slovak League.27 When he died in 1916 as the most significant American Slovak writer and journalist, Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky had fallen into poverty and was almost forgotten. However, by 1922 his memory was resurrected and his countrymen built him a monument. 28 He died at the age of 54, still eager to work, although he had none. He had abandoned Hungary due to national oppression and was going to leave America due to social oppression. His big dream to return to his liberated homeland went unfulfilled. 29 Whoever knew Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky in his younger years would never forget his elegant and aristocratic looks. He was erudite and well-educated but impulsive and always dissatisfied. He studied law, theology and medicine but finished none. In the USA he worked as a journalist, as a writer, as a banker, but without success. Nevertheless, he had one thing in common with the Czech writer Vladimir Klacel : during his life poverty, after his death, recognition.30 Here is what the literary critic Andrej Mraz had to say about him : Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky, cried out from deep within his soul to his countrymen spread across the United States of 26 Petrovsky, Gustav M.: , Dielo lll (Bacsky Petrovec : Obzor, 1966), 196 . OL ME I 9 15, XXV, 16 I 3 ,"Memorandum of the Slovak League of America." SYD I, 360. Literamy archi v Mati ci slovenskej (LAMS), fo nd broadsheets 5/21 / 19 16. 28 Composite authors: L ife and work of Gustav Mars hall - Petrovsky: Almanac of .. , 73, 74. 9 KUTLiK, F.: Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky. In: Peop le. p. 5. 3 °Capek, Tomas, Nasa Amerika [Our America ] (Prague: Czechoslovak Nati onal Council. 1926) 92. 27 g- �SLOVAKIA 31 America: come back, come home, we are perishing here, we are like a branch ripped from a tree. Many of his countrymen responded, but Marshall-Petrovsky did not make it to the ship carrying home the Slovak emigrants from America, and so came the day whhen his sad and tormented heart beat for the last time .... 31 31 Kocak, Michal, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky: Remembrance of... ," In: Slovak ... , p. 8. � 24 SLOVAKIA GUSTAV MARSHALL-PETROVSKY (1862-1916) Jan Petrovsky In the capitalist United States of America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conditions were such that American Slovaks were able to achieve a higher level of national consciousness than their cousins in the Kingdom of Hungary. This was shown by their well-developed societies, associations and organizations, by the quality and range of numerous American-Slovak publications and by their cultural activities with their own literary, theatrical and scientific achievements. 1 One of the preeminent cultural leaders of American Slovaks at that time was Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky and, since Jozef Pauco failed to include him in his book on Slovak pioneers in America, I will attempt to fill this gap. 2 The idea of national self-realization among American Slovaks originated in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when Slovak fraternal benefit societies were established. 3 The writer, journalist and patriot Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky was one of the pre-eminent leaders of American Slovaks. He was the best-known and most published of Slovak prose writers living in the USA. As such, he was an important symbol of Slovak national development. 4 He defined a nation as a people related by blood, speaking the same language and practicing the same culture and ideals. 5 Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky played a leading role in promoting Slovak culture and ideals.6 11 Bielik, Frantisek, "Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo a jeho mi es to v nas ich narodnyc h dejinach" [Slova k Emigration and Its Place in Our Nati onal History], in "Vyst'ahovalectvo a i ivot kraj anov vo svete [E mi grati on and the Life of Our Co untrymen Abroad] (Martin: Matica slove nska, 1982), 32. 2 Pauco, Jozef, Slovenski priekopnici v Amerike (Cleveland, 1972). 3 Bielik, op.cit. 4 Alner, Juraj , " Literatura o slove nskom vyst'ahovalectve do Spojenych statov americkych" [Literature about Slovak Emi grati on to the United States of Ameri ca], in : Slovaci v zahranici 4 - 5 ( I 979), I 3 7. 5 Balch, Emily G., Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), I 0. 6 Alner, " Literature about Slova k Emi gra ti on .. ... , 137. �SLOVAKIA 25 This patriot was born on June 8, 1862 in the Lutheran village of Bacsky Petrovec, in southern Hungary (now in Serbia) to the family of an affluent Slovak tanner. He attended elementary school in his home town and went on to grammar school in nearby Novy Sad and Sarvas. After studying law for a year at the Lutheran Lyceum in Presov (Slovakia), he was expelled by Education Minister Agoston Trefort for his national activity among fellow-students when he tried to form a Slovak student organization. Indeed, he was forbidden to study in any school in Hungary. Therefore, between 1882 and 1890 he studied medicine in Vienna and joined the Slovak academic society "Tatran," of which he was elected president three times. 7 Gustav's father and grandfather had also made a deep impresssion upon him, especially in his perception of his nation, language and culture. Both gave him a strong appreciation of his homeland. But the strongest influence on Gustav was his father. 8 That led to his umbrage against national oppression and Magyarization 9 in Hungary, which made his further studies in that Kingdom impossible. 10 Petrovsky was a conscious Slovak patriot who, even in the most difficult and crucial moments of harassment in Presov, never turned away from his primary goal: the social, economic, cultural and literary elevation of his nation. In that effort there was no obstacle in his temperament, boisterous and ambitious character, but on the contrary, these attributes enabled him to penetrate the cause of the problems, to recruit young Slovak students and inflame them for work 7 Kocak, Michal , "Gustav Marsall- Petrovsky : Spomienka pri 135. vyroc i narodeni a" [Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky: On the Anniversary of his 135 th Birthday], in: Slovenske narodne noviny. 8, No. 11 , 1997, p. 8. 8 Various authors, "Zivot a die/a Gustava Marfola- Petrovskeho: Zborn ik prac z medzinarodneho sy mp6zia v Novom Sade, Petro vci a Hloianoch 23. a 24. okt6bra 1987" [The Life and Work of Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," Almanac of Works from the International Symposium in No vy Sad, Petrovec and Hloiany on October 23rd and 24th, 198 7] (Novy Sad: OBZOR, 1989), p. 19. 9 It was an attem pt by the Magyar ruling classes to create a united Hungarian state of 30 mill ion people speaki ng one language (Magyar), practicing one culture, and having one fee ling and thought. Butvin , Jozef, "V boj i za narodnu a socialnu slobodu" [The Struggle fo r Nat iona l and Social Freedom], in Dejiny Slovenska slovom i obrazom II. [Slovak Histo,y in Words and Pictures II.] (Martin: Osveta, I 98 I), 58. Various authors, Life and Work of Gustav ... , p. I 9. 10 Petrovsky, Gustav, M, Janosik, kapitan horskych chlapcov - j eho biirlivy i ivot a desna smrt' [Janosik, Captain of the Mountain Boys- His Notorious Life and Frightful Death] (Bacsky Petrovec: OBZOR, I 967), 267. �26 SLOVAKIA among his people. His unshakeable activity in the 1880s helped in the revival of Slovak national life, especially the Slovak student movement, in times of the strongest Magyarization. 11 In addition to his works that appeared in the Almanach slovenskej mladeie in 1885 (Slovak Youth Almanac) and Pamatnica Tatrana in 1890 (Memory of Tatran), Petrovsky made his literary debut in Tatran with "Novely" - Z parku, Kaplan, Pod hrubou korou (Short Stories- of the Park, the Chaplain, Under the Thick Crust) in 1887. Before leaving Vienna in 1890 he published a Slovak grammar in German. 12 In the United States he published a second edition of a Practical Guidebook of Slovak in the German Language in 1907. 13 In 1890 the persecuted Marshall-Petrovsky moved to the United States. He immediately joined various Slovak fraternal-benefit societies and worked as an editor of Slovak newspapers and periodicals. From the beginning he became one of the pioneers of Slovak national and cultural life. In 1893, together with the Reverend Stefan Furdek of Cleveland, he founded the Matica slovenska in America and Petrovsky became its second president (the Hungarian government had closed the original Matica in 1875). Petrovsky was one of the founders of the Slovak Evangelical Union (1892), initially editor of P.V. Rovnianek's weekly Amerikansko-slovenske noviny (American-Slovak News, founded in 1886) in Pittsburgh, and later editor and co-owner of the weekly Slovak v Amerike (The Slovak in America, founded in 1889) 14 in New York City. Still later he edited the weekly Luteran (Lutheran) 15 in Cleveland, he helped to found the weekly Slovenske slovo (The Slovak Word) in Chicago in 19131914, and became managing editor of Chicagsky dennik (Chicago Daily). After he had a falling out with the publisher of the latter newspaper, he decided to become a banker, but failed in this attempt. He died destitute in Chicago on June 15th, 1916 after 24 years of work in the USA and was buried in the Bohemian National Cemetery. Petrovsky's work in so many newspapers may have drained him of lot of creative energy. The continual uncertainty in that profess11 Various authors, "Life and Work of Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," Almanac of .. , p. 28 . 12 Praktisches Lehrbuch der slowakische Sprache (Vienna, 1890). 13 Bartalska, I.:ubica, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in : Slovaks abroad. .., p. 299. 14 The first newspaper in which he started to wri te as an American immigrant. 15 Later Slovens/..y hlasnik (Slovak Herald). �SLOVAKIA 27 sion brought him many troubles . But the same destiny overtook many of his fellow workers. He advertised his works in the newspapers at which he was employed. These works included sketches, novels and fairy tales. The lives and characters of his literary works reflected the hardships and experiences of Slovak immigrants after they moved to the United States. 16 Petrovskys American short stories appeared at a very specific time in his life--from August of 1905 to March of 1906. From his correspondence we know that Petrovsky was at that time editor of Slovensky hlasnik (Slovak Herald) in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. This newspaper was the official organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and had a strong national orientation. In 1906 it paid a lot of attention to the trial of the Rev. Andrej Hlinka of Ruzomberok. On July 13, 1905 Petrovsky started the valuable rubric Zabava a poucenie (Fun and Advice), given to fiction . In July and August of 1905, drawing upon a Greek fairy tale and a Russian sketch, Petrovsky elaborated upon and translated four didactic pictures of life and published his sketch Kto mecom bojuje, mecom zahynie! (He Who Fights with the Sword, Will Die by the Sword!). The same literary invention follows in two short stories--The Samaritan and The Parakeet. Petrovsky's resolution to fill this rubric with reality was activated by his literary experience and so his pictures of real life as didactic stories attained wider artistic merit and gradually merged into clear fictional works: Tak sa easy menia ... (The Times, They Are a Changing . .. ), September, 1905, Pan Tlchuba v nesnadzach (Mr. Babbler in Trouble), October, 1905, which appeared under "Amusing Narratives in the Life of American Slovaks;" Spat' (Back) November-December, 1905 ; Mi n6 spik englis (Me no Speak English), January, 1906; Ochranca komarov (Protector of Mosquitoes), February, 1906; Pozde (Late), February 1906, with the subtitle "A Short Story from the Life of American Slovaks;" and Presta/ pr6by (He stopped Trying), March, 1906, with the subtitle "A Story From the life of Hungarian Serbians." 17 Meanwhile, Petrovsky also published books of advice and novels . In his much earlier Radca slovenskych prist'ahovalcov v Ame16 Bartalska, Cubica, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in Slovaci v zahranici, 4-5 (Slovaks abroad) ( 1979), p. 299, 30 I. 17 Marsall-Petrovs ky, Gustav : Spod zavejov americkych. Bacsky Petrovec: Obzor, 1966, s. 260, 26 1. �28 SLOVAKIA rike (Advisor to Slovak Immigrants in America), which he published in 1895, Petrovsky warned his countrymen against exploitation and abuse as cheap labor and criticized contemporary conditions, the system of capitalism and the huge social differences that existed in the United States. In his 1894 novel Janosik, kapitan horskych chlapcov - j eho bur/ivy i ivot a desna smrt' (Janosik, Captain of the Mountain Boys: His Riotous Life and Frightful Death), which is his most extensive work, Petrovsky focused upon traditional, never-beforetold and fabulous acts in Janosik's life. He did not depart from the main, traditional, stories which are divided into particular themesJanosik who steals from the rich and gives to the poor, who has his great love and enemies among his own people, who is admired and hated. Nevertheless, Petrovsky ' s Janosik is different in some places. Through his hero the author wanted to awaken a love for all Slovaks, emphasizing the spirit of patriotism and love for the everlasting values of his ancestors. 18 In 1906 Petrovsky published a collection of short stories entitled Spod zavejov americkych (From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America), in which he detailed the tragedy of many inexperienced countrymen, cruelly exploited and abused by capitalists. 19 Here he utilized the most common anglicized words such as majna (mine) in America, ollerajt (all right) or st6r (store). 20 As he declared: "I named my little book Spod zavejov americkych because the fairy tales contained in it originated in snowdrifts, both there and here. " 21 While in America, Petrovsky did not forget his homeland and tried to rouse his countrymen against Magyarization in Hungary. He criticized those who were indifferent to national societies. In his story Spat' (Back), he discussed the problem of the gradual denationalizing of Slovaks in America, blaming not only the American educational system, but also the indifference of many countrymen to their assimilation. 22 The literary message of this patriot, journalist, rebel, editor and social activist can be illustrated in two ways. In several novels and 18 Petrovsky, Gustav M., Janosik, Captain of .. , p. 267 . Kutlik, F. , "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in : Eud, 35, No. 69 ( I982), p. 5. 20 Petrovsky, Gustav M., Spod zavejo v americkych [From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America] (Bacsky Petrovec : OBZOR and Bratislava: TATRAN0, p. 276 . 21 Petrovsky, Gustav M. : Dielo llJ (Bae sky Petrovec: Obzor, 1966), 196 . 22 Kutlik, F., "Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky," in: People, p. 5. 19 �SLOVAKIA 29 romances he tried to educate the reader in a popular way, at the expense of literary quality. Many of his stories, especially of the love genre, are artistically of high quality and the story Back and the collection of tales From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America are touching and masterfully written.23 In his novel about Slovak coal miners in the United States, Obete ciernych diamantov (Victims of Black Diamonds, 1906), tragedy is substituted for sentimental love, and it leads to a fatal climax. Here he described the coal mining environment in the USA.24 Amongst the best of Marshall's works are the stories which he published in Spod zavejov americkych and Obete ciernych diamantov. The focus of the first group are love affairs, amusing stories of everyday life and sad, even tragic, events. In these stories Petrovsky penetrated inside of a Slovak man who lived separated from his family and his place of birth. He fixed his eyes, not only on his face, but even on his privacy. It is a sad face, covered by tragedy, often by despair, a face yearning for home, a face which is disturbed by those who forgot their homeland. In Obete ciernych diamantov, he presented the story of a mining disaster in one of America's many coalfields . He brought to the surface the tragic story of Slovaks who were looking for work overseas at a time of national oppression and poverty. The author wrote it in a remarkably suggestive style, with a sense for drama and intensity of action.25 The trials and tribulations of Slovak emigrants to America were described by Marshall- Petrovsky himself: "A frost awaits them. What a cry, what hopes they must bury in their scramble for bread. And what will happen to those living at home? Not even millions of dollars sent to Slovakia can compensate for each sender's soul and spirit. " He then added, I greet you all with my sincere fraternal heart and I wish you and I could be back in the place from whence misery and tragedy banished us, to this cold and unforgiving place. 23 1bid. Cabadaj , Peter, "Album za budanych osobnosti: Marsall- Petrovsky, Gustav [Album of Forgotten Persona liti es: Marshall- Petrovsky, Gustav], in Literarny tyi dennfk, 13 , No. 18 (2000), p. 8. 25 Petrovs ky , Gustav M., Spod zavejov americkych [From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America], p. 276. 24 �30 SLOVAKIA The branch ripped from the tree will never become rooted and the stem will dry up, even breaking its limbs ... therefore come back! Back from beneath the snowdrifts of America, here to your place of birth and poverty! Better to cry with a f ellow countryman than to smile with strangers. Here, by ourselves, we will become aliens !26 Until his death, Marshall- Petrovsky was on the front lines of the struggle for Slovak national liberation. At the beginning of the Great War in 1914 he was a co-signer in the name of the Chicagsky dennik (Chicago Daily) of the Memorandum of the Slovak League.27 When he died in 1916 as the most significant American Slovak writer and journalist, Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky had fallen into poverty and was almost forgotten. However, by 1922 his memory was resurrected and his countrymen built him a monument. 28 He died at the age of 54, still eager to work, although he had none. He had abandoned Hungary due to national oppression and was going to leave America due to social oppression. His big dream to return to his liberated homeland went unfulfilled. 29 Whoever knew Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky in his younger years would never forget his elegant and aristocratic looks. He was erudite and well-educated but impulsive and always dissatisfied. He studied law, theology and medicine but finished none. In the USA he worked as a journalist, as a writer, as a banker, but without success. Nevertheless, he had one thing in common with the Czech writer Vladimir Klacel : during his life poverty, after his death, recognition.30 Here is what the literary critic Andrej Mraz had to say about him : Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky, cried out from deep within his soul to his countrymen spread across the United States of 26 Petrovsky, Gustav M.: , Dielo lll (Bacsky Petrovec : Obzor, 1966), 196 . OL ME I 9 15, XXV, 16 I 3 ,"Memorandum of the Slovak League of America." SYD I, 360. Literamy archi v Mati ci slovenskej (LAMS), fo nd broadsheets 5/21 / 19 16. 28 Composite authors: L ife and work of Gustav Mars hall - Petrovsky: Almanac of .. , 73, 74. 9 KUTLiK, F.: Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky. In: Peop le. p. 5. 3 °Capek, Tomas, Nasa Amerika [Our America ] (Prague: Czechoslovak Nati onal Council. 1926) 92. 27 g- �SLOVAKIA 31 America: come back, come home, we are perishing here, we are like a branch ripped from a tree. Many of his countrymen responded, but Marshall-Petrovsky did not make it to the ship carrying home the Slovak emigrants from America, and so came the day whhen his sad and tormented heart beat for the last time .... 31 31 Kocak, Michal, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky: Remembrance of... ," In: Slovak ... , p. 8. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2010, Vol. 40 Description An account of the resource Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 24 SLOVAKIA GUSTAV MARSHALL-PETROVSKY (1862-1916) Jan Petrovsky In the capitalist United States of America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conditions were such that American Slovaks were able to achieve a higher level of national consciousness than their cousins in the Kingdom of Hungary. This was shown by their well-developed societies, associations and organizations, by the quality and range of numerous American-Slovak publications and by their cultural activities with their own literary, theatrical and scientific achievements. 1 One of the preeminent cultural leaders of American Slovaks at that time was Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky and, since Jozef Pauco failed to include him in his book on Slovak pioneers in America, I will attempt to fill this gap. 2 The idea of national self-realization among American Slovaks originated in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when Slovak fraternal benefit societies were established. 3 The writer, journalist and patriot Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky was one of the pre-eminent leaders of American Slovaks. He was the best-known and most published of Slovak prose writers living in the USA. As such, he was an important symbol of Slovak national development. 4 He defined a nation as a people related by blood, speaking the same language and practicing the same culture and ideals. 5 Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky played a leading role in promoting Slovak culture and ideals.6 11 Bielik, Frantisek, "Slovenske vyst'ahovalectvo a jeho mi es to v nas ich narodnyc h dejinach" [Slova k Emigration and Its Place in Our Nati onal History], in "Vyst'ahovalectvo a i ivot kraj anov vo svete [E mi grati on and the Life of Our Co untrymen Abroad] (Martin: Matica slove nska, 1982), 32. 2 Pauco, Jozef, Slovenski priekopnici v Amerike (Cleveland, 1972). 3 Bielik, op.cit. 4 Alner, Juraj , " Literatura o slove nskom vyst'ahovalectve do Spojenych statov americkych" [Literature about Slovak Emi grati on to the United States of Ameri ca], in : Slovaci v zahranici 4 - 5 ( I 979), I 3 7. 5 Balch, Emily G., Our Slavic Fellow Citizens (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), I 0. 6 Alner, " Literature about Slova k Emi gra ti on .. ... , 137. SLOVAKIA 25 This patriot was born on June 8, 1862 in the Lutheran village of Bacsky Petrovec, in southern Hungary (now in Serbia) to the family of an affluent Slovak tanner. He attended elementary school in his home town and went on to grammar school in nearby Novy Sad and Sarvas. After studying law for a year at the Lutheran Lyceum in Presov (Slovakia), he was expelled by Education Minister Agoston Trefort for his national activity among fellow-students when he tried to form a Slovak student organization. Indeed, he was forbidden to study in any school in Hungary. Therefore, between 1882 and 1890 he studied medicine in Vienna and joined the Slovak academic society "Tatran," of which he was elected president three times. 7 Gustav's father and grandfather had also made a deep impresssion upon him, especially in his perception of his nation, language and culture. Both gave him a strong appreciation of his homeland. But the strongest influence on Gustav was his father. 8 That led to his umbrage against national oppression and Magyarization 9 in Hungary, which made his further studies in that Kingdom impossible. 10 Petrovsky was a conscious Slovak patriot who, even in the most difficult and crucial moments of harassment in Presov, never turned away from his primary goal: the social, economic, cultural and literary elevation of his nation. In that effort there was no obstacle in his temperament, boisterous and ambitious character, but on the contrary, these attributes enabled him to penetrate the cause of the problems, to recruit young Slovak students and inflame them for work 7 Kocak, Michal , "Gustav Marsall- Petrovsky : Spomienka pri 135. vyroc i narodeni a" [Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky: On the Anniversary of his 135 th Birthday], in: Slovenske narodne noviny. 8, No. 11 , 1997, p. 8. 8 Various authors, "Zivot a die/a Gustava Marfola- Petrovskeho: Zborn ik prac z medzinarodneho sy mp6zia v Novom Sade, Petro vci a Hloianoch 23. a 24. okt6bra 1987" [The Life and Work of Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," Almanac of Works from the International Symposium in No vy Sad, Petrovec and Hloiany on October 23rd and 24th, 198 7] (Novy Sad: OBZOR, 1989), p. 19. 9 It was an attem pt by the Magyar ruling classes to create a united Hungarian state of 30 mill ion people speaki ng one language (Magyar), practicing one culture, and having one fee ling and thought. Butvin , Jozef, "V boj i za narodnu a socialnu slobodu" [The Struggle fo r Nat iona l and Social Freedom], in Dejiny Slovenska slovom i obrazom II. [Slovak Histo,y in Words and Pictures II.] (Martin: Osveta, I 98 I), 58. Various authors, Life and Work of Gustav ... , p. I 9. 10 Petrovsky, Gustav, M, Janosik, kapitan horskych chlapcov - j eho biirlivy i ivot a desna smrt' [Janosik, Captain of the Mountain Boys- His Notorious Life and Frightful Death] (Bacsky Petrovec: OBZOR, I 967), 267. 26 SLOVAKIA among his people. His unshakeable activity in the 1880s helped in the revival of Slovak national life, especially the Slovak student movement, in times of the strongest Magyarization. 11 In addition to his works that appeared in the Almanach slovenskej mladeie in 1885 (Slovak Youth Almanac) and Pamatnica Tatrana in 1890 (Memory of Tatran), Petrovsky made his literary debut in Tatran with "Novely" - Z parku, Kaplan, Pod hrubou korou (Short Stories- of the Park, the Chaplain, Under the Thick Crust) in 1887. Before leaving Vienna in 1890 he published a Slovak grammar in German. 12 In the United States he published a second edition of a Practical Guidebook of Slovak in the German Language in 1907. 13 In 1890 the persecuted Marshall-Petrovsky moved to the United States. He immediately joined various Slovak fraternal-benefit societies and worked as an editor of Slovak newspapers and periodicals. From the beginning he became one of the pioneers of Slovak national and cultural life. In 1893, together with the Reverend Stefan Furdek of Cleveland, he founded the Matica slovenska in America and Petrovsky became its second president (the Hungarian government had closed the original Matica in 1875). Petrovsky was one of the founders of the Slovak Evangelical Union (1892), initially editor of P.V. Rovnianek's weekly Amerikansko-slovenske noviny (American-Slovak News, founded in 1886) in Pittsburgh, and later editor and co-owner of the weekly Slovak v Amerike (The Slovak in America, founded in 1889) 14 in New York City. Still later he edited the weekly Luteran (Lutheran) 15 in Cleveland, he helped to found the weekly Slovenske slovo (The Slovak Word) in Chicago in 19131914, and became managing editor of Chicagsky dennik (Chicago Daily). After he had a falling out with the publisher of the latter newspaper, he decided to become a banker, but failed in this attempt. He died destitute in Chicago on June 15th, 1916 after 24 years of work in the USA and was buried in the Bohemian National Cemetery. Petrovsky's work in so many newspapers may have drained him of lot of creative energy. The continual uncertainty in that profess11 Various authors, "Life and Work of Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," Almanac of .. , p. 28 . 12 Praktisches Lehrbuch der slowakische Sprache (Vienna, 1890). 13 Bartalska, I.:ubica, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in : Slovaks abroad. .., p. 299. 14 The first newspaper in which he started to wri te as an American immigrant. 15 Later Slovens/..y hlasnik (Slovak Herald). SLOVAKIA 27 sion brought him many troubles . But the same destiny overtook many of his fellow workers. He advertised his works in the newspapers at which he was employed. These works included sketches, novels and fairy tales. The lives and characters of his literary works reflected the hardships and experiences of Slovak immigrants after they moved to the United States. 16 Petrovskys American short stories appeared at a very specific time in his life--from August of 1905 to March of 1906. From his correspondence we know that Petrovsky was at that time editor of Slovensky hlasnik (Slovak Herald) in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. This newspaper was the official organ of the Slovak Evangelical Union and had a strong national orientation. In 1906 it paid a lot of attention to the trial of the Rev. Andrej Hlinka of Ruzomberok. On July 13, 1905 Petrovsky started the valuable rubric Zabava a poucenie (Fun and Advice), given to fiction . In July and August of 1905, drawing upon a Greek fairy tale and a Russian sketch, Petrovsky elaborated upon and translated four didactic pictures of life and published his sketch Kto mecom bojuje, mecom zahynie! (He Who Fights with the Sword, Will Die by the Sword!). The same literary invention follows in two short stories--The Samaritan and The Parakeet. Petrovsky's resolution to fill this rubric with reality was activated by his literary experience and so his pictures of real life as didactic stories attained wider artistic merit and gradually merged into clear fictional works: Tak sa easy menia ... (The Times, They Are a Changing . .. ), September, 1905, Pan Tlchuba v nesnadzach (Mr. Babbler in Trouble), October, 1905, which appeared under "Amusing Narratives in the Life of American Slovaks;" Spat' (Back) November-December, 1905 ; Mi n6 spik englis (Me no Speak English), January, 1906; Ochranca komarov (Protector of Mosquitoes), February, 1906; Pozde (Late), February 1906, with the subtitle "A Short Story from the Life of American Slovaks;" and Presta/ pr6by (He stopped Trying), March, 1906, with the subtitle "A Story From the life of Hungarian Serbians." 17 Meanwhile, Petrovsky also published books of advice and novels . In his much earlier Radca slovenskych prist'ahovalcov v Ame16 Bartalska, Cubica, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in Slovaci v zahranici, 4-5 (Slovaks abroad) ( 1979), p. 299, 30 I. 17 Marsall-Petrovs ky, Gustav : Spod zavejov americkych. Bacsky Petrovec: Obzor, 1966, s. 260, 26 1. 28 SLOVAKIA rike (Advisor to Slovak Immigrants in America), which he published in 1895, Petrovsky warned his countrymen against exploitation and abuse as cheap labor and criticized contemporary conditions, the system of capitalism and the huge social differences that existed in the United States. In his 1894 novel Janosik, kapitan horskych chlapcov - j eho bur/ivy i ivot a desna smrt' (Janosik, Captain of the Mountain Boys: His Riotous Life and Frightful Death), which is his most extensive work, Petrovsky focused upon traditional, never-beforetold and fabulous acts in Janosik's life. He did not depart from the main, traditional, stories which are divided into particular themesJanosik who steals from the rich and gives to the poor, who has his great love and enemies among his own people, who is admired and hated. Nevertheless, Petrovsky ' s Janosik is different in some places. Through his hero the author wanted to awaken a love for all Slovaks, emphasizing the spirit of patriotism and love for the everlasting values of his ancestors. 18 In 1906 Petrovsky published a collection of short stories entitled Spod zavejov americkych (From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America), in which he detailed the tragedy of many inexperienced countrymen, cruelly exploited and abused by capitalists. 19 Here he utilized the most common anglicized words such as majna (mine) in America, ollerajt (all right) or st6r (store). 20 As he declared: "I named my little book Spod zavejov americkych because the fairy tales contained in it originated in snowdrifts, both there and here. " 21 While in America, Petrovsky did not forget his homeland and tried to rouse his countrymen against Magyarization in Hungary. He criticized those who were indifferent to national societies. In his story Spat' (Back), he discussed the problem of the gradual denationalizing of Slovaks in America, blaming not only the American educational system, but also the indifference of many countrymen to their assimilation. 22 The literary message of this patriot, journalist, rebel, editor and social activist can be illustrated in two ways. In several novels and 18 Petrovsky, Gustav M., Janosik, Captain of .. , p. 267 . Kutlik, F. , "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky," in : Eud, 35, No. 69 ( I982), p. 5. 20 Petrovsky, Gustav M., Spod zavejo v americkych [From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America] (Bacsky Petrovec : OBZOR and Bratislava: TATRAN0, p. 276 . 21 Petrovsky, Gustav M. : Dielo llJ (Bae sky Petrovec: Obzor, 1966), 196 . 22 Kutlik, F., "Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky," in: People, p. 5. 19 SLOVAKIA 29 romances he tried to educate the reader in a popular way, at the expense of literary quality. Many of his stories, especially of the love genre, are artistically of high quality and the story Back and the collection of tales From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America are touching and masterfully written.23 In his novel about Slovak coal miners in the United States, Obete ciernych diamantov (Victims of Black Diamonds, 1906), tragedy is substituted for sentimental love, and it leads to a fatal climax. Here he described the coal mining environment in the USA.24 Amongst the best of Marshall's works are the stories which he published in Spod zavejov americkych and Obete ciernych diamantov. The focus of the first group are love affairs, amusing stories of everyday life and sad, even tragic, events. In these stories Petrovsky penetrated inside of a Slovak man who lived separated from his family and his place of birth. He fixed his eyes, not only on his face, but even on his privacy. It is a sad face, covered by tragedy, often by despair, a face yearning for home, a face which is disturbed by those who forgot their homeland. In Obete ciernych diamantov, he presented the story of a mining disaster in one of America's many coalfields . He brought to the surface the tragic story of Slovaks who were looking for work overseas at a time of national oppression and poverty. The author wrote it in a remarkably suggestive style, with a sense for drama and intensity of action.25 The trials and tribulations of Slovak emigrants to America were described by Marshall- Petrovsky himself: "A frost awaits them. What a cry, what hopes they must bury in their scramble for bread. And what will happen to those living at home? Not even millions of dollars sent to Slovakia can compensate for each sender's soul and spirit. " He then added, I greet you all with my sincere fraternal heart and I wish you and I could be back in the place from whence misery and tragedy banished us, to this cold and unforgiving place. 23 1bid. Cabadaj , Peter, "Album za budanych osobnosti: Marsall- Petrovsky, Gustav [Album of Forgotten Persona liti es: Marshall- Petrovsky, Gustav], in Literarny tyi dennfk, 13 , No. 18 (2000), p. 8. 25 Petrovs ky , Gustav M., Spod zavejov americkych [From Beneath the Snowdrifts of America], p. 276. 24 30 SLOVAKIA The branch ripped from the tree will never become rooted and the stem will dry up, even breaking its limbs ... therefore come back! Back from beneath the snowdrifts of America, here to your place of birth and poverty! Better to cry with a f ellow countryman than to smile with strangers. Here, by ourselves, we will become aliens !26 Until his death, Marshall- Petrovsky was on the front lines of the struggle for Slovak national liberation. At the beginning of the Great War in 1914 he was a co-signer in the name of the Chicagsky dennik (Chicago Daily) of the Memorandum of the Slovak League.27 When he died in 1916 as the most significant American Slovak writer and journalist, Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky had fallen into poverty and was almost forgotten. However, by 1922 his memory was resurrected and his countrymen built him a monument. 28 He died at the age of 54, still eager to work, although he had none. He had abandoned Hungary due to national oppression and was going to leave America due to social oppression. His big dream to return to his liberated homeland went unfulfilled. 29 Whoever knew Gustav Marshall-Petrovsky in his younger years would never forget his elegant and aristocratic looks. He was erudite and well-educated but impulsive and always dissatisfied. He studied law, theology and medicine but finished none. In the USA he worked as a journalist, as a writer, as a banker, but without success. Nevertheless, he had one thing in common with the Czech writer Vladimir Klacel : during his life poverty, after his death, recognition.30 Here is what the literary critic Andrej Mraz had to say about him : Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky, cried out from deep within his soul to his countrymen spread across the United States of 26 Petrovsky, Gustav M.: , Dielo lll (Bacsky Petrovec : Obzor, 1966), 196 . OL ME I 9 15, XXV, 16 I 3 ,"Memorandum of the Slovak League of America." SYD I, 360. Literamy archi v Mati ci slovenskej (LAMS), fo nd broadsheets 5/21 / 19 16. 28 Composite authors: L ife and work of Gustav Mars hall - Petrovsky: Almanac of .. , 73, 74. 9 KUTLiK, F.: Gustav Marshall - Petrovsky. In: Peop le. p. 5. 3 °Capek, Tomas, Nasa Amerika [Our America ] (Prague: Czechoslovak Nati onal Council. 1926) 92. 27 g- SLOVAKIA 31 America: come back, come home, we are perishing here, we are like a branch ripped from a tree. Many of his countrymen responded, but Marshall-Petrovsky did not make it to the ship carrying home the Slovak emigrants from America, and so came the day whhen his sad and tormented heart beat for the last time .... 31 31 Kocak, Michal, "Gustav Marshall- Petrovsky: Remembrance of... ," In: Slovak ... , p. 8.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Gustáv Marshall-Petrovský (1862-1916) Description An account of the resource Ján Petrovský Slovakia, Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010 pp. 24-31 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Petrovský, Ján Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9413ffa2fd93e550347188753b7d33a3.pdf 7fdf70c9433ba45bf2de2217e32752cd PDF Text Text 32 SLOVAKIA ANDREJ HLINKA'S JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1926 Stefan Kucik Andrej Hlinka belongs among those in Slovak history whose achievements await a complex analysis and evaluation. He and his activities were ignored or misinterpreted by most Marxist historians during the communist era. On the other hand, he was also very controversial. The aim of this article is to analyze the circumstances and the course of his journey to the USA in 1926. Although the official reason for Hlinka's journey was to participate in the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, he made use of his visit to lecture to American Slovaks and to raise funds for the cause of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. After some disagreements between the Slovak League of America and Jozef Husek, the lecture tour was held under the auspices of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. Even if his lecture tour to the USA proved financially disappointing to Hlinka, he did win the sympathy of American Slovaks to his person, and to the autonomist movement in Slovakia. On June 20- 24, 1926 the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in Chicago, Illinois. As the first such Congress on the soil of the United States of America, 1 it presented the Reverend Andrej Hlinka of Rufomberok an opportunity to visit American Slovaks for the first time. Although American Slovaks had already invited Hlinka visit them in 1924, Czechoslovak authorities had refused to grant him a passport because he had been prosecuted for having illegally travelled to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In 1926 he was again prosecuted and, despite having been cleared by the County Court in Bratislava, in March of that year, he was sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight days in jail for his article on T. G. Masaryk' s favortism of the Jews published in the daily Slovak on April 5, 1924. 1 The second time such a congress met in th e USA was in 1976 tional Euchari stic Congress in Philade lphia, Pennsy lvani a, the 4 1st Interna- �SLOVAKIA 33 After explaining that he wished to travel to the Eucharistic Congress, Jan Cerny' s administration finally granted him a passport. 2 Andrej Hlinka was repeatedly invited to America by the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom led by Jozef Husek.3 On April 21 , 1926 the weekly Jednota published a letter from Hlinka to Husek dated April 3, 1926. In this letter Hlinka announced that he would arrive accompanied by his secretary Andrej Genit and the Parliamentary Deputy Jozef Buday on June 3-4, 1926. He asked Husek to prepare a schedule for his lectures. He wrote that his passport was valid for half a year, which he wished to spend in the USA, provided that political issues would not force his return home. 4 While Hlinka was granted a passport to travel to the Eucharistic Congress on April 30, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague about the details of Hlinka's planned journey. According to the Ministry in Bratislava, the goal of Hlinka's journey was to spread autonomist propaganda on behalf of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (hereinafter HSPP) and to raise funds for the Party. He also allegedly planned to draft a resolution of Slovak complaints and pleas and to submit it to the Czechoslovak government and to the League ofNations.5 Hlinka outlined the programme of his journey in the daily Slovak on May 23 , 1926. Among other things he stated that, as early as in 1894 he was asked by American Slovaks to "choke the hydra" of brotherly quarrels among them, but thus far he had not been enable to do so. Now he was going to America to enlighten the Slovaks and to help the Republic and the nation. He was going where the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements were signed. He wanted to see with 2 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hli nka (I 864 - I 926) (Brati slava, 1934), p. 544 . Ibid. , p. 543. 4 Archiv Ministerstva zahran icnich veci Ceske republiky [Archi ves of the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs of the Czech Republi c] (here inafter AMZV CR), fund (here inafter f. ) Ill. sekce MZV 19 I 8 - 1939 [3 rd section Mini stry of Foreign Affairs 19 I 8 193 8] (hereinafter III), in ventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22 , fo lder (here inafter fold .) 651 . The report o f the Consul ate of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) in Pittsburgh, to the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs (hereinafter MFA ) of the CSR in Prague from April 22, 1926 ; Jednota, April 2 1, 1926, p. 4. 5 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld. 651. Letter of the Minister of the CSR with Full Powers fo r the Admini stration of Slovakia in Brati slava to the MFA in Prague, April 30, 1926 . 3 �34 SLOVAKIA his own eyes and hear with his own ears if it was a sin to demand autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak Constitution. 6 At the time of the Hlinka's trip to the USA, reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh characterized the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America as quite tense. Besides personal problems, anxiety arose from frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government' s failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement. Meanwhile, State Insurance Commissioners were exerting pressure on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues, which greatly upset their members. 7 The reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh also described an alleged rivalry between Ivan Bielek, the President of the Slovak League of America and Jozef Rusek. Apparently, Rusek feared losing his editorship of the weekly Jednota at the upcoming 22 nd convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania on September 20 - 25 , 1926. His rival was Jan C. Sciranka, editor of Slovak v Amerike. The owner of the Slovak v Amerike was Bielek's brother-in-law Christopher L. Orbach.8 However, according to the report of the Pittsburgh Consulate, the tension between Bielek and Rusek soon dissipated. On April 14, 1926 Bielek published an article entitled Segedin-Mirov in Slo vak v Amerike, in which he denounced the imprisonment of Hlinka in the Czech Mirov prison for having offended President Masaryk. According to the Consulate, Bielek did so because he needed Husek's support at the upcoming convention of the National Slovak Society and the congress of the Slovak League of America. 9 Soon, however, arguments within the Slovak-American autonomist camp broke out again, thanks to Jozef Rusek. In a letter of April 3, 1926, Hlinka asked Rusek to prepare his lecture schedule. Rusek began to register applications for Hlinka's lectures and he wished to carry out this tour under the aegis of the Committe of Friends of Slovak Freedom. Some newspapers and organizations protested: the banker Michal Bosak in his weekly Obrana, a number of priests who 6 Slovak, May 23, 1926, pp. 1-2. AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 650. Report of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, April 15, 1926. 8 ibid. 9 i bid. 7 �SLOVAKIA 35 supported the programme of the Magyarone priest Frantisek Jehlicska for the return of Slovakia to Hungary, and Bielek and Orbach in 10 Slovak v Amerike. In addition, the Committe had already been out of existence for three years. It was originally founded to purge the "Czechoslovaks" from the Slovak League of America, and then it merged with it. Despite this fact, Husek kept the title of president of this non-existent organization, announced the arrival of Hlinka to Slovak priests and newspapers and launched the campaign on his own. II Although Jozef Husek, through his contact with Slovak priests in America started to organize Hlinka's lecture tour, the Slovak League of America, led by president Bielek, also started to organize the lectures. It established an organizing committee, composed almost entirely of priests. Husek refused to become a member of this committee and the Slovak v Amerike started to complain about Husek's actions. 12 As a result, a group of Slovak priests ended up organizing Hlinka's lecture tour and the Slovak League of America, even though it compiled the schedule of the lectures, did not control the • 13 pnests. On May 26-27 the 16 th congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Detroit. The congress "with great joy received the news, that the noble leader of the Slovak nation, Msgr. Hlinka, President of the People's Party, would visit American Slovaks." It expressed confidence in him and promised that it would "with all its strength help his noble efforts and during his stay he would be a guest of the Slovak League of America." 14 Hlinka and his colleague Jozef Buday, together with Hynek Dostal , editor of the Czech-American newspaper Hlas, which supported autonomy for the Slovaks, 15 were named honorary members of the Slovak League of America. 10 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situat ion report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 11 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 12 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prag ue, October 5, I 926. 13 Ibid. 14 A MZV CR, f. 111 , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 15 Ibid. of the Consul ate of the CS R of the Consulate of the CSR of the Consul ate of the CSR of the Co nsulate of the CSR �36 SLOVAKIA At the congress of the Slovak League, the previous officers were re-elected under the leadership of Ivan Bielek. Husek criticized this outcome. 16 He reported that the League had no funds , he accused the officers of incompetence, and warned that the League would perish if nothing was done to build up its treasury. 17 However, all these arguments between Husek and Bielek were simply personal. In fact, the Slovak League under the leadership of Ivan Bielek (1920- 1934) championed the Pittsburgh Agreement and openly supported the Slovak autonomist movement in the Czechoslovak Republic . The "Czechoslovaks" in America also prepared for the arrival of Andrej Hlinka. For instance, the Reverend Jozef Murgas of WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, that at the next meeting of priests of eastern Pennsylvania, he would ask them if their real interest was in politics or in religion and he promised to inform Getting of their answer. 18 Hlinka's arrival was announced by the daily Slovak (Bratislava) on June 4, 1926: "On June 3 our editorial staff received this telegram from Halifax : We have arrived safely. - Hlinka." 19 From the Canadian port of Halifax, Hlinka' s ship continued on to New York City, where it docked on June 5, 1926. 20 About 300 American Slovaks welcomed Hlinka at the dock. Once he had disembarked, Hlinka briefly outlined the goal of his journey. He stressed that he had come to work for both the Slovak nation and for his homeland, the Czechoslovak Republic. He emphasized concord, unity, the settling of petty arguments and forgivness, because "the nation needs us all and it needs us united." 21 In a 26-car procession the delegation proceeded to the Church of St. John Nepomucene on 66 th street, where the Reverend Stefan J. Krasul'a had been the pastor since 1916. An official reception was held in the Parish Hall, where the representatives of American Slovaks delivered their speeches.22 Here Andrej Hlinka spoke his 16 Ibid. Jednota, Jun e 2, 1926, p. 4. 18 A MZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. Missive of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA , April 15, I 926. "Czechos lovaks" were Slovaks who supp,orted th e unitary policies of the Czechoslovak government in Prague. 9 Slovak, June 5, 1926, p. I. 20 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 21 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. 22 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 17 �SLOVAKIA 37 memorable words: "If there were no America, Slovakia would still be under the Magyar yoke. To its credit the Slovaks finally got rid of the thousand-year subjugation." 23 The Slovak League of America officially welcomed Hlinka in the evening at a session of its local branch. 24 On this occassion the Slovak League also issued an official communique which was published by the daily Slowik in Bratislava. 25 A banquet was held the next day under the aegis of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. The banquet marked the completion of the programme of welcome with speeches by representatives of various Slovak organizations. Hlinka and Buday were presented with special diplomas, certifying that the Slovak League of America had granted them honorary memberships. 26 After the official welcome in New York, Jozef Rusek left the organizing of Hlinka's lecture tour to the Slovak League of America. 27 It began in Chicago after the end of the Eucharistic Congress on June 27, 1926. 28 According to the official announcement of the president of the Slovak League of America, published in the daily Slovak on July 14, 1926, Hlinka requested that lectures be presented on working days, because at the time of the announcement, there were already 136 requests for lectures. 29 Since the content of Hlinka's lecture in Chicago was generally the same as at other places in the USA, I will summarize it based upon the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago. The lecture was held in the Ashland Boulevard Auditorium which had a capacity of 4,000. The Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago stated that two thirds of the hall was filled, 30 which, in comparison with the 23 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 25 Slovak, June 16, 1926, p. I. 26 Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 27 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1965), p. 210. 28 AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago region. Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CSR in Washington, DC, July 30, 1926. 29 Slovak, July 14, 1926, p. 3. 30 The daily Slovak gave the number of 5,000 - 5,500 and stated that the hall was overcrowded. Cf. Slovak, July 16, I 926, p. 3. 24 �38 SLOVAKIA number of Slovaks living in Chicago, the majority of whom were Catholics, was not that great. Information on the lectures was also disseminated by priests from their pulpits. Tickets were sold in the churches and by the Slovak Catholic Federation. This was designed to prevent unauthorized persons from attending. The $1,000 rent for the hall was paid by the Slovak Catholic Federation. The profits were given to Andrej Hlinka. Tickets were sold for 50 and 75 cents, $1.00 and $2.00, depending upon the seating.31 As the report of the Consulate states, the beginning of the lecture was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. However, Hlinka and his entourage arrived at 2:45 p.m. The audience welcomed him with a standing ovation. The session was openned by Jan Mayer, the president of the Slovak Catholic Federation, who introduced the guests. After him Gregor K. Vaniscak, the pastor of the Slovak Parish of St. Michael the Archangel in Chicago, spoke highly of the great Andrej Hlinka's work for the Slovak nation. He compared Hlinka with the three "most important people in world history" - George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Cardinal Richelieu. After that Andrej Hlinka delivered his speech. The audience greeted him with applause and some shouted: "Viva, hooray! " Somebody from the audience, allegedly a Slovak Communist, tried to disrupt the lecture and shouted "Shame on him!" for which he was ejected by the police. Some tried to distribute the communist daily Rovnost' /'udu, for which they were also ejected and held overnight at the police station. According to the report of the Chicago consulate, Andrej Hlinka first read the list of donors who contributed to the fund Narod sebe [The Nation for Itself] and to the HSPP's election fund . He asked the donors to keep their trust in him, because he had received all the money and had spent every penny for the right purpose. As evidence he cited the establishment of Slovak Catholic enterprises such as the Lev printery, the daily Slovak, and, most importantly, the half million votes that the HSPP had gained in the last parliamentary elections, which made it the most powerful political party in Slovakia. He asked American Slovaks to continue to remember the HSPP and its struggle for recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the autono31 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Report of the Consu late of th e CS R in Chi cago on the political acti vities of th e Peopl e's Party leaders in th e Chi cago region. Supplement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CS R in Was hin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. �SLOVAKIA 39 my of Slovakia. Hlinka stated that he and the HSPP did not want anything more than that Slovaks be masters in Slovakia and Czechs in Bohemia and that Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" concerning the self-determination of nations be also applied to the Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Agreement. He declared that he was not against the Czechoslovak Republic and he was ready to "both live and die" for it, because October 28 was also the result of his nation-building efforts . He had struggled in Slovakia against the Magyars, who imprisoned him, first in Rufomberok, and then in Segedin. He added that Slovakia had long awaited October 28, 1918 as the day of liberation from the Magyar yoke. However, Hlinka continued, Slovak sons did not fight in the Czechoslovak Legions to move from one yoke to another. Instead of freedom , Slovaks were now offered "Czechization." Jozef M. Hurban, when he with others led the revolt against the Magyars in 1848, already spoke of the Slovak nation and not a "branch of the Czech nation." Similarly, when the Matica slovenska was founded in 1863, the Slovak leaders set its aim as the defence of the Slovak language as a national language and not a "Czech dialect." To spread the Czech language in Slovakia it was not necessary to establish the Matica slovenska. Therefore, if Hlinka now demands autonomy for Slovakia and wants the Pittsburgh Agreement to be respected and incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, he does not want anything new. The Memorandum of Stefan Marko Daxner from as early as in the 1860's requested from the Hungarian government a so-called "Slovak Region" that completely agrees with his present request for autonomy. However, according to Hlinka, the Czech language rules in Slovak courts, offices and schools. Catholic schools were taken from the Slovaks in spite of the fact that the Catholics form the majority in Slovakia and they have to pay taxes to maintain the school system. For these taxes Slovak Catholic children are being indoctrinated with atheism and are taught by teachers such as a certain Bilek, who was a servant in Bohemia, but in Slovakia was made a high school professor! Moreover, Hlinka continued, Slovak intellectuals cannot find work at home. Slovak workers have to look for freedom in America. Despite the fact that Slovaks constitute 15% of the total number of inhabitants in Czechoslovakia, they are virtually absent from the �40 SLOVAKIA state administration . In high schools Slovaks have no principal. From among 786 high school professors, only 175 are Slovaks. An even greater disproportion exists in the railways--from among 13,000 employees, only 412 are Slovaks. There are enough qualified intellectuals in Slovakia, but the Prague government ignores them. Therefore, the demand for autonomy is not just political posturing, but is a cultural and economic need and is crucial to the existence of the Slovak nation. Furthermore, Hlinka stated that he wanted the Slovak and Czech nations to come together and jointly work on maintaining and developing their common state, but by observing equality in the national, cultural and economic spheres. He is not creating discord for the sake of discord. He supports the Czechoslovak Republic, which he proved when the communist attack on Slovakia occurred. Then the Czechoslovak governent had an opportunity to negotiate with him and establish order; the same was true after the last parliamentary elections, in which the HSPP gained the largest number of votes in Slovakia. However, the HSPP was not even noticed by the Czechoslovak government, it was not called by the government and it was even not considered to be necessary to negotiate with it.32 As the consulate report stated, Andrej Hlinka spoke for more than an hour. The tone of his voice was gentle and polite, hence very impressive. The audience often expressed its approval with applause, especially when he defended himself against accusations of treason and Magyaronism. On this occassion he stated that his life was an open book, from which every unbiased person could read, that he had always been selflessly fighting for the rights of the Slovak people. Before World War I, when he defended the rights of the Slovaks, the Magyars accused him of being a "Pan-Slav" and after the war, when he defended the same rights, the secularists and gullible Czechs accused him of being a Magyarone. In this context he asked the audience if it was possible that he would lead the Slovak people back to Magyar slavery, in which it had suffered for more than a thousand years? If anybody with common sense could accuse him of being an instrument of the Magyars, who, because of his fight for the rights of the Slovak nation, had escorted him from one prison to another? Hlinka concluded with an appeal to American 32 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 41 Slovaks to support him and the HSPP in this fight for autonomy and the recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement. 33 After Hlinka Jozef Buday delivered his speech. According to the consular report, he was "thoughtless and rudely incited against the atheistic Czechs." He complemented the factual parts of the speech, in which Hlinka mentioned the Czech injustice against the Slovaks. 34 The consular report further stated that F. Wilson, a representative of the district council, spoke after Buday. After him came Andrej Gerat, who criticized the methods of education in Slovakia. After Gerat the Rev. G. K. Vaniscak read this resolution: 1. We support the Czecho-Slovak Republic. 2. We demand that the Pittsburgh Agreement to be incorporated into its Constitution. 3. We demand for Slovaks Slovak Christian schools . 4. We demand that in Slovakia the Slovaks be given priority m government offices, post offices, the railways, etc. 5. We demand that the Slovak language be exclusively used as the official language in all schools, offices, etc. After Vaniscak read the resolution, he asked the audience to possibly supplement it. Allegedly, some Communist suggested that all county and episcopal manors be confiscated and parceled out to the poor. After a short silence, the audience started to rise up and wanted to throw him out. Andrej Hlinka called for calm and said that the question had been politely put, so it would be politely answered. He answered that he agreed that all the manors be parceled out to the people who tilled them. Though the government is doing so, it is doing it along political lines. Concerning the episcopal manors, these belong to the Church, ergo to the people. From them schools, monasteries, publications, magazines and everything that the Church needs are maintained. Why should these manors be confiscated and parceled out when they are owned by all the people? 35 The Communist, as the daily Slo vak noted, said: "Thank you for the explanation, now 33 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. �42 SLOVAKIA I know everything. I am content. " 36 The resolution was approved in the original wording. 37 Before the session ended, Andrej Hlinka talked to his countrymen from Orava about the annexation of parts of Spis and Orava by Poland. In the name of the HSPP he promised that he would negotiate to have these regions returned to Slovakia. 38 The session concluded with the national hymn ,,Lightening over the Tatras." 39 There followed a banquet, at which Frantiska C. Jakabcinova, the president of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, gave Hlinka and Buday a gold membership medal and a gift of $1,000.40 On July 3, 1926, Andrej Hlinka had one more lecture in Chicago, the content of which was much the same as the first one. Among other places at which Hlinka and Buday lectured were Kenosha, Wisconsin, on July 3, Milwaukee, on July 14, Streator, Illinois, on July 5, Mount Olive, Illinois, on July 8, East St. Louis, on July 10, St. Louis, Missouri, on July 11 , and in Whiting, Indiana, on July 14, 1926. Then Hlinka's lectures continued in the Cleveland region. The content of these lectures was everywhere almost the same. 41 According to the consular report, the impact of Hlinka' s lectures upon the Slovak people in America was great. Workers debated them in factories and there were also quarrels and even battles (in Hege42 wich, Illinois, and Chicago Heights). Andrej Hlinka's message was summed up by Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, as follows: 1. A. Hlinka declined an interview with the editorial staff of the Czech Narodne listy before his departure to America; 36 Slovak, July 16, 1926, p. 3. 37 A MZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld . 651. Report of the Co nsul ate of the CS R in Chica- go on the political activ ities of th e Peo ple's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Suppl ement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CSR in Washin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Slovak, Jul y 16, 1926, p. 3. 41 A MZV CR, f. III, i. no. 22 , fold. 651. Report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CS R in Washington , DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 42 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 43 2. He does not fear the separation of church and state and he foretold the extinction of the Slovak Lutherans if it happened; 3. The next president of Czechoslovakia will accept the Pittsburgh Agreement; 4. Hlinka severely criticized Edvard Benes and Vavro Srobar; 5. Hlinka stressed several times that he had nothing to do with Frantisek Jehlicska, but he lectured at places, where the lectures were organized by Jehlicska's followers; 6. The lectures resulted in an anti-Czech mood; 7. Collecting money was many times carried out in such a way as if it were the only purpose of the lectures; 8. Andrej Gerat put most of the resolutions to a vote for further use in Slovakia.43 Hlinka, according to his own words, visited more than one hundred parishes, took part in eighty sessions and had more than two hundred lectures. "In the whole of America only four Catholic priests did not attend our lectures that were held in their town or neighborhood." 44 Part of Andrej Hlinka's journey to the USA was for the purpose of fund-raising . The Slovak League of America created a motto for the collection: Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. In this context it printed envelopes with the following text: I believe in the sovereignty of the Slovak nation. I believe in the united Czecho-Slovak Republic. I believe my own contrymen-leaders. I believe in the gradual administration of Slovakia. I believe that a Slovak should have priority in Slovakia. I believe that a Czech is Czech and a Slovak is Slovak. I believe that, by enacting the Pittsburgh Agreement, conditions between Czechs and Slovaks will improve, hence we willingly support the Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. 45 43 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consu late of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 44 Andrej Hlinka v Amerike [Andrej Hlinka in America]. In Jednota : Katolic/..y kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7. Middletown, PA: First Catholi c Slovak Union, 1927, p. 38. 45 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consulate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926 . �44 SLOVAKIA At the same time the Slovak League of America published the leaflet Svoji svojim [One for oneself] , in which it invited people to become its members. 46 However, the Slovak League did not have much influence over the financial part of Hlinka' s lectures. These were organized by priests in a committee established by the League. Allegedly, the envelopes were not distributed everywhere and it might happen that a local priest took the collected money, withdrew a certain amount to cover the costs of organizing the lecture, and turned the balance over to Hlinka in the form of a personal check. 47 About the collections it can be said that, there were fs laces where the fund-raising drive could not be properly organized, 8 but, on the other hand, there were places where a sizeable amount of money was raised. Milan Getting estimated the total raised was $10,000. However, he added that his estimate should be treated with some reserve. For instance, at the convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in September of 1926, Jozef Husek allegedly proposed to give Hlinka $5 ,000, but the delegates objected that the head office gave, without their consent, $1 ,000 to each Slovak bishop. They agreed on the same amount for Andrej Hlinka.49 At that time, the assets of the organization totaled $5,095 ,583 .37.50 The Slovak League of America, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, could not contribute to Hlinka, because its treasury was too small. 5 1 The final result of the fund-raising drive was most pertinently expressed by Hlinka in his letter to the Reverend Jan Postenyi after his return from the USA: "As you know, I have returned with fame , pennants and rings-but not many dollars. Business is business and I 46 AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. The leaflet Svoji svojim. AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 48 For instance, the lecture in Pittsburgh, that was held on Sund ay August 8, 1926, because according to Pennsylvania law, one co uld not collect an entrance fee. Cf. Ibid 49 AMZ V CR, f. lll, i. no. 22 , fo ld. 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of th e CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 50 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - / 965 (Cleveland : First Catholic Slovak Uni on, I 965), p. 2 I 2. 51 AMZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situation report of th e Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, I 926. 47 �SLOVAKIA 45 am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 52 According to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America. Allegedly, Gerat did not stick to the official schedule, which resulted in Hlinka presenting his lectures without reference to the local organizing committee. However, the main cause of the annoyance of American Slovaks was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at the parish of the nationalist Stefan Panik in Torrington, Connecticut, but instead agreed to lecture at Andrej Komara's parish in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 53 As Milan Getting noted, Komara had been denounced by neighboring Slovak priests as a Magyarone. Therefore, by accepting his invitation, Hlinka disappointed many of his followers .54 Allegedly, after the lecture at Komara's parish on October 3, 1926, Hlinka and Gerat55 began to show a certain nervousness. This, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, arose from the fact that Hlinka had failed to settle the arguments in the SlovakAmerican Catholic camp. It could also have been a result of their disappointment in the fund-raising drive. Another reason could have been the development of the political situation back home. In addition, Hlinka could see that the audience at his lectures was declining. He may also have been frustrated by articles published in the Czechoslovak daily Newyorsky dennik, which attacked him during his whole stay in the USA. 56 52 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Tmave [Archives of the Society of St. Adalbert in Tmava] , fascic le (hereinafter fasc.) 156. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 53 According to the Newyorsky dennik, Komara promised Hlinka $2,000, which, according to Getting, Hlinka did not deny. Cf. AMZV CR, f. Ill, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of th e CSR in Prague from October 15 , 1926. Not following the schedule of the lectures was also reported in Jednota, October 6, 1926, p. 2. 54 AMZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MF A of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 55 Meanwhile, Buday returned to Slovakia. He left America on July 24, 1926. Cf. Slovak, August 6, 1926, p. 1. 56 AMZV CR, f. 111, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. �46 SLOVAKIA The last of Hlinka's lectures in the USA was in New York City on October 11 , 1926. 57 He left the USA on October 13 , 1926 and returned to Slovakia on October 22, 1926. 58 Even if the conclusion of his lecture tour to the USA looked disappointing, it did not radically affect the attitudes of American Slovaks to his person, nor the autonomist movement in Slovakia. It is apparent, therefore, that on the occasion of the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, Illinois, Andrej Hlinka, made use of his trip to lecture and to raise funds in favour of autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic. According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America at that time was quite tense. The reasons for the tension were personal problems, frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government's failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement and the pressure of State Insurance Commissioners on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues. After initial disagreements, Hlinka's lecture tour was organized by a committee composed almost entirely of priests. Hlinka visited more than one hundred Slovak parishes, took part in eighty discussions and presented more than two hundred lectures. However, the fund-raising drive did not bring the expected results. In addition, according to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America by not having respected the schedule of the local organizational committee. The main cause of the annoyance, however, was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at nationalist Stefan Panik's parish in Torrington, Connecticut, but rather at the parish of the alleged Magyarone Andrej Komara in Bridgeport. Even if in the end his lecture tour to the USA disappointed many Slovak nationalists, Hlinka did not lose the sympathy of American Slovaks, nor support for the autonomist movement in Slovakia. 57 58 Ibid. Slo vak, October 23 , 1926, p. 3. � 32 SLOVAKIA ANDREJ HLINKA'S JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1926 Stefan Kucik Andrej Hlinka belongs among those in Slovak history whose achievements await a complex analysis and evaluation. He and his activities were ignored or misinterpreted by most Marxist historians during the communist era. On the other hand, he was also very controversial. The aim of this article is to analyze the circumstances and the course of his journey to the USA in 1926. Although the official reason for Hlinka's journey was to participate in the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, he made use of his visit to lecture to American Slovaks and to raise funds for the cause of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. After some disagreements between the Slovak League of America and Jozef Husek, the lecture tour was held under the auspices of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. Even if his lecture tour to the USA proved financially disappointing to Hlinka, he did win the sympathy of American Slovaks to his person, and to the autonomist movement in Slovakia. On June 20- 24, 1926 the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in Chicago, Illinois. As the first such Congress on the soil of the United States of America, 1 it presented the Reverend Andrej Hlinka of Rufomberok an opportunity to visit American Slovaks for the first time. Although American Slovaks had already invited Hlinka visit them in 1924, Czechoslovak authorities had refused to grant him a passport because he had been prosecuted for having illegally travelled to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In 1926 he was again prosecuted and, despite having been cleared by the County Court in Bratislava, in March of that year, he was sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight days in jail for his article on T. G. Masaryk' s favortism of the Jews published in the daily Slovak on April 5, 1924. 1 The second time such a congress met in th e USA was in 1976 tional Euchari stic Congress in Philade lphia, Pennsy lvani a, the 4 1st Interna- �SLOVAKIA 33 After explaining that he wished to travel to the Eucharistic Congress, Jan Cerny' s administration finally granted him a passport. 2 Andrej Hlinka was repeatedly invited to America by the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom led by Jozef Husek.3 On April 21 , 1926 the weekly Jednota published a letter from Hlinka to Husek dated April 3, 1926. In this letter Hlinka announced that he would arrive accompanied by his secretary Andrej Genit and the Parliamentary Deputy Jozef Buday on June 3-4, 1926. He asked Husek to prepare a schedule for his lectures. He wrote that his passport was valid for half a year, which he wished to spend in the USA, provided that political issues would not force his return home. 4 While Hlinka was granted a passport to travel to the Eucharistic Congress on April 30, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague about the details of Hlinka's planned journey. According to the Ministry in Bratislava, the goal of Hlinka's journey was to spread autonomist propaganda on behalf of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (hereinafter HSPP) and to raise funds for the Party. He also allegedly planned to draft a resolution of Slovak complaints and pleas and to submit it to the Czechoslovak government and to the League ofNations.5 Hlinka outlined the programme of his journey in the daily Slovak on May 23 , 1926. Among other things he stated that, as early as in 1894 he was asked by American Slovaks to "choke the hydra" of brotherly quarrels among them, but thus far he had not been enable to do so. Now he was going to America to enlighten the Slovaks and to help the Republic and the nation. He was going where the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements were signed. He wanted to see with 2 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hli nka (I 864 - I 926) (Brati slava, 1934), p. 544 . Ibid. , p. 543. 4 Archiv Ministerstva zahran icnich veci Ceske republiky [Archi ves of the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs of the Czech Republi c] (here inafter AMZV CR), fund (here inafter f. ) Ill. sekce MZV 19 I 8 - 1939 [3 rd section Mini stry of Foreign Affairs 19 I 8 193 8] (hereinafter III), in ventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22 , fo lder (here inafter fold .) 651 . The report o f the Consul ate of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) in Pittsburgh, to the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs (hereinafter MFA ) of the CSR in Prague from April 22, 1926 ; Jednota, April 2 1, 1926, p. 4. 5 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld. 651. Letter of the Minister of the CSR with Full Powers fo r the Admini stration of Slovakia in Brati slava to the MFA in Prague, April 30, 1926 . 3 �34 SLOVAKIA his own eyes and hear with his own ears if it was a sin to demand autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak Constitution. 6 At the time of the Hlinka's trip to the USA, reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh characterized the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America as quite tense. Besides personal problems, anxiety arose from frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government' s failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement. Meanwhile, State Insurance Commissioners were exerting pressure on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues, which greatly upset their members. 7 The reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh also described an alleged rivalry between Ivan Bielek, the President of the Slovak League of America and Jozef Rusek. Apparently, Rusek feared losing his editorship of the weekly Jednota at the upcoming 22 nd convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania on September 20 - 25 , 1926. His rival was Jan C. Sciranka, editor of Slovak v Amerike. The owner of the Slovak v Amerike was Bielek's brother-in-law Christopher L. Orbach.8 However, according to the report of the Pittsburgh Consulate, the tension between Bielek and Rusek soon dissipated. On April 14, 1926 Bielek published an article entitled Segedin-Mirov in Slo vak v Amerike, in which he denounced the imprisonment of Hlinka in the Czech Mirov prison for having offended President Masaryk. According to the Consulate, Bielek did so because he needed Husek's support at the upcoming convention of the National Slovak Society and the congress of the Slovak League of America. 9 Soon, however, arguments within the Slovak-American autonomist camp broke out again, thanks to Jozef Rusek. In a letter of April 3, 1926, Hlinka asked Rusek to prepare his lecture schedule. Rusek began to register applications for Hlinka's lectures and he wished to carry out this tour under the aegis of the Committe of Friends of Slovak Freedom. Some newspapers and organizations protested: the banker Michal Bosak in his weekly Obrana, a number of priests who 6 Slovak, May 23, 1926, pp. 1-2. AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 650. Report of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, April 15, 1926. 8 ibid. 9 i bid. 7 �SLOVAKIA 35 supported the programme of the Magyarone priest Frantisek Jehlicska for the return of Slovakia to Hungary, and Bielek and Orbach in 10 Slovak v Amerike. In addition, the Committe had already been out of existence for three years. It was originally founded to purge the "Czechoslovaks" from the Slovak League of America, and then it merged with it. Despite this fact, Husek kept the title of president of this non-existent organization, announced the arrival of Hlinka to Slovak priests and newspapers and launched the campaign on his own. II Although Jozef Husek, through his contact with Slovak priests in America started to organize Hlinka's lecture tour, the Slovak League of America, led by president Bielek, also started to organize the lectures. It established an organizing committee, composed almost entirely of priests. Husek refused to become a member of this committee and the Slovak v Amerike started to complain about Husek's actions. 12 As a result, a group of Slovak priests ended up organizing Hlinka's lecture tour and the Slovak League of America, even though it compiled the schedule of the lectures, did not control the • 13 pnests. On May 26-27 the 16 th congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Detroit. The congress "with great joy received the news, that the noble leader of the Slovak nation, Msgr. Hlinka, President of the People's Party, would visit American Slovaks." It expressed confidence in him and promised that it would "with all its strength help his noble efforts and during his stay he would be a guest of the Slovak League of America." 14 Hlinka and his colleague Jozef Buday, together with Hynek Dostal , editor of the Czech-American newspaper Hlas, which supported autonomy for the Slovaks, 15 were named honorary members of the Slovak League of America. 10 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situat ion report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 11 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 12 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prag ue, October 5, I 926. 13 Ibid. 14 A MZV CR, f. 111 , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 15 Ibid. of the Consul ate of the CS R of the Consulate of the CSR of the Consul ate of the CSR of the Co nsulate of the CSR �36 SLOVAKIA At the congress of the Slovak League, the previous officers were re-elected under the leadership of Ivan Bielek. Husek criticized this outcome. 16 He reported that the League had no funds , he accused the officers of incompetence, and warned that the League would perish if nothing was done to build up its treasury. 17 However, all these arguments between Husek and Bielek were simply personal. In fact, the Slovak League under the leadership of Ivan Bielek (1920- 1934) championed the Pittsburgh Agreement and openly supported the Slovak autonomist movement in the Czechoslovak Republic . The "Czechoslovaks" in America also prepared for the arrival of Andrej Hlinka. For instance, the Reverend Jozef Murgas of WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, that at the next meeting of priests of eastern Pennsylvania, he would ask them if their real interest was in politics or in religion and he promised to inform Getting of their answer. 18 Hlinka's arrival was announced by the daily Slovak (Bratislava) on June 4, 1926: "On June 3 our editorial staff received this telegram from Halifax : We have arrived safely. - Hlinka." 19 From the Canadian port of Halifax, Hlinka' s ship continued on to New York City, where it docked on June 5, 1926. 20 About 300 American Slovaks welcomed Hlinka at the dock. Once he had disembarked, Hlinka briefly outlined the goal of his journey. He stressed that he had come to work for both the Slovak nation and for his homeland, the Czechoslovak Republic. He emphasized concord, unity, the settling of petty arguments and forgivness, because "the nation needs us all and it needs us united." 21 In a 26-car procession the delegation proceeded to the Church of St. John Nepomucene on 66 th street, where the Reverend Stefan J. Krasul'a had been the pastor since 1916. An official reception was held in the Parish Hall, where the representatives of American Slovaks delivered their speeches.22 Here Andrej Hlinka spoke his 16 Ibid. Jednota, Jun e 2, 1926, p. 4. 18 A MZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. Missive of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA , April 15, I 926. "Czechos lovaks" were Slovaks who supp,orted th e unitary policies of the Czechoslovak government in Prague. 9 Slovak, June 5, 1926, p. I. 20 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 21 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. 22 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 17 �SLOVAKIA 37 memorable words: "If there were no America, Slovakia would still be under the Magyar yoke. To its credit the Slovaks finally got rid of the thousand-year subjugation." 23 The Slovak League of America officially welcomed Hlinka in the evening at a session of its local branch. 24 On this occassion the Slovak League also issued an official communique which was published by the daily Slowik in Bratislava. 25 A banquet was held the next day under the aegis of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. The banquet marked the completion of the programme of welcome with speeches by representatives of various Slovak organizations. Hlinka and Buday were presented with special diplomas, certifying that the Slovak League of America had granted them honorary memberships. 26 After the official welcome in New York, Jozef Rusek left the organizing of Hlinka's lecture tour to the Slovak League of America. 27 It began in Chicago after the end of the Eucharistic Congress on June 27, 1926. 28 According to the official announcement of the president of the Slovak League of America, published in the daily Slovak on July 14, 1926, Hlinka requested that lectures be presented on working days, because at the time of the announcement, there were already 136 requests for lectures. 29 Since the content of Hlinka's lecture in Chicago was generally the same as at other places in the USA, I will summarize it based upon the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago. The lecture was held in the Ashland Boulevard Auditorium which had a capacity of 4,000. The Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago stated that two thirds of the hall was filled, 30 which, in comparison with the 23 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 25 Slovak, June 16, 1926, p. I. 26 Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 27 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1965), p. 210. 28 AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago region. Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CSR in Washington, DC, July 30, 1926. 29 Slovak, July 14, 1926, p. 3. 30 The daily Slovak gave the number of 5,000 - 5,500 and stated that the hall was overcrowded. Cf. Slovak, July 16, I 926, p. 3. 24 �38 SLOVAKIA number of Slovaks living in Chicago, the majority of whom were Catholics, was not that great. Information on the lectures was also disseminated by priests from their pulpits. Tickets were sold in the churches and by the Slovak Catholic Federation. This was designed to prevent unauthorized persons from attending. The $1,000 rent for the hall was paid by the Slovak Catholic Federation. The profits were given to Andrej Hlinka. Tickets were sold for 50 and 75 cents, $1.00 and $2.00, depending upon the seating.31 As the report of the Consulate states, the beginning of the lecture was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. However, Hlinka and his entourage arrived at 2:45 p.m. The audience welcomed him with a standing ovation. The session was openned by Jan Mayer, the president of the Slovak Catholic Federation, who introduced the guests. After him Gregor K. Vaniscak, the pastor of the Slovak Parish of St. Michael the Archangel in Chicago, spoke highly of the great Andrej Hlinka's work for the Slovak nation. He compared Hlinka with the three "most important people in world history" - George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Cardinal Richelieu. After that Andrej Hlinka delivered his speech. The audience greeted him with applause and some shouted: "Viva, hooray! " Somebody from the audience, allegedly a Slovak Communist, tried to disrupt the lecture and shouted "Shame on him!" for which he was ejected by the police. Some tried to distribute the communist daily Rovnost' /'udu, for which they were also ejected and held overnight at the police station. According to the report of the Chicago consulate, Andrej Hlinka first read the list of donors who contributed to the fund Narod sebe [The Nation for Itself] and to the HSPP's election fund . He asked the donors to keep their trust in him, because he had received all the money and had spent every penny for the right purpose. As evidence he cited the establishment of Slovak Catholic enterprises such as the Lev printery, the daily Slovak, and, most importantly, the half million votes that the HSPP had gained in the last parliamentary elections, which made it the most powerful political party in Slovakia. He asked American Slovaks to continue to remember the HSPP and its struggle for recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the autono31 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Report of the Consu late of th e CS R in Chi cago on the political acti vities of th e Peopl e's Party leaders in th e Chi cago region. Supplement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CS R in Was hin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. �SLOVAKIA 39 my of Slovakia. Hlinka stated that he and the HSPP did not want anything more than that Slovaks be masters in Slovakia and Czechs in Bohemia and that Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" concerning the self-determination of nations be also applied to the Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Agreement. He declared that he was not against the Czechoslovak Republic and he was ready to "both live and die" for it, because October 28 was also the result of his nation-building efforts . He had struggled in Slovakia against the Magyars, who imprisoned him, first in Rufomberok, and then in Segedin. He added that Slovakia had long awaited October 28, 1918 as the day of liberation from the Magyar yoke. However, Hlinka continued, Slovak sons did not fight in the Czechoslovak Legions to move from one yoke to another. Instead of freedom , Slovaks were now offered "Czechization." Jozef M. Hurban, when he with others led the revolt against the Magyars in 1848, already spoke of the Slovak nation and not a "branch of the Czech nation." Similarly, when the Matica slovenska was founded in 1863, the Slovak leaders set its aim as the defence of the Slovak language as a national language and not a "Czech dialect." To spread the Czech language in Slovakia it was not necessary to establish the Matica slovenska. Therefore, if Hlinka now demands autonomy for Slovakia and wants the Pittsburgh Agreement to be respected and incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, he does not want anything new. The Memorandum of Stefan Marko Daxner from as early as in the 1860's requested from the Hungarian government a so-called "Slovak Region" that completely agrees with his present request for autonomy. However, according to Hlinka, the Czech language rules in Slovak courts, offices and schools. Catholic schools were taken from the Slovaks in spite of the fact that the Catholics form the majority in Slovakia and they have to pay taxes to maintain the school system. For these taxes Slovak Catholic children are being indoctrinated with atheism and are taught by teachers such as a certain Bilek, who was a servant in Bohemia, but in Slovakia was made a high school professor! Moreover, Hlinka continued, Slovak intellectuals cannot find work at home. Slovak workers have to look for freedom in America. Despite the fact that Slovaks constitute 15% of the total number of inhabitants in Czechoslovakia, they are virtually absent from the �40 SLOVAKIA state administration . In high schools Slovaks have no principal. From among 786 high school professors, only 175 are Slovaks. An even greater disproportion exists in the railways--from among 13,000 employees, only 412 are Slovaks. There are enough qualified intellectuals in Slovakia, but the Prague government ignores them. Therefore, the demand for autonomy is not just political posturing, but is a cultural and economic need and is crucial to the existence of the Slovak nation. Furthermore, Hlinka stated that he wanted the Slovak and Czech nations to come together and jointly work on maintaining and developing their common state, but by observing equality in the national, cultural and economic spheres. He is not creating discord for the sake of discord. He supports the Czechoslovak Republic, which he proved when the communist attack on Slovakia occurred. Then the Czechoslovak governent had an opportunity to negotiate with him and establish order; the same was true after the last parliamentary elections, in which the HSPP gained the largest number of votes in Slovakia. However, the HSPP was not even noticed by the Czechoslovak government, it was not called by the government and it was even not considered to be necessary to negotiate with it.32 As the consulate report stated, Andrej Hlinka spoke for more than an hour. The tone of his voice was gentle and polite, hence very impressive. The audience often expressed its approval with applause, especially when he defended himself against accusations of treason and Magyaronism. On this occassion he stated that his life was an open book, from which every unbiased person could read, that he had always been selflessly fighting for the rights of the Slovak people. Before World War I, when he defended the rights of the Slovaks, the Magyars accused him of being a "Pan-Slav" and after the war, when he defended the same rights, the secularists and gullible Czechs accused him of being a Magyarone. In this context he asked the audience if it was possible that he would lead the Slovak people back to Magyar slavery, in which it had suffered for more than a thousand years? If anybody with common sense could accuse him of being an instrument of the Magyars, who, because of his fight for the rights of the Slovak nation, had escorted him from one prison to another? Hlinka concluded with an appeal to American 32 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 41 Slovaks to support him and the HSPP in this fight for autonomy and the recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement. 33 After Hlinka Jozef Buday delivered his speech. According to the consular report, he was "thoughtless and rudely incited against the atheistic Czechs." He complemented the factual parts of the speech, in which Hlinka mentioned the Czech injustice against the Slovaks. 34 The consular report further stated that F. Wilson, a representative of the district council, spoke after Buday. After him came Andrej Gerat, who criticized the methods of education in Slovakia. After Gerat the Rev. G. K. Vaniscak read this resolution: 1. We support the Czecho-Slovak Republic. 2. We demand that the Pittsburgh Agreement to be incorporated into its Constitution. 3. We demand for Slovaks Slovak Christian schools . 4. We demand that in Slovakia the Slovaks be given priority m government offices, post offices, the railways, etc. 5. We demand that the Slovak language be exclusively used as the official language in all schools, offices, etc. After Vaniscak read the resolution, he asked the audience to possibly supplement it. Allegedly, some Communist suggested that all county and episcopal manors be confiscated and parceled out to the poor. After a short silence, the audience started to rise up and wanted to throw him out. Andrej Hlinka called for calm and said that the question had been politely put, so it would be politely answered. He answered that he agreed that all the manors be parceled out to the people who tilled them. Though the government is doing so, it is doing it along political lines. Concerning the episcopal manors, these belong to the Church, ergo to the people. From them schools, monasteries, publications, magazines and everything that the Church needs are maintained. Why should these manors be confiscated and parceled out when they are owned by all the people? 35 The Communist, as the daily Slo vak noted, said: "Thank you for the explanation, now 33 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. �42 SLOVAKIA I know everything. I am content. " 36 The resolution was approved in the original wording. 37 Before the session ended, Andrej Hlinka talked to his countrymen from Orava about the annexation of parts of Spis and Orava by Poland. In the name of the HSPP he promised that he would negotiate to have these regions returned to Slovakia. 38 The session concluded with the national hymn ,,Lightening over the Tatras." 39 There followed a banquet, at which Frantiska C. Jakabcinova, the president of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, gave Hlinka and Buday a gold membership medal and a gift of $1,000.40 On July 3, 1926, Andrej Hlinka had one more lecture in Chicago, the content of which was much the same as the first one. Among other places at which Hlinka and Buday lectured were Kenosha, Wisconsin, on July 3, Milwaukee, on July 14, Streator, Illinois, on July 5, Mount Olive, Illinois, on July 8, East St. Louis, on July 10, St. Louis, Missouri, on July 11 , and in Whiting, Indiana, on July 14, 1926. Then Hlinka's lectures continued in the Cleveland region. The content of these lectures was everywhere almost the same. 41 According to the consular report, the impact of Hlinka' s lectures upon the Slovak people in America was great. Workers debated them in factories and there were also quarrels and even battles (in Hege42 wich, Illinois, and Chicago Heights). Andrej Hlinka's message was summed up by Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, as follows: 1. A. Hlinka declined an interview with the editorial staff of the Czech Narodne listy before his departure to America; 36 Slovak, July 16, 1926, p. 3. 37 A MZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld . 651. Report of the Co nsul ate of the CS R in Chica- go on the political activ ities of th e Peo ple's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Suppl ement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CSR in Washin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Slovak, Jul y 16, 1926, p. 3. 41 A MZV CR, f. III, i. no. 22 , fold. 651. Report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CS R in Washington , DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 42 Ibid. �SLOVAKIA 43 2. He does not fear the separation of church and state and he foretold the extinction of the Slovak Lutherans if it happened; 3. The next president of Czechoslovakia will accept the Pittsburgh Agreement; 4. Hlinka severely criticized Edvard Benes and Vavro Srobar; 5. Hlinka stressed several times that he had nothing to do with Frantisek Jehlicska, but he lectured at places, where the lectures were organized by Jehlicska's followers; 6. The lectures resulted in an anti-Czech mood; 7. Collecting money was many times carried out in such a way as if it were the only purpose of the lectures; 8. Andrej Gerat put most of the resolutions to a vote for further use in Slovakia.43 Hlinka, according to his own words, visited more than one hundred parishes, took part in eighty sessions and had more than two hundred lectures. "In the whole of America only four Catholic priests did not attend our lectures that were held in their town or neighborhood." 44 Part of Andrej Hlinka's journey to the USA was for the purpose of fund-raising . The Slovak League of America created a motto for the collection: Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. In this context it printed envelopes with the following text: I believe in the sovereignty of the Slovak nation. I believe in the united Czecho-Slovak Republic. I believe my own contrymen-leaders. I believe in the gradual administration of Slovakia. I believe that a Slovak should have priority in Slovakia. I believe that a Czech is Czech and a Slovak is Slovak. I believe that, by enacting the Pittsburgh Agreement, conditions between Czechs and Slovaks will improve, hence we willingly support the Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. 45 43 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consu late of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 44 Andrej Hlinka v Amerike [Andrej Hlinka in America]. In Jednota : Katolic/..y kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7. Middletown, PA: First Catholi c Slovak Union, 1927, p. 38. 45 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consulate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926 . �44 SLOVAKIA At the same time the Slovak League of America published the leaflet Svoji svojim [One for oneself] , in which it invited people to become its members. 46 However, the Slovak League did not have much influence over the financial part of Hlinka' s lectures. These were organized by priests in a committee established by the League. Allegedly, the envelopes were not distributed everywhere and it might happen that a local priest took the collected money, withdrew a certain amount to cover the costs of organizing the lecture, and turned the balance over to Hlinka in the form of a personal check. 47 About the collections it can be said that, there were fs laces where the fund-raising drive could not be properly organized, 8 but, on the other hand, there were places where a sizeable amount of money was raised. Milan Getting estimated the total raised was $10,000. However, he added that his estimate should be treated with some reserve. For instance, at the convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in September of 1926, Jozef Husek allegedly proposed to give Hlinka $5 ,000, but the delegates objected that the head office gave, without their consent, $1 ,000 to each Slovak bishop. They agreed on the same amount for Andrej Hlinka.49 At that time, the assets of the organization totaled $5,095 ,583 .37.50 The Slovak League of America, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, could not contribute to Hlinka, because its treasury was too small. 5 1 The final result of the fund-raising drive was most pertinently expressed by Hlinka in his letter to the Reverend Jan Postenyi after his return from the USA: "As you know, I have returned with fame , pennants and rings-but not many dollars. Business is business and I 46 AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. The leaflet Svoji svojim. AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 48 For instance, the lecture in Pittsburgh, that was held on Sund ay August 8, 1926, because according to Pennsylvania law, one co uld not collect an entrance fee. Cf. Ibid 49 AMZ V CR, f. lll, i. no. 22 , fo ld. 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of th e CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 50 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - / 965 (Cleveland : First Catholic Slovak Uni on, I 965), p. 2 I 2. 51 AMZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situation report of th e Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, I 926. 47 �SLOVAKIA 45 am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 52 According to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America. Allegedly, Gerat did not stick to the official schedule, which resulted in Hlinka presenting his lectures without reference to the local organizing committee. However, the main cause of the annoyance of American Slovaks was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at the parish of the nationalist Stefan Panik in Torrington, Connecticut, but instead agreed to lecture at Andrej Komara's parish in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 53 As Milan Getting noted, Komara had been denounced by neighboring Slovak priests as a Magyarone. Therefore, by accepting his invitation, Hlinka disappointed many of his followers .54 Allegedly, after the lecture at Komara's parish on October 3, 1926, Hlinka and Gerat55 began to show a certain nervousness. This, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, arose from the fact that Hlinka had failed to settle the arguments in the SlovakAmerican Catholic camp. It could also have been a result of their disappointment in the fund-raising drive. Another reason could have been the development of the political situation back home. In addition, Hlinka could see that the audience at his lectures was declining. He may also have been frustrated by articles published in the Czechoslovak daily Newyorsky dennik, which attacked him during his whole stay in the USA. 56 52 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Tmave [Archives of the Society of St. Adalbert in Tmava] , fascic le (hereinafter fasc.) 156. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 53 According to the Newyorsky dennik, Komara promised Hlinka $2,000, which, according to Getting, Hlinka did not deny. Cf. AMZV CR, f. Ill, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of th e CSR in Prague from October 15 , 1926. Not following the schedule of the lectures was also reported in Jednota, October 6, 1926, p. 2. 54 AMZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MF A of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 55 Meanwhile, Buday returned to Slovakia. He left America on July 24, 1926. Cf. Slovak, August 6, 1926, p. 1. 56 AMZV CR, f. 111, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. �46 SLOVAKIA The last of Hlinka's lectures in the USA was in New York City on October 11 , 1926. 57 He left the USA on October 13 , 1926 and returned to Slovakia on October 22, 1926. 58 Even if the conclusion of his lecture tour to the USA looked disappointing, it did not radically affect the attitudes of American Slovaks to his person, nor the autonomist movement in Slovakia. It is apparent, therefore, that on the occasion of the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, Illinois, Andrej Hlinka, made use of his trip to lecture and to raise funds in favour of autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic. According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America at that time was quite tense. The reasons for the tension were personal problems, frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government's failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement and the pressure of State Insurance Commissioners on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues. After initial disagreements, Hlinka's lecture tour was organized by a committee composed almost entirely of priests. Hlinka visited more than one hundred Slovak parishes, took part in eighty discussions and presented more than two hundred lectures. However, the fund-raising drive did not bring the expected results. In addition, according to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America by not having respected the schedule of the local organizational committee. The main cause of the annoyance, however, was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at nationalist Stefan Panik's parish in Torrington, Connecticut, but rather at the parish of the alleged Magyarone Andrej Komara in Bridgeport. Even if in the end his lecture tour to the USA disappointed many Slovak nationalists, Hlinka did not lose the sympathy of American Slovaks, nor support for the autonomist movement in Slovakia. 57 58 Ibid. Slo vak, October 23 , 1926, p. 3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2010, Vol. 40 Description An account of the resource Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 32 SLOVAKIA ANDREJ HLINKA'S JOURNEY TO THE USA IN 1926 Stefan Kucik Andrej Hlinka belongs among those in Slovak history whose achievements await a complex analysis and evaluation. He and his activities were ignored or misinterpreted by most Marxist historians during the communist era. On the other hand, he was also very controversial. The aim of this article is to analyze the circumstances and the course of his journey to the USA in 1926. Although the official reason for Hlinka's journey was to participate in the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, he made use of his visit to lecture to American Slovaks and to raise funds for the cause of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. After some disagreements between the Slovak League of America and Jozef Husek, the lecture tour was held under the auspices of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. Even if his lecture tour to the USA proved financially disappointing to Hlinka, he did win the sympathy of American Slovaks to his person, and to the autonomist movement in Slovakia. On June 20- 24, 1926 the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress took place in Chicago, Illinois. As the first such Congress on the soil of the United States of America, 1 it presented the Reverend Andrej Hlinka of Rufomberok an opportunity to visit American Slovaks for the first time. Although American Slovaks had already invited Hlinka visit them in 1924, Czechoslovak authorities had refused to grant him a passport because he had been prosecuted for having illegally travelled to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In 1926 he was again prosecuted and, despite having been cleared by the County Court in Bratislava, in March of that year, he was sentenced by the Supreme Court to eight days in jail for his article on T. G. Masaryk' s favortism of the Jews published in the daily Slovak on April 5, 1924. 1 The second time such a congress met in th e USA was in 1976 tional Euchari stic Congress in Philade lphia, Pennsy lvani a, the 4 1st Interna- SLOVAKIA 33 After explaining that he wished to travel to the Eucharistic Congress, Jan Cerny' s administration finally granted him a passport. 2 Andrej Hlinka was repeatedly invited to America by the Committee of Friends of Slovak Freedom led by Jozef Husek.3 On April 21 , 1926 the weekly Jednota published a letter from Hlinka to Husek dated April 3, 1926. In this letter Hlinka announced that he would arrive accompanied by his secretary Andrej Genit and the Parliamentary Deputy Jozef Buday on June 3-4, 1926. He asked Husek to prepare a schedule for his lectures. He wrote that his passport was valid for half a year, which he wished to spend in the USA, provided that political issues would not force his return home. 4 While Hlinka was granted a passport to travel to the Eucharistic Congress on April 30, 1926, the Ministry with Full Powers for the Administration of Slovakia in Bratislava informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague about the details of Hlinka's planned journey. According to the Ministry in Bratislava, the goal of Hlinka's journey was to spread autonomist propaganda on behalf of the Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (hereinafter HSPP) and to raise funds for the Party. He also allegedly planned to draft a resolution of Slovak complaints and pleas and to submit it to the Czechoslovak government and to the League ofNations.5 Hlinka outlined the programme of his journey in the daily Slovak on May 23 , 1926. Among other things he stated that, as early as in 1894 he was asked by American Slovaks to "choke the hydra" of brotherly quarrels among them, but thus far he had not been enable to do so. Now he was going to America to enlighten the Slovaks and to help the Republic and the nation. He was going where the Cleveland and Pittsburgh Agreements were signed. He wanted to see with 2 Karol Sidor, Andrej Hli nka (I 864 - I 926) (Brati slava, 1934), p. 544 . Ibid. , p. 543. 4 Archiv Ministerstva zahran icnich veci Ceske republiky [Archi ves of the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs of the Czech Republi c] (here inafter AMZV CR), fund (here inafter f. ) Ill. sekce MZV 19 I 8 - 1939 [3 rd section Mini stry of Foreign Affairs 19 I 8 193 8] (hereinafter III), in ventory number (hereinafter i. no.) 22 , fo lder (here inafter fold .) 651 . The report o f the Consul ate of the Czechoslovak Republic (hereinafter CSR) in Pittsburgh, to the Mini stry of Foreign Affa irs (hereinafter MFA ) of the CSR in Prague from April 22, 1926 ; Jednota, April 2 1, 1926, p. 4. 5 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld. 651. Letter of the Minister of the CSR with Full Powers fo r the Admini stration of Slovakia in Brati slava to the MFA in Prague, April 30, 1926 . 3 34 SLOVAKIA his own eyes and hear with his own ears if it was a sin to demand autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak Republic and the Czechoslovak Constitution. 6 At the time of the Hlinka's trip to the USA, reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh characterized the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America as quite tense. Besides personal problems, anxiety arose from frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government' s failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement. Meanwhile, State Insurance Commissioners were exerting pressure on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues, which greatly upset their members. 7 The reports of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh also described an alleged rivalry between Ivan Bielek, the President of the Slovak League of America and Jozef Rusek. Apparently, Rusek feared losing his editorship of the weekly Jednota at the upcoming 22 nd convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania on September 20 - 25 , 1926. His rival was Jan C. Sciranka, editor of Slovak v Amerike. The owner of the Slovak v Amerike was Bielek's brother-in-law Christopher L. Orbach.8 However, according to the report of the Pittsburgh Consulate, the tension between Bielek and Rusek soon dissipated. On April 14, 1926 Bielek published an article entitled Segedin-Mirov in Slo vak v Amerike, in which he denounced the imprisonment of Hlinka in the Czech Mirov prison for having offended President Masaryk. According to the Consulate, Bielek did so because he needed Husek's support at the upcoming convention of the National Slovak Society and the congress of the Slovak League of America. 9 Soon, however, arguments within the Slovak-American autonomist camp broke out again, thanks to Jozef Rusek. In a letter of April 3, 1926, Hlinka asked Rusek to prepare his lecture schedule. Rusek began to register applications for Hlinka's lectures and he wished to carry out this tour under the aegis of the Committe of Friends of Slovak Freedom. Some newspapers and organizations protested: the banker Michal Bosak in his weekly Obrana, a number of priests who 6 Slovak, May 23, 1926, pp. 1-2. AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 650. Report of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, April 15, 1926. 8 ibid. 9 i bid. 7 SLOVAKIA 35 supported the programme of the Magyarone priest Frantisek Jehlicska for the return of Slovakia to Hungary, and Bielek and Orbach in 10 Slovak v Amerike. In addition, the Committe had already been out of existence for three years. It was originally founded to purge the "Czechoslovaks" from the Slovak League of America, and then it merged with it. Despite this fact, Husek kept the title of president of this non-existent organization, announced the arrival of Hlinka to Slovak priests and newspapers and launched the campaign on his own. II Although Jozef Husek, through his contact with Slovak priests in America started to organize Hlinka's lecture tour, the Slovak League of America, led by president Bielek, also started to organize the lectures. It established an organizing committee, composed almost entirely of priests. Husek refused to become a member of this committee and the Slovak v Amerike started to complain about Husek's actions. 12 As a result, a group of Slovak priests ended up organizing Hlinka's lecture tour and the Slovak League of America, even though it compiled the schedule of the lectures, did not control the • 13 pnests. On May 26-27 the 16 th congress of the Slovak League of America was held in Detroit. The congress "with great joy received the news, that the noble leader of the Slovak nation, Msgr. Hlinka, President of the People's Party, would visit American Slovaks." It expressed confidence in him and promised that it would "with all its strength help his noble efforts and during his stay he would be a guest of the Slovak League of America." 14 Hlinka and his colleague Jozef Buday, together with Hynek Dostal , editor of the Czech-American newspaper Hlas, which supported autonomy for the Slovaks, 15 were named honorary members of the Slovak League of America. 10 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situat ion report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 11 AMZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 12 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prag ue, October 5, I 926. 13 Ibid. 14 A MZV CR, f. 111 , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Situation report in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, June 11 , 1926. 15 Ibid. of the Consul ate of the CS R of the Consulate of the CSR of the Consul ate of the CSR of the Co nsulate of the CSR 36 SLOVAKIA At the congress of the Slovak League, the previous officers were re-elected under the leadership of Ivan Bielek. Husek criticized this outcome. 16 He reported that the League had no funds , he accused the officers of incompetence, and warned that the League would perish if nothing was done to build up its treasury. 17 However, all these arguments between Husek and Bielek were simply personal. In fact, the Slovak League under the leadership of Ivan Bielek (1920- 1934) championed the Pittsburgh Agreement and openly supported the Slovak autonomist movement in the Czechoslovak Republic . The "Czechoslovaks" in America also prepared for the arrival of Andrej Hlinka. For instance, the Reverend Jozef Murgas of WilkesBarre, Pennsylvania, promised Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, that at the next meeting of priests of eastern Pennsylvania, he would ask them if their real interest was in politics or in religion and he promised to inform Getting of their answer. 18 Hlinka's arrival was announced by the daily Slovak (Bratislava) on June 4, 1926: "On June 3 our editorial staff received this telegram from Halifax : We have arrived safely. - Hlinka." 19 From the Canadian port of Halifax, Hlinka' s ship continued on to New York City, where it docked on June 5, 1926. 20 About 300 American Slovaks welcomed Hlinka at the dock. Once he had disembarked, Hlinka briefly outlined the goal of his journey. He stressed that he had come to work for both the Slovak nation and for his homeland, the Czechoslovak Republic. He emphasized concord, unity, the settling of petty arguments and forgivness, because "the nation needs us all and it needs us united." 21 In a 26-car procession the delegation proceeded to the Church of St. John Nepomucene on 66 th street, where the Reverend Stefan J. Krasul'a had been the pastor since 1916. An official reception was held in the Parish Hall, where the representatives of American Slovaks delivered their speeches.22 Here Andrej Hlinka spoke his 16 Ibid. Jednota, Jun e 2, 1926, p. 4. 18 A MZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. Missive of the Consul ate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA , April 15, I 926. "Czechos lovaks" were Slovaks who supp,orted th e unitary policies of the Czechoslovak government in Prague. 9 Slovak, June 5, 1926, p. I. 20 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 21 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. 22 Slovak, June 23, 1926, p. 5. 17 SLOVAKIA 37 memorable words: "If there were no America, Slovakia would still be under the Magyar yoke. To its credit the Slovaks finally got rid of the thousand-year subjugation." 23 The Slovak League of America officially welcomed Hlinka in the evening at a session of its local branch. 24 On this occassion the Slovak League also issued an official communique which was published by the daily Slowik in Bratislava. 25 A banquet was held the next day under the aegis of the Slovak League of America with the support of the Slovak clergy, organizations, newspapers and other societies. The banquet marked the completion of the programme of welcome with speeches by representatives of various Slovak organizations. Hlinka and Buday were presented with special diplomas, certifying that the Slovak League of America had granted them honorary memberships. 26 After the official welcome in New York, Jozef Rusek left the organizing of Hlinka's lecture tour to the Slovak League of America. 27 It began in Chicago after the end of the Eucharistic Congress on June 27, 1926. 28 According to the official announcement of the president of the Slovak League of America, published in the daily Slovak on July 14, 1926, Hlinka requested that lectures be presented on working days, because at the time of the announcement, there were already 136 requests for lectures. 29 Since the content of Hlinka's lecture in Chicago was generally the same as at other places in the USA, I will summarize it based upon the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago. The lecture was held in the Ashland Boulevard Auditorium which had a capacity of 4,000. The Czechoslovak Consulate in Chicago stated that two thirds of the hall was filled, 30 which, in comparison with the 23 Jednota, June 9, 1926, p. I. Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 25 Slovak, June 16, 1926, p. I. 26 Slovak, June 23 , 1926, p. 5. 27 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - 1965 (Cleveland: First Catholic Slovak Union, 1965), p. 210. 28 AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Report of the Consulate of the CSR in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chicago region. Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CSR in Washington, DC, July 30, 1926. 29 Slovak, July 14, 1926, p. 3. 30 The daily Slovak gave the number of 5,000 - 5,500 and stated that the hall was overcrowded. Cf. Slovak, July 16, I 926, p. 3. 24 38 SLOVAKIA number of Slovaks living in Chicago, the majority of whom were Catholics, was not that great. Information on the lectures was also disseminated by priests from their pulpits. Tickets were sold in the churches and by the Slovak Catholic Federation. This was designed to prevent unauthorized persons from attending. The $1,000 rent for the hall was paid by the Slovak Catholic Federation. The profits were given to Andrej Hlinka. Tickets were sold for 50 and 75 cents, $1.00 and $2.00, depending upon the seating.31 As the report of the Consulate states, the beginning of the lecture was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. However, Hlinka and his entourage arrived at 2:45 p.m. The audience welcomed him with a standing ovation. The session was openned by Jan Mayer, the president of the Slovak Catholic Federation, who introduced the guests. After him Gregor K. Vaniscak, the pastor of the Slovak Parish of St. Michael the Archangel in Chicago, spoke highly of the great Andrej Hlinka's work for the Slovak nation. He compared Hlinka with the three "most important people in world history" - George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Cardinal Richelieu. After that Andrej Hlinka delivered his speech. The audience greeted him with applause and some shouted: "Viva, hooray! " Somebody from the audience, allegedly a Slovak Communist, tried to disrupt the lecture and shouted "Shame on him!" for which he was ejected by the police. Some tried to distribute the communist daily Rovnost' /'udu, for which they were also ejected and held overnight at the police station. According to the report of the Chicago consulate, Andrej Hlinka first read the list of donors who contributed to the fund Narod sebe [The Nation for Itself] and to the HSPP's election fund . He asked the donors to keep their trust in him, because he had received all the money and had spent every penny for the right purpose. As evidence he cited the establishment of Slovak Catholic enterprises such as the Lev printery, the daily Slovak, and, most importantly, the half million votes that the HSPP had gained in the last parliamentary elections, which made it the most powerful political party in Slovakia. He asked American Slovaks to continue to remember the HSPP and its struggle for recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement and the autono31 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fo ld . 65 1. Report of the Consu late of th e CS R in Chi cago on the political acti vities of th e Peopl e's Party leaders in th e Chi cago region. Supplement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CS R in Was hin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. SLOVAKIA 39 my of Slovakia. Hlinka stated that he and the HSPP did not want anything more than that Slovaks be masters in Slovakia and Czechs in Bohemia and that Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" concerning the self-determination of nations be also applied to the Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Agreement. He declared that he was not against the Czechoslovak Republic and he was ready to "both live and die" for it, because October 28 was also the result of his nation-building efforts . He had struggled in Slovakia against the Magyars, who imprisoned him, first in Rufomberok, and then in Segedin. He added that Slovakia had long awaited October 28, 1918 as the day of liberation from the Magyar yoke. However, Hlinka continued, Slovak sons did not fight in the Czechoslovak Legions to move from one yoke to another. Instead of freedom , Slovaks were now offered "Czechization." Jozef M. Hurban, when he with others led the revolt against the Magyars in 1848, already spoke of the Slovak nation and not a "branch of the Czech nation." Similarly, when the Matica slovenska was founded in 1863, the Slovak leaders set its aim as the defence of the Slovak language as a national language and not a "Czech dialect." To spread the Czech language in Slovakia it was not necessary to establish the Matica slovenska. Therefore, if Hlinka now demands autonomy for Slovakia and wants the Pittsburgh Agreement to be respected and incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic, he does not want anything new. The Memorandum of Stefan Marko Daxner from as early as in the 1860's requested from the Hungarian government a so-called "Slovak Region" that completely agrees with his present request for autonomy. However, according to Hlinka, the Czech language rules in Slovak courts, offices and schools. Catholic schools were taken from the Slovaks in spite of the fact that the Catholics form the majority in Slovakia and they have to pay taxes to maintain the school system. For these taxes Slovak Catholic children are being indoctrinated with atheism and are taught by teachers such as a certain Bilek, who was a servant in Bohemia, but in Slovakia was made a high school professor! Moreover, Hlinka continued, Slovak intellectuals cannot find work at home. Slovak workers have to look for freedom in America. Despite the fact that Slovaks constitute 15% of the total number of inhabitants in Czechoslovakia, they are virtually absent from the 40 SLOVAKIA state administration . In high schools Slovaks have no principal. From among 786 high school professors, only 175 are Slovaks. An even greater disproportion exists in the railways--from among 13,000 employees, only 412 are Slovaks. There are enough qualified intellectuals in Slovakia, but the Prague government ignores them. Therefore, the demand for autonomy is not just political posturing, but is a cultural and economic need and is crucial to the existence of the Slovak nation. Furthermore, Hlinka stated that he wanted the Slovak and Czech nations to come together and jointly work on maintaining and developing their common state, but by observing equality in the national, cultural and economic spheres. He is not creating discord for the sake of discord. He supports the Czechoslovak Republic, which he proved when the communist attack on Slovakia occurred. Then the Czechoslovak governent had an opportunity to negotiate with him and establish order; the same was true after the last parliamentary elections, in which the HSPP gained the largest number of votes in Slovakia. However, the HSPP was not even noticed by the Czechoslovak government, it was not called by the government and it was even not considered to be necessary to negotiate with it.32 As the consulate report stated, Andrej Hlinka spoke for more than an hour. The tone of his voice was gentle and polite, hence very impressive. The audience often expressed its approval with applause, especially when he defended himself against accusations of treason and Magyaronism. On this occassion he stated that his life was an open book, from which every unbiased person could read, that he had always been selflessly fighting for the rights of the Slovak people. Before World War I, when he defended the rights of the Slovaks, the Magyars accused him of being a "Pan-Slav" and after the war, when he defended the same rights, the secularists and gullible Czechs accused him of being a Magyarone. In this context he asked the audience if it was possible that he would lead the Slovak people back to Magyar slavery, in which it had suffered for more than a thousand years? If anybody with common sense could accuse him of being an instrument of the Magyars, who, because of his fight for the rights of the Slovak nation, had escorted him from one prison to another? Hlinka concluded with an appeal to American 32 Ibid. SLOVAKIA 41 Slovaks to support him and the HSPP in this fight for autonomy and the recognition of the Pittsburgh Agreement. 33 After Hlinka Jozef Buday delivered his speech. According to the consular report, he was "thoughtless and rudely incited against the atheistic Czechs." He complemented the factual parts of the speech, in which Hlinka mentioned the Czech injustice against the Slovaks. 34 The consular report further stated that F. Wilson, a representative of the district council, spoke after Buday. After him came Andrej Gerat, who criticized the methods of education in Slovakia. After Gerat the Rev. G. K. Vaniscak read this resolution: 1. We support the Czecho-Slovak Republic. 2. We demand that the Pittsburgh Agreement to be incorporated into its Constitution. 3. We demand for Slovaks Slovak Christian schools . 4. We demand that in Slovakia the Slovaks be given priority m government offices, post offices, the railways, etc. 5. We demand that the Slovak language be exclusively used as the official language in all schools, offices, etc. After Vaniscak read the resolution, he asked the audience to possibly supplement it. Allegedly, some Communist suggested that all county and episcopal manors be confiscated and parceled out to the poor. After a short silence, the audience started to rise up and wanted to throw him out. Andrej Hlinka called for calm and said that the question had been politely put, so it would be politely answered. He answered that he agreed that all the manors be parceled out to the people who tilled them. Though the government is doing so, it is doing it along political lines. Concerning the episcopal manors, these belong to the Church, ergo to the people. From them schools, monasteries, publications, magazines and everything that the Church needs are maintained. Why should these manors be confiscated and parceled out when they are owned by all the people? 35 The Communist, as the daily Slo vak noted, said: "Thank you for the explanation, now 33 34 35 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 42 SLOVAKIA I know everything. I am content. " 36 The resolution was approved in the original wording. 37 Before the session ended, Andrej Hlinka talked to his countrymen from Orava about the annexation of parts of Spis and Orava by Poland. In the name of the HSPP he promised that he would negotiate to have these regions returned to Slovakia. 38 The session concluded with the national hymn ,,Lightening over the Tatras." 39 There followed a banquet, at which Frantiska C. Jakabcinova, the president of the First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union, gave Hlinka and Buday a gold membership medal and a gift of $1,000.40 On July 3, 1926, Andrej Hlinka had one more lecture in Chicago, the content of which was much the same as the first one. Among other places at which Hlinka and Buday lectured were Kenosha, Wisconsin, on July 3, Milwaukee, on July 14, Streator, Illinois, on July 5, Mount Olive, Illinois, on July 8, East St. Louis, on July 10, St. Louis, Missouri, on July 11 , and in Whiting, Indiana, on July 14, 1926. Then Hlinka's lectures continued in the Cleveland region. The content of these lectures was everywhere almost the same. 41 According to the consular report, the impact of Hlinka' s lectures upon the Slovak people in America was great. Workers debated them in factories and there were also quarrels and even battles (in Hege42 wich, Illinois, and Chicago Heights). Andrej Hlinka's message was summed up by Milan Getting, the Czechoslovak consul in Pittsburgh, as follows: 1. A. Hlinka declined an interview with the editorial staff of the Czech Narodne listy before his departure to America; 36 Slovak, July 16, 1926, p. 3. 37 A MZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld . 651. Report of the Co nsul ate of the CS R in Chica- go on the political activ ities of th e Peo ple's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Suppl ement to a letter of th e Embassy of the CSR in Washin gton, DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Slovak, Jul y 16, 1926, p. 3. 41 A MZV CR, f. III, i. no. 22 , fold. 651. Report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Chicago on the political activities of the People 's Party leaders in the Chi cago region . Supplement to a letter of the Embassy of the CS R in Washington , DC, Jul y 30, 1926. 42 Ibid. SLOVAKIA 43 2. He does not fear the separation of church and state and he foretold the extinction of the Slovak Lutherans if it happened; 3. The next president of Czechoslovakia will accept the Pittsburgh Agreement; 4. Hlinka severely criticized Edvard Benes and Vavro Srobar; 5. Hlinka stressed several times that he had nothing to do with Frantisek Jehlicska, but he lectured at places, where the lectures were organized by Jehlicska's followers; 6. The lectures resulted in an anti-Czech mood; 7. Collecting money was many times carried out in such a way as if it were the only purpose of the lectures; 8. Andrej Gerat put most of the resolutions to a vote for further use in Slovakia.43 Hlinka, according to his own words, visited more than one hundred parishes, took part in eighty sessions and had more than two hundred lectures. "In the whole of America only four Catholic priests did not attend our lectures that were held in their town or neighborhood." 44 Part of Andrej Hlinka's journey to the USA was for the purpose of fund-raising . The Slovak League of America created a motto for the collection: Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. In this context it printed envelopes with the following text: I believe in the sovereignty of the Slovak nation. I believe in the united Czecho-Slovak Republic. I believe my own contrymen-leaders. I believe in the gradual administration of Slovakia. I believe that a Slovak should have priority in Slovakia. I believe that a Czech is Czech and a Slovak is Slovak. I believe that, by enacting the Pittsburgh Agreement, conditions between Czechs and Slovaks will improve, hence we willingly support the Fund for the Victory of the Slovak Nation. 45 43 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22 , fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consu late of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 44 Andrej Hlinka v Amerike [Andrej Hlinka in America]. In Jednota : Katolic/..y kalendar na obycajny rok 192 7. Middletown, PA: First Catholi c Slovak Union, 1927, p. 38. 45 A MZV CR, f. Ill , i. no. 22, fold. 65 1. Situation report of the Consulate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926 . 44 SLOVAKIA At the same time the Slovak League of America published the leaflet Svoji svojim [One for oneself] , in which it invited people to become its members. 46 However, the Slovak League did not have much influence over the financial part of Hlinka' s lectures. These were organized by priests in a committee established by the League. Allegedly, the envelopes were not distributed everywhere and it might happen that a local priest took the collected money, withdrew a certain amount to cover the costs of organizing the lecture, and turned the balance over to Hlinka in the form of a personal check. 47 About the collections it can be said that, there were fs laces where the fund-raising drive could not be properly organized, 8 but, on the other hand, there were places where a sizeable amount of money was raised. Milan Getting estimated the total raised was $10,000. However, he added that his estimate should be treated with some reserve. For instance, at the convention of the First Catholic Slovak Union in Scranton, Pennsylvania, in September of 1926, Jozef Husek allegedly proposed to give Hlinka $5 ,000, but the delegates objected that the head office gave, without their consent, $1 ,000 to each Slovak bishop. They agreed on the same amount for Andrej Hlinka.49 At that time, the assets of the organization totaled $5,095 ,583 .37.50 The Slovak League of America, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, could not contribute to Hlinka, because its treasury was too small. 5 1 The final result of the fund-raising drive was most pertinently expressed by Hlinka in his letter to the Reverend Jan Postenyi after his return from the USA: "As you know, I have returned with fame , pennants and rings-but not many dollars. Business is business and I 46 AMZ V CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fo ld. 65 1. The leaflet Svoji svojim. AMZV CR, f. lll, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MF A in Prague, October 5, 1926. 48 For instance, the lecture in Pittsburgh, that was held on Sund ay August 8, 1926, because according to Pennsylvania law, one co uld not collect an entrance fee. Cf. Ibid 49 AMZ V CR, f. lll, i. no. 22 , fo ld. 651 . Situati on report of the Consul ate of th e CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, 1926. 50 PAUCO, Jozef. 75 rokov Prvej Katolickej Slovenskej Jednoty 1890 - / 965 (Cleveland : First Catholic Slovak Uni on, I 965), p. 2 I 2. 51 AMZ V CR, f. III, i. no. 22, fo ld . 651 . Situation report of th e Consul ate of the CS R in Pittsburgh, to the MFA in Prague, October 5, I 926. 47 SLOVAKIA 45 am not very good at it. I am a great idealist and our masters, the bishops, skimmed off the cream." 52 According to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America. Allegedly, Gerat did not stick to the official schedule, which resulted in Hlinka presenting his lectures without reference to the local organizing committee. However, the main cause of the annoyance of American Slovaks was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at the parish of the nationalist Stefan Panik in Torrington, Connecticut, but instead agreed to lecture at Andrej Komara's parish in Bridgeport, Connecticut. 53 As Milan Getting noted, Komara had been denounced by neighboring Slovak priests as a Magyarone. Therefore, by accepting his invitation, Hlinka disappointed many of his followers .54 Allegedly, after the lecture at Komara's parish on October 3, 1926, Hlinka and Gerat55 began to show a certain nervousness. This, according to the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, arose from the fact that Hlinka had failed to settle the arguments in the SlovakAmerican Catholic camp. It could also have been a result of their disappointment in the fund-raising drive. Another reason could have been the development of the political situation back home. In addition, Hlinka could see that the audience at his lectures was declining. He may also have been frustrated by articles published in the Czechoslovak daily Newyorsky dennik, which attacked him during his whole stay in the USA. 56 52 Archiv Spolku sv. Vojtecha v Tmave [Archives of the Society of St. Adalbert in Tmava] , fascic le (hereinafter fasc.) 156. Letter of A. Hlinka to J. Postenyi, November 3, 1926. 53 According to the Newyorsky dennik, Komara promised Hlinka $2,000, which, according to Getting, Hlinka did not deny. Cf. AMZV CR, f. Ill, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of th e CSR in Prague from October 15 , 1926. Not following the schedule of the lectures was also reported in Jednota, October 6, 1926, p. 2. 54 AMZV CR, f. III , i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MF A of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 55 Meanwhile, Buday returned to Slovakia. He left America on July 24, 1926. Cf. Slovak, August 6, 1926, p. 1. 56 AMZV CR, f. 111, i. no. 22, fold. 651. Situation report of the Consulate of the CSR in Pittsburgh, to the MFA of the CSR in Prague from October 15, 1926. 46 SLOVAKIA The last of Hlinka's lectures in the USA was in New York City on October 11 , 1926. 57 He left the USA on October 13 , 1926 and returned to Slovakia on October 22, 1926. 58 Even if the conclusion of his lecture tour to the USA looked disappointing, it did not radically affect the attitudes of American Slovaks to his person, nor the autonomist movement in Slovakia. It is apparent, therefore, that on the occasion of the 28 th International Eucharistic Congress in Chicago, Illinois, Andrej Hlinka, made use of his trip to lecture and to raise funds in favour of autonomy within the Czechoslovak Republic. According to the report of the Czechoslovak consulate in Pittsburgh, the situation in the Slovak autonomist camp in America at that time was quite tense. The reasons for the tension were personal problems, frustration arising from the Czechoslovak government's failure to uphold the Pittsburgh Agreement and the pressure of State Insurance Commissioners on fraternal societies to increase their monthly dues. After initial disagreements, Hlinka's lecture tour was organized by a committee composed almost entirely of priests. Hlinka visited more than one hundred Slovak parishes, took part in eighty discussions and presented more than two hundred lectures. However, the fund-raising drive did not bring the expected results. In addition, according to the report of the Czechoslovak Consulate in Pittsburgh, Andrej Hlinka ended his lecture tour by annoying his sympathizers in America by not having respected the schedule of the local organizational committee. The main cause of the annoyance, however, was the fact that Hlinka refused to lecture at nationalist Stefan Panik's parish in Torrington, Connecticut, but rather at the parish of the alleged Magyarone Andrej Komara in Bridgeport. Even if in the end his lecture tour to the USA disappointed many Slovak nationalists, Hlinka did not lose the sympathy of American Slovaks, nor support for the autonomist movement in Slovakia. 57 58 Ibid. Slo vak, October 23 , 1926, p. 3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Andrej Hlinka's Journey to the USA in 1926 Description An account of the resource Štefan Kucík Slovakia, Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010 pp. 32-46 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kucík, Štefan, 1979- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0ac606234030bb0bc1acc7b83b34b087.pdf df782531580eefa1e027fb5d95fd7090 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 47 " JOZEF STASKO (1917-1999): HIS LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS Miroslav Chromek In the history of Slovakia, many people who opposed the communist regime in the 1940's and 1950's were severely persecuted by the Communists. They were arrested, tortured, and sent to the uranium mines. The communist authorities, meanwhile, did everything in their power to erase any mention of them in official histories of the period. Now that Slovakia is no longer ruled by the Communists, it is incumbent upon historians to reveal the story of the many thousands who suffered under communist oppression. One of these individuals was Dr. Jozef Stasko. Jozef Stasko was born of Slovak peasants in the village of Sedliacka Dubova, Orava, county, on August 1, 1917. His father Peter, who was born in 1884, emigrated to the United States before the Great War in search of work. There he suffered an industrial accident from which he ultimately died on February 27, 1923. Jozef was only six years old and his sister Anna eight when their father died. Thus, Jozefs mother Johana, who had been born in 1887, had to raise her children on her own . 1 Jozef and his sister had to help their mother work the fields , as well as to attend school. In spite of her hard life, Jozef s mother persevered and gave her children all her love, for which Jozef was grateful. After he had made his way to the United States, he wrote a long article in praise of his mother, and all mothers who cared for their children.2 After completing the local Catholic grade school, the bright young Jozef went on to high school , but ran into difficulties. At the Trstena ' gymnasium,' where he first enrolled, he was repelled by the liberal and pro-Czechoslovak attitude of his Czech teachers and decided to switch to the more Catholic-oriented 'gymnasium' m Dolny Kubin. He later reminisced about these times as follows: 1 Stefan Baranovic, "Zivot a di elo PhDr. Jozefa Stasku," in Peter Maruniak, ed ., Dr. Jozef Stasko osemdesiatrocny (Martin: Mati ca slovenska, 1998), 9. 2 JozefStasko, " Moja matka," Ave Maria, 49 (No. 4, 1965), 106. �48 SLOVAKIA At 'gymnasium 'I was reminded that I belonged to an insignificant peasant people. My mother often told me how she had to hide Slovak newspapers from Magyar authorities. After the Great War, in speaking with Slovak patriots who had been jailed by the Magyars, I felt a deep pain in my heart for the past and continued suffering of our nation. 3 After graduating from 'gymansium' in 1935 Stasko continued his studies at Comenius University in Bratislava. In the first two years he studied French and Latin, and then switched to law. At Comenius he encountered the same attitudes as at Trstena-namely Czech professors trying to create a "Czechoslovak" language: "The University was run by Czechs, the Slovak language was degraded. Professor Vazny was trying to change Slovak into Czechoslovak and Professor Chaloupecky taught us Slovak history as if Slovaks were a mere branch of the Czech nation, and that was how were supposed to comport ourselves ."4 While at university, Stasko began to display his organizational and leadership abilities. He joined the student organizations Slavia Catholica, Detvan and Mayzes. Indeed, he was elected secretary of the latter. He lived in the student Catholic dormitory Svoradov, which was a hotbed for future political, scientific and cultural leaders.5 Since he was awarded a scholarship to continue his studies at the Sorbonne, Stasko left for Paris in February of 1939, and was caught in a maelstrom. The Slovak Diet had proclaimed independence on March 14, 1939, but Stasko disagreed with this proclamation. Therefore, he immediately contacted Dr. Stefan Osusky, the former Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, and offered him his services. However, in their discussions, Stasko found Osusky to be too proCzechoslovak, and too supportive of the philosophy of the late president T.G. Masaryk. 6 3 Baranovic, op.cit., 9. /bid. , I 0. 5 Jan Okal , "Dr. Jozef Stasko 65-rocny," Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov, 12, 2:10. 53, 1982), 22. . Stasko wrote about his discussions with Osusky in " Stefan Osusky's Attempts to Establi sh Contacts with Slovakia in 1939: A Personal Memoir," Slo vakia, 32, nos. 4 �SLOVAKIA 49 Meanwhile, Stasko sought to help Slovak workers in France. Once Slovakia declared independence, Slovaks in France were regarded with suspicion as "Germanophiles. " Therefore, French employers fired many of them. In his fluent French, Stasko either defended these workers in front of their former employers or helped them to find other jobs.7 By the end of April Stasko returned to Slovakia by train. He surmised that war would soon break out and he wanted to size up the situation at home. He was particularly concerned about the 35,000 Slovak workers in Belgium and France, who might be drafted if a war broke out. He also sought to involve the government of Slovakia in helping them to retain their jobs in those uncertain times. He also wished to report to Osusky about the situation of Slovaks in southern Slovakia, which had been occupied by Hungary the previous November. 8 While in Slovakia Stasko met with Dr. Gejza Medricky, the Minister of Economics of the Slovak Republic and with General Rudolf Viest, a member of the Slovak General Staff. Stasko managed to convince Medricky not to cancel the wage agreement between France and Slovakia, which allowed Slovak workers to receive parcels without having to pay any duty on them. 9 In his meeting with General Viest, he tried to persuade the latter to send as many Slovak officers to France as possible, ostensibly to further their educations, but really to be drafted into the French army, where they could then form the nucleus of a Czecho-Slovak army when the war broke out. 10 Viest politely listened but promised nothing. If we are to believe a letter that Stasko wrote to Dr. Jozef Mikus in 1980, Stasko also met with President Jozef Tiso in Banovce nad Bebravou, while the latter was on vacation. Stasko claimed that, in a friendly atmosphere, they discussed various problems that confron58-59 ( 198 5- I 986), 9-33. See also "Zapisky Jozefa Staska," Martin , Sl ovenska narodn a knizn ica, Arch iv literatury a um eni a, (hereafter SN K-ALU) p. 15. 7 Mini sterstvo vnutra Slovenskej republi ke , Statny archiv v Bra ti slave (hereafter MVS R- SA B), Fond okresneho L.:u doveho sudu- Jozef Stasko: Vypoved Jozefa Staska na L.: ud ovom sude z 26.4. 1946, p. 3. 8 /bid 9 "Zapisky Jozefa Staska," op.cit., p. 18. 1 °Fra ntisek Vnuk , "S lovenske studentske spolky v medzivojnovo m obdobi ," in Jozef Stasko, Tvorcovia noveho Slovenska (Ca mbri dge , ON : Fri ends of Good Books, 1982) , 174. �50 SLOVAKIA ted the Slovak State. Stasko further claimed that he upbraided Tiso for Slovakia's pro-Nazi political orientation and for naively looking upon Germany as a trusted protector of the new republic. From his alleged conversation with Tiso, it is clear that Stasko did not expect 11 Nazi Germany to last very long. At the beginning of June Jozef Stasko returned to France, where he experienced the first months of the Second World War. As soon as the war broke out, he volunteered to serve in the Czechoslovak army-in-exile, which Stefan Osusky had organized in France. Stasko began his service on October 17, 1939 in camp Agda, where, incidentally, the Slovak communist politician Vladimir Clementis was also stationed. However, the latter stayed only a few months, and then moved to London, where he would join in the Czechoslovak 12 liberation movement led by ex-president Edvard Benes. Stasko, meanwhile, looked for ways and means to remain in France, and, barring that, in some other western country. As an officer-in-training, Stasko was assigned an apartment on the shores of the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Sivak, a Roman Catholic chaplain, helped him to secure this lodging. 13 On May I 0, 1940, Stasko was assigned to the I st Platoon of the 2nd Czechoslovak Regiment as a 14 sergeant, and as such, in June was sent to the front on the Marne. After France ' s defeat by the Germans, his commanding officer, First Lieutenant Dolejsek, ordered him to retreat with his platoon, and to blow up any and all stores of supplies and ammunition, which Stasko did, and for which he was recommended for a commendation . 15 Stasko then sought to remain in France, and even persuaded a French family to help him to obtain the necessary papers in order to be properly demobilized. He then hoped to make his way to the United States and asked his Orava friend and former fellow-resident at the Svoradov, Jozef Mikus, who was then charge d' affaires in Madrid, to 11 Uni versity of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections, Slovak Arc hi ves, Jozef Mikus Fo nds, box 205, fasc . 205-7, letter of Jozef Stasko to Jozef Mikus, August 16, 1980. 12 MVSR-SAB , Yypoved Jozefa Staska, op.ci t. , p. 3, and Jozef Mikus, " Dr. Jozef Stasko sedemdesiatnik ," in Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu S/o vako v, 16 (No.77 , 1987), 18. 13 SNK-ALU, Jozef Stasko, " Yo vazeni na majaku Fort de Brescau." 14 Hitl er attacked western Europe on May I 0, 1940. 15 MVSR-SAB , Vypoved Jozefa Staska, p. 5 �SLOVAKIA 51 help him. The latter replied that it was Stasko's duty to return to Slovakia. 16 Meanwhile, Stasko refused to obey what he considered to be an impossible order, and found himself jailed by the French. Stasko's regiment was stationed in a Belgian camp that was shared by soldiers from Senegal. These got roaring drunk and armed themselves and began to loot the local town. French authorities ordered Stasko to quell this rebellion but Stasko knew that the Senegalese outnumbered his forces and refused. As a result, he and his soldiers found themselves jailed, along with the Senegalese, first in Belgium and from the end of August until the middle of November in the French prison Fort de Brescau, and after that in the prison of the Chasseurs Alpins in the port city of Set. While the prison regimen was not too onerous, living conditions were terrible, especially in Belgium, because the blankets were full of bed-bugs and the prison was overrun with rats, which Stasko and the Senegalese sought to kill during the night. 17 Jozef Stasko was finally rescued by Slovak authorities, although his subsequent life in Slovakia remained difficult. Dr. Eduard Malis, of the Slovak Repatriation Commission in France, arranged for Stasko to be released and he returned to Slovakia on March 22, 1941. 18 Stasko was immediately interrogated by the police for having allegedly revealed military secrets to the enemy, but released for lack of evidence. He then returned to Orava and helped his mother with her farm work, all the while being watched by the Gestapo. 19 Since he had no prospects in Orava, he eventually moved to Bratislava and found employment as the secretary of the Association of Industry, Trade and Finance. For three years he studied and published the history of trade and commerce in Slovakia for the magazine Zivnost'. He also planned to write a history of Slovak craft guilds. 20 During the Slovak Republic, Stasko did not engage in politics, nor did he join the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party. He did attend a lecture by Dr. Imrich Karvas, the Governor of the Slovak 16 "Zapi sky Jozefa Staska," op.cit., p. 33. Stasko , " Vo vaze ni .. .," op. cit. , 1-11 18 MVSR-SA B, Vypoved Jozefa Staska, op.cit ., p. 8 19 Author interview with lmrich Kruzliak in Bratislava, April 23, 2008. 20 Milan Beres, " Laudac ia na Dr. Jozefa Stas ku pri ude l'ovanf Ceny M . R. Stefanika ," in Peter Maruni ak, ed. , Dr. Jozef Stasko osemdesiatrocny (Martin : Matica slove nska) , 70. 17 �52 SLOVAKIA National Bank, and he did take advantage of a healing session at a Slovak spa, courtesy of his friend Jozef Mikula, who was a member of the People's Party.21 Conversely, Stasko did not participate in the Slovak National Uprising of August, 1944, which he considered illprepared and premature.22 Meanwhile, at the end of the war, some Russian soldiers broke into his bachelor apartment, ransacked it and beat him up when he tried to stop them. For all these reasons, a certain Major Peter Kozurka had him arrested on December 8, 1945 for his alleged "collaboration" activities. Due to a lack of evidence against him, Stasko was released just before Christmas, 1945. 23 After these bitter experiences, Stasko became a steadfast opponent of Communism, which he saw slowly engulfing his homeland. He joined the newly-established Democratic Party, worked tirelessly to unite the Lutherans and Catholics in it, and saw it emerge victorious in the 1946 elections. Initially, four political parties fielded candidates in the 1946 elections-the Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Slovakia, the Party of Freedom and the Party of the Workers. Only the Democrats and the Communists had a chance of winning. Both campaigned against each other. The Communists, largely through their mouthpiece Pravda, tried to divide the Catholic and Lutheran supporters of the Democratic Party. They even supported the creation of a Christian Democratic Party, to represent the Catholics. Initially, Stasko supported this movement, but later abandoned it. When he campaigned on behalf of the Democratic Party, for instance in Rufomberok, the Communists had him arrested while he was making a speech! Nevertheless, in the May 26, 1946 elections, 92.3% of the Orava electorate supported Stasko to the Czechoslovak Parliament for the Democratic Party.24 However, Stasko's victory lasted only until the fall of 1947. That summer he had guided a visiting American Slovak and her daughter across the country, and they both noticed that the secret police had been following them. In September the police arrested him again, on trumped-up charges, in spite of his parliamentary immunity. After 21 MVSR-SAB , Fond od resneho l'udoveho sudu- Jozef Stasko, Cs 414/46: Zapisnica o vysluchu svedka Jozefa Staska z 18. 2. 1947 22 Jnterview with lmrich K.ruzliak, op.cit. 23 Jozef Stasko, "Vazenska psychoterapia," Slovenske poh/'ady, no.3 , 1994, p. 124. 24 "Jozefa Staska prepustili 5. Novembra 1953 ," in "Zapisky Jozefa Staska- Na galejac h v Jachymove," SNK-ALU , Martin, p. 16. �SLOVAKIA 53 his release he was warned to flee the country but refused. Therefore, he was arrested again on November 4, 1947, and this time was sentenced to six years in jail. Once again, the Democratic Party did nothing to free him and he ended up in the notorious Leopoldov prison. Here he found himself in the company of former leaders of the Slovak Republic, such as Alexander Mach and Stefan Tiso, and Jan Kempny and later certain leaders of the Democratic Party, such as , Ursmy. , 25 Jan In spite of their difficult situation, Stasko and his fellow-prisoners decided to draft and sign a "Manifest" in which they protested their imprisonment and the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, it was signed on March 14, 1951 (the 12 th anniversary of the Slovak Diet' s declaration of independence), by politicians from completely different ideologycal backgrounds . They were: Dr. Andrej Buza, Jan Kempny, Alexander Mach, Jozef Stasko Dr. Stefan Tiso and Jan Ursiny. Incredibly enough, it proclaimed the following: 1-The Slovak nation is founded upon its Christian heritage and its application in all spheres of social life. 2-In order to safeguard its Christian heritage, the Slovak nation must be free. It will be free only when it is independent and selfgovernmg. 3-The experience of our nation has led us to proclaim its right to home-rule, the form of which will be decided by the Slovak nation . One possible form is statehood. 4-W e recognize the right of humans and citizens to a democratic social and political system . We support open and friendly relations with the Czech nation and with our Magyar and Polish neighbors. 5-We are opposed to oppression, whether of individuals or of societies, in the name of ideological totalitarianism. We shall defend, even unto death, the right to our God-given freedom. 26 This "Manifest" is significant, because, after 1945 the Democratic Party had proposed a common state with the Czechs, albeit with Slovak home-rule. Now both the jailed proponents and former opponents of Slovak independence were united in their demands for Slovak independence. 25 26 Ibid. , 124-6. /bid. , 124. �54 SLOVAKIA After three years in Leopoldov prison, Stasko was transferred to the Jachymov uranium mines in the Czech Lands . Here Stasko 's health broke down , due to the ill-effects of radiation poisoning, which was evident in the development of serious skin lesions on his hands . Even though he was released after he had served a total of six 27 years in prison, he never recovered his health. After his release from jail in 1953 , Stasko returned to his native Orava, to try to start over. Initially he found work studying and cataloging the extensive correspondence of the writer-priest Ignac Grebac-Orlov at the latter's parish in Velicna. Here Stasko discovered a rich correspondence with Hviezdoslav, Jege, Bulla and Hlinka, and other important writers or politicians. He notified the Slovak Academy of Sciences of his discovery and asked if it would publish his findings. However, because of his former prison sentence, the SA V turned him down. Stasko then found employment as a manual laborer at a sawmill in Oravsky Podzamok, but his injured hands made it impossible for him to continue. After he lost this job, he was hired as a clerk at the Research Institute for the Mechanization of Forestry in the same village, largely because he was fluent in French . 28 Meanwhile, Stasko visited Bratislava on several occasions. There he met with Dr. Ambrus, who worked for Slovak Radio. He offered Stasko part-time employment as a co-producer of the serial "Know Your Land." For this program Stasko visited many villages in his native Orava, and interviewed the inhabitants. In this way he became an expert on Slovak folk culture. However, Stasko lost his job as a clerk in Oravsky Podzamok and then had to look for work in Zilina. Here he had great difficulty finding a place to board. Altogether he changed locations ten times. Finally, he found work repairing refrigerators. While working on a refrigerator at the Hotel Fatra in the nearby spa town of Rajecke Teplice, he was poisoned by leaking Methylchloride. As a result, he became a patient in the spa for about a month. While there he had the opportunity to meet with his old friends Jan Kempny and Jan Spisiak, the former ambassador to Hungary. Since his physician ordered Stasko to find less dangerous work, he then was employed in a 27 "Jozefa Staska prepustili 5. nove mb ra 1953 ," in "Zapisky Jozefa Staska- Na ¥,a lejach v Jachymove," SNK-ALU, Martin , p.21 . 8 - Ibid., p. 18. �SLOVAKIA 55 local plywood factory. The Communists saw to it that he could never find work suitable to his education.29 After six years of hard manual labor, with no prospect of the communist regime ending, Stasko decided to flee to the West. He did so with the collaboration of a former prisoner in the Jachymov mines, the electrical engineer Jozef Merko. Even though Merko lived in Moravia and Stasko in Slovakia, they started to meet on the Slovak-Moravian border, near the village of Makov, to plan their escape. They settled on the vi llage of Hulin, on the AustrianMoravian border, because it met all of their criteria-close to the border, with a main road, some friendly contacts, plus a route avoiding the mines, and with barbed-wire that could be penetrated by a truck. The truck would be "borrowed" by Merko from the television-repair factory where he worked. Merko would take with him his wife and children and Stasko his fiancee Ema Schmeringaiova. However, Stasko and Merko would not reveal to them their plans until the last moment. Stasko arrived in Hulin on August 8, 1961. He and Merko then added protective armor to the truck, to shield it from the 5,000-volt electrical wire which they would have to penetrate. Stasko described the actual escape in minute detail: We cut through the first barbed wire as if through a thread. The second wire was higher and more dangerous. We hit an obstruction and had to back up. That took about ten seconds. When we hit the thicker wire, which was electrified, we saw and heard an explosion. One section of the severed wire hit the roof of the truck and burned through it. The third wire was easily broken, but by then we noticed that the wires had coiled themselves around our tires and we were pulling the entire fence behind us. Once we had reached the Austrian side, we stepped on the gas and into freedom! 30 The refugees crossed to the Austrian side on August 15, at 3 :40 a.m. After the Austrian border guards had checked their papers and story, they allowed the truck to proceed. When they arrived in 29 30 !bid., p. 20 /bid. , p.82 �56 SLOVAKIA Vienna, astounded journalists dubbed their Tatra truck as the "tank of freedom." Austrian authorities returned it to Czechoslovakia. The refugees were then taken to the refugee camp called Kagran, where they had to wait for one month in order to acquire Austrian visas. Merko was then hired as a technician by the local television station and Stasko found work in a winery.31 Now that Stasko was free , he breathed a sigh of relief, but still had medical problems. As he put it, "The medicine of freedom relaxed my nerves. At home I had really suffered from headaches, body pain, and depression."32 However, his body still suffered from radiation poisoning. Therefore, he decided to visit his good friend Irnrich Kruzliak, who worked at Radio Free Europe in Munich . The latter immediately sent him to his doctor for a physical. When the physician inspected Stasko's hands, which had millimeter-deep cracks in them, he predicted that Stasko would survive for a maximum of two years.33 He recommended that he go to Rome, to the headquarters of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, which specialized in the disease that afflicted him. Here Stasko was, indeed, helped by taking new medicines. His health improved so much that he was then able to travel all over Europe, particularly to London and Paris, where he met various Slovaks and could guage their political activities. He was interviewed on French television about his escape from Czechoslovakia, and by the French press as well. On February 1, 1962, Dominique Aucleres published a long interview with him in Le Figaro , France 's largest-circulation newspaper. 34 Meanwhile, when Stasko visited with Kruzliak in Munich, he expressed interest in also working for Radio Free Europe, but was disappointed. Some of his former Lutheran colleagues in the Democratic Party, who had the final say as to who was hired, turned Stasko down . Therefore, a dejected Stasko decided to apply for a visa to the United States and was successful. He arrived with his fiancee in New York in May of 1962.35 31 !bid. , p.83 /bid. , p.84. 33 Author interview with Imrich Kruzliak, April 23 , 2008 34 Jozef Mikus, " Dr. Jozef Stasko sedemdesiatnik," in Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu S/ovakov, l 6 (No.77, 1987), p.1 8. 35 Jnterview with Imrich Kruzliak, op.cit. 32 �SLOVAKIA 57 In New York Stasko and his wife (they were married in 1962) flourished . He intensively studied the English language, earned a Master of Library Science degree at Columbia University, and found employment as a librarian at the New York Public Library. His wife Ema, who even in Slovakia had nursed him back to health as best as she could, also enrolled at Columbia University, where she earned a BSc. in chemistry. Meanwhile, on October 27, 1963, they were blessed with a son, Jozef Jr. With the help of their friends, the Stasko family was able to purchase a condominium apartment on Park Terrace in New York City, where he lived for the rest of his life. 36 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Jozef Stasko joined the Slovak-American community and contributed to its cultural life. He wrote articles for the monthly Ave Maria, Verbum, Horizon!. and especially for the Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov. In 1973-74 he also taught courses on immigration and American Slovaks as an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the City College in New York.37 One of Stasko ' s dreams was to establish a Library and Archives dedicated to documenting the history and culture of American Slovaks. He hoped that it would be located in Danville, Pennsylvania, at the Jankola Library, which was already in existence, and which was organized by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. This Slovak congregation had been founded by the Rev. Matus Jankola in 1909 and, since all the sisters were fluent in Slovak, he felt that they would be the ideal recipients of such an archive.38 Jozef Stasko also took an active role in the founding of the Slovak World Congress in 1970. In his 1969 presentation to a meeting of the Organizing Committee of the SWC in Linden, New Jersey, Stasko outlined his conception of the role of the Slovak World Congress among Slovaks in the USA and Canada. He rejected the "Czechoslovakism" that still existed in some quarters and, instead, championed the cause of Slovak independence. On the other 36 /bid., and Jozef Stasko to Frantisek Sub fk, ovember 3, 1963 , Uni versity of Ottawa, Arc hi ves and Spec ial Coll ecti ons, Jozef Stasko Fonds, Box 205, Fasc . 20626. 37 Baranov ic, op. cit., 13. 38 Jozef Stasko to Jozef Papi n, September 8, I 972 and Slovak Hi story Assoc iation of Ameri ca n Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Uni versity of Ottawa, Slovak Archi ves, Archi ves and Spec ial Collectio ns, Fond Jozef Stasko, Box 205 , fasc. 20515 and fasc . 2 12. �58 SLOVAKIA hand, he naively called on the SKS to seek the support of all Slovak factions in the USA, including Catholics and Lutherans and supporters of the Slovak State and its opponents.39 The Slovak World Congress was founded in reaction to the "normalization" of Czechoslovakia after the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968. Stasko put it this way: "We had to recognize that the Slovak nation at home was not free to speak its mind. Therefore, we had to do it. And we had to truly reflect what it wanted and needed." The main goal of the SKS, according to Stasko, was twofold: "to unite all Slovak factions, which by themselves were weak and ineffective, and to demand the right of the Slovak nation to self-govemment."40 Stasko then drafted what he considered to be the main role of the Slovak World Congress in the following points: 1- The leadership of the Slovak World Congress should gather information about Slovak achievements in the arts and sciences and make them available for all to see, so that Slovak demands for homerule would seem reasonable. 2- The Slovak World Congress should publish books about Slovak history and literature in foreign languages and donate them to university libraries. 3- The Slovak World Congress should seek to revise information about the Slovaks in foreign publications. To this end, it should support research and translation into foreign-languages books about the Slovak past and present. 4- The Slovak World Congress must seek to persuade Slovaks abroad to publish quality books for practical purposes. It should seek out qualified Slovaks for this purpose. It must publish in English, French and German. It should publish a periodical geared towards the general public. Slovaks abroad lack a good Slovak-English dictionary, and that makes Americans dependent upon Slovak-speakers for translations. 5- The Slovak World Congress should establish a Slovak library containing information in English about Slovakia. The SKS should consider purchasing a building in New York City for this purpose. 39 Jozef Stasko, "Preco som za SKS?" Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov, No. 7, 1972, p. 18. 40 Ibid. , 17. �SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks also lack restaurants and delicatessens, where one could purchase Slovak products. 6- The Slovak World Congress should also strive to overcome the divisions among Slovaks between Catholics, Lutherans and Jews. 41 Jozef Stasko also wrote a letter in 1980 to former members of the Democratic Party living in the USA. In it one can see that he was convinced that Communism in Czechoslovakia was doomed, and he also correctly predicted the breakup of the republic.42 Jozef Stasko lived to see an independent Slovak Republic in 1993. He and his generation had long fought for it. As he later remarked, it was one of the happiest days of his life. However, in the second half of the l 990's, Stasko's health began to deteriorate. He never really recovered from the negative effects of his imprisonment and radiation poisoning. Jozef Stasko died in New York City on September 19, 1999. At his request, his remains were transferred to and interred in Sedliacka Dubova, the village of his birth. Thus ended the almost unbelievable life of a person who, in spite of great difficulties, lived to see the realization of his dream: an independent Slovak Republic. 41 /bid., 19. lbid. , 20. 42 � SLOVAKIA 47 " JOZEF STASKO (1917-1999): HIS LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS Miroslav Chromek In the history of Slovakia, many people who opposed the communist regime in the 1940's and 1950's were severely persecuted by the Communists. They were arrested, tortured, and sent to the uranium mines. The communist authorities, meanwhile, did everything in their power to erase any mention of them in official histories of the period. Now that Slovakia is no longer ruled by the Communists, it is incumbent upon historians to reveal the story of the many thousands who suffered under communist oppression. One of these individuals was Dr. Jozef Stasko. Jozef Stasko was born of Slovak peasants in the village of Sedliacka Dubova, Orava, county, on August 1, 1917. His father Peter, who was born in 1884, emigrated to the United States before the Great War in search of work. There he suffered an industrial accident from which he ultimately died on February 27, 1923. Jozef was only six years old and his sister Anna eight when their father died. Thus, Jozefs mother Johana, who had been born in 1887, had to raise her children on her own . 1 Jozef and his sister had to help their mother work the fields , as well as to attend school. In spite of her hard life, Jozef s mother persevered and gave her children all her love, for which Jozef was grateful. After he had made his way to the United States, he wrote a long article in praise of his mother, and all mothers who cared for their children.2 After completing the local Catholic grade school, the bright young Jozef went on to high school , but ran into difficulties. At the Trstena ' gymnasium,' where he first enrolled, he was repelled by the liberal and pro-Czechoslovak attitude of his Czech teachers and decided to switch to the more Catholic-oriented 'gymnasium' m Dolny Kubin. He later reminisced about these times as follows: 1 Stefan Baranovic, "Zivot a di elo PhDr. Jozefa Stasku," in Peter Maruniak, ed ., Dr. Jozef Stasko osemdesiatrocny (Martin: Mati ca slovenska, 1998), 9. 2 JozefStasko, " Moja matka," Ave Maria, 49 (No. 4, 1965), 106. �48 SLOVAKIA At 'gymnasium 'I was reminded that I belonged to an insignificant peasant people. My mother often told me how she had to hide Slovak newspapers from Magyar authorities. After the Great War, in speaking with Slovak patriots who had been jailed by the Magyars, I felt a deep pain in my heart for the past and continued suffering of our nation. 3 After graduating from 'gymansium' in 1935 Stasko continued his studies at Comenius University in Bratislava. In the first two years he studied French and Latin, and then switched to law. At Comenius he encountered the same attitudes as at Trstena-namely Czech professors trying to create a "Czechoslovak" language: "The University was run by Czechs, the Slovak language was degraded. Professor Vazny was trying to change Slovak into Czechoslovak and Professor Chaloupecky taught us Slovak history as if Slovaks were a mere branch of the Czech nation, and that was how were supposed to comport ourselves ."4 While at university, Stasko began to display his organizational and leadership abilities. He joined the student organizations Slavia Catholica, Detvan and Mayzes. Indeed, he was elected secretary of the latter. He lived in the student Catholic dormitory Svoradov, which was a hotbed for future political, scientific and cultural leaders.5 Since he was awarded a scholarship to continue his studies at the Sorbonne, Stasko left for Paris in February of 1939, and was caught in a maelstrom. The Slovak Diet had proclaimed independence on March 14, 1939, but Stasko disagreed with this proclamation. Therefore, he immediately contacted Dr. Stefan Osusky, the former Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, and offered him his services. However, in their discussions, Stasko found Osusky to be too proCzechoslovak, and too supportive of the philosophy of the late president T.G. Masaryk. 6 3 Baranovic, op.cit., 9. /bid. , I 0. 5 Jan Okal , "Dr. Jozef Stasko 65-rocny," Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov, 12, 2:10. 53, 1982), 22. . Stasko wrote about his discussions with Osusky in " Stefan Osusky's Attempts to Establi sh Contacts with Slovakia in 1939: A Personal Memoir," Slo vakia, 32, nos. 4 �SLOVAKIA 49 Meanwhile, Stasko sought to help Slovak workers in France. Once Slovakia declared independence, Slovaks in France were regarded with suspicion as "Germanophiles. " Therefore, French employers fired many of them. In his fluent French, Stasko either defended these workers in front of their former employers or helped them to find other jobs.7 By the end of April Stasko returned to Slovakia by train. He surmised that war would soon break out and he wanted to size up the situation at home. He was particularly concerned about the 35,000 Slovak workers in Belgium and France, who might be drafted if a war broke out. He also sought to involve the government of Slovakia in helping them to retain their jobs in those uncertain times. He also wished to report to Osusky about the situation of Slovaks in southern Slovakia, which had been occupied by Hungary the previous November. 8 While in Slovakia Stasko met with Dr. Gejza Medricky, the Minister of Economics of the Slovak Republic and with General Rudolf Viest, a member of the Slovak General Staff. Stasko managed to convince Medricky not to cancel the wage agreement between France and Slovakia, which allowed Slovak workers to receive parcels without having to pay any duty on them. 9 In his meeting with General Viest, he tried to persuade the latter to send as many Slovak officers to France as possible, ostensibly to further their educations, but really to be drafted into the French army, where they could then form the nucleus of a Czecho-Slovak army when the war broke out. 10 Viest politely listened but promised nothing. If we are to believe a letter that Stasko wrote to Dr. Jozef Mikus in 1980, Stasko also met with President Jozef Tiso in Banovce nad Bebravou, while the latter was on vacation. Stasko claimed that, in a friendly atmosphere, they discussed various problems that confron58-59 ( 198 5- I 986), 9-33. See also "Zapisky Jozefa Staska," Martin , Sl ovenska narodn a knizn ica, Arch iv literatury a um eni a, (hereafter SN K-ALU) p. 15. 7 Mini sterstvo vnutra Slovenskej republi ke , Statny archiv v Bra ti slave (hereafter MVS R- SA B), Fond okresneho L.:u doveho sudu- Jozef Stasko: Vypoved Jozefa Staska na L.: ud ovom sude z 26.4. 1946, p. 3. 8 /bid 9 "Zapisky Jozefa Staska," op.cit., p. 18. 1 °Fra ntisek Vnuk , "S lovenske studentske spolky v medzivojnovo m obdobi ," in Jozef Stasko, Tvorcovia noveho Slovenska (Ca mbri dge , ON : Fri ends of Good Books, 1982) , 174. �50 SLOVAKIA ted the Slovak State. Stasko further claimed that he upbraided Tiso for Slovakia's pro-Nazi political orientation and for naively looking upon Germany as a trusted protector of the new republic. From his alleged conversation with Tiso, it is clear that Stasko did not expect 11 Nazi Germany to last very long. At the beginning of June Jozef Stasko returned to France, where he experienced the first months of the Second World War. As soon as the war broke out, he volunteered to serve in the Czechoslovak army-in-exile, which Stefan Osusky had organized in France. Stasko began his service on October 17, 1939 in camp Agda, where, incidentally, the Slovak communist politician Vladimir Clementis was also stationed. However, the latter stayed only a few months, and then moved to London, where he would join in the Czechoslovak 12 liberation movement led by ex-president Edvard Benes. Stasko, meanwhile, looked for ways and means to remain in France, and, barring that, in some other western country. As an officer-in-training, Stasko was assigned an apartment on the shores of the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Sivak, a Roman Catholic chaplain, helped him to secure this lodging. 13 On May I 0, 1940, Stasko was assigned to the I st Platoon of the 2nd Czechoslovak Regiment as a 14 sergeant, and as such, in June was sent to the front on the Marne. After France ' s defeat by the Germans, his commanding officer, First Lieutenant Dolejsek, ordered him to retreat with his platoon, and to blow up any and all stores of supplies and ammunition, which Stasko did, and for which he was recommended for a commendation . 15 Stasko then sought to remain in France, and even persuaded a French family to help him to obtain the necessary papers in order to be properly demobilized. He then hoped to make his way to the United States and asked his Orava friend and former fellow-resident at the Svoradov, Jozef Mikus, who was then charge d' affaires in Madrid, to 11 Uni versity of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections, Slovak Arc hi ves, Jozef Mikus Fo nds, box 205, fasc . 205-7, letter of Jozef Stasko to Jozef Mikus, August 16, 1980. 12 MVSR-SAB , Yypoved Jozefa Staska, op.ci t. , p. 3, and Jozef Mikus, " Dr. Jozef Stasko sedemdesiatnik ," in Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu S/o vako v, 16 (No.77 , 1987), 18. 13 SNK-ALU, Jozef Stasko, " Yo vazeni na majaku Fort de Brescau." 14 Hitl er attacked western Europe on May I 0, 1940. 15 MVSR-SAB , Vypoved Jozefa Staska, p. 5 �SLOVAKIA 51 help him. The latter replied that it was Stasko's duty to return to Slovakia. 16 Meanwhile, Stasko refused to obey what he considered to be an impossible order, and found himself jailed by the French. Stasko's regiment was stationed in a Belgian camp that was shared by soldiers from Senegal. These got roaring drunk and armed themselves and began to loot the local town. French authorities ordered Stasko to quell this rebellion but Stasko knew that the Senegalese outnumbered his forces and refused. As a result, he and his soldiers found themselves jailed, along with the Senegalese, first in Belgium and from the end of August until the middle of November in the French prison Fort de Brescau, and after that in the prison of the Chasseurs Alpins in the port city of Set. While the prison regimen was not too onerous, living conditions were terrible, especially in Belgium, because the blankets were full of bed-bugs and the prison was overrun with rats, which Stasko and the Senegalese sought to kill during the night. 17 Jozef Stasko was finally rescued by Slovak authorities, although his subsequent life in Slovakia remained difficult. Dr. Eduard Malis, of the Slovak Repatriation Commission in France, arranged for Stasko to be released and he returned to Slovakia on March 22, 1941. 18 Stasko was immediately interrogated by the police for having allegedly revealed military secrets to the enemy, but released for lack of evidence. He then returned to Orava and helped his mother with her farm work, all the while being watched by the Gestapo. 19 Since he had no prospects in Orava, he eventually moved to Bratislava and found employment as the secretary of the Association of Industry, Trade and Finance. For three years he studied and published the history of trade and commerce in Slovakia for the magazine Zivnost'. He also planned to write a history of Slovak craft guilds. 20 During the Slovak Republic, Stasko did not engage in politics, nor did he join the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party. He did attend a lecture by Dr. Imrich Karvas, the Governor of the Slovak 16 "Zapi sky Jozefa Staska," op.cit., p. 33. Stasko , " Vo vaze ni .. .," op. cit. , 1-11 18 MVSR-SA B, Vypoved Jozefa Staska, op.cit ., p. 8 19 Author interview with lmrich Kruzliak in Bratislava, April 23, 2008. 20 Milan Beres, " Laudac ia na Dr. Jozefa Stas ku pri ude l'ovanf Ceny M . R. Stefanika ," in Peter Maruni ak, ed. , Dr. Jozef Stasko osemdesiatrocny (Martin : Matica slove nska) , 70. 17 �52 SLOVAKIA National Bank, and he did take advantage of a healing session at a Slovak spa, courtesy of his friend Jozef Mikula, who was a member of the People's Party.21 Conversely, Stasko did not participate in the Slovak National Uprising of August, 1944, which he considered illprepared and premature.22 Meanwhile, at the end of the war, some Russian soldiers broke into his bachelor apartment, ransacked it and beat him up when he tried to stop them. For all these reasons, a certain Major Peter Kozurka had him arrested on December 8, 1945 for his alleged "collaboration" activities. Due to a lack of evidence against him, Stasko was released just before Christmas, 1945. 23 After these bitter experiences, Stasko became a steadfast opponent of Communism, which he saw slowly engulfing his homeland. He joined the newly-established Democratic Party, worked tirelessly to unite the Lutherans and Catholics in it, and saw it emerge victorious in the 1946 elections. Initially, four political parties fielded candidates in the 1946 elections-the Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Slovakia, the Party of Freedom and the Party of the Workers. Only the Democrats and the Communists had a chance of winning. Both campaigned against each other. The Communists, largely through their mouthpiece Pravda, tried to divide the Catholic and Lutheran supporters of the Democratic Party. They even supported the creation of a Christian Democratic Party, to represent the Catholics. Initially, Stasko supported this movement, but later abandoned it. When he campaigned on behalf of the Democratic Party, for instance in Rufomberok, the Communists had him arrested while he was making a speech! Nevertheless, in the May 26, 1946 elections, 92.3% of the Orava electorate supported Stasko to the Czechoslovak Parliament for the Democratic Party.24 However, Stasko's victory lasted only until the fall of 1947. That summer he had guided a visiting American Slovak and her daughter across the country, and they both noticed that the secret police had been following them. In September the police arrested him again, on trumped-up charges, in spite of his parliamentary immunity. After 21 MVSR-SAB , Fond od resneho l'udoveho sudu- Jozef Stasko, Cs 414/46: Zapisnica o vysluchu svedka Jozefa Staska z 18. 2. 1947 22 Jnterview with lmrich K.ruzliak, op.cit. 23 Jozef Stasko, "Vazenska psychoterapia," Slovenske poh/'ady, no.3 , 1994, p. 124. 24 "Jozefa Staska prepustili 5. Novembra 1953 ," in "Zapisky Jozefa Staska- Na galejac h v Jachymove," SNK-ALU , Martin, p. 16. �SLOVAKIA 53 his release he was warned to flee the country but refused. Therefore, he was arrested again on November 4, 1947, and this time was sentenced to six years in jail. Once again, the Democratic Party did nothing to free him and he ended up in the notorious Leopoldov prison. Here he found himself in the company of former leaders of the Slovak Republic, such as Alexander Mach and Stefan Tiso, and Jan Kempny and later certain leaders of the Democratic Party, such as , Ursmy. , 25 Jan In spite of their difficult situation, Stasko and his fellow-prisoners decided to draft and sign a "Manifest" in which they protested their imprisonment and the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, it was signed on March 14, 1951 (the 12 th anniversary of the Slovak Diet' s declaration of independence), by politicians from completely different ideologycal backgrounds . They were: Dr. Andrej Buza, Jan Kempny, Alexander Mach, Jozef Stasko Dr. Stefan Tiso and Jan Ursiny. Incredibly enough, it proclaimed the following: 1-The Slovak nation is founded upon its Christian heritage and its application in all spheres of social life. 2-In order to safeguard its Christian heritage, the Slovak nation must be free. It will be free only when it is independent and selfgovernmg. 3-The experience of our nation has led us to proclaim its right to home-rule, the form of which will be decided by the Slovak nation . One possible form is statehood. 4-W e recognize the right of humans and citizens to a democratic social and political system . We support open and friendly relations with the Czech nation and with our Magyar and Polish neighbors. 5-We are opposed to oppression, whether of individuals or of societies, in the name of ideological totalitarianism. We shall defend, even unto death, the right to our God-given freedom. 26 This "Manifest" is significant, because, after 1945 the Democratic Party had proposed a common state with the Czechs, albeit with Slovak home-rule. Now both the jailed proponents and former opponents of Slovak independence were united in their demands for Slovak independence. 25 26 Ibid. , 124-6. /bid. , 124. �54 SLOVAKIA After three years in Leopoldov prison, Stasko was transferred to the Jachymov uranium mines in the Czech Lands . Here Stasko 's health broke down , due to the ill-effects of radiation poisoning, which was evident in the development of serious skin lesions on his hands . Even though he was released after he had served a total of six 27 years in prison, he never recovered his health. After his release from jail in 1953 , Stasko returned to his native Orava, to try to start over. Initially he found work studying and cataloging the extensive correspondence of the writer-priest Ignac Grebac-Orlov at the latter's parish in Velicna. Here Stasko discovered a rich correspondence with Hviezdoslav, Jege, Bulla and Hlinka, and other important writers or politicians. He notified the Slovak Academy of Sciences of his discovery and asked if it would publish his findings. However, because of his former prison sentence, the SA V turned him down. Stasko then found employment as a manual laborer at a sawmill in Oravsky Podzamok, but his injured hands made it impossible for him to continue. After he lost this job, he was hired as a clerk at the Research Institute for the Mechanization of Forestry in the same village, largely because he was fluent in French . 28 Meanwhile, Stasko visited Bratislava on several occasions. There he met with Dr. Ambrus, who worked for Slovak Radio. He offered Stasko part-time employment as a co-producer of the serial "Know Your Land." For this program Stasko visited many villages in his native Orava, and interviewed the inhabitants. In this way he became an expert on Slovak folk culture. However, Stasko lost his job as a clerk in Oravsky Podzamok and then had to look for work in Zilina. Here he had great difficulty finding a place to board. Altogether he changed locations ten times. Finally, he found work repairing refrigerators. While working on a refrigerator at the Hotel Fatra in the nearby spa town of Rajecke Teplice, he was poisoned by leaking Methylchloride. As a result, he became a patient in the spa for about a month. While there he had the opportunity to meet with his old friends Jan Kempny and Jan Spisiak, the former ambassador to Hungary. Since his physician ordered Stasko to find less dangerous work, he then was employed in a 27 "Jozefa Staska prepustili 5. nove mb ra 1953 ," in "Zapisky Jozefa Staska- Na ¥,a lejach v Jachymove," SNK-ALU, Martin , p.21 . 8 - Ibid., p. 18. �SLOVAKIA 55 local plywood factory. The Communists saw to it that he could never find work suitable to his education.29 After six years of hard manual labor, with no prospect of the communist regime ending, Stasko decided to flee to the West. He did so with the collaboration of a former prisoner in the Jachymov mines, the electrical engineer Jozef Merko. Even though Merko lived in Moravia and Stasko in Slovakia, they started to meet on the Slovak-Moravian border, near the village of Makov, to plan their escape. They settled on the vi llage of Hulin, on the AustrianMoravian border, because it met all of their criteria-close to the border, with a main road, some friendly contacts, plus a route avoiding the mines, and with barbed-wire that could be penetrated by a truck. The truck would be "borrowed" by Merko from the television-repair factory where he worked. Merko would take with him his wife and children and Stasko his fiancee Ema Schmeringaiova. However, Stasko and Merko would not reveal to them their plans until the last moment. Stasko arrived in Hulin on August 8, 1961. He and Merko then added protective armor to the truck, to shield it from the 5,000-volt electrical wire which they would have to penetrate. Stasko described the actual escape in minute detail: We cut through the first barbed wire as if through a thread. The second wire was higher and more dangerous. We hit an obstruction and had to back up. That took about ten seconds. When we hit the thicker wire, which was electrified, we saw and heard an explosion. One section of the severed wire hit the roof of the truck and burned through it. The third wire was easily broken, but by then we noticed that the wires had coiled themselves around our tires and we were pulling the entire fence behind us. Once we had reached the Austrian side, we stepped on the gas and into freedom! 30 The refugees crossed to the Austrian side on August 15, at 3 :40 a.m. After the Austrian border guards had checked their papers and story, they allowed the truck to proceed. When they arrived in 29 30 !bid., p. 20 /bid. , p.82 �56 SLOVAKIA Vienna, astounded journalists dubbed their Tatra truck as the "tank of freedom." Austrian authorities returned it to Czechoslovakia. The refugees were then taken to the refugee camp called Kagran, where they had to wait for one month in order to acquire Austrian visas. Merko was then hired as a technician by the local television station and Stasko found work in a winery.31 Now that Stasko was free , he breathed a sigh of relief, but still had medical problems. As he put it, "The medicine of freedom relaxed my nerves. At home I had really suffered from headaches, body pain, and depression."32 However, his body still suffered from radiation poisoning. Therefore, he decided to visit his good friend Irnrich Kruzliak, who worked at Radio Free Europe in Munich . The latter immediately sent him to his doctor for a physical. When the physician inspected Stasko's hands, which had millimeter-deep cracks in them, he predicted that Stasko would survive for a maximum of two years.33 He recommended that he go to Rome, to the headquarters of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, which specialized in the disease that afflicted him. Here Stasko was, indeed, helped by taking new medicines. His health improved so much that he was then able to travel all over Europe, particularly to London and Paris, where he met various Slovaks and could guage their political activities. He was interviewed on French television about his escape from Czechoslovakia, and by the French press as well. On February 1, 1962, Dominique Aucleres published a long interview with him in Le Figaro , France 's largest-circulation newspaper. 34 Meanwhile, when Stasko visited with Kruzliak in Munich, he expressed interest in also working for Radio Free Europe, but was disappointed. Some of his former Lutheran colleagues in the Democratic Party, who had the final say as to who was hired, turned Stasko down . Therefore, a dejected Stasko decided to apply for a visa to the United States and was successful. He arrived with his fiancee in New York in May of 1962.35 31 !bid. , p.83 /bid. , p.84. 33 Author interview with Imrich Kruzliak, April 23 , 2008 34 Jozef Mikus, " Dr. Jozef Stasko sedemdesiatnik," in Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu S/ovakov, l 6 (No.77, 1987), p.1 8. 35 Jnterview with Imrich Kruzliak, op.cit. 32 �SLOVAKIA 57 In New York Stasko and his wife (they were married in 1962) flourished . He intensively studied the English language, earned a Master of Library Science degree at Columbia University, and found employment as a librarian at the New York Public Library. His wife Ema, who even in Slovakia had nursed him back to health as best as she could, also enrolled at Columbia University, where she earned a BSc. in chemistry. Meanwhile, on October 27, 1963, they were blessed with a son, Jozef Jr. With the help of their friends, the Stasko family was able to purchase a condominium apartment on Park Terrace in New York City, where he lived for the rest of his life. 36 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Jozef Stasko joined the Slovak-American community and contributed to its cultural life. He wrote articles for the monthly Ave Maria, Verbum, Horizon!. and especially for the Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov. In 1973-74 he also taught courses on immigration and American Slovaks as an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the City College in New York.37 One of Stasko ' s dreams was to establish a Library and Archives dedicated to documenting the history and culture of American Slovaks. He hoped that it would be located in Danville, Pennsylvania, at the Jankola Library, which was already in existence, and which was organized by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. This Slovak congregation had been founded by the Rev. Matus Jankola in 1909 and, since all the sisters were fluent in Slovak, he felt that they would be the ideal recipients of such an archive.38 Jozef Stasko also took an active role in the founding of the Slovak World Congress in 1970. In his 1969 presentation to a meeting of the Organizing Committee of the SWC in Linden, New Jersey, Stasko outlined his conception of the role of the Slovak World Congress among Slovaks in the USA and Canada. He rejected the "Czechoslovakism" that still existed in some quarters and, instead, championed the cause of Slovak independence. On the other 36 /bid., and Jozef Stasko to Frantisek Sub fk, ovember 3, 1963 , Uni versity of Ottawa, Arc hi ves and Spec ial Coll ecti ons, Jozef Stasko Fonds, Box 205, Fasc . 20626. 37 Baranov ic, op. cit., 13. 38 Jozef Stasko to Jozef Papi n, September 8, I 972 and Slovak Hi story Assoc iation of Ameri ca n Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Uni versity of Ottawa, Slovak Archi ves, Archi ves and Spec ial Collectio ns, Fond Jozef Stasko, Box 205 , fasc. 20515 and fasc . 2 12. �58 SLOVAKIA hand, he naively called on the SKS to seek the support of all Slovak factions in the USA, including Catholics and Lutherans and supporters of the Slovak State and its opponents.39 The Slovak World Congress was founded in reaction to the "normalization" of Czechoslovakia after the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968. Stasko put it this way: "We had to recognize that the Slovak nation at home was not free to speak its mind. Therefore, we had to do it. And we had to truly reflect what it wanted and needed." The main goal of the SKS, according to Stasko, was twofold: "to unite all Slovak factions, which by themselves were weak and ineffective, and to demand the right of the Slovak nation to self-govemment."40 Stasko then drafted what he considered to be the main role of the Slovak World Congress in the following points: 1- The leadership of the Slovak World Congress should gather information about Slovak achievements in the arts and sciences and make them available for all to see, so that Slovak demands for homerule would seem reasonable. 2- The Slovak World Congress should publish books about Slovak history and literature in foreign languages and donate them to university libraries. 3- The Slovak World Congress should seek to revise information about the Slovaks in foreign publications. To this end, it should support research and translation into foreign-languages books about the Slovak past and present. 4- The Slovak World Congress must seek to persuade Slovaks abroad to publish quality books for practical purposes. It should seek out qualified Slovaks for this purpose. It must publish in English, French and German. It should publish a periodical geared towards the general public. Slovaks abroad lack a good Slovak-English dictionary, and that makes Americans dependent upon Slovak-speakers for translations. 5- The Slovak World Congress should establish a Slovak library containing information in English about Slovakia. The SKS should consider purchasing a building in New York City for this purpose. 39 Jozef Stasko, "Preco som za SKS?" Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov, No. 7, 1972, p. 18. 40 Ibid. , 17. �SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks also lack restaurants and delicatessens, where one could purchase Slovak products. 6- The Slovak World Congress should also strive to overcome the divisions among Slovaks between Catholics, Lutherans and Jews. 41 Jozef Stasko also wrote a letter in 1980 to former members of the Democratic Party living in the USA. In it one can see that he was convinced that Communism in Czechoslovakia was doomed, and he also correctly predicted the breakup of the republic.42 Jozef Stasko lived to see an independent Slovak Republic in 1993. He and his generation had long fought for it. As he later remarked, it was one of the happiest days of his life. However, in the second half of the l 990's, Stasko's health began to deteriorate. He never really recovered from the negative effects of his imprisonment and radiation poisoning. Jozef Stasko died in New York City on September 19, 1999. At his request, his remains were transferred to and interred in Sedliacka Dubova, the village of his birth. Thus ended the almost unbelievable life of a person who, in spite of great difficulties, lived to see the realization of his dream: an independent Slovak Republic. 41 /bid., 19. lbid. , 20. 42 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2010, Vol. 40 Description An account of the resource Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 47 " JOZEF STASKO (1917-1999): HIS LIFE AND ACHIEVEMENTS Miroslav Chromek In the history of Slovakia, many people who opposed the communist regime in the 1940's and 1950's were severely persecuted by the Communists. They were arrested, tortured, and sent to the uranium mines. The communist authorities, meanwhile, did everything in their power to erase any mention of them in official histories of the period. Now that Slovakia is no longer ruled by the Communists, it is incumbent upon historians to reveal the story of the many thousands who suffered under communist oppression. One of these individuals was Dr. Jozef Stasko. Jozef Stasko was born of Slovak peasants in the village of Sedliacka Dubova, Orava, county, on August 1, 1917. His father Peter, who was born in 1884, emigrated to the United States before the Great War in search of work. There he suffered an industrial accident from which he ultimately died on February 27, 1923. Jozef was only six years old and his sister Anna eight when their father died. Thus, Jozefs mother Johana, who had been born in 1887, had to raise her children on her own . 1 Jozef and his sister had to help their mother work the fields , as well as to attend school. In spite of her hard life, Jozef s mother persevered and gave her children all her love, for which Jozef was grateful. After he had made his way to the United States, he wrote a long article in praise of his mother, and all mothers who cared for their children.2 After completing the local Catholic grade school, the bright young Jozef went on to high school , but ran into difficulties. At the Trstena ' gymnasium,' where he first enrolled, he was repelled by the liberal and pro-Czechoslovak attitude of his Czech teachers and decided to switch to the more Catholic-oriented 'gymnasium' m Dolny Kubin. He later reminisced about these times as follows: 1 Stefan Baranovic, "Zivot a di elo PhDr. Jozefa Stasku," in Peter Maruniak, ed ., Dr. Jozef Stasko osemdesiatrocny (Martin: Mati ca slovenska, 1998), 9. 2 JozefStasko, " Moja matka," Ave Maria, 49 (No. 4, 1965), 106. 48 SLOVAKIA At 'gymnasium 'I was reminded that I belonged to an insignificant peasant people. My mother often told me how she had to hide Slovak newspapers from Magyar authorities. After the Great War, in speaking with Slovak patriots who had been jailed by the Magyars, I felt a deep pain in my heart for the past and continued suffering of our nation. 3 After graduating from 'gymansium' in 1935 Stasko continued his studies at Comenius University in Bratislava. In the first two years he studied French and Latin, and then switched to law. At Comenius he encountered the same attitudes as at Trstena-namely Czech professors trying to create a "Czechoslovak" language: "The University was run by Czechs, the Slovak language was degraded. Professor Vazny was trying to change Slovak into Czechoslovak and Professor Chaloupecky taught us Slovak history as if Slovaks were a mere branch of the Czech nation, and that was how were supposed to comport ourselves ."4 While at university, Stasko began to display his organizational and leadership abilities. He joined the student organizations Slavia Catholica, Detvan and Mayzes. Indeed, he was elected secretary of the latter. He lived in the student Catholic dormitory Svoradov, which was a hotbed for future political, scientific and cultural leaders.5 Since he was awarded a scholarship to continue his studies at the Sorbonne, Stasko left for Paris in February of 1939, and was caught in a maelstrom. The Slovak Diet had proclaimed independence on March 14, 1939, but Stasko disagreed with this proclamation. Therefore, he immediately contacted Dr. Stefan Osusky, the former Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, and offered him his services. However, in their discussions, Stasko found Osusky to be too proCzechoslovak, and too supportive of the philosophy of the late president T.G. Masaryk. 6 3 Baranovic, op.cit., 9. /bid. , I 0. 5 Jan Okal , "Dr. Jozef Stasko 65-rocny," Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov, 12, 2:10. 53, 1982), 22. . Stasko wrote about his discussions with Osusky in " Stefan Osusky's Attempts to Establi sh Contacts with Slovakia in 1939: A Personal Memoir," Slo vakia, 32, nos. 4 SLOVAKIA 49 Meanwhile, Stasko sought to help Slovak workers in France. Once Slovakia declared independence, Slovaks in France were regarded with suspicion as "Germanophiles. " Therefore, French employers fired many of them. In his fluent French, Stasko either defended these workers in front of their former employers or helped them to find other jobs.7 By the end of April Stasko returned to Slovakia by train. He surmised that war would soon break out and he wanted to size up the situation at home. He was particularly concerned about the 35,000 Slovak workers in Belgium and France, who might be drafted if a war broke out. He also sought to involve the government of Slovakia in helping them to retain their jobs in those uncertain times. He also wished to report to Osusky about the situation of Slovaks in southern Slovakia, which had been occupied by Hungary the previous November. 8 While in Slovakia Stasko met with Dr. Gejza Medricky, the Minister of Economics of the Slovak Republic and with General Rudolf Viest, a member of the Slovak General Staff. Stasko managed to convince Medricky not to cancel the wage agreement between France and Slovakia, which allowed Slovak workers to receive parcels without having to pay any duty on them. 9 In his meeting with General Viest, he tried to persuade the latter to send as many Slovak officers to France as possible, ostensibly to further their educations, but really to be drafted into the French army, where they could then form the nucleus of a Czecho-Slovak army when the war broke out. 10 Viest politely listened but promised nothing. If we are to believe a letter that Stasko wrote to Dr. Jozef Mikus in 1980, Stasko also met with President Jozef Tiso in Banovce nad Bebravou, while the latter was on vacation. Stasko claimed that, in a friendly atmosphere, they discussed various problems that confron58-59 ( 198 5- I 986), 9-33. See also "Zapisky Jozefa Staska," Martin , Sl ovenska narodn a knizn ica, Arch iv literatury a um eni a, (hereafter SN K-ALU) p. 15. 7 Mini sterstvo vnutra Slovenskej republi ke , Statny archiv v Bra ti slave (hereafter MVS R- SA B), Fond okresneho L.:u doveho sudu- Jozef Stasko: Vypoved Jozefa Staska na L.: ud ovom sude z 26.4. 1946, p. 3. 8 /bid 9 "Zapisky Jozefa Staska," op.cit., p. 18. 1 °Fra ntisek Vnuk , "S lovenske studentske spolky v medzivojnovo m obdobi ," in Jozef Stasko, Tvorcovia noveho Slovenska (Ca mbri dge , ON : Fri ends of Good Books, 1982) , 174. 50 SLOVAKIA ted the Slovak State. Stasko further claimed that he upbraided Tiso for Slovakia's pro-Nazi political orientation and for naively looking upon Germany as a trusted protector of the new republic. From his alleged conversation with Tiso, it is clear that Stasko did not expect 11 Nazi Germany to last very long. At the beginning of June Jozef Stasko returned to France, where he experienced the first months of the Second World War. As soon as the war broke out, he volunteered to serve in the Czechoslovak army-in-exile, which Stefan Osusky had organized in France. Stasko began his service on October 17, 1939 in camp Agda, where, incidentally, the Slovak communist politician Vladimir Clementis was also stationed. However, the latter stayed only a few months, and then moved to London, where he would join in the Czechoslovak 12 liberation movement led by ex-president Edvard Benes. Stasko, meanwhile, looked for ways and means to remain in France, and, barring that, in some other western country. As an officer-in-training, Stasko was assigned an apartment on the shores of the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Sivak, a Roman Catholic chaplain, helped him to secure this lodging. 13 On May I 0, 1940, Stasko was assigned to the I st Platoon of the 2nd Czechoslovak Regiment as a 14 sergeant, and as such, in June was sent to the front on the Marne. After France ' s defeat by the Germans, his commanding officer, First Lieutenant Dolejsek, ordered him to retreat with his platoon, and to blow up any and all stores of supplies and ammunition, which Stasko did, and for which he was recommended for a commendation . 15 Stasko then sought to remain in France, and even persuaded a French family to help him to obtain the necessary papers in order to be properly demobilized. He then hoped to make his way to the United States and asked his Orava friend and former fellow-resident at the Svoradov, Jozef Mikus, who was then charge d' affaires in Madrid, to 11 Uni versity of Ottawa, Archives and Special Collections, Slovak Arc hi ves, Jozef Mikus Fo nds, box 205, fasc . 205-7, letter of Jozef Stasko to Jozef Mikus, August 16, 1980. 12 MVSR-SAB , Yypoved Jozefa Staska, op.ci t. , p. 3, and Jozef Mikus, " Dr. Jozef Stasko sedemdesiatnik ," in Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu S/o vako v, 16 (No.77 , 1987), 18. 13 SNK-ALU, Jozef Stasko, " Yo vazeni na majaku Fort de Brescau." 14 Hitl er attacked western Europe on May I 0, 1940. 15 MVSR-SAB , Vypoved Jozefa Staska, p. 5 SLOVAKIA 51 help him. The latter replied that it was Stasko's duty to return to Slovakia. 16 Meanwhile, Stasko refused to obey what he considered to be an impossible order, and found himself jailed by the French. Stasko's regiment was stationed in a Belgian camp that was shared by soldiers from Senegal. These got roaring drunk and armed themselves and began to loot the local town. French authorities ordered Stasko to quell this rebellion but Stasko knew that the Senegalese outnumbered his forces and refused. As a result, he and his soldiers found themselves jailed, along with the Senegalese, first in Belgium and from the end of August until the middle of November in the French prison Fort de Brescau, and after that in the prison of the Chasseurs Alpins in the port city of Set. While the prison regimen was not too onerous, living conditions were terrible, especially in Belgium, because the blankets were full of bed-bugs and the prison was overrun with rats, which Stasko and the Senegalese sought to kill during the night. 17 Jozef Stasko was finally rescued by Slovak authorities, although his subsequent life in Slovakia remained difficult. Dr. Eduard Malis, of the Slovak Repatriation Commission in France, arranged for Stasko to be released and he returned to Slovakia on March 22, 1941. 18 Stasko was immediately interrogated by the police for having allegedly revealed military secrets to the enemy, but released for lack of evidence. He then returned to Orava and helped his mother with her farm work, all the while being watched by the Gestapo. 19 Since he had no prospects in Orava, he eventually moved to Bratislava and found employment as the secretary of the Association of Industry, Trade and Finance. For three years he studied and published the history of trade and commerce in Slovakia for the magazine Zivnost'. He also planned to write a history of Slovak craft guilds. 20 During the Slovak Republic, Stasko did not engage in politics, nor did he join the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party. He did attend a lecture by Dr. Imrich Karvas, the Governor of the Slovak 16 "Zapi sky Jozefa Staska," op.cit., p. 33. Stasko , " Vo vaze ni .. .," op. cit. , 1-11 18 MVSR-SA B, Vypoved Jozefa Staska, op.cit ., p. 8 19 Author interview with lmrich Kruzliak in Bratislava, April 23, 2008. 20 Milan Beres, " Laudac ia na Dr. Jozefa Stas ku pri ude l'ovanf Ceny M . R. Stefanika ," in Peter Maruni ak, ed. , Dr. Jozef Stasko osemdesiatrocny (Martin : Matica slove nska) , 70. 17 52 SLOVAKIA National Bank, and he did take advantage of a healing session at a Slovak spa, courtesy of his friend Jozef Mikula, who was a member of the People's Party.21 Conversely, Stasko did not participate in the Slovak National Uprising of August, 1944, which he considered illprepared and premature.22 Meanwhile, at the end of the war, some Russian soldiers broke into his bachelor apartment, ransacked it and beat him up when he tried to stop them. For all these reasons, a certain Major Peter Kozurka had him arrested on December 8, 1945 for his alleged "collaboration" activities. Due to a lack of evidence against him, Stasko was released just before Christmas, 1945. 23 After these bitter experiences, Stasko became a steadfast opponent of Communism, which he saw slowly engulfing his homeland. He joined the newly-established Democratic Party, worked tirelessly to unite the Lutherans and Catholics in it, and saw it emerge victorious in the 1946 elections. Initially, four political parties fielded candidates in the 1946 elections-the Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Slovakia, the Party of Freedom and the Party of the Workers. Only the Democrats and the Communists had a chance of winning. Both campaigned against each other. The Communists, largely through their mouthpiece Pravda, tried to divide the Catholic and Lutheran supporters of the Democratic Party. They even supported the creation of a Christian Democratic Party, to represent the Catholics. Initially, Stasko supported this movement, but later abandoned it. When he campaigned on behalf of the Democratic Party, for instance in Rufomberok, the Communists had him arrested while he was making a speech! Nevertheless, in the May 26, 1946 elections, 92.3% of the Orava electorate supported Stasko to the Czechoslovak Parliament for the Democratic Party.24 However, Stasko's victory lasted only until the fall of 1947. That summer he had guided a visiting American Slovak and her daughter across the country, and they both noticed that the secret police had been following them. In September the police arrested him again, on trumped-up charges, in spite of his parliamentary immunity. After 21 MVSR-SAB , Fond od resneho l'udoveho sudu- Jozef Stasko, Cs 414/46: Zapisnica o vysluchu svedka Jozefa Staska z 18. 2. 1947 22 Jnterview with lmrich K.ruzliak, op.cit. 23 Jozef Stasko, "Vazenska psychoterapia," Slovenske poh/'ady, no.3 , 1994, p. 124. 24 "Jozefa Staska prepustili 5. Novembra 1953 ," in "Zapisky Jozefa Staska- Na galejac h v Jachymove," SNK-ALU , Martin, p. 16. SLOVAKIA 53 his release he was warned to flee the country but refused. Therefore, he was arrested again on November 4, 1947, and this time was sentenced to six years in jail. Once again, the Democratic Party did nothing to free him and he ended up in the notorious Leopoldov prison. Here he found himself in the company of former leaders of the Slovak Republic, such as Alexander Mach and Stefan Tiso, and Jan Kempny and later certain leaders of the Democratic Party, such as , Ursmy. , 25 Jan In spite of their difficult situation, Stasko and his fellow-prisoners decided to draft and sign a "Manifest" in which they protested their imprisonment and the political situation in Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, it was signed on March 14, 1951 (the 12 th anniversary of the Slovak Diet' s declaration of independence), by politicians from completely different ideologycal backgrounds . They were: Dr. Andrej Buza, Jan Kempny, Alexander Mach, Jozef Stasko Dr. Stefan Tiso and Jan Ursiny. Incredibly enough, it proclaimed the following: 1-The Slovak nation is founded upon its Christian heritage and its application in all spheres of social life. 2-In order to safeguard its Christian heritage, the Slovak nation must be free. It will be free only when it is independent and selfgovernmg. 3-The experience of our nation has led us to proclaim its right to home-rule, the form of which will be decided by the Slovak nation . One possible form is statehood. 4-W e recognize the right of humans and citizens to a democratic social and political system . We support open and friendly relations with the Czech nation and with our Magyar and Polish neighbors. 5-We are opposed to oppression, whether of individuals or of societies, in the name of ideological totalitarianism. We shall defend, even unto death, the right to our God-given freedom. 26 This "Manifest" is significant, because, after 1945 the Democratic Party had proposed a common state with the Czechs, albeit with Slovak home-rule. Now both the jailed proponents and former opponents of Slovak independence were united in their demands for Slovak independence. 25 26 Ibid. , 124-6. /bid. , 124. 54 SLOVAKIA After three years in Leopoldov prison, Stasko was transferred to the Jachymov uranium mines in the Czech Lands . Here Stasko 's health broke down , due to the ill-effects of radiation poisoning, which was evident in the development of serious skin lesions on his hands . Even though he was released after he had served a total of six 27 years in prison, he never recovered his health. After his release from jail in 1953 , Stasko returned to his native Orava, to try to start over. Initially he found work studying and cataloging the extensive correspondence of the writer-priest Ignac Grebac-Orlov at the latter's parish in Velicna. Here Stasko discovered a rich correspondence with Hviezdoslav, Jege, Bulla and Hlinka, and other important writers or politicians. He notified the Slovak Academy of Sciences of his discovery and asked if it would publish his findings. However, because of his former prison sentence, the SA V turned him down. Stasko then found employment as a manual laborer at a sawmill in Oravsky Podzamok, but his injured hands made it impossible for him to continue. After he lost this job, he was hired as a clerk at the Research Institute for the Mechanization of Forestry in the same village, largely because he was fluent in French . 28 Meanwhile, Stasko visited Bratislava on several occasions. There he met with Dr. Ambrus, who worked for Slovak Radio. He offered Stasko part-time employment as a co-producer of the serial "Know Your Land." For this program Stasko visited many villages in his native Orava, and interviewed the inhabitants. In this way he became an expert on Slovak folk culture. However, Stasko lost his job as a clerk in Oravsky Podzamok and then had to look for work in Zilina. Here he had great difficulty finding a place to board. Altogether he changed locations ten times. Finally, he found work repairing refrigerators. While working on a refrigerator at the Hotel Fatra in the nearby spa town of Rajecke Teplice, he was poisoned by leaking Methylchloride. As a result, he became a patient in the spa for about a month. While there he had the opportunity to meet with his old friends Jan Kempny and Jan Spisiak, the former ambassador to Hungary. Since his physician ordered Stasko to find less dangerous work, he then was employed in a 27 "Jozefa Staska prepustili 5. nove mb ra 1953 ," in "Zapisky Jozefa Staska- Na ¥,a lejach v Jachymove," SNK-ALU, Martin , p.21 . 8 - Ibid., p. 18. SLOVAKIA 55 local plywood factory. The Communists saw to it that he could never find work suitable to his education.29 After six years of hard manual labor, with no prospect of the communist regime ending, Stasko decided to flee to the West. He did so with the collaboration of a former prisoner in the Jachymov mines, the electrical engineer Jozef Merko. Even though Merko lived in Moravia and Stasko in Slovakia, they started to meet on the Slovak-Moravian border, near the village of Makov, to plan their escape. They settled on the vi llage of Hulin, on the AustrianMoravian border, because it met all of their criteria-close to the border, with a main road, some friendly contacts, plus a route avoiding the mines, and with barbed-wire that could be penetrated by a truck. The truck would be "borrowed" by Merko from the television-repair factory where he worked. Merko would take with him his wife and children and Stasko his fiancee Ema Schmeringaiova. However, Stasko and Merko would not reveal to them their plans until the last moment. Stasko arrived in Hulin on August 8, 1961. He and Merko then added protective armor to the truck, to shield it from the 5,000-volt electrical wire which they would have to penetrate. Stasko described the actual escape in minute detail: We cut through the first barbed wire as if through a thread. The second wire was higher and more dangerous. We hit an obstruction and had to back up. That took about ten seconds. When we hit the thicker wire, which was electrified, we saw and heard an explosion. One section of the severed wire hit the roof of the truck and burned through it. The third wire was easily broken, but by then we noticed that the wires had coiled themselves around our tires and we were pulling the entire fence behind us. Once we had reached the Austrian side, we stepped on the gas and into freedom! 30 The refugees crossed to the Austrian side on August 15, at 3 :40 a.m. After the Austrian border guards had checked their papers and story, they allowed the truck to proceed. When they arrived in 29 30 !bid., p. 20 /bid. , p.82 56 SLOVAKIA Vienna, astounded journalists dubbed their Tatra truck as the "tank of freedom." Austrian authorities returned it to Czechoslovakia. The refugees were then taken to the refugee camp called Kagran, where they had to wait for one month in order to acquire Austrian visas. Merko was then hired as a technician by the local television station and Stasko found work in a winery.31 Now that Stasko was free , he breathed a sigh of relief, but still had medical problems. As he put it, "The medicine of freedom relaxed my nerves. At home I had really suffered from headaches, body pain, and depression."32 However, his body still suffered from radiation poisoning. Therefore, he decided to visit his good friend Irnrich Kruzliak, who worked at Radio Free Europe in Munich . The latter immediately sent him to his doctor for a physical. When the physician inspected Stasko's hands, which had millimeter-deep cracks in them, he predicted that Stasko would survive for a maximum of two years.33 He recommended that he go to Rome, to the headquarters of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, which specialized in the disease that afflicted him. Here Stasko was, indeed, helped by taking new medicines. His health improved so much that he was then able to travel all over Europe, particularly to London and Paris, where he met various Slovaks and could guage their political activities. He was interviewed on French television about his escape from Czechoslovakia, and by the French press as well. On February 1, 1962, Dominique Aucleres published a long interview with him in Le Figaro , France 's largest-circulation newspaper. 34 Meanwhile, when Stasko visited with Kruzliak in Munich, he expressed interest in also working for Radio Free Europe, but was disappointed. Some of his former Lutheran colleagues in the Democratic Party, who had the final say as to who was hired, turned Stasko down . Therefore, a dejected Stasko decided to apply for a visa to the United States and was successful. He arrived with his fiancee in New York in May of 1962.35 31 !bid. , p.83 /bid. , p.84. 33 Author interview with Imrich Kruzliak, April 23 , 2008 34 Jozef Mikus, " Dr. Jozef Stasko sedemdesiatnik," in Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu S/ovakov, l 6 (No.77, 1987), p.1 8. 35 Jnterview with Imrich Kruzliak, op.cit. 32 SLOVAKIA 57 In New York Stasko and his wife (they were married in 1962) flourished . He intensively studied the English language, earned a Master of Library Science degree at Columbia University, and found employment as a librarian at the New York Public Library. His wife Ema, who even in Slovakia had nursed him back to health as best as she could, also enrolled at Columbia University, where she earned a BSc. in chemistry. Meanwhile, on October 27, 1963, they were blessed with a son, Jozef Jr. With the help of their friends, the Stasko family was able to purchase a condominium apartment on Park Terrace in New York City, where he lived for the rest of his life. 36 Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Jozef Stasko joined the Slovak-American community and contributed to its cultural life. He wrote articles for the monthly Ave Maria, Verbum, Horizon!. and especially for the Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov. In 1973-74 he also taught courses on immigration and American Slovaks as an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the City College in New York.37 One of Stasko ' s dreams was to establish a Library and Archives dedicated to documenting the history and culture of American Slovaks. He hoped that it would be located in Danville, Pennsylvania, at the Jankola Library, which was already in existence, and which was organized by the Sisters of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. This Slovak congregation had been founded by the Rev. Matus Jankola in 1909 and, since all the sisters were fluent in Slovak, he felt that they would be the ideal recipients of such an archive.38 Jozef Stasko also took an active role in the founding of the Slovak World Congress in 1970. In his 1969 presentation to a meeting of the Organizing Committee of the SWC in Linden, New Jersey, Stasko outlined his conception of the role of the Slovak World Congress among Slovaks in the USA and Canada. He rejected the "Czechoslovakism" that still existed in some quarters and, instead, championed the cause of Slovak independence. On the other 36 /bid., and Jozef Stasko to Frantisek Sub fk, ovember 3, 1963 , Uni versity of Ottawa, Arc hi ves and Spec ial Coll ecti ons, Jozef Stasko Fonds, Box 205, Fasc . 20626. 37 Baranov ic, op. cit., 13. 38 Jozef Stasko to Jozef Papi n, September 8, I 972 and Slovak Hi story Assoc iation of Ameri ca n Sisters of Saints Cyril and Methodius, Uni versity of Ottawa, Slovak Archi ves, Archi ves and Spec ial Collectio ns, Fond Jozef Stasko, Box 205 , fasc. 20515 and fasc . 2 12. 58 SLOVAKIA hand, he naively called on the SKS to seek the support of all Slovak factions in the USA, including Catholics and Lutherans and supporters of the Slovak State and its opponents.39 The Slovak World Congress was founded in reaction to the "normalization" of Czechoslovakia after the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968. Stasko put it this way: "We had to recognize that the Slovak nation at home was not free to speak its mind. Therefore, we had to do it. And we had to truly reflect what it wanted and needed." The main goal of the SKS, according to Stasko, was twofold: "to unite all Slovak factions, which by themselves were weak and ineffective, and to demand the right of the Slovak nation to self-govemment."40 Stasko then drafted what he considered to be the main role of the Slovak World Congress in the following points: 1- The leadership of the Slovak World Congress should gather information about Slovak achievements in the arts and sciences and make them available for all to see, so that Slovak demands for homerule would seem reasonable. 2- The Slovak World Congress should publish books about Slovak history and literature in foreign languages and donate them to university libraries. 3- The Slovak World Congress should seek to revise information about the Slovaks in foreign publications. To this end, it should support research and translation into foreign-languages books about the Slovak past and present. 4- The Slovak World Congress must seek to persuade Slovaks abroad to publish quality books for practical purposes. It should seek out qualified Slovaks for this purpose. It must publish in English, French and German. It should publish a periodical geared towards the general public. Slovaks abroad lack a good Slovak-English dictionary, and that makes Americans dependent upon Slovak-speakers for translations. 5- The Slovak World Congress should establish a Slovak library containing information in English about Slovakia. The SKS should consider purchasing a building in New York City for this purpose. 39 Jozef Stasko, "Preco som za SKS?" Bulletin Svetoveho kongresu Slovakov, No. 7, 1972, p. 18. 40 Ibid. , 17. SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks also lack restaurants and delicatessens, where one could purchase Slovak products. 6- The Slovak World Congress should also strive to overcome the divisions among Slovaks between Catholics, Lutherans and Jews. 41 Jozef Stasko also wrote a letter in 1980 to former members of the Democratic Party living in the USA. In it one can see that he was convinced that Communism in Czechoslovakia was doomed, and he also correctly predicted the breakup of the republic.42 Jozef Stasko lived to see an independent Slovak Republic in 1993. He and his generation had long fought for it. As he later remarked, it was one of the happiest days of his life. However, in the second half of the l 990's, Stasko's health began to deteriorate. He never really recovered from the negative effects of his imprisonment and radiation poisoning. Jozef Stasko died in New York City on September 19, 1999. At his request, his remains were transferred to and interred in Sedliacka Dubova, the village of his birth. Thus ended the almost unbelievable life of a person who, in spite of great difficulties, lived to see the realization of his dream: an independent Slovak Republic. 41 /bid., 19. lbid. , 20. 42  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Jozef Staško (1917-1999): His Life and Achievements Description An account of the resource Miroslav Chromek Slovakia, Vol. 40 (No. 74-75), 2010 pp. 47-59 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Chromek, Miroslav Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010 name