1 50 21 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8ea97d379c7675dd02bb8f78441bccaf.pdf f511cd75d1441c0293b703d38aeff9b9 PDF Text Text Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized May 26, 1907, Cleveland, Ohio) Honorary President:; John Janosik Msqr. F. J. Dubosh, P.A. 650 Braddock Ave. Monessen, Pa. 12608 Madison Avenue Lakewood 7, hio Stephen Dr. Peter P. H letko Dubiel 12210 Detroit Avenue Lakewood, Ohio Batavia Rd., Box 48 Warrensville, Ill. Joseph Steller P:·nsldent 2879 N. 44th St. Milwaukee 10, Wis. Ph i lip A. Hrobak P. 0. Box 150 ~iddletown, Pa. ADVISORY COUNCIL Vice-Presidents Michael J. Vargovic Joseph Bendik P. 0. Box 230 Uniontown, Pa. National President First Catholic Slovak Union Jul i a Krajcovic Helen Kocan 1648 W. 18th Street Chicago 8, Ill. National President First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary John Horecky Paul 2264 Walton Ave. New York 53, N. Y. Secretary-Treasurer Stephen J. Tkach Milan V. Blazek 4922 S. Leclaire Avenue Chic<tgo 38, Ill. :--ational President Pa. Catholic Slovak Union EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Anna Sotak National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Paul P. Jamriska 536 Marie Ave. Pittsburgh 2, Pa. Paul C. Kazimer Fallat National Preslden~ Slovak Catholic Sokol John Rozboril National President Slovak Catholic Cadet Union 1122 Sylvan Ave. Homestead, Pa. SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS (Affiliated with the Slovak League of America) JEDNOTA .\I idriletown, Pa. BRATSTVO SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio SLOVENSKE NOVINV ZORNICKA Cleveland, Ohio Chicago, Ill. KATOLiCKV SOKOL SVORNOST OSADN E H LASV Pl\.Ssalc, N. J. Whitaker, Pa. Chicago, Ill. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA: The old castle of Banska Stiavnica (13-16th Cent.) � Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized May 26, 1907, Cleveland, Ohio) Honorary President:; John Janosik Msqr. F. J. Dubosh, P.A. 650 Braddock Ave. Monessen, Pa. 12608 Madison Avenue Lakewood 7, hio Stephen Dr. Peter P. H letko Dubiel 12210 Detroit Avenue Lakewood, Ohio Batavia Rd., Box 48 Warrensville, Ill. Joseph Steller P:·nsldent 2879 N. 44th St. Milwaukee 10, Wis. Ph i lip A. Hrobak P. 0. Box 150 ~iddletown, Pa. ADVISORY COUNCIL Vice-Presidents Michael J. Vargovic Joseph Bendik P. 0. Box 230 Uniontown, Pa. National President First Catholic Slovak Union Jul i a Krajcovic Helen Kocan 1648 W. 18th Street Chicago 8, Ill. National President First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary John Horecky Paul 2264 Walton Ave. New York 53, N. Y. Secretary-Treasurer Stephen J. Tkach Milan V. Blazek 4922 S. Leclaire Avenue Chic<tgo 38, Ill. :--ational President Pa. Catholic Slovak Union EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Anna Sotak National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Paul P. Jamriska 536 Marie Ave. Pittsburgh 2, Pa. Paul C. Kazimer Fallat National Preslden~ Slovak Catholic Sokol John Rozboril National President Slovak Catholic Cadet Union 1122 Sylvan Ave. Homestead, Pa. SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS (Affiliated with the Slovak League of America) JEDNOTA .\I idriletown, Pa. BRATSTVO SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio SLOVENSKE NOVINV ZORNICKA Cleveland, Ohio Chicago, Ill. KATOLiCKV SOKOL SVORNOST OSADN E H LASV Pl\.Ssalc, N. J. Whitaker, Pa. Chicago, Ill. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA: The old castle of Banska Stiavnica (13-16th Cent.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized May 26, 1907, Cleveland, Ohio) Honorary President:; John Janosik Msqr. F. J. Dubosh, P.A. 650 Braddock Ave. Monessen, Pa. 12608 Madison Avenue Lakewood 7, hio Stephen Dr. Peter P. H letko Dubiel 12210 Detroit Avenue Lakewood, Ohio Batavia Rd., Box 48 Warrensville, Ill. Joseph Steller P:·nsldent 2879 N. 44th St. Milwaukee 10, Wis. Ph i lip A. Hrobak P. 0. Box 150 ~iddletown, Pa. ADVISORY COUNCIL Vice-Presidents Michael J. Vargovic Joseph Bendik P. 0. Box 230 Uniontown, Pa. National President First Catholic Slovak Union Jul i a Krajcovic Helen Kocan 1648 W. 18th Street Chicago 8, Ill. National President First Catholic Slovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary John Horecky Paul 2264 Walton Ave. New York 53, N. Y. Secretary-Treasurer Stephen J. Tkach Milan V. Blazek 4922 S. Leclaire Avenue Chic<tgo 38, Ill. :--ational President Pa. Catholic Slovak Union EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Anna Sotak National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Catholic Union Paul P. Jamriska 536 Marie Ave. Pittsburgh 2, Pa. Paul C. Kazimer Fallat National Preslden~ Slovak Catholic Sokol John Rozboril National President Slovak Catholic Cadet Union 1122 Sylvan Ave. Homestead, Pa. SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS (Affiliated with the Slovak League of America) JEDNOTA .\I idriletown, Pa. BRATSTVO SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio SLOVENSKE NOVINV ZORNICKA Cleveland, Ohio Chicago, Ill. KATOLiCKV SOKOL SVORNOST OSADN E H LASV Pl\.Ssalc, N. J. Whitaker, Pa. Chicago, Ill. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Middletown, Pa. SLOVAKIA: The old castle of Banska Stiavnica (13-16th Cent.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ea7114ef5ca7fee82566ca0db869e3bb.pdf 9b1864922378b5efa3e619289ee3e3ac PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 75 In politics it seldom pays to to sit on two chairs. OsuS'ky began his career when the Slovak League sent him to Europe to Masaryk to work for the establishment of Czecho-,Slovakia and to see to it that Slovakia was granted autonomy. Osusky found it convenient and profitable to forget the League and the rights of his Slovak people to freedom, freedom from a1ien domination. He preferred to serve Masaryk and his senseless concept of "Czechoslovakism." At one time it was said that Osusky claimed "credit" for the fact that the Pittsburgh Pact was not even mentioned dunng the Paris Peace Conference negotiations. Osusky served as a Prague ambassador for over twenty years. He did a commendable job of it. Today, perhaps as he writes his memoirs in Washington, the Czechs don't want him - and the Slovaks, his own people, won't ·have him. • • • ibe History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK 1Continu ed) Slovakia played an important role in the relations of the kingdom which developed between Hungary and Poland during the reign of the Anjous. Louis the Great wanted to ,b ecome Polish king after the death of Casimir the Great, the last male descendant of the Piastov Clan. The agreements by which this union of Poland and Hungary was to be realized, were concluded in Slovak cities, especially in ,Kosice which was on the Cracow-Budin highway. It was at Kosice, after several meetings, that it was decided to have t!he daughter of Louis the Great, succeed him to the cP olish throne after his death. The reign of the Anjous brought Slovakia a notable contribution especially in the field of culture. G001HIC ClJiL'NJRE IN SLOVAKIA Medieval culture is a Christian culture. The Church concerned itself not only with the advancement of Christian faith and morals among the uncivilized nations of Europe, �76 SLOVAKIA but also that of the cultural life. Christianity changed and ennobled the character of the medieval man who learned to realize that his life's goal was the salvation of his immortal soul. The religious spirit of the medieval person knew how to suffer the difficulties and miseries of this life patiently, because he understood that it was in this valley of tears that he prepared for eternal life. The Christian concept of life elevated the human spirit to God and gave medieval culture a special character. Christian culture of the Middle Ages attained its full development in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries and found beautiful expression in the creative arts in the Gothic style of architecture. In the beginning the Church was the only organization which fostered culture, the sciences and the arts, educated youth in its ,p arish, capitulary and monastery schools, and also collected rich treasures of artistic creations in its churches. Later, especially from the thirteneth century on, knights became a significant factor in the cultural life of Europe. They endeavored to excell not only in military accomplishments, but also in Christian virtues. From the fourteenth century the cities became important centers of progress, both cultural and spiritual. Slovakia, because of her geogrruphical position, came under the strong influence of the cultural movements, which swept across Central Europe from the second half of the thirteenth century. In Slovakia, Gothic culture reached a high degree of perfection and beauty in 1:!he fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and its final offshoots extend to the sixteenth century. Artistic works, which have been preserved from those times in Slovakia, are proof that cultural life there developed somewhat belatedly, but in its maturity did not remain behind the cultural devel'o pment of Central Europe. As everywhere in Europe, so in Slovakia, the first and only centers of culture were the monasteries and other ecclesiastical institutions. Supported generously by the royalty and the nobility, they performed not only a religious, but also a highly worthy cultural mission. �SLOVAKIA 77 Besides the old abbeys of the Benedictine Order, which originated in Slovaki'a before the inva:sion of the Turks, a large number of monasteries and churches of the Order of St. Francis a:nd of the Preachers of St. Dominic were founded in the cities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Franciscans came from Italy and the Dominicans from Spain. The Premonstratensi'ans and Cistercians originated in France and founded their first monasteries in Slovakia outside the cities. Not only beautiful churches, but also artshops, trade shops and libraries sprang up near all these institutions. To some of these monasteries and chapters the king granted the right of issuing, transcribing and clarifying documents. Such monasteries were called "trustworthy" places. In Slovakia the following enjoyed· that privilege: the Chapters in Bratislava, Nitra and Spis; the Benedictine abbey of St. Benedict near the Hron, the Premonstratensian monastery in Klastor-pod-Znievom and in Jasov. Archives originated in these abbeys in which records, various literary works and documents were deposited. When the Anjous came to the throne in Hungary, and the Luxemburgs to the throne in Bohemia, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, higher western European culture came to Central Europe, which in a twofold way penetrated into the territory of Slovakia. In those times Knighthood developed in Central Europe which with its higher culture and refined morals enlightened and edified the masses of the people. Slovak nobility soon adopted the manner of life of the knights, even to the extent of replacing wooden palisades and fortresses with strong stone citadels with moats, towers and bastions. These castles of the knights, often built on high a:nd impregnable rocks, were not only strongholds, but also witnesses of the active life of the knights. Among the owners of these castles were many Slova:k knights, as it attested to by Slovak names of many citadels Strecno, Lietava, Likava, Vrsatec, Lednica, Hrusov, Hricov, Blatnica, Krasna Horka, etc. Later, rich mining a:nd commercial towns became the most significant centers of culture. The inhabitants of the cities had more of a mind for cultural interests than the �78 SLOVAKIA agricultural inhabitants of the villages. This undoubtedly was due to the influence of their occupation and their economic condition. The German settlers of Slovak cities maintained contacts with their fatherland and its higher culture. This "city" culture made itself manifest not only in the city itself, in the architecture of urban homes and public buildings, but also in the life of the people in general. The city dwellers, as merchants and artisans, came into contact with near and distant lands, and adopted the more progressive ways of living. In the cities there were schools (in Bratislava and in Spisska Kapitula already in the thirteenth century), and foreign artisans and artists came to the cities to build and decorate civic structures, especially the parish churches. At fuat time several universities were set up in Central Europe after the pattern of the University of Paris. These universities (Prague, 1348; Cracow, 1364; Vienna, 1365) were also attended by students from Slovakia, because the first Hungarian university founded ·b y Louis the Great in Patikostoly in 1367, had closed its doors. Some of them won high academic honors and became professors at these universities. In this way Slovakia was in contact with higher European culture, the centers of which were the universities. But most striking is the participation of Slovakia in the contemporary cultural trends in the field of creative art. Gothic art, as it developed in France, Germany and Italy, ex,pressed the loftiness of the Christian spirit which .frees itself from the earth and soars into the heights. This idea received expression especially in the building of Gothic churches, which with their height, ease and gracefulness rose high above the surroundings and elevated the thoughts of the believing man to God. This style was adopted in Slovakia already in the middle of the thirteenth century and, in the church structures, blended with the final echoes of the Romanesque style. An example of early Gothic architecture has been preserved in Slovakia in the church of the former prepositure of Turiec, in Klastor-pod-Z nievom (The Monastery-be neathZniev), built about 1260. The Franciscan church in Brati- �SLOVAKIA 79 slava and the Dominican church in Kosice were built at the end of the thirteenth century. Many imposing Gothic churches were erected in the fourteenth century in the thriving cities of Slovakia, among them the parish churches in Bratislava, Levoca, Trnava, Bardejov, Presov, and, especially, St. Elizabeth's Cathedral in Kosice. Beautiful Gothic temples of worsmp were also con,rtructed in the Spis region and the mining cities of Central Slovakia. The Gothic churches of the Slovak monasteries at St. Beiiadik, Mariatal, Oko1icne, and the church of the Red Monastery ( Cerveny Klastor) date from that time. Vienna and Prague strongly influenced the development of Gothic art in western Slovakia, while Bratislava and Cracow influenced its growth in Central and Eastern Slovakia. Besides the great and imposing Gothic churches of the cities, there arose in Slovakia a large number of small village churches, which even in their simplicity and artistic modesty attest that Gothic culture penetrated deeply into medieval Slovakia arrd left many relics there. While the city churches were, as a rule, designed and built by foreign architects, the small village churches were generally designed and built by native masters, who had adopted the structural characteristics of the Gothic .style of architecture. Besides the ecclesiastical edifices of the city, the medieval castles which ornament the peaks of Slovak mountains are also counted among the relics of Gothic art. Hardly anywhere in Central Europe are there as many castles as in Slovakia. Even this circumstance proves that Slovakia participated in the contemporary growth of Europe. Some of these castles because of their location, size, and structure, are outstanding souvenirs of Gothic architecture. The majority of these castles already has succumbed to the ha:rmful influence of time, but even in the ruins some Gothic gates, windows, high vaults and arches have been preserved in Bratislava, Zvolen, Vigfas, Strecno, Trencin, Orava and Spis. Only a few Gothic homes have been preserved in the cities, because they had to be removed to make way for newer building developments in later centuries. Remnants �80 SLOVAKIA of ancient municipal buildings, city fortifications and Gothic homes are rare; only in Bratislava has, a portion of the ancient City Hall been preserved, while Levoca still has a part of its old city wall and a part of a Gothic home. Several examples of stone decorations have also been preserved; especially the reliefs on the portals of the church in Bratislava, Banska Bystrica, Spisska Nova Ves and Kosice. Woodcarving reached a high degree of perfection in Slovakia and many wooden statues of the Madonna, St. Barbara and St. Catherine have been preserved in Spis and :in the mining towns. The wing altars of the churches of Spis, Saris and other eastern cities, are among the most valuable memorials of Gothic art in Slova!kia. Some wing altars have also been preserved in Banska Bystrica, Stiavnica and other parts of Slovakia. An outstanding woodcarver of that time was Master Paul of Levoca, who made the beautiful altar of the Nativity in Bardejov and the main altar in St. Jacob's church in Levoca. The apprentices of this master artist of Levoca decorated the churches in Spis with remarkable wood-carvings. The development of Gothic painting was subject to several influences. In southern Slovakia, where Gothic frescoes were preserved in Chyzne and Stitnik, the Italian influence predominated. In western Slovakia the Italian style came 'by way of neighboring Austria, while Gothic painting developed in eastern Slovakia under the influence of Silesia. Besides mural frescoes ( the oldest painting in the Spisska Krupitula depicts the coronation of Charles Robert and dates back to 1317), many framed paintings on the wing altars have been preserved. E~amples of high artistic workmanship, especially religious articles ( chalices, monstrances, crucifixes, Mass vestments, etc.) have been preserved in many parish and monastery churches. Many of these relics originated in Slovak workshops which also exported their products. In Spis bells were poured for churches in Poland. This great wealth of mementos from the Gothic period shows clearly that Slovakia lived a rich cultural life from the 13th to the 15th century and did not remain behind neighboring cultured countries in the field of creative arts . � SLOVAKIA 75 In politics it seldom pays to to sit on two chairs. OsuS'ky began his career when the Slovak League sent him to Europe to Masaryk to work for the establishment of Czecho-,Slovakia and to see to it that Slovakia was granted autonomy. Osusky found it convenient and profitable to forget the League and the rights of his Slovak people to freedom, freedom from a1ien domination. He preferred to serve Masaryk and his senseless concept of "Czechoslovakism." At one time it was said that Osusky claimed "credit" for the fact that the Pittsburgh Pact was not even mentioned dunng the Paris Peace Conference negotiations. Osusky served as a Prague ambassador for over twenty years. He did a commendable job of it. Today, perhaps as he writes his memoirs in Washington, the Czechs don't want him - and the Slovaks, his own people, won't ·have him. • • • ibe History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK 1Continu ed) Slovakia played an important role in the relations of the kingdom which developed between Hungary and Poland during the reign of the Anjous. Louis the Great wanted to ,b ecome Polish king after the death of Casimir the Great, the last male descendant of the Piastov Clan. The agreements by which this union of Poland and Hungary was to be realized, were concluded in Slovak cities, especially in ,Kosice which was on the Cracow-Budin highway. It was at Kosice, after several meetings, that it was decided to have t!he daughter of Louis the Great, succeed him to the cP olish throne after his death. The reign of the Anjous brought Slovakia a notable contribution especially in the field of culture. G001HIC ClJiL'NJRE IN SLOVAKIA Medieval culture is a Christian culture. The Church concerned itself not only with the advancement of Christian faith and morals among the uncivilized nations of Europe, �76 SLOVAKIA but also that of the cultural life. Christianity changed and ennobled the character of the medieval man who learned to realize that his life's goal was the salvation of his immortal soul. The religious spirit of the medieval person knew how to suffer the difficulties and miseries of this life patiently, because he understood that it was in this valley of tears that he prepared for eternal life. The Christian concept of life elevated the human spirit to God and gave medieval culture a special character. Christian culture of the Middle Ages attained its full development in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries and found beautiful expression in the creative arts in the Gothic style of architecture. In the beginning the Church was the only organization which fostered culture, the sciences and the arts, educated youth in its ,p arish, capitulary and monastery schools, and also collected rich treasures of artistic creations in its churches. Later, especially from the thirteneth century on, knights became a significant factor in the cultural life of Europe. They endeavored to excell not only in military accomplishments, but also in Christian virtues. From the fourteenth century the cities became important centers of progress, both cultural and spiritual. Slovakia, because of her geogrruphical position, came under the strong influence of the cultural movements, which swept across Central Europe from the second half of the thirteenth century. In Slovakia, Gothic culture reached a high degree of perfection and beauty in 1:!he fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and its final offshoots extend to the sixteenth century. Artistic works, which have been preserved from those times in Slovakia, are proof that cultural life there developed somewhat belatedly, but in its maturity did not remain behind the cultural devel'o pment of Central Europe. As everywhere in Europe, so in Slovakia, the first and only centers of culture were the monasteries and other ecclesiastical institutions. Supported generously by the royalty and the nobility, they performed not only a religious, but also a highly worthy cultural mission. �SLOVAKIA 77 Besides the old abbeys of the Benedictine Order, which originated in Slovaki'a before the inva:sion of the Turks, a large number of monasteries and churches of the Order of St. Francis a:nd of the Preachers of St. Dominic were founded in the cities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Franciscans came from Italy and the Dominicans from Spain. The Premonstratensi'ans and Cistercians originated in France and founded their first monasteries in Slovakia outside the cities. Not only beautiful churches, but also artshops, trade shops and libraries sprang up near all these institutions. To some of these monasteries and chapters the king granted the right of issuing, transcribing and clarifying documents. Such monasteries were called "trustworthy" places. In Slovakia the following enjoyed· that privilege: the Chapters in Bratislava, Nitra and Spis; the Benedictine abbey of St. Benedict near the Hron, the Premonstratensian monastery in Klastor-pod-Znievom and in Jasov. Archives originated in these abbeys in which records, various literary works and documents were deposited. When the Anjous came to the throne in Hungary, and the Luxemburgs to the throne in Bohemia, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, higher western European culture came to Central Europe, which in a twofold way penetrated into the territory of Slovakia. In those times Knighthood developed in Central Europe which with its higher culture and refined morals enlightened and edified the masses of the people. Slovak nobility soon adopted the manner of life of the knights, even to the extent of replacing wooden palisades and fortresses with strong stone citadels with moats, towers and bastions. These castles of the knights, often built on high a:nd impregnable rocks, were not only strongholds, but also witnesses of the active life of the knights. Among the owners of these castles were many Slova:k knights, as it attested to by Slovak names of many citadels Strecno, Lietava, Likava, Vrsatec, Lednica, Hrusov, Hricov, Blatnica, Krasna Horka, etc. Later, rich mining a:nd commercial towns became the most significant centers of culture. The inhabitants of the cities had more of a mind for cultural interests than the �78 SLOVAKIA agricultural inhabitants of the villages. This undoubtedly was due to the influence of their occupation and their economic condition. The German settlers of Slovak cities maintained contacts with their fatherland and its higher culture. This "city" culture made itself manifest not only in the city itself, in the architecture of urban homes and public buildings, but also in the life of the people in general. The city dwellers, as merchants and artisans, came into contact with near and distant lands, and adopted the more progressive ways of living. In the cities there were schools (in Bratislava and in Spisska Kapitula already in the thirteenth century), and foreign artisans and artists came to the cities to build and decorate civic structures, especially the parish churches. At fuat time several universities were set up in Central Europe after the pattern of the University of Paris. These universities (Prague, 1348; Cracow, 1364; Vienna, 1365) were also attended by students from Slovakia, because the first Hungarian university founded ·b y Louis the Great in Patikostoly in 1367, had closed its doors. Some of them won high academic honors and became professors at these universities. In this way Slovakia was in contact with higher European culture, the centers of which were the universities. But most striking is the participation of Slovakia in the contemporary cultural trends in the field of creative art. Gothic art, as it developed in France, Germany and Italy, ex,pressed the loftiness of the Christian spirit which .frees itself from the earth and soars into the heights. This idea received expression especially in the building of Gothic churches, which with their height, ease and gracefulness rose high above the surroundings and elevated the thoughts of the believing man to God. This style was adopted in Slovakia already in the middle of the thirteenth century and, in the church structures, blended with the final echoes of the Romanesque style. An example of early Gothic architecture has been preserved in Slovakia in the church of the former prepositure of Turiec, in Klastor-pod-Z nievom (The Monastery-be neathZniev), built about 1260. The Franciscan church in Brati- �SLOVAKIA 79 slava and the Dominican church in Kosice were built at the end of the thirteenth century. Many imposing Gothic churches were erected in the fourteenth century in the thriving cities of Slovakia, among them the parish churches in Bratislava, Levoca, Trnava, Bardejov, Presov, and, especially, St. Elizabeth's Cathedral in Kosice. Beautiful Gothic temples of worsmp were also con,rtructed in the Spis region and the mining cities of Central Slovakia. The Gothic churches of the Slovak monasteries at St. Beiiadik, Mariatal, Oko1icne, and the church of the Red Monastery ( Cerveny Klastor) date from that time. Vienna and Prague strongly influenced the development of Gothic art in western Slovakia, while Bratislava and Cracow influenced its growth in Central and Eastern Slovakia. Besides the great and imposing Gothic churches of the cities, there arose in Slovakia a large number of small village churches, which even in their simplicity and artistic modesty attest that Gothic culture penetrated deeply into medieval Slovakia arrd left many relics there. While the city churches were, as a rule, designed and built by foreign architects, the small village churches were generally designed and built by native masters, who had adopted the structural characteristics of the Gothic .style of architecture. Besides the ecclesiastical edifices of the city, the medieval castles which ornament the peaks of Slovak mountains are also counted among the relics of Gothic art. Hardly anywhere in Central Europe are there as many castles as in Slovakia. Even this circumstance proves that Slovakia participated in the contemporary growth of Europe. Some of these castles because of their location, size, and structure, are outstanding souvenirs of Gothic architecture. The majority of these castles already has succumbed to the ha:rmful influence of time, but even in the ruins some Gothic gates, windows, high vaults and arches have been preserved in Bratislava, Zvolen, Vigfas, Strecno, Trencin, Orava and Spis. Only a few Gothic homes have been preserved in the cities, because they had to be removed to make way for newer building developments in later centuries. Remnants �80 SLOVAKIA of ancient municipal buildings, city fortifications and Gothic homes are rare; only in Bratislava has, a portion of the ancient City Hall been preserved, while Levoca still has a part of its old city wall and a part of a Gothic home. Several examples of stone decorations have also been preserved; especially the reliefs on the portals of the church in Bratislava, Banska Bystrica, Spisska Nova Ves and Kosice. Woodcarving reached a high degree of perfection in Slovakia and many wooden statues of the Madonna, St. Barbara and St. Catherine have been preserved in Spis and :in the mining towns. The wing altars of the churches of Spis, Saris and other eastern cities, are among the most valuable memorials of Gothic art in Slova!kia. Some wing altars have also been preserved in Banska Bystrica, Stiavnica and other parts of Slovakia. An outstanding woodcarver of that time was Master Paul of Levoca, who made the beautiful altar of the Nativity in Bardejov and the main altar in St. Jacob's church in Levoca. The apprentices of this master artist of Levoca decorated the churches in Spis with remarkable wood-carvings. The development of Gothic painting was subject to several influences. In southern Slovakia, where Gothic frescoes were preserved in Chyzne and Stitnik, the Italian influence predominated. In western Slovakia the Italian style came 'by way of neighboring Austria, while Gothic painting developed in eastern Slovakia under the influence of Silesia. Besides mural frescoes ( the oldest painting in the Spisska Krupitula depicts the coronation of Charles Robert and dates back to 1317), many framed paintings on the wing altars have been preserved. E~amples of high artistic workmanship, especially religious articles ( chalices, monstrances, crucifixes, Mass vestments, etc.) have been preserved in many parish and monastery churches. Many of these relics originated in Slovak workshops which also exported their products. In Spis bells were poured for churches in Poland. This great wealth of mementos from the Gothic period shows clearly that Slovakia lived a rich cultural life from the 13th to the 15th century and did not remain behind neighboring cultured countries in the field of creative arts . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 75 In politics it seldom pays to to sit on two chairs. OsuS'ky began his career when the Slovak League sent him to Europe to Masaryk to work for the establishment of Czecho-,Slovakia and to see to it that Slovakia was granted autonomy. Osusky found it convenient and profitable to forget the League and the rights of his Slovak people to freedom, freedom from a1ien domination. He preferred to serve Masaryk and his senseless concept of "Czechoslovakism." At one time it was said that Osusky claimed "credit" for the fact that the Pittsburgh Pact was not even mentioned dunng the Paris Peace Conference negotiations. Osusky served as a Prague ambassador for over twenty years. He did a commendable job of it. Today, perhaps as he writes his memoirs in Washington, the Czechs don't want him - and the Slovaks, his own people, won't ·have him. • • • ibe History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK 1Continu ed) Slovakia played an important role in the relations of the kingdom which developed between Hungary and Poland during the reign of the Anjous. Louis the Great wanted to ,b ecome Polish king after the death of Casimir the Great, the last male descendant of the Piastov Clan. The agreements by which this union of Poland and Hungary was to be realized, were concluded in Slovak cities, especially in ,Kosice which was on the Cracow-Budin highway. It was at Kosice, after several meetings, that it was decided to have t!he daughter of Louis the Great, succeed him to the cP olish throne after his death. The reign of the Anjous brought Slovakia a notable contribution especially in the field of culture. G001HIC ClJiL'NJRE IN SLOVAKIA Medieval culture is a Christian culture. The Church concerned itself not only with the advancement of Christian faith and morals among the uncivilized nations of Europe, 76 SLOVAKIA but also that of the cultural life. Christianity changed and ennobled the character of the medieval man who learned to realize that his life's goal was the salvation of his immortal soul. The religious spirit of the medieval person knew how to suffer the difficulties and miseries of this life patiently, because he understood that it was in this valley of tears that he prepared for eternal life. The Christian concept of life elevated the human spirit to God and gave medieval culture a special character. Christian culture of the Middle Ages attained its full development in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries and found beautiful expression in the creative arts in the Gothic style of architecture. In the beginning the Church was the only organization which fostered culture, the sciences and the arts, educated youth in its ,p arish, capitulary and monastery schools, and also collected rich treasures of artistic creations in its churches. Later, especially from the thirteneth century on, knights became a significant factor in the cultural life of Europe. They endeavored to excell not only in military accomplishments, but also in Christian virtues. From the fourteenth century the cities became important centers of progress, both cultural and spiritual. Slovakia, because of her geogrruphical position, came under the strong influence of the cultural movements, which swept across Central Europe from the second half of the thirteenth century. In Slovakia, Gothic culture reached a high degree of perfection and beauty in 1:!he fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and its final offshoots extend to the sixteenth century. Artistic works, which have been preserved from those times in Slovakia, are proof that cultural life there developed somewhat belatedly, but in its maturity did not remain behind the cultural devel'o pment of Central Europe. As everywhere in Europe, so in Slovakia, the first and only centers of culture were the monasteries and other ecclesiastical institutions. Supported generously by the royalty and the nobility, they performed not only a religious, but also a highly worthy cultural mission. SLOVAKIA 77 Besides the old abbeys of the Benedictine Order, which originated in Slovaki'a before the inva:sion of the Turks, a large number of monasteries and churches of the Order of St. Francis a:nd of the Preachers of St. Dominic were founded in the cities of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Franciscans came from Italy and the Dominicans from Spain. The Premonstratensi'ans and Cistercians originated in France and founded their first monasteries in Slovakia outside the cities. Not only beautiful churches, but also artshops, trade shops and libraries sprang up near all these institutions. To some of these monasteries and chapters the king granted the right of issuing, transcribing and clarifying documents. Such monasteries were called "trustworthy" places. In Slovakia the following enjoyed· that privilege: the Chapters in Bratislava, Nitra and Spis; the Benedictine abbey of St. Benedict near the Hron, the Premonstratensian monastery in Klastor-pod-Znievom and in Jasov. Archives originated in these abbeys in which records, various literary works and documents were deposited. When the Anjous came to the throne in Hungary, and the Luxemburgs to the throne in Bohemia, in the beginning of the fourteenth century, higher western European culture came to Central Europe, which in a twofold way penetrated into the territory of Slovakia. In those times Knighthood developed in Central Europe which with its higher culture and refined morals enlightened and edified the masses of the people. Slovak nobility soon adopted the manner of life of the knights, even to the extent of replacing wooden palisades and fortresses with strong stone citadels with moats, towers and bastions. These castles of the knights, often built on high a:nd impregnable rocks, were not only strongholds, but also witnesses of the active life of the knights. Among the owners of these castles were many Slova:k knights, as it attested to by Slovak names of many citadels Strecno, Lietava, Likava, Vrsatec, Lednica, Hrusov, Hricov, Blatnica, Krasna Horka, etc. Later, rich mining a:nd commercial towns became the most significant centers of culture. The inhabitants of the cities had more of a mind for cultural interests than the 78 SLOVAKIA agricultural inhabitants of the villages. This undoubtedly was due to the influence of their occupation and their economic condition. The German settlers of Slovak cities maintained contacts with their fatherland and its higher culture. This "city" culture made itself manifest not only in the city itself, in the architecture of urban homes and public buildings, but also in the life of the people in general. The city dwellers, as merchants and artisans, came into contact with near and distant lands, and adopted the more progressive ways of living. In the cities there were schools (in Bratislava and in Spisska Kapitula already in the thirteenth century), and foreign artisans and artists came to the cities to build and decorate civic structures, especially the parish churches. At fuat time several universities were set up in Central Europe after the pattern of the University of Paris. These universities (Prague, 1348; Cracow, 1364; Vienna, 1365) were also attended by students from Slovakia, because the first Hungarian university founded ·b y Louis the Great in Patikostoly in 1367, had closed its doors. Some of them won high academic honors and became professors at these universities. In this way Slovakia was in contact with higher European culture, the centers of which were the universities. But most striking is the participation of Slovakia in the contemporary cultural trends in the field of creative art. Gothic art, as it developed in France, Germany and Italy, ex,pressed the loftiness of the Christian spirit which .frees itself from the earth and soars into the heights. This idea received expression especially in the building of Gothic churches, which with their height, ease and gracefulness rose high above the surroundings and elevated the thoughts of the believing man to God. This style was adopted in Slovakia already in the middle of the thirteenth century and, in the church structures, blended with the final echoes of the Romanesque style. An example of early Gothic architecture has been preserved in Slovakia in the church of the former prepositure of Turiec, in Klastor-pod-Z nievom (The Monastery-be neathZniev), built about 1260. The Franciscan church in Brati- SLOVAKIA 79 slava and the Dominican church in Kosice were built at the end of the thirteenth century. Many imposing Gothic churches were erected in the fourteenth century in the thriving cities of Slovakia, among them the parish churches in Bratislava, Levoca, Trnava, Bardejov, Presov, and, especially, St. Elizabeth's Cathedral in Kosice. Beautiful Gothic temples of worsmp were also con,rtructed in the Spis region and the mining cities of Central Slovakia. The Gothic churches of the Slovak monasteries at St. Beiiadik, Mariatal, Oko1icne, and the church of the Red Monastery ( Cerveny Klastor) date from that time. Vienna and Prague strongly influenced the development of Gothic art in western Slovakia, while Bratislava and Cracow influenced its growth in Central and Eastern Slovakia. Besides the great and imposing Gothic churches of the cities, there arose in Slovakia a large number of small village churches, which even in their simplicity and artistic modesty attest that Gothic culture penetrated deeply into medieval Slovakia arrd left many relics there. While the city churches were, as a rule, designed and built by foreign architects, the small village churches were generally designed and built by native masters, who had adopted the structural characteristics of the Gothic .style of architecture. Besides the ecclesiastical edifices of the city, the medieval castles which ornament the peaks of Slovak mountains are also counted among the relics of Gothic art. Hardly anywhere in Central Europe are there as many castles as in Slovakia. Even this circumstance proves that Slovakia participated in the contemporary growth of Europe. Some of these castles because of their location, size, and structure, are outstanding souvenirs of Gothic architecture. The majority of these castles already has succumbed to the ha:rmful influence of time, but even in the ruins some Gothic gates, windows, high vaults and arches have been preserved in Bratislava, Zvolen, Vigfas, Strecno, Trencin, Orava and Spis. Only a few Gothic homes have been preserved in the cities, because they had to be removed to make way for newer building developments in later centuries. Remnants 80 SLOVAKIA of ancient municipal buildings, city fortifications and Gothic homes are rare; only in Bratislava has, a portion of the ancient City Hall been preserved, while Levoca still has a part of its old city wall and a part of a Gothic home. Several examples of stone decorations have also been preserved; especially the reliefs on the portals of the church in Bratislava, Banska Bystrica, Spisska Nova Ves and Kosice. Woodcarving reached a high degree of perfection in Slovakia and many wooden statues of the Madonna, St. Barbara and St. Catherine have been preserved in Spis and :in the mining towns. The wing altars of the churches of Spis, Saris and other eastern cities, are among the most valuable memorials of Gothic art in Slova!kia. Some wing altars have also been preserved in Banska Bystrica, Stiavnica and other parts of Slovakia. An outstanding woodcarver of that time was Master Paul of Levoca, who made the beautiful altar of the Nativity in Bardejov and the main altar in St. Jacob's church in Levoca. The apprentices of this master artist of Levoca decorated the churches in Spis with remarkable wood-carvings. The development of Gothic painting was subject to several influences. In southern Slovakia, where Gothic frescoes were preserved in Chyzne and Stitnik, the Italian influence predominated. In western Slovakia the Italian style came 'by way of neighboring Austria, while Gothic painting developed in eastern Slovakia under the influence of Silesia. Besides mural frescoes ( the oldest painting in the Spisska Krupitula depicts the coronation of Charles Robert and dates back to 1317), many framed paintings on the wing altars have been preserved. E~amples of high artistic workmanship, especially religious articles ( chalices, monstrances, crucifixes, Mass vestments, etc.) have been preserved in many parish and monastery churches. Many of these relics originated in Slovak workshops which also exported their products. In Spis bells were poured for churches in Poland. This great wealth of mementos from the Gothic period shows clearly that Slovakia lived a rich cultural life from the 13th to the 15th century and did not remain behind neighboring cultured countries in the field of creative arts .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The History of Slovakia (9/9) Description An account of the resource Philip A. Hrobak Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 75-80 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 Relation A related resource continued from <a href="https://slovakia.omeka.net/items/show/299">Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), pp. 72-80</a> LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c6066799d2c648d30601272429b42647.pdf 191697fac20fdcca6f1a5954187f5822 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 69 OSUSKY AFTER MARCH 14, 1939 Constantine Colen I have read Vnuk's article on Osusky in the Slovak press and believe it in the interest of historians to enlarge upon it, since I have quite a file on Osusky, the man who was delegated by the Slovak League of America to do a certain job for it in 1916 (to get the story in Europe of what was to be done with Austria-Hungary at the end of World War 1 and, particularly, to see what could be done to liberate the Slovaks from the hegemony of Budapest), but thusfar has failed to report his findings to the League. Now, how did Osusky, a Slovak who found favorwith T. G.Masaryk, protect the interests of his fellowSlovaks in France? Let me tell you how he tried to make cannon fodder of them for the French in the last war. After Germany attacked France, Osusky began to organize a new Czecho~Slovak army in France, knowing that some 50,000 Slovaks had settled there. In the years w:hen thousands upon thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help the "backward, primitive" Slovaks, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks were forced to seek their bread in foreign lands. France was one of the countries where the Slovaks settled in larger numbers. Osusky was a politician who had two irons in th fire. Thus he began his political career, and thus he ended it. Whenever he made one of his rare appearences in Slovakia, his "homeland," Osusky would turn radical and make a speech on how the Slovaks were being mistreated by Prague. On to Prague he would then go and do some smooth explaining so that his Prague boss would not be angry with him. In the fall of 1938, Osusky same to Prague and sought the favor of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party. He delivered a long address to the Club of Deputies and Senators in which he did not treat Eduard Benes and Milan Hodza too kindly. Osusky was the protege of Masaryk, while Hodza, also of Slovak origin, was in favor with Benes. It was no secret that Osusky had hoped to become the Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. The address, how- �70 SLOVAKIA ever, fell short of its mark. After Osusky left the Club, Tiso, later President of the Slovak Republic, remarked amusingly: "The discharged maid came to complain about her mistress." The Populists agreed tha Hodza could answer Osusky in the Club. Hodza, however, let one of his friends answer Osusky. Osusky and the Czechs Stephen Osusky remained in Paris where he began to organize the "liberation" movement, but behind the scenes he was also opposed to Benes. With the Czechs under Benes, Osusky was a member of Benes's "Czecho-Slovak National Committee," and yet he intervened with French authorities so that Daladier would not accept Benes as the head of the movement. Benes was furious. And it was Benes who told an American correspondent that Osusky is a link between Daladier and the Habsburg Otto. As a result, Czech emigrants turned against Osusky, calling him a traitor, a contemptible man, and a careerist who had, they said, "thrown himself out of the liberation movement." Did France Betray Czecho-Slovakia? Osusky lived so long in France that he finally became a Frenchman in spirit. After Munich, leading Czech personalities unhesitatingly declared that France had betrayed Czecho-'Slovakia. When the Czechs and Slovaks in France let it be known that they felt the same way, the French Government warned Osusky that it had enough of such "bad conduct." Osusky replied publicly in the newspapers, berating his countrymen for their "unbecoming" conduct. "In one's awn home," Osusky said, "no one allows himself to be called a traitor. A traitor is an enemy. To call the French enemies and at the same time live among them and accept their hospitality, this is something that cannot be borne well. lt simply was not true," concluded Osusky, "and France is the Mother of our freedom and independence." The First "State Act" Of course, Osusky had to show his appreciation to the French Government for letting him keep the Czecho- �SLOVAKIA 71 Slovak Embassy. Fr-ance needed soldiers. There were thousands of Slovak workers in France, and Osusky gave them the choice of sacrificing themselves for France or going to a concentration camp. In his press, of course, 0susky said this "diplomatically" thusly: "Czecho-'Slovak citizens here in France have the right to think and to give expression to their thoughts. They have a right to look after their own livelihood and to care for their own welfare." A "Proclamation" form was then issued in Czech, which the Slovak and Czechs were supposed to sign and return to 0susky's office. This was to be proof that the men were signing up "voluntavily" and without reservations for a Czecho-Slovak army, and the women for whatever duties mig,ht be ,a ssigned to them by the Czecho-lSlovak Foreign Center. As one Slovak put it: "They are forcing us to die for something that is foreign but even this verdict of death cannot be published in Slovak, but in Czech!" The Slovaks in France· Argenteuil, a suburb of Paris, was a center of Slovak national and cultural life. Over 1,000 Slovaks lived there. They were "stubborn" Slovaks, who would not be influenced by Czech or "Czechoslovak" propaganda. They had their own Slovak school. Prague tried unsuccessfuly to place a Czech teacher. Finally a Slovak was appointed. Of course, he was not an autonomist. All the Argenteuil Slovaks, however, backed the right of the Slovaks to autonomy, that is, to home rule or to states' rights. They never had any trouble with the French authorities before Germany invaded Bohemia and Moravia. But plenty after Benes, Jan Masaryk and other 0zech "patriots" with their Slovak helpers went into exile. 'Dhe cry went out to organize a "Czechoslovak" resistance. The chief problem was to organize an army in France. After months of agitation among the Slovaks, five volunteered to join the Czecho-:Slovak Legion in Fance. A roundup of Slovaks began; all capable of bearing arms were brought by the police to the Police Commissioner where they were ordered to sign up with the Czecho-Slovak Le- �72 SLOVAKIA gion. Excepting the five mentioned, all other refused to do so. Those that were citizens of France were willing to answer the call from the authorities when it was issued, but refused to sign up for the Czecho-Slovak Legion. The result was that some were jailed, while many others were placed in concentration camps at Rolland Garros, Buffalo Bill, and still others were relegated to forced labor on the Spanish frontier. Fathers of families were not excepted. Benes and Osusky had to have an army. The hapless Slovaks were then visited by agents of the Paris Czecho-Slovak Office who urged them to "get smart" and si•g n up for the Legion. The Slovaks. however, resisted stubbornly, asking: "for what?" Letters, sent to relatives in Slovakia, told of the suffering they undergo because they refused to fight against their brethren in Slovakia who had as much rig,ht to freedom and independence as Benes and his Czechs. Their attitude was like that of the French in Quebec, Canada. That is how they began to organize the Czecho-Slovak Legion in France. Much was said about it. Czech propaganda wrote about thousands and tens of thousands joining up "voluntarily and enthusiastically." The periodical "Cesko~Slovensky boj" (,T he Czecho-'S lovak Struggle) reported on the "Departure of our First Defenders": 160 men and ten officers under the command of Captain Kratky; three companies headed by two battalions. In the meantime Prchala and Snejdarek, both Czech Generals, were waiting for something to do. Osusky Vs. Benes After Slovakia proclaimed her independence on March 14, 1939, and the Czech lands were occupied by the Germans, it seemed that Osusky and Benes would become reconciled. In America Benes praised Osusky for organizing the new resistance movement in France. But Osusky apparently did not want to be a subordinate of Benes who had capitulated to Hitler at Munich. Backed by the French, who wanted Benes to lose himself, Osusky wanted the No. �73 SLOVAKIA 1 spot as far as Czecho-Slovak leadership abroad was concerned. On July 29, 1939, the "Cesko-Slovensky Boj" published th€ July 10th resolution of "Osusky's countrymen" who had settled in Grand Combe, wherein they acknowledged the leadership of Osusky and expressed full confidence in him. The Ruthenians followed suit. Pamphlets sharply critical of Benes were circulated among the Slovaks in France. In his propaganda organ, Osusky began to write a bout the need of a new and different Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the old one. He said that generals who lost the war do have the obligation to continue working, but that they did not have any right at all to lead the Slovaks and Czechs into a new fight. He did not consider himself as one of the generals who lost the war. The new resistance, it was said, must be imbued with a new spirit and must be lead by new leaders (''Slovensky I:.ud" - Buenos Aires, May 18, 1939). 1 In the "Cesko-Slovensky Boj" of June 10, 1939, he wrote about the situation and feelings of the Slovaks in Ozecho-Slovakia. "The fact is," Osusky said, "that many Slovaks do not believe in the ,l egal continuity of the CzeohoS1ovak Republic and in its restoration, because some Slovaks and Czechs threaten the Slovak with even a tougher and more ruthless centralism that the one they lived under for twenty years." Osusky recalled that he had protested against the policy followed in Slovakia. "I recall that in the fall of 1937, a year before the catastrophe," Osusky dec,Iared, "I had foretold in official places the end of the Republic if a radical change and improvement did not take place." Rigid centralism - the cause of so many quarrels between the Slovaks and Czechs - is hurried and dead, and "I hereby publicly state that I shall never agree to have the Slovak nation robbed of its sacred rights ... We are here concerned with the existence and the future of the Czecho-Slovak Republic," continued Osusky, and "whosoever threatens the Slovaks with centralism is an enemy of the restoration of the Republic. and that for the reason that without the Slovaks Czecho- �74 SLOVAKIA Slovakia cannot be and sha11 not be restored." Diplomatic double talk! Osusky in London After the fall of France, Osusky, like Hodza before him, was given the "Benes treatment" for faithful services rendered: first he was vilified and then dropped. Among other things, Benes and his political entourage accused 0susky of: using :State finances for "other purposes;" sabota·g ing the evacuation of Czecho-Slovaks from France; helping Hitler to divide the "Ozechoslovak nation" even before Munich; favoring French policy in Munich; and repudiating the "president's" conception of the second resistance movement, according to which Benes was still president of Czecho~Slovakia which legally did not cease to exist, and Benes, therefore is "the sole source of constitutional rights and State sovereignty of Masaryk's f.irst Republic." The Czech press in America, which up to that time wrote highly of Osusky and his "occomplishments," now turned against him. Osusky now became a Habsburg monarchist, a reactionary, a collaborator of Germans, and declared that he must never be allowed to return to "liberated" Czecho-'Slovakia. In his MEMOIDS, Benes referred to ()Busky and others as "malcontents who, when they wanted to extort something for their personal benefit, used to threaten or attack me (sometimes with extreme lack of decency or political propriety" (p. 1'21). Benes expe1led Osusky from his London "government-in-exile" in March, 1942, stating, however, that Osusky had "resigned." "But I did not resign," Osusky hurried to reply, "I was simply dismissed." Not being able to get his side of the story to the West, Osusky published several pamphlets to exonerate himself and indict Benes and his "illegal" political clique. As far as Osusky was concerned, "Dr. Edward Benes had resigned from the office of president of the Czecllo-,Slovak Republic," and Dr. EmH Ha.cha was elected according to the Constitution in his stead and, therefore, "legally and in fact Dr. Edward Benes ceased to ·b e president of the Ozecho-Slovak Republic." Benes, however, had the right connections in London and Washington. In the end he, and not Osusky, prevailed. �SLOVAKIA 75 In politics it seldom pays to to sit on two chairs. OsuS'ky began his career when the Slovak League sent him to Europe to Masaryk to work for the establishment of Czecho-,Slovakia and to see to it that Slovakia was granted autonomy. Osusky found it convenient and profitable to forget the League and the rights of his Slovak people to freedom, freedom from a1ien domination. He preferred to serve Masaryk and his senseless concept of "Czechoslovakism." At one time it was said that Osusky claimed "credit" for the fact that the Pittsburgh Pact was not even mentioned dunng the Paris Peace Conference negotiations. Osusky served as a Prague ambassador for over twenty years. He did a commendable job of it. Today, perhaps as he writes his memoirs in Washington, the Czechs don't want him - and the Slovaks, his own people, won't ·have him. • • • ibe History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK 1Continu ed) Slovakia played an important role in the relations of the kingdom which developed between Hungary and Poland during the reign of the Anjous. Louis the Great wanted to ,b ecome Polish king after the death of Casimir the Great, the last male descendant of the Piastov Clan. The agreements by which this union of Poland and Hungary was to be realized, were concluded in Slovak cities, especially in ,Kosice which was on the Cracow-Budin highway. It was at Kosice, after several meetings, that it was decided to have t!he daughter of Louis the Great, succeed him to the cP olish throne after his death. The reign of the Anjous brought Slovakia a notable contribution especially in the field of culture. G001HIC ClJiL'NJRE IN SLOVAKIA Medieval culture is a Christian culture. The Church concerned itself not only with the advancement of Christian faith and morals among the uncivilized nations of Europe, � SLOVAKIA 69 OSUSKY AFTER MARCH 14, 1939 Constantine Colen I have read Vnuk's article on Osusky in the Slovak press and believe it in the interest of historians to enlarge upon it, since I have quite a file on Osusky, the man who was delegated by the Slovak League of America to do a certain job for it in 1916 (to get the story in Europe of what was to be done with Austria-Hungary at the end of World War 1 and, particularly, to see what could be done to liberate the Slovaks from the hegemony of Budapest), but thusfar has failed to report his findings to the League. Now, how did Osusky, a Slovak who found favorwith T. G.Masaryk, protect the interests of his fellowSlovaks in France? Let me tell you how he tried to make cannon fodder of them for the French in the last war. After Germany attacked France, Osusky began to organize a new Czecho~Slovak army in France, knowing that some 50,000 Slovaks had settled there. In the years w:hen thousands upon thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help the "backward, primitive" Slovaks, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks were forced to seek their bread in foreign lands. France was one of the countries where the Slovaks settled in larger numbers. Osusky was a politician who had two irons in th fire. Thus he began his political career, and thus he ended it. Whenever he made one of his rare appearences in Slovakia, his "homeland," Osusky would turn radical and make a speech on how the Slovaks were being mistreated by Prague. On to Prague he would then go and do some smooth explaining so that his Prague boss would not be angry with him. In the fall of 1938, Osusky same to Prague and sought the favor of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party. He delivered a long address to the Club of Deputies and Senators in which he did not treat Eduard Benes and Milan Hodza too kindly. Osusky was the protege of Masaryk, while Hodza, also of Slovak origin, was in favor with Benes. It was no secret that Osusky had hoped to become the Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. The address, how- �70 SLOVAKIA ever, fell short of its mark. After Osusky left the Club, Tiso, later President of the Slovak Republic, remarked amusingly: "The discharged maid came to complain about her mistress." The Populists agreed tha Hodza could answer Osusky in the Club. Hodza, however, let one of his friends answer Osusky. Osusky and the Czechs Stephen Osusky remained in Paris where he began to organize the "liberation" movement, but behind the scenes he was also opposed to Benes. With the Czechs under Benes, Osusky was a member of Benes's "Czecho-Slovak National Committee," and yet he intervened with French authorities so that Daladier would not accept Benes as the head of the movement. Benes was furious. And it was Benes who told an American correspondent that Osusky is a link between Daladier and the Habsburg Otto. As a result, Czech emigrants turned against Osusky, calling him a traitor, a contemptible man, and a careerist who had, they said, "thrown himself out of the liberation movement." Did France Betray Czecho-Slovakia? Osusky lived so long in France that he finally became a Frenchman in spirit. After Munich, leading Czech personalities unhesitatingly declared that France had betrayed Czecho-'Slovakia. When the Czechs and Slovaks in France let it be known that they felt the same way, the French Government warned Osusky that it had enough of such "bad conduct." Osusky replied publicly in the newspapers, berating his countrymen for their "unbecoming" conduct. "In one's awn home," Osusky said, "no one allows himself to be called a traitor. A traitor is an enemy. To call the French enemies and at the same time live among them and accept their hospitality, this is something that cannot be borne well. lt simply was not true," concluded Osusky, "and France is the Mother of our freedom and independence." The First "State Act" Of course, Osusky had to show his appreciation to the French Government for letting him keep the Czecho- �SLOVAKIA 71 Slovak Embassy. Fr-ance needed soldiers. There were thousands of Slovak workers in France, and Osusky gave them the choice of sacrificing themselves for France or going to a concentration camp. In his press, of course, 0susky said this "diplomatically" thusly: "Czecho-'Slovak citizens here in France have the right to think and to give expression to their thoughts. They have a right to look after their own livelihood and to care for their own welfare." A "Proclamation" form was then issued in Czech, which the Slovak and Czechs were supposed to sign and return to 0susky's office. This was to be proof that the men were signing up "voluntavily" and without reservations for a Czecho-Slovak army, and the women for whatever duties mig,ht be ,a ssigned to them by the Czecho-lSlovak Foreign Center. As one Slovak put it: "They are forcing us to die for something that is foreign but even this verdict of death cannot be published in Slovak, but in Czech!" The Slovaks in France· Argenteuil, a suburb of Paris, was a center of Slovak national and cultural life. Over 1,000 Slovaks lived there. They were "stubborn" Slovaks, who would not be influenced by Czech or "Czechoslovak" propaganda. They had their own Slovak school. Prague tried unsuccessfuly to place a Czech teacher. Finally a Slovak was appointed. Of course, he was not an autonomist. All the Argenteuil Slovaks, however, backed the right of the Slovaks to autonomy, that is, to home rule or to states' rights. They never had any trouble with the French authorities before Germany invaded Bohemia and Moravia. But plenty after Benes, Jan Masaryk and other 0zech "patriots" with their Slovak helpers went into exile. 'Dhe cry went out to organize a "Czechoslovak" resistance. The chief problem was to organize an army in France. After months of agitation among the Slovaks, five volunteered to join the Czecho-:Slovak Legion in Fance. A roundup of Slovaks began; all capable of bearing arms were brought by the police to the Police Commissioner where they were ordered to sign up with the Czecho-Slovak Le- �72 SLOVAKIA gion. Excepting the five mentioned, all other refused to do so. Those that were citizens of France were willing to answer the call from the authorities when it was issued, but refused to sign up for the Czecho-Slovak Legion. The result was that some were jailed, while many others were placed in concentration camps at Rolland Garros, Buffalo Bill, and still others were relegated to forced labor on the Spanish frontier. Fathers of families were not excepted. Benes and Osusky had to have an army. The hapless Slovaks were then visited by agents of the Paris Czecho-Slovak Office who urged them to "get smart" and si•g n up for the Legion. The Slovaks. however, resisted stubbornly, asking: "for what?" Letters, sent to relatives in Slovakia, told of the suffering they undergo because they refused to fight against their brethren in Slovakia who had as much rig,ht to freedom and independence as Benes and his Czechs. Their attitude was like that of the French in Quebec, Canada. That is how they began to organize the Czecho-Slovak Legion in France. Much was said about it. Czech propaganda wrote about thousands and tens of thousands joining up "voluntarily and enthusiastically." The periodical "Cesko~Slovensky boj" (,T he Czecho-'S lovak Struggle) reported on the "Departure of our First Defenders": 160 men and ten officers under the command of Captain Kratky; three companies headed by two battalions. In the meantime Prchala and Snejdarek, both Czech Generals, were waiting for something to do. Osusky Vs. Benes After Slovakia proclaimed her independence on March 14, 1939, and the Czech lands were occupied by the Germans, it seemed that Osusky and Benes would become reconciled. In America Benes praised Osusky for organizing the new resistance movement in France. But Osusky apparently did not want to be a subordinate of Benes who had capitulated to Hitler at Munich. Backed by the French, who wanted Benes to lose himself, Osusky wanted the No. �73 SLOVAKIA 1 spot as far as Czecho-Slovak leadership abroad was concerned. On July 29, 1939, the "Cesko-Slovensky Boj" published th€ July 10th resolution of "Osusky's countrymen" who had settled in Grand Combe, wherein they acknowledged the leadership of Osusky and expressed full confidence in him. The Ruthenians followed suit. Pamphlets sharply critical of Benes were circulated among the Slovaks in France. In his propaganda organ, Osusky began to write a bout the need of a new and different Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the old one. He said that generals who lost the war do have the obligation to continue working, but that they did not have any right at all to lead the Slovaks and Czechs into a new fight. He did not consider himself as one of the generals who lost the war. The new resistance, it was said, must be imbued with a new spirit and must be lead by new leaders (''Slovensky I:.ud" - Buenos Aires, May 18, 1939). 1 In the "Cesko-Slovensky Boj" of June 10, 1939, he wrote about the situation and feelings of the Slovaks in Ozecho-Slovakia. "The fact is," Osusky said, "that many Slovaks do not believe in the ,l egal continuity of the CzeohoS1ovak Republic and in its restoration, because some Slovaks and Czechs threaten the Slovak with even a tougher and more ruthless centralism that the one they lived under for twenty years." Osusky recalled that he had protested against the policy followed in Slovakia. "I recall that in the fall of 1937, a year before the catastrophe," Osusky dec,Iared, "I had foretold in official places the end of the Republic if a radical change and improvement did not take place." Rigid centralism - the cause of so many quarrels between the Slovaks and Czechs - is hurried and dead, and "I hereby publicly state that I shall never agree to have the Slovak nation robbed of its sacred rights ... We are here concerned with the existence and the future of the Czecho-Slovak Republic," continued Osusky, and "whosoever threatens the Slovaks with centralism is an enemy of the restoration of the Republic. and that for the reason that without the Slovaks Czecho- �74 SLOVAKIA Slovakia cannot be and sha11 not be restored." Diplomatic double talk! Osusky in London After the fall of France, Osusky, like Hodza before him, was given the "Benes treatment" for faithful services rendered: first he was vilified and then dropped. Among other things, Benes and his political entourage accused 0susky of: using :State finances for "other purposes;" sabota·g ing the evacuation of Czecho-Slovaks from France; helping Hitler to divide the "Ozechoslovak nation" even before Munich; favoring French policy in Munich; and repudiating the "president's" conception of the second resistance movement, according to which Benes was still president of Czecho~Slovakia which legally did not cease to exist, and Benes, therefore is "the sole source of constitutional rights and State sovereignty of Masaryk's f.irst Republic." The Czech press in America, which up to that time wrote highly of Osusky and his "occomplishments," now turned against him. Osusky now became a Habsburg monarchist, a reactionary, a collaborator of Germans, and declared that he must never be allowed to return to "liberated" Czecho-'Slovakia. In his MEMOIDS, Benes referred to ()Busky and others as "malcontents who, when they wanted to extort something for their personal benefit, used to threaten or attack me (sometimes with extreme lack of decency or political propriety" (p. 1'21). Benes expe1led Osusky from his London "government-in-exile" in March, 1942, stating, however, that Osusky had "resigned." "But I did not resign," Osusky hurried to reply, "I was simply dismissed." Not being able to get his side of the story to the West, Osusky published several pamphlets to exonerate himself and indict Benes and his "illegal" political clique. As far as Osusky was concerned, "Dr. Edward Benes had resigned from the office of president of the Czecllo-,Slovak Republic," and Dr. EmH Ha.cha was elected according to the Constitution in his stead and, therefore, "legally and in fact Dr. Edward Benes ceased to ·b e president of the Ozecho-Slovak Republic." Benes, however, had the right connections in London and Washington. In the end he, and not Osusky, prevailed. �SLOVAKIA 75 In politics it seldom pays to to sit on two chairs. OsuS'ky began his career when the Slovak League sent him to Europe to Masaryk to work for the establishment of Czecho-,Slovakia and to see to it that Slovakia was granted autonomy. Osusky found it convenient and profitable to forget the League and the rights of his Slovak people to freedom, freedom from a1ien domination. He preferred to serve Masaryk and his senseless concept of "Czechoslovakism." At one time it was said that Osusky claimed "credit" for the fact that the Pittsburgh Pact was not even mentioned dunng the Paris Peace Conference negotiations. Osusky served as a Prague ambassador for over twenty years. He did a commendable job of it. Today, perhaps as he writes his memoirs in Washington, the Czechs don't want him - and the Slovaks, his own people, won't ·have him. • • • ibe History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK 1Continu ed) Slovakia played an important role in the relations of the kingdom which developed between Hungary and Poland during the reign of the Anjous. Louis the Great wanted to ,b ecome Polish king after the death of Casimir the Great, the last male descendant of the Piastov Clan. The agreements by which this union of Poland and Hungary was to be realized, were concluded in Slovak cities, especially in ,Kosice which was on the Cracow-Budin highway. It was at Kosice, after several meetings, that it was decided to have t!he daughter of Louis the Great, succeed him to the cP olish throne after his death. The reign of the Anjous brought Slovakia a notable contribution especially in the field of culture. G001HIC ClJiL'NJRE IN SLOVAKIA Medieval culture is a Christian culture. The Church concerned itself not only with the advancement of Christian faith and morals among the uncivilized nations of Europe, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 69 OSUSKY AFTER MARCH 14, 1939 Constantine Colen I have read Vnuk's article on Osusky in the Slovak press and believe it in the interest of historians to enlarge upon it, since I have quite a file on Osusky, the man who was delegated by the Slovak League of America to do a certain job for it in 1916 (to get the story in Europe of what was to be done with Austria-Hungary at the end of World War 1 and, particularly, to see what could be done to liberate the Slovaks from the hegemony of Budapest), but thusfar has failed to report his findings to the League. Now, how did Osusky, a Slovak who found favorwith T. G.Masaryk, protect the interests of his fellowSlovaks in France? Let me tell you how he tried to make cannon fodder of them for the French in the last war. After Germany attacked France, Osusky began to organize a new Czecho~Slovak army in France, knowing that some 50,000 Slovaks had settled there. In the years w:hen thousands upon thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help the "backward, primitive" Slovaks, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks were forced to seek their bread in foreign lands. France was one of the countries where the Slovaks settled in larger numbers. Osusky was a politician who had two irons in th fire. Thus he began his political career, and thus he ended it. Whenever he made one of his rare appearences in Slovakia, his "homeland," Osusky would turn radical and make a speech on how the Slovaks were being mistreated by Prague. On to Prague he would then go and do some smooth explaining so that his Prague boss would not be angry with him. In the fall of 1938, Osusky same to Prague and sought the favor of the deputies of the Slovak People's Party. He delivered a long address to the Club of Deputies and Senators in which he did not treat Eduard Benes and Milan Hodza too kindly. Osusky was the protege of Masaryk, while Hodza, also of Slovak origin, was in favor with Benes. It was no secret that Osusky had hoped to become the Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia. The address, how- 70 SLOVAKIA ever, fell short of its mark. After Osusky left the Club, Tiso, later President of the Slovak Republic, remarked amusingly: "The discharged maid came to complain about her mistress." The Populists agreed tha Hodza could answer Osusky in the Club. Hodza, however, let one of his friends answer Osusky. Osusky and the Czechs Stephen Osusky remained in Paris where he began to organize the "liberation" movement, but behind the scenes he was also opposed to Benes. With the Czechs under Benes, Osusky was a member of Benes's "Czecho-Slovak National Committee," and yet he intervened with French authorities so that Daladier would not accept Benes as the head of the movement. Benes was furious. And it was Benes who told an American correspondent that Osusky is a link between Daladier and the Habsburg Otto. As a result, Czech emigrants turned against Osusky, calling him a traitor, a contemptible man, and a careerist who had, they said, "thrown himself out of the liberation movement." Did France Betray Czecho-Slovakia? Osusky lived so long in France that he finally became a Frenchman in spirit. After Munich, leading Czech personalities unhesitatingly declared that France had betrayed Czecho-'Slovakia. When the Czechs and Slovaks in France let it be known that they felt the same way, the French Government warned Osusky that it had enough of such "bad conduct." Osusky replied publicly in the newspapers, berating his countrymen for their "unbecoming" conduct. "In one's awn home," Osusky said, "no one allows himself to be called a traitor. A traitor is an enemy. To call the French enemies and at the same time live among them and accept their hospitality, this is something that cannot be borne well. lt simply was not true," concluded Osusky, "and France is the Mother of our freedom and independence." The First "State Act" Of course, Osusky had to show his appreciation to the French Government for letting him keep the Czecho- SLOVAKIA 71 Slovak Embassy. Fr-ance needed soldiers. There were thousands of Slovak workers in France, and Osusky gave them the choice of sacrificing themselves for France or going to a concentration camp. In his press, of course, 0susky said this "diplomatically" thusly: "Czecho-'Slovak citizens here in France have the right to think and to give expression to their thoughts. They have a right to look after their own livelihood and to care for their own welfare." A "Proclamation" form was then issued in Czech, which the Slovak and Czechs were supposed to sign and return to 0susky's office. This was to be proof that the men were signing up "voluntavily" and without reservations for a Czecho-Slovak army, and the women for whatever duties mig,ht be ,a ssigned to them by the Czecho-lSlovak Foreign Center. As one Slovak put it: "They are forcing us to die for something that is foreign but even this verdict of death cannot be published in Slovak, but in Czech!" The Slovaks in France· Argenteuil, a suburb of Paris, was a center of Slovak national and cultural life. Over 1,000 Slovaks lived there. They were "stubborn" Slovaks, who would not be influenced by Czech or "Czechoslovak" propaganda. They had their own Slovak school. Prague tried unsuccessfuly to place a Czech teacher. Finally a Slovak was appointed. Of course, he was not an autonomist. All the Argenteuil Slovaks, however, backed the right of the Slovaks to autonomy, that is, to home rule or to states' rights. They never had any trouble with the French authorities before Germany invaded Bohemia and Moravia. But plenty after Benes, Jan Masaryk and other 0zech "patriots" with their Slovak helpers went into exile. 'Dhe cry went out to organize a "Czechoslovak" resistance. The chief problem was to organize an army in France. After months of agitation among the Slovaks, five volunteered to join the Czecho-:Slovak Legion in Fance. A roundup of Slovaks began; all capable of bearing arms were brought by the police to the Police Commissioner where they were ordered to sign up with the Czecho-Slovak Le- 72 SLOVAKIA gion. Excepting the five mentioned, all other refused to do so. Those that were citizens of France were willing to answer the call from the authorities when it was issued, but refused to sign up for the Czecho-Slovak Legion. The result was that some were jailed, while many others were placed in concentration camps at Rolland Garros, Buffalo Bill, and still others were relegated to forced labor on the Spanish frontier. Fathers of families were not excepted. Benes and Osusky had to have an army. The hapless Slovaks were then visited by agents of the Paris Czecho-Slovak Office who urged them to "get smart" and si•g n up for the Legion. The Slovaks. however, resisted stubbornly, asking: "for what?" Letters, sent to relatives in Slovakia, told of the suffering they undergo because they refused to fight against their brethren in Slovakia who had as much rig,ht to freedom and independence as Benes and his Czechs. Their attitude was like that of the French in Quebec, Canada. That is how they began to organize the Czecho-Slovak Legion in France. Much was said about it. Czech propaganda wrote about thousands and tens of thousands joining up "voluntarily and enthusiastically." The periodical "Cesko~Slovensky boj" (,T he Czecho-'S lovak Struggle) reported on the "Departure of our First Defenders": 160 men and ten officers under the command of Captain Kratky; three companies headed by two battalions. In the meantime Prchala and Snejdarek, both Czech Generals, were waiting for something to do. Osusky Vs. Benes After Slovakia proclaimed her independence on March 14, 1939, and the Czech lands were occupied by the Germans, it seemed that Osusky and Benes would become reconciled. In America Benes praised Osusky for organizing the new resistance movement in France. But Osusky apparently did not want to be a subordinate of Benes who had capitulated to Hitler at Munich. Backed by the French, who wanted Benes to lose himself, Osusky wanted the No. 73 SLOVAKIA 1 spot as far as Czecho-Slovak leadership abroad was concerned. On July 29, 1939, the "Cesko-Slovensky Boj" published th€ July 10th resolution of "Osusky's countrymen" who had settled in Grand Combe, wherein they acknowledged the leadership of Osusky and expressed full confidence in him. The Ruthenians followed suit. Pamphlets sharply critical of Benes were circulated among the Slovaks in France. In his propaganda organ, Osusky began to write a bout the need of a new and different Czecho-Slovakia, unlike the old one. He said that generals who lost the war do have the obligation to continue working, but that they did not have any right at all to lead the Slovaks and Czechs into a new fight. He did not consider himself as one of the generals who lost the war. The new resistance, it was said, must be imbued with a new spirit and must be lead by new leaders (''Slovensky I:.ud" - Buenos Aires, May 18, 1939). 1 In the "Cesko-Slovensky Boj" of June 10, 1939, he wrote about the situation and feelings of the Slovaks in Ozecho-Slovakia. "The fact is," Osusky said, "that many Slovaks do not believe in the ,l egal continuity of the CzeohoS1ovak Republic and in its restoration, because some Slovaks and Czechs threaten the Slovak with even a tougher and more ruthless centralism that the one they lived under for twenty years." Osusky recalled that he had protested against the policy followed in Slovakia. "I recall that in the fall of 1937, a year before the catastrophe," Osusky dec,Iared, "I had foretold in official places the end of the Republic if a radical change and improvement did not take place." Rigid centralism - the cause of so many quarrels between the Slovaks and Czechs - is hurried and dead, and "I hereby publicly state that I shall never agree to have the Slovak nation robbed of its sacred rights ... We are here concerned with the existence and the future of the Czecho-Slovak Republic," continued Osusky, and "whosoever threatens the Slovaks with centralism is an enemy of the restoration of the Republic. and that for the reason that without the Slovaks Czecho- 74 SLOVAKIA Slovakia cannot be and sha11 not be restored." Diplomatic double talk! Osusky in London After the fall of France, Osusky, like Hodza before him, was given the "Benes treatment" for faithful services rendered: first he was vilified and then dropped. Among other things, Benes and his political entourage accused 0susky of: using :State finances for "other purposes;" sabota·g ing the evacuation of Czecho-Slovaks from France; helping Hitler to divide the "Ozechoslovak nation" even before Munich; favoring French policy in Munich; and repudiating the "president's" conception of the second resistance movement, according to which Benes was still president of Czecho~Slovakia which legally did not cease to exist, and Benes, therefore is "the sole source of constitutional rights and State sovereignty of Masaryk's f.irst Republic." The Czech press in America, which up to that time wrote highly of Osusky and his "occomplishments," now turned against him. Osusky now became a Habsburg monarchist, a reactionary, a collaborator of Germans, and declared that he must never be allowed to return to "liberated" Czecho-'Slovakia. In his MEMOIDS, Benes referred to ()Busky and others as "malcontents who, when they wanted to extort something for their personal benefit, used to threaten or attack me (sometimes with extreme lack of decency or political propriety" (p. 1'21). Benes expe1led Osusky from his London "government-in-exile" in March, 1942, stating, however, that Osusky had "resigned." "But I did not resign," Osusky hurried to reply, "I was simply dismissed." Not being able to get his side of the story to the West, Osusky published several pamphlets to exonerate himself and indict Benes and his "illegal" political clique. As far as Osusky was concerned, "Dr. Edward Benes had resigned from the office of president of the Czecllo-,Slovak Republic," and Dr. EmH Ha.cha was elected according to the Constitution in his stead and, therefore, "legally and in fact Dr. Edward Benes ceased to ·b e president of the Ozecho-Slovak Republic." Benes, however, had the right connections in London and Washington. In the end he, and not Osusky, prevailed. SLOVAKIA 75 In politics it seldom pays to to sit on two chairs. OsuS'ky began his career when the Slovak League sent him to Europe to Masaryk to work for the establishment of Czecho-,Slovakia and to see to it that Slovakia was granted autonomy. Osusky found it convenient and profitable to forget the League and the rights of his Slovak people to freedom, freedom from a1ien domination. He preferred to serve Masaryk and his senseless concept of "Czechoslovakism." At one time it was said that Osusky claimed "credit" for the fact that the Pittsburgh Pact was not even mentioned dunng the Paris Peace Conference negotiations. Osusky served as a Prague ambassador for over twenty years. He did a commendable job of it. Today, perhaps as he writes his memoirs in Washington, the Czechs don't want him - and the Slovaks, his own people, won't ·have him. • • • ibe History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK 1Continu ed) Slovakia played an important role in the relations of the kingdom which developed between Hungary and Poland during the reign of the Anjous. Louis the Great wanted to ,b ecome Polish king after the death of Casimir the Great, the last male descendant of the Piastov Clan. The agreements by which this union of Poland and Hungary was to be realized, were concluded in Slovak cities, especially in ,Kosice which was on the Cracow-Budin highway. It was at Kosice, after several meetings, that it was decided to have t!he daughter of Louis the Great, succeed him to the cP olish throne after his death. The reign of the Anjous brought Slovakia a notable contribution especially in the field of culture. G001HIC ClJiL'NJRE IN SLOVAKIA Medieval culture is a Christian culture. The Church concerned itself not only with the advancement of Christian faith and morals among the uncivilized nations of Europe,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Osuský After March 14, 1939 Description An account of the resource Constantine Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 69-75 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/460e5a702ebd3ed54ba269409452a768.pdf d6fd783faf2ed8f1b10456590990fb51 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 �66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. �SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business �68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47). � SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 �66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. �SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business �68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 65 STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 Francis Vnuk The same day that German divisions entered Bohemia and Moravia (:M arch 15) and Hitler parked himself in the Hradcany, Weizsaeker, German State Secretary, sent a circular to all German foreign missions in countries, in which Czecho-:Slovakia had diplomatic representation, to be ready to take over Prague diplomatic services. Particularly, the persons concerned were to see to it that all political and secret material was safeguarded. Hitler made the matter public on March 16, 1939, and the Czec:h Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky issued instructions the same afternoon to the effect that all foreign offices of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ceased to function as such and were to ibe surrendered to the German foreign offices in the respective countries. We know that not all foreign representations of Prague followed Chvalkovsky's directive. The deciding factor here was not Chvalkovsky's order (after all he was only doing what the Germans wanted him to do), but the stand taken toward Germany by the respective countries. In neutral countries and those which sympathized with Germany, the order was carried out without complications. Not so, however, where the mood was anti-German. Chvalkovsky's order was thus ignored in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, and in Santiago. In three instances the diplomats were of Slovak origin: V,l adimir Hurban in Washington, George Slavik in Warsaw, and Stephen Osusky in Paris. 'Dhe case of Stephen Osusky is most interesting and perhaps least known. We know what had happened in Warsaw and in Washington. But little or nothing about what had transpired in Paris at the time. Perhaps because of Osusky' s influence. Now, what did happen in Paris at the time? Welczek, the German Ambassador in Paris, did try to contact Osusky, though unsuccessfully, after he had received Weizsaecker's directive. Late in the afternoon of 1 66 SLOVAKIA March 16th, however, a member of the German Embassy (Braeuer) did contact Cerny of the Czecho-Slovak Embassy and explained the implication of Hitler's decree. Cerny was satisfied with Braeuer's explanation, but informed him - though he and the rest of the staff were ready to do what was asked of them - they could do nothing without Osusky, who, they said, still had no made up his mind on the matter. In the evening the Germans finaHy did get to Osusky by phone. Quirring, the German Embassy's legal counsel, first talked to him and later Welczek himself. Osusky took the stand that preliminarily he could not surrender the Embassy because he had learned about Hitler's proclamation, he said, only from the newspapers and officially he had nothing from Prague. Furthermore, he added that he needed a certain amount of time to let the French Government know in an appropriate manner what had happened. Welczek took cognizance of this but reminded Osusky, in order that there be no doubt about the matter, that the situation is completely clear and that Osusky bears full responsibility for his rejective attitude to surrender the embassy and its contents. Osusky, however , took exception and denied the accusation that he had taken a rejective stand on the matter. For the reason mentioned, he said, he simply could not surrender the embassy. On the second day (March 17), Welczek again contacted Osusky. This time Osusky admitted that he had received the directive from Prague but that he would have to discuss the situation with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which still regarded him as the responsible he.ad of the Czecho-Slovak :Ennbassy because it had not been informed about the new situation. Welczek retorted that he had informed the French Government in writing about the new situation and, therefore, Osusky should know what he is supposed to do. Osusky replied that he would go to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then let the German Embassy know about the matter of surrendering his post. Dusk turned into darkness, but no report came from Osusky. Naturally, the Germans were becoming impatient. SLOVAKIA 67 When they called Osusky' s office, they were told he was not in. Neither was his secretary. They decided then to visit Osusky's office. When they came to the building and found that it was heavily guarded by the French police, they left without further pursuing their mission. In the meantime, Cerny (the Czech Embassy's legal counsel) made an appearance at the German Embassy to report that he and the other personnel of the CzechoSlovak Embassy did not identify themselves with Osusky and that they told Osusky openly they did not agree with his position. Furthermore, when he told Osusky that he would let the Germans know how the personnel felt about the matter, Osusky replied that he could not prevent him needed time ( 1Cerny) from doing so, but that he (Osusky) to arrange his affairs before he surrendered the office. After that, according to Cerny, Osusky would be indifferent to what would happen. Cerny also assured the Germans that "tomorrow (March 18) , he would again tell Osusky that the embassy personnel urgently requests that he surrender the embassy to the Germans. But the Germans knew that Cerny meant little in the situation. If the French authorities are back of Osusky, the latter certainly would not be guided by what Cerny and the Czech Embassy personnel recommended. And there were signs that Osusky did have the backing of the French for his stand. Welczek r ecalled that the position of the French Foreign Ministry heralded nothing good when it was handed the notification of Hitler's decree. At that time C h a r v e r i a t, head of the political division of the French Foreign Ministry indicated that French official circles did not rgeard the situation as clear and consistent. Complications arose, Charveriat said, because the CzechoSlovak Embassy also represented Slovakia and Ruthenia, while the Germans made a Protectorate only of Bohemia and Moravia. The French Government, continued Charveriat, wishes therefore to carefully look into all the implications and devote proper attention to the position of the Czecho-.Slovak Embassy. Rushing matters would only increase the suspicion of the French, Charveriat concluded. The Germans answered that the French have no business 68 SLOVAKIA investigating this matter, because it concerns exclusively only Osusky and Welczek as the only representative of Germany. Encouraged by French assurances, Osusky stubbornly stood his ground. German hopes to take over the Czech Embassy faded. However, after (March 23) the 'DEMPS published a telegram in whioh Osusky sought the help of Herriot. It was obvious that the telegram was inspired by French circles. Osusky then told journalists (and the French press ga,ve this wide publicity) that he was remaining in the embassy to continue to represent the interests of his countrymen in France. The French Government then assured Osusky that it would continue to recogni2e him as tJhe accredited ambassador so that he could keep on looking after the interests of Czecho-,Slovakia. These interests, however, could not re 1 ate to the Czecho-S1ovak Republic which factually did not exist. 0susky could hold his position because there were some 50,000 former Czecho../Slovak citizens in France, the overwhelming majority of whom were Slovaks. They were concentrated in the environs of Paris, Strassburg, and Lille. How did Osusky protect their interests? By forcing them to join the Czecho-Slovak Legion! As a result of French action, the Germans were not even able to take over the Czech consulates in France. What happened with Cerny and the embassy personnel for whom he spoke? He changed his "line" after the publication of Osusky's telegram in the French press, so that everything and everybody at the Czecho-Slovak Embassy came into line with Osusky. • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Peace Policy of the USSR - Our Alliance," is the theme of the lecture which will be delivered by Minister Dr. Hubert Ripka in the Prague Central Li:brary on Friday, October 31, 1947, at 7:30 P. M. The lecture is being sponsored by the Committee for the Celebration of the 30th Annirversary of the Revolution." (The Czech SVOBODNE SLOVO, 10-30-47).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Stephen Osuský and March 1939 Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 65-68 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/96c88b0c43ad0dee0c1922896b17068a.pdf 9a5cce28c1f8b40e16f0754233eab5dc PDF Text Text 58 SLOVAKIA ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG A Survey of Slovak Church Music BY ,SISTE R M. PASCH AL , SS. C. M. Characterized from the very dawn of history as a singing people, the 'S lovaks readily consecrated this talent to God's service when the glad tidings of the Gospel were brought to them more than eleven hundred years ago. Christianization of the Slovaks dates back to the ninth century, to the consecration of the first Catholic church, built by Prince Pribina in Nitra in 833. Thereafter, down through the centuries, the Slovak people have been praising God with hymns and songs. In prosperity and in adversity, in the humble church of an obscure village as well as in a baroque cathedral like that of Kosice, at the simple tasks about the home as well as on festive pilgrimages, centuries ago as well as in our own day the hymn and the chant are offered to God by generation after generation of Slovak Catholics. In recent times Slovak congregational singing attracted considerable attention during the pilgrimages which the Federation of Slovak Catholics sponsored to shrines in Canada, New York, Philadelphia, Scranton, and Washington, D. C. Onlokers were frankly amazed at the spectacle. Rarely, if ever, had they seen such large groups united in prayerful song. It is truly an inspiration to hear the Slovaks sing at their religious services especially where there is congregational participation. How did the ancestors of Modern Slovaks develop their religious music and how closely does it follow the spirit of the liturgy ? From the earliest Christian era the Catholic Church has solicitously guarded the art and purity of music in Her public worship. In this respect Church authori'ties in Slovakia were exceptionally vigilant. The Byzantine rite with its exquisitely melodic liturgy was introduced amonf the Slovaks by SS. Cyril and Methodius in 863. Through their apostles the Slovak people likewise learned to foster a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, a devotion which is so deeply rooted among the �SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks that in most of their churches it is still customary for the Rosary Society to sing Marian hymns in public procession after High Mass on the first Sunday of the month. The saintly brothers translated the missal (Kievsky misal), the ritual (Euchologium Sinajske), the breviary and a collection of liturgical hymns (strumicky oktoich) into Old Slavonic. When they visited Rome to confer with the Holy Father, Pope Adrian LI placed these liturgical books on the Blessed Virgin's altar and blessed them. Then he permitted SS. Cyril and Methodius to use the Slavonic language in the Hturgy. "Hospodine, pomiluj ny," whose author very likely was St. Methodius himself, is the only hymn preserved from that period. For several centuries the development of religious music was halted by persecutions directed against the Old Slavonic liturgy and sterile period followed. By the twelfth century, however, various diocesan synods began to approve directives for liturgical singing. A summary of the most important of these would include the following: In 1114 the Synod of Ostrihom legislated that only hymns approved by Church authorities be used in the churches. In 1494 the Synod of Nitra directed that Holy Mass be accompanied with singing in all parish churches. The Synod of Trnava in 1560 commanded under pain of censure that no hymns either in the vernacular or in Latin be admitted for church use unless it could be ascertained that they had been approved by ecclesiastical authorities over a hundred years ago, lest the faithful by 'their very attraction to exercises of devotion be misled into heresy. In 1638 the Synod of Trnava char.ged a committee of competent musicians to collect liturgical hymns sung by the people and have them presented to Church authorities for approval and publication. This measure was needed to guard against the infiltration of Protestant influence which tried to establish itself with the seventeenth century's creation and importation of new homes. Composers of proved merit contributed to ~andard collections of �60 SLOVAKIA Slovak hymns and preserved acceptable manuscript copies. One such manuscript collection was Antifonae et cantiones variae cum notis musicis Slavonice et latine. rt comprises 338 sheets of copy. Another which is dated 1657 was Cantilenae conventus Lauritani ord. Serv. B. V. M. An even greater revival was brought about when the Slovak Jesuits founded the Catholic University of Trnava in 1635. In accordance with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent (1545-1'563) they collected the ancient Slovak liturgical hymns and prepared for the press the first printed Slovak hymnal Cantus Catholici. lt was published in two editions: in 1655 and in 1700 and it has been proved that its compiler was a Slovak Jesuit, Benedikt Szollossi (1601:J1656). Cantus Catholici has three hundred eighteen pages of unisonous hymns. Of these, sixty-two are Latin and two hundred twenty-seven are Slovak. In 1937 Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky revived about seventy hymns from the threehundred-year-old Cantus Catholici by introducing a modernized form of them in the Jedno,tny katolicky spevnik of which we shall speak presently. Cantus C3itholici is uniquely valuable from the musical standpoint inasmuch as its sources are traceable to Gregorian Chant. The ancient Slovak hymns preserved in it exemplify the use of tropes among the Slavs as early as the close of the Middle Ages. Tropes, of course, are a more or less poe'tical commentary that is woven into the liturgical text, forming with it a complete unit ; it is an interpolation in a liturgical text or the embellishment brought about by such interpolation, that is, insertions or additions. Let us take the Kyrie E1eison from tlhe Ordinary of the Mass as an example. On the last syllable of the "Kyrie" where a melisma was sung, a phrase or a stanza was composed to fit the melisma. In this way some additional text was inserted between the "Kyrie" and the "eleison." Consequently, a melismatic Kyrie had nine stanzaic insertions. The Gregorian Kyrie II in mode 3 carried this interpolation thus: Kyrie - fons bonitatis, Pater ingeniti, a quo cuncta procedunt - eleison. The Cau.tus Catholici has a �SLOVAKIA 61 closely paralleled translation of this interpolation: Hospodine, studnice dobrotj, Otce nerozeny, od teba wssecko dobre pochazi - smiluj sa natl nami. This is one example of how the ancient vernacular hymns of the Slovaks were developed in Gregorian style, characterized pricipally by the use of modal modulations and cadences ending on the dominant. It is interesting to note that a number of Slovak folk songs (of which there are some 40,000) were also developed in the same manner. The Latin preface of the Cantus Catholici points out the fact that the liturgy was performed in the vernacular at the altar and in choir. The hymns and psalms taug,ht in church were frequently repeated with much spirit at recreation and feasts, in the vineyards and in the field. In the course of time manuscripts of church music were collected by interested individuals. Outstanding among the composers and compilers were Pavlin Bajan (1783), a Franciscan; and later Andrej Radlinsky and Frantisek Sasinek, two priests who made a noteworthy contribution by their 1872 publication of Vseobecna sbierka cirkevnych katolickych pesniciek slovenskych, which contained 1,047 hymns. The Society of St. Adalbert commissioned Frantisek Matzenauer, a priest director, and Joseph Mathulay, an organist, to write the accompaniments for the above mentioned collection. The result was Duchovny spevnik katolicky (1882). In response to the November 22, 1903 "Motu Proprio" of St. Pius X , a national hymnal entitled Nabozny kresfan containing 400 hymns was compiled by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka and Joseph Chladek in 1906. A unique contribution to Catholic Slovak hymnody is the voluminous Jednotny katolicky spevnik (1937). lt was projected at a meeting held by the Society of St. Adalbert on March 8, 1921, when in the presence of three newly consecrated Slovak bishops and at their direction it was resolved to compile and publish a new hymnal. Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky, a highly reputable Slovak composer, was commissioned to harmonize and arrange the Slovak hymns. Committees on liturgy, literature, and hymnody collaborated with Schneider-Trnavs'ky in this re- �62 SLOVAKIA sponsible undertaking. For ten years they devoted themselves to the dedicated work of collecting the treasures of Slovak Church music, to discriminate, to discard whatever might be classified as undesirable and to preserve or to restore all that was worthy. The Committees observed the directives contained in the "Motu Proprio" of Pope Pius X and in the "Apostolic Constitution (December 22, 1928) of Pope Pius XI. The extensive bibliography enumerates references to thirty-three printed hymnals and onehundred-four printed manuals and prayer books; six manuscript collections of hymns without melodies and ten manuscript collections with melodies. All these were studied with scholarly diligence. Of the five hundred forty-one hymns listed in the index of the Jednotny katolicky spevnik those devoted to Christmas, Lent, the Blessed Sacrament, and the Blessed Virgin Mary are most largely represented. The contents are arranged according to the liturgical year with specific recommedations for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, for liturgical processions, and for various other religious functions. Out of consideration for the needs of the congregation, the limitations of school children, and the abilities of trained choirs who would use the hymnal, the compiler also included carols, hymns for pilgrimages, choral Slovak Mass hymns, and Latin hymns. It may be asked what qualities characterize Slovak liturgical and reltgious hymns. Careful study will show that it is their singular charm to have those very characteristics which are recommended in the "Musicae Sacrae Disciplina" (December 25, 1955) of Pope Pius Xfil. Slovak hymns confirm fully to Christian teaching, they use simple tunes and simple words, and they possess religious dignity and becoming gravity. They make no provisions for brilliant solos, they exhibit no florid styles, no elaborate cadences, no suggestive worldliness or sentimentality to distract the devotion of the worshippers. The music of the Mass hymns is consonant with the religious expression contained in the texts of the Ordinary of the Mass. As a matter of fact the very text of the �SLOVAKIA 63 Mass hymns is a close paraphrase of the text of the Ordinary. These Mass hymns are still sung in Slovak parish churches both in America and abroad during the Missa Cantata. By them the choir and the congregation are enabled to unite closely with the priest in the sacred action of the Mass. Most of the hymns for Lent and Advent are written in a minor tonality and express sincere expectation, longing, love, hope, and sorrow. Diatonic progressions and sequential melodic passages make the tunes naturally singable, and the inert musical signs of the Christmas and Easter hymns come to life best when they are sung and played by souls radiating a great love for God. Marian hymns expand the praises sung in honor of the Mother of God to very numerous lines comprising more than one hundred hymns. Generally the refrain reiterates the message of her feasts or a particular supplication. Hymns in honor of the Blessed Sacrament and the Saints as well as pilgrimages and processional hymns vary in their messages and expressions but they retain the same commendable simplicity of melody subordinated to the prayerfulness of the words. The melodic structure of the Chant depends on the accent which is the soul of the Latin word. Slovak vernacular hymns which are reliable translations from Latin texts are easily adapted to Gregorian Chant since the accent and the word order of the Slovak language readily correspond to the Latin original in very many instances. A few hymns that illustrate this adaptability from Latin to Slovak are : Stabat Mater - Sta.la Matka (Sequence) Lauda Sion - Chval' Sione (Sequence) Pange Lingua - Javte usta Adore Te - Klaniam sa Ti J esu Dulcis - J ezu sladky The genuineness and the excellence of Slovak hymn tones was recognized by such an authority as Nicola A. Montani, the compiler of the Saint Gregory Hymnal (1920). �64 SLOVAKIA Mr. Montani incorporated into this American hymn book over twenty Slovak hymn tunes for which he adapted English texts and one setting for the "Tantum Ergo." In his encyclical on sacred music the late Pope Pius XII mentioned that hymns are effective in the religious instruction of boys and girls. It is worthy of mention that children in iSlovakia sang their catechism at least as early as 1913. Andrej Camba!, a Slovak Jesuit, translated into Slovak the catechism hymns originally used by Ignac Parhamer, a Jesuit missionary who instructed the people of Austria-Hungary in the eighteenth century. In his preface Father Camba! wrote : "I present this Catechism to you in song, that you may learn Christian Doctrine in a delightful manner and have it well impressed upon your minds." This survey may help to show how rich is the heritage of sacred music which has been preserved by the Slovak people, who justly pride themselves on having 2,000 hymns in their treasury of music. These hymns are the expression of the mind and heart of the Church regarding sacred music. They also embody the joyous and prayerful spirit of a singing people. (Caecilia, Vol. 85, No. 2) • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Iaitest stateanenJts ail.ways stres.setl, tihait OUT pact of alliamce with Soviet Russia and our friendshl!p with other Slav nations mwst not encroa;ch on o:ur friendly and cordiail relations with other dean0teratic states. This is .the natural desire, shared 1b y an enormous majority of our people, and nothing presvents us :fu-oan keeping the cc:xruftdence of the democratic states and stTe:nigthenmg and deepening our friendshl!p with our great western Allies. Moscow, too, wants ro fumow this line of po:lircy. rt will, however, be necessary for certain ,preijrumces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiil existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozeicho-Silovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � 58 SLOVAKIA ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG A Survey of Slovak Church Music BY ,SISTE R M. PASCH AL , SS. C. M. Characterized from the very dawn of history as a singing people, the 'S lovaks readily consecrated this talent to God's service when the glad tidings of the Gospel were brought to them more than eleven hundred years ago. Christianization of the Slovaks dates back to the ninth century, to the consecration of the first Catholic church, built by Prince Pribina in Nitra in 833. Thereafter, down through the centuries, the Slovak people have been praising God with hymns and songs. In prosperity and in adversity, in the humble church of an obscure village as well as in a baroque cathedral like that of Kosice, at the simple tasks about the home as well as on festive pilgrimages, centuries ago as well as in our own day the hymn and the chant are offered to God by generation after generation of Slovak Catholics. In recent times Slovak congregational singing attracted considerable attention during the pilgrimages which the Federation of Slovak Catholics sponsored to shrines in Canada, New York, Philadelphia, Scranton, and Washington, D. C. Onlokers were frankly amazed at the spectacle. Rarely, if ever, had they seen such large groups united in prayerful song. It is truly an inspiration to hear the Slovaks sing at their religious services especially where there is congregational participation. How did the ancestors of Modern Slovaks develop their religious music and how closely does it follow the spirit of the liturgy ? From the earliest Christian era the Catholic Church has solicitously guarded the art and purity of music in Her public worship. In this respect Church authori'ties in Slovakia were exceptionally vigilant. The Byzantine rite with its exquisitely melodic liturgy was introduced amonf the Slovaks by SS. Cyril and Methodius in 863. Through their apostles the Slovak people likewise learned to foster a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, a devotion which is so deeply rooted among the �SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks that in most of their churches it is still customary for the Rosary Society to sing Marian hymns in public procession after High Mass on the first Sunday of the month. The saintly brothers translated the missal (Kievsky misal), the ritual (Euchologium Sinajske), the breviary and a collection of liturgical hymns (strumicky oktoich) into Old Slavonic. When they visited Rome to confer with the Holy Father, Pope Adrian LI placed these liturgical books on the Blessed Virgin's altar and blessed them. Then he permitted SS. Cyril and Methodius to use the Slavonic language in the Hturgy. "Hospodine, pomiluj ny," whose author very likely was St. Methodius himself, is the only hymn preserved from that period. For several centuries the development of religious music was halted by persecutions directed against the Old Slavonic liturgy and sterile period followed. By the twelfth century, however, various diocesan synods began to approve directives for liturgical singing. A summary of the most important of these would include the following: In 1114 the Synod of Ostrihom legislated that only hymns approved by Church authorities be used in the churches. In 1494 the Synod of Nitra directed that Holy Mass be accompanied with singing in all parish churches. The Synod of Trnava in 1560 commanded under pain of censure that no hymns either in the vernacular or in Latin be admitted for church use unless it could be ascertained that they had been approved by ecclesiastical authorities over a hundred years ago, lest the faithful by 'their very attraction to exercises of devotion be misled into heresy. In 1638 the Synod of Trnava char.ged a committee of competent musicians to collect liturgical hymns sung by the people and have them presented to Church authorities for approval and publication. This measure was needed to guard against the infiltration of Protestant influence which tried to establish itself with the seventeenth century's creation and importation of new homes. Composers of proved merit contributed to ~andard collections of �60 SLOVAKIA Slovak hymns and preserved acceptable manuscript copies. One such manuscript collection was Antifonae et cantiones variae cum notis musicis Slavonice et latine. rt comprises 338 sheets of copy. Another which is dated 1657 was Cantilenae conventus Lauritani ord. Serv. B. V. M. An even greater revival was brought about when the Slovak Jesuits founded the Catholic University of Trnava in 1635. In accordance with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent (1545-1'563) they collected the ancient Slovak liturgical hymns and prepared for the press the first printed Slovak hymnal Cantus Catholici. lt was published in two editions: in 1655 and in 1700 and it has been proved that its compiler was a Slovak Jesuit, Benedikt Szollossi (1601:J1656). Cantus Catholici has three hundred eighteen pages of unisonous hymns. Of these, sixty-two are Latin and two hundred twenty-seven are Slovak. In 1937 Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky revived about seventy hymns from the threehundred-year-old Cantus Catholici by introducing a modernized form of them in the Jedno,tny katolicky spevnik of which we shall speak presently. Cantus C3itholici is uniquely valuable from the musical standpoint inasmuch as its sources are traceable to Gregorian Chant. The ancient Slovak hymns preserved in it exemplify the use of tropes among the Slavs as early as the close of the Middle Ages. Tropes, of course, are a more or less poe'tical commentary that is woven into the liturgical text, forming with it a complete unit ; it is an interpolation in a liturgical text or the embellishment brought about by such interpolation, that is, insertions or additions. Let us take the Kyrie E1eison from tlhe Ordinary of the Mass as an example. On the last syllable of the "Kyrie" where a melisma was sung, a phrase or a stanza was composed to fit the melisma. In this way some additional text was inserted between the "Kyrie" and the "eleison." Consequently, a melismatic Kyrie had nine stanzaic insertions. The Gregorian Kyrie II in mode 3 carried this interpolation thus: Kyrie - fons bonitatis, Pater ingeniti, a quo cuncta procedunt - eleison. The Cau.tus Catholici has a �SLOVAKIA 61 closely paralleled translation of this interpolation: Hospodine, studnice dobrotj, Otce nerozeny, od teba wssecko dobre pochazi - smiluj sa natl nami. This is one example of how the ancient vernacular hymns of the Slovaks were developed in Gregorian style, characterized pricipally by the use of modal modulations and cadences ending on the dominant. It is interesting to note that a number of Slovak folk songs (of which there are some 40,000) were also developed in the same manner. The Latin preface of the Cantus Catholici points out the fact that the liturgy was performed in the vernacular at the altar and in choir. The hymns and psalms taug,ht in church were frequently repeated with much spirit at recreation and feasts, in the vineyards and in the field. In the course of time manuscripts of church music were collected by interested individuals. Outstanding among the composers and compilers were Pavlin Bajan (1783), a Franciscan; and later Andrej Radlinsky and Frantisek Sasinek, two priests who made a noteworthy contribution by their 1872 publication of Vseobecna sbierka cirkevnych katolickych pesniciek slovenskych, which contained 1,047 hymns. The Society of St. Adalbert commissioned Frantisek Matzenauer, a priest director, and Joseph Mathulay, an organist, to write the accompaniments for the above mentioned collection. The result was Duchovny spevnik katolicky (1882). In response to the November 22, 1903 "Motu Proprio" of St. Pius X , a national hymnal entitled Nabozny kresfan containing 400 hymns was compiled by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka and Joseph Chladek in 1906. A unique contribution to Catholic Slovak hymnody is the voluminous Jednotny katolicky spevnik (1937). lt was projected at a meeting held by the Society of St. Adalbert on March 8, 1921, when in the presence of three newly consecrated Slovak bishops and at their direction it was resolved to compile and publish a new hymnal. Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky, a highly reputable Slovak composer, was commissioned to harmonize and arrange the Slovak hymns. Committees on liturgy, literature, and hymnody collaborated with Schneider-Trnavs'ky in this re- �62 SLOVAKIA sponsible undertaking. For ten years they devoted themselves to the dedicated work of collecting the treasures of Slovak Church music, to discriminate, to discard whatever might be classified as undesirable and to preserve or to restore all that was worthy. The Committees observed the directives contained in the "Motu Proprio" of Pope Pius X and in the "Apostolic Constitution (December 22, 1928) of Pope Pius XI. The extensive bibliography enumerates references to thirty-three printed hymnals and onehundred-four printed manuals and prayer books; six manuscript collections of hymns without melodies and ten manuscript collections with melodies. All these were studied with scholarly diligence. Of the five hundred forty-one hymns listed in the index of the Jednotny katolicky spevnik those devoted to Christmas, Lent, the Blessed Sacrament, and the Blessed Virgin Mary are most largely represented. The contents are arranged according to the liturgical year with specific recommedations for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, for liturgical processions, and for various other religious functions. Out of consideration for the needs of the congregation, the limitations of school children, and the abilities of trained choirs who would use the hymnal, the compiler also included carols, hymns for pilgrimages, choral Slovak Mass hymns, and Latin hymns. It may be asked what qualities characterize Slovak liturgical and reltgious hymns. Careful study will show that it is their singular charm to have those very characteristics which are recommended in the "Musicae Sacrae Disciplina" (December 25, 1955) of Pope Pius Xfil. Slovak hymns confirm fully to Christian teaching, they use simple tunes and simple words, and they possess religious dignity and becoming gravity. They make no provisions for brilliant solos, they exhibit no florid styles, no elaborate cadences, no suggestive worldliness or sentimentality to distract the devotion of the worshippers. The music of the Mass hymns is consonant with the religious expression contained in the texts of the Ordinary of the Mass. As a matter of fact the very text of the �SLOVAKIA 63 Mass hymns is a close paraphrase of the text of the Ordinary. These Mass hymns are still sung in Slovak parish churches both in America and abroad during the Missa Cantata. By them the choir and the congregation are enabled to unite closely with the priest in the sacred action of the Mass. Most of the hymns for Lent and Advent are written in a minor tonality and express sincere expectation, longing, love, hope, and sorrow. Diatonic progressions and sequential melodic passages make the tunes naturally singable, and the inert musical signs of the Christmas and Easter hymns come to life best when they are sung and played by souls radiating a great love for God. Marian hymns expand the praises sung in honor of the Mother of God to very numerous lines comprising more than one hundred hymns. Generally the refrain reiterates the message of her feasts or a particular supplication. Hymns in honor of the Blessed Sacrament and the Saints as well as pilgrimages and processional hymns vary in their messages and expressions but they retain the same commendable simplicity of melody subordinated to the prayerfulness of the words. The melodic structure of the Chant depends on the accent which is the soul of the Latin word. Slovak vernacular hymns which are reliable translations from Latin texts are easily adapted to Gregorian Chant since the accent and the word order of the Slovak language readily correspond to the Latin original in very many instances. A few hymns that illustrate this adaptability from Latin to Slovak are : Stabat Mater - Sta.la Matka (Sequence) Lauda Sion - Chval' Sione (Sequence) Pange Lingua - Javte usta Adore Te - Klaniam sa Ti J esu Dulcis - J ezu sladky The genuineness and the excellence of Slovak hymn tones was recognized by such an authority as Nicola A. Montani, the compiler of the Saint Gregory Hymnal (1920). �64 SLOVAKIA Mr. Montani incorporated into this American hymn book over twenty Slovak hymn tunes for which he adapted English texts and one setting for the "Tantum Ergo." In his encyclical on sacred music the late Pope Pius XII mentioned that hymns are effective in the religious instruction of boys and girls. It is worthy of mention that children in iSlovakia sang their catechism at least as early as 1913. Andrej Camba!, a Slovak Jesuit, translated into Slovak the catechism hymns originally used by Ignac Parhamer, a Jesuit missionary who instructed the people of Austria-Hungary in the eighteenth century. In his preface Father Camba! wrote : "I present this Catechism to you in song, that you may learn Christian Doctrine in a delightful manner and have it well impressed upon your minds." This survey may help to show how rich is the heritage of sacred music which has been preserved by the Slovak people, who justly pride themselves on having 2,000 hymns in their treasury of music. These hymns are the expression of the mind and heart of the Church regarding sacred music. They also embody the joyous and prayerful spirit of a singing people. (Caecilia, Vol. 85, No. 2) • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Iaitest stateanenJts ail.ways stres.setl, tihait OUT pact of alliamce with Soviet Russia and our friendshl!p with other Slav nations mwst not encroa;ch on o:ur friendly and cordiail relations with other dean0teratic states. This is .the natural desire, shared 1b y an enormous majority of our people, and nothing presvents us :fu-oan keeping the cc:xruftdence of the democratic states and stTe:nigthenmg and deepening our friendshl!p with our great western Allies. Moscow, too, wants ro fumow this line of po:lircy. rt will, however, be necessary for certain ,preijrumces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiil existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozeicho-Silovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 58 SLOVAKIA ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG A Survey of Slovak Church Music BY ,SISTE R M. PASCH AL , SS. C. M. Characterized from the very dawn of history as a singing people, the 'S lovaks readily consecrated this talent to God's service when the glad tidings of the Gospel were brought to them more than eleven hundred years ago. Christianization of the Slovaks dates back to the ninth century, to the consecration of the first Catholic church, built by Prince Pribina in Nitra in 833. Thereafter, down through the centuries, the Slovak people have been praising God with hymns and songs. In prosperity and in adversity, in the humble church of an obscure village as well as in a baroque cathedral like that of Kosice, at the simple tasks about the home as well as on festive pilgrimages, centuries ago as well as in our own day the hymn and the chant are offered to God by generation after generation of Slovak Catholics. In recent times Slovak congregational singing attracted considerable attention during the pilgrimages which the Federation of Slovak Catholics sponsored to shrines in Canada, New York, Philadelphia, Scranton, and Washington, D. C. Onlokers were frankly amazed at the spectacle. Rarely, if ever, had they seen such large groups united in prayerful song. It is truly an inspiration to hear the Slovaks sing at their religious services especially where there is congregational participation. How did the ancestors of Modern Slovaks develop their religious music and how closely does it follow the spirit of the liturgy ? From the earliest Christian era the Catholic Church has solicitously guarded the art and purity of music in Her public worship. In this respect Church authori'ties in Slovakia were exceptionally vigilant. The Byzantine rite with its exquisitely melodic liturgy was introduced amonf the Slovaks by SS. Cyril and Methodius in 863. Through their apostles the Slovak people likewise learned to foster a special devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary, a devotion which is so deeply rooted among the SLOVAKIA 59 Slovaks that in most of their churches it is still customary for the Rosary Society to sing Marian hymns in public procession after High Mass on the first Sunday of the month. The saintly brothers translated the missal (Kievsky misal), the ritual (Euchologium Sinajske), the breviary and a collection of liturgical hymns (strumicky oktoich) into Old Slavonic. When they visited Rome to confer with the Holy Father, Pope Adrian LI placed these liturgical books on the Blessed Virgin's altar and blessed them. Then he permitted SS. Cyril and Methodius to use the Slavonic language in the Hturgy. "Hospodine, pomiluj ny," whose author very likely was St. Methodius himself, is the only hymn preserved from that period. For several centuries the development of religious music was halted by persecutions directed against the Old Slavonic liturgy and sterile period followed. By the twelfth century, however, various diocesan synods began to approve directives for liturgical singing. A summary of the most important of these would include the following: In 1114 the Synod of Ostrihom legislated that only hymns approved by Church authorities be used in the churches. In 1494 the Synod of Nitra directed that Holy Mass be accompanied with singing in all parish churches. The Synod of Trnava in 1560 commanded under pain of censure that no hymns either in the vernacular or in Latin be admitted for church use unless it could be ascertained that they had been approved by ecclesiastical authorities over a hundred years ago, lest the faithful by 'their very attraction to exercises of devotion be misled into heresy. In 1638 the Synod of Trnava char.ged a committee of competent musicians to collect liturgical hymns sung by the people and have them presented to Church authorities for approval and publication. This measure was needed to guard against the infiltration of Protestant influence which tried to establish itself with the seventeenth century's creation and importation of new homes. Composers of proved merit contributed to ~andard collections of 60 SLOVAKIA Slovak hymns and preserved acceptable manuscript copies. One such manuscript collection was Antifonae et cantiones variae cum notis musicis Slavonice et latine. rt comprises 338 sheets of copy. Another which is dated 1657 was Cantilenae conventus Lauritani ord. Serv. B. V. M. An even greater revival was brought about when the Slovak Jesuits founded the Catholic University of Trnava in 1635. In accordance with the prescriptions of the Council of Trent (1545-1'563) they collected the ancient Slovak liturgical hymns and prepared for the press the first printed Slovak hymnal Cantus Catholici. lt was published in two editions: in 1655 and in 1700 and it has been proved that its compiler was a Slovak Jesuit, Benedikt Szollossi (1601:J1656). Cantus Catholici has three hundred eighteen pages of unisonous hymns. Of these, sixty-two are Latin and two hundred twenty-seven are Slovak. In 1937 Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky revived about seventy hymns from the threehundred-year-old Cantus Catholici by introducing a modernized form of them in the Jedno,tny katolicky spevnik of which we shall speak presently. Cantus C3itholici is uniquely valuable from the musical standpoint inasmuch as its sources are traceable to Gregorian Chant. The ancient Slovak hymns preserved in it exemplify the use of tropes among the Slavs as early as the close of the Middle Ages. Tropes, of course, are a more or less poe'tical commentary that is woven into the liturgical text, forming with it a complete unit ; it is an interpolation in a liturgical text or the embellishment brought about by such interpolation, that is, insertions or additions. Let us take the Kyrie E1eison from tlhe Ordinary of the Mass as an example. On the last syllable of the "Kyrie" where a melisma was sung, a phrase or a stanza was composed to fit the melisma. In this way some additional text was inserted between the "Kyrie" and the "eleison." Consequently, a melismatic Kyrie had nine stanzaic insertions. The Gregorian Kyrie II in mode 3 carried this interpolation thus: Kyrie - fons bonitatis, Pater ingeniti, a quo cuncta procedunt - eleison. The Cau.tus Catholici has a SLOVAKIA 61 closely paralleled translation of this interpolation: Hospodine, studnice dobrotj, Otce nerozeny, od teba wssecko dobre pochazi - smiluj sa natl nami. This is one example of how the ancient vernacular hymns of the Slovaks were developed in Gregorian style, characterized pricipally by the use of modal modulations and cadences ending on the dominant. It is interesting to note that a number of Slovak folk songs (of which there are some 40,000) were also developed in the same manner. The Latin preface of the Cantus Catholici points out the fact that the liturgy was performed in the vernacular at the altar and in choir. The hymns and psalms taug,ht in church were frequently repeated with much spirit at recreation and feasts, in the vineyards and in the field. In the course of time manuscripts of church music were collected by interested individuals. Outstanding among the composers and compilers were Pavlin Bajan (1783), a Franciscan; and later Andrej Radlinsky and Frantisek Sasinek, two priests who made a noteworthy contribution by their 1872 publication of Vseobecna sbierka cirkevnych katolickych pesniciek slovenskych, which contained 1,047 hymns. The Society of St. Adalbert commissioned Frantisek Matzenauer, a priest director, and Joseph Mathulay, an organist, to write the accompaniments for the above mentioned collection. The result was Duchovny spevnik katolicky (1882). In response to the November 22, 1903 "Motu Proprio" of St. Pius X , a national hymnal entitled Nabozny kresfan containing 400 hymns was compiled by Msgr. Andrej Hlinka and Joseph Chladek in 1906. A unique contribution to Catholic Slovak hymnody is the voluminous Jednotny katolicky spevnik (1937). lt was projected at a meeting held by the Society of St. Adalbert on March 8, 1921, when in the presence of three newly consecrated Slovak bishops and at their direction it was resolved to compile and publish a new hymnal. Mikulas Schneider-Trnavsky, a highly reputable Slovak composer, was commissioned to harmonize and arrange the Slovak hymns. Committees on liturgy, literature, and hymnody collaborated with Schneider-Trnavs'ky in this re- 62 SLOVAKIA sponsible undertaking. For ten years they devoted themselves to the dedicated work of collecting the treasures of Slovak Church music, to discriminate, to discard whatever might be classified as undesirable and to preserve or to restore all that was worthy. The Committees observed the directives contained in the "Motu Proprio" of Pope Pius X and in the "Apostolic Constitution (December 22, 1928) of Pope Pius XI. The extensive bibliography enumerates references to thirty-three printed hymnals and onehundred-four printed manuals and prayer books; six manuscript collections of hymns without melodies and ten manuscript collections with melodies. All these were studied with scholarly diligence. Of the five hundred forty-one hymns listed in the index of the Jednotny katolicky spevnik those devoted to Christmas, Lent, the Blessed Sacrament, and the Blessed Virgin Mary are most largely represented. The contents are arranged according to the liturgical year with specific recommedations for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, for liturgical processions, and for various other religious functions. Out of consideration for the needs of the congregation, the limitations of school children, and the abilities of trained choirs who would use the hymnal, the compiler also included carols, hymns for pilgrimages, choral Slovak Mass hymns, and Latin hymns. It may be asked what qualities characterize Slovak liturgical and reltgious hymns. Careful study will show that it is their singular charm to have those very characteristics which are recommended in the "Musicae Sacrae Disciplina" (December 25, 1955) of Pope Pius Xfil. Slovak hymns confirm fully to Christian teaching, they use simple tunes and simple words, and they possess religious dignity and becoming gravity. They make no provisions for brilliant solos, they exhibit no florid styles, no elaborate cadences, no suggestive worldliness or sentimentality to distract the devotion of the worshippers. The music of the Mass hymns is consonant with the religious expression contained in the texts of the Ordinary of the Mass. As a matter of fact the very text of the SLOVAKIA 63 Mass hymns is a close paraphrase of the text of the Ordinary. These Mass hymns are still sung in Slovak parish churches both in America and abroad during the Missa Cantata. By them the choir and the congregation are enabled to unite closely with the priest in the sacred action of the Mass. Most of the hymns for Lent and Advent are written in a minor tonality and express sincere expectation, longing, love, hope, and sorrow. Diatonic progressions and sequential melodic passages make the tunes naturally singable, and the inert musical signs of the Christmas and Easter hymns come to life best when they are sung and played by souls radiating a great love for God. Marian hymns expand the praises sung in honor of the Mother of God to very numerous lines comprising more than one hundred hymns. Generally the refrain reiterates the message of her feasts or a particular supplication. Hymns in honor of the Blessed Sacrament and the Saints as well as pilgrimages and processional hymns vary in their messages and expressions but they retain the same commendable simplicity of melody subordinated to the prayerfulness of the words. The melodic structure of the Chant depends on the accent which is the soul of the Latin word. Slovak vernacular hymns which are reliable translations from Latin texts are easily adapted to Gregorian Chant since the accent and the word order of the Slovak language readily correspond to the Latin original in very many instances. A few hymns that illustrate this adaptability from Latin to Slovak are : Stabat Mater - Sta.la Matka (Sequence) Lauda Sion - Chval' Sione (Sequence) Pange Lingua - Javte usta Adore Te - Klaniam sa Ti J esu Dulcis - J ezu sladky The genuineness and the excellence of Slovak hymn tones was recognized by such an authority as Nicola A. Montani, the compiler of the Saint Gregory Hymnal (1920). 64 SLOVAKIA Mr. Montani incorporated into this American hymn book over twenty Slovak hymn tunes for which he adapted English texts and one setting for the "Tantum Ergo." In his encyclical on sacred music the late Pope Pius XII mentioned that hymns are effective in the religious instruction of boys and girls. It is worthy of mention that children in iSlovakia sang their catechism at least as early as 1913. Andrej Camba!, a Slovak Jesuit, translated into Slovak the catechism hymns originally used by Ignac Parhamer, a Jesuit missionary who instructed the people of Austria-Hungary in the eighteenth century. In his preface Father Camba! wrote : "I present this Catechism to you in song, that you may learn Christian Doctrine in a delightful manner and have it well impressed upon your minds." This survey may help to show how rich is the heritage of sacred music which has been preserved by the Slovak people, who justly pride themselves on having 2,000 hymns in their treasury of music. These hymns are the expression of the mind and heart of the Church regarding sacred music. They also embody the joyous and prayerful spirit of a singing people. (Caecilia, Vol. 85, No. 2) • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his Iaitest stateanenJts ail.ways stres.setl, tihait OUT pact of alliamce with Soviet Russia and our friendshl!p with other Slav nations mwst not encroa;ch on o:ur friendly and cordiail relations with other dean0teratic states. This is .the natural desire, shared 1b y an enormous majority of our people, and nothing presvents us :fu-oan keeping the cc:xruftdence of the democratic states and stTe:nigthenmg and deepening our friendshl!p with our great western Allies. Moscow, too, wants ro fumow this line of po:lircy. rt will, however, be necessary for certain ,preijrumces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiil existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger of Ozeicho-Silovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Eleven Hundred Years of Prayerful Song: A Survey of Slovak Church Music Description An account of the resource Sister M. Paschal, SS.C.M. Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 58-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sister M. Paschal, SS.C.M. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0fcff6a2fbe2355dbb865f74581341f3.pdf d7a5df4e425f7e69a3af05a8c8c03079 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 55 THE KREMLIN HAS SHOWN ITS HAND Joseph Cieker It seems that the politicians, who have led and are still leading the destinies of the present time, have been charmed by some kind of enchantresses. They are unable to free themselves from the snares which had been placed for them by Communism. Nay, it would rather seem that the more it appears that they are getting free of them, the more they are really being entangled by them. Not th-at Communism has changed its content and its substance. Its substance and its goal is always the same. Only the strategy and tactics of Communism change. If leading political factors had actually devoted themselves responsibly and directly to the study of Communism, they would have undoubtedly found ,a definite course of action against it. The fact is that they have not. They rather concerned tJhemselves with its strategy and tactics. And the latter governed to a great extent their policies and diplomacy. Thus we were witnesses of the strategic and tactical squables, which perhaps, at times, led to temporary results, but in substance did not contribute to the solution of world Communism, which as a phenomenon simply will not be disputed or debated away and thereby even less to be minimized. Every strategic and tactical move of Communism is reacted to with more or less success, but the burden of the problem remains unchanged on the lives of nations. In fact the burden becomes greater with time. If these so-called victories of international non-Communist politics really were equal to the criteria which had been brought forth in connection with the various diplomatic reactions to the strategic and tactical undertakings of the Red Kremlin, then the power of international Communism would already have been broken. The fact that this power has not been broken is evidence of the fact that the victories were merely of a peripheral significance, and as such were frequently noted as brilliant actions of experimental patrols. We still have not sunk our teeth into the reality and substance of international Communism and into the body of the international policy of the Soviet Union. �56 SLOVAKIA Communism certainly is not a secret organization. Neither is the politics of the .Soviet Union. Entire libraries could be filled with literature about what Communism is, what it wants, and just how it aims to attain its ultimate goat However, even if this literature did not exist, we have before us the work of 40 years of international Communism and of the international politics of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, despite all this, leading politicians and diplomats of the West - with a few exceptions have yet to prove that they are seriously concerned about what Communism writes, talks, and does. As if all this were some sort of witchcraft. Beginning with Lenin and ending with Khrusohchev the basic principles of Communism have been clearly stated to the whole world. Leading figures of Communism have sworn time and again that they shall never abandon their goal no matter what the cost. They announced this by means of all possible forms. But it seems that the world deliberately closed its ears, so that it would not have to hear and then believe, and finally so that it would not have to proceed to serious and principal decisions. As an explanation Jet it suffice now to quote in this connection a part of a statement of a Soviet intellectual, the rector of the political School of Lenin Dmytryj Manuilsky, made twenty-eight years ago. During the past three decades many substantial changes have taken place in the Europe and world structure. During this time, international Communism has made far-reaching steps in its march to its ultimate goal. In 1931, Manuilsky, lecturing to the undergraduates of Moscow's Lenin School, said: War to the hilt between Communism and Capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course , we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 or 30 years. The bourgeoisie will have to be lulled to sleep first. So we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement in history. We shall make resounding declarations for the benefit of peace, friendship , and mutual international symphaties. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will be overjoyed to cooperate in their own destruction . They wi II leap at another chance to be our friend s. As soon as their guard is down and they are drunk with gullibil ity, · we shall leap on them and smash them with our fists. Nikita Khruschchev, the most experienced coexisten- �SLOVAKIA 57 tialist - noticing in 1955 that his speeches and recommendations in regard to coexistence are being explained altogether unilaterally by non-Communists for their own benefit and as a guarantee of permanent comfort, hurried to make the following clear: "It is true that we are adherents of coexistence, but at the same time we are also adherents of the expansion of Communism over the entire world. We are faced with the reality of the existence of two different systems in the world. You , the Capitalists, insist that you shall go your own way. Y o\! will do that until the day you realize that this has led you into a blind alley out of which there is no exit. Since you stubbornly hold to the idea that your system is not ancient and decadent enough, and since you think that you can compete with us, well, we have nothing against this. Time will prove who was right." Communism has placed its cards on the table to be seen by all in the game. It has shoved them under the very noses of its fellow players. For long decades it has never changed its game. It keeps on hammering the same tune all the time: we shall destroy you! But the nonCommunist world keeps whistling its own tune as it enters the blind alley from which there will be no way out as Nikita Khruschchev so clearly pointed out. The nonCommunist world apparently still does not have sufficient proof of what Communism really is and what it aims to attain. Stubbornly it keeps on asking the Kremlin to say it again. And then once again. After so many encores, the non-Communist world still is looking for some kind of a change of heart of the Kremlin. P erhaps, it thinks, after all these smiles there will follow a r evision of the entire Communist program. And who can say definitely that a palace r evolution in the Kremlin, or a quarrel between members of the Politbureau, or the fall of a Soviet Marshal, or a quarrel between Peking and Moscow, will not force a change of the ultimate goal? Wishful, useless thinking! All the questions which the non-Communist world has put and will put to the Kremlin have already been answered. At least the principal questions have been clearly answered. The others, the answers to peripheral questions, do not matter, because the problem posed by international Communism cannot be solved by them. � SLOVAKIA 55 THE KREMLIN HAS SHOWN ITS HAND Joseph Cieker It seems that the politicians, who have led and are still leading the destinies of the present time, have been charmed by some kind of enchantresses. They are unable to free themselves from the snares which had been placed for them by Communism. Nay, it would rather seem that the more it appears that they are getting free of them, the more they are really being entangled by them. Not th-at Communism has changed its content and its substance. Its substance and its goal is always the same. Only the strategy and tactics of Communism change. If leading political factors had actually devoted themselves responsibly and directly to the study of Communism, they would have undoubtedly found ,a definite course of action against it. The fact is that they have not. They rather concerned tJhemselves with its strategy and tactics. And the latter governed to a great extent their policies and diplomacy. Thus we were witnesses of the strategic and tactical squables, which perhaps, at times, led to temporary results, but in substance did not contribute to the solution of world Communism, which as a phenomenon simply will not be disputed or debated away and thereby even less to be minimized. Every strategic and tactical move of Communism is reacted to with more or less success, but the burden of the problem remains unchanged on the lives of nations. In fact the burden becomes greater with time. If these so-called victories of international non-Communist politics really were equal to the criteria which had been brought forth in connection with the various diplomatic reactions to the strategic and tactical undertakings of the Red Kremlin, then the power of international Communism would already have been broken. The fact that this power has not been broken is evidence of the fact that the victories were merely of a peripheral significance, and as such were frequently noted as brilliant actions of experimental patrols. We still have not sunk our teeth into the reality and substance of international Communism and into the body of the international policy of the Soviet Union. �56 SLOVAKIA Communism certainly is not a secret organization. Neither is the politics of the .Soviet Union. Entire libraries could be filled with literature about what Communism is, what it wants, and just how it aims to attain its ultimate goat However, even if this literature did not exist, we have before us the work of 40 years of international Communism and of the international politics of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, despite all this, leading politicians and diplomats of the West - with a few exceptions have yet to prove that they are seriously concerned about what Communism writes, talks, and does. As if all this were some sort of witchcraft. Beginning with Lenin and ending with Khrusohchev the basic principles of Communism have been clearly stated to the whole world. Leading figures of Communism have sworn time and again that they shall never abandon their goal no matter what the cost. They announced this by means of all possible forms. But it seems that the world deliberately closed its ears, so that it would not have to hear and then believe, and finally so that it would not have to proceed to serious and principal decisions. As an explanation Jet it suffice now to quote in this connection a part of a statement of a Soviet intellectual, the rector of the political School of Lenin Dmytryj Manuilsky, made twenty-eight years ago. During the past three decades many substantial changes have taken place in the Europe and world structure. During this time, international Communism has made far-reaching steps in its march to its ultimate goal. In 1931, Manuilsky, lecturing to the undergraduates of Moscow's Lenin School, said: War to the hilt between Communism and Capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course , we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 or 30 years. The bourgeoisie will have to be lulled to sleep first. So we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement in history. We shall make resounding declarations for the benefit of peace, friendship , and mutual international symphaties. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will be overjoyed to cooperate in their own destruction . They wi II leap at another chance to be our friend s. As soon as their guard is down and they are drunk with gullibil ity, · we shall leap on them and smash them with our fists. Nikita Khruschchev, the most experienced coexisten- �SLOVAKIA 57 tialist - noticing in 1955 that his speeches and recommendations in regard to coexistence are being explained altogether unilaterally by non-Communists for their own benefit and as a guarantee of permanent comfort, hurried to make the following clear: "It is true that we are adherents of coexistence, but at the same time we are also adherents of the expansion of Communism over the entire world. We are faced with the reality of the existence of two different systems in the world. You , the Capitalists, insist that you shall go your own way. Y o\! will do that until the day you realize that this has led you into a blind alley out of which there is no exit. Since you stubbornly hold to the idea that your system is not ancient and decadent enough, and since you think that you can compete with us, well, we have nothing against this. Time will prove who was right." Communism has placed its cards on the table to be seen by all in the game. It has shoved them under the very noses of its fellow players. For long decades it has never changed its game. It keeps on hammering the same tune all the time: we shall destroy you! But the nonCommunist world keeps whistling its own tune as it enters the blind alley from which there will be no way out as Nikita Khruschchev so clearly pointed out. The nonCommunist world apparently still does not have sufficient proof of what Communism really is and what it aims to attain. Stubbornly it keeps on asking the Kremlin to say it again. And then once again. After so many encores, the non-Communist world still is looking for some kind of a change of heart of the Kremlin. P erhaps, it thinks, after all these smiles there will follow a r evision of the entire Communist program. And who can say definitely that a palace r evolution in the Kremlin, or a quarrel between members of the Politbureau, or the fall of a Soviet Marshal, or a quarrel between Peking and Moscow, will not force a change of the ultimate goal? Wishful, useless thinking! All the questions which the non-Communist world has put and will put to the Kremlin have already been answered. At least the principal questions have been clearly answered. The others, the answers to peripheral questions, do not matter, because the problem posed by international Communism cannot be solved by them. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 55 THE KREMLIN HAS SHOWN ITS HAND Joseph Cieker It seems that the politicians, who have led and are still leading the destinies of the present time, have been charmed by some kind of enchantresses. They are unable to free themselves from the snares which had been placed for them by Communism. Nay, it would rather seem that the more it appears that they are getting free of them, the more they are really being entangled by them. Not th-at Communism has changed its content and its substance. Its substance and its goal is always the same. Only the strategy and tactics of Communism change. If leading political factors had actually devoted themselves responsibly and directly to the study of Communism, they would have undoubtedly found ,a definite course of action against it. The fact is that they have not. They rather concerned tJhemselves with its strategy and tactics. And the latter governed to a great extent their policies and diplomacy. Thus we were witnesses of the strategic and tactical squables, which perhaps, at times, led to temporary results, but in substance did not contribute to the solution of world Communism, which as a phenomenon simply will not be disputed or debated away and thereby even less to be minimized. Every strategic and tactical move of Communism is reacted to with more or less success, but the burden of the problem remains unchanged on the lives of nations. In fact the burden becomes greater with time. If these so-called victories of international non-Communist politics really were equal to the criteria which had been brought forth in connection with the various diplomatic reactions to the strategic and tactical undertakings of the Red Kremlin, then the power of international Communism would already have been broken. The fact that this power has not been broken is evidence of the fact that the victories were merely of a peripheral significance, and as such were frequently noted as brilliant actions of experimental patrols. We still have not sunk our teeth into the reality and substance of international Communism and into the body of the international policy of the Soviet Union. 56 SLOVAKIA Communism certainly is not a secret organization. Neither is the politics of the .Soviet Union. Entire libraries could be filled with literature about what Communism is, what it wants, and just how it aims to attain its ultimate goat However, even if this literature did not exist, we have before us the work of 40 years of international Communism and of the international politics of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, despite all this, leading politicians and diplomats of the West - with a few exceptions have yet to prove that they are seriously concerned about what Communism writes, talks, and does. As if all this were some sort of witchcraft. Beginning with Lenin and ending with Khrusohchev the basic principles of Communism have been clearly stated to the whole world. Leading figures of Communism have sworn time and again that they shall never abandon their goal no matter what the cost. They announced this by means of all possible forms. But it seems that the world deliberately closed its ears, so that it would not have to hear and then believe, and finally so that it would not have to proceed to serious and principal decisions. As an explanation Jet it suffice now to quote in this connection a part of a statement of a Soviet intellectual, the rector of the political School of Lenin Dmytryj Manuilsky, made twenty-eight years ago. During the past three decades many substantial changes have taken place in the Europe and world structure. During this time, international Communism has made far-reaching steps in its march to its ultimate goal. In 1931, Manuilsky, lecturing to the undergraduates of Moscow's Lenin School, said: War to the hilt between Communism and Capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course , we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 or 30 years. The bourgeoisie will have to be lulled to sleep first. So we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement in history. We shall make resounding declarations for the benefit of peace, friendship , and mutual international symphaties. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will be overjoyed to cooperate in their own destruction . They wi II leap at another chance to be our friend s. As soon as their guard is down and they are drunk with gullibil ity, · we shall leap on them and smash them with our fists. Nikita Khruschchev, the most experienced coexisten- SLOVAKIA 57 tialist - noticing in 1955 that his speeches and recommendations in regard to coexistence are being explained altogether unilaterally by non-Communists for their own benefit and as a guarantee of permanent comfort, hurried to make the following clear: "It is true that we are adherents of coexistence, but at the same time we are also adherents of the expansion of Communism over the entire world. We are faced with the reality of the existence of two different systems in the world. You , the Capitalists, insist that you shall go your own way. Y o\! will do that until the day you realize that this has led you into a blind alley out of which there is no exit. Since you stubbornly hold to the idea that your system is not ancient and decadent enough, and since you think that you can compete with us, well, we have nothing against this. Time will prove who was right." Communism has placed its cards on the table to be seen by all in the game. It has shoved them under the very noses of its fellow players. For long decades it has never changed its game. It keeps on hammering the same tune all the time: we shall destroy you! But the nonCommunist world keeps whistling its own tune as it enters the blind alley from which there will be no way out as Nikita Khruschchev so clearly pointed out. The nonCommunist world apparently still does not have sufficient proof of what Communism really is and what it aims to attain. Stubbornly it keeps on asking the Kremlin to say it again. And then once again. After so many encores, the non-Communist world still is looking for some kind of a change of heart of the Kremlin. P erhaps, it thinks, after all these smiles there will follow a r evision of the entire Communist program. And who can say definitely that a palace r evolution in the Kremlin, or a quarrel between members of the Politbureau, or the fall of a Soviet Marshal, or a quarrel between Peking and Moscow, will not force a change of the ultimate goal? Wishful, useless thinking! All the questions which the non-Communist world has put and will put to the Kremlin have already been answered. At least the principal questions have been clearly answered. The others, the answers to peripheral questions, do not matter, because the problem posed by international Communism cannot be solved by them.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Kremlin Has Shown Its Hand Description An account of the resource Joseph Cieker Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 55-57 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cieker, Jozef, 1907-1969 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/aebf66a905109a14ec9e6bc1165cc6c8.pdf 2771a004fd5d14b75a05d156558182f8 PDF Text Text 52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs �SLOVAKIA 53 approximately $175 - if the ordinary persons can afford to buy them. Cheap sweaters cost $35, and shoes cost $30. In general, Father Seginak notes, the populace is dressed in a markedly drab manner. The trip to Presov was made in a two engine plane. Since it was dark when the plane was landing, Father Seginak remarked to his traveling companion how bumpy the landing was. "Little wonder," said Father Michnik. "look out the window, we're landing in a cow pasture." There was no concrete or asphalt runway - just a muddy field. This was the Presov airport. Upon landing the first impression was the number of policemen and soldiers who guarded the field with machine guns. A bus immediately picked up the plane passengers and hustled them through guarded areas. One could not help but feel that they didn't want prying eyes to ferret out some sort of dark secret to be found there. Loudspeakers were in prominence everywhere. The presence of the hammer and sickle with an abundance of red stars left little doubt as to who ran the country. In Presov itself there is but one hotel at which one may stay - the Hotel Dukla. There is inconvenience after inconvenience. The telephone may be used only between the hours of 8 a. m. and 6 p. m. The radio in the threadbare room did little to relieve the monotony - one station blared forth propaganda incessantly. Contrary to the idea the communists would like to foist upon the world that it is the land of the workers' paradise - the raw facts of life do not substantiate it. A 57-year-old woman told of how she began her day at 4 a. m., and after a two mile walk to the potato field she worked until darkness. For lunch she was permitted to build a fire and eat a few of the potatoes with bread and barley coffee. Meat in the diet is simply non-existent. An 80-year-old woman was assigned the task of caring for the chickens and livestock. The chickens were given a communist mandate to produce a certain quota of eggs or else. The "or else" meant that the 80-year-old woman was forced to beg, borrow or steal the eggs if her quota was not filled. In the communist scheme of things four- �54 SLOVAKIA fifths of a head of steer belongs to the government. Which fifth belongs to the down-trodden peasants was not made too clear. If a head of steer dies the peasant is held responsible and must replace it. By this arrangement the government never loses. The homes of the village people are very poor. In a four-room house it is ordinary to quarter two families. They use a common kitchen and each family has one room. This apparently is Khrushchev's idea of perfect living quarters for the working people while he enjoys his dacha outside Moscow. There is no running water, heating is primitive, and sidewalks are non-existent. Electricity has been promised - probably for the purpose of installing more loudspeakers to drone the glories of communism incessantly. American movies are not shown for fear that the populace would see how well Americans live. It is a fact that the people have been led to believe utter poverty reigns in the United States. The ruthless persecution of the Byzantine Catholic Church in the Presov district has taken its toll. One example is given of the village priest who was called by a well-dressed man from the confessional on Holy Saturday. He claimed he had spiritual problems. The priest walked with him a short distance where an armored car and two motorcycles whisked him away. He was never heard from again. A communist agent in the guise of an Orthodox priest took his place. The people do not attend the church now because they know that the "priest" in reality is a communist spy in their midst. With a great deal of relief did the two priests leave this land of the living-dead. As tourists they had been warned to take no maps with them, have no prayer books and stay away from relatives, lest they implicate them as spies against the peoples' government. Father Minchik remarked to his superior that one never leaves an Iron Curtain country quite the same person he was upon entering it. A hatred and revulsion for the tyranny of communism seems to pervade a person's soul after a close contact with this social sickness of our day. - "Byzantine Catholic World." � 52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs �SLOVAKIA 53 approximately $175 - if the ordinary persons can afford to buy them. Cheap sweaters cost $35, and shoes cost $30. In general, Father Seginak notes, the populace is dressed in a markedly drab manner. The trip to Presov was made in a two engine plane. Since it was dark when the plane was landing, Father Seginak remarked to his traveling companion how bumpy the landing was. "Little wonder," said Father Michnik. "look out the window, we're landing in a cow pasture." There was no concrete or asphalt runway - just a muddy field. This was the Presov airport. Upon landing the first impression was the number of policemen and soldiers who guarded the field with machine guns. A bus immediately picked up the plane passengers and hustled them through guarded areas. One could not help but feel that they didn't want prying eyes to ferret out some sort of dark secret to be found there. Loudspeakers were in prominence everywhere. The presence of the hammer and sickle with an abundance of red stars left little doubt as to who ran the country. In Presov itself there is but one hotel at which one may stay - the Hotel Dukla. There is inconvenience after inconvenience. The telephone may be used only between the hours of 8 a. m. and 6 p. m. The radio in the threadbare room did little to relieve the monotony - one station blared forth propaganda incessantly. Contrary to the idea the communists would like to foist upon the world that it is the land of the workers' paradise - the raw facts of life do not substantiate it. A 57-year-old woman told of how she began her day at 4 a. m., and after a two mile walk to the potato field she worked until darkness. For lunch she was permitted to build a fire and eat a few of the potatoes with bread and barley coffee. Meat in the diet is simply non-existent. An 80-year-old woman was assigned the task of caring for the chickens and livestock. The chickens were given a communist mandate to produce a certain quota of eggs or else. The "or else" meant that the 80-year-old woman was forced to beg, borrow or steal the eggs if her quota was not filled. In the communist scheme of things four- �54 SLOVAKIA fifths of a head of steer belongs to the government. Which fifth belongs to the down-trodden peasants was not made too clear. If a head of steer dies the peasant is held responsible and must replace it. By this arrangement the government never loses. The homes of the village people are very poor. In a four-room house it is ordinary to quarter two families. They use a common kitchen and each family has one room. This apparently is Khrushchev's idea of perfect living quarters for the working people while he enjoys his dacha outside Moscow. There is no running water, heating is primitive, and sidewalks are non-existent. Electricity has been promised - probably for the purpose of installing more loudspeakers to drone the glories of communism incessantly. American movies are not shown for fear that the populace would see how well Americans live. It is a fact that the people have been led to believe utter poverty reigns in the United States. The ruthless persecution of the Byzantine Catholic Church in the Presov district has taken its toll. One example is given of the village priest who was called by a well-dressed man from the confessional on Holy Saturday. He claimed he had spiritual problems. The priest walked with him a short distance where an armored car and two motorcycles whisked him away. He was never heard from again. A communist agent in the guise of an Orthodox priest took his place. The people do not attend the church now because they know that the "priest" in reality is a communist spy in their midst. With a great deal of relief did the two priests leave this land of the living-dead. As tourists they had been warned to take no maps with them, have no prayer books and stay away from relatives, lest they implicate them as spies against the peoples' government. Father Minchik remarked to his superior that one never leaves an Iron Curtain country quite the same person he was upon entering it. A hatred and revulsion for the tyranny of communism seems to pervade a person's soul after a close contact with this social sickness of our day. - "Byzantine Catholic World." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs SLOVAKIA 53 approximately $175 - if the ordinary persons can afford to buy them. Cheap sweaters cost $35, and shoes cost $30. In general, Father Seginak notes, the populace is dressed in a markedly drab manner. The trip to Presov was made in a two engine plane. Since it was dark when the plane was landing, Father Seginak remarked to his traveling companion how bumpy the landing was. "Little wonder," said Father Michnik. "look out the window, we're landing in a cow pasture." There was no concrete or asphalt runway - just a muddy field. This was the Presov airport. Upon landing the first impression was the number of policemen and soldiers who guarded the field with machine guns. A bus immediately picked up the plane passengers and hustled them through guarded areas. One could not help but feel that they didn't want prying eyes to ferret out some sort of dark secret to be found there. Loudspeakers were in prominence everywhere. The presence of the hammer and sickle with an abundance of red stars left little doubt as to who ran the country. In Presov itself there is but one hotel at which one may stay - the Hotel Dukla. There is inconvenience after inconvenience. The telephone may be used only between the hours of 8 a. m. and 6 p. m. The radio in the threadbare room did little to relieve the monotony - one station blared forth propaganda incessantly. Contrary to the idea the communists would like to foist upon the world that it is the land of the workers' paradise - the raw facts of life do not substantiate it. A 57-year-old woman told of how she began her day at 4 a. m., and after a two mile walk to the potato field she worked until darkness. For lunch she was permitted to build a fire and eat a few of the potatoes with bread and barley coffee. Meat in the diet is simply non-existent. An 80-year-old woman was assigned the task of caring for the chickens and livestock. The chickens were given a communist mandate to produce a certain quota of eggs or else. The "or else" meant that the 80-year-old woman was forced to beg, borrow or steal the eggs if her quota was not filled. In the communist scheme of things four- 54 SLOVAKIA fifths of a head of steer belongs to the government. Which fifth belongs to the down-trodden peasants was not made too clear. If a head of steer dies the peasant is held responsible and must replace it. By this arrangement the government never loses. The homes of the village people are very poor. In a four-room house it is ordinary to quarter two families. They use a common kitchen and each family has one room. This apparently is Khrushchev's idea of perfect living quarters for the working people while he enjoys his dacha outside Moscow. There is no running water, heating is primitive, and sidewalks are non-existent. Electricity has been promised - probably for the purpose of installing more loudspeakers to drone the glories of communism incessantly. American movies are not shown for fear that the populace would see how well Americans live. It is a fact that the people have been led to believe utter poverty reigns in the United States. The ruthless persecution of the Byzantine Catholic Church in the Presov district has taken its toll. One example is given of the village priest who was called by a well-dressed man from the confessional on Holy Saturday. He claimed he had spiritual problems. The priest walked with him a short distance where an armored car and two motorcycles whisked him away. He was never heard from again. A communist agent in the guise of an Orthodox priest took his place. The people do not attend the church now because they know that the "priest" in reality is a communist spy in their midst. With a great deal of relief did the two priests leave this land of the living-dead. As tourists they had been warned to take no maps with them, have no prayer books and stay away from relatives, lest they implicate them as spies against the peoples' government. Father Minchik remarked to his superior that one never leaves an Iron Curtain country quite the same person he was upon entering it. A hatred and revulsion for the tyranny of communism seems to pervade a person's soul after a close contact with this social sickness of our day. - "Byzantine Catholic World."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Father Seginak's Impression of Prague and Presov Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 52-54 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/32d1053a80dcb78dc024f7df71c4639e.pdf 9418bfa45709b25302ea6e1e013f0934 PDF Text Text 38 SLOVAKIA ·SLOVAK NATION ALISM: 1 B. S. BUC, Ph.D. NATIONALISM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 1. The Ephemeral Slovak Soviet Republic Because of the deeply religious basis of the Slovaks as well as the agrarian nature of Slovakia, Communism with its revolutionary materialistic-socia l program had from the beginning no hope of winning over the Slovaks. It, therefore, endeavored all the more to conquer them by force. The first attempt at forceful domination in Slovakia was undertaken in 1919. This occurred after the First World War in connection with the creation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic whose leader was the well known Bela Kuhn. The Hungarian Communist government invaded Slovakia with its army and occupied the Eastern sector with the sities of Presov and Kosice. Following in the wake of the occupation, a public Communist assembly met at Presov on June 16, 1919, and announced the establishment of the Slovak Soviet Republic with the proclamation that: This day the Slovak Soviet RepUiblic was created on Slovaik soil, liberated from imperialism. The first conscious, instinctive act of the proletariat, freed from the yoke of Czech imperialism, was that oppressors proclaim with such great glory, but in reality falsify (1). At this assembly, a temporary revolutionary committee was appointed which transferred its seat from Presov to Kosice. There on June 20, 1919, a twenty-member Slovak Revolutionary Council was named with the Czech Communist A. Jarousek at its head. This Council formally informed the Czecho-iSlovak government in Prague that Slovakia is separating from the Czech lands. Immediately the Soviet government of Moscow hastened to greet this new Slovak dictatorship of the proletariat. The existence of this very stormily-begun Slovak Soviet Republic was short-lived. On July 5, 1919, the Red Hungarian Army was coerced to withdraw from Slovak territory and the "Slovak Soviet Republic" ended. Except for many atrocities perpetrated on the inhabitants by the �SLOVAKIA 39 Red Army, no signs whatever remained in Slovakia after this three-week Communist adventure (2). 2. Coordination of Nationalism and Class Struggle After the shattering of this first Communist attempt to enslave Slovakia in 1919, it would hardly be necessary to speak of the Communist Party in connection with Slovak nationalism. But the situation which ensued in Slovakia, after Communist occupation in 1944 through Russian partisans and then the army, made the Communist Party one of the most significant fashioners of the present fate of Slovaks in general. It was a repetition of the events of 1919, except with longer lasting and far-reaching results. Communism would never have attained its present position in Slovakia, had the end of the war not permitted it. Election results prior to the Second World War indicate that the Communist Party was never powerful in Slovakia; in the election year of 1919, it had 10.66 per cent of the votes; in 1935, 12.97 per cent. And even these percentages would be lower, if other nationalities were separated and only Slovak votes counted. This is shown by the fact that in voting districts comprising a clearly Slovak population, the percentage gains of the Communist Party were always substantially lower than in districts where they were mixed with Hungarians(3). The weak successes of the Communists in Slovakia, despite the facts that the social situation of the Slovak population was really not the best, must be attributed to the religious foundation of the Slovaks and in part to the influence of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, which in its program presented a more compact statement of the national and social demands of the Slovak inhabitants. Recalling to mind the delicacy of the nationality problem in the newly established Czecho-Slovakia, the Communist Party immediately in 1919 began to orientate its program in order to draw as much as possible from it. Clement Gottwald, leader of the Party, marked this program in 1924 in the following words: Such a solution to the question must be sought and found which will enable the Party to support nationality movements �40 SLOVAKIA and to unite its revolui-tonary energies, or to coordinate with revolutionary class warfare the whole proletariat of the CzechoSlovak RepUlblic. I am of the opinion that the Party can, with comparatirve ea,se, gain leadership in the movement of national minorities and thus cast to the r,e ar the bour,geois-chauvinist parties . .. . The Comunist Party in Slovakia must not only utilize the national movements for the class interests of the proletariat, but must stand directly at its head and lead it along paths actually revolutionary (4). In accord with the plan, the Communist Party in Slovakia also fought for the autonomy of Slovakia as did the Slovak People's Party. When in the elections of 1925 the autonomists achieved their greatest successes, the Communists hastened to promise more than autonomy. In January, 1926, they announced: 'Dhe Communist Party of Czechoslovakia raises .. these concrete demands: the complete independence of Slovakia. Let the SlovaJk nation itself decide on arranging its own affairs (5). This signified competition with the autonomists in emphasizing Slovak national ambitions. We do not know for sure whether to account the gains - even though trivial - of the Communist Party in Slovakia to its social struggle for the rights of the proletariat, or to its tactizing with Slovak nationalism. But the latter definitely gained votes for them. Despite its more than positive position in regard to Slovak nationalism, the Communist party was nevertheless organized only on a statewide basis as a "Czechoslovak" Party. Its leadership in Slovakia, however, rested in the hands of a sma:11 but capable group of Slovak intellectuals, who became adherents of the Party not from social motives, but rather because its ideological foundation introduced to them a new kind of belief. They were Slovak nationalists, but because of their negative attitude toward religion, they found it difficult to attach themselves to the other two national parties, namely, the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party; the former was led by a Catholic priest, the latter by a Lutheran minister. They were, therefore, idealists blinded by idealism to such an extent that they were unable to realize that the Communist Party was actually an instrument of Russian imperialism, concealing itself at times in relation to �SLOVAKIA 41 Slav nations under Russian Pan-Slavism. They were fittingly called "Sa:lon Communists," because both their social position and their behavior were in complete opposition to the concept "proletariat" which they were supposed to represent. It is not surprising, therefore, that this group of Slovak Communists received the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 with as much joy as the other Slovak national elements. Although the Slovak Government had forbidden the activities of the Communist Party, yet a majority of its representatives was left free and held important offices. This enabled them, through salon and not revolutionary means, to make preparations for the opportune establishment of a "Slovak Republic without Germans and Fascists" when the occasion should arise (6). 3. Towards a New Slovak Soviet Republic The moments for the fulfillment of their plans seemed to arrive when, near the end of August, 1944, Soviet parachutists succeeded in carrying the operations of war into Slo.vak territory and called forth co-called "Slovak uprising against the Germans." Slovak Communists, therefore, hastened in September of that year to establish the indepen*dent Communist Party of Slovakia to the great surprise of Czech Communist agents. They acted in accord with Moscow itself, which sought, through its partisans, to win over the President of the Slovak Republic, Joseph Tiso, by promising protection to the Slovak Republic (7). Tiso's attitude to these efforts was one of greatest rejection: Cooperation with Moscow would have signified a terrible cata,s trophe for the nation. It would have been a denial of Christianity. Communism was from its first beginnings and remained an irreconcilable enemy not only of our nation, our independence, but is a danger for all of Europe. Communism brings with itself a rapid debasement of the moral, spiritual and material level of every nation in whose bosom it reposes. Every true patriot, therefore, cannot soil his hands by cooperating with such a political system as well as with its representatives residing in Moscow (8). In these steps we see the two-faced action of Moscow, which "did not cease to assure officially that her aim was �42 SLOVAKIA to renew the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but underneath carried on, through her partisans, a survey to ascertain the mood in Slovakia towards the annexation of that country (9). 4. Change of Moscow's Plans When Moscow failed to gain support of Slovak national elements to proclaim the Slovak Soviet Republic and saw that Communism in Slovakia lacked strong roots, she decided definitely to reestablish Czecho-Slovakia. The elections of 1946 in renovated Czech-Slovakia indicate why this solution was more advantageous for Moscow's plans. The Communist Party in Czech territory had a more probable chance of winning. This decision of Moscow, however, meant the beginning of tragedy for Slovak national Communists. It was already discernible in the action of Moscow, which appointed William Siroky, a Hungarian by origin, as Chairman of the newly established Communist Party in Slovakia in preference to Slovak nationalists. In Siroky Moscow found a very compliant instrument for her further political drama in Czecho-Slovakia. Czecho-Slovakia indeed was renewed, but not in its original size and greatness. First of all Moscow annexed Ruthenia. When Dr. Edward Benes was returning from Moscow, shortly after the Red Army occupied Slovak territory, he had to remain in Kosice where the native Communists compelled him to agree to the so-called Kosice program of April, 1945, according to which the new Czecho-Slovakia was to be a state of two nations, Czech and Slovak. Clement Gottwald, as Premier of the government, announced on April 5, 1945, that "the Republic will be renewed as a comomn state of the co-equal Czech and Slovak nations" and that "the new government of the Republic will be concerned that, during the constitutional solution of the relations between the Czech and Slovak nations, the Slovak organs will be constituted with the same legislative, administrative and executive power which the Slovak nation enjoys today in its Slovak National Council" (10). Perhaps, in respect to elections, the Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 43 were at least promised autonomy as the last step to win them over to Communism. 5. Centralized Czecho-Slovakia Once Again A year later, in May of 1946, the first elections were held in the new Czecho-Slovakia, and they indicated a substantial difference within the Communist Parties of Slovakia and the Czech lands. The Communist Party of Slovakia, united with the Social Democrats, gained 30.6 per cent of the votes; whereas in Czech territory the Communist party obtained 40.4 per cent and the Social Democrats 15.6 per cent which together totalled 56 per cent. In Czech lands we see a very evident victory for the Communist Party. Of the 300 seats in Parliament, the combined parties of the Communists and Socialists had 153 deputies. A certain official from the Russian embassy made this observation about the results of the 1946 elections: "The majority is not great, but it suffices in order to rule over the other parties in a democratic way" (11). The elections sounded the death knell of the promised autonomy for Slovakia. Theoretically, the principle of two nations was continually stressed; practically, however, even a stronger centralization than during the first Czecho-Slovak Republic began to shape up. Even more, on September 28, 1948, when the Communist Party of Slovakia was abolished and became a part of the united Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This was more than the Slovak Communists could stand. Even the fear of retaliation •c ould not restrain them from rising up in opposition. The threat of revenge for this deviation from servility was not long in coming. In February of 1951, the foremost leaders, V. Clementis, Dr. G. Husak, L. Novomesky and K. Smidke, were expelled from the Party and deprived of all functions because "they planned a new Slovak separatist program and together formed a plot aimed at tearing Slovakia away from the Czecho-Slovak Republic" (12). In April others were condemned as bourgeois nationalists. The substance of their crimes is contained in a long condemnation, in which we find the following: �44 SLOVAKIA The ideological background of their treachery consisted in their attempts to solve the national question of the Slovak nation, not in collruboration with thet Czech working class but mainly in cooperation with the Slovak bourgeoisie and accepted eventually their leadership. In this connection they accepted the Slovak fascist puppet State. Later on, they successfully penetrated the leadership of the Slovak national uprising and got hold of important positions in the new People's Democratic State. They misused their positions in the Slovak National Council and on the Board of Commissioners in a criminal way in order to isolate Slovakia from the Czech working people and from the construction of Socialism, thus strengthening in Slovakia the remnants of capitalism and jeopardizing the achievements of the Slovak working class. Their aim was to break up the common Czecho-Slo,vak State and to hand over Slovakia to the reactionary bourg.eois-iP and to the mercy of foreign imperialists (13'). We do not know how L. Novomesky, one of the accused, understood, a;fter his trial, the words which he wrote in 1948, prior to his imprisonment, in the introduction to a book of his co-sufferer G. Husak: They say superficially that re,volutions devour their o,wn children. This is not trur! The truth rather is that revolutions, determined to r-emain faithful to their program, slough off those of their children who would pel'vert their meaning, their program and their end (14). After this purge President Gottwald appointed a Czech Communist, M. Bacilek, as President of the Slovak National Council. The whole apparatus of the Communist Party and administration in Slovakia is now in the hands of Czechs and Magyars, and not in the hands of Slovak elements. In liquidating the Communist Slovaks, Prague liquidated practically the idea of a Czecho,Slovak State. !Between the years 19415 and HW7, Benes had annihilated the Ca,tholics, the principal political force of Slovakia. During the course of the crisis 1n ,119418, the Czech Communists and Democrats had era.sed such Slovak Protestants as Le.Urich, and Ursiny. Prague suppressed finally the last political suppor.t of the Czecho-Siovak State in Slovakia: the Communists. The fourth Czecho-Slovak Republic as a national State of Czechs and Slovak,s is, therefore, dead. Instead a Socialist Soviet State emerges (,115). 6. Aftermath of Stalin's Death The changes in Moscow after the death of Joseph Stalin, however, testify that the drama of Slovak na- �SLOVAKIA 45 tionalist Communists is not completed and awaits the completion of its last act, if the new seemingly revolutionary directives, inaugurated by the XX Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow by Khrushchev, will be brought into effect. These directives, among other things, stress very emphatically the principle of self-determination in dealing with the national ambitions of various nations. If action really follows words, then this "new Moscow approach" towards the solution of problems stemming from nationalism may give the Slovak nationalist Communists new hopes to implement their old dream, the Slovak Soviet Republic. It seems that the first step along this new line was made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia, which convened from the first to eleventh of May, 1956, in order to discuss the directives of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. Present at this meeting was W. Siroky, the present :Prime Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Government. He uttered a manifesto in which among other things, he stressed: A!bove all it is necessary to concern ourselves with the questions of extending the jurisdiction of the Slovak Nation-al Council of the highest organ of State power in Slovakia. Today there are already suppositions for extending the legislative jurisdiction of the Slovak National Council, and we must probably think also -about constitutional changes i,n the same way. . . . In just that way must we consider extending the jurisdiction of the Slovak National Council in the eyes of the Board of Commissioners and e~pressly estaiblish constitutional conclusions of responsibility to the Board of •Commissionens o'f ithe Slovak National Council (16). The Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners, according to the Kosice program of 1945, were to be the legisfative and executive organs of the planned autonomous government of Slovakia. After the elections of 1946 their jurisdiction was completely limited, so that they really became only executive organs of the centralist administration of Prague. The conclusion of w_ Siroky's address would be that in due time a complete autonomy would prevail. But W. Siroky went so far as to say: "as the foundatio~ of its politics concerning the nationalist question, the Communist Party considers the right of na- �46 SLOVAKIA tions toward self-expression, that is, the right to break away freely from or unite freely to another nation" (17). Such a position would have been favorably acceptable to the nationalist Slovak Communists, but Siroky, a Stalinist and still in power, gave to it his own interpretation. It was certainly with the intention to threaten his imprisoned colleagues that in concluding his address he said: 'Noting our successes, . . . we can in no way underestimate the influence of the bourgeois nationalist ideology, Its heralds utilize every occasion of um.est, every want and negative mani• festation for its spread and livelihood. It is the plaitform of the enemies of socialism, and must not even lead us astray then when 1bouregois nationalism, as for example at present, emerges under the slogan of a People's Democratic Slovakia 018). Here then is the evidence why nationalist Slovak Communists, even when released from prison, have not been rehabilitated. If, however, Moscow shall desire the removal of W. Siroky and Bacilek and shall set up the first, then the world in the near future shall be surprised to hear the proclamation of a new Slovak Soviet Republic. The recently developed situation in Hungary strengthened again the position of the Stalinists and brought ahout the occupation of Slovakia by the Czech and Russ~an armies. 7. There Will Be No Stopping The existence of the Slovaks as a political force in Central Europe is not a fact of negligible importance at the present time. They have reached such a level of group consciousness that it will be impossible to disregard them in dealing with the political problems of that area. Their emergence presents a vivid example of the development of modern nationalism, for, as Don Luigi Sturzo has writ7 ten: "Once a country or a people has succeeded in developing a consciousness of its own personality and on affirming it in the struggle with which history has confronted it, there is no stopping." Many incentives led the Slovaks to develop a consciousness of their own personality despite the fact that they have been living for over a thousand . years without any specific political rights within Hungary. �SLOVAKIA 47 The first incentive came from the social philosophy of the Enlightenment. It created a new political power out of the submerged social class of people by advocating certain rights for the masses in dealing with the public affairs of states. At the same time this movement destroyed the predominance of Latin and elevated the people's language to literary prominence. In the case of the Slovaks it led to the codification of their vernacular language which became the first step towards the assertion of their own distinct personality. German Romantic philosophy provided a second incentive and gave a further impetus towards the same goal. Its contribution consisted in defining more closely the concept "people" by changing it into the concept "nation" whereby a greater stress was placed upon the importance of a common history, language and culture. This philosophy was also instrumental in creating among the Slav nations a literary and political movement called Pan-Slavism. Under the impact of Pan-Slavism Slovaks were made aware of their glorious past as represented by Greater Moravia, the first Slav state in Central Europe, and began to feel that their land was the cradle of present-day cultures. The third incentive was provided by President Wilson's principle of self-determination of nations and the Western Allies' decision to dismember Austria-Hungary after the First World War. The map of Central Europe was changed and the Slovaks became a part of a new state called the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In the CzechoSlovak Republic they were supposed to be equal partners with the kin Czechs, but these ambitions were never realized because the imaginary "Czechoslovak" nation sought to merge them with the Czechs on the ground of their close kinship. Nevertheless, in the Czecho-Slovak Republic the almost extinct Slovak community grew up into a new democratic society, and the Slovaks were ready to venture into an independent life in their own Slovak Republic. At present the overwhelming majority of Slovaks consider the situation as an enforced one and remain almost united in their efforts to regain their lost independence. �48 SLOVAKIA Under the present circumstances their ,o bjectives and efforts are directed towards the following goals: 1. Slovakia within the framework of a democratic Czecho-Slovakia is still the objective of a small group of "Czecho-Slovaks" who are composed primarily of former diplomats and leading personalities of the first CzechoS1ovakia. Being aware of the opposition of the majority of Slovaks at home agruinst the Czechs this group of Slovaks finally agreed to have the state based on the idea of two distinct Czech and Slovak nations instead of the former imaginary "Czechoslovak" nation. 2. Independent Slovakia either as a unit within the proposed federated Central Europe or simply as an independent democratic state. Both alternatives enjoy almost the same popularity with the overwhelming majority of the Slovaks at home and abroad. They represent the desires and endeavors of a substantial part of the Slovak population whose objective has always been to assure for Slovaks the rights of an ethnographically, culturally and politica:lly distinct personality in the international family of nations. 3. A Slovak Soviet Republic might have been the objective of a small group of Slovak Communists before they were executed or imprisoned as bourgeois deviationists. They once again seemed to have had a chance to act after Stalin's death but are now forestalled by what happened in Hungary in 1956. In spite of the fact that there still are groups among the Slovaks that endeavor to make Slovakia dependent upon the Czechs or upon the Russians, the ambitions of Slovak nationalism will hardly be gratified until the Slovaks find their haven in a sovereign Slovak State or in such a political arrangement of Central Europe wherein the Slovaks will be allotted the same sovereign rights as other so-called established nations possess today. (11J) iM. Gosiorovsky: "O Sovietoch na Slovensku v roku 1919", Nova Mysl, Pr-ague, September, 191'9, 2716,284. (Q) Ibidem. (3) !For ,e xample, 1n the elections of 1.929 voting districts, comprising a clearly Slovak population conceded very little percentage-wise to the Communist Party: Presov 4.57 per cent, Turcian- �SLOVAKIA 49 sky Sv. Martin 6J18 per cent, Ba,nska Bystrica 7.60 per cent. Whereas in districts comprising a greater majority of Hungarians, the Communists showed grea ter gains: Kosice 115.4!8 per cent and Nove Zamky IJ6.84 ·p er cent. - Dr. F. Durcansky, Biela Kniha, Buenos Aires, 19B4, p. 7'84). {4) Pravda Chudoby, 30. juna 1954. (5) Pravda, 30. maja 1'926. (6) Durcansky, op. cit., p. 796. (7) Dr. F. Durcansky, "Marne sa snail Moskva ziskat' Slovakov", Literarny almanac'1 Slovaka v Amerike, Chicago, 195G, pp. 43-48. (8) 1lbid., pp. 45-416. {9) J. Smutny, Doklady a rozp.ravy, CLondon, November 1952), p. 5. (10) Ustanoveni ceskoslovenske vlady Narodni fronty Cechu a Slovaku a jeji prvni projevy, (Praha 1<947), pp. 21 sp. (l1lJ) iH. Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved, (London, 1949), p. 47. C12) Rude pravo, (27. fobruara 19511). •Q13) Joseph Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe, Paris, 11955. 014) G. Husak, Zapas o zajtrajsok, (Bratislava, 1943), p. 3. (15) ,J . A. !Mikus, op. cit., ,p. 3'86. (Paris, 119515), p. 386. (16) Slovak, (jun 11956). (17) Ibidem. (lt8) Ibidem. BIBLIOGRAPHY Association Hongroise des Affaires Etrangeres. La deportation des Hongrois de Slovaquie, Budapest, .1947. Aulneau, J .: Histoire de l'Europe Central, Paris, ·1926. Autonomist: Slovakia's Plea for Autonomy, Jednota Press, Middletown, Pa., ,11935. Benes, E.: Czechoslovak Policy fo.r Victory and Peace, London, 1:94'4. Benes, E.: Le probleme .A utrichien et la question tcheque, Paris, •1908. Benes, E.: My War Memoirs, London, 1928. Blasko, S.: Slovakia in Blood and Shackles, Piassaic, N .J., 1954. Bokes, F.: Dejiny Slovakov a Slovenska (History of the Slovaks and Slovakia), Bratislava, 1'946. Botto, J.: Slovaci: Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia (Slovaks: the Development of Their National Consciousness), Turciansky Sv. Martin, ·11906. Carr, E. H.: Natio,nalism and After, London, 1·946. Chmelar, J.: National Minorities in Central Europe, Prague, 1'937. Clementis, V.: Panslavism, Past and Present, London, 194G. Culen, K.: Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (History of the Slovaks in America), Bratislava, 11942. Cul-en, K.:Cesi a Slovaci v statnych sluibach CSR (Cze'Chs and Slovak•s in the Civil Service of the Czechoslovak Republic), Bratislava, 1944>. Culen, K.: Pittsburghska dohoda (The Pittsburgh .Pact), •B ratislava, '1937. Denis, E.: La question d'Autriche: Les Slovaques, Paris, 1917. Diamond, W.: Czechoslovakia Between East and West, London. 1947. �50 SLOVAKIA Durcansky, F.: Slovenska biela kniha (Slovak White Book), Buenos Aires, 11954!. European Movement: Basis For An Eastern Europea,i Policy, London, 1950. Gottwald, K.: Slove,nsko hladuje (Slovakia is Starving), Bratislava, 1925. Gottwald, K.: Za socialisticky itat, za socialisticke pravo (For a Socialistic State, For a Socialistic Right), Prague, 1940. Hodza, M.: Federation in Central Europe, London, 1~. Hrusovsky, F.: Slovensko v dejinach Strecl,nej Europy (Slovakia in the History of Central Eu.rope), Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939. Hrufovsky, F ,: This Is Slovakia, Obrana Press, Scranton, Pa., 1955. Ingrim, R.: After Hitler Stalin? Bruce Pulb lishing Co., Milwaukee, '1946. Lloyd George, David: The Truth About the Peace Treaties, London, 1 '1925. Macartney, C. A.: Hungary a,nd Her Successo.rs, London-New York, 194'3'. Macartney, C. A.: National States and National Minorities, London, 1934. Macartney, C. A.: Problems of the Danube Basin, London, 194!2. M~ryk, T. G.: New Europe, London, 11917. Masaryk, T. G.: The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis, London, 1915. Masaryk, T. G.: La resurrection d'un etat (Souvenirs et reflections 1914-1958), Paris, .1930. Mendelsohn, P.: The Nuremberg Documents, London, 11946. Mikus, J. A.: La Slovaquie da,ns le drame de l'Europe, Paris, 1955-. Miniisterstvo vnitra (The Ministry of Interior): Spiknuti proti republice (Conspiracy Against the Czecho-Slovak Republic in Slovakia), Prague, 194'7. Osusky, S.: Benes and Slovakia, London, 1943. Peroutka, V.: Budovani statu (Building of a New State), Pra•g ue, 11'93•3-li936. Popovici, Aurel: Die Verei,n igten Staaten von Grossoesterreich, Leipzig, 1906. Rene, Renry: Questions d'Aut.riche-Hongrie et questions d'Orient, P-aris, 1903. Ripka, H.: Small and Great Nations, London, 1194!4'. Ripka, H.: Czechoslovakia Enslaved, London, 1948. Schlesinger, R.: Federalism i,n Central Europe, London, 1945. Seton Watson, R. W.: Slovakia Then and Now, London and Prague, 1 1'931. Seton Watson, R. W.: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, London, 194'3'. Seton Watson, R. W.: Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941, London, 1945. Sidor, K.: Andrej Hlinka, Bratislava, 1934. Sidor, K.: Slovenska politika na pode p.razskeho snemu (Slovak Politics On the ·F loor of the Prague ,Parliament), iBratislll/Va, 1943. Shafer, Boyd C.: Nationalism: Myth and Reality, New York, 19514. Slovak Catholic Federation of America: The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact, Chicago, 1004. �SLOVAKIA 51 Sturzo, Do r Luigi: NatiQ\nalism and Internationalism, New York, 1946. Thomson, Harrison: Czechoslovakia in European Histo.ry, Princeton Press, New Jerisey, 11'944. Ustanoveni ceskoslovenske vlady Narodni fronty Cechu a Slovaku a jeji prvni projevy (Decrees and First Manifestoes of the Czecho-Slovak Gover,nment Composed of the Czech and Slovak National Front), Prague, 1947. Ustav Dr. E. Benesa CDr. E. Benes lns'titurte): Doklady a .rozpravy (Documents and Deliberations), London, 1'952. ARTICLES IN MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS Brauner, H.: Die Volkswerdung der Slowaken (The Development of Slovaks lnot a Nation), a treatise published in Deutsches Archive ftir Landes und Volkswerdung, Vo1. V, Berlin, 1944. Darras, M.: Onze ans de vie independante en Slovaquie, Le monde slave, Paris, May-June, .1000. Durcansky, F.: l'.Europe Central dans le passe et dans l'avenir, La revue de drnit internacional, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, Geneve, XX]I, annee, no. 1, 1/94'4. Durcansky, F.: Marne sa snaii Moskva ziskat' Slovakov (The Futile Efforts of Moscow to Win Over the Slovaks), Literarny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike, an Almanach pU!blished in Chicago by the publislhers of the SLOVAK V AiMERllKE, a newspaper in the Slovak language, Chicago, 1:953. Chudoba, B.: Czechoslovakia: A Study in Disintegration, Thought, Fordham University Quarterly, March, 1950. Clementis, V.: Ni satelite de l'U.R.S.S. ni artisan d'un bloc slave, Parallele 50, Paris, September 20, '1950. Gosiorovs'ky, .M.: 0 •S ovietoch na Slovensku v roku 1919 (About the Soviets in Slovakia in 1919), Nova mysl (The New Thought), Prague, September, 111919. Hlinka, A.: Memoirs des Slovaques a la Conference de la Paix, A Memorandum to the Peace Conference in Paris, 1919. Kirschbaum, J .: Slovakia and Central European Federation Plans, SLOVAIIQ!A, a periodical plllblished by the Slovak League of Ameriica, Middletown, Pa., April, 1953. Pir, A. V.: America's Slovak Societies, published in the Bulletin of t he Slovak Nat ional Council A'broa,d, Middletown, Pa., August, 1956. Naboienska itatistika (Religious Statistics), Kalendar Kanadskej Slovenskej Ligy (Almanach of the Canadian Slovak League), Winnipeg, Manitdba, 19zy3. Schlesinger, R.: Slovakia Today and Tomorrow, Contemporary Review, London, August, 1939. ARTICLES IN NEWSPAPERS Pravda (The Truth), an official paper of the Communist Party in Slovakia. Samostatnost' pre Slovensko (Independence For Slovakia), Bratislava, May 30, 1926. Pravda Chudoby (The Truth of the Downtroddtm), a Czech, Communist rparper. Narodni h,nuti a komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska (National Movements and the Communist 'Party of Czechoslovakia), Prague, June 3'0, 1924. �52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs � 38 SLOVAKIA ·SLOVAK NATION ALISM: 1 B. S. BUC, Ph.D. NATIONALISM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 1. The Ephemeral Slovak Soviet Republic Because of the deeply religious basis of the Slovaks as well as the agrarian nature of Slovakia, Communism with its revolutionary materialistic-socia l program had from the beginning no hope of winning over the Slovaks. It, therefore, endeavored all the more to conquer them by force. The first attempt at forceful domination in Slovakia was undertaken in 1919. This occurred after the First World War in connection with the creation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic whose leader was the well known Bela Kuhn. The Hungarian Communist government invaded Slovakia with its army and occupied the Eastern sector with the sities of Presov and Kosice. Following in the wake of the occupation, a public Communist assembly met at Presov on June 16, 1919, and announced the establishment of the Slovak Soviet Republic with the proclamation that: This day the Slovak Soviet RepUiblic was created on Slovaik soil, liberated from imperialism. The first conscious, instinctive act of the proletariat, freed from the yoke of Czech imperialism, was that oppressors proclaim with such great glory, but in reality falsify (1). At this assembly, a temporary revolutionary committee was appointed which transferred its seat from Presov to Kosice. There on June 20, 1919, a twenty-member Slovak Revolutionary Council was named with the Czech Communist A. Jarousek at its head. This Council formally informed the Czecho-iSlovak government in Prague that Slovakia is separating from the Czech lands. Immediately the Soviet government of Moscow hastened to greet this new Slovak dictatorship of the proletariat. The existence of this very stormily-begun Slovak Soviet Republic was short-lived. On July 5, 1919, the Red Hungarian Army was coerced to withdraw from Slovak territory and the "Slovak Soviet Republic" ended. Except for many atrocities perpetrated on the inhabitants by the �SLOVAKIA 39 Red Army, no signs whatever remained in Slovakia after this three-week Communist adventure (2). 2. Coordination of Nationalism and Class Struggle After the shattering of this first Communist attempt to enslave Slovakia in 1919, it would hardly be necessary to speak of the Communist Party in connection with Slovak nationalism. But the situation which ensued in Slovakia, after Communist occupation in 1944 through Russian partisans and then the army, made the Communist Party one of the most significant fashioners of the present fate of Slovaks in general. It was a repetition of the events of 1919, except with longer lasting and far-reaching results. Communism would never have attained its present position in Slovakia, had the end of the war not permitted it. Election results prior to the Second World War indicate that the Communist Party was never powerful in Slovakia; in the election year of 1919, it had 10.66 per cent of the votes; in 1935, 12.97 per cent. And even these percentages would be lower, if other nationalities were separated and only Slovak votes counted. This is shown by the fact that in voting districts comprising a clearly Slovak population, the percentage gains of the Communist Party were always substantially lower than in districts where they were mixed with Hungarians(3). The weak successes of the Communists in Slovakia, despite the facts that the social situation of the Slovak population was really not the best, must be attributed to the religious foundation of the Slovaks and in part to the influence of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, which in its program presented a more compact statement of the national and social demands of the Slovak inhabitants. Recalling to mind the delicacy of the nationality problem in the newly established Czecho-Slovakia, the Communist Party immediately in 1919 began to orientate its program in order to draw as much as possible from it. Clement Gottwald, leader of the Party, marked this program in 1924 in the following words: Such a solution to the question must be sought and found which will enable the Party to support nationality movements �40 SLOVAKIA and to unite its revolui-tonary energies, or to coordinate with revolutionary class warfare the whole proletariat of the CzechoSlovak RepUlblic. I am of the opinion that the Party can, with comparatirve ea,se, gain leadership in the movement of national minorities and thus cast to the r,e ar the bour,geois-chauvinist parties . .. . The Comunist Party in Slovakia must not only utilize the national movements for the class interests of the proletariat, but must stand directly at its head and lead it along paths actually revolutionary (4). In accord with the plan, the Communist Party in Slovakia also fought for the autonomy of Slovakia as did the Slovak People's Party. When in the elections of 1925 the autonomists achieved their greatest successes, the Communists hastened to promise more than autonomy. In January, 1926, they announced: 'Dhe Communist Party of Czechoslovakia raises .. these concrete demands: the complete independence of Slovakia. Let the SlovaJk nation itself decide on arranging its own affairs (5). This signified competition with the autonomists in emphasizing Slovak national ambitions. We do not know for sure whether to account the gains - even though trivial - of the Communist Party in Slovakia to its social struggle for the rights of the proletariat, or to its tactizing with Slovak nationalism. But the latter definitely gained votes for them. Despite its more than positive position in regard to Slovak nationalism, the Communist party was nevertheless organized only on a statewide basis as a "Czechoslovak" Party. Its leadership in Slovakia, however, rested in the hands of a sma:11 but capable group of Slovak intellectuals, who became adherents of the Party not from social motives, but rather because its ideological foundation introduced to them a new kind of belief. They were Slovak nationalists, but because of their negative attitude toward religion, they found it difficult to attach themselves to the other two national parties, namely, the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party; the former was led by a Catholic priest, the latter by a Lutheran minister. They were, therefore, idealists blinded by idealism to such an extent that they were unable to realize that the Communist Party was actually an instrument of Russian imperialism, concealing itself at times in relation to �SLOVAKIA 41 Slav nations under Russian Pan-Slavism. They were fittingly called "Sa:lon Communists," because both their social position and their behavior were in complete opposition to the concept "proletariat" which they were supposed to represent. It is not surprising, therefore, that this group of Slovak Communists received the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 with as much joy as the other Slovak national elements. Although the Slovak Government had forbidden the activities of the Communist Party, yet a majority of its representatives was left free and held important offices. This enabled them, through salon and not revolutionary means, to make preparations for the opportune establishment of a "Slovak Republic without Germans and Fascists" when the occasion should arise (6). 3. Towards a New Slovak Soviet Republic The moments for the fulfillment of their plans seemed to arrive when, near the end of August, 1944, Soviet parachutists succeeded in carrying the operations of war into Slo.vak territory and called forth co-called "Slovak uprising against the Germans." Slovak Communists, therefore, hastened in September of that year to establish the indepen*dent Communist Party of Slovakia to the great surprise of Czech Communist agents. They acted in accord with Moscow itself, which sought, through its partisans, to win over the President of the Slovak Republic, Joseph Tiso, by promising protection to the Slovak Republic (7). Tiso's attitude to these efforts was one of greatest rejection: Cooperation with Moscow would have signified a terrible cata,s trophe for the nation. It would have been a denial of Christianity. Communism was from its first beginnings and remained an irreconcilable enemy not only of our nation, our independence, but is a danger for all of Europe. Communism brings with itself a rapid debasement of the moral, spiritual and material level of every nation in whose bosom it reposes. Every true patriot, therefore, cannot soil his hands by cooperating with such a political system as well as with its representatives residing in Moscow (8). In these steps we see the two-faced action of Moscow, which "did not cease to assure officially that her aim was �42 SLOVAKIA to renew the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but underneath carried on, through her partisans, a survey to ascertain the mood in Slovakia towards the annexation of that country (9). 4. Change of Moscow's Plans When Moscow failed to gain support of Slovak national elements to proclaim the Slovak Soviet Republic and saw that Communism in Slovakia lacked strong roots, she decided definitely to reestablish Czecho-Slovakia. The elections of 1946 in renovated Czech-Slovakia indicate why this solution was more advantageous for Moscow's plans. The Communist Party in Czech territory had a more probable chance of winning. This decision of Moscow, however, meant the beginning of tragedy for Slovak national Communists. It was already discernible in the action of Moscow, which appointed William Siroky, a Hungarian by origin, as Chairman of the newly established Communist Party in Slovakia in preference to Slovak nationalists. In Siroky Moscow found a very compliant instrument for her further political drama in Czecho-Slovakia. Czecho-Slovakia indeed was renewed, but not in its original size and greatness. First of all Moscow annexed Ruthenia. When Dr. Edward Benes was returning from Moscow, shortly after the Red Army occupied Slovak territory, he had to remain in Kosice where the native Communists compelled him to agree to the so-called Kosice program of April, 1945, according to which the new Czecho-Slovakia was to be a state of two nations, Czech and Slovak. Clement Gottwald, as Premier of the government, announced on April 5, 1945, that "the Republic will be renewed as a comomn state of the co-equal Czech and Slovak nations" and that "the new government of the Republic will be concerned that, during the constitutional solution of the relations between the Czech and Slovak nations, the Slovak organs will be constituted with the same legislative, administrative and executive power which the Slovak nation enjoys today in its Slovak National Council" (10). Perhaps, in respect to elections, the Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 43 were at least promised autonomy as the last step to win them over to Communism. 5. Centralized Czecho-Slovakia Once Again A year later, in May of 1946, the first elections were held in the new Czecho-Slovakia, and they indicated a substantial difference within the Communist Parties of Slovakia and the Czech lands. The Communist Party of Slovakia, united with the Social Democrats, gained 30.6 per cent of the votes; whereas in Czech territory the Communist party obtained 40.4 per cent and the Social Democrats 15.6 per cent which together totalled 56 per cent. In Czech lands we see a very evident victory for the Communist Party. Of the 300 seats in Parliament, the combined parties of the Communists and Socialists had 153 deputies. A certain official from the Russian embassy made this observation about the results of the 1946 elections: "The majority is not great, but it suffices in order to rule over the other parties in a democratic way" (11). The elections sounded the death knell of the promised autonomy for Slovakia. Theoretically, the principle of two nations was continually stressed; practically, however, even a stronger centralization than during the first Czecho-Slovak Republic began to shape up. Even more, on September 28, 1948, when the Communist Party of Slovakia was abolished and became a part of the united Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This was more than the Slovak Communists could stand. Even the fear of retaliation •c ould not restrain them from rising up in opposition. The threat of revenge for this deviation from servility was not long in coming. In February of 1951, the foremost leaders, V. Clementis, Dr. G. Husak, L. Novomesky and K. Smidke, were expelled from the Party and deprived of all functions because "they planned a new Slovak separatist program and together formed a plot aimed at tearing Slovakia away from the Czecho-Slovak Republic" (12). In April others were condemned as bourgeois nationalists. The substance of their crimes is contained in a long condemnation, in which we find the following: �44 SLOVAKIA The ideological background of their treachery consisted in their attempts to solve the national question of the Slovak nation, not in collruboration with thet Czech working class but mainly in cooperation with the Slovak bourgeoisie and accepted eventually their leadership. In this connection they accepted the Slovak fascist puppet State. Later on, they successfully penetrated the leadership of the Slovak national uprising and got hold of important positions in the new People's Democratic State. They misused their positions in the Slovak National Council and on the Board of Commissioners in a criminal way in order to isolate Slovakia from the Czech working people and from the construction of Socialism, thus strengthening in Slovakia the remnants of capitalism and jeopardizing the achievements of the Slovak working class. Their aim was to break up the common Czecho-Slo,vak State and to hand over Slovakia to the reactionary bourg.eois-iP and to the mercy of foreign imperialists (13'). We do not know how L. Novomesky, one of the accused, understood, a;fter his trial, the words which he wrote in 1948, prior to his imprisonment, in the introduction to a book of his co-sufferer G. Husak: They say superficially that re,volutions devour their o,wn children. This is not trur! The truth rather is that revolutions, determined to r-emain faithful to their program, slough off those of their children who would pel'vert their meaning, their program and their end (14). After this purge President Gottwald appointed a Czech Communist, M. Bacilek, as President of the Slovak National Council. The whole apparatus of the Communist Party and administration in Slovakia is now in the hands of Czechs and Magyars, and not in the hands of Slovak elements. In liquidating the Communist Slovaks, Prague liquidated practically the idea of a Czecho,Slovak State. !Between the years 19415 and HW7, Benes had annihilated the Ca,tholics, the principal political force of Slovakia. During the course of the crisis 1n ,119418, the Czech Communists and Democrats had era.sed such Slovak Protestants as Le.Urich, and Ursiny. Prague suppressed finally the last political suppor.t of the Czecho-Siovak State in Slovakia: the Communists. The fourth Czecho-Slovak Republic as a national State of Czechs and Slovak,s is, therefore, dead. Instead a Socialist Soviet State emerges (,115). 6. Aftermath of Stalin's Death The changes in Moscow after the death of Joseph Stalin, however, testify that the drama of Slovak na- �SLOVAKIA 45 tionalist Communists is not completed and awaits the completion of its last act, if the new seemingly revolutionary directives, inaugurated by the XX Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow by Khrushchev, will be brought into effect. These directives, among other things, stress very emphatically the principle of self-determination in dealing with the national ambitions of various nations. If action really follows words, then this "new Moscow approach" towards the solution of problems stemming from nationalism may give the Slovak nationalist Communists new hopes to implement their old dream, the Slovak Soviet Republic. It seems that the first step along this new line was made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia, which convened from the first to eleventh of May, 1956, in order to discuss the directives of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. Present at this meeting was W. Siroky, the present :Prime Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Government. He uttered a manifesto in which among other things, he stressed: A!bove all it is necessary to concern ourselves with the questions of extending the jurisdiction of the Slovak Nation-al Council of the highest organ of State power in Slovakia. Today there are already suppositions for extending the legislative jurisdiction of the Slovak National Council, and we must probably think also -about constitutional changes i,n the same way. . . . In just that way must we consider extending the jurisdiction of the Slovak National Council in the eyes of the Board of Commissioners and e~pressly estaiblish constitutional conclusions of responsibility to the Board of •Commissionens o'f ithe Slovak National Council (16). The Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners, according to the Kosice program of 1945, were to be the legisfative and executive organs of the planned autonomous government of Slovakia. After the elections of 1946 their jurisdiction was completely limited, so that they really became only executive organs of the centralist administration of Prague. The conclusion of w_ Siroky's address would be that in due time a complete autonomy would prevail. But W. Siroky went so far as to say: "as the foundatio~ of its politics concerning the nationalist question, the Communist Party considers the right of na- �46 SLOVAKIA tions toward self-expression, that is, the right to break away freely from or unite freely to another nation" (17). Such a position would have been favorably acceptable to the nationalist Slovak Communists, but Siroky, a Stalinist and still in power, gave to it his own interpretation. It was certainly with the intention to threaten his imprisoned colleagues that in concluding his address he said: 'Noting our successes, . . . we can in no way underestimate the influence of the bourgeois nationalist ideology, Its heralds utilize every occasion of um.est, every want and negative mani• festation for its spread and livelihood. It is the plaitform of the enemies of socialism, and must not even lead us astray then when 1bouregois nationalism, as for example at present, emerges under the slogan of a People's Democratic Slovakia 018). Here then is the evidence why nationalist Slovak Communists, even when released from prison, have not been rehabilitated. If, however, Moscow shall desire the removal of W. Siroky and Bacilek and shall set up the first, then the world in the near future shall be surprised to hear the proclamation of a new Slovak Soviet Republic. The recently developed situation in Hungary strengthened again the position of the Stalinists and brought ahout the occupation of Slovakia by the Czech and Russ~an armies. 7. There Will Be No Stopping The existence of the Slovaks as a political force in Central Europe is not a fact of negligible importance at the present time. They have reached such a level of group consciousness that it will be impossible to disregard them in dealing with the political problems of that area. Their emergence presents a vivid example of the development of modern nationalism, for, as Don Luigi Sturzo has writ7 ten: "Once a country or a people has succeeded in developing a consciousness of its own personality and on affirming it in the struggle with which history has confronted it, there is no stopping." Many incentives led the Slovaks to develop a consciousness of their own personality despite the fact that they have been living for over a thousand . years without any specific political rights within Hungary. �SLOVAKIA 47 The first incentive came from the social philosophy of the Enlightenment. It created a new political power out of the submerged social class of people by advocating certain rights for the masses in dealing with the public affairs of states. At the same time this movement destroyed the predominance of Latin and elevated the people's language to literary prominence. In the case of the Slovaks it led to the codification of their vernacular language which became the first step towards the assertion of their own distinct personality. German Romantic philosophy provided a second incentive and gave a further impetus towards the same goal. Its contribution consisted in defining more closely the concept "people" by changing it into the concept "nation" whereby a greater stress was placed upon the importance of a common history, language and culture. This philosophy was also instrumental in creating among the Slav nations a literary and political movement called Pan-Slavism. Under the impact of Pan-Slavism Slovaks were made aware of their glorious past as represented by Greater Moravia, the first Slav state in Central Europe, and began to feel that their land was the cradle of present-day cultures. The third incentive was provided by President Wilson's principle of self-determination of nations and the Western Allies' decision to dismember Austria-Hungary after the First World War. The map of Central Europe was changed and the Slovaks became a part of a new state called the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In the CzechoSlovak Republic they were supposed to be equal partners with the kin Czechs, but these ambitions were never realized because the imaginary "Czechoslovak" nation sought to merge them with the Czechs on the ground of their close kinship. Nevertheless, in the Czecho-Slovak Republic the almost extinct Slovak community grew up into a new democratic society, and the Slovaks were ready to venture into an independent life in their own Slovak Republic. At present the overwhelming majority of Slovaks consider the situation as an enforced one and remain almost united in their efforts to regain their lost independence. �48 SLOVAKIA Under the present circumstances their ,o bjectives and efforts are directed towards the following goals: 1. Slovakia within the framework of a democratic Czecho-Slovakia is still the objective of a small group of "Czecho-Slovaks" who are composed primarily of former diplomats and leading personalities of the first CzechoS1ovakia. Being aware of the opposition of the majority of Slovaks at home agruinst the Czechs this group of Slovaks finally agreed to have the state based on the idea of two distinct Czech and Slovak nations instead of the former imaginary "Czechoslovak" nation. 2. Independent Slovakia either as a unit within the proposed federated Central Europe or simply as an independent democratic state. Both alternatives enjoy almost the same popularity with the overwhelming majority of the Slovaks at home and abroad. They represent the desires and endeavors of a substantial part of the Slovak population whose objective has always been to assure for Slovaks the rights of an ethnographically, culturally and politica:lly distinct personality in the international family of nations. 3. A Slovak Soviet Republic might have been the objective of a small group of Slovak Communists before they were executed or imprisoned as bourgeois deviationists. They once again seemed to have had a chance to act after Stalin's death but are now forestalled by what happened in Hungary in 1956. In spite of the fact that there still are groups among the Slovaks that endeavor to make Slovakia dependent upon the Czechs or upon the Russians, the ambitions of Slovak nationalism will hardly be gratified until the Slovaks find their haven in a sovereign Slovak State or in such a political arrangement of Central Europe wherein the Slovaks will be allotted the same sovereign rights as other so-called established nations possess today. (11J) iM. Gosiorovsky: "O Sovietoch na Slovensku v roku 1919", Nova Mysl, Pr-ague, September, 191'9, 2716,284. (Q) Ibidem. (3) !For ,e xample, 1n the elections of 1.929 voting districts, comprising a clearly Slovak population conceded very little percentage-wise to the Communist Party: Presov 4.57 per cent, Turcian- �SLOVAKIA 49 sky Sv. Martin 6J18 per cent, Ba,nska Bystrica 7.60 per cent. Whereas in districts comprising a greater majority of Hungarians, the Communists showed grea ter gains: Kosice 115.4!8 per cent and Nove Zamky IJ6.84 ·p er cent. - Dr. F. Durcansky, Biela Kniha, Buenos Aires, 19B4, p. 7'84). {4) Pravda Chudoby, 30. juna 1954. (5) Pravda, 30. maja 1'926. (6) Durcansky, op. cit., p. 796. (7) Dr. F. Durcansky, "Marne sa snail Moskva ziskat' Slovakov", Literarny almanac'1 Slovaka v Amerike, Chicago, 195G, pp. 43-48. (8) 1lbid., pp. 45-416. {9) J. Smutny, Doklady a rozp.ravy, CLondon, November 1952), p. 5. (10) Ustanoveni ceskoslovenske vlady Narodni fronty Cechu a Slovaku a jeji prvni projevy, (Praha 1<947), pp. 21 sp. (l1lJ) iH. Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved, (London, 1949), p. 47. C12) Rude pravo, (27. fobruara 19511). •Q13) Joseph Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe, Paris, 11955. 014) G. Husak, Zapas o zajtrajsok, (Bratislava, 1943), p. 3. (15) ,J . A. !Mikus, op. cit., ,p. 3'86. (Paris, 119515), p. 386. (16) Slovak, (jun 11956). (17) Ibidem. (lt8) Ibidem. BIBLIOGRAPHY Association Hongroise des Affaires Etrangeres. La deportation des Hongrois de Slovaquie, Budapest, .1947. Aulneau, J .: Histoire de l'Europe Central, Paris, ·1926. Autonomist: Slovakia's Plea for Autonomy, Jednota Press, Middletown, Pa., ,11935. Benes, E.: Czechoslovak Policy fo.r Victory and Peace, London, 1:94'4. Benes, E.: Le probleme .A utrichien et la question tcheque, Paris, •1908. Benes, E.: My War Memoirs, London, 1928. Blasko, S.: Slovakia in Blood and Shackles, Piassaic, N .J., 1954. Bokes, F.: Dejiny Slovakov a Slovenska (History of the Slovaks and Slovakia), Bratislava, 1'946. Botto, J.: Slovaci: Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia (Slovaks: the Development of Their National Consciousness), Turciansky Sv. Martin, ·11906. Carr, E. H.: Natio,nalism and After, London, 1·946. Chmelar, J.: National Minorities in Central Europe, Prague, 1'937. Clementis, V.: Panslavism, Past and Present, London, 194G. Culen, K.: Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (History of the Slovaks in America), Bratislava, 11942. Cul-en, K.:Cesi a Slovaci v statnych sluibach CSR (Cze'Chs and Slovak•s in the Civil Service of the Czechoslovak Republic), Bratislava, 1944>. Culen, K.: Pittsburghska dohoda (The Pittsburgh .Pact), •B ratislava, '1937. Denis, E.: La question d'Autriche: Les Slovaques, Paris, 1917. Diamond, W.: Czechoslovakia Between East and West, London. 1947. �50 SLOVAKIA Durcansky, F.: Slovenska biela kniha (Slovak White Book), Buenos Aires, 11954!. European Movement: Basis For An Eastern Europea,i Policy, London, 1950. Gottwald, K.: Slove,nsko hladuje (Slovakia is Starving), Bratislava, 1925. Gottwald, K.: Za socialisticky itat, za socialisticke pravo (For a Socialistic State, For a Socialistic Right), Prague, 1940. Hodza, M.: Federation in Central Europe, London, 1~. Hrusovsky, F.: Slovensko v dejinach Strecl,nej Europy (Slovakia in the History of Central Eu.rope), Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939. Hrufovsky, F ,: This Is Slovakia, Obrana Press, Scranton, Pa., 1955. Ingrim, R.: After Hitler Stalin? Bruce Pulb lishing Co., Milwaukee, '1946. Lloyd George, David: The Truth About the Peace Treaties, London, 1 '1925. Macartney, C. A.: Hungary a,nd Her Successo.rs, London-New York, 194'3'. Macartney, C. A.: National States and National Minorities, London, 1934. Macartney, C. A.: Problems of the Danube Basin, London, 194!2. M~ryk, T. G.: New Europe, London, 11917. Masaryk, T. G.: The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis, London, 1915. Masaryk, T. G.: La resurrection d'un etat (Souvenirs et reflections 1914-1958), Paris, .1930. Mendelsohn, P.: The Nuremberg Documents, London, 11946. Mikus, J. A.: La Slovaquie da,ns le drame de l'Europe, Paris, 1955-. Miniisterstvo vnitra (The Ministry of Interior): Spiknuti proti republice (Conspiracy Against the Czecho-Slovak Republic in Slovakia), Prague, 194'7. Osusky, S.: Benes and Slovakia, London, 1943. Peroutka, V.: Budovani statu (Building of a New State), Pra•g ue, 11'93•3-li936. Popovici, Aurel: Die Verei,n igten Staaten von Grossoesterreich, Leipzig, 1906. Rene, Renry: Questions d'Aut.riche-Hongrie et questions d'Orient, P-aris, 1903. Ripka, H.: Small and Great Nations, London, 1194!4'. Ripka, H.: Czechoslovakia Enslaved, London, 1948. Schlesinger, R.: Federalism i,n Central Europe, London, 1945. Seton Watson, R. W.: Slovakia Then and Now, London and Prague, 1 1'931. Seton Watson, R. W.: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, London, 194'3'. Seton Watson, R. W.: Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941, London, 1945. Sidor, K.: Andrej Hlinka, Bratislava, 1934. Sidor, K.: Slovenska politika na pode p.razskeho snemu (Slovak Politics On the ·F loor of the Prague ,Parliament), iBratislll/Va, 1943. Shafer, Boyd C.: Nationalism: Myth and Reality, New York, 19514. Slovak Catholic Federation of America: The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact, Chicago, 1004. �SLOVAKIA 51 Sturzo, Do r Luigi: NatiQ\nalism and Internationalism, New York, 1946. Thomson, Harrison: Czechoslovakia in European Histo.ry, Princeton Press, New Jerisey, 11'944. Ustanoveni ceskoslovenske vlady Narodni fronty Cechu a Slovaku a jeji prvni projevy (Decrees and First Manifestoes of the Czecho-Slovak Gover,nment Composed of the Czech and Slovak National Front), Prague, 1947. Ustav Dr. E. Benesa CDr. E. Benes lns'titurte): Doklady a .rozpravy (Documents and Deliberations), London, 1'952. ARTICLES IN MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS Brauner, H.: Die Volkswerdung der Slowaken (The Development of Slovaks lnot a Nation), a treatise published in Deutsches Archive ftir Landes und Volkswerdung, Vo1. V, Berlin, 1944. Darras, M.: Onze ans de vie independante en Slovaquie, Le monde slave, Paris, May-June, .1000. Durcansky, F.: l'.Europe Central dans le passe et dans l'avenir, La revue de drnit internacional, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, Geneve, XX]I, annee, no. 1, 1/94'4. Durcansky, F.: Marne sa snaii Moskva ziskat' Slovakov (The Futile Efforts of Moscow to Win Over the Slovaks), Literarny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike, an Almanach pU!blished in Chicago by the publislhers of the SLOVAK V AiMERllKE, a newspaper in the Slovak language, Chicago, 1:953. Chudoba, B.: Czechoslovakia: A Study in Disintegration, Thought, Fordham University Quarterly, March, 1950. Clementis, V.: Ni satelite de l'U.R.S.S. ni artisan d'un bloc slave, Parallele 50, Paris, September 20, '1950. Gosiorovs'ky, .M.: 0 •S ovietoch na Slovensku v roku 1919 (About the Soviets in Slovakia in 1919), Nova mysl (The New Thought), Prague, September, 111919. Hlinka, A.: Memoirs des Slovaques a la Conference de la Paix, A Memorandum to the Peace Conference in Paris, 1919. Kirschbaum, J .: Slovakia and Central European Federation Plans, SLOVAIIQ!A, a periodical plllblished by the Slovak League of Ameriica, Middletown, Pa., April, 1953. Pir, A. V.: America's Slovak Societies, published in the Bulletin of t he Slovak Nat ional Council A'broa,d, Middletown, Pa., August, 1956. Naboienska itatistika (Religious Statistics), Kalendar Kanadskej Slovenskej Ligy (Almanach of the Canadian Slovak League), Winnipeg, Manitdba, 19zy3. Schlesinger, R.: Slovakia Today and Tomorrow, Contemporary Review, London, August, 1939. ARTICLES IN NEWSPAPERS Pravda (The Truth), an official paper of the Communist Party in Slovakia. Samostatnost' pre Slovensko (Independence For Slovakia), Bratislava, May 30, 1926. Pravda Chudoby (The Truth of the Downtroddtm), a Czech, Communist rparper. Narodni h,nuti a komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska (National Movements and the Communist 'Party of Czechoslovakia), Prague, June 3'0, 1924. �52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 38 SLOVAKIA ·SLOVAK NATION ALISM: 1 B. S. BUC, Ph.D. NATIONALISM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 1. The Ephemeral Slovak Soviet Republic Because of the deeply religious basis of the Slovaks as well as the agrarian nature of Slovakia, Communism with its revolutionary materialistic-socia l program had from the beginning no hope of winning over the Slovaks. It, therefore, endeavored all the more to conquer them by force. The first attempt at forceful domination in Slovakia was undertaken in 1919. This occurred after the First World War in connection with the creation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic whose leader was the well known Bela Kuhn. The Hungarian Communist government invaded Slovakia with its army and occupied the Eastern sector with the sities of Presov and Kosice. Following in the wake of the occupation, a public Communist assembly met at Presov on June 16, 1919, and announced the establishment of the Slovak Soviet Republic with the proclamation that: This day the Slovak Soviet RepUiblic was created on Slovaik soil, liberated from imperialism. The first conscious, instinctive act of the proletariat, freed from the yoke of Czech imperialism, was that oppressors proclaim with such great glory, but in reality falsify (1). At this assembly, a temporary revolutionary committee was appointed which transferred its seat from Presov to Kosice. There on June 20, 1919, a twenty-member Slovak Revolutionary Council was named with the Czech Communist A. Jarousek at its head. This Council formally informed the Czecho-iSlovak government in Prague that Slovakia is separating from the Czech lands. Immediately the Soviet government of Moscow hastened to greet this new Slovak dictatorship of the proletariat. The existence of this very stormily-begun Slovak Soviet Republic was short-lived. On July 5, 1919, the Red Hungarian Army was coerced to withdraw from Slovak territory and the "Slovak Soviet Republic" ended. Except for many atrocities perpetrated on the inhabitants by the SLOVAKIA 39 Red Army, no signs whatever remained in Slovakia after this three-week Communist adventure (2). 2. Coordination of Nationalism and Class Struggle After the shattering of this first Communist attempt to enslave Slovakia in 1919, it would hardly be necessary to speak of the Communist Party in connection with Slovak nationalism. But the situation which ensued in Slovakia, after Communist occupation in 1944 through Russian partisans and then the army, made the Communist Party one of the most significant fashioners of the present fate of Slovaks in general. It was a repetition of the events of 1919, except with longer lasting and far-reaching results. Communism would never have attained its present position in Slovakia, had the end of the war not permitted it. Election results prior to the Second World War indicate that the Communist Party was never powerful in Slovakia; in the election year of 1919, it had 10.66 per cent of the votes; in 1935, 12.97 per cent. And even these percentages would be lower, if other nationalities were separated and only Slovak votes counted. This is shown by the fact that in voting districts comprising a clearly Slovak population, the percentage gains of the Communist Party were always substantially lower than in districts where they were mixed with Hungarians(3). The weak successes of the Communists in Slovakia, despite the facts that the social situation of the Slovak population was really not the best, must be attributed to the religious foundation of the Slovaks and in part to the influence of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, which in its program presented a more compact statement of the national and social demands of the Slovak inhabitants. Recalling to mind the delicacy of the nationality problem in the newly established Czecho-Slovakia, the Communist Party immediately in 1919 began to orientate its program in order to draw as much as possible from it. Clement Gottwald, leader of the Party, marked this program in 1924 in the following words: Such a solution to the question must be sought and found which will enable the Party to support nationality movements 40 SLOVAKIA and to unite its revolui-tonary energies, or to coordinate with revolutionary class warfare the whole proletariat of the CzechoSlovak RepUlblic. I am of the opinion that the Party can, with comparatirve ea,se, gain leadership in the movement of national minorities and thus cast to the r,e ar the bour,geois-chauvinist parties . .. . The Comunist Party in Slovakia must not only utilize the national movements for the class interests of the proletariat, but must stand directly at its head and lead it along paths actually revolutionary (4). In accord with the plan, the Communist Party in Slovakia also fought for the autonomy of Slovakia as did the Slovak People's Party. When in the elections of 1925 the autonomists achieved their greatest successes, the Communists hastened to promise more than autonomy. In January, 1926, they announced: 'Dhe Communist Party of Czechoslovakia raises .. these concrete demands: the complete independence of Slovakia. Let the SlovaJk nation itself decide on arranging its own affairs (5). This signified competition with the autonomists in emphasizing Slovak national ambitions. We do not know for sure whether to account the gains - even though trivial - of the Communist Party in Slovakia to its social struggle for the rights of the proletariat, or to its tactizing with Slovak nationalism. But the latter definitely gained votes for them. Despite its more than positive position in regard to Slovak nationalism, the Communist party was nevertheless organized only on a statewide basis as a "Czechoslovak" Party. Its leadership in Slovakia, however, rested in the hands of a sma:11 but capable group of Slovak intellectuals, who became adherents of the Party not from social motives, but rather because its ideological foundation introduced to them a new kind of belief. They were Slovak nationalists, but because of their negative attitude toward religion, they found it difficult to attach themselves to the other two national parties, namely, the Slovak People's Party and the Slovak National Party; the former was led by a Catholic priest, the latter by a Lutheran minister. They were, therefore, idealists blinded by idealism to such an extent that they were unable to realize that the Communist Party was actually an instrument of Russian imperialism, concealing itself at times in relation to SLOVAKIA 41 Slav nations under Russian Pan-Slavism. They were fittingly called "Sa:lon Communists," because both their social position and their behavior were in complete opposition to the concept "proletariat" which they were supposed to represent. It is not surprising, therefore, that this group of Slovak Communists received the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938 with as much joy as the other Slovak national elements. Although the Slovak Government had forbidden the activities of the Communist Party, yet a majority of its representatives was left free and held important offices. This enabled them, through salon and not revolutionary means, to make preparations for the opportune establishment of a "Slovak Republic without Germans and Fascists" when the occasion should arise (6). 3. Towards a New Slovak Soviet Republic The moments for the fulfillment of their plans seemed to arrive when, near the end of August, 1944, Soviet parachutists succeeded in carrying the operations of war into Slo.vak territory and called forth co-called "Slovak uprising against the Germans." Slovak Communists, therefore, hastened in September of that year to establish the indepen*dent Communist Party of Slovakia to the great surprise of Czech Communist agents. They acted in accord with Moscow itself, which sought, through its partisans, to win over the President of the Slovak Republic, Joseph Tiso, by promising protection to the Slovak Republic (7). Tiso's attitude to these efforts was one of greatest rejection: Cooperation with Moscow would have signified a terrible cata,s trophe for the nation. It would have been a denial of Christianity. Communism was from its first beginnings and remained an irreconcilable enemy not only of our nation, our independence, but is a danger for all of Europe. Communism brings with itself a rapid debasement of the moral, spiritual and material level of every nation in whose bosom it reposes. Every true patriot, therefore, cannot soil his hands by cooperating with such a political system as well as with its representatives residing in Moscow (8). In these steps we see the two-faced action of Moscow, which "did not cease to assure officially that her aim was 42 SLOVAKIA to renew the Czecho-Slovak Republic, but underneath carried on, through her partisans, a survey to ascertain the mood in Slovakia towards the annexation of that country (9). 4. Change of Moscow's Plans When Moscow failed to gain support of Slovak national elements to proclaim the Slovak Soviet Republic and saw that Communism in Slovakia lacked strong roots, she decided definitely to reestablish Czecho-Slovakia. The elections of 1946 in renovated Czech-Slovakia indicate why this solution was more advantageous for Moscow's plans. The Communist Party in Czech territory had a more probable chance of winning. This decision of Moscow, however, meant the beginning of tragedy for Slovak national Communists. It was already discernible in the action of Moscow, which appointed William Siroky, a Hungarian by origin, as Chairman of the newly established Communist Party in Slovakia in preference to Slovak nationalists. In Siroky Moscow found a very compliant instrument for her further political drama in Czecho-Slovakia. Czecho-Slovakia indeed was renewed, but not in its original size and greatness. First of all Moscow annexed Ruthenia. When Dr. Edward Benes was returning from Moscow, shortly after the Red Army occupied Slovak territory, he had to remain in Kosice where the native Communists compelled him to agree to the so-called Kosice program of April, 1945, according to which the new Czecho-Slovakia was to be a state of two nations, Czech and Slovak. Clement Gottwald, as Premier of the government, announced on April 5, 1945, that "the Republic will be renewed as a comomn state of the co-equal Czech and Slovak nations" and that "the new government of the Republic will be concerned that, during the constitutional solution of the relations between the Czech and Slovak nations, the Slovak organs will be constituted with the same legislative, administrative and executive power which the Slovak nation enjoys today in its Slovak National Council" (10). Perhaps, in respect to elections, the Slovaks SLOVAKIA 43 were at least promised autonomy as the last step to win them over to Communism. 5. Centralized Czecho-Slovakia Once Again A year later, in May of 1946, the first elections were held in the new Czecho-Slovakia, and they indicated a substantial difference within the Communist Parties of Slovakia and the Czech lands. The Communist Party of Slovakia, united with the Social Democrats, gained 30.6 per cent of the votes; whereas in Czech territory the Communist party obtained 40.4 per cent and the Social Democrats 15.6 per cent which together totalled 56 per cent. In Czech lands we see a very evident victory for the Communist Party. Of the 300 seats in Parliament, the combined parties of the Communists and Socialists had 153 deputies. A certain official from the Russian embassy made this observation about the results of the 1946 elections: "The majority is not great, but it suffices in order to rule over the other parties in a democratic way" (11). The elections sounded the death knell of the promised autonomy for Slovakia. Theoretically, the principle of two nations was continually stressed; practically, however, even a stronger centralization than during the first Czecho-Slovak Republic began to shape up. Even more, on September 28, 1948, when the Communist Party of Slovakia was abolished and became a part of the united Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia. This was more than the Slovak Communists could stand. Even the fear of retaliation •c ould not restrain them from rising up in opposition. The threat of revenge for this deviation from servility was not long in coming. In February of 1951, the foremost leaders, V. Clementis, Dr. G. Husak, L. Novomesky and K. Smidke, were expelled from the Party and deprived of all functions because "they planned a new Slovak separatist program and together formed a plot aimed at tearing Slovakia away from the Czecho-Slovak Republic" (12). In April others were condemned as bourgeois nationalists. The substance of their crimes is contained in a long condemnation, in which we find the following: 44 SLOVAKIA The ideological background of their treachery consisted in their attempts to solve the national question of the Slovak nation, not in collruboration with thet Czech working class but mainly in cooperation with the Slovak bourgeoisie and accepted eventually their leadership. In this connection they accepted the Slovak fascist puppet State. Later on, they successfully penetrated the leadership of the Slovak national uprising and got hold of important positions in the new People's Democratic State. They misused their positions in the Slovak National Council and on the Board of Commissioners in a criminal way in order to isolate Slovakia from the Czech working people and from the construction of Socialism, thus strengthening in Slovakia the remnants of capitalism and jeopardizing the achievements of the Slovak working class. Their aim was to break up the common Czecho-Slo,vak State and to hand over Slovakia to the reactionary bourg.eois-iP and to the mercy of foreign imperialists (13'). We do not know how L. Novomesky, one of the accused, understood, a;fter his trial, the words which he wrote in 1948, prior to his imprisonment, in the introduction to a book of his co-sufferer G. Husak: They say superficially that re,volutions devour their o,wn children. This is not trur! The truth rather is that revolutions, determined to r-emain faithful to their program, slough off those of their children who would pel'vert their meaning, their program and their end (14). After this purge President Gottwald appointed a Czech Communist, M. Bacilek, as President of the Slovak National Council. The whole apparatus of the Communist Party and administration in Slovakia is now in the hands of Czechs and Magyars, and not in the hands of Slovak elements. In liquidating the Communist Slovaks, Prague liquidated practically the idea of a Czecho,Slovak State. !Between the years 19415 and HW7, Benes had annihilated the Ca,tholics, the principal political force of Slovakia. During the course of the crisis 1n ,119418, the Czech Communists and Democrats had era.sed such Slovak Protestants as Le.Urich, and Ursiny. Prague suppressed finally the last political suppor.t of the Czecho-Siovak State in Slovakia: the Communists. The fourth Czecho-Slovak Republic as a national State of Czechs and Slovak,s is, therefore, dead. Instead a Socialist Soviet State emerges (,115). 6. Aftermath of Stalin's Death The changes in Moscow after the death of Joseph Stalin, however, testify that the drama of Slovak na- SLOVAKIA 45 tionalist Communists is not completed and awaits the completion of its last act, if the new seemingly revolutionary directives, inaugurated by the XX Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow by Khrushchev, will be brought into effect. These directives, among other things, stress very emphatically the principle of self-determination in dealing with the national ambitions of various nations. If action really follows words, then this "new Moscow approach" towards the solution of problems stemming from nationalism may give the Slovak nationalist Communists new hopes to implement their old dream, the Slovak Soviet Republic. It seems that the first step along this new line was made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia, which convened from the first to eleventh of May, 1956, in order to discuss the directives of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. Present at this meeting was W. Siroky, the present :Prime Minister of the Czecho-Slovak Government. He uttered a manifesto in which among other things, he stressed: A!bove all it is necessary to concern ourselves with the questions of extending the jurisdiction of the Slovak Nation-al Council of the highest organ of State power in Slovakia. Today there are already suppositions for extending the legislative jurisdiction of the Slovak National Council, and we must probably think also -about constitutional changes i,n the same way. . . . In just that way must we consider extending the jurisdiction of the Slovak National Council in the eyes of the Board of Commissioners and e~pressly estaiblish constitutional conclusions of responsibility to the Board of •Commissionens o'f ithe Slovak National Council (16). The Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners, according to the Kosice program of 1945, were to be the legisfative and executive organs of the planned autonomous government of Slovakia. After the elections of 1946 their jurisdiction was completely limited, so that they really became only executive organs of the centralist administration of Prague. The conclusion of w_ Siroky's address would be that in due time a complete autonomy would prevail. But W. Siroky went so far as to say: "as the foundatio~ of its politics concerning the nationalist question, the Communist Party considers the right of na- 46 SLOVAKIA tions toward self-expression, that is, the right to break away freely from or unite freely to another nation" (17). Such a position would have been favorably acceptable to the nationalist Slovak Communists, but Siroky, a Stalinist and still in power, gave to it his own interpretation. It was certainly with the intention to threaten his imprisoned colleagues that in concluding his address he said: 'Noting our successes, . . . we can in no way underestimate the influence of the bourgeois nationalist ideology, Its heralds utilize every occasion of um.est, every want and negative mani• festation for its spread and livelihood. It is the plaitform of the enemies of socialism, and must not even lead us astray then when 1bouregois nationalism, as for example at present, emerges under the slogan of a People's Democratic Slovakia 018). Here then is the evidence why nationalist Slovak Communists, even when released from prison, have not been rehabilitated. If, however, Moscow shall desire the removal of W. Siroky and Bacilek and shall set up the first, then the world in the near future shall be surprised to hear the proclamation of a new Slovak Soviet Republic. The recently developed situation in Hungary strengthened again the position of the Stalinists and brought ahout the occupation of Slovakia by the Czech and Russ~an armies. 7. There Will Be No Stopping The existence of the Slovaks as a political force in Central Europe is not a fact of negligible importance at the present time. They have reached such a level of group consciousness that it will be impossible to disregard them in dealing with the political problems of that area. Their emergence presents a vivid example of the development of modern nationalism, for, as Don Luigi Sturzo has writ7 ten: "Once a country or a people has succeeded in developing a consciousness of its own personality and on affirming it in the struggle with which history has confronted it, there is no stopping." Many incentives led the Slovaks to develop a consciousness of their own personality despite the fact that they have been living for over a thousand . years without any specific political rights within Hungary. SLOVAKIA 47 The first incentive came from the social philosophy of the Enlightenment. It created a new political power out of the submerged social class of people by advocating certain rights for the masses in dealing with the public affairs of states. At the same time this movement destroyed the predominance of Latin and elevated the people's language to literary prominence. In the case of the Slovaks it led to the codification of their vernacular language which became the first step towards the assertion of their own distinct personality. German Romantic philosophy provided a second incentive and gave a further impetus towards the same goal. Its contribution consisted in defining more closely the concept "people" by changing it into the concept "nation" whereby a greater stress was placed upon the importance of a common history, language and culture. This philosophy was also instrumental in creating among the Slav nations a literary and political movement called Pan-Slavism. Under the impact of Pan-Slavism Slovaks were made aware of their glorious past as represented by Greater Moravia, the first Slav state in Central Europe, and began to feel that their land was the cradle of present-day cultures. The third incentive was provided by President Wilson's principle of self-determination of nations and the Western Allies' decision to dismember Austria-Hungary after the First World War. The map of Central Europe was changed and the Slovaks became a part of a new state called the Czecho-Slovak Republic. In the CzechoSlovak Republic they were supposed to be equal partners with the kin Czechs, but these ambitions were never realized because the imaginary "Czechoslovak" nation sought to merge them with the Czechs on the ground of their close kinship. Nevertheless, in the Czecho-Slovak Republic the almost extinct Slovak community grew up into a new democratic society, and the Slovaks were ready to venture into an independent life in their own Slovak Republic. At present the overwhelming majority of Slovaks consider the situation as an enforced one and remain almost united in their efforts to regain their lost independence. 48 SLOVAKIA Under the present circumstances their ,o bjectives and efforts are directed towards the following goals: 1. Slovakia within the framework of a democratic Czecho-Slovakia is still the objective of a small group of "Czecho-Slovaks" who are composed primarily of former diplomats and leading personalities of the first CzechoS1ovakia. Being aware of the opposition of the majority of Slovaks at home agruinst the Czechs this group of Slovaks finally agreed to have the state based on the idea of two distinct Czech and Slovak nations instead of the former imaginary "Czechoslovak" nation. 2. Independent Slovakia either as a unit within the proposed federated Central Europe or simply as an independent democratic state. Both alternatives enjoy almost the same popularity with the overwhelming majority of the Slovaks at home and abroad. They represent the desires and endeavors of a substantial part of the Slovak population whose objective has always been to assure for Slovaks the rights of an ethnographically, culturally and politica:lly distinct personality in the international family of nations. 3. A Slovak Soviet Republic might have been the objective of a small group of Slovak Communists before they were executed or imprisoned as bourgeois deviationists. They once again seemed to have had a chance to act after Stalin's death but are now forestalled by what happened in Hungary in 1956. In spite of the fact that there still are groups among the Slovaks that endeavor to make Slovakia dependent upon the Czechs or upon the Russians, the ambitions of Slovak nationalism will hardly be gratified until the Slovaks find their haven in a sovereign Slovak State or in such a political arrangement of Central Europe wherein the Slovaks will be allotted the same sovereign rights as other so-called established nations possess today. (11J) iM. Gosiorovsky: "O Sovietoch na Slovensku v roku 1919", Nova Mysl, Pr-ague, September, 191'9, 2716,284. (Q) Ibidem. (3) !For ,e xample, 1n the elections of 1.929 voting districts, comprising a clearly Slovak population conceded very little percentage-wise to the Communist Party: Presov 4.57 per cent, Turcian- SLOVAKIA 49 sky Sv. Martin 6J18 per cent, Ba,nska Bystrica 7.60 per cent. Whereas in districts comprising a greater majority of Hungarians, the Communists showed grea ter gains: Kosice 115.4!8 per cent and Nove Zamky IJ6.84 ·p er cent. - Dr. F. Durcansky, Biela Kniha, Buenos Aires, 19B4, p. 7'84). {4) Pravda Chudoby, 30. juna 1954. (5) Pravda, 30. maja 1'926. (6) Durcansky, op. cit., p. 796. (7) Dr. F. Durcansky, "Marne sa snail Moskva ziskat' Slovakov", Literarny almanac'1 Slovaka v Amerike, Chicago, 195G, pp. 43-48. (8) 1lbid., pp. 45-416. {9) J. Smutny, Doklady a rozp.ravy, CLondon, November 1952), p. 5. (10) Ustanoveni ceskoslovenske vlady Narodni fronty Cechu a Slovaku a jeji prvni projevy, (Praha 1<947), pp. 21 sp. (l1lJ) iH. Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved, (London, 1949), p. 47. C12) Rude pravo, (27. fobruara 19511). •Q13) Joseph Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe, Paris, 11955. 014) G. Husak, Zapas o zajtrajsok, (Bratislava, 1943), p. 3. (15) ,J . A. !Mikus, op. cit., ,p. 3'86. (Paris, 119515), p. 386. (16) Slovak, (jun 11956). (17) Ibidem. (lt8) Ibidem. BIBLIOGRAPHY Association Hongroise des Affaires Etrangeres. La deportation des Hongrois de Slovaquie, Budapest, .1947. Aulneau, J .: Histoire de l'Europe Central, Paris, ·1926. Autonomist: Slovakia's Plea for Autonomy, Jednota Press, Middletown, Pa., ,11935. Benes, E.: Czechoslovak Policy fo.r Victory and Peace, London, 1:94'4. Benes, E.: Le probleme .A utrichien et la question tcheque, Paris, •1908. Benes, E.: My War Memoirs, London, 1928. Blasko, S.: Slovakia in Blood and Shackles, Piassaic, N .J., 1954. Bokes, F.: Dejiny Slovakov a Slovenska (History of the Slovaks and Slovakia), Bratislava, 1'946. Botto, J.: Slovaci: Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia (Slovaks: the Development of Their National Consciousness), Turciansky Sv. Martin, ·11906. Carr, E. H.: Natio,nalism and After, London, 1·946. Chmelar, J.: National Minorities in Central Europe, Prague, 1'937. Clementis, V.: Panslavism, Past and Present, London, 194G. Culen, K.: Dejiny Slovakov v Amerike (History of the Slovaks in America), Bratislava, 11942. Cul-en, K.:Cesi a Slovaci v statnych sluibach CSR (Cze'Chs and Slovak•s in the Civil Service of the Czechoslovak Republic), Bratislava, 1944>. Culen, K.: Pittsburghska dohoda (The Pittsburgh .Pact), •B ratislava, '1937. Denis, E.: La question d'Autriche: Les Slovaques, Paris, 1917. Diamond, W.: Czechoslovakia Between East and West, London. 1947. 50 SLOVAKIA Durcansky, F.: Slovenska biela kniha (Slovak White Book), Buenos Aires, 11954!. European Movement: Basis For An Eastern Europea,i Policy, London, 1950. Gottwald, K.: Slove,nsko hladuje (Slovakia is Starving), Bratislava, 1925. Gottwald, K.: Za socialisticky itat, za socialisticke pravo (For a Socialistic State, For a Socialistic Right), Prague, 1940. Hodza, M.: Federation in Central Europe, London, 1~. Hrusovsky, F.: Slovensko v dejinach Strecl,nej Europy (Slovakia in the History of Central Eu.rope), Turciansky Sv. Martin, 1939. Hrufovsky, F ,: This Is Slovakia, Obrana Press, Scranton, Pa., 1955. Ingrim, R.: After Hitler Stalin? Bruce Pulb lishing Co., Milwaukee, '1946. Lloyd George, David: The Truth About the Peace Treaties, London, 1 '1925. Macartney, C. A.: Hungary a,nd Her Successo.rs, London-New York, 194'3'. Macartney, C. A.: National States and National Minorities, London, 1934. Macartney, C. A.: Problems of the Danube Basin, London, 194!2. M~ryk, T. G.: New Europe, London, 11917. Masaryk, T. G.: The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis, London, 1915. Masaryk, T. G.: La resurrection d'un etat (Souvenirs et reflections 1914-1958), Paris, .1930. Mendelsohn, P.: The Nuremberg Documents, London, 11946. Mikus, J. A.: La Slovaquie da,ns le drame de l'Europe, Paris, 1955-. Miniisterstvo vnitra (The Ministry of Interior): Spiknuti proti republice (Conspiracy Against the Czecho-Slovak Republic in Slovakia), Prague, 194'7. Osusky, S.: Benes and Slovakia, London, 1943. Peroutka, V.: Budovani statu (Building of a New State), Pra•g ue, 11'93•3-li936. Popovici, Aurel: Die Verei,n igten Staaten von Grossoesterreich, Leipzig, 1906. Rene, Renry: Questions d'Aut.riche-Hongrie et questions d'Orient, P-aris, 1903. Ripka, H.: Small and Great Nations, London, 1194!4'. Ripka, H.: Czechoslovakia Enslaved, London, 1948. Schlesinger, R.: Federalism i,n Central Europe, London, 1945. Seton Watson, R. W.: Slovakia Then and Now, London and Prague, 1 1'931. Seton Watson, R. W.: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, London, 194'3'. Seton Watson, R. W.: Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941, London, 1945. Sidor, K.: Andrej Hlinka, Bratislava, 1934. Sidor, K.: Slovenska politika na pode p.razskeho snemu (Slovak Politics On the ·F loor of the Prague ,Parliament), iBratislll/Va, 1943. Shafer, Boyd C.: Nationalism: Myth and Reality, New York, 19514. Slovak Catholic Federation of America: The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh Pact, Chicago, 1004. SLOVAKIA 51 Sturzo, Do r Luigi: NatiQ\nalism and Internationalism, New York, 1946. Thomson, Harrison: Czechoslovakia in European Histo.ry, Princeton Press, New Jerisey, 11'944. Ustanoveni ceskoslovenske vlady Narodni fronty Cechu a Slovaku a jeji prvni projevy (Decrees and First Manifestoes of the Czecho-Slovak Gover,nment Composed of the Czech and Slovak National Front), Prague, 1947. Ustav Dr. E. Benesa CDr. E. Benes lns'titurte): Doklady a .rozpravy (Documents and Deliberations), London, 1'952. ARTICLES IN MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS Brauner, H.: Die Volkswerdung der Slowaken (The Development of Slovaks lnot a Nation), a treatise published in Deutsches Archive ftir Landes und Volkswerdung, Vo1. V, Berlin, 1944. Darras, M.: Onze ans de vie independante en Slovaquie, Le monde slave, Paris, May-June, .1000. Durcansky, F.: l'.Europe Central dans le passe et dans l'avenir, La revue de drnit internacional, de sciences diplomatiques et politiques, Geneve, XX]I, annee, no. 1, 1/94'4. Durcansky, F.: Marne sa snaii Moskva ziskat' Slovakov (The Futile Efforts of Moscow to Win Over the Slovaks), Literarny Almanach Slovaka v Amerike, an Almanach pU!blished in Chicago by the publislhers of the SLOVAK V AiMERllKE, a newspaper in the Slovak language, Chicago, 1:953. Chudoba, B.: Czechoslovakia: A Study in Disintegration, Thought, Fordham University Quarterly, March, 1950. Clementis, V.: Ni satelite de l'U.R.S.S. ni artisan d'un bloc slave, Parallele 50, Paris, September 20, '1950. Gosiorovs'ky, .M.: 0 •S ovietoch na Slovensku v roku 1919 (About the Soviets in Slovakia in 1919), Nova mysl (The New Thought), Prague, September, 111919. Hlinka, A.: Memoirs des Slovaques a la Conference de la Paix, A Memorandum to the Peace Conference in Paris, 1919. Kirschbaum, J .: Slovakia and Central European Federation Plans, SLOVAIIQ!A, a periodical plllblished by the Slovak League of Ameriica, Middletown, Pa., April, 1953. Pir, A. V.: America's Slovak Societies, published in the Bulletin of t he Slovak Nat ional Council A'broa,d, Middletown, Pa., August, 1956. Naboienska itatistika (Religious Statistics), Kalendar Kanadskej Slovenskej Ligy (Almanach of the Canadian Slovak League), Winnipeg, Manitdba, 19zy3. Schlesinger, R.: Slovakia Today and Tomorrow, Contemporary Review, London, August, 1939. ARTICLES IN NEWSPAPERS Pravda (The Truth), an official paper of the Communist Party in Slovakia. Samostatnost' pre Slovensko (Independence For Slovakia), Bratislava, May 30, 1926. Pravda Chudoby (The Truth of the Downtroddtm), a Czech, Communist rparper. Narodni h,nuti a komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska (National Movements and the Communist 'Party of Czechoslovakia), Prague, June 3'0, 1924. 52 SLOVAKIA Rude pravo (The Red Law), an official paper of the Czeeh Communist Party. Odhaleni zradcu (The Traitors Uncovered), Pra,g ue, Felbruary 27, ,1951<. Slovak, a paper published by the Slovak Liberation Committee in Munich, Germany. Autonomna vlada pre Slovensko? (An Autonomous Government For Slovakia?), !Munich, June, 1956 . • • • FA'llHER SEGIN!AK'S IMPRE$SIONS OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV "A visit behind the Iron Curtain can best be characterized by the feeling that one is seeing the living-dead." With these words, Father Theodore Seginak, 0.S.B., superior of the Benedictine Fathers' Holy Trinity Priory, described his recent visit to Prague in Bohemia and Presov in Slovakia. After attending a meeting of all the Benedictine superiors of the world in Rome from September 18 to 26, Father Seginak was accompanied by Father Alexander Minchik, O.S.B., on the trip behind the Iron Curtain. Visas for the trip behind the Iron Curtain are most difficult to obtain. Only after repeated requests had been made did the two priests receive the necessary permission to visit. Even so only two times a week can flights from Vienna to Prague be had. At the Prague airport a thorough search of all apparel was made, as well as a close scrutiny of all money brought into the country. The customs officials demanded to see everything, and sternly warned the two priests that on their return journey they would be required to show a receipt for all purchases made during their visit. The streets of Prague were filled with sullen, downcast persons who performed their duties with a mechanical precision. One always had the feeling that the eyes of the communist "big brother" were on you. In fact, it is routine in restaurants to sit down to a meal and look up to see a policeman gaping in the window at the diners. The very best meal is steak - which is really hamburger with an egg on top. Father Seginak was amazed at the prices of clothing and the very poor quality. An American $45 suit costs  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Nationalism: Nationalism of the Communist Party Description An account of the resource B. S. Buc, Ph.D.<br />Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959<br />pp. 38-52<br /><ol><li>The Ephemeral Slovak Soviet Republic</li> <li>Coordination of Nationalism and Class Struggle</li> <li>Towards a New Slovak Soviet Republic</li> <li>Change of Moscow's Plans</li> <li>Centralized Czecho-Slovakia Once Again</li> <li>Aftermath of Stalin's Death</li> <li>There Will Be No Stopping</li> </ol> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Buc, B. S. (Bonaventure S.), 1910-1966 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/47327409e105ee97510413943ee0b6bd.pdf 64c0f2e60d8bfad4e4f2c47e3eab6e1b PDF Text Text 24 SLOVAKIA vakia. The editor of the Czech periodical had the opportunity to learn how the Slovaks in Rome felt about the matter. They held no ill will for the Archbishop of London, but they did for the Czechs associated with Novy Zivot, the editor of which certainly knows better. The Czechs apparently have learned little or nothing from the past. They keep parroting listlessly the slogan "truth will prevail" - a la Masaryk and Benes - while they spread false propaganda even about those who are supposed to be "closely related" to them. It is obvious that the Czech periodical "Novy Zivot" (New Life) is still following the old life which brought ruin to the Slovak and Czech nations. • • • INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Rev. William A. Kaschmitter, M.N. Due to the scientific and technological revolutions of the past century, the world has become international in spite of itself and does not know what to do about this new situation. The number of international organizations created since 1860 to cope with specific international problems is simply phenomenal. The first global attempt made to grapple with all of these problems in general was made after World War I when the League of Nations was formally erected. The League failed but its failure did not kill the sense of need :for such an organization and after World War II another attempt was made in the creation of the United Nations Organization. Unfortunately, many people today fear that the United Nations Organization will go the way of the League unless it can "grow up" and mature to the point where it can command not only the respect but also the confidence of all nations, great and small. Justice - Not Merely Charity There are good-hearted people who think that charity alone will suffice to cure the ills of our world. It is true that love for God and neighbor are the two greatest commandments and that acording to St. Paul, Charity is the �SLOVAKIA 25 fulfillment of the law. We must remember, however, that obligations of justice take precedence over the obligations of charity and that where justice is lacking there can be no true charity. To give to our neighbor in charity what is due to him in justice would be sordid mockery. Those of us who have seen Communists at close range know how violently they oppose charity as a substitute for justice but unfortunately they seem to know little about what justice really is and what it demands. It is equally unfortunate that many of our anti-Communist statesmen seem to know just as little as the Communists do about what justice demands in the international sphere. The Charter of the United Nations in its Preamble speaks of justice for all nations, and President Eisenhower in a recent television address declared that justice and peace are only two faces of the same coin. These declarations would not only be admirable but supremely important if they were accompanied by a clear-cut and sound definition of what justice between nations is and what it demands. Even without a precise definition of justice and its demands, such declarations would be truly precious if we could assume that the present world order is just; for then every one of us could easily supply a definition merely by saying that justice demands the preservation of the status quo, the observance of international treaties, international agreements, etc. Here, the crucial question is: Is Our Present World Order Just? Many good people seem to think that the only thing that's wrong with our world is that we have too many Communists and that if we could only be rid of Communism the whole world could be happy. They think that the ogre of Communism is kept alive only by the lying propaganda of a few self-seeking tyrants who keep their dupes in line with the most savage terrorism. I hold no brief for Communism. I could not defend Communism without betraying my own friends who suffered exquisite torture at Communist hands and without betraying all of the Christians in China, some of whom were buried alive by the Communists while I was; still in Peking. �26 SLOVAKIA Without excusing the horrors and abuses of the Communists, let us admit here and now that it is precisely the injustice of our present unbalanced and unhealthy world order that provides the Communist propaganda machine with its best ammunition. I hope within the next few minutes to cite some facts and statistics to prove that our present world is unjust but before taking up that point I'd like to call your attention to a few of the glaring failures and mistakes of the Free World in its fight against Communism. The Free World is placing great emphasis on military preparedness as a means of combatting the Communist threat. That, of course, is necessary. It's a mistake, however, to think that bombs and bullets can ever be an antidote to an ideology - especially the kind of ideology which Pope Pius XI has described as a kind of mysticism - a false mysticism, it is true, but still a mysticism. There are Communists who would be willing to fight with stones and stick;; if necessary and are willing to die rather than give up that pseudo-mysticism of theirs. MQst people in the Free World admit that bombs and bullets are no real antidote to the Communist ideology and they are therefore stressing the idea of freedom as an anti-dote to Communistic ideals and practices. Freedom is, of course, one of God's greatest natural gifts to man. History has also proven over and over again that an atmosphere of freedom is most conducive not only to sound political life but also to healthy economic development. This freedom, however, must be real; it must be for all; above all, it must be in harmony with justice. When I was directing the Catholic news service in Peking I got reports of a million people starving to death in China. These people were "free" to eat - if they could find the necessary food. They couldn't find it - and hence they were not really free to eat. The liberalistic ideas of John Locke, John Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rosseau as applied in the nineteenth century led to economic anarchy and all kinds of injustice. That kind of liberty gave birth to the monstrosity that we know as Communism today and it is still provid- �SLOVAKIA 27 ing ammunition for the Communist propaganda machine in the hungry countries today. Liberty of that kind is as closely related to Communism as a grandfather is related to his grandson. Liberty if joined together with justice can indeed serve as a splendid antidote to the Communist ideology and there are many good men who are making it so today. On the other hand, there are others who are loud in condemning Communism, but who are afraid even to whisper that the hungry people in other countries have a real right to human existence. That kind of anti-communism is ineffectual if not actually harmful. Let us then have liberty - but let it be a liberty that is eternally wedded to JUSTICE FOR ALL MEN! It is only on this kind of justice, coupled with liberty, that we will be ruble to provide an effective antidote to the Communist ideology. The biggest job ahead of us is to create a system of social thought that will provide for real justice for all men. If that justice is wedded to the truth that makes men free, this combination of justice and truth and freedom will give birth to an ideology that will be more effective than all of the "A" and "H" bombs in the world. If, on the other hand, we continue to tolerate a world order in which more than half of humanity is deprived of its right to a truly human existence, our bombs may prove to be nothing but the instruments of a wholesale destruction in which democracy itself will perish and we ourselves will go down to ultimate defeat. Our Unjust World Order Providing enough food for everybody is certainly one of the most basic requirements for a healty world order. There are many prophets of doom who fear that the day will soon come when the earth simply cannot provide food for all. It is certainly true that half of the world's population today is undernourished if not actualJy starving. Some say that no less than 70 percent of the human race is undernourished. �28 SLOVAKIA The question for us to consider is this: is all this hunger really due to over-population or is it due to mismanagement in our conduct of world affairs? Experts of our Department of Agriculture in Washington are quoted as saying that 16,000,000,000 acres could be used by modern methods throughout the world for food production. On the other hand, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations declared in its 1956 Yearbook that at present less than 3,340,000,000 acres are under cultivation. If these figures are accurate, it means that 79 percent of the land that could be used for food production, is now simply going to waste. These statistics certainly indicate that there is still a great deal of land that we could use and are not using. Other facts seem to indicate that we are not using our Godgiven brains either. Alluding to the great progress made by the agricultural scientists in recent years, the Daily News in New York declared editorially on August 7, 1952 that if we really put our scientific know-how and technical skill to work in this country, the Mississippi Basin alone could provide food for a population of 500,000,000 or approximately three times the present total population of this whole country. Reader's Digest in its issue for September, 1952, carried an article in which it was stated that Brazil alone could support a total population of one billion or nearly twenty times its present population. These estimates are based on the present findings of agricultural science and we must remember that the scientists are constantly finding ways of increasing production. As one of them declared : "The big harvest is still ahead." Another scientist, Professor Rosin, who is not interested in agriculture but in chemistry, has declared that if we devoted only as much money to chemical research as w spend in one month on military preparedness, the chemists could find ways of producing so much food artificially that we could turn all our farms into parks and flowerbeds and still feed humanity more adequately than it is being fed today. A sad but effective commentary on the statistics quoted above is provided by the "plague" of agricultural over- �SLOVAKIA 29 production which is giving farmers and statesmen such a headache in various countries. During his campaign speech on agriculture last fall, President Eisenhower told us that our Government has spent $9,000,000,000 for the purchase of agricultural surplus products merely to keep them off the market and is storing them at the cost of $1,000,000 a day. In 1957 our Government had paid farmers 260 million dollars for not cultivating 12,000,000 acres and, according to the President's campaign speech,. the planning called for the immobilization of from forty to fifty million acres in 1958. Agricultral producers of about 25 countries who met in Nairobi, Africa, a few years ago, complained that the most serious problem confronting world agriculture today is the fact that "effective demand" cannot keep up with productive capacity. Time does not permit of any detailed discussion of natural resources of our earth in so far as these things industry, trade and finance or of the still undeveloped have a bearing on hunger and the world's other ills. Suffice it to say that industry in some areas is forced to curtail production and lay off workers simply because people in other areas, some of which are enormously rich in undeveloped resources, are too poor to buy what they really need or what they would like to have. The facts and figures which I have just quoted seem to prove conclusively that if half of the human race is still hungry, the blame is not to be placed on poor old mother earth. Neither are our agricultural scientists to blame. The blame is rather to be placed on the immaturity of our international politics and our international economics. Our science is indeed worthy of the twentieth century but our international economics and our international politics seem to be stuck somewhere in the nineteenth, the eighteenth, the seventeenth or the sixteenth century. The tragic significance of the agricultural statistics which I have just quoted is punctuated and accentuated when they are compared with conditions in the hungry nations. Japan, with a population of more than 90,000,000 �30 SLOVAKIA today has less farm land than is actually under cultivation in the little State of New York. With more than six million farm families, the country has only 14,000,000 acres of food producing land. Let us remember that according to the experts quoted by Josue de Castro, there are still nearly 13,000,000,000 acres throughout the world that could be used for food production but are actually lying idle. If these figures are even approximately correct, it means that throughout the world there are more than 900 arable acres lying idle for every acre that Japan has at her disposal for food production. In the cities of Japan, a better than average wage is sufficient only to keep a man, his wife and one child in comfort. With two children the situation is no longer comfortable and with three children, a man with even a better than average wage is apt to go into debt. Three million people in Japan are suffering from tuberculosis and 1,300,000 are more or less mentally deranged, largely due to economic worries. Under such circumstances, is it surprising that this Abortion has been legalized for economic reasons so that non-Christian nation is going all-out for birth-control? a family that is too poor to support another child can legally have an abortion. In 1955 abortions in Japan equalled the number of births - 1,700,000 of each. The Japanese know the horrors connected with abortions and for that reason 30,000 experts have been trained in the use of contraceptives so as to teach people everywhere how to use them. Shall we ,b lame the Japanese for these practices or shall we place the blame on the insane world order that makes such things necessary? It would take too long to give the corresponding data concerning India, Java, Egypt, China and many other crowded sectors of the globe. I have already told you that when I was in Peking I received reports of 1,000,000 deaths by starvation in China at a time when my own brothers in Idaho were being paid for not cultivating their fields. Need I remind you that China is today the second greatest stronghold of Communism in the world? �SLOVAKIA 31 Where Is The Solution? Many of you may remember that certain spokesmen for the World Health Organization of the United Nations hoped to solve the world's problems by starting all-out birth control movements in the crowded areas of the globe. Some of the Catholic representatives in the World Health Organization opposed this plan so bitterly that the others dared not go on openly with their plan for fear that the whole Organizatiofl would be destroyed. Though the Catholic representatnves in the World Health Organization opposed birth control they did not succeed in bringing forward any real solution. During a violent controversy I had in Tokyo eight years ago .on the subject of birth control, I too was challenged to bring forward a positive solution. The challenge seemed reasonable so a number of us began to study not only the effects of the world's population and its resources but also contemporary social theory. After several years we arrived at the conclusion that contemporary social theory - at least our Catholic social teaching - is mature anough to INDICATE solutions for social and economic problems WITHIN a nation but that even our Catholic social doctrine has not matured to the point where it can effectively grapple with INTERNATIONAL social and economic problems. It was obvious to all of us that we could not find the talent in Japan that would be needed to extend our social teaching to the international sphere so I gave up my press work on the first of January last year in order to go looking for the needed talent. During this year and a half I have contacted a large number of Catholic specialists in economics, sociology, international law, moral theology, natural law, etc. In Asia and Europe as well as in the United States I found general agreement among the scholars I consulted to the effect that our failure to extend our social teaching to the international sphere has: a) greatly weakened our position in the face of international Communism; b) defeated many of our efforts for world peace. These specialists also agree that it is imperative to mobil- �32 SLOVAKIA ize the best talent of the whole world for the creation of a new science of international social justice. A Science Of International Social Justice It is of the essence of a science that it should include all of the related principles underlying a specified field of knowledge along with the conclusions logically drawn from those principles. The history of all of our sciences shows that no science has ever grown up over night but in many cases the principles were shown and accepted long before they were coordinated into a system and before most of the conclusions had been drawn. In the matter of international social justice, we have a few basic principles which can now be affirmed though the scholars have not as yet drawn up any system of conclusions from them. Perhaps the most basic of these principles is that every human being has a real right to a human existence. That does not mean that every one is entitled to a Cadillac or a Ford. Perhaps not to a bicycle. But every human being does have a right to enough to eat, enough to wear, enough to feed, clothe and house his children. People also have a right to found a family and therefore also the right to enough of this world's goods so that they can observe the natural law in family life. The correlative of a "right" is not charity or handouts, but justice. It cannot be said that this or that individual has an obligation in justice to provide this or that stranger with all that is needed for a human existence. It can, however, be said that society has an obligation in justice to set up such a social and economic order as will enable all men, under the proper conditions, to secure for themselves what is needed for a truly human existence. It can also be said that all of the members of society have an obligation in justice to do their share in order that society as a whole can create such a social and economic order. A second principle that can be affirmed is the one enunciated by Pope Pius XII on June 1, 1941, when he pointed to all of the land now going to waste throughout �SLOVAKIA 33 the world and declared that it had been "created and prepared" by God "for the use of all .. " His Holiness did not, of course say: "for the OWNERSHIP of all." It is to be expected that any attempt to reduce this principle to practice will meet with bitter opposition on the part of that liberalistic school of thought which seeks absolute freedom of action in the economic sphere and refuses to face the responsibilities which are correlative to every right. Perhaps the best answer for people who take this stand is the well known fact that a mistake in a chemical laboratory can blow up not only the laboratory but all of the workers who are in it. History shows many cases in which mistakes in politics or economics have also led to explosions that are far more disastrous than can occur in any laboratory. Communism might be referred to as one such explosion - and it has already engulfed nations with a total population of some 800,000,000. You may remember that Pope Pius XII on December 24, 1941, only two and a half weeks after Pearl Harbor, called for a "new order, based on moral principles" which would enable "nations less favored by nature" to have access to resources beyond their borders, resources which, His Holiness declared, were "destined for all." In the same paragraph, His Holiness warned that if nothing were done in the future peace treaty to create such an order, there would remain in the relations between peoples a deep and far reaching root of dissension which would eventually "lead to new conflicts." It was, perhaps, fear of such new conflicts which prompted the authors of the Atlantic Charter to make a similar plea or pledge earlier that year. Unfortunately, little has been done so far as to implement the pleas and pledges of the Holy Father or the Atlantic Charter. That the Pope's warning about "future conflicts" was well-grounded is proven by the many danger spots that exist in our world today. There is no need to cite more than one example - that of Japan: Hoping to solve their naitonal prdblems in a peaceful way, a group of Japanese business men suggested a few �34 SLOVAKIA years ago that Japan buy the whole island of New Guinea and thought $8,000,000,000 would be a fair price. The island has a population of less than 2,000,000 but an American population expert estimated in 1929 that it could support about 125,000,000 Orientals. If the proposition had reached the discussion stage, all of the nations involved could have insisted on conditions that would guarantee their own security but refusal on the part of Australia and England was so instantaneous and blunt, that it never did reach the discussion stage. According to Anton Zischka in his book Japan in der Welt, Portugal was willing to sell her part of Tim.or to Japan several decades ago but was forbidden to do so by England to which Portugal owed a great deal of money. If Japan had been able to buy New Guinea, her people would have new hope for the future and would be kept so busy with development work that radicals and war-mongers would get little or no hearing and Japan would today be a strong, steadying influence for the whole Far East. As it is, most of the foreigners I met in Tokyo feel that if nothing is done soon and in a big way to remedy Japan's economic condition, no moderate Government will be able to remain in power in Tokyo 15 or 20 years from now. These people fear that if nothing is done to give the J apanase people real hope, the country will be forced by economic necessity to go either to the extreme right of more militarism or to the extreme left of Communism. The probability is in favor of Communism and this view is confirmed by a report concerning the Japanese Federation of Student Autonomous Organizations published in the New York Times on July 18, 1957. According to the Times article,, the Federation has 270,000 members out of a total of 680,000 College and University students and its official magazine recently published an article which spoke of the "heavy responsibilities" the members would have in carrying out their "special mission" when the Democratic revolution comes. A leading Australian Catholic who visited me in Tokyo several years ago summed up the situation as follows: If Japan goes Communist, the United States will have to withdraw from Okinawa and that will mean that Australia, �SLOVAKIA 35 Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Siam and what is left of Korea and Indochina will all be surrendered to Communism. Developments of this sort would certainly bring World War III much closer. If such a war does break out, many will cry out again in a frenzy against "War Criminals." It is logical to ask, however, whether the real "War Criminal" will not be that unhealthy and insane world order which leaves half of humanity hungry in a world of potential plenty. Appeal to the Universities I have referred to two principles which could serve as foundations for a new science of international social justice. One of these principles is that every human being has a real right to a human existence. The other is that the land now going to waste was created and prepared by God for the use of all. I have also referred to the pleas of Pope Pius XII and the Atlantic Charter for a world order which would give hungry nations access to resources beyond their borders. To build up such a science and blueprint this new world order will require the best talent the world has to offer. While this science would provide guidance for statesmen, we must recognize that the statesmen are too busy to undertake this kind of an assignment which requires the quiet study that is possible only for university men and private research workers. The new science will have to be based on natural law but if it is to be of practical value it will have to be integrated with all of the social sciences. For this reason, the cooperation of economists, sociologists and specialists in international law, etc., will be needed as well as that of moralists and specialists in natural law. Objections It might be objected that even the most perfect science of international social justice will be of no use unless we get international laws passed to back up the findings of such a science. This is a real objection but an answer to it is to be found in the relationship between the ideas of law and justice. While laws are enacted to guarantee a regime of justice, it is absolutely impossible even to draft a �36 SLOVAKIA good law until our notions of justice are clear. Within nations where people have been rubbing shoulders for century after century, our notions of what is fair for everybody are fairly clear and it is for this reason that the nations have been a:ble to draft many god laws. In the international sphere, however, practically no progress has been made in the notion of justice and its demands since the days of Francisco de Vitoria 400 years ago and Hugo Grotius 300 years ago. This is one of the main reasons why our international law is ,s till so inadequate and there is no hope of developing a really effective system of international law or of ending our era of virtual international anarchy until our notions of justice between nations are clarified. Another objection which some might raise is that any attempt to introduce real international social justice would simply rob the rich without helping the poor. To this the answer is obvious. The fact that most farmers and workers in the United States today have enough money to buy automobiles has not hurt our automobile industry in the least. If an era of international social justice could raise the living standards of another billion and a half of human beings, their added buying power would open up such markets and inaugurate such a period of general prosperity as the world has never dared to envision even in its fondest dreams. Last Argument in Favor As a final argument in favor of international social justice we might say that there is no real hope of world peace as long as large segments of the human race have every reason to feel that they are not being treated justly. This feeling is the stuff of which wars are made and promoted with the plea of "self defense." World War II cost us 20,000,000 dead and 30,000,000 wounded. Financial costs, including war damages and war costs amounted to $1,340,000,000,000 or about $520 for every man, woman and child in the whole world - a total of $2,600 for every family of five persons. Not included in these items are the tears and heartaches of hundreds of millions of human beings who lost a father, a brother or a son during the war. If we are pushed into an atomic World War III, the cost of World �SLOVAKIA 37 War II will look like peanuts. It has been well said that the next war will be fought with atomic power and the one after that with bows and arrows. I remember that when I started to study history some 47 years ago, I congratulated myself on having been born in an age that is civilized and no longer wages war. I was just old enough to register for service when World War I ended, but, during World War II, I had ample time in J:ipanese Concentration Camps to think over the kind of civilization we have today and the result has been a very, very sad disillusionment. Millions of others, soldiers with their wives, their parents and their children have been similarly disillusioned and if one of our Catholic organizations can spearhead a movement in favor of such justice as will prevent wars in the future it will have millions of followers . • • • WHO SAID IT? "The United States passed a law against Communists. This law is giving the gentlemen from the Central Action Committee of the (Czechoslovak) National Front - who now shamelessly appear under the name the Council of Free Czechoslovakia - quite a headache. The new law is made to order for all Socialists, but also for many Czech Populists and Slovak Democrats who helped to destroy the economical structure of Czecho-:Slovakia, to suppress political freedom and who otherwise cleared the road for the complete victory of Communism. Of course, it is altogether possible that the gentlemen will try to dodge the consequences of their past by denying and lying about it. But it is not only the National Socialists who are appearing under a false flag. (Lettrich's) Slovak DemocFats are doing the same thing: without notifying their members or asking them for their assent, they have now changed to "Slovak Agrarians." Of course, income from the Agrarian International is connected with this and the gentlemen, who never before were agriculturists by vocation, have nevertheless become professional Slovak Agrarians." - (NAROD, Czech Bulletin, London, Nov. 1950). � 24 SLOVAKIA vakia. The editor of the Czech periodical had the opportunity to learn how the Slovaks in Rome felt about the matter. They held no ill will for the Archbishop of London, but they did for the Czechs associated with Novy Zivot, the editor of which certainly knows better. The Czechs apparently have learned little or nothing from the past. They keep parroting listlessly the slogan "truth will prevail" - a la Masaryk and Benes - while they spread false propaganda even about those who are supposed to be "closely related" to them. It is obvious that the Czech periodical "Novy Zivot" (New Life) is still following the old life which brought ruin to the Slovak and Czech nations. • • • INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Rev. William A. Kaschmitter, M.N. Due to the scientific and technological revolutions of the past century, the world has become international in spite of itself and does not know what to do about this new situation. The number of international organizations created since 1860 to cope with specific international problems is simply phenomenal. The first global attempt made to grapple with all of these problems in general was made after World War I when the League of Nations was formally erected. The League failed but its failure did not kill the sense of need :for such an organization and after World War II another attempt was made in the creation of the United Nations Organization. Unfortunately, many people today fear that the United Nations Organization will go the way of the League unless it can "grow up" and mature to the point where it can command not only the respect but also the confidence of all nations, great and small. Justice - Not Merely Charity There are good-hearted people who think that charity alone will suffice to cure the ills of our world. It is true that love for God and neighbor are the two greatest commandments and that acording to St. Paul, Charity is the �SLOVAKIA 25 fulfillment of the law. We must remember, however, that obligations of justice take precedence over the obligations of charity and that where justice is lacking there can be no true charity. To give to our neighbor in charity what is due to him in justice would be sordid mockery. Those of us who have seen Communists at close range know how violently they oppose charity as a substitute for justice but unfortunately they seem to know little about what justice really is and what it demands. It is equally unfortunate that many of our anti-Communist statesmen seem to know just as little as the Communists do about what justice demands in the international sphere. The Charter of the United Nations in its Preamble speaks of justice for all nations, and President Eisenhower in a recent television address declared that justice and peace are only two faces of the same coin. These declarations would not only be admirable but supremely important if they were accompanied by a clear-cut and sound definition of what justice between nations is and what it demands. Even without a precise definition of justice and its demands, such declarations would be truly precious if we could assume that the present world order is just; for then every one of us could easily supply a definition merely by saying that justice demands the preservation of the status quo, the observance of international treaties, international agreements, etc. Here, the crucial question is: Is Our Present World Order Just? Many good people seem to think that the only thing that's wrong with our world is that we have too many Communists and that if we could only be rid of Communism the whole world could be happy. They think that the ogre of Communism is kept alive only by the lying propaganda of a few self-seeking tyrants who keep their dupes in line with the most savage terrorism. I hold no brief for Communism. I could not defend Communism without betraying my own friends who suffered exquisite torture at Communist hands and without betraying all of the Christians in China, some of whom were buried alive by the Communists while I was; still in Peking. �26 SLOVAKIA Without excusing the horrors and abuses of the Communists, let us admit here and now that it is precisely the injustice of our present unbalanced and unhealthy world order that provides the Communist propaganda machine with its best ammunition. I hope within the next few minutes to cite some facts and statistics to prove that our present world is unjust but before taking up that point I'd like to call your attention to a few of the glaring failures and mistakes of the Free World in its fight against Communism. The Free World is placing great emphasis on military preparedness as a means of combatting the Communist threat. That, of course, is necessary. It's a mistake, however, to think that bombs and bullets can ever be an antidote to an ideology - especially the kind of ideology which Pope Pius XI has described as a kind of mysticism - a false mysticism, it is true, but still a mysticism. There are Communists who would be willing to fight with stones and stick;; if necessary and are willing to die rather than give up that pseudo-mysticism of theirs. MQst people in the Free World admit that bombs and bullets are no real antidote to the Communist ideology and they are therefore stressing the idea of freedom as an anti-dote to Communistic ideals and practices. Freedom is, of course, one of God's greatest natural gifts to man. History has also proven over and over again that an atmosphere of freedom is most conducive not only to sound political life but also to healthy economic development. This freedom, however, must be real; it must be for all; above all, it must be in harmony with justice. When I was directing the Catholic news service in Peking I got reports of a million people starving to death in China. These people were "free" to eat - if they could find the necessary food. They couldn't find it - and hence they were not really free to eat. The liberalistic ideas of John Locke, John Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rosseau as applied in the nineteenth century led to economic anarchy and all kinds of injustice. That kind of liberty gave birth to the monstrosity that we know as Communism today and it is still provid- �SLOVAKIA 27 ing ammunition for the Communist propaganda machine in the hungry countries today. Liberty of that kind is as closely related to Communism as a grandfather is related to his grandson. Liberty if joined together with justice can indeed serve as a splendid antidote to the Communist ideology and there are many good men who are making it so today. On the other hand, there are others who are loud in condemning Communism, but who are afraid even to whisper that the hungry people in other countries have a real right to human existence. That kind of anti-communism is ineffectual if not actually harmful. Let us then have liberty - but let it be a liberty that is eternally wedded to JUSTICE FOR ALL MEN! It is only on this kind of justice, coupled with liberty, that we will be ruble to provide an effective antidote to the Communist ideology. The biggest job ahead of us is to create a system of social thought that will provide for real justice for all men. If that justice is wedded to the truth that makes men free, this combination of justice and truth and freedom will give birth to an ideology that will be more effective than all of the "A" and "H" bombs in the world. If, on the other hand, we continue to tolerate a world order in which more than half of humanity is deprived of its right to a truly human existence, our bombs may prove to be nothing but the instruments of a wholesale destruction in which democracy itself will perish and we ourselves will go down to ultimate defeat. Our Unjust World Order Providing enough food for everybody is certainly one of the most basic requirements for a healty world order. There are many prophets of doom who fear that the day will soon come when the earth simply cannot provide food for all. It is certainly true that half of the world's population today is undernourished if not actualJy starving. Some say that no less than 70 percent of the human race is undernourished. �28 SLOVAKIA The question for us to consider is this: is all this hunger really due to over-population or is it due to mismanagement in our conduct of world affairs? Experts of our Department of Agriculture in Washington are quoted as saying that 16,000,000,000 acres could be used by modern methods throughout the world for food production. On the other hand, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations declared in its 1956 Yearbook that at present less than 3,340,000,000 acres are under cultivation. If these figures are accurate, it means that 79 percent of the land that could be used for food production, is now simply going to waste. These statistics certainly indicate that there is still a great deal of land that we could use and are not using. Other facts seem to indicate that we are not using our Godgiven brains either. Alluding to the great progress made by the agricultural scientists in recent years, the Daily News in New York declared editorially on August 7, 1952 that if we really put our scientific know-how and technical skill to work in this country, the Mississippi Basin alone could provide food for a population of 500,000,000 or approximately three times the present total population of this whole country. Reader's Digest in its issue for September, 1952, carried an article in which it was stated that Brazil alone could support a total population of one billion or nearly twenty times its present population. These estimates are based on the present findings of agricultural science and we must remember that the scientists are constantly finding ways of increasing production. As one of them declared : "The big harvest is still ahead." Another scientist, Professor Rosin, who is not interested in agriculture but in chemistry, has declared that if we devoted only as much money to chemical research as w spend in one month on military preparedness, the chemists could find ways of producing so much food artificially that we could turn all our farms into parks and flowerbeds and still feed humanity more adequately than it is being fed today. A sad but effective commentary on the statistics quoted above is provided by the "plague" of agricultural over- �SLOVAKIA 29 production which is giving farmers and statesmen such a headache in various countries. During his campaign speech on agriculture last fall, President Eisenhower told us that our Government has spent $9,000,000,000 for the purchase of agricultural surplus products merely to keep them off the market and is storing them at the cost of $1,000,000 a day. In 1957 our Government had paid farmers 260 million dollars for not cultivating 12,000,000 acres and, according to the President's campaign speech,. the planning called for the immobilization of from forty to fifty million acres in 1958. Agricultral producers of about 25 countries who met in Nairobi, Africa, a few years ago, complained that the most serious problem confronting world agriculture today is the fact that "effective demand" cannot keep up with productive capacity. Time does not permit of any detailed discussion of natural resources of our earth in so far as these things industry, trade and finance or of the still undeveloped have a bearing on hunger and the world's other ills. Suffice it to say that industry in some areas is forced to curtail production and lay off workers simply because people in other areas, some of which are enormously rich in undeveloped resources, are too poor to buy what they really need or what they would like to have. The facts and figures which I have just quoted seem to prove conclusively that if half of the human race is still hungry, the blame is not to be placed on poor old mother earth. Neither are our agricultural scientists to blame. The blame is rather to be placed on the immaturity of our international politics and our international economics. Our science is indeed worthy of the twentieth century but our international economics and our international politics seem to be stuck somewhere in the nineteenth, the eighteenth, the seventeenth or the sixteenth century. The tragic significance of the agricultural statistics which I have just quoted is punctuated and accentuated when they are compared with conditions in the hungry nations. Japan, with a population of more than 90,000,000 �30 SLOVAKIA today has less farm land than is actually under cultivation in the little State of New York. With more than six million farm families, the country has only 14,000,000 acres of food producing land. Let us remember that according to the experts quoted by Josue de Castro, there are still nearly 13,000,000,000 acres throughout the world that could be used for food production but are actually lying idle. If these figures are even approximately correct, it means that throughout the world there are more than 900 arable acres lying idle for every acre that Japan has at her disposal for food production. In the cities of Japan, a better than average wage is sufficient only to keep a man, his wife and one child in comfort. With two children the situation is no longer comfortable and with three children, a man with even a better than average wage is apt to go into debt. Three million people in Japan are suffering from tuberculosis and 1,300,000 are more or less mentally deranged, largely due to economic worries. Under such circumstances, is it surprising that this Abortion has been legalized for economic reasons so that non-Christian nation is going all-out for birth-control? a family that is too poor to support another child can legally have an abortion. In 1955 abortions in Japan equalled the number of births - 1,700,000 of each. The Japanese know the horrors connected with abortions and for that reason 30,000 experts have been trained in the use of contraceptives so as to teach people everywhere how to use them. Shall we ,b lame the Japanese for these practices or shall we place the blame on the insane world order that makes such things necessary? It would take too long to give the corresponding data concerning India, Java, Egypt, China and many other crowded sectors of the globe. I have already told you that when I was in Peking I received reports of 1,000,000 deaths by starvation in China at a time when my own brothers in Idaho were being paid for not cultivating their fields. Need I remind you that China is today the second greatest stronghold of Communism in the world? �SLOVAKIA 31 Where Is The Solution? Many of you may remember that certain spokesmen for the World Health Organization of the United Nations hoped to solve the world's problems by starting all-out birth control movements in the crowded areas of the globe. Some of the Catholic representatives in the World Health Organization opposed this plan so bitterly that the others dared not go on openly with their plan for fear that the whole Organizatiofl would be destroyed. Though the Catholic representatnves in the World Health Organization opposed birth control they did not succeed in bringing forward any real solution. During a violent controversy I had in Tokyo eight years ago .on the subject of birth control, I too was challenged to bring forward a positive solution. The challenge seemed reasonable so a number of us began to study not only the effects of the world's population and its resources but also contemporary social theory. After several years we arrived at the conclusion that contemporary social theory - at least our Catholic social teaching - is mature anough to INDICATE solutions for social and economic problems WITHIN a nation but that even our Catholic social doctrine has not matured to the point where it can effectively grapple with INTERNATIONAL social and economic problems. It was obvious to all of us that we could not find the talent in Japan that would be needed to extend our social teaching to the international sphere so I gave up my press work on the first of January last year in order to go looking for the needed talent. During this year and a half I have contacted a large number of Catholic specialists in economics, sociology, international law, moral theology, natural law, etc. In Asia and Europe as well as in the United States I found general agreement among the scholars I consulted to the effect that our failure to extend our social teaching to the international sphere has: a) greatly weakened our position in the face of international Communism; b) defeated many of our efforts for world peace. These specialists also agree that it is imperative to mobil- �32 SLOVAKIA ize the best talent of the whole world for the creation of a new science of international social justice. A Science Of International Social Justice It is of the essence of a science that it should include all of the related principles underlying a specified field of knowledge along with the conclusions logically drawn from those principles. The history of all of our sciences shows that no science has ever grown up over night but in many cases the principles were shown and accepted long before they were coordinated into a system and before most of the conclusions had been drawn. In the matter of international social justice, we have a few basic principles which can now be affirmed though the scholars have not as yet drawn up any system of conclusions from them. Perhaps the most basic of these principles is that every human being has a real right to a human existence. That does not mean that every one is entitled to a Cadillac or a Ford. Perhaps not to a bicycle. But every human being does have a right to enough to eat, enough to wear, enough to feed, clothe and house his children. People also have a right to found a family and therefore also the right to enough of this world's goods so that they can observe the natural law in family life. The correlative of a "right" is not charity or handouts, but justice. It cannot be said that this or that individual has an obligation in justice to provide this or that stranger with all that is needed for a human existence. It can, however, be said that society has an obligation in justice to set up such a social and economic order as will enable all men, under the proper conditions, to secure for themselves what is needed for a truly human existence. It can also be said that all of the members of society have an obligation in justice to do their share in order that society as a whole can create such a social and economic order. A second principle that can be affirmed is the one enunciated by Pope Pius XII on June 1, 1941, when he pointed to all of the land now going to waste throughout �SLOVAKIA 33 the world and declared that it had been "created and prepared" by God "for the use of all .. " His Holiness did not, of course say: "for the OWNERSHIP of all." It is to be expected that any attempt to reduce this principle to practice will meet with bitter opposition on the part of that liberalistic school of thought which seeks absolute freedom of action in the economic sphere and refuses to face the responsibilities which are correlative to every right. Perhaps the best answer for people who take this stand is the well known fact that a mistake in a chemical laboratory can blow up not only the laboratory but all of the workers who are in it. History shows many cases in which mistakes in politics or economics have also led to explosions that are far more disastrous than can occur in any laboratory. Communism might be referred to as one such explosion - and it has already engulfed nations with a total population of some 800,000,000. You may remember that Pope Pius XII on December 24, 1941, only two and a half weeks after Pearl Harbor, called for a "new order, based on moral principles" which would enable "nations less favored by nature" to have access to resources beyond their borders, resources which, His Holiness declared, were "destined for all." In the same paragraph, His Holiness warned that if nothing were done in the future peace treaty to create such an order, there would remain in the relations between peoples a deep and far reaching root of dissension which would eventually "lead to new conflicts." It was, perhaps, fear of such new conflicts which prompted the authors of the Atlantic Charter to make a similar plea or pledge earlier that year. Unfortunately, little has been done so far as to implement the pleas and pledges of the Holy Father or the Atlantic Charter. That the Pope's warning about "future conflicts" was well-grounded is proven by the many danger spots that exist in our world today. There is no need to cite more than one example - that of Japan: Hoping to solve their naitonal prdblems in a peaceful way, a group of Japanese business men suggested a few �34 SLOVAKIA years ago that Japan buy the whole island of New Guinea and thought $8,000,000,000 would be a fair price. The island has a population of less than 2,000,000 but an American population expert estimated in 1929 that it could support about 125,000,000 Orientals. If the proposition had reached the discussion stage, all of the nations involved could have insisted on conditions that would guarantee their own security but refusal on the part of Australia and England was so instantaneous and blunt, that it never did reach the discussion stage. According to Anton Zischka in his book Japan in der Welt, Portugal was willing to sell her part of Tim.or to Japan several decades ago but was forbidden to do so by England to which Portugal owed a great deal of money. If Japan had been able to buy New Guinea, her people would have new hope for the future and would be kept so busy with development work that radicals and war-mongers would get little or no hearing and Japan would today be a strong, steadying influence for the whole Far East. As it is, most of the foreigners I met in Tokyo feel that if nothing is done soon and in a big way to remedy Japan's economic condition, no moderate Government will be able to remain in power in Tokyo 15 or 20 years from now. These people fear that if nothing is done to give the J apanase people real hope, the country will be forced by economic necessity to go either to the extreme right of more militarism or to the extreme left of Communism. The probability is in favor of Communism and this view is confirmed by a report concerning the Japanese Federation of Student Autonomous Organizations published in the New York Times on July 18, 1957. According to the Times article,, the Federation has 270,000 members out of a total of 680,000 College and University students and its official magazine recently published an article which spoke of the "heavy responsibilities" the members would have in carrying out their "special mission" when the Democratic revolution comes. A leading Australian Catholic who visited me in Tokyo several years ago summed up the situation as follows: If Japan goes Communist, the United States will have to withdraw from Okinawa and that will mean that Australia, �SLOVAKIA 35 Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Siam and what is left of Korea and Indochina will all be surrendered to Communism. Developments of this sort would certainly bring World War III much closer. If such a war does break out, many will cry out again in a frenzy against "War Criminals." It is logical to ask, however, whether the real "War Criminal" will not be that unhealthy and insane world order which leaves half of humanity hungry in a world of potential plenty. Appeal to the Universities I have referred to two principles which could serve as foundations for a new science of international social justice. One of these principles is that every human being has a real right to a human existence. The other is that the land now going to waste was created and prepared by God for the use of all. I have also referred to the pleas of Pope Pius XII and the Atlantic Charter for a world order which would give hungry nations access to resources beyond their borders. To build up such a science and blueprint this new world order will require the best talent the world has to offer. While this science would provide guidance for statesmen, we must recognize that the statesmen are too busy to undertake this kind of an assignment which requires the quiet study that is possible only for university men and private research workers. The new science will have to be based on natural law but if it is to be of practical value it will have to be integrated with all of the social sciences. For this reason, the cooperation of economists, sociologists and specialists in international law, etc., will be needed as well as that of moralists and specialists in natural law. Objections It might be objected that even the most perfect science of international social justice will be of no use unless we get international laws passed to back up the findings of such a science. This is a real objection but an answer to it is to be found in the relationship between the ideas of law and justice. While laws are enacted to guarantee a regime of justice, it is absolutely impossible even to draft a �36 SLOVAKIA good law until our notions of justice are clear. Within nations where people have been rubbing shoulders for century after century, our notions of what is fair for everybody are fairly clear and it is for this reason that the nations have been a:ble to draft many god laws. In the international sphere, however, practically no progress has been made in the notion of justice and its demands since the days of Francisco de Vitoria 400 years ago and Hugo Grotius 300 years ago. This is one of the main reasons why our international law is ,s till so inadequate and there is no hope of developing a really effective system of international law or of ending our era of virtual international anarchy until our notions of justice between nations are clarified. Another objection which some might raise is that any attempt to introduce real international social justice would simply rob the rich without helping the poor. To this the answer is obvious. The fact that most farmers and workers in the United States today have enough money to buy automobiles has not hurt our automobile industry in the least. If an era of international social justice could raise the living standards of another billion and a half of human beings, their added buying power would open up such markets and inaugurate such a period of general prosperity as the world has never dared to envision even in its fondest dreams. Last Argument in Favor As a final argument in favor of international social justice we might say that there is no real hope of world peace as long as large segments of the human race have every reason to feel that they are not being treated justly. This feeling is the stuff of which wars are made and promoted with the plea of "self defense." World War II cost us 20,000,000 dead and 30,000,000 wounded. Financial costs, including war damages and war costs amounted to $1,340,000,000,000 or about $520 for every man, woman and child in the whole world - a total of $2,600 for every family of five persons. Not included in these items are the tears and heartaches of hundreds of millions of human beings who lost a father, a brother or a son during the war. If we are pushed into an atomic World War III, the cost of World �SLOVAKIA 37 War II will look like peanuts. It has been well said that the next war will be fought with atomic power and the one after that with bows and arrows. I remember that when I started to study history some 47 years ago, I congratulated myself on having been born in an age that is civilized and no longer wages war. I was just old enough to register for service when World War I ended, but, during World War II, I had ample time in J:ipanese Concentration Camps to think over the kind of civilization we have today and the result has been a very, very sad disillusionment. Millions of others, soldiers with their wives, their parents and their children have been similarly disillusioned and if one of our Catholic organizations can spearhead a movement in favor of such justice as will prevent wars in the future it will have millions of followers . • • • WHO SAID IT? "The United States passed a law against Communists. This law is giving the gentlemen from the Central Action Committee of the (Czechoslovak) National Front - who now shamelessly appear under the name the Council of Free Czechoslovakia - quite a headache. The new law is made to order for all Socialists, but also for many Czech Populists and Slovak Democrats who helped to destroy the economical structure of Czecho-:Slovakia, to suppress political freedom and who otherwise cleared the road for the complete victory of Communism. Of course, it is altogether possible that the gentlemen will try to dodge the consequences of their past by denying and lying about it. But it is not only the National Socialists who are appearing under a false flag. (Lettrich's) Slovak DemocFats are doing the same thing: without notifying their members or asking them for their assent, they have now changed to "Slovak Agrarians." Of course, income from the Agrarian International is connected with this and the gentlemen, who never before were agriculturists by vocation, have nevertheless become professional Slovak Agrarians." - (NAROD, Czech Bulletin, London, Nov. 1950). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 24 SLOVAKIA vakia. The editor of the Czech periodical had the opportunity to learn how the Slovaks in Rome felt about the matter. They held no ill will for the Archbishop of London, but they did for the Czechs associated with Novy Zivot, the editor of which certainly knows better. The Czechs apparently have learned little or nothing from the past. They keep parroting listlessly the slogan "truth will prevail" - a la Masaryk and Benes - while they spread false propaganda even about those who are supposed to be "closely related" to them. It is obvious that the Czech periodical "Novy Zivot" (New Life) is still following the old life which brought ruin to the Slovak and Czech nations. • • • INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Rev. William A. Kaschmitter, M.N. Due to the scientific and technological revolutions of the past century, the world has become international in spite of itself and does not know what to do about this new situation. The number of international organizations created since 1860 to cope with specific international problems is simply phenomenal. The first global attempt made to grapple with all of these problems in general was made after World War I when the League of Nations was formally erected. The League failed but its failure did not kill the sense of need :for such an organization and after World War II another attempt was made in the creation of the United Nations Organization. Unfortunately, many people today fear that the United Nations Organization will go the way of the League unless it can "grow up" and mature to the point where it can command not only the respect but also the confidence of all nations, great and small. Justice - Not Merely Charity There are good-hearted people who think that charity alone will suffice to cure the ills of our world. It is true that love for God and neighbor are the two greatest commandments and that acording to St. Paul, Charity is the SLOVAKIA 25 fulfillment of the law. We must remember, however, that obligations of justice take precedence over the obligations of charity and that where justice is lacking there can be no true charity. To give to our neighbor in charity what is due to him in justice would be sordid mockery. Those of us who have seen Communists at close range know how violently they oppose charity as a substitute for justice but unfortunately they seem to know little about what justice really is and what it demands. It is equally unfortunate that many of our anti-Communist statesmen seem to know just as little as the Communists do about what justice demands in the international sphere. The Charter of the United Nations in its Preamble speaks of justice for all nations, and President Eisenhower in a recent television address declared that justice and peace are only two faces of the same coin. These declarations would not only be admirable but supremely important if they were accompanied by a clear-cut and sound definition of what justice between nations is and what it demands. Even without a precise definition of justice and its demands, such declarations would be truly precious if we could assume that the present world order is just; for then every one of us could easily supply a definition merely by saying that justice demands the preservation of the status quo, the observance of international treaties, international agreements, etc. Here, the crucial question is: Is Our Present World Order Just? Many good people seem to think that the only thing that's wrong with our world is that we have too many Communists and that if we could only be rid of Communism the whole world could be happy. They think that the ogre of Communism is kept alive only by the lying propaganda of a few self-seeking tyrants who keep their dupes in line with the most savage terrorism. I hold no brief for Communism. I could not defend Communism without betraying my own friends who suffered exquisite torture at Communist hands and without betraying all of the Christians in China, some of whom were buried alive by the Communists while I was; still in Peking. 26 SLOVAKIA Without excusing the horrors and abuses of the Communists, let us admit here and now that it is precisely the injustice of our present unbalanced and unhealthy world order that provides the Communist propaganda machine with its best ammunition. I hope within the next few minutes to cite some facts and statistics to prove that our present world is unjust but before taking up that point I'd like to call your attention to a few of the glaring failures and mistakes of the Free World in its fight against Communism. The Free World is placing great emphasis on military preparedness as a means of combatting the Communist threat. That, of course, is necessary. It's a mistake, however, to think that bombs and bullets can ever be an antidote to an ideology - especially the kind of ideology which Pope Pius XI has described as a kind of mysticism - a false mysticism, it is true, but still a mysticism. There are Communists who would be willing to fight with stones and stick;; if necessary and are willing to die rather than give up that pseudo-mysticism of theirs. MQst people in the Free World admit that bombs and bullets are no real antidote to the Communist ideology and they are therefore stressing the idea of freedom as an anti-dote to Communistic ideals and practices. Freedom is, of course, one of God's greatest natural gifts to man. History has also proven over and over again that an atmosphere of freedom is most conducive not only to sound political life but also to healthy economic development. This freedom, however, must be real; it must be for all; above all, it must be in harmony with justice. When I was directing the Catholic news service in Peking I got reports of a million people starving to death in China. These people were "free" to eat - if they could find the necessary food. They couldn't find it - and hence they were not really free to eat. The liberalistic ideas of John Locke, John Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rosseau as applied in the nineteenth century led to economic anarchy and all kinds of injustice. That kind of liberty gave birth to the monstrosity that we know as Communism today and it is still provid- SLOVAKIA 27 ing ammunition for the Communist propaganda machine in the hungry countries today. Liberty of that kind is as closely related to Communism as a grandfather is related to his grandson. Liberty if joined together with justice can indeed serve as a splendid antidote to the Communist ideology and there are many good men who are making it so today. On the other hand, there are others who are loud in condemning Communism, but who are afraid even to whisper that the hungry people in other countries have a real right to human existence. That kind of anti-communism is ineffectual if not actually harmful. Let us then have liberty - but let it be a liberty that is eternally wedded to JUSTICE FOR ALL MEN! It is only on this kind of justice, coupled with liberty, that we will be ruble to provide an effective antidote to the Communist ideology. The biggest job ahead of us is to create a system of social thought that will provide for real justice for all men. If that justice is wedded to the truth that makes men free, this combination of justice and truth and freedom will give birth to an ideology that will be more effective than all of the "A" and "H" bombs in the world. If, on the other hand, we continue to tolerate a world order in which more than half of humanity is deprived of its right to a truly human existence, our bombs may prove to be nothing but the instruments of a wholesale destruction in which democracy itself will perish and we ourselves will go down to ultimate defeat. Our Unjust World Order Providing enough food for everybody is certainly one of the most basic requirements for a healty world order. There are many prophets of doom who fear that the day will soon come when the earth simply cannot provide food for all. It is certainly true that half of the world's population today is undernourished if not actualJy starving. Some say that no less than 70 percent of the human race is undernourished. 28 SLOVAKIA The question for us to consider is this: is all this hunger really due to over-population or is it due to mismanagement in our conduct of world affairs? Experts of our Department of Agriculture in Washington are quoted as saying that 16,000,000,000 acres could be used by modern methods throughout the world for food production. On the other hand, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations declared in its 1956 Yearbook that at present less than 3,340,000,000 acres are under cultivation. If these figures are accurate, it means that 79 percent of the land that could be used for food production, is now simply going to waste. These statistics certainly indicate that there is still a great deal of land that we could use and are not using. Other facts seem to indicate that we are not using our Godgiven brains either. Alluding to the great progress made by the agricultural scientists in recent years, the Daily News in New York declared editorially on August 7, 1952 that if we really put our scientific know-how and technical skill to work in this country, the Mississippi Basin alone could provide food for a population of 500,000,000 or approximately three times the present total population of this whole country. Reader's Digest in its issue for September, 1952, carried an article in which it was stated that Brazil alone could support a total population of one billion or nearly twenty times its present population. These estimates are based on the present findings of agricultural science and we must remember that the scientists are constantly finding ways of increasing production. As one of them declared : "The big harvest is still ahead." Another scientist, Professor Rosin, who is not interested in agriculture but in chemistry, has declared that if we devoted only as much money to chemical research as w spend in one month on military preparedness, the chemists could find ways of producing so much food artificially that we could turn all our farms into parks and flowerbeds and still feed humanity more adequately than it is being fed today. A sad but effective commentary on the statistics quoted above is provided by the "plague" of agricultural over- SLOVAKIA 29 production which is giving farmers and statesmen such a headache in various countries. During his campaign speech on agriculture last fall, President Eisenhower told us that our Government has spent $9,000,000,000 for the purchase of agricultural surplus products merely to keep them off the market and is storing them at the cost of $1,000,000 a day. In 1957 our Government had paid farmers 260 million dollars for not cultivating 12,000,000 acres and, according to the President's campaign speech,. the planning called for the immobilization of from forty to fifty million acres in 1958. Agricultral producers of about 25 countries who met in Nairobi, Africa, a few years ago, complained that the most serious problem confronting world agriculture today is the fact that "effective demand" cannot keep up with productive capacity. Time does not permit of any detailed discussion of natural resources of our earth in so far as these things industry, trade and finance or of the still undeveloped have a bearing on hunger and the world's other ills. Suffice it to say that industry in some areas is forced to curtail production and lay off workers simply because people in other areas, some of which are enormously rich in undeveloped resources, are too poor to buy what they really need or what they would like to have. The facts and figures which I have just quoted seem to prove conclusively that if half of the human race is still hungry, the blame is not to be placed on poor old mother earth. Neither are our agricultural scientists to blame. The blame is rather to be placed on the immaturity of our international politics and our international economics. Our science is indeed worthy of the twentieth century but our international economics and our international politics seem to be stuck somewhere in the nineteenth, the eighteenth, the seventeenth or the sixteenth century. The tragic significance of the agricultural statistics which I have just quoted is punctuated and accentuated when they are compared with conditions in the hungry nations. Japan, with a population of more than 90,000,000 30 SLOVAKIA today has less farm land than is actually under cultivation in the little State of New York. With more than six million farm families, the country has only 14,000,000 acres of food producing land. Let us remember that according to the experts quoted by Josue de Castro, there are still nearly 13,000,000,000 acres throughout the world that could be used for food production but are actually lying idle. If these figures are even approximately correct, it means that throughout the world there are more than 900 arable acres lying idle for every acre that Japan has at her disposal for food production. In the cities of Japan, a better than average wage is sufficient only to keep a man, his wife and one child in comfort. With two children the situation is no longer comfortable and with three children, a man with even a better than average wage is apt to go into debt. Three million people in Japan are suffering from tuberculosis and 1,300,000 are more or less mentally deranged, largely due to economic worries. Under such circumstances, is it surprising that this Abortion has been legalized for economic reasons so that non-Christian nation is going all-out for birth-control? a family that is too poor to support another child can legally have an abortion. In 1955 abortions in Japan equalled the number of births - 1,700,000 of each. The Japanese know the horrors connected with abortions and for that reason 30,000 experts have been trained in the use of contraceptives so as to teach people everywhere how to use them. Shall we ,b lame the Japanese for these practices or shall we place the blame on the insane world order that makes such things necessary? It would take too long to give the corresponding data concerning India, Java, Egypt, China and many other crowded sectors of the globe. I have already told you that when I was in Peking I received reports of 1,000,000 deaths by starvation in China at a time when my own brothers in Idaho were being paid for not cultivating their fields. Need I remind you that China is today the second greatest stronghold of Communism in the world? SLOVAKIA 31 Where Is The Solution? Many of you may remember that certain spokesmen for the World Health Organization of the United Nations hoped to solve the world's problems by starting all-out birth control movements in the crowded areas of the globe. Some of the Catholic representatives in the World Health Organization opposed this plan so bitterly that the others dared not go on openly with their plan for fear that the whole Organizatiofl would be destroyed. Though the Catholic representatnves in the World Health Organization opposed birth control they did not succeed in bringing forward any real solution. During a violent controversy I had in Tokyo eight years ago .on the subject of birth control, I too was challenged to bring forward a positive solution. The challenge seemed reasonable so a number of us began to study not only the effects of the world's population and its resources but also contemporary social theory. After several years we arrived at the conclusion that contemporary social theory - at least our Catholic social teaching - is mature anough to INDICATE solutions for social and economic problems WITHIN a nation but that even our Catholic social doctrine has not matured to the point where it can effectively grapple with INTERNATIONAL social and economic problems. It was obvious to all of us that we could not find the talent in Japan that would be needed to extend our social teaching to the international sphere so I gave up my press work on the first of January last year in order to go looking for the needed talent. During this year and a half I have contacted a large number of Catholic specialists in economics, sociology, international law, moral theology, natural law, etc. In Asia and Europe as well as in the United States I found general agreement among the scholars I consulted to the effect that our failure to extend our social teaching to the international sphere has: a) greatly weakened our position in the face of international Communism; b) defeated many of our efforts for world peace. These specialists also agree that it is imperative to mobil- 32 SLOVAKIA ize the best talent of the whole world for the creation of a new science of international social justice. A Science Of International Social Justice It is of the essence of a science that it should include all of the related principles underlying a specified field of knowledge along with the conclusions logically drawn from those principles. The history of all of our sciences shows that no science has ever grown up over night but in many cases the principles were shown and accepted long before they were coordinated into a system and before most of the conclusions had been drawn. In the matter of international social justice, we have a few basic principles which can now be affirmed though the scholars have not as yet drawn up any system of conclusions from them. Perhaps the most basic of these principles is that every human being has a real right to a human existence. That does not mean that every one is entitled to a Cadillac or a Ford. Perhaps not to a bicycle. But every human being does have a right to enough to eat, enough to wear, enough to feed, clothe and house his children. People also have a right to found a family and therefore also the right to enough of this world's goods so that they can observe the natural law in family life. The correlative of a "right" is not charity or handouts, but justice. It cannot be said that this or that individual has an obligation in justice to provide this or that stranger with all that is needed for a human existence. It can, however, be said that society has an obligation in justice to set up such a social and economic order as will enable all men, under the proper conditions, to secure for themselves what is needed for a truly human existence. It can also be said that all of the members of society have an obligation in justice to do their share in order that society as a whole can create such a social and economic order. A second principle that can be affirmed is the one enunciated by Pope Pius XII on June 1, 1941, when he pointed to all of the land now going to waste throughout SLOVAKIA 33 the world and declared that it had been "created and prepared" by God "for the use of all .. " His Holiness did not, of course say: "for the OWNERSHIP of all." It is to be expected that any attempt to reduce this principle to practice will meet with bitter opposition on the part of that liberalistic school of thought which seeks absolute freedom of action in the economic sphere and refuses to face the responsibilities which are correlative to every right. Perhaps the best answer for people who take this stand is the well known fact that a mistake in a chemical laboratory can blow up not only the laboratory but all of the workers who are in it. History shows many cases in which mistakes in politics or economics have also led to explosions that are far more disastrous than can occur in any laboratory. Communism might be referred to as one such explosion - and it has already engulfed nations with a total population of some 800,000,000. You may remember that Pope Pius XII on December 24, 1941, only two and a half weeks after Pearl Harbor, called for a "new order, based on moral principles" which would enable "nations less favored by nature" to have access to resources beyond their borders, resources which, His Holiness declared, were "destined for all." In the same paragraph, His Holiness warned that if nothing were done in the future peace treaty to create such an order, there would remain in the relations between peoples a deep and far reaching root of dissension which would eventually "lead to new conflicts." It was, perhaps, fear of such new conflicts which prompted the authors of the Atlantic Charter to make a similar plea or pledge earlier that year. Unfortunately, little has been done so far as to implement the pleas and pledges of the Holy Father or the Atlantic Charter. That the Pope's warning about "future conflicts" was well-grounded is proven by the many danger spots that exist in our world today. There is no need to cite more than one example - that of Japan: Hoping to solve their naitonal prdblems in a peaceful way, a group of Japanese business men suggested a few 34 SLOVAKIA years ago that Japan buy the whole island of New Guinea and thought $8,000,000,000 would be a fair price. The island has a population of less than 2,000,000 but an American population expert estimated in 1929 that it could support about 125,000,000 Orientals. If the proposition had reached the discussion stage, all of the nations involved could have insisted on conditions that would guarantee their own security but refusal on the part of Australia and England was so instantaneous and blunt, that it never did reach the discussion stage. According to Anton Zischka in his book Japan in der Welt, Portugal was willing to sell her part of Tim.or to Japan several decades ago but was forbidden to do so by England to which Portugal owed a great deal of money. If Japan had been able to buy New Guinea, her people would have new hope for the future and would be kept so busy with development work that radicals and war-mongers would get little or no hearing and Japan would today be a strong, steadying influence for the whole Far East. As it is, most of the foreigners I met in Tokyo feel that if nothing is done soon and in a big way to remedy Japan's economic condition, no moderate Government will be able to remain in power in Tokyo 15 or 20 years from now. These people fear that if nothing is done to give the J apanase people real hope, the country will be forced by economic necessity to go either to the extreme right of more militarism or to the extreme left of Communism. The probability is in favor of Communism and this view is confirmed by a report concerning the Japanese Federation of Student Autonomous Organizations published in the New York Times on July 18, 1957. According to the Times article,, the Federation has 270,000 members out of a total of 680,000 College and University students and its official magazine recently published an article which spoke of the "heavy responsibilities" the members would have in carrying out their "special mission" when the Democratic revolution comes. A leading Australian Catholic who visited me in Tokyo several years ago summed up the situation as follows: If Japan goes Communist, the United States will have to withdraw from Okinawa and that will mean that Australia, SLOVAKIA 35 Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Siam and what is left of Korea and Indochina will all be surrendered to Communism. Developments of this sort would certainly bring World War III much closer. If such a war does break out, many will cry out again in a frenzy against "War Criminals." It is logical to ask, however, whether the real "War Criminal" will not be that unhealthy and insane world order which leaves half of humanity hungry in a world of potential plenty. Appeal to the Universities I have referred to two principles which could serve as foundations for a new science of international social justice. One of these principles is that every human being has a real right to a human existence. The other is that the land now going to waste was created and prepared by God for the use of all. I have also referred to the pleas of Pope Pius XII and the Atlantic Charter for a world order which would give hungry nations access to resources beyond their borders. To build up such a science and blueprint this new world order will require the best talent the world has to offer. While this science would provide guidance for statesmen, we must recognize that the statesmen are too busy to undertake this kind of an assignment which requires the quiet study that is possible only for university men and private research workers. The new science will have to be based on natural law but if it is to be of practical value it will have to be integrated with all of the social sciences. For this reason, the cooperation of economists, sociologists and specialists in international law, etc., will be needed as well as that of moralists and specialists in natural law. Objections It might be objected that even the most perfect science of international social justice will be of no use unless we get international laws passed to back up the findings of such a science. This is a real objection but an answer to it is to be found in the relationship between the ideas of law and justice. While laws are enacted to guarantee a regime of justice, it is absolutely impossible even to draft a 36 SLOVAKIA good law until our notions of justice are clear. Within nations where people have been rubbing shoulders for century after century, our notions of what is fair for everybody are fairly clear and it is for this reason that the nations have been a:ble to draft many god laws. In the international sphere, however, practically no progress has been made in the notion of justice and its demands since the days of Francisco de Vitoria 400 years ago and Hugo Grotius 300 years ago. This is one of the main reasons why our international law is ,s till so inadequate and there is no hope of developing a really effective system of international law or of ending our era of virtual international anarchy until our notions of justice between nations are clarified. Another objection which some might raise is that any attempt to introduce real international social justice would simply rob the rich without helping the poor. To this the answer is obvious. The fact that most farmers and workers in the United States today have enough money to buy automobiles has not hurt our automobile industry in the least. If an era of international social justice could raise the living standards of another billion and a half of human beings, their added buying power would open up such markets and inaugurate such a period of general prosperity as the world has never dared to envision even in its fondest dreams. Last Argument in Favor As a final argument in favor of international social justice we might say that there is no real hope of world peace as long as large segments of the human race have every reason to feel that they are not being treated justly. This feeling is the stuff of which wars are made and promoted with the plea of "self defense." World War II cost us 20,000,000 dead and 30,000,000 wounded. Financial costs, including war damages and war costs amounted to $1,340,000,000,000 or about $520 for every man, woman and child in the whole world - a total of $2,600 for every family of five persons. Not included in these items are the tears and heartaches of hundreds of millions of human beings who lost a father, a brother or a son during the war. If we are pushed into an atomic World War III, the cost of World SLOVAKIA 37 War II will look like peanuts. It has been well said that the next war will be fought with atomic power and the one after that with bows and arrows. I remember that when I started to study history some 47 years ago, I congratulated myself on having been born in an age that is civilized and no longer wages war. I was just old enough to register for service when World War I ended, but, during World War II, I had ample time in J:ipanese Concentration Camps to think over the kind of civilization we have today and the result has been a very, very sad disillusionment. Millions of others, soldiers with their wives, their parents and their children have been similarly disillusioned and if one of our Catholic organizations can spearhead a movement in favor of such justice as will prevent wars in the future it will have millions of followers . • • • WHO SAID IT? "The United States passed a law against Communists. This law is giving the gentlemen from the Central Action Committee of the (Czechoslovak) National Front - who now shamelessly appear under the name the Council of Free Czechoslovakia - quite a headache. The new law is made to order for all Socialists, but also for many Czech Populists and Slovak Democrats who helped to destroy the economical structure of Czecho-:Slovakia, to suppress political freedom and who otherwise cleared the road for the complete victory of Communism. Of course, it is altogether possible that the gentlemen will try to dodge the consequences of their past by denying and lying about it. But it is not only the National Socialists who are appearing under a false flag. (Lettrich's) Slovak DemocFats are doing the same thing: without notifying their members or asking them for their assent, they have now changed to "Slovak Agrarians." Of course, income from the Agrarian International is connected with this and the gentlemen, who never before were agriculturists by vocation, have nevertheless become professional Slovak Agrarians." - (NAROD, Czech Bulletin, London, Nov. 1950).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource International Social Justice Description An account of the resource Rev. William A. Kaschmitter, M.N. Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 24-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kaschmitter, William A. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/705922a72e63667fe54f580c319c4fa4.pdf 58310ead3afe5d6530b02fc14e4aa1ea PDF Text Text 20 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA AND THE CHURCH The question of the position of Slovakia in the Roman Catholic Church was again erroneously explained recently. And once again by Czechs who apparently still feel that they should dominate the Slovaks in all things. In a recent issue (No. 2, 1959) of the Czech Catholic periodical "Novy '.Zivot" (New Life) - published in Rome - the question whether Archbishop Beran was a Czech or CzechoSlovak Primate was answered in this fashion: "The Prague Archbishop was therefore a Czech Metropolitan, but Primate of the Czech (Bohemian - ed.) kingdom. And this title is used on official documents to this day.. : .. When, therefore, the boundaries of the state were increased or decreased, the territory of the Primate also automatically increased or decreased. "But as long as the ICzecho..Slovak Repwblic is the legal heir of the Czech @3ohemian - ed.) kingdom, the Archbishop of Prague is the Primate of the entire state •a nd can be called the Primate of Czecho..Slovakia (or, if you will, the Czecho.JSlovak Primate), even though the Prague archbischops, after the estarblishment of the Czecho..Slovak tRepU!blic, never did call themselves in this fashion, but used only the old historic title; and the title tells us nothing else but that the Primate is (often because of the antiquity of the bis•h op's See) the first bishop in the state. The basis for this denotation i,s therefore territorial and not perhaps linguistic and the less so even political." "The truth will prevail," say the Czechs, and the Slovaks firmly believe that it will even in this case, the feelings and propaganda of the Czechs not withstanding! According to valid ecclesiastical law the status of dioceses or ecclesiastical provinces is decided exclusively and only by the Holy See, the highest ecclesiastical authority (Can. 251, par. 1). Consequently, only the Holy See grants or changes titles of persons who have jurisdiction or whatever authority, even if it be only honorary over these units. This is valid in every case and, hence, even in the case of Slovakia. When Saint Methodius was given jurisdiction over the Danubian Slovans (Slavic peoples), the Slovaks certainly belonged to that area, because the document of Pope Adrian II is even addressed to Svatopluk, who at that time �SLOVAKIA 21 ruled in Nitra, and to Kocef, Pribina's son, who managed Pannonia (Cf. Cod. dipl. et epist. regni Boh., t. 1, No. 12, pp. 7-9). Nitra had become a bishopric already in 880 A.D. (Registrum Johannis VII, epist, 257, Arch. Vatic.) on the basis of the decision of Pope John VIII. Prague only in 973, that is, ninety-three years later. The forefathers of the Slovaks, settled on both sides of the Morava river, formed the nucleus of the Great Moravian Empire. The fact that Nitra is the oldest bishopric of the Slovans north of the Danube is not altered at all by the unfavorable conditions that prevailed at that time (Wiching) or later which enabled the ignoring of its significance. At that time, therefore, Slovakia had its bishopric and belonged under the jurisdiction of Saint Methodius. After the fall of the Great Moravian Empire early in the tenth century, Slovakia eventually became a part of Hungary even as regards ecclesiastical affairs. The bishopric of Nitra was re-established about 1024 and always recalled the days of SS. Cyril and Methodius. The rest of the territory of Slovakia belonged under the ecclesiastical management of Ostrihom and Eger, even though, for example, the Spis province had its own provost from the end of the twelfth century. A great stride forward was the establishment of new bishoprics on the territory: the bishopric of Banska Bystrica, Spis Province, and Roznava in 1776; the diocese of Kosice in 1804; and the Greek Catholic diocese of Presov in 1816. Nitra, Banska Bystrica, and Roznava belonged under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Ostrihom, while the Spis and Kosice bishoprics were under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Eger as suffragan bishoprics. After the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918, the apostolic administratorship of Trnava was established temporarily. The new position of Slovakia within the Church was determined in 1937, when the Holy See issued the Apostolic Constitution "Ad ecclesiastici regiminis incrementum" (AAS, 1937, pp. 366-369). This Constitution freed the Slovak dioceses and apostolic administratorships from the jurisdiction of Ostrihom and Eger and placed �22 SLOVAKIA them directly under the jurisdiction of the Holy See. True it is, that even this position is considered temporary by the document, because it expressly states that the Apostolic See will establish a Metropolitan See as quickly as possible in Slovakia. Slovakia would then became an independent ecclesiastical province. The document, furthermore, expressly commands all concerned to abide by the decision of the Holy See and forbids any opposition to it or violation of it. Unfortunately, the world situation did not permit the establishment of an ecclesiastical province in Slovakia. Legally, then, according to Ohurch Law, the dioceses and apostolic administratorships of Slovakia are directly under the jurisdiction of the Holy See, that is, they are responsible to the Holy See dircetly and not to the Prague or Olomouc provinces. Since that is the case, we know then that the explanation given by the Czech periodical Novy Zivot is erroneous. According to present Church Law, the title of Primate is purely an honorary one. Excepting the Hungarian Primate, the bearers of this title have no jurisdiction because of it. In the past, however, Primates did have a definite right over Metropolitans and Bishops (Wernz-Vidal: Jus Canonicum, II, Nr. 517). Of course, only the Holy See has the right to grant or change this title - just as it has to grant or change any other title denoting such a high honor. Since we are concerned with a title that is more of a historical nature, its bearers use it in the same sense that it was granted, even though it is not in line with the present terminology of countries or their political division or affiliation (federation). So it is that in France the Archbishop of Lyons uses the title of "primas de Gaulles," and not the title of French Primate; the Archbishop of Salzburg uses the title "Primate of Germany" and not Primate of Austria and Germany. Similarly, then, even the Prague archbishops consistently used and still do use the title "Primate of the Bohemian Kingdom" or "Primate of the lands of the former Bohemian Kingdom." In the Czech case, there is no basis for changing this title arbitrarily by private individuals. �SLOVAKIA 23 The author of the explanation given in the Czech periodically Novy Zivot assumed that Slovakia was a part of the Bohemian Kingdom. History, however, tells us that Slovakia was not a part of that kingdom, and, therefore, had no jurisdictional connection with it. And when a new political state was formed, composed of the lands that once belonged to the Bohemian Kingdom and of Slovakia, the distinction was made, if we recall, between the so-called "historical lands" and Slovakia (as if Slovakia did not have a history of its own!) and, therefore, there was a difference between the heir to the historical lands of the Bohemian Crown and Slovakia, the land of the Slovaks. In short, what applied to the Bohemian Kingdom did not apply to Slovakia which was not a part of that kingdom. But even if anyone should think that Slovakia is also heir of the Czech State, let him bear in mind that the title of Primate is territorial. It is valid only in the territory that it was granted and not otherwise, unless the Holy See changes it with a new decision. This was adhered to even by the Archbishops of Prague. One might ,believe that, as a rule, there is only one Primate in any one state, but he would be mistaken. In Spain the title of Primate is enjoyed by two archbishops: the Archbishop of Toledo and the Archbishop of Tarragon. England and Scotland form one political state, but the Engli~h Primate is not the Primate of Scotland. When Ireland belonged to one political formation with England, the Primate of England was not the Primate of Ireland. There is, therefore, no objective argument in this regard to extend arbitrarily the title of Czech Primate over a new territory, to Slovakia. If we allow our thoughts to be the offspring of our desires, then there is no guarantee that they will be correct. It is only when our thoughts express an objective reality that they are truthful. Then even the deeds following from them can be just. Some time ago the Novy Zivot published an address of the Archbishop of London in which His Excellency on the basis of the erroneous information - referred to the Archbishop of Prague as the Primate of Czecho-Slo- �24 SLOVAKIA vakia. The editor of the Czech periodical had the opportunity to learn how the Slovaks in Rome felt about the matter. They held no ill will for the Archbishop of London, but they did for the Czechs associated with Novy Zivot, the editor of which certainly knows better. The Czechs apparently have learned little or nothing from the past. They keep parroting listlessly the slogan "truth will prevail" - a la Masaryk and Benes - while they spread false propaganda even about those who are supposed to be "closely related" to them. It is obvious that the Czech periodical "Novy Zivot" (New Life) is still following the old life which brought ruin to the Slovak and Czech nations. • • • INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Rev. William A. Kaschmitter, M.N. Due to the scientific and technological revolutions of the past century, the world has become international in spite of itself and does not know what to do about this new situation. The number of international organizations created since 1860 to cope with specific international problems is simply phenomenal. The first global attempt made to grapple with all of these problems in general was made after World War I when the League of Nations was formally erected. The League failed but its failure did not kill the sense of need :for such an organization and after World War II another attempt was made in the creation of the United Nations Organization. Unfortunately, many people today fear that the United Nations Organization will go the way of the League unless it can "grow up" and mature to the point where it can command not only the respect but also the confidence of all nations, great and small. Justice - Not Merely Charity There are good-hearted people who think that charity alone will suffice to cure the ills of our world. It is true that love for God and neighbor are the two greatest commandments and that acording to St. Paul, Charity is the � 20 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA AND THE CHURCH The question of the position of Slovakia in the Roman Catholic Church was again erroneously explained recently. And once again by Czechs who apparently still feel that they should dominate the Slovaks in all things. In a recent issue (No. 2, 1959) of the Czech Catholic periodical "Novy '.Zivot" (New Life) - published in Rome - the question whether Archbishop Beran was a Czech or CzechoSlovak Primate was answered in this fashion: "The Prague Archbishop was therefore a Czech Metropolitan, but Primate of the Czech (Bohemian - ed.) kingdom. And this title is used on official documents to this day.. : .. When, therefore, the boundaries of the state were increased or decreased, the territory of the Primate also automatically increased or decreased. "But as long as the ICzecho..Slovak Repwblic is the legal heir of the Czech @3ohemian - ed.) kingdom, the Archbishop of Prague is the Primate of the entire state •a nd can be called the Primate of Czecho..Slovakia (or, if you will, the Czecho.JSlovak Primate), even though the Prague archbischops, after the estarblishment of the Czecho..Slovak tRepU!blic, never did call themselves in this fashion, but used only the old historic title; and the title tells us nothing else but that the Primate is (often because of the antiquity of the bis•h op's See) the first bishop in the state. The basis for this denotation i,s therefore territorial and not perhaps linguistic and the less so even political." "The truth will prevail," say the Czechs, and the Slovaks firmly believe that it will even in this case, the feelings and propaganda of the Czechs not withstanding! According to valid ecclesiastical law the status of dioceses or ecclesiastical provinces is decided exclusively and only by the Holy See, the highest ecclesiastical authority (Can. 251, par. 1). Consequently, only the Holy See grants or changes titles of persons who have jurisdiction or whatever authority, even if it be only honorary over these units. This is valid in every case and, hence, even in the case of Slovakia. When Saint Methodius was given jurisdiction over the Danubian Slovans (Slavic peoples), the Slovaks certainly belonged to that area, because the document of Pope Adrian II is even addressed to Svatopluk, who at that time �SLOVAKIA 21 ruled in Nitra, and to Kocef, Pribina's son, who managed Pannonia (Cf. Cod. dipl. et epist. regni Boh., t. 1, No. 12, pp. 7-9). Nitra had become a bishopric already in 880 A.D. (Registrum Johannis VII, epist, 257, Arch. Vatic.) on the basis of the decision of Pope John VIII. Prague only in 973, that is, ninety-three years later. The forefathers of the Slovaks, settled on both sides of the Morava river, formed the nucleus of the Great Moravian Empire. The fact that Nitra is the oldest bishopric of the Slovans north of the Danube is not altered at all by the unfavorable conditions that prevailed at that time (Wiching) or later which enabled the ignoring of its significance. At that time, therefore, Slovakia had its bishopric and belonged under the jurisdiction of Saint Methodius. After the fall of the Great Moravian Empire early in the tenth century, Slovakia eventually became a part of Hungary even as regards ecclesiastical affairs. The bishopric of Nitra was re-established about 1024 and always recalled the days of SS. Cyril and Methodius. The rest of the territory of Slovakia belonged under the ecclesiastical management of Ostrihom and Eger, even though, for example, the Spis province had its own provost from the end of the twelfth century. A great stride forward was the establishment of new bishoprics on the territory: the bishopric of Banska Bystrica, Spis Province, and Roznava in 1776; the diocese of Kosice in 1804; and the Greek Catholic diocese of Presov in 1816. Nitra, Banska Bystrica, and Roznava belonged under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Ostrihom, while the Spis and Kosice bishoprics were under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Eger as suffragan bishoprics. After the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918, the apostolic administratorship of Trnava was established temporarily. The new position of Slovakia within the Church was determined in 1937, when the Holy See issued the Apostolic Constitution "Ad ecclesiastici regiminis incrementum" (AAS, 1937, pp. 366-369). This Constitution freed the Slovak dioceses and apostolic administratorships from the jurisdiction of Ostrihom and Eger and placed �22 SLOVAKIA them directly under the jurisdiction of the Holy See. True it is, that even this position is considered temporary by the document, because it expressly states that the Apostolic See will establish a Metropolitan See as quickly as possible in Slovakia. Slovakia would then became an independent ecclesiastical province. The document, furthermore, expressly commands all concerned to abide by the decision of the Holy See and forbids any opposition to it or violation of it. Unfortunately, the world situation did not permit the establishment of an ecclesiastical province in Slovakia. Legally, then, according to Ohurch Law, the dioceses and apostolic administratorships of Slovakia are directly under the jurisdiction of the Holy See, that is, they are responsible to the Holy See dircetly and not to the Prague or Olomouc provinces. Since that is the case, we know then that the explanation given by the Czech periodical Novy Zivot is erroneous. According to present Church Law, the title of Primate is purely an honorary one. Excepting the Hungarian Primate, the bearers of this title have no jurisdiction because of it. In the past, however, Primates did have a definite right over Metropolitans and Bishops (Wernz-Vidal: Jus Canonicum, II, Nr. 517). Of course, only the Holy See has the right to grant or change this title - just as it has to grant or change any other title denoting such a high honor. Since we are concerned with a title that is more of a historical nature, its bearers use it in the same sense that it was granted, even though it is not in line with the present terminology of countries or their political division or affiliation (federation). So it is that in France the Archbishop of Lyons uses the title of "primas de Gaulles," and not the title of French Primate; the Archbishop of Salzburg uses the title "Primate of Germany" and not Primate of Austria and Germany. Similarly, then, even the Prague archbishops consistently used and still do use the title "Primate of the Bohemian Kingdom" or "Primate of the lands of the former Bohemian Kingdom." In the Czech case, there is no basis for changing this title arbitrarily by private individuals. �SLOVAKIA 23 The author of the explanation given in the Czech periodically Novy Zivot assumed that Slovakia was a part of the Bohemian Kingdom. History, however, tells us that Slovakia was not a part of that kingdom, and, therefore, had no jurisdictional connection with it. And when a new political state was formed, composed of the lands that once belonged to the Bohemian Kingdom and of Slovakia, the distinction was made, if we recall, between the so-called "historical lands" and Slovakia (as if Slovakia did not have a history of its own!) and, therefore, there was a difference between the heir to the historical lands of the Bohemian Crown and Slovakia, the land of the Slovaks. In short, what applied to the Bohemian Kingdom did not apply to Slovakia which was not a part of that kingdom. But even if anyone should think that Slovakia is also heir of the Czech State, let him bear in mind that the title of Primate is territorial. It is valid only in the territory that it was granted and not otherwise, unless the Holy See changes it with a new decision. This was adhered to even by the Archbishops of Prague. One might ,believe that, as a rule, there is only one Primate in any one state, but he would be mistaken. In Spain the title of Primate is enjoyed by two archbishops: the Archbishop of Toledo and the Archbishop of Tarragon. England and Scotland form one political state, but the Engli~h Primate is not the Primate of Scotland. When Ireland belonged to one political formation with England, the Primate of England was not the Primate of Ireland. There is, therefore, no objective argument in this regard to extend arbitrarily the title of Czech Primate over a new territory, to Slovakia. If we allow our thoughts to be the offspring of our desires, then there is no guarantee that they will be correct. It is only when our thoughts express an objective reality that they are truthful. Then even the deeds following from them can be just. Some time ago the Novy Zivot published an address of the Archbishop of London in which His Excellency on the basis of the erroneous information - referred to the Archbishop of Prague as the Primate of Czecho-Slo- �24 SLOVAKIA vakia. The editor of the Czech periodical had the opportunity to learn how the Slovaks in Rome felt about the matter. They held no ill will for the Archbishop of London, but they did for the Czechs associated with Novy Zivot, the editor of which certainly knows better. The Czechs apparently have learned little or nothing from the past. They keep parroting listlessly the slogan "truth will prevail" - a la Masaryk and Benes - while they spread false propaganda even about those who are supposed to be "closely related" to them. It is obvious that the Czech periodical "Novy Zivot" (New Life) is still following the old life which brought ruin to the Slovak and Czech nations. • • • INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Rev. William A. Kaschmitter, M.N. Due to the scientific and technological revolutions of the past century, the world has become international in spite of itself and does not know what to do about this new situation. The number of international organizations created since 1860 to cope with specific international problems is simply phenomenal. The first global attempt made to grapple with all of these problems in general was made after World War I when the League of Nations was formally erected. The League failed but its failure did not kill the sense of need :for such an organization and after World War II another attempt was made in the creation of the United Nations Organization. Unfortunately, many people today fear that the United Nations Organization will go the way of the League unless it can "grow up" and mature to the point where it can command not only the respect but also the confidence of all nations, great and small. Justice - Not Merely Charity There are good-hearted people who think that charity alone will suffice to cure the ills of our world. It is true that love for God and neighbor are the two greatest commandments and that acording to St. Paul, Charity is the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 20 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA AND THE CHURCH The question of the position of Slovakia in the Roman Catholic Church was again erroneously explained recently. And once again by Czechs who apparently still feel that they should dominate the Slovaks in all things. In a recent issue (No. 2, 1959) of the Czech Catholic periodical "Novy '.Zivot" (New Life) - published in Rome - the question whether Archbishop Beran was a Czech or CzechoSlovak Primate was answered in this fashion: "The Prague Archbishop was therefore a Czech Metropolitan, but Primate of the Czech (Bohemian - ed.) kingdom. And this title is used on official documents to this day.. : .. When, therefore, the boundaries of the state were increased or decreased, the territory of the Primate also automatically increased or decreased. "But as long as the ICzecho..Slovak Repwblic is the legal heir of the Czech @3ohemian - ed.) kingdom, the Archbishop of Prague is the Primate of the entire state •a nd can be called the Primate of Czecho..Slovakia (or, if you will, the Czecho.JSlovak Primate), even though the Prague archbischops, after the estarblishment of the Czecho..Slovak tRepU!blic, never did call themselves in this fashion, but used only the old historic title; and the title tells us nothing else but that the Primate is (often because of the antiquity of the bis•h op's See) the first bishop in the state. The basis for this denotation i,s therefore territorial and not perhaps linguistic and the less so even political." "The truth will prevail," say the Czechs, and the Slovaks firmly believe that it will even in this case, the feelings and propaganda of the Czechs not withstanding! According to valid ecclesiastical law the status of dioceses or ecclesiastical provinces is decided exclusively and only by the Holy See, the highest ecclesiastical authority (Can. 251, par. 1). Consequently, only the Holy See grants or changes titles of persons who have jurisdiction or whatever authority, even if it be only honorary over these units. This is valid in every case and, hence, even in the case of Slovakia. When Saint Methodius was given jurisdiction over the Danubian Slovans (Slavic peoples), the Slovaks certainly belonged to that area, because the document of Pope Adrian II is even addressed to Svatopluk, who at that time SLOVAKIA 21 ruled in Nitra, and to Kocef, Pribina's son, who managed Pannonia (Cf. Cod. dipl. et epist. regni Boh., t. 1, No. 12, pp. 7-9). Nitra had become a bishopric already in 880 A.D. (Registrum Johannis VII, epist, 257, Arch. Vatic.) on the basis of the decision of Pope John VIII. Prague only in 973, that is, ninety-three years later. The forefathers of the Slovaks, settled on both sides of the Morava river, formed the nucleus of the Great Moravian Empire. The fact that Nitra is the oldest bishopric of the Slovans north of the Danube is not altered at all by the unfavorable conditions that prevailed at that time (Wiching) or later which enabled the ignoring of its significance. At that time, therefore, Slovakia had its bishopric and belonged under the jurisdiction of Saint Methodius. After the fall of the Great Moravian Empire early in the tenth century, Slovakia eventually became a part of Hungary even as regards ecclesiastical affairs. The bishopric of Nitra was re-established about 1024 and always recalled the days of SS. Cyril and Methodius. The rest of the territory of Slovakia belonged under the ecclesiastical management of Ostrihom and Eger, even though, for example, the Spis province had its own provost from the end of the twelfth century. A great stride forward was the establishment of new bishoprics on the territory: the bishopric of Banska Bystrica, Spis Province, and Roznava in 1776; the diocese of Kosice in 1804; and the Greek Catholic diocese of Presov in 1816. Nitra, Banska Bystrica, and Roznava belonged under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Ostrihom, while the Spis and Kosice bishoprics were under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Eger as suffragan bishoprics. After the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918, the apostolic administratorship of Trnava was established temporarily. The new position of Slovakia within the Church was determined in 1937, when the Holy See issued the Apostolic Constitution "Ad ecclesiastici regiminis incrementum" (AAS, 1937, pp. 366-369). This Constitution freed the Slovak dioceses and apostolic administratorships from the jurisdiction of Ostrihom and Eger and placed 22 SLOVAKIA them directly under the jurisdiction of the Holy See. True it is, that even this position is considered temporary by the document, because it expressly states that the Apostolic See will establish a Metropolitan See as quickly as possible in Slovakia. Slovakia would then became an independent ecclesiastical province. The document, furthermore, expressly commands all concerned to abide by the decision of the Holy See and forbids any opposition to it or violation of it. Unfortunately, the world situation did not permit the establishment of an ecclesiastical province in Slovakia. Legally, then, according to Ohurch Law, the dioceses and apostolic administratorships of Slovakia are directly under the jurisdiction of the Holy See, that is, they are responsible to the Holy See dircetly and not to the Prague or Olomouc provinces. Since that is the case, we know then that the explanation given by the Czech periodical Novy Zivot is erroneous. According to present Church Law, the title of Primate is purely an honorary one. Excepting the Hungarian Primate, the bearers of this title have no jurisdiction because of it. In the past, however, Primates did have a definite right over Metropolitans and Bishops (Wernz-Vidal: Jus Canonicum, II, Nr. 517). Of course, only the Holy See has the right to grant or change this title - just as it has to grant or change any other title denoting such a high honor. Since we are concerned with a title that is more of a historical nature, its bearers use it in the same sense that it was granted, even though it is not in line with the present terminology of countries or their political division or affiliation (federation). So it is that in France the Archbishop of Lyons uses the title of "primas de Gaulles," and not the title of French Primate; the Archbishop of Salzburg uses the title "Primate of Germany" and not Primate of Austria and Germany. Similarly, then, even the Prague archbishops consistently used and still do use the title "Primate of the Bohemian Kingdom" or "Primate of the lands of the former Bohemian Kingdom." In the Czech case, there is no basis for changing this title arbitrarily by private individuals. SLOVAKIA 23 The author of the explanation given in the Czech periodically Novy Zivot assumed that Slovakia was a part of the Bohemian Kingdom. History, however, tells us that Slovakia was not a part of that kingdom, and, therefore, had no jurisdictional connection with it. And when a new political state was formed, composed of the lands that once belonged to the Bohemian Kingdom and of Slovakia, the distinction was made, if we recall, between the so-called "historical lands" and Slovakia (as if Slovakia did not have a history of its own!) and, therefore, there was a difference between the heir to the historical lands of the Bohemian Crown and Slovakia, the land of the Slovaks. In short, what applied to the Bohemian Kingdom did not apply to Slovakia which was not a part of that kingdom. But even if anyone should think that Slovakia is also heir of the Czech State, let him bear in mind that the title of Primate is territorial. It is valid only in the territory that it was granted and not otherwise, unless the Holy See changes it with a new decision. This was adhered to even by the Archbishops of Prague. One might ,believe that, as a rule, there is only one Primate in any one state, but he would be mistaken. In Spain the title of Primate is enjoyed by two archbishops: the Archbishop of Toledo and the Archbishop of Tarragon. England and Scotland form one political state, but the Engli~h Primate is not the Primate of Scotland. When Ireland belonged to one political formation with England, the Primate of England was not the Primate of Ireland. There is, therefore, no objective argument in this regard to extend arbitrarily the title of Czech Primate over a new territory, to Slovakia. If we allow our thoughts to be the offspring of our desires, then there is no guarantee that they will be correct. It is only when our thoughts express an objective reality that they are truthful. Then even the deeds following from them can be just. Some time ago the Novy Zivot published an address of the Archbishop of London in which His Excellency on the basis of the erroneous information - referred to the Archbishop of Prague as the Primate of Czecho-Slo- 24 SLOVAKIA vakia. The editor of the Czech periodical had the opportunity to learn how the Slovaks in Rome felt about the matter. They held no ill will for the Archbishop of London, but they did for the Czechs associated with Novy Zivot, the editor of which certainly knows better. The Czechs apparently have learned little or nothing from the past. They keep parroting listlessly the slogan "truth will prevail" - a la Masaryk and Benes - while they spread false propaganda even about those who are supposed to be "closely related" to them. It is obvious that the Czech periodical "Novy Zivot" (New Life) is still following the old life which brought ruin to the Slovak and Czech nations. • • • INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Rev. William A. Kaschmitter, M.N. Due to the scientific and technological revolutions of the past century, the world has become international in spite of itself and does not know what to do about this new situation. The number of international organizations created since 1860 to cope with specific international problems is simply phenomenal. The first global attempt made to grapple with all of these problems in general was made after World War I when the League of Nations was formally erected. The League failed but its failure did not kill the sense of need :for such an organization and after World War II another attempt was made in the creation of the United Nations Organization. Unfortunately, many people today fear that the United Nations Organization will go the way of the League unless it can "grow up" and mature to the point where it can command not only the respect but also the confidence of all nations, great and small. Justice - Not Merely Charity There are good-hearted people who think that charity alone will suffice to cure the ills of our world. It is true that love for God and neighbor are the two greatest commandments and that acording to St. Paul, Charity is the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia and the Church Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 20-24 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/181a4f66019df58bee489bbf12571e20.pdf 3b6d4dd15c1e3e7264337d94b791a387 PDF Text Text 6 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT Fnmcis Vnuk On September 27, 1940, at the New Chancellery in Berlin, the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact was signed. "The ceremony of signing" - noted Shirer "was carried through with typical Axis talent for the theatrical." (1) The German and satellite press greeted the occasion as an event of far-reaching importance, a "Magna Charta" of the New Order, which was going to bring about exactly what had been promised in the preamble to the Pact, namely, "world peace" . . . and "prosperity and welfare of the peoples" in Europe and Greater East Asia(2). After the ceremonial signing, Hitler entered the hall to honor the occasion by his presence. Then followed the adulatory speeches of Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Kurusu. In the course of his speech Ribbentrop stated: "The purpose of the Pact is, a:bove an things, to help restore peace to the world as quickly as possible. Therefore, any otherstate, which wishes to adhere to this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful conditions, will be sincerely and gratefully made welcome and will participate in the economic and political reorganization" (3) In response to this rather blunt hint, the nations of Central Europe, tied to Germany by geopolitical conditions, duly applied for admittance. Hungary was the first in the field, the others following her more or less reluctantly. It was clear to the 'Slovaks and Rumanians that they could not afford to stand aside, even if they wished. They had to rank at least as high in Hitler's esteem as Hungary which still hrad unfulfilled territorial claims against them. And thus towards the end of November, 1940, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Slovak delegations in close succession went to Vienna or Berlin ( 4) to sign the Protocol of adherence to the Tripartitie Pact. Hungary did so on the 20th, Rumania on the 22nd, and Slovakia on the 24th of November, 1940(5). Slovakia's accession to the Tripartite Pact followed the proclamation of the "spiritual adherence" a few weeks �SLOVAKIA 7 previously. Though Ciano sneered at the event as "a useless bit of ersatz diplomacy" (6) , the Germans made it into a spectacular State visit which was arranged for Tuka and his entourage. State visits had a strange fascination for Turoa. Nothing appealed to him more than to be a centre of attention, surrounded by high officials, and facing the flashlights of official photographers and reporters. He did not -conceal his disappointment when the Germans advised him against his proposed visit to Rumania, or when the Italians asked him to postpone his offered visit of Italy till "after the war." The signing of the Protocol of Accession enabled him to taste the cherished moments of ceremonial courtesies and at the same time to demonstrate his devotion to Germany. Apart from these rather personal considerations, there were also quite a few important political, economic, and cultural problems to be discussed, new poUcies outlined, and achievements and failures reported. SIGNATURES The German preparations for Tuka's State visit were very detailed and thorough. Tuka was to be received with all the honors and courtesies due to the head of a friendly government. In the captured documents of the former German Foreign Ministry, there is a special file (7) dealing exclusively with various aspects of the visit and this is the principal source of all relevant information. The Slov,ak delegation(8), which consisted of Tuka, Murgas, Mracna, Radlinsky and Farkas, left Bratislava by auto on the afternoon of November 23, 1940. They crossed the bridge to Petrfalka and proceeded to Vienna where ,a special train was awaiting them. The reception there was very austere. There were no guards of honor to inspect, no speeches of welcome; just one representative of the Protocol to accompany them on their night journey to Berlin. '.Dhe train left West Bahnhof at 7:32 P. M. and took them through Linz, Passau, Regensburg, Hof, and Leipzig to the Anhalter Bahnhof, Berlin, where they arrived on Sunday morning at 10 :40 A. M. - just 20 minutes after the Rumanian delegation, its mission accomplished, left Berlin on its return journey (9). �8 SLOVAKIA At the Anhalter Bahnhof everything was pompous, well-organized, and impressive. Welcoming personalities were grouped in four parties. The first party, headed by the Slovak charge d'affaires, consisted of foreign diploma:ts ·and the heads of missions in Berlin. Specially invited German representatives of the Party and the Army were in the second, the members of the Slovak Legation in the third, and the personnel of the German Foreign Ministry in the fourth group. Tuka, as he alighted from his salon-car, was welcomed by Ribbentrop and Matthew Cernak, and introduced by them to the other members of the welcoming parties on the platform. Then followed the inspection of the Guard of Honor. Tuka, in the uniform of the Hlinka Guards and accompanied by Ribbentrop, was trying his unsoldierly best to make his gait and mien look soldier-like. From the station the procession of cars went to Schloss Bellevue which was going to be Tuka's residence during his two-day stay in Berlin. There he was welcomed by Meissner who acted as master of the house (Hausherr). At 11 :30 Tuka paid a visit to Ribbentrop at the latter's office, 73 Wilhelmstrasse, where they spent about an hour in discussion. The great moment came at 1:00 P. M. In the Grand Reception Hall of the New Chancellery stood a huge massive signature table. The representatives of the Press had already taken their places: the foreign correspondents at the window-side, the Germans at the door. At 12:58 P. M., the great door opened and an impressive procession entered. It was led by the Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. He was followed by Tuka and Ribbentrop, the Japanese Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, the Hungarian and Rumanian Ministers, State Secretary Weizsaecker, and State Under-Secretary Gaus. Ribbentrop sat at the center of the table, Tuka at his right and, next to him, the Italian Ambassador and the Rumanian Minister. At Ribbentrop's left were seated the Japanese Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister. Everything went without a hitch like a well-rehearsed drama. The Protocol of Accession (10) was signed amidst �SLOVAKIA 9 the flashes of light and rustle of reporter's notebooks, short speeches were solemnly read out and courteous applause resounded in the spacious hall. In the afternoon Ribbentrop gave a reception at the Hotel Adlon for the Slovak Delegation and the members of the Slovak Legation in Berlin. In the morning of the next day (Monday, November 25) Tuka took part in the wreath-laying ceremony at the Ehrenmahl (The War Memorial at the famous Unter den Linden). Another reception was given by Cernak in the afternoon at the Hotel Esplanade. At 5:30 P. M. Tuka had his great and memorable moment. He was taken to the Work Room of the New Chancellery where he was received by Hitler. That was the climax of Tuka's State visit. Shortly before 7 P. M., the Slovak Delegation was again on the Anhalter Bahnhof. With the German and foreign guests to bid them farewell, guards of honor to inspect, hands to shake or raise in Nazi salute, the parting ceremony was as imposing as the welcoming one. At 7:05 P. M., the special train with the Slovak Delegation left Berlin on its return journey to Vienna, where they arrived on November 26, at 10:54 A. M. The Slovak Parliament gave its approval to the Protocol of Accession to the Tripartite Pact on February 6, 1941(11). DISCUSSIONS The records of discussions between Ribbentrop and Tuka were not found. But it is possible to gauge their nature and content from numerous memoranda passed between Ribbentrop and his advisers shortly before Tuka's visit. Some of these memoranda are very sketchy, others go into great details. They deal with subjects which Tuka outlined to Consul-General Wuester (on November 11, 1940) as the topics he would like to discuss perisonally with Ribbentrop on the occasion of his State visit. And even if the discussions did not follow the proposed course exactly, they could not have departed far from it. These memoranda are thus of interest to every student of Slovak affairs. They certainly cast some light on the Slovak scene as it was set in November, 1940, and provide a �10 SLOVAKIA guileless cross-section of the Slovak political, economic, and cultural life. The problems were grouped under four headings and each division had further subsections. The same pattern will be followed in this study. The subject matter for discussion was to proceed along the following lines: A. Political Problems. 1. Internal Policy: Internally Slovakia was in the middle of a political crisis and Woermann and Killinger briefed Ribbentrop about its extent. They informed him that Tuka and Mach were working on the establishment of the Nazi system in Slovakia ("nazionalsozialistische Staatsfuehrung"), in the spirit of the Salzburg conversations. In this attempt they had to wage a struggle against the opposing forces centered around President Tiso. Tiso',s camp consisted of in Killinger's terminology - clericals, former :Durcansky hangers-on and four members of the government. Tuka demanded dismissal of these ministers, but Tiso ref used to comply with his request. Tuka then decided to fight it out with Tiso, and, according to Killinger, there were forces at work striving for a complete elimination of Tiso from the Slovak political life ( eine vollige Auschaltung Tisos aus dem politischen Leben"). In discussing this question with Tuka, Ribbentrop was advised to recommend that Tuka should apply his measures in such a way as not to affect the position of President Tiso. There was no objection to the eventual removal of the uncooperative ministers, but as far as Tiso was concerned, his removal would only deteriorate and not improve the internal situation in Slovakia. "Tiso" - runs Woermann's recommendation to Ribbentrop - "as Hlinka's successor and the co-founder of the Slovak State, is a very popular personality in Slovakia" ("eine durchhaus volkstuemliche Personlichkeit"), and, therefore, the elimination of the clerical influence should be carried out carefully and possibly by evolutionary means. The conversion of Slovakia into a Christian state according to Schusch- �SLOVAKIA 11 nigg's model ("Staendestatt'), as contemplated by Tiso and his friends, could be prevented even without the removal of Tiso. On the other hand Tuka should be commended for his fight for the Nazi reorientation of Slovakia. 2. Territorial demands: 'rhe second problem Tuka wanted to discuss was the territorial cession of the eastern part of the Protektorat to Slovakia (the region of Moravske Slovacko). In this respect several memoranda were passed to the German Foreign Ministry outlying the reason and justification of this demand. But the Germans were not happy about the proposition. Ribbentrop was advised to tell Tuka that the idea of the frontier rectification in favor of Slovakia could not be considered ("keine Folge gegeben werden koenne" ). 3. Slovak-Hungarian Relations: The Slovak-Hungarian relations were by far the most important point of the discussions. The Vienna Award by which Slovakia was forced to cede part of her territories to Hungary - was a source of constant Slovak grievances and was genuinely detested by all Slovaks, whether they were pro-Nazi, anti-Nazi, or just sitting on the fence. Tuka was convinced that the Salzburg conversations meant a step towards a more acceptable solution. At Salzburg (July 1940) Tiso wrenched from Ribbentrop a somewhat vague and non-committal promise that the question of the frontier rectification between Slovakia and Hungary though unsuitable for settlement at that time - cou~d be considered later ("dass in Augenblick nicht an die Regelung dieser Frage zu denken sei, dass vielleicht spaeter einmal der Augenblick kommen duerfe"). On the basis of this promise the Slovak Foreign Ministry forwarded to Berlin a number of Aide-Memoires, maps and statistical material and wanted them to be examined by the Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart. Tuka was to ask Ribbentrop for the official German attitude towards these Slovak requests. It was proposed to tell Tuka that the moment for the settlement of the disputed boundary issue was still inap- �12 SLOVAKIA propriate ("Es waere unzeitmaessig diese slowakische Ansprueche jetzt geltent zu machen"). With regard to the examination of the Slovak documentary material by the Auslandsinstitut in Stutgart - since the Germans did not want the Hungarians to get wind that something was going on - it was suggested that this request should be declined. Tuka should be told that the German Foreign Ministry would examine the pertinent Slovak material, but it did not think it expedient to pass such things on to the Auslandsinstitut. 4. Ruthene Question: Then there was the question of the Ruthene minority. This group, about 50,000 strong, was subjected to intense communistic propaganda inciting it to demand the same privileges as those granted to the German ethnic group. The solution of this question required a precarious balance in counteracting the communist propaganda without arousing the suspicions of being hostile towards the USSR which at that time was being courted by the Germans into joining the Tripartite Pact. Tuka was to be told that the Slovak Government would have to try to win the sympathies of the Ruthenes even if it involved the offer of a guarantee of cultural autonomy. But the communist intrigues would have to be suppressed just the same ("Kommunistische Umtriebe unter ihnen waeren zu unterdruecken") . 5. Attitude towards the Croats: It was expected that Tuka, who had just learned about the German attitude towards the Croats, would make an offer to influence the Croats through Slovak propaganda. It was suggested that his declaration should be merely noted and any discussion of his proposal should be declined. B. Economic Problems: The economic topics for the discussions are of equal importance. In spite, or, perhaps because of the war, the Slovak economy was developing very favorably. The Ger- �SLOVAKIA 13 mans were taking 75 per cent of Slovak exports and, contrary to the general belief, were providing valuable expert and material assistance. Nevertheless, there were points of friction even in this sphere, especially with regard to the direction in which the development should proceed. The Germans pressed for projects like the improved facilities of the Bratislava Danube harbor, raising of the level of agricultural economy, erection of family houses for workers, etc., whereas the Slovaks were for industrial development, new factories, improved local communications, etc. At the time of Tuka's visit the Slovak grievances concerned the price increases, tourist trade, and employment of Czech skilled workers. 1. Price Question: The Slovak government was afraid that the price increases might create unwanted social reactions which, in turn, could be exploited by the communists. But the Germans maintained that, since rising prices were a general phenomenon in all Southeast Europe, and also in the Protektorat whose economy was closely bound with Slovakia's, it was desirable for them to go up in Slovakia as well. It was proposed to point out to Tuka that the price increases would, in the long run, increase Slovakia's national income through expansion in exports to Germany and through the wage transfer of the 80,000 Slovak laborers working there. The Germans would try to mitigate the effect of price increases by such measures, for example, as lowering the prices of goods imported from the Protektorat. Likewise - in spite of the recent increases in the price of coal - the export prices of German coal delivered to Slovakia were not increased, but were retained at the level fixed in April, 1940, and would stay there. 2. Tourist Trade: in the mater of the Slovak complaint concerning the rapid decrease in the tourist trade, it was to be stated that there was not much the Germans could do about it. It was, however, to be expected that after the war Slovakia would enjoy an unprecedented tourist activity. �14 SLOVAKIA 3. Employment of Czech Workers: For Tuka this represented another thorny problem. There were still many Czechs working in industrial establishments in Slovakia, mainly as skilled workers. Tuka pressed for their removal, since he saw in them a constant element of unrest ("Unruheherde"). The Germans promised to cooperate, saying that some Czechs had already been transferred. RilJbentrop, however, would have to advise Tuka that those Czechs working in the armament industry could be removed only when satisfactory replacements by skilled Slovak workers had been found. C. Resettlement Problems: 1. Czechs in Slovakia: Tuka strove to rid Slovakia of all Czechs (approximat ely 25,000 in number), as well as t o bring bac 1c to Slovakia all Slovaks living in the Protektorat. Since the negotiations ("Auseinandersetzungverhandlungen") with the Germans were ominously dragging on, Tuka wanted to ask Ribbentrop about the German view on the matter. Ribbentrop was advised to instruct Tuka that the proposal would be examined in due time, but, on the other hand, not to give any prospect for fulfillment of this wish ("Keine Aussicht auf Erfuellung des Wuensches za machen" ). 2. Slovaks in the German POW Camps: After the military collapse of France, several unfortunate Slovaks found themselves as POWs in German captivity. In most cases they were Slovak workers from Paris and from the Northern French coalfields who were mobilized into "Czecho-Slovak" army units to fight for the restoration of the defunct Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Slovak Foreign Ministry had been demanding their release since the end of the Franco-German hostilities, but the German authorities were not very quick in answering. Tuka was to be assured that their release was pending. 3. Slovaks in France: With equal commendable zeal the Slovak Government �SLOVAKIA 15 tried to obtain the release of all Slovaks in the French Army Service, in both occupied and unoccupied France, and pleaded for the repatriation of those who desired it. Tuka was to be told that the Germans looked upon the request with understanding and would give it their support. D. Cultural and Other Problems: In the cultural field there was complete satisfaction on both sides. The Slovak-German cultural relations were very friendly and prepartions for the signing of a Cultural Agreement ("Kultur-Abkomm en") were on the way. Similarly there were no complaints about the treatment of the German ethnic group in Slovakia. IV CONCLUSION Looking at the event after almost 20 years' interval, when one has the benefit of seeing what was back of the German mind, and when one knows all the answers to what were then the annoying questions of the day, it is only too easy to be critical, cynical, or even malicious. Was Tuka really the villain of the drama? Was he really responsible for all subsequent Slovak misfortunes? Was his signature on the Protocol the death-warrant of the Slovak State as some of his critics want us to believe? Or, was he just an innocent victim of circumstances from which there was no way out? Did he merely carry out the inevitable and inescapable steps to save the nation from a much worse disaster, as his admirers try to convince us? Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to either of these views. Tuka's personality was of a far more complex nature than to be an object of a clear-cut judgment. It would be futile and out of place to argue about this. However, to make the picture as complete as possible, it seems only just to add the following notes by way of a postscript. It is undeniable now, as it was conclusive then, that. the Tripartite Pact was directed against the USA (12) ,, where, as it happened, lived almost a third of the Slovak �16 SLOVAKIA nation. And there is no doubt about Tuka's willingness to have Slovakia bound to Germany lock, stock, and barrel. But the personal ambition of a sick man was not the only why and wherefore behind Tuka's move. There were also political motives and these were by no means insignificant: to gain for Slovakia an honorable place in the New Europe - which at that time was not just a remote phantasy; to ward off the Hungarian danger - as menacing and ubiquitous as ever. It is not always realized that the fear of being swallowed by Hungary had a hand not only at the birth of the Slovak State, but was present in the background of practically every action of subsequent Slovak foreign policy. The political and military situation - at the time of Slovakia's accession to the Pact - strongly favored the German position. Germany was the undisputed master of Europe, and with the USSR she had a Treaty of NonAggression. The USA was keeping out of the war and was likely to stay out. For Hitler and his gang "the war was already won." This thought, however, was not shared by all. There were many who did concede (though they have less courage to admit it now) that the war might finish in a draw Such a situation would have curbed Hitler's ambitions for world domination, but it would leave the nations of Central Europe at his mercy. And it is better to be left at the mercy of a benign than an irate master. Then the question arises as to what would have happened if Tuka "per impossiblile" would have chosen to resist German prompting and decided not to join the bloc. The problem may be highly academic, but the answer to it is less so. In fact, an eloquent reply was provided about three months after Slovakia's accession to the Pact by the adherence of Bulgaria. To the Western way of thinking, Bulgaria was the best of the bad satellites of Hitler. She saved most of her Jewish population from extermination, she did not declare war on the USSR (though the USSR found it expedient to declare war on her). In the face of German pressure she yielded the bare minimum - and this included the accession to the Pact. It is hardly to be expected that Slovak opposition could have been more ef- �SLOVAKIA 17 fective. With no friends and no guarantees in the West, Slovakia could not behave the way Yugoslavia did. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. W. Shirer: A Berlin Diary, Hamilton, London, 1941,. For the text of the Tripartite Pact see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, pp. 355-6, or Int. Affairs, 193946, Vol. III, OUP, 1954, pp. 81-82. C. A. Macartney: October Fifteenth, EdinJburgh Univ. Press, 1956, Vol. I, p. 439. The Hrungarians, went to Vienna, the Rumaniallls and Slovaks to Berlin. Other countries followed suit: Spain secretly in November 1940; Bulgaria on March 1, 1941; Yugoslavia on March 25, 194'1; Croatia, on June 115, 1941'. The USSR nearly joined the Pact, too (See Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 248--9, 258-9). Ciano's Diary 1939-43, Heinemann, London, 1947. Ent ry ·of November 20, 11)40: " ... I do not attach much importance to the adherence of these states (Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia) which are vassais of Germany, or almost so. In £act they weaken the Tripartite Agreement itseltf, and s,eem to be useless bits of ersatz diplomacy. " Auswartiges Amt, Buero St. Sekretaer, Besuch Tuka, 610/ 248742-818. 8. For the Delegation's "Who's Who" see Alppendix II. 9. "He (Antonescu) had bairely left Berlin . .. when Dr. Tuka, the Slovak Prime Minister, arrived to sign his counrtry's adhesion to the Pact. The document was ready and his signature was prompt" - Dipl. correspond,e nt of the London "Times". In fact, the s igning took place less than two and ·a halif hours after Tukas' arrival. 1-0. For the text of the Brotocol see Alppendix I. 11. Joseph Lettrich: History of Modern Slovakia, Atlantic Press, London, 1956, p. 167. 12. Ar.ticle 3 of the Pact runs: (The three Contracti!Ilg Parties) "further undertake to assist one another with all political, econemic and military means, if one of them is attacked by a Poweir at present not involved in the European war or in the Chiinese..Jarpanese conflict." This could have meant only the USA or the USSR. But Article 5 stated that the iterms of the Pact did not "in any way aifilieot the politica'l strutus which exists between each of the three Contraicting Parties and Soviet Russiia." APPENDIX I The Protocol of Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one hand, and the Government of Slovakia, on the other hand, represented by the signa,to:ries to the documenrt, declare as follows: 1. Slovakia joins the Tripartite Pact sig.n ed at Berlin on September 27, 1940. 2. As far as the joint technical commissions provided under Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact concern matters affecting Slovak �18 SLOVAKIA interests, Slovakia. will be represented ait the discussions of these committees. 3. The text o;f the Tr.iipartite Pact is atltached to the present Protocol, which is drawn up in the German, Italian, Japanese, and Slovak languages, each text to ha1Ve the validity of the original. The Protocol comes into effect on the da~ of signature . .AIPPENDIX II The Slovak Delegation - Who Was Who: Dr. Vojtech Tuka - Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign A1ff.airs. Born on July 4, 1880, at P.i-argy, Tuka was, before 1918, a Professor of Internationa,l Law at the then Hungarian University at Bratislava. After the first World Wa r he played a leading role in the Slovak autonomist movement of the Hlinka Party. Accused of treason by the Czech Brague, he wa•s involved in the notorious "Tuka Trial." On flimsy and rigged evid'ence he was found guiity of espiona•ge and p:l,,Oltting a,ga,inst the Repuiblic and sentenced to 15 years in ja11. After havi,ng been imprisoned at Pankrac in Prague for more than seven years, sick and nearly blind, he was pardoned by Presidental amnesty, and the remainder of his sentence he was to spend in custody at Plzen. Released in October, 1938, he pr-0mptly resumed his political activity. In the first Slovak independent goviermnent ~March 1J939) he became the deputy Prime Minister and laiter, after the retirement of Sidor. ,also the acting Minfater of Interior. On the election ·of Dr. Joseph Tiso as Presiident o:f Slovakia, Tuka became Brime Minister. Mter the Sal2Jburg Conference (July 1940) Tuka not only retained his post, but a'lso took over the Foreign Ministry. Tuka was executed by the Prague Government in Bratislava August 20, 1946. Slovak Minister in Berlin. A high school Matul Cernak teacher by profession, Cernak had a long record of continuous activity in the ranks of the Hlinka Party. In Septem,ber, 1<938, he was appointed a minister in the Czecho-Slovak Government. He immediately demanded autonomy for Slovakia. This not granted, he resigned in protest. In the first Sloviak autonomous governmenit he was given the post of the Ministry of Educaiti001 (October 11938) and in addition was entrusted with the lead,ership of the Youth Organization (Hlinka's Youth). Being openly for a complete secession, he was imprisoned by the Czechs (March 1939) and treated raither brutaUy. After the Declaration of Slovak Independence he was sent to Germany as the Slovak diplomatic representative. He was killed by a bomb sent through the mail in Munich, July 5, 1955. Karo• Murgal - Ohief of the Propaganda Bureau. A joumaHsit, Murga§ came into prominence in the hectic days of October 1938 Ma!l"Ch 1939. After the Salzburg Oond'eroo.ce· he was made the Chie!f of the Propaganda Bureau as the only suifable ohoice (h,e was the on1y person of irutelligence and aibility ready to toiw the German line). Ing. Jozef Mracna - Ohief of the Political Division of the Slovak Foreign Ministry. Mraona was born on February 21, 1900. He was a career diplomat of the Czooho..Slovak diplomatic service. At the time of the declaration of Slovak independence (March 1939) he was the Cze:cho..Slovak Consul in New York, but immediately offered his services to the Slovak State. Gifted, honest and exiperieru:ed, he was 1 �SLOVAKIA 19 the most caiplllble and authoritative personality in the Slovak Foreig111 Ministry, but later he became rather passive. He enjoyed Tuka's full confidence and in return was his loyal, but not uncritica'l, co-worker. ,or. Raduz Radlinsky - Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol at the Slovak Foreign Miinistry. Former employee of the Czecho-61ovak Foreign Ministry, where he held a minor position in the Protocol. On the basis of this activity he was entrusted with the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol in Bratislava. '11he Germans constantly objected to his position. Lieutenant-Colonel ~tefan Tata.rko Military Aittache at the Slovak Legaition in Berlin. A professional soldier of some ability, Tatarko created practically out of nothing the Sfovak Military Secret Service. Later he was apointed military -atta:che to Berlin. Ait one time he was not trusted by the Germans because of his in:cautiously expressed d'oulbts about final German vietory. But he must have corrected himself, because later he was promoted to the Chief of Cabinet at the Slovak Ministry of defense. Jan Belnay - Commercial Atta:che at the Slovak Legation in Berlin. He was born on Oct-Ober 23, 1900. Mosit of his study-years (in Chemistry) were spent in Germany, the remainder in Prague. He worked at the Czecho-Slovak Economic Academy, a111d Ia1ter at the Czecho-Slovak EX1pOrt Institute. In MaTCh, 11939, he joined the staff of the Slovak Foreign Ministry and s·oon was appointed a commercial attaohe to Berlin. His professional eicperien:ce and fluent knowledge of German served him in good stead and in 1941 he was promoted to the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. Jan Farkal - Tuka's Adjutant . .A,s a comparnion in T~a's tribulations (he figured in the "Tuka Trial") Fark'as claimed also a share in Tuka's honors. He devoutly followed Tuka's footsteps and parroted his pronoun:cements aholllt the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, but was not particularly giiited to make a higher grade. A,t one stage Tuka insisted on his appointment as a Minister of Finance, but was rebuff.ed. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Since, in the new situation, it was impossilble to coHa-borate oifficiaHy with the Soviet Union, we . . . d~d nothing which might prejudike or ipre.vent the removal of co-operation at the earliest posstble moment; I need 0I11ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves rund important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London. 1944. � 6 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT Fnmcis Vnuk On September 27, 1940, at the New Chancellery in Berlin, the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact was signed. "The ceremony of signing" - noted Shirer "was carried through with typical Axis talent for the theatrical." (1) The German and satellite press greeted the occasion as an event of far-reaching importance, a "Magna Charta" of the New Order, which was going to bring about exactly what had been promised in the preamble to the Pact, namely, "world peace" . . . and "prosperity and welfare of the peoples" in Europe and Greater East Asia(2). After the ceremonial signing, Hitler entered the hall to honor the occasion by his presence. Then followed the adulatory speeches of Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Kurusu. In the course of his speech Ribbentrop stated: "The purpose of the Pact is, a:bove an things, to help restore peace to the world as quickly as possible. Therefore, any otherstate, which wishes to adhere to this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful conditions, will be sincerely and gratefully made welcome and will participate in the economic and political reorganization" (3) In response to this rather blunt hint, the nations of Central Europe, tied to Germany by geopolitical conditions, duly applied for admittance. Hungary was the first in the field, the others following her more or less reluctantly. It was clear to the 'Slovaks and Rumanians that they could not afford to stand aside, even if they wished. They had to rank at least as high in Hitler's esteem as Hungary which still hrad unfulfilled territorial claims against them. And thus towards the end of November, 1940, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Slovak delegations in close succession went to Vienna or Berlin ( 4) to sign the Protocol of adherence to the Tripartitie Pact. Hungary did so on the 20th, Rumania on the 22nd, and Slovakia on the 24th of November, 1940(5). Slovakia's accession to the Tripartite Pact followed the proclamation of the "spiritual adherence" a few weeks �SLOVAKIA 7 previously. Though Ciano sneered at the event as "a useless bit of ersatz diplomacy" (6) , the Germans made it into a spectacular State visit which was arranged for Tuka and his entourage. State visits had a strange fascination for Turoa. Nothing appealed to him more than to be a centre of attention, surrounded by high officials, and facing the flashlights of official photographers and reporters. He did not -conceal his disappointment when the Germans advised him against his proposed visit to Rumania, or when the Italians asked him to postpone his offered visit of Italy till "after the war." The signing of the Protocol of Accession enabled him to taste the cherished moments of ceremonial courtesies and at the same time to demonstrate his devotion to Germany. Apart from these rather personal considerations, there were also quite a few important political, economic, and cultural problems to be discussed, new poUcies outlined, and achievements and failures reported. SIGNATURES The German preparations for Tuka's State visit were very detailed and thorough. Tuka was to be received with all the honors and courtesies due to the head of a friendly government. In the captured documents of the former German Foreign Ministry, there is a special file (7) dealing exclusively with various aspects of the visit and this is the principal source of all relevant information. The Slov,ak delegation(8), which consisted of Tuka, Murgas, Mracna, Radlinsky and Farkas, left Bratislava by auto on the afternoon of November 23, 1940. They crossed the bridge to Petrfalka and proceeded to Vienna where ,a special train was awaiting them. The reception there was very austere. There were no guards of honor to inspect, no speeches of welcome; just one representative of the Protocol to accompany them on their night journey to Berlin. '.Dhe train left West Bahnhof at 7:32 P. M. and took them through Linz, Passau, Regensburg, Hof, and Leipzig to the Anhalter Bahnhof, Berlin, where they arrived on Sunday morning at 10 :40 A. M. - just 20 minutes after the Rumanian delegation, its mission accomplished, left Berlin on its return journey (9). �8 SLOVAKIA At the Anhalter Bahnhof everything was pompous, well-organized, and impressive. Welcoming personalities were grouped in four parties. The first party, headed by the Slovak charge d'affaires, consisted of foreign diploma:ts ·and the heads of missions in Berlin. Specially invited German representatives of the Party and the Army were in the second, the members of the Slovak Legation in the third, and the personnel of the German Foreign Ministry in the fourth group. Tuka, as he alighted from his salon-car, was welcomed by Ribbentrop and Matthew Cernak, and introduced by them to the other members of the welcoming parties on the platform. Then followed the inspection of the Guard of Honor. Tuka, in the uniform of the Hlinka Guards and accompanied by Ribbentrop, was trying his unsoldierly best to make his gait and mien look soldier-like. From the station the procession of cars went to Schloss Bellevue which was going to be Tuka's residence during his two-day stay in Berlin. There he was welcomed by Meissner who acted as master of the house (Hausherr). At 11 :30 Tuka paid a visit to Ribbentrop at the latter's office, 73 Wilhelmstrasse, where they spent about an hour in discussion. The great moment came at 1:00 P. M. In the Grand Reception Hall of the New Chancellery stood a huge massive signature table. The representatives of the Press had already taken their places: the foreign correspondents at the window-side, the Germans at the door. At 12:58 P. M., the great door opened and an impressive procession entered. It was led by the Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. He was followed by Tuka and Ribbentrop, the Japanese Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, the Hungarian and Rumanian Ministers, State Secretary Weizsaecker, and State Under-Secretary Gaus. Ribbentrop sat at the center of the table, Tuka at his right and, next to him, the Italian Ambassador and the Rumanian Minister. At Ribbentrop's left were seated the Japanese Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister. Everything went without a hitch like a well-rehearsed drama. The Protocol of Accession (10) was signed amidst �SLOVAKIA 9 the flashes of light and rustle of reporter's notebooks, short speeches were solemnly read out and courteous applause resounded in the spacious hall. In the afternoon Ribbentrop gave a reception at the Hotel Adlon for the Slovak Delegation and the members of the Slovak Legation in Berlin. In the morning of the next day (Monday, November 25) Tuka took part in the wreath-laying ceremony at the Ehrenmahl (The War Memorial at the famous Unter den Linden). Another reception was given by Cernak in the afternoon at the Hotel Esplanade. At 5:30 P. M. Tuka had his great and memorable moment. He was taken to the Work Room of the New Chancellery where he was received by Hitler. That was the climax of Tuka's State visit. Shortly before 7 P. M., the Slovak Delegation was again on the Anhalter Bahnhof. With the German and foreign guests to bid them farewell, guards of honor to inspect, hands to shake or raise in Nazi salute, the parting ceremony was as imposing as the welcoming one. At 7:05 P. M., the special train with the Slovak Delegation left Berlin on its return journey to Vienna, where they arrived on November 26, at 10:54 A. M. The Slovak Parliament gave its approval to the Protocol of Accession to the Tripartite Pact on February 6, 1941(11). DISCUSSIONS The records of discussions between Ribbentrop and Tuka were not found. But it is possible to gauge their nature and content from numerous memoranda passed between Ribbentrop and his advisers shortly before Tuka's visit. Some of these memoranda are very sketchy, others go into great details. They deal with subjects which Tuka outlined to Consul-General Wuester (on November 11, 1940) as the topics he would like to discuss perisonally with Ribbentrop on the occasion of his State visit. And even if the discussions did not follow the proposed course exactly, they could not have departed far from it. These memoranda are thus of interest to every student of Slovak affairs. They certainly cast some light on the Slovak scene as it was set in November, 1940, and provide a �10 SLOVAKIA guileless cross-section of the Slovak political, economic, and cultural life. The problems were grouped under four headings and each division had further subsections. The same pattern will be followed in this study. The subject matter for discussion was to proceed along the following lines: A. Political Problems. 1. Internal Policy: Internally Slovakia was in the middle of a political crisis and Woermann and Killinger briefed Ribbentrop about its extent. They informed him that Tuka and Mach were working on the establishment of the Nazi system in Slovakia ("nazionalsozialistische Staatsfuehrung"), in the spirit of the Salzburg conversations. In this attempt they had to wage a struggle against the opposing forces centered around President Tiso. Tiso',s camp consisted of in Killinger's terminology - clericals, former :Durcansky hangers-on and four members of the government. Tuka demanded dismissal of these ministers, but Tiso ref used to comply with his request. Tuka then decided to fight it out with Tiso, and, according to Killinger, there were forces at work striving for a complete elimination of Tiso from the Slovak political life ( eine vollige Auschaltung Tisos aus dem politischen Leben"). In discussing this question with Tuka, Ribbentrop was advised to recommend that Tuka should apply his measures in such a way as not to affect the position of President Tiso. There was no objection to the eventual removal of the uncooperative ministers, but as far as Tiso was concerned, his removal would only deteriorate and not improve the internal situation in Slovakia. "Tiso" - runs Woermann's recommendation to Ribbentrop - "as Hlinka's successor and the co-founder of the Slovak State, is a very popular personality in Slovakia" ("eine durchhaus volkstuemliche Personlichkeit"), and, therefore, the elimination of the clerical influence should be carried out carefully and possibly by evolutionary means. The conversion of Slovakia into a Christian state according to Schusch- �SLOVAKIA 11 nigg's model ("Staendestatt'), as contemplated by Tiso and his friends, could be prevented even without the removal of Tiso. On the other hand Tuka should be commended for his fight for the Nazi reorientation of Slovakia. 2. Territorial demands: 'rhe second problem Tuka wanted to discuss was the territorial cession of the eastern part of the Protektorat to Slovakia (the region of Moravske Slovacko). In this respect several memoranda were passed to the German Foreign Ministry outlying the reason and justification of this demand. But the Germans were not happy about the proposition. Ribbentrop was advised to tell Tuka that the idea of the frontier rectification in favor of Slovakia could not be considered ("keine Folge gegeben werden koenne" ). 3. Slovak-Hungarian Relations: The Slovak-Hungarian relations were by far the most important point of the discussions. The Vienna Award by which Slovakia was forced to cede part of her territories to Hungary - was a source of constant Slovak grievances and was genuinely detested by all Slovaks, whether they were pro-Nazi, anti-Nazi, or just sitting on the fence. Tuka was convinced that the Salzburg conversations meant a step towards a more acceptable solution. At Salzburg (July 1940) Tiso wrenched from Ribbentrop a somewhat vague and non-committal promise that the question of the frontier rectification between Slovakia and Hungary though unsuitable for settlement at that time - cou~d be considered later ("dass in Augenblick nicht an die Regelung dieser Frage zu denken sei, dass vielleicht spaeter einmal der Augenblick kommen duerfe"). On the basis of this promise the Slovak Foreign Ministry forwarded to Berlin a number of Aide-Memoires, maps and statistical material and wanted them to be examined by the Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart. Tuka was to ask Ribbentrop for the official German attitude towards these Slovak requests. It was proposed to tell Tuka that the moment for the settlement of the disputed boundary issue was still inap- �12 SLOVAKIA propriate ("Es waere unzeitmaessig diese slowakische Ansprueche jetzt geltent zu machen"). With regard to the examination of the Slovak documentary material by the Auslandsinstitut in Stutgart - since the Germans did not want the Hungarians to get wind that something was going on - it was suggested that this request should be declined. Tuka should be told that the German Foreign Ministry would examine the pertinent Slovak material, but it did not think it expedient to pass such things on to the Auslandsinstitut. 4. Ruthene Question: Then there was the question of the Ruthene minority. This group, about 50,000 strong, was subjected to intense communistic propaganda inciting it to demand the same privileges as those granted to the German ethnic group. The solution of this question required a precarious balance in counteracting the communist propaganda without arousing the suspicions of being hostile towards the USSR which at that time was being courted by the Germans into joining the Tripartite Pact. Tuka was to be told that the Slovak Government would have to try to win the sympathies of the Ruthenes even if it involved the offer of a guarantee of cultural autonomy. But the communist intrigues would have to be suppressed just the same ("Kommunistische Umtriebe unter ihnen waeren zu unterdruecken") . 5. Attitude towards the Croats: It was expected that Tuka, who had just learned about the German attitude towards the Croats, would make an offer to influence the Croats through Slovak propaganda. It was suggested that his declaration should be merely noted and any discussion of his proposal should be declined. B. Economic Problems: The economic topics for the discussions are of equal importance. In spite, or, perhaps because of the war, the Slovak economy was developing very favorably. The Ger- �SLOVAKIA 13 mans were taking 75 per cent of Slovak exports and, contrary to the general belief, were providing valuable expert and material assistance. Nevertheless, there were points of friction even in this sphere, especially with regard to the direction in which the development should proceed. The Germans pressed for projects like the improved facilities of the Bratislava Danube harbor, raising of the level of agricultural economy, erection of family houses for workers, etc., whereas the Slovaks were for industrial development, new factories, improved local communications, etc. At the time of Tuka's visit the Slovak grievances concerned the price increases, tourist trade, and employment of Czech skilled workers. 1. Price Question: The Slovak government was afraid that the price increases might create unwanted social reactions which, in turn, could be exploited by the communists. But the Germans maintained that, since rising prices were a general phenomenon in all Southeast Europe, and also in the Protektorat whose economy was closely bound with Slovakia's, it was desirable for them to go up in Slovakia as well. It was proposed to point out to Tuka that the price increases would, in the long run, increase Slovakia's national income through expansion in exports to Germany and through the wage transfer of the 80,000 Slovak laborers working there. The Germans would try to mitigate the effect of price increases by such measures, for example, as lowering the prices of goods imported from the Protektorat. Likewise - in spite of the recent increases in the price of coal - the export prices of German coal delivered to Slovakia were not increased, but were retained at the level fixed in April, 1940, and would stay there. 2. Tourist Trade: in the mater of the Slovak complaint concerning the rapid decrease in the tourist trade, it was to be stated that there was not much the Germans could do about it. It was, however, to be expected that after the war Slovakia would enjoy an unprecedented tourist activity. �14 SLOVAKIA 3. Employment of Czech Workers: For Tuka this represented another thorny problem. There were still many Czechs working in industrial establishments in Slovakia, mainly as skilled workers. Tuka pressed for their removal, since he saw in them a constant element of unrest ("Unruheherde"). The Germans promised to cooperate, saying that some Czechs had already been transferred. RilJbentrop, however, would have to advise Tuka that those Czechs working in the armament industry could be removed only when satisfactory replacements by skilled Slovak workers had been found. C. Resettlement Problems: 1. Czechs in Slovakia: Tuka strove to rid Slovakia of all Czechs (approximat ely 25,000 in number), as well as t o bring bac 1c to Slovakia all Slovaks living in the Protektorat. Since the negotiations ("Auseinandersetzungverhandlungen") with the Germans were ominously dragging on, Tuka wanted to ask Ribbentrop about the German view on the matter. Ribbentrop was advised to instruct Tuka that the proposal would be examined in due time, but, on the other hand, not to give any prospect for fulfillment of this wish ("Keine Aussicht auf Erfuellung des Wuensches za machen" ). 2. Slovaks in the German POW Camps: After the military collapse of France, several unfortunate Slovaks found themselves as POWs in German captivity. In most cases they were Slovak workers from Paris and from the Northern French coalfields who were mobilized into "Czecho-Slovak" army units to fight for the restoration of the defunct Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Slovak Foreign Ministry had been demanding their release since the end of the Franco-German hostilities, but the German authorities were not very quick in answering. Tuka was to be assured that their release was pending. 3. Slovaks in France: With equal commendable zeal the Slovak Government �SLOVAKIA 15 tried to obtain the release of all Slovaks in the French Army Service, in both occupied and unoccupied France, and pleaded for the repatriation of those who desired it. Tuka was to be told that the Germans looked upon the request with understanding and would give it their support. D. Cultural and Other Problems: In the cultural field there was complete satisfaction on both sides. The Slovak-German cultural relations were very friendly and prepartions for the signing of a Cultural Agreement ("Kultur-Abkomm en") were on the way. Similarly there were no complaints about the treatment of the German ethnic group in Slovakia. IV CONCLUSION Looking at the event after almost 20 years' interval, when one has the benefit of seeing what was back of the German mind, and when one knows all the answers to what were then the annoying questions of the day, it is only too easy to be critical, cynical, or even malicious. Was Tuka really the villain of the drama? Was he really responsible for all subsequent Slovak misfortunes? Was his signature on the Protocol the death-warrant of the Slovak State as some of his critics want us to believe? Or, was he just an innocent victim of circumstances from which there was no way out? Did he merely carry out the inevitable and inescapable steps to save the nation from a much worse disaster, as his admirers try to convince us? Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to either of these views. Tuka's personality was of a far more complex nature than to be an object of a clear-cut judgment. It would be futile and out of place to argue about this. However, to make the picture as complete as possible, it seems only just to add the following notes by way of a postscript. It is undeniable now, as it was conclusive then, that. the Tripartite Pact was directed against the USA (12) ,, where, as it happened, lived almost a third of the Slovak �16 SLOVAKIA nation. And there is no doubt about Tuka's willingness to have Slovakia bound to Germany lock, stock, and barrel. But the personal ambition of a sick man was not the only why and wherefore behind Tuka's move. There were also political motives and these were by no means insignificant: to gain for Slovakia an honorable place in the New Europe - which at that time was not just a remote phantasy; to ward off the Hungarian danger - as menacing and ubiquitous as ever. It is not always realized that the fear of being swallowed by Hungary had a hand not only at the birth of the Slovak State, but was present in the background of practically every action of subsequent Slovak foreign policy. The political and military situation - at the time of Slovakia's accession to the Pact - strongly favored the German position. Germany was the undisputed master of Europe, and with the USSR she had a Treaty of NonAggression. The USA was keeping out of the war and was likely to stay out. For Hitler and his gang "the war was already won." This thought, however, was not shared by all. There were many who did concede (though they have less courage to admit it now) that the war might finish in a draw Such a situation would have curbed Hitler's ambitions for world domination, but it would leave the nations of Central Europe at his mercy. And it is better to be left at the mercy of a benign than an irate master. Then the question arises as to what would have happened if Tuka "per impossiblile" would have chosen to resist German prompting and decided not to join the bloc. The problem may be highly academic, but the answer to it is less so. In fact, an eloquent reply was provided about three months after Slovakia's accession to the Pact by the adherence of Bulgaria. To the Western way of thinking, Bulgaria was the best of the bad satellites of Hitler. She saved most of her Jewish population from extermination, she did not declare war on the USSR (though the USSR found it expedient to declare war on her). In the face of German pressure she yielded the bare minimum - and this included the accession to the Pact. It is hardly to be expected that Slovak opposition could have been more ef- �SLOVAKIA 17 fective. With no friends and no guarantees in the West, Slovakia could not behave the way Yugoslavia did. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. W. Shirer: A Berlin Diary, Hamilton, London, 1941,. For the text of the Tripartite Pact see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, pp. 355-6, or Int. Affairs, 193946, Vol. III, OUP, 1954, pp. 81-82. C. A. Macartney: October Fifteenth, EdinJburgh Univ. Press, 1956, Vol. I, p. 439. The Hrungarians, went to Vienna, the Rumaniallls and Slovaks to Berlin. Other countries followed suit: Spain secretly in November 1940; Bulgaria on March 1, 1941; Yugoslavia on March 25, 194'1; Croatia, on June 115, 1941'. The USSR nearly joined the Pact, too (See Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 248--9, 258-9). Ciano's Diary 1939-43, Heinemann, London, 1947. Ent ry ·of November 20, 11)40: " ... I do not attach much importance to the adherence of these states (Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia) which are vassais of Germany, or almost so. In £act they weaken the Tripartite Agreement itseltf, and s,eem to be useless bits of ersatz diplomacy. " Auswartiges Amt, Buero St. Sekretaer, Besuch Tuka, 610/ 248742-818. 8. For the Delegation's "Who's Who" see Alppendix II. 9. "He (Antonescu) had bairely left Berlin . .. when Dr. Tuka, the Slovak Prime Minister, arrived to sign his counrtry's adhesion to the Pact. The document was ready and his signature was prompt" - Dipl. correspond,e nt of the London "Times". In fact, the s igning took place less than two and ·a halif hours after Tukas' arrival. 1-0. For the text of the Brotocol see Alppendix I. 11. Joseph Lettrich: History of Modern Slovakia, Atlantic Press, London, 1956, p. 167. 12. Ar.ticle 3 of the Pact runs: (The three Contracti!Ilg Parties) "further undertake to assist one another with all political, econemic and military means, if one of them is attacked by a Poweir at present not involved in the European war or in the Chiinese..Jarpanese conflict." This could have meant only the USA or the USSR. But Article 5 stated that the iterms of the Pact did not "in any way aifilieot the politica'l strutus which exists between each of the three Contraicting Parties and Soviet Russiia." APPENDIX I The Protocol of Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one hand, and the Government of Slovakia, on the other hand, represented by the signa,to:ries to the documenrt, declare as follows: 1. Slovakia joins the Tripartite Pact sig.n ed at Berlin on September 27, 1940. 2. As far as the joint technical commissions provided under Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact concern matters affecting Slovak �18 SLOVAKIA interests, Slovakia. will be represented ait the discussions of these committees. 3. The text o;f the Tr.iipartite Pact is atltached to the present Protocol, which is drawn up in the German, Italian, Japanese, and Slovak languages, each text to ha1Ve the validity of the original. The Protocol comes into effect on the da~ of signature . .AIPPENDIX II The Slovak Delegation - Who Was Who: Dr. Vojtech Tuka - Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign A1ff.airs. Born on July 4, 1880, at P.i-argy, Tuka was, before 1918, a Professor of Internationa,l Law at the then Hungarian University at Bratislava. After the first World Wa r he played a leading role in the Slovak autonomist movement of the Hlinka Party. Accused of treason by the Czech Brague, he wa•s involved in the notorious "Tuka Trial." On flimsy and rigged evid'ence he was found guiity of espiona•ge and p:l,,Oltting a,ga,inst the Repuiblic and sentenced to 15 years in ja11. After havi,ng been imprisoned at Pankrac in Prague for more than seven years, sick and nearly blind, he was pardoned by Presidental amnesty, and the remainder of his sentence he was to spend in custody at Plzen. Released in October, 1938, he pr-0mptly resumed his political activity. In the first Slovak independent goviermnent ~March 1J939) he became the deputy Prime Minister and laiter, after the retirement of Sidor. ,also the acting Minfater of Interior. On the election ·of Dr. Joseph Tiso as Presiident o:f Slovakia, Tuka became Brime Minister. Mter the Sal2Jburg Conference (July 1940) Tuka not only retained his post, but a'lso took over the Foreign Ministry. Tuka was executed by the Prague Government in Bratislava August 20, 1946. Slovak Minister in Berlin. A high school Matul Cernak teacher by profession, Cernak had a long record of continuous activity in the ranks of the Hlinka Party. In Septem,ber, 1<938, he was appointed a minister in the Czecho-Slovak Government. He immediately demanded autonomy for Slovakia. This not granted, he resigned in protest. In the first Sloviak autonomous governmenit he was given the post of the Ministry of Educaiti001 (October 11938) and in addition was entrusted with the lead,ership of the Youth Organization (Hlinka's Youth). Being openly for a complete secession, he was imprisoned by the Czechs (March 1939) and treated raither brutaUy. After the Declaration of Slovak Independence he was sent to Germany as the Slovak diplomatic representative. He was killed by a bomb sent through the mail in Munich, July 5, 1955. Karo• Murgal - Ohief of the Propaganda Bureau. A joumaHsit, Murga§ came into prominence in the hectic days of October 1938 Ma!l"Ch 1939. After the Salzburg Oond'eroo.ce· he was made the Chie!f of the Propaganda Bureau as the only suifable ohoice (h,e was the on1y person of irutelligence and aibility ready to toiw the German line). Ing. Jozef Mracna - Ohief of the Political Division of the Slovak Foreign Ministry. Mraona was born on February 21, 1900. He was a career diplomat of the Czooho..Slovak diplomatic service. At the time of the declaration of Slovak independence (March 1939) he was the Cze:cho..Slovak Consul in New York, but immediately offered his services to the Slovak State. Gifted, honest and exiperieru:ed, he was 1 �SLOVAKIA 19 the most caiplllble and authoritative personality in the Slovak Foreig111 Ministry, but later he became rather passive. He enjoyed Tuka's full confidence and in return was his loyal, but not uncritica'l, co-worker. ,or. Raduz Radlinsky - Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol at the Slovak Foreign Miinistry. Former employee of the Czecho-61ovak Foreign Ministry, where he held a minor position in the Protocol. On the basis of this activity he was entrusted with the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol in Bratislava. '11he Germans constantly objected to his position. Lieutenant-Colonel ~tefan Tata.rko Military Aittache at the Slovak Legaition in Berlin. A professional soldier of some ability, Tatarko created practically out of nothing the Sfovak Military Secret Service. Later he was apointed military -atta:che to Berlin. Ait one time he was not trusted by the Germans because of his in:cautiously expressed d'oulbts about final German vietory. But he must have corrected himself, because later he was promoted to the Chief of Cabinet at the Slovak Ministry of defense. Jan Belnay - Commercial Atta:che at the Slovak Legation in Berlin. He was born on Oct-Ober 23, 1900. Mosit of his study-years (in Chemistry) were spent in Germany, the remainder in Prague. He worked at the Czecho-Slovak Economic Academy, a111d Ia1ter at the Czecho-Slovak EX1pOrt Institute. In MaTCh, 11939, he joined the staff of the Slovak Foreign Ministry and s·oon was appointed a commercial attaohe to Berlin. His professional eicperien:ce and fluent knowledge of German served him in good stead and in 1941 he was promoted to the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. Jan Farkal - Tuka's Adjutant . .A,s a comparnion in T~a's tribulations (he figured in the "Tuka Trial") Fark'as claimed also a share in Tuka's honors. He devoutly followed Tuka's footsteps and parroted his pronoun:cements aholllt the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, but was not particularly giiited to make a higher grade. A,t one stage Tuka insisted on his appointment as a Minister of Finance, but was rebuff.ed. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Since, in the new situation, it was impossilble to coHa-borate oifficiaHy with the Soviet Union, we . . . d~d nothing which might prejudike or ipre.vent the removal of co-operation at the earliest posstble moment; I need 0I11ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves rund important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London. 1944. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 6 SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT Fnmcis Vnuk On September 27, 1940, at the New Chancellery in Berlin, the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact was signed. "The ceremony of signing" - noted Shirer "was carried through with typical Axis talent for the theatrical." (1) The German and satellite press greeted the occasion as an event of far-reaching importance, a "Magna Charta" of the New Order, which was going to bring about exactly what had been promised in the preamble to the Pact, namely, "world peace" . . . and "prosperity and welfare of the peoples" in Europe and Greater East Asia(2). After the ceremonial signing, Hitler entered the hall to honor the occasion by his presence. Then followed the adulatory speeches of Ribbentrop, Ciano, and Kurusu. In the course of his speech Ribbentrop stated: "The purpose of the Pact is, a:bove an things, to help restore peace to the world as quickly as possible. Therefore, any otherstate, which wishes to adhere to this bloc with the intention of contributing to the restoration of peaceful conditions, will be sincerely and gratefully made welcome and will participate in the economic and political reorganization" (3) In response to this rather blunt hint, the nations of Central Europe, tied to Germany by geopolitical conditions, duly applied for admittance. Hungary was the first in the field, the others following her more or less reluctantly. It was clear to the 'Slovaks and Rumanians that they could not afford to stand aside, even if they wished. They had to rank at least as high in Hitler's esteem as Hungary which still hrad unfulfilled territorial claims against them. And thus towards the end of November, 1940, Hungarian, Rumanian, and Slovak delegations in close succession went to Vienna or Berlin ( 4) to sign the Protocol of adherence to the Tripartitie Pact. Hungary did so on the 20th, Rumania on the 22nd, and Slovakia on the 24th of November, 1940(5). Slovakia's accession to the Tripartite Pact followed the proclamation of the "spiritual adherence" a few weeks SLOVAKIA 7 previously. Though Ciano sneered at the event as "a useless bit of ersatz diplomacy" (6) , the Germans made it into a spectacular State visit which was arranged for Tuka and his entourage. State visits had a strange fascination for Turoa. Nothing appealed to him more than to be a centre of attention, surrounded by high officials, and facing the flashlights of official photographers and reporters. He did not -conceal his disappointment when the Germans advised him against his proposed visit to Rumania, or when the Italians asked him to postpone his offered visit of Italy till "after the war." The signing of the Protocol of Accession enabled him to taste the cherished moments of ceremonial courtesies and at the same time to demonstrate his devotion to Germany. Apart from these rather personal considerations, there were also quite a few important political, economic, and cultural problems to be discussed, new poUcies outlined, and achievements and failures reported. SIGNATURES The German preparations for Tuka's State visit were very detailed and thorough. Tuka was to be received with all the honors and courtesies due to the head of a friendly government. In the captured documents of the former German Foreign Ministry, there is a special file (7) dealing exclusively with various aspects of the visit and this is the principal source of all relevant information. The Slov,ak delegation(8), which consisted of Tuka, Murgas, Mracna, Radlinsky and Farkas, left Bratislava by auto on the afternoon of November 23, 1940. They crossed the bridge to Petrfalka and proceeded to Vienna where ,a special train was awaiting them. The reception there was very austere. There were no guards of honor to inspect, no speeches of welcome; just one representative of the Protocol to accompany them on their night journey to Berlin. '.Dhe train left West Bahnhof at 7:32 P. M. and took them through Linz, Passau, Regensburg, Hof, and Leipzig to the Anhalter Bahnhof, Berlin, where they arrived on Sunday morning at 10 :40 A. M. - just 20 minutes after the Rumanian delegation, its mission accomplished, left Berlin on its return journey (9). 8 SLOVAKIA At the Anhalter Bahnhof everything was pompous, well-organized, and impressive. Welcoming personalities were grouped in four parties. The first party, headed by the Slovak charge d'affaires, consisted of foreign diploma:ts ·and the heads of missions in Berlin. Specially invited German representatives of the Party and the Army were in the second, the members of the Slovak Legation in the third, and the personnel of the German Foreign Ministry in the fourth group. Tuka, as he alighted from his salon-car, was welcomed by Ribbentrop and Matthew Cernak, and introduced by them to the other members of the welcoming parties on the platform. Then followed the inspection of the Guard of Honor. Tuka, in the uniform of the Hlinka Guards and accompanied by Ribbentrop, was trying his unsoldierly best to make his gait and mien look soldier-like. From the station the procession of cars went to Schloss Bellevue which was going to be Tuka's residence during his two-day stay in Berlin. There he was welcomed by Meissner who acted as master of the house (Hausherr). At 11 :30 Tuka paid a visit to Ribbentrop at the latter's office, 73 Wilhelmstrasse, where they spent about an hour in discussion. The great moment came at 1:00 P. M. In the Grand Reception Hall of the New Chancellery stood a huge massive signature table. The representatives of the Press had already taken their places: the foreign correspondents at the window-side, the Germans at the door. At 12:58 P. M., the great door opened and an impressive procession entered. It was led by the Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. He was followed by Tuka and Ribbentrop, the Japanese Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, the Hungarian and Rumanian Ministers, State Secretary Weizsaecker, and State Under-Secretary Gaus. Ribbentrop sat at the center of the table, Tuka at his right and, next to him, the Italian Ambassador and the Rumanian Minister. At Ribbentrop's left were seated the Japanese Ambassador and the Hungarian Minister. Everything went without a hitch like a well-rehearsed drama. The Protocol of Accession (10) was signed amidst SLOVAKIA 9 the flashes of light and rustle of reporter's notebooks, short speeches were solemnly read out and courteous applause resounded in the spacious hall. In the afternoon Ribbentrop gave a reception at the Hotel Adlon for the Slovak Delegation and the members of the Slovak Legation in Berlin. In the morning of the next day (Monday, November 25) Tuka took part in the wreath-laying ceremony at the Ehrenmahl (The War Memorial at the famous Unter den Linden). Another reception was given by Cernak in the afternoon at the Hotel Esplanade. At 5:30 P. M. Tuka had his great and memorable moment. He was taken to the Work Room of the New Chancellery where he was received by Hitler. That was the climax of Tuka's State visit. Shortly before 7 P. M., the Slovak Delegation was again on the Anhalter Bahnhof. With the German and foreign guests to bid them farewell, guards of honor to inspect, hands to shake or raise in Nazi salute, the parting ceremony was as imposing as the welcoming one. At 7:05 P. M., the special train with the Slovak Delegation left Berlin on its return journey to Vienna, where they arrived on November 26, at 10:54 A. M. The Slovak Parliament gave its approval to the Protocol of Accession to the Tripartite Pact on February 6, 1941(11). DISCUSSIONS The records of discussions between Ribbentrop and Tuka were not found. But it is possible to gauge their nature and content from numerous memoranda passed between Ribbentrop and his advisers shortly before Tuka's visit. Some of these memoranda are very sketchy, others go into great details. They deal with subjects which Tuka outlined to Consul-General Wuester (on November 11, 1940) as the topics he would like to discuss perisonally with Ribbentrop on the occasion of his State visit. And even if the discussions did not follow the proposed course exactly, they could not have departed far from it. These memoranda are thus of interest to every student of Slovak affairs. They certainly cast some light on the Slovak scene as it was set in November, 1940, and provide a 10 SLOVAKIA guileless cross-section of the Slovak political, economic, and cultural life. The problems were grouped under four headings and each division had further subsections. The same pattern will be followed in this study. The subject matter for discussion was to proceed along the following lines: A. Political Problems. 1. Internal Policy: Internally Slovakia was in the middle of a political crisis and Woermann and Killinger briefed Ribbentrop about its extent. They informed him that Tuka and Mach were working on the establishment of the Nazi system in Slovakia ("nazionalsozialistische Staatsfuehrung"), in the spirit of the Salzburg conversations. In this attempt they had to wage a struggle against the opposing forces centered around President Tiso. Tiso',s camp consisted of in Killinger's terminology - clericals, former :Durcansky hangers-on and four members of the government. Tuka demanded dismissal of these ministers, but Tiso ref used to comply with his request. Tuka then decided to fight it out with Tiso, and, according to Killinger, there were forces at work striving for a complete elimination of Tiso from the Slovak political life ( eine vollige Auschaltung Tisos aus dem politischen Leben"). In discussing this question with Tuka, Ribbentrop was advised to recommend that Tuka should apply his measures in such a way as not to affect the position of President Tiso. There was no objection to the eventual removal of the uncooperative ministers, but as far as Tiso was concerned, his removal would only deteriorate and not improve the internal situation in Slovakia. "Tiso" - runs Woermann's recommendation to Ribbentrop - "as Hlinka's successor and the co-founder of the Slovak State, is a very popular personality in Slovakia" ("eine durchhaus volkstuemliche Personlichkeit"), and, therefore, the elimination of the clerical influence should be carried out carefully and possibly by evolutionary means. The conversion of Slovakia into a Christian state according to Schusch- SLOVAKIA 11 nigg's model ("Staendestatt'), as contemplated by Tiso and his friends, could be prevented even without the removal of Tiso. On the other hand Tuka should be commended for his fight for the Nazi reorientation of Slovakia. 2. Territorial demands: 'rhe second problem Tuka wanted to discuss was the territorial cession of the eastern part of the Protektorat to Slovakia (the region of Moravske Slovacko). In this respect several memoranda were passed to the German Foreign Ministry outlying the reason and justification of this demand. But the Germans were not happy about the proposition. Ribbentrop was advised to tell Tuka that the idea of the frontier rectification in favor of Slovakia could not be considered ("keine Folge gegeben werden koenne" ). 3. Slovak-Hungarian Relations: The Slovak-Hungarian relations were by far the most important point of the discussions. The Vienna Award by which Slovakia was forced to cede part of her territories to Hungary - was a source of constant Slovak grievances and was genuinely detested by all Slovaks, whether they were pro-Nazi, anti-Nazi, or just sitting on the fence. Tuka was convinced that the Salzburg conversations meant a step towards a more acceptable solution. At Salzburg (July 1940) Tiso wrenched from Ribbentrop a somewhat vague and non-committal promise that the question of the frontier rectification between Slovakia and Hungary though unsuitable for settlement at that time - cou~d be considered later ("dass in Augenblick nicht an die Regelung dieser Frage zu denken sei, dass vielleicht spaeter einmal der Augenblick kommen duerfe"). On the basis of this promise the Slovak Foreign Ministry forwarded to Berlin a number of Aide-Memoires, maps and statistical material and wanted them to be examined by the Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart. Tuka was to ask Ribbentrop for the official German attitude towards these Slovak requests. It was proposed to tell Tuka that the moment for the settlement of the disputed boundary issue was still inap- 12 SLOVAKIA propriate ("Es waere unzeitmaessig diese slowakische Ansprueche jetzt geltent zu machen"). With regard to the examination of the Slovak documentary material by the Auslandsinstitut in Stutgart - since the Germans did not want the Hungarians to get wind that something was going on - it was suggested that this request should be declined. Tuka should be told that the German Foreign Ministry would examine the pertinent Slovak material, but it did not think it expedient to pass such things on to the Auslandsinstitut. 4. Ruthene Question: Then there was the question of the Ruthene minority. This group, about 50,000 strong, was subjected to intense communistic propaganda inciting it to demand the same privileges as those granted to the German ethnic group. The solution of this question required a precarious balance in counteracting the communist propaganda without arousing the suspicions of being hostile towards the USSR which at that time was being courted by the Germans into joining the Tripartite Pact. Tuka was to be told that the Slovak Government would have to try to win the sympathies of the Ruthenes even if it involved the offer of a guarantee of cultural autonomy. But the communist intrigues would have to be suppressed just the same ("Kommunistische Umtriebe unter ihnen waeren zu unterdruecken") . 5. Attitude towards the Croats: It was expected that Tuka, who had just learned about the German attitude towards the Croats, would make an offer to influence the Croats through Slovak propaganda. It was suggested that his declaration should be merely noted and any discussion of his proposal should be declined. B. Economic Problems: The economic topics for the discussions are of equal importance. In spite, or, perhaps because of the war, the Slovak economy was developing very favorably. The Ger- SLOVAKIA 13 mans were taking 75 per cent of Slovak exports and, contrary to the general belief, were providing valuable expert and material assistance. Nevertheless, there were points of friction even in this sphere, especially with regard to the direction in which the development should proceed. The Germans pressed for projects like the improved facilities of the Bratislava Danube harbor, raising of the level of agricultural economy, erection of family houses for workers, etc., whereas the Slovaks were for industrial development, new factories, improved local communications, etc. At the time of Tuka's visit the Slovak grievances concerned the price increases, tourist trade, and employment of Czech skilled workers. 1. Price Question: The Slovak government was afraid that the price increases might create unwanted social reactions which, in turn, could be exploited by the communists. But the Germans maintained that, since rising prices were a general phenomenon in all Southeast Europe, and also in the Protektorat whose economy was closely bound with Slovakia's, it was desirable for them to go up in Slovakia as well. It was proposed to point out to Tuka that the price increases would, in the long run, increase Slovakia's national income through expansion in exports to Germany and through the wage transfer of the 80,000 Slovak laborers working there. The Germans would try to mitigate the effect of price increases by such measures, for example, as lowering the prices of goods imported from the Protektorat. Likewise - in spite of the recent increases in the price of coal - the export prices of German coal delivered to Slovakia were not increased, but were retained at the level fixed in April, 1940, and would stay there. 2. Tourist Trade: in the mater of the Slovak complaint concerning the rapid decrease in the tourist trade, it was to be stated that there was not much the Germans could do about it. It was, however, to be expected that after the war Slovakia would enjoy an unprecedented tourist activity. 14 SLOVAKIA 3. Employment of Czech Workers: For Tuka this represented another thorny problem. There were still many Czechs working in industrial establishments in Slovakia, mainly as skilled workers. Tuka pressed for their removal, since he saw in them a constant element of unrest ("Unruheherde"). The Germans promised to cooperate, saying that some Czechs had already been transferred. RilJbentrop, however, would have to advise Tuka that those Czechs working in the armament industry could be removed only when satisfactory replacements by skilled Slovak workers had been found. C. Resettlement Problems: 1. Czechs in Slovakia: Tuka strove to rid Slovakia of all Czechs (approximat ely 25,000 in number), as well as t o bring bac 1c to Slovakia all Slovaks living in the Protektorat. Since the negotiations ("Auseinandersetzungverhandlungen") with the Germans were ominously dragging on, Tuka wanted to ask Ribbentrop about the German view on the matter. Ribbentrop was advised to instruct Tuka that the proposal would be examined in due time, but, on the other hand, not to give any prospect for fulfillment of this wish ("Keine Aussicht auf Erfuellung des Wuensches za machen" ). 2. Slovaks in the German POW Camps: After the military collapse of France, several unfortunate Slovaks found themselves as POWs in German captivity. In most cases they were Slovak workers from Paris and from the Northern French coalfields who were mobilized into "Czecho-Slovak" army units to fight for the restoration of the defunct Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Slovak Foreign Ministry had been demanding their release since the end of the Franco-German hostilities, but the German authorities were not very quick in answering. Tuka was to be assured that their release was pending. 3. Slovaks in France: With equal commendable zeal the Slovak Government SLOVAKIA 15 tried to obtain the release of all Slovaks in the French Army Service, in both occupied and unoccupied France, and pleaded for the repatriation of those who desired it. Tuka was to be told that the Germans looked upon the request with understanding and would give it their support. D. Cultural and Other Problems: In the cultural field there was complete satisfaction on both sides. The Slovak-German cultural relations were very friendly and prepartions for the signing of a Cultural Agreement ("Kultur-Abkomm en") were on the way. Similarly there were no complaints about the treatment of the German ethnic group in Slovakia. IV CONCLUSION Looking at the event after almost 20 years' interval, when one has the benefit of seeing what was back of the German mind, and when one knows all the answers to what were then the annoying questions of the day, it is only too easy to be critical, cynical, or even malicious. Was Tuka really the villain of the drama? Was he really responsible for all subsequent Slovak misfortunes? Was his signature on the Protocol the death-warrant of the Slovak State as some of his critics want us to believe? Or, was he just an innocent victim of circumstances from which there was no way out? Did he merely carry out the inevitable and inescapable steps to save the nation from a much worse disaster, as his admirers try to convince us? Unfortunately there is no straightforward answer to either of these views. Tuka's personality was of a far more complex nature than to be an object of a clear-cut judgment. It would be futile and out of place to argue about this. However, to make the picture as complete as possible, it seems only just to add the following notes by way of a postscript. It is undeniable now, as it was conclusive then, that. the Tripartite Pact was directed against the USA (12) ,, where, as it happened, lived almost a third of the Slovak 16 SLOVAKIA nation. And there is no doubt about Tuka's willingness to have Slovakia bound to Germany lock, stock, and barrel. But the personal ambition of a sick man was not the only why and wherefore behind Tuka's move. There were also political motives and these were by no means insignificant: to gain for Slovakia an honorable place in the New Europe - which at that time was not just a remote phantasy; to ward off the Hungarian danger - as menacing and ubiquitous as ever. It is not always realized that the fear of being swallowed by Hungary had a hand not only at the birth of the Slovak State, but was present in the background of practically every action of subsequent Slovak foreign policy. The political and military situation - at the time of Slovakia's accession to the Pact - strongly favored the German position. Germany was the undisputed master of Europe, and with the USSR she had a Treaty of NonAggression. The USA was keeping out of the war and was likely to stay out. For Hitler and his gang "the war was already won." This thought, however, was not shared by all. There were many who did concede (though they have less courage to admit it now) that the war might finish in a draw Such a situation would have curbed Hitler's ambitions for world domination, but it would leave the nations of Central Europe at his mercy. And it is better to be left at the mercy of a benign than an irate master. Then the question arises as to what would have happened if Tuka "per impossiblile" would have chosen to resist German prompting and decided not to join the bloc. The problem may be highly academic, but the answer to it is less so. In fact, an eloquent reply was provided about three months after Slovakia's accession to the Pact by the adherence of Bulgaria. To the Western way of thinking, Bulgaria was the best of the bad satellites of Hitler. She saved most of her Jewish population from extermination, she did not declare war on the USSR (though the USSR found it expedient to declare war on her). In the face of German pressure she yielded the bare minimum - and this included the accession to the Pact. It is hardly to be expected that Slovak opposition could have been more ef- SLOVAKIA 17 fective. With no friends and no guarantees in the West, Slovakia could not behave the way Yugoslavia did. REFERENCES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. W. Shirer: A Berlin Diary, Hamilton, London, 1941,. For the text of the Tripartite Pact see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol. V, pp. 355-6, or Int. Affairs, 193946, Vol. III, OUP, 1954, pp. 81-82. C. A. Macartney: October Fifteenth, EdinJburgh Univ. Press, 1956, Vol. I, p. 439. The Hrungarians, went to Vienna, the Rumaniallls and Slovaks to Berlin. Other countries followed suit: Spain secretly in November 1940; Bulgaria on March 1, 1941; Yugoslavia on March 25, 194'1; Croatia, on June 115, 1941'. The USSR nearly joined the Pact, too (See Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 248--9, 258-9). Ciano's Diary 1939-43, Heinemann, London, 1947. Ent ry ·of November 20, 11)40: " ... I do not attach much importance to the adherence of these states (Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia) which are vassais of Germany, or almost so. In £act they weaken the Tripartite Agreement itseltf, and s,eem to be useless bits of ersatz diplomacy. " Auswartiges Amt, Buero St. Sekretaer, Besuch Tuka, 610/ 248742-818. 8. For the Delegation's "Who's Who" see Alppendix II. 9. "He (Antonescu) had bairely left Berlin . .. when Dr. Tuka, the Slovak Prime Minister, arrived to sign his counrtry's adhesion to the Pact. The document was ready and his signature was prompt" - Dipl. correspond,e nt of the London "Times". In fact, the s igning took place less than two and ·a halif hours after Tukas' arrival. 1-0. For the text of the Brotocol see Alppendix I. 11. Joseph Lettrich: History of Modern Slovakia, Atlantic Press, London, 1956, p. 167. 12. Ar.ticle 3 of the Pact runs: (The three Contracti!Ilg Parties) "further undertake to assist one another with all political, econemic and military means, if one of them is attacked by a Poweir at present not involved in the European war or in the Chiinese..Jarpanese conflict." This could have meant only the USA or the USSR. But Article 5 stated that the iterms of the Pact did not "in any way aifilieot the politica'l strutus which exists between each of the three Contraicting Parties and Soviet Russiia." APPENDIX I The Protocol of Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, on the one hand, and the Government of Slovakia, on the other hand, represented by the signa,to:ries to the documenrt, declare as follows: 1. Slovakia joins the Tripartite Pact sig.n ed at Berlin on September 27, 1940. 2. As far as the joint technical commissions provided under Article 4 of the Tripartite Pact concern matters affecting Slovak 18 SLOVAKIA interests, Slovakia. will be represented ait the discussions of these committees. 3. The text o;f the Tr.iipartite Pact is atltached to the present Protocol, which is drawn up in the German, Italian, Japanese, and Slovak languages, each text to ha1Ve the validity of the original. The Protocol comes into effect on the da~ of signature . .AIPPENDIX II The Slovak Delegation - Who Was Who: Dr. Vojtech Tuka - Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign A1ff.airs. Born on July 4, 1880, at P.i-argy, Tuka was, before 1918, a Professor of Internationa,l Law at the then Hungarian University at Bratislava. After the first World Wa r he played a leading role in the Slovak autonomist movement of the Hlinka Party. Accused of treason by the Czech Brague, he wa•s involved in the notorious "Tuka Trial." On flimsy and rigged evid'ence he was found guiity of espiona•ge and p:l,,Oltting a,ga,inst the Repuiblic and sentenced to 15 years in ja11. After havi,ng been imprisoned at Pankrac in Prague for more than seven years, sick and nearly blind, he was pardoned by Presidental amnesty, and the remainder of his sentence he was to spend in custody at Plzen. Released in October, 1938, he pr-0mptly resumed his political activity. In the first Slovak independent goviermnent ~March 1J939) he became the deputy Prime Minister and laiter, after the retirement of Sidor. ,also the acting Minfater of Interior. On the election ·of Dr. Joseph Tiso as Presiident o:f Slovakia, Tuka became Brime Minister. Mter the Sal2Jburg Conference (July 1940) Tuka not only retained his post, but a'lso took over the Foreign Ministry. Tuka was executed by the Prague Government in Bratislava August 20, 1946. Slovak Minister in Berlin. A high school Matul Cernak teacher by profession, Cernak had a long record of continuous activity in the ranks of the Hlinka Party. In Septem,ber, 1<938, he was appointed a minister in the Czecho-Slovak Government. He immediately demanded autonomy for Slovakia. This not granted, he resigned in protest. In the first Sloviak autonomous governmenit he was given the post of the Ministry of Educaiti001 (October 11938) and in addition was entrusted with the lead,ership of the Youth Organization (Hlinka's Youth). Being openly for a complete secession, he was imprisoned by the Czechs (March 1939) and treated raither brutaUy. After the Declaration of Slovak Independence he was sent to Germany as the Slovak diplomatic representative. He was killed by a bomb sent through the mail in Munich, July 5, 1955. Karo• Murgal - Ohief of the Propaganda Bureau. A joumaHsit, Murga§ came into prominence in the hectic days of October 1938 Ma!l"Ch 1939. After the Salzburg Oond'eroo.ce· he was made the Chie!f of the Propaganda Bureau as the only suifable ohoice (h,e was the on1y person of irutelligence and aibility ready to toiw the German line). Ing. Jozef Mracna - Ohief of the Political Division of the Slovak Foreign Ministry. Mraona was born on February 21, 1900. He was a career diplomat of the Czooho..Slovak diplomatic service. At the time of the declaration of Slovak independence (March 1939) he was the Cze:cho..Slovak Consul in New York, but immediately offered his services to the Slovak State. Gifted, honest and exiperieru:ed, he was 1 SLOVAKIA 19 the most caiplllble and authoritative personality in the Slovak Foreig111 Ministry, but later he became rather passive. He enjoyed Tuka's full confidence and in return was his loyal, but not uncritica'l, co-worker. ,or. Raduz Radlinsky - Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol at the Slovak Foreign Miinistry. Former employee of the Czecho-61ovak Foreign Ministry, where he held a minor position in the Protocol. On the basis of this activity he was entrusted with the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol in Bratislava. '11he Germans constantly objected to his position. Lieutenant-Colonel ~tefan Tata.rko Military Aittache at the Slovak Legaition in Berlin. A professional soldier of some ability, Tatarko created practically out of nothing the Sfovak Military Secret Service. Later he was apointed military -atta:che to Berlin. Ait one time he was not trusted by the Germans because of his in:cautiously expressed d'oulbts about final German vietory. But he must have corrected himself, because later he was promoted to the Chief of Cabinet at the Slovak Ministry of defense. Jan Belnay - Commercial Atta:che at the Slovak Legation in Berlin. He was born on Oct-Ober 23, 1900. Mosit of his study-years (in Chemistry) were spent in Germany, the remainder in Prague. He worked at the Czecho-Slovak Economic Academy, a111d Ia1ter at the Czecho-Slovak EX1pOrt Institute. In MaTCh, 11939, he joined the staff of the Slovak Foreign Ministry and s·oon was appointed a commercial attaohe to Berlin. His professional eicperien:ce and fluent knowledge of German served him in good stead and in 1941 he was promoted to the position of Chief of the Diplomatic Protocol. Jan Farkal - Tuka's Adjutant . .A,s a comparnion in T~a's tribulations (he figured in the "Tuka Trial") Fark'as claimed also a share in Tuka's honors. He devoutly followed Tuka's footsteps and parroted his pronoun:cements aholllt the introduction of Nazism into Slovakia, but was not particularly giiited to make a higher grade. A,t one stage Tuka insisted on his appointment as a Minister of Finance, but was rebuff.ed. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Since, in the new situation, it was impossilble to coHa-borate oifficiaHy with the Soviet Union, we . . . d~d nothing which might prejudike or ipre.vent the removal of co-operation at the earliest posstble moment; I need 0I11ly recall how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves rund important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND WEST, London. 1944.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia's Accession to the Tripartite Pact Description An account of the resource Francis Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 6-19 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5179b2412e512cdaa1ac666128e66c6f.pdf e623b1edf714b7b51719573ff1cdc264 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. IX JUNE-DECEMBER, 1959 NO. 5 (30) SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM Joseph Pauco In the past two years hundreds of American Slovaks visited Slovakia. They were not molested or harmed in any way; and no one was arrested or detained by the police that we know of. It is obvious that Prague wants visitors from America, because that means American DOLLARS. \Only two Slovak clergymen were allowed to visit Slovakia, though many more applied for visas but were refused them. The Czech Reds do not want Slovak Catholic priests from America to visit Slovakia. And most wellknown Slovak personalities in America, too, are persona no grata. They want to know too much about the plight of the Church in Slovakia, the condition of the Bishops and the cler• gy and the schools. I have talked with dozens of Americans of Slovak origin who have visited Slovakia. This report is based on these conversations. After World War n, a certain Slovak came to America to his father. '!'his year he was allowed to visit Slovakia. He had let his brothers and other relatives know that he was coming. So they waited for him at the station. And they waited and waited in the crowd for some time. H e did not recognize them, and they did not recognize him. "We had not seen each other for thirteen years," he related. "My brother and brother-in-law have changed beyond recognition." "My brother," he continued, "is younger than I, but today he looks older than our father. He has aged terribly; h e is wrinkled and gray. He is not the same man I said goodbye to in Slovakia thirteen years ago." What did he go through? They confiscated his property, as well as that of the other relatives. A nephew, a priest, is languishing somewhere in a concentration camp, while his two sisters members of a religious order are forced to work in the fields. The family is large and there is no money, or any way of earning it, that is, enough of it to k eep going. The spiritual and material property of these people is indescribable. No wonder the man aged prematurely! "During my stay in Slovakia," continued my fr i e n d, "not a single smile ever lit up the faces of my relatives. We all cried when my brother r elated what terrible things had transpired since the end of the war. And they all cry even when they eat a nd s leep." He met with his friends in the village. When h e lef-t them thirteen years ago, they were well off. Today they have nothing. All �2 SLOVAKIA must work in the kholkhoses. 1 ly." When this did not work out All are aging prematurely; all : very well, the 1Reds began to use are beggars today. "They walk I pressure. First on the wealthier In rags," said my friend, "like farmers, whom they labeled parasites, ~lood-sucker, and_ politithe gypsies used to long ago." d . cal unrel!ables. After their holdd f It .. so epresse m ings were diminished "by law," I never e all my life," he continued. "These the Reds began to work on the people have virtually lost all faith small farmers. They gave them in themselves. In their great fear a "choice": either to give up and sorrow th ey care for no th ing; their own farms and work on the nothing interests them. They pray kholkhoses, or to lose everything constantly, and it is prayer that and work the same amount ot k eeps them from despairing. I acreage somewhere else. In the certainly would not want to live end the en ti re community is in Slovakia today," concluded my changed. The farmers have nofriend. thing left but a garden which Farmers in Slovakia are losing cannot sustain the family. People their land. 'I'he Czech Communist get paid for working in the kholState is confiscating it system- khoses. Not in money, but in atically. The S tat e now owns "units." A unit is worth 6 crowns most of the farmers and their (86 cents) and three kilograms farms. The farmers, sooner or (6.6 lbs.) of grain. But to earn later, are forced to join the khol- this unit, the kholkhose slave khose system or they lose every- must, for example, cultivate cuthing. In the end they do lose cumbers or tobacco six hour!!. everythtng. Here is the story as The value of the "unit" is figured told by an American with a bro- otherwise for different jobs. ther in Slovakia, who "voluntariKholkhose guards are also paid ly" joined the collective farm in units. Daily they get one and system. a half units, that is, 9 crowns My brother owned 12 hectares ($1.28) and 4.50 kilograms (9.90 of land (29.64 acres). He was ob- lbs.) of grain. But the guard not liged to give the government an- cnly watches and supervises, but nually 2,640 lbs. of beef, 1,000 also must work. lbs. of pork, 8,360 lbs. of grain, A farmer's cow is worth 110 350 eggs, and 2,500 liters of milk. units to the State, that is, he If the season was dry and crops must pay with his work 666 were poor, or the animals gob crowns ($95.14) and give 330 kisick and died, the farmer was lograms (726 lbs. of grain. This lost. He had no mo n e y with means that a farmer must buy which to buy grain, meat, eggs, his own cow annually or else or milk. And even if he had lose It. In the summer the cows money, he could not buy any- have a common pasture; in the thing, because the other farmers, winter they are fed from the too, had to surrender their pro- kholkhoses. A milker has to take ducts. What could he do but sur- care of 16 cows. He milks the render his land to the State? cows by hand three times daily. 'I'o get the farmers to join the Everything is systematized. Each kholkhose system, the Reds pro- person works in his own departmised just about everything to ment only. With a whip over his h ave the farmers join "voluntarl- head at all times. People must I �SLOVAKIA 3 work Sundays, too, so that the I are now administe red by orthoReds can show that they comple- : dox clergyme n from Russia and tely control the "reaction ary pea- : Bohemia the Slovak Greek Cathsants," who have always been olics (Byzantin e Rite) attend faithful to God and to their Roman Catholic churches even if nation. 'I'oday practicall y every- I they have to walk ~iles to get thing is owned by the State - . to one. The Catholics are bebusiness, industry, bakeries, bu- ' coming thus more united in suftcher shops, drugstore s, farms, fering and in their opposition to and even the doctors. Everythin g the Reds. When I asked recent visitors is owned by all the people. "Everything is ours, but only to look to Slovakia how fares it with the at," is what the people say in schools there, I was told that the teachers must sign a statemen t Slovakia. that they have r enounced the * * * I asked several Am erican Slo- Catholic Faith or else they lose vaks who had visited Slovakia their positions. "The future ot 1 recently, how the Church fared I Communi sm," the Reds keep on in Slovakia and how the priests j bellowing , "depends on th e trainwere treated. I was told that ing of our youth." And God and many priests still are in jail and ! religion must be eradicated from that those who are not are under the h ear ts and minds of all strict police control. The Czech youngster s no matter what the Red secret police and their a- cost, according to the Reds. 'I'he Slovaks feel that they have gents shadow every cle~gyman . 1 then ~sked about the priests who been .forsaken by all except God. had signed the governme nt proturn constantly for . A c- To Him they . . regar d t o "C a th o11c gram m th at anot~er w~r pvaymg help, refused had who tion," and those soon breaks . • . . out. Yes, m their t o sign 1•t . Th e num b er o f th ose to the o- 1great afflict10n they are beggmg led ed lo alt who bewar, another allow to . . g · God Y Y g P R d f I th t th th vernment program was negligible . s e e a ee ey About half of the latter have c~use never let up unless they are will . t . th d tt d 1 0 n. beat up. The Slovaks are now eir ~ c a 1rea Y regre e Those who refused to sign have hardened and determine d to fight. th to live a hell on ear . The They tried to help the Magyars Communi sts spread malicious ru• 1956, but mors about them to turn their when they revolted inthem with Red Prague stopped parishion ers against them. Where its armies. If America or the remain churches that happens the West had come to the aid of the empty and then the Reds chase Magyars at that time, the Slothe priests to the labor camps, vaks over there say that they, saying that they have nothing to the Poles, Ukrainian s, Rumanian s, do in the parish. Of course, Sun- and the other behind the Iron days mean nothing to the Reds. Curtain would also have ma.de a People must devote Sundays to bid for freedom - and the situaput time in the "work brigades." tion today in central and eastern This means that people cannot Europe would be different that go to church - and in turn "the it is. They still ask why America. priest has nothing to do!" This and the West did not help. And in time will have telling effects. if they did not help in 1956, what Since the Greek Catholic churches are the chances of help from I �4 SLOVAKIA America and the West the next · clothes from America? They were time some nation makes a bid getting quite a bit of help from to burst from its Red chains? American relatives at first, but Who has the heart to tell them · since "Care" was proscribed and that America and the West have the government has taken over decided on a policy of "peace- everything, little is coming in, ful coexistence"? Of course, not because of exorbitant taxes or Radio Free Europe or the Voice ' customs d!!ty. A headkerchief of America - but the Reds will, j (babuska) from America for e>..and they did tell them: "Don't ample, is taxed 50 crowns ($7.15), expect any help from the Ameri- and other articles of wear as can imperiali~ts. Comrade Nikita ! high as 200 crowns per kilogram! Khruschchev 1s the only one now that can help. Stick by him!" A Slovak lady, who had visited I Slovakia recently, told of her sur* '~ * prise when she b o ugh t some How about the cost of living meat at a butcher shop and some in Slovakia? Terribly high._ Break- buns at a bakery. The clerk fast a very small piece ot would not wrap the merchandise. butter, a little jam, two pieces When she asked for wrapping of bread and a cup of coffee - paper, she was told to bring her come to 12 crowns (7 crowns own next time or wrap her stuff one dollar). Lunch pork and in an apron. sauerkraut, bread, and a small beer - adds up to 17.50 crowns. How about buying an auto in A kilogram (2.2 lbs.) of tomatoes Slovakia? Well, they are offered - 12 crowns; 3 lbs. of bread for sale, but not for everybody 8 crowns - a liter of vodka or anybody. The prices are ex80 crowns; a liter of rum 96 orbitant, but then it's not so easy crowns; a kilogram of sugar to get one even if one has the 10.20; poor quality sausage - 25 cash. A reguest form for an auto crowns per kilogram; better qua- must first be filled out and sent lity - 80 crowns; women's dress to the proper authorities. It may mater i a 1 400 crowns (per take up to three years to get an dress) and to sew same another answer. ~ut that does not mean 300 crowns; men's suits - 1,200 1 that one 1s ready to get the auto. crowns; work shoes 200, and 'I'he reply usually tells the apdress shoes - 380 crowns. There , plicant what further steps he are cheaper shoes, but they last . must take. only about 2-3 weeks of conti- j It's the same thing, my informnuous wear'. the better shoes ant tells me, with building one's last about six months. h ome. F' · • 1rs t h e mus t ge t perm1sThus a person must work two sion to build; then he waits till weeks to buy poor clothes. Facto- I he gets an approval for the nery workers are a bit better off. ! cessary material. He may ask for But even an expert or techni- ' a certain kin~ of material and cian does not make more than get another kmd. 1,400 crowns per month. A tractor man gets 1,200 crowns per "Y~~ know ,"_ my informer told month. A commander of the Na- · me, m Slovakia they have plenty tional Security is no better off. II of everything poverty, fear, jails, drudgery except money How about getting food and and fabricated materials. Many I I I I = -1 I i I I �SLOVAKIA times I could not even buy matches in a Slovak village. .And when I walked into a store and asked what they had to sell, one 'comrade' replied sourly: 'Don't ask what we have, but what we don't have!'" 5 low shadowing me for several days. When I entered the home of my aunt, the man slipped out of sight. The next morning he reappeared again. On this occasion he approached me and said: * * * "Pardon me, but I think you Visitors to Slovakia are gene- are looking for the home of your friend 's mother, not - the friend rally surprised at the excessive that lives in the same town in drinking of the ordinary folks. America that you do? Well, his " I visited five communities," a mother lives over there." friend of mine told me after returning from Slovakia, " but the "Surprised? Of course, I was," drinking problem is the same in continued Janko. "I had told no all of them, and, I suppose, in all one that I was going to visit my of Slovakia." The Slovaks drink friend 's mother, because he had not because they are well off, asked me not to, since he was but because they are suffering a public official. But the shadow extreme hardships. It seems that evidently knew whom I would the people there are trying to probably visit in that particular drink their hapless lot away. village! When I visited some re"But the stuH they are drinking," latives and friends in another added my friend, "is t e r r i b I e town, I was shadowed again." stuff, poison that most people themselves make clandestinely. Another American visitor viPerhaps it is worse than the worst moonshine ever made in sited the pastor of the parish to America." The clergy are doing which his relatives belong. "How their best to convince the people are you, Father?" he asked. "Oh, not to drink, but to little avail. I'm getting along fine, thank you. :',,lore than on e priest told me So fine, in fact, that things could that the situation is worsening hardly be better. And briefly, let me tell you how fine: with the years. "Last Sunday I gave a sermon Shadowing visitors is common and then celebrated Holy -Mass. in Slovakia. I learned from sev- .As 1 left the church, a welleral friends who recently visited known Communist olll!icial apSlovakia that the secret police proached me and asked me to of any district know who is com- repeat the sermon I gave since ing from where into the area. he did not have time to attend My friend, let's call him Janko church, because, he said, he want(John), recently visited his re- ed to be edified. latives, and he had quite a few of them. ".As I left the home of "Yes, he did want to learn one of my relatives for the home something. He wanted to hear of another," said Janko, "I be- from my own lips what I had came a w a r e of the fact that ' said so that he could check this somebody was following me. Well, with the report that would be the first time it did not bother brought to him by his own stoome. But I noticed the same fel- \ ges 1 " concluded the priest. I � SLOVAKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. IX JUNE-DECEMBER, 1959 NO. 5 (30) SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM Joseph Pauco In the past two years hundreds of American Slovaks visited Slovakia. They were not molested or harmed in any way; and no one was arrested or detained by the police that we know of. It is obvious that Prague wants visitors from America, because that means American DOLLARS. \Only two Slovak clergymen were allowed to visit Slovakia, though many more applied for visas but were refused them. The Czech Reds do not want Slovak Catholic priests from America to visit Slovakia. And most wellknown Slovak personalities in America, too, are persona no grata. They want to know too much about the plight of the Church in Slovakia, the condition of the Bishops and the cler• gy and the schools. I have talked with dozens of Americans of Slovak origin who have visited Slovakia. This report is based on these conversations. After World War n, a certain Slovak came to America to his father. '!'his year he was allowed to visit Slovakia. He had let his brothers and other relatives know that he was coming. So they waited for him at the station. And they waited and waited in the crowd for some time. H e did not recognize them, and they did not recognize him. "We had not seen each other for thirteen years," he related. "My brother and brother-in-law have changed beyond recognition." "My brother," he continued, "is younger than I, but today he looks older than our father. He has aged terribly; h e is wrinkled and gray. He is not the same man I said goodbye to in Slovakia thirteen years ago." What did he go through? They confiscated his property, as well as that of the other relatives. A nephew, a priest, is languishing somewhere in a concentration camp, while his two sisters members of a religious order are forced to work in the fields. The family is large and there is no money, or any way of earning it, that is, enough of it to k eep going. The spiritual and material property of these people is indescribable. No wonder the man aged prematurely! "During my stay in Slovakia," continued my fr i e n d, "not a single smile ever lit up the faces of my relatives. We all cried when my brother r elated what terrible things had transpired since the end of the war. And they all cry even when they eat a nd s leep." He met with his friends in the village. When h e lef-t them thirteen years ago, they were well off. Today they have nothing. All �2 SLOVAKIA must work in the kholkhoses. 1 ly." When this did not work out All are aging prematurely; all : very well, the 1Reds began to use are beggars today. "They walk I pressure. First on the wealthier In rags," said my friend, "like farmers, whom they labeled parasites, ~lood-sucker, and_ politithe gypsies used to long ago." d . cal unrel!ables. After their holdd f It .. so epresse m ings were diminished "by law," I never e all my life," he continued. "These the Reds began to work on the people have virtually lost all faith small farmers. They gave them in themselves. In their great fear a "choice": either to give up and sorrow th ey care for no th ing; their own farms and work on the nothing interests them. They pray kholkhoses, or to lose everything constantly, and it is prayer that and work the same amount ot k eeps them from despairing. I acreage somewhere else. In the certainly would not want to live end the en ti re community is in Slovakia today," concluded my changed. The farmers have nofriend. thing left but a garden which Farmers in Slovakia are losing cannot sustain the family. People their land. 'I'he Czech Communist get paid for working in the kholState is confiscating it system- khoses. Not in money, but in atically. The S tat e now owns "units." A unit is worth 6 crowns most of the farmers and their (86 cents) and three kilograms farms. The farmers, sooner or (6.6 lbs.) of grain. But to earn later, are forced to join the khol- this unit, the kholkhose slave khose system or they lose every- must, for example, cultivate cuthing. In the end they do lose cumbers or tobacco six hour!!. everythtng. Here is the story as The value of the "unit" is figured told by an American with a bro- otherwise for different jobs. ther in Slovakia, who "voluntariKholkhose guards are also paid ly" joined the collective farm in units. Daily they get one and system. a half units, that is, 9 crowns My brother owned 12 hectares ($1.28) and 4.50 kilograms (9.90 of land (29.64 acres). He was ob- lbs.) of grain. But the guard not liged to give the government an- cnly watches and supervises, but nually 2,640 lbs. of beef, 1,000 also must work. lbs. of pork, 8,360 lbs. of grain, A farmer's cow is worth 110 350 eggs, and 2,500 liters of milk. units to the State, that is, he If the season was dry and crops must pay with his work 666 were poor, or the animals gob crowns ($95.14) and give 330 kisick and died, the farmer was lograms (726 lbs. of grain. This lost. He had no mo n e y with means that a farmer must buy which to buy grain, meat, eggs, his own cow annually or else or milk. And even if he had lose It. In the summer the cows money, he could not buy any- have a common pasture; in the thing, because the other farmers, winter they are fed from the too, had to surrender their pro- kholkhoses. A milker has to take ducts. What could he do but sur- care of 16 cows. He milks the render his land to the State? cows by hand three times daily. 'I'o get the farmers to join the Everything is systematized. Each kholkhose system, the Reds pro- person works in his own departmised just about everything to ment only. With a whip over his h ave the farmers join "voluntarl- head at all times. People must I �SLOVAKIA 3 work Sundays, too, so that the I are now administe red by orthoReds can show that they comple- : dox clergyme n from Russia and tely control the "reaction ary pea- : Bohemia the Slovak Greek Cathsants," who have always been olics (Byzantin e Rite) attend faithful to God and to their Roman Catholic churches even if nation. 'I'oday practicall y every- I they have to walk ~iles to get thing is owned by the State - . to one. The Catholics are bebusiness, industry, bakeries, bu- ' coming thus more united in suftcher shops, drugstore s, farms, fering and in their opposition to and even the doctors. Everythin g the Reds. When I asked recent visitors is owned by all the people. "Everything is ours, but only to look to Slovakia how fares it with the at," is what the people say in schools there, I was told that the teachers must sign a statemen t Slovakia. that they have r enounced the * * * I asked several Am erican Slo- Catholic Faith or else they lose vaks who had visited Slovakia their positions. "The future ot 1 recently, how the Church fared I Communi sm," the Reds keep on in Slovakia and how the priests j bellowing , "depends on th e trainwere treated. I was told that ing of our youth." And God and many priests still are in jail and ! religion must be eradicated from that those who are not are under the h ear ts and minds of all strict police control. The Czech youngster s no matter what the Red secret police and their a- cost, according to the Reds. 'I'he Slovaks feel that they have gents shadow every cle~gyman . 1 then ~sked about the priests who been .forsaken by all except God. had signed the governme nt proturn constantly for . A c- To Him they . . regar d t o "C a th o11c gram m th at anot~er w~r pvaymg help, refused had who tion," and those soon breaks . • . . out. Yes, m their t o sign 1•t . Th e num b er o f th ose to the o- 1great afflict10n they are beggmg led ed lo alt who bewar, another allow to . . g · God Y Y g P R d f I th t th th vernment program was negligible . s e e a ee ey About half of the latter have c~use never let up unless they are will . t . th d tt d 1 0 n. beat up. The Slovaks are now eir ~ c a 1rea Y regre e Those who refused to sign have hardened and determine d to fight. th to live a hell on ear . The They tried to help the Magyars Communi sts spread malicious ru• 1956, but mors about them to turn their when they revolted inthem with Red Prague stopped parishion ers against them. Where its armies. If America or the remain churches that happens the West had come to the aid of the empty and then the Reds chase Magyars at that time, the Slothe priests to the labor camps, vaks over there say that they, saying that they have nothing to the Poles, Ukrainian s, Rumanian s, do in the parish. Of course, Sun- and the other behind the Iron days mean nothing to the Reds. Curtain would also have ma.de a People must devote Sundays to bid for freedom - and the situaput time in the "work brigades." tion today in central and eastern This means that people cannot Europe would be different that go to church - and in turn "the it is. They still ask why America. priest has nothing to do!" This and the West did not help. And in time will have telling effects. if they did not help in 1956, what Since the Greek Catholic churches are the chances of help from I �4 SLOVAKIA America and the West the next · clothes from America? They were time some nation makes a bid getting quite a bit of help from to burst from its Red chains? American relatives at first, but Who has the heart to tell them · since "Care" was proscribed and that America and the West have the government has taken over decided on a policy of "peace- everything, little is coming in, ful coexistence"? Of course, not because of exorbitant taxes or Radio Free Europe or the Voice ' customs d!!ty. A headkerchief of America - but the Reds will, j (babuska) from America for e>..and they did tell them: "Don't ample, is taxed 50 crowns ($7.15), expect any help from the Ameri- and other articles of wear as can imperiali~ts. Comrade Nikita ! high as 200 crowns per kilogram! Khruschchev 1s the only one now that can help. Stick by him!" A Slovak lady, who had visited I Slovakia recently, told of her sur* '~ * prise when she b o ugh t some How about the cost of living meat at a butcher shop and some in Slovakia? Terribly high._ Break- buns at a bakery. The clerk fast a very small piece ot would not wrap the merchandise. butter, a little jam, two pieces When she asked for wrapping of bread and a cup of coffee - paper, she was told to bring her come to 12 crowns (7 crowns own next time or wrap her stuff one dollar). Lunch pork and in an apron. sauerkraut, bread, and a small beer - adds up to 17.50 crowns. How about buying an auto in A kilogram (2.2 lbs.) of tomatoes Slovakia? Well, they are offered - 12 crowns; 3 lbs. of bread for sale, but not for everybody 8 crowns - a liter of vodka or anybody. The prices are ex80 crowns; a liter of rum 96 orbitant, but then it's not so easy crowns; a kilogram of sugar to get one even if one has the 10.20; poor quality sausage - 25 cash. A reguest form for an auto crowns per kilogram; better qua- must first be filled out and sent lity - 80 crowns; women's dress to the proper authorities. It may mater i a 1 400 crowns (per take up to three years to get an dress) and to sew same another answer. ~ut that does not mean 300 crowns; men's suits - 1,200 1 that one 1s ready to get the auto. crowns; work shoes 200, and 'I'he reply usually tells the apdress shoes - 380 crowns. There , plicant what further steps he are cheaper shoes, but they last . must take. only about 2-3 weeks of conti- j It's the same thing, my informnuous wear'. the better shoes ant tells me, with building one's last about six months. h ome. F' · • 1rs t h e mus t ge t perm1sThus a person must work two sion to build; then he waits till weeks to buy poor clothes. Facto- I he gets an approval for the nery workers are a bit better off. ! cessary material. He may ask for But even an expert or techni- ' a certain kin~ of material and cian does not make more than get another kmd. 1,400 crowns per month. A tractor man gets 1,200 crowns per "Y~~ know ,"_ my informer told month. A commander of the Na- · me, m Slovakia they have plenty tional Security is no better off. II of everything poverty, fear, jails, drudgery except money How about getting food and and fabricated materials. Many I I I I = -1 I i I I �SLOVAKIA times I could not even buy matches in a Slovak village. .And when I walked into a store and asked what they had to sell, one 'comrade' replied sourly: 'Don't ask what we have, but what we don't have!'" 5 low shadowing me for several days. When I entered the home of my aunt, the man slipped out of sight. The next morning he reappeared again. On this occasion he approached me and said: * * * "Pardon me, but I think you Visitors to Slovakia are gene- are looking for the home of your friend 's mother, not - the friend rally surprised at the excessive that lives in the same town in drinking of the ordinary folks. America that you do? Well, his " I visited five communities," a mother lives over there." friend of mine told me after returning from Slovakia, " but the "Surprised? Of course, I was," drinking problem is the same in continued Janko. "I had told no all of them, and, I suppose, in all one that I was going to visit my of Slovakia." The Slovaks drink friend 's mother, because he had not because they are well off, asked me not to, since he was but because they are suffering a public official. But the shadow extreme hardships. It seems that evidently knew whom I would the people there are trying to probably visit in that particular drink their hapless lot away. village! When I visited some re"But the stuH they are drinking," latives and friends in another added my friend, "is t e r r i b I e town, I was shadowed again." stuff, poison that most people themselves make clandestinely. Another American visitor viPerhaps it is worse than the worst moonshine ever made in sited the pastor of the parish to America." The clergy are doing which his relatives belong. "How their best to convince the people are you, Father?" he asked. "Oh, not to drink, but to little avail. I'm getting along fine, thank you. :',,lore than on e priest told me So fine, in fact, that things could that the situation is worsening hardly be better. And briefly, let me tell you how fine: with the years. "Last Sunday I gave a sermon Shadowing visitors is common and then celebrated Holy -Mass. in Slovakia. I learned from sev- .As 1 left the church, a welleral friends who recently visited known Communist olll!icial apSlovakia that the secret police proached me and asked me to of any district know who is com- repeat the sermon I gave since ing from where into the area. he did not have time to attend My friend, let's call him Janko church, because, he said, he want(John), recently visited his re- ed to be edified. latives, and he had quite a few of them. ".As I left the home of "Yes, he did want to learn one of my relatives for the home something. He wanted to hear of another," said Janko, "I be- from my own lips what I had came a w a r e of the fact that ' said so that he could check this somebody was following me. Well, with the report that would be the first time it did not bother brought to him by his own stoome. But I noticed the same fel- \ ges 1 " concluded the priest. I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published by the Slovak League of America VOL. IX JUNE-DECEMBER, 1959 NO. 5 (30) SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM Joseph Pauco In the past two years hundreds of American Slovaks visited Slovakia. They were not molested or harmed in any way; and no one was arrested or detained by the police that we know of. It is obvious that Prague wants visitors from America, because that means American DOLLARS. \Only two Slovak clergymen were allowed to visit Slovakia, though many more applied for visas but were refused them. The Czech Reds do not want Slovak Catholic priests from America to visit Slovakia. And most wellknown Slovak personalities in America, too, are persona no grata. They want to know too much about the plight of the Church in Slovakia, the condition of the Bishops and the cler• gy and the schools. I have talked with dozens of Americans of Slovak origin who have visited Slovakia. This report is based on these conversations. After World War n, a certain Slovak came to America to his father. '!'his year he was allowed to visit Slovakia. He had let his brothers and other relatives know that he was coming. So they waited for him at the station. And they waited and waited in the crowd for some time. H e did not recognize them, and they did not recognize him. "We had not seen each other for thirteen years," he related. "My brother and brother-in-law have changed beyond recognition." "My brother," he continued, "is younger than I, but today he looks older than our father. He has aged terribly; h e is wrinkled and gray. He is not the same man I said goodbye to in Slovakia thirteen years ago." What did he go through? They confiscated his property, as well as that of the other relatives. A nephew, a priest, is languishing somewhere in a concentration camp, while his two sisters members of a religious order are forced to work in the fields. The family is large and there is no money, or any way of earning it, that is, enough of it to k eep going. The spiritual and material property of these people is indescribable. No wonder the man aged prematurely! "During my stay in Slovakia," continued my fr i e n d, "not a single smile ever lit up the faces of my relatives. We all cried when my brother r elated what terrible things had transpired since the end of the war. And they all cry even when they eat a nd s leep." He met with his friends in the village. When h e lef-t them thirteen years ago, they were well off. Today they have nothing. All 2 SLOVAKIA must work in the kholkhoses. 1 ly." When this did not work out All are aging prematurely; all : very well, the 1Reds began to use are beggars today. "They walk I pressure. First on the wealthier In rags," said my friend, "like farmers, whom they labeled parasites, ~lood-sucker, and_ politithe gypsies used to long ago." d . cal unrel!ables. After their holdd f It .. so epresse m ings were diminished "by law," I never e all my life," he continued. "These the Reds began to work on the people have virtually lost all faith small farmers. They gave them in themselves. In their great fear a "choice": either to give up and sorrow th ey care for no th ing; their own farms and work on the nothing interests them. They pray kholkhoses, or to lose everything constantly, and it is prayer that and work the same amount ot k eeps them from despairing. I acreage somewhere else. In the certainly would not want to live end the en ti re community is in Slovakia today," concluded my changed. The farmers have nofriend. thing left but a garden which Farmers in Slovakia are losing cannot sustain the family. People their land. 'I'he Czech Communist get paid for working in the kholState is confiscating it system- khoses. Not in money, but in atically. The S tat e now owns "units." A unit is worth 6 crowns most of the farmers and their (86 cents) and three kilograms farms. The farmers, sooner or (6.6 lbs.) of grain. But to earn later, are forced to join the khol- this unit, the kholkhose slave khose system or they lose every- must, for example, cultivate cuthing. In the end they do lose cumbers or tobacco six hour!!. everythtng. Here is the story as The value of the "unit" is figured told by an American with a bro- otherwise for different jobs. ther in Slovakia, who "voluntariKholkhose guards are also paid ly" joined the collective farm in units. Daily they get one and system. a half units, that is, 9 crowns My brother owned 12 hectares ($1.28) and 4.50 kilograms (9.90 of land (29.64 acres). He was ob- lbs.) of grain. But the guard not liged to give the government an- cnly watches and supervises, but nually 2,640 lbs. of beef, 1,000 also must work. lbs. of pork, 8,360 lbs. of grain, A farmer's cow is worth 110 350 eggs, and 2,500 liters of milk. units to the State, that is, he If the season was dry and crops must pay with his work 666 were poor, or the animals gob crowns ($95.14) and give 330 kisick and died, the farmer was lograms (726 lbs. of grain. This lost. He had no mo n e y with means that a farmer must buy which to buy grain, meat, eggs, his own cow annually or else or milk. And even if he had lose It. In the summer the cows money, he could not buy any- have a common pasture; in the thing, because the other farmers, winter they are fed from the too, had to surrender their pro- kholkhoses. A milker has to take ducts. What could he do but sur- care of 16 cows. He milks the render his land to the State? cows by hand three times daily. 'I'o get the farmers to join the Everything is systematized. Each kholkhose system, the Reds pro- person works in his own departmised just about everything to ment only. With a whip over his h ave the farmers join "voluntarl- head at all times. People must I SLOVAKIA 3 work Sundays, too, so that the I are now administe red by orthoReds can show that they comple- : dox clergyme n from Russia and tely control the "reaction ary pea- : Bohemia the Slovak Greek Cathsants," who have always been olics (Byzantin e Rite) attend faithful to God and to their Roman Catholic churches even if nation. 'I'oday practicall y every- I they have to walk ~iles to get thing is owned by the State - . to one. The Catholics are bebusiness, industry, bakeries, bu- ' coming thus more united in suftcher shops, drugstore s, farms, fering and in their opposition to and even the doctors. Everythin g the Reds. When I asked recent visitors is owned by all the people. "Everything is ours, but only to look to Slovakia how fares it with the at," is what the people say in schools there, I was told that the teachers must sign a statemen t Slovakia. that they have r enounced the * * * I asked several Am erican Slo- Catholic Faith or else they lose vaks who had visited Slovakia their positions. "The future ot 1 recently, how the Church fared I Communi sm," the Reds keep on in Slovakia and how the priests j bellowing , "depends on th e trainwere treated. I was told that ing of our youth." And God and many priests still are in jail and ! religion must be eradicated from that those who are not are under the h ear ts and minds of all strict police control. The Czech youngster s no matter what the Red secret police and their a- cost, according to the Reds. 'I'he Slovaks feel that they have gents shadow every cle~gyman . 1 then ~sked about the priests who been .forsaken by all except God. had signed the governme nt proturn constantly for . A c- To Him they . . regar d t o "C a th o11c gram m th at anot~er w~r pvaymg help, refused had who tion," and those soon breaks . • . . out. Yes, m their t o sign 1•t . Th e num b er o f th ose to the o- 1great afflict10n they are beggmg led ed lo alt who bewar, another allow to . . g · God Y Y g P R d f I th t th th vernment program was negligible . s e e a ee ey About half of the latter have c~use never let up unless they are will . t . th d tt d 1 0 n. beat up. The Slovaks are now eir ~ c a 1rea Y regre e Those who refused to sign have hardened and determine d to fight. th to live a hell on ear . The They tried to help the Magyars Communi sts spread malicious ru• 1956, but mors about them to turn their when they revolted inthem with Red Prague stopped parishion ers against them. Where its armies. If America or the remain churches that happens the West had come to the aid of the empty and then the Reds chase Magyars at that time, the Slothe priests to the labor camps, vaks over there say that they, saying that they have nothing to the Poles, Ukrainian s, Rumanian s, do in the parish. Of course, Sun- and the other behind the Iron days mean nothing to the Reds. Curtain would also have ma.de a People must devote Sundays to bid for freedom - and the situaput time in the "work brigades." tion today in central and eastern This means that people cannot Europe would be different that go to church - and in turn "the it is. They still ask why America. priest has nothing to do!" This and the West did not help. And in time will have telling effects. if they did not help in 1956, what Since the Greek Catholic churches are the chances of help from I 4 SLOVAKIA America and the West the next · clothes from America? They were time some nation makes a bid getting quite a bit of help from to burst from its Red chains? American relatives at first, but Who has the heart to tell them · since "Care" was proscribed and that America and the West have the government has taken over decided on a policy of "peace- everything, little is coming in, ful coexistence"? Of course, not because of exorbitant taxes or Radio Free Europe or the Voice ' customs d!!ty. A headkerchief of America - but the Reds will, j (babuska) from America for e>..and they did tell them: "Don't ample, is taxed 50 crowns ($7.15), expect any help from the Ameri- and other articles of wear as can imperiali~ts. Comrade Nikita ! high as 200 crowns per kilogram! Khruschchev 1s the only one now that can help. Stick by him!" A Slovak lady, who had visited I Slovakia recently, told of her sur* '~ * prise when she b o ugh t some How about the cost of living meat at a butcher shop and some in Slovakia? Terribly high._ Break- buns at a bakery. The clerk fast a very small piece ot would not wrap the merchandise. butter, a little jam, two pieces When she asked for wrapping of bread and a cup of coffee - paper, she was told to bring her come to 12 crowns (7 crowns own next time or wrap her stuff one dollar). Lunch pork and in an apron. sauerkraut, bread, and a small beer - adds up to 17.50 crowns. How about buying an auto in A kilogram (2.2 lbs.) of tomatoes Slovakia? Well, they are offered - 12 crowns; 3 lbs. of bread for sale, but not for everybody 8 crowns - a liter of vodka or anybody. The prices are ex80 crowns; a liter of rum 96 orbitant, but then it's not so easy crowns; a kilogram of sugar to get one even if one has the 10.20; poor quality sausage - 25 cash. A reguest form for an auto crowns per kilogram; better qua- must first be filled out and sent lity - 80 crowns; women's dress to the proper authorities. It may mater i a 1 400 crowns (per take up to three years to get an dress) and to sew same another answer. ~ut that does not mean 300 crowns; men's suits - 1,200 1 that one 1s ready to get the auto. crowns; work shoes 200, and 'I'he reply usually tells the apdress shoes - 380 crowns. There , plicant what further steps he are cheaper shoes, but they last . must take. only about 2-3 weeks of conti- j It's the same thing, my informnuous wear'. the better shoes ant tells me, with building one's last about six months. h ome. F' · • 1rs t h e mus t ge t perm1sThus a person must work two sion to build; then he waits till weeks to buy poor clothes. Facto- I he gets an approval for the nery workers are a bit better off. ! cessary material. He may ask for But even an expert or techni- ' a certain kin~ of material and cian does not make more than get another kmd. 1,400 crowns per month. A tractor man gets 1,200 crowns per "Y~~ know ,"_ my informer told month. A commander of the Na- · me, m Slovakia they have plenty tional Security is no better off. II of everything poverty, fear, jails, drudgery except money How about getting food and and fabricated materials. Many I I I I = -1 I i I I SLOVAKIA times I could not even buy matches in a Slovak village. .And when I walked into a store and asked what they had to sell, one 'comrade' replied sourly: 'Don't ask what we have, but what we don't have!'" 5 low shadowing me for several days. When I entered the home of my aunt, the man slipped out of sight. The next morning he reappeared again. On this occasion he approached me and said: * * * "Pardon me, but I think you Visitors to Slovakia are gene- are looking for the home of your friend 's mother, not - the friend rally surprised at the excessive that lives in the same town in drinking of the ordinary folks. America that you do? Well, his " I visited five communities," a mother lives over there." friend of mine told me after returning from Slovakia, " but the "Surprised? Of course, I was," drinking problem is the same in continued Janko. "I had told no all of them, and, I suppose, in all one that I was going to visit my of Slovakia." The Slovaks drink friend 's mother, because he had not because they are well off, asked me not to, since he was but because they are suffering a public official. But the shadow extreme hardships. It seems that evidently knew whom I would the people there are trying to probably visit in that particular drink their hapless lot away. village! When I visited some re"But the stuH they are drinking," latives and friends in another added my friend, "is t e r r i b I e town, I was shadowed again." stuff, poison that most people themselves make clandestinely. Another American visitor viPerhaps it is worse than the worst moonshine ever made in sited the pastor of the parish to America." The clergy are doing which his relatives belong. "How their best to convince the people are you, Father?" he asked. "Oh, not to drink, but to little avail. I'm getting along fine, thank you. :',,lore than on e priest told me So fine, in fact, that things could that the situation is worsening hardly be better. And briefly, let me tell you how fine: with the years. "Last Sunday I gave a sermon Shadowing visitors is common and then celebrated Holy -Mass. in Slovakia. I learned from sev- .As 1 left the church, a welleral friends who recently visited known Communist olll!icial apSlovakia that the secret police proached me and asked me to of any district know who is com- repeat the sermon I gave since ing from where into the area. he did not have time to attend My friend, let's call him Janko church, because, he said, he want(John), recently visited his re- ed to be edified. latives, and he had quite a few of them. ".As I left the home of "Yes, he did want to learn one of my relatives for the home something. He wanted to hear of another," said Janko, "I be- from my own lips what I had came a w a r e of the fact that ' said so that he could check this somebody was following me. Well, with the report that would be the first time it did not bother brought to him by his own stoome. But I noticed the same fel- \ ges 1 " concluded the priest. I  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia Under Communism Description An account of the resource Joseph Paučo Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), June-December 1959 pp. 1-5 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb1c7289d31cbcab00966343b7893e79.pdf 8346f725c8f693c2dbe47d87d5fd73de PDF Text Text JUNE-DECEMBER, 1959 VOL. IX NO. 5 (30) IN THIS ISSUE : SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT SLOVAKIA AND THE CHURCH INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE SLOVAK NATIONALISM: NATIONALISM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY FATHER SEGINAK'S IMPRESSLON OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV THE KREMLIN HAS SHOWN ITS HAND ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 OSUSKY AFTER MARCH 14, 1939 THE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA WHO SAID IT: 19, 37, 64, 68 • • • Edited and compiled by PHILIP A. HROBAK SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. • • • Published by TH E SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THIS IS SLOVAKIA, Hrusovsky; $1.00. THE SLOVAKS, Yurchak; paper cover $2.00; cloth $3.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY, Skultety; $1.00 (paper); $2.00 (cloth cover). • THE DELIVERANCE OF SISTER CECILIA, $3.75. THE CHURCH OF SILENCE IN SLOVAKIA, Zubek; $3.50. FALSE FREEDOM, Delaney; $2.00. SLOVAKIA'S ROAD TO STATEHOOD, Woytko; $1.50. ·'CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' - History Made to Order, Hrobak; 50c. UNCONQUERABLES, Pauco; $3.50 t:;UDOV1T STUR AND HIS PLACE IN THE SLAVIC WORLD, Prof. J. Kirschbaum; 25c. ANTHOLOGY OF SLOVAK POETRY, Kramoris; $2.00. ♦ ♦ ♦ SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The main purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. $1.00 per annum in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. SLOVAKIA P. 0. Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � JUNE-DECEMBER, 1959 VOL. IX NO. 5 (30) IN THIS ISSUE : SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT SLOVAKIA AND THE CHURCH INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE SLOVAK NATIONALISM: NATIONALISM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY FATHER SEGINAK'S IMPRESSLON OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV THE KREMLIN HAS SHOWN ITS HAND ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 OSUSKY AFTER MARCH 14, 1939 THE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA WHO SAID IT: 19, 37, 64, 68 • • • Edited and compiled by PHILIP A. HROBAK SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. • • • Published by TH E SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THIS IS SLOVAKIA, Hrusovsky; $1.00. THE SLOVAKS, Yurchak; paper cover $2.00; cloth $3.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY, Skultety; $1.00 (paper); $2.00 (cloth cover). • THE DELIVERANCE OF SISTER CECILIA, $3.75. THE CHURCH OF SILENCE IN SLOVAKIA, Zubek; $3.50. FALSE FREEDOM, Delaney; $2.00. SLOVAKIA'S ROAD TO STATEHOOD, Woytko; $1.50. ·'CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' - History Made to Order, Hrobak; 50c. UNCONQUERABLES, Pauco; $3.50 t:;UDOV1T STUR AND HIS PLACE IN THE SLAVIC WORLD, Prof. J. Kirschbaum; 25c. ANTHOLOGY OF SLOVAK POETRY, Kramoris; $2.00. ♦ ♦ ♦ SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The main purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. $1.00 per annum in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. SLOVAKIA P. 0. Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document JUNE-DECEMBER, 1959 VOL. IX NO. 5 (30) IN THIS ISSUE : SLOVAKIA UNDER COMMUNISM SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION TO THE TRIPARTITE PACT SLOVAKIA AND THE CHURCH INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE SLOVAK NATIONALISM: NATIONALISM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY FATHER SEGINAK'S IMPRESSLON OF PRAGUE AND PRESOV THE KREMLIN HAS SHOWN ITS HAND ELEVEN HUNDRED YEARS OF PRAYERFUL SONG STEPHEN OSUSKY AND MARCH 1939 OSUSKY AFTER MARCH 14, 1939 THE HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA WHO SAID IT: 19, 37, 64, 68 • • • Edited and compiled by PHILIP A. HROBAK SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. • • • Published by TH E SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THIS IS SLOVAKIA, Hrusovsky; $1.00. THE SLOVAKS, Yurchak; paper cover $2.00; cloth $3.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY, Skultety; $1.00 (paper); $2.00 (cloth cover). • THE DELIVERANCE OF SISTER CECILIA, $3.75. THE CHURCH OF SILENCE IN SLOVAKIA, Zubek; $3.50. FALSE FREEDOM, Delaney; $2.00. SLOVAKIA'S ROAD TO STATEHOOD, Woytko; $1.50. ·'CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' - History Made to Order, Hrobak; 50c. UNCONQUERABLES, Pauco; $3.50 t:;UDOV1T STUR AND HIS PLACE IN THE SLAVIC WORLD, Prof. J. Kirschbaum; 25c. ANTHOLOGY OF SLOVAK POETRY, Kramoris; $2.00. ♦ ♦ ♦ SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The main purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. $1.00 per annum in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. SLOVAKIA P. 0. Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 5 (30) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-December 1959 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cbb7ce60aa3a0e412b377e83ab896a76.pdf 1b1c514b3207fc0bcaa5382ba1dbba99 PDF Text Text 72 SLOVAKIA The History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK tContinued) With their economic development the cities and towns also became important centers of cultural life. German settlers brough higher education to the Slovaks, so that many Slovak cities became centers of western European culture. Schools originated near the parish churches and the monasteries. Hospitals were built in many cities. Into all the cities came the architects, contractors and artists, who built and decorated not on:ly churches and city halls, but also the homes of the prosperous citizens. Of course, all this had some influence on the outlying villages and hamlets which were in constant touch with the cities. CRAFTSMEN'S GUILDS IN SLOVAKIA Besides the merchants, who brought various merchandise from the neighboring countries into Slovak cities and formed the wealthiest group, there lived in these cities also the tradesmen, who established their workshops and sold their wares at the markets. Slovaks were acquainted with some trades, others they acquired from their neighbors, but the bulk of trades were introduced into Slovakia by the German colonists in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At first only those trades were fostered which served the everyday needs of the people (carpentry, cabinet-making, tanning, shoemaking, cloth-making, tailoring, etc.). Other trades originated and developed gradually with the economic and cultural conditions of the country. The higher the standard of living, the more trades were developed and applied in the cities, towns and hamlets. Just as the various types of trades came to the Slovaks by way of Germany, so came also the custom of the tradesmen organizing in associations which were called guilds. In every city there were as many guilds as there were different types of trades. As the number of trades �SLOVAKIA 73 gradually increased, so did the number of guilds. In the large cities each trade had its own independent guild, while in the smaller towns, and later in the larger villages, the closely-related trades were united in one common guild. Only some cities were granted a monopoly on certain types of trade; e.g., only Kosice had the privilege of making linen (barchet) and Bardejov had the right to bleach cloth. In the larger cities work shops were usually grouped in particular streets so that many of these streets derived their names from the type of trade that prevailed there. In Bratislava, even today there still are streets called Sedlarska, Klobucnicka; in Trnava: Pekarska, Halenarska, Ostrozna, Masiarska ; in Banska Bystrica : Kovacska ; in Hlohovec: Mydlarska ; in Zilina and in Kosice: Zvonarska, Kovacska, Masiarska. As a technical organization, the guild took care of all the interests of its member,s. Each guild had its own written by-laws which contained detailed regulations called articles. The furrier's guild in Kosice had its own articles already in 1305. The Bratislava guild of butchers, shoemakers and bakers had written articles already in 1376. The organization of the guilds took place in the fourteenth century, attained its greatest development in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and lasted until modern times, when factory products began to give real competition to the products of the guilds. The by-laws of each city guild had to be approved by the city council and by the landlords; and by secular and church authorities in the smaller towns. The guilds frequently had their statutes approved even by their sovereigns. Due to the fact that many Slovak cities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had a majority of German inhabitants, the guild regulations were written at first in German or Latin. But later, when the Slovaks became the majority, the by-laws and correspondence of the guilds were more frequently in the Slovak language. The Trnava Guild of Tailors already in 1558 did its writing in Slovak; the Butchers' Guild in 1562. The guilds of Trencin and Hlohovec used the Slovak language at the end of the sixteenth �74 SLOVAKIA century. In the seventeenth century all the smaller towns (Banovce, Bojnice, Beckov, Bytca, Holic, Humenne, !lava, Jelsava, Myjava, Prievidza, Puchov, Rajec, Skalica, Sastin, Topol'cany, etc.) kept their guild records in Slovak. Only a master-craftsman could become a member of a respectable guild, after he had fulfilled all technical and moral requirements. In each guild the number of mastercraftsmen was limited to prevent overproduction in goods. In Bratislava in 1376, there could be only twenty-eight butchers and sixteen bakers. Every member of a guild was obliged to present only perfect products at prices determined by the guild. All tradesmen had to work in the same way so that their products were of like quality and price, and all competition removed. At the head of each guild was a guildmaster, whom the members elected for a period of one year. If there were a number of master craftsmen in a guild, the leader of the guild was the chief guildmaster. The guildmaster was the head of the guild, represented the guild before the authorities, especially before the city council in whose presence he took the oath of office after his election. He took care of all the guild's interests, ipresided at meetings, held several times a year in his home, and at banquets. He supervised the work of all members of his particular guild, judged th~ir products especially before they went to market, saw to it that all regulations were strictly observed, and in his care were all documents and letters and finances of his guild. The guildmaster was ,s ole arbiter of all arguments between members; he imposed punishment and collected all fines. He was a very respected personality not only among the membership of his guild, but among the general public as well. Members of the guild were divided into senior and junior master craftsmen. The elder masters, authorized by the guildmaster, supervised the work of the members of the guild and maintained order and discipline. The younger masters were obliged to perform various menial duties, such as lighting candles in the church, serving as waiters at banquets, taking care of the weak and sick masters, dig- �SLOVAKIA 75 ging graves and acting as pallbearers for deceased masters. After banquets, if the senior masters were unable to find their way home, the junior members were obliged to escort them. Great care was taken to see that all members of a guild conscientiousl y performed their religious obligations. The wealthier guilds had their own altar in the parish church which was dedicated to the patron saint of their guild. Every guild member was obliged to attend divine services on Sunday and Holy Days, and had to receive the sacraments at least once a year. At church processions the entire guild took part under its own standard, which bore the image of the patron saint and the trademark of the guild. Any member guilty of transgression s, which caused scandal and so harmed the good name of a respectable guild, was obliged to pay a prescribed sum into the guild's treasury, or give candles to his church. In the event of danger, when an enemy threatened the city, the guild members were obliged to defend the ramparts of the city. The city assigned to each guild a tower or bastion which the members had to keep in good order and supply it with weapons and ammunition. City bastions have retained individual guild names even to this day (Pekarska basta, Obuvnicka, Masiarska, etc.). If a fire broke out in the city, each guild had to take part in the rescue work and also bring a prescribed number of buckets of water to help extinguish it. So that only honorable persons could become members of a guild, people of good morals and technically well prepared, many years of apprenticeshi p and str ict education wer e prescribed for applicants. SLOVAKIA AFTER THE TURKISH INVASION When the Turks abandoned plundered Hungary, King Bela IV set out to reconstruct his country. He invited foreign settlers in large numbers, so that some might cultivate the depopulated areas. Many Germans settled in the hilly regions to found new villages and towns. But nomadic Cumans also came again to occupy the lowlands and the southern foothills of the Slovak mountains. The Ger mans �76 SLOVAKIA brought a high degree of culture into the country and contributed handsomely to its economy, while the Cumans were supposed to be the military support of the Hungarian king. But Hungary, even during the reign of Bela IV, was in a difficult situation, which was caused by internal revolutions and the growth of the Bohemian kingdom under Premysl Otokar II and his successors. Bela nr could not maintain the integrity of his kingdom. His son wanted to rule during his lifetime, and Bela was forced to let him rule over the Eastern part of Hungary. This partition of Hungary weakened it terribly and increased the dangers of invasion by outside enemies. While the members of the ruling family quarreled, the wealthy nobles strengthened thei r own positions and prestige. Slovak territory played an important role in the development of these relations, since both the Czechs and the Hungarians were interested in it. Premysl Otokar II became ruler of Austrian lands and extended his rule to the banks of the Adriatic Sea. Since the Hungarian king claimed a part of these lands, especially Styria, hostile relations between the Czechs and Hungarians resulted. But Premysl Otokar II also wanted Slovakia, and this only infuriated the Hungarian monarch more. Wars were inevitable. They were fought on Slovak soil and the Slovaks paid with their lives and property for the enmity existing between two foreign rulers. A part of western Slovakia, including Bratislava, Trnava and Nitra, became prey of the Bohemian king several times after 1271 and the victim of the ruthless devastation of the Czech armies. Finally, this area fell into the hands of Austrian dukes and barons. After Bela's death (1270), the Hungarian throne was occupied by rulers who became friendly with the pagan Cumans, spent most of their time in their camps, where they abandoned themselves to riotous, pagan living. Consequently the whole country suffered. In 1280 the Bishops and nobles persuaded King Ladislaus IV to abandon his reckless adventures and to domesticate the wild Cumans. But the Cumans rebelled and pillaged the whole country, including Slovakia, where they committed the most brutal �SLOVAKIA 77 .atrocities. Later, in 1285, the Tartars again invaded Slovakia and devastated Spis and the whole of eastern Slovakia. This invasion was used by the Cumans to pillage western Slovakia. It was thus that Slovakia had to pay for the weaknesses and defects of the kings of Hungary and their friendly relations with the Cumans. The weaker the king, the more the power of the nobility increased. They appropriated royal and ecclesiastical properties and recognized no government over themselves. When King Ladislaus IV refused to reform and continued to spend most of his time in the Cuman camps, the Hungarian magnates assassinated him. His successor, Andrew III (1290-1301), tried to be a good king and did what he could to save the kingdom from catastrophe; but it was too late. By the end of the thirteenth century Hungary disintegrated into several parts in which wealthy magnates reigned as independent little kings. Among these nobles was Matus Cak (Mahtoosh Tchak) of Trencin, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," who become the ruler of a large part of Slovakia at the end of the thirteenth century. Ca:k was not a Slovak by birth, but his ancestors had acquired large tracts of land in Slovakia. When he became the highest official of the royalty during the reign of Andrew III, he took advantage of his position and added new lands and castles to his family's holdings. Matus Cak seized the lands of many nobles, forced others to recognize his sovereignty, appropriated many royal citadels and in his ruthlessness did not even hesitate taking ecclesiastical properties. In 1299 he captured Trencin Castle which became the main stronghold of the mighty lord of the Vah and the Tatras. Ca.k's power extended from the Morava river to Spis and from the Danube to the Tatras, so that all of western Slovakia, except Bratislava and vicinity, and a large part of central Slovakia were under his rule. Beyond the Danube the mighty Vy s e h r a d Castle guarded the borders of Ca.k's country. In his Trencin citadel Matus Cak organized his entire court in regal splendor, and numerous courtiers did his bidding. As an independent ruler, he had his own army, coined his own money in Nitra �78 SLOVAKIA and established relations with neighboring rulers. Cak of Trencin built up his great power on the wealth which flowed to him from his extensive holdings. But the most reliable support of his power was the devotion and loyalty of his land administrators and his people. In Ca.k's army divisions of Slovak warriors also fought; they distinguished themselves by their courage, devotion and heroism. Ca.k's military glory, therefore, was in a large measure the merit of his Slovak subjects. At that time the Amadei Clan ruled over eastern Slovakia, including Kosice. It did not recognize the sovereignty of the Hungarian king. In 1301, when the death of King Andrew ill brought the Arpad dynasty to an end and several rulers sought the Hungarian throne, Slovakia was for all practical purposes an independent state under Matus Cak of Trencin. SLOVAKIA UNDER THE ANJOUS After Andrew ill's death, a part of the Hungarian nobility headed by Matus Cak called a son of King Wenceslaus of Bohemia to the throne, who already then was in possession of the Polish Crown. But the twelve-year-old Crown Prince Wenceslaus, crowned in Stolny Belehrad, was op.p osed by another group which sided with Pope Boniface VIII and chose Charles Robert of the French house of Anjou, who ruled in Naples. Relying on his power, Matus Cak of Trencin opposed Charles Robert and defended the interests of the Bohemian Wenceslaus. He resisted the An jous even after Wenceslaus renounced the Hungarian Crown and died shortly after in 1306 as the last male descendant of the Premysl dynasty. Soon after his accession to the throne, the Hungarian king attempted to break the power of the magnates and unite Hungary under his own rule. Matus Cak of Trencin continued to oppose the rule of Charles Robert. With his army he attacked the royal castle at Budin and fought the magnates and bishops who supported Charles Robert. In 1311, after he succeeded in gaining the support of the majority of the nobility, Charles Robert prepared for a showdown with Matus Cak. But the latter allied himself with �SLOVAKIA 79 the Amadei clan who opposed the king in eastern Slovakia. The combined armies of Matus Cak and the Amadei defended themselves successfully at Saris Castle and forced the king to retreat. The royal army withdrew to Spis to rally the support of the German colonists there. With these new allies Charles again set out after Matus Cak. In the decisive battle, which took place June 15, 1312, at Rozhanovce, not far from Kosice, the king was victorious. The Amadei clan was completely routed, lost all its citadels and properties and was forced to flee to Poland, where it found refuge at the court of Ladislaus Lokietek, whom it had aided a short time before against the Czechs. The Amadei never returned to Hungary, but remained in Poland, and Charles Robert became master of eastern Slovakia. Matus Ca.k's setback at Rozhanovce did not break him completely. He continued to act independently in western Slovakia. Indeed, his power and prestige were still so great that the German King Frederick the Handsome, sought his aid in 1315 against Louis, the Bavarian, and against John of Luxemburg. Even though Charles Robert captured Vysehrad and Komarno in 1317 and dangerously threatened the sovereignty of Matus Cak of Trencin, nevertheless, the lord of the Vah and the 'flatras continued to rule independently to the end of his life. It was only after Matus Cak died in the Trencin castle in 1321, that Charles Robert was able to extend his rule over the western half of Slovakia. The following year Charles Robert also seized Bratislava. which had been in the hands of the Austrian dukes since tht beginning of the fourteenth century. Slovakia, after a brief period of independence, again became a part of the kingdom of Hungary which, under the rule of the Anjou dynasty, enjoyed a period of great political, economic and cultural growth. As soon as Charles Robert reunited the Hungarian kingdom, his first care was to put the economic affairs of Hungary into order. He founded many new cities, supported the development of mining, established a sound financial system, and encouraged commerce with neighboring states. It was during this period that a large number of new cities were founded also in Slovakia ·a nd the older ones were granted new privileges. �80 SLOVAKIA Bratislava, Trnava, Levoca, and Kosice became important centers of international commerce. The king- ipaid special attention to the Slovak mining towns, because their wealth swelled the royal coffers appreciably. Mining commissions supervised all mining projects and regulated the sale of all precious metals. A Count of the Chamber headed the mining commission; he concluded the rental agreement with the ruler and guaranteed the king revenues from the mines. The territory of Slovakia, rich in metallic ores, was divided into two mining chambers: the western half of Slovakia belonged under the management of the mining chamber of Kremnica, while the eastern half was managed by the chamber of Smolnica, which later moved its headquarters to Kosice. Zupan Done, who managed a large part of central Slovakia as the administrator of Zvolen, was a loyal adherent and faithful aide of Robert. At that time the Zvolen region was an extensive area, out of which later were gradually formed the independent districts of Turiec, Orava and Liptov, besides that of Zvolen. Administrator Done founded Liptovsky Hradok, built many churches, endowed monasteries, and served at the pa!pal court in Avignon as a rei[)resentative of Charles Robert. Slovakia played a significant role even in the international relations of the Hungarian kingdom. Already in 1327, Charles Robert and the Bohemian king, met in Trnava, where they formed an alliance against the Habsburgs. Slovakia became the territory on which the interests of the Hungarian, Bohemian and Polish kingdoms were settled. In 1335 the legates of John of Bohemia, Casimir the Great of Po-land and Charles Robert assembled at Trenein to determine the conditions of a friendly alliance. At this meeting an agreement was reached which enabled the meeting of the three kings in Vysehrad Castle and thus contributed largely to safeguard peace in central Europe. Louis the Great (1342-1382), son and successor of Charles Robert, tried to extend the limits of the Hungarian kingdom. He waged frequent wars on the southern borders of Hungary and conquered the northern part of the Balkan peninsula and the territory of present-day Rumania. (To be continued) � 72 SLOVAKIA The History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK tContinued) With their economic development the cities and towns also became important centers of cultural life. German settlers brough higher education to the Slovaks, so that many Slovak cities became centers of western European culture. Schools originated near the parish churches and the monasteries. Hospitals were built in many cities. Into all the cities came the architects, contractors and artists, who built and decorated not on:ly churches and city halls, but also the homes of the prosperous citizens. Of course, all this had some influence on the outlying villages and hamlets which were in constant touch with the cities. CRAFTSMEN'S GUILDS IN SLOVAKIA Besides the merchants, who brought various merchandise from the neighboring countries into Slovak cities and formed the wealthiest group, there lived in these cities also the tradesmen, who established their workshops and sold their wares at the markets. Slovaks were acquainted with some trades, others they acquired from their neighbors, but the bulk of trades were introduced into Slovakia by the German colonists in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At first only those trades were fostered which served the everyday needs of the people (carpentry, cabinet-making, tanning, shoemaking, cloth-making, tailoring, etc.). Other trades originated and developed gradually with the economic and cultural conditions of the country. The higher the standard of living, the more trades were developed and applied in the cities, towns and hamlets. Just as the various types of trades came to the Slovaks by way of Germany, so came also the custom of the tradesmen organizing in associations which were called guilds. In every city there were as many guilds as there were different types of trades. As the number of trades �SLOVAKIA 73 gradually increased, so did the number of guilds. In the large cities each trade had its own independent guild, while in the smaller towns, and later in the larger villages, the closely-related trades were united in one common guild. Only some cities were granted a monopoly on certain types of trade; e.g., only Kosice had the privilege of making linen (barchet) and Bardejov had the right to bleach cloth. In the larger cities work shops were usually grouped in particular streets so that many of these streets derived their names from the type of trade that prevailed there. In Bratislava, even today there still are streets called Sedlarska, Klobucnicka; in Trnava: Pekarska, Halenarska, Ostrozna, Masiarska ; in Banska Bystrica : Kovacska ; in Hlohovec: Mydlarska ; in Zilina and in Kosice: Zvonarska, Kovacska, Masiarska. As a technical organization, the guild took care of all the interests of its member,s. Each guild had its own written by-laws which contained detailed regulations called articles. The furrier's guild in Kosice had its own articles already in 1305. The Bratislava guild of butchers, shoemakers and bakers had written articles already in 1376. The organization of the guilds took place in the fourteenth century, attained its greatest development in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and lasted until modern times, when factory products began to give real competition to the products of the guilds. The by-laws of each city guild had to be approved by the city council and by the landlords; and by secular and church authorities in the smaller towns. The guilds frequently had their statutes approved even by their sovereigns. Due to the fact that many Slovak cities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had a majority of German inhabitants, the guild regulations were written at first in German or Latin. But later, when the Slovaks became the majority, the by-laws and correspondence of the guilds were more frequently in the Slovak language. The Trnava Guild of Tailors already in 1558 did its writing in Slovak; the Butchers' Guild in 1562. The guilds of Trencin and Hlohovec used the Slovak language at the end of the sixteenth �74 SLOVAKIA century. In the seventeenth century all the smaller towns (Banovce, Bojnice, Beckov, Bytca, Holic, Humenne, !lava, Jelsava, Myjava, Prievidza, Puchov, Rajec, Skalica, Sastin, Topol'cany, etc.) kept their guild records in Slovak. Only a master-craftsman could become a member of a respectable guild, after he had fulfilled all technical and moral requirements. In each guild the number of mastercraftsmen was limited to prevent overproduction in goods. In Bratislava in 1376, there could be only twenty-eight butchers and sixteen bakers. Every member of a guild was obliged to present only perfect products at prices determined by the guild. All tradesmen had to work in the same way so that their products were of like quality and price, and all competition removed. At the head of each guild was a guildmaster, whom the members elected for a period of one year. If there were a number of master craftsmen in a guild, the leader of the guild was the chief guildmaster. The guildmaster was the head of the guild, represented the guild before the authorities, especially before the city council in whose presence he took the oath of office after his election. He took care of all the guild's interests, ipresided at meetings, held several times a year in his home, and at banquets. He supervised the work of all members of his particular guild, judged th~ir products especially before they went to market, saw to it that all regulations were strictly observed, and in his care were all documents and letters and finances of his guild. The guildmaster was ,s ole arbiter of all arguments between members; he imposed punishment and collected all fines. He was a very respected personality not only among the membership of his guild, but among the general public as well. Members of the guild were divided into senior and junior master craftsmen. The elder masters, authorized by the guildmaster, supervised the work of the members of the guild and maintained order and discipline. The younger masters were obliged to perform various menial duties, such as lighting candles in the church, serving as waiters at banquets, taking care of the weak and sick masters, dig- �SLOVAKIA 75 ging graves and acting as pallbearers for deceased masters. After banquets, if the senior masters were unable to find their way home, the junior members were obliged to escort them. Great care was taken to see that all members of a guild conscientiousl y performed their religious obligations. The wealthier guilds had their own altar in the parish church which was dedicated to the patron saint of their guild. Every guild member was obliged to attend divine services on Sunday and Holy Days, and had to receive the sacraments at least once a year. At church processions the entire guild took part under its own standard, which bore the image of the patron saint and the trademark of the guild. Any member guilty of transgression s, which caused scandal and so harmed the good name of a respectable guild, was obliged to pay a prescribed sum into the guild's treasury, or give candles to his church. In the event of danger, when an enemy threatened the city, the guild members were obliged to defend the ramparts of the city. The city assigned to each guild a tower or bastion which the members had to keep in good order and supply it with weapons and ammunition. City bastions have retained individual guild names even to this day (Pekarska basta, Obuvnicka, Masiarska, etc.). If a fire broke out in the city, each guild had to take part in the rescue work and also bring a prescribed number of buckets of water to help extinguish it. So that only honorable persons could become members of a guild, people of good morals and technically well prepared, many years of apprenticeshi p and str ict education wer e prescribed for applicants. SLOVAKIA AFTER THE TURKISH INVASION When the Turks abandoned plundered Hungary, King Bela IV set out to reconstruct his country. He invited foreign settlers in large numbers, so that some might cultivate the depopulated areas. Many Germans settled in the hilly regions to found new villages and towns. But nomadic Cumans also came again to occupy the lowlands and the southern foothills of the Slovak mountains. The Ger mans �76 SLOVAKIA brought a high degree of culture into the country and contributed handsomely to its economy, while the Cumans were supposed to be the military support of the Hungarian king. But Hungary, even during the reign of Bela IV, was in a difficult situation, which was caused by internal revolutions and the growth of the Bohemian kingdom under Premysl Otokar II and his successors. Bela nr could not maintain the integrity of his kingdom. His son wanted to rule during his lifetime, and Bela was forced to let him rule over the Eastern part of Hungary. This partition of Hungary weakened it terribly and increased the dangers of invasion by outside enemies. While the members of the ruling family quarreled, the wealthy nobles strengthened thei r own positions and prestige. Slovak territory played an important role in the development of these relations, since both the Czechs and the Hungarians were interested in it. Premysl Otokar II became ruler of Austrian lands and extended his rule to the banks of the Adriatic Sea. Since the Hungarian king claimed a part of these lands, especially Styria, hostile relations between the Czechs and Hungarians resulted. But Premysl Otokar II also wanted Slovakia, and this only infuriated the Hungarian monarch more. Wars were inevitable. They were fought on Slovak soil and the Slovaks paid with their lives and property for the enmity existing between two foreign rulers. A part of western Slovakia, including Bratislava, Trnava and Nitra, became prey of the Bohemian king several times after 1271 and the victim of the ruthless devastation of the Czech armies. Finally, this area fell into the hands of Austrian dukes and barons. After Bela's death (1270), the Hungarian throne was occupied by rulers who became friendly with the pagan Cumans, spent most of their time in their camps, where they abandoned themselves to riotous, pagan living. Consequently the whole country suffered. In 1280 the Bishops and nobles persuaded King Ladislaus IV to abandon his reckless adventures and to domesticate the wild Cumans. But the Cumans rebelled and pillaged the whole country, including Slovakia, where they committed the most brutal �SLOVAKIA 77 .atrocities. Later, in 1285, the Tartars again invaded Slovakia and devastated Spis and the whole of eastern Slovakia. This invasion was used by the Cumans to pillage western Slovakia. It was thus that Slovakia had to pay for the weaknesses and defects of the kings of Hungary and their friendly relations with the Cumans. The weaker the king, the more the power of the nobility increased. They appropriated royal and ecclesiastical properties and recognized no government over themselves. When King Ladislaus IV refused to reform and continued to spend most of his time in the Cuman camps, the Hungarian magnates assassinated him. His successor, Andrew III (1290-1301), tried to be a good king and did what he could to save the kingdom from catastrophe; but it was too late. By the end of the thirteenth century Hungary disintegrated into several parts in which wealthy magnates reigned as independent little kings. Among these nobles was Matus Cak (Mahtoosh Tchak) of Trencin, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," who become the ruler of a large part of Slovakia at the end of the thirteenth century. Ca:k was not a Slovak by birth, but his ancestors had acquired large tracts of land in Slovakia. When he became the highest official of the royalty during the reign of Andrew III, he took advantage of his position and added new lands and castles to his family's holdings. Matus Cak seized the lands of many nobles, forced others to recognize his sovereignty, appropriated many royal citadels and in his ruthlessness did not even hesitate taking ecclesiastical properties. In 1299 he captured Trencin Castle which became the main stronghold of the mighty lord of the Vah and the Tatras. Ca.k's power extended from the Morava river to Spis and from the Danube to the Tatras, so that all of western Slovakia, except Bratislava and vicinity, and a large part of central Slovakia were under his rule. Beyond the Danube the mighty Vy s e h r a d Castle guarded the borders of Ca.k's country. In his Trencin citadel Matus Cak organized his entire court in regal splendor, and numerous courtiers did his bidding. As an independent ruler, he had his own army, coined his own money in Nitra �78 SLOVAKIA and established relations with neighboring rulers. Cak of Trencin built up his great power on the wealth which flowed to him from his extensive holdings. But the most reliable support of his power was the devotion and loyalty of his land administrators and his people. In Ca.k's army divisions of Slovak warriors also fought; they distinguished themselves by their courage, devotion and heroism. Ca.k's military glory, therefore, was in a large measure the merit of his Slovak subjects. At that time the Amadei Clan ruled over eastern Slovakia, including Kosice. It did not recognize the sovereignty of the Hungarian king. In 1301, when the death of King Andrew ill brought the Arpad dynasty to an end and several rulers sought the Hungarian throne, Slovakia was for all practical purposes an independent state under Matus Cak of Trencin. SLOVAKIA UNDER THE ANJOUS After Andrew ill's death, a part of the Hungarian nobility headed by Matus Cak called a son of King Wenceslaus of Bohemia to the throne, who already then was in possession of the Polish Crown. But the twelve-year-old Crown Prince Wenceslaus, crowned in Stolny Belehrad, was op.p osed by another group which sided with Pope Boniface VIII and chose Charles Robert of the French house of Anjou, who ruled in Naples. Relying on his power, Matus Cak of Trencin opposed Charles Robert and defended the interests of the Bohemian Wenceslaus. He resisted the An jous even after Wenceslaus renounced the Hungarian Crown and died shortly after in 1306 as the last male descendant of the Premysl dynasty. Soon after his accession to the throne, the Hungarian king attempted to break the power of the magnates and unite Hungary under his own rule. Matus Cak of Trencin continued to oppose the rule of Charles Robert. With his army he attacked the royal castle at Budin and fought the magnates and bishops who supported Charles Robert. In 1311, after he succeeded in gaining the support of the majority of the nobility, Charles Robert prepared for a showdown with Matus Cak. But the latter allied himself with �SLOVAKIA 79 the Amadei clan who opposed the king in eastern Slovakia. The combined armies of Matus Cak and the Amadei defended themselves successfully at Saris Castle and forced the king to retreat. The royal army withdrew to Spis to rally the support of the German colonists there. With these new allies Charles again set out after Matus Cak. In the decisive battle, which took place June 15, 1312, at Rozhanovce, not far from Kosice, the king was victorious. The Amadei clan was completely routed, lost all its citadels and properties and was forced to flee to Poland, where it found refuge at the court of Ladislaus Lokietek, whom it had aided a short time before against the Czechs. The Amadei never returned to Hungary, but remained in Poland, and Charles Robert became master of eastern Slovakia. Matus Ca.k's setback at Rozhanovce did not break him completely. He continued to act independently in western Slovakia. Indeed, his power and prestige were still so great that the German King Frederick the Handsome, sought his aid in 1315 against Louis, the Bavarian, and against John of Luxemburg. Even though Charles Robert captured Vysehrad and Komarno in 1317 and dangerously threatened the sovereignty of Matus Cak of Trencin, nevertheless, the lord of the Vah and the 'flatras continued to rule independently to the end of his life. It was only after Matus Cak died in the Trencin castle in 1321, that Charles Robert was able to extend his rule over the western half of Slovakia. The following year Charles Robert also seized Bratislava. which had been in the hands of the Austrian dukes since tht beginning of the fourteenth century. Slovakia, after a brief period of independence, again became a part of the kingdom of Hungary which, under the rule of the Anjou dynasty, enjoyed a period of great political, economic and cultural growth. As soon as Charles Robert reunited the Hungarian kingdom, his first care was to put the economic affairs of Hungary into order. He founded many new cities, supported the development of mining, established a sound financial system, and encouraged commerce with neighboring states. It was during this period that a large number of new cities were founded also in Slovakia ·a nd the older ones were granted new privileges. �80 SLOVAKIA Bratislava, Trnava, Levoca, and Kosice became important centers of international commerce. The king- ipaid special attention to the Slovak mining towns, because their wealth swelled the royal coffers appreciably. Mining commissions supervised all mining projects and regulated the sale of all precious metals. A Count of the Chamber headed the mining commission; he concluded the rental agreement with the ruler and guaranteed the king revenues from the mines. The territory of Slovakia, rich in metallic ores, was divided into two mining chambers: the western half of Slovakia belonged under the management of the mining chamber of Kremnica, while the eastern half was managed by the chamber of Smolnica, which later moved its headquarters to Kosice. Zupan Done, who managed a large part of central Slovakia as the administrator of Zvolen, was a loyal adherent and faithful aide of Robert. At that time the Zvolen region was an extensive area, out of which later were gradually formed the independent districts of Turiec, Orava and Liptov, besides that of Zvolen. Administrator Done founded Liptovsky Hradok, built many churches, endowed monasteries, and served at the pa!pal court in Avignon as a rei[)resentative of Charles Robert. Slovakia played a significant role even in the international relations of the Hungarian kingdom. Already in 1327, Charles Robert and the Bohemian king, met in Trnava, where they formed an alliance against the Habsburgs. Slovakia became the territory on which the interests of the Hungarian, Bohemian and Polish kingdoms were settled. In 1335 the legates of John of Bohemia, Casimir the Great of Po-land and Charles Robert assembled at Trenein to determine the conditions of a friendly alliance. At this meeting an agreement was reached which enabled the meeting of the three kings in Vysehrad Castle and thus contributed largely to safeguard peace in central Europe. Louis the Great (1342-1382), son and successor of Charles Robert, tried to extend the limits of the Hungarian kingdom. He waged frequent wars on the southern borders of Hungary and conquered the northern part of the Balkan peninsula and the territory of present-day Rumania. (To be continued) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 72 SLOVAKIA The History of Slovakia: By PHILIP A. HROBAK tContinued) With their economic development the cities and towns also became important centers of cultural life. German settlers brough higher education to the Slovaks, so that many Slovak cities became centers of western European culture. Schools originated near the parish churches and the monasteries. Hospitals were built in many cities. Into all the cities came the architects, contractors and artists, who built and decorated not on:ly churches and city halls, but also the homes of the prosperous citizens. Of course, all this had some influence on the outlying villages and hamlets which were in constant touch with the cities. CRAFTSMEN'S GUILDS IN SLOVAKIA Besides the merchants, who brought various merchandise from the neighboring countries into Slovak cities and formed the wealthiest group, there lived in these cities also the tradesmen, who established their workshops and sold their wares at the markets. Slovaks were acquainted with some trades, others they acquired from their neighbors, but the bulk of trades were introduced into Slovakia by the German colonists in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At first only those trades were fostered which served the everyday needs of the people (carpentry, cabinet-making, tanning, shoemaking, cloth-making, tailoring, etc.). Other trades originated and developed gradually with the economic and cultural conditions of the country. The higher the standard of living, the more trades were developed and applied in the cities, towns and hamlets. Just as the various types of trades came to the Slovaks by way of Germany, so came also the custom of the tradesmen organizing in associations which were called guilds. In every city there were as many guilds as there were different types of trades. As the number of trades SLOVAKIA 73 gradually increased, so did the number of guilds. In the large cities each trade had its own independent guild, while in the smaller towns, and later in the larger villages, the closely-related trades were united in one common guild. Only some cities were granted a monopoly on certain types of trade; e.g., only Kosice had the privilege of making linen (barchet) and Bardejov had the right to bleach cloth. In the larger cities work shops were usually grouped in particular streets so that many of these streets derived their names from the type of trade that prevailed there. In Bratislava, even today there still are streets called Sedlarska, Klobucnicka; in Trnava: Pekarska, Halenarska, Ostrozna, Masiarska ; in Banska Bystrica : Kovacska ; in Hlohovec: Mydlarska ; in Zilina and in Kosice: Zvonarska, Kovacska, Masiarska. As a technical organization, the guild took care of all the interests of its member,s. Each guild had its own written by-laws which contained detailed regulations called articles. The furrier's guild in Kosice had its own articles already in 1305. The Bratislava guild of butchers, shoemakers and bakers had written articles already in 1376. The organization of the guilds took place in the fourteenth century, attained its greatest development in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and lasted until modern times, when factory products began to give real competition to the products of the guilds. The by-laws of each city guild had to be approved by the city council and by the landlords; and by secular and church authorities in the smaller towns. The guilds frequently had their statutes approved even by their sovereigns. Due to the fact that many Slovak cities in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had a majority of German inhabitants, the guild regulations were written at first in German or Latin. But later, when the Slovaks became the majority, the by-laws and correspondence of the guilds were more frequently in the Slovak language. The Trnava Guild of Tailors already in 1558 did its writing in Slovak; the Butchers' Guild in 1562. The guilds of Trencin and Hlohovec used the Slovak language at the end of the sixteenth 74 SLOVAKIA century. In the seventeenth century all the smaller towns (Banovce, Bojnice, Beckov, Bytca, Holic, Humenne, !lava, Jelsava, Myjava, Prievidza, Puchov, Rajec, Skalica, Sastin, Topol'cany, etc.) kept their guild records in Slovak. Only a master-craftsman could become a member of a respectable guild, after he had fulfilled all technical and moral requirements. In each guild the number of mastercraftsmen was limited to prevent overproduction in goods. In Bratislava in 1376, there could be only twenty-eight butchers and sixteen bakers. Every member of a guild was obliged to present only perfect products at prices determined by the guild. All tradesmen had to work in the same way so that their products were of like quality and price, and all competition removed. At the head of each guild was a guildmaster, whom the members elected for a period of one year. If there were a number of master craftsmen in a guild, the leader of the guild was the chief guildmaster. The guildmaster was the head of the guild, represented the guild before the authorities, especially before the city council in whose presence he took the oath of office after his election. He took care of all the guild's interests, ipresided at meetings, held several times a year in his home, and at banquets. He supervised the work of all members of his particular guild, judged th~ir products especially before they went to market, saw to it that all regulations were strictly observed, and in his care were all documents and letters and finances of his guild. The guildmaster was ,s ole arbiter of all arguments between members; he imposed punishment and collected all fines. He was a very respected personality not only among the membership of his guild, but among the general public as well. Members of the guild were divided into senior and junior master craftsmen. The elder masters, authorized by the guildmaster, supervised the work of the members of the guild and maintained order and discipline. The younger masters were obliged to perform various menial duties, such as lighting candles in the church, serving as waiters at banquets, taking care of the weak and sick masters, dig- SLOVAKIA 75 ging graves and acting as pallbearers for deceased masters. After banquets, if the senior masters were unable to find their way home, the junior members were obliged to escort them. Great care was taken to see that all members of a guild conscientiousl y performed their religious obligations. The wealthier guilds had their own altar in the parish church which was dedicated to the patron saint of their guild. Every guild member was obliged to attend divine services on Sunday and Holy Days, and had to receive the sacraments at least once a year. At church processions the entire guild took part under its own standard, which bore the image of the patron saint and the trademark of the guild. Any member guilty of transgression s, which caused scandal and so harmed the good name of a respectable guild, was obliged to pay a prescribed sum into the guild's treasury, or give candles to his church. In the event of danger, when an enemy threatened the city, the guild members were obliged to defend the ramparts of the city. The city assigned to each guild a tower or bastion which the members had to keep in good order and supply it with weapons and ammunition. City bastions have retained individual guild names even to this day (Pekarska basta, Obuvnicka, Masiarska, etc.). If a fire broke out in the city, each guild had to take part in the rescue work and also bring a prescribed number of buckets of water to help extinguish it. So that only honorable persons could become members of a guild, people of good morals and technically well prepared, many years of apprenticeshi p and str ict education wer e prescribed for applicants. SLOVAKIA AFTER THE TURKISH INVASION When the Turks abandoned plundered Hungary, King Bela IV set out to reconstruct his country. He invited foreign settlers in large numbers, so that some might cultivate the depopulated areas. Many Germans settled in the hilly regions to found new villages and towns. But nomadic Cumans also came again to occupy the lowlands and the southern foothills of the Slovak mountains. The Ger mans 76 SLOVAKIA brought a high degree of culture into the country and contributed handsomely to its economy, while the Cumans were supposed to be the military support of the Hungarian king. But Hungary, even during the reign of Bela IV, was in a difficult situation, which was caused by internal revolutions and the growth of the Bohemian kingdom under Premysl Otokar II and his successors. Bela nr could not maintain the integrity of his kingdom. His son wanted to rule during his lifetime, and Bela was forced to let him rule over the Eastern part of Hungary. This partition of Hungary weakened it terribly and increased the dangers of invasion by outside enemies. While the members of the ruling family quarreled, the wealthy nobles strengthened thei r own positions and prestige. Slovak territory played an important role in the development of these relations, since both the Czechs and the Hungarians were interested in it. Premysl Otokar II became ruler of Austrian lands and extended his rule to the banks of the Adriatic Sea. Since the Hungarian king claimed a part of these lands, especially Styria, hostile relations between the Czechs and Hungarians resulted. But Premysl Otokar II also wanted Slovakia, and this only infuriated the Hungarian monarch more. Wars were inevitable. They were fought on Slovak soil and the Slovaks paid with their lives and property for the enmity existing between two foreign rulers. A part of western Slovakia, including Bratislava, Trnava and Nitra, became prey of the Bohemian king several times after 1271 and the victim of the ruthless devastation of the Czech armies. Finally, this area fell into the hands of Austrian dukes and barons. After Bela's death (1270), the Hungarian throne was occupied by rulers who became friendly with the pagan Cumans, spent most of their time in their camps, where they abandoned themselves to riotous, pagan living. Consequently the whole country suffered. In 1280 the Bishops and nobles persuaded King Ladislaus IV to abandon his reckless adventures and to domesticate the wild Cumans. But the Cumans rebelled and pillaged the whole country, including Slovakia, where they committed the most brutal SLOVAKIA 77 .atrocities. Later, in 1285, the Tartars again invaded Slovakia and devastated Spis and the whole of eastern Slovakia. This invasion was used by the Cumans to pillage western Slovakia. It was thus that Slovakia had to pay for the weaknesses and defects of the kings of Hungary and their friendly relations with the Cumans. The weaker the king, the more the power of the nobility increased. They appropriated royal and ecclesiastical properties and recognized no government over themselves. When King Ladislaus IV refused to reform and continued to spend most of his time in the Cuman camps, the Hungarian magnates assassinated him. His successor, Andrew III (1290-1301), tried to be a good king and did what he could to save the kingdom from catastrophe; but it was too late. By the end of the thirteenth century Hungary disintegrated into several parts in which wealthy magnates reigned as independent little kings. Among these nobles was Matus Cak (Mahtoosh Tchak) of Trencin, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," who become the ruler of a large part of Slovakia at the end of the thirteenth century. Ca:k was not a Slovak by birth, but his ancestors had acquired large tracts of land in Slovakia. When he became the highest official of the royalty during the reign of Andrew III, he took advantage of his position and added new lands and castles to his family's holdings. Matus Cak seized the lands of many nobles, forced others to recognize his sovereignty, appropriated many royal citadels and in his ruthlessness did not even hesitate taking ecclesiastical properties. In 1299 he captured Trencin Castle which became the main stronghold of the mighty lord of the Vah and the Tatras. Ca.k's power extended from the Morava river to Spis and from the Danube to the Tatras, so that all of western Slovakia, except Bratislava and vicinity, and a large part of central Slovakia were under his rule. Beyond the Danube the mighty Vy s e h r a d Castle guarded the borders of Ca.k's country. In his Trencin citadel Matus Cak organized his entire court in regal splendor, and numerous courtiers did his bidding. As an independent ruler, he had his own army, coined his own money in Nitra 78 SLOVAKIA and established relations with neighboring rulers. Cak of Trencin built up his great power on the wealth which flowed to him from his extensive holdings. But the most reliable support of his power was the devotion and loyalty of his land administrators and his people. In Ca.k's army divisions of Slovak warriors also fought; they distinguished themselves by their courage, devotion and heroism. Ca.k's military glory, therefore, was in a large measure the merit of his Slovak subjects. At that time the Amadei Clan ruled over eastern Slovakia, including Kosice. It did not recognize the sovereignty of the Hungarian king. In 1301, when the death of King Andrew ill brought the Arpad dynasty to an end and several rulers sought the Hungarian throne, Slovakia was for all practical purposes an independent state under Matus Cak of Trencin. SLOVAKIA UNDER THE ANJOUS After Andrew ill's death, a part of the Hungarian nobility headed by Matus Cak called a son of King Wenceslaus of Bohemia to the throne, who already then was in possession of the Polish Crown. But the twelve-year-old Crown Prince Wenceslaus, crowned in Stolny Belehrad, was op.p osed by another group which sided with Pope Boniface VIII and chose Charles Robert of the French house of Anjou, who ruled in Naples. Relying on his power, Matus Cak of Trencin opposed Charles Robert and defended the interests of the Bohemian Wenceslaus. He resisted the An jous even after Wenceslaus renounced the Hungarian Crown and died shortly after in 1306 as the last male descendant of the Premysl dynasty. Soon after his accession to the throne, the Hungarian king attempted to break the power of the magnates and unite Hungary under his own rule. Matus Cak of Trencin continued to oppose the rule of Charles Robert. With his army he attacked the royal castle at Budin and fought the magnates and bishops who supported Charles Robert. In 1311, after he succeeded in gaining the support of the majority of the nobility, Charles Robert prepared for a showdown with Matus Cak. But the latter allied himself with SLOVAKIA 79 the Amadei clan who opposed the king in eastern Slovakia. The combined armies of Matus Cak and the Amadei defended themselves successfully at Saris Castle and forced the king to retreat. The royal army withdrew to Spis to rally the support of the German colonists there. With these new allies Charles again set out after Matus Cak. In the decisive battle, which took place June 15, 1312, at Rozhanovce, not far from Kosice, the king was victorious. The Amadei clan was completely routed, lost all its citadels and properties and was forced to flee to Poland, where it found refuge at the court of Ladislaus Lokietek, whom it had aided a short time before against the Czechs. The Amadei never returned to Hungary, but remained in Poland, and Charles Robert became master of eastern Slovakia. Matus Ca.k's setback at Rozhanovce did not break him completely. He continued to act independently in western Slovakia. Indeed, his power and prestige were still so great that the German King Frederick the Handsome, sought his aid in 1315 against Louis, the Bavarian, and against John of Luxemburg. Even though Charles Robert captured Vysehrad and Komarno in 1317 and dangerously threatened the sovereignty of Matus Cak of Trencin, nevertheless, the lord of the Vah and the 'flatras continued to rule independently to the end of his life. It was only after Matus Cak died in the Trencin castle in 1321, that Charles Robert was able to extend his rule over the western half of Slovakia. The following year Charles Robert also seized Bratislava. which had been in the hands of the Austrian dukes since tht beginning of the fourteenth century. Slovakia, after a brief period of independence, again became a part of the kingdom of Hungary which, under the rule of the Anjou dynasty, enjoyed a period of great political, economic and cultural growth. As soon as Charles Robert reunited the Hungarian kingdom, his first care was to put the economic affairs of Hungary into order. He founded many new cities, supported the development of mining, established a sound financial system, and encouraged commerce with neighboring states. It was during this period that a large number of new cities were founded also in Slovakia ·a nd the older ones were granted new privileges. 80 SLOVAKIA Bratislava, Trnava, Levoca, and Kosice became important centers of international commerce. The king- ipaid special attention to the Slovak mining towns, because their wealth swelled the royal coffers appreciably. Mining commissions supervised all mining projects and regulated the sale of all precious metals. A Count of the Chamber headed the mining commission; he concluded the rental agreement with the ruler and guaranteed the king revenues from the mines. The territory of Slovakia, rich in metallic ores, was divided into two mining chambers: the western half of Slovakia belonged under the management of the mining chamber of Kremnica, while the eastern half was managed by the chamber of Smolnica, which later moved its headquarters to Kosice. Zupan Done, who managed a large part of central Slovakia as the administrator of Zvolen, was a loyal adherent and faithful aide of Robert. At that time the Zvolen region was an extensive area, out of which later were gradually formed the independent districts of Turiec, Orava and Liptov, besides that of Zvolen. Administrator Done founded Liptovsky Hradok, built many churches, endowed monasteries, and served at the pa!pal court in Avignon as a rei[)resentative of Charles Robert. Slovakia played a significant role even in the international relations of the Hungarian kingdom. Already in 1327, Charles Robert and the Bohemian king, met in Trnava, where they formed an alliance against the Habsburgs. Slovakia became the territory on which the interests of the Hungarian, Bohemian and Polish kingdoms were settled. In 1335 the legates of John of Bohemia, Casimir the Great of Po-land and Charles Robert assembled at Trenein to determine the conditions of a friendly alliance. At this meeting an agreement was reached which enabled the meeting of the three kings in Vysehrad Castle and thus contributed largely to safeguard peace in central Europe. Louis the Great (1342-1382), son and successor of Charles Robert, tried to extend the limits of the Hungarian kingdom. He waged frequent wars on the southern borders of Hungary and conquered the northern part of the Balkan peninsula and the territory of present-day Rumania. (To be continued)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The History of Slovakia (8/9) Description An account of the resource Philip A. Hrobak Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959 pp. 72-80 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 Relation A related resource continued from <a href="https://slovakia.omeka.net/items/show/260">Vol. 8, No. 3 (28), pp. 69-80</a><br />continues in <a href="https://slovakia.omeka.net/items/show/285">Vol. 9, No. 5 (30), pp. 75-80</a> LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/dd5cf87b9c392cd95a93d1dde94a90ec.pdf 2cbd75ff6a93b2f8719110fa0ef6fd93 PDF Text Text 68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the �SLOVAKIA 69 Slavs, to Great Moravia. With our forefathers they laid the foundations for the church organization, the Slav liturgy, Slovak alphabet and literature in Slovakia. In the 10th century Slovakia became a battlefield in the struggle among the Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans. At the beginning of the 11th century she became a part of the Hungarian Kingdom under the Arpad dynasty. In the 15th and 16th centuries the internal problems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasion of central Europe by the Turks in the 16th and 17th centuries reduced Hungary to the area of presentday Slovakia. For quite some time sessions of the Hungarian Parliament were held in Bratislava, the Slovak capital, and the coronations of Hungarian kings were celebrated there. The end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century mark the beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. In 1848 the Slovaks aided the Habsburgs in putting down the Kossuth rebellion with the hope that Slovakia would be finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated monarchy; this, however, was never r ealized. In the "Memorandum" of the Slovak nation of June 7, 1861, a Slovak national assemblage asked the parliament of Hungary to create an administrative unit for the counties inhabited by the Slovak population under the name of the "Slovak Region," with a degree of political and cultural autonomy, but the Hungarian parliament refused the petition. In 1891 the Serbs and Rumanians from Transylvania and the Slovaks convoked a congress in Budapest, claiming national rights and asking for a federative reform of the kingdom on the principle of equality, but to no avail. The end of the first World War saw the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Its passing ushered in a new and hopeful era for the Slovaks who were confident that the new Czecho-Slovak partnership within the framework of the newly created Czecho-Slovak state would at last fulfill their aspirations. General Milan R. Stefanik, champion of the Slovak cause, had his misgivings. Andrew Hlinka, great Slovak patriotic leader, went clandestinely to the �70 SLOVAKIA Paris Peace Conference in September of 1919 advocating an international guarantee for the self-government of the Slovak nation within the state of Czecho-Slovakia. He was denounced by the Czecho-Slovak delegation, headed by Dr. Eduard Benes, to the French police as a Habsburg spy and was forced to return to Slovakia where by the order of Prague he was imprisoned until April 1920. In the opinion of the Slovak leaders, the Czecho-Slovak state became a Czech state, enlarged by Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Close to eleven hundred years elapsed before the· Slovak nation on March 14, 1939, finally declared its independence. Even though the Slovak State was largely the result of a tense international situation, it nevertheless corresponded to the aspirations of the Slovak people· for freedom and the principle of self-determination and self-government. Altogether 27 states recognized the international individuality of Slovakia, among them the Holy See, Switzerland, Sweden, France the Soviet Unon, and Great Britain. The Slovak Constitution contained principles which in some aspects combined the features of the liberal state, of Christian democracy, and of the authoritarian state. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation. As the second great war drew to a close, at the end of April, 1945, Moscow claimed exclusive rights to the occupation of the territory formerly comprising CzechoSlovakia. By September of that year, the Czech Communists were well on the road to power. In the first election of May 26, 1946, 56 percent of the voters in the Czech lands elected 130 out of 229 deputies from the Marxist bloc; in Slovakia, however, the Reds were soundly trounced. The stage was set for the transition, and the complete seizure of the government by the Czech Communists. The Select Committee on Communist Agression of the Ameri- �SLOVAKIA 71 ,can House of Representatives in 1953, on evidence before it, estimated, that there were about 100 forced labor camps in Czecho-Slovakia, confining approximately 300,000 political prisoners. In Slovakia, as elsewhere, the Church bears the full fury of Communist terror and brutality. The Slovak Pre.sident, Monsignor Joseph Tisco, was sentenced to death by a People's Court, and executed by order of the Benes government. There are priests imprisoned in the CzechoSlovak Republic at the present time. This does not include the deported monks, nuns, and priests of the Eastern (Greek) Catholic Rite. Slovak bishops Vojtassak, Buzalka, .and Gojdic are also in prison. Slovakia's resistance to Communism continues in the tradition of its resistance against all who would destroy her identity, her religion, and culture, for she carries the glorious torch of Christianity which she received 1100 years ago from the hands of two saintly brothers, Cyril and Methodius. Those of us who have had the fortune to live most of our lives in a free country take our freedom and independence for granted, but our brothers over there, less fortunate than we, are now engaged in a struggle to regain it. Together with their enslaved brother Slav nations, they are looking forward to the day when they can again rededicate themselves as free men to the universal principle set out in the preamble to the American Constitution "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and institute a new government." We would be remiss in our moral duty if we did not do all in our power to hasten the advent of that day. � 68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the �SLOVAKIA 69 Slavs, to Great Moravia. With our forefathers they laid the foundations for the church organization, the Slav liturgy, Slovak alphabet and literature in Slovakia. In the 10th century Slovakia became a battlefield in the struggle among the Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans. At the beginning of the 11th century she became a part of the Hungarian Kingdom under the Arpad dynasty. In the 15th and 16th centuries the internal problems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasion of central Europe by the Turks in the 16th and 17th centuries reduced Hungary to the area of presentday Slovakia. For quite some time sessions of the Hungarian Parliament were held in Bratislava, the Slovak capital, and the coronations of Hungarian kings were celebrated there. The end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century mark the beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. In 1848 the Slovaks aided the Habsburgs in putting down the Kossuth rebellion with the hope that Slovakia would be finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated monarchy; this, however, was never r ealized. In the "Memorandum" of the Slovak nation of June 7, 1861, a Slovak national assemblage asked the parliament of Hungary to create an administrative unit for the counties inhabited by the Slovak population under the name of the "Slovak Region," with a degree of political and cultural autonomy, but the Hungarian parliament refused the petition. In 1891 the Serbs and Rumanians from Transylvania and the Slovaks convoked a congress in Budapest, claiming national rights and asking for a federative reform of the kingdom on the principle of equality, but to no avail. The end of the first World War saw the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Its passing ushered in a new and hopeful era for the Slovaks who were confident that the new Czecho-Slovak partnership within the framework of the newly created Czecho-Slovak state would at last fulfill their aspirations. General Milan R. Stefanik, champion of the Slovak cause, had his misgivings. Andrew Hlinka, great Slovak patriotic leader, went clandestinely to the �70 SLOVAKIA Paris Peace Conference in September of 1919 advocating an international guarantee for the self-government of the Slovak nation within the state of Czecho-Slovakia. He was denounced by the Czecho-Slovak delegation, headed by Dr. Eduard Benes, to the French police as a Habsburg spy and was forced to return to Slovakia where by the order of Prague he was imprisoned until April 1920. In the opinion of the Slovak leaders, the Czecho-Slovak state became a Czech state, enlarged by Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Close to eleven hundred years elapsed before the· Slovak nation on March 14, 1939, finally declared its independence. Even though the Slovak State was largely the result of a tense international situation, it nevertheless corresponded to the aspirations of the Slovak people· for freedom and the principle of self-determination and self-government. Altogether 27 states recognized the international individuality of Slovakia, among them the Holy See, Switzerland, Sweden, France the Soviet Unon, and Great Britain. The Slovak Constitution contained principles which in some aspects combined the features of the liberal state, of Christian democracy, and of the authoritarian state. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation. As the second great war drew to a close, at the end of April, 1945, Moscow claimed exclusive rights to the occupation of the territory formerly comprising CzechoSlovakia. By September of that year, the Czech Communists were well on the road to power. In the first election of May 26, 1946, 56 percent of the voters in the Czech lands elected 130 out of 229 deputies from the Marxist bloc; in Slovakia, however, the Reds were soundly trounced. The stage was set for the transition, and the complete seizure of the government by the Czech Communists. The Select Committee on Communist Agression of the Ameri- �SLOVAKIA 71 ,can House of Representatives in 1953, on evidence before it, estimated, that there were about 100 forced labor camps in Czecho-Slovakia, confining approximately 300,000 political prisoners. In Slovakia, as elsewhere, the Church bears the full fury of Communist terror and brutality. The Slovak Pre.sident, Monsignor Joseph Tisco, was sentenced to death by a People's Court, and executed by order of the Benes government. There are priests imprisoned in the CzechoSlovak Republic at the present time. This does not include the deported monks, nuns, and priests of the Eastern (Greek) Catholic Rite. Slovak bishops Vojtassak, Buzalka, .and Gojdic are also in prison. Slovakia's resistance to Communism continues in the tradition of its resistance against all who would destroy her identity, her religion, and culture, for she carries the glorious torch of Christianity which she received 1100 years ago from the hands of two saintly brothers, Cyril and Methodius. Those of us who have had the fortune to live most of our lives in a free country take our freedom and independence for granted, but our brothers over there, less fortunate than we, are now engaged in a struggle to regain it. Together with their enslaved brother Slav nations, they are looking forward to the day when they can again rededicate themselves as free men to the universal principle set out in the preamble to the American Constitution "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and institute a new government." We would be remiss in our moral duty if we did not do all in our power to hasten the advent of that day. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the SLOVAKIA 69 Slavs, to Great Moravia. With our forefathers they laid the foundations for the church organization, the Slav liturgy, Slovak alphabet and literature in Slovakia. In the 10th century Slovakia became a battlefield in the struggle among the Slovaks, Magyars, and Germans. At the beginning of the 11th century she became a part of the Hungarian Kingdom under the Arpad dynasty. In the 15th and 16th centuries the internal problems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasion of central Europe by the Turks in the 16th and 17th centuries reduced Hungary to the area of presentday Slovakia. For quite some time sessions of the Hungarian Parliament were held in Bratislava, the Slovak capital, and the coronations of Hungarian kings were celebrated there. The end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century mark the beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. In 1848 the Slovaks aided the Habsburgs in putting down the Kossuth rebellion with the hope that Slovakia would be finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated monarchy; this, however, was never r ealized. In the "Memorandum" of the Slovak nation of June 7, 1861, a Slovak national assemblage asked the parliament of Hungary to create an administrative unit for the counties inhabited by the Slovak population under the name of the "Slovak Region," with a degree of political and cultural autonomy, but the Hungarian parliament refused the petition. In 1891 the Serbs and Rumanians from Transylvania and the Slovaks convoked a congress in Budapest, claiming national rights and asking for a federative reform of the kingdom on the principle of equality, but to no avail. The end of the first World War saw the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Its passing ushered in a new and hopeful era for the Slovaks who were confident that the new Czecho-Slovak partnership within the framework of the newly created Czecho-Slovak state would at last fulfill their aspirations. General Milan R. Stefanik, champion of the Slovak cause, had his misgivings. Andrew Hlinka, great Slovak patriotic leader, went clandestinely to the 70 SLOVAKIA Paris Peace Conference in September of 1919 advocating an international guarantee for the self-government of the Slovak nation within the state of Czecho-Slovakia. He was denounced by the Czecho-Slovak delegation, headed by Dr. Eduard Benes, to the French police as a Habsburg spy and was forced to return to Slovakia where by the order of Prague he was imprisoned until April 1920. In the opinion of the Slovak leaders, the Czecho-Slovak state became a Czech state, enlarged by Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Close to eleven hundred years elapsed before the· Slovak nation on March 14, 1939, finally declared its independence. Even though the Slovak State was largely the result of a tense international situation, it nevertheless corresponded to the aspirations of the Slovak people· for freedom and the principle of self-determination and self-government. Altogether 27 states recognized the international individuality of Slovakia, among them the Holy See, Switzerland, Sweden, France the Soviet Unon, and Great Britain. The Slovak Constitution contained principles which in some aspects combined the features of the liberal state, of Christian democracy, and of the authoritarian state. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation. As the second great war drew to a close, at the end of April, 1945, Moscow claimed exclusive rights to the occupation of the territory formerly comprising CzechoSlovakia. By September of that year, the Czech Communists were well on the road to power. In the first election of May 26, 1946, 56 percent of the voters in the Czech lands elected 130 out of 229 deputies from the Marxist bloc; in Slovakia, however, the Reds were soundly trounced. The stage was set for the transition, and the complete seizure of the government by the Czech Communists. The Select Committee on Communist Agression of the Ameri- SLOVAKIA 71 ,can House of Representatives in 1953, on evidence before it, estimated, that there were about 100 forced labor camps in Czecho-Slovakia, confining approximately 300,000 political prisoners. In Slovakia, as elsewhere, the Church bears the full fury of Communist terror and brutality. The Slovak Pre.sident, Monsignor Joseph Tisco, was sentenced to death by a People's Court, and executed by order of the Benes government. There are priests imprisoned in the CzechoSlovak Republic at the present time. This does not include the deported monks, nuns, and priests of the Eastern (Greek) Catholic Rite. Slovak bishops Vojtassak, Buzalka, .and Gojdic are also in prison. Slovakia's resistance to Communism continues in the tradition of its resistance against all who would destroy her identity, her religion, and culture, for she carries the glorious torch of Christianity which she received 1100 years ago from the hands of two saintly brothers, Cyril and Methodius. Those of us who have had the fortune to live most of our lives in a free country take our freedom and independence for granted, but our brothers over there, less fortunate than we, are now engaged in a struggle to regain it. Together with their enslaved brother Slav nations, they are looking forward to the day when they can again rededicate themselves as free men to the universal principle set out in the preamble to the American Constitution "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and institute a new government." We would be remiss in our moral duty if we did not do all in our power to hasten the advent of that day.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource March 14, 1939: Slovak Independence Day Description An account of the resource Andrew Pastor Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959 pp. 68-71 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pastor, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/94c7af9930b8fd081eee8daaa38561f2.pdf ef787b1d3973786a30ecccafcb3db7c9 PDF Text Text SLOVAK.IA 47 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL. D., PH. D. mE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC I Introductory Note "No Constitution can be considered perfect or permanent", says R. G. Gettell in his renowned work Political Science. "The final requisite for a good constitution is that the constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State" (1). Among the critics and adversaries of the Slovak Republic there were few, if any, who read the Slovak Constitution, the fundamental principles that determined the basic nature of the Slovak ,S tate and Government, the distribution of its severeign powers among the various organs of government and the relation of the government to the people over whom its authority was exercised. We, therefore, hardly find someone who based his criticism of the Slovak Republic on the constitutional or legal basis or on the constitutional form of the Slovak state. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the U. S., in its special report No. 8, prepared in co-operation with Georgetown University and a group of experts from various parts of the United States, expressed its opinion in the following terms: "The Constitution contained principles, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal state, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state. In the beginning all power of the Slovak Republic was vested in the Parliament but later on, in 1941, after Slovakia had entered the war against the ,soviet Union, the executive was to prevai I over the legislature. "The Slovak state was far from being a perfect democracy in the traditional sense. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation" (2). This statement, though basically true and expressing to a great extent the view of the writer, should be complemented by a political as well as juridical analysis of the text of the Constitution and of the circumstances in which �48 SLOVAKIA it was drafted and adopted by the Slovak Diet. The first question seems to be: from whence came the features of the liberal, the Christian democratic , and the authoritari an State? As for the democratic traditions in Slovakia, they antidated not only the attainment of political independen ce in 1939, but also the inclusion of Slovakia into the CzechoSlovak Republic in 1918. The Slovak nobility was assimilated by the Ma,gyars to a great extent before the Slovak national revival took place at the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century, so that no aristocratic traditions could hinder the acceptance and developmen t of modern democratic ideas. In fact, Slovakia became the refuge of many lofty intellectual efforts during the 17th century and later it "revealed itself as a meeting-pla ce of practically all contempor ary currents of cultural and political ideas" (3). It is true that the policy of Budapest, after the Ausgleich of 1867, aimed at suppressing Slovak nationalism and Slovak political activities. This resulted in the reduction of the IS lovak representat ion in Budapest's Parliament to only two representat ives at the end of World War I. However, this situation cannot reasonably be used as a yardstick for Slovak disposition for political maturity. This became evident shortly after the creation of the CzechoSlovak Republic, when not only genuine Slovak political parties sprang up, but also, more or less, all the Czech parties extended their activities into Slovakia. Practically all political tendencies from socialism to agrarian democracy and communism found an echo in the Slovak poulation. The genuine and most representat ive Slovak parties were: 1) the Slovak People's Party, later called Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the Party of National l:Jnity (since October 1938), representin g the bulk of the nationally conscious Catholic population, although some non-Catholics were among its members (the party never officially labeled its program as Catholic); and, 2) the Slovak National Party which organized those Slovak Protestants who remained faithful to the traditions of Slovak national- �SLOVAKIA 49 ism and to the idea of distinct Slovak culture and selfgovernment. All political parties in Slovakia developed during the period of 191'8-1938 along the lines of the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia which is often praised as a model of modern democratic constitutions. It must, therefore, sound highly improbable and illogial when adversaries of the Slovak State assert that all this changed from one day to another, that all the democratic traditions of Czecho-Slovakia ,w ere so weak that they were transformed without any resistance into "fascist" and "nazi" tendencies by the simple act of the declaration of Slovakia's independence. It would certainly be safe to assume that democracy survived, in many respects, the Declaration of 1M arch 14, 19'39, and that the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect the principles of democratic thinking and institutions which were alive in Slovakia. Actually, they survived to such an extent that in many respects the Slovak Constitution has a strinking resemblance to the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (4). Provisions referring to legislative powers of the Parliament, election and powers of the President of the Republic, the judiciary, and the whole legal structure of the Slovak State had much in common with the Constitution of Czecho..!Slovakia which, like the ,S lovak Constitution, adopted principles of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, or the fundamental principles of French and American Constitutions. The authors of the Slovak Constitution were jurists and parliamentarians educated predominantly at the universities and in the Parliament of Czecho-:Slovakia; with one or two exceptions, they were men who studied law abroad and were mainly responsible for the liberal elements in the draft of the Slovak Constitution. There are, of course, striking differences, too, as far as the ideological bases of these two constitutions are concerned. The religiosity of the Slovak people and their Christian world outlook gave quite a different ideological basis to the Slovak constitution in general, and to its many provisions regarding social institutions, which reflect the ideas of the Papal encyclicals in particular. While the Slovak �50 SLOVAKIA Constitution presents God as the ultimate source of Law and declares that the function of the Slovak Republic is to unite all the moral and economic forces of the people in a Christian and national community in order to become the executor of social justice and the protector of common good, the ideological roots of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution were as far from God and religion as were Prague's leading politicians. On the other hand, the Slovak Constitution could not but differ in provisions or institutions which were imposed by the international situation and which are described as "authoritarian." As we mentioned before, the final requisite for a good Constitution, according to Gettell, is that the Constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State. While the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia reflected certain ideological currents and political structures of the French Republic which was mainly responsible for the creation and existence of Czecho-Slovakia and for the new organization of Central Europe after First World War, the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect a new situation, new organization and a "new order" in Central Europe, created by Hitler's Germany in 1938-1939 with the consent of France and England. Considered objectively, one has to to recognize that it took courage and deep attachment to traditions to proclaim in Slovakia, in 1939, God as the ultimate source of Law and order and to use Papal encyclicals as the basis for social institutions, human and family rights on the one hand, and, on the other, "to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czechoslovak state" (5). When, in the summer of 1939, the committee appointed by the Slovak Parliament, labored on the draft of the Constitution, the political crisis in Europe was nearing its climax, and the ideological confusion attained irrational dimensions. The area of Central and Eastern Europe was exposed to ideological struggles and political ambitions of at least three Great Powers and, thus, Democracy, Communism, and Nazism as well as remnants of liberal tendencies were engaged in a rough competition for influence over the Central European peoples. Slovakia, in the middle of this ideological ferment and 1 �SLOVAKIA 51 international instability, found herself also threatened by aggression or territorial claims from her neighbors, so that even the very existence of the newly created state on the banks of the Danube and the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains was, from its beginning, endangered. To expect, in the midst of such political and ideological chaos, any uncompromis ing attitudes on the side of the Constitutiona l Committee would amount to expecting from it something humanly impossible. Slovakia had to take a compromising position politically and ideologically not only for reasons of good relations with her neighbors, but also, if not in the first place, in order to survive as a State, since Democracy was considered a provocation, and, in its classic form, in the summer of 1939, was already dying in all Central Eiuropean countries. An analysis of the main principles and fundamental rights will show how far the work of the Constitutiona l Committee of Slovakia - despite its compromising tenor reflects the tendencies and genuine traditions of the Slovak people. According to the expert opinion of several jurists, the Constitution adopted practically the whole sysb~m of democratic-lib eralistic constitutions of the 1'8th and 19th centuries and, though Slovakia was weighed in from the right and left between Godless bolshevism and anti-Christian neo-paganism , she brought forth a constitution "saturated with the Christian spirit and especially with the principles of the social encyclicals of the Holy See" (6). As for the features of Christian democracy, besides many institutions concerned with social life, family, attitude to work, and function of property, in which we can find the influence of modern Christian sociology, the Christian character was given to the whole Constitution by its Preamble which reads as follows: "The Slovak nation, under the protection of Almighty God, survived throughout the ages on the territory destined for its national development and there, with the help of God, Who is the Source of all Power and Law, established its independent Slovak State. "The SI ova k State unites, according to Natural Law, all the moral and economic forces of the Nation in a Christian and national community for the purpose of regulating clashing social aspirations and mutually opposed interests of all occupational and professional groups, and has for its goal the highest attainable degree of happi- �52 SLOVAKIA ness of society and the individual. This ideal can only be achieved through a moral and political process, initiated by the State, which in harmonious unity will function as an executor of social justice and a protector of common good." It would certainly be difficult to find among the constitutions of modern states any other which so clearly states that God must be recognized as the original source of Law and Order and that the function of the nation in a Christian and national community in order to become "an executor of social justice and protector of common good" (7). The accentuation of the social function of the State, which we find in the Preamble, and the emphasis placed on the happiness of both the individual and society, are an indication of the legislators' intention to build a modern welfare state on the principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how these ideas found their expressions in particular provisions and institutions of the Slovak Constitution. n General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution It is not necessary to be an expert in constitutional law to notice that the Slovak Constitution contains all the democratic devices which political science usually requires from democratic constitutions - such as the separation of powers, the doctrine of checks and balances, and the principle of rule by law. Even the most bitter adversaries of Slovak independence - the Communists and the supporters of Czechoslovakism - did not try to deny these features to the Slovak Constitution. "The Slovak State was intended to make a full show of independence," wrote Alexander IKunosi, one of today's communist diplomats of Czecho-,Slovakia, in 11944, from his London exile: "It was to be vested with all the institutions formerly possessed by the Czechoslovak State. Steps were taken to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czecho-Slovak State" (8). Admitting this, the adversaries of the Slovak Republic could not try to say that "the parlimentary facade of Government in Slovakia had, of course, no real signifi1 �SLOVAKIA 53 cance, " or that the "Diet did not express the will of the nation or the people," which, as we shall see further , hardly correspond with the truth since the Parliament in Slovakia was not only in theory but also in fact the suprem e organ of the State and the most essential powers were vested in Parliament from the beginning to the end. The Constitution was adopted by a legally constit uted Slovak Diet which was established in accordance with the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and on the basis of the general election which took place on December 18, 19'38. According to Law No. 299, adopted on November 22, 1938, Slovakia became an autonomous part of Czecho-Slovakia, with her own Government and her own Diet composed of 63 members, vested with legislative powers goveerning not only internal affairs, but required also for ratification of Czecho-Slovak international agreements concerning Slovakia. This Diet, summoned to a session on March 14, 1939, by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Emil H a c h a , declared Slovakia an independent State, and a special committee of the Diet prepared the draft of the Constitution which was adopted unanimously on July 31, 1939, as Law No. 185. The draft of the Constitution was preceded by a study of several existing modern constitutions with a view to giving the country a set of principles that would correspond with contemporary constitutional thinking and the practical needs and national traditions of the Slovak people. The text was prepared by two university professors of Law, Dr. V. Tuka and Dr. F. :Durcansky, and by several jurists and parliamentarians of young and old generations, Senator Dr. K. Mederly, Dr. M. Sokol, Dr. V. Tvrdy, and Dr. Cerhelyi. In 103 short articles (paragraphs) divided into 13 chapters, the Slovak Constitution gave a radical as well as social basis to the new State in Central Europe. The first article of the Constitution declared the Slovak State a Republic with a President as an elected head, with t erms, according to Gettell, are used to indicate a representative democracy (9) . According to articles 6, 7, 8, and 9, legislative power �54 SLOVAKIA for the entire country vested in the Parliament, composed of 80 members and elected in a general, direct, equal, and secret suffrage for a period of five years. The right to vote belonged to every citizen over 2'1 years of age, man and woman, without racial or religious discrimination. This right to be elected to Parliament belonged to citizens over 30 years of age. The Parliament was based on the unicameral system,. and the President of the Republic was obliged to convene the Parliament for regular sessions twice a year, and for extraordinary sessions whenever the majority of members. demanded such a session. Laws promulgated by the Parliament required the President's signature for their validity. Paragraph 26 provided, however, that laws could be promulgated despite the President's veto, if they were adopted by a three-fifths majority in the presence of a two-thirds majority of deputies. The right to appoint governments belonged to the President, but the Government was responsible to Parliament and subject to its vote of confidence. The Parliament also had the right of prosecution of the· President for high treason. Part IN of the Constitution deals with the powers and functions of the President, who was elected for a period of seven years. Any citizen, 40 years of age or over, was eligible for the office, and the election was valid if two. thirds of the members were present and the candidate obtained a three-fifths majority. A comparision of powers and functions of the Slovak ·P resident, as defined in the Constitution, with those of other parliamentary democracies will prove that his powers were somewhere between the extensive functions and powers of the American president and the purely representative functions of the Presidents of France (before De Gaulle). He represented the State internationally, had the right, with the consent of Parliament to declare wars and conclude peace, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to appoint, but not to dismiss university professors, judges, civil servants, and military officers of the three highest categories. He also had the right to be present at the sessions of the Government and Council of State, to request their convention under his chairmanship, �SLOVAKIA 55 to convene, dissolve and prologue Parliament, to sign or veto Parliament's acts, etc. While making the president a dominant figure of the executive, the Constitution, on the other hand, contained provisions which were designed to prevent dictatorial powers (10). The Parliament was able, as we have seen, to promulgate laws even if opposed by the President and according to paragraph 40, "any executive act of the president requires counter-signature by a competent cabinet minister for its validity." No person could be re-elected more than once to the presidential office and when the president died during his term, abdicated or was permanently unable to exercise his functions, it was the duty of the Prime Minister to assume temporary functions of the president. A new president had to be elected by the iParliament within thirty days. The President represented, together with the Cabinet, the executive of the !Slovak Republic and, consequently, the Slovak Government had some features of a presidential type of government and, at the same time, it also contained elements of parliamentary government. An expert on constitutional theories can prove both, because - while the essential characteristics of parliamentary government are: 1) a politically independent head of State; and, 2) a cabinet which is politically responsible to Parliament - "parliamentary Government may also develop in the opposite direction. The Cabinet can become the dominant political organ, able to control the government of the country and direct the work of the Parliament which assists it in the execution of its program," says Andre Mathiot in his ercellent treatise "The British Political System" (11). it is not, however, our intention to discuss theoretical issues here. One can easily prove that the executive in the Slovak Republic was also predominantly of the presidential type, because "every system of 'P arliamentary government has its own distinctive features, resulting from a complex of many different factors. History, the national temperament, beliefs and ideologies, conventions of political behavior, attempts to imitate a particular model or to avoid certain dangers, etc." - states Mathiot. All these factors �56 SLOVAKIA played their distinctive roles in the Slovak Constitution and made it a constitution "sui generis." As for the powers and constitution of the Slovak Cabinet, the President of the Republic appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and determined which member would administer individual ministries (Article 41). The Parliament was also empowered to call the Cabinet and its individual members to political responsibility and to express lack of confidence which would result in the dissolution of the cabinet (Article 48) . Practical considerations demanded, on the other hand, a certain measure of delegation of legislative powers to the Cabinet. The jurisdiction of the Cabinet was limited to governmental orders, namely, during a national emergency, or orders pertaining to the execution of certain types of laws, and within the limits specified in the laws. Validity of such orders was conditional, since the Prime Minister was obliged to submit them within three months to the Parliament, which, in turn, could disallow such measures or could make whatever changes it deemed necessary, or pass it as its own law (12). Chapter V of the Slovak Constitution defined the functions and composition of the Council of State, a pecial body composed of outstanding personalities from various walks of life whose functions pertained to a sort of control of the political life in ,Slovakia. The Council was composed of 6 members appointed by the President of the Republic, ten members were chosen by the Slovak People's Party, two members by the registered parties of ethnic groups, and one was delegated by each estate. The Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly were also memb2rs of the Council. The functions of the Council were defined by the Article 52 and consisted in initiating legislation, controlling and prosecuting the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, and in advising the President and the government on matters of a political, cultural, and economic nature. The Council also prepared the list of candidates for parliamentary elections and made decisions concerning the loss of 0 �SLOVAKIA 57 parliamentary seats, following a request from the President of the Assembly. Politically, the reason for the existence of the Council was given by the desire to have, in the absence of a Senate, representatives in the political life of the new State from groups or professions who usually did not look for an election to Parliament, but whose advice, abilities, and moral stature were destined to help the Government in its endeavour to make the population happy and united behind the political leadership. The authors of the draft of the Constitution expressed their intention in stating that "the Council of State is the expression of political and national unity, and also joins the national and political life with the constitutional representatives, combining itself the function of legal initiation and control." Following the social doctrine of the Papal encyclicals, the authors of the Constitution also included in their draft certain institutions which characterize the so-called "corporative" systems. Chapter VII of the Slovak Constitution had foressen organization of Slovakia's inhabitants into six self-administered bodies called "stavy" (estates) according to occupation and profession: the association of workers and employers in agriculture, in industry, trade, commerce and banking; the association of the free professions and the association of State and public employees. "The associations included both employers and employees and they were assigned to take care of the economic, social, and cultural interests of their members, to solve labor and wage disputes and problems among employees and employers, and to help members of the association to achieve better results in their industries and occupations and a higher standard of living for the nation (Article 62). Acting on Law No. 297 of the Collection of Laws, the President of the Republic appointed the presidents on November 19, 1940, and the aim of the associations was again given as "to manifest the unity of the Slovak workers' community, without heed to classes and callings, and bearing in mind only the interests of the nation and the State" (13). As for the judiciary, we have already stated that the Slovak Constitution was based on the principle of separa- �58 SLOVAKIA tion of powers, as defined by modern political theories. There were three types of courts: courts of law, administrative courts, and military courts. The organization of courts and their legal competence were left to a special legislation. As in any modern constitutions, the Slovak Constitution provided that the courts of law were empowered to review any decision of administrative courts and, on the other hand, the jurisdiction of military courts could be extended over the civil population during wartime and for war crimes. "Judges are independent," states Article 67, "in their judicial functions and are bound only by law." The Constitution contained provisions that no person could be deprived of the judge designated by law to hear the case (Article 62), and Article 66 made the judiciary free of any interference either on the part of administrative or political leadership. The professional judges were appointed to their positions permanently and "they have held a highly privileged position, appropriate to their equally high office," states Judge A. Peltzner (14). The Chapter dealing with the rights and obligations of the citizens (Chapter X) can sustain comparision with any democratic and liberal constitution and a modern "Bill of Rights." The 1Slovak Constitution guaranteed full and equal rights to all citizens without distinction of sex, race, creed, occupation, or ethnic origin. The guarantees refer to personal freedoms, private ownership, religious freedom, freedom of expression of opinion, scientific research and arts (15), provided they were exercised within the limits of valid laws and did not come into conflict with public order and Christian morals [Article 85] - (16). The Constitution was based on the principle that "no person can be punished for behavior which is not in conflict with valid legal form and for which a punishment has not been previously determined," applying the old principle "nulla poena sine lege," and all inhabitants, regardless of origin, nationality, religion, or occupation, were entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property (Article 81). There are, in the Slovak Constitution, even some particular provisions which intended to give to the Slovak State �SLOVAKIA 59 a progressive, modern, social and Christian character. Such provisions are as follows: Ownership has a social function and demands from the owner adminstration in the best interest of the common good (Article 79). Marriage, family and motherhood are under the· strict protection of the legal order (Article 86). Labor is protected. Exploitation of socially weak citizens is. prohibited. Wages should be adequate to the working effort and family status. Mental and physical work is a civil duty, etc. "All these provisions can be described," says Dr. Peltzner, "as an intensified care and protection of the family, social purpose of private ownership, protection of the working man, his wages, and social justice to all. All were aimed at achieving a new social order, where clashing social interests would be minimized and eventually abolished. This concept of social and labor legislation was greatly influenced by the encyclical letters of the Popes of the Roman Catholic Church, especially by Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno" (17). ln order to present a complete picture of the Slovak Constitution, we have to mention provisions regarding political parties. The chapter dealing with the political organization (Chapter Vil) merely legalized the existing situation which was created in Slovakia by the so-called Zilina .A:greement of October 6, 1938, long before Slovakia declared her independence and the Parliament adopted the Constitution. The provision referring to political parties consists of only two paragraphs, the first stating that "the Slovak people participate in political life through the medium of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the Party of Slovak National Unity) ," and the second legalizing the political activities of ethnic groups, providing that "the ethnic groups participate in political life through a medium of their own political party, provided that such a party can be considered as a representative of the political will of the entire ethnic group" (Articles 58, 59). Since October, 1938, when the number of political parties was reduced due to internal and international circumstances and development, there were in Slovakia three po1 �60 SLOVAKIA litical parties, legally constituted and taking part in the political life of Slovakia. The Communist and the Social Democrat parties, representing only ten deputies, had been dissolved or suppressed following the Zilina Agreement. Six other parties merged into the Slovak National Unity Party, which remained the backbone of the political s y s t e m of autonomous Slovakia before March 1939, and of the Slovak Republic thereafter. The German and Magyar ethnic groups were represented by two minority parties, and the Ukrainian minority by a member of Parliament within Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the Party of National Unity. The fact that the Slovak Constitution provided for only one party for the Slovak people caused certain criticism abroad and marked, according to some critics, the Slovak R e p u b 1 i c as an authoritarian state. For everybody who knows the Slovak political life between the years 1918-1939 and who is aware of the composition of the Slovak Diet in which representatives of practically all previous political parties except Communists and Social Democrats had their seats, such reproaches would seem to be more of a theoretical than practical nature. There is no doubt that without provisions restricting political life of the Slovak population to one party only, even if it was composed of fractions of many parties, the Constitution would have looked more democratic and beyond reproach, because a multiparty system is one of the main characteristics of modern representative democracies. However, war conditions and specific needs and dangers forced the Slovak political leaders to adopt many restrictions which are understandable only if we take into consideration all the problems and dangers which the Slovak Republic had to face from the first days of its existence to the end of the war from the outside and the inside. This as well as other features which marked the Slovak Constitution as "authoritarian" were or will be discussed later in this treatise. Before concluding our remarks on the general characteristics of the Slovak Constitution, it seems appropriate to analyze the formal features of the text and its contents. In this respect, we can say that from the point of view of political science and constitutional law, the Slo- �SLOVAKIA 61 vak Constitution conforms to all requirements which political science demands from modern constitutions. It can be classified as a comprehensive set of fundamental principles and laws covering the whole field of government and making provisions for the exercise of political power. It outlined the governmental organization, determined the relations of the governors and the governed, and provided a legal method for amendments, so that it might be changed when necessary by the prescribed majority in Parliament. m "Authoritarian" Features and Deviations The statement of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives mentions that the Slovak Constitution contained also principles of "an authoritarian state." There is, however, no indication in the report where these principles are to be found, except perhaps in the words that "the executive was to prevail over the legislature after Slovakia, in 1941, had entered the war against the Soviet Union," and that "the number of political parties was reduced - after the Communist and the Social Democrat parties. had been suppressed as subversive - in October, 1938, and the six other parties merged into the Slovak Unity Party, the backbone of the political system of the Slovak State." Actually, the Constitution did not reduce the number of Slovak political parties. It merely legalized a situation which was created in Slovakia in 1938, when Czecho-Slovakia became a federation. We have already explained in part how and why this happened and that unity was not forced on any political party as was later claimed. The representatives of all Slovak and Czecho-Slovak parties were happy that the victorious autonomist movement did not resort to reprisals, and the Slovak population, regardless of previous political affiliation or creed, also approved the new situation. Though the law and electoral system allowed participation of many parties and the autonomous government of Dr. Tiso published an announcement requiring political parties to file the list of their candidates for election, only the Slovak People's Party - the Party of National Unity filed a joint list of candidates which contained leading per- �62 SLOVAKIA sonalities of all previous parties except the Communist and Social Democrats. The new Slovak Parliament issued from this election, held on December 18, 1938, and conducted under the rules of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and electoral system, was composed of 48 former Populists, 12 former agrarian, Artisans, Slovak Nationalists and even National Socialists (Dr. E. Benes's Party), two Germans, one Hungarian, and one Ukrainian. It was this Diet which unanimously proclaimed Slovakia on March 14, 1939, an independent State and adopted the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. There were no changes in Party system or in the composition of party representatives in 1939, and former adherents of Prague's centralism worked in the 1Slovak Parliament and Party organs quite happily together with former autonomists, Protestant ministers with the Catholic clergy, agrarians with artisans, etc. , until 1944, when the outcome of the War became clearly unfavorable to the further existence of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho.,Slovakia by the ,Soviets and Allies was in sight. There was, of course, a change in the structure of the Party of National Unity, which combined from March, 1939, nominations with election of Party functionaries on all levels, and the role of the Party altered considerably. The President of the Party, Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, and this writer as Secretary General, insisted on avoiding imitation of foreign models either in ideology or organization, as had been admitted even by Communist and Czech adversaries (18). Some features and symbols of Italian and German party systems were nevertheless adopted, and on the surface there was an adaptation to the "New Order" in Central Europe, which in some respect was far from a parliamentarian or representative democracy in the traditional sense. In practice and ideologically Slovakia, however, continued the "decrepit democratic system of Benes' Republic," as Hitler stated in his reproach to the Slovak leaders in July, 1940, during the so-called "Salzburg Summons." After the Salzburg meeting which resulted in the forced resignation of the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Af- �SLOVAKIA 63 fairs, Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, and of this writer a:s Secretary General of the Party, some measures were adopted which did not correspond either with the letter or with the spirit of the Slovak Constitution and which measures effected, in some respects, "the executive prevailed over the legislature." The Party's importance for some time considerably diminished and the Hlinka Guard, originally and according to the law a section of the ·P arty, tried to control the Party and political life, but this development did not bring about any constitutional changes, it did not last for any length of time, and was either challenged or disapproved and finally checked by the Parliament, the President and the Party leaders (19). It is a matter of fact that there were, in this period, attempts to introduce a sort of "Slovak National Socialism" in the administration of public affairs and there were arbitrary actions of irresponsible persons and groups against certain ,groups of population, but the Parliament and especally the President and the .P arty tried to stop these currents and transgressions and gained satisfactory control of the situation in this case, as in the first weeks after the declaration of independence. This, however, did not prevent the adversaries of the Slovak •S tate from an incorrect and often malicious interpretation of the intentions of the Slovak political leaders who centralized political institutions and also economic and administrative offices only because they were forced to do so by war conditions and by the desire to achieve unity of the nation which was before intentionally divided into many fractions by Prague's rulers who ruled Slovakia during twenty years according to the old dictum "divide et impera." They presented many institutions which were imposed upon Slovakia by war conditions and the international situation as a part of a "totalitarian or authoritative system," though, on the other hand, they admitted that "public offices and institutions which had not formerly existed in 1Slovakia, were introduced on a Czecho..Slovak model, among them the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Audit Department, the Post �64 SLOVAKIA Office Savings Bank, the National Bank, the Land Office, the Statistics Office, etc. " (20). The war imposed a number of new offices everywhere, in Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, such as: Price Control Office, Central :Eiconomic Office, Propaganda Office, etc. When similar offices were organized in Slovakia, the adversaries of Slovak independence, from their London or Washington asylums, denounced them as proofs and instruments of "authoritarian" or "nazi and fascist" systems and oppression. No doubt, the Slovak administration during the last years of the war had some offices and institutions which had names or structures similar to German or Italian institutions, but there was "a mixture of old and new elements," as admitted even by the Communists and Czech adversaries and definitely the democratic or "Czechoslovak" model prevailed and the intention of the responsible Slovak leaders behind all these institutions was not to introduce nazism or fascism, but to secure prosperity, security, and smooth functioning of the new State, or in other words, to save the Slovak people and its substance at a time when it was faced with physical and spiritual ruin. Some original "authoritarian" features of the !Slovak Constitution are due to the fact that the jurists and Parliamentarians who prepared the draft looked for inspirations in the countries which were in similar political or geographical situations and equally threatened either by the impact of nazism or communism. For this reason mainly the Constitution of Austria under Dolfuss-Schuschni gg and the Constitution of Portugal were studied by some members of the preparatory legislative committee and, while the Ausstrian Constitution showed them how to defend the country against infiltration of German National Socialist ideology, the Constitution of Portugal was studied because of the threat of Communist infiltration. Adversaries of Slovak independence who knew that this was the correct interpretation of the "authoritarian" elements in the Slovak Constitution, tried to prove, of course, the very opposite: they spoke and wrote of a deliberate introduction of "nazi" or "fascist" ideology and system, using for proof some short comings or measures imposed by the war and German pressure �SLOVAKIA 65 on Slovak Administration and Government. They also failed to realize that "the value of any form of government may be judged either by the success and efficiency with which it accomplishes its proper purposes or by the effect which it produces on its citizens and the degree of satisfaction and confidence that they feel toward it," as Gettel says. That there were problems and shortcomings, none among responsible Slovak leaders had ever denied. "Our constitutional o~gans, our legislation, executive, and judiciary are in their infancy," wrote the official newspaper Slovak. "We shall show no weakness if we admit that here and there various institutions are still very shaky." There was quite open criticism of all shortcomings and often violent attacks on institutions and leaders from many parts, even from President Tiso and the young leadership of the Party, because, while there was formally only one Slovak political party, the public heard critical voices, and public opinion was created outside Parliament by the Party press, Hlinka Guard press, German and Hungarian minority press, and clandestine Communist opposition. All of them wrote and spoke from their own angles and viewpoints. Certainly, too many voices for an "authoritarian" or "nazi" regime and State - a fact which was later recognized even by some adversaries. "The fact remains," reported Dr. M. Kvetko, one of the leaders of the "People's Democracy," installed in Slovakia in collaboration with the Communists, to American authorities in Germany in 1948, "that a significant number of the politicians of the Slovak People's Party, and especially of the populace, were not inclined to fascism and prevented its spread so effectively that, excepting the retaliations against Jews and Communists, no special actions were undertaken against the vast majority of the people. And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed the affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collaboration (with nazism) as the Communists tried to do in order to frighten the people and create chaos, so that they could come to power." This chapter was intended, however, to deal with the �66 SLOVAKIA Constitution of the Slovak Republic which, without being changed, remained the basis of legal system and ,governmental structure from 1939 to 1945, when Russians armies overran the country, raping and looting without precedence in Slovak history, and imposed on the Slovak people the new "people's democracy" and Czech domination within the framework of a restored Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak Constituaion reflected old Slovak Christian and democratic traditions and there can hardly be any doubt that the responsible Slovak leaders endeavoured to govern in accordance with the Constitution, and only because of limitations imposed by the international situation and other circumstances which were beyond the control of the people and their leaders, t here were deviations from the Constitution. For this reason it can be admitted that "the Slovak State reflected a compromise between the past and present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central E' u rope." And for the same reason the Slovak Constitution "contained principles which in some aspects combined features of the liberal, the Christian Democratic, and the authoritarian State." 1. R. ,G. Gettell: Political Science, University of Calif., 1933, p. 244. 2. Cfr.: "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czecho-Slovakia," Union Calendar No. 929, House Report No. 2684, Part 14, Washington, 1954. The Select Committee was composed of Congressmen, as well as a group of experts from Georgetown University and various parts of the United States. 3. Milan Hodza : Federation in Central Europe, London, 1942, p. 208-9. 4. Cfr . .Alexander Kunosi: The Basis of Czechoslovak Unity, London, 1944, p. 86; and H. Lee MdBain: The New Constitutions of Europe, New York, 1922, p. 307-342. 5. Even communist adversaries has to admit that "the Nazi model was not shamelessly imposed" and that "the n ew Slovak state was launched with all the paraphernalia of a national ideology apparently corporative and Christian," as wrote K. Kunosi in London, in 1944. 6. Joseph .A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de !'Europe, Paris, 1955, p. 12.7-131; also article by J. F. Gleiman in symposium Slovenska Republika, ed. N. Sprinc, Scranton, Pa., 1949, p. 108-112, and the English translation in Slovakia, Middletown, Pa., Vol. II, No. 3, p. 20 . .An excellent analysis of the Slovak Constitution was also prepared by former judge .Anton Peltzner, DL. D., as a thesis for the M. .A. degree at the U niversity of Montreal in 1957. �SLOVAKIA 67 7. "This presentation of God as the ultimate ,s ource of Law, and the interdependence of human and divine order as reflected in the Preamble of the Slovak !Constitution can prompt one to question." says Dr. A. Peltzner in his analysis, "why the authors of the text considered it wise and appropriate to formulate the preface in such a sense and import." The answer, in his opinion and in the opinion of all who are familiar with the history of the Slovak people, is based on two elements: l) there was a long and sincere dedication of the Slovak people to their religion, and a mutually long and faithful service of the Slovak clergy to their nation ; and, 2) the geographical position of the Slovak Republic was such that, on the Eastern frontiers stood the might of ,M arxist atheism, and from the Western side there was a potential danger of spreading and infiltrating of modern paganism, as formulated and taught by ,o erman National Socialism. The political leaders of the Slovak people considered it, therefore, as highly desirable to state that '\Slovaks stood firmly by their national traditions, of which belief in God and His Omnipotence was the substance of the whole concept." - Cfr. Dr. A. Peltzner: The Slovak Constitution and Modern Political Theory, p . 105. 8. Ibidem, p. 8·6. 9. lbidem, p. 195. 10. Ibidem, p. 48. 11. Andre Mathiot: The Bri tish Political System , London, 1958, p . 13·5. 12. The Constitution empowered the Cabinet to issue a government order with -the legal force and effect of law when economic, financial or political interests of the State required immediate attention, and only when lack of action could cause irreparable damage to these interests. 13. Cfr. Kunosi: Opus cit., p. 86. 14. ilbidem, pp. 76-82. 15. See: Chapter X, articles 75-85. That some of these freedoms were later limited or in individual cases disregarded, nobody would deny. The war imposed restrictions on personal freedoms in every country. In Slovakia, one could hardly expect that ideological influences of Germany and the political and economic pressures of war conditions would not result in a restriction of civil rights, or in transgressions by some individuals or groups of individuals. This, however, was not the fault of the Constitution, and as for the President of the Slovak !Republic and the Parliament, they tried to apply restrictions with respect to human life and natural rights. 16. 'The measures adopted against Jewish citizens were in many regards unconstitutional and mainly a result of German interference and deceit, especially as far as the transfer of a part of Slovak Jews to Poland was concerned. They were destined for labor, not extermination. The President as well as other Slovak authorities tried to avoid the tragedy but were able to save only a portion of those to be transferred. On the attitude of the Slovak Population see Raport du Co mite In- �68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the � SLOVAK.IA 47 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL. D., PH. D. mE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC I Introductory Note "No Constitution can be considered perfect or permanent", says R. G. Gettell in his renowned work Political Science. "The final requisite for a good constitution is that the constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State" (1). Among the critics and adversaries of the Slovak Republic there were few, if any, who read the Slovak Constitution, the fundamental principles that determined the basic nature of the Slovak ,S tate and Government, the distribution of its severeign powers among the various organs of government and the relation of the government to the people over whom its authority was exercised. We, therefore, hardly find someone who based his criticism of the Slovak Republic on the constitutional or legal basis or on the constitutional form of the Slovak state. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the U. S., in its special report No. 8, prepared in co-operation with Georgetown University and a group of experts from various parts of the United States, expressed its opinion in the following terms: "The Constitution contained principles, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal state, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state. In the beginning all power of the Slovak Republic was vested in the Parliament but later on, in 1941, after Slovakia had entered the war against the ,soviet Union, the executive was to prevai I over the legislature. "The Slovak state was far from being a perfect democracy in the traditional sense. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation" (2). This statement, though basically true and expressing to a great extent the view of the writer, should be complemented by a political as well as juridical analysis of the text of the Constitution and of the circumstances in which �48 SLOVAKIA it was drafted and adopted by the Slovak Diet. The first question seems to be: from whence came the features of the liberal, the Christian democratic , and the authoritari an State? As for the democratic traditions in Slovakia, they antidated not only the attainment of political independen ce in 1939, but also the inclusion of Slovakia into the CzechoSlovak Republic in 1918. The Slovak nobility was assimilated by the Ma,gyars to a great extent before the Slovak national revival took place at the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century, so that no aristocratic traditions could hinder the acceptance and developmen t of modern democratic ideas. In fact, Slovakia became the refuge of many lofty intellectual efforts during the 17th century and later it "revealed itself as a meeting-pla ce of practically all contempor ary currents of cultural and political ideas" (3). It is true that the policy of Budapest, after the Ausgleich of 1867, aimed at suppressing Slovak nationalism and Slovak political activities. This resulted in the reduction of the IS lovak representat ion in Budapest's Parliament to only two representat ives at the end of World War I. However, this situation cannot reasonably be used as a yardstick for Slovak disposition for political maturity. This became evident shortly after the creation of the CzechoSlovak Republic, when not only genuine Slovak political parties sprang up, but also, more or less, all the Czech parties extended their activities into Slovakia. Practically all political tendencies from socialism to agrarian democracy and communism found an echo in the Slovak poulation. The genuine and most representat ive Slovak parties were: 1) the Slovak People's Party, later called Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the Party of National l:Jnity (since October 1938), representin g the bulk of the nationally conscious Catholic population, although some non-Catholics were among its members (the party never officially labeled its program as Catholic); and, 2) the Slovak National Party which organized those Slovak Protestants who remained faithful to the traditions of Slovak national- �SLOVAKIA 49 ism and to the idea of distinct Slovak culture and selfgovernment. All political parties in Slovakia developed during the period of 191'8-1938 along the lines of the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia which is often praised as a model of modern democratic constitutions. It must, therefore, sound highly improbable and illogial when adversaries of the Slovak State assert that all this changed from one day to another, that all the democratic traditions of Czecho-Slovakia ,w ere so weak that they were transformed without any resistance into "fascist" and "nazi" tendencies by the simple act of the declaration of Slovakia's independence. It would certainly be safe to assume that democracy survived, in many respects, the Declaration of 1M arch 14, 19'39, and that the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect the principles of democratic thinking and institutions which were alive in Slovakia. Actually, they survived to such an extent that in many respects the Slovak Constitution has a strinking resemblance to the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (4). Provisions referring to legislative powers of the Parliament, election and powers of the President of the Republic, the judiciary, and the whole legal structure of the Slovak State had much in common with the Constitution of Czecho..!Slovakia which, like the ,S lovak Constitution, adopted principles of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, or the fundamental principles of French and American Constitutions. The authors of the Slovak Constitution were jurists and parliamentarians educated predominantly at the universities and in the Parliament of Czecho-:Slovakia; with one or two exceptions, they were men who studied law abroad and were mainly responsible for the liberal elements in the draft of the Slovak Constitution. There are, of course, striking differences, too, as far as the ideological bases of these two constitutions are concerned. The religiosity of the Slovak people and their Christian world outlook gave quite a different ideological basis to the Slovak constitution in general, and to its many provisions regarding social institutions, which reflect the ideas of the Papal encyclicals in particular. While the Slovak �50 SLOVAKIA Constitution presents God as the ultimate source of Law and declares that the function of the Slovak Republic is to unite all the moral and economic forces of the people in a Christian and national community in order to become the executor of social justice and the protector of common good, the ideological roots of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution were as far from God and religion as were Prague's leading politicians. On the other hand, the Slovak Constitution could not but differ in provisions or institutions which were imposed by the international situation and which are described as "authoritarian." As we mentioned before, the final requisite for a good Constitution, according to Gettell, is that the Constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State. While the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia reflected certain ideological currents and political structures of the French Republic which was mainly responsible for the creation and existence of Czecho-Slovakia and for the new organization of Central Europe after First World War, the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect a new situation, new organization and a "new order" in Central Europe, created by Hitler's Germany in 1938-1939 with the consent of France and England. Considered objectively, one has to to recognize that it took courage and deep attachment to traditions to proclaim in Slovakia, in 1939, God as the ultimate source of Law and order and to use Papal encyclicals as the basis for social institutions, human and family rights on the one hand, and, on the other, "to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czechoslovak state" (5). When, in the summer of 1939, the committee appointed by the Slovak Parliament, labored on the draft of the Constitution, the political crisis in Europe was nearing its climax, and the ideological confusion attained irrational dimensions. The area of Central and Eastern Europe was exposed to ideological struggles and political ambitions of at least three Great Powers and, thus, Democracy, Communism, and Nazism as well as remnants of liberal tendencies were engaged in a rough competition for influence over the Central European peoples. Slovakia, in the middle of this ideological ferment and 1 �SLOVAKIA 51 international instability, found herself also threatened by aggression or territorial claims from her neighbors, so that even the very existence of the newly created state on the banks of the Danube and the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains was, from its beginning, endangered. To expect, in the midst of such political and ideological chaos, any uncompromis ing attitudes on the side of the Constitutiona l Committee would amount to expecting from it something humanly impossible. Slovakia had to take a compromising position politically and ideologically not only for reasons of good relations with her neighbors, but also, if not in the first place, in order to survive as a State, since Democracy was considered a provocation, and, in its classic form, in the summer of 1939, was already dying in all Central Eiuropean countries. An analysis of the main principles and fundamental rights will show how far the work of the Constitutiona l Committee of Slovakia - despite its compromising tenor reflects the tendencies and genuine traditions of the Slovak people. According to the expert opinion of several jurists, the Constitution adopted practically the whole sysb~m of democratic-lib eralistic constitutions of the 1'8th and 19th centuries and, though Slovakia was weighed in from the right and left between Godless bolshevism and anti-Christian neo-paganism , she brought forth a constitution "saturated with the Christian spirit and especially with the principles of the social encyclicals of the Holy See" (6). As for the features of Christian democracy, besides many institutions concerned with social life, family, attitude to work, and function of property, in which we can find the influence of modern Christian sociology, the Christian character was given to the whole Constitution by its Preamble which reads as follows: "The Slovak nation, under the protection of Almighty God, survived throughout the ages on the territory destined for its national development and there, with the help of God, Who is the Source of all Power and Law, established its independent Slovak State. "The SI ova k State unites, according to Natural Law, all the moral and economic forces of the Nation in a Christian and national community for the purpose of regulating clashing social aspirations and mutually opposed interests of all occupational and professional groups, and has for its goal the highest attainable degree of happi- �52 SLOVAKIA ness of society and the individual. This ideal can only be achieved through a moral and political process, initiated by the State, which in harmonious unity will function as an executor of social justice and a protector of common good." It would certainly be difficult to find among the constitutions of modern states any other which so clearly states that God must be recognized as the original source of Law and Order and that the function of the nation in a Christian and national community in order to become "an executor of social justice and protector of common good" (7). The accentuation of the social function of the State, which we find in the Preamble, and the emphasis placed on the happiness of both the individual and society, are an indication of the legislators' intention to build a modern welfare state on the principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how these ideas found their expressions in particular provisions and institutions of the Slovak Constitution. n General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution It is not necessary to be an expert in constitutional law to notice that the Slovak Constitution contains all the democratic devices which political science usually requires from democratic constitutions - such as the separation of powers, the doctrine of checks and balances, and the principle of rule by law. Even the most bitter adversaries of Slovak independence - the Communists and the supporters of Czechoslovakism - did not try to deny these features to the Slovak Constitution. "The Slovak State was intended to make a full show of independence," wrote Alexander IKunosi, one of today's communist diplomats of Czecho-,Slovakia, in 11944, from his London exile: "It was to be vested with all the institutions formerly possessed by the Czechoslovak State. Steps were taken to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czecho-Slovak State" (8). Admitting this, the adversaries of the Slovak Republic could not try to say that "the parlimentary facade of Government in Slovakia had, of course, no real signifi1 �SLOVAKIA 53 cance, " or that the "Diet did not express the will of the nation or the people," which, as we shall see further , hardly correspond with the truth since the Parliament in Slovakia was not only in theory but also in fact the suprem e organ of the State and the most essential powers were vested in Parliament from the beginning to the end. The Constitution was adopted by a legally constit uted Slovak Diet which was established in accordance with the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and on the basis of the general election which took place on December 18, 19'38. According to Law No. 299, adopted on November 22, 1938, Slovakia became an autonomous part of Czecho-Slovakia, with her own Government and her own Diet composed of 63 members, vested with legislative powers goveerning not only internal affairs, but required also for ratification of Czecho-Slovak international agreements concerning Slovakia. This Diet, summoned to a session on March 14, 1939, by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Emil H a c h a , declared Slovakia an independent State, and a special committee of the Diet prepared the draft of the Constitution which was adopted unanimously on July 31, 1939, as Law No. 185. The draft of the Constitution was preceded by a study of several existing modern constitutions with a view to giving the country a set of principles that would correspond with contemporary constitutional thinking and the practical needs and national traditions of the Slovak people. The text was prepared by two university professors of Law, Dr. V. Tuka and Dr. F. :Durcansky, and by several jurists and parliamentarians of young and old generations, Senator Dr. K. Mederly, Dr. M. Sokol, Dr. V. Tvrdy, and Dr. Cerhelyi. In 103 short articles (paragraphs) divided into 13 chapters, the Slovak Constitution gave a radical as well as social basis to the new State in Central Europe. The first article of the Constitution declared the Slovak State a Republic with a President as an elected head, with t erms, according to Gettell, are used to indicate a representative democracy (9) . According to articles 6, 7, 8, and 9, legislative power �54 SLOVAKIA for the entire country vested in the Parliament, composed of 80 members and elected in a general, direct, equal, and secret suffrage for a period of five years. The right to vote belonged to every citizen over 2'1 years of age, man and woman, without racial or religious discrimination. This right to be elected to Parliament belonged to citizens over 30 years of age. The Parliament was based on the unicameral system,. and the President of the Republic was obliged to convene the Parliament for regular sessions twice a year, and for extraordinary sessions whenever the majority of members. demanded such a session. Laws promulgated by the Parliament required the President's signature for their validity. Paragraph 26 provided, however, that laws could be promulgated despite the President's veto, if they were adopted by a three-fifths majority in the presence of a two-thirds majority of deputies. The right to appoint governments belonged to the President, but the Government was responsible to Parliament and subject to its vote of confidence. The Parliament also had the right of prosecution of the· President for high treason. Part IN of the Constitution deals with the powers and functions of the President, who was elected for a period of seven years. Any citizen, 40 years of age or over, was eligible for the office, and the election was valid if two. thirds of the members were present and the candidate obtained a three-fifths majority. A comparision of powers and functions of the Slovak ·P resident, as defined in the Constitution, with those of other parliamentary democracies will prove that his powers were somewhere between the extensive functions and powers of the American president and the purely representative functions of the Presidents of France (before De Gaulle). He represented the State internationally, had the right, with the consent of Parliament to declare wars and conclude peace, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to appoint, but not to dismiss university professors, judges, civil servants, and military officers of the three highest categories. He also had the right to be present at the sessions of the Government and Council of State, to request their convention under his chairmanship, �SLOVAKIA 55 to convene, dissolve and prologue Parliament, to sign or veto Parliament's acts, etc. While making the president a dominant figure of the executive, the Constitution, on the other hand, contained provisions which were designed to prevent dictatorial powers (10). The Parliament was able, as we have seen, to promulgate laws even if opposed by the President and according to paragraph 40, "any executive act of the president requires counter-signature by a competent cabinet minister for its validity." No person could be re-elected more than once to the presidential office and when the president died during his term, abdicated or was permanently unable to exercise his functions, it was the duty of the Prime Minister to assume temporary functions of the president. A new president had to be elected by the iParliament within thirty days. The President represented, together with the Cabinet, the executive of the !Slovak Republic and, consequently, the Slovak Government had some features of a presidential type of government and, at the same time, it also contained elements of parliamentary government. An expert on constitutional theories can prove both, because - while the essential characteristics of parliamentary government are: 1) a politically independent head of State; and, 2) a cabinet which is politically responsible to Parliament - "parliamentary Government may also develop in the opposite direction. The Cabinet can become the dominant political organ, able to control the government of the country and direct the work of the Parliament which assists it in the execution of its program," says Andre Mathiot in his ercellent treatise "The British Political System" (11). it is not, however, our intention to discuss theoretical issues here. One can easily prove that the executive in the Slovak Republic was also predominantly of the presidential type, because "every system of 'P arliamentary government has its own distinctive features, resulting from a complex of many different factors. History, the national temperament, beliefs and ideologies, conventions of political behavior, attempts to imitate a particular model or to avoid certain dangers, etc." - states Mathiot. All these factors �56 SLOVAKIA played their distinctive roles in the Slovak Constitution and made it a constitution "sui generis." As for the powers and constitution of the Slovak Cabinet, the President of the Republic appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and determined which member would administer individual ministries (Article 41). The Parliament was also empowered to call the Cabinet and its individual members to political responsibility and to express lack of confidence which would result in the dissolution of the cabinet (Article 48) . Practical considerations demanded, on the other hand, a certain measure of delegation of legislative powers to the Cabinet. The jurisdiction of the Cabinet was limited to governmental orders, namely, during a national emergency, or orders pertaining to the execution of certain types of laws, and within the limits specified in the laws. Validity of such orders was conditional, since the Prime Minister was obliged to submit them within three months to the Parliament, which, in turn, could disallow such measures or could make whatever changes it deemed necessary, or pass it as its own law (12). Chapter V of the Slovak Constitution defined the functions and composition of the Council of State, a pecial body composed of outstanding personalities from various walks of life whose functions pertained to a sort of control of the political life in ,Slovakia. The Council was composed of 6 members appointed by the President of the Republic, ten members were chosen by the Slovak People's Party, two members by the registered parties of ethnic groups, and one was delegated by each estate. The Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly were also memb2rs of the Council. The functions of the Council were defined by the Article 52 and consisted in initiating legislation, controlling and prosecuting the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, and in advising the President and the government on matters of a political, cultural, and economic nature. The Council also prepared the list of candidates for parliamentary elections and made decisions concerning the loss of 0 �SLOVAKIA 57 parliamentary seats, following a request from the President of the Assembly. Politically, the reason for the existence of the Council was given by the desire to have, in the absence of a Senate, representatives in the political life of the new State from groups or professions who usually did not look for an election to Parliament, but whose advice, abilities, and moral stature were destined to help the Government in its endeavour to make the population happy and united behind the political leadership. The authors of the draft of the Constitution expressed their intention in stating that "the Council of State is the expression of political and national unity, and also joins the national and political life with the constitutional representatives, combining itself the function of legal initiation and control." Following the social doctrine of the Papal encyclicals, the authors of the Constitution also included in their draft certain institutions which characterize the so-called "corporative" systems. Chapter VII of the Slovak Constitution had foressen organization of Slovakia's inhabitants into six self-administered bodies called "stavy" (estates) according to occupation and profession: the association of workers and employers in agriculture, in industry, trade, commerce and banking; the association of the free professions and the association of State and public employees. "The associations included both employers and employees and they were assigned to take care of the economic, social, and cultural interests of their members, to solve labor and wage disputes and problems among employees and employers, and to help members of the association to achieve better results in their industries and occupations and a higher standard of living for the nation (Article 62). Acting on Law No. 297 of the Collection of Laws, the President of the Republic appointed the presidents on November 19, 1940, and the aim of the associations was again given as "to manifest the unity of the Slovak workers' community, without heed to classes and callings, and bearing in mind only the interests of the nation and the State" (13). As for the judiciary, we have already stated that the Slovak Constitution was based on the principle of separa- �58 SLOVAKIA tion of powers, as defined by modern political theories. There were three types of courts: courts of law, administrative courts, and military courts. The organization of courts and their legal competence were left to a special legislation. As in any modern constitutions, the Slovak Constitution provided that the courts of law were empowered to review any decision of administrative courts and, on the other hand, the jurisdiction of military courts could be extended over the civil population during wartime and for war crimes. "Judges are independent," states Article 67, "in their judicial functions and are bound only by law." The Constitution contained provisions that no person could be deprived of the judge designated by law to hear the case (Article 62), and Article 66 made the judiciary free of any interference either on the part of administrative or political leadership. The professional judges were appointed to their positions permanently and "they have held a highly privileged position, appropriate to their equally high office," states Judge A. Peltzner (14). The Chapter dealing with the rights and obligations of the citizens (Chapter X) can sustain comparision with any democratic and liberal constitution and a modern "Bill of Rights." The 1Slovak Constitution guaranteed full and equal rights to all citizens without distinction of sex, race, creed, occupation, or ethnic origin. The guarantees refer to personal freedoms, private ownership, religious freedom, freedom of expression of opinion, scientific research and arts (15), provided they were exercised within the limits of valid laws and did not come into conflict with public order and Christian morals [Article 85] - (16). The Constitution was based on the principle that "no person can be punished for behavior which is not in conflict with valid legal form and for which a punishment has not been previously determined," applying the old principle "nulla poena sine lege," and all inhabitants, regardless of origin, nationality, religion, or occupation, were entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property (Article 81). There are, in the Slovak Constitution, even some particular provisions which intended to give to the Slovak State �SLOVAKIA 59 a progressive, modern, social and Christian character. Such provisions are as follows: Ownership has a social function and demands from the owner adminstration in the best interest of the common good (Article 79). Marriage, family and motherhood are under the· strict protection of the legal order (Article 86). Labor is protected. Exploitation of socially weak citizens is. prohibited. Wages should be adequate to the working effort and family status. Mental and physical work is a civil duty, etc. "All these provisions can be described," says Dr. Peltzner, "as an intensified care and protection of the family, social purpose of private ownership, protection of the working man, his wages, and social justice to all. All were aimed at achieving a new social order, where clashing social interests would be minimized and eventually abolished. This concept of social and labor legislation was greatly influenced by the encyclical letters of the Popes of the Roman Catholic Church, especially by Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno" (17). ln order to present a complete picture of the Slovak Constitution, we have to mention provisions regarding political parties. The chapter dealing with the political organization (Chapter Vil) merely legalized the existing situation which was created in Slovakia by the so-called Zilina .A:greement of October 6, 1938, long before Slovakia declared her independence and the Parliament adopted the Constitution. The provision referring to political parties consists of only two paragraphs, the first stating that "the Slovak people participate in political life through the medium of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the Party of Slovak National Unity) ," and the second legalizing the political activities of ethnic groups, providing that "the ethnic groups participate in political life through a medium of their own political party, provided that such a party can be considered as a representative of the political will of the entire ethnic group" (Articles 58, 59). Since October, 1938, when the number of political parties was reduced due to internal and international circumstances and development, there were in Slovakia three po1 �60 SLOVAKIA litical parties, legally constituted and taking part in the political life of Slovakia. The Communist and the Social Democrat parties, representing only ten deputies, had been dissolved or suppressed following the Zilina Agreement. Six other parties merged into the Slovak National Unity Party, which remained the backbone of the political s y s t e m of autonomous Slovakia before March 1939, and of the Slovak Republic thereafter. The German and Magyar ethnic groups were represented by two minority parties, and the Ukrainian minority by a member of Parliament within Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the Party of National Unity. The fact that the Slovak Constitution provided for only one party for the Slovak people caused certain criticism abroad and marked, according to some critics, the Slovak R e p u b 1 i c as an authoritarian state. For everybody who knows the Slovak political life between the years 1918-1939 and who is aware of the composition of the Slovak Diet in which representatives of practically all previous political parties except Communists and Social Democrats had their seats, such reproaches would seem to be more of a theoretical than practical nature. There is no doubt that without provisions restricting political life of the Slovak population to one party only, even if it was composed of fractions of many parties, the Constitution would have looked more democratic and beyond reproach, because a multiparty system is one of the main characteristics of modern representative democracies. However, war conditions and specific needs and dangers forced the Slovak political leaders to adopt many restrictions which are understandable only if we take into consideration all the problems and dangers which the Slovak Republic had to face from the first days of its existence to the end of the war from the outside and the inside. This as well as other features which marked the Slovak Constitution as "authoritarian" were or will be discussed later in this treatise. Before concluding our remarks on the general characteristics of the Slovak Constitution, it seems appropriate to analyze the formal features of the text and its contents. In this respect, we can say that from the point of view of political science and constitutional law, the Slo- �SLOVAKIA 61 vak Constitution conforms to all requirements which political science demands from modern constitutions. It can be classified as a comprehensive set of fundamental principles and laws covering the whole field of government and making provisions for the exercise of political power. It outlined the governmental organization, determined the relations of the governors and the governed, and provided a legal method for amendments, so that it might be changed when necessary by the prescribed majority in Parliament. m "Authoritarian" Features and Deviations The statement of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives mentions that the Slovak Constitution contained also principles of "an authoritarian state." There is, however, no indication in the report where these principles are to be found, except perhaps in the words that "the executive was to prevail over the legislature after Slovakia, in 1941, had entered the war against the Soviet Union," and that "the number of political parties was reduced - after the Communist and the Social Democrat parties. had been suppressed as subversive - in October, 1938, and the six other parties merged into the Slovak Unity Party, the backbone of the political system of the Slovak State." Actually, the Constitution did not reduce the number of Slovak political parties. It merely legalized a situation which was created in Slovakia in 1938, when Czecho-Slovakia became a federation. We have already explained in part how and why this happened and that unity was not forced on any political party as was later claimed. The representatives of all Slovak and Czecho-Slovak parties were happy that the victorious autonomist movement did not resort to reprisals, and the Slovak population, regardless of previous political affiliation or creed, also approved the new situation. Though the law and electoral system allowed participation of many parties and the autonomous government of Dr. Tiso published an announcement requiring political parties to file the list of their candidates for election, only the Slovak People's Party - the Party of National Unity filed a joint list of candidates which contained leading per- �62 SLOVAKIA sonalities of all previous parties except the Communist and Social Democrats. The new Slovak Parliament issued from this election, held on December 18, 1938, and conducted under the rules of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and electoral system, was composed of 48 former Populists, 12 former agrarian, Artisans, Slovak Nationalists and even National Socialists (Dr. E. Benes's Party), two Germans, one Hungarian, and one Ukrainian. It was this Diet which unanimously proclaimed Slovakia on March 14, 1939, an independent State and adopted the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. There were no changes in Party system or in the composition of party representatives in 1939, and former adherents of Prague's centralism worked in the 1Slovak Parliament and Party organs quite happily together with former autonomists, Protestant ministers with the Catholic clergy, agrarians with artisans, etc. , until 1944, when the outcome of the War became clearly unfavorable to the further existence of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho.,Slovakia by the ,Soviets and Allies was in sight. There was, of course, a change in the structure of the Party of National Unity, which combined from March, 1939, nominations with election of Party functionaries on all levels, and the role of the Party altered considerably. The President of the Party, Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, and this writer as Secretary General, insisted on avoiding imitation of foreign models either in ideology or organization, as had been admitted even by Communist and Czech adversaries (18). Some features and symbols of Italian and German party systems were nevertheless adopted, and on the surface there was an adaptation to the "New Order" in Central Europe, which in some respect was far from a parliamentarian or representative democracy in the traditional sense. In practice and ideologically Slovakia, however, continued the "decrepit democratic system of Benes' Republic," as Hitler stated in his reproach to the Slovak leaders in July, 1940, during the so-called "Salzburg Summons." After the Salzburg meeting which resulted in the forced resignation of the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Af- �SLOVAKIA 63 fairs, Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, and of this writer a:s Secretary General of the Party, some measures were adopted which did not correspond either with the letter or with the spirit of the Slovak Constitution and which measures effected, in some respects, "the executive prevailed over the legislature." The Party's importance for some time considerably diminished and the Hlinka Guard, originally and according to the law a section of the ·P arty, tried to control the Party and political life, but this development did not bring about any constitutional changes, it did not last for any length of time, and was either challenged or disapproved and finally checked by the Parliament, the President and the Party leaders (19). It is a matter of fact that there were, in this period, attempts to introduce a sort of "Slovak National Socialism" in the administration of public affairs and there were arbitrary actions of irresponsible persons and groups against certain ,groups of population, but the Parliament and especally the President and the .P arty tried to stop these currents and transgressions and gained satisfactory control of the situation in this case, as in the first weeks after the declaration of independence. This, however, did not prevent the adversaries of the Slovak •S tate from an incorrect and often malicious interpretation of the intentions of the Slovak political leaders who centralized political institutions and also economic and administrative offices only because they were forced to do so by war conditions and by the desire to achieve unity of the nation which was before intentionally divided into many fractions by Prague's rulers who ruled Slovakia during twenty years according to the old dictum "divide et impera." They presented many institutions which were imposed upon Slovakia by war conditions and the international situation as a part of a "totalitarian or authoritative system," though, on the other hand, they admitted that "public offices and institutions which had not formerly existed in 1Slovakia, were introduced on a Czecho..Slovak model, among them the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Audit Department, the Post �64 SLOVAKIA Office Savings Bank, the National Bank, the Land Office, the Statistics Office, etc. " (20). The war imposed a number of new offices everywhere, in Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, such as: Price Control Office, Central :Eiconomic Office, Propaganda Office, etc. When similar offices were organized in Slovakia, the adversaries of Slovak independence, from their London or Washington asylums, denounced them as proofs and instruments of "authoritarian" or "nazi and fascist" systems and oppression. No doubt, the Slovak administration during the last years of the war had some offices and institutions which had names or structures similar to German or Italian institutions, but there was "a mixture of old and new elements," as admitted even by the Communists and Czech adversaries and definitely the democratic or "Czechoslovak" model prevailed and the intention of the responsible Slovak leaders behind all these institutions was not to introduce nazism or fascism, but to secure prosperity, security, and smooth functioning of the new State, or in other words, to save the Slovak people and its substance at a time when it was faced with physical and spiritual ruin. Some original "authoritarian" features of the !Slovak Constitution are due to the fact that the jurists and Parliamentarians who prepared the draft looked for inspirations in the countries which were in similar political or geographical situations and equally threatened either by the impact of nazism or communism. For this reason mainly the Constitution of Austria under Dolfuss-Schuschni gg and the Constitution of Portugal were studied by some members of the preparatory legislative committee and, while the Ausstrian Constitution showed them how to defend the country against infiltration of German National Socialist ideology, the Constitution of Portugal was studied because of the threat of Communist infiltration. Adversaries of Slovak independence who knew that this was the correct interpretation of the "authoritarian" elements in the Slovak Constitution, tried to prove, of course, the very opposite: they spoke and wrote of a deliberate introduction of "nazi" or "fascist" ideology and system, using for proof some short comings or measures imposed by the war and German pressure �SLOVAKIA 65 on Slovak Administration and Government. They also failed to realize that "the value of any form of government may be judged either by the success and efficiency with which it accomplishes its proper purposes or by the effect which it produces on its citizens and the degree of satisfaction and confidence that they feel toward it," as Gettel says. That there were problems and shortcomings, none among responsible Slovak leaders had ever denied. "Our constitutional o~gans, our legislation, executive, and judiciary are in their infancy," wrote the official newspaper Slovak. "We shall show no weakness if we admit that here and there various institutions are still very shaky." There was quite open criticism of all shortcomings and often violent attacks on institutions and leaders from many parts, even from President Tiso and the young leadership of the Party, because, while there was formally only one Slovak political party, the public heard critical voices, and public opinion was created outside Parliament by the Party press, Hlinka Guard press, German and Hungarian minority press, and clandestine Communist opposition. All of them wrote and spoke from their own angles and viewpoints. Certainly, too many voices for an "authoritarian" or "nazi" regime and State - a fact which was later recognized even by some adversaries. "The fact remains," reported Dr. M. Kvetko, one of the leaders of the "People's Democracy," installed in Slovakia in collaboration with the Communists, to American authorities in Germany in 1948, "that a significant number of the politicians of the Slovak People's Party, and especially of the populace, were not inclined to fascism and prevented its spread so effectively that, excepting the retaliations against Jews and Communists, no special actions were undertaken against the vast majority of the people. And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed the affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collaboration (with nazism) as the Communists tried to do in order to frighten the people and create chaos, so that they could come to power." This chapter was intended, however, to deal with the �66 SLOVAKIA Constitution of the Slovak Republic which, without being changed, remained the basis of legal system and ,governmental structure from 1939 to 1945, when Russians armies overran the country, raping and looting without precedence in Slovak history, and imposed on the Slovak people the new "people's democracy" and Czech domination within the framework of a restored Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak Constituaion reflected old Slovak Christian and democratic traditions and there can hardly be any doubt that the responsible Slovak leaders endeavoured to govern in accordance with the Constitution, and only because of limitations imposed by the international situation and other circumstances which were beyond the control of the people and their leaders, t here were deviations from the Constitution. For this reason it can be admitted that "the Slovak State reflected a compromise between the past and present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central E' u rope." And for the same reason the Slovak Constitution "contained principles which in some aspects combined features of the liberal, the Christian Democratic, and the authoritarian State." 1. R. ,G. Gettell: Political Science, University of Calif., 1933, p. 244. 2. Cfr.: "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czecho-Slovakia," Union Calendar No. 929, House Report No. 2684, Part 14, Washington, 1954. The Select Committee was composed of Congressmen, as well as a group of experts from Georgetown University and various parts of the United States. 3. Milan Hodza : Federation in Central Europe, London, 1942, p. 208-9. 4. Cfr . .Alexander Kunosi: The Basis of Czechoslovak Unity, London, 1944, p. 86; and H. Lee MdBain: The New Constitutions of Europe, New York, 1922, p. 307-342. 5. Even communist adversaries has to admit that "the Nazi model was not shamelessly imposed" and that "the n ew Slovak state was launched with all the paraphernalia of a national ideology apparently corporative and Christian," as wrote K. Kunosi in London, in 1944. 6. Joseph .A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de !'Europe, Paris, 1955, p. 12.7-131; also article by J. F. Gleiman in symposium Slovenska Republika, ed. N. Sprinc, Scranton, Pa., 1949, p. 108-112, and the English translation in Slovakia, Middletown, Pa., Vol. II, No. 3, p. 20 . .An excellent analysis of the Slovak Constitution was also prepared by former judge .Anton Peltzner, DL. D., as a thesis for the M. .A. degree at the U niversity of Montreal in 1957. �SLOVAKIA 67 7. "This presentation of God as the ultimate ,s ource of Law, and the interdependence of human and divine order as reflected in the Preamble of the Slovak !Constitution can prompt one to question." says Dr. A. Peltzner in his analysis, "why the authors of the text considered it wise and appropriate to formulate the preface in such a sense and import." The answer, in his opinion and in the opinion of all who are familiar with the history of the Slovak people, is based on two elements: l) there was a long and sincere dedication of the Slovak people to their religion, and a mutually long and faithful service of the Slovak clergy to their nation ; and, 2) the geographical position of the Slovak Republic was such that, on the Eastern frontiers stood the might of ,M arxist atheism, and from the Western side there was a potential danger of spreading and infiltrating of modern paganism, as formulated and taught by ,o erman National Socialism. The political leaders of the Slovak people considered it, therefore, as highly desirable to state that '\Slovaks stood firmly by their national traditions, of which belief in God and His Omnipotence was the substance of the whole concept." - Cfr. Dr. A. Peltzner: The Slovak Constitution and Modern Political Theory, p . 105. 8. Ibidem, p. 8·6. 9. lbidem, p. 195. 10. Ibidem, p. 48. 11. Andre Mathiot: The Bri tish Political System , London, 1958, p . 13·5. 12. The Constitution empowered the Cabinet to issue a government order with -the legal force and effect of law when economic, financial or political interests of the State required immediate attention, and only when lack of action could cause irreparable damage to these interests. 13. Cfr. Kunosi: Opus cit., p. 86. 14. ilbidem, pp. 76-82. 15. See: Chapter X, articles 75-85. That some of these freedoms were later limited or in individual cases disregarded, nobody would deny. The war imposed restrictions on personal freedoms in every country. In Slovakia, one could hardly expect that ideological influences of Germany and the political and economic pressures of war conditions would not result in a restriction of civil rights, or in transgressions by some individuals or groups of individuals. This, however, was not the fault of the Constitution, and as for the President of the Slovak !Republic and the Parliament, they tried to apply restrictions with respect to human life and natural rights. 16. 'The measures adopted against Jewish citizens were in many regards unconstitutional and mainly a result of German interference and deceit, especially as far as the transfer of a part of Slovak Jews to Poland was concerned. They were destined for labor, not extermination. The President as well as other Slovak authorities tried to avoid the tragedy but were able to save only a portion of those to be transferred. On the attitude of the Slovak Population see Raport du Co mite In- �68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAK.IA 47 Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL. D., PH. D. mE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC I Introductory Note "No Constitution can be considered perfect or permanent", says R. G. Gettell in his renowned work Political Science. "The final requisite for a good constitution is that the constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State" (1). Among the critics and adversaries of the Slovak Republic there were few, if any, who read the Slovak Constitution, the fundamental principles that determined the basic nature of the Slovak ,S tate and Government, the distribution of its severeign powers among the various organs of government and the relation of the government to the people over whom its authority was exercised. We, therefore, hardly find someone who based his criticism of the Slovak Republic on the constitutional or legal basis or on the constitutional form of the Slovak state. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives of the U. S., in its special report No. 8, prepared in co-operation with Georgetown University and a group of experts from various parts of the United States, expressed its opinion in the following terms: "The Constitution contained principles, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal state, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state. In the beginning all power of the Slovak Republic was vested in the Parliament but later on, in 1941, after Slovakia had entered the war against the ,soviet Union, the executive was to prevai I over the legislature. "The Slovak state was far from being a perfect democracy in the traditional sense. It reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. But, in general, it was an expression of the self-preservation instinct of the Slovak nation" (2). This statement, though basically true and expressing to a great extent the view of the writer, should be complemented by a political as well as juridical analysis of the text of the Constitution and of the circumstances in which 48 SLOVAKIA it was drafted and adopted by the Slovak Diet. The first question seems to be: from whence came the features of the liberal, the Christian democratic , and the authoritari an State? As for the democratic traditions in Slovakia, they antidated not only the attainment of political independen ce in 1939, but also the inclusion of Slovakia into the CzechoSlovak Republic in 1918. The Slovak nobility was assimilated by the Ma,gyars to a great extent before the Slovak national revival took place at the end of the 18th and in the first half of the 19th century, so that no aristocratic traditions could hinder the acceptance and developmen t of modern democratic ideas. In fact, Slovakia became the refuge of many lofty intellectual efforts during the 17th century and later it "revealed itself as a meeting-pla ce of practically all contempor ary currents of cultural and political ideas" (3). It is true that the policy of Budapest, after the Ausgleich of 1867, aimed at suppressing Slovak nationalism and Slovak political activities. This resulted in the reduction of the IS lovak representat ion in Budapest's Parliament to only two representat ives at the end of World War I. However, this situation cannot reasonably be used as a yardstick for Slovak disposition for political maturity. This became evident shortly after the creation of the CzechoSlovak Republic, when not only genuine Slovak political parties sprang up, but also, more or less, all the Czech parties extended their activities into Slovakia. Practically all political tendencies from socialism to agrarian democracy and communism found an echo in the Slovak poulation. The genuine and most representat ive Slovak parties were: 1) the Slovak People's Party, later called Hlinka's Slovak People's Party and the Party of National l:Jnity (since October 1938), representin g the bulk of the nationally conscious Catholic population, although some non-Catholics were among its members (the party never officially labeled its program as Catholic); and, 2) the Slovak National Party which organized those Slovak Protestants who remained faithful to the traditions of Slovak national- SLOVAKIA 49 ism and to the idea of distinct Slovak culture and selfgovernment. All political parties in Slovakia developed during the period of 191'8-1938 along the lines of the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia which is often praised as a model of modern democratic constitutions. It must, therefore, sound highly improbable and illogial when adversaries of the Slovak State assert that all this changed from one day to another, that all the democratic traditions of Czecho-Slovakia ,w ere so weak that they were transformed without any resistance into "fascist" and "nazi" tendencies by the simple act of the declaration of Slovakia's independence. It would certainly be safe to assume that democracy survived, in many respects, the Declaration of 1M arch 14, 19'39, and that the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect the principles of democratic thinking and institutions which were alive in Slovakia. Actually, they survived to such an extent that in many respects the Slovak Constitution has a strinking resemblance to the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic (4). Provisions referring to legislative powers of the Parliament, election and powers of the President of the Republic, the judiciary, and the whole legal structure of the Slovak State had much in common with the Constitution of Czecho..!Slovakia which, like the ,S lovak Constitution, adopted principles of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, or the fundamental principles of French and American Constitutions. The authors of the Slovak Constitution were jurists and parliamentarians educated predominantly at the universities and in the Parliament of Czecho-:Slovakia; with one or two exceptions, they were men who studied law abroad and were mainly responsible for the liberal elements in the draft of the Slovak Constitution. There are, of course, striking differences, too, as far as the ideological bases of these two constitutions are concerned. The religiosity of the Slovak people and their Christian world outlook gave quite a different ideological basis to the Slovak constitution in general, and to its many provisions regarding social institutions, which reflect the ideas of the Papal encyclicals in particular. While the Slovak 50 SLOVAKIA Constitution presents God as the ultimate source of Law and declares that the function of the Slovak Republic is to unite all the moral and economic forces of the people in a Christian and national community in order to become the executor of social justice and the protector of common good, the ideological roots of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution were as far from God and religion as were Prague's leading politicians. On the other hand, the Slovak Constitution could not but differ in provisions or institutions which were imposed by the international situation and which are described as "authoritarian." As we mentioned before, the final requisite for a good Constitution, according to Gettell, is that the Constitution shall correspond to actual conditions within the State. While the Constitution of Czecho-Slovakia reflected certain ideological currents and political structures of the French Republic which was mainly responsible for the creation and existence of Czecho-Slovakia and for the new organization of Central Europe after First World War, the Slovak Constitution could not but reflect a new situation, new organization and a "new order" in Central Europe, created by Hitler's Germany in 1938-1939 with the consent of France and England. Considered objectively, one has to to recognize that it took courage and deep attachment to traditions to proclaim in Slovakia, in 1939, God as the ultimate source of Law and order and to use Papal encyclicals as the basis for social institutions, human and family rights on the one hand, and, on the other, "to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czechoslovak state" (5). When, in the summer of 1939, the committee appointed by the Slovak Parliament, labored on the draft of the Constitution, the political crisis in Europe was nearing its climax, and the ideological confusion attained irrational dimensions. The area of Central and Eastern Europe was exposed to ideological struggles and political ambitions of at least three Great Powers and, thus, Democracy, Communism, and Nazism as well as remnants of liberal tendencies were engaged in a rough competition for influence over the Central European peoples. Slovakia, in the middle of this ideological ferment and 1 SLOVAKIA 51 international instability, found herself also threatened by aggression or territorial claims from her neighbors, so that even the very existence of the newly created state on the banks of the Danube and the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains was, from its beginning, endangered. To expect, in the midst of such political and ideological chaos, any uncompromis ing attitudes on the side of the Constitutiona l Committee would amount to expecting from it something humanly impossible. Slovakia had to take a compromising position politically and ideologically not only for reasons of good relations with her neighbors, but also, if not in the first place, in order to survive as a State, since Democracy was considered a provocation, and, in its classic form, in the summer of 1939, was already dying in all Central Eiuropean countries. An analysis of the main principles and fundamental rights will show how far the work of the Constitutiona l Committee of Slovakia - despite its compromising tenor reflects the tendencies and genuine traditions of the Slovak people. According to the expert opinion of several jurists, the Constitution adopted practically the whole sysb~m of democratic-lib eralistic constitutions of the 1'8th and 19th centuries and, though Slovakia was weighed in from the right and left between Godless bolshevism and anti-Christian neo-paganism , she brought forth a constitution "saturated with the Christian spirit and especially with the principles of the social encyclicals of the Holy See" (6). As for the features of Christian democracy, besides many institutions concerned with social life, family, attitude to work, and function of property, in which we can find the influence of modern Christian sociology, the Christian character was given to the whole Constitution by its Preamble which reads as follows: "The Slovak nation, under the protection of Almighty God, survived throughout the ages on the territory destined for its national development and there, with the help of God, Who is the Source of all Power and Law, established its independent Slovak State. "The SI ova k State unites, according to Natural Law, all the moral and economic forces of the Nation in a Christian and national community for the purpose of regulating clashing social aspirations and mutually opposed interests of all occupational and professional groups, and has for its goal the highest attainable degree of happi- 52 SLOVAKIA ness of society and the individual. This ideal can only be achieved through a moral and political process, initiated by the State, which in harmonious unity will function as an executor of social justice and a protector of common good." It would certainly be difficult to find among the constitutions of modern states any other which so clearly states that God must be recognized as the original source of Law and Order and that the function of the nation in a Christian and national community in order to become "an executor of social justice and protector of common good" (7). The accentuation of the social function of the State, which we find in the Preamble, and the emphasis placed on the happiness of both the individual and society, are an indication of the legislators' intention to build a modern welfare state on the principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how principles of Christian social doctrines. We shall see below how these ideas found their expressions in particular provisions and institutions of the Slovak Constitution. n General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution It is not necessary to be an expert in constitutional law to notice that the Slovak Constitution contains all the democratic devices which political science usually requires from democratic constitutions - such as the separation of powers, the doctrine of checks and balances, and the principle of rule by law. Even the most bitter adversaries of Slovak independence - the Communists and the supporters of Czechoslovakism - did not try to deny these features to the Slovak Constitution. "The Slovak State was intended to make a full show of independence," wrote Alexander IKunosi, one of today's communist diplomats of Czecho-,Slovakia, in 11944, from his London exile: "It was to be vested with all the institutions formerly possessed by the Czechoslovak State. Steps were taken to produce a sort of Slovak edition of the Czecho-Slovak State" (8). Admitting this, the adversaries of the Slovak Republic could not try to say that "the parlimentary facade of Government in Slovakia had, of course, no real signifi1 SLOVAKIA 53 cance, " or that the "Diet did not express the will of the nation or the people," which, as we shall see further , hardly correspond with the truth since the Parliament in Slovakia was not only in theory but also in fact the suprem e organ of the State and the most essential powers were vested in Parliament from the beginning to the end. The Constitution was adopted by a legally constit uted Slovak Diet which was established in accordance with the Czecho-Slovak Constitution, and on the basis of the general election which took place on December 18, 19'38. According to Law No. 299, adopted on November 22, 1938, Slovakia became an autonomous part of Czecho-Slovakia, with her own Government and her own Diet composed of 63 members, vested with legislative powers goveerning not only internal affairs, but required also for ratification of Czecho-Slovak international agreements concerning Slovakia. This Diet, summoned to a session on March 14, 1939, by the President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, Dr. Emil H a c h a , declared Slovakia an independent State, and a special committee of the Diet prepared the draft of the Constitution which was adopted unanimously on July 31, 1939, as Law No. 185. The draft of the Constitution was preceded by a study of several existing modern constitutions with a view to giving the country a set of principles that would correspond with contemporary constitutional thinking and the practical needs and national traditions of the Slovak people. The text was prepared by two university professors of Law, Dr. V. Tuka and Dr. F. :Durcansky, and by several jurists and parliamentarians of young and old generations, Senator Dr. K. Mederly, Dr. M. Sokol, Dr. V. Tvrdy, and Dr. Cerhelyi. In 103 short articles (paragraphs) divided into 13 chapters, the Slovak Constitution gave a radical as well as social basis to the new State in Central Europe. The first article of the Constitution declared the Slovak State a Republic with a President as an elected head, with t erms, according to Gettell, are used to indicate a representative democracy (9) . According to articles 6, 7, 8, and 9, legislative power 54 SLOVAKIA for the entire country vested in the Parliament, composed of 80 members and elected in a general, direct, equal, and secret suffrage for a period of five years. The right to vote belonged to every citizen over 2'1 years of age, man and woman, without racial or religious discrimination. This right to be elected to Parliament belonged to citizens over 30 years of age. The Parliament was based on the unicameral system,. and the President of the Republic was obliged to convene the Parliament for regular sessions twice a year, and for extraordinary sessions whenever the majority of members. demanded such a session. Laws promulgated by the Parliament required the President's signature for their validity. Paragraph 26 provided, however, that laws could be promulgated despite the President's veto, if they were adopted by a three-fifths majority in the presence of a two-thirds majority of deputies. The right to appoint governments belonged to the President, but the Government was responsible to Parliament and subject to its vote of confidence. The Parliament also had the right of prosecution of the· President for high treason. Part IN of the Constitution deals with the powers and functions of the President, who was elected for a period of seven years. Any citizen, 40 years of age or over, was eligible for the office, and the election was valid if two. thirds of the members were present and the candidate obtained a three-fifths majority. A comparision of powers and functions of the Slovak ·P resident, as defined in the Constitution, with those of other parliamentary democracies will prove that his powers were somewhere between the extensive functions and powers of the American president and the purely representative functions of the Presidents of France (before De Gaulle). He represented the State internationally, had the right, with the consent of Parliament to declare wars and conclude peace, to appoint and dismiss ministers, to appoint, but not to dismiss university professors, judges, civil servants, and military officers of the three highest categories. He also had the right to be present at the sessions of the Government and Council of State, to request their convention under his chairmanship, SLOVAKIA 55 to convene, dissolve and prologue Parliament, to sign or veto Parliament's acts, etc. While making the president a dominant figure of the executive, the Constitution, on the other hand, contained provisions which were designed to prevent dictatorial powers (10). The Parliament was able, as we have seen, to promulgate laws even if opposed by the President and according to paragraph 40, "any executive act of the president requires counter-signature by a competent cabinet minister for its validity." No person could be re-elected more than once to the presidential office and when the president died during his term, abdicated or was permanently unable to exercise his functions, it was the duty of the Prime Minister to assume temporary functions of the president. A new president had to be elected by the iParliament within thirty days. The President represented, together with the Cabinet, the executive of the !Slovak Republic and, consequently, the Slovak Government had some features of a presidential type of government and, at the same time, it also contained elements of parliamentary government. An expert on constitutional theories can prove both, because - while the essential characteristics of parliamentary government are: 1) a politically independent head of State; and, 2) a cabinet which is politically responsible to Parliament - "parliamentary Government may also develop in the opposite direction. The Cabinet can become the dominant political organ, able to control the government of the country and direct the work of the Parliament which assists it in the execution of its program," says Andre Mathiot in his ercellent treatise "The British Political System" (11). it is not, however, our intention to discuss theoretical issues here. One can easily prove that the executive in the Slovak Republic was also predominantly of the presidential type, because "every system of 'P arliamentary government has its own distinctive features, resulting from a complex of many different factors. History, the national temperament, beliefs and ideologies, conventions of political behavior, attempts to imitate a particular model or to avoid certain dangers, etc." - states Mathiot. All these factors 56 SLOVAKIA played their distinctive roles in the Slovak Constitution and made it a constitution "sui generis." As for the powers and constitution of the Slovak Cabinet, the President of the Republic appointed and dismissed the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and determined which member would administer individual ministries (Article 41). The Parliament was also empowered to call the Cabinet and its individual members to political responsibility and to express lack of confidence which would result in the dissolution of the cabinet (Article 48) . Practical considerations demanded, on the other hand, a certain measure of delegation of legislative powers to the Cabinet. The jurisdiction of the Cabinet was limited to governmental orders, namely, during a national emergency, or orders pertaining to the execution of certain types of laws, and within the limits specified in the laws. Validity of such orders was conditional, since the Prime Minister was obliged to submit them within three months to the Parliament, which, in turn, could disallow such measures or could make whatever changes it deemed necessary, or pass it as its own law (12). Chapter V of the Slovak Constitution defined the functions and composition of the Council of State, a pecial body composed of outstanding personalities from various walks of life whose functions pertained to a sort of control of the political life in ,Slovakia. The Council was composed of 6 members appointed by the President of the Republic, ten members were chosen by the Slovak People's Party, two members by the registered parties of ethnic groups, and one was delegated by each estate. The Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly were also memb2rs of the Council. The functions of the Council were defined by the Article 52 and consisted in initiating legislation, controlling and prosecuting the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers, and in advising the President and the government on matters of a political, cultural, and economic nature. The Council also prepared the list of candidates for parliamentary elections and made decisions concerning the loss of 0 SLOVAKIA 57 parliamentary seats, following a request from the President of the Assembly. Politically, the reason for the existence of the Council was given by the desire to have, in the absence of a Senate, representatives in the political life of the new State from groups or professions who usually did not look for an election to Parliament, but whose advice, abilities, and moral stature were destined to help the Government in its endeavour to make the population happy and united behind the political leadership. The authors of the draft of the Constitution expressed their intention in stating that "the Council of State is the expression of political and national unity, and also joins the national and political life with the constitutional representatives, combining itself the function of legal initiation and control." Following the social doctrine of the Papal encyclicals, the authors of the Constitution also included in their draft certain institutions which characterize the so-called "corporative" systems. Chapter VII of the Slovak Constitution had foressen organization of Slovakia's inhabitants into six self-administered bodies called "stavy" (estates) according to occupation and profession: the association of workers and employers in agriculture, in industry, trade, commerce and banking; the association of the free professions and the association of State and public employees. "The associations included both employers and employees and they were assigned to take care of the economic, social, and cultural interests of their members, to solve labor and wage disputes and problems among employees and employers, and to help members of the association to achieve better results in their industries and occupations and a higher standard of living for the nation (Article 62). Acting on Law No. 297 of the Collection of Laws, the President of the Republic appointed the presidents on November 19, 1940, and the aim of the associations was again given as "to manifest the unity of the Slovak workers' community, without heed to classes and callings, and bearing in mind only the interests of the nation and the State" (13). As for the judiciary, we have already stated that the Slovak Constitution was based on the principle of separa- 58 SLOVAKIA tion of powers, as defined by modern political theories. There were three types of courts: courts of law, administrative courts, and military courts. The organization of courts and their legal competence were left to a special legislation. As in any modern constitutions, the Slovak Constitution provided that the courts of law were empowered to review any decision of administrative courts and, on the other hand, the jurisdiction of military courts could be extended over the civil population during wartime and for war crimes. "Judges are independent," states Article 67, "in their judicial functions and are bound only by law." The Constitution contained provisions that no person could be deprived of the judge designated by law to hear the case (Article 62), and Article 66 made the judiciary free of any interference either on the part of administrative or political leadership. The professional judges were appointed to their positions permanently and "they have held a highly privileged position, appropriate to their equally high office," states Judge A. Peltzner (14). The Chapter dealing with the rights and obligations of the citizens (Chapter X) can sustain comparision with any democratic and liberal constitution and a modern "Bill of Rights." The 1Slovak Constitution guaranteed full and equal rights to all citizens without distinction of sex, race, creed, occupation, or ethnic origin. The guarantees refer to personal freedoms, private ownership, religious freedom, freedom of expression of opinion, scientific research and arts (15), provided they were exercised within the limits of valid laws and did not come into conflict with public order and Christian morals [Article 85] - (16). The Constitution was based on the principle that "no person can be punished for behavior which is not in conflict with valid legal form and for which a punishment has not been previously determined," applying the old principle "nulla poena sine lege," and all inhabitants, regardless of origin, nationality, religion, or occupation, were entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property (Article 81). There are, in the Slovak Constitution, even some particular provisions which intended to give to the Slovak State SLOVAKIA 59 a progressive, modern, social and Christian character. Such provisions are as follows: Ownership has a social function and demands from the owner adminstration in the best interest of the common good (Article 79). Marriage, family and motherhood are under the· strict protection of the legal order (Article 86). Labor is protected. Exploitation of socially weak citizens is. prohibited. Wages should be adequate to the working effort and family status. Mental and physical work is a civil duty, etc. "All these provisions can be described," says Dr. Peltzner, "as an intensified care and protection of the family, social purpose of private ownership, protection of the working man, his wages, and social justice to all. All were aimed at achieving a new social order, where clashing social interests would be minimized and eventually abolished. This concept of social and labor legislation was greatly influenced by the encyclical letters of the Popes of the Roman Catholic Church, especially by Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno" (17). ln order to present a complete picture of the Slovak Constitution, we have to mention provisions regarding political parties. The chapter dealing with the political organization (Chapter Vil) merely legalized the existing situation which was created in Slovakia by the so-called Zilina .A:greement of October 6, 1938, long before Slovakia declared her independence and the Parliament adopted the Constitution. The provision referring to political parties consists of only two paragraphs, the first stating that "the Slovak people participate in political life through the medium of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the Party of Slovak National Unity) ," and the second legalizing the political activities of ethnic groups, providing that "the ethnic groups participate in political life through a medium of their own political party, provided that such a party can be considered as a representative of the political will of the entire ethnic group" (Articles 58, 59). Since October, 1938, when the number of political parties was reduced due to internal and international circumstances and development, there were in Slovakia three po1 60 SLOVAKIA litical parties, legally constituted and taking part in the political life of Slovakia. The Communist and the Social Democrat parties, representing only ten deputies, had been dissolved or suppressed following the Zilina Agreement. Six other parties merged into the Slovak National Unity Party, which remained the backbone of the political s y s t e m of autonomous Slovakia before March 1939, and of the Slovak Republic thereafter. The German and Magyar ethnic groups were represented by two minority parties, and the Ukrainian minority by a member of Parliament within Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, the Party of National Unity. The fact that the Slovak Constitution provided for only one party for the Slovak people caused certain criticism abroad and marked, according to some critics, the Slovak R e p u b 1 i c as an authoritarian state. For everybody who knows the Slovak political life between the years 1918-1939 and who is aware of the composition of the Slovak Diet in which representatives of practically all previous political parties except Communists and Social Democrats had their seats, such reproaches would seem to be more of a theoretical than practical nature. There is no doubt that without provisions restricting political life of the Slovak population to one party only, even if it was composed of fractions of many parties, the Constitution would have looked more democratic and beyond reproach, because a multiparty system is one of the main characteristics of modern representative democracies. However, war conditions and specific needs and dangers forced the Slovak political leaders to adopt many restrictions which are understandable only if we take into consideration all the problems and dangers which the Slovak Republic had to face from the first days of its existence to the end of the war from the outside and the inside. This as well as other features which marked the Slovak Constitution as "authoritarian" were or will be discussed later in this treatise. Before concluding our remarks on the general characteristics of the Slovak Constitution, it seems appropriate to analyze the formal features of the text and its contents. In this respect, we can say that from the point of view of political science and constitutional law, the Slo- SLOVAKIA 61 vak Constitution conforms to all requirements which political science demands from modern constitutions. It can be classified as a comprehensive set of fundamental principles and laws covering the whole field of government and making provisions for the exercise of political power. It outlined the governmental organization, determined the relations of the governors and the governed, and provided a legal method for amendments, so that it might be changed when necessary by the prescribed majority in Parliament. m "Authoritarian" Features and Deviations The statement of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives mentions that the Slovak Constitution contained also principles of "an authoritarian state." There is, however, no indication in the report where these principles are to be found, except perhaps in the words that "the executive was to prevail over the legislature after Slovakia, in 1941, had entered the war against the Soviet Union," and that "the number of political parties was reduced - after the Communist and the Social Democrat parties. had been suppressed as subversive - in October, 1938, and the six other parties merged into the Slovak Unity Party, the backbone of the political system of the Slovak State." Actually, the Constitution did not reduce the number of Slovak political parties. It merely legalized a situation which was created in Slovakia in 1938, when Czecho-Slovakia became a federation. We have already explained in part how and why this happened and that unity was not forced on any political party as was later claimed. The representatives of all Slovak and Czecho-Slovak parties were happy that the victorious autonomist movement did not resort to reprisals, and the Slovak population, regardless of previous political affiliation or creed, also approved the new situation. Though the law and electoral system allowed participation of many parties and the autonomous government of Dr. Tiso published an announcement requiring political parties to file the list of their candidates for election, only the Slovak People's Party - the Party of National Unity filed a joint list of candidates which contained leading per- 62 SLOVAKIA sonalities of all previous parties except the Communist and Social Democrats. The new Slovak Parliament issued from this election, held on December 18, 1938, and conducted under the rules of the Czecho-Slovak Constitution and electoral system, was composed of 48 former Populists, 12 former agrarian, Artisans, Slovak Nationalists and even National Socialists (Dr. E. Benes's Party), two Germans, one Hungarian, and one Ukrainian. It was this Diet which unanimously proclaimed Slovakia on March 14, 1939, an independent State and adopted the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. There were no changes in Party system or in the composition of party representatives in 1939, and former adherents of Prague's centralism worked in the 1Slovak Parliament and Party organs quite happily together with former autonomists, Protestant ministers with the Catholic clergy, agrarians with artisans, etc. , until 1944, when the outcome of the War became clearly unfavorable to the further existence of the Slovak Republic and the restoration of Czecho.,Slovakia by the ,Soviets and Allies was in sight. There was, of course, a change in the structure of the Party of National Unity, which combined from March, 1939, nominations with election of Party functionaries on all levels, and the role of the Party altered considerably. The President of the Party, Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, and this writer as Secretary General, insisted on avoiding imitation of foreign models either in ideology or organization, as had been admitted even by Communist and Czech adversaries (18). Some features and symbols of Italian and German party systems were nevertheless adopted, and on the surface there was an adaptation to the "New Order" in Central Europe, which in some respect was far from a parliamentarian or representative democracy in the traditional sense. In practice and ideologically Slovakia, however, continued the "decrepit democratic system of Benes' Republic," as Hitler stated in his reproach to the Slovak leaders in July, 1940, during the so-called "Salzburg Summons." After the Salzburg meeting which resulted in the forced resignation of the Minister of the Interior and Foreign Af- SLOVAKIA 63 fairs, Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, and of this writer a:s Secretary General of the Party, some measures were adopted which did not correspond either with the letter or with the spirit of the Slovak Constitution and which measures effected, in some respects, "the executive prevailed over the legislature." The Party's importance for some time considerably diminished and the Hlinka Guard, originally and according to the law a section of the ·P arty, tried to control the Party and political life, but this development did not bring about any constitutional changes, it did not last for any length of time, and was either challenged or disapproved and finally checked by the Parliament, the President and the Party leaders (19). It is a matter of fact that there were, in this period, attempts to introduce a sort of "Slovak National Socialism" in the administration of public affairs and there were arbitrary actions of irresponsible persons and groups against certain ,groups of population, but the Parliament and especally the President and the .P arty tried to stop these currents and transgressions and gained satisfactory control of the situation in this case, as in the first weeks after the declaration of independence. This, however, did not prevent the adversaries of the Slovak •S tate from an incorrect and often malicious interpretation of the intentions of the Slovak political leaders who centralized political institutions and also economic and administrative offices only because they were forced to do so by war conditions and by the desire to achieve unity of the nation which was before intentionally divided into many fractions by Prague's rulers who ruled Slovakia during twenty years according to the old dictum "divide et impera." They presented many institutions which were imposed upon Slovakia by war conditions and the international situation as a part of a "totalitarian or authoritative system," though, on the other hand, they admitted that "public offices and institutions which had not formerly existed in 1Slovakia, were introduced on a Czecho..Slovak model, among them the Supreme Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Audit Department, the Post 64 SLOVAKIA Office Savings Bank, the National Bank, the Land Office, the Statistics Office, etc. " (20). The war imposed a number of new offices everywhere, in Great Britain, in the United States, and in Canada, such as: Price Control Office, Central :Eiconomic Office, Propaganda Office, etc. When similar offices were organized in Slovakia, the adversaries of Slovak independence, from their London or Washington asylums, denounced them as proofs and instruments of "authoritarian" or "nazi and fascist" systems and oppression. No doubt, the Slovak administration during the last years of the war had some offices and institutions which had names or structures similar to German or Italian institutions, but there was "a mixture of old and new elements," as admitted even by the Communists and Czech adversaries and definitely the democratic or "Czechoslovak" model prevailed and the intention of the responsible Slovak leaders behind all these institutions was not to introduce nazism or fascism, but to secure prosperity, security, and smooth functioning of the new State, or in other words, to save the Slovak people and its substance at a time when it was faced with physical and spiritual ruin. Some original "authoritarian" features of the !Slovak Constitution are due to the fact that the jurists and Parliamentarians who prepared the draft looked for inspirations in the countries which were in similar political or geographical situations and equally threatened either by the impact of nazism or communism. For this reason mainly the Constitution of Austria under Dolfuss-Schuschni gg and the Constitution of Portugal were studied by some members of the preparatory legislative committee and, while the Ausstrian Constitution showed them how to defend the country against infiltration of German National Socialist ideology, the Constitution of Portugal was studied because of the threat of Communist infiltration. Adversaries of Slovak independence who knew that this was the correct interpretation of the "authoritarian" elements in the Slovak Constitution, tried to prove, of course, the very opposite: they spoke and wrote of a deliberate introduction of "nazi" or "fascist" ideology and system, using for proof some short comings or measures imposed by the war and German pressure SLOVAKIA 65 on Slovak Administration and Government. They also failed to realize that "the value of any form of government may be judged either by the success and efficiency with which it accomplishes its proper purposes or by the effect which it produces on its citizens and the degree of satisfaction and confidence that they feel toward it," as Gettel says. That there were problems and shortcomings, none among responsible Slovak leaders had ever denied. "Our constitutional o~gans, our legislation, executive, and judiciary are in their infancy," wrote the official newspaper Slovak. "We shall show no weakness if we admit that here and there various institutions are still very shaky." There was quite open criticism of all shortcomings and often violent attacks on institutions and leaders from many parts, even from President Tiso and the young leadership of the Party, because, while there was formally only one Slovak political party, the public heard critical voices, and public opinion was created outside Parliament by the Party press, Hlinka Guard press, German and Hungarian minority press, and clandestine Communist opposition. All of them wrote and spoke from their own angles and viewpoints. Certainly, too many voices for an "authoritarian" or "nazi" regime and State - a fact which was later recognized even by some adversaries. "The fact remains," reported Dr. M. Kvetko, one of the leaders of the "People's Democracy," installed in Slovakia in collaboration with the Communists, to American authorities in Germany in 1948, "that a significant number of the politicians of the Slovak People's Party, and especially of the populace, were not inclined to fascism and prevented its spread so effectively that, excepting the retaliations against Jews and Communists, no special actions were undertaken against the vast majority of the people. And so, with regard to the fact that Slovak people managed the affairs in Slovakia, we can hardly speak of treason and collaboration (with nazism) as the Communists tried to do in order to frighten the people and create chaos, so that they could come to power." This chapter was intended, however, to deal with the 66 SLOVAKIA Constitution of the Slovak Republic which, without being changed, remained the basis of legal system and ,governmental structure from 1939 to 1945, when Russians armies overran the country, raping and looting without precedence in Slovak history, and imposed on the Slovak people the new "people's democracy" and Czech domination within the framework of a restored Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak Constituaion reflected old Slovak Christian and democratic traditions and there can hardly be any doubt that the responsible Slovak leaders endeavoured to govern in accordance with the Constitution, and only because of limitations imposed by the international situation and other circumstances which were beyond the control of the people and their leaders, t here were deviations from the Constitution. For this reason it can be admitted that "the Slovak State reflected a compromise between the past and present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central E' u rope." And for the same reason the Slovak Constitution "contained principles which in some aspects combined features of the liberal, the Christian Democratic, and the authoritarian State." 1. R. ,G. Gettell: Political Science, University of Calif., 1933, p. 244. 2. Cfr.: "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Czecho-Slovakia," Union Calendar No. 929, House Report No. 2684, Part 14, Washington, 1954. The Select Committee was composed of Congressmen, as well as a group of experts from Georgetown University and various parts of the United States. 3. Milan Hodza : Federation in Central Europe, London, 1942, p. 208-9. 4. Cfr . .Alexander Kunosi: The Basis of Czechoslovak Unity, London, 1944, p. 86; and H. Lee MdBain: The New Constitutions of Europe, New York, 1922, p. 307-342. 5. Even communist adversaries has to admit that "the Nazi model was not shamelessly imposed" and that "the n ew Slovak state was launched with all the paraphernalia of a national ideology apparently corporative and Christian," as wrote K. Kunosi in London, in 1944. 6. Joseph .A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de !'Europe, Paris, 1955, p. 12.7-131; also article by J. F. Gleiman in symposium Slovenska Republika, ed. N. Sprinc, Scranton, Pa., 1949, p. 108-112, and the English translation in Slovakia, Middletown, Pa., Vol. II, No. 3, p. 20 . .An excellent analysis of the Slovak Constitution was also prepared by former judge .Anton Peltzner, DL. D., as a thesis for the M. .A. degree at the U niversity of Montreal in 1957. SLOVAKIA 67 7. "This presentation of God as the ultimate ,s ource of Law, and the interdependence of human and divine order as reflected in the Preamble of the Slovak !Constitution can prompt one to question." says Dr. A. Peltzner in his analysis, "why the authors of the text considered it wise and appropriate to formulate the preface in such a sense and import." The answer, in his opinion and in the opinion of all who are familiar with the history of the Slovak people, is based on two elements: l) there was a long and sincere dedication of the Slovak people to their religion, and a mutually long and faithful service of the Slovak clergy to their nation ; and, 2) the geographical position of the Slovak Republic was such that, on the Eastern frontiers stood the might of ,M arxist atheism, and from the Western side there was a potential danger of spreading and infiltrating of modern paganism, as formulated and taught by ,o erman National Socialism. The political leaders of the Slovak people considered it, therefore, as highly desirable to state that '\Slovaks stood firmly by their national traditions, of which belief in God and His Omnipotence was the substance of the whole concept." - Cfr. Dr. A. Peltzner: The Slovak Constitution and Modern Political Theory, p . 105. 8. Ibidem, p. 8·6. 9. lbidem, p. 195. 10. Ibidem, p. 48. 11. Andre Mathiot: The Bri tish Political System , London, 1958, p . 13·5. 12. The Constitution empowered the Cabinet to issue a government order with -the legal force and effect of law when economic, financial or political interests of the State required immediate attention, and only when lack of action could cause irreparable damage to these interests. 13. Cfr. Kunosi: Opus cit., p. 86. 14. ilbidem, pp. 76-82. 15. See: Chapter X, articles 75-85. That some of these freedoms were later limited or in individual cases disregarded, nobody would deny. The war imposed restrictions on personal freedoms in every country. In Slovakia, one could hardly expect that ideological influences of Germany and the political and economic pressures of war conditions would not result in a restriction of civil rights, or in transgressions by some individuals or groups of individuals. This, however, was not the fault of the Constitution, and as for the President of the Slovak !Republic and the Parliament, they tried to apply restrictions with respect to human life and natural rights. 16. 'The measures adopted against Jewish citizens were in many regards unconstitutional and mainly a result of German interference and deceit, especially as far as the transfer of a part of Slovak Jews to Poland was concerned. They were destined for labor, not extermination. The President as well as other Slovak authorities tried to avoid the tragedy but were able to save only a portion of those to be transferred. On the attitude of the Slovak Population see Raport du Co mite In- 68 SLOVAKIA 17. 18. 19. 20. ternational de la Croix Rouge , Geneve, 1948, I-IL1, I-er vol., P. 674, and also J . A. Mikus, Opus. c it. , p. 136. Ibid em, p. 101. Cfr. A . Kuno si: Opus cit., and a lso Chap ter on Political parties. It is a m att er of controv ersy a mong experts of constitutional law if the preponderance of the executiv e over the legislature gives a n a uthorHaria n character to a State. "A domina nt exec utiv e can be defend ed on th eore ti cal grounds," says Andre Mathiot. " The Cabinet, no less than Parlia m ent, com es into being as the r esult of an elec tion which more or less d et ermines its composition. Thus, in Great Britain, the relationship between the Crown, Parliament and the Cabin et ha ve gra du a lly d eveloped to produce a uniqu e parliam entary regime in which the executiv e is now th e dominant organ. Parliamen t remains legally sovereign a nd in th eory the supreme organ in th e State, but it is 110 exagger ation to say that effective political power is nowa days concentrated in the small group of men who constitute th e Cabinet" (Opus cit. , p. 135). W e have, of course, no intention to rights, on theoretical grounds, and to compare the r egime in Great Britain with that in Slovakia. Cfr. Kunos i: opus cit., p. 89. • • • MARCH 14, 1939: SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY By Andrew Pastor The day of independence of a nation represents the culminating point in what often was a long struggle for its achievement. Independence comes easy, but the road leading to it is strewn with hardships, sufferings, miseries, and oftentimes death. Whether that day be the 4th of July, or the 14th day of March, it is a day of recollection upon which each individual looks with pride, knowing that this day years ago marked the beginning of a new and brighter era in the historic evolution of one's nation. What is the historical background of Slovakia's independence? Briefly the political history of the Slovaks dates back to the 9th century when Rastislav, the ruler of Great Moravia (846-870), made himself known for the intensive christianization of their territory by inviting Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slovaks and the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Joseph M. Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.<br />Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959<br />pp. 47-68<br /><ol type="I"><li>Introductory Note</li> <li>General Characteristics of the Slovak Constitution</li> <li>"Authoritarian" Features and Deviations</li> </ol> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ffdd90e93a1e0dd7bfadee4f9be62543.pdf 3d921bb0dc4b66649d2663cee5110f77 PDF Text Text 32 SLOVAKIA Bratislava streets rang out with song for quite a time. We embraced each other and danced. Then we marched, or rather should ,J say, danced all the way to Svoradov. The fraternity was another joyous scene. I still remember vividly how we embraced Colman Murgas in the refectory, his eyes streaming with tears. I was so excited that 1 could hardly eat. Like so many others, l had lost my appetite for food. Like them, I was satiated with joy. The Slovaks proclaimed their country an independent Republic on March 14, 1939. • • • SLOVAK NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM B. S. BUC, Ph.D. 1. The Nation of Emigrants Slovak nationalism cannot be considered as the outgrowth of the Central European soil and the pure product of political forces of that sector. It was steadily developing under many outside influences which penetrated that sector either in the form of new ideas or in the form of outside political and economic interests. Moreover, in the period of the greatest oppression, the real shaping of the Slovak national will for survival was occuring outside Slovakia, among emigrants. About one third of the present Slovak population lives outside Slovakia as emigrants in various sectors of the world. That makes Slovaks truly a nation of emigrants. They were forced to emigrate either for economic or political reasons. Slovakia is a mountainous country with forests covering 40 % of the land. Moreover, prior to 1918, a substantial part of Slovak land was owned by the Magyar or foreign aristocracy, so that Slovaks had little opportunity to make living from agriculture. Temporary or permanent emigration became, therefore the only solution to the economic problem for many children of Slovak farmers. When they �SLOVAKIA 33 reached free soil, especially the United 1S tates of America, they proved themselves to be the greatest promoters of Slovak nationalism, not only among themselves but also in their native country. They conveyed ideas of democracy and freedom to their homeland and influenced the outside world to help their compatriots at home in their struggle for survival in Hungary. In 1918, when Slovakia became a part of Czecho-Slovakia, emigration did not cease. It is true, however, that in the first years of the new Republic, Czecho-,Slovakia inaugurated a drastic agrarian reform, wherein almost all of the soil belonging to the aristocracy was apportioned among new owners. Nevertheless, these reforms failed to ameliorate the original situation, because they aimed at rewarding political careerists rather than at bettering the social position of the inhabitants. According to a French observer : "many of the good lands, instead of being apportioned among the peasants, were used to constitute a new agrarian bourgeoisie, under the name of 'surplus estates' " (1). These estates served to favor the political aims of the Czech agrarian party, who used them either to establish Czechs in Southern Slovakia, or to reward Slovaks who were inclined to apply cen• tralist politics to the government of Slovakia. This gave rise to a privileged class, the "surplussers" who resembled very much the ancient landlords of the Hungarian feudal system. While the latter received their lands as a recompense for their services in the army, the former received them for their services in politics (2). Under Czecho-Slovakia, however, Slovak industry fared even worse. The Czechs were chiefly concerned with industrial expansion within their own domains and, therefore, not only contributed nothing to the expansion of former Slovak industries, but adversely put down many existing undertakings in an evident attempt to keep Slovakia agrarian. According to William iDiamond: "During the period from 1934 to 1937, 91.5% of all factory manufacturing in the state occured in Czech lands" ( 3). According to information presented in May of 1949 to the XIX Congress of the Communist !Party in Prague by William Siroky, who at that time was Chairman of the Communist Party in Slovakia, 92,000 workers were engaged in Slovak industries and trades in 191i3. This figure �34 SLOVAKIA comprised about 17 % of the total population. After the unification of Czechs and Slovaks, the progressive tendency in industry since the First World War was completely halted. In 1'927, no more than 80,000 workers were engaged in industry in Slovakia. Within ten more years, during which industry showed great and rapid progress in Czech lands the increase in the number of workers in Slovakia was negligible, with the result that in 1937 they numbered 104,91'5 ( 4). Because of this unhealthy economic situation in Slovakia, almost one-third of the entire S 1 o v a k population sought relief through emigration. The majority emigrated to the United States between 1'873 and 1918. When the United States placed a limit on immigration in 1918, however, the Slovaks emigrated to Canada, South America, Australia, France, and Belgium. This emigration actually became the only liberty-holding portion of Slovaks and, therefore, chiefly before 1918, an almost exclusive representative of Slovak national endeavors. 2. Slovak Immigrants in the United States The leading position in these endeavors was held by Slovak immigrants in the United States. In 1910 Slovaks in this country numbered 281,707; by 1920 the number had increased to 619,866. According to a private appraisal, however, the number should be at least 200,000 more, for about that number of people of Slovak descent may have registered as Austro-iHungarians. Slovaks are represented mostly in the state of Pennsylvania, where in 1920 they numbered 296,219. The remainder are scattered mainly through nine states: Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana ( 5) . On United States soil, the Slovaks developed a very living, organized activity chiefly in the field of fraternalism. At the present time there exist eleven such ·Slovak fraternal organizations with a membership of more than 400,000 and with assets totaling 88½ million d0llars (6). They established besides an extensive Slovak press, which had a great significance for Slovak nationalism in that it was really the only national press during the time of fierce �SLOVAKIA 35 magyarization at the close of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. 3. Shaping of the National Will Every coercive measure of the Hungarian government encountered great opposition in the Slovak press of the United States. On the soil of this country Slovak and Magyars waged an obstinate battle, with the result that the Western World became acquainted with the name "Slovak" and with the nationality problem of Austria-Hungary. The first public and organized opposition of Slovaks towards !Magyars in the United ,States took place at Cleveland in 1902. The Magyar immigrants of that city were attempting to place in the Public Square a monument dedicated to their revolutionary Magyar leader of 1848, Louis Kossuth. They were hindered by the Slovaks, who publicly revealed Kossuth's totalitarian methods towards Slovaks and other nationalities of Hungary. When, in 1906, the Hungarian government brought Rev. Andrew Hlinka and several other 'Slovak patriots to trial, this action led the immigrants of all convictions in the United States to join forces and to found a united organization called Slovak League of America at the first Slovak Congress assembled in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 26, 1907. According to .its first tenets, the principal aim of the Slovak League was to exert every effort "that S 1 ova k nation would rank among the other nations as an equal among equals'' (7). Its first step was the creation of a national fund to carry on an active struggle for the liberation of Slovaks. Among the League's first successes in this country must be numbered the fact that, during the census of 1910, the following question was aked in the questionnaire: what is your mother tongue? Through this change, passed by the Senate at the proposal of Senator Oliver, the Slovaks as well as the other nationalities of former Hungary could not be separated from the universal concept of "Hungarian", under which they should have been originally classed for belonging to the Hungarian Kingdom (8). At the outbreak of the First World War, the Slovak �36 SLOVAKIA League published a memorandum, which was sent to all members of Congress and to other distinguished political figures in the United States as well as others in the West. This memorandum, in the spirit of American democratic ideals, stressed the desire that: The Slovaks in Hungary should obtain their natural privileges of life, freedom, and pursuit of happiness, which they have been deprived of by the dynasty; that the ,Slovaks be given opportunity to develop their national spirit, their abilities, and the natural resources of their native land; that the Slovaks be guaranteed the realization of their national ideals and efforts, which have been mercilessly trodden by the tyrannical Hungarian Government (9). The memorandum was signed by: all ofificials of the Slovak League; the representatives of twenty-three Slovak newspapers; the representatives of twenty organizations; fifty-two Slovak Catholic priests and forty Slovak Protestant ministers. 'It was published in five languages besides English. The main significance of this memorandum, however, lies in the fact that the 1S lovaks in this country immediately after the outbreak of the war assumed the leadership of the entire Slovak nation. They did it not only because they were free to express the will of the whole nation, but also because the number of their organized ranks exceeded the number of organized Slovaks ever known in their own fatherland. The number of publications represented on the memorandum also exceeded the number edited by the Slovaks in their native country. 4. In Search of a New Ally When the Slovak immigrants in the United States had sent out the afore-mentioned memorandum, they still had not made up their minds clearly concerning the future of their native land. Since they did not intend to form an independent state out of Slovakia, they had to concern themselves with the problem of deciding within what kind of future framework the Slovaks should enjoy those political rights which they sought. All were unanimously agreed that Slovakia must be definitely torn away from Hungary. Several proposed combinations developed. Some favored the Czechs as the ally to be sought. Others favored the Russians. Others favored the Poles, who already had promises from the Allies for the �SLOVAKIA 37 restoration of Poland. Gradually the Czechs came to be selected as the most logical ally to be sought (10). The thinking most prevalent in the minds of the Slovak immigrants in the United States is clearly stated in a letter of the Rev. Matthew Jankola, one of the foremost active participants in these matters. In a letter written in Bridgeport, Conn., on December 15, 1915, he wrote: We shall mean nothing in a monarchy, and absolutely nothing in a great Russia. But we would stand on a footing of equality with the Czechs, a la Austria and Hungary; or as formerly Norway and Sweden; with our own self-government, our own parliament, our own Slovak State language. Can we ever obtain this under Russia, or in In regards to the Czechs, their supremacy can Austria-Hungary? only be temporary; until the time that we rear one generation in our own spirit. I do not consider Czech liberalism so dangerous. Our naI mean common ture and character are different. The S I ova k shall retain their character (11). people - In the meantime, in Europe, profesor Thomas G. Masaryk began a revolutionary movement for the liberation of Czechs and Slovaks in Austria-Hungary. Under his influence the Czech immigrants in the United States also formed a joint organization under the name "Czech National Alliance" , which organization adopted the same program regarding Czechs as the Slovak League had done regarding Slovaks. T. G. Masaryk soon became the recognized head of the movement for the liberation of the Czechs and the alliance of the Slovaks with the Czechs. 5. The Cleveland Agreement Professor T. G. Masaryk from •Paris asked the Czech ational Alliance in America to gain the cooperation of the Slovak League for common Czech and Slovak liberation efforts. Following that request, the secretary of the Czech National Alliance invited the Slovak League of America to a meeting. Along with this invitation the secretary sent a proposed draft of an agreement which was accepted in Cleveland on October 25, 1915, and since that time has been known as the Cleveland Agreement. It contained the following points: 1. Independence of Czech lands and Slovakia. 2. A union of the Czech and Slovak nations in a federative alliance of states with a complete national autonomy for Slovakia, with its own state government, its own cultural freedom and, therefore, �38 SLOVAKIA its own complete use of the Slovak language, its own financial and political government, and with Slovak as the ,State language. 3. Voting power: general, secret, and direct. 4. Form of government: A personal union with a democratic State, the same as in ,England. 5. These points form the basis of the mutual agreement and can be enlarged or expanded only with the approval of both parties. The Czech National Alliance reserves the right of making possible changes, and the Slovak League has the same right (12) . This Cleveland Agreement opened up suppositions for the close cooperation of Czechs and Slovaks and eventually led to the formation of the common political state of the Czecho-<Slovak Republic. In spite of this agreement, however, the Czech side began to show indications of naming all common liberation undertakings as Czech. This instilled in the Slovaks the fear that the Czechs did not wish to accept the Slovaks as equal partners. Many discussions, therefore, ensued with the result that, during these sessions, one of the Slovak representatives clearly pin-pointed the Slovak position with the words: "Yes, we want to tear away from the Magyars and be with the Czechs, but not under the Czechs" ( 13). The above-mentioned Czech tactic prompted many of the Slovaks to lose faith in the Cleveland Agreement and in the Czechs, and prompted them to look for new allies. Such a decision did not take a firm foothold because, in the meantime, important events had occurred in the diplomatic world. President Wilson was re-elected on November 8, 1916. Soon after his re-election (December 21, 1916) he issued a proclamation to the warring nations in which he asked for a statement of their war aims. The Allies answered on January 12, 1917, and, in the conditions which they enumerated, the following sentence was found: "Liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, Czecho-Slovaks from foreign government control" (14 ) . T. G. Masaryk explains that the term "Czecho-Slovaks" was written into the Allies' reply after the reply had been completed. "The word Czecho.JSlovaks", he writes, "contained in the proclamation, has its own interesting internal history. There were three suggestions: liberation of the Czechs - the Czech nation - the Czecho-Slovaks. The latter suggestion was accepted at a conference of Dr. Ed- �SLOVAKIA 39 ward Benes (Czech), Milan R. Stefanik (.Slovak), and Stephen Osusky (American Slovak)" (15). Dr. Benes, on the other hand, writes that he conferred with Mr. Osusky and Mr. Sychravy about the matter, since M. iR. Stefanik was then in Russia; and he further states that "Osusky expressed fear that the Allies' reply to President Wilson might name Czechs only, not the Slovaks". - For that reason he insisted on the term "Czecho-Slovaks" (16). 6. The Pittsburgh Pact The Allies' reply concerning the liberation of CzechoSlovakia definitely determined that, after a victoriously ended war, the Slovaks would be thrust into a common political state with the Czechs, which opened up among the Slovaks all sorts of speculations regarding the future of their fatherland. The official pronouncement concerning the Czecho-Slovaks indicated the existence of two separate groups with the formation of a new state. The Slovaks, therefore, had less reasons to fear that the Czechs would deprive them of their national individuality. T. G. Masaryk, who came to the United States near the end of the war, in April of 1'918, helped in no way to dispel this fear. He was looked upon as the person who could settle most of the small differences, suspicions, and discrepancies that had arisen. Delivering his first speech May 5, 191'8, in Chicago, Ill., he repeatedly mentioned the Czech lands, the Czech army, the Czech fight, the Czech future, etc., but not once did he mention Slovakia and completely ignored Slovak participation in the struggle. His speech was a big disappointment to the Slovaks and ,g ave rise to new doubts about Czech sincerity. On May 30, 1918, T. G. Masaryk came to 'Pittsburgh. Once again he spoke, but this time he changed face and stated proudly that he was of Slovak descent. He also said that Slovaks and Czechs were united and that the differences which arose were artificially produced through German and Magyar influences. He declared that there would be a free Bohemia and a free Slovakia, that political control, education, courts of justice, and all else in Slovakia would be_ Slovak, and in Bohemia, Czech. Each n a t i o n, therefore, would be master in its own home. �SLOVAKIA 40 The huge gathering received Masaryk's address with tremendous acclaim. All Slovaks were overjoyed, for these were just the things they had been wishing for (17). That same evening Masaryk held a conference with the representatives of the Slovaks in the Moose Temple and on the following day, May 31st, drafted a new agreement establishing the relations between Czechs and Slovaks in the new state. Besides him this agreement was signed by eleven Czechs and seventeen ,Slovak representatives and contained the following: The Czecho-Slovak Pact agreed upon in Pittsburgh , Pa., on May 30th, 1918. Representatives of the Slovak and Czech or anlzations the Slovak League, the Czech National Alliin the United States discussed the Czechoance, and the Alliance of Czech Catholics Slovak question in the presence of the chairman of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, 1Prof. Masaryk, and the program declaration made up to this time, and resolved the following: We approve the political program which endeavors to unite the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state of the Czech lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own parliament, and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in the schools, in offices, and in public life in general. The Czecho-Slovak State shall be a republic, its constitution shall be democratic. The organization of the cooperation of the Czechs and Slovaks in the USA shall be intensified and arranged with mutual understanding as necessity and the changing conditions shall require. The detailed regulations for the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak State are being left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives. ( 18). Saturated with the ideals of American democracy, Slovak immigrants in this country endeavored in the Pittsburgh 'P act to assure for their fatherland such rights as they enjoyed here. They labored thus in full knowledge of their leading position, which they held as regards their enslaved fatherland. They were the only free and organized portion of the Slovak nation, and Slovaks at home, as far as they were able under existing circumstances, not only accepted them as the framers of their political future, but also placed in them their only hope of liberation from Magyar enslavement. The greatest weakness of the Pittsburgh Pact as regards any decisions in Slovakia showed itself to be the final 1 �SLOVAKIA 41 point which stated that "the detailed arrangements and regulations in the Czecho-Slovak State are being left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives". Without having any knowledge of the action of the Slovak League in the United States, the newly created Slovak Council in Slovakia - formed as a result of the war's end - met in Turciansky Svaty Martin on October 30, 1918, two days after the iPrague Proclamation of an independent Czecho.JSlovak Republic. Here a declaration was brought out in which, altough the Council requested the right of self-expression for Slovaks according to the demands of President Wilson on October 18, 1918, it nevertheless announced that "the Slovak nation is both a linguistic and culturo-historical component of the joint CzechoSlovak nation" (19). Amidst the enthusiastic atmosphere, the small group of those who stood for complete union of Czechs and Slovaks were free to draw up the declaration in such a way that it would best fit their objectives. By emphasizing that "the 1Slovak nation is both a linguistic and a culturo-historical component of the joint Czecho-Slovak nation" the Martin Declaration - as it came to be known since - was considered to be the denial of the distinct Slovak individuality about which the Slovak representatives were most concerned when they entered into the Cleveland and ·Pittsburgh agreements with the Czechs. The freedom exercised by the promoters of the union with the Czechs in drawing up the declaration in Turciansky Sv. Martin is also apparent from the fact that one of them, Dr. Milan Hodza, who was entrusted with the task of publishing the document, left out several points arbitrarily. One of the omitted points was the request that the Slovaks be represented at the peace conference. This Martin Declaration - no matter how doubtfull its worth - was, however, considered a free expression of the will of the liberated Slovaks by Prague, and, consequently, the Pittsburgh Pact was declared void. T. G. Masaryk went so far that, in his reply of October 12, 1929, to the Rev. Andrew Hlinka, leader of the Slovak People's Party, he wrote of this Pact: �42 SLOVAKIA But the main thing is that the document that verbal agreement is forged, is a falsum, because at the time when the American Slovaks wanted that verbal agreement, the League did not exist legally, it was not recognized by the State until 1919. For that reason a serious politician, a statesman, cannot and must not operate with a paper. Falsification cannot become an act of State .•• (20). From its very beginning, therefore, Czecho-Slovakia was organized as a centralistic Czech state, in which Slovakia was more in the position of a colony than as an equal partner. The Czechs, on the other hand, tactfully utilized the already-mentioned conflicts .w ithin the Slovak camp. For the majority of inhabitants, the incorporation of Slovakia into the Czecho-Slovak Republic was such an unexpected surprise that a certain development was necessary before the complete range of the new political situation actually came forth. To make matter worse, a split occurred even among the active members of the Slovak League. One part, under the impact of alarming news from their liberated native country, was convinced that the carrying out of the Pittsbwgh Pact would be a misfortune for Slovakia and, therefore, did not insist, as was expected, upon its incorporation into the constitution of the new state. The other part, even though comprising an insignificant number of opportunists, was won over to the idea of centralism by being rewarded with well-paid offices within the administration of the new state. The Pittsburgh Pact was, therefore, excluded with comparative ease from all discussions during the formation of 'Slovak and Czech relations in the new Czecho-Slovakia. Even though this pact failed to fulfill its primary function, it gave to 'Slovak autonomists an effective weapon to accuse the Czechs of insincerity and faithlessness. With the creation of Czecho-Slovakia, there was an obvious tendency, according to the Czech writer Vaclav Peroutka, to exclude "Catholics from public offices and the enjoyment of honor" (21). And it was under such circumstances that in May, 1919, a year after its signing, the Pittsburgh ·P act came into the hands of the Rev. Andrew Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Catholics. He did not hesitate to make out of it the Magna Charta of the movement for autonomy. It gave his autonomist movement a clear program and offered effect- �SLOVAKIA 43 ive propaganda material to depict Czech faithlessness. It is quite obvious that the denial of the Pittsburgh Pact occasioned much greater harm to the survival of Czecho-Slovakia than it would have done at the beginning when the newly liberated, still politically immature Slovakia was consolidating its forces. Even though the Slovak immigrant failed to achieve his original goal through this pact, he nevertheless created in his native country an irresistable desire to attain it. The Pittsburgh Pact sounded the tocsin to battle, the outcome of which was to be a clearer and more accurate definition of national rights. The present situation shows that the Slovak immigrant in the United States has almost lost his distinguishing marks in the new American society. Whereas, in the history of Slovakia, he still remains one of the most distinguished actors in defining its national character and in determining its political ambitions. If the "American democratic crusading spirit" sank deep into the life of a nation by means of an immigrant, it perhaps did so mostly in the case of Slovakia in connection with the iPittsburgh Pact. 7. The Present Political Emigrants The afore-mentioned Slovak emigrants, who left Slovakia mostly from social motives, were joined in recent years by a small though in its actions a very alert group of people, who left Slovakia and came to the West from clearly political motives. They departed in two waves. The first represented the functionaries of the independent Slovak Republic who, after the downfall of Slovakia in 1945, sought asylum in the West to escape the vengeance of the so-called "people's courts" . They were joined three years later (1948) by a further wave of political exiles who fled when Communists took complete control of the Czecho-Slovak government. The latter group comprised functionaries of non-Communist parties of the Czecho-Slovakia, in other words, people who were not in accord with the Communist "People's Democracy". In both instances we actually behold the first mass, political, Slovak emigration which, from the viewpoint of Slovak nationalism, signifies that political activity is its �44 SLOVAKIA very pulsating vocation. Its aim is the return homeward of all exiles and, therefore, a change in the political situation which forced the Slovaks to leave their native land. Slovak emigrants are bearing influence in two ways: they are endeavoring to gain the favor of Western Democracies in their efforts to overthrow the Communist dictatorship; and they are displaying the ability to organize underground movements to bring about a change, perhaps through internal revolution. One could probably surmise that the group who left Slovakia immediately after Second War will seek the revival of an independent Slovakia as a continuation of the Slovak Republic, whereas the other group will simply join those forces that work for the restoration of a democratic CzechoSlovakia. But the time-interval between these two waves of emigrants is not an accurate divisor of their political affiliation. It is true, however, that the Slovaks are divided into two camps: the Slovak and Czecho ..Slovak camp. The former aims for an i n d e p e n d e n t Slovakia without the Czecho-Slovak framework; the latter aims for a Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak framework. Numerically, however, those who desire an independent Slovakia constitute the overwhelming majority. They include not only former functionaries of the 1Slovak Republic but also at least 90% of all those who left Czecho-Slovakia after the Communist coup of 194'8. As an o r g a n i z e d force, both camps act through three organs: the National Council of Free Czechoslovakia; the Slovak National Council Abroad; and the Slovak Liberation Committee. The aim of the National Council of Free Czechoslovakia is the destruction of present Communist dictatorship and the restoration of democracy in the spirit of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. E. Benes (anti-Catholic). CzechoJSlovakia involves, however, the solution of two problems: 1. the problem of some three and one-half million displaced Sudeten Germans whose desire to return to their homeland is being actively supported by the newly-risen West Germany; 2. what position is Slovakia to have in the new demecratic CzechoSlovakia. It is a known fact that the greater majority of Slovaks 1 �SLOVAKIA 45, at home are more than ever before opposed to any idea or form of a Czecho-Slovakia. Informed people know that Slovakia can be maintained within the framework of CzechoSlovakia only by force and violence. The other two organs, the Slovak National Council Abroad and the Slovak Liberation Committee, are striving for the creation of an independent Slovakia. Their difference lies not so much in their aim as in their methods. Even though the Slovak National Council Abroad avers that the Slovak Republic which existed during the Second World War was formed in accord with the principles of international law as the free manifestation of the people, it nevertheless does not insist upon her legal continuity. lt is a great promoter of the federative solution of Central Europe in which it seeks for Slovakia the same position that other national groups will have. It is the political organ of the greater number of the 1Slovak exiles of 1945 and 1948. Furthermore, its program has been endorsed by the two largest organizations of older emigrants, namely, the Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League. The Slovak Liberation Committee is the political organ of a radical portion of the Slovak exiles. It strives for an independent Slovakia on the basis of a legal continuity of the former Slovak Republic. It is distinguished by a special activity which manifests itself principally in many memorandums sent to the United Nations Organization as well as to the other r esponsible political circles in the West. Because of this across-the-border activity as well as other efforts to organize underground movements in Slovakia, which is dominated by Czech Communists, the ·Slovak Liberation Committee is looked upon in Czecho-Slovakia as the principal enemy of the government of the People's Democracy. It seems to be quite popular with the dissatisfied and change-hungry inhabitants at home. 1 It is hard to foretell whether any of these organs will succeed in achieving any of their objectives at the present time. It is highly improbable that any of them will succeed in organizing an active underground movement, which would be in a position to bring about a change in the present po- �46 SLOVAKIA litical situation with the aid of an internal revolution. The hope for a change depends only upon a new war, and then upon the measure in which respective efforts will be in accord with the interests of victorious powers. 1. ,M. Darras: "Onze ans de vie independente en Slovaque", LeMonde slave, (rnai-juin, 1930), 177. 2. Joseph A. Mikus: La Slovaque dans le Drame de l'Europe, Paris, 1'955, p. 57. 3. ·W illiam ,Diamond : Czechoslovakia Between East and West, London, 1947, p. 172. 4. Pravda, Bratislava, May 29, 1949. 15. ,Karol Sidor: Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji, Bratislava, 1929, p. 1'6. 6. Bulletin of the Slovak National Council Abroad, Middletown, Pa., August, 1956, p. 3. 7. Sidor: loc. cit., p. 32. 8. Karol Sidor: Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji, Bratislava, 1929, p. 33. 9. The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh ,Pact, Chicago, Tylka Bros. Press, 1Inc., 1934, p. 10. 10. I bid., p. 13. 11. Ibid., p. 13. 12. Ibid., p. 16. 13. Ibid., p. 18. 14. Ibid., p. 19. 15. T. G. Masaryk : La resurection d' un Etat ('Souvenir et reflection 1914-1918), Paris, 1930, p . 256. 16. nr .. Eduard Benes: My War Memoirs, London, 1928, p. 157. 17. The Slovaks and The Pittsburgh Pact, Joe. cit., p . 24. 18. Ibid., p. 27. 19. Dr. Frantisek Bokes : Dejiny Sloven ska a Slovakov, Bratislava, 1946, p. 363. 20. To this an authority on American law on April 23, 1930, when asked a bout the legality of the Slovak League had to say: "I understand the organization in question having a C onstitution, by-laws, officers, etc., though not chartered by the State. For the purpose of taking the action which -w as taken, such an organization would have all the n ecessary power as fully as if had been chartered. The agreement entered into by the unchartered organization refered to would be just as effectiv-e as if entered into with a chartered organization and just as valid if closed on ,Memorial Day as on any other day". (The Slovaks and The Pittsburgh Pact, loc. cit., p. 36-39). 21. Vaclav Peroutka : Budovani statu, Prague, 1933-1935, I , p. 352 . • • • RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound In cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety; 229 pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � 32 SLOVAKIA Bratislava streets rang out with song for quite a time. We embraced each other and danced. Then we marched, or rather should ,J say, danced all the way to Svoradov. The fraternity was another joyous scene. I still remember vividly how we embraced Colman Murgas in the refectory, his eyes streaming with tears. I was so excited that 1 could hardly eat. Like so many others, l had lost my appetite for food. Like them, I was satiated with joy. The Slovaks proclaimed their country an independent Republic on March 14, 1939. • • • SLOVAK NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM B. S. BUC, Ph.D. 1. The Nation of Emigrants Slovak nationalism cannot be considered as the outgrowth of the Central European soil and the pure product of political forces of that sector. It was steadily developing under many outside influences which penetrated that sector either in the form of new ideas or in the form of outside political and economic interests. Moreover, in the period of the greatest oppression, the real shaping of the Slovak national will for survival was occuring outside Slovakia, among emigrants. About one third of the present Slovak population lives outside Slovakia as emigrants in various sectors of the world. That makes Slovaks truly a nation of emigrants. They were forced to emigrate either for economic or political reasons. Slovakia is a mountainous country with forests covering 40 % of the land. Moreover, prior to 1918, a substantial part of Slovak land was owned by the Magyar or foreign aristocracy, so that Slovaks had little opportunity to make living from agriculture. Temporary or permanent emigration became, therefore the only solution to the economic problem for many children of Slovak farmers. When they �SLOVAKIA 33 reached free soil, especially the United 1S tates of America, they proved themselves to be the greatest promoters of Slovak nationalism, not only among themselves but also in their native country. They conveyed ideas of democracy and freedom to their homeland and influenced the outside world to help their compatriots at home in their struggle for survival in Hungary. In 1918, when Slovakia became a part of Czecho-Slovakia, emigration did not cease. It is true, however, that in the first years of the new Republic, Czecho-,Slovakia inaugurated a drastic agrarian reform, wherein almost all of the soil belonging to the aristocracy was apportioned among new owners. Nevertheless, these reforms failed to ameliorate the original situation, because they aimed at rewarding political careerists rather than at bettering the social position of the inhabitants. According to a French observer : "many of the good lands, instead of being apportioned among the peasants, were used to constitute a new agrarian bourgeoisie, under the name of 'surplus estates' " (1). These estates served to favor the political aims of the Czech agrarian party, who used them either to establish Czechs in Southern Slovakia, or to reward Slovaks who were inclined to apply cen• tralist politics to the government of Slovakia. This gave rise to a privileged class, the "surplussers" who resembled very much the ancient landlords of the Hungarian feudal system. While the latter received their lands as a recompense for their services in the army, the former received them for their services in politics (2). Under Czecho-Slovakia, however, Slovak industry fared even worse. The Czechs were chiefly concerned with industrial expansion within their own domains and, therefore, not only contributed nothing to the expansion of former Slovak industries, but adversely put down many existing undertakings in an evident attempt to keep Slovakia agrarian. According to William iDiamond: "During the period from 1934 to 1937, 91.5% of all factory manufacturing in the state occured in Czech lands" ( 3). According to information presented in May of 1949 to the XIX Congress of the Communist !Party in Prague by William Siroky, who at that time was Chairman of the Communist Party in Slovakia, 92,000 workers were engaged in Slovak industries and trades in 191i3. This figure �34 SLOVAKIA comprised about 17 % of the total population. After the unification of Czechs and Slovaks, the progressive tendency in industry since the First World War was completely halted. In 1'927, no more than 80,000 workers were engaged in industry in Slovakia. Within ten more years, during which industry showed great and rapid progress in Czech lands the increase in the number of workers in Slovakia was negligible, with the result that in 1937 they numbered 104,91'5 ( 4). Because of this unhealthy economic situation in Slovakia, almost one-third of the entire S 1 o v a k population sought relief through emigration. The majority emigrated to the United States between 1'873 and 1918. When the United States placed a limit on immigration in 1918, however, the Slovaks emigrated to Canada, South America, Australia, France, and Belgium. This emigration actually became the only liberty-holding portion of Slovaks and, therefore, chiefly before 1918, an almost exclusive representative of Slovak national endeavors. 2. Slovak Immigrants in the United States The leading position in these endeavors was held by Slovak immigrants in the United States. In 1910 Slovaks in this country numbered 281,707; by 1920 the number had increased to 619,866. According to a private appraisal, however, the number should be at least 200,000 more, for about that number of people of Slovak descent may have registered as Austro-iHungarians. Slovaks are represented mostly in the state of Pennsylvania, where in 1920 they numbered 296,219. The remainder are scattered mainly through nine states: Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana ( 5) . On United States soil, the Slovaks developed a very living, organized activity chiefly in the field of fraternalism. At the present time there exist eleven such ·Slovak fraternal organizations with a membership of more than 400,000 and with assets totaling 88½ million d0llars (6). They established besides an extensive Slovak press, which had a great significance for Slovak nationalism in that it was really the only national press during the time of fierce �SLOVAKIA 35 magyarization at the close of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. 3. Shaping of the National Will Every coercive measure of the Hungarian government encountered great opposition in the Slovak press of the United States. On the soil of this country Slovak and Magyars waged an obstinate battle, with the result that the Western World became acquainted with the name "Slovak" and with the nationality problem of Austria-Hungary. The first public and organized opposition of Slovaks towards !Magyars in the United ,States took place at Cleveland in 1902. The Magyar immigrants of that city were attempting to place in the Public Square a monument dedicated to their revolutionary Magyar leader of 1848, Louis Kossuth. They were hindered by the Slovaks, who publicly revealed Kossuth's totalitarian methods towards Slovaks and other nationalities of Hungary. When, in 1906, the Hungarian government brought Rev. Andrew Hlinka and several other 'Slovak patriots to trial, this action led the immigrants of all convictions in the United States to join forces and to found a united organization called Slovak League of America at the first Slovak Congress assembled in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 26, 1907. According to .its first tenets, the principal aim of the Slovak League was to exert every effort "that S 1 ova k nation would rank among the other nations as an equal among equals'' (7). Its first step was the creation of a national fund to carry on an active struggle for the liberation of Slovaks. Among the League's first successes in this country must be numbered the fact that, during the census of 1910, the following question was aked in the questionnaire: what is your mother tongue? Through this change, passed by the Senate at the proposal of Senator Oliver, the Slovaks as well as the other nationalities of former Hungary could not be separated from the universal concept of "Hungarian", under which they should have been originally classed for belonging to the Hungarian Kingdom (8). At the outbreak of the First World War, the Slovak �36 SLOVAKIA League published a memorandum, which was sent to all members of Congress and to other distinguished political figures in the United States as well as others in the West. This memorandum, in the spirit of American democratic ideals, stressed the desire that: The Slovaks in Hungary should obtain their natural privileges of life, freedom, and pursuit of happiness, which they have been deprived of by the dynasty; that the ,Slovaks be given opportunity to develop their national spirit, their abilities, and the natural resources of their native land; that the Slovaks be guaranteed the realization of their national ideals and efforts, which have been mercilessly trodden by the tyrannical Hungarian Government (9). The memorandum was signed by: all ofificials of the Slovak League; the representatives of twenty-three Slovak newspapers; the representatives of twenty organizations; fifty-two Slovak Catholic priests and forty Slovak Protestant ministers. 'It was published in five languages besides English. The main significance of this memorandum, however, lies in the fact that the 1S lovaks in this country immediately after the outbreak of the war assumed the leadership of the entire Slovak nation. They did it not only because they were free to express the will of the whole nation, but also because the number of their organized ranks exceeded the number of organized Slovaks ever known in their own fatherland. The number of publications represented on the memorandum also exceeded the number edited by the Slovaks in their native country. 4. In Search of a New Ally When the Slovak immigrants in the United States had sent out the afore-mentioned memorandum, they still had not made up their minds clearly concerning the future of their native land. Since they did not intend to form an independent state out of Slovakia, they had to concern themselves with the problem of deciding within what kind of future framework the Slovaks should enjoy those political rights which they sought. All were unanimously agreed that Slovakia must be definitely torn away from Hungary. Several proposed combinations developed. Some favored the Czechs as the ally to be sought. Others favored the Russians. Others favored the Poles, who already had promises from the Allies for the �SLOVAKIA 37 restoration of Poland. Gradually the Czechs came to be selected as the most logical ally to be sought (10). The thinking most prevalent in the minds of the Slovak immigrants in the United States is clearly stated in a letter of the Rev. Matthew Jankola, one of the foremost active participants in these matters. In a letter written in Bridgeport, Conn., on December 15, 1915, he wrote: We shall mean nothing in a monarchy, and absolutely nothing in a great Russia. But we would stand on a footing of equality with the Czechs, a la Austria and Hungary; or as formerly Norway and Sweden; with our own self-government, our own parliament, our own Slovak State language. Can we ever obtain this under Russia, or in In regards to the Czechs, their supremacy can Austria-Hungary? only be temporary; until the time that we rear one generation in our own spirit. I do not consider Czech liberalism so dangerous. Our naI mean common ture and character are different. The S I ova k shall retain their character (11). people - In the meantime, in Europe, profesor Thomas G. Masaryk began a revolutionary movement for the liberation of Czechs and Slovaks in Austria-Hungary. Under his influence the Czech immigrants in the United States also formed a joint organization under the name "Czech National Alliance" , which organization adopted the same program regarding Czechs as the Slovak League had done regarding Slovaks. T. G. Masaryk soon became the recognized head of the movement for the liberation of the Czechs and the alliance of the Slovaks with the Czechs. 5. The Cleveland Agreement Professor T. G. Masaryk from •Paris asked the Czech ational Alliance in America to gain the cooperation of the Slovak League for common Czech and Slovak liberation efforts. Following that request, the secretary of the Czech National Alliance invited the Slovak League of America to a meeting. Along with this invitation the secretary sent a proposed draft of an agreement which was accepted in Cleveland on October 25, 1915, and since that time has been known as the Cleveland Agreement. It contained the following points: 1. Independence of Czech lands and Slovakia. 2. A union of the Czech and Slovak nations in a federative alliance of states with a complete national autonomy for Slovakia, with its own state government, its own cultural freedom and, therefore, �38 SLOVAKIA its own complete use of the Slovak language, its own financial and political government, and with Slovak as the ,State language. 3. Voting power: general, secret, and direct. 4. Form of government: A personal union with a democratic State, the same as in ,England. 5. These points form the basis of the mutual agreement and can be enlarged or expanded only with the approval of both parties. The Czech National Alliance reserves the right of making possible changes, and the Slovak League has the same right (12) . This Cleveland Agreement opened up suppositions for the close cooperation of Czechs and Slovaks and eventually led to the formation of the common political state of the Czecho-<Slovak Republic. In spite of this agreement, however, the Czech side began to show indications of naming all common liberation undertakings as Czech. This instilled in the Slovaks the fear that the Czechs did not wish to accept the Slovaks as equal partners. Many discussions, therefore, ensued with the result that, during these sessions, one of the Slovak representatives clearly pin-pointed the Slovak position with the words: "Yes, we want to tear away from the Magyars and be with the Czechs, but not under the Czechs" ( 13). The above-mentioned Czech tactic prompted many of the Slovaks to lose faith in the Cleveland Agreement and in the Czechs, and prompted them to look for new allies. Such a decision did not take a firm foothold because, in the meantime, important events had occurred in the diplomatic world. President Wilson was re-elected on November 8, 1916. Soon after his re-election (December 21, 1916) he issued a proclamation to the warring nations in which he asked for a statement of their war aims. The Allies answered on January 12, 1917, and, in the conditions which they enumerated, the following sentence was found: "Liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, Czecho-Slovaks from foreign government control" (14 ) . T. G. Masaryk explains that the term "Czecho-Slovaks" was written into the Allies' reply after the reply had been completed. "The word Czecho.JSlovaks", he writes, "contained in the proclamation, has its own interesting internal history. There were three suggestions: liberation of the Czechs - the Czech nation - the Czecho-Slovaks. The latter suggestion was accepted at a conference of Dr. Ed- �SLOVAKIA 39 ward Benes (Czech), Milan R. Stefanik (.Slovak), and Stephen Osusky (American Slovak)" (15). Dr. Benes, on the other hand, writes that he conferred with Mr. Osusky and Mr. Sychravy about the matter, since M. iR. Stefanik was then in Russia; and he further states that "Osusky expressed fear that the Allies' reply to President Wilson might name Czechs only, not the Slovaks". - For that reason he insisted on the term "Czecho-Slovaks" (16). 6. The Pittsburgh Pact The Allies' reply concerning the liberation of CzechoSlovakia definitely determined that, after a victoriously ended war, the Slovaks would be thrust into a common political state with the Czechs, which opened up among the Slovaks all sorts of speculations regarding the future of their fatherland. The official pronouncement concerning the Czecho-Slovaks indicated the existence of two separate groups with the formation of a new state. The Slovaks, therefore, had less reasons to fear that the Czechs would deprive them of their national individuality. T. G. Masaryk, who came to the United States near the end of the war, in April of 1'918, helped in no way to dispel this fear. He was looked upon as the person who could settle most of the small differences, suspicions, and discrepancies that had arisen. Delivering his first speech May 5, 191'8, in Chicago, Ill., he repeatedly mentioned the Czech lands, the Czech army, the Czech fight, the Czech future, etc., but not once did he mention Slovakia and completely ignored Slovak participation in the struggle. His speech was a big disappointment to the Slovaks and ,g ave rise to new doubts about Czech sincerity. On May 30, 1918, T. G. Masaryk came to 'Pittsburgh. Once again he spoke, but this time he changed face and stated proudly that he was of Slovak descent. He also said that Slovaks and Czechs were united and that the differences which arose were artificially produced through German and Magyar influences. He declared that there would be a free Bohemia and a free Slovakia, that political control, education, courts of justice, and all else in Slovakia would be_ Slovak, and in Bohemia, Czech. Each n a t i o n, therefore, would be master in its own home. �SLOVAKIA 40 The huge gathering received Masaryk's address with tremendous acclaim. All Slovaks were overjoyed, for these were just the things they had been wishing for (17). That same evening Masaryk held a conference with the representatives of the Slovaks in the Moose Temple and on the following day, May 31st, drafted a new agreement establishing the relations between Czechs and Slovaks in the new state. Besides him this agreement was signed by eleven Czechs and seventeen ,Slovak representatives and contained the following: The Czecho-Slovak Pact agreed upon in Pittsburgh , Pa., on May 30th, 1918. Representatives of the Slovak and Czech or anlzations the Slovak League, the Czech National Alliin the United States discussed the Czechoance, and the Alliance of Czech Catholics Slovak question in the presence of the chairman of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, 1Prof. Masaryk, and the program declaration made up to this time, and resolved the following: We approve the political program which endeavors to unite the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state of the Czech lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own parliament, and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in the schools, in offices, and in public life in general. The Czecho-Slovak State shall be a republic, its constitution shall be democratic. The organization of the cooperation of the Czechs and Slovaks in the USA shall be intensified and arranged with mutual understanding as necessity and the changing conditions shall require. The detailed regulations for the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak State are being left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives. ( 18). Saturated with the ideals of American democracy, Slovak immigrants in this country endeavored in the Pittsburgh 'P act to assure for their fatherland such rights as they enjoyed here. They labored thus in full knowledge of their leading position, which they held as regards their enslaved fatherland. They were the only free and organized portion of the Slovak nation, and Slovaks at home, as far as they were able under existing circumstances, not only accepted them as the framers of their political future, but also placed in them their only hope of liberation from Magyar enslavement. The greatest weakness of the Pittsburgh Pact as regards any decisions in Slovakia showed itself to be the final 1 �SLOVAKIA 41 point which stated that "the detailed arrangements and regulations in the Czecho-Slovak State are being left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives". Without having any knowledge of the action of the Slovak League in the United States, the newly created Slovak Council in Slovakia - formed as a result of the war's end - met in Turciansky Svaty Martin on October 30, 1918, two days after the iPrague Proclamation of an independent Czecho.JSlovak Republic. Here a declaration was brought out in which, altough the Council requested the right of self-expression for Slovaks according to the demands of President Wilson on October 18, 1918, it nevertheless announced that "the Slovak nation is both a linguistic and culturo-historical component of the joint CzechoSlovak nation" (19). Amidst the enthusiastic atmosphere, the small group of those who stood for complete union of Czechs and Slovaks were free to draw up the declaration in such a way that it would best fit their objectives. By emphasizing that "the 1Slovak nation is both a linguistic and a culturo-historical component of the joint Czecho-Slovak nation" the Martin Declaration - as it came to be known since - was considered to be the denial of the distinct Slovak individuality about which the Slovak representatives were most concerned when they entered into the Cleveland and ·Pittsburgh agreements with the Czechs. The freedom exercised by the promoters of the union with the Czechs in drawing up the declaration in Turciansky Sv. Martin is also apparent from the fact that one of them, Dr. Milan Hodza, who was entrusted with the task of publishing the document, left out several points arbitrarily. One of the omitted points was the request that the Slovaks be represented at the peace conference. This Martin Declaration - no matter how doubtfull its worth - was, however, considered a free expression of the will of the liberated Slovaks by Prague, and, consequently, the Pittsburgh Pact was declared void. T. G. Masaryk went so far that, in his reply of October 12, 1929, to the Rev. Andrew Hlinka, leader of the Slovak People's Party, he wrote of this Pact: �42 SLOVAKIA But the main thing is that the document that verbal agreement is forged, is a falsum, because at the time when the American Slovaks wanted that verbal agreement, the League did not exist legally, it was not recognized by the State until 1919. For that reason a serious politician, a statesman, cannot and must not operate with a paper. Falsification cannot become an act of State .•• (20). From its very beginning, therefore, Czecho-Slovakia was organized as a centralistic Czech state, in which Slovakia was more in the position of a colony than as an equal partner. The Czechs, on the other hand, tactfully utilized the already-mentioned conflicts .w ithin the Slovak camp. For the majority of inhabitants, the incorporation of Slovakia into the Czecho-Slovak Republic was such an unexpected surprise that a certain development was necessary before the complete range of the new political situation actually came forth. To make matter worse, a split occurred even among the active members of the Slovak League. One part, under the impact of alarming news from their liberated native country, was convinced that the carrying out of the Pittsbwgh Pact would be a misfortune for Slovakia and, therefore, did not insist, as was expected, upon its incorporation into the constitution of the new state. The other part, even though comprising an insignificant number of opportunists, was won over to the idea of centralism by being rewarded with well-paid offices within the administration of the new state. The Pittsburgh Pact was, therefore, excluded with comparative ease from all discussions during the formation of 'Slovak and Czech relations in the new Czecho-Slovakia. Even though this pact failed to fulfill its primary function, it gave to 'Slovak autonomists an effective weapon to accuse the Czechs of insincerity and faithlessness. With the creation of Czecho-Slovakia, there was an obvious tendency, according to the Czech writer Vaclav Peroutka, to exclude "Catholics from public offices and the enjoyment of honor" (21). And it was under such circumstances that in May, 1919, a year after its signing, the Pittsburgh ·P act came into the hands of the Rev. Andrew Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Catholics. He did not hesitate to make out of it the Magna Charta of the movement for autonomy. It gave his autonomist movement a clear program and offered effect- �SLOVAKIA 43 ive propaganda material to depict Czech faithlessness. It is quite obvious that the denial of the Pittsburgh Pact occasioned much greater harm to the survival of Czecho-Slovakia than it would have done at the beginning when the newly liberated, still politically immature Slovakia was consolidating its forces. Even though the Slovak immigrant failed to achieve his original goal through this pact, he nevertheless created in his native country an irresistable desire to attain it. The Pittsburgh Pact sounded the tocsin to battle, the outcome of which was to be a clearer and more accurate definition of national rights. The present situation shows that the Slovak immigrant in the United States has almost lost his distinguishing marks in the new American society. Whereas, in the history of Slovakia, he still remains one of the most distinguished actors in defining its national character and in determining its political ambitions. If the "American democratic crusading spirit" sank deep into the life of a nation by means of an immigrant, it perhaps did so mostly in the case of Slovakia in connection with the iPittsburgh Pact. 7. The Present Political Emigrants The afore-mentioned Slovak emigrants, who left Slovakia mostly from social motives, were joined in recent years by a small though in its actions a very alert group of people, who left Slovakia and came to the West from clearly political motives. They departed in two waves. The first represented the functionaries of the independent Slovak Republic who, after the downfall of Slovakia in 1945, sought asylum in the West to escape the vengeance of the so-called "people's courts" . They were joined three years later (1948) by a further wave of political exiles who fled when Communists took complete control of the Czecho-Slovak government. The latter group comprised functionaries of non-Communist parties of the Czecho-Slovakia, in other words, people who were not in accord with the Communist "People's Democracy". In both instances we actually behold the first mass, political, Slovak emigration which, from the viewpoint of Slovak nationalism, signifies that political activity is its �44 SLOVAKIA very pulsating vocation. Its aim is the return homeward of all exiles and, therefore, a change in the political situation which forced the Slovaks to leave their native land. Slovak emigrants are bearing influence in two ways: they are endeavoring to gain the favor of Western Democracies in their efforts to overthrow the Communist dictatorship; and they are displaying the ability to organize underground movements to bring about a change, perhaps through internal revolution. One could probably surmise that the group who left Slovakia immediately after Second War will seek the revival of an independent Slovakia as a continuation of the Slovak Republic, whereas the other group will simply join those forces that work for the restoration of a democratic CzechoSlovakia. But the time-interval between these two waves of emigrants is not an accurate divisor of their political affiliation. It is true, however, that the Slovaks are divided into two camps: the Slovak and Czecho ..Slovak camp. The former aims for an i n d e p e n d e n t Slovakia without the Czecho-Slovak framework; the latter aims for a Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak framework. Numerically, however, those who desire an independent Slovakia constitute the overwhelming majority. They include not only former functionaries of the 1Slovak Republic but also at least 90% of all those who left Czecho-Slovakia after the Communist coup of 194'8. As an o r g a n i z e d force, both camps act through three organs: the National Council of Free Czechoslovakia; the Slovak National Council Abroad; and the Slovak Liberation Committee. The aim of the National Council of Free Czechoslovakia is the destruction of present Communist dictatorship and the restoration of democracy in the spirit of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. E. Benes (anti-Catholic). CzechoJSlovakia involves, however, the solution of two problems: 1. the problem of some three and one-half million displaced Sudeten Germans whose desire to return to their homeland is being actively supported by the newly-risen West Germany; 2. what position is Slovakia to have in the new demecratic CzechoSlovakia. It is a known fact that the greater majority of Slovaks 1 �SLOVAKIA 45, at home are more than ever before opposed to any idea or form of a Czecho-Slovakia. Informed people know that Slovakia can be maintained within the framework of CzechoSlovakia only by force and violence. The other two organs, the Slovak National Council Abroad and the Slovak Liberation Committee, are striving for the creation of an independent Slovakia. Their difference lies not so much in their aim as in their methods. Even though the Slovak National Council Abroad avers that the Slovak Republic which existed during the Second World War was formed in accord with the principles of international law as the free manifestation of the people, it nevertheless does not insist upon her legal continuity. lt is a great promoter of the federative solution of Central Europe in which it seeks for Slovakia the same position that other national groups will have. It is the political organ of the greater number of the 1Slovak exiles of 1945 and 1948. Furthermore, its program has been endorsed by the two largest organizations of older emigrants, namely, the Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League. The Slovak Liberation Committee is the political organ of a radical portion of the Slovak exiles. It strives for an independent Slovakia on the basis of a legal continuity of the former Slovak Republic. It is distinguished by a special activity which manifests itself principally in many memorandums sent to the United Nations Organization as well as to the other r esponsible political circles in the West. Because of this across-the-border activity as well as other efforts to organize underground movements in Slovakia, which is dominated by Czech Communists, the ·Slovak Liberation Committee is looked upon in Czecho-Slovakia as the principal enemy of the government of the People's Democracy. It seems to be quite popular with the dissatisfied and change-hungry inhabitants at home. 1 It is hard to foretell whether any of these organs will succeed in achieving any of their objectives at the present time. It is highly improbable that any of them will succeed in organizing an active underground movement, which would be in a position to bring about a change in the present po- �46 SLOVAKIA litical situation with the aid of an internal revolution. The hope for a change depends only upon a new war, and then upon the measure in which respective efforts will be in accord with the interests of victorious powers. 1. ,M. Darras: "Onze ans de vie independente en Slovaque", LeMonde slave, (rnai-juin, 1930), 177. 2. Joseph A. Mikus: La Slovaque dans le Drame de l'Europe, Paris, 1'955, p. 57. 3. ·W illiam ,Diamond : Czechoslovakia Between East and West, London, 1947, p. 172. 4. Pravda, Bratislava, May 29, 1949. 15. ,Karol Sidor: Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji, Bratislava, 1929, p. 1'6. 6. Bulletin of the Slovak National Council Abroad, Middletown, Pa., August, 1956, p. 3. 7. Sidor: loc. cit., p. 32. 8. Karol Sidor: Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji, Bratislava, 1929, p. 33. 9. The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh ,Pact, Chicago, Tylka Bros. Press, 1Inc., 1934, p. 10. 10. I bid., p. 13. 11. Ibid., p. 13. 12. Ibid., p. 16. 13. Ibid., p. 18. 14. Ibid., p. 19. 15. T. G. Masaryk : La resurection d' un Etat ('Souvenir et reflection 1914-1918), Paris, 1930, p . 256. 16. nr .. Eduard Benes: My War Memoirs, London, 1928, p. 157. 17. The Slovaks and The Pittsburgh Pact, Joe. cit., p . 24. 18. Ibid., p. 27. 19. Dr. Frantisek Bokes : Dejiny Sloven ska a Slovakov, Bratislava, 1946, p. 363. 20. To this an authority on American law on April 23, 1930, when asked a bout the legality of the Slovak League had to say: "I understand the organization in question having a C onstitution, by-laws, officers, etc., though not chartered by the State. For the purpose of taking the action which -w as taken, such an organization would have all the n ecessary power as fully as if had been chartered. The agreement entered into by the unchartered organization refered to would be just as effectiv-e as if entered into with a chartered organization and just as valid if closed on ,Memorial Day as on any other day". (The Slovaks and The Pittsburgh Pact, loc. cit., p. 36-39). 21. Vaclav Peroutka : Budovani statu, Prague, 1933-1935, I , p. 352 . • • • RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound In cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety; 229 pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 32 SLOVAKIA Bratislava streets rang out with song for quite a time. We embraced each other and danced. Then we marched, or rather should ,J say, danced all the way to Svoradov. The fraternity was another joyous scene. I still remember vividly how we embraced Colman Murgas in the refectory, his eyes streaming with tears. I was so excited that 1 could hardly eat. Like so many others, l had lost my appetite for food. Like them, I was satiated with joy. The Slovaks proclaimed their country an independent Republic on March 14, 1939. • • • SLOVAK NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM B. S. BUC, Ph.D. 1. The Nation of Emigrants Slovak nationalism cannot be considered as the outgrowth of the Central European soil and the pure product of political forces of that sector. It was steadily developing under many outside influences which penetrated that sector either in the form of new ideas or in the form of outside political and economic interests. Moreover, in the period of the greatest oppression, the real shaping of the Slovak national will for survival was occuring outside Slovakia, among emigrants. About one third of the present Slovak population lives outside Slovakia as emigrants in various sectors of the world. That makes Slovaks truly a nation of emigrants. They were forced to emigrate either for economic or political reasons. Slovakia is a mountainous country with forests covering 40 % of the land. Moreover, prior to 1918, a substantial part of Slovak land was owned by the Magyar or foreign aristocracy, so that Slovaks had little opportunity to make living from agriculture. Temporary or permanent emigration became, therefore the only solution to the economic problem for many children of Slovak farmers. When they SLOVAKIA 33 reached free soil, especially the United 1S tates of America, they proved themselves to be the greatest promoters of Slovak nationalism, not only among themselves but also in their native country. They conveyed ideas of democracy and freedom to their homeland and influenced the outside world to help their compatriots at home in their struggle for survival in Hungary. In 1918, when Slovakia became a part of Czecho-Slovakia, emigration did not cease. It is true, however, that in the first years of the new Republic, Czecho-,Slovakia inaugurated a drastic agrarian reform, wherein almost all of the soil belonging to the aristocracy was apportioned among new owners. Nevertheless, these reforms failed to ameliorate the original situation, because they aimed at rewarding political careerists rather than at bettering the social position of the inhabitants. According to a French observer : "many of the good lands, instead of being apportioned among the peasants, were used to constitute a new agrarian bourgeoisie, under the name of 'surplus estates' " (1). These estates served to favor the political aims of the Czech agrarian party, who used them either to establish Czechs in Southern Slovakia, or to reward Slovaks who were inclined to apply cen• tralist politics to the government of Slovakia. This gave rise to a privileged class, the "surplussers" who resembled very much the ancient landlords of the Hungarian feudal system. While the latter received their lands as a recompense for their services in the army, the former received them for their services in politics (2). Under Czecho-Slovakia, however, Slovak industry fared even worse. The Czechs were chiefly concerned with industrial expansion within their own domains and, therefore, not only contributed nothing to the expansion of former Slovak industries, but adversely put down many existing undertakings in an evident attempt to keep Slovakia agrarian. According to William iDiamond: "During the period from 1934 to 1937, 91.5% of all factory manufacturing in the state occured in Czech lands" ( 3). According to information presented in May of 1949 to the XIX Congress of the Communist !Party in Prague by William Siroky, who at that time was Chairman of the Communist Party in Slovakia, 92,000 workers were engaged in Slovak industries and trades in 191i3. This figure 34 SLOVAKIA comprised about 17 % of the total population. After the unification of Czechs and Slovaks, the progressive tendency in industry since the First World War was completely halted. In 1'927, no more than 80,000 workers were engaged in industry in Slovakia. Within ten more years, during which industry showed great and rapid progress in Czech lands the increase in the number of workers in Slovakia was negligible, with the result that in 1937 they numbered 104,91'5 ( 4). Because of this unhealthy economic situation in Slovakia, almost one-third of the entire S 1 o v a k population sought relief through emigration. The majority emigrated to the United States between 1'873 and 1918. When the United States placed a limit on immigration in 1918, however, the Slovaks emigrated to Canada, South America, Australia, France, and Belgium. This emigration actually became the only liberty-holding portion of Slovaks and, therefore, chiefly before 1918, an almost exclusive representative of Slovak national endeavors. 2. Slovak Immigrants in the United States The leading position in these endeavors was held by Slovak immigrants in the United States. In 1910 Slovaks in this country numbered 281,707; by 1920 the number had increased to 619,866. According to a private appraisal, however, the number should be at least 200,000 more, for about that number of people of Slovak descent may have registered as Austro-iHungarians. Slovaks are represented mostly in the state of Pennsylvania, where in 1920 they numbered 296,219. The remainder are scattered mainly through nine states: Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Connecticut, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana ( 5) . On United States soil, the Slovaks developed a very living, organized activity chiefly in the field of fraternalism. At the present time there exist eleven such ·Slovak fraternal organizations with a membership of more than 400,000 and with assets totaling 88½ million d0llars (6). They established besides an extensive Slovak press, which had a great significance for Slovak nationalism in that it was really the only national press during the time of fierce SLOVAKIA 35 magyarization at the close of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. 3. Shaping of the National Will Every coercive measure of the Hungarian government encountered great opposition in the Slovak press of the United States. On the soil of this country Slovak and Magyars waged an obstinate battle, with the result that the Western World became acquainted with the name "Slovak" and with the nationality problem of Austria-Hungary. The first public and organized opposition of Slovaks towards !Magyars in the United ,States took place at Cleveland in 1902. The Magyar immigrants of that city were attempting to place in the Public Square a monument dedicated to their revolutionary Magyar leader of 1848, Louis Kossuth. They were hindered by the Slovaks, who publicly revealed Kossuth's totalitarian methods towards Slovaks and other nationalities of Hungary. When, in 1906, the Hungarian government brought Rev. Andrew Hlinka and several other 'Slovak patriots to trial, this action led the immigrants of all convictions in the United States to join forces and to found a united organization called Slovak League of America at the first Slovak Congress assembled in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 26, 1907. According to .its first tenets, the principal aim of the Slovak League was to exert every effort "that S 1 ova k nation would rank among the other nations as an equal among equals'' (7). Its first step was the creation of a national fund to carry on an active struggle for the liberation of Slovaks. Among the League's first successes in this country must be numbered the fact that, during the census of 1910, the following question was aked in the questionnaire: what is your mother tongue? Through this change, passed by the Senate at the proposal of Senator Oliver, the Slovaks as well as the other nationalities of former Hungary could not be separated from the universal concept of "Hungarian", under which they should have been originally classed for belonging to the Hungarian Kingdom (8). At the outbreak of the First World War, the Slovak 36 SLOVAKIA League published a memorandum, which was sent to all members of Congress and to other distinguished political figures in the United States as well as others in the West. This memorandum, in the spirit of American democratic ideals, stressed the desire that: The Slovaks in Hungary should obtain their natural privileges of life, freedom, and pursuit of happiness, which they have been deprived of by the dynasty; that the ,Slovaks be given opportunity to develop their national spirit, their abilities, and the natural resources of their native land; that the Slovaks be guaranteed the realization of their national ideals and efforts, which have been mercilessly trodden by the tyrannical Hungarian Government (9). The memorandum was signed by: all ofificials of the Slovak League; the representatives of twenty-three Slovak newspapers; the representatives of twenty organizations; fifty-two Slovak Catholic priests and forty Slovak Protestant ministers. 'It was published in five languages besides English. The main significance of this memorandum, however, lies in the fact that the 1S lovaks in this country immediately after the outbreak of the war assumed the leadership of the entire Slovak nation. They did it not only because they were free to express the will of the whole nation, but also because the number of their organized ranks exceeded the number of organized Slovaks ever known in their own fatherland. The number of publications represented on the memorandum also exceeded the number edited by the Slovaks in their native country. 4. In Search of a New Ally When the Slovak immigrants in the United States had sent out the afore-mentioned memorandum, they still had not made up their minds clearly concerning the future of their native land. Since they did not intend to form an independent state out of Slovakia, they had to concern themselves with the problem of deciding within what kind of future framework the Slovaks should enjoy those political rights which they sought. All were unanimously agreed that Slovakia must be definitely torn away from Hungary. Several proposed combinations developed. Some favored the Czechs as the ally to be sought. Others favored the Russians. Others favored the Poles, who already had promises from the Allies for the SLOVAKIA 37 restoration of Poland. Gradually the Czechs came to be selected as the most logical ally to be sought (10). The thinking most prevalent in the minds of the Slovak immigrants in the United States is clearly stated in a letter of the Rev. Matthew Jankola, one of the foremost active participants in these matters. In a letter written in Bridgeport, Conn., on December 15, 1915, he wrote: We shall mean nothing in a monarchy, and absolutely nothing in a great Russia. But we would stand on a footing of equality with the Czechs, a la Austria and Hungary; or as formerly Norway and Sweden; with our own self-government, our own parliament, our own Slovak State language. Can we ever obtain this under Russia, or in In regards to the Czechs, their supremacy can Austria-Hungary? only be temporary; until the time that we rear one generation in our own spirit. I do not consider Czech liberalism so dangerous. Our naI mean common ture and character are different. The S I ova k shall retain their character (11). people - In the meantime, in Europe, profesor Thomas G. Masaryk began a revolutionary movement for the liberation of Czechs and Slovaks in Austria-Hungary. Under his influence the Czech immigrants in the United States also formed a joint organization under the name "Czech National Alliance" , which organization adopted the same program regarding Czechs as the Slovak League had done regarding Slovaks. T. G. Masaryk soon became the recognized head of the movement for the liberation of the Czechs and the alliance of the Slovaks with the Czechs. 5. The Cleveland Agreement Professor T. G. Masaryk from •Paris asked the Czech ational Alliance in America to gain the cooperation of the Slovak League for common Czech and Slovak liberation efforts. Following that request, the secretary of the Czech National Alliance invited the Slovak League of America to a meeting. Along with this invitation the secretary sent a proposed draft of an agreement which was accepted in Cleveland on October 25, 1915, and since that time has been known as the Cleveland Agreement. It contained the following points: 1. Independence of Czech lands and Slovakia. 2. A union of the Czech and Slovak nations in a federative alliance of states with a complete national autonomy for Slovakia, with its own state government, its own cultural freedom and, therefore, 38 SLOVAKIA its own complete use of the Slovak language, its own financial and political government, and with Slovak as the ,State language. 3. Voting power: general, secret, and direct. 4. Form of government: A personal union with a democratic State, the same as in ,England. 5. These points form the basis of the mutual agreement and can be enlarged or expanded only with the approval of both parties. The Czech National Alliance reserves the right of making possible changes, and the Slovak League has the same right (12) . This Cleveland Agreement opened up suppositions for the close cooperation of Czechs and Slovaks and eventually led to the formation of the common political state of the Czecho-<Slovak Republic. In spite of this agreement, however, the Czech side began to show indications of naming all common liberation undertakings as Czech. This instilled in the Slovaks the fear that the Czechs did not wish to accept the Slovaks as equal partners. Many discussions, therefore, ensued with the result that, during these sessions, one of the Slovak representatives clearly pin-pointed the Slovak position with the words: "Yes, we want to tear away from the Magyars and be with the Czechs, but not under the Czechs" ( 13). The above-mentioned Czech tactic prompted many of the Slovaks to lose faith in the Cleveland Agreement and in the Czechs, and prompted them to look for new allies. Such a decision did not take a firm foothold because, in the meantime, important events had occurred in the diplomatic world. President Wilson was re-elected on November 8, 1916. Soon after his re-election (December 21, 1916) he issued a proclamation to the warring nations in which he asked for a statement of their war aims. The Allies answered on January 12, 1917, and, in the conditions which they enumerated, the following sentence was found: "Liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, Czecho-Slovaks from foreign government control" (14 ) . T. G. Masaryk explains that the term "Czecho-Slovaks" was written into the Allies' reply after the reply had been completed. "The word Czecho.JSlovaks", he writes, "contained in the proclamation, has its own interesting internal history. There were three suggestions: liberation of the Czechs - the Czech nation - the Czecho-Slovaks. The latter suggestion was accepted at a conference of Dr. Ed- SLOVAKIA 39 ward Benes (Czech), Milan R. Stefanik (.Slovak), and Stephen Osusky (American Slovak)" (15). Dr. Benes, on the other hand, writes that he conferred with Mr. Osusky and Mr. Sychravy about the matter, since M. iR. Stefanik was then in Russia; and he further states that "Osusky expressed fear that the Allies' reply to President Wilson might name Czechs only, not the Slovaks". - For that reason he insisted on the term "Czecho-Slovaks" (16). 6. The Pittsburgh Pact The Allies' reply concerning the liberation of CzechoSlovakia definitely determined that, after a victoriously ended war, the Slovaks would be thrust into a common political state with the Czechs, which opened up among the Slovaks all sorts of speculations regarding the future of their fatherland. The official pronouncement concerning the Czecho-Slovaks indicated the existence of two separate groups with the formation of a new state. The Slovaks, therefore, had less reasons to fear that the Czechs would deprive them of their national individuality. T. G. Masaryk, who came to the United States near the end of the war, in April of 1'918, helped in no way to dispel this fear. He was looked upon as the person who could settle most of the small differences, suspicions, and discrepancies that had arisen. Delivering his first speech May 5, 191'8, in Chicago, Ill., he repeatedly mentioned the Czech lands, the Czech army, the Czech fight, the Czech future, etc., but not once did he mention Slovakia and completely ignored Slovak participation in the struggle. His speech was a big disappointment to the Slovaks and ,g ave rise to new doubts about Czech sincerity. On May 30, 1918, T. G. Masaryk came to 'Pittsburgh. Once again he spoke, but this time he changed face and stated proudly that he was of Slovak descent. He also said that Slovaks and Czechs were united and that the differences which arose were artificially produced through German and Magyar influences. He declared that there would be a free Bohemia and a free Slovakia, that political control, education, courts of justice, and all else in Slovakia would be_ Slovak, and in Bohemia, Czech. Each n a t i o n, therefore, would be master in its own home. SLOVAKIA 40 The huge gathering received Masaryk's address with tremendous acclaim. All Slovaks were overjoyed, for these were just the things they had been wishing for (17). That same evening Masaryk held a conference with the representatives of the Slovaks in the Moose Temple and on the following day, May 31st, drafted a new agreement establishing the relations between Czechs and Slovaks in the new state. Besides him this agreement was signed by eleven Czechs and seventeen ,Slovak representatives and contained the following: The Czecho-Slovak Pact agreed upon in Pittsburgh , Pa., on May 30th, 1918. Representatives of the Slovak and Czech or anlzations the Slovak League, the Czech National Alliin the United States discussed the Czechoance, and the Alliance of Czech Catholics Slovak question in the presence of the chairman of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, 1Prof. Masaryk, and the program declaration made up to this time, and resolved the following: We approve the political program which endeavors to unite the Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state of the Czech lands and Slovakia. Slovakia shall have its own administration, its own parliament, and its own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official language in the schools, in offices, and in public life in general. The Czecho-Slovak State shall be a republic, its constitution shall be democratic. The organization of the cooperation of the Czechs and Slovaks in the USA shall be intensified and arranged with mutual understanding as necessity and the changing conditions shall require. The detailed regulations for the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak State are being left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives. ( 18). Saturated with the ideals of American democracy, Slovak immigrants in this country endeavored in the Pittsburgh 'P act to assure for their fatherland such rights as they enjoyed here. They labored thus in full knowledge of their leading position, which they held as regards their enslaved fatherland. They were the only free and organized portion of the Slovak nation, and Slovaks at home, as far as they were able under existing circumstances, not only accepted them as the framers of their political future, but also placed in them their only hope of liberation from Magyar enslavement. The greatest weakness of the Pittsburgh Pact as regards any decisions in Slovakia showed itself to be the final 1 SLOVAKIA 41 point which stated that "the detailed arrangements and regulations in the Czecho-Slovak State are being left to the liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legal representatives". Without having any knowledge of the action of the Slovak League in the United States, the newly created Slovak Council in Slovakia - formed as a result of the war's end - met in Turciansky Svaty Martin on October 30, 1918, two days after the iPrague Proclamation of an independent Czecho.JSlovak Republic. Here a declaration was brought out in which, altough the Council requested the right of self-expression for Slovaks according to the demands of President Wilson on October 18, 1918, it nevertheless announced that "the Slovak nation is both a linguistic and culturo-historical component of the joint CzechoSlovak nation" (19). Amidst the enthusiastic atmosphere, the small group of those who stood for complete union of Czechs and Slovaks were free to draw up the declaration in such a way that it would best fit their objectives. By emphasizing that "the 1Slovak nation is both a linguistic and a culturo-historical component of the joint Czecho-Slovak nation" the Martin Declaration - as it came to be known since - was considered to be the denial of the distinct Slovak individuality about which the Slovak representatives were most concerned when they entered into the Cleveland and ·Pittsburgh agreements with the Czechs. The freedom exercised by the promoters of the union with the Czechs in drawing up the declaration in Turciansky Sv. Martin is also apparent from the fact that one of them, Dr. Milan Hodza, who was entrusted with the task of publishing the document, left out several points arbitrarily. One of the omitted points was the request that the Slovaks be represented at the peace conference. This Martin Declaration - no matter how doubtfull its worth - was, however, considered a free expression of the will of the liberated Slovaks by Prague, and, consequently, the Pittsburgh Pact was declared void. T. G. Masaryk went so far that, in his reply of October 12, 1929, to the Rev. Andrew Hlinka, leader of the Slovak People's Party, he wrote of this Pact: 42 SLOVAKIA But the main thing is that the document that verbal agreement is forged, is a falsum, because at the time when the American Slovaks wanted that verbal agreement, the League did not exist legally, it was not recognized by the State until 1919. For that reason a serious politician, a statesman, cannot and must not operate with a paper. Falsification cannot become an act of State .•• (20). From its very beginning, therefore, Czecho-Slovakia was organized as a centralistic Czech state, in which Slovakia was more in the position of a colony than as an equal partner. The Czechs, on the other hand, tactfully utilized the already-mentioned conflicts .w ithin the Slovak camp. For the majority of inhabitants, the incorporation of Slovakia into the Czecho-Slovak Republic was such an unexpected surprise that a certain development was necessary before the complete range of the new political situation actually came forth. To make matter worse, a split occurred even among the active members of the Slovak League. One part, under the impact of alarming news from their liberated native country, was convinced that the carrying out of the Pittsbwgh Pact would be a misfortune for Slovakia and, therefore, did not insist, as was expected, upon its incorporation into the constitution of the new state. The other part, even though comprising an insignificant number of opportunists, was won over to the idea of centralism by being rewarded with well-paid offices within the administration of the new state. The Pittsburgh Pact was, therefore, excluded with comparative ease from all discussions during the formation of 'Slovak and Czech relations in the new Czecho-Slovakia. Even though this pact failed to fulfill its primary function, it gave to 'Slovak autonomists an effective weapon to accuse the Czechs of insincerity and faithlessness. With the creation of Czecho-Slovakia, there was an obvious tendency, according to the Czech writer Vaclav Peroutka, to exclude "Catholics from public offices and the enjoyment of honor" (21). And it was under such circumstances that in May, 1919, a year after its signing, the Pittsburgh ·P act came into the hands of the Rev. Andrew Hlinka, the leader of the Slovak Catholics. He did not hesitate to make out of it the Magna Charta of the movement for autonomy. It gave his autonomist movement a clear program and offered effect- SLOVAKIA 43 ive propaganda material to depict Czech faithlessness. It is quite obvious that the denial of the Pittsburgh Pact occasioned much greater harm to the survival of Czecho-Slovakia than it would have done at the beginning when the newly liberated, still politically immature Slovakia was consolidating its forces. Even though the Slovak immigrant failed to achieve his original goal through this pact, he nevertheless created in his native country an irresistable desire to attain it. The Pittsburgh Pact sounded the tocsin to battle, the outcome of which was to be a clearer and more accurate definition of national rights. The present situation shows that the Slovak immigrant in the United States has almost lost his distinguishing marks in the new American society. Whereas, in the history of Slovakia, he still remains one of the most distinguished actors in defining its national character and in determining its political ambitions. If the "American democratic crusading spirit" sank deep into the life of a nation by means of an immigrant, it perhaps did so mostly in the case of Slovakia in connection with the iPittsburgh Pact. 7. The Present Political Emigrants The afore-mentioned Slovak emigrants, who left Slovakia mostly from social motives, were joined in recent years by a small though in its actions a very alert group of people, who left Slovakia and came to the West from clearly political motives. They departed in two waves. The first represented the functionaries of the independent Slovak Republic who, after the downfall of Slovakia in 1945, sought asylum in the West to escape the vengeance of the so-called "people's courts" . They were joined three years later (1948) by a further wave of political exiles who fled when Communists took complete control of the Czecho-Slovak government. The latter group comprised functionaries of non-Communist parties of the Czecho-Slovakia, in other words, people who were not in accord with the Communist "People's Democracy". In both instances we actually behold the first mass, political, Slovak emigration which, from the viewpoint of Slovak nationalism, signifies that political activity is its 44 SLOVAKIA very pulsating vocation. Its aim is the return homeward of all exiles and, therefore, a change in the political situation which forced the Slovaks to leave their native land. Slovak emigrants are bearing influence in two ways: they are endeavoring to gain the favor of Western Democracies in their efforts to overthrow the Communist dictatorship; and they are displaying the ability to organize underground movements to bring about a change, perhaps through internal revolution. One could probably surmise that the group who left Slovakia immediately after Second War will seek the revival of an independent Slovakia as a continuation of the Slovak Republic, whereas the other group will simply join those forces that work for the restoration of a democratic CzechoSlovakia. But the time-interval between these two waves of emigrants is not an accurate divisor of their political affiliation. It is true, however, that the Slovaks are divided into two camps: the Slovak and Czecho ..Slovak camp. The former aims for an i n d e p e n d e n t Slovakia without the Czecho-Slovak framework; the latter aims for a Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak framework. Numerically, however, those who desire an independent Slovakia constitute the overwhelming majority. They include not only former functionaries of the 1Slovak Republic but also at least 90% of all those who left Czecho-Slovakia after the Communist coup of 194'8. As an o r g a n i z e d force, both camps act through three organs: the National Council of Free Czechoslovakia; the Slovak National Council Abroad; and the Slovak Liberation Committee. The aim of the National Council of Free Czechoslovakia is the destruction of present Communist dictatorship and the restoration of democracy in the spirit of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. E. Benes (anti-Catholic). CzechoJSlovakia involves, however, the solution of two problems: 1. the problem of some three and one-half million displaced Sudeten Germans whose desire to return to their homeland is being actively supported by the newly-risen West Germany; 2. what position is Slovakia to have in the new demecratic CzechoSlovakia. It is a known fact that the greater majority of Slovaks 1 SLOVAKIA 45, at home are more than ever before opposed to any idea or form of a Czecho-Slovakia. Informed people know that Slovakia can be maintained within the framework of CzechoSlovakia only by force and violence. The other two organs, the Slovak National Council Abroad and the Slovak Liberation Committee, are striving for the creation of an independent Slovakia. Their difference lies not so much in their aim as in their methods. Even though the Slovak National Council Abroad avers that the Slovak Republic which existed during the Second World War was formed in accord with the principles of international law as the free manifestation of the people, it nevertheless does not insist upon her legal continuity. lt is a great promoter of the federative solution of Central Europe in which it seeks for Slovakia the same position that other national groups will have. It is the political organ of the greater number of the 1Slovak exiles of 1945 and 1948. Furthermore, its program has been endorsed by the two largest organizations of older emigrants, namely, the Slovak League of America and the Canadian Slovak League. The Slovak Liberation Committee is the political organ of a radical portion of the Slovak exiles. It strives for an independent Slovakia on the basis of a legal continuity of the former Slovak Republic. It is distinguished by a special activity which manifests itself principally in many memorandums sent to the United Nations Organization as well as to the other r esponsible political circles in the West. Because of this across-the-border activity as well as other efforts to organize underground movements in Slovakia, which is dominated by Czech Communists, the ·Slovak Liberation Committee is looked upon in Czecho-Slovakia as the principal enemy of the government of the People's Democracy. It seems to be quite popular with the dissatisfied and change-hungry inhabitants at home. 1 It is hard to foretell whether any of these organs will succeed in achieving any of their objectives at the present time. It is highly improbable that any of them will succeed in organizing an active underground movement, which would be in a position to bring about a change in the present po- 46 SLOVAKIA litical situation with the aid of an internal revolution. The hope for a change depends only upon a new war, and then upon the measure in which respective efforts will be in accord with the interests of victorious powers. 1. ,M. Darras: "Onze ans de vie independente en Slovaque", LeMonde slave, (rnai-juin, 1930), 177. 2. Joseph A. Mikus: La Slovaque dans le Drame de l'Europe, Paris, 1'955, p. 57. 3. ·W illiam ,Diamond : Czechoslovakia Between East and West, London, 1947, p. 172. 4. Pravda, Bratislava, May 29, 1949. 15. ,Karol Sidor: Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji, Bratislava, 1929, p. 1'6. 6. Bulletin of the Slovak National Council Abroad, Middletown, Pa., August, 1956, p. 3. 7. Sidor: loc. cit., p. 32. 8. Karol Sidor: Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji, Bratislava, 1929, p. 33. 9. The Slovaks and the Pittsburgh ,Pact, Chicago, Tylka Bros. Press, 1Inc., 1934, p. 10. 10. I bid., p. 13. 11. Ibid., p. 13. 12. Ibid., p. 16. 13. Ibid., p. 18. 14. Ibid., p. 19. 15. T. G. Masaryk : La resurection d' un Etat ('Souvenir et reflection 1914-1918), Paris, 1930, p . 256. 16. nr .. Eduard Benes: My War Memoirs, London, 1928, p. 157. 17. The Slovaks and The Pittsburgh Pact, Joe. cit., p . 24. 18. Ibid., p. 27. 19. Dr. Frantisek Bokes : Dejiny Sloven ska a Slovakov, Bratislava, 1946, p. 363. 20. To this an authority on American law on April 23, 1930, when asked a bout the legality of the Slovak League had to say: "I understand the organization in question having a C onstitution, by-laws, officers, etc., though not chartered by the State. For the purpose of taking the action which -w as taken, such an organization would have all the n ecessary power as fully as if had been chartered. The agreement entered into by the unchartered organization refered to would be just as effectiv-e as if entered into with a chartered organization and just as valid if closed on ,Memorial Day as on any other day". (The Slovaks and The Pittsburgh Pact, loc. cit., p. 36-39). 21. Vaclav Peroutka : Budovani statu, Prague, 1933-1935, I , p. 352 . • • • RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound In cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety; 229 pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak Nationalism: The Role of Emigrants in Slovak Nationalism Description An account of the resource B. S. Buc, Ph.D.<br />Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959<br />pp. 32-46<br /><ol><li>The Nation of Emigrants</li> <li>Slovak Immigrants in the United States</li> <li>Shaping of the National Will</li> <li>In Search of a New Ally</li> <li>The Cleveland Agreement</li> <li>The Pittsburgh Pact</li> <li>The Present Political Emigrants</li> </ol> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Buc, B. S. (Bonaventure S.), 1910-1966 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/759d3af9024e26a0f4ce546ef688c640.pdf 7e0fadd488e0f42a01c99f2897f46fff PDF Text Text 24 SLOVAKIA THE STIRRING DAYS OF MARCH 1939 Dr. Joseph Pauco I lived at the Svoradov. On March 10, 1939, at about three in the morning, my friends awakened and told me that Czech soldiers had occupied the city of Trencin and that entire regiments of the Czech army were pouring through Malacky. The vanguards, they said, were already supposed to be in Bratislava. It was not easy to believe this report, because at that time a lot of rumors were in the wind. After a time, I stretched out on the bed and soon fell asleep again. My alarm-clock roused me at 5:30 A. M., when I had to get up to be on time at the editorial office of the Slovenska Pravda. I usually took a bus that stopped in front of the Svoradov. But this morning there seemed to be no bus operating from this point. That March morning was really chilly. After some time, I decided not to wait for a bus, so I started out on foot. The streets were quiet. In front of the district administra tion building I came upon a guard who was stepping lively. iHe cast his keen eye upon me searchingly for a moment and then went about his business of stepping lively again. I did not even wait for the streetcar near the church of the Holy Trinity. As I walked by the main post-office, I noticed that it was guarded by six soldiers and four policemen. All were heavily armed. "My friends at the Svoradov may have been right", flashed through my mind. Bratislava was full of espionage agents. Some may have been caught, while others were about to be taken in. From that point to the office I came across no one else that might strike my attention. I arrived at the office on schedule. At 6:115 A. M. I was on the third floor of the gigantic printing enterprise of the SLOVAK and the SLOVENS KA PR.AIVDA, the Andrej Building, on King Alexander street. Several minutes later, the entire editorial office of the daily Slovenska Pravda bristled with activity. In the office �SLOVAKIA 25 with me were Dr. Aladar Kocis, editor-in-chief, Celo Radvanyi, and Joseph 1P etro. We had no foreboding about what was to happen. Even after l told my colleagues what I had heard at the Svoradov that morning, they thought nothing of it. We applied ourselves to our tasks. That morning I was to write the leading editorial about the discussions taking place in Prague. Minister Karol Sidor was the ,Slovak representative in these discussions. My article was to be based on the reports supplied by the Slovak Press Bureau. The reports brought nothing new. I was then convinced that the discussions would be meaningless. And I meant to tell our readers just that. Well, it so happened that I wrote nothing that morning. Neither did my colleagues. Before I could strike a sentence on paper, the doors of my office flew open and a Czech major, with revolver in hand and accompanied by two bayonet-toting gendarmes, rushed at me. The major announced in a loud Czech voice : "In the name of the new Slovak Government I am stopping all work in this building and taking it over!" With that all four of us were taken to Dr. Kocis's office. We were all stunned. We did not know who the major and his companions were. The major and the gendarmes appeared to be a bit queer. But we could say nothing. The major ordered the gendarmes to cut all telephone wires. This they did speedily. In the hallway, they came upon the janitress and our secretary, Mrs. Noskay; both were detained in a separate room of the building. The major forbade us to look out the windows. A short time later he left us, ordering the gendarmes to keep an eye on us. After a time we asked the gendarmes what was going on, why they came to Bratislava, and who ordered them here. But they were not talking. They simply complained that they were tired and hungry. Several minutes later the Czech major brought in the editor-in-chief of the Slovenska Politika, Augustine Nacin. The major barked again that we were not to go near the windows : "iKeep at least six feet away!" When he left us again, however, we managed to get a few peeps in on the street below. It was full of people talking loudly and gesticulating wildly. There we spied two of our colleagues, Jo-- �26 SLOVAKIA seph Nizii.ansky and John Hrusovsky. They were looking up at our window quizzingly. Hrusovsky with his cane, switching his pipe rhythmically from one end of his mouth to the other. We waved to them from the window and one of my colleagues tapped on the window. It was precisely at this moment of tapping on the window that the Cech major burst again into the room. "Vo that again," he raved menacingly, "and I begin to shoot!" Well, we did not want to argue with him. We pulled away from the windows and- waited quietely for developments. About 9 :00 A. M. the Czech major paid us another visit, this time with a piece of paper in his hand. He read our names off the paper to identify us. Then, ordering Celo Radvanyi to remain in the room, he led the rest of us down the stairs. Armed guards in military and police uniforms were all over the place. At the main entrance to the building three soldiers manned a machine-gun aimed at the main portal. The major halted us at the main entrance, pulled out his revolver and, holding it over our heads, let us out into the street one at a time. People gaped at us, but nobody spoke to us. We looked about for familiar faces, but in vain. We still did not know exactly what was happening. On the corner of the National Bank we separated with the understanding that we would return in an hour to see whether we could get to work again. I then walked briskly to the Svoradov. When I arrived there things were pretty lively. One of my friends to-Id me that about the same time the Czech army took over the Andrej Building, detectives and policemen came to Svoradov to arrest Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum. This, however, was easier said than done, because the academicians of the Svoradov were determined to have a say in the matter. They forced the unwanted guests out of the building. We were about to call a mass meeting of all the inmates of Svoradov, when one of our boys announced that a bus pulled in with a load of armed guards. Immediately we locked all entrances to the building. Moments later army tanks thundered on the premises and �SLOVAKIA 27 Svoradov was quickly surrounded by heavily armed soldiers and policemen. They banged on all entrances, ordering the academicians to let them in. But nobody was willing to listen to Czech orders. Windows were opened on the upper floors of Svoradov and the students soon began shouting and ridiculing the invaders. "If there is to be a circus," one academician shouted, "why not sell admission tickets?" Others got their cameras and took pictures of our "so closely related" brethren, the Czechs, who came to the Svoradov boarding home with tanks and guns to prove their friendship for the Slovaks. The university courtyard of old Svoradov was called Alcazar. It so happened that six gendarmes got into the courtyard one way or another and were soon surrounded by quite a number of students, who were determined to keep them out of the building. Angry words were exchanged for a time. Dr. Kirschbaum, several others, and I, working on a plan of action, could hear them on the second floor. I was sent out to learn what was happening in the courtyard. Plowing through the mass of students, I faced the gendarmes and inquired where they came from, what they wanted or were looking for here, and who permitted them to violate private property rights. All looked very sheepishly at me and a bit flustered by my audacity. Finally, one of the gendarmes said: "We are looking for one Mr. Kristbaum." "Kristbaum ?" - I queried - "why there is no Kristbaum and we never heard of any Kristbaum !" I then reminded the gendarmes that they were on academic ground and that the mana,gement and students demanded that they leave the premises willingly at once. The gendarmes hesitated momentarily, then pointed their guns at us. When the students pushed closer to them, however, they put their guns down. Greatly outnumbered, they decided to leave the premises, the students accompanying them to the steet. After locking the door, several academicians visited the wine-shop in the cellar of the building and reminded the lessee to have more regard for the Slovaks. It was through this place the gendarmes got into the courtyard of Svoradov. �28 SLOVAKIA A half-hour later the Czech army and gendarmerie pulled away from Svoradov. It was then we called our colleagues of the Lafranconi. After joining us, the entire mass of students paraded in three columns in the streets of Bratislava, loudly singing songs to the wild applause of shoppers and inhabitants. As the paraders approached the government building on the Vajansky coast or bank, they were joined by masses of the population who, too, wanted to demonstrate against the Czech occupation of Slovakia, and particularly the city of Bratislava. The Slovak academicians had fired the Slovak masses with enthusiasm and determination to stand up for right and justice, the sacred cause of freedom and independence, which had been violated by Prague. The Czechs had blundered again, and blundered terribly. The chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks widened. After twenty years of the Masaryk and Benes brand of democracy, the 1S lovaks and the Czechs were never before so far apart. The occupation of Slovakia by the Czechs was the straw that broke the camel's back. The Slovaks will never willingly join the Czechs in any venture. Czecho-Slovakia still exists, but only on paper. The Slovaks are kept in line only by force and violence. The Czechs sowed the wind and reaped a whirlwind. They have not a single true friend in Europe today. In the meantime, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum had gone to the residence of Premier Dr. Joseph Tiso, the home of the Jesuits, where he pledged the loyalty of all Slovak students. As soon as he returned, he told us in front of the Slovak National Theater on the Hviezdoslav Square: "Dr. Joseph Tiso was saying his breviary. To the Slovak youth he sends this message: Carry on in a manner that you may not harm yourselves and that the world might see that we are not afraid of the bayonets and machineguns of any occupation army." There were parades and demostrations in Bratislava before March 10, 1939. And there many were after that. But the demonstration of the Slovak students on March 10, 1939, was undoubtedly the most spontaneous and greatest of all of them. The demonstrations were organized by the Club of Hlinka Academicians which was headed by Dr. Jo- �SLOVAKIA 29 seph Kirschbaum. The leaders of the academicians were everywhere when Bratislava needed help. They were in government buildings, editorial offices, and did jobs that were dangerous. Several ,w ere scared off by events that followed, while hundreds were jailed. Of those who managed to escape from their homeland after it was occupied by the Czech and the Red Armies in 1945, I might mention at least Dr. Joseph Mikula and Dr. Gabriel Danihel in addition to Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum. They rendered valuable services at that time, services which served Slovak politicians in good stead a few hours after the events of March 10th had been initiated. Bratislava, the capital city of Slovakia, was on its feet from the 10th to the 14th of March, 1939. Several tragic events occured. The Czech army and gendarmery took recourse to arms. The Hlinka Guards of the area repulsed the occupation of the Trade Building. A volley of shots rang out. Anthony Kopal, 27-year old laborer of Vel'ke Uherce, was hit fatally and died a short time later in the Bratislava State Hospital. The first victim of the Czech March 10th putsch. That evening, 58-year old Mary Psota was shot dead as she was closing her tobacco shop which was located opposite the District Court Building. Czech soldiers, firing from the building, were responsible for her death. The Czechs had occupied the broadcasting station in Bratislava. The Slovak Hlinka Guards fought for it all day on March 10 and did get possession of it at 10 :30 that night. It was then that Premier Karol Sidor spoke over the air. Up to that time the whole Slovakia was in confusion. Cities and towns were taken by the Czechs after General Homola announced over the air and with placards that he was taking over all political, military, judicial powers in Slovakia in the name of the Prague Government. Slovak army officers and police were disarmed and placed under guard; about 500 civic leaders were imprisoned and later taken to a jail in Moravia where they were held three days. Minister Matthew Cernak was among them. In the meantime, reports were pouring in from all parts of Slovakia, particularly from the cities and towns �30 SLOVAKIA which told of the brutalities committed by the Czech occupation forces. The situation was very grave. If the 'Slovaks would have had access to weapons, there undoubtedly would have been very much blood shed on March 10th in the fight against the Czech occupants. There were indications of this especially in Trencin, Nitra, Spisska Nova Ves, and Banska Stiavnica. The atrocities committed by the "brotherly" Czechs on March 10th shall never be forgotten by the Slovaks. What happened in those days was governed by the international situation. Adolph Hitler had decided to liquidate Czecho...:Slovakia. His decision and its consequences are already recorded by history. But during those three hectic March days, the 'Slovaks were convinced that, if an unexpected turn in events did not take place - which even the majority of the foremost Slovak politicians could not foresee - the Czechs would have continued to occupy Slovakia with their army. Little wonder then that the Slovaks in these days were bitter and proclaimed: Never again with the Czechs! March 14, 1939, arrived. A glorious day for the Slovaks, nowithstanding anything that anti-Slovak ~lements say about it to the contrary! The 'Slovaks knew only the simple facts of that historical event. First, Karol Sidor was called to Berlin. He did not go. Then the Germans called Tiso, not once but twice. But he, too, was reluctant to accept the invitation. When a third invitation was delivered to him by German representatives in person, Dr. Tiso deliberated with the presidium of the Slovak People's Party. The latter decided that Dr. Tiso should accept the invitation, so Tiso flew to Berlin. On Tuesday morning, March 14, before we could form ranks in Svoradov, somebody brought in a report that Hitler had requested iDr. Tiso to proclaim the independence of Slovakia directly from Berlin. But Tiso did not broadcast anything from Berlin. We were lined up to march to the Parliament Building to learn what the Slovak legislators had in mind. Furthermore, we wanted to be on hand in case the Czechs would again attempt to take over that building. It was a cold March morning. Rolling clouds overhead, �SLOVAKIA 31 snow clouds. The lively march of the academicians caught the attention of the inhabitants and warmed their hearts. They had little sleep the past three days, but there they were again on the streets waving banners and flags, shouting joyous acclaim to the Slovak Government and the academicians and demanding that the "Czechs get out of Slovakia". ; Our hearts were warm and we broke into song. Finally, we arrived at our destination and waited patiently. Then, as we broke into song again, we were joined by the academicians of Lafranconi and thousands of people. Soon the square was a mass of people. The banner of the Slovak Catholic Student Federation fluttered in the breeze over our heads. What we had gone through the past three days was like a motion picture. Then we had to make way for oncoming autos. In the first we saw temporary Premier Karol Sidor; in the second, Dr. Joseph Tiso. Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum greeted Karol Sidor and I greeted Dr. Joseph Tiso in the name of the student body. Without delay the Slovak parliament was in session. We still did not know definitely what was about to happen. Our representative, Dr. Kirschbaum, also went into the Parliament Building. After a time, he came out briefly to tell us that a very serious matter was being discussed. After he left us, he came out again shortly thereafter to inform us that the Parliament of autonomous Slovakia had decided to proclaim the independence of Slovakia. This happened at precisely seven minutes and twelve seconds after twelve o'clock noon. Bratislava streets burst out with joyous acclaim. Alexander Mach and Dr. Kirschbaum rushed to an auto and sped to the broadcasting station. First Mach made a brief broadcast and then Dr. Kirschbaum spoke in the name of Slovak youth. They told of the historical event that had taken place. As soon as the cities and towns heard the broadcast, bells began to peel in all the churches of Slovakia. The Fourth of July had arrived for the Slovaks on March 14, 1939. All offices and schools were quickly closed for the rest of the day. The Slovaks prayed and sang with joy as never before. �32 SLOVAKIA Bratislava streets rang out with song for quite a time. We embraced each other and danced. Then we marched, or rather should ,J say, danced all the way to Svoradov. The fraternity was another joyous scene. I still remember vividly how we embraced Colman Murgas in the refectory, his eyes streaming with tears. I was so excited that 1 could hardly eat. Like so many others, l had lost my appetite for food. Like them, I was satiated with joy. The Slovaks proclaimed their country an independent Republic on March 14, 1939. • • • SLOVAK NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM B. S. BUC, Ph.D. 1. The Nation of Emigrants Slovak nationalism cannot be considered as the outgrowth of the Central European soil and the pure product of political forces of that sector. It was steadily developing under many outside influences which penetrated that sector either in the form of new ideas or in the form of outside political and economic interests. Moreover, in the period of the greatest oppression, the real shaping of the Slovak national will for survival was occuring outside Slovakia, among emigrants. About one third of the present Slovak population lives outside Slovakia as emigrants in various sectors of the world. That makes Slovaks truly a nation of emigrants. They were forced to emigrate either for economic or political reasons. Slovakia is a mountainous country with forests covering 40 % of the land. Moreover, prior to 1918, a substantial part of Slovak land was owned by the Magyar or foreign aristocracy, so that Slovaks had little opportunity to make living from agriculture. Temporary or permanent emigration became, therefore the only solution to the economic problem for many children of Slovak farmers. When they � 24 SLOVAKIA THE STIRRING DAYS OF MARCH 1939 Dr. Joseph Pauco I lived at the Svoradov. On March 10, 1939, at about three in the morning, my friends awakened and told me that Czech soldiers had occupied the city of Trencin and that entire regiments of the Czech army were pouring through Malacky. The vanguards, they said, were already supposed to be in Bratislava. It was not easy to believe this report, because at that time a lot of rumors were in the wind. After a time, I stretched out on the bed and soon fell asleep again. My alarm-clock roused me at 5:30 A. M., when I had to get up to be on time at the editorial office of the Slovenska Pravda. I usually took a bus that stopped in front of the Svoradov. But this morning there seemed to be no bus operating from this point. That March morning was really chilly. After some time, I decided not to wait for a bus, so I started out on foot. The streets were quiet. In front of the district administra tion building I came upon a guard who was stepping lively. iHe cast his keen eye upon me searchingly for a moment and then went about his business of stepping lively again. I did not even wait for the streetcar near the church of the Holy Trinity. As I walked by the main post-office, I noticed that it was guarded by six soldiers and four policemen. All were heavily armed. "My friends at the Svoradov may have been right", flashed through my mind. Bratislava was full of espionage agents. Some may have been caught, while others were about to be taken in. From that point to the office I came across no one else that might strike my attention. I arrived at the office on schedule. At 6:115 A. M. I was on the third floor of the gigantic printing enterprise of the SLOVAK and the SLOVENS KA PR.AIVDA, the Andrej Building, on King Alexander street. Several minutes later, the entire editorial office of the daily Slovenska Pravda bristled with activity. In the office �SLOVAKIA 25 with me were Dr. Aladar Kocis, editor-in-chief, Celo Radvanyi, and Joseph 1P etro. We had no foreboding about what was to happen. Even after l told my colleagues what I had heard at the Svoradov that morning, they thought nothing of it. We applied ourselves to our tasks. That morning I was to write the leading editorial about the discussions taking place in Prague. Minister Karol Sidor was the ,Slovak representative in these discussions. My article was to be based on the reports supplied by the Slovak Press Bureau. The reports brought nothing new. I was then convinced that the discussions would be meaningless. And I meant to tell our readers just that. Well, it so happened that I wrote nothing that morning. Neither did my colleagues. Before I could strike a sentence on paper, the doors of my office flew open and a Czech major, with revolver in hand and accompanied by two bayonet-toting gendarmes, rushed at me. The major announced in a loud Czech voice : "In the name of the new Slovak Government I am stopping all work in this building and taking it over!" With that all four of us were taken to Dr. Kocis's office. We were all stunned. We did not know who the major and his companions were. The major and the gendarmes appeared to be a bit queer. But we could say nothing. The major ordered the gendarmes to cut all telephone wires. This they did speedily. In the hallway, they came upon the janitress and our secretary, Mrs. Noskay; both were detained in a separate room of the building. The major forbade us to look out the windows. A short time later he left us, ordering the gendarmes to keep an eye on us. After a time we asked the gendarmes what was going on, why they came to Bratislava, and who ordered them here. But they were not talking. They simply complained that they were tired and hungry. Several minutes later the Czech major brought in the editor-in-chief of the Slovenska Politika, Augustine Nacin. The major barked again that we were not to go near the windows : "iKeep at least six feet away!" When he left us again, however, we managed to get a few peeps in on the street below. It was full of people talking loudly and gesticulating wildly. There we spied two of our colleagues, Jo-- �26 SLOVAKIA seph Nizii.ansky and John Hrusovsky. They were looking up at our window quizzingly. Hrusovsky with his cane, switching his pipe rhythmically from one end of his mouth to the other. We waved to them from the window and one of my colleagues tapped on the window. It was precisely at this moment of tapping on the window that the Cech major burst again into the room. "Vo that again," he raved menacingly, "and I begin to shoot!" Well, we did not want to argue with him. We pulled away from the windows and- waited quietely for developments. About 9 :00 A. M. the Czech major paid us another visit, this time with a piece of paper in his hand. He read our names off the paper to identify us. Then, ordering Celo Radvanyi to remain in the room, he led the rest of us down the stairs. Armed guards in military and police uniforms were all over the place. At the main entrance to the building three soldiers manned a machine-gun aimed at the main portal. The major halted us at the main entrance, pulled out his revolver and, holding it over our heads, let us out into the street one at a time. People gaped at us, but nobody spoke to us. We looked about for familiar faces, but in vain. We still did not know exactly what was happening. On the corner of the National Bank we separated with the understanding that we would return in an hour to see whether we could get to work again. I then walked briskly to the Svoradov. When I arrived there things were pretty lively. One of my friends to-Id me that about the same time the Czech army took over the Andrej Building, detectives and policemen came to Svoradov to arrest Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum. This, however, was easier said than done, because the academicians of the Svoradov were determined to have a say in the matter. They forced the unwanted guests out of the building. We were about to call a mass meeting of all the inmates of Svoradov, when one of our boys announced that a bus pulled in with a load of armed guards. Immediately we locked all entrances to the building. Moments later army tanks thundered on the premises and �SLOVAKIA 27 Svoradov was quickly surrounded by heavily armed soldiers and policemen. They banged on all entrances, ordering the academicians to let them in. But nobody was willing to listen to Czech orders. Windows were opened on the upper floors of Svoradov and the students soon began shouting and ridiculing the invaders. "If there is to be a circus," one academician shouted, "why not sell admission tickets?" Others got their cameras and took pictures of our "so closely related" brethren, the Czechs, who came to the Svoradov boarding home with tanks and guns to prove their friendship for the Slovaks. The university courtyard of old Svoradov was called Alcazar. It so happened that six gendarmes got into the courtyard one way or another and were soon surrounded by quite a number of students, who were determined to keep them out of the building. Angry words were exchanged for a time. Dr. Kirschbaum, several others, and I, working on a plan of action, could hear them on the second floor. I was sent out to learn what was happening in the courtyard. Plowing through the mass of students, I faced the gendarmes and inquired where they came from, what they wanted or were looking for here, and who permitted them to violate private property rights. All looked very sheepishly at me and a bit flustered by my audacity. Finally, one of the gendarmes said: "We are looking for one Mr. Kristbaum." "Kristbaum ?" - I queried - "why there is no Kristbaum and we never heard of any Kristbaum !" I then reminded the gendarmes that they were on academic ground and that the mana,gement and students demanded that they leave the premises willingly at once. The gendarmes hesitated momentarily, then pointed their guns at us. When the students pushed closer to them, however, they put their guns down. Greatly outnumbered, they decided to leave the premises, the students accompanying them to the steet. After locking the door, several academicians visited the wine-shop in the cellar of the building and reminded the lessee to have more regard for the Slovaks. It was through this place the gendarmes got into the courtyard of Svoradov. �28 SLOVAKIA A half-hour later the Czech army and gendarmerie pulled away from Svoradov. It was then we called our colleagues of the Lafranconi. After joining us, the entire mass of students paraded in three columns in the streets of Bratislava, loudly singing songs to the wild applause of shoppers and inhabitants. As the paraders approached the government building on the Vajansky coast or bank, they were joined by masses of the population who, too, wanted to demonstrate against the Czech occupation of Slovakia, and particularly the city of Bratislava. The Slovak academicians had fired the Slovak masses with enthusiasm and determination to stand up for right and justice, the sacred cause of freedom and independence, which had been violated by Prague. The Czechs had blundered again, and blundered terribly. The chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks widened. After twenty years of the Masaryk and Benes brand of democracy, the 1S lovaks and the Czechs were never before so far apart. The occupation of Slovakia by the Czechs was the straw that broke the camel's back. The Slovaks will never willingly join the Czechs in any venture. Czecho-Slovakia still exists, but only on paper. The Slovaks are kept in line only by force and violence. The Czechs sowed the wind and reaped a whirlwind. They have not a single true friend in Europe today. In the meantime, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum had gone to the residence of Premier Dr. Joseph Tiso, the home of the Jesuits, where he pledged the loyalty of all Slovak students. As soon as he returned, he told us in front of the Slovak National Theater on the Hviezdoslav Square: "Dr. Joseph Tiso was saying his breviary. To the Slovak youth he sends this message: Carry on in a manner that you may not harm yourselves and that the world might see that we are not afraid of the bayonets and machineguns of any occupation army." There were parades and demostrations in Bratislava before March 10, 1939. And there many were after that. But the demonstration of the Slovak students on March 10, 1939, was undoubtedly the most spontaneous and greatest of all of them. The demonstrations were organized by the Club of Hlinka Academicians which was headed by Dr. Jo- �SLOVAKIA 29 seph Kirschbaum. The leaders of the academicians were everywhere when Bratislava needed help. They were in government buildings, editorial offices, and did jobs that were dangerous. Several ,w ere scared off by events that followed, while hundreds were jailed. Of those who managed to escape from their homeland after it was occupied by the Czech and the Red Armies in 1945, I might mention at least Dr. Joseph Mikula and Dr. Gabriel Danihel in addition to Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum. They rendered valuable services at that time, services which served Slovak politicians in good stead a few hours after the events of March 10th had been initiated. Bratislava, the capital city of Slovakia, was on its feet from the 10th to the 14th of March, 1939. Several tragic events occured. The Czech army and gendarmery took recourse to arms. The Hlinka Guards of the area repulsed the occupation of the Trade Building. A volley of shots rang out. Anthony Kopal, 27-year old laborer of Vel'ke Uherce, was hit fatally and died a short time later in the Bratislava State Hospital. The first victim of the Czech March 10th putsch. That evening, 58-year old Mary Psota was shot dead as she was closing her tobacco shop which was located opposite the District Court Building. Czech soldiers, firing from the building, were responsible for her death. The Czechs had occupied the broadcasting station in Bratislava. The Slovak Hlinka Guards fought for it all day on March 10 and did get possession of it at 10 :30 that night. It was then that Premier Karol Sidor spoke over the air. Up to that time the whole Slovakia was in confusion. Cities and towns were taken by the Czechs after General Homola announced over the air and with placards that he was taking over all political, military, judicial powers in Slovakia in the name of the Prague Government. Slovak army officers and police were disarmed and placed under guard; about 500 civic leaders were imprisoned and later taken to a jail in Moravia where they were held three days. Minister Matthew Cernak was among them. In the meantime, reports were pouring in from all parts of Slovakia, particularly from the cities and towns �30 SLOVAKIA which told of the brutalities committed by the Czech occupation forces. The situation was very grave. If the 'Slovaks would have had access to weapons, there undoubtedly would have been very much blood shed on March 10th in the fight against the Czech occupants. There were indications of this especially in Trencin, Nitra, Spisska Nova Ves, and Banska Stiavnica. The atrocities committed by the "brotherly" Czechs on March 10th shall never be forgotten by the Slovaks. What happened in those days was governed by the international situation. Adolph Hitler had decided to liquidate Czecho...:Slovakia. His decision and its consequences are already recorded by history. But during those three hectic March days, the 'Slovaks were convinced that, if an unexpected turn in events did not take place - which even the majority of the foremost Slovak politicians could not foresee - the Czechs would have continued to occupy Slovakia with their army. Little wonder then that the Slovaks in these days were bitter and proclaimed: Never again with the Czechs! March 14, 1939, arrived. A glorious day for the Slovaks, nowithstanding anything that anti-Slovak ~lements say about it to the contrary! The 'Slovaks knew only the simple facts of that historical event. First, Karol Sidor was called to Berlin. He did not go. Then the Germans called Tiso, not once but twice. But he, too, was reluctant to accept the invitation. When a third invitation was delivered to him by German representatives in person, Dr. Tiso deliberated with the presidium of the Slovak People's Party. The latter decided that Dr. Tiso should accept the invitation, so Tiso flew to Berlin. On Tuesday morning, March 14, before we could form ranks in Svoradov, somebody brought in a report that Hitler had requested iDr. Tiso to proclaim the independence of Slovakia directly from Berlin. But Tiso did not broadcast anything from Berlin. We were lined up to march to the Parliament Building to learn what the Slovak legislators had in mind. Furthermore, we wanted to be on hand in case the Czechs would again attempt to take over that building. It was a cold March morning. Rolling clouds overhead, �SLOVAKIA 31 snow clouds. The lively march of the academicians caught the attention of the inhabitants and warmed their hearts. They had little sleep the past three days, but there they were again on the streets waving banners and flags, shouting joyous acclaim to the Slovak Government and the academicians and demanding that the "Czechs get out of Slovakia". ; Our hearts were warm and we broke into song. Finally, we arrived at our destination and waited patiently. Then, as we broke into song again, we were joined by the academicians of Lafranconi and thousands of people. Soon the square was a mass of people. The banner of the Slovak Catholic Student Federation fluttered in the breeze over our heads. What we had gone through the past three days was like a motion picture. Then we had to make way for oncoming autos. In the first we saw temporary Premier Karol Sidor; in the second, Dr. Joseph Tiso. Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum greeted Karol Sidor and I greeted Dr. Joseph Tiso in the name of the student body. Without delay the Slovak parliament was in session. We still did not know definitely what was about to happen. Our representative, Dr. Kirschbaum, also went into the Parliament Building. After a time, he came out briefly to tell us that a very serious matter was being discussed. After he left us, he came out again shortly thereafter to inform us that the Parliament of autonomous Slovakia had decided to proclaim the independence of Slovakia. This happened at precisely seven minutes and twelve seconds after twelve o'clock noon. Bratislava streets burst out with joyous acclaim. Alexander Mach and Dr. Kirschbaum rushed to an auto and sped to the broadcasting station. First Mach made a brief broadcast and then Dr. Kirschbaum spoke in the name of Slovak youth. They told of the historical event that had taken place. As soon as the cities and towns heard the broadcast, bells began to peel in all the churches of Slovakia. The Fourth of July had arrived for the Slovaks on March 14, 1939. All offices and schools were quickly closed for the rest of the day. The Slovaks prayed and sang with joy as never before. �32 SLOVAKIA Bratislava streets rang out with song for quite a time. We embraced each other and danced. Then we marched, or rather should ,J say, danced all the way to Svoradov. The fraternity was another joyous scene. I still remember vividly how we embraced Colman Murgas in the refectory, his eyes streaming with tears. I was so excited that 1 could hardly eat. Like so many others, l had lost my appetite for food. Like them, I was satiated with joy. The Slovaks proclaimed their country an independent Republic on March 14, 1939. • • • SLOVAK NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM B. S. BUC, Ph.D. 1. The Nation of Emigrants Slovak nationalism cannot be considered as the outgrowth of the Central European soil and the pure product of political forces of that sector. It was steadily developing under many outside influences which penetrated that sector either in the form of new ideas or in the form of outside political and economic interests. Moreover, in the period of the greatest oppression, the real shaping of the Slovak national will for survival was occuring outside Slovakia, among emigrants. About one third of the present Slovak population lives outside Slovakia as emigrants in various sectors of the world. That makes Slovaks truly a nation of emigrants. They were forced to emigrate either for economic or political reasons. Slovakia is a mountainous country with forests covering 40 % of the land. Moreover, prior to 1918, a substantial part of Slovak land was owned by the Magyar or foreign aristocracy, so that Slovaks had little opportunity to make living from agriculture. Temporary or permanent emigration became, therefore the only solution to the economic problem for many children of Slovak farmers. When they � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 24 SLOVAKIA THE STIRRING DAYS OF MARCH 1939 Dr. Joseph Pauco I lived at the Svoradov. On March 10, 1939, at about three in the morning, my friends awakened and told me that Czech soldiers had occupied the city of Trencin and that entire regiments of the Czech army were pouring through Malacky. The vanguards, they said, were already supposed to be in Bratislava. It was not easy to believe this report, because at that time a lot of rumors were in the wind. After a time, I stretched out on the bed and soon fell asleep again. My alarm-clock roused me at 5:30 A. M., when I had to get up to be on time at the editorial office of the Slovenska Pravda. I usually took a bus that stopped in front of the Svoradov. But this morning there seemed to be no bus operating from this point. That March morning was really chilly. After some time, I decided not to wait for a bus, so I started out on foot. The streets were quiet. In front of the district administra tion building I came upon a guard who was stepping lively. iHe cast his keen eye upon me searchingly for a moment and then went about his business of stepping lively again. I did not even wait for the streetcar near the church of the Holy Trinity. As I walked by the main post-office, I noticed that it was guarded by six soldiers and four policemen. All were heavily armed. "My friends at the Svoradov may have been right", flashed through my mind. Bratislava was full of espionage agents. Some may have been caught, while others were about to be taken in. From that point to the office I came across no one else that might strike my attention. I arrived at the office on schedule. At 6:115 A. M. I was on the third floor of the gigantic printing enterprise of the SLOVAK and the SLOVENS KA PR.AIVDA, the Andrej Building, on King Alexander street. Several minutes later, the entire editorial office of the daily Slovenska Pravda bristled with activity. In the office SLOVAKIA 25 with me were Dr. Aladar Kocis, editor-in-chief, Celo Radvanyi, and Joseph 1P etro. We had no foreboding about what was to happen. Even after l told my colleagues what I had heard at the Svoradov that morning, they thought nothing of it. We applied ourselves to our tasks. That morning I was to write the leading editorial about the discussions taking place in Prague. Minister Karol Sidor was the ,Slovak representative in these discussions. My article was to be based on the reports supplied by the Slovak Press Bureau. The reports brought nothing new. I was then convinced that the discussions would be meaningless. And I meant to tell our readers just that. Well, it so happened that I wrote nothing that morning. Neither did my colleagues. Before I could strike a sentence on paper, the doors of my office flew open and a Czech major, with revolver in hand and accompanied by two bayonet-toting gendarmes, rushed at me. The major announced in a loud Czech voice : "In the name of the new Slovak Government I am stopping all work in this building and taking it over!" With that all four of us were taken to Dr. Kocis's office. We were all stunned. We did not know who the major and his companions were. The major and the gendarmes appeared to be a bit queer. But we could say nothing. The major ordered the gendarmes to cut all telephone wires. This they did speedily. In the hallway, they came upon the janitress and our secretary, Mrs. Noskay; both were detained in a separate room of the building. The major forbade us to look out the windows. A short time later he left us, ordering the gendarmes to keep an eye on us. After a time we asked the gendarmes what was going on, why they came to Bratislava, and who ordered them here. But they were not talking. They simply complained that they were tired and hungry. Several minutes later the Czech major brought in the editor-in-chief of the Slovenska Politika, Augustine Nacin. The major barked again that we were not to go near the windows : "iKeep at least six feet away!" When he left us again, however, we managed to get a few peeps in on the street below. It was full of people talking loudly and gesticulating wildly. There we spied two of our colleagues, Jo-- 26 SLOVAKIA seph Nizii.ansky and John Hrusovsky. They were looking up at our window quizzingly. Hrusovsky with his cane, switching his pipe rhythmically from one end of his mouth to the other. We waved to them from the window and one of my colleagues tapped on the window. It was precisely at this moment of tapping on the window that the Cech major burst again into the room. "Vo that again," he raved menacingly, "and I begin to shoot!" Well, we did not want to argue with him. We pulled away from the windows and- waited quietely for developments. About 9 :00 A. M. the Czech major paid us another visit, this time with a piece of paper in his hand. He read our names off the paper to identify us. Then, ordering Celo Radvanyi to remain in the room, he led the rest of us down the stairs. Armed guards in military and police uniforms were all over the place. At the main entrance to the building three soldiers manned a machine-gun aimed at the main portal. The major halted us at the main entrance, pulled out his revolver and, holding it over our heads, let us out into the street one at a time. People gaped at us, but nobody spoke to us. We looked about for familiar faces, but in vain. We still did not know exactly what was happening. On the corner of the National Bank we separated with the understanding that we would return in an hour to see whether we could get to work again. I then walked briskly to the Svoradov. When I arrived there things were pretty lively. One of my friends to-Id me that about the same time the Czech army took over the Andrej Building, detectives and policemen came to Svoradov to arrest Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum. This, however, was easier said than done, because the academicians of the Svoradov were determined to have a say in the matter. They forced the unwanted guests out of the building. We were about to call a mass meeting of all the inmates of Svoradov, when one of our boys announced that a bus pulled in with a load of armed guards. Immediately we locked all entrances to the building. Moments later army tanks thundered on the premises and SLOVAKIA 27 Svoradov was quickly surrounded by heavily armed soldiers and policemen. They banged on all entrances, ordering the academicians to let them in. But nobody was willing to listen to Czech orders. Windows were opened on the upper floors of Svoradov and the students soon began shouting and ridiculing the invaders. "If there is to be a circus," one academician shouted, "why not sell admission tickets?" Others got their cameras and took pictures of our "so closely related" brethren, the Czechs, who came to the Svoradov boarding home with tanks and guns to prove their friendship for the Slovaks. The university courtyard of old Svoradov was called Alcazar. It so happened that six gendarmes got into the courtyard one way or another and were soon surrounded by quite a number of students, who were determined to keep them out of the building. Angry words were exchanged for a time. Dr. Kirschbaum, several others, and I, working on a plan of action, could hear them on the second floor. I was sent out to learn what was happening in the courtyard. Plowing through the mass of students, I faced the gendarmes and inquired where they came from, what they wanted or were looking for here, and who permitted them to violate private property rights. All looked very sheepishly at me and a bit flustered by my audacity. Finally, one of the gendarmes said: "We are looking for one Mr. Kristbaum." "Kristbaum ?" - I queried - "why there is no Kristbaum and we never heard of any Kristbaum !" I then reminded the gendarmes that they were on academic ground and that the mana,gement and students demanded that they leave the premises willingly at once. The gendarmes hesitated momentarily, then pointed their guns at us. When the students pushed closer to them, however, they put their guns down. Greatly outnumbered, they decided to leave the premises, the students accompanying them to the steet. After locking the door, several academicians visited the wine-shop in the cellar of the building and reminded the lessee to have more regard for the Slovaks. It was through this place the gendarmes got into the courtyard of Svoradov. 28 SLOVAKIA A half-hour later the Czech army and gendarmerie pulled away from Svoradov. It was then we called our colleagues of the Lafranconi. After joining us, the entire mass of students paraded in three columns in the streets of Bratislava, loudly singing songs to the wild applause of shoppers and inhabitants. As the paraders approached the government building on the Vajansky coast or bank, they were joined by masses of the population who, too, wanted to demonstrate against the Czech occupation of Slovakia, and particularly the city of Bratislava. The Slovak academicians had fired the Slovak masses with enthusiasm and determination to stand up for right and justice, the sacred cause of freedom and independence, which had been violated by Prague. The Czechs had blundered again, and blundered terribly. The chasm between the Czechs and the Slovaks widened. After twenty years of the Masaryk and Benes brand of democracy, the 1S lovaks and the Czechs were never before so far apart. The occupation of Slovakia by the Czechs was the straw that broke the camel's back. The Slovaks will never willingly join the Czechs in any venture. Czecho-Slovakia still exists, but only on paper. The Slovaks are kept in line only by force and violence. The Czechs sowed the wind and reaped a whirlwind. They have not a single true friend in Europe today. In the meantime, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum had gone to the residence of Premier Dr. Joseph Tiso, the home of the Jesuits, where he pledged the loyalty of all Slovak students. As soon as he returned, he told us in front of the Slovak National Theater on the Hviezdoslav Square: "Dr. Joseph Tiso was saying his breviary. To the Slovak youth he sends this message: Carry on in a manner that you may not harm yourselves and that the world might see that we are not afraid of the bayonets and machineguns of any occupation army." There were parades and demostrations in Bratislava before March 10, 1939. And there many were after that. But the demonstration of the Slovak students on March 10, 1939, was undoubtedly the most spontaneous and greatest of all of them. The demonstrations were organized by the Club of Hlinka Academicians which was headed by Dr. Jo- SLOVAKIA 29 seph Kirschbaum. The leaders of the academicians were everywhere when Bratislava needed help. They were in government buildings, editorial offices, and did jobs that were dangerous. Several ,w ere scared off by events that followed, while hundreds were jailed. Of those who managed to escape from their homeland after it was occupied by the Czech and the Red Armies in 1945, I might mention at least Dr. Joseph Mikula and Dr. Gabriel Danihel in addition to Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum. They rendered valuable services at that time, services which served Slovak politicians in good stead a few hours after the events of March 10th had been initiated. Bratislava, the capital city of Slovakia, was on its feet from the 10th to the 14th of March, 1939. Several tragic events occured. The Czech army and gendarmery took recourse to arms. The Hlinka Guards of the area repulsed the occupation of the Trade Building. A volley of shots rang out. Anthony Kopal, 27-year old laborer of Vel'ke Uherce, was hit fatally and died a short time later in the Bratislava State Hospital. The first victim of the Czech March 10th putsch. That evening, 58-year old Mary Psota was shot dead as she was closing her tobacco shop which was located opposite the District Court Building. Czech soldiers, firing from the building, were responsible for her death. The Czechs had occupied the broadcasting station in Bratislava. The Slovak Hlinka Guards fought for it all day on March 10 and did get possession of it at 10 :30 that night. It was then that Premier Karol Sidor spoke over the air. Up to that time the whole Slovakia was in confusion. Cities and towns were taken by the Czechs after General Homola announced over the air and with placards that he was taking over all political, military, judicial powers in Slovakia in the name of the Prague Government. Slovak army officers and police were disarmed and placed under guard; about 500 civic leaders were imprisoned and later taken to a jail in Moravia where they were held three days. Minister Matthew Cernak was among them. In the meantime, reports were pouring in from all parts of Slovakia, particularly from the cities and towns 30 SLOVAKIA which told of the brutalities committed by the Czech occupation forces. The situation was very grave. If the 'Slovaks would have had access to weapons, there undoubtedly would have been very much blood shed on March 10th in the fight against the Czech occupants. There were indications of this especially in Trencin, Nitra, Spisska Nova Ves, and Banska Stiavnica. The atrocities committed by the "brotherly" Czechs on March 10th shall never be forgotten by the Slovaks. What happened in those days was governed by the international situation. Adolph Hitler had decided to liquidate Czecho...:Slovakia. His decision and its consequences are already recorded by history. But during those three hectic March days, the 'Slovaks were convinced that, if an unexpected turn in events did not take place - which even the majority of the foremost Slovak politicians could not foresee - the Czechs would have continued to occupy Slovakia with their army. Little wonder then that the Slovaks in these days were bitter and proclaimed: Never again with the Czechs! March 14, 1939, arrived. A glorious day for the Slovaks, nowithstanding anything that anti-Slovak ~lements say about it to the contrary! The 'Slovaks knew only the simple facts of that historical event. First, Karol Sidor was called to Berlin. He did not go. Then the Germans called Tiso, not once but twice. But he, too, was reluctant to accept the invitation. When a third invitation was delivered to him by German representatives in person, Dr. Tiso deliberated with the presidium of the Slovak People's Party. The latter decided that Dr. Tiso should accept the invitation, so Tiso flew to Berlin. On Tuesday morning, March 14, before we could form ranks in Svoradov, somebody brought in a report that Hitler had requested iDr. Tiso to proclaim the independence of Slovakia directly from Berlin. But Tiso did not broadcast anything from Berlin. We were lined up to march to the Parliament Building to learn what the Slovak legislators had in mind. Furthermore, we wanted to be on hand in case the Czechs would again attempt to take over that building. It was a cold March morning. Rolling clouds overhead, SLOVAKIA 31 snow clouds. The lively march of the academicians caught the attention of the inhabitants and warmed their hearts. They had little sleep the past three days, but there they were again on the streets waving banners and flags, shouting joyous acclaim to the Slovak Government and the academicians and demanding that the "Czechs get out of Slovakia". ; Our hearts were warm and we broke into song. Finally, we arrived at our destination and waited patiently. Then, as we broke into song again, we were joined by the academicians of Lafranconi and thousands of people. Soon the square was a mass of people. The banner of the Slovak Catholic Student Federation fluttered in the breeze over our heads. What we had gone through the past three days was like a motion picture. Then we had to make way for oncoming autos. In the first we saw temporary Premier Karol Sidor; in the second, Dr. Joseph Tiso. Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum greeted Karol Sidor and I greeted Dr. Joseph Tiso in the name of the student body. Without delay the Slovak parliament was in session. We still did not know definitely what was about to happen. Our representative, Dr. Kirschbaum, also went into the Parliament Building. After a time, he came out briefly to tell us that a very serious matter was being discussed. After he left us, he came out again shortly thereafter to inform us that the Parliament of autonomous Slovakia had decided to proclaim the independence of Slovakia. This happened at precisely seven minutes and twelve seconds after twelve o'clock noon. Bratislava streets burst out with joyous acclaim. Alexander Mach and Dr. Kirschbaum rushed to an auto and sped to the broadcasting station. First Mach made a brief broadcast and then Dr. Kirschbaum spoke in the name of Slovak youth. They told of the historical event that had taken place. As soon as the cities and towns heard the broadcast, bells began to peel in all the churches of Slovakia. The Fourth of July had arrived for the Slovaks on March 14, 1939. All offices and schools were quickly closed for the rest of the day. The Slovaks prayed and sang with joy as never before. 32 SLOVAKIA Bratislava streets rang out with song for quite a time. We embraced each other and danced. Then we marched, or rather should ,J say, danced all the way to Svoradov. The fraternity was another joyous scene. I still remember vividly how we embraced Colman Murgas in the refectory, his eyes streaming with tears. I was so excited that 1 could hardly eat. Like so many others, l had lost my appetite for food. Like them, I was satiated with joy. The Slovaks proclaimed their country an independent Republic on March 14, 1939. • • • SLOVAK NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM B. S. BUC, Ph.D. 1. The Nation of Emigrants Slovak nationalism cannot be considered as the outgrowth of the Central European soil and the pure product of political forces of that sector. It was steadily developing under many outside influences which penetrated that sector either in the form of new ideas or in the form of outside political and economic interests. Moreover, in the period of the greatest oppression, the real shaping of the Slovak national will for survival was occuring outside Slovakia, among emigrants. About one third of the present Slovak population lives outside Slovakia as emigrants in various sectors of the world. That makes Slovaks truly a nation of emigrants. They were forced to emigrate either for economic or political reasons. Slovakia is a mountainous country with forests covering 40 % of the land. Moreover, prior to 1918, a substantial part of Slovak land was owned by the Magyar or foreign aristocracy, so that Slovaks had little opportunity to make living from agriculture. Temporary or permanent emigration became, therefore the only solution to the economic problem for many children of Slovak farmers. When they  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Stirring Days of March 1939 Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Paučo Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959 pp. 24-32 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/44dea4db73a2cba7053fc15fdcff2cab.pdf 18d19ff1faa43e1fbf52876c80522a5e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up �8 SLOVAKIA military installations in a zone bounded on the west by the frontier of the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians and the eastern edge of Javorniky, and to man these installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider necessary ... Military sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechts) will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht (in this zone)" (3) . The establishment of this zone ( 4) represents in many respects an interesting aspect of Slovak-German relations. It casts a favorable light on a well-conceived but less successful attempt to extricate Slovak foreign policy from the agreed upon Slovak-German coordination in this field. This praiseworthy attempt and the subsequent unyielding behavior of Slovak politicians in the face of Hitler's demands contrast sharply with the charges of vassalage and servile obedience. In fact, the Slovaks resisted and contradicted Hitler's wishes (and with some success, too ) when powerful nations yielded and were advising others to yield. The negotiations concerning the zone were initiated on the night of March 17-18, 1939, in Vienna. At this time the occupation of Western Slovakia was already an accomplished fact (5) and - since possession is nine points of the law - the position of the ISlovak negotiators was noticeably weakened and by no means enviable. Nevertheless Dr. Joseph Tiso, Durcansky, Tuka, and Mach, the principal Slovak representatives, were determined to save could be saved. Preliminary negotiations started at Biirckel's flat at 5 p. m. Afterwards the Slovaks met SeyssInquart, then Keitel, and finally, at 1 a . m., on the 18th, in the Hotel Imperial they faced Hitler. Each stop represented more humiliation and more pressing demands and brought home one thing: Hitler was going to exact a high price for his protection ; much higher than he ever hinted at in Berlin on March 13th. Tiso was so disappointed at what he rightly considered - being let down that h e wanted to return to Bratislava without even seeing Hitler. Only his companions persuaded him to stay, arguing that in front of the Germans they all ought to show a united �SLOVAKIA 9 determination not to give up even an inch of sacred Slovak soil (6). When Hitler, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Keitel, met the Slovaks, he told them - according to the testimony of Tiso - that the 'Shutzvertrag' could be realized only if Germany were given far-reaching concessions to build up a zone in Western Slovakia. The extent of these concessions - as Tiso clearly saw - left the Slovaks practically without any rights to exercise their sovereignty in that territory. It was more than he could bear. At 2 :45 A. M. he got up and was at the point of departure. Hitler, it must be said, in spite of his many shortcommings had a soft spot for the Slovaks and, apparently moved by the pathetic sight of the hardpressed protegees, stopped Tiso with a very assuring piece of oratory. He said: "I do not want even an inch of Slovak ground. In Slovakia the Slovaks alone will develop their own national, cultural, and economic life. I shall guarantee the full independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia. The historical frontiers of Slovakia are and remain forever unchanged. I shall hold my protective hand over ,S lovakia and nobody will reach with stealthy hand for the Slovak State, where the Slovaks will live their own full life" (7). This rhetorical outburst pacified the Slovaks; the rest of the discussion was carried on in a much happier mood. The Slovaks ceded the Germans the right to build and man fortifications in the zone "so as to enable the German Wehrmacht, in the event of war, to take up such positions as are most advantageous to it" (8). The Slovak delegation left Vienna with the impression that the zone remained within the legal structure of the Slovak State. No treaty was formulated or signed that night. Formal negotiations were conducted on the afternoon of March 18. Tiso did not take part in these conversations. The Slovaks were represented by Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Tuka a Zvrskovec; the Germans by Keppler and Gaus, the legal adviser to the Foreign Minister. The Treaty of Protection ( Schutzvertrag) was signed in Vienna the same day by :Durcansky and Tuka who also pledged to obtain Tiso's signature to the Treaty by noon of March 19, in re-1 �10 SLOVAKIA turn for which Keppl er undert ook to get Ribbe ntrop's signature within 24 hours. :Durcansky, Tuka, and Veesenmayer broug ht the Treaty to Tiso for signat ure the evening March 18; he signed it and appear ed to be satisfi ed · with its formu lation (9). Ribben trop, on the other hand, did not sign the Treaty within the stipula ted time limit. All in all, the Germa ns were in no partic ular hurry with respec t to the Slovaks. The reason for their procra stinati on, which was so frustra ting and inexpl icable to the Slovak s then (10), is seen clearly now: they hoped to come to terms with the Poles and Hunga rians. The Polish White Book gives an accoun t of Ribbentrop's propos als to Lipski on March 21 (11), namely , that German-lPolish discus sions "would be possib le on this subject" (i. e., on the questi on of Slovak ia). But the Germa ns must have consid ered the Polish attitud e discou raging , and Ribbe ntrop put his signat ure on the Treaty on -March 23, in Berlin (12), but not before Article 3 of the Treaty was modifi ed and the words "in order to defend Slovak State agains t any possib le extern al attack s" were omitte d. Once the Treaty was signed, the execut ion of Article 2 proved to be more difficu lt than anticip ated. Appar ently the Germa n milita ry author ities were not very happy with what, after all, was a politic al settlem ent. Their behavi or left much to be desire d and Slovak protes ts were very soon pourin g in. At first, the surpri sed Slovak s asked for an explan ation, but later protes ted very vigorio usly. On March 25, the .Slovak Foreig n ·M inistry in a 'note verbal e" called for a more definit e determ ination of the probable durati on and charac ter in intern ationa l law of the Germa n occupa tion of Slovak territo ry. The note also protested a•g ainst the exerci se of sovere ign rights "beyon d those of milita ry necess ity" and agains t the remov al of milita ry materi al which - they claime d - by the secess ion of Slovak ia, had leg-ally become Slovak 'State proper ty (13). It was inevita ble that the occupa tion would cause considera ble frictio n betwee n the Slovak popula tion and the Germa n troops , and that this frictio n would projec t unfavora bly into Slovak -Germ an relatio ns. But the amoun t �SLOVAKIA 11 of misunderstanding surpassed every expectation. The Slovaks in their optimistic enthusiasm were determined to enjoy their newly-gained independence to the fullest extent and consequently found the German presence in the zone very annoying and did not even try to hide their displeasure. The Germans, on the other hand, especially the military, did not bother to adjust their behavior in respect to the Slovaks. An ordinary German soldier and officer, fresh from victorious entries into Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia, was hardly expected to be less arrogant towards Slovaks than he was towards Czechs; superiority was after all the essential part of his make-up. There were many instances of discontent, misunderstanding, and small incidents, and their existence could be best gauged by the frequent apologies and assurances which the 'Slovak Press Bureau was issuing in the newspapers and on the air. Under pressure of Slovak protests and complaints, the German representatives of General Staff and Foreign Ministry, at a meeting on March 28, agreed on a unified attitude towards the question of the zone. Their conclusions, though still by no means modest, represent in many respects retreat in the face of the Slovak protests, and can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. Withdrawal of the German Custom Frontier Protection Force to the Slovak-Moravian frontier. 2. The Vah fixed as the line of military occupation. 3. Appointment of a staff officer to the Consul General to act as liaison between the Slovak Army and the Wehrmacht. 4. The German troops east of the Vah to be recalled. 5. German claim to the entire war material of the former Czecho~Slovak army. 6. No removal of war material east of the occupied zone. 7. Decision as to size of the Slovak army. 8. Creation of s e p a r ate military formation for the Volksdeutche (14). Negotiations on the above topics took place on April 4 and were reported by Pares. Unfortunately no details concerning conversations are available, but it is known that �12 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were represented by Dr. Tiso and the Ministers of War, Finance, and Economics, and the chief subject was the removal of war material "purchased by the German Government from the Czecho-!S lovak Government which had been stored in Slovakia" (15). As a result of these conversations, in addition to a German military adviser to be sent to Bratislava, a mixed Slovak-German commission was to be appointed to settle any controversial issue. At about the same time Tuka in his broadcast promised that the German army would leave when it was no longer needed. On April 15, the High Command of the Wehrmacht submitted a list of requirements, the fulfilment of which was expected from the Slovak Government under the Treaty of Protection. The demands, even in their "more lenient" form, were very exacting: 1. The High Command intended to maintain its military forces east of the Vah until the removal of "Czech arms and Czech war material" was completed. 2. Among the sovereign rights they claimed the right to occupy military and also public and private buildings, to use all forms and means of transport, to have at their disposal the factories concerned with war economy, duty-free import and export, postal services, telecommunications and Intelligence Service (Abwehrdienst). 3. The zone to include also Trencin, Krupa, Zilina, and Povazska Bystrica. 4. The size of Slovak army to be completed at one per cent of the population. 5. No units of the Slovak army to be garrisoned within the zone, but para-military formations (Hlinka Guards) to be allowed. 6. Export and import of war material to and from Slovakia to be refused or permitted by the Slovak Government only in agreement with the Reich Government or the High Command of the Wehrmacht (16). When these requirements were communicated by Druffel to Tiso, the latter declared that the Slovak Government did not wish to make difficulties, but asked for discussions with the German authorities on the highest level before �SLOVAKIA 13 making any definite commitments. The Germans consented and, as a result, a conference took place in Berlin on April 19. Slovak representatives included Tiso, :Durcansky, and Tuka, the Ministry of Defense was represented by Catlos and Schneider, and also present were Cernak and Szathmary from the Slovak Legation in Berlin. The German delegation consisted of top-ranking experts, both political and military, but conspicious by their absence were the policy making personalities of the Reich. Its members were: Weissacker, Keppler, Wormann, Gaus, Altenburg, Tippelskirsch, HeydenRynsch, and Becker. Slovak grievances were numerous. To start with, Tiso mentioned the occupation by German troops of the aerodrome of Malacky and the demand by a German armored formation for transit through Bratislava. Then he complained of the severity of the demands of the German Wehrmacht, stating that "extension of the zone to Trencin and Zilina was hardly bearable for the Slovak Government"; of the behaviour of the German troops who in some villages occupied schools and thus made school attendance impossible, and employed Czech workers in preference to Slovaks. Furthermore, he claimed a share in the ownership of the former Czecho-Slovak arms factories and clamored for the return of a number of aircraft. German answers were either non-commital or asked to extend negotiations to clarify the application of the Treaty. Apparently the Slovaks demanded more than the German representatives were empowered to grant. Meanwhile the joint Slovak~German Commission was negotiating the treaty on the Zone of Protection but it did not seem to make any noticeable progress. On June 12, the Slovaks submitted another "note verbale'' which contained a number of Slovak views on the interpretation of the text of the Treaty. Arguments advanced by Slovaks were discussed at the conference on June 19 (17), where Tiso expressed the wish to draw up a memorandum and to discuss it personally with Hitler in hopeful expectation that the Slovaks might get more favorable treatment at the hands of the Fuhrer, than they were getting from his representatives. Hitler, however, declined to see Tiso and refused to consider the various points of the Slovak memorandum. �14 SLOVAKIA On June 21 this memorandum, in the form of an "aide memoire", was submitted to the German Foreign Ministry (18). It represented a voluminous list of complaints and expressed an outburst of accumulated Slovak indi,gnation about the German injustices. It questioned German rights to exclude Slovak garrisons from the zonal area, the interpretation of "sovereign rights", and claimed as Slovak the former Cecho..!Slovak military installations which were taken over by the Wehnnacht (such as the artillery range at Malacky); furthermore, it also questioned the wisdom of maintaining German ,garrisons outside the zone (e. g., in .Zilina, Trencin, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn) and criticised excursions of German troops to Bratislava and other places outside the zone. With regard to military material, the Slovak memorandum complained about the removal of war material from Pezinok, Modra, Malacky, Plavecke Podhradie, Hlboke, Turecky Vrch, Senica, Nemcova, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn, Trencin, Istebnik, Skalka, and .Zilina in a manner which "transgressed the bounds of an amicable atmosphere". Furthermore, it objected to occupation of munition factories and factories producing various types of war material at Dubnica, Povazska IBystrica, Stara Tura, Myjava, and .Zilina; to taking over of the stocks and installations of the airports at Novy Dvor and .Zilina; and it sadly commented that proceedings connected with the removal of war material were often conducted "as though Slovakia were an enemy country and not a State whose political and territorial independence had been guaranted by the Flihrer and Chancellor". The memorandum concluded a few more grievances against the military authorities whose attitude caused "administrative and economic uncertainty". The matter was then brought to Hitler's attention. This is evident from a statement made by Keitel on June 20, according to which Hitler's decision on the subject at the conference held by him amounted to the following: "The Flihrer said that he wished the negotiations to be conducted energetically and resolutely which, together with our concrete offers, must lead to early success. The prerequisite for the proposed support of Slovakia is the complete accep- �SLOVAKIA 15 tance of our demeands, the more so as Slovakia is dependent on our military, economic, and financial aid." This authoritative pronouncement meant that all the subsequent attempts of the ,Slovaks for better terms encountered the adamant attitude of the German authorities. Thus, when, on June 22, the Slovak Minister in 'Berlin (Matus Cernak) saw Wormann at the German Foreign Ministry, he was brusquely told that the Germans disagreed with the Slovak Foreign Ministry's attempts to establish inconsistencies between the demands of the German Military Delegation and the assurances given by leading German statesmen regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Protection. He was asked to make it clear in Bratislava that "the Military Delegation was among these demands in the name of the German Government". Cernak sugested that concessions be made by both parties and thought that this would make it possible to reach an agreement which would "not only maintain, but arouse sympathy for Germany" among the Slovak poulation. But Wormann had little understanding for the Slovak point of view and berated the Slovaks because several of the demands expressed in the memorandum of June 19 were in contradiction to the Treaty of Protection (19). On July 3, Cernak again called on the German Foreign Ministry, where he saw Weizsa.cker. He pleaded with him for moderation of the German demands, arguing that "Tiso's ... pro-German policy would be shaken, if it were not supported. In case of emergency, Slovakia would, of course, be completely at the disposal of German Armed Forces, but in peace-time one ought to remain within the scope of the terms of the Treaty. But again Cerna.k's arguments were of no avail and were, one by one, refuted by Weizsa.cker. Faced with such an uncooperative attitude, Cernak asked to be allowed to speak to Ribbentrop personally, but was told that the Foreign Minister was not available (20). The Slovaks, ignorant of Hitler's decision and trusting in his words with hopeful optimism, left no stone unturned in their attempts to secure more favorable terms. Their representatives were untiring in demanding interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop who, as the chief architects of the 1 �16 SLOVAKIA Slovak-German Treaty, could be made, they thought, to stand up to their promises. In this, however, they wer e unsuccessful. But they could get only to Weizsacker; and he, after trying to persuade them that the German negotiators "were acting on the instructions issued to them by the authoritative persons in the Reich", admonished the Slovaks that they should look at them as such and "conduct themselves accordingly" (21). As time went by, the Germans were getting progressively more and more anxious to have the whole issue about the interpretation of the Treaty finally settled and were apparently annoyed by the delay caused by the stubborness of the Slovaks. In view of the approaching German~olish conflict it was paramont for them to have their stand in Slovakia precisely determined and legalized. Their activity (often on the verge of nervousness) was in sharp contrast with the patient and determined attitude of the Slovaks who were unwilling to retreat. The situation was provided with a real touch of comedy when the Slovak statesmen went on their summer holidays (Tiso left for Topofcianky, Durcansky for the High Tatras) while German couriers were flying between and Bratislava. On July 19, Druffel was shown a report from Cernak according to which Eisenlohr and Weizsacker had expressed themselves in favour of token Slovak garrisons in the protected zone. On the strength of this report, Durcansky urged Catlos to dispatch some troops into the zone. On July 2:1, Catlos ordered one batallion to move in and, at the same time, informed the German military mission of his action. From the Germans came a vehement protest, coupled with threats, and the order was recalled. This move displeased Durcansky immensely. He maintained that Catlos should have created a "fait accompli" without regard for the German military mission and their feelings. The argument went so far that Catlos threatened to resign (22). Whether Catlos's action was right or wrong is open to question. It may be recalled, however, that at that time, the German military authorities were resolutely against ·any Slovak troops in that zone, and the same view was shared by Hitler. �SLOVAKIA 17 On July 17, the German Foreign Ministry sent to their representative in Bratislava a letter of instructions with an enclosed draft of the Treaty on the Zone of Protection (23). With this draft as a basis, new negotiations ensued. Unfortunately no records were found concerning their course. From the report of tH. Bernard (new German Minister to Slovakia who replaced Druffel), we learn that they were concluded by July 31 and the Slovak representatives (again, we do not know, who they were; Tuka was probably one of them; Tiso and :Durcansky were vacationing) accepted the draft of the treaty with small amendments (24). Barckhausen then took this modified version of the Treaty to Berlin and, on August 7, brought it to Bratislava to Tuka, who then forwarded it to Tiso and :Durcansky (on their vacation) with a request for their approval (25 ). But the Treaty in its new form did not appeal either to Tiso or :Durcansky. Rejecting various points of the draft, they again upset the German applecart. On August 10, a new series of discussions was initiated, this time with :Durcansky present. These discussions finally brought concrete results. On Saturday evening, August 12, 1939, the Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed at Bratislava by Minister Bernard and Lt. General Barckhausen on behalf of the German Reich, and by the Slovak Premier Tiso. The Treaty consisted of four Sections. Section I delimitated its extent. ,S ection II defined military sovereign rights of the German Wehrmacht and the sovereign rights of the Slovak State; German military sovereign rights included the right to requisition public and private premises, to use all means and lines of transportation, and to supervise armament factories working for the Reich; Germany was also given jurisdiction over her nationals; this Section also provided for Slovak garrisions within the zone. Section 1',III laid down rules regarding the employment of the personnel and material in, and on the payment for, the construction of fortifications. Section IV contained provisions for settlement of differences arising from the application of the Treaty. 1 �SLOVAKIA: 16 Verbatim German Text of Treaty (.From Photostat) Abschrift. Schutzzonenvert rag Zur Regelung der sich aus dem Schutzvertrage vom 18./23. Marz 1939 ergebenden Fragen ist zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Slowakischen Republik durch die unterzeichneten Bevollmachtigten beider Regierungen folgendes vereinbart worden. Abschnitt I): Abgrenzung der Schutzzone. Artikel 1: Die Ausdehnung der in Artikel 2 des deutsch-slowakis chen Vertrages vom 18./ 23. Marz 1939 genannten Zone in folgendem mit ''Schutzzone" bezeichnet - ergibt sich aus der diesem Vertrage als Bestandteil angehefteten Landkarte in Masstabe 1: 7·5,000. Die Schutzzone erstreckt sich von Westen her bis zu der dieser Landkarte eingezeichneten roten Linie, und sie schliesst den von dieser Linie bedecken Tei! des slowakischen Gebietes ein. Eine Bez·e ichnung der ostwartigen Schutzzonenbeg renzungslinie im Gelande durch Tafeln oder Grenzsteine erfolgt nicht. lnnerhalb dieser Schutzzone wird das Deutsche Reich die ihm im Schutzvertrage vom 18-/ 23. Marz 1939 von dem Slowakischen Staat iibertragenen Aufgaben nach Massgabe der Bestimmungen dieses Vertrages durchfiihren. Abschnitt II): Rechtsverhaltni sse in der Schutzzone. Artikel 2: Mit den militarischen IHoheitsrechten, deren Ausiibung der deutschen Wehrmacht in Arti~el 2 des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz iibertragen worden ist, hat sie das Recht erhalten, im Sinne der fiir die Verteidigung des Slowakischen Staates im allgemeinen bestehenden Gesetze Leistungen im gleichen Masse wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in lFriedenszeiten zu fordern (ohne die ,B estimmungen, die in dem slowakischen Gesetz Nr. 131/36 enthalten sind). Bei Aufwendungen, die iiber den Rahmen normaler Manciverleistung en auch zeitlich hinausgehen, sind die hierfiir zu zahlenden Entschadigungen nach den ortsiiblichen Tagespreisen zu bemessen. Die deutsche Wehrmacht haftet fiir Schaden in gleichem Ausmass wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in tlbungszeiten. Demzufolge hat die deutsche Wehrmacht insbesondere folgende Rechte: a) (Das Recht, jederzeit in der Schutzzone militarische Anlagen zu errichten und im 'Benehmen mit den slowakischen Behcirden tiffentliche Gebaude, Grundstiicke and Anlagen fiir militarische Zwecke in Anspruch zu nehmen und private Gebaude und Grundstiicke in Benutzun_ zu nehmen, ohne die Durchfiihrung des Enteignungsverfahrens oder des Verfahrens zur voriibergehende n Entziehung der Benutzung abzuwarten, jedoch unbeschadet ,e iner spateren Regelung der Entschadigung. Die Entschadigung wird unter Mitwirkun,g deutscher Beauftragter im Wege giitlicher Verhandlun,gen mit den Betroffenen festigesetzt. IKommt eine giitliche Eintgung nicht zustande, so bleibt es den Betroffenen vorbehalten, die Festsetzung der Entschadig-ung nach den slowakischen Gesetzen zu betragen. In diesem Falle bleibt im �SLOVAKIA 19 Verhaltnis zu dem Deutschen Reich die Hohe der Entschadigung einer Vereinbarung mit der Slowakischen Regierung vorbehalten. b) Das Recht zur Benutzung der in der Schutzzone vorhanden,en Transportmittel und Transportwege unter moglichster Berucksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Jnteressen der Slowakischen Republik. Ausserdem kann bei Vorliegen besonderer militarischer Notwendigkeiten die Bahn Pressburg-Ty,r nau-Pistyan-Trencin'8 illeinJCadca und die Strassen Pressburg-Modern-Na das-Trencin and Pressburg-Tyrnau-Pis tyan-Trencin,Sillein>C adca, von Trencin aus bis Cadca auch auf dem ostwartigen Waag-und Kysucaufer benutzt werden. Ferner erhalt die deutsche Wehrmacht das Recht, alle Orte zwischen Pressburg (ausschliesslich) and Cadca an den oben genannten Strassen bei Vorliegen militarischer Griinde vorubergehend zur Einquartierung zu benutzen. Die Slowakische Regierung ist hiervon in Kenntnis zu setzen. Die Benutzung der Eisenbahnlinien wird durch Sondertarifabmachun gen geregelt. Bei der Benutzung anderer slowakischer Verkehrsmittel sind die ortsiiblichen Tarifsatze zu zahlen, wenn nicht im Wege der Vereinbarung ein anderweitiger Entgelt fur die Benutzung festgesetzt wird. c) Das Recht, Riistungsbetriebe, die Auftrage vom Deutschen Reich erhalten, zu beaufsichtigen und auszunutzen unter BeriicksichUgung der Bediirfnisse der slowakischen Wehrmacht. Hieriiber wird eine besondere Vereinbarung zwischen den zustandigen Stellen der Deutschen Regierung und der Regierung des Slowakischen iStaates abgeschlossen werden. d) iDas Recht, in der Schutzzone alle erforderlichen Massnahmen des militarischen Abwehrdienstes zu treffen und von den Behorden des Slowakischen Staates die Anordnung und Durchfiihrung aller hierfiir erforderlichen Exekutivmassnahmen zu verlangen. !Die Deutsche Wehrmacht hat das !Recht, gegeniiber deutschen Wehrmachtangehori<g en und den fiir Wehrmachtzwecke in der Schutzzone tatigen reichsdeutschen Beamten, An-gestellten und Arbeitern deutsche militarische Exekutivorgane einzusetzen. Diese diirfen ,g egentiber Personen, die nicht die Staatsangehorigkeit im Deutschen Reich besitzen, nur in dringenden •Fallen, sofern slowakische Sicherheitsorgane nicht errechbar sind, Exekutivmassnahmen treffen. Festgenommene sind den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden unverziiglich, spatestens binnen 24 Stunden, zu ubergeben. e) Das Recht zur zollfreien Versor,g ung der deutschen Truppen und zur zollfreien Belieferung der militarischen Anlrugen aus dem Reich. Hieriiber wird eine Sondervereinbarung getroffen. Die Slowakische Regierung wird in engsten Einvernehmen mit der deutschen Wehrmacht alle Massnahmen treffen, die erforderlich sind, um der deutschen Wehrmacht die Durchfiihrung der ihr zum Schutz des Slowakischen S·taates, der Schutzzone und der darin befindlichen Truppen und militarischen Anlagen ubertragenen Aufgaben im Sinne des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 zu ermoglichen und zu erleichtern. Artikel 3: Alie Hoheitsrechte in der Schutzzone ubt, soweit nicht im Vertrage vom 18. /2:3. Marz 1939 und in diesem Vertrage anders vereinbart, der Slowakische Staat aus. Hinsichtlich der Hoheitsrechte des Slowakischen Staates ist inbesondere folgendes vereinbart: a) Die Geltung aller jetzt und kiinftig gultigen rechtlichen Vor- �20 SLOVAKIA schriften der Slowakischen Republik erstreckt sich auf das Gebiet der Schutzzone, wenn dies nicht ausdriicklich ausgenommen wird, oder dem Sinne dieses Vertraiges und des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 widerspricht. b) ,Die slowakischen Behorden in der Schutzzone iiben ihren Dienst weiterhin aus und unterliegen weiterhin uneingeschrankt der Aufsich t der ihnen vorgesetzten Behorden des Slowakischen Staates. c) Die Ausnutzung und Belegung der in der Schutzzone befindlichen militarischen Anlagen durch die slowakische Wehrmacht, das Uberliegen der Schutzzone durch slowakische Militarflugzeu.ge soiwie das Betraten der Schutzzone durch einzelne Angehorige der slowakischen Wehrmacht wird durch besondere Vereinbarung geregelt. d) In der Schutzzone kann der Zutrtt zu militarisch wichtigen Gebietsteilen, Befestigungsarbeiten and -anlagen von der deutschen Wehrmacht verhindert werden. Das Betretungsverbot wird von den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden auf Veranlassung der deutschen Wehrmachtstellen und in beiderseitigem Einvernehmen erlassen und der Bevolkerung in ortsiiblichen Weise bekanntgegeben werden. e) Die Einrichtung von Uberfluigzonen in der Schutzzone zur Ermoglichen des gegenseitiigen zivilen Flugverkehrs wird einer besonderen Vereinbarung vorbehalten. f) Deutsche Wehrmachtangehorig e diirfen das slowakische Staatsgebiet ausserhalb der Schutzzone nur betreten 1) aus dienstlichem Anlass mit Bewilligung der slowakischen zustandigen Behorden (Ausnahme Art. 2c) 2) bei Urlaub nur gemass den deutschen Bestimmungen iiber Auslandsurlaub. Artikel 4: Deutsche Wehrmachtsangehorig e, die sich auf Grund des Schutzvertragen vom 18./23. Marz 1939 in der Schutzzone befinden, sind den deutschen Strafgesetzen unterworfen und unterstehen wegen aller in der Schutzzone begangenen strafbaren Handlungen der deutschen Strafgerich tsbarkeit. Sonstige deutsche Staatsangehorige, die bei den Befestigungsarbeiten beschaftigt sind, sind wegen strafbarer Handlungen, die in der Schutzzone begangen sind und sich gegen das Deutsche Reich richten, allein der deutschen Strafgerichtsbarkeit unterworfen. Deutsche Reichsangehoriige sowie reichsdeutsche Handelsgesellschaften, Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossens chaften, die auf Grund eines privaten Vertragsverhaltnisses mit der Errichtung militarischer Anlagen in der Schutzzone befasst sind, konnen aus ihrem gegen-seitigen Rechtsverhaltnis sowie aus ihrem Rechtsverhaltnis zum Deutschen Reich wegen eines Anspruchs aus ihren iRechtsverhaltnissen, namentlich aus Arbeits-, Dienst-- und Lieferungsverhaltnissen oder wegen einer unerlaubten Handlung, die mit der Tatigkeit zur Errichtung der militarischen AnlaJgen unmittelbar in Zusammenhang steht, nur vor deutschen Gerichten verklagt werden. Klagen wegen dieser Anspriiche konnen bei dem Amts- oder Landgericht Briinn erhoben werden. Es bleibt der Reichsregierung vorbehalten, auch andere Gerichte zu bestimmen. Artikel 5: In den vor die deutschen Gerichte gehorigen Strafsachen sind die Sicherheitsbehorden des Slowakischn Staates befugt, bei Gefahr im Verzuge nach den fiir sie geltenden Verfahrengesetzten �SLOVAKIA 21 die ;\-lassnahmen zu treffen, die zur Aufklii.rung des Sachverhalts, zur Festhaltung des Beschuldigten oder zur Sicherung von Gegen-stii.nden notwendig sind, die z1ir Begehung strafbarer Handlungen gebraucht oder bestimmt sind. Von dem Veranlassten haben die Sicherheitsbehiirden des Slowakischen Staates unverziiglich den nii.chsten Gerichtsherrn (Divisionskommander) in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm einen festgenommen Beschuldigten zuzufahren. Deutsche Wehrmachtsan:gehiirige sowie die fiir Wehrmacht21wecke in der ,s chutzzone tii.ti1g en deutschen •Reichsangehorigen haben stii.ndig einen giiltigen Personenausweis bei sich zu fiihren, mit dem sie sich gegeniiber slowakischen Sicherheitsorganen auf Aufforderung ausweisen konnen. A r t ikel 6 : Die Slowakischen Behiirden werden Handlungen, die ,g egen die in diesem Vertrag festgelegten Interessen des Deutschen Reichs gerichtet sind, so verfol•g en als ob sie gegen den Slowakischen Staat gerichtet wii.ren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird dafiir Sorge tragen, dass das Deutsch e Reich die Miiglichkeit erhii.lt, den deutschen Interessen Geltung zu verschaffen, wenn es sich in Strafverfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehorden um Fragen handelt, die das gemeinsame Interesse des Deutschen Reichs und des Slowakischen Staates beriihren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird ferner im Einvernehmen mit der Reichsregierung Vorkehrungen treffen, dass den in Artikel 4 bezeichneten Personen in Verfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehiirden in sprachlicher Hinsicht weitestgehende Erleichterungen zuteil werden. Absch nitt 111 ) : Befestigung.sarbeiten. A r t ike l 7: Militii.rische Bauten and -Anlagen innerhalb der Schutzzone werden vom Reich auf eigene Kosten hergestellt. Artike l 8 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird das fiir die Arbeiten und Anlagen in der Schutzzone erforderliche Material nach Miiglichkeit aus dem slowakischen Staatsgebiet beziehen. Soweit Preise hierfiir niclrt im Wege der Ausschreibun,g und freien Vereinbarung festJgelegt werden, sind die iiblichen Ta,g espreisen zu zahlen . Artike l 9 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird bei der Ausfiihrung d er Arbeiten und Anlagen vorzugsweise Arbeits krii.fte aus der Slowakei anstellen. Eine Abweichung hiervon kommt insbesondere in Frage, wenn militii.rische Griinde die Einstellung bestimmter anderer Arbeitskrii.fte, z. B. gelernter Fach- und Spezialarbeiter erforderlich machen. Arbeitskrii.fte aus der Slowakei werden in slowakischer Wii.hrung entlohnt. Bei der Einstellung von Arbeitern wird nach einem allgemeinen, im Benehmen mit d er Slowakischen iRegierung aufgestellten Vertrage formular vorfabren. A r t ike l 10: Nach den slowakischen Gesetzen ist zu verfahren, wenn bei Arbeiten and Anlagen der deutschen Wehrmacht in der Schutzzone historisch wichtige 1Funde gemacht werden, oder wenn dabei Mineral- und Erzlager, oder andere Bodenschii.tze entdeckt werden. Art ike l 11 : Die deutsche Wehrmacht ,w ird bei den in der Schutzzone durchzufiihrenden Arbeiten und Anlagen mit besonderer Sor,g falt auf historische Denkmii.ler und auf die fiir den Slowakischen Staat und die slowakische Nation bedeutsamen Oiits Riicksicht nehmen. Abschnitt IV ) : Schlussbestimm ungen. Artike l 12 : Alie Meinungsverchiedenheiten, die sich aus der Durchfiihrung dieses Vertrages ergeben, werden, soweit sie nicht zur Zu- �22 SLOVAKIA stiindigkeit anderer O11gane gehoren, einer Kommission unterbreitet, die aus 2 deutschen und 2 slo.wakischen Mitgliedern bestehen soil, die im Bedarfsfalle zusammen tritt und das Recht hat, Sachvers·tiindige hinzuzuziehen und nach Bedarf auch ein fiinftes Mitglied zu bestellen. Kommt eine Einigung iiber das fiinfte Mitglied nicht zustande, so ist die Angelegenheit auf dem iiblichen diplomatischen Wege bei den 1Regierungen anhangig zu machen. Die Anrufunig der Kommission hat keine aufschiebende Wirkung. Dieser Vertra;g wird in doppelter Urschrift, in deutscher und in slowakischer Sprache ausgefertigt. Er tritt am Tage nach der Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Pressburg, den 12. August 1939. Fiir das Deutsche Reich: a. o. Gesandter und bevollmachtigter Minister des Deutschen Reichs in Pressburg Generalleu tnant 1. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, (hereafter as D. G. F. P.) Volume Vil, pp. 10-11. 2. For the Treaty and the Confidential -P rotocol on economic and financial cooperation see D. G. F. P. V[, pp. 42-4-5. 3. D. G. F. P. VJ, p. 43 - The Academic Guard played an out~ standing role since October 1938, but its participation on the struggle for independence was of great importance especially in the decisive days of March 10-14, 1939. It was a paramilitary organization of university students, led by Dr. J. Kirschbaum as supreme command er. After March 14, it supplied the Slovak Republic with many outstanding workers in the Slovak public life, namely in Party organization, press, diplomacy, cultural associations etc. Among the leaders of the Academic Guard who played an important part in March 1939, are now in exile Dr. Joseph ,P auco, Dr. Joseph Mikula, Koloman Murgas, Dr. G. Danihel, Dr. L . Jankovic, etc. In 1940 the Academic Guard was dissolved by the order of the Ministry of Jnternal Affairs because it opposed introduction of National Socialist ideology in 1Slovakia. Dr. Kirschbaum was first called to arms and then sent abroad. No Slovak newspaper was allowed to mention his nam e for two following years. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1939-1945. 4. The origin of this zone can be traced back to Berlin where Hitler, talking to Tiso on March 13, told him among other things tha,t not only Hungarians and Poles were mobilizing, but "the Czechs also want to occcupy the western part of Slovakia up to the Vah." Tiso in his defense hinted at this ominous suggestion which is also ,supported by the 0 . K. W. Memorandum of March 24, (R 100 (see: Nazi Conspiracy and Agression, VJII, p. 83) according to which, if Slovakia is k ept independent, the military Schutzzone is to extend up to the Vah; but if Slovakia is divided between Poles and Hungarians, the whole area up to the Nitra is to be incorporated in the Protectorate ("Sollte Slowakei aufigeteilet werden, soil die Ostwest [Neutra-linie] Grenze werden und Pressburg einbezogen werden"). 5. According to the report of the British Consul in •B ratislava on iMarch 15, the German troops had reached Malacky by mid.day of that day and Trencfn by evening (D. Brit. F. P .. 3rd Series. Vol. IV, �SLOVAKIA 23 p. 287). On March 17, the Slovak Foreign Ministry lodged in a "note verbale" several complaints on the behaviour of the German troops in the occupied territory. 6. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Joseph Pauco, Passaic, 1952, p. 232. 7. ibid. pp. ,233-4. 8. D. G. F. P., VJ, p. 756. 9. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, p. 234, footnote. 10. Tiso, Tuka and f>urcansky were invited to Berlin, where the latter two arrived on March 21. ,Ribbentrop kept them waiti.Il!g in complete uncertainty for three full days and then on March 23, at 12: 30 P. M., in their presence si,gned the Schutzvertrag. 11. The Polish White Book, pp. 62-3. 12. The offer to the Poles was, nevertheless, still open, and Hitler would have waived the .g uarantee if the ·Poles had been more cooperative (Cf. Doc. R 100 of March 24. How long the Fueh·rer considers himself bound to the 'T reaty concluded with Slovakia is open to doubt. It seems that he will use Slovakia as an asset to bargain between himself, Poland, and Hungary). On March 26, Ribbentrop a•g ain suggest-ed to Lipski "that the Slovak problem might still be discussed within the framework of a general Ausgleich" (see: Polish White Book, p. 67.), but the Poles now rejected the offer definitely. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. D. G. F. P., VI, pp. 114-115. ibid. p. 146. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. D. G. F. P., V[, pp. 7-56-762. ibid. p. 774. ibid. pp. 840-841. ibid. p. 916. ibid. pp. 9·52-953. ibid. p. 840, footnote. ibid. p. 1025. D. G F. P., Third Series, Vol. V, p. 89. D. G. F. P., Vil, pp. 254-255. At this conference, Tiso, Tuka, f>urcansky, and Mach negotiated with Barckhausen, Drufiel, Becker, and Hoffmann. The Slovaks advanced every argument imaiginable. if>urcansky thought that the presence of the German troops in the zone and outside it was generally interpreted as lack of trust on the part of the German Government in the Slovak Government. Tuka pointed out that the Slovak State should not be protected in the same manner as one would protect a flock of sheep, but that it should contribute to its own protection by having its own army, and this army must not be deprived of its equipment. Tiso and f>urcansky expressed the fea•r that, in case of the outbreak of Polish-!German hostilities, Hungary would invade Slovakia and, hence, Slovakia must be prepared for every eventuality. As for the Slovak desiderata, ihey were centered about these three points: (i) Establishment of two garrisons in the zone and the free use of the Malacky artillery range. (ii) Withdrawal of German military and other uniformed units (police, gendarmerie) from Zilina, Trencin, and Nove Mesto nad Vahom. (iii) Approval to keep nine tons of poisonous war gas ('Yperit'). D. G. F. P., VII, p. 2. � SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up �8 SLOVAKIA military installations in a zone bounded on the west by the frontier of the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians and the eastern edge of Javorniky, and to man these installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider necessary ... Military sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechts) will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht (in this zone)" (3) . The establishment of this zone ( 4) represents in many respects an interesting aspect of Slovak-German relations. It casts a favorable light on a well-conceived but less successful attempt to extricate Slovak foreign policy from the agreed upon Slovak-German coordination in this field. This praiseworthy attempt and the subsequent unyielding behavior of Slovak politicians in the face of Hitler's demands contrast sharply with the charges of vassalage and servile obedience. In fact, the Slovaks resisted and contradicted Hitler's wishes (and with some success, too ) when powerful nations yielded and were advising others to yield. The negotiations concerning the zone were initiated on the night of March 17-18, 1939, in Vienna. At this time the occupation of Western Slovakia was already an accomplished fact (5) and - since possession is nine points of the law - the position of the ISlovak negotiators was noticeably weakened and by no means enviable. Nevertheless Dr. Joseph Tiso, Durcansky, Tuka, and Mach, the principal Slovak representatives, were determined to save could be saved. Preliminary negotiations started at Biirckel's flat at 5 p. m. Afterwards the Slovaks met SeyssInquart, then Keitel, and finally, at 1 a . m., on the 18th, in the Hotel Imperial they faced Hitler. Each stop represented more humiliation and more pressing demands and brought home one thing: Hitler was going to exact a high price for his protection ; much higher than he ever hinted at in Berlin on March 13th. Tiso was so disappointed at what he rightly considered - being let down that h e wanted to return to Bratislava without even seeing Hitler. Only his companions persuaded him to stay, arguing that in front of the Germans they all ought to show a united �SLOVAKIA 9 determination not to give up even an inch of sacred Slovak soil (6). When Hitler, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Keitel, met the Slovaks, he told them - according to the testimony of Tiso - that the 'Shutzvertrag' could be realized only if Germany were given far-reaching concessions to build up a zone in Western Slovakia. The extent of these concessions - as Tiso clearly saw - left the Slovaks practically without any rights to exercise their sovereignty in that territory. It was more than he could bear. At 2 :45 A. M. he got up and was at the point of departure. Hitler, it must be said, in spite of his many shortcommings had a soft spot for the Slovaks and, apparently moved by the pathetic sight of the hardpressed protegees, stopped Tiso with a very assuring piece of oratory. He said: "I do not want even an inch of Slovak ground. In Slovakia the Slovaks alone will develop their own national, cultural, and economic life. I shall guarantee the full independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia. The historical frontiers of Slovakia are and remain forever unchanged. I shall hold my protective hand over ,S lovakia and nobody will reach with stealthy hand for the Slovak State, where the Slovaks will live their own full life" (7). This rhetorical outburst pacified the Slovaks; the rest of the discussion was carried on in a much happier mood. The Slovaks ceded the Germans the right to build and man fortifications in the zone "so as to enable the German Wehrmacht, in the event of war, to take up such positions as are most advantageous to it" (8). The Slovak delegation left Vienna with the impression that the zone remained within the legal structure of the Slovak State. No treaty was formulated or signed that night. Formal negotiations were conducted on the afternoon of March 18. Tiso did not take part in these conversations. The Slovaks were represented by Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Tuka a Zvrskovec; the Germans by Keppler and Gaus, the legal adviser to the Foreign Minister. The Treaty of Protection ( Schutzvertrag) was signed in Vienna the same day by :Durcansky and Tuka who also pledged to obtain Tiso's signature to the Treaty by noon of March 19, in re-1 �10 SLOVAKIA turn for which Keppl er undert ook to get Ribbe ntrop's signature within 24 hours. :Durcansky, Tuka, and Veesenmayer broug ht the Treaty to Tiso for signat ure the evening March 18; he signed it and appear ed to be satisfi ed · with its formu lation (9). Ribben trop, on the other hand, did not sign the Treaty within the stipula ted time limit. All in all, the Germa ns were in no partic ular hurry with respec t to the Slovaks. The reason for their procra stinati on, which was so frustra ting and inexpl icable to the Slovak s then (10), is seen clearly now: they hoped to come to terms with the Poles and Hunga rians. The Polish White Book gives an accoun t of Ribbentrop's propos als to Lipski on March 21 (11), namely , that German-lPolish discus sions "would be possib le on this subject" (i. e., on the questi on of Slovak ia). But the Germa ns must have consid ered the Polish attitud e discou raging , and Ribbe ntrop put his signat ure on the Treaty on -March 23, in Berlin (12), but not before Article 3 of the Treaty was modifi ed and the words "in order to defend Slovak State agains t any possib le extern al attack s" were omitte d. Once the Treaty was signed, the execut ion of Article 2 proved to be more difficu lt than anticip ated. Appar ently the Germa n milita ry author ities were not very happy with what, after all, was a politic al settlem ent. Their behavi or left much to be desire d and Slovak protes ts were very soon pourin g in. At first, the surpri sed Slovak s asked for an explan ation, but later protes ted very vigorio usly. On March 25, the .Slovak Foreig n ·M inistry in a 'note verbal e" called for a more definit e determ ination of the probable durati on and charac ter in intern ationa l law of the Germa n occupa tion of Slovak territo ry. The note also protested a•g ainst the exerci se of sovere ign rights "beyon d those of milita ry necess ity" and agains t the remov al of milita ry materi al which - they claime d - by the secess ion of Slovak ia, had leg-ally become Slovak 'State proper ty (13). It was inevita ble that the occupa tion would cause considera ble frictio n betwee n the Slovak popula tion and the Germa n troops , and that this frictio n would projec t unfavora bly into Slovak -Germ an relatio ns. But the amoun t �SLOVAKIA 11 of misunderstanding surpassed every expectation. The Slovaks in their optimistic enthusiasm were determined to enjoy their newly-gained independence to the fullest extent and consequently found the German presence in the zone very annoying and did not even try to hide their displeasure. The Germans, on the other hand, especially the military, did not bother to adjust their behavior in respect to the Slovaks. An ordinary German soldier and officer, fresh from victorious entries into Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia, was hardly expected to be less arrogant towards Slovaks than he was towards Czechs; superiority was after all the essential part of his make-up. There were many instances of discontent, misunderstanding, and small incidents, and their existence could be best gauged by the frequent apologies and assurances which the 'Slovak Press Bureau was issuing in the newspapers and on the air. Under pressure of Slovak protests and complaints, the German representatives of General Staff and Foreign Ministry, at a meeting on March 28, agreed on a unified attitude towards the question of the zone. Their conclusions, though still by no means modest, represent in many respects retreat in the face of the Slovak protests, and can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. Withdrawal of the German Custom Frontier Protection Force to the Slovak-Moravian frontier. 2. The Vah fixed as the line of military occupation. 3. Appointment of a staff officer to the Consul General to act as liaison between the Slovak Army and the Wehrmacht. 4. The German troops east of the Vah to be recalled. 5. German claim to the entire war material of the former Czecho~Slovak army. 6. No removal of war material east of the occupied zone. 7. Decision as to size of the Slovak army. 8. Creation of s e p a r ate military formation for the Volksdeutche (14). Negotiations on the above topics took place on April 4 and were reported by Pares. Unfortunately no details concerning conversations are available, but it is known that �12 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were represented by Dr. Tiso and the Ministers of War, Finance, and Economics, and the chief subject was the removal of war material "purchased by the German Government from the Czecho-!S lovak Government which had been stored in Slovakia" (15). As a result of these conversations, in addition to a German military adviser to be sent to Bratislava, a mixed Slovak-German commission was to be appointed to settle any controversial issue. At about the same time Tuka in his broadcast promised that the German army would leave when it was no longer needed. On April 15, the High Command of the Wehrmacht submitted a list of requirements, the fulfilment of which was expected from the Slovak Government under the Treaty of Protection. The demands, even in their "more lenient" form, were very exacting: 1. The High Command intended to maintain its military forces east of the Vah until the removal of "Czech arms and Czech war material" was completed. 2. Among the sovereign rights they claimed the right to occupy military and also public and private buildings, to use all forms and means of transport, to have at their disposal the factories concerned with war economy, duty-free import and export, postal services, telecommunications and Intelligence Service (Abwehrdienst). 3. The zone to include also Trencin, Krupa, Zilina, and Povazska Bystrica. 4. The size of Slovak army to be completed at one per cent of the population. 5. No units of the Slovak army to be garrisoned within the zone, but para-military formations (Hlinka Guards) to be allowed. 6. Export and import of war material to and from Slovakia to be refused or permitted by the Slovak Government only in agreement with the Reich Government or the High Command of the Wehrmacht (16). When these requirements were communicated by Druffel to Tiso, the latter declared that the Slovak Government did not wish to make difficulties, but asked for discussions with the German authorities on the highest level before �SLOVAKIA 13 making any definite commitments. The Germans consented and, as a result, a conference took place in Berlin on April 19. Slovak representatives included Tiso, :Durcansky, and Tuka, the Ministry of Defense was represented by Catlos and Schneider, and also present were Cernak and Szathmary from the Slovak Legation in Berlin. The German delegation consisted of top-ranking experts, both political and military, but conspicious by their absence were the policy making personalities of the Reich. Its members were: Weissacker, Keppler, Wormann, Gaus, Altenburg, Tippelskirsch, HeydenRynsch, and Becker. Slovak grievances were numerous. To start with, Tiso mentioned the occupation by German troops of the aerodrome of Malacky and the demand by a German armored formation for transit through Bratislava. Then he complained of the severity of the demands of the German Wehrmacht, stating that "extension of the zone to Trencin and Zilina was hardly bearable for the Slovak Government"; of the behaviour of the German troops who in some villages occupied schools and thus made school attendance impossible, and employed Czech workers in preference to Slovaks. Furthermore, he claimed a share in the ownership of the former Czecho-Slovak arms factories and clamored for the return of a number of aircraft. German answers were either non-commital or asked to extend negotiations to clarify the application of the Treaty. Apparently the Slovaks demanded more than the German representatives were empowered to grant. Meanwhile the joint Slovak~German Commission was negotiating the treaty on the Zone of Protection but it did not seem to make any noticeable progress. On June 12, the Slovaks submitted another "note verbale'' which contained a number of Slovak views on the interpretation of the text of the Treaty. Arguments advanced by Slovaks were discussed at the conference on June 19 (17), where Tiso expressed the wish to draw up a memorandum and to discuss it personally with Hitler in hopeful expectation that the Slovaks might get more favorable treatment at the hands of the Fuhrer, than they were getting from his representatives. Hitler, however, declined to see Tiso and refused to consider the various points of the Slovak memorandum. �14 SLOVAKIA On June 21 this memorandum, in the form of an "aide memoire", was submitted to the German Foreign Ministry (18). It represented a voluminous list of complaints and expressed an outburst of accumulated Slovak indi,gnation about the German injustices. It questioned German rights to exclude Slovak garrisons from the zonal area, the interpretation of "sovereign rights", and claimed as Slovak the former Cecho..!Slovak military installations which were taken over by the Wehnnacht (such as the artillery range at Malacky); furthermore, it also questioned the wisdom of maintaining German ,garrisons outside the zone (e. g., in .Zilina, Trencin, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn) and criticised excursions of German troops to Bratislava and other places outside the zone. With regard to military material, the Slovak memorandum complained about the removal of war material from Pezinok, Modra, Malacky, Plavecke Podhradie, Hlboke, Turecky Vrch, Senica, Nemcova, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn, Trencin, Istebnik, Skalka, and .Zilina in a manner which "transgressed the bounds of an amicable atmosphere". Furthermore, it objected to occupation of munition factories and factories producing various types of war material at Dubnica, Povazska IBystrica, Stara Tura, Myjava, and .Zilina; to taking over of the stocks and installations of the airports at Novy Dvor and .Zilina; and it sadly commented that proceedings connected with the removal of war material were often conducted "as though Slovakia were an enemy country and not a State whose political and territorial independence had been guaranted by the Flihrer and Chancellor". The memorandum concluded a few more grievances against the military authorities whose attitude caused "administrative and economic uncertainty". The matter was then brought to Hitler's attention. This is evident from a statement made by Keitel on June 20, according to which Hitler's decision on the subject at the conference held by him amounted to the following: "The Flihrer said that he wished the negotiations to be conducted energetically and resolutely which, together with our concrete offers, must lead to early success. The prerequisite for the proposed support of Slovakia is the complete accep- �SLOVAKIA 15 tance of our demeands, the more so as Slovakia is dependent on our military, economic, and financial aid." This authoritative pronouncement meant that all the subsequent attempts of the ,Slovaks for better terms encountered the adamant attitude of the German authorities. Thus, when, on June 22, the Slovak Minister in 'Berlin (Matus Cernak) saw Wormann at the German Foreign Ministry, he was brusquely told that the Germans disagreed with the Slovak Foreign Ministry's attempts to establish inconsistencies between the demands of the German Military Delegation and the assurances given by leading German statesmen regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Protection. He was asked to make it clear in Bratislava that "the Military Delegation was among these demands in the name of the German Government". Cernak sugested that concessions be made by both parties and thought that this would make it possible to reach an agreement which would "not only maintain, but arouse sympathy for Germany" among the Slovak poulation. But Wormann had little understanding for the Slovak point of view and berated the Slovaks because several of the demands expressed in the memorandum of June 19 were in contradiction to the Treaty of Protection (19). On July 3, Cernak again called on the German Foreign Ministry, where he saw Weizsa.cker. He pleaded with him for moderation of the German demands, arguing that "Tiso's ... pro-German policy would be shaken, if it were not supported. In case of emergency, Slovakia would, of course, be completely at the disposal of German Armed Forces, but in peace-time one ought to remain within the scope of the terms of the Treaty. But again Cerna.k's arguments were of no avail and were, one by one, refuted by Weizsa.cker. Faced with such an uncooperative attitude, Cernak asked to be allowed to speak to Ribbentrop personally, but was told that the Foreign Minister was not available (20). The Slovaks, ignorant of Hitler's decision and trusting in his words with hopeful optimism, left no stone unturned in their attempts to secure more favorable terms. Their representatives were untiring in demanding interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop who, as the chief architects of the 1 �16 SLOVAKIA Slovak-German Treaty, could be made, they thought, to stand up to their promises. In this, however, they wer e unsuccessful. But they could get only to Weizsacker; and he, after trying to persuade them that the German negotiators "were acting on the instructions issued to them by the authoritative persons in the Reich", admonished the Slovaks that they should look at them as such and "conduct themselves accordingly" (21). As time went by, the Germans were getting progressively more and more anxious to have the whole issue about the interpretation of the Treaty finally settled and were apparently annoyed by the delay caused by the stubborness of the Slovaks. In view of the approaching German~olish conflict it was paramont for them to have their stand in Slovakia precisely determined and legalized. Their activity (often on the verge of nervousness) was in sharp contrast with the patient and determined attitude of the Slovaks who were unwilling to retreat. The situation was provided with a real touch of comedy when the Slovak statesmen went on their summer holidays (Tiso left for Topofcianky, Durcansky for the High Tatras) while German couriers were flying between and Bratislava. On July 19, Druffel was shown a report from Cernak according to which Eisenlohr and Weizsacker had expressed themselves in favour of token Slovak garrisons in the protected zone. On the strength of this report, Durcansky urged Catlos to dispatch some troops into the zone. On July 2:1, Catlos ordered one batallion to move in and, at the same time, informed the German military mission of his action. From the Germans came a vehement protest, coupled with threats, and the order was recalled. This move displeased Durcansky immensely. He maintained that Catlos should have created a "fait accompli" without regard for the German military mission and their feelings. The argument went so far that Catlos threatened to resign (22). Whether Catlos's action was right or wrong is open to question. It may be recalled, however, that at that time, the German military authorities were resolutely against ·any Slovak troops in that zone, and the same view was shared by Hitler. �SLOVAKIA 17 On July 17, the German Foreign Ministry sent to their representative in Bratislava a letter of instructions with an enclosed draft of the Treaty on the Zone of Protection (23). With this draft as a basis, new negotiations ensued. Unfortunately no records were found concerning their course. From the report of tH. Bernard (new German Minister to Slovakia who replaced Druffel), we learn that they were concluded by July 31 and the Slovak representatives (again, we do not know, who they were; Tuka was probably one of them; Tiso and :Durcansky were vacationing) accepted the draft of the treaty with small amendments (24). Barckhausen then took this modified version of the Treaty to Berlin and, on August 7, brought it to Bratislava to Tuka, who then forwarded it to Tiso and :Durcansky (on their vacation) with a request for their approval (25 ). But the Treaty in its new form did not appeal either to Tiso or :Durcansky. Rejecting various points of the draft, they again upset the German applecart. On August 10, a new series of discussions was initiated, this time with :Durcansky present. These discussions finally brought concrete results. On Saturday evening, August 12, 1939, the Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed at Bratislava by Minister Bernard and Lt. General Barckhausen on behalf of the German Reich, and by the Slovak Premier Tiso. The Treaty consisted of four Sections. Section I delimitated its extent. ,S ection II defined military sovereign rights of the German Wehrmacht and the sovereign rights of the Slovak State; German military sovereign rights included the right to requisition public and private premises, to use all means and lines of transportation, and to supervise armament factories working for the Reich; Germany was also given jurisdiction over her nationals; this Section also provided for Slovak garrisions within the zone. Section 1',III laid down rules regarding the employment of the personnel and material in, and on the payment for, the construction of fortifications. Section IV contained provisions for settlement of differences arising from the application of the Treaty. 1 �SLOVAKIA: 16 Verbatim German Text of Treaty (.From Photostat) Abschrift. Schutzzonenvert rag Zur Regelung der sich aus dem Schutzvertrage vom 18./23. Marz 1939 ergebenden Fragen ist zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Slowakischen Republik durch die unterzeichneten Bevollmachtigten beider Regierungen folgendes vereinbart worden. Abschnitt I): Abgrenzung der Schutzzone. Artikel 1: Die Ausdehnung der in Artikel 2 des deutsch-slowakis chen Vertrages vom 18./ 23. Marz 1939 genannten Zone in folgendem mit ''Schutzzone" bezeichnet - ergibt sich aus der diesem Vertrage als Bestandteil angehefteten Landkarte in Masstabe 1: 7·5,000. Die Schutzzone erstreckt sich von Westen her bis zu der dieser Landkarte eingezeichneten roten Linie, und sie schliesst den von dieser Linie bedecken Tei! des slowakischen Gebietes ein. Eine Bez·e ichnung der ostwartigen Schutzzonenbeg renzungslinie im Gelande durch Tafeln oder Grenzsteine erfolgt nicht. lnnerhalb dieser Schutzzone wird das Deutsche Reich die ihm im Schutzvertrage vom 18-/ 23. Marz 1939 von dem Slowakischen Staat iibertragenen Aufgaben nach Massgabe der Bestimmungen dieses Vertrages durchfiihren. Abschnitt II): Rechtsverhaltni sse in der Schutzzone. Artikel 2: Mit den militarischen IHoheitsrechten, deren Ausiibung der deutschen Wehrmacht in Arti~el 2 des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz iibertragen worden ist, hat sie das Recht erhalten, im Sinne der fiir die Verteidigung des Slowakischen Staates im allgemeinen bestehenden Gesetze Leistungen im gleichen Masse wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in lFriedenszeiten zu fordern (ohne die ,B estimmungen, die in dem slowakischen Gesetz Nr. 131/36 enthalten sind). Bei Aufwendungen, die iiber den Rahmen normaler Manciverleistung en auch zeitlich hinausgehen, sind die hierfiir zu zahlenden Entschadigungen nach den ortsiiblichen Tagespreisen zu bemessen. Die deutsche Wehrmacht haftet fiir Schaden in gleichem Ausmass wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in tlbungszeiten. Demzufolge hat die deutsche Wehrmacht insbesondere folgende Rechte: a) (Das Recht, jederzeit in der Schutzzone militarische Anlagen zu errichten und im 'Benehmen mit den slowakischen Behcirden tiffentliche Gebaude, Grundstiicke and Anlagen fiir militarische Zwecke in Anspruch zu nehmen und private Gebaude und Grundstiicke in Benutzun_ zu nehmen, ohne die Durchfiihrung des Enteignungsverfahrens oder des Verfahrens zur voriibergehende n Entziehung der Benutzung abzuwarten, jedoch unbeschadet ,e iner spateren Regelung der Entschadigung. Die Entschadigung wird unter Mitwirkun,g deutscher Beauftragter im Wege giitlicher Verhandlun,gen mit den Betroffenen festigesetzt. IKommt eine giitliche Eintgung nicht zustande, so bleibt es den Betroffenen vorbehalten, die Festsetzung der Entschadig-ung nach den slowakischen Gesetzen zu betragen. In diesem Falle bleibt im �SLOVAKIA 19 Verhaltnis zu dem Deutschen Reich die Hohe der Entschadigung einer Vereinbarung mit der Slowakischen Regierung vorbehalten. b) Das Recht zur Benutzung der in der Schutzzone vorhanden,en Transportmittel und Transportwege unter moglichster Berucksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Jnteressen der Slowakischen Republik. Ausserdem kann bei Vorliegen besonderer militarischer Notwendigkeiten die Bahn Pressburg-Ty,r nau-Pistyan-Trencin'8 illeinJCadca und die Strassen Pressburg-Modern-Na das-Trencin and Pressburg-Tyrnau-Pis tyan-Trencin,Sillein>C adca, von Trencin aus bis Cadca auch auf dem ostwartigen Waag-und Kysucaufer benutzt werden. Ferner erhalt die deutsche Wehrmacht das Recht, alle Orte zwischen Pressburg (ausschliesslich) and Cadca an den oben genannten Strassen bei Vorliegen militarischer Griinde vorubergehend zur Einquartierung zu benutzen. Die Slowakische Regierung ist hiervon in Kenntnis zu setzen. Die Benutzung der Eisenbahnlinien wird durch Sondertarifabmachun gen geregelt. Bei der Benutzung anderer slowakischer Verkehrsmittel sind die ortsiiblichen Tarifsatze zu zahlen, wenn nicht im Wege der Vereinbarung ein anderweitiger Entgelt fur die Benutzung festgesetzt wird. c) Das Recht, Riistungsbetriebe, die Auftrage vom Deutschen Reich erhalten, zu beaufsichtigen und auszunutzen unter BeriicksichUgung der Bediirfnisse der slowakischen Wehrmacht. Hieriiber wird eine besondere Vereinbarung zwischen den zustandigen Stellen der Deutschen Regierung und der Regierung des Slowakischen iStaates abgeschlossen werden. d) iDas Recht, in der Schutzzone alle erforderlichen Massnahmen des militarischen Abwehrdienstes zu treffen und von den Behorden des Slowakischen Staates die Anordnung und Durchfiihrung aller hierfiir erforderlichen Exekutivmassnahmen zu verlangen. !Die Deutsche Wehrmacht hat das !Recht, gegeniiber deutschen Wehrmachtangehori<g en und den fiir Wehrmachtzwecke in der Schutzzone tatigen reichsdeutschen Beamten, An-gestellten und Arbeitern deutsche militarische Exekutivorgane einzusetzen. Diese diirfen ,g egentiber Personen, die nicht die Staatsangehorigkeit im Deutschen Reich besitzen, nur in dringenden •Fallen, sofern slowakische Sicherheitsorgane nicht errechbar sind, Exekutivmassnahmen treffen. Festgenommene sind den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden unverziiglich, spatestens binnen 24 Stunden, zu ubergeben. e) Das Recht zur zollfreien Versor,g ung der deutschen Truppen und zur zollfreien Belieferung der militarischen Anlrugen aus dem Reich. Hieriiber wird eine Sondervereinbarung getroffen. Die Slowakische Regierung wird in engsten Einvernehmen mit der deutschen Wehrmacht alle Massnahmen treffen, die erforderlich sind, um der deutschen Wehrmacht die Durchfiihrung der ihr zum Schutz des Slowakischen S·taates, der Schutzzone und der darin befindlichen Truppen und militarischen Anlagen ubertragenen Aufgaben im Sinne des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 zu ermoglichen und zu erleichtern. Artikel 3: Alie Hoheitsrechte in der Schutzzone ubt, soweit nicht im Vertrage vom 18. /2:3. Marz 1939 und in diesem Vertrage anders vereinbart, der Slowakische Staat aus. Hinsichtlich der Hoheitsrechte des Slowakischen Staates ist inbesondere folgendes vereinbart: a) Die Geltung aller jetzt und kiinftig gultigen rechtlichen Vor- �20 SLOVAKIA schriften der Slowakischen Republik erstreckt sich auf das Gebiet der Schutzzone, wenn dies nicht ausdriicklich ausgenommen wird, oder dem Sinne dieses Vertraiges und des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 widerspricht. b) ,Die slowakischen Behorden in der Schutzzone iiben ihren Dienst weiterhin aus und unterliegen weiterhin uneingeschrankt der Aufsich t der ihnen vorgesetzten Behorden des Slowakischen Staates. c) Die Ausnutzung und Belegung der in der Schutzzone befindlichen militarischen Anlagen durch die slowakische Wehrmacht, das Uberliegen der Schutzzone durch slowakische Militarflugzeu.ge soiwie das Betraten der Schutzzone durch einzelne Angehorige der slowakischen Wehrmacht wird durch besondere Vereinbarung geregelt. d) In der Schutzzone kann der Zutrtt zu militarisch wichtigen Gebietsteilen, Befestigungsarbeiten and -anlagen von der deutschen Wehrmacht verhindert werden. Das Betretungsverbot wird von den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden auf Veranlassung der deutschen Wehrmachtstellen und in beiderseitigem Einvernehmen erlassen und der Bevolkerung in ortsiiblichen Weise bekanntgegeben werden. e) Die Einrichtung von Uberfluigzonen in der Schutzzone zur Ermoglichen des gegenseitiigen zivilen Flugverkehrs wird einer besonderen Vereinbarung vorbehalten. f) Deutsche Wehrmachtangehorig e diirfen das slowakische Staatsgebiet ausserhalb der Schutzzone nur betreten 1) aus dienstlichem Anlass mit Bewilligung der slowakischen zustandigen Behorden (Ausnahme Art. 2c) 2) bei Urlaub nur gemass den deutschen Bestimmungen iiber Auslandsurlaub. Artikel 4: Deutsche Wehrmachtsangehorig e, die sich auf Grund des Schutzvertragen vom 18./23. Marz 1939 in der Schutzzone befinden, sind den deutschen Strafgesetzen unterworfen und unterstehen wegen aller in der Schutzzone begangenen strafbaren Handlungen der deutschen Strafgerich tsbarkeit. Sonstige deutsche Staatsangehorige, die bei den Befestigungsarbeiten beschaftigt sind, sind wegen strafbarer Handlungen, die in der Schutzzone begangen sind und sich gegen das Deutsche Reich richten, allein der deutschen Strafgerichtsbarkeit unterworfen. Deutsche Reichsangehoriige sowie reichsdeutsche Handelsgesellschaften, Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossens chaften, die auf Grund eines privaten Vertragsverhaltnisses mit der Errichtung militarischer Anlagen in der Schutzzone befasst sind, konnen aus ihrem gegen-seitigen Rechtsverhaltnis sowie aus ihrem Rechtsverhaltnis zum Deutschen Reich wegen eines Anspruchs aus ihren iRechtsverhaltnissen, namentlich aus Arbeits-, Dienst-- und Lieferungsverhaltnissen oder wegen einer unerlaubten Handlung, die mit der Tatigkeit zur Errichtung der militarischen AnlaJgen unmittelbar in Zusammenhang steht, nur vor deutschen Gerichten verklagt werden. Klagen wegen dieser Anspriiche konnen bei dem Amts- oder Landgericht Briinn erhoben werden. Es bleibt der Reichsregierung vorbehalten, auch andere Gerichte zu bestimmen. Artikel 5: In den vor die deutschen Gerichte gehorigen Strafsachen sind die Sicherheitsbehorden des Slowakischn Staates befugt, bei Gefahr im Verzuge nach den fiir sie geltenden Verfahrengesetzten �SLOVAKIA 21 die ;\-lassnahmen zu treffen, die zur Aufklii.rung des Sachverhalts, zur Festhaltung des Beschuldigten oder zur Sicherung von Gegen-stii.nden notwendig sind, die z1ir Begehung strafbarer Handlungen gebraucht oder bestimmt sind. Von dem Veranlassten haben die Sicherheitsbehiirden des Slowakischen Staates unverziiglich den nii.chsten Gerichtsherrn (Divisionskommander) in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm einen festgenommen Beschuldigten zuzufahren. Deutsche Wehrmachtsan:gehiirige sowie die fiir Wehrmacht21wecke in der ,s chutzzone tii.ti1g en deutschen •Reichsangehorigen haben stii.ndig einen giiltigen Personenausweis bei sich zu fiihren, mit dem sie sich gegeniiber slowakischen Sicherheitsorganen auf Aufforderung ausweisen konnen. A r t ikel 6 : Die Slowakischen Behiirden werden Handlungen, die ,g egen die in diesem Vertrag festgelegten Interessen des Deutschen Reichs gerichtet sind, so verfol•g en als ob sie gegen den Slowakischen Staat gerichtet wii.ren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird dafiir Sorge tragen, dass das Deutsch e Reich die Miiglichkeit erhii.lt, den deutschen Interessen Geltung zu verschaffen, wenn es sich in Strafverfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehorden um Fragen handelt, die das gemeinsame Interesse des Deutschen Reichs und des Slowakischen Staates beriihren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird ferner im Einvernehmen mit der Reichsregierung Vorkehrungen treffen, dass den in Artikel 4 bezeichneten Personen in Verfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehiirden in sprachlicher Hinsicht weitestgehende Erleichterungen zuteil werden. Absch nitt 111 ) : Befestigung.sarbeiten. A r t ike l 7: Militii.rische Bauten and -Anlagen innerhalb der Schutzzone werden vom Reich auf eigene Kosten hergestellt. Artike l 8 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird das fiir die Arbeiten und Anlagen in der Schutzzone erforderliche Material nach Miiglichkeit aus dem slowakischen Staatsgebiet beziehen. Soweit Preise hierfiir niclrt im Wege der Ausschreibun,g und freien Vereinbarung festJgelegt werden, sind die iiblichen Ta,g espreisen zu zahlen . Artike l 9 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird bei der Ausfiihrung d er Arbeiten und Anlagen vorzugsweise Arbeits krii.fte aus der Slowakei anstellen. Eine Abweichung hiervon kommt insbesondere in Frage, wenn militii.rische Griinde die Einstellung bestimmter anderer Arbeitskrii.fte, z. B. gelernter Fach- und Spezialarbeiter erforderlich machen. Arbeitskrii.fte aus der Slowakei werden in slowakischer Wii.hrung entlohnt. Bei der Einstellung von Arbeitern wird nach einem allgemeinen, im Benehmen mit d er Slowakischen iRegierung aufgestellten Vertrage formular vorfabren. A r t ike l 10: Nach den slowakischen Gesetzen ist zu verfahren, wenn bei Arbeiten and Anlagen der deutschen Wehrmacht in der Schutzzone historisch wichtige 1Funde gemacht werden, oder wenn dabei Mineral- und Erzlager, oder andere Bodenschii.tze entdeckt werden. Art ike l 11 : Die deutsche Wehrmacht ,w ird bei den in der Schutzzone durchzufiihrenden Arbeiten und Anlagen mit besonderer Sor,g falt auf historische Denkmii.ler und auf die fiir den Slowakischen Staat und die slowakische Nation bedeutsamen Oiits Riicksicht nehmen. Abschnitt IV ) : Schlussbestimm ungen. Artike l 12 : Alie Meinungsverchiedenheiten, die sich aus der Durchfiihrung dieses Vertrages ergeben, werden, soweit sie nicht zur Zu- �22 SLOVAKIA stiindigkeit anderer O11gane gehoren, einer Kommission unterbreitet, die aus 2 deutschen und 2 slo.wakischen Mitgliedern bestehen soil, die im Bedarfsfalle zusammen tritt und das Recht hat, Sachvers·tiindige hinzuzuziehen und nach Bedarf auch ein fiinftes Mitglied zu bestellen. Kommt eine Einigung iiber das fiinfte Mitglied nicht zustande, so ist die Angelegenheit auf dem iiblichen diplomatischen Wege bei den 1Regierungen anhangig zu machen. Die Anrufunig der Kommission hat keine aufschiebende Wirkung. Dieser Vertra;g wird in doppelter Urschrift, in deutscher und in slowakischer Sprache ausgefertigt. Er tritt am Tage nach der Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Pressburg, den 12. August 1939. Fiir das Deutsche Reich: a. o. Gesandter und bevollmachtigter Minister des Deutschen Reichs in Pressburg Generalleu tnant 1. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, (hereafter as D. G. F. P.) Volume Vil, pp. 10-11. 2. For the Treaty and the Confidential -P rotocol on economic and financial cooperation see D. G. F. P. V[, pp. 42-4-5. 3. D. G. F. P. VJ, p. 43 - The Academic Guard played an out~ standing role since October 1938, but its participation on the struggle for independence was of great importance especially in the decisive days of March 10-14, 1939. It was a paramilitary organization of university students, led by Dr. J. Kirschbaum as supreme command er. After March 14, it supplied the Slovak Republic with many outstanding workers in the Slovak public life, namely in Party organization, press, diplomacy, cultural associations etc. Among the leaders of the Academic Guard who played an important part in March 1939, are now in exile Dr. Joseph ,P auco, Dr. Joseph Mikula, Koloman Murgas, Dr. G. Danihel, Dr. L . Jankovic, etc. In 1940 the Academic Guard was dissolved by the order of the Ministry of Jnternal Affairs because it opposed introduction of National Socialist ideology in 1Slovakia. Dr. Kirschbaum was first called to arms and then sent abroad. No Slovak newspaper was allowed to mention his nam e for two following years. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1939-1945. 4. The origin of this zone can be traced back to Berlin where Hitler, talking to Tiso on March 13, told him among other things tha,t not only Hungarians and Poles were mobilizing, but "the Czechs also want to occcupy the western part of Slovakia up to the Vah." Tiso in his defense hinted at this ominous suggestion which is also ,supported by the 0 . K. W. Memorandum of March 24, (R 100 (see: Nazi Conspiracy and Agression, VJII, p. 83) according to which, if Slovakia is k ept independent, the military Schutzzone is to extend up to the Vah; but if Slovakia is divided between Poles and Hungarians, the whole area up to the Nitra is to be incorporated in the Protectorate ("Sollte Slowakei aufigeteilet werden, soil die Ostwest [Neutra-linie] Grenze werden und Pressburg einbezogen werden"). 5. According to the report of the British Consul in •B ratislava on iMarch 15, the German troops had reached Malacky by mid.day of that day and Trencfn by evening (D. Brit. F. P .. 3rd Series. Vol. IV, �SLOVAKIA 23 p. 287). On March 17, the Slovak Foreign Ministry lodged in a "note verbale" several complaints on the behaviour of the German troops in the occupied territory. 6. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Joseph Pauco, Passaic, 1952, p. 232. 7. ibid. pp. ,233-4. 8. D. G. F. P., VJ, p. 756. 9. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, p. 234, footnote. 10. Tiso, Tuka and f>urcansky were invited to Berlin, where the latter two arrived on March 21. ,Ribbentrop kept them waiti.Il!g in complete uncertainty for three full days and then on March 23, at 12: 30 P. M., in their presence si,gned the Schutzvertrag. 11. The Polish White Book, pp. 62-3. 12. The offer to the Poles was, nevertheless, still open, and Hitler would have waived the .g uarantee if the ·Poles had been more cooperative (Cf. Doc. R 100 of March 24. How long the Fueh·rer considers himself bound to the 'T reaty concluded with Slovakia is open to doubt. It seems that he will use Slovakia as an asset to bargain between himself, Poland, and Hungary). On March 26, Ribbentrop a•g ain suggest-ed to Lipski "that the Slovak problem might still be discussed within the framework of a general Ausgleich" (see: Polish White Book, p. 67.), but the Poles now rejected the offer definitely. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. D. G. F. P., VI, pp. 114-115. ibid. p. 146. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. D. G. F. P., V[, pp. 7-56-762. ibid. p. 774. ibid. pp. 840-841. ibid. p. 916. ibid. pp. 9·52-953. ibid. p. 840, footnote. ibid. p. 1025. D. G F. P., Third Series, Vol. V, p. 89. D. G. F. P., Vil, pp. 254-255. At this conference, Tiso, Tuka, f>urcansky, and Mach negotiated with Barckhausen, Drufiel, Becker, and Hoffmann. The Slovaks advanced every argument imaiginable. if>urcansky thought that the presence of the German troops in the zone and outside it was generally interpreted as lack of trust on the part of the German Government in the Slovak Government. Tuka pointed out that the Slovak State should not be protected in the same manner as one would protect a flock of sheep, but that it should contribute to its own protection by having its own army, and this army must not be deprived of its equipment. Tiso and f>urcansky expressed the fea•r that, in case of the outbreak of Polish-!German hostilities, Hungary would invade Slovakia and, hence, Slovakia must be prepared for every eventuality. As for the Slovak desiderata, ihey were centered about these three points: (i) Establishment of two garrisons in the zone and the free use of the Malacky artillery range. (ii) Withdrawal of German military and other uniformed units (police, gendarmerie) from Zilina, Trencin, and Nove Mesto nad Vahom. (iii) Approval to keep nine tons of poisonous war gas ('Yperit'). D. G. F. P., VII, p. 2. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up 8 SLOVAKIA military installations in a zone bounded on the west by the frontier of the Slovak State and on the east by the general line of the eastern edge of the Little Carpathians, the eastern edge of the White Carpathians and the eastern edge of Javorniky, and to man these installations with such forces as the German Wehrmacht consider necessary ... Military sovereign rights (Hoheitsrechts) will be exercised by the German Wehrmacht (in this zone)" (3) . The establishment of this zone ( 4) represents in many respects an interesting aspect of Slovak-German relations. It casts a favorable light on a well-conceived but less successful attempt to extricate Slovak foreign policy from the agreed upon Slovak-German coordination in this field. This praiseworthy attempt and the subsequent unyielding behavior of Slovak politicians in the face of Hitler's demands contrast sharply with the charges of vassalage and servile obedience. In fact, the Slovaks resisted and contradicted Hitler's wishes (and with some success, too ) when powerful nations yielded and were advising others to yield. The negotiations concerning the zone were initiated on the night of March 17-18, 1939, in Vienna. At this time the occupation of Western Slovakia was already an accomplished fact (5) and - since possession is nine points of the law - the position of the ISlovak negotiators was noticeably weakened and by no means enviable. Nevertheless Dr. Joseph Tiso, Durcansky, Tuka, and Mach, the principal Slovak representatives, were determined to save could be saved. Preliminary negotiations started at Biirckel's flat at 5 p. m. Afterwards the Slovaks met SeyssInquart, then Keitel, and finally, at 1 a . m., on the 18th, in the Hotel Imperial they faced Hitler. Each stop represented more humiliation and more pressing demands and brought home one thing: Hitler was going to exact a high price for his protection ; much higher than he ever hinted at in Berlin on March 13th. Tiso was so disappointed at what he rightly considered - being let down that h e wanted to return to Bratislava without even seeing Hitler. Only his companions persuaded him to stay, arguing that in front of the Germans they all ought to show a united SLOVAKIA 9 determination not to give up even an inch of sacred Slovak soil (6). When Hitler, in the presence of Ribbentrop and Keitel, met the Slovaks, he told them - according to the testimony of Tiso - that the 'Shutzvertrag' could be realized only if Germany were given far-reaching concessions to build up a zone in Western Slovakia. The extent of these concessions - as Tiso clearly saw - left the Slovaks practically without any rights to exercise their sovereignty in that territory. It was more than he could bear. At 2 :45 A. M. he got up and was at the point of departure. Hitler, it must be said, in spite of his many shortcommings had a soft spot for the Slovaks and, apparently moved by the pathetic sight of the hardpressed protegees, stopped Tiso with a very assuring piece of oratory. He said: "I do not want even an inch of Slovak ground. In Slovakia the Slovaks alone will develop their own national, cultural, and economic life. I shall guarantee the full independence and territorial integrity of Slovakia. The historical frontiers of Slovakia are and remain forever unchanged. I shall hold my protective hand over ,S lovakia and nobody will reach with stealthy hand for the Slovak State, where the Slovaks will live their own full life" (7). This rhetorical outburst pacified the Slovaks; the rest of the discussion was carried on in a much happier mood. The Slovaks ceded the Germans the right to build and man fortifications in the zone "so as to enable the German Wehrmacht, in the event of war, to take up such positions as are most advantageous to it" (8). The Slovak delegation left Vienna with the impression that the zone remained within the legal structure of the Slovak State. No treaty was formulated or signed that night. Formal negotiations were conducted on the afternoon of March 18. Tiso did not take part in these conversations. The Slovaks were represented by Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Tuka a Zvrskovec; the Germans by Keppler and Gaus, the legal adviser to the Foreign Minister. The Treaty of Protection ( Schutzvertrag) was signed in Vienna the same day by :Durcansky and Tuka who also pledged to obtain Tiso's signature to the Treaty by noon of March 19, in re-1 10 SLOVAKIA turn for which Keppl er undert ook to get Ribbe ntrop's signature within 24 hours. :Durcansky, Tuka, and Veesenmayer broug ht the Treaty to Tiso for signat ure the evening March 18; he signed it and appear ed to be satisfi ed · with its formu lation (9). Ribben trop, on the other hand, did not sign the Treaty within the stipula ted time limit. All in all, the Germa ns were in no partic ular hurry with respec t to the Slovaks. The reason for their procra stinati on, which was so frustra ting and inexpl icable to the Slovak s then (10), is seen clearly now: they hoped to come to terms with the Poles and Hunga rians. The Polish White Book gives an accoun t of Ribbentrop's propos als to Lipski on March 21 (11), namely , that German-lPolish discus sions "would be possib le on this subject" (i. e., on the questi on of Slovak ia). But the Germa ns must have consid ered the Polish attitud e discou raging , and Ribbe ntrop put his signat ure on the Treaty on -March 23, in Berlin (12), but not before Article 3 of the Treaty was modifi ed and the words "in order to defend Slovak State agains t any possib le extern al attack s" were omitte d. Once the Treaty was signed, the execut ion of Article 2 proved to be more difficu lt than anticip ated. Appar ently the Germa n milita ry author ities were not very happy with what, after all, was a politic al settlem ent. Their behavi or left much to be desire d and Slovak protes ts were very soon pourin g in. At first, the surpri sed Slovak s asked for an explan ation, but later protes ted very vigorio usly. On March 25, the .Slovak Foreig n ·M inistry in a 'note verbal e" called for a more definit e determ ination of the probable durati on and charac ter in intern ationa l law of the Germa n occupa tion of Slovak territo ry. The note also protested a•g ainst the exerci se of sovere ign rights "beyon d those of milita ry necess ity" and agains t the remov al of milita ry materi al which - they claime d - by the secess ion of Slovak ia, had leg-ally become Slovak 'State proper ty (13). It was inevita ble that the occupa tion would cause considera ble frictio n betwee n the Slovak popula tion and the Germa n troops , and that this frictio n would projec t unfavora bly into Slovak -Germ an relatio ns. But the amoun t SLOVAKIA 11 of misunderstanding surpassed every expectation. The Slovaks in their optimistic enthusiasm were determined to enjoy their newly-gained independence to the fullest extent and consequently found the German presence in the zone very annoying and did not even try to hide their displeasure. The Germans, on the other hand, especially the military, did not bother to adjust their behavior in respect to the Slovaks. An ordinary German soldier and officer, fresh from victorious entries into Austria, the Sudetenland, and Bohemia, was hardly expected to be less arrogant towards Slovaks than he was towards Czechs; superiority was after all the essential part of his make-up. There were many instances of discontent, misunderstanding, and small incidents, and their existence could be best gauged by the frequent apologies and assurances which the 'Slovak Press Bureau was issuing in the newspapers and on the air. Under pressure of Slovak protests and complaints, the German representatives of General Staff and Foreign Ministry, at a meeting on March 28, agreed on a unified attitude towards the question of the zone. Their conclusions, though still by no means modest, represent in many respects retreat in the face of the Slovak protests, and can be briefly summarized as follows: 1. Withdrawal of the German Custom Frontier Protection Force to the Slovak-Moravian frontier. 2. The Vah fixed as the line of military occupation. 3. Appointment of a staff officer to the Consul General to act as liaison between the Slovak Army and the Wehrmacht. 4. The German troops east of the Vah to be recalled. 5. German claim to the entire war material of the former Czecho~Slovak army. 6. No removal of war material east of the occupied zone. 7. Decision as to size of the Slovak army. 8. Creation of s e p a r ate military formation for the Volksdeutche (14). Negotiations on the above topics took place on April 4 and were reported by Pares. Unfortunately no details concerning conversations are available, but it is known that 12 SLOVAKIA the Slovaks were represented by Dr. Tiso and the Ministers of War, Finance, and Economics, and the chief subject was the removal of war material "purchased by the German Government from the Czecho-!S lovak Government which had been stored in Slovakia" (15). As a result of these conversations, in addition to a German military adviser to be sent to Bratislava, a mixed Slovak-German commission was to be appointed to settle any controversial issue. At about the same time Tuka in his broadcast promised that the German army would leave when it was no longer needed. On April 15, the High Command of the Wehrmacht submitted a list of requirements, the fulfilment of which was expected from the Slovak Government under the Treaty of Protection. The demands, even in their "more lenient" form, were very exacting: 1. The High Command intended to maintain its military forces east of the Vah until the removal of "Czech arms and Czech war material" was completed. 2. Among the sovereign rights they claimed the right to occupy military and also public and private buildings, to use all forms and means of transport, to have at their disposal the factories concerned with war economy, duty-free import and export, postal services, telecommunications and Intelligence Service (Abwehrdienst). 3. The zone to include also Trencin, Krupa, Zilina, and Povazska Bystrica. 4. The size of Slovak army to be completed at one per cent of the population. 5. No units of the Slovak army to be garrisoned within the zone, but para-military formations (Hlinka Guards) to be allowed. 6. Export and import of war material to and from Slovakia to be refused or permitted by the Slovak Government only in agreement with the Reich Government or the High Command of the Wehrmacht (16). When these requirements were communicated by Druffel to Tiso, the latter declared that the Slovak Government did not wish to make difficulties, but asked for discussions with the German authorities on the highest level before SLOVAKIA 13 making any definite commitments. The Germans consented and, as a result, a conference took place in Berlin on April 19. Slovak representatives included Tiso, :Durcansky, and Tuka, the Ministry of Defense was represented by Catlos and Schneider, and also present were Cernak and Szathmary from the Slovak Legation in Berlin. The German delegation consisted of top-ranking experts, both political and military, but conspicious by their absence were the policy making personalities of the Reich. Its members were: Weissacker, Keppler, Wormann, Gaus, Altenburg, Tippelskirsch, HeydenRynsch, and Becker. Slovak grievances were numerous. To start with, Tiso mentioned the occupation by German troops of the aerodrome of Malacky and the demand by a German armored formation for transit through Bratislava. Then he complained of the severity of the demands of the German Wehrmacht, stating that "extension of the zone to Trencin and Zilina was hardly bearable for the Slovak Government"; of the behaviour of the German troops who in some villages occupied schools and thus made school attendance impossible, and employed Czech workers in preference to Slovaks. Furthermore, he claimed a share in the ownership of the former Czecho-Slovak arms factories and clamored for the return of a number of aircraft. German answers were either non-commital or asked to extend negotiations to clarify the application of the Treaty. Apparently the Slovaks demanded more than the German representatives were empowered to grant. Meanwhile the joint Slovak~German Commission was negotiating the treaty on the Zone of Protection but it did not seem to make any noticeable progress. On June 12, the Slovaks submitted another "note verbale'' which contained a number of Slovak views on the interpretation of the text of the Treaty. Arguments advanced by Slovaks were discussed at the conference on June 19 (17), where Tiso expressed the wish to draw up a memorandum and to discuss it personally with Hitler in hopeful expectation that the Slovaks might get more favorable treatment at the hands of the Fuhrer, than they were getting from his representatives. Hitler, however, declined to see Tiso and refused to consider the various points of the Slovak memorandum. 14 SLOVAKIA On June 21 this memorandum, in the form of an "aide memoire", was submitted to the German Foreign Ministry (18). It represented a voluminous list of complaints and expressed an outburst of accumulated Slovak indi,gnation about the German injustices. It questioned German rights to exclude Slovak garrisons from the zonal area, the interpretation of "sovereign rights", and claimed as Slovak the former Cecho..!Slovak military installations which were taken over by the Wehnnacht (such as the artillery range at Malacky); furthermore, it also questioned the wisdom of maintaining German ,garrisons outside the zone (e. g., in .Zilina, Trencin, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn) and criticised excursions of German troops to Bratislava and other places outside the zone. With regard to military material, the Slovak memorandum complained about the removal of war material from Pezinok, Modra, Malacky, Plavecke Podhradie, Hlboke, Turecky Vrch, Senica, Nemcova, Nove Mesto nad Va.horn, Trencin, Istebnik, Skalka, and .Zilina in a manner which "transgressed the bounds of an amicable atmosphere". Furthermore, it objected to occupation of munition factories and factories producing various types of war material at Dubnica, Povazska IBystrica, Stara Tura, Myjava, and .Zilina; to taking over of the stocks and installations of the airports at Novy Dvor and .Zilina; and it sadly commented that proceedings connected with the removal of war material were often conducted "as though Slovakia were an enemy country and not a State whose political and territorial independence had been guaranted by the Flihrer and Chancellor". The memorandum concluded a few more grievances against the military authorities whose attitude caused "administrative and economic uncertainty". The matter was then brought to Hitler's attention. This is evident from a statement made by Keitel on June 20, according to which Hitler's decision on the subject at the conference held by him amounted to the following: "The Flihrer said that he wished the negotiations to be conducted energetically and resolutely which, together with our concrete offers, must lead to early success. The prerequisite for the proposed support of Slovakia is the complete accep- SLOVAKIA 15 tance of our demeands, the more so as Slovakia is dependent on our military, economic, and financial aid." This authoritative pronouncement meant that all the subsequent attempts of the ,Slovaks for better terms encountered the adamant attitude of the German authorities. Thus, when, on June 22, the Slovak Minister in 'Berlin (Matus Cernak) saw Wormann at the German Foreign Ministry, he was brusquely told that the Germans disagreed with the Slovak Foreign Ministry's attempts to establish inconsistencies between the demands of the German Military Delegation and the assurances given by leading German statesmen regarding the conclusion of the Treaty of Protection. He was asked to make it clear in Bratislava that "the Military Delegation was among these demands in the name of the German Government". Cernak sugested that concessions be made by both parties and thought that this would make it possible to reach an agreement which would "not only maintain, but arouse sympathy for Germany" among the Slovak poulation. But Wormann had little understanding for the Slovak point of view and berated the Slovaks because several of the demands expressed in the memorandum of June 19 were in contradiction to the Treaty of Protection (19). On July 3, Cernak again called on the German Foreign Ministry, where he saw Weizsa.cker. He pleaded with him for moderation of the German demands, arguing that "Tiso's ... pro-German policy would be shaken, if it were not supported. In case of emergency, Slovakia would, of course, be completely at the disposal of German Armed Forces, but in peace-time one ought to remain within the scope of the terms of the Treaty. But again Cerna.k's arguments were of no avail and were, one by one, refuted by Weizsa.cker. Faced with such an uncooperative attitude, Cernak asked to be allowed to speak to Ribbentrop personally, but was told that the Foreign Minister was not available (20). The Slovaks, ignorant of Hitler's decision and trusting in his words with hopeful optimism, left no stone unturned in their attempts to secure more favorable terms. Their representatives were untiring in demanding interviews with Hitler and Ribbentrop who, as the chief architects of the 1 16 SLOVAKIA Slovak-German Treaty, could be made, they thought, to stand up to their promises. In this, however, they wer e unsuccessful. But they could get only to Weizsacker; and he, after trying to persuade them that the German negotiators "were acting on the instructions issued to them by the authoritative persons in the Reich", admonished the Slovaks that they should look at them as such and "conduct themselves accordingly" (21). As time went by, the Germans were getting progressively more and more anxious to have the whole issue about the interpretation of the Treaty finally settled and were apparently annoyed by the delay caused by the stubborness of the Slovaks. In view of the approaching German~olish conflict it was paramont for them to have their stand in Slovakia precisely determined and legalized. Their activity (often on the verge of nervousness) was in sharp contrast with the patient and determined attitude of the Slovaks who were unwilling to retreat. The situation was provided with a real touch of comedy when the Slovak statesmen went on their summer holidays (Tiso left for Topofcianky, Durcansky for the High Tatras) while German couriers were flying between and Bratislava. On July 19, Druffel was shown a report from Cernak according to which Eisenlohr and Weizsacker had expressed themselves in favour of token Slovak garrisons in the protected zone. On the strength of this report, Durcansky urged Catlos to dispatch some troops into the zone. On July 2:1, Catlos ordered one batallion to move in and, at the same time, informed the German military mission of his action. From the Germans came a vehement protest, coupled with threats, and the order was recalled. This move displeased Durcansky immensely. He maintained that Catlos should have created a "fait accompli" without regard for the German military mission and their feelings. The argument went so far that Catlos threatened to resign (22). Whether Catlos's action was right or wrong is open to question. It may be recalled, however, that at that time, the German military authorities were resolutely against ·any Slovak troops in that zone, and the same view was shared by Hitler. SLOVAKIA 17 On July 17, the German Foreign Ministry sent to their representative in Bratislava a letter of instructions with an enclosed draft of the Treaty on the Zone of Protection (23). With this draft as a basis, new negotiations ensued. Unfortunately no records were found concerning their course. From the report of tH. Bernard (new German Minister to Slovakia who replaced Druffel), we learn that they were concluded by July 31 and the Slovak representatives (again, we do not know, who they were; Tuka was probably one of them; Tiso and :Durcansky were vacationing) accepted the draft of the treaty with small amendments (24). Barckhausen then took this modified version of the Treaty to Berlin and, on August 7, brought it to Bratislava to Tuka, who then forwarded it to Tiso and :Durcansky (on their vacation) with a request for their approval (25 ). But the Treaty in its new form did not appeal either to Tiso or :Durcansky. Rejecting various points of the draft, they again upset the German applecart. On August 10, a new series of discussions was initiated, this time with :Durcansky present. These discussions finally brought concrete results. On Saturday evening, August 12, 1939, the Treaty on the Zone of Protection was signed at Bratislava by Minister Bernard and Lt. General Barckhausen on behalf of the German Reich, and by the Slovak Premier Tiso. The Treaty consisted of four Sections. Section I delimitated its extent. ,S ection II defined military sovereign rights of the German Wehrmacht and the sovereign rights of the Slovak State; German military sovereign rights included the right to requisition public and private premises, to use all means and lines of transportation, and to supervise armament factories working for the Reich; Germany was also given jurisdiction over her nationals; this Section also provided for Slovak garrisions within the zone. Section 1',III laid down rules regarding the employment of the personnel and material in, and on the payment for, the construction of fortifications. Section IV contained provisions for settlement of differences arising from the application of the Treaty. 1 SLOVAKIA: 16 Verbatim German Text of Treaty (.From Photostat) Abschrift. Schutzzonenvert rag Zur Regelung der sich aus dem Schutzvertrage vom 18./23. Marz 1939 ergebenden Fragen ist zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Slowakischen Republik durch die unterzeichneten Bevollmachtigten beider Regierungen folgendes vereinbart worden. Abschnitt I): Abgrenzung der Schutzzone. Artikel 1: Die Ausdehnung der in Artikel 2 des deutsch-slowakis chen Vertrages vom 18./ 23. Marz 1939 genannten Zone in folgendem mit ''Schutzzone" bezeichnet - ergibt sich aus der diesem Vertrage als Bestandteil angehefteten Landkarte in Masstabe 1: 7·5,000. Die Schutzzone erstreckt sich von Westen her bis zu der dieser Landkarte eingezeichneten roten Linie, und sie schliesst den von dieser Linie bedecken Tei! des slowakischen Gebietes ein. Eine Bez·e ichnung der ostwartigen Schutzzonenbeg renzungslinie im Gelande durch Tafeln oder Grenzsteine erfolgt nicht. lnnerhalb dieser Schutzzone wird das Deutsche Reich die ihm im Schutzvertrage vom 18-/ 23. Marz 1939 von dem Slowakischen Staat iibertragenen Aufgaben nach Massgabe der Bestimmungen dieses Vertrages durchfiihren. Abschnitt II): Rechtsverhaltni sse in der Schutzzone. Artikel 2: Mit den militarischen IHoheitsrechten, deren Ausiibung der deutschen Wehrmacht in Arti~el 2 des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz iibertragen worden ist, hat sie das Recht erhalten, im Sinne der fiir die Verteidigung des Slowakischen Staates im allgemeinen bestehenden Gesetze Leistungen im gleichen Masse wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in lFriedenszeiten zu fordern (ohne die ,B estimmungen, die in dem slowakischen Gesetz Nr. 131/36 enthalten sind). Bei Aufwendungen, die iiber den Rahmen normaler Manciverleistung en auch zeitlich hinausgehen, sind die hierfiir zu zahlenden Entschadigungen nach den ortsiiblichen Tagespreisen zu bemessen. Die deutsche Wehrmacht haftet fiir Schaden in gleichem Ausmass wie die slowakische Wehrmacht in tlbungszeiten. Demzufolge hat die deutsche Wehrmacht insbesondere folgende Rechte: a) (Das Recht, jederzeit in der Schutzzone militarische Anlagen zu errichten und im 'Benehmen mit den slowakischen Behcirden tiffentliche Gebaude, Grundstiicke and Anlagen fiir militarische Zwecke in Anspruch zu nehmen und private Gebaude und Grundstiicke in Benutzun_ zu nehmen, ohne die Durchfiihrung des Enteignungsverfahrens oder des Verfahrens zur voriibergehende n Entziehung der Benutzung abzuwarten, jedoch unbeschadet ,e iner spateren Regelung der Entschadigung. Die Entschadigung wird unter Mitwirkun,g deutscher Beauftragter im Wege giitlicher Verhandlun,gen mit den Betroffenen festigesetzt. IKommt eine giitliche Eintgung nicht zustande, so bleibt es den Betroffenen vorbehalten, die Festsetzung der Entschadig-ung nach den slowakischen Gesetzen zu betragen. In diesem Falle bleibt im SLOVAKIA 19 Verhaltnis zu dem Deutschen Reich die Hohe der Entschadigung einer Vereinbarung mit der Slowakischen Regierung vorbehalten. b) Das Recht zur Benutzung der in der Schutzzone vorhanden,en Transportmittel und Transportwege unter moglichster Berucksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Jnteressen der Slowakischen Republik. Ausserdem kann bei Vorliegen besonderer militarischer Notwendigkeiten die Bahn Pressburg-Ty,r nau-Pistyan-Trencin'8 illeinJCadca und die Strassen Pressburg-Modern-Na das-Trencin and Pressburg-Tyrnau-Pis tyan-Trencin,Sillein>C adca, von Trencin aus bis Cadca auch auf dem ostwartigen Waag-und Kysucaufer benutzt werden. Ferner erhalt die deutsche Wehrmacht das Recht, alle Orte zwischen Pressburg (ausschliesslich) and Cadca an den oben genannten Strassen bei Vorliegen militarischer Griinde vorubergehend zur Einquartierung zu benutzen. Die Slowakische Regierung ist hiervon in Kenntnis zu setzen. Die Benutzung der Eisenbahnlinien wird durch Sondertarifabmachun gen geregelt. Bei der Benutzung anderer slowakischer Verkehrsmittel sind die ortsiiblichen Tarifsatze zu zahlen, wenn nicht im Wege der Vereinbarung ein anderweitiger Entgelt fur die Benutzung festgesetzt wird. c) Das Recht, Riistungsbetriebe, die Auftrage vom Deutschen Reich erhalten, zu beaufsichtigen und auszunutzen unter BeriicksichUgung der Bediirfnisse der slowakischen Wehrmacht. Hieriiber wird eine besondere Vereinbarung zwischen den zustandigen Stellen der Deutschen Regierung und der Regierung des Slowakischen iStaates abgeschlossen werden. d) iDas Recht, in der Schutzzone alle erforderlichen Massnahmen des militarischen Abwehrdienstes zu treffen und von den Behorden des Slowakischen Staates die Anordnung und Durchfiihrung aller hierfiir erforderlichen Exekutivmassnahmen zu verlangen. !Die Deutsche Wehrmacht hat das !Recht, gegeniiber deutschen Wehrmachtangehori<g en und den fiir Wehrmachtzwecke in der Schutzzone tatigen reichsdeutschen Beamten, An-gestellten und Arbeitern deutsche militarische Exekutivorgane einzusetzen. Diese diirfen ,g egentiber Personen, die nicht die Staatsangehorigkeit im Deutschen Reich besitzen, nur in dringenden •Fallen, sofern slowakische Sicherheitsorgane nicht errechbar sind, Exekutivmassnahmen treffen. Festgenommene sind den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden unverziiglich, spatestens binnen 24 Stunden, zu ubergeben. e) Das Recht zur zollfreien Versor,g ung der deutschen Truppen und zur zollfreien Belieferung der militarischen Anlrugen aus dem Reich. Hieriiber wird eine Sondervereinbarung getroffen. Die Slowakische Regierung wird in engsten Einvernehmen mit der deutschen Wehrmacht alle Massnahmen treffen, die erforderlich sind, um der deutschen Wehrmacht die Durchfiihrung der ihr zum Schutz des Slowakischen S·taates, der Schutzzone und der darin befindlichen Truppen und militarischen Anlagen ubertragenen Aufgaben im Sinne des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 zu ermoglichen und zu erleichtern. Artikel 3: Alie Hoheitsrechte in der Schutzzone ubt, soweit nicht im Vertrage vom 18. /2:3. Marz 1939 und in diesem Vertrage anders vereinbart, der Slowakische Staat aus. Hinsichtlich der Hoheitsrechte des Slowakischen Staates ist inbesondere folgendes vereinbart: a) Die Geltung aller jetzt und kiinftig gultigen rechtlichen Vor- 20 SLOVAKIA schriften der Slowakischen Republik erstreckt sich auf das Gebiet der Schutzzone, wenn dies nicht ausdriicklich ausgenommen wird, oder dem Sinne dieses Vertraiges und des Vertrages vom 18./23. Marz 1939 widerspricht. b) ,Die slowakischen Behorden in der Schutzzone iiben ihren Dienst weiterhin aus und unterliegen weiterhin uneingeschrankt der Aufsich t der ihnen vorgesetzten Behorden des Slowakischen Staates. c) Die Ausnutzung und Belegung der in der Schutzzone befindlichen militarischen Anlagen durch die slowakische Wehrmacht, das Uberliegen der Schutzzone durch slowakische Militarflugzeu.ge soiwie das Betraten der Schutzzone durch einzelne Angehorige der slowakischen Wehrmacht wird durch besondere Vereinbarung geregelt. d) In der Schutzzone kann der Zutrtt zu militarisch wichtigen Gebietsteilen, Befestigungsarbeiten and -anlagen von der deutschen Wehrmacht verhindert werden. Das Betretungsverbot wird von den zustandigen slowakischen Behorden auf Veranlassung der deutschen Wehrmachtstellen und in beiderseitigem Einvernehmen erlassen und der Bevolkerung in ortsiiblichen Weise bekanntgegeben werden. e) Die Einrichtung von Uberfluigzonen in der Schutzzone zur Ermoglichen des gegenseitiigen zivilen Flugverkehrs wird einer besonderen Vereinbarung vorbehalten. f) Deutsche Wehrmachtangehorig e diirfen das slowakische Staatsgebiet ausserhalb der Schutzzone nur betreten 1) aus dienstlichem Anlass mit Bewilligung der slowakischen zustandigen Behorden (Ausnahme Art. 2c) 2) bei Urlaub nur gemass den deutschen Bestimmungen iiber Auslandsurlaub. Artikel 4: Deutsche Wehrmachtsangehorig e, die sich auf Grund des Schutzvertragen vom 18./23. Marz 1939 in der Schutzzone befinden, sind den deutschen Strafgesetzen unterworfen und unterstehen wegen aller in der Schutzzone begangenen strafbaren Handlungen der deutschen Strafgerich tsbarkeit. Sonstige deutsche Staatsangehorige, die bei den Befestigungsarbeiten beschaftigt sind, sind wegen strafbarer Handlungen, die in der Schutzzone begangen sind und sich gegen das Deutsche Reich richten, allein der deutschen Strafgerichtsbarkeit unterworfen. Deutsche Reichsangehoriige sowie reichsdeutsche Handelsgesellschaften, Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossens chaften, die auf Grund eines privaten Vertragsverhaltnisses mit der Errichtung militarischer Anlagen in der Schutzzone befasst sind, konnen aus ihrem gegen-seitigen Rechtsverhaltnis sowie aus ihrem Rechtsverhaltnis zum Deutschen Reich wegen eines Anspruchs aus ihren iRechtsverhaltnissen, namentlich aus Arbeits-, Dienst-- und Lieferungsverhaltnissen oder wegen einer unerlaubten Handlung, die mit der Tatigkeit zur Errichtung der militarischen AnlaJgen unmittelbar in Zusammenhang steht, nur vor deutschen Gerichten verklagt werden. Klagen wegen dieser Anspriiche konnen bei dem Amts- oder Landgericht Briinn erhoben werden. Es bleibt der Reichsregierung vorbehalten, auch andere Gerichte zu bestimmen. Artikel 5: In den vor die deutschen Gerichte gehorigen Strafsachen sind die Sicherheitsbehorden des Slowakischn Staates befugt, bei Gefahr im Verzuge nach den fiir sie geltenden Verfahrengesetzten SLOVAKIA 21 die ;\-lassnahmen zu treffen, die zur Aufklii.rung des Sachverhalts, zur Festhaltung des Beschuldigten oder zur Sicherung von Gegen-stii.nden notwendig sind, die z1ir Begehung strafbarer Handlungen gebraucht oder bestimmt sind. Von dem Veranlassten haben die Sicherheitsbehiirden des Slowakischen Staates unverziiglich den nii.chsten Gerichtsherrn (Divisionskommander) in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm einen festgenommen Beschuldigten zuzufahren. Deutsche Wehrmachtsan:gehiirige sowie die fiir Wehrmacht21wecke in der ,s chutzzone tii.ti1g en deutschen •Reichsangehorigen haben stii.ndig einen giiltigen Personenausweis bei sich zu fiihren, mit dem sie sich gegeniiber slowakischen Sicherheitsorganen auf Aufforderung ausweisen konnen. A r t ikel 6 : Die Slowakischen Behiirden werden Handlungen, die ,g egen die in diesem Vertrag festgelegten Interessen des Deutschen Reichs gerichtet sind, so verfol•g en als ob sie gegen den Slowakischen Staat gerichtet wii.ren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird dafiir Sorge tragen, dass das Deutsch e Reich die Miiglichkeit erhii.lt, den deutschen Interessen Geltung zu verschaffen, wenn es sich in Strafverfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehorden um Fragen handelt, die das gemeinsame Interesse des Deutschen Reichs und des Slowakischen Staates beriihren. Die Slowakische Regierung wird ferner im Einvernehmen mit der Reichsregierung Vorkehrungen treffen, dass den in Artikel 4 bezeichneten Personen in Verfahren vor slowakischen Justizbehiirden in sprachlicher Hinsicht weitestgehende Erleichterungen zuteil werden. Absch nitt 111 ) : Befestigung.sarbeiten. A r t ike l 7: Militii.rische Bauten and -Anlagen innerhalb der Schutzzone werden vom Reich auf eigene Kosten hergestellt. Artike l 8 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird das fiir die Arbeiten und Anlagen in der Schutzzone erforderliche Material nach Miiglichkeit aus dem slowakischen Staatsgebiet beziehen. Soweit Preise hierfiir niclrt im Wege der Ausschreibun,g und freien Vereinbarung festJgelegt werden, sind die iiblichen Ta,g espreisen zu zahlen . Artike l 9 : Die Deutsche Wehrmacht wird bei der Ausfiihrung d er Arbeiten und Anlagen vorzugsweise Arbeits krii.fte aus der Slowakei anstellen. Eine Abweichung hiervon kommt insbesondere in Frage, wenn militii.rische Griinde die Einstellung bestimmter anderer Arbeitskrii.fte, z. B. gelernter Fach- und Spezialarbeiter erforderlich machen. Arbeitskrii.fte aus der Slowakei werden in slowakischer Wii.hrung entlohnt. Bei der Einstellung von Arbeitern wird nach einem allgemeinen, im Benehmen mit d er Slowakischen iRegierung aufgestellten Vertrage formular vorfabren. A r t ike l 10: Nach den slowakischen Gesetzen ist zu verfahren, wenn bei Arbeiten and Anlagen der deutschen Wehrmacht in der Schutzzone historisch wichtige 1Funde gemacht werden, oder wenn dabei Mineral- und Erzlager, oder andere Bodenschii.tze entdeckt werden. Art ike l 11 : Die deutsche Wehrmacht ,w ird bei den in der Schutzzone durchzufiihrenden Arbeiten und Anlagen mit besonderer Sor,g falt auf historische Denkmii.ler und auf die fiir den Slowakischen Staat und die slowakische Nation bedeutsamen Oiits Riicksicht nehmen. Abschnitt IV ) : Schlussbestimm ungen. Artike l 12 : Alie Meinungsverchiedenheiten, die sich aus der Durchfiihrung dieses Vertrages ergeben, werden, soweit sie nicht zur Zu- 22 SLOVAKIA stiindigkeit anderer O11gane gehoren, einer Kommission unterbreitet, die aus 2 deutschen und 2 slo.wakischen Mitgliedern bestehen soil, die im Bedarfsfalle zusammen tritt und das Recht hat, Sachvers·tiindige hinzuzuziehen und nach Bedarf auch ein fiinftes Mitglied zu bestellen. Kommt eine Einigung iiber das fiinfte Mitglied nicht zustande, so ist die Angelegenheit auf dem iiblichen diplomatischen Wege bei den 1Regierungen anhangig zu machen. Die Anrufunig der Kommission hat keine aufschiebende Wirkung. Dieser Vertra;g wird in doppelter Urschrift, in deutscher und in slowakischer Sprache ausgefertigt. Er tritt am Tage nach der Unterzeichnung in Kraft. Pressburg, den 12. August 1939. Fiir das Deutsche Reich: a. o. Gesandter und bevollmachtigter Minister des Deutschen Reichs in Pressburg Generalleu tnant 1. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, (hereafter as D. G. F. P.) Volume Vil, pp. 10-11. 2. For the Treaty and the Confidential -P rotocol on economic and financial cooperation see D. G. F. P. V[, pp. 42-4-5. 3. D. G. F. P. VJ, p. 43 - The Academic Guard played an out~ standing role since October 1938, but its participation on the struggle for independence was of great importance especially in the decisive days of March 10-14, 1939. It was a paramilitary organization of university students, led by Dr. J. Kirschbaum as supreme command er. After March 14, it supplied the Slovak Republic with many outstanding workers in the Slovak public life, namely in Party organization, press, diplomacy, cultural associations etc. Among the leaders of the Academic Guard who played an important part in March 1939, are now in exile Dr. Joseph ,P auco, Dr. Joseph Mikula, Koloman Murgas, Dr. G. Danihel, Dr. L . Jankovic, etc. In 1940 the Academic Guard was dissolved by the order of the Ministry of Jnternal Affairs because it opposed introduction of National Socialist ideology in 1Slovakia. Dr. Kirschbaum was first called to arms and then sent abroad. No Slovak newspaper was allowed to mention his nam e for two following years. See Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1939-1945. 4. The origin of this zone can be traced back to Berlin where Hitler, talking to Tiso on March 13, told him among other things tha,t not only Hungarians and Poles were mobilizing, but "the Czechs also want to occcupy the western part of Slovakia up to the Vah." Tiso in his defense hinted at this ominous suggestion which is also ,supported by the 0 . K. W. Memorandum of March 24, (R 100 (see: Nazi Conspiracy and Agression, VJII, p. 83) according to which, if Slovakia is k ept independent, the military Schutzzone is to extend up to the Vah; but if Slovakia is divided between Poles and Hungarians, the whole area up to the Nitra is to be incorporated in the Protectorate ("Sollte Slowakei aufigeteilet werden, soil die Ostwest [Neutra-linie] Grenze werden und Pressburg einbezogen werden"). 5. According to the report of the British Consul in •B ratislava on iMarch 15, the German troops had reached Malacky by mid.day of that day and Trencfn by evening (D. Brit. F. P .. 3rd Series. Vol. IV, SLOVAKIA 23 p. 287). On March 17, the Slovak Foreign Ministry lodged in a "note verbale" several complaints on the behaviour of the German troops in the occupied territory. 6. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Joseph Pauco, Passaic, 1952, p. 232. 7. ibid. pp. ,233-4. 8. D. G. F. P., VJ, p. 756. 9. Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, p. 234, footnote. 10. Tiso, Tuka and f>urcansky were invited to Berlin, where the latter two arrived on March 21. ,Ribbentrop kept them waiti.Il!g in complete uncertainty for three full days and then on March 23, at 12: 30 P. M., in their presence si,gned the Schutzvertrag. 11. The Polish White Book, pp. 62-3. 12. The offer to the Poles was, nevertheless, still open, and Hitler would have waived the .g uarantee if the ·Poles had been more cooperative (Cf. Doc. R 100 of March 24. How long the Fueh·rer considers himself bound to the 'T reaty concluded with Slovakia is open to doubt. It seems that he will use Slovakia as an asset to bargain between himself, Poland, and Hungary). On March 26, Ribbentrop a•g ain suggest-ed to Lipski "that the Slovak problem might still be discussed within the framework of a general Ausgleich" (see: Polish White Book, p. 67.), but the Poles now rejected the offer definitely. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. D. G. F. P., VI, pp. 114-115. ibid. p. 146. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. D. G. F. P., V[, pp. 7-56-762. ibid. p. 774. ibid. pp. 840-841. ibid. p. 916. ibid. pp. 9·52-953. ibid. p. 840, footnote. ibid. p. 1025. D. G F. P., Third Series, Vol. V, p. 89. D. G. F. P., Vil, pp. 254-255. At this conference, Tiso, Tuka, f>urcansky, and Mach negotiated with Barckhausen, Drufiel, Becker, and Hoffmann. The Slovaks advanced every argument imaiginable. if>urcansky thought that the presence of the German troops in the zone and outside it was generally interpreted as lack of trust on the part of the German Government in the Slovak Government. Tuka pointed out that the Slovak State should not be protected in the same manner as one would protect a flock of sheep, but that it should contribute to its own protection by having its own army, and this army must not be deprived of its equipment. Tiso and f>urcansky expressed the fea•r that, in case of the outbreak of Polish-!German hostilities, Hungary would invade Slovakia and, hence, Slovakia must be prepared for every eventuality. As for the Slovak desiderata, ihey were centered about these three points: (i) Establishment of two garrisons in the zone and the free use of the Malacky artillery range. (ii) Withdrawal of German military and other uniformed units (police, gendarmerie) from Zilina, Trencin, and Nove Mesto nad Vahom. (iii) Approval to keep nine tons of poisonous war gas ('Yperit'). D. G. F. P., VII, p. 2.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The German Zone of Protection in Slovakia Description An account of the resource František Vnuk Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959 pp. 7-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Vnuk, František, 1926- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d1cc0a93dbd95bd1b1fbd778b50e6325.pdf 65f52a16a669273bb3ae5d3524330cae PDF Text Text SL OV AK IA Published by the Slovak League of America VOrL. IX MARCH, 1959 NO. 4 (29) FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DEOLAR ATION OF INDEPE NDENCE (A chapter from the book "The Case of Slovakia" to be published on the occasion of the twentieth anniversar y of Slovakia's declaration of Independen ce ) By J. M. Kirschba um The presentat ion of events which led to Slovakia' s declaration of independe nce needs some comment s and explanation in order to be properly understoo d. Some American historian s accepted, without the necessary caution, the one-sided Czech presentat ion of the political causes, as well as of the activities of individua l Slovak politician s and their intentions . Three things are to be particula rly comment ed upon: 1) the imminent menace of Hungaria n occupatio n; 2) the visit of Keppler-S eyss-Inqu art-Biirck el to Bratislav a, or the so-called Sidor episode; and, 3) attitudes and activities of the prinicpal Slovak leaders. The writer, though too young according to the American standard s to play a role in national politics, was, in many respects, involved in the ,M arch imbroglio as a former member of the editorial staff of the Slovak People's Party newspape rs, as a leader of universit y and youth organizatio ns, and since October 1938 as the Executiv e Secretary to the Minister of Justice and, finally, as a close friend of Alexande r Mach and Dr. Ferdinan d Durcansk y. Being one of those on the list of the Prague's government who was supposed to be arrested on March 10, 1939, the writer was from the first moment in continuou s contact with Dr. Joseph Tiso and Karol 1Sidor, on the one hand, and with Dr. Durcansk y over the border in Vienna, on the other, and, of course, with Alexande r Mach and the leaders of the Universit y Hlinka Guards, as well. �SLOVAKIA 2 Was there any serious Hungarian menace? Did Ribbentrop use Horthy's telegram as part of a premeditated trick in order to influence Dr. Tiso and :Durcansky, or did the Hungarians really intend to occupy Slovakia? All documents and published memoirs prove that the Hungarian government undoubtedly aimed at the annexation of Slovakia in 1938-1939; this was a twenty-year effort on the part of Magyar politicians and diplomats, in 1938 strongly supported by Mussolini and Ciano, and never denied by any Magyar. The slogan of Magyar politics between the wars was "Mindent visza" - everything returned that Hungary "lost" at the 'P eace Conference of 1919 or prior to that time. In 1938-1939 the Magyars saw, for the first time, an opportunity for their dreams and desires to be realized. According to published documents of the Nurenberg Trials, the telegram sent to Hitler by Hungary's Regent Nicholas Horthy and mentioned during the conversations between the Chancellor Hitler and the Slovak representatives, reads as follows : Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks. I cannot express how happy I am, for this headI dislike using big words water region is, in fact, for Hungary a vital question. Notwithstanding our recruits of but five weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust. I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly on my gratitude. In friendly devotion Horthy Budapest, March 13, 1939. The term "headwater region" means Slovakia, and, since the Slovak leaders were informed by Dr. Vehsenmeyer already in February of a planned invasion of Slovakia by Hungary about March 15, they definitely could not doubt the seriousness of the situation. In fact, the Hungarian menace played quite an important role before Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were invited by Chancellor Hitler to Berlin. When President Ha.cha, on March 10, deposed the Slovak autonomous government and 1 �SLOVAKIA 3 issued orders for the arrest over 300 Slovak leaders, including the members of Dr. Tiso's government and the Slovak Diet, Dr. :Durcansky fled to Vienna in order to save Slovakia from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors. :Durcansky was one of the Slovak politicians who knew of German plans with regard to Bohemia, since he was also present at the meeting with Dr. Vehsenmeyer, on February 13, at which the latter informed Slovak leaders of Hungary's plans. After a long discussion with deposed premier Msgr. Tiso, the writer, on the afternoon of March 10, crossed the Danube in order to meet :Durcansky on Austrian territory and discuss the proper steps to be taken. There was no doubt that Germany would, within two or three days, occupy Bohemia and Slovakia's fate depended on Slovakia's decision and political adroitness. For :Durcansky and the writer it was clear that the hour of decision in regard to Slovakia's independence had arrived. In our eyes, it was one of the historical opportunities which numerically small, dominated peoples cannot bypass without paying heavy penalties. Long before March, we spoke and wrote on Slovakia's right to independence and definitely no hatred toward the Czechs or sympathy for Germany or Nazism played any role in our minds. As members of the conservative Slovak People's Party with a Christian democratic world outlook, we were opposed to the Nazi ideology or political system from all points of view. We were both former functionaries of Catholic University organizations (1), who received their political schooling in Paris and we were adherents to the philosophy of the natural right of peoples to self-government. In our opinion, and such was the case with many educated Slovaks of our generation, the March events presented to Slovaks the first international opportunity to apply the right to independence. When we saw that Slovakia could be saved at the same time from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors, we feverishly worked on preparing Slovakia's declaration of independence. A draft of a government of Independent Slovakia was prepared by :Durcansky, and we discussed what steps to take in Slova- �4 SLOVAKIA kia and what to do in Vienna and Berlin where, since Munich, there was undoubtedl y a new "Versailles " for Central Europe, with a German free hand in disposing of the future of Central European peoples. While Durcansky returned to Vienna, the writer crossed the Danube with the draft of the new governmen t and had a task to obtain Dr. Tiso's consent and to convince Karol Sidor that the hour had struck for declaring Slovakia's independen ce ; that it was the only way to save Slovakia and that we should not hesitate to seize a historical opportunity to achieve what peoples of the globe, including the Americans, tried to achieve by blood and bitter battle as the highest ideal of their national aspirations . Back in Bratislava I found the situation a little confused but no longer in the hands of the Czech gendarmer ie and army. The Hlinka Guards and university students were openly manifestat ing for independen ce. Dr. Tiso left Bratislava in the meantime, for his parish town Banovce, and I was able to reach him only through messengers and by the telephone. My long discussion with Karol Sidor, who was on the list of the future governmen t of independen t Slovakia as Prime Minister, was not successful He was reluctant to give a written statement that he was in favor of Slovakia's independen ce, though he agreed with our activities for independen ce. Sidor feared that I could be arrested and such a statement, if found by the police would cause more harm than good. He feared particularl y that the Czechs would execute the 300 Slovak political prisoners among whom he had many personal friends. ,Sidor was not against Slovakia's independen ce in principle and had previous contacts with German representat ives, the last on March 7 with Seyss-Inqu art with whom he discussed such a possibility. According to his views, expressed during our conversation, the situation was not yet ripe and, therefore, he said he would neither hinder nor help if anyone else were to try to make Slovakia independen t (2). Sidor's behavior was also caused, as I learned during my second conversatio n with him, by the fact that he knew that Prague would appoint him Prime Minister of the Slovak Autonomou s Governmen t. In the middle of our second �SLOVAKIA 5 discussion, Prague's radio actually announced that President Ha.cha nominated him head of the Slovak Autonomous Government. Sidor got off his seat after the news and sa~d to me: "For the time being, I am decided to accept this . premiership." My secretary and several officers of the A c a d e m 1 c Guard were waiting in front of Sidor's residence and one of them was sent to bring the news to Dr. :Durcansky who, in the firm hope that my mission was successful, in the meantime, informed the German representative s in Vienna that Slovakia would declare independence and handed them the draft of the proposed Slovak government headed by Dr. Tiso as President and Sidor as Prime Minister (3). The radio news of Sidor's acceptance of Hacha's nomination caused confusion in Vienna and Berlin about the Slovak situation and it was for this reason that Hitler send Keppler to Bratislava to learn from Sidor what was the intention of :Slovak leaders. W. Keppler, who was at that time Secretary of State, accompanied by Reichs Governor, Seyss-Inquart , the Gauleiter of Astria, Joseph Biirckel, Franz Karmasin, and Rudolf Vavra, an active leader of the Slovak group in Vienna, paid a midnight visit to Sidor in the government building in Bratislava. Sidor expected the visitors and to the contrary of what was unobjectively reported about impolite behavior and pressure, Keppler behaved politely, did not insist and did not threaten. He informed Sidor, apologizing for his late visit, that Chancellor Hitler received telegrams urging him to support Slovakia's claim for independence and, therefore, sent him to ascertain the real state of affairs. Sidor at first argued evasively through an interpreter and tried to convince his visitors that Slovakia was not yet prepared, according to his views, and that the Parliament and not individuals had the right to declare independence. The discussion became less diplomatic only when Biirckel, who was apparently under the influence of alcohol, began to talk loudly and showed Sidor the list of government which Dr. :Durcansky had sent to Berlin, relying on the success of my earlier discussions with Sidor. Bfirckel, undiplomatica lly and not quite in line with the truth, in- �6 SLOVAKIA sisted that Sidor had already given his consent "when Dr. Kirschbaum visited you". Sidor declared that it was not true. Biirckel, surprised and irate, retorted that "the Fuhrer must not be embarrasse d and deceived". Though Sidor tried to explain that he had neither embarrasse d nor deceived Chancellor Hitler, Keppler and his entourage seemed apparently diappointed and disillusioned, and Keppler later reported to Hitler that Sidor was a "soldier of Prague and had been bribed". It was this failure of Keppler's mission which motivated Hitler to send an invitation to Dr. Joseph Tiso. The writer was asked by :Durcansky from Vienna to find out if Tiso would accept such an invitation. I called Dr. Tiso at about midnight and mentioned that I wished to discuss matters of utmost importance with him. Dr. Tiso answered that it was too late to discuss serious matters and asked me to call the next morning. I immediatel y sent two reliable officers of the Acandemic Guards and my chauffeur with a message to Dr. Tiso's parish town and informed Dr. :Durcansky in Vienna. Another messenger was, however, also enroute with two formal invitations through Consular channels. Dr. Tiso asked the writer to inform the president of The Slovak Diet, the Slovak Governmen t and the leadership of the Hlinka Party that he would be back in Bratislava for consultatio n in the morning. At a joint meeting of all the leaders of Parliament , Governmen t, and the Party - it was decided, on the morning of March 13, to accept the invitation. Accompani ed by a member of Parliament , Dr. Tiso left for Vienna and from Vienna, joined by Dr. :Durcansky and Keppler, flew to Berlin. For truth's sake, the writer adds that Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were received in Berlin in accordance with diplomatic protocol, as representat ives of foreign nations were accustomed to being received. From many discussions which the writer had with Dr. Tiso on this subject and from Dr. Tiso's report to the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939, it is clear that the Slovak representat ives were received politely and no pressure or arrogant behavior (such as adversaries of Slovak independen ce tried to make the Western World believe) ( 4) was resorted to on that occasion. �SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up � SL OV AK IA Published by the Slovak League of America VOrL. IX MARCH, 1959 NO. 4 (29) FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DEOLAR ATION OF INDEPE NDENCE (A chapter from the book "The Case of Slovakia" to be published on the occasion of the twentieth anniversar y of Slovakia's declaration of Independen ce ) By J. M. Kirschba um The presentat ion of events which led to Slovakia' s declaration of independe nce needs some comment s and explanation in order to be properly understoo d. Some American historian s accepted, without the necessary caution, the one-sided Czech presentat ion of the political causes, as well as of the activities of individua l Slovak politician s and their intentions . Three things are to be particula rly comment ed upon: 1) the imminent menace of Hungaria n occupatio n; 2) the visit of Keppler-S eyss-Inqu art-Biirck el to Bratislav a, or the so-called Sidor episode; and, 3) attitudes and activities of the prinicpal Slovak leaders. The writer, though too young according to the American standard s to play a role in national politics, was, in many respects, involved in the ,M arch imbroglio as a former member of the editorial staff of the Slovak People's Party newspape rs, as a leader of universit y and youth organizatio ns, and since October 1938 as the Executiv e Secretary to the Minister of Justice and, finally, as a close friend of Alexande r Mach and Dr. Ferdinan d Durcansk y. Being one of those on the list of the Prague's government who was supposed to be arrested on March 10, 1939, the writer was from the first moment in continuou s contact with Dr. Joseph Tiso and Karol 1Sidor, on the one hand, and with Dr. Durcansk y over the border in Vienna, on the other, and, of course, with Alexande r Mach and the leaders of the Universit y Hlinka Guards, as well. �SLOVAKIA 2 Was there any serious Hungarian menace? Did Ribbentrop use Horthy's telegram as part of a premeditated trick in order to influence Dr. Tiso and :Durcansky, or did the Hungarians really intend to occupy Slovakia? All documents and published memoirs prove that the Hungarian government undoubtedly aimed at the annexation of Slovakia in 1938-1939; this was a twenty-year effort on the part of Magyar politicians and diplomats, in 1938 strongly supported by Mussolini and Ciano, and never denied by any Magyar. The slogan of Magyar politics between the wars was "Mindent visza" - everything returned that Hungary "lost" at the 'P eace Conference of 1919 or prior to that time. In 1938-1939 the Magyars saw, for the first time, an opportunity for their dreams and desires to be realized. According to published documents of the Nurenberg Trials, the telegram sent to Hitler by Hungary's Regent Nicholas Horthy and mentioned during the conversations between the Chancellor Hitler and the Slovak representatives, reads as follows : Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks. I cannot express how happy I am, for this headI dislike using big words water region is, in fact, for Hungary a vital question. Notwithstanding our recruits of but five weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust. I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly on my gratitude. In friendly devotion Horthy Budapest, March 13, 1939. The term "headwater region" means Slovakia, and, since the Slovak leaders were informed by Dr. Vehsenmeyer already in February of a planned invasion of Slovakia by Hungary about March 15, they definitely could not doubt the seriousness of the situation. In fact, the Hungarian menace played quite an important role before Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were invited by Chancellor Hitler to Berlin. When President Ha.cha, on March 10, deposed the Slovak autonomous government and 1 �SLOVAKIA 3 issued orders for the arrest over 300 Slovak leaders, including the members of Dr. Tiso's government and the Slovak Diet, Dr. :Durcansky fled to Vienna in order to save Slovakia from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors. :Durcansky was one of the Slovak politicians who knew of German plans with regard to Bohemia, since he was also present at the meeting with Dr. Vehsenmeyer, on February 13, at which the latter informed Slovak leaders of Hungary's plans. After a long discussion with deposed premier Msgr. Tiso, the writer, on the afternoon of March 10, crossed the Danube in order to meet :Durcansky on Austrian territory and discuss the proper steps to be taken. There was no doubt that Germany would, within two or three days, occupy Bohemia and Slovakia's fate depended on Slovakia's decision and political adroitness. For :Durcansky and the writer it was clear that the hour of decision in regard to Slovakia's independence had arrived. In our eyes, it was one of the historical opportunities which numerically small, dominated peoples cannot bypass without paying heavy penalties. Long before March, we spoke and wrote on Slovakia's right to independence and definitely no hatred toward the Czechs or sympathy for Germany or Nazism played any role in our minds. As members of the conservative Slovak People's Party with a Christian democratic world outlook, we were opposed to the Nazi ideology or political system from all points of view. We were both former functionaries of Catholic University organizations (1), who received their political schooling in Paris and we were adherents to the philosophy of the natural right of peoples to self-government. In our opinion, and such was the case with many educated Slovaks of our generation, the March events presented to Slovaks the first international opportunity to apply the right to independence. When we saw that Slovakia could be saved at the same time from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors, we feverishly worked on preparing Slovakia's declaration of independence. A draft of a government of Independent Slovakia was prepared by :Durcansky, and we discussed what steps to take in Slova- �4 SLOVAKIA kia and what to do in Vienna and Berlin where, since Munich, there was undoubtedl y a new "Versailles " for Central Europe, with a German free hand in disposing of the future of Central European peoples. While Durcansky returned to Vienna, the writer crossed the Danube with the draft of the new governmen t and had a task to obtain Dr. Tiso's consent and to convince Karol Sidor that the hour had struck for declaring Slovakia's independen ce ; that it was the only way to save Slovakia and that we should not hesitate to seize a historical opportunity to achieve what peoples of the globe, including the Americans, tried to achieve by blood and bitter battle as the highest ideal of their national aspirations . Back in Bratislava I found the situation a little confused but no longer in the hands of the Czech gendarmer ie and army. The Hlinka Guards and university students were openly manifestat ing for independen ce. Dr. Tiso left Bratislava in the meantime, for his parish town Banovce, and I was able to reach him only through messengers and by the telephone. My long discussion with Karol Sidor, who was on the list of the future governmen t of independen t Slovakia as Prime Minister, was not successful He was reluctant to give a written statement that he was in favor of Slovakia's independen ce, though he agreed with our activities for independen ce. Sidor feared that I could be arrested and such a statement, if found by the police would cause more harm than good. He feared particularl y that the Czechs would execute the 300 Slovak political prisoners among whom he had many personal friends. ,Sidor was not against Slovakia's independen ce in principle and had previous contacts with German representat ives, the last on March 7 with Seyss-Inqu art with whom he discussed such a possibility. According to his views, expressed during our conversation, the situation was not yet ripe and, therefore, he said he would neither hinder nor help if anyone else were to try to make Slovakia independen t (2). Sidor's behavior was also caused, as I learned during my second conversatio n with him, by the fact that he knew that Prague would appoint him Prime Minister of the Slovak Autonomou s Governmen t. In the middle of our second �SLOVAKIA 5 discussion, Prague's radio actually announced that President Ha.cha nominated him head of the Slovak Autonomous Government. Sidor got off his seat after the news and sa~d to me: "For the time being, I am decided to accept this . premiership." My secretary and several officers of the A c a d e m 1 c Guard were waiting in front of Sidor's residence and one of them was sent to bring the news to Dr. :Durcansky who, in the firm hope that my mission was successful, in the meantime, informed the German representative s in Vienna that Slovakia would declare independence and handed them the draft of the proposed Slovak government headed by Dr. Tiso as President and Sidor as Prime Minister (3). The radio news of Sidor's acceptance of Hacha's nomination caused confusion in Vienna and Berlin about the Slovak situation and it was for this reason that Hitler send Keppler to Bratislava to learn from Sidor what was the intention of :Slovak leaders. W. Keppler, who was at that time Secretary of State, accompanied by Reichs Governor, Seyss-Inquart , the Gauleiter of Astria, Joseph Biirckel, Franz Karmasin, and Rudolf Vavra, an active leader of the Slovak group in Vienna, paid a midnight visit to Sidor in the government building in Bratislava. Sidor expected the visitors and to the contrary of what was unobjectively reported about impolite behavior and pressure, Keppler behaved politely, did not insist and did not threaten. He informed Sidor, apologizing for his late visit, that Chancellor Hitler received telegrams urging him to support Slovakia's claim for independence and, therefore, sent him to ascertain the real state of affairs. Sidor at first argued evasively through an interpreter and tried to convince his visitors that Slovakia was not yet prepared, according to his views, and that the Parliament and not individuals had the right to declare independence. The discussion became less diplomatic only when Biirckel, who was apparently under the influence of alcohol, began to talk loudly and showed Sidor the list of government which Dr. :Durcansky had sent to Berlin, relying on the success of my earlier discussions with Sidor. Bfirckel, undiplomatica lly and not quite in line with the truth, in- �6 SLOVAKIA sisted that Sidor had already given his consent "when Dr. Kirschbaum visited you". Sidor declared that it was not true. Biirckel, surprised and irate, retorted that "the Fuhrer must not be embarrasse d and deceived". Though Sidor tried to explain that he had neither embarrasse d nor deceived Chancellor Hitler, Keppler and his entourage seemed apparently diappointed and disillusioned, and Keppler later reported to Hitler that Sidor was a "soldier of Prague and had been bribed". It was this failure of Keppler's mission which motivated Hitler to send an invitation to Dr. Joseph Tiso. The writer was asked by :Durcansky from Vienna to find out if Tiso would accept such an invitation. I called Dr. Tiso at about midnight and mentioned that I wished to discuss matters of utmost importance with him. Dr. Tiso answered that it was too late to discuss serious matters and asked me to call the next morning. I immediatel y sent two reliable officers of the Acandemic Guards and my chauffeur with a message to Dr. Tiso's parish town and informed Dr. :Durcansky in Vienna. Another messenger was, however, also enroute with two formal invitations through Consular channels. Dr. Tiso asked the writer to inform the president of The Slovak Diet, the Slovak Governmen t and the leadership of the Hlinka Party that he would be back in Bratislava for consultatio n in the morning. At a joint meeting of all the leaders of Parliament , Governmen t, and the Party - it was decided, on the morning of March 13, to accept the invitation. Accompani ed by a member of Parliament , Dr. Tiso left for Vienna and from Vienna, joined by Dr. :Durcansky and Keppler, flew to Berlin. For truth's sake, the writer adds that Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were received in Berlin in accordance with diplomatic protocol, as representat ives of foreign nations were accustomed to being received. From many discussions which the writer had with Dr. Tiso on this subject and from Dr. Tiso's report to the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939, it is clear that the Slovak representat ives were received politely and no pressure or arrogant behavior (such as adversaries of Slovak independen ce tried to make the Western World believe) ( 4) was resorted to on that occasion. �SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SL OV AK IA Published by the Slovak League of America VOrL. IX MARCH, 1959 NO. 4 (29) FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DEOLAR ATION OF INDEPE NDENCE (A chapter from the book "The Case of Slovakia" to be published on the occasion of the twentieth anniversar y of Slovakia's declaration of Independen ce ) By J. M. Kirschba um The presentat ion of events which led to Slovakia' s declaration of independe nce needs some comment s and explanation in order to be properly understoo d. Some American historian s accepted, without the necessary caution, the one-sided Czech presentat ion of the political causes, as well as of the activities of individua l Slovak politician s and their intentions . Three things are to be particula rly comment ed upon: 1) the imminent menace of Hungaria n occupatio n; 2) the visit of Keppler-S eyss-Inqu art-Biirck el to Bratislav a, or the so-called Sidor episode; and, 3) attitudes and activities of the prinicpal Slovak leaders. The writer, though too young according to the American standard s to play a role in national politics, was, in many respects, involved in the ,M arch imbroglio as a former member of the editorial staff of the Slovak People's Party newspape rs, as a leader of universit y and youth organizatio ns, and since October 1938 as the Executiv e Secretary to the Minister of Justice and, finally, as a close friend of Alexande r Mach and Dr. Ferdinan d Durcansk y. Being one of those on the list of the Prague's government who was supposed to be arrested on March 10, 1939, the writer was from the first moment in continuou s contact with Dr. Joseph Tiso and Karol 1Sidor, on the one hand, and with Dr. Durcansk y over the border in Vienna, on the other, and, of course, with Alexande r Mach and the leaders of the Universit y Hlinka Guards, as well. SLOVAKIA 2 Was there any serious Hungarian menace? Did Ribbentrop use Horthy's telegram as part of a premeditated trick in order to influence Dr. Tiso and :Durcansky, or did the Hungarians really intend to occupy Slovakia? All documents and published memoirs prove that the Hungarian government undoubtedly aimed at the annexation of Slovakia in 1938-1939; this was a twenty-year effort on the part of Magyar politicians and diplomats, in 1938 strongly supported by Mussolini and Ciano, and never denied by any Magyar. The slogan of Magyar politics between the wars was "Mindent visza" - everything returned that Hungary "lost" at the 'P eace Conference of 1919 or prior to that time. In 1938-1939 the Magyars saw, for the first time, an opportunity for their dreams and desires to be realized. According to published documents of the Nurenberg Trials, the telegram sent to Hitler by Hungary's Regent Nicholas Horthy and mentioned during the conversations between the Chancellor Hitler and the Slovak representatives, reads as follows : Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks. I cannot express how happy I am, for this headI dislike using big words water region is, in fact, for Hungary a vital question. Notwithstanding our recruits of but five weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust. I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly on my gratitude. In friendly devotion Horthy Budapest, March 13, 1939. The term "headwater region" means Slovakia, and, since the Slovak leaders were informed by Dr. Vehsenmeyer already in February of a planned invasion of Slovakia by Hungary about March 15, they definitely could not doubt the seriousness of the situation. In fact, the Hungarian menace played quite an important role before Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were invited by Chancellor Hitler to Berlin. When President Ha.cha, on March 10, deposed the Slovak autonomous government and 1 SLOVAKIA 3 issued orders for the arrest over 300 Slovak leaders, including the members of Dr. Tiso's government and the Slovak Diet, Dr. :Durcansky fled to Vienna in order to save Slovakia from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors. :Durcansky was one of the Slovak politicians who knew of German plans with regard to Bohemia, since he was also present at the meeting with Dr. Vehsenmeyer, on February 13, at which the latter informed Slovak leaders of Hungary's plans. After a long discussion with deposed premier Msgr. Tiso, the writer, on the afternoon of March 10, crossed the Danube in order to meet :Durcansky on Austrian territory and discuss the proper steps to be taken. There was no doubt that Germany would, within two or three days, occupy Bohemia and Slovakia's fate depended on Slovakia's decision and political adroitness. For :Durcansky and the writer it was clear that the hour of decision in regard to Slovakia's independence had arrived. In our eyes, it was one of the historical opportunities which numerically small, dominated peoples cannot bypass without paying heavy penalties. Long before March, we spoke and wrote on Slovakia's right to independence and definitely no hatred toward the Czechs or sympathy for Germany or Nazism played any role in our minds. As members of the conservative Slovak People's Party with a Christian democratic world outlook, we were opposed to the Nazi ideology or political system from all points of view. We were both former functionaries of Catholic University organizations (1), who received their political schooling in Paris and we were adherents to the philosophy of the natural right of peoples to self-government. In our opinion, and such was the case with many educated Slovaks of our generation, the March events presented to Slovaks the first international opportunity to apply the right to independence. When we saw that Slovakia could be saved at the same time from Hungarian occupation or division among the neighbors, we feverishly worked on preparing Slovakia's declaration of independence. A draft of a government of Independent Slovakia was prepared by :Durcansky, and we discussed what steps to take in Slova- 4 SLOVAKIA kia and what to do in Vienna and Berlin where, since Munich, there was undoubtedl y a new "Versailles " for Central Europe, with a German free hand in disposing of the future of Central European peoples. While Durcansky returned to Vienna, the writer crossed the Danube with the draft of the new governmen t and had a task to obtain Dr. Tiso's consent and to convince Karol Sidor that the hour had struck for declaring Slovakia's independen ce ; that it was the only way to save Slovakia and that we should not hesitate to seize a historical opportunity to achieve what peoples of the globe, including the Americans, tried to achieve by blood and bitter battle as the highest ideal of their national aspirations . Back in Bratislava I found the situation a little confused but no longer in the hands of the Czech gendarmer ie and army. The Hlinka Guards and university students were openly manifestat ing for independen ce. Dr. Tiso left Bratislava in the meantime, for his parish town Banovce, and I was able to reach him only through messengers and by the telephone. My long discussion with Karol Sidor, who was on the list of the future governmen t of independen t Slovakia as Prime Minister, was not successful He was reluctant to give a written statement that he was in favor of Slovakia's independen ce, though he agreed with our activities for independen ce. Sidor feared that I could be arrested and such a statement, if found by the police would cause more harm than good. He feared particularl y that the Czechs would execute the 300 Slovak political prisoners among whom he had many personal friends. ,Sidor was not against Slovakia's independen ce in principle and had previous contacts with German representat ives, the last on March 7 with Seyss-Inqu art with whom he discussed such a possibility. According to his views, expressed during our conversation, the situation was not yet ripe and, therefore, he said he would neither hinder nor help if anyone else were to try to make Slovakia independen t (2). Sidor's behavior was also caused, as I learned during my second conversatio n with him, by the fact that he knew that Prague would appoint him Prime Minister of the Slovak Autonomou s Governmen t. In the middle of our second SLOVAKIA 5 discussion, Prague's radio actually announced that President Ha.cha nominated him head of the Slovak Autonomous Government. Sidor got off his seat after the news and sa~d to me: "For the time being, I am decided to accept this . premiership." My secretary and several officers of the A c a d e m 1 c Guard were waiting in front of Sidor's residence and one of them was sent to bring the news to Dr. :Durcansky who, in the firm hope that my mission was successful, in the meantime, informed the German representative s in Vienna that Slovakia would declare independence and handed them the draft of the proposed Slovak government headed by Dr. Tiso as President and Sidor as Prime Minister (3). The radio news of Sidor's acceptance of Hacha's nomination caused confusion in Vienna and Berlin about the Slovak situation and it was for this reason that Hitler send Keppler to Bratislava to learn from Sidor what was the intention of :Slovak leaders. W. Keppler, who was at that time Secretary of State, accompanied by Reichs Governor, Seyss-Inquart , the Gauleiter of Astria, Joseph Biirckel, Franz Karmasin, and Rudolf Vavra, an active leader of the Slovak group in Vienna, paid a midnight visit to Sidor in the government building in Bratislava. Sidor expected the visitors and to the contrary of what was unobjectively reported about impolite behavior and pressure, Keppler behaved politely, did not insist and did not threaten. He informed Sidor, apologizing for his late visit, that Chancellor Hitler received telegrams urging him to support Slovakia's claim for independence and, therefore, sent him to ascertain the real state of affairs. Sidor at first argued evasively through an interpreter and tried to convince his visitors that Slovakia was not yet prepared, according to his views, and that the Parliament and not individuals had the right to declare independence. The discussion became less diplomatic only when Biirckel, who was apparently under the influence of alcohol, began to talk loudly and showed Sidor the list of government which Dr. :Durcansky had sent to Berlin, relying on the success of my earlier discussions with Sidor. Bfirckel, undiplomatica lly and not quite in line with the truth, in- 6 SLOVAKIA sisted that Sidor had already given his consent "when Dr. Kirschbaum visited you". Sidor declared that it was not true. Biirckel, surprised and irate, retorted that "the Fuhrer must not be embarrasse d and deceived". Though Sidor tried to explain that he had neither embarrasse d nor deceived Chancellor Hitler, Keppler and his entourage seemed apparently diappointed and disillusioned, and Keppler later reported to Hitler that Sidor was a "soldier of Prague and had been bribed". It was this failure of Keppler's mission which motivated Hitler to send an invitation to Dr. Joseph Tiso. The writer was asked by :Durcansky from Vienna to find out if Tiso would accept such an invitation. I called Dr. Tiso at about midnight and mentioned that I wished to discuss matters of utmost importance with him. Dr. Tiso answered that it was too late to discuss serious matters and asked me to call the next morning. I immediatel y sent two reliable officers of the Acandemic Guards and my chauffeur with a message to Dr. Tiso's parish town and informed Dr. :Durcansky in Vienna. Another messenger was, however, also enroute with two formal invitations through Consular channels. Dr. Tiso asked the writer to inform the president of The Slovak Diet, the Slovak Governmen t and the leadership of the Hlinka Party that he would be back in Bratislava for consultatio n in the morning. At a joint meeting of all the leaders of Parliament , Governmen t, and the Party - it was decided, on the morning of March 13, to accept the invitation. Accompani ed by a member of Parliament , Dr. Tiso left for Vienna and from Vienna, joined by Dr. :Durcansky and Keppler, flew to Berlin. For truth's sake, the writer adds that Dr. Tiso and Dr. :Durcansky were received in Berlin in accordance with diplomatic protocol, as representat ives of foreign nations were accustomed to being received. From many discussions which the writer had with Dr. Tiso on this subject and from Dr. Tiso's report to the Slovak Diet on March 14, 1939, it is clear that the Slovak representat ives were received politely and no pressure or arrogant behavior (such as adversaries of Slovak independen ce tried to make the Western World believe) ( 4) was resorted to on that occasion. SLOVAKIA 7 The news of Dr. Tiso's departure caused the t ension in Bratislava and in all of Slovakia to grow. There was now not only fear of Hungarian occupation, if Dr. Tiso's mission were to fail but also fear of occupation by the Germans whose troops were stationed on the banks of the Danube on the Austrian side. At the same time there was, however , also a strong hope that Slovakia finally would become an independent state and that the dreams, desires and wishes of many Slovak generations would come true. 1. T h e writer was vice-presiden t of Pax R oma na and Slavia Catholi ca a nd, for ma ny year s, pr esiden t of th e Catholic Fed e ration of Slovak Stud en ts. 2. Cfr. Sidor's: Poznamky k historickym dnom r. 1939 p u blish ed by Lettri ch's R egime, Br atislava, 1946, a nd a lso accounts in Slovenska Obrana, October , 1939. 3. T h e Governm en t was composed as follows : Presiden t - Dr . Joseph T iso ; Prime Minister K. Sid or ; For e ig n Affairs - D r . Durcansky; E du cation - M. Cerna k ; F ina n ce - A. Mederly; Economy - Dr . Pru'.ii ns ky; Communica tions - Dr. Kir schba um ; Nationa l Defense - Gen. ,C atlos; 1Propaganda - A. Mach ; Justice - D r . V. T uka. - See de ta ils in Slovenska Obrana, October 17, 1939 . 4. 'T h e minu tes of th e Slovak Diet. Als o S idor's r em a rks on the historic days (ma nuscr ip ts, no t th e excerpts p ublis h ed b y th e Comm u nists in order to cond emn Dr. Tiso) . • • • THE GERMAN ZONE OF PROTECTION IN SLOVAK.IA (A study in Slovak-German relations in March-August 1939) Frantisek Vnuk On March 14, 1939, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed by the Slovak Assembly. Two days later Baron von Weizsiicker wired a circular to all German diplomatic missions informing them that Slovak Prime Minister Dr. Tiso had transmitted the following r equest to the Fuhrer by telegram: With full trust in you, the Flihrer and Chancellor of the Gret er German Reich, the Slovak State places itself under your protection. The 'Slovak State asks you to take over this protection (1). Hitler acknowledged the receipt of the telegram and complied with the request. For this purpose a treaty of protection between Germany and Slovakia was drawn up (2) . Article 2 of the treaty stipulated that "the German Wehrmacht shall at all times have the right to set up  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Facts and Events Behind the Scenes of Slovakia's Declaration of Independence Description An account of the resource J. M. Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29), March 1959 pp. 1-7 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1896f03edffa8a57aca9d1693840f69c.pdf a48001a94f659697c97069c2d2c517dc PDF Text Text MAR CH, VOL. IX (29) IN THIS ISSUE: FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE THE GERMAN ZONE OF ' p MARCH 14 - SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY SLOVAK NATIONALISM : THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY TH E HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA • • • Edited and compiled by PHILIP A. HROBAK SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. • • • Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �\ I! I RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THIS IS SLOVAKIA, Hrusovsky; $1.00. THE SLOVAKS, Yurchak; paper cover $2.00; cloth $3.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY, Skultety; $1.00 (paper); $2.00 (cloth cover). THE DELIVERANCE OF SISTER CECILIA, $3.75. THE CHURCH OF SILENCE IN SLOVAKIA, Zubek; $3.50. FALSE FREEDOM, Delaney; $2.00. SLOVAKIA'S ROAD TO STATEHOOD,' Woytko; $1.50. History Made to Order, Hrobak; 50c. ·'CZECHOSLOVAKIA" - UNCONQUERABLES, Pauco; $3.50 "GUDOViT STUR AND HIS PLACE IN THE SLAVIC WORLD , Prof. J. Khschbaum; 25c. ANTHOLOGY OF SLOVAK POETRY, Kramoris; $2.0~. ♦ ♦ ♦ SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak Leag ue of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of -Slovak descent. The main purpos~ of SLOVAKIA i_s to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. · $1.00 per annum in tpe U. S. A. ,_ ~-.:. ··c: •·- . "'' $2.00 elsewhere. .,. . _:. ·,:_; SLOVAKIA P.O. Box 150 Middletown, --Pa. ' - .. '; ~'1• ---:t ., ------ Printed in the U. S. A. . J EQNOTA ; PRESS MiddletO;fi, Pa. ·, ·-!'-.l " � MAR CH, VOL. IX (29) IN THIS ISSUE: FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE THE GERMAN ZONE OF ' p MARCH 14 - SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY SLOVAK NATIONALISM : THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY TH E HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA • • • Edited and compiled by PHILIP A. HROBAK SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. • • • Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �\ I! I RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THIS IS SLOVAKIA, Hrusovsky; $1.00. THE SLOVAKS, Yurchak; paper cover $2.00; cloth $3.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY, Skultety; $1.00 (paper); $2.00 (cloth cover). THE DELIVERANCE OF SISTER CECILIA, $3.75. THE CHURCH OF SILENCE IN SLOVAKIA, Zubek; $3.50. FALSE FREEDOM, Delaney; $2.00. SLOVAKIA'S ROAD TO STATEHOOD,' Woytko; $1.50. History Made to Order, Hrobak; 50c. ·'CZECHOSLOVAKIA" - UNCONQUERABLES, Pauco; $3.50 "GUDOViT STUR AND HIS PLACE IN THE SLAVIC WORLD , Prof. J. Khschbaum; 25c. ANTHOLOGY OF SLOVAK POETRY, Kramoris; $2.0~. ♦ ♦ ♦ SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak Leag ue of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of -Slovak descent. The main purpos~ of SLOVAKIA i_s to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. · $1.00 per annum in tpe U. S. A. ,_ ~-.:. ··c: •·- . "'' $2.00 elsewhere. .,. . _:. ·,:_; SLOVAKIA P.O. Box 150 Middletown, --Pa. ' - .. '; ~'1• ---:t ., ------ Printed in the U. S. A. . J EQNOTA ; PRESS MiddletO;fi, Pa. ·, ·-!'-.l " � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1959, Vol. 9 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 4 [sic] (No. 29), March 1959.</li> <li>Issue 5 [sic] (No. 30), June-December 1959.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1959 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MAR CH, VOL. IX (29) IN THIS ISSUE: FACTS AND EVENTS BEHIND THE SCENES OF SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE THE GERMAN ZONE OF ' p MARCH 14 - SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY SLOVAK NATIONALISM : THE ROLE OF EMIGRANTS IN SLOVAK NATIONALISM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY TH E HISTORY OF SLOVAKIA • • • Edited and compiled by PHILIP A. HROBAK SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. • • • Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA \ I! I RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THIS IS SLOVAKIA, Hrusovsky; $1.00. THE SLOVAKS, Yurchak; paper cover $2.00; cloth $3.00. SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY, Skultety; $1.00 (paper); $2.00 (cloth cover). THE DELIVERANCE OF SISTER CECILIA, $3.75. THE CHURCH OF SILENCE IN SLOVAKIA, Zubek; $3.50. FALSE FREEDOM, Delaney; $2.00. SLOVAKIA'S ROAD TO STATEHOOD,' Woytko; $1.50. History Made to Order, Hrobak; 50c. ·'CZECHOSLOVAKIA" - UNCONQUERABLES, Pauco; $3.50 "GUDOViT STUR AND HIS PLACE IN THE SLAVIC WORLD , Prof. J. Khschbaum; 25c. ANTHOLOGY OF SLOVAK POETRY, Kramoris; $2.0~. ♦ ♦ ♦ SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak Leag ue of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of -Slovak descent. The main purpos~ of SLOVAKIA i_s to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. · $1.00 per annum in tpe U. S. A. ,_ ~-.:. ··c: •·- . "'' $2.00 elsewhere. .,. . _:. ·,:_; SLOVAKIA P.O. Box 150 Middletown, --Pa. ' - .. '; ~'1• ---:t ., ------ Printed in the U. S. A. . J EQNOTA ; PRESS MiddletO;fi, Pa. ·, ·-!'-.l "  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 9, No. 4 (29) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1959