1 50 21 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d01df4810d9810f72e330513bc129662.pdf c058f72321a3e992748eda642e65cf85 PDF Text Text Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio • Frances L. Mizenko Honorary President 3756 Lee Road Cleveland 28, Ohio Dr. Peter P. H letko 1~ 13 W. -18th Street Chicago 9, Ill inois Stephen J. Tkach 173 N. Main Street Wilkes-Barre, Pa. !'resident A. Philip Hrobak P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa. Andrew J. Hamrock 61 Woodland Avenu e Campbell, Ohio Vice-President Jacob Kocis ADVISORY COUNCIL Michael J . Vargovich 1547 -- 167th Street Hammond, Ind. National President Firs t Catholi c Slovak Vice-President Julia Krajcovic Helen Kocan 1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill. National President First Catholi c S lovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary Francis nion H rusovsky Fran k 2900 East Boulevard Cleveland 4, Ohio Sobus National Preside nt Slovak Catholic Sokol Secretary-Treasu rer Stephen J . Tka ch Milan V. Blaz ek National President nion Penna. Slovak -1922 S. Leclaire Avenue Chicago 38, Ill. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Gabriela E. Vavrek National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Union Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. John Rozboril Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J. National President Slovak Catholic Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America ) JEDNOTA SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Middletown, Pa. Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio BRATSTVO SLOVENSKE NOVINY ZORNICKA Cleveland, Ohio Chicago, Ill. KATOLICKY SOKOL SVORNOST OSADN E H LASY Passaic, N. J. Whitaker, Pa. Chicago, Ill. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind. �~ N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~ ~ ~XL ,.<l♦ ><«V;!o,o.;. k 6 - "· Jw♦ jt.fff<l<t. "- t.>'>J~!'°" ,.( .. 4,,'"i, ~....... <>4',~y..,1d.-,mf;>,j><J>><,tt ♦ ><IM ... > '""""'"'J,,,A \,,-:4.?,1 ,i ~<-W.«·:. . ., lw'♦,-.i:,.j>>"l"''"'-"'i-!ml♦ h•<<f~l'I:♦, '-<j ,..,,, ,x,lk). >>.folj ~I>! ~~ 4 --.fl♦lo;·:,:,,.(.>·,, .. ,.11,#lt<P.~<I ><> _, ~tl\okll. l>llt. ~~- •~ ' fl-"' <I< ♦}:' <,y.,, ... ,..:, l~«' , ..,; »·to ~ ♦ !:S~ s.11>»,,.,. «<+~ i .......... , lo -~h'«< ti"'~,;-~, " ' ~ . , . ~ , ..~ -~.,.~ ~y ~""'l, ,-N:4• !I, ; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~" !. Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'! I j We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938, is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed. In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation. � Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio • Frances L. Mizenko Honorary President 3756 Lee Road Cleveland 28, Ohio Dr. Peter P. H letko 1~ 13 W. -18th Street Chicago 9, Ill inois Stephen J. Tkach 173 N. Main Street Wilkes-Barre, Pa. !'resident A. Philip Hrobak P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa. Andrew J. Hamrock 61 Woodland Avenu e Campbell, Ohio Vice-President Jacob Kocis ADVISORY COUNCIL Michael J . Vargovich 1547 -- 167th Street Hammond, Ind. National President Firs t Catholi c Slovak Vice-President Julia Krajcovic Helen Kocan 1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill. National President First Catholi c S lovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary Francis nion H rusovsky Fran k 2900 East Boulevard Cleveland 4, Ohio Sobus National Preside nt Slovak Catholic Sokol Secretary-Treasu rer Stephen J . Tka ch Milan V. Blaz ek National President nion Penna. Slovak -1922 S. Leclaire Avenue Chicago 38, Ill. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Gabriela E. Vavrek National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Union Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. John Rozboril Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J. National President Slovak Catholic Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America ) JEDNOTA SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Middletown, Pa. Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio BRATSTVO SLOVENSKE NOVINY ZORNICKA Cleveland, Ohio Chicago, Ill. KATOLICKY SOKOL SVORNOST OSADN E H LASY Passaic, N. J. Whitaker, Pa. Chicago, Ill. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind. �~ N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~ ~ ~XL ,.<l♦ ><«V;!o,o.;. k 6 - "· Jw♦ jt.fff<l<t. "- t.>'>J~!'°" ,.( .. 4,,'"i, ~....... <>4',~y..,1d.-,mf;>,j><J>><,tt ♦ ><IM ... > '""""'"'J,,,A \,,-:4.?,1 ,i ~<-W.«·:. . ., lw'♦,-.i:,.j>>"l"''"'-"'i-!ml♦ h•<<f~l'I:♦, '-<j ,..,,, ,x,lk). >>.folj ~I>! ~~ 4 --.fl♦lo;·:,:,,.(.>·,, .. ,.11,#lt<P.~<I ><> _, ~tl\okll. l>llt. ~~- •~ ' fl-"' <I< ♦}:' <,y.,, ... ,..:, l~«' , ..,; »·to ~ ♦ !:S~ s.11>»,,.,. «<+~ i .......... , lo -~h'«< ti"'~,;-~, " ' ~ . , . ~ , ..~ -~.,.~ ~y ~""'l, ,-N:4• !I, ; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~" !. Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'! I j We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938, is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed. In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio • Frances L. Mizenko Honorary President 3756 Lee Road Cleveland 28, Ohio Dr. Peter P. H letko 1~ 13 W. -18th Street Chicago 9, Ill inois Stephen J. Tkach 173 N. Main Street Wilkes-Barre, Pa. !'resident A. Philip Hrobak P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa. Andrew J. Hamrock 61 Woodland Avenu e Campbell, Ohio Vice-President Jacob Kocis ADVISORY COUNCIL Michael J . Vargovich 1547 -- 167th Street Hammond, Ind. National President Firs t Catholi c Slovak Vice-President Julia Krajcovic Helen Kocan 1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill. National President First Catholi c S lovak Ladies Union Recording Secretary Francis nion H rusovsky Fran k 2900 East Boulevard Cleveland 4, Ohio Sobus National Preside nt Slovak Catholic Sokol Secretary-Treasu rer Stephen J . Tka ch Milan V. Blaz ek National President nion Penna. Slovak -1922 S. Leclaire Avenue Chicago 38, Ill. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Gabriela E. Vavrek National President Ladies Pennsylvania Slovak Union Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. John Rozboril Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J. National President Slovak Catholic Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America ) JEDNOTA SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Middletown, Pa. Scranton, Pa. Cleveland, Ohio BRATSTVO SLOVENSKE NOVINY ZORNICKA Cleveland, Ohio Chicago, Ill. KATOLICKY SOKOL SVORNOST OSADN E H LASY Passaic, N. J. Whitaker, Pa. Chicago, Ill. Wilkes-Barre, Pa. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind. ~ N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~ ~ ~XL ,.<l♦ ><«V;!o,o.;. k 6 - "· Jw♦ jt.fff<l<t. "- t.>'>J~!'°" ,.( .. 4,,'"i, ~....... <>4',~y..,1d.-,mf;>,j><J>><,tt ♦ ><IM ... > '""""'"'J,,,A \,,-:4.?,1 ,i ~<-W.«·:. . ., lw'♦,-.i:,.j>>"l"''"'-"'i-!ml♦ h•<<f~l'I:♦, '-<j ,..,,, ,x,lk). >>.folj ~I>! ~~ 4 --.fl♦lo;·:,:,,.(.>·,, .. ,.11,#lt<P.~<I ><> _, ~tl\okll. l>llt. ~~- •~ ' fl-"' <I< ♦}:' <,y.,, ... ,..:, l~«' , ..,; »·to ~ ♦ !:S~ s.11>»,,.,. «<+~ i .......... , lo -~h'«< ti"'~,;-~, " ' ~ . , . ~ , ..~ -~.,.~ ~y ~""'l, ,-N:4• !I, ; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~" !. Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'! I j We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938, is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed. In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9d0ab676ff2e6ce5e3da3c983e1f8c77.pdf 75e57d5c95416413d1a65f9325148d2f PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 63 cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr. Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the "Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State." (More Coming) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the 14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad (New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka. The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest; even today many forests exist there, the source of much of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~ served a vaulted room. Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398, the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by the Hussites and held several months. When they were evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had �64 SLOVAKIA it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450 by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders. King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve 11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it. In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer. The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby building a one-story renaissance structure around three sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle: he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country; when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from 1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state . .Since the time it has been under state management and now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras, the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-• zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras . • • • 'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00. � SLOVAKIA 63 cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr. Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the "Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State." (More Coming) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the 14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad (New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka. The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest; even today many forests exist there, the source of much of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~ served a vaulted room. Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398, the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by the Hussites and held several months. When they were evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had �64 SLOVAKIA it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450 by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders. King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve 11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it. In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer. The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby building a one-story renaissance structure around three sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle: he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country; when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from 1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state . .Since the time it has been under state management and now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras, the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-• zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras . • • • 'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 63 cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr. Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the "Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State." (More Coming) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the 14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad (New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka. The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest; even today many forests exist there, the source of much of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~ served a vaulted room. Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398, the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by the Hussites and held several months. When they were evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had 64 SLOVAKIA it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450 by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders. King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve 11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it. In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer. The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby building a one-story renaissance structure around three sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle: he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country; when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from 1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state . .Since the time it has been under state management and now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras, the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-• zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras . • • • 'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: The New Castle of Liptov Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 63-64 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/108886e603427dc15d464e5d907bb6dc.pdf e015e64f1ff9a2b6b9129d0ca848f992 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 55 Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.) HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA? P.A. HROBAK ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925), and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc. •~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized importance in the family of nations" (p. 71). "lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom" (p. 72). This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un. known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York 'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches, etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role. "As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his "The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the American Government. �56 SLOVAKIA This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An illustration: "Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion. The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the Slovaks came in" (p. 73). The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic, simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y �57 SLOVAKIA accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America. The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom Rome!) and <killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis. Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-<letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable. OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern European History, Smith College; J.D., German University of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations, Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-, tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East (1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ." This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of 'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it. The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky, "who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism," gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre 1 �58 SLOVAKIA for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a "living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons. of Czech life." 'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive .period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering on the Czech Brethren." T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_, strosity. OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con• ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope (1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ," etc. �SLOVAKIA 59 "The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by (p. 106). its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" - The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the "Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none, how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close "a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here "Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was in relating historical facts. "In its ent from its strument of constituent • genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable, definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10, 1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the body to give fundamental represe<ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to Slovakia" - (p. 109). Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of �60 SLOVAKIA Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic" State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it? Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr. G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation. "AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr. Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of the nation . .." But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen. tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka, leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde- �SLOVAKIA 61 pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia. The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims on their ibehalf. Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was <lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-· mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything. The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-· sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth . • Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-· ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads: "We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic, �SLOVAKIA 62 to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land, to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and progressive." To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble, which reads as follows: "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility, p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of America." Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is "perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut "our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia," instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"! Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this manner: "The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the country dlifferential status" (p. 116). Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze- �SLOVAKIA 63 cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr. Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the "Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State." (More Coming) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the 14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad (New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka. The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest; even today many forests exist there, the source of much of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~ served a vaulted room. Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398, the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by the Hussites and held several months. When they were evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had � SLOVAKIA 55 Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.) HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA? P.A. HROBAK ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925), and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc. •~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized importance in the family of nations" (p. 71). "lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom" (p. 72). This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un. known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York 'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches, etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role. "As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his "The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the American Government. �56 SLOVAKIA This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An illustration: "Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion. The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the Slovaks came in" (p. 73). The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic, simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y �57 SLOVAKIA accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America. The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom Rome!) and <killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis. Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-<letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable. OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern European History, Smith College; J.D., German University of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations, Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-, tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East (1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ." This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of 'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it. The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky, "who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism," gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre 1 �58 SLOVAKIA for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a "living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons. of Czech life." 'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive .period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering on the Czech Brethren." T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_, strosity. OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con• ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope (1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ," etc. �SLOVAKIA 59 "The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by (p. 106). its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" - The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the "Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none, how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close "a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here "Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was in relating historical facts. "In its ent from its strument of constituent • genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable, definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10, 1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the body to give fundamental represe<ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to Slovakia" - (p. 109). Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of �60 SLOVAKIA Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic" State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it? Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr. G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation. "AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr. Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of the nation . .." But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen. tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka, leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde- �SLOVAKIA 61 pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia. The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims on their ibehalf. Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was <lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-· mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything. The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-· sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth . • Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-· ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads: "We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic, �SLOVAKIA 62 to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land, to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and progressive." To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble, which reads as follows: "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility, p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of America." Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is "perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut "our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia," instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"! Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this manner: "The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the country dlifferential status" (p. 116). Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze- �SLOVAKIA 63 cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr. Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the "Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State." (More Coming) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the 14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad (New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka. The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest; even today many forests exist there, the source of much of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~ served a vaulted room. Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398, the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by the Hussites and held several months. When they were evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 55 Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.) HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA? P.A. HROBAK ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925), and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc. •~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized importance in the family of nations" (p. 71). "lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom" (p. 72). This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un. known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York 'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches, etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role. "As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his "The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the American Government. 56 SLOVAKIA This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An illustration: "Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion. The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the Slovaks came in" (p. 73). The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic, simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y 57 SLOVAKIA accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America. The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom Rome!) and <killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis. Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-<letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable. OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern European History, Smith College; J.D., German University of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations, Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-, tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East (1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ." This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of 'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it. The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky, "who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism," gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre 1 58 SLOVAKIA for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a "living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons. of Czech life." 'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive .period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering on the Czech Brethren." T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_, strosity. OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con• ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope (1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ," etc. SLOVAKIA 59 "The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by (p. 106). its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" - The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the "Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none, how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close "a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here "Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was in relating historical facts. "In its ent from its strument of constituent • genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable, definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10, 1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the body to give fundamental represe<ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to Slovakia" - (p. 109). Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of 60 SLOVAKIA Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic" State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it? Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr. G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation. "AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr. Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of the nation . .." But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen. tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka, leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde- SLOVAKIA 61 pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia. The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims on their ibehalf. Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was <lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-· mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything. The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-· sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth . • Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-· ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads: "We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic, SLOVAKIA 62 to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land, to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and progressive." To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble, which reads as follows: "WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility, p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of America." Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is "perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut "our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia," instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"! Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this manner: "The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the country dlifferential status" (p. 116). Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze- SLOVAKIA 63 cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr. Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the "Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State." (More Coming) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the 14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad (New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka. The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest; even today many forests exist there, the source of much of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~ served a vaulted room. Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398, the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by the Hussites and held several months. When they were evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda? (2/8) Description An account of the resource P. A. Hrobak Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 55-63 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 Relation A related resource continued from <a href="/items/show/186">Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), pp. 38-62</a><br />continues in <a href="/items/show/222">Vol. 6, No. 1 (18), pp. 57-64</a> LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fde68cf3e2a138c471cf9a7af8a0f1b8.pdf 422c447b0c47a3b463fa9461a996b44b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the �50 SLOVAKIA trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip. A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the Benes followers present it now. Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England." The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr. Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk news rugency. The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ., 1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda, the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-• port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of the Council's decision. In the United States the report �SLOVAKIA 51 was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in 1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech. How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~ sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will of the British Government. This is a matter orf record. Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth. In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka, Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943, and through the first week of November. It is of interest to note here that during this same time Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers, reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18, 1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De .. claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen.. eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how- �52 SLOVAKIA ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity. I am referring to this incident in order to show that the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the first exile (World War I), they did the same during the second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency. One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy. It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home. DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945, when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in flagrant violation of th e Constitution. As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia began earlier than 1943. According to the official report handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik, Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal �SLOVAKIA 53 question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs on page 207. Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow, in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population will wish it." rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-· cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia." Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included. It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions." On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed 'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes. It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested. When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~ viet Union." This quotation is according to the official 1 �54 SLOVAKIA Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~ tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe." Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries, and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands." It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in 1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except 'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers. 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is Socialism? Socialism is government control, government operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business, all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05). � SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the �50 SLOVAKIA trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip. A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the Benes followers present it now. Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England." The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr. Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk news rugency. The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ., 1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda, the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-• port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of the Council's decision. In the United States the report �SLOVAKIA 51 was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in 1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech. How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~ sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will of the British Government. This is a matter orf record. Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth. In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka, Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943, and through the first week of November. It is of interest to note here that during this same time Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers, reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18, 1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De .. claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen.. eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how- �52 SLOVAKIA ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity. I am referring to this incident in order to show that the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the first exile (World War I), they did the same during the second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency. One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy. It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home. DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945, when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in flagrant violation of th e Constitution. As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia began earlier than 1943. According to the official report handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik, Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal �SLOVAKIA 53 question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs on page 207. Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow, in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population will wish it." rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-· cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia." Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included. It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions." On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed 'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes. It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested. When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~ viet Union." This quotation is according to the official 1 �54 SLOVAKIA Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~ tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe." Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries, and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands." It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in 1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except 'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers. 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is Socialism? Socialism is government control, government operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business, all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the 50 SLOVAKIA trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip. A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the Benes followers present it now. Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England." The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr. Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk news rugency. The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ., 1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda, the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-• port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of the Council's decision. In the United States the report SLOVAKIA 51 was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in 1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech. How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~ sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will of the British Government. This is a matter orf record. Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth. In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka, Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943, and through the first week of November. It is of interest to note here that during this same time Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers, reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18, 1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De .. claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen.. eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how- 52 SLOVAKIA ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity. I am referring to this incident in order to show that the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the first exile (World War I), they did the same during the second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency. One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy. It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home. DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945, when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in flagrant violation of th e Constitution. As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia began earlier than 1943. According to the official report handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik, Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal SLOVAKIA 53 question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs on page 207. Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow, in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population will wish it." rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-· cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia." Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included. It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions." On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed 'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes. It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested. When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~ viet Union." This quotation is according to the official 1 54 SLOVAKIA Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~ tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe." Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries, and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands." It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in 1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except 'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers. 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is Socialism? Socialism is government control, government operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business, all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Beneš's Trip to Moscow and Czecho-Slovak Propaganda Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 49-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d31c8fb0500b44a0f2ea75f3bcd30340.pdf 1f2e83c344a1cccfc46a1ac889e01145 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 39 THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D. There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions: First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora. vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed? Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me. thodius and their immediate puipils? Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia? In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography, especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades, there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions. R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l) states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire, is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)." John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages" omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire. H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho- �40 SLOVAKIA Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2). For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great Moravia and the cultmal wor>k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3). This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~ tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary (Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans, phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast dou'bt on the aibove theses . Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan eoclesirus-tical organization" (5) The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo cir<:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of �SLOVAKIA 41 the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in. 849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"< 8) . Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9), it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history. The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-· ,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles, from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity, but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world �42 SLOVAKIA languages, nor were they presented to the learned world even in a:bst:mct form. Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk university professors and e~perts of whom I might men., tion the following: a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky, Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan. :b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik. c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery. d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner. Every one of these men made a study of one or the other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav, Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several ,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in foreign languaiges(l0). To what conclusions does the scientific research of these experts lead to, even though the results of their studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll). 'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these: 1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825 wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp. 794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con., sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig" was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country). 2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout �43 SLOVAKIA the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900 that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav, Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-· si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today. 3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work, including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a ·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~ so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J. Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- . 1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism." By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend? What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius? Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources, such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &ancormn, Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and "Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short time to SvatoplUJk's empire. 1 a �44 SLOVAKIA "The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan, "brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav. The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek , V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book , legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c; even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia. According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists, the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was "in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia. According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l. As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the �SLOVAKIA 45 ;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the Psa1ms(l9l. St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months." Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal; written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-· tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e prayed in the Slovak translation. Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e., a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius," written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great 1 �46 SLOVAKIA Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and "albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935. Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) . Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore, this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure." "Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) . This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-· kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations. As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the �SLOVAKIA 47 view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at.. temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there "were l aid the foundations for the national Church and nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft and the directive of the future of the who>J.e subsequent historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia." Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia, which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century. In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655), Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada" _and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre. futruble proofs of this. Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &pected to tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-• tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which 1 1 �48 SLOVAKIA Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases, even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies. References 1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol. 2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe, London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc. 3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia. 'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian centre of the Western Slavs." 4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18. 5. Ibidem , p. 21. 6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik ibidem, p. 20. 7. Lbidem, p. 293. 8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... " 9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris, 1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89. 10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927; Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik, Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a , 1948, etc. 11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78. 12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke (Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) . �SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the � SLOVAKIA 39 THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D. There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions: First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora. vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed? Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me. thodius and their immediate puipils? Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia? In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography, especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades, there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions. R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l) states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire, is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)." John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages" omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire. H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho- �40 SLOVAKIA Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2). For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great Moravia and the cultmal wor>k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3). This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~ tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary (Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans, phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast dou'bt on the aibove theses . Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan eoclesirus-tical organization" (5) The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo cir<:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of �SLOVAKIA 41 the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in. 849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"< 8) . Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9), it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history. The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-· ,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles, from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity, but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world �42 SLOVAKIA languages, nor were they presented to the learned world even in a:bst:mct form. Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk university professors and e~perts of whom I might men., tion the following: a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky, Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan. :b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik. c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery. d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner. Every one of these men made a study of one or the other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav, Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several ,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in foreign languaiges(l0). To what conclusions does the scientific research of these experts lead to, even though the results of their studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll). 'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these: 1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825 wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp. 794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con., sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig" was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country). 2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout �43 SLOVAKIA the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900 that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav, Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-· si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today. 3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work, including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a ·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~ so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J. Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- . 1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism." By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend? What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius? Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources, such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &ancormn, Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and "Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short time to SvatoplUJk's empire. 1 a �44 SLOVAKIA "The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan, "brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav. The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek , V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book , legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c; even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia. According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists, the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was "in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia. According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l. As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the �SLOVAKIA 45 ;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the Psa1ms(l9l. St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months." Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal; written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-· tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e prayed in the Slovak translation. Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e., a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius," written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great 1 �46 SLOVAKIA Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and "albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935. Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) . Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore, this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure." "Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) . This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-· kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations. As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the �SLOVAKIA 47 view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at.. temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there "were l aid the foundations for the national Church and nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft and the directive of the future of the who>J.e subsequent historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia." Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia, which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century. In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655), Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada" _and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre. futruble proofs of this. Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &pected to tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-• tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which 1 1 �48 SLOVAKIA Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases, even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies. References 1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol. 2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe, London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc. 3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia. 'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian centre of the Western Slavs." 4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18. 5. Ibidem , p. 21. 6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik ibidem, p. 20. 7. Lbidem, p. 293. 8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... " 9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris, 1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89. 10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927; Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik, Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a , 1948, etc. 11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78. 12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke (Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) . �SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 39 THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D. There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions: First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora. vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed? Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me. thodius and their immediate puipils? Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia? In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography, especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades, there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions. R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l) states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire, is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)." John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages" omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire. H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho- 40 SLOVAKIA Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2). For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great Moravia and the cultmal wor>k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3). This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~ tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary (Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans, phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast dou'bt on the aibove theses . Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan eoclesirus-tical organization" (5) The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo cir<:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of SLOVAKIA 41 the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in. 849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"< 8) . Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9), it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history. The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-· ,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles, from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity, but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world 42 SLOVAKIA languages, nor were they presented to the learned world even in a:bst:mct form. Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk university professors and e~perts of whom I might men., tion the following: a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky, Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan. :b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik. c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery. d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner. Every one of these men made a study of one or the other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav, Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several ,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in foreign languaiges(l0). To what conclusions does the scientific research of these experts lead to, even though the results of their studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll). 'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these: 1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825 wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp. 794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con., sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig" was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country). 2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout 43 SLOVAKIA the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900 that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav, Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-· si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today. 3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work, including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a ·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~ so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J. Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- . 1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism." By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend? What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius? Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources, such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &ancormn, Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and "Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short time to SvatoplUJk's empire. 1 a 44 SLOVAKIA "The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan, "brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav. The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek , V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book , legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c; even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia. According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists, the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was "in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia. According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l. As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the SLOVAKIA 45 ;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the Psa1ms(l9l. St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months." Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal; written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-· tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e prayed in the Slovak translation. Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e., a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius," written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great 1 46 SLOVAKIA Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and "albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935. Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) . Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore, this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure." "Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) . This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-· kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations. As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the SLOVAKIA 47 view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at.. temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there "were l aid the foundations for the national Church and nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft and the directive of the future of the who>J.e subsequent historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia." Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia, which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century. In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655), Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada" _and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre. futruble proofs of this. Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &pected to tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-• tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which 1 1 48 SLOVAKIA Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases, even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies. References 1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol. 2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe, London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc. 3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia. 'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian centre of the Western Slavs." 4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18. 5. Ibidem , p. 21. 6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik ibidem, p. 20. 7. Lbidem, p. 293. 8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... " 9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris, 1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89. 10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927; Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik, Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a , 1948, etc. 11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78. 12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke (Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) . SLOVAKIA 49 13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen Sprache, Vjenna, 1900. 14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention '·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi, M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc. 15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951, p. 42. 16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the ,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks, t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans .a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from Slovak History, p. 30). 17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 . 18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261. 19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14. 20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom . 21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14. 22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva, 1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5. • • • BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA Dr. Michael Zibrin Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which Washington and London consented. Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization Description An account of the resource Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D. Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 39-49 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c672884b42cfb02d25713c71e2a2e99a.pdf be52d8e8e9ba19505d5ae12a900ea058 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 21 LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA By Constantine Oulen We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik, because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ... fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic. We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms. We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich really belongs under the Czechs. We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~ titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the beauty of colors with a color-blind person. The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich, however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts. L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938 "had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities (p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population. But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into 1 �22 SLOVAKIA the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase in population of those cities. But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics even in this case? He could have proved his case even with correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~ Slovruk Republic. According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know, already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had 1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic (Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400 i.nhabitants in 1949. According to Lettrich, Turciansky &vaty Martin had 3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900; 4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953). But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T. Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only 10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there the figures for 1940 and 1946. It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area." Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946. �SLOVAKIA 23 When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different; he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example, the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent; Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed 'modern"! "Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000 Crowns" (p. 38). That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution, but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is quite familiar. It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution, oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from 1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially .p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar nation. On the other hand, however, what was done to the Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW, and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the �24 SLOVAKIA thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes. At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars, when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19 months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14 days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time did not even happen in Hungary. But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years! What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police? Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the 300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"? 1 ".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children of Slovak nationality" (p. 37). But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd . .Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919). Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others. 1 �SLOVAKIA 25 Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118 Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show 30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They left .that to Lettrioh ! "In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) , Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar• guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees: 12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18 were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts. Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what are the facts ? 1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed by the Hungarian State. 2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic. 3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the 1 �26 SLOVAKIA Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute majority of State employees, even those of German and Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . . vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty oath; the number of those who r&fused was never recorded statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok). Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40). At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ; 10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary. Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and 10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors. Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation. But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated many of them to teach in Magyar schools! Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to, name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'., Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky, Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek, FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy. Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously �SLOVAKIA 27 by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists" should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of Czech professo:vs,, were they not? It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics: 1 "The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3 percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks (16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak, that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised, suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life. "This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000 'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) . And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually >Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under- �28 SLOVAKIA took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices. "Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United States" (p. 40) . Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is · diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds. From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns. There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika Slo;v enska"). How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia? Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State, hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-· va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter must be liquidated. The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply �SLOVAKIA 29 ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do the r eports of that Federation tell us? In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only 3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000 hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000 hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000 hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000 hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in 1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000 hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914, but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises 2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923; in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only 898,000 hours in 1003. These figures tell us that there must have b.een greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost 40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order: 1 1 1 1 "In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . .. "No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e- �30 SLOVAKIA nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general, that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de· gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86). "The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side. What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non- �SLOVAKIA 31 Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was, during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr. Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with the poor economy of the Czech lands. At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some 15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5 thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he ,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~ terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171). Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in behalf of the ecorromic e:,q>erls before the National Court was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of frauds and falsificatio ns? Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history." The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald. Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his.. t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in �32 SLOVAKIA Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts. According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even states .that the Jews were co·- foun<lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news. Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing. Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter .. ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in . There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what that role wa.s. The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica, which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran) preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of 1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a �SLOVAKIA 33 publication was after the first world war - and it came from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik. The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in 'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a memiber only because most of the people who visited the Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany; he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection. To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies; they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these very same words were used a countless number of times by Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians, scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection. T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement (the Hlasists) with these counsels: "Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national; the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself economically from Jewish capital. . •." Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism, preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews �34 SLOVAKIA always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19. Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK (August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22, 1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ." T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes, and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938). And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that they might go to the lands of those nations, which they voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8). Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland. in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko, another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner: "Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than �SLOV.AKI.A 35 Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other words, he recommended Hitler's methods. Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must rid ourselves of all parasites!" Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel, a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside." Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts, wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians." But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars." And those he did expel ! Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in 1910 only 2 percent did. It is both interesting and significant to the informed reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his "history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik, Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak," �36 SLOVAKIA but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals. Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious, which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the uprising against the German army at the end of August 1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps, where living and housing conditions were adequate, the prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~ ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947). The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0>vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved. After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in SlovaJkia at that time! History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called "Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich �SLOVAKIA 37 used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals." Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example, we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf course, those who were present on that occasion know that a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical (Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting out the name of Canon Korper. Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He, too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the names of very distinguished scholars and representatives of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka. And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists. Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and trivial. 1 �38 SLOVAKIA The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At that time there was no force, single or combined, which could or did intervene to change the course o!f events. Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself, were forced to do things under given circumstances, which they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~ tions. And that is und~rstandable. But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the • "Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs. In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's ,p olitical and moral stature! • • • "CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a ",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today. � SLOVAKIA 21 LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA By Constantine Oulen We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik, because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ... fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic. We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms. We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich really belongs under the Czechs. We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~ titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the beauty of colors with a color-blind person. The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich, however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts. L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938 "had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities (p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population. But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into 1 �22 SLOVAKIA the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase in population of those cities. But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics even in this case? He could have proved his case even with correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~ Slovruk Republic. According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know, already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had 1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic (Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400 i.nhabitants in 1949. According to Lettrich, Turciansky &vaty Martin had 3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900; 4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953). But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T. Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only 10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there the figures for 1940 and 1946. It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area." Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946. �SLOVAKIA 23 When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different; he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example, the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent; Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed 'modern"! "Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000 Crowns" (p. 38). That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution, but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is quite familiar. It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution, oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from 1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially .p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar nation. On the other hand, however, what was done to the Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW, and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the �24 SLOVAKIA thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes. At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars, when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19 months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14 days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time did not even happen in Hungary. But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years! What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police? Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the 300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"? 1 ".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children of Slovak nationality" (p. 37). But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd . .Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919). Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others. 1 �SLOVAKIA 25 Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118 Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show 30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They left .that to Lettrioh ! "In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) , Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar• guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees: 12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18 were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts. Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what are the facts ? 1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed by the Hungarian State. 2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic. 3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the 1 �26 SLOVAKIA Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute majority of State employees, even those of German and Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . . vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty oath; the number of those who r&fused was never recorded statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok). Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40). At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ; 10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary. Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and 10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors. Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation. But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated many of them to teach in Magyar schools! Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to, name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'., Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky, Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek, FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy. Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously �SLOVAKIA 27 by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists" should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of Czech professo:vs,, were they not? It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics: 1 "The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3 percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks (16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak, that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised, suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life. "This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000 'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) . And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually >Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under- �28 SLOVAKIA took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices. "Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United States" (p. 40) . Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is · diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds. From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns. There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika Slo;v enska"). How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia? Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State, hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-· va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter must be liquidated. The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply �SLOVAKIA 29 ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do the r eports of that Federation tell us? In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only 3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000 hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000 hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000 hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000 hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in 1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000 hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914, but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises 2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923; in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only 898,000 hours in 1003. These figures tell us that there must have b.een greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost 40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order: 1 1 1 1 "In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . .. "No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e- �30 SLOVAKIA nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general, that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de· gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86). "The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side. What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non- �SLOVAKIA 31 Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was, during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr. Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with the poor economy of the Czech lands. At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some 15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5 thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he ,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~ terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171). Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in behalf of the ecorromic e:,q>erls before the National Court was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of frauds and falsificatio ns? Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history." The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald. Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his.. t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in �32 SLOVAKIA Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts. According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even states .that the Jews were co·- foun<lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news. Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing. Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter .. ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in . There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what that role wa.s. The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica, which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran) preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of 1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a �SLOVAKIA 33 publication was after the first world war - and it came from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik. The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in 'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a memiber only because most of the people who visited the Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany; he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection. To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies; they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these very same words were used a countless number of times by Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians, scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection. T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement (the Hlasists) with these counsels: "Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national; the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself economically from Jewish capital. . •." Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism, preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews �34 SLOVAKIA always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19. Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK (August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22, 1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ." T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes, and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938). And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that they might go to the lands of those nations, which they voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8). Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland. in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko, another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner: "Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than �SLOV.AKI.A 35 Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other words, he recommended Hitler's methods. Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must rid ourselves of all parasites!" Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel, a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside." Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts, wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians." But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars." And those he did expel ! Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in 1910 only 2 percent did. It is both interesting and significant to the informed reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his "history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik, Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak," �36 SLOVAKIA but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals. Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious, which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the uprising against the German army at the end of August 1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps, where living and housing conditions were adequate, the prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~ ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947). The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0>vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved. After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in SlovaJkia at that time! History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called "Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich �SLOVAKIA 37 used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals." Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example, we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf course, those who were present on that occasion know that a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical (Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting out the name of Canon Korper. Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He, too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the names of very distinguished scholars and representatives of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka. And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists. Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and trivial. 1 �38 SLOVAKIA The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At that time there was no force, single or combined, which could or did intervene to change the course o!f events. Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself, were forced to do things under given circumstances, which they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~ tions. And that is und~rstandable. But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the • "Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs. In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's ,p olitical and moral stature! • • • "CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a ",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 21 LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA By Constantine Oulen We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik, because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ... fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic. We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms. We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich really belongs under the Czechs. We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~ titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the beauty of colors with a color-blind person. The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich, however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts. L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938 "had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities (p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population. But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into 1 22 SLOVAKIA the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase in population of those cities. But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics even in this case? He could have proved his case even with correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~ Slovruk Republic. According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know, already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had 1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic (Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400 i.nhabitants in 1949. According to Lettrich, Turciansky &vaty Martin had 3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900; 4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953). But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T. Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only 10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there the figures for 1940 and 1946. It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area." Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946. SLOVAKIA 23 When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different; he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example, the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent; Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed 'modern"! "Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000 Crowns" (p. 38). That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution, but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is quite familiar. It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution, oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from 1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially .p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar nation. On the other hand, however, what was done to the Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW, and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the 24 SLOVAKIA thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes. At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars, when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19 months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14 days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time did not even happen in Hungary. But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years! What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police? Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the 300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"? 1 ".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children of Slovak nationality" (p. 37). But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd . .Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919). Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others. 1 SLOVAKIA 25 Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118 Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show 30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They left .that to Lettrioh ! "In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) , Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar• guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees: 12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18 were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts. Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what are the facts ? 1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed by the Hungarian State. 2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic. 3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the 1 26 SLOVAKIA Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute majority of State employees, even those of German and Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . . vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty oath; the number of those who r&fused was never recorded statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok). Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40). At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ; 10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary. Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and 10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors. Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation. But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated many of them to teach in Magyar schools! Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to, name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'., Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky, Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek, FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy. Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously SLOVAKIA 27 by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists" should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of Czech professo:vs,, were they not? It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics: 1 "The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3 percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks (16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak, that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised, suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life. "This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000 'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) . And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually >Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under- 28 SLOVAKIA took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices. "Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United States" (p. 40) . Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is · diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds. From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns. There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika Slo;v enska"). How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia? Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State, hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-· va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter must be liquidated. The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply SLOVAKIA 29 ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do the r eports of that Federation tell us? In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only 3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000 hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000 hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000 hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000 hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in 1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000 hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914, but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises 2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923; in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only 898,000 hours in 1003. These figures tell us that there must have b.een greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost 40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order: 1 1 1 1 "In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . .. "No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e- 30 SLOVAKIA nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general, that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de· gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86). "The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side. What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non- SLOVAKIA 31 Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was, during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr. Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with the poor economy of the Czech lands. At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some 15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5 thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he ,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~ terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171). Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in behalf of the ecorromic e:,q>erls before the National Court was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of frauds and falsificatio ns? Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history." The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald. Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his.. t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in 32 SLOVAKIA Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts. According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even states .that the Jews were co·- foun<lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news. Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing. Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter .. ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in . There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what that role wa.s. The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica, which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran) preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of 1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a SLOVAKIA 33 publication was after the first world war - and it came from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik. The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in 'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a memiber only because most of the people who visited the Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany; he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection. To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies; they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these very same words were used a countless number of times by Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians, scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection. T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement (the Hlasists) with these counsels: "Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national; the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself economically from Jewish capital. . •." Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism, preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews 34 SLOVAKIA always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19. Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK (August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22, 1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ." T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes, and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938). And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that they might go to the lands of those nations, which they voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8). Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland. in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko, another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner: "Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than SLOV.AKI.A 35 Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other words, he recommended Hitler's methods. Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must rid ourselves of all parasites!" Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel, a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside." Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts, wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians." But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars." And those he did expel ! Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in 1910 only 2 percent did. It is both interesting and significant to the informed reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his "history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik, Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak," 36 SLOVAKIA but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals. Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious, which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the uprising against the German army at the end of August 1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps, where living and housing conditions were adequate, the prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~ ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947). The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0>vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved. After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in SlovaJkia at that time! History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called "Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich SLOVAKIA 37 used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals." Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example, we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf course, those who were present on that occasion know that a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical (Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting out the name of Canon Korper. Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He, too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the names of very distinguished scholars and representatives of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka. And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists. Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and trivial. 1 38 SLOVAKIA The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At that time there was no force, single or combined, which could or did intervene to change the course o!f events. Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself, were forced to do things under given circumstances, which they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~ tions. And that is und~rstandable. But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the • "Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs. In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's ,p olitical and moral stature! • • • "CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a ",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Lettrich's History of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Constantine Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 21-38 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/153ca7b8e0894787ec040bf3e8d190e4.pdf ecc8df4f3de4b9451f36843379cd1f91 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 3 THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS IN SLOVAKIA Dr. Joseph Pauco In recent months many evident proofs of the failures of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists themselves? Centralization 1 On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism. F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists. The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22, 19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia: "The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia; it is its fighting diivision." The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~ gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a." Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the 1 1 �4 SLOVAKIA Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled "Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs. As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact openly, when he said: "Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions." For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party ·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony. 'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k, Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them . "Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak, in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights." Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly �SLOVAKIA 5 dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause. Slovak Nationalism The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were most violently attooked by the communists. William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups." Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes, aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant, stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them." Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie." Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~ structive variety - populist s~paratism." !Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he �6 said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism, carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy." Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~ ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . " ·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission, the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices." This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who untitl recently held the first position in the Communist Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~ gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze<:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union - become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens." Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot- �SLOVAKIA 7 ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did not materialize. Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even Bacile<k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns his attention to the communist writers, saying: "Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a romantic novel which would depict the fact that without the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti<: industria>liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks." If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers who stand in the service of communism and the so-called "Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a "Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~ ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates, then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions, we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple. The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun• ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said: �8 SLOVAKIA "If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . . We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the low level of the teaching and training work of our teruohers." That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-· parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy .Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the Communist Party no end of trouble. That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak nationali<Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-· cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead, dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the party.'' Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number �SLOVAKIA 9 of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and party. Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere. Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception. The Resistance Movement Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e movement, Bernard Nemcek. Reports from Prague about the communist verdict tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement to create an independent Slovak State. The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for state independence. Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist? In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com- �10 SLOVAKIA munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses. Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions taken by the communists themselves, there can be no doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism. In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence for Slova!kia, he replied: "I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the determination to have their own state and there is no power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with any other state form ." Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic. And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing its bitter fate. It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-· gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955, definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first 1 �SLOVAKIA 11 one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have 1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948. It is certain that under other circumstances the strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater. What do we mean by saying under other circumstances? The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness. Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac• ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter. Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the very people, who together with tihe communists for three years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col., •J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not 'be trusted by tlhe West. Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S<>-<!alled �12 SLOVAKIA ~'Council of Free Ozecho-<Slovrukia" - should not be used or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe), United States Information Agency (Voice of America), and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United States Government, because they are totally discredited and cursed by the Slovaks at home. 1Should anyone wish to, be corredly informed about how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-· lish a Slovak independent state. The Reds Fear the West .C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's" court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times attacks of this kind are made almost daily. On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war." Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend "pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~ ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime, reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central- �SLOVAKIA 13 European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac. tionary elements." The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile, who speak for state independence for their own nation, is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able. Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis, reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective. The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator, "they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one specialty. More than any other group they are concealing their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union, that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed of Tiso's Legacy." On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in �14 SLOVAKIA the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western Germ.any." The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against "the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are constantly warning escapees not to return home. The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles. It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists say one thing at home, something else at the conference ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever ,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of Slovaks in the West look for thei<r sup,po<rt. ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests." To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1 �SLOVAKIA 15 tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the situation, they would not have to concern themselves with the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~ tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep. Perhaps this is best refle<>Jro in the words of Karel Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-. pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party." In other words, what is being done in the, West in the interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit>n does have a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of the Slovak nation. The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava that Americans "iha<ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te." The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would -hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it. �16 SLOV.AKIA The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better for them than a government of their own choice. Against the Kersten Committee The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee. The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation." The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked, "rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~ triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said, 'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of the methods, which are used by the American reaction to slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time, however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in." On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law �SLOVAKIA 17 about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive plans to start a new war." On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among otiher things in that article, we read: "On December 31, 1954, there was published in the United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements', and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet, army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ... The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . . "About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators, who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~ tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco, Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute secrecy, behind closed doors. "The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country. "Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern- �18 SLOVAKIA ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course, there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for anything _of value. "The so...called document of the American Government, prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-· cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their nati·o n to Hitler." . We find the very same insults and abusive names also jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery . It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip, which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war against peace-J.oving countries." The Prague government is also angry because the Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the Sl~va:k Republic. As far as the reproaches of the Prague government and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in -a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however, mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective 1 �SLOVAKIA 19 work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence. Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._, pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who sympathized with them. But it does not matter whom they single out for abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~ munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:.. ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary struggle to bring order and political balance in Central Europe has no su'b stantiation. While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course, it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1 �.20 SLOVAKIA lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record .the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism . The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL ,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as :a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and .has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers. And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used. It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To .waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes ,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto the ocean. We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence, must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native "populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and "imperialis tic American capitalism." 1 1 � SLOVAKIA 3 THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS IN SLOVAKIA Dr. Joseph Pauco In recent months many evident proofs of the failures of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists themselves? Centralization 1 On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism. F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists. The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22, 19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia: "The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia; it is its fighting diivision." The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~ gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a." Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the 1 1 �4 SLOVAKIA Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled "Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs. As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact openly, when he said: "Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions." For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party ·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony. 'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k, Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them . "Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak, in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights." Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly �SLOVAKIA 5 dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause. Slovak Nationalism The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were most violently attooked by the communists. William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups." Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes, aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant, stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them." Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie." Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~ structive variety - populist s~paratism." !Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he �6 said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism, carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy." Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~ ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . " ·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission, the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices." This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who untitl recently held the first position in the Communist Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~ gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze<:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union - become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens." Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot- �SLOVAKIA 7 ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did not materialize. Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even Bacile<k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns his attention to the communist writers, saying: "Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a romantic novel which would depict the fact that without the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti<: industria>liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks." If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers who stand in the service of communism and the so-called "Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a "Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~ ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates, then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions, we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple. The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun• ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said: �8 SLOVAKIA "If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . . We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the low level of the teaching and training work of our teruohers." That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-· parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy .Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the Communist Party no end of trouble. That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak nationali<Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-· cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead, dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the party.'' Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number �SLOVAKIA 9 of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and party. Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere. Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception. The Resistance Movement Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e movement, Bernard Nemcek. Reports from Prague about the communist verdict tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement to create an independent Slovak State. The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for state independence. Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist? In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com- �10 SLOVAKIA munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses. Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions taken by the communists themselves, there can be no doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism. In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence for Slova!kia, he replied: "I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the determination to have their own state and there is no power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with any other state form ." Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic. And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing its bitter fate. It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-· gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955, definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first 1 �SLOVAKIA 11 one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have 1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948. It is certain that under other circumstances the strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater. What do we mean by saying under other circumstances? The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness. Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac• ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter. Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the very people, who together with tihe communists for three years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col., •J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not 'be trusted by tlhe West. Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S<>-<!alled �12 SLOVAKIA ~'Council of Free Ozecho-<Slovrukia" - should not be used or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe), United States Information Agency (Voice of America), and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United States Government, because they are totally discredited and cursed by the Slovaks at home. 1Should anyone wish to, be corredly informed about how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-· lish a Slovak independent state. The Reds Fear the West .C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's" court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times attacks of this kind are made almost daily. On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war." Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend "pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~ ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime, reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central- �SLOVAKIA 13 European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac. tionary elements." The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile, who speak for state independence for their own nation, is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able. Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis, reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective. The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator, "they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one specialty. More than any other group they are concealing their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union, that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed of Tiso's Legacy." On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in �14 SLOVAKIA the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western Germ.any." The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against "the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are constantly warning escapees not to return home. The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles. It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists say one thing at home, something else at the conference ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever ,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of Slovaks in the West look for thei<r sup,po<rt. ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests." To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1 �SLOVAKIA 15 tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the situation, they would not have to concern themselves with the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~ tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep. Perhaps this is best refle<>Jro in the words of Karel Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-. pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party." In other words, what is being done in the, West in the interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit>n does have a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of the Slovak nation. The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava that Americans "iha<ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te." The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would -hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it. �16 SLOV.AKIA The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better for them than a government of their own choice. Against the Kersten Committee The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee. The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation." The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked, "rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~ triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said, 'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of the methods, which are used by the American reaction to slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time, however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in." On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law �SLOVAKIA 17 about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive plans to start a new war." On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among otiher things in that article, we read: "On December 31, 1954, there was published in the United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements', and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet, army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ... The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . . "About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators, who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~ tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco, Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute secrecy, behind closed doors. "The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country. "Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern- �18 SLOVAKIA ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course, there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for anything _of value. "The so...called document of the American Government, prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-· cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their nati·o n to Hitler." . We find the very same insults and abusive names also jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery . It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip, which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war against peace-J.oving countries." The Prague government is also angry because the Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the Sl~va:k Republic. As far as the reproaches of the Prague government and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in -a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however, mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective 1 �SLOVAKIA 19 work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence. Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._, pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who sympathized with them. But it does not matter whom they single out for abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~ munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:.. ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary struggle to bring order and political balance in Central Europe has no su'b stantiation. While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course, it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1 �.20 SLOVAKIA lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record .the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism . The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL ,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as :a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and .has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers. And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used. It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To .waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes ,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto the ocean. We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence, must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native "populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and "imperialis tic American capitalism." 1 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 3 THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS IN SLOVAKIA Dr. Joseph Pauco In recent months many evident proofs of the failures of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists themselves? Centralization 1 On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism. F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists. The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22, 19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia: "The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia; it is its fighting diivision." The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~ gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a." Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the 1 1 4 SLOVAKIA Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled "Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs. As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact openly, when he said: "Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions." For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party ·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony. 'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k, Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them . "Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak, in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights." Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly SLOVAKIA 5 dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause. Slovak Nationalism The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were most violently attooked by the communists. William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups." Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes, aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant, stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them." Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie." Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~ structive variety - populist s~paratism." !Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he 6 said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism, carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy." Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~ ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . " ·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission, the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices." This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who untitl recently held the first position in the Communist Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~ gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze<:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union - become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens." Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot- SLOVAKIA 7 ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did not materialize. Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even Bacile<k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns his attention to the communist writers, saying: "Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a romantic novel which would depict the fact that without the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti<: industria>liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks." If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers who stand in the service of communism and the so-called "Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a "Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~ ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates, then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions, we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple. The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun• ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said: 8 SLOVAKIA "If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . . We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the low level of the teaching and training work of our teruohers." That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-· parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy .Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the Communist Party no end of trouble. That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak nationali<Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-· cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead, dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the party.'' Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number SLOVAKIA 9 of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and party. Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere. Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception. The Resistance Movement Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e movement, Bernard Nemcek. Reports from Prague about the communist verdict tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement to create an independent Slovak State. The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for state independence. Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist? In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com- 10 SLOVAKIA munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses. Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions taken by the communists themselves, there can be no doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism. In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence for Slova!kia, he replied: "I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the determination to have their own state and there is no power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with any other state form ." Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic. And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing its bitter fate. It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-· gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955, definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first 1 SLOVAKIA 11 one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have 1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948. It is certain that under other circumstances the strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater. What do we mean by saying under other circumstances? The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness. Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac• ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter. Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the very people, who together with tihe communists for three years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col., •J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not 'be trusted by tlhe West. Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S<>-<!alled 12 SLOVAKIA ~'Council of Free Ozecho-<Slovrukia" - should not be used or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe), United States Information Agency (Voice of America), and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United States Government, because they are totally discredited and cursed by the Slovaks at home. 1Should anyone wish to, be corredly informed about how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-· lish a Slovak independent state. The Reds Fear the West .C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's" court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times attacks of this kind are made almost daily. On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war." Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend "pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~ ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime, reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central- SLOVAKIA 13 European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac. tionary elements." The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile, who speak for state independence for their own nation, is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able. Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis, reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective. The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator, "they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one specialty. More than any other group they are concealing their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union, that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed of Tiso's Legacy." On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in 14 SLOVAKIA the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western Germ.any." The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against "the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are constantly warning escapees not to return home. The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles. It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists say one thing at home, something else at the conference ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever ,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of Slovaks in the West look for thei<r sup,po<rt. ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests." To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1 SLOVAKIA 15 tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the situation, they would not have to concern themselves with the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~ tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep. Perhaps this is best refle<>Jro in the words of Karel Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-. pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party." In other words, what is being done in the, West in the interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit>n does have a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of the Slovak nation. The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava that Americans "iha<ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te." The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would -hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it. 16 SLOV.AKIA The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better for them than a government of their own choice. Against the Kersten Committee The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee. The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation." The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked, "rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~ triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said, 'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of the methods, which are used by the American reaction to slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time, however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in." On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law SLOVAKIA 17 about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive plans to start a new war." On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among otiher things in that article, we read: "On December 31, 1954, there was published in the United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements', and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet, army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ... The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . . "About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators, who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~ tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco, Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute secrecy, behind closed doors. "The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country. "Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern- 18 SLOVAKIA ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course, there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for anything _of value. "The so...called document of the American Government, prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-· cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their nati·o n to Hitler." . We find the very same insults and abusive names also jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery . It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip, which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war against peace-J.oving countries." The Prague government is also angry because the Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the Sl~va:k Republic. As far as the reproaches of the Prague government and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in -a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however, mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective 1 SLOVAKIA 19 work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence. Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._, pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who sympathized with them. But it does not matter whom they single out for abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~ munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:.. ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary struggle to bring order and political balance in Central Europe has no su'b stantiation. While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course, it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1 .20 SLOVAKIA lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record .the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism . The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL ,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as :a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and .has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers. And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used. It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To .waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes ,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto the ocean. We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence, must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native "populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and "imperialis tic American capitalism." 1 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Failures of Communist Politics in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Paučo Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 3-20 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b3f4e5263ce41309f048807e8d9ccfee.pdf 284f076f8b0d44613883b79dce9beb5a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica VOL. V DECEMBER, 1955 NO. 4 ( 17) ??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ??? Wa:nt to fight Communism? You don 't know how? Well, here's the answer, according to CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with "TRJUTH DOLJLARS" that's how! American "Truth Dollars," we are told, " send words of truth a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron Curtain." But have you ever read or ·heard those "words of truth and hope" which bombard the Iron Curtain countries? Neither have most Americans! Take the case of ,Slovakia, which was wantonly destroyed by the victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the war in total d'isregard o.f the will of the Slovak nation, what have your "Truth Dollars" done for the unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE, which oper,a tes RA'DIO FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has not been •s ending words of truth and hope to the Slovak people. The "Czechoslovak" division or unit of RFE is completely under the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists and Red collabomtors former members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic Slovaks, because they are and have been opposed to freedom and poli- tical independence for their own nation. Both these groups have a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak, anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before, during and after the laist war. And we have not heard that they have publicly repudiated those policies. American "TRUTH DOLLARS" are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs and S lovak J udases in the service of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH DOLLARS fight Communism "by exposing Red lies ... reveallng news suppressed by Moscow and by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have · been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators in the_ "Czechoslovak" (really CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin<:e it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have been sent regularly to V'arious leading lights of the Free Europe Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM); both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE remains practicall y unchanged. Personal visits to the New York Office of RFE have not helped much either. It seem s that the Fnee Europe Committee people themseJ.ves are not interested in knowing the truth about what happened in Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and. after the war. In fact, they have 1 0 �2 SLOVAKIA made it quite obvious that they do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE began operations with the blessing of our State Department! When the Slov·a ks fought the Communists and pro-Soviet policy, they were beaten down by the Be,. nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer, Vanek, Tigrid,Schoenfeld, Firt, Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.). These Red collaborators did not know how to fight Communism at home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and .Czechs how to fight it. Of course, for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" ! The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E EUROPE is, we believe, a good idea, but the way it is being put a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo• va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The peopl,e preparing them certainly must know that by now. But they ~e not in their jobs to tell that Slovaks are entitled to freedom ,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the .persons who got them the jobs, so they are not impartial. And those persons are the Benes Czechs. If we wene to judge the entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would have to say that it is strictly a socialistic enterpris·e. Since we are not sufficiently informed on the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time. But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists. "Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words of truth; that's how hard 'Truth Dollars' work. Your dollars will .hel,2 70 million people resist the Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are by exiles in the native tongue of the people to whom they a,re beamed." All this, from a recent advertisement of the Crusa,de for Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent say bluntly: We don't believe it as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and independence, distorts facts of the past and favors enemies of the Slov,a k nation, the enemies of America, as well! The Benes Czechs and •t heir hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats," have deceived and embarrassed Americans entirely too tong. Their own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load them with American "TRUTH DOI,LARS"? The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. That's all there 'is to it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There ·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio Free Europe are supposed to do. Why not let them do it? � SLOVAKIA Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica VOL. V DECEMBER, 1955 NO. 4 ( 17) ??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ??? Wa:nt to fight Communism? You don 't know how? Well, here's the answer, according to CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with "TRJUTH DOLJLARS" that's how! American "Truth Dollars," we are told, " send words of truth a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron Curtain." But have you ever read or ·heard those "words of truth and hope" which bombard the Iron Curtain countries? Neither have most Americans! Take the case of ,Slovakia, which was wantonly destroyed by the victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the war in total d'isregard o.f the will of the Slovak nation, what have your "Truth Dollars" done for the unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE, which oper,a tes RA'DIO FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has not been •s ending words of truth and hope to the Slovak people. The "Czechoslovak" division or unit of RFE is completely under the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists and Red collabomtors former members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic Slovaks, because they are and have been opposed to freedom and poli- tical independence for their own nation. Both these groups have a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak, anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before, during and after the laist war. And we have not heard that they have publicly repudiated those policies. American "TRUTH DOLLARS" are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs and S lovak J udases in the service of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH DOLLARS fight Communism "by exposing Red lies ... reveallng news suppressed by Moscow and by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have · been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators in the_ "Czechoslovak" (really CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin<:e it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have been sent regularly to V'arious leading lights of the Free Europe Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM); both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE remains practicall y unchanged. Personal visits to the New York Office of RFE have not helped much either. It seem s that the Fnee Europe Committee people themseJ.ves are not interested in knowing the truth about what happened in Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and. after the war. In fact, they have 1 0 �2 SLOVAKIA made it quite obvious that they do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE began operations with the blessing of our State Department! When the Slov·a ks fought the Communists and pro-Soviet policy, they were beaten down by the Be,. nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer, Vanek, Tigrid,Schoenfeld, Firt, Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.). These Red collaborators did not know how to fight Communism at home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and .Czechs how to fight it. Of course, for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" ! The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E EUROPE is, we believe, a good idea, but the way it is being put a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo• va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The peopl,e preparing them certainly must know that by now. But they ~e not in their jobs to tell that Slovaks are entitled to freedom ,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the .persons who got them the jobs, so they are not impartial. And those persons are the Benes Czechs. If we wene to judge the entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would have to say that it is strictly a socialistic enterpris·e. Since we are not sufficiently informed on the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time. But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists. "Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words of truth; that's how hard 'Truth Dollars' work. Your dollars will .hel,2 70 million people resist the Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are by exiles in the native tongue of the people to whom they a,re beamed." All this, from a recent advertisement of the Crusa,de for Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent say bluntly: We don't believe it as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and independence, distorts facts of the past and favors enemies of the Slov,a k nation, the enemies of America, as well! The Benes Czechs and •t heir hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats," have deceived and embarrassed Americans entirely too tong. Their own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load them with American "TRUTH DOI,LARS"? The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. That's all there 'is to it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There ·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio Free Europe are supposed to do. Why not let them do it? � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica VOL. V DECEMBER, 1955 NO. 4 ( 17) ??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ??? Wa:nt to fight Communism? You don 't know how? Well, here's the answer, according to CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with "TRJUTH DOLJLARS" that's how! American "Truth Dollars," we are told, " send words of truth a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron Curtain." But have you ever read or ·heard those "words of truth and hope" which bombard the Iron Curtain countries? Neither have most Americans! Take the case of ,Slovakia, which was wantonly destroyed by the victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the war in total d'isregard o.f the will of the Slovak nation, what have your "Truth Dollars" done for the unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE, which oper,a tes RA'DIO FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has not been •s ending words of truth and hope to the Slovak people. The "Czechoslovak" division or unit of RFE is completely under the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists and Red collabomtors former members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic Slovaks, because they are and have been opposed to freedom and poli- tical independence for their own nation. Both these groups have a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak, anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before, during and after the laist war. And we have not heard that they have publicly repudiated those policies. American "TRUTH DOLLARS" are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs and S lovak J udases in the service of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH DOLLARS fight Communism "by exposing Red lies ... reveallng news suppressed by Moscow and by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have · been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators in the_ "Czechoslovak" (really CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin<:e it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have been sent regularly to V'arious leading lights of the Free Europe Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM); both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE remains practicall y unchanged. Personal visits to the New York Office of RFE have not helped much either. It seem s that the Fnee Europe Committee people themseJ.ves are not interested in knowing the truth about what happened in Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and. after the war. In fact, they have 1 0 2 SLOVAKIA made it quite obvious that they do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE began operations with the blessing of our State Department! When the Slov·a ks fought the Communists and pro-Soviet policy, they were beaten down by the Be,. nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer, Vanek, Tigrid,Schoenfeld, Firt, Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.). These Red collaborators did not know how to fight Communism at home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and .Czechs how to fight it. Of course, for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" ! The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E EUROPE is, we believe, a good idea, but the way it is being put a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo• va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The peopl,e preparing them certainly must know that by now. But they ~e not in their jobs to tell that Slovaks are entitled to freedom ,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the .persons who got them the jobs, so they are not impartial. And those persons are the Benes Czechs. If we wene to judge the entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would have to say that it is strictly a socialistic enterpris·e. Since we are not sufficiently informed on the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time. But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists. "Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words of truth; that's how hard 'Truth Dollars' work. Your dollars will .hel,2 70 million people resist the Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are by exiles in the native tongue of the people to whom they a,re beamed." All this, from a recent advertisement of the Crusa,de for Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent say bluntly: We don't believe it as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and independence, distorts facts of the past and favors enemies of the Slov,a k nation, the enemies of America, as well! The Benes Czechs and •t heir hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats," have deceived and embarrassed Americans entirely too tong. Their own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load them with American "TRUTH DOI,LARS"? The Czechs are not and do not want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to be Czechs. That's all there 'is to it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There ·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio Free Europe are supposed to do. Why not let them do it?  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource ??? "Truth Dollars" ??? Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955 pp. 1-2 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0bc301038cf82cccbb95f298f39f3f3e.pdf c8a6e974fab72cceddd5eba2f36fa9c7 PDF Text Text \t OL. V DECEMBER , · 1955 IN THIS ISSUE: ??? "Truth Dollars"??? Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia ( ' L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia": Cast les of Slovakia: WHO S AID IT ? - History or Propag a nda ? Liptovsky H ra dok 54 * * * . Ed ited and comp il ed by PHILIP A. HROBAK Publi s h ed by TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA NO. 4 ( 17 ) �SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa, � \t OL. V DECEMBER , · 1955 IN THIS ISSUE: ??? "Truth Dollars"??? Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia ( ' L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia": Cast les of Slovakia: WHO S AID IT ? - History or Propag a nda ? Liptovsky H ra dok 54 * * * . Ed ited and comp il ed by PHILIP A. HROBAK Publi s h ed by TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA NO. 4 ( 17 ) �SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa, � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document \t OL. V DECEMBER , · 1955 IN THIS ISSUE: ??? "Truth Dollars"??? Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia ( ' L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia": Cast les of Slovakia: WHO S AID IT ? - History or Propag a nda ? Liptovsky H ra dok 54 * * * . Ed ited and comp il ed by PHILIP A. HROBAK Publi s h ed by TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA NO. 4 ( 17 ) SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa,  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/14d56edbe08d0137ffd15ed7c9a9214b.pdf 564a93caabf378580091ac196aa402af PDF Text Text Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio • Honorary Dr. Peter 19-13 W. Chicago Fran ce s L. Mizenko 3756 Lee Road Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio President P. H letko I th Street ~. Illinoi s J President Philip A . Hro ba k P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa. \'ice-Pre sident Jacob Kocis 15-17 - 167th Street Hammond, Ind. Vice-President Julia Krajcovic 1648 W. L th St., St ephen J . Tka c h 173 N . Main Street Wi l kes-Barre, Pa . A ndre w J . H amrock 61 Woodland Av enue Campbel l , Ohio ADVISORY COUNCIL Mi c hael J . Vargovich National President l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n 'hie-ago 8, Ill. Recording 'ecretary Franc is H rusovsky 2900 East Bou l evard Cleveland I, Ohio H e l en Ko c an .'fationa l Pre sident Fir st Catholic Sl ovak Ladie s 1-nion F ra n k Sobus - :-lational President lovak Cathol i c- Soko l Secretary-Treasurer Milan V . Blazek .J922 S. Lec laire Avenu Chicago 38, Ill. St ephen J . Tkach National President nion Penna . Sl ovak EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. Joseph Prusa 205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J. · Gabri el a E. Vavrek National President Ladies Pennsy lvania Sl ovak Union Jo h n Rozbor il ~ational President Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica ) JEDNOTA Middletown , Pa. SLOVENSKA OBRANA Scranton, Pa. ZENSKA JEDNOTA Cleve l and, Ohio BRATSTVO Wi l kes-Barre , Pa. SLOVENSKE NOVINY C l eve l and, Ohio ZORNICKA Chica.go, Ill. KATOLiCKY SOKOL Passai c, N. J. SVORNOST Whitaker, Pa. OSADNE HLASY Chicago, Ill. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind . �SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress. � Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio • Honorary Dr. Peter 19-13 W. Chicago Fran ce s L. Mizenko 3756 Lee Road Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio President P. H letko I th Street ~. Illinoi s J President Philip A . Hro ba k P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa. \'ice-Pre sident Jacob Kocis 15-17 - 167th Street Hammond, Ind. Vice-President Julia Krajcovic 1648 W. L th St., St ephen J . Tka c h 173 N . Main Street Wi l kes-Barre, Pa . A ndre w J . H amrock 61 Woodland Av enue Campbel l , Ohio ADVISORY COUNCIL Mi c hael J . Vargovich National President l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n 'hie-ago 8, Ill. Recording 'ecretary Franc is H rusovsky 2900 East Bou l evard Cleveland I, Ohio H e l en Ko c an .'fationa l Pre sident Fir st Catholic Sl ovak Ladie s 1-nion F ra n k Sobus - :-lational President lovak Cathol i c- Soko l Secretary-Treasurer Milan V . Blazek .J922 S. Lec laire Avenu Chicago 38, Ill. St ephen J . Tkach National President nion Penna . Sl ovak EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. Joseph Prusa 205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J. · Gabri el a E. Vavrek National President Ladies Pennsy lvania Sl ovak Union Jo h n Rozbor il ~ational President Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica ) JEDNOTA Middletown , Pa. SLOVENSKA OBRANA Scranton, Pa. ZENSKA JEDNOTA Cleve l and, Ohio BRATSTVO Wi l kes-Barre , Pa. SLOVENSKE NOVINY C l eve l and, Ohio ZORNICKA Chica.go, Ill. KATOLiCKY SOKOL Passai c, N. J. SVORNOST Whitaker, Pa. OSADNE HLASY Chicago, Ill. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind . �SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Officers of the Slovak League of America (Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio • Honorary Dr. Peter 19-13 W. Chicago Fran ce s L. Mizenko 3756 Lee Road Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio President P. H letko I th Street ~. Illinoi s J President Philip A . Hro ba k P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa. \'ice-Pre sident Jacob Kocis 15-17 - 167th Street Hammond, Ind. Vice-President Julia Krajcovic 1648 W. L th St., St ephen J . Tka c h 173 N . Main Street Wi l kes-Barre, Pa . A ndre w J . H amrock 61 Woodland Av enue Campbel l , Ohio ADVISORY COUNCIL Mi c hael J . Vargovich National President l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n 'hie-ago 8, Ill. Recording 'ecretary Franc is H rusovsky 2900 East Bou l evard Cleveland I, Ohio H e l en Ko c an .'fationa l Pre sident Fir st Catholic Sl ovak Ladie s 1-nion F ra n k Sobus - :-lational President lovak Cathol i c- Soko l Secretary-Treasurer Milan V . Blazek .J922 S. Lec laire Avenu Chicago 38, Ill. St ephen J . Tkach National President nion Penna . Sl ovak EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Paul P. Jamriska 810 Montooth Street Pittsburgh 10, Pa. Joseph Prusa 205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J. · Gabri el a E. Vavrek National President Ladies Pennsy lvania Sl ovak Union Jo h n Rozbor il ~ational President Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica ) JEDNOTA Middletown , Pa. SLOVENSKA OBRANA Scranton, Pa. ZENSKA JEDNOTA Cleve l and, Ohio BRATSTVO Wi l kes-Barre , Pa. SLOVENSKE NOVINY C l eve l and, Ohio ZORNICKA Chica.go, Ill. KATOLiCKY SOKOL Passai c, N. J. SVORNOST Whitaker, Pa. OSADNE HLASY Chicago, Ill. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind . SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16) Description An account of the resource includes photo of ruins of Bzovík Castle Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6ac7410f395676e02818cc53fe896984.pdf 6ee6848fb54c5fa492946fff146e6a3a PDF Text Text SLOVAK.IA 72 The Czecho-Slovak Exile CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE Dr. Mi chael Zibrin July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~ fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-. zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true. The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in 1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform. The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always Etood very close to the Communists, even during small political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl, Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate �Sl.JOVAKIA 73 they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own. History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo. cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-· jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that lhis material was sent by France and a French military mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier, when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent - stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less surprising when one remembers that he was actually among the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere. ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not only in Czecho-!Slovakia. Certainly one of the most important persons in the Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes, the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially, on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council. Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic 1 �74 SLOVAKIA party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all Czechs. Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu. cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July, 1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc." T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee! On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger. A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote : "The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not - as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaganda line. "These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. "A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist a.gents or have criminal records. '1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin �SLOVAKIA 75 by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. ' "Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line." I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right! The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~ crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only. To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one can say that its activities during the second World War are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi. net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger, who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however, Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of 1 �76 SLOVAKIA the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second front against Churchill's will. We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943 against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it. 1 I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943, in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so �SLOVAKIA 77 smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war. Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928, "Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~ ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government, formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia. Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know, that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They all were united in their pro-Communist activities, and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's name will be forever connected not only with our fight for national liberation, but also with the struggle for social liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . . Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats came to the United States and suddenly discovered that they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica- �78 SLOVAKIA tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their activities back home. The first document signed by the ministers and the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~ cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25, 1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party, not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~ nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats. But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse, they put it into effect. The most important parts of this agreement are the following: 1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life. 2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee is being created with an equal numlber of representatives from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership, wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties. This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1 �SLOVAKIA 79 ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist Party by Peter Zenkl. It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from Government. But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the' Working People" created a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This committee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward a socialist dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes, together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions, , would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but �80 SLOVAKlA actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from the instant they began to function. Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem, Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~ munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration " to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy, Christ'ianit y, and freedom. This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it. A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented on major effects of this agreement in this manner: "The aims of the socialist bloc were many: "1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them, through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi· nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together. "2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all, and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the Communists will divide them among themselves. "3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and, thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already been published for this so-called united youth organization and are led by the Commundsts. "In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist dictatorship." Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member �SLOVAKIA 81 of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by the editor Jandaceik. Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~ ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the University he expelled those students who had participated in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February. Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~ of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr. Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States. Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party. Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called "Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5. Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he �82 SLOVAKIA was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and thorough propagator. From Canada he came to the United States and at the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania. iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem, however, before the voting day, and often at midnight, cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva, Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had. The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party, however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group. The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable �SLOVAKIA 83 results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and are paid by the Amerilcan citizens. In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-· man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the West, requesting political asylum. Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West. He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe. Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad. What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia? The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr. Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western World and praising everything he found after his return to �84 SLOVAK.IA Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the goods in their possession and the common people are starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE. When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there have been, since the start, members who were sent West by the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley. The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains. To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies. But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and they still do that and help to betray America. There is no excuse for them, or is there? Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1 �SLOVAKIA 86 inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?" There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements. Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time. Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible. but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~ cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL known Communist in the old country. Why should we be shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden• tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts. Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the "Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman. 'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity �86 SLOVAKIA that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per., haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a fOTgery . Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the "Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as ridiculous and highly impossible. In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada, another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks" �f?LOV,AKIA 87 in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to the policy of the present members of the Council then in Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him, Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel Miksche. It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment, with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own failures and a!bandoned projects. SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives. Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue. Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the "Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-· ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the persons from the Council do not distinguish between a 1 �88 SLOVAKIA Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also pay for their protection and defense It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry, his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un., dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to him only through representin g himself as from me. When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak" group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un. derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko, Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions. If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present group. What is broadcast and written now - for American money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them. �SLOVAKIA 89 These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy. chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~ lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~ stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta affairs they only curse them. Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko, much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague. The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In. vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer to whom the security of the United States is of paramount internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope, therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~ ter also and that the organizations in question will be cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group. iLausman was so aggressive that during the second World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As- �90 SLOVAKIA sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept., able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that Russian territory extends for the first time in history west of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn. In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal. Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol., lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however, refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country. Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions, sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia. After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika. The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several months later, as the premier by Benes. Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted �SLOVAKIA 91 to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~ ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts. At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty, because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal. The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December, 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of thie SloViak National Council. When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his life. Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them. When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1 �92 SLOVAKIA SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it benefited him. On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized" on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~ lection of Laws and Regulations. T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words: ". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . " Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement ! Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one. 'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator" of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very •b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi- �SLOVAKIA 93 zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl view of Prague. All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation, and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols. I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in their books. Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or (Josef Konbel, the with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes). Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to note what has been written albout him here in the United States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a more serious character: "Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16, 1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army. " He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities." I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-· ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by �94 SLOVAK.IA the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and ineffective. About the others aJbove, I must confess the same opinion as to character. The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party. But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity. It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete conformance with the Communists had negated the party as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history. During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos• sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats, Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was �SLOVAKIA 95 clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats is not very well known and evaluated in the United States; if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S. am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of State Acheson could not have secured for them influential positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll. It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled, and even JnUrdered. They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of 1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner, working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer needed by the Communists. Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction. On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh 14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech �96 SLOVAKIA Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in free England, the present representative of the "Council of Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which he said: "WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES." 1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19, 1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert Ri,pka. In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25, 1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now their only means of survival. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single 'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240). � SLOVAK.IA 72 The Czecho-Slovak Exile CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE Dr. Mi chael Zibrin July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~ fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-. zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true. The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in 1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform. The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always Etood very close to the Communists, even during small political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl, Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate �Sl.JOVAKIA 73 they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own. History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo. cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-· jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that lhis material was sent by France and a French military mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier, when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent - stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less surprising when one remembers that he was actually among the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere. ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not only in Czecho-!Slovakia. Certainly one of the most important persons in the Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes, the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially, on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council. Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic 1 �74 SLOVAKIA party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all Czechs. Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu. cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July, 1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc." T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee! On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger. A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote : "The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not - as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaganda line. "These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. "A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist a.gents or have criminal records. '1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin �SLOVAKIA 75 by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. ' "Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line." I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right! The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~ crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only. To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one can say that its activities during the second World War are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi. net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger, who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however, Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of 1 �76 SLOVAKIA the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second front against Churchill's will. We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943 against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it. 1 I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943, in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so �SLOVAKIA 77 smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war. Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928, "Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~ ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government, formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia. Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know, that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They all were united in their pro-Communist activities, and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's name will be forever connected not only with our fight for national liberation, but also with the struggle for social liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . . Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats came to the United States and suddenly discovered that they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica- �78 SLOVAKIA tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their activities back home. The first document signed by the ministers and the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~ cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25, 1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party, not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~ nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats. But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse, they put it into effect. The most important parts of this agreement are the following: 1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life. 2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee is being created with an equal numlber of representatives from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership, wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties. This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1 �SLOVAKIA 79 ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist Party by Peter Zenkl. It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from Government. But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the' Working People" created a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This committee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward a socialist dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes, together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions, , would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but �80 SLOVAKlA actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from the instant they began to function. Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem, Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~ munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration " to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy, Christ'ianit y, and freedom. This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it. A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented on major effects of this agreement in this manner: "The aims of the socialist bloc were many: "1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them, through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi· nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together. "2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all, and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the Communists will divide them among themselves. "3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and, thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already been published for this so-called united youth organization and are led by the Commundsts. "In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist dictatorship." Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member �SLOVAKIA 81 of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by the editor Jandaceik. Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~ ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the University he expelled those students who had participated in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February. Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~ of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr. Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States. Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party. Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called "Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5. Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he �82 SLOVAKIA was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and thorough propagator. From Canada he came to the United States and at the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania. iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem, however, before the voting day, and often at midnight, cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva, Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had. The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party, however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group. The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable �SLOVAKIA 83 results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and are paid by the Amerilcan citizens. In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-· man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the West, requesting political asylum. Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West. He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe. Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad. What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia? The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr. Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western World and praising everything he found after his return to �84 SLOVAK.IA Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the goods in their possession and the common people are starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE. When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there have been, since the start, members who were sent West by the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley. The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains. To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies. But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and they still do that and help to betray America. There is no excuse for them, or is there? Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1 �SLOVAKIA 86 inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?" There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements. Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time. Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible. but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~ cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL known Communist in the old country. Why should we be shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden• tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts. Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the "Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman. 'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity �86 SLOVAKIA that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per., haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a fOTgery . Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the "Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as ridiculous and highly impossible. In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada, another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks" �f?LOV,AKIA 87 in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to the policy of the present members of the Council then in Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him, Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel Miksche. It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment, with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own failures and a!bandoned projects. SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives. Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue. Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the "Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-· ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the persons from the Council do not distinguish between a 1 �88 SLOVAKIA Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also pay for their protection and defense It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry, his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un., dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to him only through representin g himself as from me. When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak" group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un. derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko, Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions. If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present group. What is broadcast and written now - for American money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them. �SLOVAKIA 89 These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy. chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~ lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~ stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta affairs they only curse them. Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko, much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague. The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In. vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer to whom the security of the United States is of paramount internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope, therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~ ter also and that the organizations in question will be cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group. iLausman was so aggressive that during the second World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As- �90 SLOVAKIA sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept., able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that Russian territory extends for the first time in history west of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn. In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal. Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol., lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however, refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country. Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions, sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia. After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika. The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several months later, as the premier by Benes. Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted �SLOVAKIA 91 to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~ ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts. At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty, because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal. The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December, 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of thie SloViak National Council. When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his life. Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them. When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1 �92 SLOVAKIA SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it benefited him. On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized" on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~ lection of Laws and Regulations. T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words: ". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . " Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement ! Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one. 'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator" of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very •b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi- �SLOVAKIA 93 zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl view of Prague. All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation, and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols. I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in their books. Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or (Josef Konbel, the with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes). Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to note what has been written albout him here in the United States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a more serious character: "Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16, 1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army. " He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities." I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-· ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by �94 SLOVAK.IA the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and ineffective. About the others aJbove, I must confess the same opinion as to character. The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party. But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity. It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete conformance with the Communists had negated the party as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history. During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos• sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats, Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was �SLOVAKIA 95 clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats is not very well known and evaluated in the United States; if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S. am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of State Acheson could not have secured for them influential positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll. It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled, and even JnUrdered. They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of 1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner, working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer needed by the Communists. Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction. On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh 14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech �96 SLOVAKIA Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in free England, the present representative of the "Council of Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which he said: "WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES." 1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19, 1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert Ri,pka. In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25, 1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now their only means of survival. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single 'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAK.IA 72 The Czecho-Slovak Exile CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE Dr. Mi chael Zibrin July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~ fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-. zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true. The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in 1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform. The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always Etood very close to the Communists, even during small political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl, Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate Sl.JOVAKIA 73 they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own. History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo. cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-· jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that lhis material was sent by France and a French military mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier, when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent - stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less surprising when one remembers that he was actually among the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere. ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not only in Czecho-!Slovakia. Certainly one of the most important persons in the Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes, the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially, on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council. Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic 1 74 SLOVAKIA party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all Czechs. Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu. cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July, 1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc." T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee! On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger. A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote : "The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not - as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaganda line. "These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. "A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist a.gents or have criminal records. '1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin SLOVAKIA 75 by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. ' "Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line." I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right! The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~ crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only. To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one can say that its activities during the second World War are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi. net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger, who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however, Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of 1 76 SLOVAKIA the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second front against Churchill's will. We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943 against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it. 1 I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943, in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in London. They were made not only by the admirers of the Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge part of Poland to the Soviets. If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements, I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so SLOVAKIA 77 smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war. Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928, "Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~ ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government, formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia. Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know, that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." They all were united in their pro-Communist activities, and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's name will be forever connected not only with our fight for national liberation, but also with the struggle for social liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . . Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats came to the United States and suddenly discovered that they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica- 78 SLOVAKIA tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their activities back home. The first document signed by the ministers and the members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~ cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25, 1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party, not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~ nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats. But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse, they put it into effect. The most important parts of this agreement are the following: 1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life. 2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee is being created with an equal numlber of representatives from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership, wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties. This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1 SLOVAKIA 79 ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist Party by Peter Zenkl. It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from Government. But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them. The "National Front of the' Working People" created a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This committee had the task of coordinating the work of the socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward a socialist dictatorship. The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such, would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes, together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions, , would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but 80 SLOVAKlA actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from the instant they began to function. Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem, Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~ munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration " to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy, Christ'ianit y, and freedom. This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it. A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented on major effects of this agreement in this manner: "The aims of the socialist bloc were many: "1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them, through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi· nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together. "2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all, and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the Communists will divide them among themselves. "3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and, thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already been published for this so-called united youth organization and are led by the Commundsts. "In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist dictatorship." Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member SLOVAKIA 81 of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by the editor Jandaceik. Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~ ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the University he expelled those students who had participated in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February. Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~ of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr. Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States. Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party. Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called "Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5. Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he 82 SLOVAKIA was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and thorough propagator. From Canada he came to the United States and at the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania. iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem, however, before the voting day, and often at midnight, cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva, Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had. The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party, however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group. The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable SLOVAKIA 83 results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and are paid by the Amerilcan citizens. In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-· man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the West, requesting political asylum. Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West. He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe. Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad. What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia? The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr. Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western World and praising everything he found after his return to 84 SLOVAK.IA Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the goods in their possession and the common people are starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE. When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there have been, since the start, members who were sent West by the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley. The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains. To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies. But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and they still do that and help to betray America. There is no excuse for them, or is there? Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1 SLOVAKIA 86 inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?" There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements. Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time. Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible. but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~ cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL known Communist in the old country. Why should we be shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden• tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts. Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the "Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman. 'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity 86 SLOVAKIA that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per., haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a fOTgery . Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the "Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as ridiculous and highly impossible. In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada, another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks" f?LOV,AKIA 87 in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to the policy of the present members of the Council then in Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him, Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel Miksche. It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment, with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own failures and a!bandoned projects. SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives. Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue. Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the "Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-· ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the persons from the Council do not distinguish between a 1 88 SLOVAKIA Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also pay for their protection and defense It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry, his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un., dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to him only through representin g himself as from me. When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak" group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un. derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko, Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions. If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present group. What is broadcast and written now - for American money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them. SLOVAKIA 89 These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy. chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~ lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~ stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta affairs they only curse them. Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko, much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague. The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In. vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer to whom the security of the United States is of paramount internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope, therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~ ter also and that the organizations in question will be cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group. iLausman was so aggressive that during the second World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As- 90 SLOVAKIA sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept., able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that Russian territory extends for the first time in history west of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn. In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal. Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol., lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however, refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country. Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions, sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia. After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika. The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several months later, as the premier by Benes. Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted SLOVAKIA 91 to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~ ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts. At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty, because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal. The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December, 1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of thie SloViak National Council. When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his life. Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them. When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1 92 SLOVAKIA SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it benefited him. On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized" on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~ lection of Laws and Regulations. T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words: ". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . " Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement ! Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2, 1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity. WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one. 'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator" of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very •b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi- SLOVAKIA 93 zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl view of Prague. All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation, and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols. I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in their books. Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or (Josef Konbel, the with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes). Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to note what has been written albout him here in the United States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a more serious character: "Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16, 1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army. " He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities." I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-· ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by 94 SLOVAK.IA the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and ineffective. About the others aJbove, I must confess the same opinion as to character. The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party. But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity. It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete conformance with the Communists had negated the party as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history. During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos• sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats, Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was SLOVAKIA 95 clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats is not very well known and evaluated in the United States; if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S. am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of State Acheson could not have secured for them influential positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll. It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled, and even JnUrdered. They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of 1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner, working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer needed by the Communists. Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction. On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh 14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech 96 SLOVAKIA Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in free England, the present representative of the "Council of Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which he said: "WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES." 1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19, 1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert Ri,pka. In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25, 1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now their only means of survival. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single 'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Czecho-Slovak Exile: Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp.72-96 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5ab34595263a54da8afa1489b5229db4.pdf 5e54c1d9fa399b29de74101669df481a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 63 THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS Dr. Henrich Bartek Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty , ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination. The history of European nations and States during the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when small nations make marked social and cultural progress, their desire for political independen ce - a national state of their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e. To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c schemes is not historically correct, !because both world wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so- �64 SLOVAKIA cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence, one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and independen ce? In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case, Europe would pass out of existence. Before World War ill, half the European continent was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain, Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples, who look forward to the historic future as a united people with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn out to be a detriment to modern civilization . The political and national states which exist as such at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss, Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were �SLOVAKIA 66 forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ sistinig German aggression in 1941. lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small nations, would clamor for complete independence, although this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small nations of central and eastern Europe. Slovakia - a Democratic Nation At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary, which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak common people, however, became the chief exponents of SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope, but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence, their aims were social and oultural as well as political. �66 SLOVAKIA This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic ideals among iSlova.k classes. 1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars, but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged natioo.al state. Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra., dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary. Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-· vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after 1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national rights to self-government and self-determination in the first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a time and under such unfavorable circumstances. In the first Czecho->Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were forced to defend their national individuality against the officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak" nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood. �SLOVAKIA 67 At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938 gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-· and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State. Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the Slovak Republic. Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial, educational a:nd cultural ,progress. 1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications and books were published yearly, literary and scientific wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im• proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak Republic. �68 SLOVAKIA All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a ,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family of European nations. The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-· ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has 1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy. Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the Swedes and the Norwegians. Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w<mk in the interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world, for they created their own national state, a creation at the 1 �SI..JOVAK.IA 69 same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future in the history of central Europe. Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol" a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic! The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history. Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but at any rate there are some very significant observations to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that a small nation, building its own national culture, labors under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations which eD'joy national independence generally have a high cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~ der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less complex. 'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative �SLOVAKIA 70 necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence, seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an overpopulated Europe. !Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than a large state. 'I1here are many added advantages that small states have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-· creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-· come the greatest boon for civilization. The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1 �SLOVAK.IA 71 tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~ manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity from total exUnction. Today - ten years after the termination of the Great War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~ turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear• lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from complete ruin and decay. We who cherish our Western heritage still have the will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we . have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once, all will be lost for a long time to come . • • • REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak $3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50 (the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00; "SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50. � SLOVAKIA 63 THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS Dr. Henrich Bartek Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty , ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination. The history of European nations and States during the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when small nations make marked social and cultural progress, their desire for political independen ce - a national state of their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e. To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c schemes is not historically correct, !because both world wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so- �64 SLOVAKIA cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence, one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and independen ce? In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case, Europe would pass out of existence. Before World War ill, half the European continent was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain, Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples, who look forward to the historic future as a united people with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn out to be a detriment to modern civilization . The political and national states which exist as such at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss, Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were �SLOVAKIA 66 forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ sistinig German aggression in 1941. lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small nations, would clamor for complete independence, although this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small nations of central and eastern Europe. Slovakia - a Democratic Nation At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary, which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak common people, however, became the chief exponents of SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope, but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence, their aims were social and oultural as well as political. �66 SLOVAKIA This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic ideals among iSlova.k classes. 1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars, but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged natioo.al state. Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra., dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary. Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-· vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after 1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national rights to self-government and self-determination in the first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a time and under such unfavorable circumstances. In the first Czecho->Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were forced to defend their national individuality against the officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak" nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood. �SLOVAKIA 67 At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938 gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-· and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State. Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the Slovak Republic. Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial, educational a:nd cultural ,progress. 1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications and books were published yearly, literary and scientific wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im• proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak Republic. �68 SLOVAKIA All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a ,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family of European nations. The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-· ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has 1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy. Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the Swedes and the Norwegians. Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w<mk in the interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world, for they created their own national state, a creation at the 1 �SI..JOVAK.IA 69 same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future in the history of central Europe. Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol" a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic! The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history. Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but at any rate there are some very significant observations to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that a small nation, building its own national culture, labors under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations which eD'joy national independence generally have a high cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~ der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less complex. 'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative �SLOVAKIA 70 necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence, seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an overpopulated Europe. !Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than a large state. 'I1here are many added advantages that small states have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-· creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-· come the greatest boon for civilization. The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1 �SLOVAK.IA 71 tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~ manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity from total exUnction. Today - ten years after the termination of the Great War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~ turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear• lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from complete ruin and decay. We who cherish our Western heritage still have the will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we . have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once, all will be lost for a long time to come . • • • REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak $3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50 (the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00; "SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 63 THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS Dr. Henrich Bartek Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty , ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination. The history of European nations and States during the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when small nations make marked social and cultural progress, their desire for political independen ce - a national state of their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e. To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c schemes is not historically correct, !because both world wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so- 64 SLOVAKIA cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence, one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and independen ce? In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case, Europe would pass out of existence. Before World War ill, half the European continent was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain, Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples, who look forward to the historic future as a united people with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn out to be a detriment to modern civilization . The political and national states which exist as such at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss, Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were SLOVAKIA 66 forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ sistinig German aggression in 1941. lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small nations, would clamor for complete independence, although this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small nations of central and eastern Europe. Slovakia - a Democratic Nation At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary, which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak common people, however, became the chief exponents of SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope, but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence, their aims were social and oultural as well as political. 66 SLOVAKIA This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic ideals among iSlova.k classes. 1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars, but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged natioo.al state. Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra., dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary. Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-· vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after 1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national rights to self-government and self-determination in the first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a time and under such unfavorable circumstances. In the first Czecho->Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were forced to defend their national individuality against the officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak" nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood. SLOVAKIA 67 At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938 gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-· and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State. Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the Slovak Republic. Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial, educational a:nd cultural ,progress. 1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications and books were published yearly, literary and scientific wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im• proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak Republic. 68 SLOVAKIA All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a ,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family of European nations. The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-· ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has 1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy. Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the Swedes and the Norwegians. Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w<mk in the interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world, for they created their own national state, a creation at the 1 SI..JOVAK.IA 69 same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future in the history of central Europe. Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol" a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic! The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history. Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but at any rate there are some very significant observations to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that a small nation, building its own national culture, labors under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations which eD'joy national independence generally have a high cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~ der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less complex. 'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative SLOVAKIA 70 necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence, seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an overpopulated Europe. !Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than a large state. 'I1here are many added advantages that small states have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-· creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-· come the greatest boon for civilization. The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1 SLOVAK.IA 71 tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~ manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity from total exUnction. Today - ten years after the termination of the Great War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~ turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear• lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from complete ruin and decay. We who cherish our Western heritage still have the will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we . have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once, all will be lost for a long time to come . • • • REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak $3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50 (the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00; "SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Significance of Small Nations Description An account of the resource Dr. Henrich Bartek Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp. 63-71 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bartek, Henrich, 1907-1986 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9cccf38bc22879e70dd339fdc97c1403.pdf 3399f86f31024434dee12664ff3567f9 PDF Text Text 38 SLOVAKIA HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA? P. A. HIROBAK In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA" (504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars." Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or, possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record! But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the "twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which, in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" ! Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts, but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia," t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived. The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug- �SLOVAKIA 39 geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers," who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia" were little or not at all concerned with the history of the Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history. Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his "twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers," does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of history, su<!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations. I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia" were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general, without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no regard for the Slorvaks and their history. ,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed- �40 SLOVAKIA ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch" (strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past thirty-seven years. Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation, while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire ,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes, but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive" Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics. ,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles, Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many ,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l<_?ng, so the shorter "Czech" is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term "Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however, mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in- �SLOVAKIA 41 variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of "mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The tendency is too olbviou.s. Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&e and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians, Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious. They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re, when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii. And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us. The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd, co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past 1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry. In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood writers" of our time. It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk �42 SLOV.AKIA federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights. The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the "stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition. Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation. They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers" who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book "CzechoslovaJkia." Propaganda oa.- history? Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak," mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St. Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless" editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all! 1 • "C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .." By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague, Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and in the following is mine. "The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918, l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak �SLOVAKIA 43 Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&n of the main Slav tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP, 3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to 1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma• gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6). It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being. Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit" with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~ fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii, which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the size of present-day Bohemia . • "The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S. Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc. CI:I\A.PrIDR III - "Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing (623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba• bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9). �SLOVAKIA 44 Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954). The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the territory of ISrum<>'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led the SlovaJks. As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY," Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede, without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were completely independent during the time of Charlemagne (8th-9th cenrtury). Why? 1 • "Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora. 11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s ,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de• feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10). Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the "Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not �SLOVAKIA 45 identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia. This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs, then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans, invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to sue for peace. Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say. As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars, the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it in 907. Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and �46 SLOVAKIA the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the "Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber 30, 1944. • •~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13). Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the "Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration, and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc. It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans, or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime. The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention (p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents 1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination. The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did �SLOVAKIA 47 more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering their population. Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality. Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa, zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us from whom they might have acquired those words, since they are rarely used !by the Czechs . • CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J. Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University; Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member, Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc. "The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620, uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho• slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the �48 SLOVAKIA Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained its independence" (P. 29). !Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What "Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?. Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language, literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual Monarchy. What Kerner means to imply when he says that the "Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us: "All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory, dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re· volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states, including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based �SLOVAKIA 49 their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,' which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107). To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy. In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison, because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know, too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57). Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian" magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech" and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however, remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past: the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia. �50 SLOVAKIA "A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church." Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars, Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity" (p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious. On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened "w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later, according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . . the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1 �SLOVAKIA 51 guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge (35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791." What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious about <the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~ ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner. • "A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik. The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'<IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli• tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks" (p. 36) . ,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by �52 SLOVAKIA omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a "dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live" language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they used Sloiv•aik. Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech. Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks . 1 • "Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security, not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years. ·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the >benefit of the Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38). This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-, fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize �SLOVAKIA 53 the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence - to become masters of their own household, of their own destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later, eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs. Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve" language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people, both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur, Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a language they did not consider their own. Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks, b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and their ,w riters. 1 • "The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda, worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44). �54 SLOVAKIA It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on "Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb.. bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch" of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it! 1 • I "Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48). The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history; the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation, hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy. Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and �SLOVAKIA 55 thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and their national wealth! CHA[PTER [V - Peace Conference" - • "The World War, Revolution and iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er. '10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd. After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53). 'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France? The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies in various countries still less! • "This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council, which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by the nation at home" (p. 56). 1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council, which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known, he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course, wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home. When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand: "Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio- �56 SLOVAKIA Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-· vakis," the ra nswer was "no." The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it: 1 "It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors." In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor." After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary: "In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy" (Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75). The very same Czech members of parliament requested Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said: "We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible �SLOVAKIA 57 with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of the realm and under the Habsburg crown." It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech State within a federated Austria-Hungary." Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore, say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work "Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ). When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the "Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&al Milan R. Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A., Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe? Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the "OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis" legend. �58 SLOVAKIA The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted, without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it, in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83 of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully, even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce." • "In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat time. It s eems most probrul>le that when it ,was first uttered it meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62). Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say "pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following: " In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) . So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists on having a "Orechoslovak" nation! �SLOVAKIA 69 AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze- choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth, however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other "historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary notwithstandi ng. If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course, was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation. The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows: ''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to believe otheIWise? • "The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo, under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0- �60 SLOVAKIA slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of less than fifteen millions" (p. 63). But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert" information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs, who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population was in the majority, and this included some three and a half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans" (p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"! • "The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu· nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her Western allies" (p. 68) . It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a. Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was "forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious. Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They �SLOVAKIA 61 chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends," because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish majority of her population was not ready to die for a tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that. Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied: "The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite as powerfully as today." • "Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace Cont rence had access to and used the best available information and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ). After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II. At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe 350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead.., ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a nasvigalble river. Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma- �62 SLOVAKIA cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M. Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's "Svet<Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads: "Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism. U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured a durable settlement" (p. 69). Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem. her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient "common sense and intelligence" at that time. (More coming) WHO SAID IT? "In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian a<bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142). � 38 SLOVAKIA HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA? P. A. HIROBAK In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA" (504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars." Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or, possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record! But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the "twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which, in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" ! Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts, but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia," t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived. The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug- �SLOVAKIA 39 geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers," who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia" were little or not at all concerned with the history of the Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history. Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his "twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers," does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of history, su<!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations. I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia" were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general, without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no regard for the Slorvaks and their history. ,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed- �40 SLOVAKIA ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch" (strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past thirty-seven years. Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation, while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire ,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes, but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive" Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics. ,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles, Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many ,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l<_?ng, so the shorter "Czech" is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term "Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however, mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in- �SLOVAKIA 41 variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of "mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The tendency is too olbviou.s. Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&e and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians, Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious. They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re, when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii. And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us. The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd, co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past 1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry. In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood writers" of our time. It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk �42 SLOV.AKIA federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights. The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the "stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition. Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation. They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers" who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book "CzechoslovaJkia." Propaganda oa.- history? Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak," mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St. Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless" editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all! 1 • "C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .." By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague, Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and in the following is mine. "The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918, l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak �SLOVAKIA 43 Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&n of the main Slav tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP, 3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to 1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma• gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6). It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being. Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit" with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~ fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii, which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the size of present-day Bohemia . • "The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S. Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc. CI:I\A.PrIDR III - "Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing (623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba• bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9). �SLOVAKIA 44 Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954). The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the territory of ISrum<>'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led the SlovaJks. As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY," Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede, without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were completely independent during the time of Charlemagne (8th-9th cenrtury). Why? 1 • "Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora. 11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s ,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de• feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10). Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the "Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not �SLOVAKIA 45 identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia. This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs, then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans, invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to sue for peace. Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say. As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars, the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it in 907. Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and �46 SLOVAKIA the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the "Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber 30, 1944. • •~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13). Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the "Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration, and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc. It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans, or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime. The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention (p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents 1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination. The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did �SLOVAKIA 47 more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering their population. Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality. Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa, zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us from whom they might have acquired those words, since they are rarely used !by the Czechs . • CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J. Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University; Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member, Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc. "The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620, uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho• slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the �48 SLOVAKIA Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained its independence" (P. 29). !Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What "Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?. Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language, literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual Monarchy. What Kerner means to imply when he says that the "Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us: "All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory, dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re· volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states, including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based �SLOVAKIA 49 their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,' which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107). To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy. In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison, because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know, too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57). Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian" magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech" and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however, remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past: the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia. �50 SLOVAKIA "A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church." Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars, Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity" (p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious. On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened "w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later, according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . . the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1 �SLOVAKIA 51 guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge (35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791." What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious about <the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~ ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner. • "A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik. The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'<IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli• tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks" (p. 36) . ,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by �52 SLOVAKIA omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a "dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live" language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they used Sloiv•aik. Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech. Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks . 1 • "Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security, not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years. ·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the >benefit of the Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38). This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-, fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize �SLOVAKIA 53 the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence - to become masters of their own household, of their own destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later, eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs. Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve" language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people, both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur, Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a language they did not consider their own. Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks, b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and their ,w riters. 1 • "The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda, worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44). �54 SLOVAKIA It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on "Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb.. bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch" of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it! 1 • I "Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48). The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history; the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation, hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy. Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and �SLOVAKIA 55 thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and their national wealth! CHA[PTER [V - Peace Conference" - • "The World War, Revolution and iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er. '10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd. After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53). 'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France? The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies in various countries still less! • "This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council, which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by the nation at home" (p. 56). 1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council, which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known, he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course, wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home. When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand: "Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio- �56 SLOVAKIA Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-· vakis," the ra nswer was "no." The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it: 1 "It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors." In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor." After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary: "In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy" (Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75). The very same Czech members of parliament requested Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said: "We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible �SLOVAKIA 57 with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of the realm and under the Habsburg crown." It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech State within a federated Austria-Hungary." Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore, say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work "Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ). When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the "Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&al Milan R. Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A., Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe? Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the "OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis" legend. �58 SLOVAKIA The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted, without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it, in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83 of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully, even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce." • "In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat time. It s eems most probrul>le that when it ,was first uttered it meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62). Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say "pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following: " In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) . So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists on having a "Orechoslovak" nation! �SLOVAKIA 69 AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze- choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth, however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other "historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary notwithstandi ng. If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course, was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation. The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows: ''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to believe otheIWise? • "The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo, under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0- �60 SLOVAKIA slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of less than fifteen millions" (p. 63). But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert" information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs, who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population was in the majority, and this included some three and a half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans" (p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"! • "The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu· nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her Western allies" (p. 68) . It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a. Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was "forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious. Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They �SLOVAKIA 61 chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends," because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish majority of her population was not ready to die for a tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that. Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied: "The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite as powerfully as today." • "Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace Cont rence had access to and used the best available information and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ). After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II. At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe 350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead.., ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a nasvigalble river. Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma- �62 SLOVAKIA cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M. Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's "Svet<Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads: "Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism. U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured a durable settlement" (p. 69). Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem. her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient "common sense and intelligence" at that time. (More coming) WHO SAID IT? "In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian a<bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 38 SLOVAKIA HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA? P. A. HIROBAK In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA" (504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars." Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or, possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record! But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the "twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which, in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" ! Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts, but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia," t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived. The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug- SLOVAKIA 39 geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers," who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia" were little or not at all concerned with the history of the Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history. Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his "twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers," does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of history, su<!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations. I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia" were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general, without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no regard for the Slorvaks and their history. ,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed- 40 SLOVAKIA ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch" (strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past thirty-seven years. Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation, while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire ,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes, but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive" Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics. ,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles, Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many ,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l<_?ng, so the shorter "Czech" is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term "Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however, mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in- SLOVAKIA 41 variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of "mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The tendency is too olbviou.s. Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&e and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians, Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious. They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re, when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii. And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us. The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd, co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past 1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry. In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood writers" of our time. It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk 42 SLOV.AKIA federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights. The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the "stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition. Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation. They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers" who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book "CzechoslovaJkia." Propaganda oa.- history? Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak," mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St. Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless" editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all! 1 • "C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .." By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague, Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and in the following is mine. "The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918, l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak SLOVAKIA 43 Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&n of the main Slav tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP, 3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to 1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma• gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6). It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being. Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit" with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~ fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii, which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the size of present-day Bohemia . • "The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S. Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc. CI:I\A.PrIDR III - "Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing (623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba• bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9). SLOVAKIA 44 Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954). The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the territory of ISrum<>'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led the SlovaJks. As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY," Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede, without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were completely independent during the time of Charlemagne (8th-9th cenrtury). Why? 1 • "Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora. 11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s ,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland, Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de• feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10). Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the "Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not SLOVAKIA 45 identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia. This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs, then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans, invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to sue for peace. Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say. As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars, the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it in 907. Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and 46 SLOVAKIA the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the "Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber 30, 1944. • •~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13). Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the "Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration, and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc. It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans, or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime. The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention (p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents 1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination. The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did SLOVAKIA 47 more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering their population. Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality. Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa, zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us from whom they might have acquired those words, since they are rarely used !by the Czechs . • CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J. Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University; Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member, Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc. "The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620, uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho• slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the 48 SLOVAKIA Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained its independence" (P. 29). !Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What "Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?. Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language, literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual Monarchy. What Kerner means to imply when he says that the "Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us: "All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory, dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re· volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states, including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based SLOVAKIA 49 their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,' which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107). To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy. In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison, because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know, too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57). Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian" magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech" and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however, remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past: the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia. 50 SLOVAKIA "A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church." Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars, Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity" (p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes, and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious. On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened "w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later, according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . . the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1 SLOVAKIA 51 guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge (35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791." What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious about <the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~ ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner. • "A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik. The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'<IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli• tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks" (p. 36) . ,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by 52 SLOVAKIA omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a "dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live" language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they used Sloiv•aik. Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech. Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks . 1 • "Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security, not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years. ·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the >benefit of the Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38). This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-, fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize SLOVAKIA 53 the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence - to become masters of their own household, of their own destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later, eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs. Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve" language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people, both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur, Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a language they did not consider their own. Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks, b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and their ,w riters. 1 • "The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda, worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44). 54 SLOVAKIA It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on "Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb.. bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch" of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it! 1 • I "Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48). The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history; the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation, hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy. Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and SLOVAKIA 55 thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and their national wealth! CHA[PTER [V - Peace Conference" - • "The World War, Revolution and iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er. '10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd. After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53). 'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France? The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies in various countries still less! • "This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council, which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by the nation at home" (p. 56). 1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council, which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known, he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course, wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home. When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand: "Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio- 56 SLOVAKIA Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-· vakis," the ra nswer was "no." The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it: 1 "It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors." In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty, called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor." After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary: "In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy" (Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75). The very same Czech members of parliament requested Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said: "We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible SLOVAKIA 57 with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of the realm and under the Habsburg crown." It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech State within a federated Austria-Hungary." Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore, say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work "Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ). When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the "Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&al Milan R. Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A., Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe? Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the "OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis" legend. 58 SLOVAKIA The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted, without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it, in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83 of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully, even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce." • "In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat time. It s eems most probrul>le that when it ,was first uttered it meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62). Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say "pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following: " In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) . So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists on having a "Orechoslovak" nation! SLOVAKIA 69 AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze- choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth, however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other "historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary notwithstandi ng. If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course, was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation. The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows: ''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to believe otheIWise? • "The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo, under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0- 60 SLOVAKIA slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of less than fifteen millions" (p. 63). But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert" information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs, who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population was in the majority, and this included some three and a half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans" (p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"! • "The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu· nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her Western allies" (p. 68) . It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a. Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was "forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious. Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They SLOVAKIA 61 chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends," because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish majority of her population was not ready to die for a tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that. Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied: "The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite as powerfully as today." • "Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace Cont rence had access to and used the best available information and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ). After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II. At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe 350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead.., ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a nasvigalble river. Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma- 62 SLOVAKIA cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M. Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's "Svet<Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads: "Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism. U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured a durable settlement" (p. 69). Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem. her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient "common sense and intelligence" at that time. (More coming) WHO SAID IT? "In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian a<bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda? (1/8) Description An account of the resource P. A. Hrobak Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp. 38-62 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 Relation A related resource continues in <a href="/items/show/176">Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), pp. 55-62</a> LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ab31f7bb36899df83936062218757082.pdf 5fda8ada46d10ec0f628057fd6343ca5 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 29 THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK Fr. Janik-Horak (This article results from the contents of the corresponding article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.) Two months ago - when we had written that the Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond recognition. We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it. First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case, which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the exiles would lbe frightened into inaction. Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of Cerna,k in M<Unich would incite the German population, and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles, while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups. �30 SLOVAKIA It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia. We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles; the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and which, in fact, he did ;p ublish. The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ; it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight; they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say: good riddance ! Courageously then - Heroically Now! Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE. 'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e �SLOVAKIA 31 now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore, that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us. In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never, however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty meaningless phrase which we might use in America to coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today. If we have written courageously up to this time, then from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do have a positive, healthy, political program. We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices. We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day 1 �32 SLOVAKIA we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country! It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage in their fight for the freedom and independence of the Slova!k nation. '.Dhe 'Munich <killing of Cernak hais cast light on several real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~ honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front. '!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are being financed •b y American dollars. Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE. Must All Exiles Think Alike? The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and truthfully about conditions in exile. Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic- �SLOVAKIA 33 a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow? Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor land even though they knew practically nothing about it . And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of others. 1 No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~ tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right are they trying to force that criminal political conception upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would continually try to force into the administration of their country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises, and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss their hands. With the Munich murder the situation has gone so far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not 1 �34 SLOVAKIA interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press . In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why? Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the free world from the substance of the Communist threat which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to 10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a light that not only shall we be understood at all why we are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even better than in the West; that there are dances at which the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en- �SLOVAKIA 36 twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~ tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea. In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation. Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile, if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia, Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years, is beginning to go through the process of old settlers, which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these anti-exile sentiments. Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their �36 SLOVAKIA prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation. Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents in Germany. What are we to say about the threats made against refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en, titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who was it that let them have them? And how come that GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE? Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such? While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated? Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the USA with the statement that we are writing against the Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the :bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but 1 �SLOVAKIA 37 when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the face. We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak" unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples" democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists. Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on their bosoms. Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home telling how he became an official of the State Department. He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl, Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech Radio hour. Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not doUar politicians. • • • Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago; AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L. Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles. � SLOVAKIA 29 THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK Fr. Janik-Horak (This article results from the contents of the corresponding article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.) Two months ago - when we had written that the Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond recognition. We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it. First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case, which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the exiles would lbe frightened into inaction. Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of Cerna,k in M<Unich would incite the German population, and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles, while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups. �30 SLOVAKIA It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia. We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles; the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and which, in fact, he did ;p ublish. The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ; it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight; they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say: good riddance ! Courageously then - Heroically Now! Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE. 'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e �SLOVAKIA 31 now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore, that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us. In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never, however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty meaningless phrase which we might use in America to coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today. If we have written courageously up to this time, then from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do have a positive, healthy, political program. We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices. We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day 1 �32 SLOVAKIA we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country! It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage in their fight for the freedom and independence of the Slova!k nation. '.Dhe 'Munich <killing of Cernak hais cast light on several real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~ honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front. '!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are being financed •b y American dollars. Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE. Must All Exiles Think Alike? The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and truthfully about conditions in exile. Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic- �SLOVAKIA 33 a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow? Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor land even though they knew practically nothing about it . And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of others. 1 No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~ tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right are they trying to force that criminal political conception upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would continually try to force into the administration of their country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises, and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss their hands. With the Munich murder the situation has gone so far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not 1 �34 SLOVAKIA interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press . In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why? Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the free world from the substance of the Communist threat which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to 10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a light that not only shall we be understood at all why we are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even better than in the West; that there are dances at which the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en- �SLOVAKIA 36 twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~ tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea. In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation. Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile, if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia, Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years, is beginning to go through the process of old settlers, which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these anti-exile sentiments. Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their �36 SLOVAKIA prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation. Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents in Germany. What are we to say about the threats made against refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en, titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who was it that let them have them? And how come that GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE? Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such? While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated? Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the USA with the statement that we are writing against the Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the :bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but 1 �SLOVAKIA 37 when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the face. We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak" unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples" democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists. Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on their bosoms. Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home telling how he became an official of the State Department. He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl, Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech Radio hour. Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not doUar politicians. • • • Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago; AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L. Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 29 THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK Fr. Janik-Horak (This article results from the contents of the corresponding article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.) Two months ago - when we had written that the Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond recognition. We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it. First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case, which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the exiles would lbe frightened into inaction. Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of Cerna,k in M<Unich would incite the German population, and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles, while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups. 30 SLOVAKIA It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia. We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles; the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and which, in fact, he did ;p ublish. The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ; it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight; they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say: good riddance ! Courageously then - Heroically Now! Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE. 'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e SLOVAKIA 31 now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore, that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us. In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never, however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty meaningless phrase which we might use in America to coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today. If we have written courageously up to this time, then from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do have a positive, healthy, political program. We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices. We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day 1 32 SLOVAKIA we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country! It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage in their fight for the freedom and independence of the Slova!k nation. '.Dhe 'Munich <killing of Cernak hais cast light on several real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~ honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front. '!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are being financed •b y American dollars. Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE. Must All Exiles Think Alike? The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and truthfully about conditions in exile. Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic- SLOVAKIA 33 a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow? Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor land even though they knew practically nothing about it . And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of others. 1 No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~ tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right are they trying to force that criminal political conception upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would continually try to force into the administration of their country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises, and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss their hands. With the Munich murder the situation has gone so far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not 1 34 SLOVAKIA interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press . In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why? Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the free world from the substance of the Communist threat which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to 10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a light that not only shall we be understood at all why we are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even better than in the West; that there are dances at which the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en- SLOVAKIA 36 twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~ tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea. In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation. Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile, if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia, Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years, is beginning to go through the process of old settlers, which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these anti-exile sentiments. Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their 36 SLOVAKIA prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation. Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents in Germany. What are we to say about the threats made against refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en, titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who was it that let them have them? And how come that GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE? Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such? While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated? Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the USA with the statement that we are writing against the Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the :bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but 1 SLOVAKIA 37 when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the face. We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak" unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples" democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists. Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on their bosoms. Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home telling how he became an official of the State Department. He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl, Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech Radio hour. Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not doUar politicians. • • • Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago; AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L. Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Murder of Matúš Černák Description An account of the resource Fr. Janík-Horák Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp. 29-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Janík-Horák, František Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3df390c146b8a19ed69021c960bfd41b.pdf 6b96444e10dcd12ca2c175bd4bb3614b PDF Text Text 22 SLOVAKIA ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust five years ago. But how times have changed since then! Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this cold war is really passing into our hands? It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs. Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the good work. Thank you very much . • • • MEMORANDUM To the President and the Congress of the United States, Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24, 1955, Washington, D. C. We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of the Congress of the United States of America, and do solemnly and unanimously resolve that: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the principles upon which our Country was founded under God, the American Way of Life, which has made our America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America shall continue to be our primary interest. 2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state �SLOVAKIA 23 or form of political organization under which they wish to live This principle, not applied practically in the past with respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended. We fully endorae the principle that the Government of the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any government and any state or form of political organization which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy of self-detezmina.tion. 3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state. We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs<!ribe to the policy that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare and security of the United States of America and the rest of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the earth. We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist.. ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence �24 SLOVAKIA means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement. Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that. 4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us. We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress, under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by a congressional committee to become acquainted with the background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, the nations who always were and still are our friends, the peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends, because to them America has always been a living symbol of freedom and independence, and today is just about their last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny. 5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in its charter, but an organization of governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and national interests of the nations they presume to represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the free political systems of the world, including our own American Way of Life. �SLOVAKIA 25 The sad experiences with the United Nations during the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. As we see it, there is something monstrous about the idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring us all under their yoke. We, therefore, respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to demand the expulsion of all nations and governments espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N., gives any aid and succor to any nation or government which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N. 6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a vehicle for domestic legislation. �26 SLOVAKIA 7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States. 8. Once again we respectfully request the President rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak nation was violated. We also request the President and the Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II. We further petition the President and the Congress of the United States to voice a strong protest against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague. 9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization �SLOVAKIA 27 of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes, which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies. We, therefore, respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal with them accordingly. We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called "Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech "progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political, cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such people are employed by various agencies of government, like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon any longer. We respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to give this matter their serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of our country. 10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in- �28 SLOVAKIA terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-<:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered. The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to the Slovak nation, be<!ause it still is the most effective weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we are descended from. We protested when the fundamental rights of other nations were threatened or violated and we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened. As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only by the United States and other democratic countries, but even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today. Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955, with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America, in the City of Washington, D. C. PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President. DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary � 22 SLOVAKIA ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust five years ago. But how times have changed since then! Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this cold war is really passing into our hands? It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs. Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the good work. Thank you very much . • • • MEMORANDUM To the President and the Congress of the United States, Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24, 1955, Washington, D. C. We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of the Congress of the United States of America, and do solemnly and unanimously resolve that: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the principles upon which our Country was founded under God, the American Way of Life, which has made our America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America shall continue to be our primary interest. 2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state �SLOVAKIA 23 or form of political organization under which they wish to live This principle, not applied practically in the past with respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended. We fully endorae the principle that the Government of the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any government and any state or form of political organization which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy of self-detezmina.tion. 3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state. We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs<!ribe to the policy that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare and security of the United States of America and the rest of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the earth. We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist.. ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence �24 SLOVAKIA means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement. Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that. 4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us. We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress, under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by a congressional committee to become acquainted with the background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, the nations who always were and still are our friends, the peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends, because to them America has always been a living symbol of freedom and independence, and today is just about their last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny. 5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in its charter, but an organization of governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and national interests of the nations they presume to represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the free political systems of the world, including our own American Way of Life. �SLOVAKIA 25 The sad experiences with the United Nations during the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. As we see it, there is something monstrous about the idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring us all under their yoke. We, therefore, respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to demand the expulsion of all nations and governments espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N., gives any aid and succor to any nation or government which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N. 6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a vehicle for domestic legislation. �26 SLOVAKIA 7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States. 8. Once again we respectfully request the President rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak nation was violated. We also request the President and the Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II. We further petition the President and the Congress of the United States to voice a strong protest against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague. 9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization �SLOVAKIA 27 of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes, which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies. We, therefore, respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal with them accordingly. We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called "Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech "progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political, cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such people are employed by various agencies of government, like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon any longer. We respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to give this matter their serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of our country. 10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in- �28 SLOVAKIA terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-<:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered. The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to the Slovak nation, be<!ause it still is the most effective weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we are descended from. We protested when the fundamental rights of other nations were threatened or violated and we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened. As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only by the United States and other democratic countries, but even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today. Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955, with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America, in the City of Washington, D. C. PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President. DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 22 SLOVAKIA ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust five years ago. But how times have changed since then! Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this cold war is really passing into our hands? It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs. Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the good work. Thank you very much . • • • MEMORANDUM To the President and the Congress of the United States, Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24, 1955, Washington, D. C. We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of the Congress of the United States of America, and do solemnly and unanimously resolve that: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the principles upon which our Country was founded under God, the American Way of Life, which has made our America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America shall continue to be our primary interest. 2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state SLOVAKIA 23 or form of political organization under which they wish to live This principle, not applied practically in the past with respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended. We fully endorae the principle that the Government of the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any government and any state or form of political organization which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy of self-detezmina.tion. 3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state. We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs<!ribe to the policy that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare and security of the United States of America and the rest of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the earth. We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist.. ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence 24 SLOVAKIA means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement. Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that. 4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us. We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress, under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by a congressional committee to become acquainted with the background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, the nations who always were and still are our friends, the peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends, because to them America has always been a living symbol of freedom and independence, and today is just about their last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny. 5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in its charter, but an organization of governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and national interests of the nations they presume to represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the free political systems of the world, including our own American Way of Life. SLOVAKIA 25 The sad experiences with the United Nations during the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations. As we see it, there is something monstrous about the idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring us all under their yoke. We, therefore, respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to demand the expulsion of all nations and governments espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N., gives any aid and succor to any nation or government which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N. 6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a vehicle for domestic legislation. 26 SLOVAKIA 7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States. 8. Once again we respectfully request the President rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak nation was violated. We also request the President and the Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II. We further petition the President and the Congress of the United States to voice a strong protest against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague. 9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization SLOVAKIA 27 of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes, which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies. We, therefore, respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal with them accordingly. We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called "Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech "progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political, cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such people are employed by various agencies of government, like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon any longer. We respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to give this matter their serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of our country. 10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in- 28 SLOVAKIA terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-<:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered. The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to the Slovak nation, be<!ause it still is the most effective weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we are descended from. We protested when the fundamental rights of other nations were threatened or violated and we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened. As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only by the United States and other democratic countries, but even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today. Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955, with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America, in the City of Washington, D. C. PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President. DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp. 22-28 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9506db18b11df4019d53bd51040d4297.pdf a2e6c1a3765de41d4c8d4aa33812bc58 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 11 REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY {iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue of America in Washington, May 23, 1955) I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from your members throughout the country. I was, frankly, at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you. In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze<:h or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters. Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland, Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great, if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task. Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have we run into a problem. About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time: �12 SLOVAKIA Dear Congressman Bentley: You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe. I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to make it. United States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so : It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy - from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities. As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000 Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records: Ratio of Czech RFE New York 1. Employees full time 18 Slovak 6 Slovaks To Czech s 33 % �13 SLOVAKIA 2. Freelance employed in 1954 Total RFffi Munich l.Employees at radio desk Employees Production Dept. 51 31 60 % 69 37 44 % 72 30 26 13 36 1/c 40 % 39 % 39 102 Broadcasting total 26 % 26 98 1954 in employed 2. Freelance % 16 6 36 Munich, non-broadcasting The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and 45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting (common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation in Germany. Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story, and something must be added to these figures: The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end, it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who, speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S. Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime. How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those �14 SLOV.MGA. events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day . They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing? What is their present hope or fear? What is happening to the wife and children, the church, the living standard, the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party at this time? For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work. Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what they work for. You are aware that they have been both criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r them all for their belief that they must get on with the fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free to speak for themselves. I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to you. Yours sincerely, (s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON. There you have the official statement of policy of the Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question. �SLOVAKIA 15 Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia; it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia." On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say: "Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves That is to say, that such status would be resolved by means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom for all. "I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that country may truke place. I would rather believe that the Department has not committed itself in the future to either the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the people of that area should freely choose at the time they may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice." �16 SLOVAKIA The reply from the Department of State dated May 2 sets forth the official position of our government in this respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing this also: "In dealing with Central and IDastern European states, their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of the stability, security and economic viability of Central and Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine their own governmental and economic institutions, as well as their relationships with each other and with the other peoples of Europe. "With respect to the question of the future territorial organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State. "The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one state since 1918, except for the period of World War II when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State seek to have this government take action which may be construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the present Communist regime, and has come to favor the break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State. "'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure along this line from continuing to deal with the historical concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own �SLOVAKIA 17 free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern Europe, consequences which would exist long after that area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it includes national minorities." So there you have the official views of the Free :mu. rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more important for you to know these official viewpoints than to hear anythtng which I might have to say. You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia. However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes what appears to me to be the correct position and that is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their homeland. I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part of the State Department and I think it is something we all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But there is one all-important task before us at the moment and that is to work together in e<Very possible way for the lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important, should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for �18 SLOVAKIA an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to which we must devote our all. Developments are taking place today in Europe which are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty, they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other enslaved peoples in that part of Europe . And I do believe that this happy development has come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures engendered upon her by the free world of which this country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on. Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova- �SLOVAKIA 19 kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee, of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration and action. This is the type of pressure used against the Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see continued in the future. Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further concessions which would further abandon the enslaved people to their fate. I personally think there will be little, if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen to this letter which I received from the State Department last December: 'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence. "Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the �20 Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice." In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better than to let you know what the Communists think about you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April 19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a few paragraphs from this Communist document to close my remarks this evening: "The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants. "The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves in the fight against their common fascist enemy. "At the present time, reports, both in the American and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how American justice and various congressional investigating �SLOVAKIA 21 committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II. "Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of the United States of America base their hostile activities against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist emigre groups. "'Dhe present Government of the United States quite openly gives support to and encourages those elements, who, as early as the period before World War II, sided with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive groups in the United Sates of America. "Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in Western Germany, in the organization of plots against Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new master but along the same fascist line." So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by your own organization and its leaders, must be effective, must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the �22 SLOVAKIA ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust five years ago. But how times have changed since then! Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this cold war is really passing into our hands? It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs. Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the good work. Thank you very much . • • • MEMORANDUM To the President and the Congress of the United States, Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24, 1955, Washington, D. C. We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of the Congress of the United States of America, and do solemnly and unanimously resolve that: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the principles upon which our Country was founded under God, the American Way of Life, which has made our America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America shall continue to be our primary interest. 2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state � SLOVAKIA 11 REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY {iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue of America in Washington, May 23, 1955) I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from your members throughout the country. I was, frankly, at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you. In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze<:h or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters. Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland, Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great, if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task. Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have we run into a problem. About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time: �12 SLOVAKIA Dear Congressman Bentley: You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe. I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to make it. United States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so : It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy - from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities. As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000 Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records: Ratio of Czech RFE New York 1. Employees full time 18 Slovak 6 Slovaks To Czech s 33 % �13 SLOVAKIA 2. Freelance employed in 1954 Total RFffi Munich l.Employees at radio desk Employees Production Dept. 51 31 60 % 69 37 44 % 72 30 26 13 36 1/c 40 % 39 % 39 102 Broadcasting total 26 % 26 98 1954 in employed 2. Freelance % 16 6 36 Munich, non-broadcasting The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and 45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting (common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation in Germany. Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story, and something must be added to these figures: The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end, it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who, speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S. Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime. How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those �14 SLOV.MGA. events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day . They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing? What is their present hope or fear? What is happening to the wife and children, the church, the living standard, the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party at this time? For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work. Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what they work for. You are aware that they have been both criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r them all for their belief that they must get on with the fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free to speak for themselves. I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to you. Yours sincerely, (s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON. There you have the official statement of policy of the Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question. �SLOVAKIA 15 Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia; it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia." On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say: "Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves That is to say, that such status would be resolved by means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom for all. "I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that country may truke place. I would rather believe that the Department has not committed itself in the future to either the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the people of that area should freely choose at the time they may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice." �16 SLOVAKIA The reply from the Department of State dated May 2 sets forth the official position of our government in this respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing this also: "In dealing with Central and IDastern European states, their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of the stability, security and economic viability of Central and Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine their own governmental and economic institutions, as well as their relationships with each other and with the other peoples of Europe. "With respect to the question of the future territorial organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State. "The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one state since 1918, except for the period of World War II when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State seek to have this government take action which may be construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the present Communist regime, and has come to favor the break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State. "'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure along this line from continuing to deal with the historical concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own �SLOVAKIA 17 free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern Europe, consequences which would exist long after that area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it includes national minorities." So there you have the official views of the Free :mu. rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more important for you to know these official viewpoints than to hear anythtng which I might have to say. You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia. However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes what appears to me to be the correct position and that is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their homeland. I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part of the State Department and I think it is something we all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But there is one all-important task before us at the moment and that is to work together in e<Very possible way for the lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important, should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for �18 SLOVAKIA an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to which we must devote our all. Developments are taking place today in Europe which are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty, they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other enslaved peoples in that part of Europe . And I do believe that this happy development has come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures engendered upon her by the free world of which this country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on. Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova- �SLOVAKIA 19 kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee, of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration and action. This is the type of pressure used against the Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see continued in the future. Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further concessions which would further abandon the enslaved people to their fate. I personally think there will be little, if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen to this letter which I received from the State Department last December: 'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence. "Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the �20 Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice." In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better than to let you know what the Communists think about you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April 19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a few paragraphs from this Communist document to close my remarks this evening: "The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants. "The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves in the fight against their common fascist enemy. "At the present time, reports, both in the American and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how American justice and various congressional investigating �SLOVAKIA 21 committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II. "Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of the United States of America base their hostile activities against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist emigre groups. "'Dhe present Government of the United States quite openly gives support to and encourages those elements, who, as early as the period before World War II, sided with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive groups in the United Sates of America. "Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in Western Germany, in the organization of plots against Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new master but along the same fascist line." So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by your own organization and its leaders, must be effective, must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the �22 SLOVAKIA ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust five years ago. But how times have changed since then! Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this cold war is really passing into our hands? It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs. Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the good work. Thank you very much . • • • MEMORANDUM To the President and the Congress of the United States, Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24, 1955, Washington, D. C. We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of the Congress of the United States of America, and do solemnly and unanimously resolve that: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the principles upon which our Country was founded under God, the American Way of Life, which has made our America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America shall continue to be our primary interest. 2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 11 REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY {iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue of America in Washington, May 23, 1955) I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from your members throughout the country. I was, frankly, at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you. In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze<:h or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters. Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland, Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great, if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task. Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have we run into a problem. About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time: 12 SLOVAKIA Dear Congressman Bentley: You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe. I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to make it. United States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so : It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy - from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities. As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000 Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records: Ratio of Czech RFE New York 1. Employees full time 18 Slovak 6 Slovaks To Czech s 33 % 13 SLOVAKIA 2. Freelance employed in 1954 Total RFffi Munich l.Employees at radio desk Employees Production Dept. 51 31 60 % 69 37 44 % 72 30 26 13 36 1/c 40 % 39 % 39 102 Broadcasting total 26 % 26 98 1954 in employed 2. Freelance % 16 6 36 Munich, non-broadcasting The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and 45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting (common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation in Germany. Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story, and something must be added to these figures: The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end, it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who, speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S. Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime. How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those 14 SLOV.MGA. events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day . They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing? What is their present hope or fear? What is happening to the wife and children, the church, the living standard, the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party at this time? For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work. Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what they work for. You are aware that they have been both criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r them all for their belief that they must get on with the fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free to speak for themselves. I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to you. Yours sincerely, (s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON. There you have the official statement of policy of the Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question. SLOVAKIA 15 Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia; it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia." On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say: "Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves That is to say, that such status would be resolved by means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom for all. "I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that country may truke place. I would rather believe that the Department has not committed itself in the future to either the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the people of that area should freely choose at the time they may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice." 16 SLOVAKIA The reply from the Department of State dated May 2 sets forth the official position of our government in this respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing this also: "In dealing with Central and IDastern European states, their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of the stability, security and economic viability of Central and Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine their own governmental and economic institutions, as well as their relationships with each other and with the other peoples of Europe. "With respect to the question of the future territorial organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State. "The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one state since 1918, except for the period of World War II when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State seek to have this government take action which may be construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the present Communist regime, and has come to favor the break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State. "'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure along this line from continuing to deal with the historical concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own SLOVAKIA 17 free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern Europe, consequences which would exist long after that area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it includes national minorities." So there you have the official views of the Free :mu. rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more important for you to know these official viewpoints than to hear anythtng which I might have to say. You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia. However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes what appears to me to be the correct position and that is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their homeland. I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part of the State Department and I think it is something we all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But there is one all-important task before us at the moment and that is to work together in e<Very possible way for the lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important, should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for 18 SLOVAKIA an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to which we must devote our all. Developments are taking place today in Europe which are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty, they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other enslaved peoples in that part of Europe . And I do believe that this happy development has come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures engendered upon her by the free world of which this country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on. Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova- SLOVAKIA 19 kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee, of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration and action. This is the type of pressure used against the Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see continued in the future. Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further concessions which would further abandon the enslaved people to their fate. I personally think there will be little, if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen to this letter which I received from the State Department last December: 'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence. "Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the 20 Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice." In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better than to let you know what the Communists think about you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April 19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a few paragraphs from this Communist document to close my remarks this evening: "The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants. "The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves in the fight against their common fascist enemy. "At the present time, reports, both in the American and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how American justice and various congressional investigating SLOVAKIA 21 committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II. "Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of the United States of America base their hostile activities against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist emigre groups. "'Dhe present Government of the United States quite openly gives support to and encourages those elements, who, as early as the period before World War II, sided with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive groups in the United Sates of America. "Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in Western Germany, in the organization of plots against Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new master but along the same fascist line." So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by your own organization and its leaders, must be effective, must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the 22 SLOVAKIA ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust five years ago. But how times have changed since then! Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this cold war is really passing into our hands? It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs. Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the good work. Thank you very much . • • • MEMORANDUM To the President and the Congress of the United States, Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24, 1955, Washington, D. C. We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of the Congress of the United States of America, and do solemnly and unanimously resolve that: 1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the principles upon which our Country was founded under God, the American Way of Life, which has made our America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America shall continue to be our primary interest. 2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Remarks of the Hon. Alvin M. Bentley Description An account of the resource Before the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America in Washington, May 23, 1955) Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp. 11-22 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/972606398b7036535e70791fa1bd27af.pdf 0eee8edb0f9e09c5d8dfe6637cce1b76 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 3 APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK By Phi1ip A . Hrobak Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915, he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men. Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr. Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland, Ohio, several weelks Irater. ·· �4 SLOVAKIA In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St. Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring" factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where he labored successfully until his death in 1915. In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language, the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers read the Holy Mass. As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in 1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road. IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish. In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish in Cleveland. �SLOVAKIA 5 Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892); the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found many others, including the parish schools which were built later. The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world. Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding spirit throughout his life. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized that much more could be acomplished by an organization than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized into benefit and social organizations on the local level. Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established the First Catholic Slovak Union. Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth $22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00 �6 SLOV.A,~IA in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members; another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in 1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them. Furdek and his followers, the members of the First Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford, Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue, Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill. The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as well as many non~Slovak parishes. Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek was loved and revered by his own people and respected even by the enemies of his Church and nation. Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and �SLOVAKIA 7 his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America and the members of the organization he founded to be up and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and foreign missions, etc. At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it, but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~ ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise. The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare and security of the United States of America. But it is also interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions, achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism. Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations could better their lot if they drew their strength from the rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of �8 SLOVAKIA which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even under the most adverse conditions, and generation after generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in America did not have to surrender their character, their national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could not become an unworthy citizen. Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5 articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries), an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of scientists about the origin of the world and man. The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to �SLOVAKIA 9 love something that was unlknown to them; they could love and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in several generations of Slovaks in America. Father Furdek endearvored to a<!quaint Amerioans with Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota" (1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians, Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise. Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding, tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people. To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger, bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them. Father culties and thoroughly, fered what Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he �10 SLOVAKIA decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the membership and the delegates to the convention until the proposition was approved. We know today that if it had not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought it was time to seriously think of building a home for the orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je<lnota, he let the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~ ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully. Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over 10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior, Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America, the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union, the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc Father Furdek. Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod" until the end of time. � SLOVAKIA 3 APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK By Phi1ip A . Hrobak Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915, he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men. Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr. Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland, Ohio, several weelks Irater. ·· �4 SLOVAKIA In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St. Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring" factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where he labored successfully until his death in 1915. In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language, the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers read the Holy Mass. As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in 1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road. IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish. In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish in Cleveland. �SLOVAKIA 5 Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892); the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found many others, including the parish schools which were built later. The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world. Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding spirit throughout his life. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized that much more could be acomplished by an organization than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized into benefit and social organizations on the local level. Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established the First Catholic Slovak Union. Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth $22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00 �6 SLOV.A,~IA in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members; another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in 1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them. Furdek and his followers, the members of the First Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford, Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue, Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill. The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as well as many non~Slovak parishes. Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek was loved and revered by his own people and respected even by the enemies of his Church and nation. Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and �SLOVAKIA 7 his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America and the members of the organization he founded to be up and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and foreign missions, etc. At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it, but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~ ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise. The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare and security of the United States of America. But it is also interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions, achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism. Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations could better their lot if they drew their strength from the rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of �8 SLOVAKIA which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even under the most adverse conditions, and generation after generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in America did not have to surrender their character, their national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could not become an unworthy citizen. Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5 articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries), an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of scientists about the origin of the world and man. The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to �SLOVAKIA 9 love something that was unlknown to them; they could love and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in several generations of Slovaks in America. Father Furdek endearvored to a<!quaint Amerioans with Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota" (1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians, Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise. Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding, tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people. To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger, bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them. Father culties and thoroughly, fered what Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he �10 SLOVAKIA decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the membership and the delegates to the convention until the proposition was approved. We know today that if it had not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought it was time to seriously think of building a home for the orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je<lnota, he let the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~ ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully. Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over 10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior, Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America, the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union, the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc Father Furdek. Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod" until the end of time. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 3 APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK By Phi1ip A . Hrobak Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915, he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men. Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr. Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland, Ohio, several weelks Irater. ·· 4 SLOVAKIA In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St. Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring" factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where he labored successfully until his death in 1915. In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language, the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers read the Holy Mass. As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in 1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road. IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish. In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish in Cleveland. SLOVAKIA 5 Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892); the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found many others, including the parish schools which were built later. The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world. Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding spirit throughout his life. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized that much more could be acomplished by an organization than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized into benefit and social organizations on the local level. Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established the First Catholic Slovak Union. Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth $22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00 6 SLOV.A,~IA in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members; another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in 1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them. Furdek and his followers, the members of the First Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford, Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue, Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill. The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as well as many non~Slovak parishes. Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek was loved and revered by his own people and respected even by the enemies of his Church and nation. Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and SLOVAKIA 7 his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America and the members of the organization he founded to be up and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and foreign missions, etc. At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it, but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~ ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise. The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare and security of the United States of America. But it is also interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions, achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism. Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations could better their lot if they drew their strength from the rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of 8 SLOVAKIA which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even under the most adverse conditions, and generation after generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in America did not have to surrender their character, their national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could not become an unworthy citizen. Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5 articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries), an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of scientists about the origin of the world and man. The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to SLOVAKIA 9 love something that was unlknown to them; they could love and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in several generations of Slovaks in America. Father Furdek endearvored to a<!quaint Amerioans with Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota" (1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians, Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise. Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding, tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people. To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger, bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them. Father culties and thoroughly, fered what Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he 10 SLOVAKIA decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the membership and the delegates to the convention until the proposition was approved. We know today that if it had not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought it was time to seriously think of building a home for the orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je<lnota, he let the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~ ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully. Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over 10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior, Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America, the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union, the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc Father Furdek. Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod" until the end of time.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Rev. Stephen Furdek Description An account of the resource Philip A. Hrobak Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955 pp. 3-10 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/93e414fffd506459bf7780cefd5c472b.pdf 54815f0a3b47f0a4352806044a567894 PDF Text Text IN TID!-1. ISSUE: THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League The Murder of Matus Cernak Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda ? The Significance of Small Nations Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage WHO SAID IT?: 62-96 * * * Edited and compi led by PHILIP A. HROBAK Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �\ : \' I SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica, a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent. rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation and its long struggle for fl'eedom and .i.J ulependence. As Ame1·i cam,, members of the Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given 1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence. !J.'hey al'e tledi<·ated to the cause of the Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to oppose the plague ot Communism and all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems. Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1· yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA l3ox ·+50 Middletown, Pa. -------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A. i EDN OT A: PR ES S M iddletown, P a. �SLOVAKIA Published quarterly by the Slovak VOL. V League of America JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955 NO. 2-3 (15-16 ) TEN YEARS AGO . ... I the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So• tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith. Jiu and his heroic armies. T<he out foundation. " "joyous, historic" event was cele· At t he same time Monsignor Jan orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo· of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be· again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling t he Slovak National Council - him : " All Czecho-Slovaks are Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera. ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten ..... tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms." cialiistic policy and philosophy, Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze• cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled joy: "Presov aga in I I i "triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib. Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze. serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain "our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red our Slav liberators, the Great Army." Powers, to Providence for putting Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said : fi n, and giving us Benes." "Do not allow yourselves to be A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union , vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet �2 SLOVAKIA Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich Union will do." Later, after -b eing welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a member of the so-called Council of free." Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems from political and geographical Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of joying freedom in tJhe USA, told Slavic unity." A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK 1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza, of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union. Jleved that collaboration between Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed that ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed· could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why Czecho-Slovak-Soviet Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak as the leading editorial on July 18, nations? And w·hy should they 1945. Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of to serve the FR>EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA, Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee a mass meeting in Most in 1945: . "We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union." trenched in these institutions? � IN TID!-1. ISSUE: THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League The Murder of Matus Cernak Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda ? The Significance of Small Nations Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage WHO SAID IT?: 62-96 * * * Edited and compi led by PHILIP A. HROBAK Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �\ : \' I SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica, a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent. rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation and its long struggle for fl'eedom and .i.J ulependence. As Ame1·i cam,, members of the Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given 1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence. !J.'hey al'e tledi<·ated to the cause of the Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to oppose the plague ot Communism and all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems. Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1· yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA l3ox ·+50 Middletown, Pa. -------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A. i EDN OT A: PR ES S M iddletown, P a. �SLOVAKIA Published quarterly by the Slovak VOL. V League of America JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955 NO. 2-3 (15-16 ) TEN YEARS AGO . ... I the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So• tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith. Jiu and his heroic armies. T<he out foundation. " "joyous, historic" event was cele· At t he same time Monsignor Jan orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo· of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be· again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling t he Slovak National Council - him : " All Czecho-Slovaks are Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera. ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten ..... tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms." cialiistic policy and philosophy, Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze• cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled joy: "Presov aga in I I i "triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib. Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze. serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain "our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red our Slav liberators, the Great Army." Powers, to Providence for putting Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said : fi n, and giving us Benes." "Do not allow yourselves to be A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union , vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet �2 SLOVAKIA Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich Union will do." Later, after -b eing welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a member of the so-called Council of free." Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems from political and geographical Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of joying freedom in tJhe USA, told Slavic unity." A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK 1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza, of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union. Jleved that collaboration between Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed that ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed· could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why Czecho-Slovak-Soviet Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak as the leading editorial on July 18, nations? And w·hy should they 1945. Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of to serve the FR>EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA, Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee a mass meeting in Most in 1945: . "We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union." trenched in these institutions? � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document IN TID!-1. ISSUE: THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League The Murder of Matus Cernak Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda ? The Significance of Small Nations Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage WHO SAID IT?: 62-96 * * * Edited and compi led by PHILIP A. HROBAK Published by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA \ : \' I SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica, a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent. rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation and its long struggle for fl'eedom and .i.J ulependence. As Ame1·i cam,, members of the Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given 1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence. !J.'hey al'e tledi<·ated to the cause of the Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to oppose the plague ot Communism and all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems. Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1· yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA l3ox ·+50 Middletown, Pa. -------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A. i EDN OT A: PR ES S M iddletown, P a. SLOVAKIA Published quarterly by the Slovak VOL. V League of America JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955 NO. 2-3 (15-16 ) TEN YEARS AGO . ... I the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So• tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith. Jiu and his heroic armies. T<he out foundation. " "joyous, historic" event was cele· At t he same time Monsignor Jan orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo· of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be· again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling t he Slovak National Council - him : " All Czecho-Slovaks are Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera. ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten ..... tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms." cialiistic policy and philosophy, Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze• cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled joy: "Presov aga in I I i "triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib. Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze. serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain "our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red our Slav liberators, the Great Army." Powers, to Providence for putting Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said : fi n, and giving us Benes." "Do not allow yourselves to be A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union , vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet 2 SLOVAKIA Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich Union will do." Later, after -b eing welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a member of the so-called Council of free." Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems from political and geographical Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of joying freedom in tJhe USA, told Slavic unity." A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK 1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza, of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union. Jleved that collaboration between Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed that ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed· could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why Czecho-Slovak-Soviet Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak as the leading editorial on July 18, nations? And w·hy should they 1945. Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of to serve the FR>EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA, Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee a mass meeting in Most in 1945: . "We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union." trenched in these institutions?  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June-September 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/73211fb74e35c4af309a97a7ffc1c7b8.pdf 31d167ba8598a1ec4055158275c90fba PDF Text Text Officers of the Slovak League of America (O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.) • John J . Sirotnak 610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg. Scranton 3, Pa. Honorar y Presillen1 Dr. Peter P. H letko 1943 W. 4Sth Street Chi cago n. Illinoi s Dr. Julius Janci 215 East ' Mason Street Owoss o, Mich. President Philip A. Hrobak P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek Georgian Cour t Co ll ege Vice-Pres ident Lak e wood, N. J . Jacob Kocis A DVISORY COUNCIL 1547 - 167th Sll eet Mic hae l J . Vargovich Ha mmond , Ind . Nat iona l President First Catholi c Slovak Un ion \'ice-Pr e s ident of U. S. A. Ju Iia K rajcovic 1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan National President Re cording Secretary First Catholic Slovak Francis H rusovsky Ladies Union 2900 East Bo ul evard Frank Sobus Cle veland 4, Olli:> National President Slovak Catholic Sokol Secr e tary-Tre asurer Milan V. Blazek Stephen J. Tkach 4205 W. Cull erton Street National Presid ent Chicago 23, Ill. Penna. Slovak U ni on Gabriela E. Vavrek National President Ladies P e nnsylvania Slovak Union EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Paul P. Jamriska Sl O Montooth Street PittRhurgh 10, Pa. Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J . John Rozboril National President S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica) JEDNOTA Middletown, Pa. BRATST VO SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Cleveland , Ohio Scrnn ton , P a. Wilk es-Barre, Pa. SL OV ENSKE NOVINY Cleveland , Ohio ZORNICKA Wilke.s -Barre, Pa. KATOLiCKY SOKOL Pass ai c, N . J. SVORNOST Whitaker, Pa . OSADNE HLASY Chic,a go, Ill. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind. �Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 . • � Officers of the Slovak League of America (O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.) • John J . Sirotnak 610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg. Scranton 3, Pa. Honorar y Presillen1 Dr. Peter P. H letko 1943 W. 4Sth Street Chi cago n. Illinoi s Dr. Julius Janci 215 East ' Mason Street Owoss o, Mich. President Philip A. Hrobak P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek Georgian Cour t Co ll ege Vice-Pres ident Lak e wood, N. J . Jacob Kocis A DVISORY COUNCIL 1547 - 167th Sll eet Mic hae l J . Vargovich Ha mmond , Ind . Nat iona l President First Catholi c Slovak Un ion \'ice-Pr e s ident of U. S. A. Ju Iia K rajcovic 1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan National President Re cording Secretary First Catholic Slovak Francis H rusovsky Ladies Union 2900 East Bo ul evard Frank Sobus Cle veland 4, Olli:> National President Slovak Catholic Sokol Secr e tary-Tre asurer Milan V. Blazek Stephen J. Tkach 4205 W. Cull erton Street National Presid ent Chicago 23, Ill. Penna. Slovak U ni on Gabriela E. Vavrek National President Ladies P e nnsylvania Slovak Union EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Paul P. Jamriska Sl O Montooth Street PittRhurgh 10, Pa. Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J . John Rozboril National President S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica) JEDNOTA Middletown, Pa. BRATST VO SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Cleveland , Ohio Scrnn ton , P a. Wilk es-Barre, Pa. SL OV ENSKE NOVINY Cleveland , Ohio ZORNICKA Wilke.s -Barre, Pa. KATOLiCKY SOKOL Pass ai c, N . J. SVORNOST Whitaker, Pa . OSADNE HLASY Chic,a go, Ill. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind. �Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 . • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Officers of the Slovak League of America (O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.) • John J . Sirotnak 610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg. Scranton 3, Pa. Honorar y Presillen1 Dr. Peter P. H letko 1943 W. 4Sth Street Chi cago n. Illinoi s Dr. Julius Janci 215 East ' Mason Street Owoss o, Mich. President Philip A. Hrobak P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek Georgian Cour t Co ll ege Vice-Pres ident Lak e wood, N. J . Jacob Kocis A DVISORY COUNCIL 1547 - 167th Sll eet Mic hae l J . Vargovich Ha mmond , Ind . Nat iona l President First Catholi c Slovak Un ion \'ice-Pr e s ident of U. S. A. Ju Iia K rajcovic 1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan National President Re cording Secretary First Catholic Slovak Francis H rusovsky Ladies Union 2900 East Bo ul evard Frank Sobus Cle veland 4, Olli:> National President Slovak Catholic Sokol Secr e tary-Tre asurer Milan V. Blazek Stephen J. Tkach 4205 W. Cull erton Street National Presid ent Chicago 23, Ill. Penna. Slovak U ni on Gabriela E. Vavrek National President Ladies P e nnsylvania Slovak Union EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Paul P. Jamriska Sl O Montooth Street PittRhurgh 10, Pa. Joseph Prusa 205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J . John Rozboril National President S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS ( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica) JEDNOTA Middletown, Pa. BRATST VO SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA Cleveland , Ohio Scrnn ton , P a. Wilk es-Barre, Pa. SL OV ENSKE NOVINY Cleveland , Ohio ZORNICKA Wilke.s -Barre, Pa. KATOLiCKY SOKOL Pass ai c, N . J. SVORNOST Whitaker, Pa . OSADNE HLASY Chic,a go, Ill. SLOVAK V AMERIKE Whiting, Ind. Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 . •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (14) Description An account of the resource includes photo of ruins of Spiš Castle Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1955 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/efa6f46e44b94f6f5c82ce212e023eec.pdf dcb6d3cffabaa2213aae768b7623cc98 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Published VOL. V quarterly by the Slovak League of MARCH 1955 America NO . 1 (14) HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA is told on the following pa,ges by witnesses called upon to testify by the Select Committee on Com• mu.nist Aiggression of the House of Representatives, headed by the Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil· waukee, Wis. Michael Galayda is an .American citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was there W1,d saw Communism at work a mong his people w'ho had persdstenUy ,and consistently fought the Red plague for over a hundred years. H e makes his home in Hazleton, Pa. Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the terror and horror of Red rule in Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name. Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America in 1950; he is assistant editor of the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, and a1so chairman of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k National Council Abroad. Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law 1 and politics and was very active ' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which invaded his native Slovakia. Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer, became the director of the Press Bureau of the Slovak League of America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon after his arrival in America several years ago. Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in West Germany, was a Sergeant of the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia. Jur Detviansky was an active officer of the Sloviak Army before he Hed to the West. Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia, is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits "HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From Rome), Italy. Rev. Stephen Nahalka, S.T.D., ecclesiastical writer and former personal secretary to Bishop John Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese, 1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was sentenced to 24 years 1n prison 1by the Reds lives in Rome. Italy. Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of America since 19'50, is a native AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for government. His articles and pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the maohinations of the Benes Czechs (Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the men of the Kremlin - +and the Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. · �SLOVAKIA Communist Aggression Against Slovakia (The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts because of the pro-Soviet -poli<:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.). FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8 SLOVAKIA !Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western Slaivs. The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country. FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries �SLOVAKIA 3 from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance. In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century, she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized under the Arpad dynasty. In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings were celebrated in BratisJava. The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy. In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never satisfied. h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle 7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of "Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act. �4 SLOVAKIA In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom, except for some autonomous bodies. 1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary. 1 World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire. Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage for the peace settlements. Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G. Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement and support. Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state, as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish Republic. Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement, and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at 1 1 1 �5 SLOVAKIA the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent. 1 A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers. 1 In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany. A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18, 1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of peace .. ." On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918, 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 6 and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed the separation of Slo.va:lci<a from the Kiingdom of Hungary and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the first ,caJbinet. However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved. In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state, for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia. Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April 1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and reestabllished in December 19'18. 1 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ConstitutJional Structure Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until. February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence. The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the �SLOVAKIA 7 preamble of the Constitution of the United States. The main body of the Consbitution provided for a popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary. Parties and Politics The politics of the period may ibe divided into four phases: 1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19) Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a split on partisan lines followed. 2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20) The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia. 3. The agrarian era (1922-35) This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout this period. 4. The crisis ( 1935-38) This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic. The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the period betiween the two World Wars formed the following groups: National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never beoame very ,powenfu:l. �8 SLOVAKIA Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist Party and the Slovak Pe>ipulist Party, respectiively, this group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life. The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its strongholds, especially in Slovakia. Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support. National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate. Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social democratic parties of other European countries, had more influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction . Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe, the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World War. Economic, Social and Cultural Development Agrarian reform iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore, was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula- �SLOVAKIA 9 tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances. Economic development While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former Austro..lHJungarian Empire. 'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods, were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great Britain. Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries to weather the crisis. Education and social progress The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools. The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies, and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives. The Religious Situation The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun- �SLOVAKIA :iO try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild. A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself, therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence. In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic, the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith. 1 Internal Problems 'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain, asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain. 'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both the internal and international point of rview. The Czech statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente, 1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France, 1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed �11 SLOVAKIA that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs. Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only 58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most important questions such a;s the relation betlween state and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority. Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity. From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent, while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic. From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia. All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has 1 1 �12 SLOVAKIA been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main points: !Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government. As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment. Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament. A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali>zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May 8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive. The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon it. Laws enacted by the <Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the 1 �SLOVAKIA 13 President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal was never discussed in the Parliament. Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small traditionailist <Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia, stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of >the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic." Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating, however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic. This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for a better economic amd social <poll.icy in the German areas suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the 'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant. T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia. �14 SLOVAKIA PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government. It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty. Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went to Germany. This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed ,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso. 1 November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670 inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the formation of a common party !known henceforth as the Party of National Unity. This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the �15 SLOVAKIA Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-<Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine (,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the common <budget. FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS Beforre Munich The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy. A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on vanquished Austda and Hungary. Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union into the League. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission. 1 Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the <leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action. De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and �16 SLOVAKIA Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must ae<!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler. 1 After Munich After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the country's only hope of sur:vival. The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted. The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible, direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors. On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia. Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph �SLOVAKIA 17 Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr. Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence. President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich." German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague (March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via." Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead. The Establishment of the Slovak Republic Even though the Slovak state was largely the result of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment. After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the <Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line in foreign policy. Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand, Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939, �18 SLOVAKIA SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine. The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature. The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October 1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state, and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar. The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the se'Lf-q>reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation. The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union. Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers. 1 World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame of freedom fHalrering. After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun- �SLOVAKIA 19 try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and London, which became the cenrters of their political activities. Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration of a free Czecho-iSlovakia. The committee was recognized first as the provisional and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's original frontiein; were guaranteed. While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's <international .p osition would be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country. Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of the war as an ally. No. such treaty having been <:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation. During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla<:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire- �20 SLOVAKIA ,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a "government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts" would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in Czecho-1Slovakia. In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination, with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany. These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and the Slovak Government. :FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA, AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA. Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le? Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people. Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was going on; is that correct? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ? Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es. Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail? Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik Army." �SLOVAKIA 21 !Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve? Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right. MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were put in jail? Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946. Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Why? Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against communism. Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism? Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed. 'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did you try to get a Un~ted States passport? Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did. Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States? Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we decided to leave and join the American Army. Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home? Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home. Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont? Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did. Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you are taiking the train to 'Bratislava? Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time what happened. Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing? Mr. Galayda. Yes. 1 1 �22 SLOVAKIA Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way of Budapest and Bratislava? Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake. They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one soldier and we can't move. Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up? Mr. Gailay<la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour. Mr. Boll!in. One hour. Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved of his valualbles, jewelry, money? Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything. Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally reached .Prague ? Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home. Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia? Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start speruking agafast communism. Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ; you made some speeches against communism? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. ls that correct? Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them? Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say something. iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a Mr. Galayda. No. complaint? Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&t ed ? 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 23 Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia. Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp? Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight. Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia? Mr. Ga:layda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain? Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so. Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there? Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years, and I know. They iaire no good in this world. Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United States who may feel that communism is a good system of government? Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have, freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f what they have. Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the Communists? iMr. Galayda. No. Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press? Mr. Galayda. No. Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly? Mr. Galayda . No. Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No. visi'o n as we do !ill America here.? Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit? Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight. (Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that correct? Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct. Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen at that time? �2-l SLOVAKIA Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this country. Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root? Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes. Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to Slova·k ia at that time? Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to visit him and see him. Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd? Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much. Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good in ,Slovakia; is that correct? Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were. Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r then. Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes. press... Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . . Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes. iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years. Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was. sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia? Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in contact with the Commun.ists? Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated, they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people. 1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944? Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes. lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout. �SLOVAKIA 25 Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising? Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right. Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if necessary? !Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the same time. Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising? Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for them and buried them. Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here. We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean that the . . . Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run. Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run? Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot them from the back. iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie they were trying to get away from them? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that? Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly. Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms? Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms. Mir. Bonin. They were without arms? Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people. Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father? 1 1 �26 SLOVAKIA ,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons. Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct? Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right. Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe? MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved? MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel. sti1l buried. 'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in jail your1self? 1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days. Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why? Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife went to the authorities <a!Ild they let me free after 14 days. Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him. Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes. ,r elease? ~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes. knowledge? Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours? Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community? •M r. Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Priests? Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right. Mr. McTigue. Nuns? of different rel,i gious faiths? people And lMcTigu.e. Mr. Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes. MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get back to the United States? �SLOVAKIA 27 Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver. Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes. · property; didn't you? Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter you left? . Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa. The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one country to. another? Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir. Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty to the Government. (Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954). a FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946 to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is (Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes. that correct. Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes. thaJt correct? Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did you have with the Communists? Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad. Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in --any way so that you would give your property ;to them? Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government. Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to �28 SLOVAKIA the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is !Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. that correct? MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I' close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated in any way by the Communists? !Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in one truck rund took them away. Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they shot? Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists. MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs. Smre~ovsky. Yes. va:kia since 1945 . . . Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right. come Communists? Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?. Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and live again like decent people. MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir. them? Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and princilples under the domination of the Russian system? Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right. Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain? Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir. �SLOVAKIA 29 MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them? 1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly. Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct? Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr. Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia? Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly. (WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00 Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa. Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed? Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly, Jednota. Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were born in Slovakia, is that correct. Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true. Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia? Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia. Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is that coTrect? [)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir. Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in 1944; is that correct? Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true. Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine? Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right. Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there? Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were �30 SLOVAKIA murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between 1939 and 1941. I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;>edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941, after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in ~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands, sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told me their relatives were deported in the night. The people knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot. Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred. iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia? Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women, and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass grarves. iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew about? Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a. Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves disc01Vered later on; is that correct? Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what �SLOVAKIA :n I saJW at these mass graves. Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the reoord, but not have it read at this time? Dr. Paulco. All right. Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord. Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe us the highlights of it as of thJis moment? Dr. PaUlc<>. All right. Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files. Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am sure you recall thait testimony. Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia. Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect? Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti- �32 SLOVAKIA zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in 194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943, this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen, were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling against the Communists. He wrote several books againist communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch. 1 Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot? Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia. !Mr. McTigue. About '50,000? Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000. Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year? Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months. Mr. McTigue. Three months? Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia, and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and to the mines in Dombas. Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally end? �33 SLOVAKIA Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in September 1944. Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct? Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true. Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch? Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army, and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates practicaly from every village and every town from eastern Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign. He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak question to the International Tribunal. Mr. Bonin. Tribunal? Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia. That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso. Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv? Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr. 1 �34 SLOVAKIA Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld War Iil. Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in motion? Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall, that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947. Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in the spiritual and politic8il world? Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct. Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll. Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean countries to be in political life; isn't that correct? Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit. Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to engBlge in political lifo . . . Dr. Pauco. Yes. MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their clerical life; isn't that coreivct? Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass there practically every Sunday. 'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country? Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary, �SLOVAKIA 35 from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets, I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of my relatives came through the border just several months ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks, like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia, Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the United States. Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia? Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945. Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country? Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950. Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n. Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in 1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ; they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those. Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these �SLOVAKIA 36 people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the Soviet agents. ,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding. Dr. Pauoo. Yes. Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that. I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired, is that OOlITect.. Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct. Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a? Dr. Pauoo. Yes. !Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt? Dr. Pauico. That is correct. Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to them? Dr. Pauco. Yes Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is <the fhist time, I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate the trouble. Dr. Pauc·o. Yes. Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct? Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes. Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there? iDr. Pallico. Yes. iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t were dTopped in? Dr. PauJco. Yes. Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes, to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place . Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue. Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the 1 �SLOVAKIA 37 United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is that correct? Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt. Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je<lnota? Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless as they possibly can. Dr. Paiu100. That is correct. Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia. Dr. Pauco. Thank you. Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco. Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr. Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign nation? - Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir. Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- · termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania, Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to goveTn themselves; is that correct. Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct. MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity 1 �SLOVAKIA 38 presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free world. Thank you ve,r y much. Dr. P,aulco. Thank you. Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·. Dr. Pauco. Yes. Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova>lcia, did you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the 1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people? Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on April 4. Mr. Feighan. I see. Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends , of the methods which I mentioned before. Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o see it and observe .iit? Dr. Pmrco. No, no. Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco Or. Paulco. You are wekome. Mr. Bonin. Thank you <very much. (Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was. Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground movemerut in Slovakia? Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who started it. iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ? Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944. tr? �SLOVAKIA 39 :Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this underground moivement? Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger of communism. They studied communism and decided to combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World War II. The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions. The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations at the !beginning w&e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir activities in the political field. Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement? Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field. The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party. So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population. Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party. Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un- �40 SLOVAKIA derground in Slovakia? Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so. Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground movement from without ? Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We ,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion, informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;, iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or any member here might ask in that regard, you just use yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure. Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission. Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.? Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for the United States. ·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited States in 1950? Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did. Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'( Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by 1 1 �41 SLOVAKIA the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet. Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945. Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did. Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct? Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of the leaders outside. MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in Slova,kiia? Dr. Mii kula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava? Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia. Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this. Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst the Repl]blic." iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi<s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4." And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year? Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947. Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations 2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say, 70 or 80 times? [)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that. Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity? Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense? Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely. 1 1 1 �42 SLOVAKIA Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you? Dr. Mikula. That i:s me. Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter; Dr. Mikula. Yes. is t:Jhiat rig1ht? Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel. Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit? Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that we tahlced albout. Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently, sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans. Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over the counwy. So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station. It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there. JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery police. �SLOVAKIA 43 Mr. McTigue. Communis t police? Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes. Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say? Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March 4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard. The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards : il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R. Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis order? Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary. What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy came people from Slova:kiia. There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia. 'Dhe movements of the population are very serious thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle. Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order? Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further: Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station. �44 SLOVAKIA Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was said. If they find something against the regime they wt accorcmng to regufations. Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest police station. This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions. They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says: To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the other members of the unit. I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested. Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to the oommittee . . . Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized. Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in SwvaJkia ,a t the present time? Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That is a general rea:son �SLOVAKIA 45 Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve. Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today? Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout 80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am. acti:ve part to fight oommundsm. Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why? Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason. !Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce. Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the Communist taikeover; is that correct? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries? Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½ million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people. Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over, aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken out of theiir normal life. Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions. Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley? . Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia? Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945. Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume. Dr. Mitkula. Yes. �46 SLOVAKIA Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities of the underground since that time? Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945 our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children. Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four and one was ,s ix. Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained? Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949. Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue? Dr. Milrula. Yes. !Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct? Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I a'In receiving informia,tion, but later. Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite, would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae? DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat. Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit ·stronger? Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo- �SLOVAKIA 47 ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere, the same procedure. Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union? Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18 villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion. Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does, what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any? Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there will be a cha1I1ge. iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a. Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems. Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination? Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i<s po<l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90 per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is cutting otff the will to resist. iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan? MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so desiire? · Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important �48 SLOVAKIA things that they need; some kind of good will that we have a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem. MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope, ilS that right? Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs. Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries? Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals, a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists. The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must be directed against those opportunists, because they are afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re readty to betray todlay and every day. Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee? Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome. Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes. with your family? Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very great extent. !Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954). ance here today. 1 �SLOVAKIA 49 FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America. :Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United States and Canada. · Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should do to combat this new kind of enemy. Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of America? Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout 300,000. !Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of .America? Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses? Mr. McTigue. Yes. 1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907. 'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan, that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith the statement? · Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered. !Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first express my deep appreciation to this committee for the opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the dread detail of Communist aggression. I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends, �50 SLOVAKIA peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well. Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the business, the duty, of every American to take part in it; every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own America. I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation. The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble. ("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official 011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue [Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is not repeated here.) Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the sellout to Moscow; is that correct? Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir. Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1 �SLOVAKIA 51 Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with Communists? Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely. Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence? Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget what communism is, and just let them get strong enough until they can take all of us. Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive? How can we most help them at a time like this? Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime they have. ~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among the ,people of SlovaJkia? Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with the people directly and indirectly right through the war, and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today. Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with what is going on over there today; is that correct? Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl>ova~ia and then we get it. Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley? Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic, what exactly was the relationship at that time between Slovakia and Germany? �52 SLOVAKIA Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it. Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example, that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany? Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men by classes; they never had many men in the field. Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor when the Germans declared war? Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business. We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United States. iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time? Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find that out from our own United States Goveirnment because that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is absolutely no record of it. Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany? Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean, running the country of Slovakia itself. Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at thait time? Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of �SLOVAKIA 53 the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the wax, were good. Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms that you normally would expect? Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one accoro. Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944, when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from that time Slovakia lost its. independence? Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides. They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by the partisans on the other end. Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation did the Tiso government continue in po,w er? Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25; the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans. Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not have popular support. �54 SLOVAKIA Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when? Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945. Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany? Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria. Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured with the American troops? Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State Department, and, of course, the Army Department. Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of the Slovak Goivernment? Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison. Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals? Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague. Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely unified government? Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true. The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek, a Czech. Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat? Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any- �SLOVAKIA 55 thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty. Mr. Bentley. Who? Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record. They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport. Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would simply have states' rights. The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much later. Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine, when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned, what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that? Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct. Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l think at this time it is quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists. Mr. Hrobak. That is correct. Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard. Mr. Hrobak. Correct. iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that Mr. Hrobak Yes. too. Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi- �56 SLOVAKIA sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s. Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct. Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country. Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia. Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge of that, too. Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks, patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-. crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is "Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras). The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these, The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946. Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946 and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s in BraUshwa. In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10, �57 SLOVAKIA 1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other Slova!k p8{!)ers. Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin. The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward Benes." Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication? Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and Canada. And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time. Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak. (Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954). 1 STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava. During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now, as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant force in tha,t country. Introduction Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history. �58 SLOVAKIA After losing her political independe nce in the ninth century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power structure . On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the " �SLOVAKIA 69 people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation foisted upon the Sl01Vak people." For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion on this pomt at any time. The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with the alternative of the partition of her territory among Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939, thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for independence. During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo- �SLOVAKIA 60 lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important point : All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II. As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire: To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster which would put an end to the Slovak national state. Because of this difference in psychological attitude, Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow. 1 A. The Blueprint for Sovietization After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests," �SLOVAKIA 61 says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided, after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other, after the war, all possilble economic help." No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations. The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus for those who had been aspiring to political power within the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around 10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938. The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia. Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement, as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all political, legislative, military, and governmental executive power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the ,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati<ves shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over." The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas Agreement were laid down in another document, the first three articles of which read as follows : �62 SLOVAKIA "(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs, as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be their common government organized on the principle of equality. "(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular. "(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should therefore, lean on the Soviet Union." It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following passage (pp. 408-409) : ''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) , which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.'' - wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ." 1 "Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De- �SLOVAKIA 63 cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue." In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched on the problem of the National Front Government: "It will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national front ." (pp. 409-410). On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties, and organization of the National Front Government as it emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to become a "people's" democrwcy. Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24 percent of the population, became the future leading force of Slwakia. B. The August 1944 Insurrection Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser, had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs, and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators. More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin, Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army, and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions �64 SLOVAKIA from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2 Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing. Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of the activity of the different groups. In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of (1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26. ( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29. �SLOVAKIA 66 August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22, 1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries." The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising, and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and their opportunity was not long in arising. On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko, refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day. ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the �66 SLOVAKIA partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[>rising whioh was announced on August 29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo .. crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the Reich from ,w hich they were never to return. Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months, tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &ama. It is evident that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952. As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev. With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~ tioned him as follows: Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian? Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3 (3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013. �SLOVAKIA 67 Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia. This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country. C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the historical facts. During World War II, though subject to a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia was a relatively free country. During five years, until the insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava was able to master all the difficulties of the war period during these years. Then the Red army came. I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The house in question, which was located on a hill, was then chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary. After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of �68 SLOVAKJA the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on the dining-room ta>ble and began checking on our identity. Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded to examine these things in detail and chose for himself whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather suitcase, etc. We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red army had entered the house and began in turn to forage through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed because she had been violated. After this visit by offi .. cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk, successively entered bhe house, each one having held us, that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their own way, until 2 :30 a. m. In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around 200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women had to go to the hospital for examination. During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets, around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned. D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945 On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets, through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which, except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had been loyal to the Slova>k State - all of this without any plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats", who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state will in Slovaikia. �SuOVA.KIA 69 According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely, the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1, plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia. Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others. Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~ Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of the Communists increased, in comparison with the year 1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet "Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this 50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional ,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment for Slo:vaikia. MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was progressing in every field of Government activity: In the field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and this without any consultation with the nation - mines, 1 �70 SLOVAKIA 100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production, 80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72 percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47 percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent; clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent; wood industry, 8 percent. By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working people fell within the field of private industry. ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34, dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation. By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice were created: Oommunit,y and <list.riot "people's courts" and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with Germany. The political character of this distorted justice was determined by three circumstances : 1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55 Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the the of memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two political ,parties in power. 2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide upon cases which were not punishable according to the Penal Code. 3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility. 4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate- �SLOVAKIA 71 gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps: a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts"; b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it; c. Those who· do not work; d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them within the framework of laibor duty. '5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t. 6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the confiscation of the ded'endant's property. It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and "unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation. This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal revenge. By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly, and other human rights were likewise a;bolished. E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia All these measures were aimed at the weakening of traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko, Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided �SLOVAK.IA 72 to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s. Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on. In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against " . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37 plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23 deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies). The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided. There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia. Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further limitatio!Ils on the politi>Cal preirogative s of his own party. 1 After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947, to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1; the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia. �SI.IOVAKIA 73 Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946 and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec<h area) was finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp. Conclusion As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954), contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in Slovrukia. (Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954). fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r . Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is that correct, Father? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total number of seven times? Father Botelk. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.? Father Botek. Yes. �74 SLOVAKIA Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949? Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950. Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944. kia, Father? Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and 1946 following the Communist occupation. Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all church-Operated school,s. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church? Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic press. Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in Father Botek. Yes. religion, is tihat right, Father? Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics in Slo;vakia? Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic. Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia? F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that would be able to defend their rights by democratic method. Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father? Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their 1 �SLOVAKIA 75 pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~ cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then inco:riporated into the so-called Kosice agreement concluded in 1945. The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party. He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~ cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us.. ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1 �76 SLOVAKIA tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party, Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however, became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they also, on their part, tried to win su>ppo•r t of the Catholic population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side. There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement of a final decision. They made indications that they might be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became apparent that no agreement could be reached with the Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections, and the Communists and the representative s of the Free- �77 SLOVAKIA dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started ,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party. We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we<re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic party which would .not admit religious freedom and they were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1 �78 SLOVAKIA ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises and in arguments with the Communists they always yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in order to defend their rights. Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this commission, representative s of the Communist Party were Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000. Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was liquidated and you were arrested? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you were arrested, Fathoc? Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received �SLOVAKIA instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action. However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and therefore any acttvities developed by this organization oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted. The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e sent to a room where they were searched while, in the meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from 8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally the employees of the bureau were released to their homes, and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau was investigated by the police. On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also 1 �80 SLOVAKlA the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional court's prison where they held me for another five months pending investigation. At the end of these five months, my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action, which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists. Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father? F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me and on the other hand, if another .person would be given �SLOVAKIA 81 the same instructions, this other person could do harm to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at the district national committee for some discussion. I was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even after they had served their terms imposed by the courts. However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered. TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and on the same day the police arrived and took me to a forced-labor camp at Nova:ky My parishioners protested against my arrest; however, they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my experiences which I had at that time when I was held at the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked how they became involved in underground activities and how it happened that they were arrested since there were always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated that there was always a Communist spy planted by the Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police. �82 SLOVAKIA I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested. In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore, they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-<:aJled representaUves of the Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts, stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of the Catholic Action. The Communists declared that since the Vatican was against the people and since the bishops supported the v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore, they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at which this Communist Catholic Action was founded. Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops, �SLOVAKIA 83 however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See declared every person who would sign this memorandum as excommunicated from the Catholic Church. Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp in 1950; is that correct? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were you sent to a hospital? Father Botelk. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the hospital? Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals. These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries. That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants. They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a university without any previous education, which was otheIWise required from university students. This was the same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals. MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father? Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951. Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out of SlQIVakia? Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe. At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However, �84 SLOVAKIA this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second time, at which time we were only four escapees and we succeeded in crossing the border. ,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time is in Rome; is that correct, Father? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion in SlovaJkia. Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests. IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question. Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the Communists? Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See. However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective. to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the �SLOVAKIA 86 clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops, and admitted only those whom they considered harmless; but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were monitored. Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the pupils with the, theory of Marxism? Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine. Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat this Communist march toward worrld revolution? Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have had great successes in educating the very young people in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact; that if communism is given enough time, that these youths will become completely communistic and the Communist strength will be increased. Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God? Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children, for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and �86 SLOVAK IA "Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor, Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man." Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia? Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were poor. Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were a member of the clergy? Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations, and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten, so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This, may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to. IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper it is written on? Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss. Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y haive covered very well your experien ces back over the years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say? �SLOVAKIA 87 Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent. Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you come from? F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa .. milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia. Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia. Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and 13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints. Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian population. Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the straight news given on those programs? Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well, turn it off because the news is over and they are now going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic and we do not want any Oze<!h Republic." Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are doing some good behind the Iron Curtain? Father Botek They certainly are of great use and great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling. Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are they j&mmed by the Soviets? �88 SLOVAKIA Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one. Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why there has been some resentment to the broadcasts? F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States, who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the United States, these programs do not bring any reports on the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also beams SlO'Vakian programs. Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic? Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945, not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However, Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy, self-rule. Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing? Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was �SLOVAKIA 89 opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government. Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there is only one way. Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in 1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944, they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people with promises of an independent Slovakian State but within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists, however, was disapproved by Moscow. Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S. S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but in su!bstance it would be socialistic? Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic. Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951? Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the third year any more. Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony. (Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954). 1 �90 SLOVAKIA TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA (The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.) Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is Father Nahalka. Yes. that correct? Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia? Father N ahalka. Yes. Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia? Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was ordained in Rome. Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia, is that correct? !Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in Slovakia. Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct? Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946 to 1949. Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called, Father Nrahalka. Yes. in Slovakia? Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place? Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this town was occupied by Communist guerillas. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what the guerillas did in that town? Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80 innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut �SLOVAKIA 91 stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic, Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise. Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch over the bishop's activiities? FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom those files. Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home, for example, wired ? Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the Communists placed microphones in the conference room for the bishop's conferences. Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k in 1949? Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the 'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary. Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists, Father? 1 Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and held in imprisonment until January 1946. 1 �92 SLOVAKIA ,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father? -Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953. Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago. Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia? FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the border. Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge on th-at? Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign broadcasts. Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia? Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed to the political part of the program of those broad~asts mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not state the entire Communist case in Slovakia. Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist? Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs, �93 SLOVAKIA the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~ ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda. '.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the time when the transmitters were still in operation, people in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs broadoost by Radio Vatican. IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any good - I mean, against the Communists? Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still more efficient if they adjusted their political programs also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population. (Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954). THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct? Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es. iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913 at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct? Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes. Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security, is that correct? Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir. Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to 1951, is that correct? Mr. Dobrotka. That is right. 1 �94 SLOVAKIA Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security completely controlled by the Communists,? Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under Communist control. Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under Communist control, isn't that correct? Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the Communists got control, is that corerct? Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over. Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house searches, and so forth and so on? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders. Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made? Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League? Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated because the Communists considered this organization a swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3 supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America. iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in Slovakia? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders. Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they? iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only u:pon special order by telephone. !Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed �SLOVAKIA 95 you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were they plain-clothes men? Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me. Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did you m0lke,? Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests. Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that there was any political significance to what a priest had to say? Mr. Dobrotka. I <know I sulbmitted annual reports to this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political speeches within their sermons. Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and peasants and the PQpulace in general? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground acti<vities. Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal Security? Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I was active there were approximately three cases of arrests of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the area under my jurisdiction. Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting to your superiors that the priests were only talking to God, is that correct? �96 SLOVAKIA Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for their arrest. Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from SlorvaJkia? Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951. Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of Slorvalcia? Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in escaping. Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor Service unit at Bad Kreuznach? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir. Mr. Kersten. Any questions? Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name? Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie, which was under the Minister of Interior. Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938? Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state. Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist Party at that time in 1938? Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any political parties. Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed your duties of reporting on priesrts? Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the time when the Catholic Action was started. Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist Party at that time ? Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir. Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party? Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB in order to protect their own existence were forced to file an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party. Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time? �SLOVAKIA 97 Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in February 1948. Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March 1948? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic and I attended Mass every Sunday. Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948? Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the local priest, local teacher and local government officer were suspicious, because these persons were considered as reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set on us by the Communist Party. Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to belie:ve in God? Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe. Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as possilble. Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions. (The witness was excused.) (,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954). THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows: Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919, �98 SLOVAKIA in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct? _Mr. Detviansiky. Yes. Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct? Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct. Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct? Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir. ,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office by the Communists? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. McTig,ue. Why? Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person. Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the Communists, is that correct? Mr. Detviansiky. Yes. Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik and in English. Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set? Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment, this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken away from the farmers and transferred to industrial pul'p()ses. Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the Communists, is that correct? ,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other �SWVAKIA 99 in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas. ~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas? Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the most significant of them was that which occurred at Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed this action of despair because he stated that since they took aiway from him everything they should take away also his family. Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West? Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951. Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is that correct? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been receiving here aH you expected? Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and I am impatient to return to my home country. Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with the progress of OUI' fight against communism. Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the people of the other captive nations that are in the free world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is that right? Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better. Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms, �100 S!LOVAIHA would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists? Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men would use such an oipportunity. Mr. Kersten. Thank you. The witness was. excused. (Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954). When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings, the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream "murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary 25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous." It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and 1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to "sing"! � SLOVAKIA Published VOL. V quarterly by the Slovak League of MARCH 1955 America NO . 1 (14) HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA is told on the following pa,ges by witnesses called upon to testify by the Select Committee on Com• mu.nist Aiggression of the House of Representatives, headed by the Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil· waukee, Wis. Michael Galayda is an .American citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was there W1,d saw Communism at work a mong his people w'ho had persdstenUy ,and consistently fought the Red plague for over a hundred years. H e makes his home in Hazleton, Pa. Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the terror and horror of Red rule in Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name. Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America in 1950; he is assistant editor of the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, and a1so chairman of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k National Council Abroad. Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law 1 and politics and was very active ' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which invaded his native Slovakia. Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer, became the director of the Press Bureau of the Slovak League of America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon after his arrival in America several years ago. Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in West Germany, was a Sergeant of the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia. Jur Detviansky was an active officer of the Sloviak Army before he Hed to the West. Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia, is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits "HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From Rome), Italy. Rev. Stephen Nahalka, S.T.D., ecclesiastical writer and former personal secretary to Bishop John Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese, 1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was sentenced to 24 years 1n prison 1by the Reds lives in Rome. Italy. Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of America since 19'50, is a native AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for government. His articles and pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the maohinations of the Benes Czechs (Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the men of the Kremlin - +and the Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. · �SLOVAKIA Communist Aggression Against Slovakia (The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts because of the pro-Soviet -poli<:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.). FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8 SLOVAKIA !Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western Slaivs. The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country. FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries �SLOVAKIA 3 from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance. In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century, she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized under the Arpad dynasty. In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings were celebrated in BratisJava. The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy. In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never satisfied. h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle 7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of "Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act. �4 SLOVAKIA In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom, except for some autonomous bodies. 1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary. 1 World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire. Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage for the peace settlements. Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G. Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement and support. Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state, as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish Republic. Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement, and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at 1 1 1 �5 SLOVAKIA the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent. 1 A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers. 1 In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany. A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18, 1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of peace .. ." On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918, 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 6 and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed the separation of Slo.va:lci<a from the Kiingdom of Hungary and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the first ,caJbinet. However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved. In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state, for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia. Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April 1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and reestabllished in December 19'18. 1 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ConstitutJional Structure Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until. February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence. The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the �SLOVAKIA 7 preamble of the Constitution of the United States. The main body of the Consbitution provided for a popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary. Parties and Politics The politics of the period may ibe divided into four phases: 1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19) Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a split on partisan lines followed. 2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20) The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia. 3. The agrarian era (1922-35) This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout this period. 4. The crisis ( 1935-38) This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic. The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the period betiween the two World Wars formed the following groups: National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never beoame very ,powenfu:l. �8 SLOVAKIA Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist Party and the Slovak Pe>ipulist Party, respectiively, this group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life. The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its strongholds, especially in Slovakia. Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support. National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate. Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social democratic parties of other European countries, had more influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction . Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe, the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World War. Economic, Social and Cultural Development Agrarian reform iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore, was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula- �SLOVAKIA 9 tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances. Economic development While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former Austro..lHJungarian Empire. 'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods, were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great Britain. Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries to weather the crisis. Education and social progress The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools. The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies, and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives. The Religious Situation The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun- �SLOVAKIA :iO try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild. A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself, therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence. In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic, the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith. 1 Internal Problems 'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain, asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain. 'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both the internal and international point of rview. The Czech statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente, 1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France, 1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed �11 SLOVAKIA that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs. Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only 58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most important questions such a;s the relation betlween state and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority. Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity. From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent, while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic. From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia. All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has 1 1 �12 SLOVAKIA been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main points: !Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government. As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment. Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament. A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali>zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May 8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive. The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon it. Laws enacted by the <Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the 1 �SLOVAKIA 13 President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal was never discussed in the Parliament. Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small traditionailist <Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia, stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of >the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic." Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating, however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic. This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for a better economic amd social <poll.icy in the German areas suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the 'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant. T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia. �14 SLOVAKIA PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government. It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty. Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went to Germany. This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed ,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso. 1 November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670 inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the formation of a common party !known henceforth as the Party of National Unity. This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the �15 SLOVAKIA Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-<Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine (,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the common <budget. FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS Beforre Munich The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy. A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on vanquished Austda and Hungary. Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union into the League. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission. 1 Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the <leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action. De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and �16 SLOVAKIA Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must ae<!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler. 1 After Munich After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the country's only hope of sur:vival. The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted. The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible, direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors. On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia. Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph �SLOVAKIA 17 Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr. Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence. President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich." German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague (March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via." Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead. The Establishment of the Slovak Republic Even though the Slovak state was largely the result of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment. After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the <Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line in foreign policy. Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand, Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939, �18 SLOVAKIA SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine. The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature. The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October 1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state, and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar. The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the se'Lf-q>reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation. The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union. Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers. 1 World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame of freedom fHalrering. After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun- �SLOVAKIA 19 try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and London, which became the cenrters of their political activities. Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration of a free Czecho-iSlovakia. The committee was recognized first as the provisional and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's original frontiein; were guaranteed. While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's <international .p osition would be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country. Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of the war as an ally. No. such treaty having been <:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation. During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla<:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire- �20 SLOVAKIA ,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a "government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts" would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in Czecho-1Slovakia. In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination, with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany. These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and the Slovak Government. :FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA, AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA. Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le? Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people. Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was going on; is that correct? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ? Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es. Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail? Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik Army." �SLOVAKIA 21 !Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve? Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right. MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were put in jail? Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946. Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Why? Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against communism. Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism? Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed. 'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did you try to get a Un~ted States passport? Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did. Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States? Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we decided to leave and join the American Army. Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home? Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home. Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont? Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did. Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you are taiking the train to 'Bratislava? Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time what happened. Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing? Mr. Galayda. Yes. 1 1 �22 SLOVAKIA Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way of Budapest and Bratislava? Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake. They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one soldier and we can't move. Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up? Mr. Gailay<la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour. Mr. Boll!in. One hour. Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved of his valualbles, jewelry, money? Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything. Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally reached .Prague ? Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home. Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia? Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start speruking agafast communism. Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ; you made some speeches against communism? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. ls that correct? Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them? Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say something. iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a Mr. Galayda. No. complaint? Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&t ed ? 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 23 Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia. Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp? Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight. Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia? Mr. Ga:layda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain? Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so. Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there? Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years, and I know. They iaire no good in this world. Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United States who may feel that communism is a good system of government? Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have, freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f what they have. Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the Communists? iMr. Galayda. No. Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press? Mr. Galayda. No. Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly? Mr. Galayda . No. Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No. visi'o n as we do !ill America here.? Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit? Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight. (Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that correct? Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct. Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen at that time? �2-l SLOVAKIA Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this country. Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root? Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes. Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to Slova·k ia at that time? Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to visit him and see him. Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd? Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much. Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good in ,Slovakia; is that correct? Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were. Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r then. Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes. press... Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . . Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes. iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years. Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was. sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia? Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in contact with the Commun.ists? Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated, they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people. 1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944? Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes. lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout. �SLOVAKIA 25 Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising? Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right. Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if necessary? !Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the same time. Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising? Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for them and buried them. Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here. We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean that the . . . Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run. Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run? Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot them from the back. iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie they were trying to get away from them? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that? Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly. Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms? Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms. Mir. Bonin. They were without arms? Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people. Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father? 1 1 �26 SLOVAKIA ,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons. Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct? Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right. Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe? MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved? MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel. sti1l buried. 'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in jail your1self? 1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days. Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why? Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife went to the authorities <a!Ild they let me free after 14 days. Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him. Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes. ,r elease? ~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes. knowledge? Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours? Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community? •M r. Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Priests? Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right. Mr. McTigue. Nuns? of different rel,i gious faiths? people And lMcTigu.e. Mr. Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes. MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get back to the United States? �SLOVAKIA 27 Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver. Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes. · property; didn't you? Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter you left? . Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa. The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one country to. another? Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir. Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty to the Government. (Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954). a FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946 to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is (Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes. that correct. Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes. thaJt correct? Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did you have with the Communists? Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad. Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in --any way so that you would give your property ;to them? Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government. Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to �28 SLOVAKIA the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is !Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. that correct? MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I' close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated in any way by the Communists? !Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in one truck rund took them away. Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they shot? Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists. MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs. Smre~ovsky. Yes. va:kia since 1945 . . . Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right. come Communists? Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?. Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and live again like decent people. MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir. them? Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and princilples under the domination of the Russian system? Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right. Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain? Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir. �SLOVAKIA 29 MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them? 1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly. Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct? Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr. Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia? Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly. (WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00 Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa. Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed? Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly, Jednota. Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were born in Slovakia, is that correct. Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true. Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia? Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia. Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is that coTrect? [)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir. Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in 1944; is that correct? Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true. Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine? Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right. Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there? Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were �30 SLOVAKIA murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between 1939 and 1941. I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;>edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941, after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in ~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands, sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told me their relatives were deported in the night. The people knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot. Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred. iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia? Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women, and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass grarves. iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew about? Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a. Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves disc01Vered later on; is that correct? Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what �SLOVAKIA :n I saJW at these mass graves. Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the reoord, but not have it read at this time? Dr. Paulco. All right. Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord. Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe us the highlights of it as of thJis moment? Dr. PaUlc<>. All right. Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files. Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am sure you recall thait testimony. Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia. Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect? Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti- �32 SLOVAKIA zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in 194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943, this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen, were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling against the Communists. He wrote several books againist communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch. 1 Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot? Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia. !Mr. McTigue. About '50,000? Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000. Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year? Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months. Mr. McTigue. Three months? Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia, and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and to the mines in Dombas. Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally end? �33 SLOVAKIA Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in September 1944. Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct? Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true. Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch? Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army, and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates practicaly from every village and every town from eastern Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign. He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak question to the International Tribunal. Mr. Bonin. Tribunal? Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia. That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso. Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv? Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr. 1 �34 SLOVAKIA Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld War Iil. Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in motion? Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall, that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947. Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in the spiritual and politic8il world? Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct. Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll. Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean countries to be in political life; isn't that correct? Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit. Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to engBlge in political lifo . . . Dr. Pauco. Yes. MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their clerical life; isn't that coreivct? Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass there practically every Sunday. 'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country? Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary, �SLOVAKIA 35 from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets, I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of my relatives came through the border just several months ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks, like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia, Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the United States. Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia? Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945. Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country? Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950. Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n. Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in 1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ; they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those. Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these �SLOVAKIA 36 people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the Soviet agents. ,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding. Dr. Pauoo. Yes. Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that. I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired, is that OOlITect.. Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct. Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a? Dr. Pauoo. Yes. !Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt? Dr. Pauico. That is correct. Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to them? Dr. Pauco. Yes Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is <the fhist time, I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate the trouble. Dr. Pauc·o. Yes. Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct? Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes. Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there? iDr. Pallico. Yes. iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t were dTopped in? Dr. PauJco. Yes. Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes, to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place . Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue. Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the 1 �SLOVAKIA 37 United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is that correct? Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt. Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je<lnota? Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless as they possibly can. Dr. Paiu100. That is correct. Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia. Dr. Pauco. Thank you. Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco. Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr. Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign nation? - Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir. Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- · termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania, Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to goveTn themselves; is that correct. Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct. MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity 1 �SLOVAKIA 38 presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free world. Thank you ve,r y much. Dr. P,aulco. Thank you. Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·. Dr. Pauco. Yes. Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova>lcia, did you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the 1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people? Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on April 4. Mr. Feighan. I see. Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends , of the methods which I mentioned before. Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o see it and observe .iit? Dr. Pmrco. No, no. Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco Or. Paulco. You are wekome. Mr. Bonin. Thank you <very much. (Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was. Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground movemerut in Slovakia? Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who started it. iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ? Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944. tr? �SLOVAKIA 39 :Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this underground moivement? Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger of communism. They studied communism and decided to combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World War II. The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions. The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations at the !beginning w&e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir activities in the political field. Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement? Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field. The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party. So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population. Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party. Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un- �40 SLOVAKIA derground in Slovakia? Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so. Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground movement from without ? Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We ,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion, informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;, iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or any member here might ask in that regard, you just use yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure. Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission. Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.? Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for the United States. ·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited States in 1950? Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did. Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'( Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by 1 1 �41 SLOVAKIA the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet. Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945. Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did. Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct? Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of the leaders outside. MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in Slova,kiia? Dr. Mii kula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava? Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia. Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this. Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst the Repl]blic." iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi<s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4." And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year? Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947. Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations 2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say, 70 or 80 times? [)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that. Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity? Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense? Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely. 1 1 1 �42 SLOVAKIA Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you? Dr. Mikula. That i:s me. Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter; Dr. Mikula. Yes. is t:Jhiat rig1ht? Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel. Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit? Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that we tahlced albout. Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently, sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans. Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over the counwy. So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station. It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there. JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery police. �SLOVAKIA 43 Mr. McTigue. Communis t police? Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes. Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say? Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March 4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard. The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards : il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R. Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis order? Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary. What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy came people from Slova:kiia. There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia. 'Dhe movements of the population are very serious thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle. Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order? Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further: Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station. �44 SLOVAKIA Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was said. If they find something against the regime they wt accorcmng to regufations. Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest police station. This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions. They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says: To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the other members of the unit. I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested. Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to the oommittee . . . Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized. Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in SwvaJkia ,a t the present time? Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That is a general rea:son �SLOVAKIA 45 Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve. Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today? Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout 80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am. acti:ve part to fight oommundsm. Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why? Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason. !Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce. Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the Communist taikeover; is that correct? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries? Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½ million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people. Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over, aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken out of theiir normal life. Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions. Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley? . Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia? Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945. Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume. Dr. Mitkula. Yes. �46 SLOVAKIA Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities of the underground since that time? Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945 our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children. Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four and one was ,s ix. Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained? Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949. Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue? Dr. Milrula. Yes. !Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct? Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I a'In receiving informia,tion, but later. Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite, would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae? DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat. Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit ·stronger? Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo- �SLOVAKIA 47 ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere, the same procedure. Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union? Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18 villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion. Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does, what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any? Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there will be a cha1I1ge. iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a. Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems. Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination? Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i<s po<l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90 per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is cutting otff the will to resist. iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan? MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so desiire? · Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important �48 SLOVAKIA things that they need; some kind of good will that we have a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem. MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope, ilS that right? Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs. Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries? Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals, a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists. The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must be directed against those opportunists, because they are afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re readty to betray todlay and every day. Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee? Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome. Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes. with your family? Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very great extent. !Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954). ance here today. 1 �SLOVAKIA 49 FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America. :Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United States and Canada. · Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should do to combat this new kind of enemy. Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of America? Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout 300,000. !Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of .America? Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses? Mr. McTigue. Yes. 1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907. 'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan, that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith the statement? · Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered. !Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first express my deep appreciation to this committee for the opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the dread detail of Communist aggression. I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends, �50 SLOVAKIA peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well. Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the business, the duty, of every American to take part in it; every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own America. I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation. The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble. ("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official 011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue [Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is not repeated here.) Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the sellout to Moscow; is that correct? Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir. Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1 �SLOVAKIA 51 Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with Communists? Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely. Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence? Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget what communism is, and just let them get strong enough until they can take all of us. Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive? How can we most help them at a time like this? Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime they have. ~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among the ,people of SlovaJkia? Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with the people directly and indirectly right through the war, and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today. Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with what is going on over there today; is that correct? Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl>ova~ia and then we get it. Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley? Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic, what exactly was the relationship at that time between Slovakia and Germany? �52 SLOVAKIA Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it. Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example, that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany? Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men by classes; they never had many men in the field. Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor when the Germans declared war? Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business. We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United States. iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time? Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find that out from our own United States Goveirnment because that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is absolutely no record of it. Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany? Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean, running the country of Slovakia itself. Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at thait time? Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of �SLOVAKIA 53 the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the wax, were good. Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms that you normally would expect? Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one accoro. Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944, when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from that time Slovakia lost its. independence? Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides. They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by the partisans on the other end. Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation did the Tiso government continue in po,w er? Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25; the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans. Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not have popular support. �54 SLOVAKIA Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when? Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945. Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany? Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria. Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured with the American troops? Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State Department, and, of course, the Army Department. Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of the Slovak Goivernment? Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison. Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals? Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague. Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely unified government? Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true. The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek, a Czech. Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat? Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any- �SLOVAKIA 55 thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty. Mr. Bentley. Who? Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record. They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport. Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would simply have states' rights. The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much later. Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine, when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned, what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that? Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct. Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l think at this time it is quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists. Mr. Hrobak. That is correct. Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard. Mr. Hrobak. Correct. iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that Mr. Hrobak Yes. too. Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi- �56 SLOVAKIA sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s. Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct. Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country. Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia. Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge of that, too. Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks, patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-. crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is "Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras). The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these, The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946. Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946 and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s in BraUshwa. In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10, �57 SLOVAKIA 1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other Slova!k p8{!)ers. Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin. The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward Benes." Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication? Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and Canada. And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time. Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak. (Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954). 1 STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava. During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now, as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant force in tha,t country. Introduction Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history. �58 SLOVAKIA After losing her political independe nce in the ninth century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power structure . On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the " �SLOVAKIA 69 people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation foisted upon the Sl01Vak people." For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion on this pomt at any time. The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with the alternative of the partition of her territory among Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939, thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for independence. During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo- �SLOVAKIA 60 lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important point : All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II. As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire: To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster which would put an end to the Slovak national state. Because of this difference in psychological attitude, Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow. 1 A. The Blueprint for Sovietization After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests," �SLOVAKIA 61 says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided, after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other, after the war, all possilble economic help." No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations. The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus for those who had been aspiring to political power within the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around 10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938. The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia. Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement, as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all political, legislative, military, and governmental executive power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the ,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati<ves shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over." The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas Agreement were laid down in another document, the first three articles of which read as follows : �62 SLOVAKIA "(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs, as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be their common government organized on the principle of equality. "(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular. "(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should therefore, lean on the Soviet Union." It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following passage (pp. 408-409) : ''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) , which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.'' - wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ." 1 "Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De- �SLOVAKIA 63 cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue." In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched on the problem of the National Front Government: "It will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national front ." (pp. 409-410). On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties, and organization of the National Front Government as it emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to become a "people's" democrwcy. Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24 percent of the population, became the future leading force of Slwakia. B. The August 1944 Insurrection Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser, had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs, and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators. More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin, Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army, and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions �64 SLOVAKIA from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2 Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing. Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of the activity of the different groups. In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of (1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26. ( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29. �SLOVAKIA 66 August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22, 1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries." The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising, and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and their opportunity was not long in arising. On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko, refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day. ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the �66 SLOVAKIA partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[>rising whioh was announced on August 29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo .. crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the Reich from ,w hich they were never to return. Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months, tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &ama. It is evident that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952. As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev. With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~ tioned him as follows: Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian? Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3 (3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013. �SLOVAKIA 67 Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia. This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country. C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the historical facts. During World War II, though subject to a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia was a relatively free country. During five years, until the insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava was able to master all the difficulties of the war period during these years. Then the Red army came. I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The house in question, which was located on a hill, was then chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary. After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of �68 SLOVAKJA the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on the dining-room ta>ble and began checking on our identity. Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded to examine these things in detail and chose for himself whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather suitcase, etc. We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red army had entered the house and began in turn to forage through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed because she had been violated. After this visit by offi .. cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk, successively entered bhe house, each one having held us, that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their own way, until 2 :30 a. m. In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around 200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women had to go to the hospital for examination. During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets, around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned. D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945 On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets, through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which, except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had been loyal to the Slova>k State - all of this without any plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats", who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state will in Slovaikia. �SuOVA.KIA 69 According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely, the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1, plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia. Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others. Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~ Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of the Communists increased, in comparison with the year 1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet "Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this 50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional ,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment for Slo:vaikia. MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was progressing in every field of Government activity: In the field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and this without any consultation with the nation - mines, 1 �70 SLOVAKIA 100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production, 80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72 percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47 percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent; clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent; wood industry, 8 percent. By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working people fell within the field of private industry. ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34, dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation. By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice were created: Oommunit,y and <list.riot "people's courts" and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with Germany. The political character of this distorted justice was determined by three circumstances : 1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55 Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the the of memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two political ,parties in power. 2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide upon cases which were not punishable according to the Penal Code. 3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility. 4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate- �SLOVAKIA 71 gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps: a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts"; b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it; c. Those who· do not work; d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them within the framework of laibor duty. '5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t. 6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the confiscation of the ded'endant's property. It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and "unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation. This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal revenge. By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly, and other human rights were likewise a;bolished. E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia All these measures were aimed at the weakening of traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko, Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided �SLOVAK.IA 72 to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s. Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on. In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against " . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37 plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23 deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies). The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided. There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia. Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further limitatio!Ils on the politi>Cal preirogative s of his own party. 1 After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947, to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1; the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia. �SI.IOVAKIA 73 Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946 and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec<h area) was finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp. Conclusion As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954), contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in Slovrukia. (Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954). fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r . Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is that correct, Father? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total number of seven times? Father Botelk. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.? Father Botek. Yes. �74 SLOVAKIA Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949? Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950. Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944. kia, Father? Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and 1946 following the Communist occupation. Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all church-Operated school,s. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church? Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic press. Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in Father Botek. Yes. religion, is tihat right, Father? Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics in Slo;vakia? Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic. Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia? F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that would be able to defend their rights by democratic method. Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father? Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their 1 �SLOVAKIA 75 pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~ cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then inco:riporated into the so-called Kosice agreement concluded in 1945. The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party. He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~ cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us.. ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1 �76 SLOVAKIA tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party, Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however, became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they also, on their part, tried to win su>ppo•r t of the Catholic population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side. There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement of a final decision. They made indications that they might be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became apparent that no agreement could be reached with the Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections, and the Communists and the representative s of the Free- �77 SLOVAKIA dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started ,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party. We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we<re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic party which would .not admit religious freedom and they were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1 �78 SLOVAKIA ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises and in arguments with the Communists they always yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in order to defend their rights. Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this commission, representative s of the Communist Party were Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000. Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was liquidated and you were arrested? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you were arrested, Fathoc? Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received �SLOVAKIA instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action. However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and therefore any acttvities developed by this organization oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted. The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e sent to a room where they were searched while, in the meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from 8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally the employees of the bureau were released to their homes, and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau was investigated by the police. On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also 1 �80 SLOVAKlA the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional court's prison where they held me for another five months pending investigation. At the end of these five months, my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action, which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists. Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father? F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me and on the other hand, if another .person would be given �SLOVAKIA 81 the same instructions, this other person could do harm to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at the district national committee for some discussion. I was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even after they had served their terms imposed by the courts. However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered. TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and on the same day the police arrived and took me to a forced-labor camp at Nova:ky My parishioners protested against my arrest; however, they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my experiences which I had at that time when I was held at the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked how they became involved in underground activities and how it happened that they were arrested since there were always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated that there was always a Communist spy planted by the Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police. �82 SLOVAKIA I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested. In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore, they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-<:aJled representaUves of the Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts, stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of the Catholic Action. The Communists declared that since the Vatican was against the people and since the bishops supported the v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore, they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at which this Communist Catholic Action was founded. Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops, �SLOVAKIA 83 however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See declared every person who would sign this memorandum as excommunicated from the Catholic Church. Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp in 1950; is that correct? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were you sent to a hospital? Father Botelk. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the hospital? Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals. These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries. That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants. They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a university without any previous education, which was otheIWise required from university students. This was the same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals. MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father? Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951. Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out of SlQIVakia? Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe. At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However, �84 SLOVAKIA this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second time, at which time we were only four escapees and we succeeded in crossing the border. ,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time is in Rome; is that correct, Father? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion in SlovaJkia. Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests. IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question. Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the Communists? Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See. However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective. to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the �SLOVAKIA 86 clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops, and admitted only those whom they considered harmless; but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were monitored. Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the pupils with the, theory of Marxism? Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine. Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat this Communist march toward worrld revolution? Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have had great successes in educating the very young people in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact; that if communism is given enough time, that these youths will become completely communistic and the Communist strength will be increased. Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God? Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children, for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and �86 SLOVAK IA "Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor, Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man." Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia? Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were poor. Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were a member of the clergy? Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations, and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten, so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This, may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to. IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper it is written on? Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss. Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y haive covered very well your experien ces back over the years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say? �SLOVAKIA 87 Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent. Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you come from? F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa .. milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia. Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia. Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and 13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints. Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian population. Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the straight news given on those programs? Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well, turn it off because the news is over and they are now going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic and we do not want any Oze<!h Republic." Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are doing some good behind the Iron Curtain? Father Botek They certainly are of great use and great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling. Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are they j&mmed by the Soviets? �88 SLOVAKIA Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one. Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why there has been some resentment to the broadcasts? F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States, who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the United States, these programs do not bring any reports on the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also beams SlO'Vakian programs. Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic? Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945, not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However, Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy, self-rule. Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing? Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was �SLOVAKIA 89 opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government. Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there is only one way. Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in 1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944, they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people with promises of an independent Slovakian State but within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists, however, was disapproved by Moscow. Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S. S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but in su!bstance it would be socialistic? Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic. Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951? Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the third year any more. Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony. (Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954). 1 �90 SLOVAKIA TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA (The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.) Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is Father Nahalka. Yes. that correct? Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia? Father N ahalka. Yes. Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia? Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was ordained in Rome. Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia, is that correct? !Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in Slovakia. Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct? Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946 to 1949. Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called, Father Nrahalka. Yes. in Slovakia? Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place? Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this town was occupied by Communist guerillas. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what the guerillas did in that town? Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80 innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut �SLOVAKIA 91 stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic, Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise. Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch over the bishop's activiities? FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom those files. Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home, for example, wired ? Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the Communists placed microphones in the conference room for the bishop's conferences. Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k in 1949? Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the 'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary. Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists, Father? 1 Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and held in imprisonment until January 1946. 1 �92 SLOVAKIA ,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father? -Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953. Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago. Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia? FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the border. Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge on th-at? Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign broadcasts. Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia? Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed to the political part of the program of those broad~asts mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not state the entire Communist case in Slovakia. Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist? Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs, �93 SLOVAKIA the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~ ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda. '.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the time when the transmitters were still in operation, people in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs broadoost by Radio Vatican. IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any good - I mean, against the Communists? Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still more efficient if they adjusted their political programs also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population. (Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954). THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct? Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es. iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913 at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct? Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes. Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security, is that correct? Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir. Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to 1951, is that correct? Mr. Dobrotka. That is right. 1 �94 SLOVAKIA Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security completely controlled by the Communists,? Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under Communist control. Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under Communist control, isn't that correct? Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the Communists got control, is that corerct? Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over. Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house searches, and so forth and so on? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders. Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made? Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League? Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated because the Communists considered this organization a swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3 supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America. iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in Slovakia? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders. Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they? iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only u:pon special order by telephone. !Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed �SLOVAKIA 95 you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were they plain-clothes men? Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me. Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did you m0lke,? Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests. Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that there was any political significance to what a priest had to say? Mr. Dobrotka. I <know I sulbmitted annual reports to this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political speeches within their sermons. Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and peasants and the PQpulace in general? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground acti<vities. Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal Security? Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I was active there were approximately three cases of arrests of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the area under my jurisdiction. Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting to your superiors that the priests were only talking to God, is that correct? �96 SLOVAKIA Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for their arrest. Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from SlorvaJkia? Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951. Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of Slorvalcia? Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in escaping. Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor Service unit at Bad Kreuznach? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir. Mr. Kersten. Any questions? Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name? Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie, which was under the Minister of Interior. Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938? Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state. Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist Party at that time in 1938? Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any political parties. Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed your duties of reporting on priesrts? Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the time when the Catholic Action was started. Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist Party at that time ? Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir. Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party? Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB in order to protect their own existence were forced to file an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party. Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time? �SLOVAKIA 97 Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in February 1948. Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March 1948? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic and I attended Mass every Sunday. Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948? Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the local priest, local teacher and local government officer were suspicious, because these persons were considered as reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set on us by the Communist Party. Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to belie:ve in God? Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe. Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as possilble. Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions. (The witness was excused.) (,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954). THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows: Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919, �98 SLOVAKIA in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct? _Mr. Detviansiky. Yes. Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct? Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct. Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct? Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir. ,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office by the Communists? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. McTig,ue. Why? Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person. Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the Communists, is that correct? Mr. Detviansiky. Yes. Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik and in English. Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set? Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment, this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken away from the farmers and transferred to industrial pul'p()ses. Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the Communists, is that correct? ,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other �SWVAKIA 99 in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas. ~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas? Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the most significant of them was that which occurred at Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed this action of despair because he stated that since they took aiway from him everything they should take away also his family. Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West? Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951. Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is that correct? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been receiving here aH you expected? Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and I am impatient to return to my home country. Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with the progress of OUI' fight against communism. Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the people of the other captive nations that are in the free world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is that right? Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better. Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms, �100 S!LOVAIHA would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists? Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men would use such an oipportunity. Mr. Kersten. Thank you. The witness was. excused. (Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954). When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings, the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream "murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary 25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous." It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and 1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to "sing"! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Published VOL. V quarterly by the Slovak League of MARCH 1955 America NO . 1 (14) HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA is told on the following pa,ges by witnesses called upon to testify by the Select Committee on Com• mu.nist Aiggression of the House of Representatives, headed by the Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil· waukee, Wis. Michael Galayda is an .American citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was there W1,d saw Communism at work a mong his people w'ho had persdstenUy ,and consistently fought the Red plague for over a hundred years. H e makes his home in Hazleton, Pa. Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the terror and horror of Red rule in Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name. Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America in 1950; he is assistant editor of the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union, and a1so chairman of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k National Council Abroad. Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law 1 and politics and was very active ' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which invaded his native Slovakia. Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer, became the director of the Press Bureau of the Slovak League of America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon after his arrival in America several years ago. Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in West Germany, was a Sergeant of the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia. Jur Detviansky was an active officer of the Sloviak Army before he Hed to the West. Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia, is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits "HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From Rome), Italy. Rev. Stephen Nahalka, S.T.D., ecclesiastical writer and former personal secretary to Bishop John Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese, 1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was sentenced to 24 years 1n prison 1by the Reds lives in Rome. Italy. Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of America since 19'50, is a native AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for government. His articles and pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the maohinations of the Benes Czechs (Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the men of the Kremlin - +and the Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. · SLOVAKIA Communist Aggression Against Slovakia (The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts because of the pro-Soviet -poli<:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.). FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8 SLOVAKIA !Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western Slaivs. The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country. FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries SLOVAKIA 3 from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance. In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century, she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized under the Arpad dynasty. In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings were celebrated in BratisJava. The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy. In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never satisfied. h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle 7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of "Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act. 4 SLOVAKIA In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom, except for some autonomous bodies. 1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary. 1 World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire. Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage for the peace settlements. Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G. Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement and support. Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state, as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish Republic. Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement, and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at 1 1 1 5 SLOVAKIA the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent. 1 A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers. 1 In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany. A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18, 1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of peace .. ." On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918, 1 1 SLOVAKIA 6 and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed the separation of Slo.va:lci<a from the Kiingdom of Hungary and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the first ,caJbinet. However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved. In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state, for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia. Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April 1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and reestabllished in December 19'18. 1 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ConstitutJional Structure Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until. February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence. The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the SLOVAKIA 7 preamble of the Constitution of the United States. The main body of the Consbitution provided for a popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary. Parties and Politics The politics of the period may ibe divided into four phases: 1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19) Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a split on partisan lines followed. 2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20) The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia. 3. The agrarian era (1922-35) This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout this period. 4. The crisis ( 1935-38) This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic. The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the period betiween the two World Wars formed the following groups: National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never beoame very ,powenfu:l. 8 SLOVAKIA Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist Party and the Slovak Pe>ipulist Party, respectiively, this group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life. The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its strongholds, especially in Slovakia. Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support. National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate. Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social democratic parties of other European countries, had more influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction . Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe, the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World War. Economic, Social and Cultural Development Agrarian reform iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore, was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula- SLOVAKIA 9 tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances. Economic development While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former Austro..lHJungarian Empire. 'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods, were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great Britain. Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries to weather the crisis. Education and social progress The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools. The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies, and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives. The Religious Situation The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun- SLOVAKIA :iO try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild. A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself, therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence. In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic, the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith. 1 Internal Problems 'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain, asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain. 'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both the internal and international point of rview. The Czech statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente, 1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France, 1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed 11 SLOVAKIA that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs. Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only 58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most important questions such a;s the relation betlween state and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority. Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity. From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent, while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic. From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia. All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has 1 1 12 SLOVAKIA been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main points: !Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government. As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment. Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament. A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali>zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May 8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive. The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon it. Laws enacted by the <Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the 1 SLOVAKIA 13 President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal was never discussed in the Parliament. Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small traditionailist <Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia, stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of >the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic." Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating, however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic. This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for a better economic amd social <poll.icy in the German areas suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the 'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant. T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia. 14 SLOVAKIA PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government. It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty. Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went to Germany. This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed ,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso. 1 November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670 inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the formation of a common party !known henceforth as the Party of National Unity. This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the 15 SLOVAKIA Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-<Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine (,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the common <budget. FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS Beforre Munich The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy. A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on vanquished Austda and Hungary. Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union into the League. When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission. 1 Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the <leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action. De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and 16 SLOVAKIA Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must ae<!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler. 1 After Munich After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the country's only hope of sur:vival. The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted. The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible, direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors. On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia. Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph SLOVAKIA 17 Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr. Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence. President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich." German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague (March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via." Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead. The Establishment of the Slovak Republic Even though the Slovak state was largely the result of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment. After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the <Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line in foreign policy. Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand, Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939, 18 SLOVAKIA SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine. The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature. The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October 1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state, and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar. The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise between the past and the present, between an old tradition and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the se'Lf-q>reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation. The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union. Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers. 1 World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame of freedom fHalrering. After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun- SLOVAKIA 19 try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and London, which became the cenrters of their political activities. Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration of a free Czecho-iSlovakia. The committee was recognized first as the provisional and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's original frontiein; were guaranteed. While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's <international .p osition would be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country. Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of the war as an ally. No. such treaty having been <:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation. During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla<:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire- 20 SLOVAKIA ,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a "government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts" would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in Czecho-1Slovakia. In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination, with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany. These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and the Slovak Government. :FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA, AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA. Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le? Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people. Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was going on; is that correct? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ? Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es. Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail? Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik Army." SLOVAKIA 21 !Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve? Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right. MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were put in jail? Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946. Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Why? Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against communism. Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism? Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed. 'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did you try to get a Un~ted States passport? Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did. Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States? Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we decided to leave and join the American Army. Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home? Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home. Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont? Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did. Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you are taiking the train to 'Bratislava? Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time what happened. Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing? Mr. Galayda. Yes. 1 1 22 SLOVAKIA Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way of Budapest and Bratislava? Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake. They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one soldier and we can't move. Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up? Mr. Gailay<la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour. Mr. Boll!in. One hour. Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved of his valualbles, jewelry, money? Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything. Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally reached .Prague ? Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home. Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia? Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start speruking agafast communism. Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ; you made some speeches against communism? Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Galayda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. ls that correct? Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them? Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say something. iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a Mr. Galayda. No. complaint? Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&t ed ? 1 1 SLOVAKIA 23 Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia. Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp? Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight. Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia? Mr. Ga:layda. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain? Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so. Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there? Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years, and I know. They iaire no good in this world. Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United States who may feel that communism is a good system of government? Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have, freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f what they have. Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the Communists? iMr. Galayda. No. Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press? Mr. Galayda. No. Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly? Mr. Galayda . No. Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No. visi'o n as we do !ill America here.? Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit? Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight. (Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that correct? Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct. Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen at that time? 2-l SLOVAKIA Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this country. Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root? Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes. Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to Slova·k ia at that time? Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to visit him and see him. Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd? Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much. Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good in ,Slovakia; is that correct? Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were. Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r then. Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes. press... Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . . Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes. iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years. Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was. sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia? Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in contact with the Commun.ists? Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated, they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people. 1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944? Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes. lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout. SLOVAKIA 25 Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising? Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right. Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if necessary? !Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the same time. Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising? Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for them and buried them. Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here. We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean that the . . . Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run. Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run? Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot them from the back. iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie they were trying to get away from them? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that? Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly. Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms? Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms. Mir. Bonin. They were without arms? Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people. Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father? 1 1 26 SLOVAKIA ,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons. Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct? Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right. Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe? MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved? MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel. sti1l buried. 'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in jail your1self? 1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days. Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why? Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife went to the authorities <a!Ild they let me free after 14 days. Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law? Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him. Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes. ,r elease? ~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes. knowledge? Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours? Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community? •M r. Smrekovsky. Yes. Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Priests? Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right. Mr. McTigue. Nuns? of different rel,i gious faiths? people And lMcTigu.e. Mr. Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes. MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get back to the United States? SLOVAKIA 27 Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver. Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes. · property; didn't you? Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter you left? . Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa. The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one country to. another? Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir. Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty to the Government. (Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954). a FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946 to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is (Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes. that correct. Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes. thaJt correct? Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did you have with the Communists? Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad. Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in --any way so that you would give your property ;to them? Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government. Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to 28 SLOVAKIA the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is !Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes. that correct? MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I' close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated in any way by the Communists? !Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in one truck rund took them away. Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they shot? Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists. MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs. Smre~ovsky. Yes. va:kia since 1945 . . . Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right. come Communists? Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?. Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and live again like decent people. MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir. them? Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and princilples under the domination of the Russian system? Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right. Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain? Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir. SLOVAKIA 29 MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them? 1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly. Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct? Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr. Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia? Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly. (WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00 Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa. Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed? Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly, Jednota. Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were born in Slovakia, is that correct. Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true. Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia? Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia. Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is that coTrect? [)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir. Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in 1944; is that correct? Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true. Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine? Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right. Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there? Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were 30 SLOVAKIA murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between 1939 and 1941. I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;>edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941, after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in ~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands, sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told me their relatives were deported in the night. The people knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot. Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred. iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia? Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women, and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass grarves. iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew about? Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a. Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves disc01Vered later on; is that correct? Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what SLOVAKIA :n I saJW at these mass graves. Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the reoord, but not have it read at this time? Dr. Paulco. All right. Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord. Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe us the highlights of it as of thJis moment? Dr. PaUlc<>. All right. Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files. Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am sure you recall thait testimony. Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia. Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect? Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti- 32 SLOVAKIA zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in 194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943, this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen, were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling against the Communists. He wrote several books againist communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch. 1 Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot? Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia. !Mr. McTigue. About '50,000? Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000. Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year? Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months. Mr. McTigue. Three months? Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia, and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and to the mines in Dombas. Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally end? 33 SLOVAKIA Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in September 1944. Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct? Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true. Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch? Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army, and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates practicaly from every village and every town from eastern Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign. He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak question to the International Tribunal. Mr. Bonin. Tribunal? Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia. That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso. Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv? Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr. 1 34 SLOVAKIA Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld War Iil. Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in motion? Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall, that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947. Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in the spiritual and politic8il world? Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct. Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll. Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean countries to be in political life; isn't that correct? Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit. Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to engBlge in political lifo . . . Dr. Pauco. Yes. MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their clerical life; isn't that coreivct? Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass there practically every Sunday. 'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country? Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary, SLOVAKIA 35 from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets, I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of my relatives came through the border just several months ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks, like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia, Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the United States. Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia? Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945. Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country? Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950. Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n. Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in 1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ; they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those. Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these SLOVAKIA 36 people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the Soviet agents. ,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding. Dr. Pauoo. Yes. Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that. I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired, is that OOlITect.. Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct. Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a? Dr. Pauoo. Yes. !Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt? Dr. Pauico. That is correct. Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to them? Dr. Pauco. Yes Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is <the fhist time, I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate the trouble. Dr. Pauc·o. Yes. Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct? Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes. Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there? iDr. Pallico. Yes. iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t were dTopped in? Dr. PauJco. Yes. Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes, to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place . Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue. Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the 1 SLOVAKIA 37 United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is that correct? Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt. Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je<lnota? Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless as they possibly can. Dr. Paiu100. That is correct. Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia. Dr. Pauco. Thank you. Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco. Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr. Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign nation? - Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir. Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- · termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania, Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to goveTn themselves; is that correct. Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct. MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity 1 SLOVAKIA 38 presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free world. Thank you ve,r y much. Dr. P,aulco. Thank you. Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·. Dr. Pauco. Yes. Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova>lcia, did you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the 1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people? Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on April 4. Mr. Feighan. I see. Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends , of the methods which I mentioned before. Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o see it and observe .iit? Dr. Pmrco. No, no. Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco Or. Paulco. You are wekome. Mr. Bonin. Thank you <very much. (Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954). FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was. Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground movemerut in Slovakia? Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who started it. iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ? Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944. tr? SLOVAKIA 39 :Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this underground moivement? Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger of communism. They studied communism and decided to combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World War II. The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions. The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations at the !beginning w&e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir activities in the political field. Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement? Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field. The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party. So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population. Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party. Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un- 40 SLOVAKIA derground in Slovakia? Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so. Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground movement from without ? Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We ,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion, informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;, iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or any member here might ask in that regard, you just use yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure. Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission. Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.? Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for the United States. ·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited States in 1950? Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did. Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'( Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by 1 1 41 SLOVAKIA the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet. Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945. Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did. Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct? Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of the leaders outside. MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in Slova,kiia? Dr. Mii kula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava? Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia. Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this. Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst the Repl]blic." iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi<s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4." And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year? Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947. Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations 2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say, 70 or 80 times? [)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that. Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity? Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense? Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely. 1 1 1 42 SLOVAKIA Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you? Dr. Mikula. That i:s me. Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter; Dr. Mikula. Yes. is t:Jhiat rig1ht? Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel. Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit? Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that we tahlced albout. Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently, sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans. Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over the counwy. So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station. It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there. JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery police. SLOVAKIA 43 Mr. McTigue. Communis t police? Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes. Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say? Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March 4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard. The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards : il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R. Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis order? Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary. What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy came people from Slova:kiia. There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia. 'Dhe movements of the population are very serious thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle. Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order? Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further: Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station. 44 SLOVAKIA Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was said. If they find something against the regime they wt accorcmng to regufations. Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest police station. This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions. They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says: To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the other members of the unit. I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested. Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to the oommittee . . . Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized. Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in SwvaJkia ,a t the present time? Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That is a general rea:son SLOVAKIA 45 Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve. Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today? Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout 80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am. acti:ve part to fight oommundsm. Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why? Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason. !Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce. Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the Communist taikeover; is that correct? Dr. Mikula. Yes. Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries? Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½ million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people. Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over, aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken out of theiir normal life. Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions. Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley? . Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia? Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945. Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume. Dr. Mitkula. Yes. 46 SLOVAKIA Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities of the underground since that time? Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945 our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children. Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four and one was ,s ix. Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained? Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949. Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue? Dr. Milrula. Yes. !Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct? Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I a'In receiving informia,tion, but later. Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite, would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae? DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat. Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit ·stronger? Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo- SLOVAKIA 47 ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere, the same procedure. Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union? Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18 villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion. Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does, what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any? Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there will be a cha1I1ge. iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a. Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems. Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination? Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i<s po<l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90 per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is cutting otff the will to resist. iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan? MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so desiire? · Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important 48 SLOVAKIA things that they need; some kind of good will that we have a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem. MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope, ilS that right? Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs. Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries? Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals, a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists. The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must be directed against those opportunists, because they are afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re readty to betray todlay and every day. Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee? Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome. Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes. with your family? Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very great extent. !Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954). ance here today. 1 SLOVAKIA 49 FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America. :Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United States and Canada. · Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should do to combat this new kind of enemy. Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of America? Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout 300,000. !Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of .America? Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses? Mr. McTigue. Yes. 1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907. 'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan, that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith the statement? · Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered. !Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first express my deep appreciation to this committee for the opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the dread detail of Communist aggression. I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends, 50 SLOVAKIA peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well. Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the business, the duty, of every American to take part in it; every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own America. I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation. The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble. ("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official 011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue [Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is not repeated here.) Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the sellout to Moscow; is that correct? Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir. Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1 SLOVAKIA 51 Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with Communists? Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely. Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence? Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget what communism is, and just let them get strong enough until they can take all of us. Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive? How can we most help them at a time like this? Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime they have. ~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among the ,people of SlovaJkia? Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with the people directly and indirectly right through the war, and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today. Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with what is going on over there today; is that correct? Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl>ova~ia and then we get it. Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley? Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic, what exactly was the relationship at that time between Slovakia and Germany? 52 SLOVAKIA Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it. Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example, that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany? Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men by classes; they never had many men in the field. Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor when the Germans declared war? Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business. We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United States. iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time? Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find that out from our own United States Goveirnment because that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is absolutely no record of it. Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany? Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean, running the country of Slovakia itself. Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at thait time? Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of SLOVAKIA 53 the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the wax, were good. Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms that you normally would expect? Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one accoro. Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944, when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from that time Slovakia lost its. independence? Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides. They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by the partisans on the other end. Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation did the Tiso government continue in po,w er? Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25; the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans. Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not have popular support. 54 SLOVAKIA Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when? Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945. Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany? Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria. Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured with the American troops? Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State Department, and, of course, the Army Department. Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of the Slovak Goivernment? Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison. Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals? Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague. Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely unified government? Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true. The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek, a Czech. Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat? Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any- SLOVAKIA 55 thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty. Mr. Bentley. Who? Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record. They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport. Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would simply have states' rights. The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much later. Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine, when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned, what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that? Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct. Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l think at this time it is quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists. Mr. Hrobak. That is correct. Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard. Mr. Hrobak. Correct. iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that Mr. Hrobak Yes. too. Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi- 56 SLOVAKIA sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s. Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct. Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country. Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia. Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge of that, too. Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks, patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-. crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is "Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras). The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these, The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946. Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946 and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s in BraUshwa. In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10, 57 SLOVAKIA 1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other Slova!k p8{!)ers. Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin. The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward Benes." Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication? Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and Canada. And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time. Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak. (Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954). 1 STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava. During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now, as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant force in tha,t country. Introduction Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history. 58 SLOVAKIA After losing her political independe nce in the ninth century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power structure . On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the " SLOVAKIA 69 people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation foisted upon the Sl01Vak people." For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion on this pomt at any time. The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with the alternative of the partition of her territory among Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939, thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for independence. During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo- SLOVAKIA 60 lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important point : All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II. As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire: To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster which would put an end to the Slovak national state. Because of this difference in psychological attitude, Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow. 1 A. The Blueprint for Sovietization After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests," SLOVAKIA 61 says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided, after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other, after the war, all possilble economic help." No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations. The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus for those who had been aspiring to political power within the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around 10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938. The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia. Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement, as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all political, legislative, military, and governmental executive power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the ,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati<ves shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over." The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas Agreement were laid down in another document, the first three articles of which read as follows : 62 SLOVAKIA "(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs, as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be their common government organized on the principle of equality. "(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular. "(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should therefore, lean on the Soviet Union." It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following passage (pp. 408-409) : ''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) , which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.'' - wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ." 1 "Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De- SLOVAKIA 63 cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue." In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched on the problem of the National Front Government: "It will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national front ." (pp. 409-410). On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties, and organization of the National Front Government as it emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to become a "people's" democrwcy. Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24 percent of the population, became the future leading force of Slwakia. B. The August 1944 Insurrection Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser, had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs, and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators. More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin, Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army, and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions 64 SLOVAKIA from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2 Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing. Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of the activity of the different groups. In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of (1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26. ( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29. SLOVAKIA 66 August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22, 1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries." The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising, and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and their opportunity was not long in arising. On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko, refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day. ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the 66 SLOVAKIA partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[>rising whioh was announced on August 29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo .. crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the Reich from ,w hich they were never to return. Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months, tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &ama. It is evident that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952. As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev. With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~ tioned him as follows: Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian? Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3 (3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013. SLOVAKIA 67 Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia. This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country. C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the historical facts. During World War II, though subject to a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia was a relatively free country. During five years, until the insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava was able to master all the difficulties of the war period during these years. Then the Red army came. I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The house in question, which was located on a hill, was then chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary. After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of 68 SLOVAKJA the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on the dining-room ta>ble and began checking on our identity. Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded to examine these things in detail and chose for himself whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather suitcase, etc. We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red army had entered the house and began in turn to forage through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed because she had been violated. After this visit by offi .. cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk, successively entered bhe house, each one having held us, that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their own way, until 2 :30 a. m. In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around 200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women had to go to the hospital for examination. During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets, around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned. D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945 On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets, through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which, except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had been loyal to the Slova>k State - all of this without any plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats", who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state will in Slovaikia. SuOVA.KIA 69 According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely, the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1, plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia. Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others. Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~ Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of the Communists increased, in comparison with the year 1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet "Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this 50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional ,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment for Slo:vaikia. MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was progressing in every field of Government activity: In the field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and this without any consultation with the nation - mines, 1 70 SLOVAKIA 100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production, 80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72 percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47 percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent; clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent; wood industry, 8 percent. By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working people fell within the field of private industry. ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34, dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation. By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice were created: Oommunit,y and <list.riot "people's courts" and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with Germany. The political character of this distorted justice was determined by three circumstances : 1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55 Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the the of memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two political ,parties in power. 2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide upon cases which were not punishable according to the Penal Code. 3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility. 4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate- SLOVAKIA 71 gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps: a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts"; b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it; c. Those who· do not work; d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them within the framework of laibor duty. '5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t. 6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the confiscation of the ded'endant's property. It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and "unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation. This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal revenge. By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly, and other human rights were likewise a;bolished. E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia All these measures were aimed at the weakening of traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko, Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided SLOVAK.IA 72 to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s. Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on. In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against " . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37 plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23 deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies). The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided. There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia. Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further limitatio!Ils on the politi>Cal preirogative s of his own party. 1 After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947, to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1; the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia. SI.IOVAKIA 73 Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946 and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec<h area) was finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp. Conclusion As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954), contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in Slovrukia. (Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954). fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r . Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is that correct, Father? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total number of seven times? Father Botelk. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.? Father Botek. Yes. 74 SLOVAKIA Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949? Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950. Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944. kia, Father? Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and 1946 following the Communist occupation. Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all church-Operated school,s. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church? Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic press. Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in Father Botek. Yes. religion, is tihat right, Father? Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics in Slo;vakia? Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic. Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia? F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that would be able to defend their rights by democratic method. Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father? Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their 1 SLOVAKIA 75 pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~ cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then inco:riporated into the so-called Kosice agreement concluded in 1945. The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party. He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~ cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us.. ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1 76 SLOVAKIA tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party, Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however, became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they also, on their part, tried to win su>ppo•r t of the Catholic population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side. There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement of a final decision. They made indications that they might be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became apparent that no agreement could be reached with the Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections, and the Communists and the representative s of the Free- 77 SLOVAKIA dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started ,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party. We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we<re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic party which would .not admit religious freedom and they were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1 78 SLOVAKIA ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises and in arguments with the Communists they always yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in order to defend their rights. Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this commission, representative s of the Communist Party were Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000. Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was liquidated and you were arrested? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you were arrested, Fathoc? Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received SLOVAKIA instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action. However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and therefore any acttvities developed by this organization oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted. The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e sent to a room where they were searched while, in the meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from 8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally the employees of the bureau were released to their homes, and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau was investigated by the police. On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also 1 80 SLOVAKlA the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional court's prison where they held me for another five months pending investigation. At the end of these five months, my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action, which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists. Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father? F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me and on the other hand, if another .person would be given SLOVAKIA 81 the same instructions, this other person could do harm to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at the district national committee for some discussion. I was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even after they had served their terms imposed by the courts. However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered. TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and on the same day the police arrived and took me to a forced-labor camp at Nova:ky My parishioners protested against my arrest; however, they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my experiences which I had at that time when I was held at the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked how they became involved in underground activities and how it happened that they were arrested since there were always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated that there was always a Communist spy planted by the Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police. 82 SLOVAKIA I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested. In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore, they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-<:aJled representaUves of the Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts, stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of the Catholic Action. The Communists declared that since the Vatican was against the people and since the bishops supported the v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore, they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at which this Communist Catholic Action was founded. Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops, SLOVAKIA 83 however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See declared every person who would sign this memorandum as excommunicated from the Catholic Church. Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp in 1950; is that correct? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were you sent to a hospital? Father Botelk. Yes. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the hospital? Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals. These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries. That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants. They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a university without any previous education, which was otheIWise required from university students. This was the same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals. MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father? Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951. Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out of SlQIVakia? Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe. At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However, 84 SLOVAKIA this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second time, at which time we were only four escapees and we succeeded in crossing the border. ,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time is in Rome; is that correct, Father? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion in SlovaJkia. Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests. IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question. Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the Communists? Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See. However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective. to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the SLOVAKIA 86 clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops, and admitted only those whom they considered harmless; but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were monitored. Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the pupils with the, theory of Marxism? Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine. Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat this Communist march toward worrld revolution? Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have had great successes in educating the very young people in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact; that if communism is given enough time, that these youths will become completely communistic and the Communist strength will be increased. Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God? Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children, for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and 86 SLOVAK IA "Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor, Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man." Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia? Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were poor. Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were a member of the clergy? Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations, and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten, so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This, may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to. IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper it is written on? Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss. Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y haive covered very well your experien ces back over the years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say? SLOVAKIA 87 Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent. Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you come from? F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa .. milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia. Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia. Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and 13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints. Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian population. Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the straight news given on those programs? Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well, turn it off because the news is over and they are now going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic and we do not want any Oze<!h Republic." Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are doing some good behind the Iron Curtain? Father Botek They certainly are of great use and great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling. Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are they j&mmed by the Soviets? 88 SLOVAKIA Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one. Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia? Father Botek. Yes. Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why there has been some resentment to the broadcasts? F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States, who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the United States, these programs do not bring any reports on the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also beams SlO'Vakian programs. Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic? Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945, not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However, Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy, self-rule. Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing? Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was SLOVAKIA 89 opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government. Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there is only one way. Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in 1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944, they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people with promises of an independent Slovakian State but within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists, however, was disapproved by Moscow. Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S. S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but in su!bstance it would be socialistic? Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic. Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951? Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the third year any more. Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony. (Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954). 1 90 SLOVAKIA TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA (The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.) Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is Father Nahalka. Yes. that correct? Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia? Father N ahalka. Yes. Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia? Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was ordained in Rome. Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia, is that correct? !Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in Slovakia. Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct? Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946 to 1949. Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called, Father Nrahalka. Yes. in Slovakia? Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place? Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this town was occupied by Communist guerillas. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what the guerillas did in that town? Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80 innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut SLOVAKIA 91 stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic, Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise. Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch over the bishop's activiities? FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom those files. Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home, for example, wired ? Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the Communists placed microphones in the conference room for the bishop's conferences. Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k in 1949? Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the 'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary. Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists, Father? 1 Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and held in imprisonment until January 1946. 1 92 SLOVAKIA ,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father? -Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953. Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago. Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia? FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the border. Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge on th-at? Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign broadcasts. Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia? Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed to the political part of the program of those broad~asts mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not state the entire Communist case in Slovakia. Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist? Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs, 93 SLOVAKIA the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~ ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda. '.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the time when the transmitters were still in operation, people in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs broadoost by Radio Vatican. IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any good - I mean, against the Communists? Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still more efficient if they adjusted their political programs also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population. (Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954). THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct? Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es. iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913 at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct? Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes. Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security, is that correct? Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir. Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to 1951, is that correct? Mr. Dobrotka. That is right. 1 94 SLOVAKIA Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security completely controlled by the Communists,? Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under Communist control. Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under Communist control, isn't that correct? Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes. Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the Communists got control, is that corerct? Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over. Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house searches, and so forth and so on? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders. Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made? Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested. Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League? Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated because the Communists considered this organization a swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3 supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America. iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in Slovakia? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders. Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they? iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only u:pon special order by telephone. !Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed SLOVAKIA 95 you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were they plain-clothes men? Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me. Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did you m0lke,? Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests. Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that there was any political significance to what a priest had to say? Mr. Dobrotka. I <know I sulbmitted annual reports to this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political speeches within their sermons. Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and peasants and the PQpulace in general? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground acti<vities. Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal Security? Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I was active there were approximately three cases of arrests of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the area under my jurisdiction. Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting to your superiors that the priests were only talking to God, is that correct? 96 SLOVAKIA Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for their arrest. Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from SlorvaJkia? Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951. Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of Slorvalcia? Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in escaping. Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor Service unit at Bad Kreuznach? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir. Mr. Kersten. Any questions? Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name? Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie, which was under the Minister of Interior. Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938? Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state. Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist Party at that time in 1938? Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any political parties. Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed your duties of reporting on priesrts? Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the time when the Catholic Action was started. Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist Party at that time ? Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir. Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party? Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB in order to protect their own existence were forced to file an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party. Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time? SLOVAKIA 97 Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in February 1948. Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March 1948? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic and I attended Mass every Sunday. Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948? Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the local priest, local teacher and local government officer were suspicious, because these persons were considered as reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set on us by the Communist Party. Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to belie:ve in God? Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe. Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth? Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as possilble. Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions. (The witness was excused.) (,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954). THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows: Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919, 98 SLOVAKIA in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct? _Mr. Detviansiky. Yes. Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct? Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct. Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct? Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir. ,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office by the Communists? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. McTig,ue. Why? Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person. Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the Communists, is that correct? Mr. Detviansiky. Yes. Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik and in English. Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set? Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment, this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken away from the farmers and transferred to industrial pul'p()ses. Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the Communists, is that correct? ,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other SWVAKIA 99 in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas. ~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas? Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the most significant of them was that which occurred at Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed this action of despair because he stated that since they took aiway from him everything they should take away also his family. Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West? Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951. Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is that correct? Mr. Detviansky. Yes. Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been receiving here aH you expected? Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and I am impatient to return to my home country. Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with the progress of OUI' fight against communism. Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the people of the other captive nations that are in the free world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is that right? Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better. Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms, 100 S!LOVAIHA would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists? Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men would use such an oipportunity. Mr. Kersten. Thank you. The witness was. excused. (Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954). When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings, the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream "murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary 25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous." It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and 1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to "sing"!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource How the Communists Seized Slovakia (special issue) Description An account of the resource From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives<br /><ol><li>From the Special Report No. 8</li> <li>Michael Galayda</li> <li>Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovský</li> <li>Dr. Joseph Paučo</li> <li>Dr. Joseph Mikula</li> <li>Philip A. Hrobák</li> <li>Dr. Joseph A. Mikuš</li> <li>Father Anton Botek</li> <li>Father Stephen Náhalka</li> <li>Ján Dobrotka</li> <li>Jur Detviansky</li> <li>Reaction of Beneš Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-Slovak Reds</li> </ol> Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (14), March 1955<br />pp. 1-100 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1955 specialissue https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/289e982e1ea11932791357752174d95c.pdf 40d13f557c6a9506f09893826987ea60 PDF Text Text MARCH 1955 VOL. V NO . 1 ( 14) o,~:o STAT E U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~ t _; :L\UG 16 J960 LIBRAR'V IN THIS ISSUE: HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives 1. From the Special Report No . 8 2. Michael Galayda 3. Mr. and 4. Dr. Joseph Pauco Mr!l. Smrekovsky 5. Dr. Joseph Mikula 6. Philip A. Hrobak 7. .Dr. Joseph A. Mikus 8. Father Anton 9. Father Stephen Nahalka Botek 10. Jan Dobrotka 11. J ur 12. Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho- Detviansky Slovak Reds * • Edited and compiled by PHILIP - A. HROBAK Published by THE S LOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �I' SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and i.nd ependence. As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[ America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli<'atecl to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere. SLOVAKIA Box 150 MiclcIJetown , Pa. CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich, "The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not true that these states have e v er corresponded to ," instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2. line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e." We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid t h em in the future. P,r inted in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown , Pa. � MARCH 1955 VOL. V NO . 1 ( 14) o,~:o STAT E U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~ t _; :L\UG 16 J960 LIBRAR'V IN THIS ISSUE: HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives 1. From the Special Report No . 8 2. Michael Galayda 3. Mr. and 4. Dr. Joseph Pauco Mr!l. Smrekovsky 5. Dr. Joseph Mikula 6. Philip A. Hrobak 7. .Dr. Joseph A. Mikus 8. Father Anton 9. Father Stephen Nahalka Botek 10. Jan Dobrotka 11. J ur 12. Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho- Detviansky Slovak Reds * • Edited and compiled by PHILIP - A. HROBAK Published by THE S LOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �I' SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and i.nd ependence. As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[ America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli<'atecl to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere. SLOVAKIA Box 150 MiclcIJetown , Pa. CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich, "The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not true that these states have e v er corresponded to ," instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2. line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e." We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid t h em in the future. P,r inted in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown , Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1955, Vol. 5 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li> <li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1955 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MARCH 1955 VOL. V NO . 1 ( 14) o,~:o STAT E U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~ t _; :L\UG 16 J960 LIBRAR'V IN THIS ISSUE: HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives 1. From the Special Report No . 8 2. Michael Galayda 3. Mr. and 4. Dr. Joseph Pauco Mr!l. Smrekovsky 5. Dr. Joseph Mikula 6. Philip A. Hrobak 7. .Dr. Joseph A. Mikus 8. Father Anton 9. Father Stephen Nahalka Botek 10. Jan Dobrotka 11. J ur 12. Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho- Detviansky Slovak Reds * • Edited and compiled by PHILIP - A. HROBAK Published by THE S LOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA I' SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and i.nd ependence. As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[ America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli<'atecl to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere. SLOVAKIA Box 150 MiclcIJetown , Pa. CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich, "The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not true that these states have e v er corresponded to ," instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2. line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e." We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid t h em in the future. P,r inted in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown , Pa.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (14) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1955